    [Senate Hearing 116-148, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                    ------                                S.
                                                      S.  Hrg. 116-148, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 4049

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                 U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                              U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                                   ----------

            JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

           [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM_Part 1

           U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND b U.S. NORTHERN
      COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S.
      TRANSPORTATION COMMAND b AIR FORCE POSTURE b DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
      BUDGET POSTURE b NAVY POSTURE b U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND b ARMY POSTURE

                                     ______

                                                     S. Hrg. 116-148, Pt. 1

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                    APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 4049

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                 U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

                U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                              U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                                   __________

            JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                  ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     56-187          WASHINGTON : 2024

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma,          JACK REED, Rhode Island
                 Chairman                   JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi            KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                   RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota               TIM KAINE, Virginia
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                        ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina             MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                   GARY C. PETER
                                            JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, FloridaS, Michigan          TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota              DOUG JONES, Alabama
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                                  John Bonsell, Staff Director
                                Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
                                       Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                January 30, 2020

                                                                       Page

    United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command..     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Townsend, General Stephen J., USA, Commander, United States
      Africa
      Command........................................................     4

    Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
      Command........................................................    13

    Questions for the Record.........................................    53

                               February 13, 2020

    United States Northern Command and United States Strategic
      Command........................................................    65

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................    65

                               Witness Statements

    O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United          65
      States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
      Command.

    Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN, Commander, United States
      Strategic
      Command........................................................    95

    Questions for the Record.........................................   146

                               February 25, 2020

    United States European Command and United States Transportation     163
      Command.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   163

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   164

                               Witness Statements

    Wolters, General Tod D., USAF, Commander, United States European
      Command/
      North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander
      Europe.........................................................   166

    Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States            175
      Transportation Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   211

                                     (iii)

                                 March 3, 2020

                                                                       Page

    Air Force Posture................................................   231

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................   231

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   232

                               Witness Statements

    Barrett, Honorable Barbara M., Secretary of the Air Force........   234

    Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force   235

    Questions for the Record.........................................   280

                                 March 4, 2018

    Department of Defense Budget Posture.............................   297

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   297

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   298

                               Witness Statements

    Esper, Hon. Mark T., Secretary of Defense........................   300

    Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of       310
      Staff.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   361

                                 March 5, 2020

    Navy Posture.....................................................   399

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   399

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   400

                               Witness Statements

    Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations.......   402

    Modly, Hon. Thomas B., Acting Secretary of the Navy..............   417

    Berger, General David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps...   418

    Questions for the Record.........................................   451

                                      (iv)

                                 March 12, 2020

                                                                       Page

    United States Central Command....................................   467

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   467

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   468

                               Witness Statements

    McKenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States   470
      Central Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   499

                                 March 26, 2020

                                                                       Page

    Army Posture.....................................................   513

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   513

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   514

                               Witness Statements

    McCarthy, Honorable Ryan D., Secretary of the Army and              517
      McConville, General James C., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.

    Paper Hearing Questions for the Record...........................   532

    Questions for the Record.........................................   567

                                      (v)

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:59 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally,
    Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds says it is time we start,
    and so we are going to start.
        Good morning. The committee today has received testimony
    from SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] and AFRICOM
    [United States Africa Command]. This is a very significant
    meeting because in my narrow view we have the two comms that
    never were adequately resourced--I really believe that--
    compared to the threat that we are facing.
        We have two great heroes here. We have General Steve
    Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM and Admiral Craig Faller,
    Commander of SOUTHCOM.
        This committee's top priority is to ensure the effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). That is
    this. We have been adhering to this to the letter in a very
    bipartisan way.
        We identified the competition with China and Russia. That
    is where the problem is. That is something that people were not
    really sensitive to until we came out with this document.
    China's and Russia's growing influence is not limited to Europe
    and the Indo-Pacific, and both countries clearly view Africa
    and Latin America as critical battlefields to fulfill their
    global ambitions and challenge the United States.
        This is particularly evident in Africa. Over the last 20
    years, I have conducted over about 160 African country visits
    working with that continent. I can tell you that it is no
    coincidence that China established the first overseas military
    base in Djibouti. You know, that is the first time. They have
    always done it in their own city limits before, but now it is
    Djibouti. Now they are as far south in Africa as Tanzania and
    all over the country. I visited Djibouti last February and saw
    firsthand what they are doing there, and they are active there.
        Elsewhere China is using cash and debt to trap the
    countries and to force them to put their infrastructure and
    potentially their sovereignty on sale.
        At the same time, Russia is using its military,
    mercenaries, and weapons sales to buy influence, exploit
    Africa's natural resources, and prop up leaders sympathetic to
    Russian interests and hostile to the United States.
        While the NDS states that competition with Russia and China
    should be DOD's [U.S. Department of Defense] top priority, it
    makes clear that we must maintain pressure on radical terrorist
    groups like al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria].
        Today, more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to al
    Qaeda and ISIS are operating across Africa. Many of these
    groups have ambition to attack Americans and our partners.
    Without sustained pressure, the threat posed by these groups
    will grow.
        In SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR), China and
    Russia are pursuing a similar strategy by using economic and
    military means to expand their access and influence right here
    in our own hemisphere.
        China has increased its naval deployments to the region by
    70 percent over the last 5 years, and Chinese companies
    currently have over 50 active port projects in this region and
    there are more on the planning board.
        Russia props up oppressive regimes in places like Cuba,
    Venezuela, and Nicaragua that are hostile to the United States.
    They are also deploying advanced military assets to the region,
    including strategic bombers and warships.
        At the same time, many of the drugs that are poisoning the
    American cities are coming from Latin America. These drugs are
    trafficked by illicit networks.
        I would say in my opening statement that in both of these
    comms, I have been pretty outspoken as a conservative but one
    who has really been concerned because they do not seem to get
    the attention that some of the other comms do. I mean, you
    know, if you look at Africa, you have a total of 6,000 people
    there, but how much are you going to get accomplished with
    6,000 people? You look at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. What
    is that? Seventy-five thousand, INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command] is even bigger than that.
        So if the object here and people are talking about on the
    subject that is taking place is to reduce and to reposition
    people, you are talking about the two areas where there are not
    enough people to reposition. That is a narrow view, but that is
    mine.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    welcome our witnesses.
        But first let me extend my condolences to the families of
    the brave Americans who were killed in action in the attack on
    the Kenyan airbase earlier this month, as well as those who are
    recovering from those wounds, and also extend my condolences to
    the families of the two airmen who were recently killed in
    Afghanistan.
        Again, thank you to the witnesses for appearing here today.
    Both of you are leading commands during challenging times, and
    we thank you for your continued service. Please also extend our
    gratitude to the service men and women who, under your command,
    continue their outstanding service to the Nation.
        There is currently an effort underway to review U.S. Force
    posture around the globe in an effort to ensure the Department
    of Defense funding and forces are allocated in line with the
    National Defense Strategy. We understand that AFRICOM is the
    first combatant command to go through the review process and
    that SOUTHCOM will shortly follow.
        While it is wise and in fact necessary to take a hard look
    and methodological look at our investments in military
    activities around the globe, it would be strategically unwise
    to disengage from either Africa or Latin America in an effort
    to generate small, near-term budgetary gains. Given the
    relatively small number of forces under consideration, such a
    move would not generate the type of savings necessary for
    meaningful NDS investments and would likely come at a much
    higher cost in terms of increased long-term security risks.
        Our competitors recognize that investing in Africa and
    Latin America is in their long-term interests, as evidenced by
    Chinese and Russian military and economic activity that
    continues to grow across these continents year by year. General
    Townsend and Admiral Faller, I look forward to hearing your
    assessments regarding where and how United States interests are
    best served in the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM areas of operation (AO,
    including where we may be able to gain efficiencies without
    undue risk to the U.S. interests, and where you believe it
    would be strategically responsible to do so.
        As you both note in your testimony, Latin America and
    Africa are beset by a vicious cycle of challenges that our
    competitors are seeking to leverage to their advantage.
    Countries with weak democratic institutions and rampant
    corruption are being overtly wooed by Chinese and Russian
    investments and covertly manipulated through information
    operations and a flood of disinformation. We are not only
    competing globally for influence and access, we must also work
    to ensure that new forms of military and economic colonialism
    do not take root in those regions. I am especially concerned
    about Chinese economic intentions and whether our partner
    countries are positioned to defend themselves against China's
    predatory lending practices.
        As you well know, the problems we face and the security
    solutions required are multidimensional. They do not lend
    themselves to geographic or bureaucratic boundaries and require
    well-resourced and well-integrated whole-of-government
    solutions. Continuing to restrict development aid, rebuff
    partners and allies, and constrain multilateral efforts, as the
    administration has repeatedly endeavored to do, all but ensures
    that present challenges in places like Latin America and Africa
    will continue to expand and travel to America's doorstep. I
    will be interested in your views on the importance of investing
    in diplomacy and development to foster long-term stability in
    these regions, as well as your assessment of the impact of
    significant force reductions on the interagency and
    international partners we coordinate with and depend upon to
    advance our objectives.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service and thank you for
    your testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We will go ahead and start with opening statements, and we
    will start with you, General Townsend. Your statement will be
    made a part of the record. You may proceed.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER,
                      UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        General Townsend. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
        It is a privilege to be a part of and to lead America's
    finest men and women at United States Africa Command, an
    exceptional team dedicated to protecting America and advancing
    her interests on the African continent.
        I would like to take a moment to honor the memories of
    three exceptional Americans, United States Army Specialist
    Henry Mayfield, Jr.; Mr. Bruce Triplet; and Mr. Dustin Harrison
    who lost their lives in the service of our nation on January
    5th in Manda Bay, Kenya. To their families, our thoughts and
    prayers are with you. Your loved ones died while protecting the
    American people from the very real threat of al Qaeda and al
    Shabaab terrorist groups.
        I am here this morning with my battle buddy, shipmate, and
    friend, Admiral Craig Faller, to discuss shared challenges and
    opportunities in both our areas of responsibility while we
    further readiness of the joint force and our ability to fight
    across the globe.
        AFRICOM is critical to maintaining this ability as Africa
    overwatches a global crossroads with strategic chokepoints and
    sea lines of communication that are essential to global
    commerce and critical to United States operations in the world.
    Our future security and prosperity rest on this strategic
    access in times of crisis and ensuring these waters remain
    free, open, and secure.
        AFRICOM is engaged in an ongoing blank slate review. In
    concert with the Department of Defense, we have developed a
    prioritized list of objectives and actions to protect the
    Homeland and secure our strategic interests in Africa while
    ensuring the American taxpayers' investments are in the right
    areas.
        Africa is key terrain for competition with China and Russia
    who are aggressively using economic and military means to
    expand their access and influence. I believe Africa offers
    America a competitive edge over China and Russia, and we should
    take advantage of it.
        We will grow more efficient to contribute to higher defense
    priorities and refocus resources to global power competition,
    but we cannot take pressure off major terrorist groups like al
    Qaeda and ISIS. These groups and many others remain an
    inconvenient reality in Africa. While we should not try to
    confront each one, we should remain resolute in confronting
    those who threaten Americans and the American Homeland like al
    Shabaab, the largest and most violent of al Qaeda's branches.
    Today AFRICOM does that with a light and relatively low cost
    footprint by supporting African and international partners who
    are leading these efforts.
        In my first 6 months of command, I learned that small
    investments, a few troops, and a few bucks can go a long way
    and make a real difference in Africa. Our whole-of-government
    and partner-centric approach acts as a force multiplier to
    address Africa's many complex challenges. What AFRICOM
    accomplishes with a few people and a few dollars on a continent
    three and a half times the size of the continental United
    States is a bargain for the American taxpayer and low cost
    insurance for America in that region.
        A secure and stable Africa remains an enduring American
    interest. AFRICOM stands ready to protect and advance American
    interests and respond to crises in Africa.
        Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, for your continued support to our armed forces. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Townsend follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Stephen J. Townsend
                                  introduction
    A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
    the Committee:
        I am honored and privileged to represent the members of United
    States Africa Command, an exceptional team dedicated to protecting our
    nation and advancing our interests. United States Africa Command has
    been engaged in a ``blank slate review'' since I took command in July
    last year, an effort which has accelerated since I provided my initial
    assessment to the Secretary of Defense in October. In concert with the
    Department of Defense, we have developed a prioritized list of
    objectives and actions to protect the Homeland, secure our strategic
    interests in Africa, and focus the American taxpayer's investment in
    the right areas. We are further refocusing United States Africa
    Command's approach on the objectives of the National Security, Defense,
    and Military Strategies. These foundational documents acknowledge the
    strategic importance of Africa and guide our mission: United States
    Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and
    malign actors, strengthens security forces and responds to crises in
    order to advance United States national interests and promote regional
    security and stability.
        Africa is home to the fastest growing economies and populations in
    the world, sits at crossroads of international commerce and trade, and
    watches over the world's most important sea lines of communication. The
    U.S. plays a unique role in ensuring these strategic routes remain open
    to all. The international order we have helped create gives people
    everywhere the best hope for safe, secure, and prosperous lives.
    Africans recognize this and continue to look to the United States for
    leadership. Our future security, prosperity, and strategic access in
    times of crisis rest on free, open, and secure sea and air lines of
    communication around Africa. Simply put, a secure and stable Africa is
    essential for America's security.
                             strategic environment
        A Vast Continent. The land mass of Africa is larger than the United
    States, China, India, Japan, and all of Europe combined. This vast
    continent of opportunity and promise also includes strategic challenges
    from malign competitors and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Of
    the 1.3 billion people who live in Africa, over two-thirds live in
    conditions of astonishing poverty. \1\ Poverty and food insecurity are
    exacerbated by natural resource degradation, shifting weather patterns,
    climate impact, infectious disease outbreaks, and conflict. Lack of
    economic opportunities and a search for a better life leads to internal
    displacement and refugees, which creates new challenges and conflicts
    over increasingly scarce resources. These factors and others have led
    to an uptick in migration to Europe in recent years, under dangerous
    conditions in many cases, and feed a lucrative market for VEOs and
    criminal networks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 85 percent of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day,
    World Bank October 2019
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These challenges will be amplified as Africa's population continues
    to grow. By 2050, Africa's population is projected to double, and more
    than a quarter of the world's inhabitants will reside on the continent.
    By 2100, Africa's population is projected to almost double again. \2\
    At that point, almost 1 in 3 people on the planet will live in Africa.
    This massive population growth will further strain resources, require
    job creation, potentially lead to surges in migration to Europe and
    beyond, and will increase political instability, communal conflict,
    trans-regional terrorism, and further marginalization of already
    vulnerable populations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/
    Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nonetheless, Africa is also a land of opportunity. Over half of the
    world's farming land is in Africa, and when effectively managed,
    Africa's population growth and rich natural resources drive progress.
    Of note, 26 African nations hold reserves of minerals determined to be
    critical to the United States economy and national security. \3\ For
    2020, the World Bank projects six of the world's fastest growing
    economies to be in Africa, with Rwanda identified as the second fastest
    growing economy in the world (after Guyana) with 8.1 percent GDP
    growth. In conditions that promote a healthy business climate, these
    burgeoning markets present opportunities for U.S. trade and investment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Executive Order 13817, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and
    Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, December 20, 2017
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Africa and National Security. Located at the crossroads of the
    world, Africa watches over strategic choke points and sea lines of
    communication, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of
    Gibraltar on NATO's southern flank, the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb
    strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These strategic pathways are
    essential to global commerce and critical to the operations of most of
    our Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands. These corridors
    facilitate one-third of the world's shipping, and are key to the
    movement of Africa's vast natural resources including energy and
    strategic mineral. African, United States, and global prosperity depend
    on unhindered access to these waters.
        Global Power Competition. \4\ China and Russia have long recognized
    the strategic and economic importance of Africa, and continue to seize
    opportunities to expand their influence across the continent. The
    National Defense Strategy directs us to prioritize great power
    competition with China and Russia due to the ``magnitude of the threats
    they post to United States security and prosperity today and the
    potential for those threats to increase in the future.'' The United
    States encourages constructive partners helping to develop Africa's
    economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors to the
    benefit of all Africans. However, malign actors, unencumbered by
    international norms and professional military standards, leverage speed
    of action and access to economic and security arenas in many parts of
    the continent. Their coercive and exploitative activities undermine and
    threaten many African countries' stability. China is outpacing all of
    its competitors in Africa, where, with the construction of a military
    port and helicopter landing pads, it is converting its first overseas
    military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform. We know
    they seek to open more bases and their unprofitable seaport investments
    in East Africa and Southern Africa track closely with involvement by
    Chinese military forces. These Chinese seaports are not genuine
    commercial ports; these investments are geo-economic tools to increase
    the PRC's geopolitical influence throughout the continent. China
    continues to invest heavily in African infrastructure and currently
    maintains 52 embassies in Africa--three more than the United States and
    a 24 percent increase since 2012. China also leads its G20 partners in
    head of state and senior leadership visits to the continent over the
    last decade. In the last seven years, China has sold over two billion
    USD in arms to African partners. During the same period, Russia
    increased access agreements by 200 percent and remains the top arms
    dealer for the entire continent, selling nearly nine billion USD in
    arms to African partners. Russian private military companies (PMCs)
    have a highly destabilizing influence in Africa, as they are frequently
    employed to secure Russian investments at the expense of Africans, to
    prop up corrupt regimes and establish a broader Russian military
    footprint globally. In Libya, Russian PMCs almost certainly downed a
    United States unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a
    sophisticated Russian air defense system. From the 7th Forum On China-
    Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018 where China
    pledged over 60 billion USD in investments, to the October 2019 Russia-
    Africa Summit in Sochi where all 54 African countries attended with
    over 43 Heads of State, it is clear that China prioritizes Africa and
    Russia sees an opportunity to gain a strong position on NATO's southern
    flank. China and Russia's corrupt and exploitative investment and
    security assistance often prioritizes their own gains rather than
    building long-term African security capacity, and their activities
    often undermine transparency, accountability, and respect for human
    rights. Importantly, they erode United States influence and access over
    time.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ I use ``global'' rather than ``great'' because China and Russia
    are ``global powers'' but they are not ``great powers'' in the way the
    United States is. Further, calling Russia ``great'' plays right into
    the Russian's hands as their dream is for Russia to be considered great
    like the United States and they are far from it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        VEOs Remain a Reality. Violent extremist networks are expanding in
    Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and
    disenfranchised populations while employing violence to exacerbate
    despair and hopelessness. They undermine public trust in local
    governments and militaries, eventually filling--via illegitimate
    means--security and public service voids while expanding their radical
    ideology. In general, African governments view VEOs as near-term
    threats to their capacity to govern effectively, protect their
    populations, and improve their economies. They also pose threats to
    U.S. interests. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the United States
    in the region, and some aspire to strike the United States Homeland.
    United States Africa Command prioritizes efforts on the most capable
    VEOs today. In East Africa, we focus on al Qaeda's al Shabaab. Al
    Shabaab is the largest and most kinetically active al Qaeda network in
    the world. After a series of complex attacks targeting Somali and
    United States bases last year, in November al Shabaab's leadership
    publicly identified Americans and United States interests worldwide as
    priority targets--mirroring Usama bin Laden's declaration of war on the
    United States in 1996. The latest manifestation of this threat was the
    5 January 2020 attack by al Shabaab on United States Forces at the
    Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay, which killed three Americans and
    clearly demonstrated al Shabaab's willingness and capability to attack
    the United States outside of Somalia.
        While al Shabaab is most dangerous to United States interests
    today, ISIS is rapidly franchising VEOs in all corners of Africa and
    may become a pre-eminent threat to United States interests, as it did
    until western intervention in Iraq and Syria. In West Africa, the
    primary VEO threats are al Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin
    (JNIM) and ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Unlike we
    have seen elsewhere, in this region, both al Qaeda and ISIS networks
    are working together to exploit under-governed regions, disenfranchised
    populations, and porous borders and threaten the security and stability
    of our African partners, our allies, United States commercial and
    security interests, and U.S. citizens. Kidnapping for ransom remains a
    pervasive threat throughout Africa where Americans and other Western
    partners are often targeted by VEOs to raise revenue or exact other
    concessions from Western countries. Left unchecked, this threat will
    continue to expand across Africa.
        Africa is a complex continent with a unique environment. There are
    numerous big challenges, but its potential is enormous. Today our
    African partners are under siege from new agents coming to strip them
    of their natural resources, trap them in unpayable debt, and undermine
    the international order. Chinese investment has brought some benefit to
    the continent through infrastructure projects that have improved roads
    and connected markets to transportation hubs. However, the United
    States offers a unique partnership, as we believe in investing in and
    fortifying our African partners to enable ``African solutions to
    African problems''--the bedrock of long-term self-sufficiency,
    security, and development.
                united states africa command strategic approach
    United States Africa Command's operations are a bargain for America . .
            .an ``ounce of prevention'' that is just pennies on the defense
            dollar.
        The United States must continue to advance our national interests
    in Africa within the international order that underwrites global
    security and prosperity. Following our national strategic guidance to
    achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, United States Africa Command applies
    a partner-centric, interagency-based approach dating back to the
    inception of the command in 2007. In an era of global power
    competition, the combined efforts of the Department of Defense,
    Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
    the broader interagency, American businesses, and the charitable
    generosity of the American people are critical to achieving our
    objectives in the National Defense Strategy. This whole-of-government
    model defines United States Africa Command's strategic approach across
    three themes: we partner for success, compete to win, and maintain
    pressure on malign networks.
        First, we understand Africa's challenges cannot be resolved solely
    through the use of United States military power. United States Africa
    Command must Partner for Success with a diverse network that includes
    African nations, strategic allies, United States Government agencies
    and departments, and multinational coalitions to prevent, address and
    mitigate conflict in Africa. We emphasize military support to diplomacy
    and development as our security activities directly complement
    Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread of harmful
    ideologies, strengthen governments to protect their citizens, and
    promote stability and security, good governance, and economic
    successes. Security is a key enabler of U.S. whole-of-government and
    whole-of-society efforts--a minimum security threshold must be met for
    diplomacy to work, economies to flourish, and development efforts to
    take root. On the other side, development and diplomatic engagement are
    necessary to consolidate military and other security gains. United
    States Africa Command helps African partners create this operational
    space in Africa to build the governance and economic growth necessary
    for them to repel malign actors and VEO influences.
        Second, we Compete to Win. We conduct our security activities to
    safeguard U.S. interests. We seek areas where our interests align with
    those of our allies and partners as we work together to achieve shared
    objectives. This is particularly true where we see unhelpful activities
    and pressure exerted by malign actors. Chinese, Russian and VEO
    activities on the continent are destabilizing and promote a disregard
    for human rights and inclusive economic growth that will upend the
    progress the continent has seen in the last ten years. United States
    Africa Command must continue to find ways to expand the competitive
    space and outpace Chinese and Russian influence to maintain our
    strategic access in Africa. America's values, our high standards of
    professionalism, our direct focus and commitment to addressing partner
    security needs, and our high-quality equipment and niche capabilities
    give us a qualitative advantage over these competitors in Africa . . .
    which our African partners actively seek.
        Most importantly, in order to counter potential threats to the U.S.
    and our core interests, we work closely with allies and partners to
    apply persistent Pressure on the Malign Networks of global and regional
    competitors, VEOs, and transnational criminal organizations. Our
    principal means for applying pressure is working with our African and
    international partners, increasing African security capabilities,
    information operations, and, only when necessary, using military force.
    Ultimately, in countries like Somalia that have seen progress over the
    course of a decade of investment, our use of force in Africa directly
    supports host government, African, and international partner efforts to
    provide the security required for development activities to bring about
    long-term stability and prosperity.
        This strategic approach allows us to protect our citizens and
    interests at home and abroad, advance American prosperity and values,
    and support allies and partners overseas so they become more self-
    reliant and less dependent on U.S. security assistance.
                     priorities, partners, and competitors
        United States Africa Command advances United States strategic
    objectives by focusing on global power competition to maintain
    strategic access, by prioritizing efforts that protect the Homeland and
    U.S. personnel on the continent, and by responding to regional crises
    across our area of responsibility. United States security cooperation
    with African partners builds professional, capable militaries that can
    provide security which sets the conditions for economic growth and
    development. We achieve and maintain influence with our African
    partners through security cooperation, exercises, engagements,
    operations, and ``setting the theater'' or maturing infrastructure on
    the continent.
        Protecting United States personnel and facilities remains United
    States Africa Command's number one responsibility. Our mission to
    protect United States embassies and forces in Africa is central to our
    force posture. The Department of State has designated 32 diplomatic
    facilities worldwide as High Threat, High Risk posts--15 are in our
    area of responsibility, spread across an area 3.5 times the size of the
    United States. This critical mission requires heightened readiness and
    vigilance. Additionally, on any given day there are approximately 6,000
    Department of Defense personnel across the continent supporting U.S.
    interests, addressing global security challenges, and maintaining
    strategic access and influence. Even if the numbers of at-risk
    diplomatic posts and military personnel are reduced, the remainder will
    still require the backing and protection of the Department of Defense.
    Al-Shabaab's capability to reach outside the borders of Somalia to
    strike Americans in locations we once considered beyond their reach
    highlights the growing threat to our interests. After the 5 January
    attack in Kenya, we have taken swift measures to increase our force
    protection posture and harden our location at Manda Bay, while pursuing
    the attackers and their network. We are also taking a hard look at all
    our locations across the continent in light of this expanded threat.
        We benefit greatly from close coordination with a variety of U.S.
    and international partners. There are currently 28 representatives from
    13 different U.S. Government departments holding key positions on my
    staff. All United States Africa Command activities are closely
    coordinated with Defense Attaches and Chiefs of Security Cooperation in
    our embassies across Africa. In addition, United States Africa Command
    collaborates with the United States National Guard's State Partnership
    Program (SPP), where 15 African countries are paired with United States
    National Guard units. The SPP creates enduring bonds between Americans
    and Africans, and we are encouraged as more African countries apply to
    the program every year. Furthermore, foreign liaison officers
    representing 18 countries and multinational organizations are assigned
    to United States Africa Command headquarters providing key reach back
    capability within their Ministries of Defense and General Staffs.
    Outside the command, we regularly work with the African Union, European
    Union, NATO, United Nations, and the Regional Economic Communities in
    Africa on operations, exercises, engagements, security cooperation, and
    maturing the theater activities.
        In Africa, Counter-VEO is Global Power Competition. United States
    Africa Command prioritizes global power competition, even while we
    remain engaged in counter-VEO (C-VEO) operations. At AFRICOM, we
    recognize the strategic environment is changing and the Joint Force
    must orient the bulk of our efforts against China and Russia even as we
    counter VEOs that threaten America. In Africa, the C-VEO fight is a key
    component of global power competition as these efforts are not mutually
    exclusive. Our experience, training, equipment, advice, and other
    unique capabilities to support C-VEO efforts led by our allies and
    partners addresses immediate partner needs, builds relationships for
    the future, and is a distinct U.S. advantage that our competitors
    cannot match. Al Qaeda and ISIS influence is growing in Africa and al
    Shabaab's capability to threaten American interests in East Africa and
    the Homeland is on a dangerous trajectory. The international community
    is not making durable progress to contain priority VEOs in Africa,
    mainly because military activities remain insufficiently coordinated
    and lack a ``whole of coalition'' balance between military and non-
    military investments. Outside of arms sales that they leverage to their
    own benefit, China and Russia do little to counter violent extremist
    groups seeking to destabilize Africa. However, as one African leader
    recently shared, ``a drowning man will accept any hand.'' In the
    absence of even limited United States C-VEO assistance, African
    partners are turning to our competitors to fill the void, including by
    accepting training and other military engagement opportunities
    overseas. In our highest priority countries, where U.S. interests are
    greatest, C-VEO assistance is a key tool in our global power
    competition toolkit.
        In Africa, Building Partner Capability is Global Power Competition.
    Building partner capability is also an important tool in global power
    competition, reinforcing the U.S. role as the world's elite
    professional fighting force and furthering American values, respect for
    human rights, and adherence to obligations and commitments. We have
    learned that we cannot surge trust. The enduring relationships built
    while we develop partner capabilities provide us with the long-term
    strategic alliances we need to address future challenges.
        United States Africa Command and its component commands conduct
    engagements and exercises throughout the region designed to strengthen
    key partnerships and improve partner capabilities in basic military
    skills, maritime security, C-VEO efforts, counter-trafficking,
    humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and control of key infectious
    diseases. United States Africa Command leverages an interagency toolkit
    and coordinates a broad group of programs to complement our capability-
    building efforts such as, among others, the Department of State's
    Global Peace Operations Initiative, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
    Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and the Women, Peace &
    Security Initiative. These programs help professionalize partner
    military and security forces and strengthen defense institutions
    through training on human rights, the rule of law, and prevention of
    violence against women.
        United States-facilitated exercises offer some of the best return
    on investment by advancing our force readiness and providing our
    African partners with exposure to American values, expertise, and
    professionalism. Our exercise program improves partners' capabilities,
    encourages self-sufficiency, and develops opportunities for burden
    sharing over the long-term. United States Naval Forces Africa completed
    Exercise Cutlass Express in November, combining for the first time with
    United States Central Command's International Maritime Exercise,
    creating the second largest maritime exercise in the world for little
    in the way of additional resources. This exercise also allowed United
    States Africa Command and United States Central Command to practice
    cross-boundary operations along our seam. The ability to attract large
    coalitions of partners and allies to exercises addressing shared
    security concerns is a unique U.S. advantage that sends a strong
    message to our partners and competitors.
        Another United States Africa Command niche capability with long-
    term and high return on investment is United States professional
    military education and training. In 2019, African partners sent 763 of
    their best and brightest military leaders for training at professional
    military schools in the United States through Department of State's
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In
    addition, in August, United States Africa Command's Senior Enlisted
    Leader hosted the third annual and largest African Senior Enlisted
    Leader Conference with over 67 African partners from 29 countries.
    These are important stakeholders that our competitors dismiss--strong
    officer and enlisted leadership is a bedrock of responsible defense
    institutions and our African partners look to United States Forces as a
    model.
        United States Africa Command engages partners to establish the
    security environment required for economic opportunity and trade to
    flourish. With a whole-of-government approach, enhanced security
    fosters development and investment with United States initiatives such
    as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Prosper Africa, and the Better
    Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. Efforts
    like these open doors for United States companies to compete overseas
    and respond to China's increased economic engagement in Africa.
                              regional assessments
        In East Africa, we see opportunity in several countries and strong
    partners in others. Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya are the top
    African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributors and some
    of our strongest African partners in the fight against al Shabaab in
    Somalia. Djibouti also contributes troops to AMISOM and hosts our
    largest presence on the continent at Camp Lemonnier, home to more than
    3,000 Americans supporting multiple United States combatant commands
    and other organizations. Thanks to our collective security and whole-
    of-government efforts, we have seen real and tangible progress in
    Somalia over more than a decade, albeit slower than we would like.
    AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made gains in al Shabaab
    strongholds in the south, holding territory and establishing outposts.
    Gains are fragile, though, and at risk of stalling, so there is much
    work to be done. Al Qaeda's al Shabaab is a very real threat to
    Somalia, the region, the international community, and even the United
    States Homeland, but political friction between the Federal Government
    of Somalia and Somali Federal Member States threatens to distract
    Mogadishu from the fight. Somalia's Prime Minister Khayre called 2019
    Somalia's ``Year of Action,'' and has led encouraging security sector
    reforms replacing corrupt leaders with reform-minded officers. United
    States-trained ``Danab'' SNA units, along with U.S. counterterrorism
    efforts, are important to maintain momentum and secure hard-fought
    gains. Importantly, the European Union continues to fund AMISOM
    stipends at over 200M EUR per year. Underscoring the importance and
    urgency of the international effort, al Shabaab's 5 January Manda Bay
    attack--the group's first ever attack on a military base inside Kenya--
    demonstrates their intent and capability to strike outside Somalia. It
    is critical that AMISOM remain in the fight, as the SNA requires more
    time and international support before they are able to counter al
    Shabaab themselves. In the next 6 months, I intend to review United
    States military operations in Somalia in detail to assess our progress
    and the way ahead.
        North Africa is home to some of our oldest friends and newest
    democratic partners. Morocco was the first country to recognize our new
    nation in 1777 and remains by our side through exercises, training
    programs, foreign military sales, and counterterrorism cooperation.
    We'd like to strengthen our security cooperation with Algeria as it
    enters a new era under its first new president in twenty years. Tunisia
    just completed its second free and fair presidential election since its
    2011 revolution. The Tunisians are strong partners in the fight against
    ISIS-Libya and complement our security cooperation investment dollars
    with national funds. However, much of the international community
    remains paralyzed in Libya as we watch a civil war play out with no
    real progress toward a political solution. As we continue to support
    the United Nations action plan, Turkey and Russia are weighing in
    heavily on opposing sides. Notably, Russia continues to harvest
    benefits from the instability in Libya--its military meddling has
    prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties and humanitarian
    suffering. Moscow continues to deny any Russian involvement in the
    conflict, but its private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner
    Group with strong links to the Kremlin, are leading the fight for the
    self-styled ``Libyan National Army'' against the UN-backed and United
    States-recognized Government of National Accord. Turkey's recent
    deployment of troops and hardware to counter Russian PMCs risks a
    significant escalation, as both Russia and Turkey are attempting to tip
    the scales in their favor. A potential bad outcome for both the United
    States and NATO is Russia gaining access to oil and military bases with
    long-range anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities on NATO's
    southern flank. Despite these frictions, United States Africa Command
    continues to keep pressure on ISIS and other VEOs as they seek to take
    advantage of the security vacuum created by the civil war in Libya. Our
    persistent focus on ISIS-Libya, in coordination with our interagency
    and African partners and at low cost in Department of Defense
    resources, continues to disrupt ISIS freedom of action as a regional
    terrorist threat. We will remain vigilant to counter VEO reconstitution
    efforts.
        In West Africa, we see functioning democracies, peaceful transfers
    of power, and an engaged regional organization in the Economic
    Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Senegal remains a stalwart,
    fully functioning democracy, focused on bolstering their defense
    institutions. Ghana hosts our West Africa Logistics Network, a unique
    shared-expense logistics hub that supports United States, African, and
    European partners across the continent. However, we also see a serious
    regional threat from VEOs emanating from the Sahel. Security is
    deteriorating rapidly, with a 250 percent increase in VEO violence
    since 2018 in Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger. Having quickly
    spread from northern Mali, al Qaeda's JNIM, ISIS-aligned groups, and
    other VEOs are now operating throughout the Sahel region. They are
    taking advantage of porous borders, weak governments, under-resourced
    and overextended militaries, and disenfranchised populations, and are
    now even threatening Gulf of Guinea countries. Our African partners are
    trying to help address this growing regional threat themselves through
    the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Accra Initiative and various ECOWAS
    initiatives. However, despite United States bilateral security
    assistance and generous pledges of support from the international
    community coordinated by the European Union, they cannot effectively
    control their own borders or address security and related governance
    challenges in the region without substantive external assistance from
    their Western partners. We praise our French partners who are assisting
    this African-led effort in a significant way with over 4,400 French
    troops deployed as part of Operation Barkhane. In our view, African and
    European partners must do more to roll back the VEO threat and there
    must be a better synchronization of efforts in West Africa. The window
    of opportunity to dig a firebreak and prevent the further spread of
    VEOs is months, not years. We applaud emerging plans by the French and
    Germans to develop new structures to improve coordination,
    synchronization, and effectiveness of international assistance, and
    improve African partner fighting capabilities. We encourage all
    approaches that will allow regional partners to be more self-
    sufficient.
        In Central and Southern Africa, we again see some strong
    partnerships and a few opportunities. Botswana is a bright spot with
    its enduring democracy, continued stability, professional military and
    good relations with the United States In 2019, Rwanda became the 15th
    African nation to join the SPP, establishing their partnership with the
    Nebraska National Guard in December. South Africa is the second-largest
    economy in Africa and the largest United States trade partner on the
    continent. There is enormous potential for Mozambique, where the United
    States, France, and other partners have invested in an 11 billion USD
    liquid natural gas project that is located in the same areas as an
    increasingly violent group that has claimed links to ISIS. In addition,
    United States Africa Command support to USAID for Cyclone Idai relief
    and recovery efforts have opened a door with Mozambique for future
    security cooperation opportunities.
        China and Russia are in a position of advantage in central and
    southern Africa. Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in
    the Central African Republic, where they are deploying PMCs, extracting
    minerals, and attempting to buy influence. In Mozambique, Moscow
    provided second-rate counterterrorism assistance in the hopes of buying
    oil and gas concessions. Russia also deployed strategic bombers to
    South Africa, and participated in the first-ever trilateral Chinese-
    Russian-South African naval exercise MOSI in November 2019. ISIS and
    other spoilers look to exploit long-simmering grievances and gaps in
    governance in the region. We are exploring renewed military-to-military
    outreach in South Africa.
                                economy of force
        United States Africa Command continues to assess and implement
    reform efforts to maximize value from our precious resources. For
    example, we prioritize the warfighting readiness of assigned and
    allocated forces through refinement of our exercise program. We are
    committed to optimizing the effectiveness of our security cooperation
    assistance and activities and we must be innovative in how we use our
    assets in support of our strategic objectives. Honest assessments and
    prudent investments ensure the United States maximizes the impact of
    every taxpayer dollar while remaining the premier security partner for
    priority African Governments.
        U.S. foreign assistance should serve America's interests and should
    support countries that help us to advance our foreign policy goals.
    United States Africa Command's efforts are focused on priority nations
    and strategic objectives that are sustainable, consistent with our
    national-level guidance, maintain our strategic access and protect the
    Homeland and United States personnel on the continent.
        It is a commander's responsibility to ensure our world-class troops
    have the resources they need. We must protect our forces when we move
    them into uncertain environments. The pace of improved base defense
    capabilities against emerging threats has been too slow. We need to
    accelerate C-UAS technologies to Africa to improve local domain
    awareness and provide an additional layer of warning and force
    protection while also improving capabilities across the joint force. As
    previously mentioned, our exercises hone partner capabilities and
    encourage self-sufficiency and burden sharing. This small investment in
    relationships and the human capital of our partners can make a
    difference in a crisis. With the continued support of Congress, United
    States Africa Command can best provide our troops the protection they
    deserve while enabling engagements critical to war-winning activities
    in any theater.
                                   conclusion
    A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
        United States Africa Command remains ready to protect United States
    citizens, interests, strategic access, and respond to crises in our
    area of responsibility. The men and women of United States Africa
    Command, our partners on the continent, and our broad collection of
    stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy
    and security environment. Strategic access to Africa, its airspace, and
    its surrounding waters is vital to United States national security. As
    outlined in our governing strategies, long-term global power
    competition with China and Russia and the need to limit the harmful
    influence of malign actors in the region is of utmost importance.
        In my first 6 months of command, and through our ongoing ``blank
    slate review'' process, I have learned that small investments in Africa
    go a long way. A few bucks and a few troops can make a significant
    difference and have proven to be the cornerstone of multinational
    efforts in the region. What United States Africa Command accomplishes
    with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent 3.5 times
    the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the
    American taxpayer. That said, United States Africa Command is
    diligently working to make our operations even more efficient and
    adjusting our posture and activities to ensure United States strategic
    access for today and tomorrow. Africa is key terrain for competition
    with China and Russia, and our support to C-VEO operations is
    necessary. While we can and will grow more efficient to contribute to
    higher NDS priorities, if the United States steps back from Africa too
    far, China and Russia will fill the void to our detriment. Violent
    extremist organizations will be able to grow unchecked, some will
    ultimately threaten the Homeland, and we will lose opportunities for
    increased trade and investments with some of the fastest growing
    economies in the world.
        Finally, it remains my honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, and families of United States
    Africa Command. Our efforts have made the United States safer and
    advanced American interests while helping Africans do more for
    themselves. United States Africa Command is an investment in America's,
    Africa's, and the world's future.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Townsend.
        Admiral Faller?

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Faller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    Senators, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
    honored to be here with my shipmate and good friend, General
    Steve Townsend.
        We also thank you for the steadfast support you provide to
    our men and women every day at SOUTHCOM, and I am truly
    grateful for the honor and opportunity to lead them.
        I am with Ambassador Jean Manes, our civilian deputy
    commander, former United States Ambassador to El Salvador; and
    Sergeant Major Zickefoose, Command Sergeant Major for SOUTHCOM,
    two of the eyes and ears of our command.
        The western hemisphere is our shared home. It is our
    neighborhood and we are connected to the nations there in every
    domain, sea, air, space, land, cyber, and most importantly,
    culturally and with values. Over the last year, I have had the
    opportunity to visit our partners and see firsthand the
    opportunities and challenges that directly impact the security
    of our hemisphere.
        I have come to describe the challenges of a vicious circle
    of threats that deliberately erodes the security and stability
    of this region and the United States of America. This vicious
    circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, with
    weak institutions, rampant corruption, exploited by
    transnational criminal organizations often better funded than
    the security organizations they face, external state actors
    that do not share those values, China, Russia, and Iran, and
    violent extremist organizations. They are trying to advance
    their interests at the expense of United States and partner
    nation security.
        In fact, the aha for me over the last year is the extent to
    which China is aggressively pursuing its interests right here
    in our neighborhood. This vicious circle can be seen most
    acutely in the tragedy that is Venezuela. The human suffering
    of this once thriving democracy has driven 5 million people to
    flee to neighboring countries like Colombia, Brazil, Peru,
    Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and more. These countries are
    dealing with this and the strains to their health care,
    education, and social services are palatable. Colombia alone
    spent $2.5 billion, a significant part of their GDP [gross
    domestic product], over the last 2 years just to support the
    migrants. While Russia, Cuba, and China prop up this
    illegitimate Maduro dictatorship, the democracies of the world
    look for a way to get the Venezuelan people what they deserve,
    a free and prosperous Venezuela.
        The only way to attack this vicious circle is as a team. In
    this neighborhood, a little goes a long way, and our partners
    are willing to contribute. But we need the right and focused,
    persistent military presence which might take the form of
    security force assisted brigades or small teams of special
    operation forces or marines to conduct specialized training or
    our National Guard forces forging long-term relations via the
    State Partnership Program or our maritime forces where presence
    at sea establishes sea control and
    attacks these transnational criminal organizations, as we have
    recently done with the deployment of littoral combat ship USS
    Detroit.
        Deployments like the United States naval ship Comfort show
    the best outstretched hand of America, and that mission treated
    over 70,000 patients and extended our enduring promise as a
    trusted partner to the neighborhood.
        Security cooperation is a critical tool in a region with
    willing partners who thrive given the opportunity.
    International military education and training, IMET
    [International Military Education and Training], as a small
    investment, yields long-term returns. It builds lasting trusted
    relationships. As I speak, half of our nation's chiefs of
    defense are graduates of IMET programs.
        Finally, our people, our greatest asset. Joint Interagency
    Task Force South, JIATF-South in Key West, our southernmost
    base in the continental United States, holds significant
    strategic value in defending against a wide range of threats to
    U.S. national security. We are taking steps to improve the
    resiliencies of that headquarters building and to improve the
    quality of life of our military and civilian personnel who
    struggle in one of the country's most expensive economies.
        At our headquarters in Miami, we are also working to
    address the cost of living and housing concerns that create
    hardships for our families.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the
    opportunity to testify today. The SOUTHCOM team appreciates the
    support of Congress, and you continue to place trust and honor
    in us and we will not let you down.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
        Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States
    Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    directs, we are focused on sustaining our advantages in the Western
    Hemisphere--the most important of which are strong partnerships founded
    on shared democratic values. Recent trends illustrate that the Western
    Hemisphere--our shared neighborhood--is critical space in the global
    competition--and global challenges--posed by the People's Republic of
    China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives immense
    benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our
    partnerships in the Western Hemisphere strong and vibrant will allow us
    to achieve the NDS objective of maintaining a favorable regional
    balance of power that reduces security threats to the Homeland.
        Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the
    Caribbean, the region is home to 825 percent of all United States
    exports and key global infrastructure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes,
    and deep water ports that provide access to both the Atlantic and
    Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to our Homeland in every
    domain--land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values--
    which makes any threat or encroachment in this region particularly
    concerning. Latin America's strategic importance lies in its unique
    potential as both a vulnerability and an opportunity for our own
    security, prosperity, and efforts to address global challenges. \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ R. Evan Ellis (2016). ``Thinking Strategically About Latin
    America and the Caribbean.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese Government absorbed three
    more Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative,
    bringing the regional total to 19--more than half of all countries in
    the region. Beijing now has 29 government exchange programs with Latin
    America and the Caribbean, and continues to expand offers of
    professional military education, equipment donations, and funding for
    infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our
    neighborhood, establishing a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying
    (for the first time) its most advanced nuclear-capable warship; and
    sending a research ship capable of mapping and cutting undersea cables,
    as well as two other naval research vessels to operate near our
    Homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage, oppression in Venezuela is
    ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily
    arrested for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019.
    Between January 2018 and May 2019, regime-aligned security forces
    killed more than 7,000 people, and many of these killings may
    constitute extrajudicial killings.
        These malign state actors are part of a vicious circle of threats
    that deliberately erode stability and security in the region. This
    vicious circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, often
    with weak governance and porous legal frameworks, exacerbated by a
    propensity towards patronage and corruption that is deliberately
    exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external
    state actors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist
    organizations (VEOs) to advance their own ends at the expense of United
    States and partner nation security. This vicious circle continues to
    negatively impact our Homeland, most acutely in the form of illegal
    immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in other, more harmful
    ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government
    corruption, support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin
    America and the Caribbean is at its lowest levels in 15 years, \2\
    providing further openings for malign state actors to increase their
    influence. A number of countries are experiencing democratic
    backsliding, with others sliding towards outright authoritarianism.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 2018/2019 AmericasBaromter report, funded by USAID. Available
    at: https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-
    slump-across-americas-according-to-new-survey/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Positive Trends. These threats are real, and they demand a sense of
    urgency. But so do the opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile,
    Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru demonstrate that, while democracy
    may be troubled, citizens are exercising democratic rights to uphold
    their constitutions. Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador now recognize the
    Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban officials, some
    even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and
    El Salvador are doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular
    migration towards our border; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago regularly
    deploy to regional disaster response efforts, to include supporting the
    Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian; and Colombia, Brazil, and Chile
    continue to grow their contributions to global security.
        Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of
    USSOUTHCOM are moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and
    sustain our security advantages in the Western Hemisphere. While doing
    so, we remain committed to making good use of every taxpayer dollar
    Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we undertook a detailed
    review of all aspects of our organization to gain efficiencies and
    support the Department's reform efforts. I look forward to discussing
    how we are freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our
    top priorities: strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering
    threats, and building the readiness of our team.
        Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and
    partnerships--which is exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where
    strengthening partnerships is the best way to counter threats, enhance
    our collective readiness and capability to meet global challenges, and
    maintain the regional balance of power in favor of the United States.
    We also support the interagency, including the Department of State,
    U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland
    Security, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities,
    reinforcing the importance of leveraging all tools of national
    security.
        We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other
    competitors by playing to our strengths of shared values,
    professionalism, and equipment built to last, and by investing in
    education, intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, joint
    operations, and security cooperation. More than anything else,
    persistent presence matters in this fight. Like athletes, we have to be
    present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win.
        Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors. As the Department
    of Defense has prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has
    aggressively turned its attention to the Western Hemisphere, exporting
    corrupt business practices and disregard for international law and
    standards to countries already struggling with government corruption
    and weak governance. The competitive space is truly global and all-
    domain as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the
    PRC and Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15
    worldwide) still recognize Taiwan--a fact that has not gone unnoticed
    by Beijing, which is engaging in persistent (and successful) dollar
    diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19 Latin American and
    Caribbean nations now participating in the One Belt One Road Initiative
    and pledges of at least $150 billion in loans, the PRC is now the
    region's largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of
    predatory financing and ``no strings attached'' largesse it has wielded
    in other parts of the world. On the defense side, this includes
    ``gifts'' of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to copy our
    successful military education program.
        Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host
    Chinese infrastructure projects. Most concerning, certain investments
    have strategic value for future military uses. Chinese investment in
    numerous deep water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the
    Panama Canal could enable the Chinese military to threaten sea lanes
    vital to global commerce and the movement of United States Forces.
    Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the
    sovereign rights of coastal states to conduct illegal fishing in the
    Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Latin American countries, while
    Chinese mining and infrastructure projects have created lasting
    environmental damage. Beijing sees immense value in South America's
    strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing
    additional access to regional space infrastructure. With
    telecommunication projects in 16 countries, Huawei and ZTE provide the
    backbone of commercial and government communication systems, providing
    a backdoor for the Chinese Government to monitor or intercept official
    information we share with our partners. Beijing is also gaining real-
    time, street-level situational awareness by selling surveillance
    technology through its ``Smart Cities'' initiative--the same technology
    the Chinese Communist Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens.
    \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses
    and China's National Intelligence Law, citizens living in democracies
    in the Western Hemisphere could have their entire digital identity
    under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia continues to play the role of ``spoiler,'' seeking to sow
    disunity and discredit the United States within our own hemisphere. As
    it does across the world, Russia meddles in regional affairs by
    spreading false information on its media platforms and engaging in
    malicious cyber activity. Russia's ability to disseminate
    disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En
    Espanol's social media platforms received more views in 2019 than any
    other Spanish-language news source. While Moscow denies having a
    military presence in the region, Russian ``advisors'' continue to prop
    up the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy
    relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua
    provide Russia with footholds close to our Homeland, giving Putin
    strategic options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia's
    access to the Western Hemisphere, allowing Russia to collect
    intelligence in close proximity to the United States.
        Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the
    Americas in the past, maintains facilitation networks and raises funds
    through its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah supporters cache
    weapons and raise funds, often via charitable donations, remittances,
    and sometimes through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and money
    laundering. Having a footprint in the region also allows Iran to
    collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible
    retaliatory attacks against United States and/or Western interests.
        After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for
    authoritarianism, an exporter of malign ideology, and an underlying
    driver of instability in the region. Cuban intelligence personnel
    support and counsel non-democratic leaders, including directly propping
    up the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba, Russia, and the
    PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to
    undercut United States initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays
    the thousands of Cuban medical personnel it sends as humanitarian, such
    aid routinely includes intelligence collection, propagation of Cuba's
    failed ideology, and advancing a distinctly anti-United States agenda.
        The final malign actors--Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela--pose
    one of the most direct threats to peace and security in the Western
    Hemisphere. Emboldened by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Cuban
    protection and patronage, Maduro has allowed Venezuela to become a safe
    haven for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and drug traffickers while the
    Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020 hold, the number
    of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian
    exodus. To date, nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant
    strain on Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and other host countries in
    the region. Colombia bears the brunt of this crisis and has generously
    stepped up to support the over 1.6 million refugees while at the same
    time having 7.8 million internally displaced persons of their own, the
    largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan
    crisis will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require
    significant support to help Venezuelans address the decades of
    mismanagement, widespread insecurity, and corruption of defense and
    other institutions in order to realize the natural richness of their
    resources.
        What We're Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the
    field to compete, and when we are on the field, our impacts are
    positive and long-lasting. In the absence of an enduring U.S. military
    presence, recurring rotations of small teams of Special Operations
    Forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    national guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and exchange
    critical expertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership
    Program (SPP) is uniquely positioned based on its dual military
    experience to provide a persistent and sustained presence to our
    partner nations by means of senior leader visits, exchanges, and
    cooperative training and exercises in areas ranging from humanitarian
    assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo
    (JTF-B) and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
    (SPMAGTF) build collective response and security capability and
    readiness in Army and Marine Corps Reserve Forces and partner
    militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil, Colombia, and
    Peru integrated into the SPMAGTF last year, building interoperability
    for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three partners also
    formed part of the hospital ship USNS Comfort's multinational team. The
    2019 Comfort mission delivered significant returns, providing world-
    class medical care to nearly 68,000 patients in 12 countries, reducing
    suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela, and enhancing
    medical readiness in the United States Navy, our partners, and allies.
    JTF-B facilitates strategic access to Central America, builds enduring
    relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to
    create regional stability and security. JTF-B provided medical care to
    over 20,000 partner nation patients, rapid response capability for a
    wide range of contingencies, and assigned forces to participate in
    exercises.
        As directed by the NDS, we're deepening relations with ``regional
    countries that export military capabilities to priority regional and
    global security challenges.'' Recently designated a Major Non-NATO ally
    and the newest partner in the State Partnership Program (SPP), we work
    closely with Brazil on a range of priority missions. Chile exports its
    security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and Central
    America, and is actively partnering with us and United States Army
    South to
    develop a concept for a combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise
    later this year. Colombia--NATO's only global partner in the region--
    seeks to share its humanitarian demining and counter IED expertise with
    NATO allies while also serving in South Korea as part of the United
    Nations Command, a legacy that stems from its participation in the
    Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong supporter of United
    States efforts to hold global malign actors accountable, de-flagging
    numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation of United
    States and international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its
    weight having supported coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq
    and Afghanistan and applying training and equipment received via the
    Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their current deployments
    to the UN Mission in Mali.
        In the face of the PRC's and Russia's global assault on
    international norms, engagement on shared values is more important than
    ever before. As I told this Committee last year, education, training,
    and security cooperation efforts like the SPP and the Combatant
    Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2)
    Program and the Department of State's International Military Education
    and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of
    time and money, these programs are helping us reinforce mutual
    understanding, shared values and culture, and doctrine. Along with
    IMET; our Human Rights Initiative; noncommissioned officer development;
    and Women, Peace, and Security programs
    enhance the professionalism of the region's militaries and security
    forces. In particular, USSOUTHCOM's decades-long commitment to
    promoting respect for human rights has become a cornerstone of our
    strong partnerships with like-minded militaries. These efforts are
    among the most effective ways we can expand competitive space and
    outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage our partners to hold
    the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of
    peace, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
        Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information
    about Beijing's predatory economic practices, the security risks
    associated with Chinese technology, and activities by Russia, Iran, and
    their authoritarian allies that undermine regional sovereignty and
    security. In addition to expanding our information sharing efforts
    throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with
    partners in the region to enhance our understanding of the security
    threats posed by the Venezuelan crisis, which in turn assists with
    multinational efforts to plan for longer term recovery and stability
    once free and fair democratic elections are held.
        We also support the NDS' focus on developing operational concepts
    to enhance Joint Force lethality while building interoperability with
    allied and partner forces. We leverage our science and technology
    portfolio in high-end multinational exercises like UNITAS and PANAMAX,
    providing opportunities for the Services to test new warfighting
    capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment. Through our
    Caribbean-focused Tradewinds exercise, we are now laying the groundwork
    for a combined task force that can counter a range of threats and
    enable sea control and denial operations. We conduct cyber training and
    capacity building with partners like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in an
    effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish shared cyber
    situational awareness in the region. We continue to work closely with
    other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure globally
    integrated plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and
    opportunities in this hemisphere.
        Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs. As the NDS recognizes,
    ``non-state actors also threaten the security environment with
    increasingly sophisticated capabilities.'' TCOs engage in a wide array
    of illegal activities that generate approximately two trillion dollars
    in illicit proceeds annually, including drug and weapons trafficking,
    human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We see these
    impacts directly in our Homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans
    since 1999, \4\ costing our nation billions in criminal justice,
    healthcare, and productivity costs--in addition to the suffering caused
    by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption and violence, TCOs also
    challenge and erode the governance of partners that we rely on to
    advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse decades of
    successful U.S. policies and security investments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html. From 1999
    to 2017, more than 700,000 people have died from a drug overdose.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment
    facilitating opportunities for malign actors to expand influence, and
    VEOs leverage to move people and weapons through our hemisphere. This
    latter vulnerability is particularly troublesome; there is an
    interconnected system of pathways that spans our neighborhood, running
    through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central
    America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our Homeland, and
    anything can move on them--for the right price. This ongoing threat was
    illustrated in 2019 by several successful U.S. law enforcement
    operations against human smuggling networks, which continue to enable
    the movement of individuals with terrorist links, many of whom attempt
    to enter the U.S. Homeland illegally.
        What We're Doing. We're strengthening partnerships with countries
    that contribute military capabilities to regional security and beyond,
    with a focus on enabling combined operations and building
    interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to the U.S. Homeland, reduce
    the effectiveness of priority TCOs, and prevent VEOs from leveraging
    regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.
        Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared
    responsibility, and one in which they are sacrificing blood and
    treasure to meet their commitment to halve cocaine production by 2023.
    Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to conduct maritime
    counterdrug operations while working closely with Panama and Costa Rica
    to seize drugs headed to the United States. In 2019, Colombia also
    manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of
    almost 600 police and military killed or wounded, largely due to IEDs
    emplaced to protect the coca fields. Inside of Colombia, their security
    forces also disrupted and destroyed over 300 cocaine-producing labs,
    preventing over 400 metric tons of cocaine from ever leaving the
    country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America's
    security challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six
    Central American countries through the United States Colombia Action
    Plan program since the program's inception in fiscal year 2013. We
    continue to enable Colombian operations against priority narco-
    terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents, yielding
    significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.
        In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our
    capacity-building efforts on improving border security, drug
    interdiction rates, and institutional effectiveness. Jamaica has now
    integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into Joint
    Interagency Task Force South counterdrug operations, enhancing our
    operational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training
    by Naval Special Warfare teams, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales Navales
    (FEN) is now entirely self-sufficient and responsible for more than 80
    percent of Guatemala's drug seizures. Like Guatemala, Costa Rica,
    Panama and El Salvador are applying United States-provided training and
    equipment to regularly interdict drug shipments more than 100 miles
    from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across
    America from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El
    Salvador are leveraging our Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian
    Assistance Program to better address factors driving violence and
    migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center
    for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a force multiplier across the
    hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the
    strategic level and reinforce accountability and transparency in
    defense institutions.
        In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on
    modest investment. Last year, the international and interagency ``team
    of teams'' at JIATF-South helped keep 280 metric tons of cocaine off
    U.S. streets. JIATF-South-led interdictions at sea account for almost
    four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement
    efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times larger than the
    United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF-South continue to be among the
    best investments in the U.S. Government.
        In fiscal year 2020, thanks to congressional support, we are
    filling detection and monitoring (D&M) capability gaps through
    innovative solutions like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV).
    Having only recently deployed, the MMSV already has supported the
    disruption of over 3000 kilograms of cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of
    marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping
    a low profile vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a
    capacity-building platform in the Dominican Republic, a key transit
    point for cocaine trafficking into major United States cities like
    Washington DC, Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying
    commercially-available technology like unmanned aircraft systems to
    increase the MMSV's ability to conduct D&M and provide information to
    partner nations who are conducting the interceptions. In addition to
    the MMSV, we now have one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the
    region that will provide needed naval capabilities and technological
    advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deployments--these
    will be game changers.
        On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM,
    and support the work of our interagency partners to stop individuals
    with known or suspected ties to terrorism who are attempting to exploit
    the region's weak border security to move into the U.S. Homeland. We
    deepened counter threat finance collaboration with the Treasury
    Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based member of al
    Qaeda last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging
    the DOD Rewards Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for
    minimal investment; in 2019, we paid $1.2 million for 72 rewards
    (information) that led to the neutralization of 97 terrorists, the
    seizure of 80 weapons caches, and the destruction of 22 drug labs.
        In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago
    continues to pay dividends for international efforts targeting
    extremist networks supporting ISIS and other dangerous groups. Our
    biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and stop known or
    suspected terrorists last year, while we deepened collaboration with
    Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious activities
    by supporters of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.
        Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)
    support the global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy
    combatants off the battlefield. As we take proactive steps to address
    infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations,
    the JTF-GTMO team remains the epitome of professionalism, conducting
    safe, legal, and humane detention operations that protect our Homeland
    and U.S. troops serving in harm's way.
        Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our Homeland's
    defense, we are focused on building an effective, efficient, and
    resilient team.
        For decades, USSOUTHCOM's modest budget and small footprint have
    encouraged us to embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches.
    Over the last five years, we absorbed 25 percent cuts to our personnel,
    a 10 percent reduction to our Exercise program, and a steady decline in
    available assets and forces needed to support our mission. We've tried
    to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to minimize operational
    impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies,
    improve performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.
        With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the
    Department's current reform efforts. Our revised campaign plan drove a
    review of all fiscal year 2020
    operations, activities, and investments. We eliminated over 200 lower
    priority events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic
    partners. We've also revised our joint exercise program to make it more
    effective and more relevant. In 2019, we sharpened our emphasis on
    building readiness of U.S. Forces and supporting Joint Force
    experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exercises to more
    directly support the global competition with the PRC and Russia. Other
    areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF-GTMO manning,
    contracts, and theater posture.
        At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved
    support to military and civilian families, and enhanced our training
    and professional development programs to build a more ready, results-
    oriented organization. We continue to work closely with the Department
    of the Army and local South Florida community to address housing and
    high living costs impacting our men and women. At JTF-GTMO, we
    undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine
    long-term requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces,
    and operational efficiency. We are also taking steps to improve quality
    of life and resiliency of JIATF-South's headquarters building at Naval
    Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in the continental
    United States, NAS Key West has significant strategic value in
    defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I
    look forward to working with the Congress on our housing issues in the
    year ahead to ensure our men and women get the support they need.
        Congressional Support. I'd like to repeat last year's invitation to
    members of this Committee to visit our neighbors and reinforce the
    message that we value this region and the role our partners play in
    keeping our neighborhood safe. Your presence, attention, and
    engagement, along with that of other key leaders, matters. I also want
    to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating
    under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel.
    Confidence in stable, predictable budgets will reassure friendly
    nations that we are reliable security partners.
        Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our
    competitive edge: persistent presence and engagement. We appreciate
    congressional support for initiatives that have streamlined security
    cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of
    choice. Your continued support to these security cooperation programs
    and capabilities like IMET and the Perry Center allow us to build trust
    and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow
    contributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly,
    support for analytic initiatives focused on open source/publicly
    available information helps mitigate reduced intelligence resources and
    provides a steady stream of useful information (especially about malign
    state actors) that we can share with partners.
        As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the
    counterdrug mission, we still only enabled the successful interdiction
    of about nine percent of known drug movement. That is a small increase
    over previous years, but still significantly below where we need to be.
    We appreciate your continued support to creative solutions like the
    MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug
    forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter
    will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the
    security of the Western Hemisphere. Each additional force package
    (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable ship, embarked
    helicopter, and law enforcement detachment) enables the disruption of
    35 more metric tons of cocaine. \5\ Grey hulls, in particular, still
    serve as a powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our
    competitors, and a reassuring one to our friends. They can also yield
    multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while participating in our
    UNITAS exercise last year, the USS Michael Murphy supported the
    interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than
    2,000 pounds of cocaine, simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of
    intelligence, demonstrating rules-based maritime behavior, and
    providing coalition training opportunities for the U.S. Navy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ USCG National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and/or
    the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship could fill this requirement, providing
    us with a game-changing edge, providing unique capabilities to engage
    drug traffickers where they are most vulnerable.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Conclusion. I'd like to close as I began: with a note of caution,
    and one of hope.
        Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends
    on the security of our borders and the stability of our hemisphere--
    both of which are under assault. Likewise, our ability to advance
    diplomatic and economic goals depends on the strength of both our
    partnerships and our shared values. We've seen what happens when we
    ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In the past
    decade, we've seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs,
    increased presence of malign actors, and negative trends in democracy.
        We're now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security
    threats we face now and in the near future, and the significant
    opportunities that await only with our initiative and engagement in the
    hemisphere. There is no other region we depend upon more for our
    prosperity and security, and with which we are more closely tied
    through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin
    America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for
    our shared values. As I hope I've conveyed, the right, focused
    attention and modest investments go a long way in this part of the
    world, paying significant security dividends to both our global efforts
    and to our Homeland's defense. When we don't engage in our
    neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our Homeland security pays
    the price. When we do engage, we reduce threats to the Homeland and
    limit opportunities for adversaries to operate in close proximity to
    us, and there is no better return on investment than that.
        Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the
    USSOUTHCOM team and their families. I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Admiral Faller.
        The comments I made in my opening statement I am very
    sincere about because a lot of people do not realize, when they
    look at all of the comms that we have around, did we ever have
    the right resources relative to the threats that are posed. I
    am going to ask you each the same question, which I have worded
    very carefully because we hear from so many people who are not
    aware of the threat to our national security that you would
    find in SOUTHCOM and in Africa. Why does it really matter in
    terms of our national security?
        I am going to start with you, Admiral Faller. You have
    touched on it. I know you believe in it, but the question would
    be, why should the American people care what China and Russia
    are doing in Africa and Latin America? Specifically, how does
    what they are doing threaten our national security? I know the
    President is very interested in this. He wants to make sure
    that we do not have resources in places that do not have a
    direct threat on our national security. I would like to have
    you restate what the direct threat is out there to our national
    security.
        Admiral Faller. Senator, this region matters. It is the
    cultural values. It is the extensive interaction we have in
    trade. We have a positive trade balance with the region, but
    that is eroding. We are the number one trading partner. China
    is fast catching us in that regard.
        Panama Canal, strategic access. Two-thirds of the traffic
    that goes through that has an economic direct tie to the United
    States.
        I look around the region and I see China working on
    multiple port deals, IT [information technology]
    infrastructure, dams, mining, logging, fishing, including
    significant illegal fishing, illegal mining and illegal
    logging. I look at the port access that they are pursuing in El
    Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the question why would
    China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year lease for
    most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a 2-hour
    flight of the continental United States. They are trying to
    achieve positional advantage right here in our neighborhood and
    that is alarming and concerning to me. It drives a sense of
    urgency with which I look at this competition.
        Chairman Inhofe. You know, the terrorists that are out
    there--we are not really talking about just locally there, even
    in El Salvador and the rest. You are the door to this country,
    right through your area, and I think you have stated that very
    well.
        The same thing to you, General Townsend. I may not have
    mentioned this in the opening statement, but if you are looking
    for places to save, I cannot see that you would find it there.
    I mean, you have a total of what? Six thousand to six thousand
    five hundred people in the whole continent. Of that, most of
    those, 4,000 of those, are in Djibouti. Of course, they have
    other missions outside of the continent of Africa.
        But when you go to West Africa, you have only got what?
    Twelve hundred to thirteen hundred people. It is not like the
    other comms with 75,000, 80,000, and 100,000 people if what you
    are trying to accomplish is to reduce our footprint around the
    world.
        Specifically in Africa, talking about how that directly
    affects our national security.
        General Townsend. Thank you, Chairman.
        You asked why should America care about Africa. For a lot
    of the same reasons that Admiral Faller talked about America
    caring about South America, although it is a little bit more
    geographically distant.
        The strategic access that America needs to the African
    continent rests on the fact that it is that global crossroads I
    talked about in my opening statement. There are also tremendous
    natural resources there, to include rare earth minerals that
    America needs. There is also a burgeoning population there, and
    there is good and bad news with that. It is a tremendous
    potential opportunity for the future, also significant risk. I
    think that in the past maybe we have been able to pay less
    attention to Africa and it would be okay for America. I do not
    believe that is the case for the future.
        As far as the threats go that you asked about, China and
    Russia are every bit as busy in Africa today and for the same
    reasons that Admiral Faller talked about them being busy in
    South America. They are acting on their own behalf for
    positional advantage and Russia, in particular, pursuing
    extractive ventures. China and Russia are seeking to counter
    the strategic access that we need for American security and
    American prosperity.
        Secondly, the violent extremist organizations that are on
    the continent both in the east and in the west. Some of those
    groups threaten the American Homeland today. Some of them will
    potentially be a threat in the future years.
        Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate that. I am glad you mentioned
    in your opening statement the IMET program because China
    realizes what we have done with that program, how well that has
    served us. They are now emulating that. They actually had a
    meeting in Beijing--I think they had all 52 countries
    represented there, talking about how they were going to expand
    that program, put more money in it. You are watching that, I am
    sure, very carefully throughout your whole area.
        General Townsend. Yes, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay, good.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you again, General Townsend and Admiral Faller.
        I think it could be safely said that both of your COCOMs
    [combatant commands] are conducting economy of force
    operations. Is that right, General Townsend?
        General Townsend. That is what we are doing, both of us.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Faller?
        Admiral Faller. We are at a very low level of force. Yes,
    sir.
        Senator Reed. We have to do that, but we have to do it
    smartly and wisely and that means cooperation and collaboration
    across our government and also collaboration with other
    governments.
        General Townsend, the French are now conducting significant
    operations in the Sahel part of Africa. If we drew down, what
    signal would that send and what practical consequences might
    that have for their cooperation in the fight?
        General Townsend. Senator Reed, as you pointed out, the
    French are the lead international partner in the Sahel region
    of West Africa. They have about 4,500 troops there that are
    engaged in active operations every day to counter the threat
    that is there. The threat comes from both al Qaeda groups and
    ISIS groups there. That threat is very serious and that threat
    is on the advance, and I think the French would say--in fact,
    they have said publicly recently--that their efforts are not
    having the desired effect that they need. We are supporting
    both the French and the larger international effort there.
        There is a significant European effort there. Our position,
    the position of the Department of Defense, is that the
    Europeans need to step up and do more in the Sahel to help the
    French. The French are calling on Europe to step up and do
    more. I absolutely think that is the right thing to do. But as
    we see the violent extremists advancing, if we were to withdraw
    support from the French precipitously, then that would not go
    in a good direction. I think what we have to do is we have got
    to synchronize our support and the removal of support, if we
    decide to do that, with the arrival of European support. But
    there is a chance there that the French can offset that.
        Senator Reed. What you are saying is it would not be
    particularly coherent if we are telling the EU [European Union]
    to step up support of France as we reduce our support.
        General Townsend. I think there is certainly a timing issue
    there, Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Faller, following up the point that
    the chairman made, which I think is an excellent point,
    programs like IMET are just absolutely critical, and in your
    AO, China is aggressively pursuing these IMET options. You
    indicated that in certain countries--I think it was El
    Salvador--there is one IMET slot that the United States offers
    and 50 that the Chinese offer. Is that----
        Admiral Faller. Recently an example was provided along
    those lines where they have come in analyzing how many folks we
    were sending to Carlisle, and they were going five times over
    that to their war college in China, which they have copied from
    our program and translated it into Spanish. We talked to the
    students that come back from that to get a sense for the
    quality and the approach. It is all based off of the U.S.
    doctrine.
        Senator Reed. It has to be pointed out that the IMET
    program is funded by the Department of State. One of the
    critical programs we are talking about is not within DOD, which
    again suggests that this whole-of-government approach--we have
    to look not just at funding for your COCOM but are we putting
    the money in the State Department? Are we putting money into
    AID [U.S. Agency for International Development]? Are we putting
    money into various programs that will allow you to conduct a
    much more efficient economy of force operation? Is that fair?
        Admiral Faller. That is an accurate statement. We really
    depend on that IMET, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Going back to Africa, General Townsend, you
    indicated that the extremist threat is all through the
    continent, but my sense is that al Shabaab and others are still
    contemplating projecting power outside of Africa, which is a
    much more critical threat to the United States. Is that fair?
        General Townsend. Senator, that is accurate.
        Senator Reed. We are going to continue to focus on that
    threat to the United States particularly.
        General Townsend. I believe we should.
        Senator Reed. Finally, I think again the issue here is
    maintaining appropriate force and also maintaining the
    coordination with our government and with our allies. You are
    pursuing that, and I think you should continue to do so. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our
    country.
        I would like to begin by just talking a little bit about
    the disinformation and influence operations which Russia has
    used successfully in a number of different instances, but
    specifically what plans and actions that you have and your team
    have created to address the technological advances and the
    changing character of war to assure that America maintains a
    strategic advantage in your areas of operation.
        Admiral Faller. The disinformation campaign that Russia has
    been on is truly about, in all instances, painting the United
    States in an inaccurate light. One example is reporting that I
    was on the border of Venezuela about to lead an invasion force.
    Another example was they twisted it just enough in an article
    in RT [RT International] to say that I had said something that
    was at odds with the Vice President of the United States, which
    was complete baloney. Their largest by volume, outside of the
    Russian language, effort in social media is in Spanish. You
    have to ask what is the national interest of Russia in that
    disinformation here in our neighborhood and around the world,
    and it is concerning to us.
        We have countered within our means in information
    operations (IO), military information, and support a strong
    relationship with the State Department and alignment in
    messaging, information with some increased authorities in cyber
    to go after them and put the truth out and try to make a dent
    in that space. But more needs to be done clearly, and more
    should be done to take advantage of machine learning and those
    types of skills that the Department has embarked on to really
    get after to thwart their disinformation campaigns.
        Senator Rounds. General Townsend?
        General Townsend. Senator, not unlike SOUTHCOM, we see the
    same kind of disinformation campaigns and not just from Russia
    but from other actors such as Iran. Recently Iran announced
    that I was killed at the engagement at Manda Bay. I am glad to
    hear that is exaggerated.
        There is fairly low-tech warfare in Africa overall, but we
    do see armed UAVs [unmanned autonomous vehicles], unmanned
    vehicles armed, now being provided by multiple actors, China,
    Turkey, et cetera. We also see sophisticated air defense
    systems. We also see technologies that have I think even
    greater impacts like the Chinese smart city technologies where
    they are coming in and, in the interest of public safety and
    security, they are offering to equip African cities with camera
    systems, surveillance systems all over, facial recognition
    technologies. Of course, we know that all of those systems are
    reporting back to China first before they report to the African
    country where they are established. I think that the growth of
    high-tech is a concern certainly in Africa.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        I think part of the challenge we have is sharing that,
    look, the propaganda has never really quit from our
    adversaries. They understand its value. They are very good at
    it. They simply advance to using social media and other means
    in which to really bend things their direction. In doing so,
    they influence individuals who really in many cases share the
    same values that we share in this country.
        The IMET program has been mentioned several times here, and
    I think it is critical that we continue to be able to have
    communications and relationships with what is in many cases
    perhaps one of the most stable parts of any one of these
    nations' governments and that is their military. While their
    civilian leaders come and go, in many cases they have a stable
    force of professionals. The question is, do they find and do
    they understand the way that we do business to be appropriate
    and a better way than what our adversaries offer them?
        I would just like to once again offer each of you the
    opportunity to talk a little bit about IMET at this time in
    which I think some people question whether or not it is a valid
    program and how critical it is and how inexpensive it is for us
    to continue to have that relationship with the militaries from
    the different countries.
        Admiral Faller. The value is in the building of trust. You
    get to know your shipmate, your battle buddy. You share
    experience and doctrine. A recent example. In El Salvador, the
    new president came in, favorable connections to the United
    States, appointed a new chief of defense and minister of
    defense. The minister of defense is a Naval War College grad.
    The chief of defense is an Army War College grad. You can sit
    down around a roundtable and have a serious conversation
    without stilted talking points about the real challenges and
    opportunities and the complexity of making progress. That is
    just one of many examples I could cite, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Townsend. Senator, just like Admiral Faller has
    explained, IMET is invaluable to us. I think it is a long-term
    way to influence a government and a military by training those
    people who grew up to be the chief of defense, and that same
    kind of thing is found in Africa as well.
        I think the United States is their preferred partner for a
    number of reasons, not the least of which is our competence and
    capability but also our values. That is part of that. I think
    that is a strong thing that is imparted through IMET.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Townsend, Admiral Faller, let me begin by adding my
    condolences to those that have been expressed already for the
    servicemembers lost in the month of January. I want to
    particularly call out Captain Ryan Phanouf from Hudson, New
    Hampshire who was an airman lost in Afghanistan earlier this
    week. I know that all of New Hampshire mourns his loss and the
    loss of everyone and sends condolences to all of the families.
    Thank you.
        I want to begin, Admiral Faller, with where we are with
    drug interdiction. When you were here last year, we talked
    about the drug interdiction efforts which are still so
    important to States like New Hampshire where we have a huge
    opioid epidemic still and are seeing heroin now coming into the
    country. Can you talk about what progress has been made and the
    role that the USS Detroit has played in improving interdiction
    efforts?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, as we have discussed, the deaths
    due to the narcotics overdoses, drugs are too many and are a
    national security challenge. Those pathways that they come
    through just as easily are used by terrorists and other illicit
    materials. We cannot do enough to get after that challenge
    right here in our neighborhood and how it erodes communities
    across the country.
        Over the past year, we have focused on building our
    partners to get them more into the game. Fifty percent of our
    interdictions last year were partner-enabled, and nations like
    Colombia have stepped up to lead their own exercises and
    operations, recently an Orion operation where we had many
    metric tons which was lives saved here. Eighteen nations
    participated, Colombian led, and all we did with the United
    States was participate. That is a key effort, and we have got
    to do more there.
        In our own efforts, intelligence sharing is key--human
    intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
    (ISR) from platforms. We need more intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance. Our human efforts were funded, but they
    were funded above our core budget in an unfunded requirement. A
    key area to look at and how do we get more efficient, but also
    apply leverage there.
        Then finally in our platforms, we depend on ships. At the
    end of the day, it has got to be a Coast Guard cutter. Our
    Coast Guard performed brilliantly, supplying more ships than
    they had even promised through the allocation process. Our Navy
    stepped up this year with the USS Detroit. We need more ships.
    We think the number of Navy ships would be about three to
    sustain the presence and pressure. The pressure matters on
    these nations, and that pressure has got to be at the source in
    coca eradication and at the street here in the United States.
    Colombia has made progress at that source site, eradicated
    cocaine with the Colombian chief of defense on the Ecuador
    border. They have made progress, and the result has been that
    deaths are down but still too many. We had almost a record year
    in interdictions but still not enough.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. Well, thank you for those efforts,
    and we hope that we can continue to do more to support them.
        This question is really for both of you. We have now, for
    the last 2\1/2\ years, had the Women, Peace, and Security Act
    in effect. DOD has made significant progress in implementing
    that. We just put $4 million for gender advisors into the 2020
    defense budget.
        Can you talk about the successes that you have seen both in
    SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM because of the effort to better integrate
    women and be able to appeal to those women in Africa, the women
    in Latin America who we need to address if we are going to be
    successful?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. You asked me about
    Women, Peace, and Security at my confirmation hearing 6 months
    ago, and I told you I did not know much about it but I would
    look into it. I was able to actually attend one of these
    forums.
        At AFRICOM, Women, Peace, and Security is integrated into
    every event that we do. We see some advantages here. It is not
    just about promoting the role of women in the armed forces, but
    it has an impact across their societies as well. It is integral
    to everything we do, and we have had a communications
    symposium, which I was fortunate enough to attend. We have a
    female intel officer training program. There is a seminar that
    is about to kick off in a Flintlock exercise that we are about
    to start. Those are just some examples. We try to integrate
    some of that into every event.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller. Similarly we integrate it in every event,
    Senator. Recently Ambassador Manes and I were in Colombia. We
    did a roundtable with some key women warriors from the
    Colombian Army. We had the chief of defense from Colombia,
    their chief of their army, their chief of the air force. In
    that audience of women--there were about 50 of them--were nine
    command sergeant majors. I will tell you what. They were
    getting after it, and it was motivating. Afterwards, the chief
    of the Colombian Army came and said, hey, can you do some more
    of that with us because it really brings out the competitive
    spirit. The reason why? We are better when we are integrated
    and stronger when we are integrated.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much. I think it
    is a very important model for us to show to the rest of the
    world, particularly in developing countries in Africa and Latin
    America.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I would second that. Thank you, Senator Shaheen for those
    words.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We
    truly appreciate your efforts in some challenging regions that
    often are not hitting the headlines of our newspapers every
    day. Thanks to you, thanks for your teams.
        Sergeant Major, good luck to you on retirement. I still
    think Nebraska or Iowa is a great place to go.
        Admiral Faller, thank you for sitting down with me the
    other day. I really do appreciate that. We had a great
    discussion.
        I would like to go a little more into IMET. You have heard
    a number of my colleagues just talking about how important it
    is. We had an Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
    hearing just a while back, and you were able to visit with us
    about the importance of IMET at that particular subcommittee
    meeting. It has been in the press a lot lately. We all
    acknowledge that we can do better in vetting. But strategically
    can you talk to what that means for our partners strategically
    and what it does to assist not only those countries but the
    United States as well?
        Admiral Faller. The United States military education system
    is our strength. Like the education system in our country, our
    training education is sought after and valued, and it builds
    stronger partners that know and trust us, and the relationships
    that go with that last a lifetime.
        Just an example of that comes up time and time again. I
    have a Colombian brigadier general who is a full director of
    our exercise division at headquarters. He is a graduate of
    Leavenworth, Carlisle, the PathFinder School, the Advanced Army
    Armor School, and the Ranger School. He is an honor grad at
    Ranger School. The Colombians value that as do our partner
    nations.
        We can use more IMET. Our budget is about $10 million a
    year for 28 democratic countries. Secretary of Defense Esper
    visited SOUTHCOM last week. A priority of his is to seek more
    money. He is seeking a 50 percent increase in the IMET budget.
    We could spend that 50 percent increase in IMET next year in
    our schoolhouses at the Western Hemisphere Institute for
    security at Fort Benning, game-changer, the Inter-American Air
    Force Academy in Texas. These are schoolhouses that we do not
    think a lot about, in addition to Carlisle and Newport, Maxwell
    with the Air Force and the Marine Corps university. But all
    these schoolhouses work together to make a difference in
    strengthening the hemispheric security.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Yes, General Townsend.
        General Townsend. Senator, I could not say it any better
    than Admiral Faller just did.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. No, I do appreciate that. Of
    course, our State Partnership Programs as well. Iowa is
    partnered with Kosovo, and I know a number of those officers
    that I worked with a decade ago--I have seen them rise through
    the ranks and we continue to stay in close contact. But those
    partnerships are very, very valuable. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller, I want to talk a little bit about the
    integration of missions that we see between SOUTHCOM and
    NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]. Obviously, there has been a
    lot of attention on our southern border and what has continued
    to happen with drug cartels. Whether it is weapons crossing the
    border, whether it is the drugs that Senator Shaheen just
    talked about, all of that is very concerning.
        But what I would like to focus on in just the minute and a
    half that I have left is also the issue of human trafficking.
    Not only do we have illegal drug trade wreaking havoc across
    Iowa, a lot of our rural communities, but Iowa wrestles a lot
    with the serious problem of human trafficking. The Polaris
    Project in 2016 dubbed Des Moines, Iowa as one of the top 100
    human trafficking sites in the United States. That is not
    something we are proud of.
        Could you describe the resourcing and coordination
    challenges that exist when you are trying to address the threat
    between these different areas of responsibility between
    SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM work very closely
    together. General O'Shaughnessy and I traveled to Mexico City.
    We sat down with the head of their army and their navy to talk
    about how do we improve information sharing, how do we get
    after these ungoverned spaces that are spawning instability
    into North America and beyond and South America, Latin America,
    the Caribbean, and how do we help the Mexicans share
    information with Guatemala. It was a very productive meeting.
    We came up with tangible steps to do that.
        Then we went to Guatemala City the next day and had that
    same level of conversation with those nations to try to forge
    more coordination. At the heart of getting after these wicked
    problems that create instability here, including the human
    trafficking, is sharing intelligence, building trust, breaking
    down barriers, understanding and then ensuring that the right
    agency, law enforcement agency, other agencies, have the
    information they need to make an impact. That is a key element
    of what we are doing as we move ahead. Then we take that into
    exercise program which is also a similar element.
        We are adequately resourced to do this, but we are
    carefully looking at how we can become more efficient as we
    move forward.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Well, please let us know if there
    is anything additional that we as Congress can help with.
        Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for your service to
    our country. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
    witnesses.
        I want to add my comments of support for the families of
    Colonel Voss and Captain Phanouf. Colonel Voss, though a Guam
    resident, was based out of Joint Base Langley in Virginia.
    Thinking about his family and all those that you mentioned.
        Admiral Faller, I want to start with you on Venezuela.
    There is an article that was in The Wall Street Journal a
    couple of days ago that I would like to put into the record.
        [The information follows:]
                     How Putin Outfoxed Trump in Venezuela
      the trump administration underestimated how much support president
    nicolas maduro would receive from russia and cuba, as well as from u.s.
                                     allies
    By Jessica Donati, Andrew Restuccia and Ian Talley
    January 27, 2020

        The Trump administration's bid to replace Venezuela's authoritarian
    leader Nicol s Maduro hit a roadblock after a meeting with Russian
    officials in Rome last year--and has never recovered.
        U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams arrived at the Westin Excelsior hotel
    hoping to persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro and to
    recognize Juan Guaido as Venezuela's legitimate leader. Russian deputy
    foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov instead demanded the U.S. back down
    from military threats and lift the economic sanctions intended to force
    Mr. Maduro's hand.
        In the months that followed, the U.S. campaign spiraled into a
    foreign-policy debacle, thwarted by familiar adversaries, Russia and
    Cuba, as well as allies, Turkey and India-all countries that one way or
    another helped Venezuela sidestep U.S. sanctions, according to current
    and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists. The
    European Union watched from the sidelines.
        The Trump administration, confident Mr. Maduro would fall, didn't
    foresee Russia leading the way for other countries to eclipse the
    sanctions. In turn, administration reluctance to impose sanctions on
    Russian enterprises and others kept Venezuela's oil and gold flowing to
    buyers.
        This month, in a sign of how much the opposition is floundering,
    Venezuela security forces blocked Mr. Guaido from entering the National
    Assembly building, where he was seeking re-election as leader. Mr.
    Guaido, in a blue suit, tried and failed to scale the spiked iron
    fence.
        Russia now handles more than two-thirds of Venezuela's crude oil,
    current and former administration officials said, including helping to
    conceal export destinations. The lifeline has helped Mr. Maduro slow
    the economy's free fall, consolidate his grip on power and weaken the
    opposition.
        Almost half of the $1.5 billion in Venezuelan crude exported to
    India in the 9 months after the U.S. sanctions was purchased by an
    Indian joint venture with Russia's oil giant, Rosneft, according to a
    Wall Street Journal analysis of data compiled by trade database Import
    Genius.
        The United Arab Emirates has imported around $1 billion in gold
    from Venezuela since gold sanctions were imposed in late 2018,
    according to Venezuela trade records. U.S. intelligence officials say
    the actual amounts are far higher, based on evidence that Venezuelan
    gold is leaving the country masked as originating from Colombia, Uganda
    and elsewhere. The exports land in Turkey, the U.A.E. and other gold-
    trade hubs.
        The Turkish Embassy in Washington denied any oil or gold trade with
    Venezuela that breached U.S. sanctions. ``The allegations do not
    reflect the facts, and they are only speculative and hearsay,'' a
    spokesman said.
        The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment. It referred
    to past foreign-ministry statements criticizing the U.S. for
    interfering in Venezuela's affairs. Officials from India and the U.A.E.
    didn't respond to requests for comment.
        Administration officials acknowledge President Trump's frustration
    and say the White House continues to press for Mr. Maduro's ouster. Mr.
    Trump, pointing to America's superior economy and military, suggested
    in a recent interview with the Journal that the U.S. had the resources
    to outlast Mr. Maduro. ``We have a lot of options,'' the president
    said.
        Yet with an election, impeachment and attention turned to the
    Middle East, Venezuela has for now moved to a back burner, an
    administration official said.
        The stalemate allows Mr. Maduro to take a star turn as David to
    America's Goliath. He makes speeches and appearances nearly every day
    to show he remains comfortably in charge. He chided Mr. Abrams and
    other U.S. officials, saying they misled Mr. Trump that a regime change
    would be easy.
        ``They're trying to save their jobs because Trump is furious with
    the lies they've fed him on Venezuela,'' Mr. Maduro said in a recent
    address. ``They failed, and Venezuela triumphed.''
        Mr. Maduro's hold on the presidency has been costly for what was
    once Latin America's most-prosperous economy. Hyperinflation, high
    infant mortality rates and a shortage of medical supplies contribute to
    the humanitarian crisis there. Food, electricity and water shortages
    have driven an exodus of 4.5 million people.
        Mr. Abrams, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged this month that the
    yearlong U.S. effort to remove Mr. Maduro hit unexpected obstacles.
    ``We underestimated the importance of the Cuban and Russian support for
    the regime,'' he said. ``The Russian role in the economy, particularly
    the oil economy, is larger and larger.''
        Mr. Guaido, in an interview, sounded a similar note. ``I think we
    did underestimate things,'' he said. He called on countries to help
    block gold exports from Venezuela. ``You have to try to bring pressure
    on those who support the regime,'' he said. ``Sanctions today are the
    only real tool we have.''
        Mr. Guaido's approval rating had fallen by more than 20 points to
    38%, according to Venezuelan pollster Datanalisis. Allegations against
    opposition members, including accepting bribes from Maduro cronies,
    have eroded confidence.
        Despite the setbacks, administration officials said there are no
    plans to abandon Mr. Guaido. Vice President Mike Pence last month
    summoned senior administration officials to a meeting in the White
    House's Situation Room. U.S. officials later hosted a conference with
    opposition leaders to try to reinvigorate them, people familiar with
    the gathering said.
        Mr. Guaido's backers see Russia as their principal obstacle and
    want the U.S., Europe and other allies to take a harder line on
    sanctions loopholes.
        ``Russia in my view has become the most important partner of
    Maduro,'' said Carlos Vecchio, the Venezuela ambassador to the U.S. for
    Mr. Guaido. ``A multilateral approach on sanctions is critical.''
        The EU hasn't introduced oil sanctions or prevented Maduro
    officials from traveling to the eurozone to raise money and support.
        Charles Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela who is now
    president of the nonpartisan think tank World Affairs Council of
    Atlanta, said the Trump administration's predicament showed the
    difficulty of regime change without military force.
        ``And if you use military force,'' he said, ``there are all sorts
    of other problems.''
        The U.S. has warned officials in Russia, Turkey, the U.A.E. and
    India about sanctions violations in private meetings, U.S. officials
    said, but hasn't moved to blacklist companies or individuals suspected
    of breaking the sanctions.
        Policy options have split the administration. Some officials
    believe sanctions on Russia's oil firm Rosneft and other companies
    doing business with intermediaries could close loopholes that have
    allowed Mr. Maduro to survive.
        Others say they could undermine U.S. interests elsewhere, including
    Iran. India agreed to stop importing Iranian crude as part of
    Washington's pressure campaign against Tehran, but it continues to
    import Venezuelan oil. India pays for the deliveries in gasoline, a
    trade that the nation says doesn't violate U.S. sanctions.
        Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hasn't ruled out negotiations with
    Mr. Maduro.
        ``We will continue to tweak our policy to get the strategy just
    right, but we've seen no evidence that Maduro is remotely interested in
    having free and fair elections,'' Mr. Pompeo said recently about direct
    talks. ``As far as our strategy, the tack we'll take, I'm sure that
    will change over time.''
    Long road
        Mr. Guaido, 36 years old, was virtually unknown in Mr. Trump's
    circles before he came to Washington with a delegation in December
    2018. Administration officials and opposition leaders made a plan to
    put Mr. Guaido in charge, and Mr. Pence was given a central role.
        Administration officials targeted Venezuela, in part to punish Cuba
    and win support among Cuban Americans, a potent Republican voting bloc
    in Florida. Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mauricio Claver
    Carone, the National Security Council's head for Latin American
    affairs, had roles in forging Venezuela policy.
        Cuba provides Mr. Maduro with intelligence and security services,
    helping to minimize defections in his government, U.S. officials said.
        When Mr. Guaido declared himself interim president in a widely
    watched oath of office ceremony a year ago, the U.S. swiftly recognized
    him as Venezuela's legitimate leader. Canada, Brazil, Argentina,
    Colombia, Chile, Peru and other South American countries followed. They
    supported Mr. Guaido on the grounds that Mr. Maduro's election to a
    second six-year term was a sham.
        Two days after Mr. Guaido's oath, Mr. Abrams was appointed as the
    top envoy to Venezuela. He was given one job: Remove Nicol s Maduro.
        Mr. Abrams rattled some at the State Department, in part for his
    involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, a covert operation in the mid-
    1980s to sell weapons to Iran and use the proceeds to arm rebels in
    Nicaragua.
        Some career State Department staff feared that any heavy-handed
    U.S. intervention would derail Mr. Guaido's popular support, while
    political appointees questioned Mr. Abrams's support of Mr. Trump.
        In March, Mr. Abrams met with the Russian deputy foreign minister
    in Rome. After Russia refused to back Mr. Guaido, the U.S. envoy
    promised more sanctions and possible military action. After this
    article was published, Mr. Abrams said: ``I and all the others in the
    U.S. party had very low expectations of what could come from the
    meeting.''
        The realization that regime change wouldn't be easy came in April.
    The opposition planned to have Venezuela's top court recognize the
    National Assembly, headed by Mr. Guaido, as the legitimate
    representative of the Venezuelan people. That would give the country's
    armed forces legal grounds to abandon Mr. Maduro.
        Guaido supporters expected high-ranking Maduro officials to
    announce they were switching sides. The plan flopped, and White House
    frustrations erupted.
        In May, secret talks brokered by Norway opened in Barbados between
    Mr. Maduro and the opposition, which called for fair elections. In
    August, Mr. Maduro quit the talks.
        Looking back, the U.S. campaign originated with unrealistic
    expectations, current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan
    opposition activists said.
        ``There was a firm belief, and briefed to the president, that all
    that had to be done was to recognize Guaido, and Maduro would fall,''
    said Fernando Cutz, a former White House National Security Council
    official during the Trump and Obama administrations who was involved in
    U.S.-Venezuela policy.
        The administration's call for the Venezuelan military to defect and
    support Mr. Guaido was wishful thinking, said Michael Shifter,
    president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank:
    ``The last thing the military are going to do is follow orders from a
    foreign power, especially the U.S.''
        Mr. Trump complained to aides and allies that he was led to believe
    Mr. Maduro would be removed quickly, people familiar with the matter
    said.
        The president directed much of his anger at national security
    adviser John Bolton, those people said, adding that those frustrations
    contributed to Mr. Bolton's ouster in September.
    Helping hand
        With Russia's help, Venezuelan oil output could return to 1 million
    barrels a day from a low of 650,000 to 700,000 barrels, Rapidan Energy
    Group, a geopolitical risk consulting firm, said in December. Rosneft
    is helping Petr centsleos de Venezuela SA, the state oil company, pay
    for overdue maintenance and the hiring of foreign experts, according to
    the group.
        Russia has provided Venezuela more than $300 million in currency
    over the past 18 months-dollars and euros that have become more scarce
    under the sanctions, according to the Journal analysis of data from
    Import Genius.
        Mr. Abrams said he still believed sanctions will work. ``The
    situation of the regime is untenable and many people in the regime
    clearly know it,' he said. ``They would not keep sending their money,
    their wives, their children, and their mistresses out of the country if
    they thought it was stabilizing.''
        Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the
    Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said the standoff
    this month at the National Assembly underscored the opposition's
    weakened state.
        ``At the same time,'' she said, ``the [Maduro] government has no
    real options for ending the economic, humanitarian and legitimacy
    crises that it faces.''
        The issue surfaced at a Trump re-election event this month in
    Florida, a battleground state with the largest population of
    Venezuelans in the U.S. Some of Mr. Trump's supporters in Florida have
    voiced frustration that Mr. Maduro remained in power.
        Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, speaking informally to a small
    group at the event, said the administration had expected the leadership
    change to happen faster, and that some officials sought more aggressive
    efforts, according to a person familiar with conversation.
        A spokesman for Mr. Ross declined to comment on the meeting but
    said the administration is looking at all options. ``The U.S. is 100%
    behind Guaido,'' Mr. Ross said Thursday in a TV interview.

    --Jose de Cordoba, Alex Leary, Kejal Vyas and Vivian Salama contributed
    to this article.

        Senator Kaine. The title of it is unnecessarily
    provocative. The title is ``How Putin Outfoxed Trump in
    Venezuela.'' I do not think the title is a fair
    characterization. I think the article, though, is very, very
    good.
        Basically if I were going to title the article, I would
    title it how the United States underestimated the difficulty of
    what we were trying to do in Venezuela. I think the U.S. has
    done a number of good things. I think the Trump administration
    has. I could pick a few faults, but generally done good. But
    the core of the article is how we really underestimated how
    hard it would be.
        I just remember this last year when we were talking about
    it here and in the Foreign Relations Committee, there were sort
    of some real blue skies scenarios that were being painted by
    the administration about how Maduro is about to collapse. I
    went to Colombia and visited in Colombia, then went to the
    border in Cucuta in March, and everything I was hearing from
    the Colombians and everybody down there is this is not easy. It
    is going to be really, really hard. They were exactly right
    about how difficult it was going to be. Here on Capitol Hill we
    were getting blue skies scenarios from the administration about
    the imminent collapse of the Maduro Government. We just got it
    wrong. On the intel side, we just got it wrong.
        One of the things that is galling in the article is one of
    the reasons it is so hard is not just our adversaries.
    Venezuela is propped up by Iran and Cuba and China and Russia.
    The UAE [United Arab Emirates], Turkey, India, allies of ours
    have helped them evade United States sanctions and have helped
    prop them up, and they are one of the reasons why the Maduro
    Government has had some lasting power.
        I guess I just want to caution all of us on matters like
    this. These are tough situations, and we can do everything
    right and still find it very hard to accomplish what we want.
    That is not our fault. But we need to be very wary of blue
    skies scenarios and being told we will support this person and
    things are likely to work out our way. We are in for the long
    haul in these situations.
        I will tell, Admiral Faller, I would love to talk to you
    further. We have done European Reassurance Initiatives and
    Asian Reassurance Initiatives. It might be time to do an
    Americas Reassurance Initiative. I do not really like the title
    because ``reassurance'' already sounds defensive like no, no,
    no, we are really interested in you. I do not know that we have
    to be defensive about it. But we need to have a comprehensive,
    whole-of-government diplomacy and military and economic trade
    focus on the Americas because while we are focusing elsewhere,
    I know where our adversaries are focused. They are focusing on
    our own back yard.
        General Townsend, I want to ask you a question. There was a
    recent study of some challenges within the special operations
    community, and while it was special operations focused, a
    number of the areas of the study dealt with items in AFRICOM.
    There is a comprehensive review that SOCOM [U.S. Special
    Operations Command] put out last week looking at a variety of
    cultural and ethical challenges in the special operations
    forces, including some that led to scandals. Many took place in
    AFRICOM.
        One of the themes was extremely high operational tempos
    caused problems. Here was the finding, ``a trend of
    disaggregation at the individual and small team levels risks
    employing forces where operational requirements misalign with
    the four gen validation standards.'' I have been on the
    committee for 7 years. I think what that means is we had forces
    deployed in teams and sizes that lacked the oversight or the
    ability to do the missions they were assigned.
        Now, I think the recommendations are largely for SOCOM, but
    because SOCOM operates within combatant commands, what
    responsibility do you think the COCOMs have in making sure that
    the forces provided to you are appropriately resourced and led?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
        I am familiar with the study, and I am familiar with the
    conclusions of it. I agree with what that study talks about. As
    you are aware, most of the forces operating on the African
    continent these days are special operating forces (SOF), not
    exclusively but a lot of them.
        This phenomenon you mentioned correctly does not just apply
    to special operating forces. Over the course of this war, we
    have disaggregated formations time and time again and separated
    small teams from their higher echelons of command and
    leadership.
        Senator Kaine. Some of the recommendations here or findings
    are a little bit like the study about the McCain and Fitzgerald
    instances in the Pacific. I mean, there are some similar
    challenges about high OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] and other
    things leading to the problems.
        General Townsend. Right. So I think at the COCOM level, we
    absolutely need to do whatever we can to keep teams together
    and not disaggregate them. I am a firm believer in this. I have
    been in a command that has had my team disaggregated and
    scattered all over. So I am believer in keeping team integrity
    in every task that we can.
        Also, part of our blank slate review process that we are
    undergoing with the Department of Defense is to look at how we
    can reduce the operational tempo, particularly of SOF forces,
    but all forces, reduce their operational tempo so it is not
    just about trying to redirect resources but it is to return
    some resources to home station. The SOF operational tempo is
    still stretched. Even though it is now reaching a dwell of
    about 1 year deployed for 2 years at home, the goal is 1 to 3,
    and there is still some work to be done there.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
        Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator McSally?
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Townsend, I represent Arizona, and on January 5
    Dustin Harrison from Tucson was killed by al Shabaab terrorists
    at Manda Bay in Kenya. His wife Hope and his 2-year-old
    daughter Heaven are back home in Tucson grieving the loss of
    her husband and father.
        Now, I was a part of the team to stand up AFRICOM as my
    last assignment in the military, one of the more challenging
    assignments I had. So I am aware of the challenges you have on
    the continent.
        But some articles about the situation there was that it was
    a woefully undefended perimeter or surprisingly sparse
    security, given the level of assets, air assets and others,
    that you have there.
        I know an investigation is ongoing, and I do not want to
    put any more of our service men and women into harm's way. But
    what can you share about what is happening today to make sure
    an attack like that is not happening or the risk is not going
    to happen now and in the future? What can I share with Heaven
    and Hope to make sure that others are not going to be in a
    similar risk?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, I also offer our
    condolences. Those family members are in our thoughts and
    prayers for our fallen comrades.
        Also, thank you for pointing out there is an investigation
    going on, so I do not want to get in front of that. You know,
    you have worn a uniform so you know that frequently what we
    think we know at the start of an event is not what actually we
    discover after we have thoroughly investigated it.
        But there are some early conclusions, and I think it is
    self-obvious we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we
    needed to be. Al Shabaab managed to penetrate onto that
    airfield. A lot of people do not know but the base where our
    troops live is not where the airfield is. But they were able to
    get access to that airfield, kill three Americans, and destroy
    six aircraft there. So we were not as prepared, and we are
    digging into that to find out why that is the case.
        But since that event, there are about 120 infantrymen there
    on the ground now who are securing that place, and they have
    been working hard since January 6 to put in the appropriate
    level of defenses. I am confident that by the time they are
    done, Manda Bay will be much more properly defended.
        We are not just stopping there, though. We are looking
    across the continent because I think that we viewed, and the
    Kenyans viewed, Manda Bay as a safe area. The Kenyans have
    family housing there for their military. It is a resort area.
    So al Shabaab has shown their reach and the danger that they
    pose, and I think we need to take that seriously, and so I am
    looking with a clear eye at every location in Africa now.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I was at J-33 in that assignment running our
    counterterrorism operations. One of the challenges we had at
    the time--this was back in 2007 to 2010--we saw al Shabaab
    growing. We saw the training camps. We were watching hundreds,
    thousands of fighters being trained. At the time, they were a
    lawful legitimate target, but the Obama administration felt
    like they were not a real problem or risk. So we could not take
    them out.
        Last year, I think there were 67 strikes conducted in
    Somalia. Can you share what the impact of those strikes are,
    and is it whack-a-mole or what is the strategy here going
    forward in order to address this growing terrorist threat in
    East Africa?
        General Townsend. There is an international effort there
    that supports the Somali Government.
        Senator McSally. I know. We have been talking about that
    for a very long time.
        General Townsend. Yes, and the Somali national army, and so
    our role is in support of that. The two major tasks that we are
    doing is helping to train a specific part of the Somali
    national army, the Danab or special light infantry units, and
    we are also doing our counterterrorism strikes. They are meant
    to help the international effort and the Somali effort, but
    they are also meant to protect America.
        I do not believe that it is whack-a-mole. What we do is we
    keep an eye on al Shabaab every day, and we are looking for
    ways to reduce their capacity wherever we can. That effort to
    disrupt and degrade al Shabaab and their leadership and their
    mid-level leadership and higher-level leadership is a critical
    part of what we are doing.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
        Admiral Faller, I am out of time, but I will submit some
    questions for the record specifically about the drug flow
    coming up from your AOR to our country through my State,
    Arizona, and the latest tactics that the cartels are using and
    how we are countering them. But I will have to submit those for
    the record. Thanks.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to talk in a few minutes about China and Russia and
    their activities both in Latin America and in Africa.
        But, Admiral Faller, since we have been sitting here, eight
    Americans have died of drug overdoses in the last hour, 67,000
    people a year, one person a day in Maine.
        What is going on with China and Russia are threats. They
    are indirect threats. They are important. But we are talking
    about Americans dying, and you and I have talked about this in
    the past. I have heard from you and from other national
    security officials that we are picking up--we are interdicting
    about 25 percent of the drug shipments through the ocean to
    North America that we know of. Twenty-five percent of what we
    know of. To me, we are talking about allocating resources
    around the world for all kinds of threats. This is a direct
    threat killing Americans that we do not have enough ships. I do
    not get it. When do we get to interdicting the ships that we
    know are carrying drugs into this country to kill our people?
        Admiral Faller. It is a national security crisis.
        Senator King. Absolutely.
        Admiral Faller. It is actually worse statistics than you
    mentioned. We detect 25 percent. We are only interdicting 9
    percent. To interdict, we need greater partner capacity, as I
    mentioned in the answer to Senator Shaheen. We also need
    assets. At the end of the day, you have got to be on the field
    to compete. When the playing field is twice the size----
        Senator King. Well, who do we need to talk to to get those
    assets? The Secretary of Defense, the President, the Vice
    President, who? Where do we go? It is infuriating that we know
    what is coming. We know it out there, and the phrase I got was
    we have far more targets than we can action. That is a
    euphemism for we are woefully falling down on this
    responsibility.
        Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard stepped up in a big way.
    Our U.S. Navy used to have readiness challenges that has them
    stretched globally, and that has impacted their force
    allocation to us.
        Senator King. Is it people or ships? Do we just need more
    ships?
        Admiral Faller. It is not just ships, Senator. We need the
    intelligence, so we need the intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance assets (ISR). We have about 20 percent of what
    our need is there, and then that then turns into the ability to
    interdict. We also need our steady funding and our security
    cooperation so we can help our partner nations help themselves.
    So it is pulling this together in a full court press beyond
    ships that we can work together with partners and in our
    interagency and get the ``W'' back in front of whole-of-
    government, Senator.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, and I know that you are
    working on this, but I just hope you will keep pressing. If you
    have to say there is this really obnoxious Senator that is on
    my back and I have got to do something, that is fine. I can
    fulfill that responsibility quite adequately.
        Let us talk about China for a minute. By the way, these
    charts from both of you are very helpful. It really graphically
    indicates what is going on.
        It seems to me China is following sort of a two-track
    strategy in both Africa and South America. One is what I call
    debt imperialism. They are getting these small countries in
    debt to them, and then they have got their hooks into them.
    General, is that part of what you are seeing happening in
    Africa?
        General Townsend. That is exactly what we are seeing. We
    are also seeing a new, more sophisticated development in that.
    So the debt trap diplomacy has now become known on the
    continent. Most African leaders are wise to it. Actually I
    would commend our State Department for helping get African
    leaders more savvy about what the Chinese are doing with some
    of these debt trap loans. The Chinese are adapting, though, and
    evolving their presentation, and they are becoming more
    sophisticated about it. So I am a little bit worried because
    they are getting smarter about it.
        Senator King. Well, that is a concern. But the other thing
    is sort of more direct. I think, Admiral Faller, you used the
    word positional advantage. Just looking at your chart, Jamaica,
    El Salvador, Ecuador, Chile, Belize ports. Ports. I mean, that
    is a strategic advantage. Whatever happened to the Monroe
    Doctrine? We are allowing an adversary--I will not say an enemy
    but an adversary--to establish significant positional advantage
    within our hemisphere. Admiral?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, it is not just the ports. It is IT
    infrastructure. It is space stations. It is cyber. It is safe
    cities, as General Townsend mentioned. China has figured out
    that the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean are cash
    strapped, so instead of trying to do arms sales, they are
    coming in with significant gifts. I could cite $17 million in
    one country in South America, $20 million in a Caribbean
    nation. These are 1-year gifts of trucks and boats and IT
    infrastructure, well beyond uniforms and PME [professional
    military education]. That is alarming to me as they build not
    just debt but dependency, and we are trying to build trust and
    teams.
        Senator King. Maybe our motto should be beware of Chinese
    bearing gifts and telecommunications equipment.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your
    testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank both of you, both for your service and you being here
    today.
        I am going to ask each of you to elaborate on the topic
    that Admiral Faller just brought up in response to Senator
    King's first question because each of you and/or your
    predecessors have commented of the challenge, given the mass
    geography that you are responsible for, each of you, the
    challenges in ISR, Admiral, that you just raised. Are you
    getting the assets that you have asked for? Are you getting the
    assets you need? If not, why not, if you know?
        Then to putting a finer point perhaps or an additional
    point on that broader discussion that I want you to have with
    me. On December 20, with the signing of the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA), of course, we began the process of
    standing up the sixth military branch in Space Force. Whether
    in ISR or whatever, but Space Force seems to me to fit right
    into this. What I am wondering about is--I know it is early,
    but time is short--have you been invited into the discussion or
    inserted yourself into the discussion of how to best man,
    train, and equip a Space Force to assist you? Maybe you can
    elaborate a little bit on your partner countries and what role,
    if any, they could play. I would ask, Admiral, to go first and
    then General Townsend.
        Admiral Faller. Intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance is a key part of our intelligence picture, and
    there is a global demand and we are short in this hemisphere. I
    mentioned we were meeting 20 percent of our goal. A good chunk
    of that 20 percent is using the Department of Homeland Security
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assets. So it is a team
    effort. The DOD portion of that is probably closer to about 8
    percent, and so it is key. We recognize the global challenges,
    and we do the best we can with what we have. I think there are
    some advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence
    that we can use and should pursue, and we are going to work
    that.
        With respect to Space Force, we have excellent coordination
    with General Raymond and his team. It is a key interest like
    cyber in every nation that we deal with. Fundamental to this is
    information sharing into the space realm and space agreements
    that we are working with nations like Brazil, Chile, and other
    countries that will help counter China's efforts in that realm
    and continue to ensure that we have positional advantage. We
    cannot work fast enough in that arena, Senator, but we are
    working on it as hard as we can.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you.
        General Townsend. Senator, on your question about
    resources, I would say that my command, with one exception, is
    pretty adequately resourced for the tasks we are given to do
    today. As small as those resources are, I think it is adequate
    with the exception of ISR that you mentioned, and I know that
    every combatant commander that sits here in front of you will
    say the exact same thing. Admiral Faller briefed his level of
    resourcing. We are at about 25 percent of our known validated
    requirement for ISR.
        You mentioned the Space Force. Interestingly enough, I just
    met with General Raymond yesterday. We were discussing about
    the development of his new force, and we are in constant
    contact with Space Force and Space Command. They have recently
    deployed some folks to our headquarters to assist us with
    space.
        Everything we do, of course, on the continent has ties to
    space, and not only on our side but on our adversaries' side as
    well. I recently got a briefing, and the Chinese have somewhere
    between 13 and 16 space facilities on the African continent and
    the Russians have 5 or 6. So they are also investing heavily in
    space infrastructure on the African continent.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you both, and with that, I yield my
    time.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your ongoing service as well.
        You both highlighted in your written testimony the National
    Guard State Partnership Program and how that works to ensure
    bonds both at junior levels and senior levels with militaries
    in your region. In the last 4 years, the Michigan National
    Guard has completed 19 events with Liberia, one of their State
    Partnership counterparts, and they have also planned another 20
    events coming up in this next fiscal year.
        I had the opportunity to see some of that firsthand in 2017
    when I was in Liberia, and I know that the partnership
    certainly helps build relationships in West Africa as well as
    other places around the world.
        So my question to both of you is, how are you leveraging
    State Partnership Programs in your area of responsibility? When
    I look at the amount of money we are spending, roughly $3
    million in each of your areas, maybe you can give us a sense of
    what you are doing. Is that adequate resourcing? If not, what
    would be adequate and what would you do with it? General
    Townsend?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
        The State Partnership Program is a fantastic resource for
    us, and I did not have a good appreciation for it until I took
    this job. One of the first conferences I went to, all of the--
    at the time--14 partnerships were present with their National
    Guard partners from the United States. It is very responsive.
    It is very flexible. What I like about it is the States and the
    countries do a lot of things sort of below the radar, and it is
    a constant kind of presence.
        We now have 15 partnerships in Africa. We have just added
    Rwanda and Nebraska. That is the new one, and the next one in
    the queue we are working up towards is Ethiopia. These
    countries want these partnerships. They talk to their
    counterparts on the continent that have them, and they realize
    the value of it. I cannot say enough good about the State
    Partnership Program.
        Senator Peters. Are they resourced enough?
        General Townsend. You mentioned we have $2.9 million, about
    $3 million that you mentioned. I think they are probably
    adequate right now. What I have not done is I have not done an
    analysis to see if we add Ethiopia, do we get more money, or is
    that another mouth to feed from the same $2.9 million. I have
    to look into that. I do not know the answer to that, and I will
    get back to you on that.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Townsend. We anticipate receiving additional resources from
    the National Guard Bureau (NGB), but understand current appropriation
    for State Partnership Program (SPP) is relatively flat. In fiscal year
    2019 AFRICOM received about $2.9 million in SPP funding which allowed
    us to support 196 engagements of 250 planned. I support appropriating
    more resources to the NGB (title 10, USC section 341) to fund the
    valuable return on investment we receive through SPP.

        Admiral Faller?
        Admiral Faller. Similar extremely positive experience. It
    is a habitual relationship that aligns itself very well, and
    the year and after year builds friendships. The training that
    is provided, the equipment. Most of our exercise support for
    our major exercises comes from State Partnerships, and that is
    something that we depend on as our force provider. So it is a
    game-changer for us. We added Brazil and New York this year,
    and it was a big deal for the Brazilians and the New York
    National Guard.
        In terms of the funding levels, we are seeking to get guard
    partner reps established in every embassy as part of our
    embassy country teams. We are working through the funding with
    respect to that. We think there is an opportunity for some
    additional State partners within our headquarters to augment
    our force and to increase the understanding of how we can
    leverage partner expertise. Cyber is a particular area where
    some States are excellent in cyber. How do we better leverage
    that? I have to get back to you on a level of funding and I
    will take that for the record.
        But the authorities piece is also an area too. So we can
    use the flexible authorities.
        One quick story. Recently in Colombia and we have Oklahoma.
    It is not a State partner of Colombia, but the Oklahoma Guard
    has surged ISR support for 6 months to help augment Colombia in
    getting after FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]
    dissidents, the ELN [National Liberation Army], and
    narcotraffickers. Some tremendous successes with their MC-12's
    with just 30 guardsmen and one contractor support. Lost cost,
    high payoff.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        I have a very limited time. So it will be just a quick
    answer from each of you.
        We understand that climate change will have a significant
    impact on security issues across the planet. The Army War
    College just recently put out a report suggesting the
    challenges of climate change. In the brief time we have left,
    is there one specific concern related to climate change in your
    area that you think we should be focusing on. General, do you
    want to start?
        General Townsend. Yes. I think probably the desertification
    that we see expanding south from the Sahara into the Sahel and
    water management I think. Water is going to be huge point of
    friction on the African continent in the future.
        Admiral Faller. Recently in Central America--and we look at
    the impact on changes in weather to the coffee and the white
    corn and things like that. So we are really focused on how do
    we work with whole-of-government to support that stability
    necessary so people can stay home and find jobs.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        I was struck by some of your comments. I think even Senator
    King's comments led me to kind of aggregate. You accomplish so
    much with few people and few dollars. Admiral Faller, you said
    we do the best we can with what we have. I have heard
    ``adequate'' used several times and ``probably adequate'' used
    one time.
        So when we have this discussion about why are you not doing
    more, I always wonder whether or not you all should just put a
    mirror down there and say because you are not giving us the
    resources to say ``more than adequate,'' thinking
    strategically, doing more, anticipating threats.
        To a large extent, the graphics were great, but what we are
    trying to do is catch up with a pace in China and against China
    and in Africa and South America where it looks like we are
    losing. The gap is narrowing and some points we are trying to
    catch up. Is that an adequate statement?
        Admiral Faller. We see our competitive advantage narrowing
    in this hemisphere, and we have got to maintain that
    competitive advantage and across all the elements of national
    power focused in the military. So what does it take to do that?
    Certainly more efficient use of resources we have, leveraging
    other things. I mentioned artificial intelligence a couple
    times. But at the end of the day, any athletic competition I
    have ever been in or anything I have ever done takes a person
    to compete. So zero in any math equation is either zero or
    unsolvable. We have to be present to make a difference.
        Senator Tillis. General Townsend?
        General Townsend. Senator, I think that our competitive
    advantage is not eroding. In some cases, they have an
    advantage. There are some areas we are just not going to out-
    compete China in. One example is spending money in large
    amounts on the African continent to build infrastructure. We
    are not going to build bridges and dams and railroads and
    stadiums and palaces like they are doing. So we have to rely on
    our strengths, and I think our interagency and our military
    have a lot of those strengths. So I think that we also do not
    have to compete everywhere in Africa. We have to pick and
    choose where we are going to out-compete.
        Senator Tillis. If I have time, I am going to ask a little
    bit about that.
        We all have to take a look at what is happening around the
    globe. When all of a sudden we see the threat of Iran in the
    Middle East, we have to redeploy assets there. It has got to
    come from somewhere.
        ISR is something that is desperately needed across the
    board. I have had several discussions with your predecessors,
    Admiral, and they say the thing that is most frustrating to
    them is they have enough intelligence to know there is a lot of
    stuff moving across the border killing American citizens and
    there is not a damn thing they can do about it. You just do not
    have the resources on the water, on the ground to do it.
        I really do believe if you take a look at the number of
    people who are dying from narcoterrorism, it is remarkable to
    me, the hundreds of people who die every day in this country.
    If that was a terrorist organization doing that anywhere in the
    world, we would stand up a capability and rain down hell on
    them. But it is happening every single day.
        I want to ask you a question because I will run out of
    time. As you are looking north of your area of responsibility
    and then to the southern border of Mexico, how much better are
    we getting at securing that border so you are limiting the
    pathways that these drugs, guns, and victims of human
    trafficking? Are we starting to tighten and make any progress
    there within your area of responsibility? Any comments you can
    give on Mexico's contribution will be appreciated.
        Admiral Faller. We certainly look at the security as a
    required zone defense. So border security is almost like a goal
    line stand. You need your linebackers and your halfbacks as you
    move down. I think the pressure has worked. We have seen some
    positive indication.
        But clearly, given the migrant caravans that have recently
    come up, the connection between those caravans and
    transnational criminal organizations and narcotrafficking and
    the political instability. More needs to be done, and it has
    got to be those nations stepping up. The partners have to step
    up and our whole-of-government efforts sustained in a way. To
    get after sustainable security, it takes time to get some of
    these efforts up. We saw Ambassador Jean E. Manes make progress
    in El Salvador, but it was sustained, whole-of-government
    efforts.
        Senator Tillis. Finally, General Townsend, you wake up in
    the morning. What are the top three things that worry you most
    about your job?
        General Townsend. I think the first one is another event
    like a Manda Bay, an attack where we are just not looking for
    it.
        Then I think what al Shabaab might do next that we are not
    tracking on out of East Africa.
        Then just making sure I can do right by the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines of AFRICOM.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all especially for your service, but thanks for
    being here to bring us up to speed.
        Admiral Faller, I want to talk about Guantanamo just a
    little bit because we talked about the efficiencies and the
    things that you are trying to do there to get more
    accountability. My goodness, when it is costing $13 million per
    inmate--$13 million--what type of efficiencies do you think you
    can do to cut into that? How can we better operate? Do you not
    think it is time we look at repositioning these prisoners that
    would be more cost effective to the American taxpayers? West
    Virginians could do a lot with that $13 million. I can assure
    you on that one. So any thoughts you might have on Guantanamo,
    what direction we should go, policy for the long term, and then
    short-term efficiencies?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, the safe, humane, legal treatment
    of those detainees is a top mission of ours. We have a
    significant guard force aligned to that mission set, some
    1,800. As part of this combatant command zero slate review, we
    are going to take a hard look at if there is a better way, a
    more efficient way to conduct that mission set. That review is
    ongoing. I will report out to the Secretary of Defense soon.
        Senator Manchin. Let me just ask this question, and I am
    sorry to interrupt you, sir.
        Have you all looked to see if we are capable and able? I
    understand we have quite a few detainees in the United States
    prisons in some of our hardened facilities that would be more
    effective and efficient. The geopolitical ramifications of this
    thing--we just got to get more cost effective here and do the
    common sense thing. I cannot explain this back home.
        Admiral Faller. As we look at our review, we are looking at
    different models on what we can learn from. As to whether we
    would move that detention facility, that is a policy decision--
    --
        Senator Manchin. I understand. I understand that.
        Admiral Faller. I just want to note, Senator, that we
    remind our team every day that the USS Cole, 9/11, and I know
    we are all deeply committed to ensuring that we do right by
    that. The United States needs the capability to deal with----
        Senator Manchin. How many new prisoners have you brought
    into Guantanamo this last year? How many new prisoners have you
    brought to Guantanamo?
        Admiral Faller. Sir, we have currently 40 and that number
    has remained steady.
        Senator Manchin. So we have not put any more there.
        Admiral Faller. We are not increasing it.
        Senator Manchin. We are not increasing at all. Where are we
    putting them, our combatants? When we capture these combatants,
    where do we put them?
        Admiral Faller. The detainees that are being taken off the
    battlefield in other areas are being dealt with by separate
    different----
        Senator Manchin. It is not $13 million a person you do not
    think. Do you?
        Admiral Faller. I do not know the cost in other areas, sir.
        Senator Manchin. I am sorry, sir, on that.
        General Townsend, if I can go to you. Just give me a
    comparison of basically of where we are. Troop-wise I think we
    are up to 80,000 in the Middle East. Deployment--we are up to
    80,000.
        General Townsend. I do not know the exact number.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. In AFRICOM, where are you in
    AFRICOM?
        General Townsend. Today on the continent we have about
    5,100 U.S. servicemembers and about 1,000 DOD civilians and
    contractors.
        Senator Manchin. We can say it is quite disproportionate.
    Right? There is a difference. Extreme organizations, Boko
    Haram, al Shabaab, al Qaeda, and many more. Basically the
    amount of manpower you have dealing with the influence of China
    now, you have got your hands full there and it looks like we
    are spread pretty darned thin not being able to stop this in
    Africa with what we see coming because it is not getting any
    less intense there and less violent and less threat to the
    United States of America, but most of everything we have is
    going towards the Middle East and also on fighting the drugs
    that are coming to this country, money going for different
    things besides the front line of defense so far as stopping the
    drugs coming into our country. Are you being hampered by the
    amount of resources you are able to call on?
        General Townsend. Senator, as I mentioned previously, I
    think that the tasks we are given today--we are adequately
    resourced with the exception of ISR. I think that the defense-
    wide review that all of the combatant commands are
    participating----
        Senator Manchin. So in order to do the mission, you think
    at 5,100-plus you are in good shape.
        General Townsend. To do the tasks that we are assigned
    today. That is right, and I think the defense-wide review will
    potentially decrease the tasks that we have to do.
        Senator Manchin. You think the tasks will change? It is
    very mobile what is happening----
        General Townsend. The tasks we are assigned will change.
        Senator Manchin. Yes, and by that, it could change as far
    as the demand on resources. Right? Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your career and for your willingness to
    hang in there and take up these responsibilities.
        As I see it, the world right now has four naval pinch
    points. You guys own two of them, the Suez Canal and Panama
    Canal. The Malaccan Strait I would argue is one and now the
    South China Sea.
        Let us talk about the Suez for just a minute. If you look
    at what Russia has done in Syria with Latakia and Tortus and
    now what they are talking about in Berbera down near Djibouti
    where we have a base and now the Chinese have a base there, it
    is pretty obvious that Russia is increasing their operational
    tempo in Africa.
        General, tell me a little bit because one of the things I
    worry about most--I have been listening to this stuff for a
    while here, and the thing that I see beginning to develop is
    the opportunity that Russia and China join together in an area
    where we are under-deployed and it creates a real strategic
    challenge for us. Russia and China are members of the Shanghai
    Cooperative Organization, along with India and Pakistan, four
    nuclear powers. But Africa is one of the few places where I can
    see, other than the Arctic, that they have the potential to
    really come together and create a real headache for us.
        Would you share what Russia is doing in your AOR and how we
    should be thinking about it as we look toward the NDAA this
    next year?
        General Townsend. Yes, Senator.
        So we provided some handouts there----
        Senator Perdue. They are very helpful.
        General Townsend.--to kind of lay out graphically what
    Russia is doing, and you can see it is quite a bit.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. Dramatically increased would you
    not say over the last 3 years?
        General Townsend. They have.
        I think Russia's goals are predominantly for their benefit
    for resource extraction. They also want to position
    particularly in northern Africa, particularly in Libya. They
    want a position on NATO's southern flank there. They also I
    think want to thwart what we are trying to do and present
    themselves as a great power alternative to the United States.
        What I see them doing with China, though, we are not really
    seeing a great level of cooperation with one recent exception.
    There was an exercise a couple of months ago in South Africa
    called Exercise Mosi where the South Africans, the Russians,
    and Chinese navies conducted an exercise on the very southern
    tip of the continent. That is the first visible sign of
    cooperation that we have seen. We are not seeing that in a
    great measure, but they are all over the continent and they are
    doing mostly resource extraction.
        Senator Perdue. One of the things we do not talk about
    here--and it is a follow-up real quick, and I need to get to
    Admiral Faller about South America with a couple of questions.
    But what are our NATO allies doing in Africa to help us stand
    up to the requirements that we are trying to fulfill in your
    AOR?
        General Townsend. Senator, as you are aware, NATO itself is
    not greatly active, but----
        Senator Perdue. I should have said the members of NATO.
        General Townsend. Members of NATO are very involved. In
    fact, in West Africa, we are a tertiary supporter of the
    French, buttressed by several other European countries there.
    In East Africa in Somalia, it is the European Union that is
    keeping the AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] forces in
    the field by paying for their sustainment in the field. So the
    European partners are doing quite a bit. I believe there is
    room for them to do more, and I think our government has
    recently called on the Europeans to do more. So has France by
    the way.
        Senator Perdue. I am really concerned. Your charts are
    great. $145 billion already invested in Africa and a plan to
    get to $250 billion in South America within the next 5 years by
    China alone. I think these numbers are correct. We put in $8
    billion of aid into something called Power Africa, and I am
    making a point with this. We attracted something like $46
    billion of foreign direct investment to back that up. So we
    have employed over $50 billion with only $8 billion of our seed
    money in there. Leverage is a big part of this with our allies,
    and we have got to continue to do that, and you guys are right
    in the middle of that.
        Admiral, with regard to South America, 56 ports they have
    already invested in. I am worried about two things right now
    directly. In Argentina, the Georgia National Guard is a partner
    down there, and you in our meeting yesterday talked about this
    a little bit. But tell us a little bit about China's PLA
    [People's Liberation Army] managing that space station in
    Argentina, and then secondarily, what does the up-tempo mean in
    the Panama Canal Zone that China has really undertaken just in
    the last--since you have taken over in that AOR?
        Admiral Faller. As you state, beyond economic, China seeks
    to take their soft aims and turn them into hard power targets,
    and it is in space. It is in cyber. It is in port access. It is
    in access--generally, they signed into the previous Panama
    administration some 40 agreements for access, influence,
    including IT in Panama. Fortunately for us, the current team in
    Panama, the administration there, has changed policy and has
    recognized the threat that that could have on their
    sovereignty.
        We look up into the Caribbean. In one Caribbean nation,
    China has built a road across the country, 1,200 acres of
    access granted for Chinese use. The equipment was brought in
    under dubious circumstances. They parked it right next to the
    embassy so we could be reminded of that, and now they get to
    collect the tolls for 50 years on that road.
        Those are just three quick examples of what we see with
    Chinese influence.
        I pivot and look into Venezuela where China, Russia, Cuba
    working alongside each other to block the forces and voices of
    democracy particularly in cyber.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here. I apologize
    for being late. Demands on our time these days are a little bit
    overwhelming.
        General Townsend, first let me just say that I join my
    colleagues in sending condolences to you and the families of
    those killed and injured in the attack on Manda Bay. I
    especially want to point out and send our condolences to the
    family of Army Specialist Mitch Mayfield who was a valued
    soldier in the 1st battalion of the 58th Aviation Regiment out
    of Fort Rucker, Alabama. It is an amazing group down there, and
    he was certainly part of that amazing group.
        Admiral, I want to go back to something that I think you
    may have touched on briefly with Senator Shaheen concerning the
    USS Detroit and the littoral combat ships (LCSs) that are being
    used around. That ship was not made in Alabama, but we have a
    lot of the LCSs made down at Austal down in Mobile that are
    employed around the world. I would like, if you could, tell me
    a little bit more about how the LCS has been helpful in the
    operations in your area. Is it possible to use or would you
    want additional LCSs or other vessels like the EPF
    [Expeditionary Fast Transport] to help in your area of
    expertise?
        Admiral Faller. So our counternarcotics mission demands
    platforms for end game work and with law enforcement to take
    both the detainees we gain intel from and the drugs off the
    streets here in the United States Detroit has had success in
    that endeavor. They have an unmanned aerial vehicle Fire Scout
    embarked along with a helicopter. That is a great force
    package.
        We have also used the Detroit in a freedom of navigation
    operation off the coast of Venezuela in waters that Venezuela
    claims that international law does not recognize. Detroit did a
    magnificent job sailing close to the coast of Venezuela and
    providing that intelligence and reporting back to us.
        So the ships are multi-mission. The ships are capable.
    Unfortunately, we had a rocky start. I think the kinks are
    being worked out. The Detroit's performance since November has
    been above standards in all manners of reliability, and we
    welcome the deployment of the next littoral combat ship to the
    region. We could use more of these ships. They are well suited
    for the kind of missions in this hemisphere.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much.
        As a former U.S. attorney, I am acutely aware of the drug
    problem that we have in this country and the importation of
    drugs, and I would like to do all we can. I have been concerned
    about the administration's diverting of some resources to what
    I think would be more appropriate for interdiction. But that is
    for another case, another discussion.
        I believe Senator Kaine mentioned an American reassurance
    initiative, and I want to give you a chance to talk about that
    a little bit more, Admiral. There has been discussion for years
    about developing a western hemisphere security initiative, but
    so far we have just not been able to get it down.
        Can you tell us what the status of those conversations is
    and what impact that may or may not have on the future in your
    area?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, proximity matters, and this is our
    neighborhood. When you can fly to Central America shorter
    flights than Washington, DC from Miami, it is telling of how
    closely connected we are, and there have been doctrines over
    the years. We had the Good Neighbor Policy for FDR [Franklin D.
    Roosevelt]. We have had the Monroe Doctrine. I think there has
    been discussion by others, the think tanks, and Senator Kaine
    has mentioned it. I think there might be a big idea for this
    hemisphere where we pull together the whole-of-government
    efforts necessary to recognize that these interior lines, in
    military speak, this neighborhood matters. China and Russia
    certainly recognize that.
        To the extent that it takes resources, some of that
    resources is just our time and attention, and a little goes a
    long way. If it was a stock, it would have a great P/E [price-
    earnings] ratio and you would want to invest in it for the
    future, and the investments we have made are sound. I think we
    need to stay the course and look to where we can smartly
    increase and focus those investments. A big idea associated
    with something like, as you mentioned, a western hemisphere
    initiative might be a great way to start.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you, sir.
        Now, I would like to encourage you to stay in touch with my
    office about it. We are right there in Alabama, right there on
    the Gulf of Mexico. So it is closer to us than a lot of folks.
    My office is more than willing to help initiate those
    discussions or help develop those. So stay in touch and let us
    know.
        So thank you very much to both of you for your service and
    for being here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, General, thank you for your service. Thank you for
    being here today.
        Admiral, let me start with you. My State of Missouri has
    been deeply affected by the drugs coming into this country from
    Latin America. Your testimony has provided examples of certain
    Latin American countries who are stepping up their effort on
    the counternarcotics front.
        I am interested in who is maybe not pulling their weight.
    Can you give us some examples of places where countries could
    be doing more but are not doing so, have refused to do so,
    whether that is the result of corruption or other reasons?
        Admiral Faller. These transnational criminal
    organizations--$90 billion they took in last year to fuel
    instability across the region. They have ungoverned territory
    in countries across the region, and that bridges over into the
    NORTHCOM AOR. It is something we look at to the extent we
    influence and leverage and put pressure on our partners to do
    more.
        Unfortunately, the worst offender of the whole lot is not a
    country that we can cooperate with right now, and that is
    Venezuela. We look at Venezuela where the Maduro regime is
    being propped up by Cuba, Russia, and China and we see the
    narcotrafficking that has increased substantially in the air
    and over land from Colombia into Venezuela. Then it becomes
    extremely difficult to track as it leaves in commercial
    privatized shipping, private airplanes, and so we look at
    countries stepping up, and I think the international effort on
    pressure on Maduro and that illegitimate regime is a focus area
    where we can do more.
        Within the Central American countries, I would call out
    Panama, the relationship the Missouri Guard has with them. They
    have stepped up. Costa Rica has stepped up. You have got
    another blight of no democracy in Nicaragua which is another
    problem site. El Salvador has done more. Guatemala has done
    more. Some others can do more. They are working on it, but
    there is certainly more effect that we can have from some of
    our partners.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. That is very helpful.
        General, let me turn to you. Secretary Esper has called on
    our European allies to do more in the Sahel, and he has said
    recently that additional contributions by European allies--I am
    quoting him here--could offset whatever changes we make as we
    consider next steps in Africa.
        I am wondering if you agree with that first, and then I am
    going to ask you to elaborate. But do you agree with that
    statement from the Secretary?
        General Townsend. I do agree with the statement that
    European contributions could in many ways offset what we are
    doing there.
        Senator Hawley. Could you give us just on that point,
    General, some specific examples of ways that you think our NATO
    allies could contribute more in the Sahel than they currently
    are doing?
        General Townsend. Well, sure. The French have called on
    their European neighbors to contribute more forces to the
    effort there trying to directly confront the violent extremist
    groups there in the Sahel, specifically Mali and Niger, Burkina
    Faso. I think that is something they can do and should do.
        Also, we are providing some support that European countries
    have, specifically NATO allies, a capacity to do. Airlift is
    one thing we are supporting the French forces with. Air
    refueling for French fighter aircraft is another thing. These
    are capacities that are resident in many European countries
    that they could provide. I think our Department is going to
    lead an effort to try to get some European partners to do some
    of those things and offset the support we are providing right
    now.
        I think they do not have the capacity to do some of the
    more technical types of support. We do some technical
    intelligence type of support that is fairly exquisite, and
    there are not a lot of countries that can do that at that same
    level. But they can mitigate a lot of the support that we
    provide.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        General, let me ask you about China. I am very concerned by
    the PLA's presence in Djibouti. Do you worry that the PLA could
    use its forces there to contest our ability to transit the Bab
    al Mandeb or adjacent waterways in a future crisis?
        General Townsend. On a daily basis, I do not worry a great
    deal about the Chinese presence in Djibouti at their base, but
    the potential is there. So we keep an eye on it. We are not
    blind to that. But there is a potential there in some future
    crisis that they could potentially use that base there to cause
    problems.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, in your assessment
    what should we be doing now to assure our access to that
    maritime chokepoint in a future scenario?
        General Townsend. I think we are doing that to a great
    extent and that is competing, making sure that those countries
    that are there, Djibouti being one of them, Somalia being
    another one--those countries prefer the United States as a
    strategic partner. I am not saying that they should not
    interact with China or Russia at all, but what I want is at 2
    o'clock in the morning when the Secretary of State calls a head
    of state in Africa and says America needs to come in tonight,
    they yes to us and they do not say yes to the Chinese or the
    Russians.
        Senator Hawley. My time has expired.
        Admiral, I want to ask you a few questions about the
    Chinese activity in your AOR. I will submit those for the
    record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Townsend, General Esmail Qaani, who assumed the
    position as the head of Iran's Qods Force after Soleimani's
    killing, has vowed to strike back at the United States and
    called on Hezbollah to exact further revenge. The Voice of
    America reported earlier this month that Iran may seek to
    strike back in Africa, citing the rise of Iranian military
    influence on the continent and the potential of softer targets.
        What have you been doing to ensure the safety of our
    servicemembers and American citizens in Africa? Second, how
    have plans to reduce United States Forces in Africa accounted
    for the possible increase in future terrorist activity? How
    well equipped and trained are local forces in Africa?
        General Townsend. Senator, to your first question, we are
    following those reports. There is intelligence reporting that
    comports with that. Both the Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah
    I think are looking for opportunities to strike back at America
    wherever, and we think one of those places is certainly Africa.
    We are watching and listening carefully for that. We are not
    taking any specific measures yet. We do not really have a good
    enough picture to take actions, but we are watching and
    listening for that.
        Then on your second question, the quality of African
    security forces varies widely depending on where we are talking
    about in Africa. Some are exceptionally good and others are not
    so good, and the partners that we work with--we are trying to
    get them all to a level where they can at least be self-
    sufficient would be the ideal, if they could handle their own
    security threats on their own.
        Senator Gillibrand. I took a CODEL [congressional
    delegation] a few years ago and we did stop in Chad to assess
    our support and how well they were doing to support Nigeria. Do
    you have any thoughts about how that relationship is
    developing? Is it moving forward or has it retreated?
        General Townsend. I think that relationship is pretty
    sound. There is a multinational joint task force that operates
    there. All of those countries around the Lake Chad basin are
    operating there. Chad has recently redeployed some forces from
    Nigeria, but that was part of a scheduled move, not some sort
    of breakdown in the relationship or the partnership there in
    the joint task force. So I think that that group is
    functioning.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
        Earlier this month, the al Shabaab launch an attack on
    Manda airfield, killing an American servicemember and two
    contractors. The New York Times reported that al Shabaab used
    the attacks as a message to African forces that American troops
    would abandon them just as they did with the Syrian Kurds. At
    the same time, an African Center for Strategic Studies report
    stated that the activity of Africa's extremist groups has
    doubled since 2013.
        How has the decision to withdraw support from Syria
    impacted the resolve and trust of our African partners?
        General Townsend. I do not know that our decision to
    withdraw from Syria has affected their calculus. That has not
    come up in any discussions I have had with African leaders. But
    the thing that they are always looking for is can we count on
    you as a partner. But I have not heard that they are looking
    towards our withdrawal from Syria as some indication.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you have any plans at this point or
    any strategies to reduce our forces in Africa? What do you
    think the impact of those reductions could be on our
    counterterrorism efforts?
        General Townsend. We are engaged in this blank slate review
    process with the Department of Defense, and I think that is a
    necessary and a good process to do to make sure that our
    resources are always pointed at our highest priorities. We have
    made some presentations and recommendations to the Secretary of
    Defense. He is still in a decision cycle, and I do not want to
    get in front of his decision about what may happen with our
    troop presence on the continent.
        I will say that there are threats to America that will
    emanate from the African continent, both global power and great
    power threats, as well as violent extremist organizations.
        Senator Gillibrand. A quick question in my remaining time
    on China. Both China and Russia have been making large economic
    investments in both Africa and Latin America in order to expand
    their influence around the globe. When we were in Africa, they
    were investing in Djibouti and doing a huge investment in the
    airfield there. This is yet another example of how the battle
    for world leadership in this century cannot be fought by just
    spending more money on weapons. Instead, we have to learn
    lessons from the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and build
    lasting relationships and partnerships.
        What role do your COCOMs play in any whole-of-government
    coordination aimed at aligning all of our levers of power
    towards a common goal in your respective AORs?
        Admiral Faller. What you cited about China and Russia is so
    key, Senator. We are seeing it in Cuba, 90 miles from Key West
    where China and Russia are working alongside certainly not for
    United States national interests or for any partnerships in the
    hemisphere.
        But our partnerships, our mil-to-mil partnerships, are key,
    and working with our partners to build strong institutions. It
    is these institutions that do the right thing and have trust
    and respect the rule of law and human rights. We have a human
    rights office in SOUTHCOM that we staff to work on these sorts
    of things that are part of professionalism and part of trust
    building.
        General Townsend. Senator, I would just say our level of
    resourcing is such that if we want to get anything done for
    America on the African continent, we have to do it as a whole-
    of-government working with the Department of State and USAID.
    That is just in our DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] at AFRICOM how
    we operate every day.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. I want to talk about the biggest and the
    most important story in the world, the Wuhan coronavirus. This
    coronavirus is a catastrophe on the scale of Chernobyl for
    China, but actually it is probably worse than Chernobyl which
    was localized in its effect. The coronavirus could result in a
    global pandemic.
        While you were all sleeping overnight, the number of
    diagnosed cases in China increased by 30 percent. Let me be
    clear. That is not new cases. That is just newly admitted
    cases. It is probably several orders of magnitude higher than
    that.
        Also while you were sleeping, China now has its entire
    border with Russia closed, 2,600 miles. Russia has closed that
    border. El Al has shut down travel between Israel and China.
    Air France has shut down travel between China and France, and
    that is in addition to all the other countries that have
    already shut down travel.
        From what we know so far--and there are still many
    unknowns--this virus could have both a long incubation period,
    as much as 14 days, and individuals could be contagious while
    asymptomatic, which was not the case with SARS [severe acute
    respiratory syndrome] in 2003.
        Furthermore, from some cases, it appears that the virus
    could be aerosolized, which means it does not require the kind
    of contact that you have with, say, a married couple kissing
    each other or a family living in close quarters in a hotel or
    apartment, but rather the distances we are all sitting apart
    right now.
        Yet, China is still lying about all of this. They have been
    lying about it from the very beginning, and you do not need
    their history of lying about SARS in 2003, though it is
    relevant here. You just have to see what has happened over the
    last 2 months. We now know that the first case manifested no
    later than December 1, even though China did not reveal it to
    the WHO [World Health Organization] until a month later on
    December 31st when they continued to hide it from their own
    citizens and they continued to say that it had been contained
    inside Wuhan. Today it is in every single province in China.
        They also claimed for almost 2 months until earlier this
    week that it had originated in a seafood market in Wuhan, that
    locals had contracted it from animals in, say, bat soup or
    snake tartare. That is not the case.
        The Lancet published a study last weekend demonstrating
    that of the original 40 cases, 14 of them had no contact with
    the seafood market, including patient zero. As one
    epidemiologist said, that virus went into the seafood market
    before it came out of the seafood market.
        We still do not know where it originated. It could have
    been another seafood market. It could have been a farm. It
    could have been a food processing company.
        I would note that Wuhan also has China's only biosafety
    level 4 super laboratory that works with the world's most
    deadly pathogens to include, yes, coronavirus.
        Now, look at China's own actions. They have quarantined 60
    million people--60 million--more than the entire population of
    our west coast. They have shut down schools indefinitely.
    Classes canceled nationwide indefinitely. Hong Kong, a part of
    China, has basically shut down all travel from the mainland.
        That is why it is essential that we immediately stop all
    travel on commercial aircraft between China and the United
    States, making exceptions, of course, for American citizens to
    come back as we just brought back yesterday, allowing a central
    trade to flow as long as crews on ships and aircraft are not
    allowed to go into the general population in America, and
    making exceptions, of course, for medical personnel to go into
    China to try to get a handle on this. It is essential that we
    take those steps and essential that we get to the bottom of
    China's deceit and incompetence on this measure.
        Gentlemen, I raise this with you because you are
    responsible in your combatant commands for some countries that
    have the most fragile public institutions, to include the most
    fragile public health institutions, in the world. So I ask,
    even though as of this morning there are not yet confirmed
    cases of coronavirus in your combatant commands, though I
    suspect there will be soon, what is your assessment about the
    ability of the governments in your combatant commands to handle
    a potential global pandemic like this. General Townsend?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator.
        There are not, that I am aware of, any confirmed cases as
    you mentioned, but there are some suspected cases. The first
    report of a suspected case I heard of is in Djibouti, which you
    would imagine with the significant Chinese presence there.
        The capacity of African nations to deal with this problem
    varies widely. For example, in eastern Africa, central east
    Africa, they have been dealing with Ebola and they have been
    dealing with Ebola largely on their own and doing a pretty good
    job of it. So I think capacity there, but anywhere else in
    Africa is probably not to that degree.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller?
        Admiral Faller. The Venezuela crisis has already strained
    the social services of many of the nations. As you are aware,
    Senator, we had deployed the hospital ship Comfort twice in 1
    year to 12 different nations. In one 5-day span, it can do the
    equivalent of a whole month for a region of some of the major
    countries. So I would be extremely concerned. Like General
    Townsend, the capacities vary widely, but in many cases they
    are strained and to the limit. I would be very concerned if we
    saw this spread.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        As a defensive measure, I would just say again it is
    essential that we shut down all commercial air travel
    immediately between the United States and China. As an
    offensive measure, because that probably will not stop it
    entirely and because if it becomes a global pandemic, we have
    to deal with countries with very limited capabilities here, we
    need a Manhattan Project level effort to work with our best
    research scientists and laboratories in this country to develop
    a vaccine as quickly as possible.
        [Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                     united states africa command (africom)
        1. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, as of November 2019, the
    Nigerian Air Base 201 is in service to support intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, yet press reports
    have said the Administration is considering drawing down our presence
    in Africa. What is the right balance of ISR assets throughout the
    region to address rising violent extremism as well as great power
    competition?
        General Townsend. While different types of intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are better-suited for these two
    problem-sets, we are now evaluating what the right balance should look
    like through the Combatant Command Review process. In short, AFRICOM
    does not have sufficient ISR to accomplish our currently assigned tasks
    with an appropriate balance of effectiveness and risk.

        2. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, due to the growing complexity
    of global priorities, demand for ISR capacity is stretched to its
    limits. How can we work with allies to collaborate on ISR priorities in
    Africa?
        General Townsend. We continually collaborate with partners to
    synchronize each of our independent ISR capabilities and capacities to
    maximize our combined collection efforts for our common strategic goals
    through formal and informal engagements. European partners can and
    should do more especially in West Africa.

        3. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, France has been a critical
    partner in addressing violent extremism across the Sahel--deploying MQ-
    9s as well as ground troops. In light of recent reports that the
    Administration is considering a drawdown of deployed troops, how can we
    marshal additional international support, including those countries
    that currently operate U.S. unmanned systems, to support our objectives
    in the region?
        General Townsend. Through our bilateral relationships as well as
    multinational forums, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO), the European Union, and the Organization for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) we continue to advocate for increased
    European support to French led operations in the region. European
    partners can and should do more especially in West Africa.

        4. Senator Inhofe. General Townsend, given the amount of engagement
    by China and Russia in Africa, what is the risk to the National Defense
    Strategy and great power competition if we withdraw some forces?
        General Townsend. USAFRICOM's Campaign Plan nests within the NSS
    and NDS; stressing the great power competition challenges faced on the
    continent. China and Russia continue to challenge the United States
    power and influence in Africa. Russia continuously attempts to
    marginalize United States efforts in countries with Russian interests.
    China challenges United States efforts across the continent with their
    One Belt, One Road Initiative; providing infrastructure and high
    interest loans. If we withdraw additional forces in Africa, China and
    Russia will likely fill the vacuum.
                   united states southern command (southcom)
        5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, as the region currently competes
    for a limited number of ISR assets, what is SOUTHCOM's vision for
    expanding U.S. ISR operations to ensure adequate surveillance of
    illicit trafficking routes and counter global and regional threats?
        Admiral Faller. We are always looking for innovative solutions to
    mitigate ISR shortfalls in this region. We are investing in contractor
    owned and operated vessels, government owned and contractor operated
    platforms, unmanned aircraft systems, and open source means to fill the
    ISR requirements for our counterdrug mission and to counter global and
    regional threats. With Congress' support we have been able to work with
    the Department of Defense's Counternarcotics policy office and U.S. Air
    Force to purchase commercial aircraft that can increase our
    surveillance capability against top threats in the region. Also with
    the support of Congress, we are leasing a multi-mission support vessel
    that is currently supporting counter drug detection and monitoring
    efforts. The vessel has an air surveillance radar, an unmanned aircraft
    system, and expanded partner nation command and control capability.
    Regional partners are leading interdiction efforts with the vessel by
    embarking their personnel and equipment.
        We are also developing a concept to deploy unmanned aerial systems,
    for ourselves, as well as for our partner nations that would increase
    our regional domain awareness. Other areas in which innovation is
    advancing awareness are the cyber and social media domain. We are
    exploring avenues to increase our capability to leverage and exploit
    publicly available information and open sources. The capability, if
    appropriately funded, will provide near-persistent and organic ISR for
    this AOR within the open source domain.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, what is SOUTHCOM's future plan
    to equip allies and partners with unmanned ISR systems in order to
    provide more thorough situational awareness of regional threats?
        Admiral Faller. Partner nations throughout the region have
    expressed interest in acquiring unmanned ISR systems to improve domain
    awareness of their sovereign borders, as well as to detect and defend
    against transnational threats. Brazil has purchased an unmanned aerial
    system (UAS), and they plan to purchase more in the future. We are
    incorporating these types of systems into our strategic and theater
    plans, and building these purchases into our long-term security
    cooperation and foreign assistance plans. USSOUTHCOM complements those
    foreign assistance programs by supporting key partners like Colombia
    and Brazil acquiring and/or researching modernization programs for
    significant UAS systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper, Scan Eagle, and
    potentially Blackjack. We develop security assistance programs to
    support partner nations with smaller UAS requirements to support
    counter narcotics and border security--once partner nations have this
    capability it will improve our collective awareness of transnational
    threats in the region and allow us to counter those threats
    collectively as well. To date, Brazil has used its own funds to
    purchase Scan Eagle; Colombia has used a combination of
    counternarcotics, section 333, and FMF to acquire Scan Eagle and hand
    launched UAS like PUMA; and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have
    acquired Raven and Puma UAS with section 333 funds.

        7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Faller, how would you describe the role
    of unmanned systems for use in future missions of disaster relief and
    humanitarian aid?
        Admiral Faller. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been deployed by
    several organizations in support of Humanitarian Assistance missions,
    including other Combatant Commands, non-governmental organizations, and
    State and local governments with great success. We have informally
    experimented with UASs during some humanitarian response efforts
    previously. UAS technologies enabled situational awareness for a
    continuum of response options to optimize minimal resources and maximum
    effect, saving lives and speeding recovery times.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                border security
        8. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, what impact have the additional
    15,000 Mexican troops on the United States border and the additional
    Mexican Guard troops on Mexico's southern border made to the border
    security effort?
        Admiral Faller. Having a layered defense is the best approach to
    border security. At SOUTHCOM, we work with our partners in Central
    America to improve their regional security and border security efforts
    before threats reach the Mexican border. However, the Department of
    State is best capable to address this issue. The Government of Mexico
    does not coordinate migration issues with the Department of Defense.

        9. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, have these additional troops
    stemmed the flow of illegal immigration through Mexico and into the
    United States?
        Admiral Faller. I would defer to NORTHCOM for specific migration
    information associated with Mexican troop deployments.

        10. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, have the
    Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador
    done to prevent people from fleeing north?
        Admiral Faller. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have made
    great advances in helping stop migrants headed toward our southwest
    border. On Jan. 15, 2020, a migrant caravan originated in San Pedro
    Sula, Honduras. Because of enforcement actions by Mexico, Guatemala,
    Honduras, and El Salvador, the caravan never arrived at our southwest
    border. Their actions included apprehensions, repatriations, increased
    border security, and arrests of organizers and facilitators. That is
    just one example showing how these countries are working on this
    problem set together.
        Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador also continue biometrically
    enrolling caravan migrants. Guatemala was the first country in the
    region to sign an Asylum Cooperation Agreement with the United States
    in July of 2019. This agreement allows the transfer of third-country
    nationals from El Salvador and Honduras who are seeking asylum or other
    forms of protection in the United States to apply for asylum in
    Guatemala in order to prevent abuse of the asylum process and removes
    key incentives for attempting to illegally enter the United States
    Guatemala has been receiving ACA transferees since November 21, 2019.
        Ultimately, these countries will need to focus on citizen security
    so that their populations feel safe, and economic development so that
    the people have hope for a better life. USSOUTHCOM works with our
    partner militaries in the region to help train and equip them to better
    secure their nations, largely through security cooperation programs
    like 333 and joint, combine exercises--two programs at risk of
    sustaining cuts in fiscal year 2021.

        11. Senator Tillis. Admiral Faller, have there been any specific
    military-related cooperation efforts in this area between United States
    Southern Command and the Northern Triangle countries?
        Admiral Faller. Through our security cooperation efforts, we have
    trained and equipped various military units, to include partner nation
    air forces, armies, and navies, to perform border and maritime security
    functions and protect their own sovereign territory. USSOUTHCOM relies
    heavily on section 333 building partner capacity authorities to build
    and improve partner nation capabilities to counter shared threats that
    directly impact the security of the homeland. Further, our security
    cooperation programs are rooted in the fundamental respect for
    universal human rights and emphasize the importance of civilian control
    of the military. Through our Defense Institution Building programs, we
    strengthen the Ministries of Defense to assist partners implement
    policies and processes that allow for more informed decision-making,
    and align scarce defense resources with mission priorities to address
    national and regional security issues. This elevates the holistic
    output of our programs, ensuring our partner nations can similarly
    apply a whole-of-government approach to guarantee citizen security. We
    also share intelligence on transnational criminal organizations that
    threaten our shared interests, which in turn helps these partners
    develop their organic capabilities to identify and disrupt key criminal
    groups involved in the movement of drugs and people to our Homeland.
    Additionally, our civil affairs personnel work alongside other U.S.
    agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations and host nation
    agencies to mitigate facets of instability within the Northern
    Triangle. This improves host nation responsiveness to its population by
    addressing civil vulnerabilities in order to reduce the causes of
    migration and support capacity to conduct civil-military operations.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                            counter-drug operations
        12. Senator McSally. Admiral Faller, last year you discussed the
    Cartels' use of submersibles, naval tracks going further out to sea,
    and remote air fields to facilitate the flow of drugs. Please provide
    an update on the latest tactics that the drug cartels are using and how
    we're countering them.
        Admiral Faller. Drug traffickers continuously adjust their tactics
    to improve their concealment techniques, and have been moving toward
    secure communication devices and applications to coordinate drug
    shipments. They smuggle cocaine primarily via noncommercial maritime
    movements, using go-fast vessels, fishing boats, and low profile
    vessels that originate from Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We are
    seeing an increase in illicit air traffic from Venezuela, indicating
    traffickers are increasingly using the permissive environment under the
    Maduro regime to move drugs toward the United States. The volume of
    known aerial drug flow from Venezuela in 2019 was about 11 percent
    higher than in 2018 and 94 percent higher than in 2015. Additionally,
    traffickers are now using larger, faster aircraft to more quickly move
    greater quantities of drugs while reducing their risk of interdiction.
    For example, at least 10 of the 55 aircraft identified by Guatemalan
    authorities in 2019 as involved in cocaine trafficking were jets
    designed to move small groups of people.
        In addition to traditional air and maritime movements, drug
    trafficking organizations (DTOs) will continue to exploit the use of
    maritime container shipments to transport narcotics. To combat these
    ever-changing tactics, we rely on Joint Interagency task Force-South
    (JIATF-S) as the action arm of SOUTHCOM in the counter-drug fight.
    JIATF-S has seamless integration between the intelligence and
    operations directorates. Additionally, JIATF-S has Tactical Analysis
    Team (TAT) positions in key source and destination countries to
    facilitate increased information sharing between JIATF-S, foreign
    partners, and law enforcement. JIATF-S is working with SOUTHCOM and
    regional partners to deploy new ground-based radars to increase real-
    time information flow an improve security response times and accuracy.
    JIATF-S has also developed a specialized container targeting cell that
    works directly with the National Targeting Center to counter the
    increased use of container shipments. Resourcing is key to the fight.
                                human smuggling
        13. Senator McSally. Admiral Faller, criminal organizations in your
    area of responsibility have become more involved in migrant smuggling.
    In fiscal year 2019, United States authorities apprehended nearly
    608,000 unauthorized migrants from the Northern Triangle at the
    southwest border. Families or unaccompanied minors made up 81 percent
    of those apprehended, many of whom were seeking asylum. Please provide
    an explanation of SOUTHCOM's role in countering these criminal
    smuggling operations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing
    our borders.
        Admiral Faller. Effectively addressing issues such as criminal
    smuggling operations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing
    our borders requires SOUTHCOM to leverage our partnerships with the
    interagency community and to take a whole-of-government approach. A key
    partner in this area is the U.S. Department of State and State's Bureau
    of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Together
    SOUTHCOM and the Department of State use a wide range of tools to
    counter crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad, including foreign
    assistance, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and
    reporting, sanctions, and rewards. Specifically, SOUTHCOM leverages our
    partnerships and contacts with partner nations to help develop and
    implement the architecture necessary for international drug control and
    cross-border law enforcement cooperation. SOUTHCOM works in unison with
    INL and our partner nations, international and regional organizations,
    non-governmental organizations, U.S. Federal, State, and local criminal
    justice entities to achieve these goals. All of our programs are
    consistent with security and governance priorities of the United States
    Strategy for Engagement in Central America and the Central America
    Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and complement efforts under the
    Central American Governments' Alliance for Prosperity.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                         united states southern command
        14. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, we have watched over the last 2
    years as Russia and Cuba continue to prop up dangerous dictators like
    Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. Can you tell me the current status of
    their presence in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Russia maintains several hundred military and
    civilian personnel throughout Venezuela. These personnel enhance
    Venezuela's military readiness by repairing Russian-origin equipment,
    improving intelligence and surveillance capabilities, training
    personnel, and advising on cybersecurity and domestic security. In 2018
    and 2019, Moscow deployed two nuclear-capable Tu-160 Blackjack bombers
    to Venezuela to demonstrate their support for the Maduro regime.
    Additionally, Russia has investments and joint ventures in the
    extraction of natural resources throughout the country.
        Havana's security and economic partnership with Caracas remains
    very strong. Cuba continues to provide to the Maduro regime an
    estimated 20,000 to 25,000 trainers, advisors, doctors, personal
    security forces, and intelligence agents who enable the regime's
    control and oppression of the Venezuelan people. Caracas, in exchange,
    helps fulfill Cuba's oil needs, as Havana remains heavily dependent on
    Caracas for energy.

        15. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, do Russia and Cuba have plans
    beyond simply keeping Maduro in power?
        Admiral Faller. Moscow's and Havana's goals in Venezuela extend
    beyond keeping Maduro in power. Russia views a partnership with
    Venezuela as a key geostrategic objective. Russia hopes to extract oil
    through several joint ventures, and profit as an intermediary for
    Caracas' oil sales. Venezuela still owes $800 million to Russian oil
    firms, down from $2.3 billion in early 2019, as well as approximately
    $3 billion to the Russian Government. A close relationship with
    Maduro's regime also allows Moscow to deepen its security footprint,
    project power, and collect intelligence out of Venezuela, challenging
    United States interests in our near abroad. Moscow may also seek to
    expand its presence in the region beyond Venezuela, through other
    authoritarian regimes such as Nicaragua. Russia likely intends to
    maintain a lasting presence in Venezuela to support its economic
    interests and disrupt United States objectives.
        Cuba sympathizes ideologically with Maduro's regime and also seeks
    to keep Caracas as an economic lifeline. Cuba is heavily dependent on
    external support for vital resources, in particular oil from Venezuela.
    Cuba refines Venezuelan crude for its own use and for resale, bringing
    in needed foreign currency.

        16. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, what is Communist China's role
    in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Beijing provides economic and security support to
    Maduro's regime. China is Venezuela's largest creditor, with Venezuela
    facing $20 billion in debt. Beijing seeks to maintain a close
    relationship with Caracas in part to ensure payment of this debt
    through oil deliveries. Chinese state-owned enterprises have provided
    significant loans for infrastructure support, including improving
    Venezuela's 4G and 5G networks. Some of this support directly supports
    Maduro's repressive apparatus. For example, the assistance provided by
    Chinese state-owned firm ZTE enables the ``Carnet de la Patria''
    system, tying food rations to political reliability. As of 2018, China
    had sold approximately $1 billion in military equipment to Venezuela,
    to include combat aircraft, light tanks, and other armored vehicles,
    and air search radars. Additionally, Beijing in 2019 provided to the
    Maduro regime 68 tons of humanitarian aid, mostly medical supplies.

        17. Senator Scott. Admiral Faller, what does Communist China want
    out of its support for Maduro?
        Admiral Faller. China remains deeply invested in Venezuela's
    natural resources, and wants to protect its investments and joint oil
    ventures. Chinese official foreign direct investment in Venezuela is
    over $3 billion, largely concentrated in the joint petroleum venture,
    Sinovensa, as well as in railroads, telecommunications, and mining.
    Beijing also wants to ensure Venezuela repays its $20 billion debt. The
    Chinese Government also tries to use its approach to Venezuela to
    portray itself as a responsible global power as opposed to foreign
    intervention in domestic disputes.
                          united states africa command
        18. Senator Scott. General Townsend, what are you seeing in Africa
    in terms of China's efforts to get control of strategic ports and
    industries?
        General Townsend. China is Africa's number one trading partner and
    is more reliant than any other nation on trade through the Red and
    Mediterranean Seas. Beijing seeks to secure its access to those trade
    routes and is aggressively pursuing military access to strategic ports
    in East and West Africa through infrastructure investments and securing
    port operator licenses. Beijing likely does not need full control over
    African nation's port facilities to achieve its goals for commercial
    and military access. These ports have political, commercial, military,
    and security objectives, therefore they need better networks of roads
    and rail lines that China has already started investing in.
        China invests in companies and infrastructure for natural resource
    extraction in African nations. The bulk of Africa's exports to China is
    raw materials. Though Beijing does not seek to directly control these
    industries, Chinese investments provides Beijing a platform to secure
    access to African industries and exert influence on African political
    and economic elites.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                     chinese investments near panama canal
        19. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, you wrote in your testimony
    that ``Chinese investment in deep-water ports and infrastructure on
    both sides of the Panama Canal could enable the [People's Liberation
    Army (PLA)] to threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the
    movement of United States Forces.'' Can you elaborate on this
    statement?
        Admiral Faller. Chinese companies, many with close ties to the
    Chinese Communist Party (CCP), manage ports on both sides of the Canal.
    While the Panama Canal Authority controls overall canal operations,
    Beijing could leverage its companies' access to the canal and
    associated critical infrastructure to slow or delay United States
    vessels' use of the canal during a crisis or during a political
    dispute. China leverages military modernization, influence operations,
    and predatory economics to coerce countries to its advantage and
    compete for influence.
            pla's ambitions in southcom area of responsibility (aor)
        20. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, how would you described the
    PLA's long-term ambitions in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
        Admiral Faller. China is competing with the United States for
    influence in the region and seeks to supplant the United States'
    standing as the region's partner of choice. Beijing's increasing
    economic engagement in the region over the past three decades is a
    deliberate strategy China has used in other regions to create favorable
    conditions for enhanced military-to-military cooperation, ranging from
    combined training to expanding deployments. The PLA is likely to:

        1.  Provide security along the growing number of trade routes
    associated with China's One Belt One Road Initiative, particularly
    against non-state actors, such as pirates;
        2.  Achieve Beijing's stated goal of building closer relationships
    with host government officials by providing military training modeled
    after the United States' International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) programs;
        3.  Engage in global humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    operations to gain recognition as a responsible and reliable
    international humanitarian aid provider;
        4.  Increase naval diplomacy, to include deployments of its
    hospital ship ANWEI, and pursue its long-term strategy to obtain naval
    bases overseas through construction, purchases, and long-term leases;
    and
        5.  Provide ``gifts'' of military equipment to foster closer
    security relations, follow-on foreign military sales, interoperability,
    and joint exercises and operations.
                       chinese activities in southcom aor
        21. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, China has been rapidly
    expanding its presence in Latin America. Can you describe the
    challenges posed by China's efforts, especially when it comes to port
    access and telecommunications infrastructure?
        Admiral Faller. Our main concern is that Chinese investment in deep
    water ports and infrastructure in the region could enable the People's
    Liberation Army (PLA) to threaten sea-lanes vital to global commerce
    and the movement of United States Forces during a crisis. Beijing's
    focus on port development increases its global and regional economic
    access and supports its efforts to become Latin America's top trading
    partner. China is the top trading partner for five counties in the
    region and remains the regions second largest trading partner behind
    the United States. The Chinese Government will provide loans to develop
    ports and other critical infrastructure. When countries cannot pay back
    the loan, Beijing is not above taking ownership of the project, as we
    have seen in its handling of Sri Lanka's inability to pay for a port
    development loan. This enables Beijing to exercise economic pressure to
    resolve political or legal disputes.
        Chinese companies are the main telecommunications infrastructure
    provider for most countries in the region. These companies, such as
    Huawei and ZTE, are aggressively promoting 5G wireless networks and
    Safe City technology in Latin America and the Caribbean. Under Chinese
    law, Beijing can compel companies to share data with its security and
    intelligence services, including those companies doing business outside
    of China. Moreover, as National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien stated
    in February, we have evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly
    to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains
    and sells around the world. Adopting Chinese telecommunications
    technology could limit the United States' ability to share data with
    our partners because we would not be able to ensure the security/data
    integrity of these networks.
        Additionally, most of the precursor chemicals necessary to produce
    the illicit drugs that are trafficked to the United States originate
    from Chinese companies and are exported to ports in both the producing
    countries and in Central America.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                     libya
        22. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what is AFRICOM's role in
    mitigating ongoing tensions in Libya, and what are the key United
    States strategic interests in resolving this conflict?
        General Townsend. USAFRICOM continues to support Ambassador Norland
    and the Department of State's Libya External Office efforts toward a
    diplomatic and political solution to the Libyan conflict. The United
    States has a strategic interest in a stable and prosperous Libya. An
    independent and secure Libya promotes economic growth and stability in
    the region.

        23. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, will the Trump
    Administration devote more military resources to supporting the Berlin
    agreement and supporting our military partners on the ground?
        General Townsend. The Department of Defense is currently directing
    a series of Combatant Command Reviews. AFRICOM is reviewing all of our
    military requirements and resources supporting the interagency and our
    African partners. We continue to emphasize military support to
    diplomacy and development engagement, which serves to consolidate
    military and other security gains.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, do you think that
    additional investment is helpful or necessary to support the Berlin
    agreement and support our military partners on the ground?
        General Townsend. From a military perspective, AFRICOM recognizes
    the potential value of additional investment and resources but those
    decisions will be guided by any future policy decisions. The Government
    of National Accord and our aligned forces benefit from U.S. engagement,
    including the assets we provide to bolster Ambassador Norland's
    engagements.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, in addition to potential
    military support, how do you think the United States should engage
    diplomatically in the conflict in Libya?
        General Townsend. AFRICOM continues to support the Libya External
    Office and all State Department engagements in Libya within our current
    resources and authorities. Ambassador Norland's recent travel to the
    Berlin conference shows how diplomacy can leverage our support for a
    peacefully negotiated resolution to the conflict in Libya.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what does an escalation
    of violence in Libya mean to the United States and our regional
    partner's interests in the Maghreb?
        General Townsend. Further escalation of the Libyan conflict will
    likely exacerbate a series of political, economic, and security
    challenges for the United States and our regional partners. The
    widespread weapons proliferation, use of private military contractors
    and foreign fighters, and oil disruptions are already overwhelming
    Libya's institutions, resulting in ungoverned spaces that increase
    internal displacement and forced migration, and create opportunities
    for radical and extremist actors. These actors are also making use of
    private military companies and foreign fighters as combatants in order
    to obfuscate their activities. We expect these trends will continue to
    spill over into other fragile countries, as we observed in Mali in
    2012. Our regional partners--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt--
    would feel the majority of these effects, as would our European allies,
    who are the top recipients of Libyan migrants and largest importers of
    Libyan oil. Worsening violence would also hamstring Libya's greatest
    resource, hydrocarbons, causing ripple effects across global oil
    prices.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. General Townsend, what do you see as the
    most destabilizing factor in the Libyan conflict, and what should the
    United States strategy prioritize to encourage a peaceful outcome?
        General Townsend. The perpetuation and escalation of the Libyan
    conflict is a direct result of foreign interference. External actors
    have not only armed and supplied both sides, but are providing direct
    military support by providing reinforcements in the form of private
    military contractors and/or foreign fighters, air support,
    intelligence, and training. As long as external actors continue to
    replenish the forces of each side, the conflict will continue.
                        iranian proxy threat in southcom
        28. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, how have recent events
    impacted your force protection assessment of both United States Forces
    deployed forward and our partners, as it relates to the threat of
    Iranian proxies in SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. Lebanese Hezbollah does maintain a presence in our
    neighborhood, largely conducting logistical support, money laundering,
    and fundraising that we watch closely. In recent months, Argentina,
    Honduras, and Paraguay have designated Hezbollah as a terrorist
    organization, and Brazilian officials stated they plan to do the same.
    As the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, any increased
    Iranian presence this close to our homeland is cause for concern. We
    have seen an increased Iranian presence in Venezuela since its crisis
    deepened. We continue to watch the threat from Iran closely.

        29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, what are actions you are
    taking to address these force protection concerns and keep both our
    servicemembers and our partners safe?
        Admiral Faller. Our actions include persistent threat information
    and intelligence sharing at the speed of relevance; education and
    training; key leader engagements; security cooperation; defense/
    security institution building as well as the strengthening of our
    partner nation military and security forces to counter threats in order
    to enhance and operationalize security across the Joint Force. For
    example, we work with our partners to conduct subject matter expert
    exchanges to share best practices with military police teams that
    provide force protection and physical security support. We have also
    conducted a short-notice force protection assessment of our forward
    locations to ensure vigilance, adherence to procedures, rigorous
    training, and proper equipment.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, do you require any
    additional resources to protect our people and our assets?
        Admiral Faller. It is imperative that we remain vigilant against
    this threat. Increased human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity, a lower
    cost solution to technical ISR, provides a more penetrative capability
    to target groups, organizations, and networks to discern planned
    actions and intended outcomes of Iranian proxies that pose a more
    nefarious direct threat to United States security. We must also
    marginalize malign Iranian influence by continuously improving security
    cooperation and information sharing with our partners and maintaining
    persistent presence throughout the region.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, in your assessment, what
    regions within your area of responsibility are most susceptible to
    targeting by Iranian proxy groups?
        Admiral Faller. The Iranian Threat Network (ITN), to include
    Lebanese Hezbollah, views the entire region as a permissive operating
    environment. Because of the ITN's diffuse presence in the region, the
    group could target Western interests anywhere. The ITN could exploit
    migration flows through Central America or refugee streams out of
    Venezuela into neighboring countries to facilitate its terrorist-
    related activities. Historically, Iranian proxies have operated in the
    ``tri-border'' region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. They also
    have looked to carry out attacks in areas with a pronounced DOD and/or
    Israeli presence in the region.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                               population growth
        32. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, as noted in your posture
    statement, the population of the African continent is growing rapidly,
    projected to double by 2050 and double again by 2100. This population
    growth has the potential to exacerbate the extreme poverty present on
    the continent, especially among younger generations who both make up
    the majority of the population and who are most vulnerable to
    recruitment by violent extremist organizations. How can the military
    prepare for conflict in areas of highly concentrated large populations?
        General Townsend. The militaries of our African partners must
    prepare themselves to address these complex challenges by continuing
    their current efforts to professionalize their forces. Not just in
    terms of operational capability, but also in terms of solidifying
    command and control along with a respect for the protection of
    civilians, so that more and more militaries in Africa are sources of
    stability. DOD and DOS security sector assistance programs address both
    these aspects of professionalizing their armed forces.

        33. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, what role does interagency
    cooperation play in addressing these issues and what partnership
    programs exist for AFRICOM to address the results of population growth
    and poverty rates?
        General Townsend. In Africa, we see our work in the security sector
    as a critical enabler of our interagency partners' efforts across the
    continent. AFRICOM works closely with interagency partners across our
    area of responsibility; our embedded State and USAID experts reinforce
    that multi-level coordination to ensure our DOD programs are
    synchronized with broader Whole-of-Government efforts. Our long-
    standing partnership improves responsiveness to the challenges posed by
    population growth and widespread poverty.
                                  border wall
        34. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the President has stated that
    he will fund the border wall with money appropriated by this Congress
    for military construction (MILCON) projects, including nearly $254
    million in fiscal year 2019 (fiscal year 2019) military construction
    funds from SOUTHCOM, and $124 million in fiscal year 2020 counterdrug
    money. How will these anticipated transfers affect overall SOUTHCOM
    readiness or will they at all?
        Admiral Faller. To date, SOUTHCOM funding has not been directly
    impacted by these transfers. However, the budget uncertainty that comes
    from these policy debates does impact our ability to plan internally,
    as well as with our partner nations.

        35. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, what are the consequences of
    withholding this funding?
        Admiral Faller. Right now, the only practical consequence we have
    observed is an increased uncertainty in our ability to plan and our
    ability to execute contractual obligations due to the slow movement of
    funding allocation.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                  border wall
        36. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, the Washington Post has
    reported that the Administration plans on diverting an additional $7.2
    billion in counterdrug and MILCON funding in the fiscal year 2021 bill
    to construct the President's wasteful and ineffective border wall. I
    understand you can't speak to the fiscal year 2021 budget, but SOUTHCOM
    is charged with deterring and defeating threats to defend the U.S.
    Homeland and our interests--many of the threats within SOUTHCOM's area
    of responsibility involve counterdrug efforts. Is a border wall the
    most effective military or defense investment we can make to prevent
    entry of illegal drugs into the United States?
        Admiral Faller. Border security is national security. DTOs are
    continuously adjusting and varying their techniques for smuggling
    illicit cargo into our homeland and we must therefore create a defense
    in depth to counter these illicit pathways. SOUTHCOM is charged with
    conducting detection and monitoring in support of law enforcement in
    the air and maritime domains, which is where our experience and
    expertise are focused. The United States-Mexico land border falls under
    the responsibility of United States Northern Command.

        37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, what investments,
    capabilities, and resources, in your experience, have proved to be most
    effective in disrupting the movement of illegal drugs and preventing
    their entry into the United States?
        Admiral Faller. The most effective strategy in the fight against
    illicit trafficking in the air and maritime domains is fighting it as a
    team. We are taking a three-pronged approach to this mission--security
    cooperation to increase partner capacity, increased intelligence to
    better understand the threat, and increased assets to action that
    intelligence.
        Last year, our partners played a critical role in 50 percent of our
    drug interdictions, up from 40 percent the year before. Getting our
    partners in the game by training and equipping them through security
    cooperation programs is exactly the right approach as these threats
    affect us all, and we need to tackle them together. Security
    cooperation programs allow us to train, advise, educate, and equip our
    partner nations--enabling them to help us in this fight.
        In order for us to function as an effective team, we need more
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The ideal force package
    for maritime detection and monitoring includes long and medium range
    maritime patrol aircraft, using capable maritime radar and camera
    systems for detection, classification, and monitoring. The P-3 and P-8
    flying missions deep in the Eastern Pacific allow for interdiction of
    illicit conveyances far from shore, and outside dense fishing fleets.
    Medium range maritime patrol aircraft like the DH-8 and HC-130 are very
    capable platforms utilized closer to shore, but are nearly as
    effective. Similarly, persistent U.S. Coast Guard medium endurance and
    national security cutters in high threat areas, properly equipped with
    Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capable helicopters and Over-The-Horizon
    (OTH) small boats are the backbone of counter-narcotics operations in
    the source and transit zones. Creative solutions such as the Multi-
    Mission Support Vessel (MMSV), the PALE ALE aircraft, and use of
    unmanned aerial systems like the MQ-9 contribute to the mission by
    filling in asset gaps.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              combatting terrorism
        38. Senator Warren. General Townsend, the Sahel is experiencing a
    ``devastating surge in terrorist attacks,'' according to officials from
    the United Nations, with terror-attack casualties in the region
    increasing five-fold since 2016. This challenge cannot be addressed by
    military power alone and investing in our civilian tools is a cost-
    effective way to prevent further conflict--for every $1 we spend on
    prevention, we save $16 in response costs. How do investments in the
    State Department, USAID, and other civilian tools of national security
    support your goals of promoting security and stability in Africa?
        General Townsend. USAID and State lead U.S. efforts to support the
    long-term solutions to insecurity and instability including economic
    growth, development, and good governance. Additionally, USAID and
    State's work on capacity building directly supports security and
    stability, through professionalization of security forces via
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) and institutional
    capacity building programs funded with Foreign Military Financing and
    Peacekeeping Operations funds, as well as social cohesion and counter
    violent extremism messaging.
                                   migration
        39. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, as former SOUTHCOM Commanders
    General Craddock, General Hill, General McCaffrey, General Wilhelm, and
    Admiral Stavridis have noted, ``Improving conditions in Honduras,
    Guatemala, and El Salvador is a critical way to address the root causes
    of migration and prevent the humanitarian crisis at our border. This is
    a solution to many of the drivers that cause people to leave their
    country and move north.'' Do you agree with these senior military
    leaders that we need a comprehensive civilian-military effort to tackle
    the challenges in the Northern Triangle and advance our security
    interests?
        Admiral Faller. I do strongly agree that the challenges facing our
    partners in Central America are complex and require a comprehensive
    whole-of-government effort. Several factors contribute to individual or
    family units' decision to migrate to the United States. The United
    States Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and Central America
    governments' complimentary strategy, Alliance for Prosperity broadens
    our vision for how we achieve security. The plans prioritize three
    interconnected objectives: prosperity, governance, and security. A
    secure, democratic, and prosperous Central America will provide an
    environment in which all of its citizens choose to remain and thrive.

        40. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, what do you recommend that we
    do differently to tackle the challenges in the Northern Triangle and
    advance our security interests?
        Admiral Faller. The challenges in the Northern Triangle can be
    found all around the region and would truly benefit from a sustained,
    whole-of-government approach to address the threats and unlock the
    promise of this hemisphere. Getting our partners in the game by
    training and equipping them through security cooperation programs like
    section 333, and professionalizing militaries through Defense
    Institution Building is exactly the right approach. In order for us to
    be a reliable, trusted partner, these security cooperation programs
    must be part of long-term strategic plans, catered to the needs and
    capabilities of each country. This kind of out-year planning would
    require increased, multi-year, consistent funding that protects against
    the instability posed by things like government shutdowns and
    continuing resolutions. Programs like IMET and FMF through the
    Department of State funding are also a critical part of this holistic
    solution, as are economic development programs by USAID and the newly
    developed U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC),
    which is aimed at catalyzing market-based, private-sector development,
    spurring economic growth in less-developed countries, and advancing the
    foreign policy interests of the United States.

        41. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, new leaders in the Northern
    Triangle region are taking responsibility for addressing migration to
    the United States. For example, El Salvador's new president is
    prioritizing tackling the root causes of migration--from corruption to
    poverty. However, in spite of these commitments, the U.S. has not
    restored the majority of funding to the region that was cut off last
    spring. Given the Administration's focus on burden-sharing, are you
    concerned that continuing to withhold funding to the region could
    undermine efforts by these leaders, who will need our support to
    bolster efforts to curb forced migration?
        Admiral Faller. In light of the administration's policies toward
    the region, the Department of Defense is permitted to fund security
    cooperation programs that directly impact the national security
    interests of the United States. This includes programs that address
    improving partner nation security forces to counter transnational crime
    and secure porous borders. IMET, which is a critical tool in building
    and strengthening relationships and partnerships in the region in the
    long term, is also increasingly available. Both of these programs work
    in concert to enhance shared values and increase burden sharing
    throughout the region.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                              success in colombia
        42. Senator Jones. Admiral Faller, the United States has had some
    notable success in helping Colombia develop its own security forces,
    who now help other countries develop theirs. Are there lessons from
    this relationship we can export to our other train, advise, and assist
    missions?
        Admiral Faller. Colombia has invested a great deal of its own
    resources in treasure and blood over the last two decades to achieve
    the successes you note. Signed in 2000, Plan Colombia included both
    foreign and military assistance for Colombia. It had a great deal of
    bipartisan support in the United States that has been strategically
    sustained over the years. Efforts to assist Colombia were also
    international, with the European Union supporting social and economic
    programs. This sustained support has now enabled Colombia to export
    military and security training to seven countries in the hemisphere.
        The United States-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security (USCAP)
    is a collaborative arrangement between the United States and Colombia
    to conduct security cooperation capacity building training and
    investments in seven regional partner nations. Since 2013, there have
    been over 500 engagements and a total of 6,200 partner nation personnel
    trained. Just one example of how Colombia is training other nations
    through USCAP is the Regional Helicopter Training Center, which is a
    Spanish language initial entry rotary wing qualification course located
    in Melgar, Colombia. The center annually trains 50 Colombian military
    members and 24 Latin American partner nation students.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, McSally,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
        I have already kind of explained the situation we have. You
    and I are both going to waive our opening statements, as are
    our witnesses. Then we get right into questions. I think we
    will be fine with the votes coming up that way.
        [Statement of General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy as prepared
    for delivery.]

     OPENING STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF,
     COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
                       AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee: I am honored to be here today and to
    serve as the commander of U.S. Northern Command and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command. I am also pleased to
    testify alongside Admiral Chas Richard. Chas and his team at
    STRATCOM have been outstanding partners every step of the way.
        I will keep my remarks brief this morning, and I would ask
    that my full written statement be entered into the record.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are charged with executing the National
    Defense Strategy's number one objective: Defend the Homeland.
        Our adversaries have watched, learned, and invested to
    offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses. They have
    demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate their
    capability, capacity and intent to hold our Homeland at risk
    below the nuclear threshold.
        The changing security envirnoment makes it clear that the
    Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no
    longer protective moats. They are now avenues of approach,
    which highlights the increase in adversary presence in the
    Arctic.
        We need to invest in a capable and persistent defense that
    can deter adversaries, protect critical infrastructure, enable
    power projection forward and prevent Homeland vulnerabilities.
        To deter, detect, and defeat the threats arrayed against
    the Homeland today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are transforming our
    commands and our way of thinking. We cannot defend the Nation
    against 21st century threats with 20th century technology. We
    must be able to outpace our adversaries using a layered defense
    infused with our latest technology.
        As such, our layered defense needs to establish awareness
    in all domains, from below the oceans to the highest levels of
    space, including the unseen cyber domain, which are all at
    risk. We need a layered sensing grid, with sensors in all
    domains, to detect and track threats from their point of
    origin.
        It requires the ability to discriminate between ballistic
    missiles, advanced cruise missiles, hypersonics and small
    unmanned aerial systems at the full ranges from which they are
    employed as well as the platforms from which they are
    delivered.
        We need an adaptable architecture for Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control, capable of fusing a myriad of sensors
    across the globe into accurate, decision-quality threat
    information, and at the speed of relevance for effective
    command and control.
        Lastly, we need the ability to deploy defeat mechanisms
    capable of neutralizing advanced weapons systems in order to
    defend the Homeland. We have put great effort into these areas,
    such as ballistic missile defense, and the need also exists to
    agressively defeat additional threats, to include the ever-
    growing cyber and cruise missile threat.
        Consistent with these concepts, we are changing how we
    engage with industry. We are in partnership with the Defense
    industry to harness emerging technologies and also collaborate
    with the commercial industry to leverage existing and rapidly
    advancing technology in order to apply them to our current
    Homeland defense problem sets.
        We have shared our toughest challenges with a wide array of
    industry partners, ranging from traditional large defense
    companies to small and new commercial start-ups, so they can
    plug into our Homeland defense system of systems. we have
    received an overwhelming response from industry and we are
    optimistic. However, more needs to be done to keep pace with
    the advancing threats to our Homeland. We need to ensure we
    have complete awareness of what is happening in and around our
    great Nation and have the ability to defeat all threats.
        In line with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and to
    capture our sense of urgency, we have declared 2020 as the year
    of Homeland defense. We are mindful of the gravity of our
    mission and of the trust that you have placed in us. You and
    the Committee should have great faith in the men and women at
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD because together, we have the watch. Thank
    you for your support and I look forward to your questions.

            Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       Prepared Statement by Admiral Charles A. Richard, USN, Commander,
                        United States Strategic Command

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        So that being the case, we will go ahead and just start
    with questions. I only have one that I really wanted to get to.
    I talked to both of you guys on other occasions about this, but
    what we ran up against--and this was kind of a surprise to a
    lot of us--the NNSA's [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] primary job is to build the nuclear warheads to
    meet the requirements of the Department of Defense (DOD).
    Earlier this year when we heard that the NNSA budget had been
    cut, we called the DOD and asked them what they thought, and to
    my surprise, when I got a hold of them, they said they did not
    know because they do not get it until after such time as--
    actually I think Energy gets it first, and so they did not have
    it. I am not sure how it happened.
        Then I went back and I have talked to you folks about it.
    What are you really able to do if you do not hear about what
    the budget is before it is already signed off or in the process
    of being concluded? That is something we have a concern about.
        Then it reminded me back when I was first elected--and that
    was when David Boren had this job, and he called me. I remember
    this. This was way back in 1994. He called me up and he said,
    well, Inhofe, there is something I have been trying to get done
    for a long time and I failed. Maybe you can do it, and it was
    correcting this very problem that we are pointing out right
    now. So we may be addressing this.
        So the question I would ask you is do you agree this thing
    ought to be changed. You got to be in on this thing to know--
    you remember what we did earlier this year. We had to go in and
    talk to the President because they had dropped the budget down
    about 8 percent on NNSA, and nobody was aware of it except the
    Department of Energy. So we went and talked to the President
    and had a meeting, and we brought it back up to just under the
    20 figure. So that is what happened there.
        Do the two of you agree that this is something that needs
    to be corrected after all these years?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud yours and the
    Committee's leadership in addressing the necessary resources
    for the nuclear weapons complex. That, along with nuclear
    command and control and recapitalization of the triad systems,
    are essential for maintaining strategic deterrence, which is
    foundational to everything else we do inside the Defense
    Department.
        Chairman, you are well aware of the responsibility of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council to certify NNSA's budget, and I have a
    role in providing a recommendation to the Nuclear Weapons
    Council to that end.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
        Admiral Richard. If there are weaknesses--and you described
    one--in terms of our ability in a timely manner to do that,
    that is something that I will take up with the Secretary to
    address how we might be able to do that better.
        Chairman Inhofe. Why do we not do this for the record? We
    will just start this discussion going and not try to do it
    under the timelines we are dealing with today.
        So I will go ahead. I had one other area to bring up. Last
    summer, the Missile Defense Agency canceled their program to
    modernize the ground-based interceptors that were up in Alaska
    due to technical failures. The next generation interceptor,
    then, we find will not likely be fielded until 2030. I think
    that would be a good thing for you to answer on the record as
    to what about that gap, can we handle that gap, because
    everyone up here is going to be interested in that. Okay?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, I am terribly concerned that there has
    been no significant effort to extend the New START [Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement with Russia. Do you believe
    that New START treaty gives you critical value in planning
    strategic concerns based upon on-site inspections and deck
    relations, and if it is not extended, you will be at a
    disadvantage?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, New START treaty has
    been valuable to this Nation and to my command. The Russians
    are largely compliant with it. It does have the benefit of not
    only limiting the total number of strategic weapons to both
    nations' benefit, and it has the transparency and confidence-
    building measures that you just described, all of which has
    been good for deterrence.
        However, it does not address a very large class of weapons
    that the Russians have a significant advantage in. It does not
    constrain novel systems, and it is a bilateral treaty.
        Ultimately a decision to extend a treaty is a political
    decision. I do provide best military advice down the lines of
    what I just offered to my department to contribute to that.
        Senator Reed. But if we do not do this, we will lose a
    great deal in terms of deterrence, in terms of, just as I
    mentioned previously, signaling for the first time in 40-plus
    years there is no arms control regime in the world, and that
    could lead to proliferation, not just eroded relationships
    between Russia and the United States.
        Thank you, Admiral. I just want to--in the context of
    moving quickly.
        General O'Shaughnessy, one of the issues that came up in
    our discussions and also in your testimony is the threat of
    cruise missiles to the United States. We are configured pretty
    well since the 1950s for ballistic missiles, but cruise
    missiles and other hypersonic weapon systems are more
    challenging.
        Give us an idea of what you think you need to be effective
    to deal with this cruise missile threat.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator, for highlighting
    that important threat that we have facing us today as a Nation
    and something that we really have to invest in in order to
    maintain our competitive advantage and our ability to defend
    this great Nation over time.
        Specifically, I think as we look at the way we have been
    approaching the threats we have been looking and from the
    ballistic missile standpoint and then cruise missiles, kind of
    UASs--and I think we have to look at this more holistically,
    and really we need domain awareness over our entire territory
    and the approaches to it. Then if we are able to have that
    domain awareness with sensors from the undersea all the way up
    through space, we can then take that to be able to defend
    ourselves against all the threats, to include the cruise
    missile threat that you mentioned.
        Some of the things that we are doing right now to get after
    that, as an example in this year's budget, we are increasing
    our domain awareness capability with sensors within the
    National Capital Region. For example, with our wide area
    surveillance program, we have money this year for over the
    horizon radars that will not only be helpful for cruise missile
    threats but also hypersonic threats. We also have funding in
    place for some additional radars to give us the ability to
    truly see and understand the domain on the approaches to us.
        But this is just a start. Senator, what I would say is we
    have to invest into the future in understanding what is
    happening in and around our territory and really understanding
    our ability to have defeat mechanisms that can defeat these
    proliferated threats such as the cruise missiles.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        I yield back all my time.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, your opening statement refers to an
    increase in both Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. On page 4,
    it states that China is likely to double the size of their
    stockpile by the end of this decade. On page 5, it states that
    Russia's overall nuclear stockpile is, ``likely to grow
    significantly over the next decade.''
        Does our current program of record for modernization expand
    our nuclear forces?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, it does not. We do not seek
    parity. It is not only in the statement in terms of what they
    are going to do, we could also back up and look at what Russia
    in particular has been doing over the last 15 years to expand
    and modernize her arsenal, all while we just extended life-
    extended systems that we already have.
        So the recapitalization that we are asking for is one-for-
    one. We do not seek more. We do not seek a greater number. We
    simply seek a sufficient number of capabilities to enable us to
    achieve national objectives.
        Senator Fischer. I have been struck by the reception that
    this budget has gotten. Earlier this week, a New York Times
    column summed up the budget's investment in nuclear
    modernization by saying, ``the President's spending proposal
    requests money for a new arms race with Russia and with China
    and restores nuclear weapons as central to military policy.''
        The truth is actually the opposite of that. There is no
    policy change, as you stated, that relates to nuclear weapons
    in this budget, and it is Russia and China that are expanding
    their arsenals while we are not. Is that correct?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I must confess the whole concept
    that we are starting an arms race baffles me in terms of no
    nation has done more than the United States to reduce the
    reliance on nuclear weapons. No nation has divested more
    nuclear weapons than the United States has. We have waited 15
    years in some cases to the absolute limits of what our systems
    will go before we simply sought to replace like for like inside
    our triad. So I do not understand where the concept of an arms
    race comes in, and you are absolutely correct, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        On page 12 of your prepared remarks, you state, ``our
    nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation
    around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our
    national defense. I cannot overemphasize the need to modernize
    our nuclear forces and recapitalize the supporting
    infrastructure to ensure we can maintain this deterrent in the
    future. I am concerned that the oft-repeated message of the
    need to modernize and recapitalize has lost its impact and that
    collectively we have under-estimated the risks associated with
    such a complex and time-constrained modernization and
    recapitalization effort. Even seemingly small issues can have a
    disproportionate impact on the force. We cannot afford more
    delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities and must
    maintain a focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the
    associated infrastructure.''
        I really appreciate your candor on this. As you know, we
    continue to hear calls to slow down, to cut funding, and to
    reexamine issues that have already been studied numerous times.
    I appreciate your clear description of the urgency that we
    have.
        Do you have anything you would like to add to that?
        Admiral Richard. No, ma'am, other than----
        Senator Fischer. I took the words right out of your mouth.
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. We chose those very carefully
    to accurately describe the situation this Nation faces. These
    capabilities are foundational to our survival as a Nation. It
    is a great credit that we have been able to take the--it is a
    once every other generation responsibility to recapitalize the
    strategic deterrent. We had wise leaders back in the 1980s who
    saw the need for this--leadership and resources. We have
    benefited with no nuclear use for up to 42 years in some cases
    with particular weapon systems, no great power war, and the
    return on investment that we achieved--the submarine is a great
    example, designed for 30 years. We thought that was what we
    were going to get. In fact, you wind up getting 42. What a
    credit to the people that designed it, built it, operated it,
    that we were able to take it out as far as we can. But in the
    submarine's case, we are literally reaching physics and
    engineering limits such that you cannot extend it. You can only
    take a piece of high-strength steel, pressurize it at great
    depths, then take that pressure back off before you just do not
    want to get in the tube anymore. That is the limits that we
    have reached, and it is our turn to provide that leadership for
    the next 40 or 50 years to give them the benefits that we have
    already received.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy, for your meeting with me
    yesterday. I would commend to my colleagues that they also
    contact you to have a classified briefing on what we need to do
    with our cruise missiles. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer,
        Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to
    consider two civilian nominations and a list of 871 pending
    military nominations. All the nominations have been before the
    Committee the required length of time.
        First, I ask the Committee to consider the nomination of
    James McPherson to be Under Secretary of the Army and Charles
    Williams to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
    Installations, and Environment.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian
    nominations out?
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Chairman Inhofe. Is there a second?
        Senator Fischer. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. Any opposition?
        [No response.]
        Chairman Inhofe. That does pass.
        Finally I ask the Committee to consider a list of 871
    pending military nominations. Is there a motion to favorably
    report these 871?
        Senator Shaheen. So moved.
        Senator Fischer. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. Second.
        All in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Opposed?
        [No response.]
        Chairman Inhofe. It carries.
        [The information referred to follows:]

     MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
     WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 13,
                                     2020.
         1.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Colin R. Young) (Reference No. 1224)
         2.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Mario A. Ortega) (Reference No. 1378)
         3.  LTG Thomas A. Bussiere, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (Reference No. 1386)
         4.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
    of brigadier general (list begins with Joseph R. Harris II) (Reference
    No. 1387)
         5.  BG Billy M. Nabors, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
    1388)
         6.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 24 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with AnnMarie K. Anthony)
    (Reference No. 1389)
         7.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 14 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with Dann S. Carlson)
    (Reference No. 1391)
         8.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade
    of major general (list begins with Steven J. deMilliano) (Reference No.
    1392)
         9.  BG Andrew J. MacDonald, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
    1393)
        10.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the
    grade of major general (list begins with Todd M. Audet) (Reference No.
    1394)
        11.  BG Christopher E. Finerty, ANG to be major general (Reference
    No. 1395)
        12.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of major general (Joseph B. Wilson) (Reference No. 1396)
        13.  Col. Ronald F. Taylor, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 1398)
        14.  BG Aaron R. Dean II, ARNG to be major general (Reference No.
    1399)
        15.  BG Michael S. Martin, USMCR to be major general (Reference No.
    1401)
        16.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with Douglas K. Clark)
    (Reference No. 1403)
        17.  LTG Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commander, Air Mobility Command (Reference No. 1441)
        18.  In the Air Force there are 5 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Joshua E. Erlandsen) (Reference No. 1443)
        19.  In the Air Force there are 44 appointments to be lieutenant
    colonel (list begins with Matthew G. Adkins) (Reference No. 1444)
        20.  In the Air Force there are 31 appointments to be lieutenant
    colonel (list begins with Jenara L. Allen) (Reference No. 1445)
        21.  In the Air Force there are 129 appointments to be lieutenant
    colonel (list begins with Daniel J. Adams) (Reference No. 1446)
        22.  In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to be colonel (list
    begins with Jennifer R. Bein) (Reference No. 1447)
        23.  In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to be colonel (list
    begins with Wesley M. Abadie) (Reference No. 1448)
        24.  In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Lior Aljadeff) (Reference No. 1449)
        25.  In the Air Force there are 294 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Jason K. Adams) (Reference No. 1450)
        26.  In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be lieutenant
    colonel (list begins with Victoria M. Aglewilson) (Reference No. 1451)
        27.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Junelene M. Bungay) (Reference No. 1452)
        28.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant
    colonel (Christopher J. Nastal) (Reference No. 1453)
        29.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Alexander
    Khutoryan) (Reference No. 1454)
        30.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Daniel S.
    Kim) (Reference No. 1455)
        31.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Marilyn
    L. Smith) (Reference No. 1456)
        32.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel
    (Zachary J. Conly) (Reference No. 1457)
        33.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Audrey J.
    Dean) (Reference No. 1458)
        34.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel
    (Michael W. Brancamp) (Reference No. 1459)
        35.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Tracy J.
    Brown) (Reference No. 1460)
        36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Kenneth A.
    Wieder) (Reference No. 1461)
        37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel
    (Chong K. Yi) (Reference No. 1462)
        38.  In the Army Reserve there are 11 appointments to be colonel
    (list begins with John C. Benson) (Reference No. 1467)
        39.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Ross C.
    Puffer) (Reference No. 1468)
        40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Amanda G.
    Luschinski) (Reference No. 1469)
        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (June E.
    Osavio) (Reference No. 1470)
        42.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to be major (list begins
    with Yasmin J. Alter) (Reference No. 1471)
        43.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to be lieutenant colonel
    (list begins with Otha J. Holmes) (Reference No. 1472)
        44.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel
    (Shaun P. Miller) (Reference No. 1473)
        45.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major (Keith
    A. Stevenson) (Reference No. 1474)
        46.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Krista H.
    Clarke) (Reference No. 1475)
        47.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be colonel (Peter K.
    Marlin) (Reference No. 1476)
        48.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Angela I.
    Iyanobor) (Reference No. 1477)
        49.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel
    (John J. Landers) (Reference No. 1478)
        50.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (David P.
    Frommer) (Reference No. 1479)
        51.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander
    (Catherine M. Dickinson) (Reference No. 1480)
        52.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be commander (Donald A.
    Sinitiere) (Reference No. 1481)
        53.  In the Navy there are 61 appointments to be captain and below
    (list begins with Stephen W. Aldridge) (Reference No. 1483)
        54.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be captain (Paul J.
    Kaylor) (Reference No. 1484)
        55.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander
    (Andrew S. Jackson) (Reference No. 1485)
        56.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Joseph P. Ball) (Reference No. 1489)
        57.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Donald K. Brown) (Reference No. 1490)
        58.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Christina L. Hudson) (Reference No. 1491)
        59.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to be major (list
    begins with James M. Shipman) (Reference No. 1492)
        60.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major
    (Christopher L. Kaiser) (Reference No. 1493)
        61.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Peter T. Graham) (Reference No. 1494)
        62.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list
    begins with Daniel E. Fuson) (Reference No. 1495)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 871

        Now, for those who may have come in a little bit late, we
    are waiving opening statements. We are going to get right to
    the questions, and we are going to adhere to the 5-minute rule.
    Thank you very much.
        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and for your service.
        I want to follow up on Senator Reed's question about the
    New START treaty because, as he pointed out, we are less than a
    year from its expiration. We could extend it for 5 years
    without going through a whole Senate confirmation process, and
    it seems to me--while I recognize the concern that you
    expressed, Admiral Richard, that I have heard from other
    sources about the fact that it does not encompass a number of
    other weapons. The fact is we could extend it and work on those
    other weapons at the same time without losing the important
    information that we are currently getting from New START.
        So I wonder if you could describe how STRATCOM uses
    information from New START such as through inspections and data
    exchanges as you look at your day-to-day planning.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, so that insight gives us a much
    better idea of what the threat level is from that particular
    class of weapon systems are, which enables us to do a very
    calculated and thorough job of determining exactly how we deter
    the use of that, all very valuable and helpful. So I would
    desire to keep those attributes.
        But I am also required to do the same thing on the parts
    that are not included in the treaty. So better for me if we
    could down a path to address all of that.
        Senator Shaheen. Sure. But if we do not extend New START
    and it expires next February, you lose that information. Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Richard. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. I think this is probably for General
    O'Shaughnessy. Last August, 33 airmen from New Hampshire's Air
    National Guard spent several weeks on a remote Alaskan island
    near the Bering Sea. I am sorry Senator Sullivan is not here
    because they were part of a rotating group of airmen and
    guardsmen who were helping to build a new home for a group of
    indigenous people who have been displaced due to rising sea
    levels.
        Can you talk about what you see from climate change and
    what we are doing to try and shore up our infrastructure and to
    be prepared for the challenges we are going to face as climate
    change increases and creates more of these kinds of situations?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would talk to is the
    importance of the Arctic and specifically in this case Alaska
    not only, as you mentioned, with increased activity and the
    things that we are seeing and some problems with erosion that
    are very real--they are real from both a military aspect, as
    well as, of course, as you mentioned, the indigenous
    population.
        One of the things that we try to do is we partner, as you
    mentioned, with organizations that are tied to the indigenous
    people--for example, Tulikika and AFN has been a great
    partner--because I think we have common challenges of which we
    might have common solutions. We went to Barrow, for example,
    and saw some of the erosion as the ice has melted and now the
    waves are hitting the shore. That affects us and some of our
    radar installations just as much as it effects the local
    village, and so we are trying to partner with the local
    communities to truly understand what is happening and the
    impacts.
        But we also see it because simultaneously this is a
    critical part for us for the defense of our Homeland. If you
    look at it as an avenue of approach and we see the Arctic as an
    avenue of approach to our Homeland that we need to be able to
    defend, and we need to be able to operate out of. Therefore,
    you need infrastructure. You need the ability to actually bring
    your force in and sustain a force. You need to be able to
    communicate. You need to actually understand what is happening
    in that domain and have the domain awareness.
        These are very similar. We find multiple opportunities in
    some of the forums that we have led with our partners in both
    industry, local populations, local communities, all the way
    down to the villages that we find these common approaches that
    we might be able to solve. We are working, for example, in
    communications that might help us with the proliferation of LEO
    [low Earth orbit]. That would bring communication not only to
    us as a military but even to the remotest villages.
        Senator Shaheen. So, as you are looking at preparing
    budgets for future years, how are you factoring in the cost of
    those infrastructure needs that we have as we are seeing the
    impacts of climate change?
        General O'Shaughnessy. So what we are doing is we are
    trying to look at the infrastructure that we need, the
    infrastructure that we need to be able to defend our nation.
    This is actually not just with the United States We are working
    in partnership with Canada, and especially with my NORAD hat
    on, we are very interested in similar issues that we see from
    the Canadian front of having an infrastructure in place
    throughout the Arctic that will give us the ability to defend
    our nation. In doing so, we have to have the sustainability of
    that infrastructure going into the future.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
        Admiral Richard, I will start with you as we continue the
    discussion about modernization. As has been discussed, the
    ground-based strategic deterrent will replace the Minuteman III
    as the sole intercontinental ballistic missile starting about
    the mid-2020s. Congress has appropriated the funds to do that
    for this fiscal year.
        But while the GBSD will enter service this decade, the Air
    Force will continue to sustain the Minuteman III into the
    2030s. This is an old program from the 1970s, and I think some
    of the silos date back to maybe even the 1960s. I am concerned
    about failure to modernize with our nuclear deterrent, and I
    think that in the long run, this will be a lot more costly and
    makes it a risky gamble with our national survival.
        So just if you can, how are we balancing the maintenance
    issues that will occur as we continue to hold onto the
    Minuteman III and talk a little bit about that. Are you
    confident then that as we move into the new system, that the
    timeline is suitable as a deterrent?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the short answer is yes. It is
    yet another example of why we have no margin left in terms of
    the need to recapitalize. In terms of sustainment of Minuteman
    III, I am not sure that it is often recognized the
    extraordinary levels the Air Force went to to be able to
    accomplish that. Unlike a submarine, which is designed to have
    depot level maintenance, the Minuteman III was not. It was
    designed to serve for a certain period of time and get
    replaced, and the Air Force went in after the fact and figured
    out how to take that and get a depot maintenance capability
    retrofitted into the weapon system that will then enable it to
    go till the crossover point. I think it is a great credit to
    the Air Force they were able to accomplish that. That is what
    gives me confidence, provided no further delay in GBSD, that
    this will work.
        Senator Ernst. Well, God bless the Air Force, you know,
    their extraordinary effort, and it just points to the fact,
    though, that as Congress, we need to be aware of these issues
    and make sure that we stay on top of it.
        General O'Shaughnessy, thank you for being here.
        I am going to redirect and talk about something that has
    not been brought up yet.
        At the SOUTHCOM posture hearing, I asked Admiral Faller
    about challenges with COCOM and interagency coordination to
    stop the flow of drugs and human trafficking over our southern
    border and entering into the United States. It is surprising
    but my home State of Iowa really sees one of the highest rates
    of human trafficking, and I know that there are many colleagues
    here that have those same concerns and same issues in their
    home States. We have also felt the pain and the pressure of
    illicit drugs that enter into the stream in our States.
        What I would like to hear from you is thoughts on how that
    interagency coordination is going, the collaboration that you
    might have with SOUTHCOM, and what are the efforts that we see
    to push back on some of the flows of drugs and human
    trafficking?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for
    highlighting that.
        One of the things that we do find is a very strong
    collaboration amongst the interagency. I think it starts with
    the Interdiction Committee and that is led, of course, by the
    Drug Czar and Admiral Schultz as the co-chairs, but it brings
    the entire interagency together with respect to the
    counternarcotics, counterdrug, and the transnational organized
    crime and the aspects of that. It is a great forum of which we
    all get together. Admiral Faller is there, as well as myself,
    to really bring the team together, if you will.
        In addition, as you mentioned, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM have a
    great relationship. In fact, Admiral Faller is actually my
    cousin, as it turns out. So there is a great relationship
    there.
        Senator Ernst. Okay, good. Sounds a lot like Iowa.
        [Laughter.]
        General O'Shaughnessy. We see that we clearly have to work
    together as we do this.
        We actually went down together to Mexico City to meet with
    the Mexican leadership and especially looking at SEDENA and
    SAMARA and the great work that they are doing to help with both
    the migration flow and the counternarcotics problem.
        Then we went right from there to Guatemala, and we were
    able to work with the local Guatemalan officials and really see
    how do we stem this flow and how do we get to the roots to be
    able stem that flow.
        I think it is those kind of relationships and working
    together that is important, but is also important what we are
    doing on our actual border, and as you know, we are very active
    with respect to some of the work that we are doing to provide
    assistance. We are the lead Federal Agency but we provide great
    assistance because we see this as a national crisis, 68,000 to
    69,000 Americans killed last year. That is something that we
    have to be a part of the solution, and we are. We flew over
    5,000 hours in support of that last year, over 2,000 man-days
    of intelligence analysis. It is one of the things I think we
    bring as the military, that we can bring that expertise and
    bring that right to our interagency partners. We continue to
    find those areas where we can bring that value to the
    interagency process.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate it so much. Thank you,
    gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here and thank you for your
    service.
        Admiral, thanks particularly for your enormous contribution
    to our submarine force. I assume you continue to share the
    Navy's strategy and support it to achieve 66 submarines by
    2048.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I do.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am somewhat disquieted, even dismayed
    by the apparent change of pace in construction reflected in
    this budget, dropping one of the submarines that was planned
    for this year at the Electric Boat shipyard. Do you share that
    concern that we may be falling off the necessary pace?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I am pleased that Navy is
    maintaining the highest priority on the Columbia-class
    submarine, which directly supports my mission set, and beyond
    that, I think that is just indicative of the difficult budget
    choices that Navy and the whole Department of Defense are
    having to make.
        Senator Blumenthal. But those budget choices reflect
    priorities, and the Virginia-class--and I agree with you
    completely about the Columbia-class and there is a lot of
    progress in the budget in that regard. But the Virginia-class
    is essential to our undersea superiority. Is it not?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the Virginia-class submarine is
    the finest submarine in the world.
        Senator Blumenthal. We want to continue to build more of
    them.
        Admiral Richard. Absolutely, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. In that regard, I want to ask about
    hypersonic missiles which in your testimony you say, ``ensure
    our deterrence and conventional power remains strong in the
    future.'' Are you satisfied with the investment that we are
    making in hypersonic missiles, given the Russians and the
    Chinese investing so heavily in them? That can be a question
    for both of you.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I will start with, because
    there are two ways to answer--there are two aspects to your
    question. One is offensive use of hypersonics by us, plus there
    is a defensive piece, and I remind everybody the Russians have
    publicly reported that they have hypersonics on alert now. This
    is a very real thing.
        My command has had a longstanding requirement for
    conventional prompt strike. Hypersonic technologies would be an
    ideal way to go accomplish that, and I think that enables me to
    better deter threats to this nation. Also, I have
    responsibility for global strike already inside the Department
    of Defense, and I think we would be an ideal command because we
    have concepts, command, and control ready to go to use that to
    the best advantage.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied, though, that we are
    investing sufficiently in all of the aspects of hypersonics
    both offensive----
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I am. I was actually very pleased
    in the priority. It is in line with the National Defense
    Strategy in terms of the priority that this budget submission
    puts in that and a couple of other technical areas.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you concerned about a developing
    potential arms race in hypersonics?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, no. Again, it is do you have
    sufficient capability, technologies to meet our national
    objectives. I think we are on pace to do that.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I would highlight on the
    defensive side, one of the key aspects I think is the space
    sensing layer and the importance that we invest in that and
    continue to invest, which we are and this budget includes that.
    But we need to continue to invest in that space sensing layer
    because as we go from a ballistic missile to a hypersonic glide
    vehicle, for instance, it really changes the problem of
    maintaining custody of that weapon system throughout its entire
    flight, and the best way to get at that is the space sensing
    layer. So I strongly endorse continued investment in that for a
    defensive.
        It is also about awareness because unlike a ballistic
    missile where you know where it is going, the hypersonic glide
    vehicle--you do not necessarily know because it has the energy
    and the ability to maneuver. We have to be able to keep track
    of that, and so I can give the warning to Admiral Richard so he
    knows where that is going from the NORTHCOM and NORAD
    perspective.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I agree with you that it
    introduces a potential game-changing technology and new
    challenges in terms of both defense and deterrence and offense,
    and I would like to ask for more information perhaps in a
    classified setting if we can arrange a briefing.
        I am also going to submit for the record, because we are
    adhering strictly to time limits, questions on the threats
    posed by cyber. I understand there was a recent cybersecurity
    conference that involved the National Guard, which I would like
    to learn more about, and also troops at the border. So I will
    be submitting questions for the record on those two topics.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard, I want to return to the
    budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
    President's budget has it at just under $20 billion. Are you
    confident that that is a sufficient number to proceed with
    nuclear modernization?
        Admiral Richard. Senator Cotton, the short answer is yes.
    There is not a lot of excess margin that number, but it is
    sufficient.
        I will also offer that I have a very close relationship
    with NNSA. I just spoke to Ms. Gordon-Hagerty actually
    yesterday in a continuing series. I would point to that as an
    example of us making sure that she has the right resources.
        Senator Cotton. And if you take the warhead modernization
    program on the one hand and you take the triad modernization--
    the delivery systems on the other hand, that is also a number
    that is satisfactory to keep those two things integrated over
    the next several years?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, again with no extra margin.
    I would throw in nuclear command and control as the third piece
    of that that also needs to be synchronized.
        Senator Cotton. I would as well given the fact that we have
    woefully--woefully--undercapitalized our nuclear command and
    control and infrastructure over the last many decades.
        The one thing I hear you say, not much excess margin. To
    the extent that Congress does not meet that budget number of
    just under $20 billion, would we be introducing more risk into
    those programs for every dollar that we go below it?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, and in fact, we are close
    enough into this recapitalization that we can also give you a
    number where you start to see points of no return, and they are
    not that far off. They are in the early 2030s, that if we do
    not recapitalize now, we simply lose the fundamental
    infrastructure and capacity that if we cross over, you cannot
    recover for like a decade no matter how much money you put at
    it. Those points are starting to come into view.
        Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, I want to talk about
    the Wuhan coronavirus. It is the Wuhan coronavirus, not some
    politically correct name that a bunch of politically correct
    bureaucrats at the World Health Organization have come up with,
    to give you a sense of their misplaced priorities.
        You were recently directed in your role as Commander of the
    Northern Command to begin prudent planning for a potential
    pandemic. I think it is very prudent to begin prudent planning.
    So could you talk us through what the role for Northern Command
    would be in such a situation and the extent to which you have
    already begun planning or even exercises for that scenario?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. So, Senator, what we are
    doing first and the immediate actions we have taken have been
    in support of Health and Human Services with respect to housing
    some Americans coming home, and I think right now we have over
    600 still in our facilities in support of both the State
    Department bringing their folks home, as well as HHS. That has
    been going extremely well, and we appreciate the close
    coordination through the interagency to make that happen. It
    also is tied to 11 airports, of which we have facilities that
    are on standby in coordination with both the Department of
    Homeland Security, as well as HHS and CDC, as you would
    imagine. The ongoing collaboration continues to make sure we
    are part of the support structure that we would have here
    within the United States to be able to respond to this virus.
        Now, to your point about the global aspects of this and our
    role as NORTHCOM, we are, as you would expect, doing the
    appropriate prudent military planning to ensure that we are
    able to respond. The types of things that we are doing is, for
    example, we are running a BTC every single day and that
    includes representatives from all around the globe, all the
    geographic combatant commands that are in there to make sure
    that we see what is happening within their regions and that we
    are centrally managing that from our headquarters in NORTHCOM.
        We have plans in place, as you would imagine, that look for
    what is the scope that this could go to potentially and making
    sure that we are not caught by surprise.
        Both our role that we are doing in the day-to-day is very
    much informative to the role that we are doing for the planning
    and making sure that we are prepared for the worst case
    scenario that might happen and make sure we are doing that
    globally not just here in the United States.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I think we are still at
    only 14 cases in the United States that have been confirmed by
    public health authorities.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Let us hope that remains the case. I think
    we are in a much better position than we were a few weeks ago
    when we had 20,000 people landing in the United States from
    mainland China every single day. So I commend the President and
    the administration for the travel ban put in place.
        But there are still around a million and a half Americans
    who traveled from--or a million and a half persons who traveled
    from mainland China starting in mid-November until the travel
    ban went into place. So we have even a fraction of what China
    reported, just overnight, 14,000 cases, which I should add were
    not newly discovered cases or the result of new scientific
    breakthroughs, but a political decision to finally start
    getting a little bit closer to the truth. Obviously, it is
    going to put a lot of emphasis and stress on the mission and
    the planning that you and your people have been doing. So thank
    you for that.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Admiral Richard, congratulations on your
    assumption of command, and I would remiss if I did not invite
    you back to Sandia and Los Alamos. I know you have been there
    before.
        But during your confirmation hearing, you agreed that
    restoring plutonium pit production at Los Alamos is the
    military's top priority. However, in your answer you also
    stated that there are issues. Now that you have had a little
    time to work with NNSA and get up to speed on that, I would
    like to ask you to articulate what the specific issues and
    impediments are that you see in meeting the current goals.
        Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, when I talked about the
    weapons complex infrastructure, the plutonium pit would be the
    first thing that I would call attention to in terms of our
    nation's ability to generate that number of pits that is
    essential simply for the sustainment programs that we desire to
    go do. The concern actually again was funding. Step one is to
    provide adequate resources. I am very confident, particularly
    in the near term at Los Alamos, that with adequate funding we
    can deliver 30 pits per year by 2026, and I continue to work
    with NNSA and Ms. Gordon-Hagerty to make sure the longer-term
    plan is also--I have equal confidence in that.
        Senator Heinrich. One of my concerns with regard to that is
    if we are going to do pit production at two locations and the
    intellectual capital is currently pretty much all at Los
    Alamos, not losing, not poaching that capital to a second
    facility before we actually get job number one done. Do you
    share those concerns?
        Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, not only do I share them,
    but it is in the weapons complex and other areas writ large, do
    we have enough talent to be able to accomplish what we have to
    go do.
        So I work with Ms. Gordon-Hagerty closely on her stack of
    responsibilities with regard to that, as well as we do a number
    of things at United States Strategic Command to bring talent
    into the strategic deterrence area at large. I can give you a
    longer answer for a question for the record. But, for example,
    we have an academic alliance with over 70 colleges and
    universities where we are trying to encourage people to come in
    and develop expertise in national security strategic
    deterrence, and the weapons complex benefits from that.
        Senator Heinrich. As you have articulated, we are pushing
    up against very thin margins on all three parts of the triad.
    What are the consequences for your command if any one of those
    legs experiences a significant delay? And if that were to
    occur, how would you rebalance?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I thank you for that
    question.
        I think we all well know the commanders of Strategic
    Command have been repeatedly asked that question over time.
    Part of how we got to the point that we are at was by doing
    operational mitigations to make up for lack of earlier
    decisions to recapitalize.
        We are very close to turning that rheostat about as far as
    it is going to go. So the last remaining things that I have--
    and you can refer to them as a hedge. Sometimes that is more
    thought of for the weapons complex. But the triad itself was
    built with an overlapping, interlocking set of attributes that
    are very complementary, and each leg makes up for the
    weaknesses in the other leg.
        I would get to the point where I--basically that is called
    inter-leg hedging. I would have to start taking the attributes
    of the triad apart, and I will lose attributes along the way.
    So I can cross-cover with one piece of the triad on another,
    but I may lose the survivability of the ballistic missile
    submarines. I may lose the flexibility and signaling for the
    bombers. That is about what is left for us to do.
        Senator Heinrich. Moving on real quick, I do not have a lot
    of time left. But you are familiar with my interest in
    hypersonics and more broadly in just maintaining the R&D focus
    to have a third offset, whether that is through the lens of
    hypersonics or directed energy or, for that matter, artificial
    intelligence.
        We are seeing a big bump in this budget in the area of
    hypersonics. It is a $3.2 billion overall number. It is a 23
    percent increase. How is that money going to be spent so that
    when you are scaling, that you are still efficient and spending
    it wisely?
        Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, that question would be best
    answered by the services that are responsible. All of them are
    working on it. I am pleased with the progress. I am working to
    make sure that when that capability is delivered, I am ready to
    receive it with concepts of operation and command and control,
    being able to immediately put it to use defending the nation.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
        Senator Scott. First, thank you both for your service.
        General O'Shaughnessy, I think we have all been following
    what Communist China has been doing around the world. I am from
    Florida, and so everybody in Florida is clearly watching what
    is happening in Latin America, especially Communist China's
    involvement in Venezuela but even in other countries with their
    investments. What they are trying to do is build relationships
    and make people dependent on them.
        How does Communist China's involvement in Latin America
    impact our national security?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Well, I think you bring up a good
    point because sometimes it is easy to forget about our own
    neighborhood, as we look at this global competition that we are
    in with China. Admiral Faller has done a really good job I
    think of highlighting that and the consequences thereof and the
    focus that we need to have not only within the Department of
    Defense but as a nation to that.
        Of course, we also see it, for example, in the Bahamas,
    which is even closer to home, where we see China is trying to
    get an influence with one of our closest neighbors and great
    partners.
        I think we have to be cognizant of it. We have to think
    about it from the aspect of what are the implications to us
    from a national security standpoint, and then what are the
    implications to us just as a nation as we see this global
    competition playing out in our own hemisphere close to home.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Admiral Richard, do you think we have enough--whether it is
    Communist China or Russia in Latin America, do you think we
    have the right amount of assets there and the right amount of
    focus there, or do we need to put more focus based on what they
    are doing to try to have an impact close to our borders?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I applaud the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs' focus broadly on global integration, and when
    you take a global view of the competitions that we have, it
    drives visibility into those areas. So I think the Department
    is moving in the right direction to look at the totality of
    what we need to be concerned about and not just focus on one
    geographic region.
        Senator Scott. So Canada is about to make a decision on 5G
    on Huawei. It is my understanding that the military
    establishment in Canada has said that the Trudeau
    administration should not go forward with doing any business
    with Huawei with regard to their 5G.
        How would that impact our relationship with Canada if they
    do?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is clearly
    we see the security implications of 5G not only with Canada but
    with our allies and partners and even here at home. Clearly we
    see this as a national security implications at large, and
    making sure that we, with all our allies and partners--that
    they all go into any negotiations and ultimately procurement of
    infrastructure with clear eyes to truly understand what are the
    risks and then what can we do to mitigate those risks.
        I think as we do continue to work with Canada as a close
    ally and a partner, just like we have done with other allies
    and partners, we need to make sure that we are sharing all the
    intel that we have, which we are, and making sure that we
    provide them all the things that they need to make the proper
    decision and an informed decision to fully understand the risks
    that they take and ultimately the implications, to your point,
    that we might have here at home with what we can share with
    them, how we would share with them, and what the implications
    would be.
        I think as we look at Canada with the NORAD aspect of that,
    that becomes even closer to home because of our binational
    relationship we have with them and making sure that we
    understand the rippling effects of potential security concerns
    relative to Huawei, 5G, and we see as very real concerns.
        Senator Scott. So knowing the risks especially like with
    NORAD, what should Congress be doing to try to make sure that
    Canada makes the right decision and to follow the lead of their
    military establishment that Huawei should not be a partner for
    5G?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I think the continuation of what we
    are doing already, which is the great conversations and
    dialogue that we are having with our partner in Canada, again
    sharing the intel so that we make sure that they understand
    fully the risks that they might be taking on so that they can
    make a decision, their own sovereign decision that they will
    make, but it is an informed decision fully understanding the
    risks, the consequences, and ultimately what the rippling
    effects might be as a result of that from a national security,
    for their own security, and then for us together as a
    binational organization within NORAD as an example, and as we
    are tied with North America very much so the rippling effects
    through the binational, bilateral relationship.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank both of you for your service.
        I can only repeat to you what I have heard in talking and
    listening to people with expertise, and this is how they have
    kind of explained the Cold War coming to an end and where we
    are today and if we are on top of our game or if we are ahead
    of our game. Basically the United States in the 1980s took the
    position to be very aggressive in some of the weapons we
    designed. Russia could not keep up with what we were doing. It
    kind of forced them into a situation where they had to evaluate
    could we defend ourselves against America with the superior
    weapons they have designed. That is what was given to me, along
    those lines.
        Now, if you take it from the Cold War forward, have we
    still stayed on top of our game? It sounds to me as if
    hypersonic weapons and other future weapons have been more
    advanced by other countries such China, even Russia coming back
    into the scene in a real aggressive way, maybe North Korea to a
    certain extent. Are we going to be able to deter them from
    moving forward because of our superiority, or are we going to
    be playing defense to catch up?
        So however you can help me with that to understand it
    better.
        Admiral Richard. Let me start that in terms of, first, I go
    back to that was a choice by China and Russia to develop those
    weapons. We certainly could have done that and we did not. I
    think their actions in many cases speak louder than what they
    tell us in terms of what their intentions are. Again, this is a
    competition just like any other military competition, and I am
    confident that this nation has the ability to produce the
    capabilities we have to have. For deterrence, again the basic
    equation has not changed. Can I deny you your aim or can I
    impose a cost on you that is greater than what you seek? I can
    do that if necessary.
        Senator Manchin. Admiral and General both, the evaluation
    was given to me about the Cold War and the end of the Cold War.
    Is that accurate? We outpaced them so far that they had to come
    to the realization they could not compete and defend
    themselves?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would offer, I would break
    that into a conventional piece and a strategic deterrence
    piece. On the conventional side of the house, in general I
    would say that that is in the main correct. What we were able
    to do on the strategic deterrence side is hold strategic
    deterrence. The whole goal on strategic deterrence is for
    nothing to happen, and we were successfully able to do that. So
    I would recharacterize that slightly in terms of a conventional
    force advantage that we achieved.
        Senator Manchin. General?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would add to that,
    though, as you fast forward to today, what we do see is our
    adversaries really investing in some of that conventional
    capability that does have the ability to hold us at risk and we
    have to, therefore, be able to defend against it. What I am
    referring to, for example, is the submarine that has very good
    capability that carries cruise missiles, some of the long-range
    aviation like the bombers----
        Senator Manchin. We have the USS West Virginia. I have been
    on it and spent some time with them. I appreciate it. You do an
    excellent job.
        General O'Shaughnessy. And so I think from our perspective
    we think a lot from the Cold War about the nuclear aspect and
    deterrence. I think as we reach today, we also have to factor
    in the conventional aspect of this and having peer adversaries
    that have the capability to reach out to us at home in ways
    that we did not have in the Cold War that we have to factor
    into our defense.
        Senator Manchin. My final question would be basically you
    are looking 30 years down the road--at least 30 years down the
    road--for the life of the weapons and the defense that we are
    doing with our triad. Are we looking at their capabilities and
    where they are looking 30 years down the road too and if they
    might be to the point to where they are advancing quicker,
    willing to make more sacrifices, spend more money to become an
    equal super power?
        The One Belt, One Road, as far as I am concerned, is China
    wants to be the only super power left by 2050. I hope Americans
    understand that, and I hope we in Congress understand it. That
    is what I am concerned about. I am determined in my life and
    for my children, whatever I can do and whatever decision can
    prevent that from happening because this is the greatest
    country on earth. There is no doubt what their mission is, what
    China's mission is.
        Admiral Richard. Sir, not only do I agree but I will give
    you a quick example. Columbia is going to be in service until
    2080. The Navy and the submarine force--and there are Air Force
    equivalents to this too--have long had very extensive programs
    that are looking 30 years down the road, and they are physics-
    based--they are not necessarily intel-based--and looking at
    anything that could be developed into a threat so that we in
    parallel start working the countermeasure to that. I have great
    confidence in those programs. They have served us well.
        General O'Shaughnessy. And in my time, I would just quickly
    say that that is why the NDS implementation, which very clear
    focuses on this great competition and the competition with
    China in particular and Russia drives, us to make sure we do
    invest in those right resources that will allow us to compete
    appropriately going into the future, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. It is my confidence in military leaders
    like yourselves that gives me the confidence for my children
    and grandchildren. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your thoughtfulness and coming before us
    today.
        I want to talk a little bit about the hypersonics issue,
    circle back to that, because of Arnault Engineering Development
    Complex which is there in Tennessee, and of course, they are
    very much engaged in some of the work that we are trying to do
    as we look forward. I actually had some people in the office
    yesterday, and we discussed this and Arnault's importance to
    the Air Force.
        But one of the things that continues to come up as we talk
    about hypersonics is personnel and a trained workforce. General
    O'Shaughnessy, I would love to hear from you. Do you think we
    have what we need to meet the demand as we move forward, and
    how do we go about backfilling that? How do you change
    recruitment in order for us to be able to backfill that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for
    highlighting that.
        One of the things we look at, first, there is a capability
    but then there is also a capacity. If you look at our entire
    defense industrial base, one of the things I think we have to
    really focus on is are we able to both have the technology and
    to make sure we are taking advantage of the emerging technology
    in the appropriate ways, but also do we have the capacity to
    turn that into actual weapon systems that can be relevant on
    the battlefield.
        Senator Blackburn. I am glad you mentioned that because I
    had noted in 2017 at a hypersonics conference--I think the
    Chinese had like 250 papers, and it was 10 times what we had
    had.
        So, Admiral Richard, as you look at this, are you
    attracting and training and retaining the experts that are
    going to be needed in order to meet the demand?
        Admiral Richard. Ma'am, the short answer is you are
    highlighting a challenge for the department across the board.
    It is not only in hypersonics that you talk about, but I could
    point to any number of other areas where we face an equivalent
    challenge.
        I had been very pleased in the efforts particularly by the
    services to reach out, develop, attract, and create this
    industrial base that we are going to have to have not only for
    hypersonics but for the capabilities writ large. They are
    working very hard on it.
        Senator Blackburn. Then human capital is one component, but
    then facilities, areas like Arnault Engineering, are important.
    So where are we on the sufficiency of our facilities and having
    what we need there?
        Admiral Richard. Again, I applaud service efforts to go
    after the capacity and the industrial base physical plant
    necessary to achieve the results that you are talking about.
    They are working very hard on both pieces of that.
        Senator Blackburn. Then highlighting another area, let us
    move over and talk about electromagnetic spectrum. As you know,
    this is something where I have spent a good bit of time working
    on how we proceed in this area, how we utilize expertise when
    it comes to working in a contested EW [electronic warfare]
    environment. Do we have that? Are we moving forward with the
    right type work, the visualization, the modeling, so that we
    are growing the expertise in this area?
        Admiral Richard. So, ma'am, let me start that.
        Senator, one, I applaud your interest and your leadership
    in terms of electromagnetic spectrum. That is yet another
    domain not unlike space and cyber that was permissive and we
    had freedom of maneuver for a very long period of time, and
    that has changed. So it too has to have a certain level of
    expertise. The services are working very hard on that.
        For example, if you would allow me to have a Navy flashback
    for a second. I am a joint commander now but just left the
    Navy. The submarine force, which I recently commanded, has been
    an emergency flank wide open trying to develop that expertise
    to the point that we have restructured the electronic
    technicians' rating to elevate greater numbers, better
    training, and I could go into more detail on that. You see all
    the services working like that right now.
        Senator Blackburn. Let me ask you this. Are we at a point
    where we should develop a concept of operations for EW?
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. You hit on a couple of things
    that we have to continue to work on. There are numerous
    concepts of operation. To be able to knit them together in a
    whole is----
        Senator Blackburn. Right, but we need one overriding
    strategy.
        Admiral Richard. One overarching piece----
        Senator Blackburn. And if you are reworking training and
    looking at a different utilization of expertise, then it seems
    to me we would be well served to move to one concept of
    operations that would enable each of our military divisions.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I not only agree, but I
    would also highlight another point you made earlier that a key
    piece of that concept is going to be electronic battle
    management, electronic warfare battle management, the ability
    to visualize. We cannot be statically assigned anymore in our
    use of the RF spectrum. We have to be dynamic. We have to
    maneuver, and we are going to have to be able to visualize and
    understand it to accomplish that. Now, the concepts will start
    from there.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General O'Shaughnessy, one of the questions I ask quite
    frequently in these hearings is what does China want, and I
    want to ask you pointedly, what does China want in the Arctic?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Well, thank you, Senator, for
    allowing me to highlight a little bit of the Arctic and the
    importance of the Arctic. As it relates to one of our global
    competitors and potential adversaries, I think it is important
    to look at what is their desire in the Arctic.
        What we see initially is clearly an economic desire because
    of the natural resources there, and they want to be able to
    take full advantage of those resources.
        But we also see activity, for example, the Xuelong, one of
    their supposed scientific research vessels that potentially
    could be the precursor to increased submarine activity and
    those things from a more nefarious aspect.
        So we are looking at it clearly to understand what is it
    they are trying to do, but from our perspective, we are
    concerned about that as an avenue of approach. We are concerned
    about that as----
        Senator King. They are clearly highly interested. I was at
    an Arctic conference in Iceland a couple of years ago. There
    was a 40-person delegation from China, and they have designated
    themselves as a near-Arctic nation, which is like Australia
    saying--you know. But there they are.
        Now, let me follow up. There was a sentence in your
    presentation that got my attention. Finally, in the past year,
    we observed signs of nascent but growing strategic cooperation
    between China and Russia, including a combined bomber patrol
    last July and Chinese participation in multiple Russian
    exercises. I find that very important and concerning. Expand on
    that a bit please.
        General O'Shaughnessy. This was not particularly concerning
    the Arctic, but I will get back to the Arctic in the answer.
        What we do see is----
        Senator King. But the Arctic is one of the places where
    they may well find common cause.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, and that is where I will
    move back to where I have some concern there.
        One of the things we do see is Russia actually has more
    advanced operational capability with respect to the longer-
    range bomber force, and as we see them fairly routinely flying
    in and around our--Adak as an example. As we see them working
    with Russia and China together, we have concerns as we just
    look at that capability, and if they were to work together,
    they could potentially advance China's ability in that regard.
        Clearly in the Arctic, we also see the potential if they
    work together, but I think there is a little bit different
    approach because clearly Russia has concerns about China
    infringing on them from an economic standpoint. Yet,
    nonetheless, we see Russia with some very significant----
        Senator King. Russia is being very aggressive in the Arctic
    in terms of icebreakers, airstrips. I mean, that is a big part
    of where they are putting some of their major investments.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Exactly, and so that is where I was
    going with this answer is that we can actually see the
    potential for China to leverage Russia's capability and
    capacity and understanding to develop China's----
        Senator King. Do you have adequate sensors to determine if
    something is coming over the top?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We do not, sir.
        Senator King. And that is clearly a gap that needs to be
    addressed.
        General O'Shaughnessy. It is, Senator.
        Senator King. This hearing seems to be the hypersonic
    hearing, and I think that is important, and the budget is
    important, the additional resources. But we are behind. Russia
    and China are fielding hypersonic missiles now, and are we not
    4 or 5 years from there? And my concern is that some of that
    research should be going into defense because right now
    hypersonics are really a nightmare weapon for an aircraft
    carrier, for all kinds of targets. So are we going to put some
    money into how to defend ourselves against hypersonics,
    Admiral?
        Admiral Richard. The short answer is yes, and I think you
    see the budget priorities that are being developed to do just
    that.
        But I will also go back and offer particularly for Russia
    and China, we are defending today by deterrence. I can impose a
    cost on them that I think they will find unacceptable, to deter
    their use of that or any of their other novel weapon systems.
        Senator King. How do you deter? If we get into a conflict
    and they--I mean, I do not understand deterrence when they use
    a hypersonic to take out an aircraft carrier in the strait
    between Iceland and Scotland.
        Admiral Richard. Sir, I would have to go into a classified
    session to give you details of options that I could provide to
    redress that.
        Senator King. Well, I just hope that 23 percent budget
    increase--part of that goes to defense.
        Finally, very briefly, can hypersonics be nuclearized? Can
    a hypersonic missile carry a nuclear warhead?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, absolutely, yes.
        Senator King. So is this really triad 2.0? It is not a
    ballistic missile. It is not a submarine. It is not an
    aircraft. Or it could be, I guess, all three of those. But
    clearly we need to think about hypersonics in terms of the
    triad, in terms of our strategic deterrence.
        Admiral Richard. Absolutely, I will offer that it is not
    our policy or intent right now to nuclearize hypersonics. Other
    nations can choose to do what they wish in that area, and, yes,
    this is the competition. This has a lot of similarities to the
    introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile back in
    the late 1950s and early 1960s, and we are ready to address it.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I
    appreciate your testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank both of you for your service and for being here.
        I was going to start, Admiral Richard, with a question
    about GBSD, and you answered it beautifully for Senator Fischer
    and in your statements. But I will just emphasize the
    importance of doing all we can to keep it on track, if not even
    escalate a little bit, and that is reflected, of course, in the
    budget and I appreciate that.
        I want to ask both of you some questions about the standing
    up of Space Force, starting with you, of course, Admiral
    Richard, given the unique relationship between STRATCOM and
    space and space capabilities, and first, generally ask you, are
    you comfortable with how it is going in terms of the standing
    up of Space Force? And what and how are you communicating with
    Space Force in terms of helping them be successful in training,
    equipping, manning the force?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would draw a distinction
    between Space Command, the joint operational command, and the
    Space Force. My relationship is much more with Space Command.
    Senator, I would describe it as we are the proud parents. We
    were where those responsibilities came from. I am delighted
    that the decision the nation and the Department has made. It is
    putting necessary attention to our freedom of maneuver and
    action inside space. General Raymond and I speak frequently. We
    are setting up a set of war fighter talks here in the very near
    future. I am encouraged across the board that it improves
    mission performance overall, particularly his responsibilities
    as the sensor manager, looking across missile warning, missile
    defense, and space situational awareness. The nation wins
    because we are more effectively utilizing our assets.
        Senator Cramer. Very well said.
        General O'Shaughnessy, so again same, basically because
    obviously the relationship between Space Command and STRATCOM
    is special, but yours is awfully important as well.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
        I am excited about both the Space Force and United States
    Space Command. I think we are already starting to see some of
    the benefits of this. I think we as a nation are very fortunate
    to have a great American, Jay Raymond, leading both of these at
    this time and really chartering the course that these will take
    going into the future.
        Specifically for us for Homeland defense, from the NORTHCOM
    role we are very much tied from the U.S. Space Command side
    relative to those sensors. The very sensors that Admiral
    Richard mentioned are the ones that we are using for our own
    Homeland defense.
        The second aspect is we look at warfighting as space, a
    domain of warfighting, that occurs, and we are talking about
    that in really relevant ways, and clearly from a Homeland
    defense aspect, that has significant consequences.
        Then from a U.S. Space Force, excited about the potential
    there, as that has now been stood up, of how that is going to
    allow us to really focus like a laser on space going into the
    future.
        Senator Cramer. Well, just following up a little bit on
    that, one of the challenges I think, of course, is actually
    manning, training, and equipping this force. I think the
    services all play a role in that, which I think is somewhat
    unique to the way Space Force has been designed to be
    successful. I certainly look forward to anything that you can
    add to that discussion as well.
        As I run out of time, I want you to answer that if you have
    more to say about it, and then actually ask you about our
    northern tier bases--of course, I have three of them in North
    Dakota--and what we ought to be looking for in terms of
    capabilities to meet a potential Arctic conflict and to make
    sure that we are in sync with the strategy.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Well, I would start first on the
    Space Force. Clearly the intent is it is not just a pulling
    away from just the United States Air Force but actually looking
    within the Department of Defense where are our space experts
    and how do we actually bring them into the Space Force as well.
        That aside, relative to your question on the Arctic, we are
    actually excited about some of the things that we are actually
    doing right now in your State to support our Arctic operations.
    Clearly we see the future in our defense of our nation is very
    critically dependent on our ability to operate in the Arctic,
    our ability to have domain awareness. So, some of the things we
    are doing with over-the-horizon radars are critically important
    for us to have that domain awareness, that understanding of
    what is happening on the approaches to our nation and in
    cooperation with Canada through North America is critically
    important. Whether you are talking hypersonics--and the over-
    the-horizon radars have great capability against the
    hypersonics so we can maintain that custody--or whether we are
    talking about the cruise missile threats and the bombers, those
    are all played because of some of the work that we are doing
    within your State.
        Senator Cramer. Well said, and I appreciate both of you and
    yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard and General O'Shaughnessy, your command
    areas play a very important role in defending the United States
    from the threat of ballistic missiles, and I note that the
    Missile Defense Agency's budget request discusses a layered
    approach to Homeland defense as the underlay to the current
    ground-based mid-course defense system that protects the
    continental United States. Specifically the MDA request
    discusses Aegis and THAAD as potential options for a layered
    Homeland defense approach. But I am also interested in the
    potential for transportable ground-based interceptors or other
    systems that can serve as an underlay to existing GMD system
    and add flexibility and depth in a cost-effective way.
        As you know, MDA has completed an environmental impact
    statement of three locations to host a potential third GMD
    site, including two fields at Fort Custer in Michigan, which
    were identified as the least expensive and least
    environmentally impacted site.
        But the question for both of you is, can you please discuss
    how you view the potential of a layered Homeland missile
    defense system, and what role would the three locations, which
    MDA has already studied, play in this layered system?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will start with this.
        First, I will talk to one of the reasons that this demand
    signal is there, as we look at the cancellation of RKV and the
    resulting timeline between now and when an NGI, next generation
    interceptor, could be fielded. We have very significant
    concerns about that from NORTHCOM. We have been working closely
    with both MDA, as well as OSDR&E, Dr. Griffin. I am pleased to
    announce now that we are bringing time in as a variable within
    that discussion. What we are trying to do--we cannot wait 10
    years to get the next generation interceptor fielded. We are
    trying to bring that left, and so I think we will see, as the
    RFP actually gets released, we are actually looking to bring
    time left and get that fielded faster. I think we are in a good
    position there.
        But that brings you to part of that mitigation, as the
    threat continues to advance, is this layered defense concept,
    which we very much support, and you see money in the budget
    this year.
        The initial concept, to your point, was to bring in as an
    underlayer the ability to use, whether it be a THAAD modified
    potentially with additional boost capability or whether it be
    an SM-3 IIA missile that we could use in that regard is
    existing capability that we could bring into the Homeland
    defense architecture to provide that ballistic missile defense.
        But the follow-on to that is, okay, we will understand
    using that existing capability, but what is the capability we
    could actually develop that might not be what we need to deploy
    overseas but we could use specifically built for our Homeland
    defense. That gets into the point where the next iteration of
    the layered defense might be individual weapon systems that are
    designed to be fielded within the continental U.S. and in
    Alaska to defend the United States using maybe the technology
    that is in our current systems but portrayed a different way.
        I think all the work that has been done with all of the
    continental interceptor sites will go into potentially where we
    could put those, how we do those. So I think it is just part of
    the information that we now have as we look at this new
    approach with both the current GBI, the NGIs, this layered
    defense with the current system, additional system informed by
    some of the work that we have done to include within your
    State.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Admiral, do you want to add anything?
        Admiral Richard. Just very quickly. Missile defense is
    deterrence by denial. We have a very clear national policy on
    what it is designed for and what it is not designed for, and so
    everything General O'Shaughnessy just talked about not only
    allows him to execute his mission responsibilities, but it is a
    part of the tailored deterrent strategies that I am required by
    the Nuclear Posture Review to develop. That is precisely the
    path I think we need to go down. I would throw in sensing is
    also a key piece as both of us have talked about.
        Senator Peters. One final question. I am the ranking member
    on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee within
    this Committee, and one area that I have been focusing on are
    some of the ethics associated with the military application of
    artificial intelligence and automation in particular. I know
    there are a number of ethical concerns related to these
    weapons. I think the dilemma is represented by the threat that
    you both identified in your written statements of Russia's
    nuclear-capable autonomous underwater weapon, the Poseidon. I
    know what the threat is is all up to debate to talk about.
        But if we face time-sensitive threats in the U.S., are we
    at a tactical disadvantage if we require human involvement in
    our decision chain where our adversaries may not do that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will take that. What I
    would say is what we have to get away from is what we now have
    as either the human in the loop or sometimes the human is the
    loop in some of our systems to a human on the loop. What that
    will allow you to do is actually make those decisions at the
    speed of relevance because what can and should be done by
    machines and by AI and leveraging that will be done by that.
    But it will identify those key areas where we humans have to be
    the ones ethically, morally making those decisions. I think
    human on the loop is a concept we need to apply to leverage
    that capability while not preventing ourselves from operating
    at the speed of relevance.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. By the way, we have been notified the
    first vote is underway. So we are going to try to get to
    everybody here. Let us try to keep our remarks brief.
        Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Admiral, let me start with you. As you know, we are the
    proud home in Missouri of the Whiteman Air Force Base and the
    B-2 bomber. Let me ask you about the Air Force's budget request
    and the funding cuts for the B-2 defense management system.
    Does that decision cause you any concern about the B-2's
    ability to operate in high end threat environments to the end
    of its service life?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I think it is a great example of
    some of the difficult decisions that we are going to have to
    make in trading or balancing near-term risks for long-term
    risks. Overall, the Air Force is way ahead on the bomber
    program. Bomber road map I think it is referred to I endorse. I
    think that is a very thoughtful approach, and the loss of the
    defensive management system--we will accommodate that risk for
    the greater gain the Air Force is going to provide overall.
        Senator Hawley. That sounds like a yes to me. You think
    that there is a risk that it will. There will be some detriment
    to its ability to operate in high end capacity.
        Admiral Richard. There is but I can manage it.
        Senator Hawley. What else do we need to ensure that the B-2
    maintains its ability to operate in those environments if this
    decision goes forward?
        Admiral Richard. That is part of the planning that I have
    to do. So we will use operational mechanisms to compensate for
    technological abilities of the aircraft. I retain full
    confidence that the B-2 can do the missions that I will ask it
    to do.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Well, I will be following up with
    you on that.
        General, let me turn to you for a second. Russian bombers
    make regular visits to our coastlines we know. What role would
    you say that the F-15EX could play in protecting our Homeland
    against these and other threats in the decades that are coming?
        General O'Shaughnessy. One of the things that we do see is
    it is not only the increasing frequency but also the complexity
    of how they are maneuvering and the missions that they are
    flying. Some of it has to do with where we would need to go to
    intercept them based on the length of their missiles that they
    carry, the range that the missiles now have. For example, the
    S-23 is an example of a long-range missile. What that means is
    we want to intercept them further out. We want to go further so
    that we can not only get the missiles. We want to hit the
    bombers so that they never actually get to launch them.
        So the F-15EX brings us that. It brings us that extended
    range that we can get with the F-15EX, as well as a much
    significant improvement in the number of missiles it can carry.
    So we see that from a Homeland defense aspect. We see that new
    platform as being well suited for the Homeland defense role in
    both our counter-cruise missile defense, our counter-airborne
    threats such as the Russian bombers.
        Senator Hawley. Great. That is great to hear.
        Admiral, let me come back to you and let us talk a little
    bit about nuclear policy. Are you confident that Beijing would
    stick to its announced no-first-use policy if there were a
    conflict with the United States?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I think I could drive a truck
    through that no-first-use policy.
        Senator Hawley. Why do you say that?
        Admiral Richard. In other words, I am not trying to be
    flippant on a very serious matter. Right? The number of
    situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred
    that do not meet our definition of first use--I should back up.
    They are very opaque about what their intentions are. They are
    very different from the Russians. We have very little to go on
    in terms of how they interpret that relative to what we see
    from the other competitor.
        So what constitutes first use? Where might they say we are
    actually not--that is our territory. Therefore, it does not
    count as an attack against you.
        More broadly, the Soviet Union had a no-first-use policy. I
    do not think we took great comfort in that either, and so the
    declaratory policy things are not helpful in my mission area to
    deter.
        Senator Hawley. That is very helpful and I think is a great
    point for those who would advocate a no-first-use policy on our
    end as to why that that would be I think a very serious
    strategic mistake.
        Let me give you, Admiral, still on the same subject an
    opportunity to clarify something. A senior U.S. official
    recently was reported as saying--and I am quoting now--the sole
    reason the United States has nuclear weapons is to prevent
    others from using nuclear weapons. That does not seem to be
    exactly what our declaratory policy is. Can you clarify what
    our declaratory policy is?
        Admiral Richard. So the Nuclear Posture Review lays it out
    very clearly in terms of our strategic capabilities are
    designed to deter a strategic attack on the United States,
    which can be nuclear, but I think it wisely acknowledged the
    fact that it now may be possible to have a strategic attack
    against our vital interests that is non-nuclear, particularly
    in space and cyber.
        Senator Hawley. Right. So we will only consider the
    employment of nuclear weapons in extreme countries to defend
    our vital interests or those of our allies or partners, and
    those circumstances could include, as you just said,
    significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Is that correct? Am
    I getting that correct?
        Admiral Richard. That is correct.
        Senator Hawley. Great.
        Admiral, I have got another question for you about the W-76
    TAC 2. I will submit that for the record because I am about out
    of time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service. In particular, Admiral
    Richard, as one Alabama native to another, thank you for your
    service. Alabama is very proud of you and so is the University
    of Alabama Roll Tide. I just thought I would throw that in real
    quickly. I know you appreciate that.
        The other thing that folks in Alabama are particularly
    proud of these days is our 117th air refueling wing, which as
    you know, won the prestigious STRATCOM Omaha Trophy this past
    year. I want to take the opportunity to congratulate Colonel
    Scott Grant, the commander there--he has just done an amazing
    job--Command Chief Master Sergeant Davis and the other airmen.
    I think sometimes our National Guard unit is going to get
    overlooked in the scheme of things, and I so much appreciate
    them winning that award. It is the first time a guard unit has
    won that.
        Can you talk a little bit about the critical role that the
    unit plays in the strategic deterrence mission that we have?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I just would highlight. That is a
    very competitive award, and it speaks highly of that wing's
    ability to compete in that broad a competition.
        Air refueling is vital. I am not an airman, but no gas, no
    bombs, and so it is critical to my mission set for the bomber
    leg to have adequate tanking capacity. General O'Shaughnessy
    will tell you here in a second it is equally critical in his
    areas for Homeland air defense. It is something we pay very
    close attention to in terms of having capability in the right
    priority to meet those missions
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you.
        This past Monday, the President's Budget Request and the
    briefings that we got indicated that the Air Force intends to
    divest several aging aircraft, namely 17 B-1 bombers, 16 KC-10
    tankers, 13 KC-135 tankers. To replace the tankers, the budget
    asks for 15 KC-146's, but those are not going to be fully
    operational for another 3 years.
        So with the delay in the operational capability status of
    the KC-46's, does this in any way--does this divestiture of
    these legacy tankers pose any kind of threat to the reliable
    in-air refueling capability of the joint force? I will ask
    either or both of you that question.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I will start, Senator, and say in
    this year's budget, I think our United States Air Force made
    some difficult decisions in how do we get to the future faster.
    This is just one of those decisions where we are trying to
    divest yourselves of legacy platforms while moving to the
    future, in this case the KC-46. So while, yes, there will be an
    impact in the short term to the availability of tankers, we
    will be able to mitigate our way through that. We still are
    working closely,. In fact, I talked to the TRANSCOM commander
    just yesterday about this. I believe we will be able to
    mitigate that going forward. But it is crucial that we are able
    to get to the KC-46 and multiple other modern platforms that
    the Air Force is trying to get to.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you both for
    being here.
        Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will yield back.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate it.
        We will now recognize Senator Sullivan. At the conclusion
    of his remarks, we will be adjourned. Senator Sullivan
    presiding.
        Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
        General O'Shaughnessy, I particularly appreciate your
    testimony. It was probably the most comprehensive, insightful
    description of our strategic interests in the Arctic that I
    have seen. In your testimony, you say the Arctic is the new
    front line of Homeland defense. It sounds like you are saying
    that the Arctic and Alaska are no longer a sanctuary from which
    we can safely project power, but it is more of a battle space
    area. Is that correct? What are the implications from your
    mindset as the NORTHCOM Commander?
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is exactly correct, Senator,
    and as always, I find myself well aligned with you relative to
    the importance of the Arctic. It is not only from the strategic
    location that it is, but now, to your point, it is clearly an
    avenue of approach to our great nation. As we look at what----
        Senator Sullivan. That impacts the whole nation.
        General O'Shaughnessy. It impacts the whole nation,
    absolutely.
        As we look at now Alaska where--I will just use the Russian
    long-range aviation. Whether it be hypersonics or whether it be
    the cruise missiles that can be launched from that long-range
    aviation, we clearly see that avenue of approach as being
    critical. So we have to, one, have awareness of what is going
    on in that space, and then we have to be able to defend in that
    space. The time that will be required to respond is short
    because of the pure geography.
        I think what we really need to think about in Alaska is how
    do we invest to have that domain awareness, having the right
    sensors and ability to understand what is happening, but also
    the ability to defend immediately and what are the systems that
    we could invest in that would allow us to have that persistent
    defense in Alaska because it is key terrain that will be
    important to us as a nation in any conflict whether that be
    with Russia or China going forward.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Let me go on to a little bit more detail. You know, it
    seems from whether it is Secretary Pompeo's speech in Finland
    at the Arctic Council, major publications like The New York
    Times, 60 Minutes--you know, there is a lot of discussion about
    the great power competition in the Arctic. I appreciate Senator
    King highlighting that in his questions for you.
        You know, unfortunately, this Committee has observed that
    the Pentagon is the organization that sometimes seems the
    furthest behind, with the exception of certainly your great
    advocacy, General O'Shaughnessy.
        In your personal opinion and the advocate for the
    capabilities in the region, what specific capabilities are you
    advocating for to ensure that we can both protect the Homeland
    in these avenues of approach that you talked about, but also to
    continue to project power from Alaska to not just PACOM but
    EUCOM, STRATCOM? And if you can talk on JPARC and even OCONUS
    KC-46 deployments, that would be helpful as well, in terms of
    capabilities.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator.
        First, I would say we have to complete the next generation
    interceptor. We have literally holes in the ground right now
    that we need to fill with capabilities. So we need to bring
    that left, and we need to bring that as fast as possible.
        We need to augment that with additional ballistic missile
    capability that we could put in Alaska, whether that be SM-3
    IIA's, whether that be potentially THAAD deployments there. We
    need to bring that into Alaska. We need a sensing capability
    that will be persistent, that will be steady state, that will
    always be there. We have the technology today. We just have to
    deploy it to Alaska.
        The second thing I think we need--and I would applaud the
    Air Force for moving the additional fifth generation aircraft,
    the F-35's, to Eielson. It is now truly the fifth generation
    center of excellence, and therefore, you need a place to train.
    I think continued investment in the JPARC range is critically
    important not only for fifth gen, but for the Arctic, and
    Arctic Edge upcoming exercise we have with great
    participation--for example, from the marines--I think is
    critically important because the joint force needs to train in
    Arctic conditions.
        I make the observation that we can deploy a force anywhere,
    all over the world, and we can train that force very quickly
    and have them out the door in a matter of days. You cannot do
    that to the Arctic. If you are not training, if you do not have
    the right equipment, and if you are not versed in operating in
    the Arctic, you will not effectively be able to operate there.
    Our adversaries are operating there, and therefore, we need to
    be able to operate there as well. To your point, it is now a
    battle space, and so we need to be able to operate in Alaska in
    the Arctic in cooperation with Canada from the NORAD side.
        I think continued investment. The tankers are important
    because it is a strategic place where you can actually get to
    the European theater quicker than you can even get to the South
    China Sea from Alaska. Therefore, having that as a center where
    we have robust tankers is important, as well as the entire
    joint force I think just continuing to be able to operate.
        Senator Sullivan. The Secretary of Defense said that if you
    collocated the over 100 fifth generation fighters that we are
    going to have in Alaska with the OCONUS deployment of KC-46's,
    it would show that our adversaries--that we would have extreme
    strategic reach whether in PACOM or EUCOM. Do you agree with
    that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I do believe there is a powerful
    synergy of bringing together the fifth generation with
    additional and modern day tanker capability.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question for both of
    you. Actually just two real quick ones.
        In our office call, you talked about your number one
    unfunded priority for some type of space-based communications
    for the Arctic. Can you just briefly touch on that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Senator, for allowing us
    to highlight that.
        One of my main concerns in the Arctic is communication.
    Basic communication that we normally use satellites for becomes
    challenged above about 65, even harder above 70.
        One of the things we find is the commercial technology is
    there, and so we have been working with commercial companies
    over the proliferation of LEO and finding ways that we might be
    able to bring that ability to have essentially broadband
    connectivity anywhere, for example, within Alaska. That is a
    huge implication for us to be able to operate if we can connect
    the force in areas that today we cannot connect the force even
    through our commercial partners.
        Whether it OneWeb or whether it is Starlink, we think, for
    example, in some of our partnership with Starlink over the last
    several experiments that we have done, for example, at Eglin
    where we are able to show our ability to connect that force
    with their satellites--this is not hypothetical. This is
    satellites that are in orbit today.
        Senator Sullivan. But it is your number one unfunded
    priority because that is not just protecting the comms in the
    Arctic. That protects the whole Homeland in terms of the avenue
    of approach concern that you talked about.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is exactly right, Senator. It
    is my number one priority to have Arctic coms, and I think the
    proliferation of LEO and a Starlink or a OneWeb type solution
    is the way to get it fastest.
        Senator Sullivan. Final question for both you, gentlemen,
    and it is a just a quick answer on this. But I have been
    frustrated with Under Secretary Griffin. You know, I think we
    are seeing really smart guys in the Pentagon making dumb
    decisions. Let me give you one. It was already briefly touched
    on.
        This Committee has worked really hard in a bipartisan way
    with the administration fully supporting it to build up our
    missile defense. There has now been a decision recently,
    despite the fact that we just built 20 new silos at Fort
    Greely, to make those empty for the next 10 years. I cannot
    think of something that is unequivocally more--well, that is
    just going to harm our readiness in terms of missile defense. I
    mean, there is no dispute about that. 20 empty silos for 20
    years.
        How do we fix that gap, fill that, and correct what to me
    seems like just kind of a boneheaded decision at the upper
    levels of the Pentagon?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first I will say that the
    unfortunate decision to cancel the RKV was the right decision
    that was made at that time----
        Senator Sullivan. But do you agree to have 20 empty silos
    for 10 years?
        General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. What I am very dissatisfied
    with is it is going to take us 10 years to actually produce the
    next generation interceptor. We have been working very closely
    with MDA and Dr. Griffin personally. I met with him on Monday,
    and I am pleased to announce that we are going to bring this
    left. The way we will have to do that is we will have to find
    some trade space, but we have to put time as an important part
    of this because our adversaries are not waiting. Our
    adversaries are building capability and capacity, and so we
    have to be able to respond. So we are going to insert time into
    this so that we are going to have trade space developed so we
    can bring missiles to put, interceptors to put into those holes
    sooner.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Admiral, any views on that?
        Admiral Richard. I would just say that General
    O'Shaughnessy described that very well. We both have a role in
    setting the requirements for missile defense. Those
    requirements are valid, and General O'Shaughnessy just laid out
    how we are going to meet those.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I believe this Committee will be
    supportive of any role that we can play in support to help fill
    that gap, which I think is important for the nation's missile
    defense overall.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen. We all appreciate your
    testimony.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                     counter-uas [unmanned aerial systems]
        1. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard, what are STRATCOM's defined
    counter-UAS requirements for the services to provide capability against
    current and future threats?
        Admiral Richard. Protect vital national security assets by
    detecting, identifying, tracking and defeating UAS threats.
        Attribution is another critical requirement in countering the UAS
    problem. We must boost the ability to attribute ``left of launch''
    activities in order to truly stop the threat and achieve effective
    deterrence. A successful effort will involve whole-of-government, to
    include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), Intelligence Community, and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) working together with DOD in the Homeland.

        2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard what counter-UAS capabilities
    are fielded today and how effective are they against the current
    threat? Are you confident our strategic capabilities are defensible?
        Admiral Richard. Our counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities include
    kinetic and non-kinetic measures. Current C-UAS systems have had
    limited success; however, DOD is working to develop and field more
    effective capabilities. While there are challenges for C-UAS systems, I
    am confident we are on the right path to enhance the protection of our
    strategic assets. However, as mentioned above, we must not focus just
    on the defeat, we must also present an effective deterrent which is
    achieved through attribution.

        3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard what capabilities are in the
    acquisitions process for the future and how long will it take until
    they are IOC? Are you confident our strategic capabilities will be
    defensible in the future?
        Admiral Richard. The services are exploring multiple kinetic and
    non-kinetic C-UAS capabilities, and are considering emerging threats
    such as swarms, pre-programmed control of UASs, and other control
    technologies like Wi-Fi. The United States Army has been identified as
    the C-UAS Executive Agent (EA); I would defer to them for specific
    programs and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates. I am confident
    they will facilitate necessary service development to effectively
    defend strategic capabilities.
        Additionally, over the last year, we have worked directly with OSD
    through the Senior Integration Group and now the EA at multiple levels,
    to address the issue of attribution and ``left of launch'' activities
    to achieve effective deterrence. We are also in the process of
    advocating inclusion of the concepts of attribution and deterrence
    within the overarching EA C-UAS Strategy.

        4. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard are you aware of any counter-UAS
    capabilities or innovations that might be available, but cannot be
    purchased because they do not specifically fall within defined
    requirements for a current program of record? If they exist, what would
    it take to be able to purchase those capabilities?
        Admiral Richard. Purchasing C-UAS capabilities does not appear to
    be hindered by bureaucratic procedures; the problem lies in the
    significant challenge of rapidly developing effective technological
    solutions to pace the threat. I defer to the EA to execute the
    evaluation and acquisition process for C-UAS innovations that do not
    fall within defined requirements for a current program of record.

        5. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard can you quantify what you are
    losing by not having the ability to buy off-the-shelf Counter-UAS
    technology that is ready today? Are U.S. strategic assets at greater
    risk because of our bureaucratic processes?
        Admiral Richard. While UASs pose an identifiable risk to our
    strategic assets, the DOD has an established process to gain approval
    to purchase off-the-shelf C-UAS equipment. The Services, led by the EA,
    are focusing appropriate resources and proactively developing C-UAS
    layered defense and interoperable technologies in response to the
    threat. I am confident in the EA's ability to streamline the
    acquisition process for fielding required C-UAS capabilities.

        6. Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard do you believe current
    acquisitions processes will yield counter-UAS capabilities in time to
    defend against future threats?Would the answer change if you were able
    to make iterative adjustments to current programs of record?
        Admiral Richard if our current processes can take a decade to get
    you counter-UAS capability, how do you plan to keep up with new
    technological threats?
        Admiral Richard. I am confident the Army EA is addressing C-UAS
    requirements as rapidly as possible to meet existing and future
    threats. The EA is working with the Services to compress the timelines
    needed for modifying current C-UAS equipment to address the changing
    threats and capability gaps.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                              northcom / stratcom
        7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard and General O'Shaughnessy,
    electromagnetic spectrum plays a critical role in many DOD missions.
    Can you describe some of the ways that STRATCOM and NORTHCOM rely on
    spectrum to support their missions? What are some of the future
    spectrum warfighter needs that will be essential to competing with
    Russia and China on a future battlefield?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM is highly dependent on the
    electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to provide Strategic Deterrence and
    deliver Decisive Response, if necessary. Every aspect of our mission--
    from sensor to shooter communications to data management and
    information flow--requires EMS access to meet deterrence objectives.
        Our adversaries have observed America's dominance on the
    battlefield and view our reliance on the spectrum as a vulnerability.
    They organize, train and equip forces to engage and maneuver within the
    EMS to gain military advantage. They are investing heavily to counter
    our radar, navigation, communications, and data link capabilities, and
    our technological advantages are eroding.
        We must develop future redundant electronic protection systems and
    resilient capabilities to counter the growing EMS threat. Additionally,
    we must continue efforts to develop an Electromagnetic Battle
    Management (EMBM) system that dynamically characterizes the EMS
    Operational Environment (EMOE), provides near real-time situational
    awareness, decision support, and command and control capabilities.
        General O'Shaughnessy. The electromagnetic spectrum serves a vital
    role in USNORTHCOM's missions and operations across our Area of
    Responsibility (AOR). USNORTHCOM relies on spectrum-dependent systems
    to provide command and control; voice and data communications;
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat
    detection and targeting systems; electronic attack and electronic
    protection; and battlefield situational awareness and protection.
        Military operations in the future will see a widespread use of
    battlefield sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging
    advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine
    learning for near real-time assessment and decision making. In light of
    this, we must be able to continue to operate through a congested,
    constrained, and contested spectrum environment for effective
    operations.

        8. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard, STRATCOM is the combatant
    command responsible for the advocacy and coordination of joint
    electromagnetic spectrum operations in the Department of Defense, which
    requires the accounting and deconfliction of DOD, civilian, and
    adversary use of electromagnetic spectrum.
        What is STRATCOM's role in coordinating spectrum use by DOD and
    civilian entities? In your opinion, is the Department well-postured to
    share spectrum currently reserved for DOD use--does the Department have
    the appropriate modelling tools, capabilities, and policies to allow
    for spectrum-sharing with commercial telecoms?
        Does STRATCOM possess the required visibility into DOD, civilian,
    and adversary systems' use of electromagnetic spectrum to enable the
    Department's electronic warfare operations?
        Admiral Richard. All warfighting domains fundamentally rely on the
    electromagnetic spectrum. The DOD CIO serves as the lead for
    coordination, approval, and representation of departmental positions on
    all spectrum matters within the U.S. Government and in regional,
    national, and international spectrum management forums and
    organizations.
        USSTRATCOM's role is to advocate on behalf of CCMDs to ensure they
    have the capabilities necessary to maneuver in the electromagnetic
    spectrum, and the ability to train and exercise in operationally
    representative environments.
        Historically, the DOD, other government agencies and industry have
    viewed the spectrum in terms of exclusive blocks of airwaves off limits
    to one another. Improvements in spectrum sharing technologies are
    needed to enable real-time spectrum access by all EMS users. These
    technologies, when combined with modeling tools and policies, will
    facilitate the means to dynamically share spectrum and enable DOD
    operations at the same time in the same slice of airwaves.
        Dynamic sharing and the ability to maneuver in the spectrum
    requires the ability to monitor and understand an increasingly
    congested and contested electromagnetic operational environment.
    Electromagnetic Battle Management will be a key element of the
    Department's future Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Until
    this capability is developed and implemented, our ability to
    characterize spectrum use at the level required to deconflict DOD and
    civilian EMS use will remain a challenge.
        We must continue to invest in personnel and technologies to enable
    Joint EMS Operations (JEMSO) from the tactical through Joint Task Force
    and combatant command levels. Maintaining a warfighting advantage
    requires superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum.

        9. Senator Rounds. Admiral Richard, mid-band spectrum, particularly
    between 3 gigahertz and 4.2 gigahertz where DOD operates many of its
    systems, has been widely discussed as important for commercial 5G
    implementation. NTIA recently released an initial report with DOD that
    found that it would be possible to do real time spectrum sharing that
    would protect the critical DOD systems that reside in this band, while
    providing attractive opportunities for commercial businesses. What are
    some examples of DOD systems in this area that support your missions?
    What will be some of the challenges and opportunities toward evaluating
    potential real time spectrum sharing of this band?
        Admiral Richard. Examples of systems in this spectrum range are
    Aegis SPY radars for the missile defense mission and some commercial
    SATCOM used by DOD for mission accomplishment. The Services (as
    capability providers), in conjunction with DOD CIO and the Joint Staff,
    evaluate challenges and opportunities in potential real time spectrum
    sharing.
        However, large high-power systems such as the Aegis SPY radar would
    be challenged to share spectrum real time while continuing to perform
    as designed for their mission. SATCOM, on the other hand, can provide
    specific channels in the spectrum to support some USSTRATCOM mission
    needs.
        A lack of advanced EMS modeling and simulation capability limits
    the ability to evaluate potential spectrum sharing implications. The
    ability to rapidly map radio frequency systems with their parametrics--
    frequency, signal characteristics, spatial impacts, and mission
    purpose--would allow better frequency use comparisons for spectrum
    sharing considerations.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                             installation security
        10. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what proactive measures
    have you implemented to enhance force protection measures on our
    military installations to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks
    against DOD personnel and their families?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We continually assess the threat and adjust
    our protective posture to mitigate, reduce vulnerability, increase
    community awareness, and prepare for a rapid response to heightened
    threat conditions. We work closely with federal law enforcement
    agencies and have Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives
    assigned to our Headquarters. Commanders at all echelons are empowered
    to implement additional supplemental, site-specific actions to achieve
    a measured and sustainable protective posture consistent with our force
    protection priorities.
                             illicit tobacco trade
        11. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what impact has the
    increase of Mexican troops on the southern Mexican border have on
    illicit tobacco trade?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We partner with Mexico's Army and Navy (to
    include the Naval Infantry) to build ground-based and maritime
    capacities to enhance Mexico's ability to secure its Southern Border.
    While these military capacities are sometimes applied to operations in
    support of civil authorities, we do not focus our capacity development
    efforts to counter the trafficking of any specific commodity.
                               mission readiness
        12. Senator Tillis. General O'Shaughnessy, what issue(s) have the
    greatest impact on your mission readiness?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The rapid advancements of our adversaries,
    particularly in the areas of precision missiles, cyber, and increased
    maritime activity, present a challenge to our defensive capabilities.
    Adversary advancements in ballistic missile, hypersonic glide vehicles,
    and cruise missile capabilities, combined with increasing evidence of
    adversary intent, challenge our ability to detect, defeat, and deter
    aggression. Ever-increasing cyber threats also target our nation's
    infrastructure and add to the complexity of the threat environment.

        13. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, what issue(s) have the
    greatest impact on your mission readiness?
        Admiral Richard. [Deleted.]
                                personnel issues
        14. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, your command's mission demands
    expertise in highly technical and scientific fields, what challenges in
    terms of recruiting and retention concern you, and how do you intend to
    approach them?
        Admiral Richard. The Services undertake the bulk of recruiting
    efforts, evaluate retention incentives and track the skill sets needed
    to support our mission requirements. We work closely with them to
    ensure appropriate workforce strategic deterrent expertise remains
    available for our missions.
        The competitive marketplace for technical and scientific talent
    presents many recruitment challenges. With a robust economy, hiring
    officials face fierce competition with our private sector competitors.
    An additional challenge is the inability to secure job offers pending
    security clearance adjudications, which can take several months. Highly
    talented candidates either move on or lose interest while waiting for
    their clearance before a firm offer can even be made. Our workforce is
    multi-generational and we face the challenge of a large segment at, or
    nearing, retirement eligibility.
        Attracting and recruiting a highly talented workforce entails a
    three-pronged approach:
             First, we are utilizing our academic alliance to drive
    force renewal through student internship and recent graduate program
    opportunities. These initiatives can lead to full-time positions
    creating a pipeline of talent acquisition and succession. These
    programs provide outreach and partnership opportunities with
    educational institutions to brand USSTRATCOM as a premier employer.
            Second is the use of all available Direct Hiring
    Authorities (DHA) that apply to USSTRATCOM. This enhances our ability
    to offer non-competitive opportunities for critical talent in high-
    demand fields such as Information Technology. DHA also provides
    opportunities for community outreach with business leaders, chambers of
    commerce and the wider public, to market immediate USSTRATCOM
    employment opportunities through venues such as social media and
    electronic job boards.
            The third focus is the continued development, training,
    education and mentoring of our current workforce talent.
            Additionally, USSTRATCOM will continue to sustain and
    foster a climate that inspires; promotes and values trust; focuses on
    diversity and inclusion; continues to offer training and development
    opportunities; and maintains a sincere quality of life focus for the
    workforce. There are also numerous resources available to USSTRATCOM
    geared to retaining a high-quality workforce, including recruitment,
    retention and relocation bonuses, performance incentives, flexible work
    schedules, a modern command facility, and a multitude of training and
    development opportunities.
                               command transition
        15. Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, have any significant issues
    occurred during the transition of the responsibility of space
    operations from STRATCOM to United States Space Command (SPACECOM)
    following the establishment of United States Space Command last year?
    What is the current status of this transfer of space responsibilities?
        Admiral Richard. None to date. From the beginning, USSTRATCOM has
    been fully committed to providing the support required for USSPACECOM
    success. We expect this process to continue until USSPACECOM reaches
    full operational capability. All space related UCP responsibilities
    have been transferred to USSPACECOM.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                                      abms
        16. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, I understand that the
    Air Force plans to conduct tests of ABMS every 4 months, with the next
    test occurring in April 2020. Given that the Air Force has primary
    responsibility to develop ABMS, how do you characterize NORTHCOM's
    specific role in the development of this system?
        General O'Shaughnessy. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are partnered with the
    Air Force on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) to provide an
    operational, bi-national, and joint perspective and support for further
    development of an adaptive joint all-domain command and control
    capability in support of defending the Homeland. Due to COVID-19, the
    April 2020 test has been delayed until late summer; exact date is
    pending.
        Domain awareness, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and
    defeat capabilities that are developed for peer-level Homeland defense
    threats must go beyond customized single-threat, one-Service solutions,
    and instead be developed collaboratively by the Joint Force to address
    a range of threats. The ABMS and JADC2 align well with our
    understanding of both the all-domain operational environment and the
    decision superiority required for a capable defense of the Homeland.
    The range of threats to the Homeland creates an urgency to develop the
    JADC2 system that we need for the future and the rapid development
    cycle for ABMS aligns with that urgency.

        17. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, how does NORTHCOM's role
    compare to the role other COCOMs have in the development of ABMS?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Due to the urgency of threats facing the
    Homeland, USNORTHCOM embarked on a campaign of rapid field prototyping
    and partnership with industry to further advance our Homeland defense
    capabilities. Our prototyping efforts last year were extremely
    successful and aligned well with the vision of combatant command-led
    Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) demonstrations every 3 months.
        We were excited to take operational lead for the ABMS Demonstration
    #1 in December 2019 and are partnered with United States Space Command
    for ABMS Demonstration #2 in 2020. We're looking forward to working
    with other combatant commands for future ABMS demonstrations to
    globally integrate the ABMS development efforts within the Department
    of Defense.

        18. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, recent reports indicate
    that senior Army leaders have expressed reservations about ABMS. The
    Army Chief of Staff called the system ``Air-centric''. Additionally,
    the chief of the Army's Futures & Concepts Center said, ``ABMS cannot
    be the sole solution, because it doesn't account for, in some cases,
    the scale of unique requirements of all the other services.'' I
    understand that an Army unit was also involved in December's ABMS
    demonstration. To what extent was Army leadership involved in designing
    and planning the December demonstration of ABMS?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Army and Marine Corps partnered closely
    with the Air Force over the past year to develop joint fires
    capabilities that now have a central role in the Advanced Battle
    Management System (ABMS). In the December 2019 ABMS Demonstration, we
    worked closely with the Army and leveraged their capability to showcase
    command and control connections to an Army High-Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System unit, which conducted a simulated strike on a target
    generated by the ABMS. We also integrated an Army Air Defense Artillery
    Sentinel Radar system for detection and tracking of airborne threats,
    while connecting an Air Force Special Operations Command ground unit to
    demonstrate individual-level connectivity.
        During the ABMS Demonstration #2 in 2020, we anticipate the Army's
    participation in ABMS will grow considerably from their partnership in
    development of events on two of their major test ranges, Yuma Proving
    Ground and White Sands Missile Range, as well as increased connections
    to Army Fires units. Additionally, we are working closely with Army
    Futures Command to integrate its Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Battle Command System capability into the Air Force's ABMS.

        19. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, what will be the Army's
    involvement in future demonstrations?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I believe the Army's participation in future
    demonstrations is critical. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are currently working
    to integrate Army Futures Command emerging capabilities and infantry
    unit-level connectivity into the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management
    System (ABMS), along with expanding Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Battle Command System connectivity. Ultimately, the Army's capabilities
    play an important role in development of a joint system-of-systems
    architecture where any sensor connects to the best shooter at every
    command and control node.

        20. Senator Perdue. General O'Shaughnessy, in Georgia, our Air
    National Guard JSTARS operators are highly-trained and mission-capable,
    and I believe that these operators can provide critical assistance as
    ABMS continues its testing and demonstrations. To that end, I am
    pleased that the Air Force has invited the 116th and 461st Air Control
    Wings of the Georgia Air National Guard to the April demonstration of
    ABMS. In your view, to what extent will current Air National Guard
    JSTARS operators improve your ABMS demonstrations and testing?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We are working closely with operators from
    the 116th and 461st Air Control Wings to further develop the
    operational concepts for the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS).
    Our Blue Force team for ABMS Demonstration #2 will contain two Air
    Battle Managers (ABMs) from Robins AFB. In line with the Air Force's
    efforts to develop a multi-domain operator career field, we will work
    with the ABM community to create joint warfighters who can effectively
    operate across all domains simultaneously. The airmen from Robins AFB,
    along with others from the ABM community, bring valuable expertise that
    can be used to design and build the Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control system to ensure our competitive advantage against peer
    adversaries in the future.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
               submarine survivability post-w76-2 missile launch
        21. Senator Hawley. Admiral Richard, some have argued that firing a
    missile with the W76-2 would leave the firing submarine vulnerable to
    attack. Do you have any concerns about our forces' ability to safely
    perform split launches?
        Admiral Richard. Introduction of the W76-2 has not changed the
    operating patterns or objectives assigned to SSBNs and does not
    introduce any new vulnerabilities to the force. Our submarine force has
    trained extensively for decades and continues to train for this
    scenario, and I have full confidence that, if directed, they can and
    will successfully execute such a mission.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
            metrics from military deployment to the southwest border
        22. Senator Reed. General O'Shaughnessy, as I mentioned in my
    opening statement, I remain concerned with the military utility of the
    ongoing deployment of active duty forces to our southern border. Active
    duty troops are currently manning Mobile Surveillance Camera (MSC)
    stations owned and deployed by CBP. Could you tell us how many migrants
    active duty and guard troops have encountered or detected while manning
    the MSCs, and if so, where exactly have they been encountered between
    legal points of entry?
        General O'Shaughnessy. As of 27 May 2020, title 10 forces have
    detected 21,069 migrants in fiscal year 2020. Military personnel
    encountered a total of 780 migrants during that same timeframe. Of
    these, 128 were encountered by title 10 forces, and 652 were
    encountered by title 32 forces. These encounters were near El Centro
    and San Diego, CA; Tucson, Nogales, Ajo, and Yuma, AZ; Laredo, Del Rio,
    El Paso, Rio Grande City, McAllen, Weslaco, Harlingen, Brownsville, and
    Fort Brown, Texas.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              troops at the border
        23. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you please
    provide this Committee an update on U.S. Military operations at our
    southern border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We are assisting the Department of Homeland
    Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in four mission
    areas: 1) operating mobile surveillance camera assets for detection and
    monitoring, 2) operational support such as motor transport maintenance,
    heavy equipment operations, and crisis response force capabilities, 3)
    infrastructure support, to include barrier and fence repairs, and 4)
    aviation support, to include light and medium rotary-wing, fixed-wing,
    and unmanned aircraft systems. To maximize our direct support to DHS,
    our command and control structure is geographically-aligned with CBP
    sectors.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the current
    troop levels at the southern border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. As of 27 May 2020, there are 5,559 DOD
    personnel supporting the southwest border operations. Of those, 3,112
    are title 10 and 2447 are T32 forces.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you provide an
    updated cost estimate for troop deployments for fiscal year 2019 and
    quarter 1 fiscal year 2020?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the DOD Comptroller. The Services
    and DOD Comptroller capture costs associated with DOD support to our
    southwest border operations.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you tell us what
    resources--if any--have been diverted to execute this mission?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the
    Services, determines sourcing solutions of units supporting the
    southwest border mission. Two USNORTHCOM-allocated units have elements
    dual-purposed for southwest border support, meaning they can be
    diverted to another mission if required by a higher priority tasking.
    The first is the Aviation Brigade assigned to the Defense Chemical
    Radiological Force that is providing 10 UH-60 aircraft in support of
    DHS. The second is the Military Police Battalion assigned as the
    Homeland defense quick reaction force while also serving as part of the
    crisis response force for southwest border support. If a higher
    priority mission requires either of these forces, they can be diverted
    to that mission.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, are there any unique
    capabilities that the military is providing the Department of the
    Homeland Security that they cannot provide organically?
        General O'Shaughnessy. No. The support DOD provides to the
    Department of Homeland Security is not unique to DOD. However, DOD is
    providing support with capabilities and capacity that DHS lacks.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what is the criteria
    for withdrawal of troops from the border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Secretary of Defense determines whether
    to support requests for assistance from Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). DHS currently does not
    have sufficient resources to meet all of their requirements on the
    southwest border.

        29. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, last year--as the
    Operational Commander when troops were initially deployed to the
    border--you said that you felt that your perspective was considered in
    the decision making process. What is your perspective now, and what is
    your current recommendation to this Committee on the deployment of
    active duty troops to the southern border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I continue to believe border security is
    national security and that effective security reduces threats to the
    Homeland. While Homeland defense remains the core mission for
    USNORTHCOM, we are providing military support to the Department of
    Homeland Security to help fill their gaps on the southwest border.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what feedback are
    you getting from subordinate Commanders on the impact of border
    deployments on mission readiness and concurrent deployment commitments?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Deployments can have both positive and
    negative readiness consequences. Feedback received through subordinate
    component channels and deployed units indicates they have been able to
    conduct some individual-level training to help maintain or increase
    readiness levels.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, have these
    deployments compromised readiness in the force providing services and
    units?
        General O'Shaughnessy. As a combatant commander, I am a consumer of
    Service readiness. Monitoring and evaluating force readiness is a
    Service responsibility. That said, we continually seek ways to mitigate
    readiness impacts. We have been able to keep some units at home
    station, which enables them to maintain readiness and conduct normal
    training. For example, by dual-tasking aviation units for both
    detection and monitoring as well as crisis response force missions,
    pilots are able to fly and maintain proficiency vice standing alert.
    Marine Corps units are rotating more frequently so that they are able
    to conduct normal unit training at home station. All of these actions
    help to mitigate impacts to Service readiness.
         electro magnetic spectrum/cyber management and missile defense
        32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, your testimony highlights
    our need to remain focused on hardening missile defenses and our strike
    capability in respect to non-kinetic threats, specifically those that
    exist in cyber space or along the electromagnetic spectrum. You stated
    that, ``Our adversaries have observed our use and dependence on the
    Electro Magnetic Spectrum, and have developed and organized their
    forces to achieve Electro Magnetic Spectrum superiority; it is
    essential we develop capabilities and appropriately organize to counter
    this threat. '' How are you testing and hardening your networks and
    lines of communication that allow you to provide critical missile
    defense, deterrence, and strike against an enemy who has specifically
    designed offensive capabilities to deny ours?
        Admiral Richard. Our testing and certification process for Electro-
    Magnetic Pulse protection implements established DOD standards, which
    include system level, threat-relatable test protocols. We track the
    status of these assets and publish a report annually. Infrastructure
    improvements require testing and validation as well as periodic
    revalidation against threat relatable test protocols in order to
    maintain their certified status. For example, the upgraded test
    facility at Patuxent River NAS is expected to resume operations later
    this fall and the Air Force recently executed a long anticipated test
    on a B-52 this past January.

        33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, can you speak to the
    relationship you have with CYBERCOM and the information sharing
    mechanisms that exist to communicate and respond to a non-kinetic
    attack--be it electronic warfare or cyber--on our missile defense
    architecture or our strike capability?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM communicates with CYBERCOM on a
    continuous basis during steady-state operations and in crisis
    situations. USSTRATCOM's Cyber Operations Integrated Planning Element
    (COIPE) is provided to us by CYBERCOM specifically for the purpose of
    facilitating coordination and information sharing between our combatant
    commands. The COIPE collaborates on any intelligence or observations
    from the field that potentially indicate a threat in and through
    cyberspace to our critical mission systems, including our missile
    defense and strike capabilities.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, can you highlight how you
    interact with NORTHCOM and NORAD on missile defense in this regard?
        Admiral Richard. From a cyberspace perspective, the same
    interaction and relationships exist with NORAD/NORTHCOM as they do with
    CYBERCOM. We have an extensive amount of shared mission space with
    NORTHCOM when it comes to the Missile Defense System and we have
    processes in place to accomplish the mission.
        Day-to-day, our Joint Cyber Center and Cyber Operations Integrated
    Planning Element collaborates with their counterparts at NORAD/NORTHCOM
    and other combatant commands to stay current on any known or
    anticipated threats. We also receive updates from CYBERCOM and the
    Intelligence Community via multiple secure information sharing systems.
        During a crisis, we are able to coordinate operational control and
    direct the activities of organic cyberspace defense forces within each
    of our Commands. If the demand for defensive capability exceeds our
    capacity, we work with CYBERCOM to request additional support or more
    specialized forces. In this situation, USSTRATCOM would be working
    closely with NORAD/NORTHCOM to ensure we are not duplicating effort and
    are maximizing our defensive capability on critical mission systems.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, you are responsible for
    coordinating global missile defense planning with other combatant
    commands, services, and agencies that employ our Nation's missile
    defense capabilities. Can you expand on the maintenance of these
    complex relationships?
        Admiral Richard. We maintain these relationships through constant
    outreach and regular interaction with other combatant commands. We
    provide regional combatant commands recommendations in areas such as
    defense duration, defense sufficiency, allied/partner missile defense
    integration, and risk to the global force through the Missile Defense
    Executive Board (MDEB) and its associated subordinate groups to include
    the Operation Forces Standing Committee (OFSC). Our independent
    analysis informs combatant command operational plan updates and assists
    in their Integrated Priority List development.
        Additionally, we provide support to the Chairman regarding Global
    Force Management and other assessments such as the Capabilities Gap
    Assessment and the Annual Joint Assessment.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, how often you conduct
    exercises to stress test these relationships and lines of
    communication?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM exercises all mission areas while
    simulating the need to conduct these missions in a denied and degraded
    cyber, space and EMS environment at least twice a year in our global
    series Tier 1 exercises (Global Thunder and Global Lightning).
    Additionally, we also exercise USSTRATCOM missions in support of other
    combatant command exercises while simulating these same contested EMS
    conditions.
        Our Global Storm exercises allow us to focus on specific objectives
    and procedures for operating in a contested EMS environment; these are
    conducted several times a year. During the last year we also conducted
    over 380 short duration (3-4 hour) training events which focus both
    inside USSTRATCOM and with other commands; these proficiency events
    test our battle staff members on various facets of command control.
        Finally, we have specific weekly exercises with combatant commands
    involving challenging ballistic missile scenarios to test and stress
    interactions and lines of communication.
        All of these numerous exercise opportunities improve our ability
    and readiness to successfully operate in future conflicts.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, in your current
    configuration and architecture, which area presents you with the
    greatest challenge to meeting the National Defense Strategy's intent:
    deterrence, detection, or strike?
        Admiral Richard. All of these areas are necessary, and all are
    challenged. We now face multiple actors across all domains who
    constitute a strategic threat to the United States, our allies and
    partners and we must recapitalize the capabilities associated within
    all areas that underpin our ability to meet National Defense Strategy
    objectives.
        While the problem has become more complex, the conceptual
    foundations of strategic deterrence remain sound, and we must continue
    the development of the next generation of deterrence experts. Likewise,
    the detection capabilities we employ today are the best in the world,
    but we must design and deploy the advanced measures, such as space-
    based capabilities, required to address emerging threats such as
    hypersonic weapons.
        Finally, our strategic strike capabilities are safe, secure and
    ready, but they are rapidly approaching end of life. We must
    recapitalize our command and control architecture, each leg of the
    nuclear triad and continue development of our conventional hypersonic
    strike capability.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richard, what would you like
    congress to pay attention to so we can better support your mission?
        Admiral Richard. I thank Congress for your continuing support of
    USSTRATCOM's missions. An on-time budget ensures defense programs
    arrive on time and are available to meet our warfighting requirements.
    Continuing resolutions delay new program starts and impact critical
    programs such as the Columbia-class SSBN from fielding when required.
                               election security
        39. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, in your advanced
    testimony you talk about your efforts to open up lines of communication
    and integrate the numerous agencies involved in the defense of the
    Homeland from both kinetic and non-kinetic threats. You specifically
    mentioned that in December 2019, USNORTHCOM hosted a cyber-forum that
    addressed election security and brought together all the participating
    commands, departments, and agencies to ensure that you, ``are aligned
    and ready to defend our networks, critical infrastructure, and our
    democratic processes.'' This is an overlap of several issues I am
    deeply concerned about--the protection of the privacy of our citizens,
    the infrastructure that keeps our economy running, and the democratic
    institutions and election infrastructure that will allow American
    voices to be heard in 2020. Can you expand upon the cyber-forum that
    addressed election security, and your key takeaways for NORTHCOM?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The December 2019 cyber forum included
    participants from United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), United
    States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), as
    well as The Adjutants General (TAGs). Representatives from the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice
    (DOJ) also participated, and we continue to seek ways to improve
    information sharing with other federal partners.
        Two key takeaways from the forum were the need for better
    communication channels among all partners for improved situational
    awareness, as well as a clearly defined process for ensuring non-DOD
    partners understand how to levy DOD assistance. We used these takeaways
    during Super Tuesday voting, when USNORTHCOM, along with USCYBERCOM,
    NGB, DHS, DOJ, and the intelligence community conducted real-time
    election defense coordination against foreign threats.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the plans
    in the future to keep conversations like this going as we move toward
    the 2020 election and beyond?
        General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
    supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal
    agency for election security. In this role, we continue to work closely
    with DHS to defend not only the 2020 elections, but future elections as
    well. USNORTHCOM will continue to refine our processes and exercise
    scenarios with our federal partners to enhance communications and
    streamline support to DHS.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, in your testimony
    you state, ``Our adversaries--including state and non-state actors--
    continue to actively target military networks, civilian critical
    infrastructure, and our democratic processes through network-based
    intrusions.'' I am proud to say that the Connecticut National Guard
    Election Task Force will be conducting cyber defense operations along
    with several other states during the 2020 elections.
        General O'Shaughnessy. The National Guard plays an essential role
    in defending against malicious cyber activities targeting elections. I
    applaud the efforts of all National Guard units supporting cyber
    defense of the 2020 elections.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, can you speak to
    your plan to integrate efforts such as those of the Connecticut
    National Guard--but also the role of CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and
    Infrastructure Security Agency--to mitigate threats to our election
    infrastructure?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the lead
    federal response agency for cyber election security and has been
    sharing information and providing assistance to all organizations,
    including the National Guard, that request support. USNORTHCOM, in
    partnership with United States Cyber Command, is assisting CISA by
    providing intelligence information. Additionally, the National Guard
    Bureau (NGB) has been sharing information and conducting tabletop
    exercises with National Guard forces, and some states have already
    begun to execute support at the state level.
     the threat of information operations and need for cognitive security
                                    (cogsec)
        43. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, the Emerging Field
    of Cognitive Security (COGSEC) focuses on the evolving information
    environment and suggests that in the future, governments, social
    platforms, and non-state actors will be engaged in a continual arms
    race to influence--and protect from influence--large groups of users
    online. This field was highlighted by RAND analyst Dr. Rand Waltzman
    who previously testified in front of the SASC Cybersecurity
    Subcommittee in 2017. I am concerned about these efforts to exploit the
    cognitive biases of large public groups to support the execution of
    military objectives. This threat was crystalized in 2014 in Eastern
    Ukraine, in which information operations campaigns targeted both
    civilian and military members of Ukraine based on their cognitive
    biases to achieve a military objective, the annexation of Crimea. How
    can we protect our Homeland from non-kinetic attacks like we saw in
    Ukraine?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our adversaries have the ability to threaten
    our Homeland in multiple domains--to include the information domain.
    Whether an attack originates in cyberspace or in the physical domain,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we cannot
    defeat that which we cannot detect. Protecting our Homeland in the
    information domain requires a collaborative whole-of-government effort,
    and our contributions include intelligence support to information
    operations, cyber, and counter-messaging efforts in support of our
    interagency partners.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what counter measure
    are we taking now, or can we take in the future, to increase our
    defense of the Homeland in this increasingly complex operating
    environment?
        General O'Shaughnessy. As we defend the Homeland against threats in
    all domains, USNORTHCOM is focused on countering adversary narratives
    by, with, and through our fellow combatant commands and partners. In an
    age of rapidly advancing technology, strategic competition, and
    innovation, we cannot rely on antiquated technology or outdated
    approaches. We are bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new
    technologies to bear against our adversaries in order to defend our
    Homeland. One such initiative is through the USNORTHCOM-created
    Homeland defense Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
    program, which enables all combatant commands to conduct information
    operations as part of an integrated effort to improve our Homeland
    defense.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, great power
    competition includes being able to defend against adversaries like
    Russia, China, and Iran's ability to carry out non kinetic attacks on
    the Homeland. How do you see the problem of our adversaries conducting
    information operations within United States borders?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our adversaries possess the capability to
    threaten our Homeland in the information domain. Defense against
    information operations requires a whole-of-government effort, and close
    collaboration with a wide range of partners. USNORTHCOM places a high
    priority on our support to the Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
    Cyber Command, and other government partners to defend the Homeland in
    the information domain.

        46. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, over the past 10
    years, we have seen many attempts to destabilize the United States from
    the inside out and subvert faith in democratic institutions. In
    coordination with CYBERCOM what are you doing to protect the Homeland
    from these often invisible, but very meaningful threats to the
    Homeland?
        General O'Shaughnessy. In synchronizing efforts with USCYBERCOM, we
    are bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new technologies to bear
    against our adversaries to defend our Homeland. As we defend the
    Homeland against complex threats in all domains, USNORTHCOM understands
    the status quo is not acceptable and we are actively building a capable
    defense that provides a credible deterrent. In an age of rapidly
    advancing technology, rising strategic competition, and extraordinary
    innovation, we are working closely with our partners in the Department
    of Defense, to include USCYBERCOM and the National Guard Bureau to
    defend our networks and our elections infrastructure to protect our
    critical democratic institutions.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                           missile defense of hawaii
        47. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, in your written
    testimony you highlighted North Korea's successful tests of ICBMs
    capable of ranging to most or all of North America. How confident are
    you in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System to
    defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea, and does
    that confidence include ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I am confident we can defend against an ICBM
    threat from North Korea today, including threats to Hawaii. However,
    adversary capabilities continue to advance. We are on the ragged edge
    for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and need to modernize and
    advance our missile defense capabilities to keep pace.
                         homeland defense radar hawaii
        48. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy and Admiral Richard, how
    important is the Homeland Defense Raar-Hawaii (HDR-H) in terms of
    providing discriminating radar tracking information for the Ground
    Based Interceptors? Would there be additional vulnerabilities or risks
    to Hawaii from evolving missile threats without the HDR-H?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I remain confident in our ability to defend
    Hawaii today with the current Ballistic Missile Defense System and
    sensor suite, which includes the Sea-Based X-Band Radar and AN/TPY-2
    radars. In addition, the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) could
    provide some improved capability for Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
    defense of Hawaii. Specifically, the HDR-H could provide further
    layered defense post-GBI engagement to track data to engage a threat
    not intercepted by GBIs.
        Admiral Richard. I defer to Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD to
    address the importance of HDR-H radar tracking information to Ground
    Based Interceptors and associated risks to Hawaii in the absence of
    this capability.
                               homeland security
        49. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, Homeland defense is the
    number one priority and focus of NORTHCOM and NORAD. In an era of cyber
    threats, misinformation campaigns, hypersonic weapons and the growth of
    space as a warfighting domain, how has the concept of Homeland defense
    evolved in the first part of the 21st century?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Given the changes in the global security
    environment, the speed and complexity of war has accelerated such that
    future conflict will involve all domains and will be trans-regional in
    nature. Accordingly, Homeland defense is now an important consideration
    for all combatant commands, given that defense at home and power
    projection abroad are acknowledged as interdependent efforts. Homeland
    defense concepts and capabilities must continue to be at the forefront
    of planning and operations across the Joint Force in order to ensure
    our ability to project power and influence abroad.

        50. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, what metrics do you use
    to measure the efficacy of programs foused on Homeland defense?
        General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single
    unyielding priority: defending the Homeland. In order to defend against
    these 21st century threats, our Homeland defense enterprise must
    reflect the fact that the threats to the Homeland have expanded beyond
    the violent extremist threat that led to USNORTHCOM's establishment.
    Both USNORTHCOM and NORAD have refocused our efforts on deterring and
    defeating the complex nation-state threats and adversarial strategies
    that have eroded our military advantage; our defense priorities should
    continue to evolve to stay ahead of current and emerging threats
    identified in the National Defense Strategy. When acquiring
    capabilities to defend the Homeland, individual programs are measured
    and tested to ensure they meet established operational requirements.

        51. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, what additional tools,
    if any, does the United States need to develop further to address these
    evolving threats to the Homeland?
        General O'Shaughnessy. In order to effectively defend the Homeland,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD)
    consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for domain
    awareness, an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and
    control (JADC2), and new defeat mechanisms for advanced threats,
    including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and
    small unmanned aerial systems. These three elements are vital to
    deterring and defeating advanced threats to the Homeland, and
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a sense of profound urgency to
    bring these capabilities into the fight.
                                  north korea
        52. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, you have expressed STRATCOM's
    commitment to supporting DOD efforts to work with partners in the Indo-
    Pacific region to reduce military tensions and support the achievement
    of the fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. Given the
    variety of messages the United States has received over the past year
    from North Korea's leadership regarding the direction of their nuclear
    program, what do you think the next steps are to achieve full
    denuclearization of North Korea, and what role can STRATCOM play in
    achieving that goal?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM supports the Department's efforts to
    work with regional partners to reduce military tension. I defer to the
    State Department for their diplomatic efforts in achieving the final,
    fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                           new start and arms control
        53. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, can you tell explain how New
    START verification help you do your job at Strategic Command? For
    example, how do you use the 18 inspection per year and constant flow of
    information from Russia on the whereabouts of their nuclear weapons to
    help protect the United States?
        Admiral Richard. The verification regime enhances our ability to
    accurately assess Russian capabilities which significantly contributes
    to our understanding of their force structure and pace of
    modernization. For example, Russia's new Avangard hypersonic glide
    vehicle and Sarmat heavy ICBM will both be accountable under New START
    and we will be provided access to those systems via the verification
    regime.

        54. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, the Trump administration is
    proposing to negotiate a new arms control ageement that includes
    additional types of nuclear weapons not covered by New START and also
    includes China. My understanding is that such an agreement would be
    unprecedented and complicated. New START expires in less than a year.
    Do you think it's possible to negotiate and bring into force a new
    trilateral arms control agreement before New START expires on February
    5, 2021? Is there a specific point at which you will recommend that the
    President extend New START regardless of the status of the trilateral
    diplomatic effort? Is this country safer in a world where we have no
    controls over or insights into Russian strategic forces?
        Admiral Richard. I defer to the State Department regarding the
    specifics for negotiating agreements. China has reaped significant
    benefits by not being bound to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty, and has consequently built a substantial arsenal of medium- and
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
        I support any arms control agreement that enhances the security of
    this nation. Russia has been largely compliant with New START (NST) as
    it sets a limit on the number of deployed strategic weapons they have.
    However, as a bilateral treaty, NST fails to account for thousands of
    non-strategic weapons and new systems in development outside of the
    treaty definitions. In a perfect world, having all of these attributes
    would make my job easier. When asked, my best military advice to the
    President will be NST has served us well and we should preserve those
    treaty attributes that are beneficial, seek to address those issues the
    NST does not address, and remain cognizant of the limits of military
    advice to diplomatic initiatives.
        Whether the world is safer without the insights provided by NST
    depends on the evolution of Russian strategy and their forces absent
    such an agreement, and how the United States strategy might need to
    adapt to address any changes. Our current strategy and planned
    modernization as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review includes
    posturing our nuclear force structure and stockpile to hedge against
    these prospective and unanticipated risks.

        55. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, how does STRATCOM approach its
    mission of deterring China diferently from the mission to deter Russia?
    What adversary presents the greater nuclear risk to the United States?
    Are you confident in your strategic deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis
    China? How does the fact that New START exists help you address the
    concerns you have with the risk presented by Russia?
        Admiral Richard. The deterrence strategies for Russia and China are
    broadly similar as both countries pose an existential threat to the
    United States. For China, our strategy is designed to prevent Beijing
    from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through
    the limited use of its nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear
    weapons, however limited, is acceptable.
        For Russia, the strategy is to ensure Russia understands that
    nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its
    objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger
    incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Any use of nuclear
    weapons, however limited, is unacceptable.
        While Russia has greater nuclear capability today, China's lack of
    transparency and refusal to participate in arms control agreements
    produces considerable uncertainty surrounding its intentions. China's
    ongoing nuclear modernization, which includes it likely doubling the
    size of its nuclear warhead stockpile by the end of the decade, is a
    glaring example.
        Our current strategy and planned nuclear force modernization, in
    support of the Nuclear Posture Review, includes posturing our forces
    and stockpile to hedge against prospective and unanticipated risks from
    Russia and China.
        New START helps address concerns regarding Russia. It provides a
    ceiling on specific strategic offensive arms and a verification regime
    (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) that
    permits visibility into Russian strategic offensive capabilities.

        56. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, what military developments by
    China are most worrisome to you? If yo were asked for your military
    advice on which Chinese nuclear weapons systems you would most likely
    to see reduced or eliminated, which would you suggest?
        Admiral Richard. While the full answer to this question includes
    higher classification considerations, there are a number of
    unclassified Chinese military developments that concern me:
            China's investment in highly accurate medium- and
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles suggests that Beijing believes it
    can fight and win a regional conventional war within the nuclear
    shadow.
            China is developing two new ICBMs to greatly increase
    the nuclear threat to CONUS. Once operational, the DF-41 road-mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missile will be able to strike most of the
    continental United States with multiple independently-targetable
    warheads. China is also developing the JL-3 next-generation submarine-
    launched ballistic missile.
            Finally, China is investing in a defense industrial
    base capable of researching and developing next-generation strategic
    capabilities, such as low observable airframes, hypersonic weapons,
    quantum computing, artificial intelligence, counter-space, cyber, and
    nanotechnology.
            See classified response for additional considerations.
        My best military advice is informed by China's actions, not its
    words. Their ongoing nuclear modernization investments, their
    aggressive expansion activities in the South and East China Seas, and
    the assessment that China will likely double the size of its nuclear
    stockpile by the end of the decade, indicates China's leaders either no
    longer believe a small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to maintain a
    second-strike capability, or they are pursuing a more aggressive
    nuclear strategy.

        57. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, Russian officials confirmed
    that the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle an Sarmat heavy ICBM will be
    limited by New START. Can you confirm this to be the case? Why is it
    important that New START limits these systems--what is it about these
    specific systems that you find worrisome? If New START expires, will
    you be concerned with the loss of transparency into these brand new
    nuclear weapons?
        Admiral Richard. Yes. Russian leadership made several public
    statements affirming Avangard did in fact meet the treaty criteria for
    reporting. A United States team inspected the system in late November
    of last year. In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
    himself stated that the Avangard and Sarmat systems will be accountable
    under New START (NST).
        It is important for these systems to fall under the NST limits
    because they are new strategic offensive capabilities. The NST imposes
    ceilings on these systems and provides transparency, to the benefit of
    both parties.
        The loss of the NST verification regime would reduce our ability to
    accurately assess Russian strategic capabilities, including new systems
    like Avangard, Sarmat, and others. The comprehensive deterrence
    strategy, as defined in the Nuclear Posture Review, includes the force
    structure and stockpile to hedge against prospective and unanticipated
    risks.
        A fully modernized nuclear Triad, including requisite NC3
    capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons, provides the diversity and
    flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for effective deterrence as the
    geopolitical landscape evolves.

        58. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, are the vast majority of
    Russia's strategic nuclear delivery systems coered by New START today?
    90 percent of the systems? More than 90 percent? Do you think this will
    be the case in 2021 as well?
        Admiral Richard. One hundred percent of Russia's strategic nuclear
    delivery systems are accountable under New START (NST) today. NST does
    not impose any limits on the thousands of Russian non-strategic nuclear
    weapons or developmental systems designed to evade treaty restrictions.
        It would be improper for me to speculate regarding the outcome of
    ongoing discussions concerning NST extension.
                                     slcm-n
        59. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, the Pentagon is currently
    undertaking an analysis of alternatives for a ne nuclear-armed sea-
    launched cruise missile as proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
    Did STRATCOM support President Obama's decision to retire the missile
    and warhead in 2010? If so, why?
        Admiral Richard. Under General Cartwright, USSTRATCOM led a study
    which ultimately recommended retirement of the TLAM-N [Tomahawk Land
    Attack Missile-Nuclear]. This recommendation was in-line with then
    President Obama's policy that the Nation needed to reduce nuclear
    weapons to the minimum required for deterrence and followed from the
    1991 Presidential Initiatives to remove nuclear weapons from all Navy
    vessels except Trident SSBNs.
        The 1991 decision drove reductions in TLAM-N funding due to the
    need to support higher priority programs, causing TLAM-N readiness to
    degrade incrementally and ultimately drove significant operational risk
    across the system. That operational risk was the reason TLAM-N was
    retired and a suitable replacement was not pursued.
        When TLAM-N was retired, the threat environment was perceived as
    more benign, and we determined the capability was not needed. Since
    then, adversaries have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons by
    expanding their arsenals, modifying policies for their use and adding
    new capabilities designed to complicate our deterrence strategy. Russia
    has undergone a nearly complete modernization of its strategic systems,
    while China has rapidly expanded their forces and will soon have a
    nuclear triad of their own.

        60. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, if a decision is made to
    renuclearize the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM, can you
    tell me what doing so would entail? In addition to the cost to acquire
    the missile and warhead, would there be additional certification,
    security, storage, and operational costs to maintain the capability?
        Admiral Richard. The Navy is conducting a SLCM Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) study; it is premature to presume answers to these
    questions at this time.
        If the AOA concludes the Navy attack submarine is the appropriate
    platform, the study would provide justification, trade-offs, and
    initial estimates of costs associated with acquisition, sustainment,
    certification, security, storage and operational cycle.
        I defer to the Navy to answer specifics on what is required and the
    associated costs of acquiring a SLCM-N capability.

        61. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, would arming attack submarines
    with nuclear SLCMs mean that each submarine could carry fewer
    conventional Tomahawks?
        Admiral Richard. My response is stated in the answer to Question 60
    above. I defer to the Navy for specific SLCM-N AOA questions.
                                      gbsd
        62. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, according to the 2018 NPR, the
    life of the Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further.'' However, in
    your testimony you did not say that and instead said that extending the
    life Minuteman III (through 2070) would be more costly than GBSD and
    that the Minuteman III cannot address future challenges and threats to
    the ICBM force. Why did the NPR claim that the life of the Minuteman
    III ``cannot be extended further?''
        Admiral Richard. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined that the cost of
    pursuing the GBSD program is comparable to a Minuteman III life
    extension program (LEP); and, more importantly, will deliver the
    improved reliability, security, and effectiveness required to meet
    current and future challenges--making replacement of the Minuteman III
    system a more cost-effective choice. The 2018 NPR subsequently
    reaffirmed the importance of maintaining an effective ICBM capability
    in meeting future deterrence requirements, and endorsed continuation of
    the GBSD program.
        We are six years removed from the correct decision to pursue GBSD
    over another Minuteman LEP, and GBSD must achieve Initial Operational
    Capability before the Minuteman III begins to age-out. USSTRATCOM
    continues to support GBSD as the most expeditious, economical and cost-
    effective approach to maintaining the land-based portion of our
    strategic deterrent force.

        63. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard, you stated in your testimony
    that the Minuteman III missiles ``will have increasing difficulty
    penetrating future adversary defenses.'' But don't the missiles contain
    a repertoire of countermeasures to overcome such defenses? Unlike the
    United States, have U.S. adversaries figured out a way to defend
    against a large-scale ballistic missile attack?
        Admiral Richard. Minuteman III has carried a single countermeasure
    system for decades. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined future adversary
    defenses will improve, and GBSD must deploy improved countermeasures to
    defeat emerging challenges.
        Today, no country can defend against a large-scale ballistic
    missile attack.
        Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for
    developing and fielding missile defense systems, potential adversaries
    have long made substantial investments in their own missile defense
    systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that
    could threaten United States space-based assets.
        For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding
    strategic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68
    nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded multiple types of shorter-
    range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In addition,
    Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-
    energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ``experimental''
    satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance
    Russian counterspace capabilities.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                                 gbsd contract
        64. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, can you explain why the Air
    Force decided to move forward with a sole source award for GBSD, rather
    than canceling the solicitation to rework the requirements and timeline
    to attract healthy competition?
        Admiral Richard. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific
    questions regarding the ongoing GBSD source selection acquisition
    process.
                               ftc investigation
        65. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, the Federal Trade
    Commission issued a civil investigative demand to the company that won
    the GBSD contract, requesting information on its bid. Before moving
    forward with sole source negotiations, will the Air Force wait until
    the FTC investigation of the GBSD bid is complete?
        Admiral Richard. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific
    questions regarding any litigation related to the ongoing GBSD source
    selection acquisition process.
                         non-nuclear strategic threats
        66. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, during your confirmation
    hearing you stated, ``The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was very wise in
    acknowledging the possibility that strategic attacks could be other
    than nuclear and start to set a policy for us to address those.'' Since
    this is most certainly a strategic capability our adversaries are
    pursuing, would you recommend any policy shifts in order to better
    address deterring non-nuclear strategic attacks?
        Admiral Richard. No. The NPR stipulates that a critical role of
    U.S. nuclear forces is the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear
    attack. Further the NPR recognizes U.S. nuclear capabilities make
    essential contributions to the deterrence of non-nuclear aggression.
    Accordingly, the NPR states the U.S. will maintain the range of
    flexible nuclear capabilities needed to ensure nuclear or non-nuclear
    aggression against the U.S., allies, and partners will fail to achieve
    its objectives.
        Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for
    developing and fielding missile defense systems, potential adversaries
    have long made substantial investments in their own missile defense
    systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that
    could threaten United States space-based assets.
        For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding
    strategic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68
    nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded multiple types of shorter-
    range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In addition,
    Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-
    energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ``experimental''
    satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance
    Russian counterspace capabilities.

        67. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Richard, should the Department be
    investing in more research and development to counter non-nuclear
    strategic threats?
        Admiral Richard. The Department's current and projected R&D
    investments are appropriate. R&D programs for artificial intelligence,
    cyber, autonomy, quantum computing, hypersonics, directed energy and
    other innovative technologies will result in leading-edge capabilities
    to meet warfighter needs, defense priorities, and the means to counter
    evolving non-nuclear strategic threats.
                           national defense strategy
        68. Senator Duckworth. General O'Shaughnessy, please tell me what
    actions NORTHCOM needs to take in the coming year to better align
    itself with the National Defense Strategy and great power competition?
        General O'Shaughnessy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are aggressively
    implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy and executing the top
    priority of the NDS: defend the Homeland. With that focus on the NDS,
    we are transforming the USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters and our
    components while placing a strong emphasis on integrating Homeland
    defense into global defense planning, exercises, and operations. We
    have also developed the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for
    Layered Defense (SHIELD) to provide a persistent, purpose-built defense
    architecture. This forward-looking concept incorporates improved domain
    awareness, joint all-domain command and control, and advanced defeat
    mechanisms as critical pillars for defense of our Homeland.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
                      UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our hearing will come to order.
        We meet today to continue receiving the posture statements.
    There will be quite a few more. It is the time of year, and we
    have General Tod Wolters--and I appreciate very much the time
    we spent together in Munich last week--and General Stephen
    Lyons. I appreciate the two and the years of service that you
    have donated and given to your country.
        As stated many times before, the Armed Services Committee's
    top priority is to ensure the effective implementation of the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS). We pretty much--it surprised
    me, Senator Wicker--how we have really stuck with that from the
    very beginning. It means that we must ensure that in this era
    of great power competition with Russia and China that our
    military services are resourcing our combatant commands to
    address the challenge of strategic competition.
        This is especially true of our two combatant commands
    (COCOMS) that are here today. EUCOM [European Command] is
    focused on deterring Vladimir Putin who has repeatedly shown
    his willingness to use force to achieve his political
    objectives. Then there is TRANSCOM [Transportation Command]
    whose focus on full spectrum mobility operations includes
    sealift and airlift, both of which face capability shortfalls.
        I just returned from the Munich Security Conference with
    several others here at this table. It was a great reminder of
    the importance of allies and partners as we deal with the
    challenges from China and Russia. There are great opportunities
    to work with our European friends especially in Africa, and I
    hope that we will continue to do that.
        America's commitment to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] remains bipartisan and unwavering. We are
    matching our words with action especially through our posture
    investments in the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the
    upcoming exercises called Defender 20, which will be the
    largest movement of United States troops to Europe since the
    end of the Cold War. We are talking about, in addition to the
    10,000 already there, an additional 20,000, and so that is a
    large one. It is a record-setter.
        General Wolters, I look forward to hearing about your
    priorities going forward especially in the maritime domain
    where Russia is increasing activity, advancing submarines and
    in air and missile defense as China continues to threaten
    United States and allied forces with its missile arsenal.
        General Lyons, you recently stated that the aerial
    refueling fleet is the most stressed in the U.S. Transportation
    Command's arsenal. So we look forward to getting your thoughts
    on how we can address the shortfall, much of which is due to
    the problems that we have had with the KC-46. I am particularly
    sensitive to that because I was honored to come back from all
    the way to Washington State to come back to Altus Air Force
    Base in the KC-46. At that time--that was less than a year
    ago--I did not think there was any problem with it. Obviously,
    there is.
        Before we turn to Senator Reed, we would remind the members
    that we will have a classified, closed, informal briefing at
    2:30, and that is going to conflict with some of the votes.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
    General Wolters is testifying for the first time before the
    Committee in his current position as Commander of United States
    European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or
    the SACEUR.
        General Lyons, I welcome your return to testify before the
    Committee on the posture of the U.S. Transportation Command.
        Let me thank both of you for the many decades of military
    service, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated
    men and women serving under your command.
        The transatlantic relationship remains absolutely critical
    to U.S. national security. Our close bond with our European
    allies and partners is one of our greatest strategic
    advantages. In the fiscal year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress reaffirmed the unbreakable
    U.S. commitment to NATO.
        I am concerned, however, that significant cuts in the
    European Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, as proposed in the
    President's fiscal year 2021 budget request may send the wrong
    signal to our allies and our adversaries regarding our support
    for the transatlantic relationship.
        The EUCOM Commander faces a wide range of complex security
    challenges, including the reemergence of a revanchist Russia
    seeking to reassert a claim to great power status. Russia is
    actively undermining the rules-based international order that
    it views as contrary to its strategic interests. Russia has
    deployed its military aggressively to attempt to coerce its
    neighbors and undermine their sovereignty. Consistent with the
    2018 National Defense Strategy, EUCOM is developing the
    operational concepts, plans, and programs necessary for the
    strategic competition with Russia and to ensure our combat
    credible military deterrent against Russia's efforts to
    threaten the sovereignty of our allies and partners. General
    Wolters, the Committee will be very interested in whether you
    have the force posture in Europe and resources to meet this
    challenge.
        Additionally, Russia is engaged in a campaign of hybrid
    warfare, below the level of military conflict, to advance its
    strategic interests. Recent news reports have highlighted that
    Russia is, once again, conducting information warfare
    operations to influence the upcoming United States presidential
    elections to advance preferred candidates and sow division and
    undermine public faith in our democratic process. I would be
    interested in how EUCOM is working with CYBERCOM [Cyber
    Command] and other agencies to counter the Russian hybrid
    threat and what progress, if any, have we made on ensuring a
    coordinated, whole-of-government strategy to defend against
    Russian malign influence.
        A major test of both EUCOM and TRANSCOM will come this
    spring, as the Chairman has indicated, with the Defender-Europe
    20 exercise. This exercise is about the transportation of a
    division-sized combat force, the largest deployment of troops
    from the United States to Europe for an exercise in the past 25
    years. There are some of us that still remember Reforger. In
    total, some 37,000 U.S., NATO, and partner forces will
    participate in Defender. This exercise will highlight the
    combat-credible military deterrent provided by United States
    and allied forces against aggression in Europe.
        Now, turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM
    perform duties that sustain the entire Department of Defense
    (DOD) effort in protecting our Nation's security. With the
    competitive edge and its ability to deploy and sustain
    America's armed forces, TRANSCOM provides DOD with unique
    capabilities that we have come to expect and perhaps too
    frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are busy
    supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
    without them, the United States would be at a significant
    disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
        The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships
    held in readiness by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). But
    it is aging and will need to be modernized over the next
    decade. Three years ago, the Committee authorized the Defense
    Department to begin a program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve
    Force. This program will authorize DOD to purchase up to two
    foreign-built vessels while the Navy designed a family of
    auxiliary vessels for a number of uses, including
    recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force.
        Then, 2 years ago, Congress authorized the department to
    buy five more foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department
    submitted a funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S.
    shipyards, a plan we have yet to receive. General Lyons, I am
    interested in the status of the RRF recapitalization in fiscal
    year 2021.
        The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil
    Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as
    40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable and will be
    able to provide needed surge capacity in the future. General
    Lyons, I am interested in your views on the state of this fleet
    and if anything needs to be done to ensure their readiness.
        Our global transportation capability owned or managed by
    TRANSCOM has been one of our asymmetric advantages of many
    years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
    will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year,
    we received the report of the analysis of wartime
    transportation needs in the Mobility Requirements Study. It was
    clear to the Committee that the Department needed to continue
    the analytical effort to identify requirements because the
    study presented last year did not reflect implementation of the
    National Defense Strategy. General Lyons, perhaps you could
    give us an update on where TRANSCOM stands in updating this
    analysis.
        Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats
    because of the command's extensive work with private sector
    entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General
    Lyons, I would like to get an update from you on where TRANSCOM
    stands in its effort to improve its cybersecurity posture.
        Again, let me thank the witnesses for appearing before the
    Committee today. I look forward to your testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We will now hear opening statements. We will start with
    you, General Wolters, and then General Lyons. Your statements
    should be around 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made
    a part of the record. General Wolters?

              STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF,
    COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
                          ORGANIZATION SUPREME
                        ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

        General Wolters. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to
    appear before you, and on behalf of the men, women, and
    families that represent USEUCOM, we thank each and every one of
    you for your steadfast support. As all of you well know, it is
    an absolute privilege to serve alongside the patriots that
    represent the United States of America.
        In Europe, political uncertainty, energy competition, and
    diffusion of disruptive technology are stressing the
    established Western order. Threats and challenges, most notably
    Russia, Iran, and China, seek to take advantage of these
    conditions through aggressive action using all instruments of
    national power and are backed by increasingly capable military
    forces.
        Fully aligned with the National Defense Strategy
    implementation efforts, we confront these challenges by
    adapting our approach to most effectively employ our means.
    Together with the likeminded allies and partners, our team of
    patriots defend freedom in all domains across the area of
    responsibility and around the clock. Thanks to their efforts
    and the authorities and resources you provide, EUCOM continues
    to maintain positive momentum with respect to readiness and is
    postured to compete, deter, and effectively respond with the
    full weight of the transatlantic alliance.
        In 2019, NATO took significant military strides with
    improvements in command and control, indications and warnings,
    mission command, and by approving a new NATO military strategy
    titled ``Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response.'' NATO
    continues to adapt its force structure with the establishment
    of two additional NATO headquarters. Joint Forces Command
    Norfolk, which is focused on maintaining transatlantic lines of
    communications, and the German-led Joint Support Enabling
    Command focused on rear-area logistics coordination. These
    headquarters increase our ability to command and control,
    enable deployment, and sustain NATO forces in crisis or
    conflict.
        The European Union (EU), NATO, and EUCOM have made progress
    improving infrastructure and transit procedures to facilitate
    rapid movement of forces across the Euro-Atlantic. We will
    leverage many of these advancements to facilitate deployment of
    a division-sized force, as mentioned by the Chairman, during
    the United States-led exercise Defender-Europe 20, an exercise
    that showcases United States and allied commitment to
    collective security of the Euro-Atlantic.
        The United States' position in Europe is an invaluable
    cornerstone of national security. Today, United States
    servicemembers in Europe continue to generate peace alongside
    our allies and partners. We are grateful for sustained
    congressional interest and support through authorities and
    funding. Together with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    coast guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, your support
    demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the
    homeland forward and preserve peace for the 1 billion citizens
    in the Euro-Atlantic.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Wolters follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General Tod D. Wolters
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Senate Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men,
    women, and their families preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic, it is
    an honor to testify before you today. It is a privilege to serve
    alongside these dedicated patriots in a mission that is essential to
    national security. Their selfless service and tireless commitment is an
    inspiration. Together, with likeminded Allies and partners, our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians work
    to defend peace and prosperity around the clock.
        The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) articulate how a free and prosperous Europe, defended by
    a capable and credible Euro-Atlantic Alliance, remains foundational to
    our security in an increasingly competitive strategic environment.
    USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments are aligned with our
    strategies to meet the challenges of great power competition from both
    Russia and China. Enabled by deep and meaningful Ally and partner
    relationships, USEUCOM is ready to fight and win against capable
    adversaries should deterrence fail. We are proud of the collaborative
    work across the Joint Force to implement these strategies and are
    grateful for continued Congressional interest and support.
        In Europe, political uncertainty, migration, energy competition,
    and diffusion of disruptive technology are stressing the established
    democratic order. Competitors, most notably Russia, China, and Iran,
    seek to take advantage of these conditions through aggressive action
    using all instruments of national power, and are backed by increasingly
    capable military forces. An environment exists where adversary
    disinformation and destructive cyber campaigns can be amplified to
    foment instability. This nexus is testing national governments and
    multi-national institutions like the European Union (EU) and North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
        risks and challenges in the useucom area of responsibility (aor)
        The USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers a large and diverse
    geographic area. It encompasses not only nations such as Russia,
    Turkey, Ukraine, and Israel, but a diverse set of perspectives from the
    Arctic, Iberian Peninsula, Mediterranean Sea, and Eastern Europe.
    Russia
        Russia's sizable nuclear arsenal ensures they will remain a long-
    term, existential threat to the United States. Russia's vast non-
    strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and apparent misperception they
    could gain advantage in crisis or conflict through its use is
    concerning. Russia continues to engage in disruptive behavior despite
    widespread international disapproval and continued economic sanctions,
    and continues to challenge the rules-based international order and
    violate its obligations under international agreements. The Kremlin
    employs coercion and aggressive actions amid growing signs of domestic
    unrest. These actions suggest Russian leadership may feel compelled to
    take greater risks to maintain power, counter Western influence, and
    seize opportunities to demonstrate a perception of great power status.
        Over the past twelve years, Russia has invaded two neighboring
    states, violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading
    to the treaty's termination, developed new strategic platforms
    resulting in the Skyfallto deliverfor nuclear cruise missile accident
    that killed 7 Russian scientists last year, weapons, and abrogated its
    responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
    Europe, all at the expense of strategic stability. Russia employs a
    below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies and
    intermediary forces in an attempt to weaken, divide, and intimidate our
    Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute,
    and malign actions. These actions include information and cyber
    operations, election meddling, political subversion, economic
    intimidation, military sales, exercises, and the calculated use of
    force. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have attacked NATO member
    government and commercial data networks. Russian proxies continue their
    attempt to undermine democratic institutions through concerted election
    meddling against the United States, Allies, and partners.
        Beyond Europe, Russia is working to build influence in the Arctic,
    Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. They are pursuing a
    partnership of convenience with China to close off the current free and
    open international order. By probing United States, Allied, and partner
    response thresholds, Russian leadership plays a dangerous game fraught
    with the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
        The Kremlin continues to maintain robust levels of defense
    spending, modernizing its forces across the board, with the intent of
    building a more flexible and rapidly deployable force to provide an
    enhanced capability to seize and maintain the initiative in both
    competition and conflict. Russia continues to rotate its forces through
    active conflicts in Syria and Ukraine to improve, test, and validate
    combat capabilities. Russia counts on its malign influence
    capabilities, conventional military, and nuclear forces to underwrite
    this aggressive approach. Modern Russian Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD), cyber and electronic warfare systems, counter-space,
    and long-range precision fires capabilities are postured and employed
    to challenge United States and Allied warfighting systems, doctrine,
    and authorities.
    Ukraine
        Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and
    its proxies continue their campaign to destabilize Ukraine's defense,
    economic, and political sectors with the intent of cementing Ukraine
    into the Kremlin's sphere of influence. Of particular concern is the
    ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated and stoked by Russia.
    Even with the implementation of the Minsk agreements, ceasefire
    violations occur often. Russia also continues to undermine the
    government of Ukraine through cyber-attacks, support of illegitimate
    elections in eastern Ukraine, and aggressive actions in the Black Sea
    and Sea of Azov, including an attack on Ukrainian naval vessels.
    Contrary to Russian efforts, these coercive actions have energized
    Ukrainian civil society and reinforced aspirations to membership in
    Euro-Atlantic institutions like the EU and NATO. The recent election of
    President Zelenskyy further solidified this pro-Western course. Ukraine
    has enhanced its commitment to fighting corruption and enacting defense
    reform, including by meeting the requirements of our Ukraine Security
    Assistance Initiative (USAI).
    Poland and Baltics
        Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point for both NATO
    and Russia. For NATO, this is the region at the greatest risk of
    Russian aggression and miscalculated escalation due to historical
    grievances and geographic position. For the Kremlin, Polish and Baltic
    geopolitical alignment with the West are reminders of a withered sphere
    of control, of the rush toward NATO's open door, isolation of its
    Kaliningrad exclave, and lost access to the Baltic Sea from the Russian
    mainland. The Kremlin sees the region's substantial ethnic Russian
    population as a potential justification for intervention. It actively
    targets this population with extensive propaganda and malign influence
    operations. While NATO forces in the region currently help deter any
    overt Russian attack, Russian military forces in the Western Military
    District and Kaliningrad hold a geographic advantage and outnumber NATO
    forces postured in the region. Russia is actively employing malign
    information and cyber operations in an attempt to weaken regional
    stability and Alliance resolve. Allies in the region are deepening
    their knowledge and expertise in the cyber and information domains to
    the benefit of the United States and the Alliance. Poland's defense
    budget increases, burden-sharing basing offers with the United States,
    and on-going modernization that include Patriot and F-35 acquisitions,
    provide significant capability enhancements in the region and
    demonstrate resolve to meet and exceed the 2014 Wales Summit
    commitments.
    South Caucasus
        The Kremlin exerts influence over countries in the South Caucasus
    through manipulation of regional tensions and enduring military
    conflicts with all instruments of national power. The Kremlin believes
    chronic instability in this area is central to regional hegemony.
    Russia maintains leverage over Georgia through its occupation of
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including its attempts to alter the
    administrative boundary lines of occupied territories, interfere with
    the transit of people and goods within Georgia's sovereign territory,
    and complicate Georgia's NATO membership aspirations.
        Russia also maintains its political influence over Armenia and
    Azerbaijan by playing both sides of the enduring conflict in Nagorno-
    Karabakh, while questionably serving as a neutral mediator in the Minsk
    Process peace negotiations. As an example of supplying both sides of
    the conflict, Russia provides military grant assistance to Armenia, a
    Collective Security Treaty Organization member, while simultaneously
    selling advanced military systems and hardware to Azerbaijan. Russia
    also influences support of operations farther abroad, such as
    convincing Armenia to deploy forces to Syria as part of the Russian
    contingent support for Assad's regime.
    Balkans
        The Balkans remain a strategically important region where ethnic
    tensions within nations and between neighbors continue to foster
    regional instability and are primary targets of persistent Russian
    malign influence. Aside from historical and cultural ties with the
    Balkan region, Russia views the sustainment of social and political
    tensions in the region as a central tenet of its goal to prevent
    individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path toward Euro-
    Atlantic alignment and integration. Nonetheless, Montenegro, and soon
    North Macedonia's accession into NATO represent tremendous success
    stories in spite of Russia's significant attempts to block and dissuade
    integration.
        Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and
    several other nations have yet to recognize its status as a sovereign
    nation. Kosovo, and neighboring Serbia, have not yet normalized
    relations, but despite tensions, we continue to encourage both parties
    to maintain dialogue to find a peaceful solution. The principal
    stabilizing force in Kosovo remains NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which
    includes a small, but significant United States contribution. KFOR's
    presence will remain essential to stability while Serbia and Kosovo
    pursue a stable relationship through the planned 10-year transition of
    the Kosovo Security Forces.
        Serbia has attempted to find a balance between Russia and the West
    but finds its EU ambitions impeded by internal corruption, structural
    and economic challenges, EU-Russia sanctions, and the requirement to
    normalize relations with Kosovo. China has emerged as an alternative
    patron, engaging in both economic and defense support matters.
        Bosnia and Herzegovina remains mired in political and ethnic
    instability. Fueled by Russian influence, obstructionistsseek greater
    autonomy for Republika Srpska to weaken state-level authorities and
    frustrate progress towards further alignment with NATO and the EU.
    Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions between Bosniaks,
    Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina's
    ability to chart a path towards lasting stability.
    Turkey
        Acknowledging tensions and political disputes, Turkey remains a
    strategic United States Ally, critical to NATO and United States
    interests in Europe, EURASIA, and the Middle East. Home to the second
    largest military in NATO, Turkey borders a volatile region and is
    geostrategically located to assist in countering Russia. Turkey is also
    the only NATO member to share a border with Iran. Ankara continues to
    view the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and its affiliates as their
    greatest security threat. From Turkey's perspective, continued United
    States support for the Syrian Democratic Forces remains the principal
    irritant to our bilateral security relationship. Turkey's intervention
    into Northeast Syria to address these security concerns degraded United
    States counter-terrorism efforts and further harmed our bilateral
    relationship.
        Turkey's purchase of the Russian produced S-400 air defense system
    is incompatible with Turkish procurement of the F-35, the S-400 cannot
    be integratedwith NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense command and
    control network.
        Turkey's role in countering Russia, however, is pivotal. The
    relationship between Moscow and Ankara remains transactional. Both
    nations view the Black Sea region as their natural area of influence
    and they continue to clash in Libya and are in direct combat in Idlib,
    Syria. Both United States and Turkey's long-term strategic interests
    are best served by continuing to work together to improve counter-
    Russia cooperation both bilaterally and through NATO.
    Israel
        Israel continues to face a complex set of evolving security
    challenges spanning the spectrum of conflict. Regional instability is
    fueled by Iran's efforts to threaten Israel and Russia's expanded
    involvement in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.
        Israel's adversaries, most notably Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese-
    Hezbollah, have taken advantage of this turbulence. Iran has positioned
    forces to threaten and attack Israel, attempted to expand its
    influence, and increased lethal support to regional partners.
        Iran and its proxies have also made significant gains in asymmetric
    capabilities, including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
    and unmanned aerial systems. Iran remains committed to modernizing its
    military and continues to improve the range, lethality, and accuracy of
    its ballistic missile systems and has the region's largest ballistic
    missile arsenal with the capability of striking targets 2,000
    kilometers beyond its borders.
    Mediterranean and Southern Flank
        While migrant and refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa
    have decreased, steady movement of people across Turkey and through the
    Mediterranean continue to stress European nations and the EU. Migration
    remains a major security and humanitarian concern for Allies and
    partners across Southern Europe and consumes scarce defense and
    security resources.
    Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
        VEOs remain a transregional threat with decentralized command and
    control, finance, and facilitation networks spanning from conflict
    zones into Europe. These extremists continue to take advantage of
    instability in North Africa, Iraq, and Syria to hide and husband
    resources in the face of coalition gains. VEO-inspired and organized
    attacks in Europe further complicate integration efforts, isolate
    refugee and migrant communities, and make these groups vulnerable to
    recruitment. Despite the death of al-Baghdadi, ISIS and other VEOs
    still require persistent global pressure to prevent a resurgence and
    preclude future attacks against the Homeland, Europe, and our global
    partners.
    China
        China's aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the
    USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's desire to build influence in Europe to
    tilt the international order to its advantage. Seventeen Central and
    Eastern European nations have joined the China-led, 17+1 framework for
    cooperation. Many European countries, including the 17+1, are also
    signatories to China's One Belt One Road Initiative. China also pursues
    bilateral deals with targeted nations to build infrastructure and
    secure agreements enabling cost-effective global trade. Chinese foreign
    direct investment and Chinese-backed business ventures in Europe
    provide China an avenue to exert influence at the expense of long-term
    United States, Allied, and partner interests.
        Of particular concern are China's efforts to expand 5G networks
    into Europe through state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE. These
    networks place intellectual property, sensitive technology, and private
    personal information at heightened risk of acquisition and exploitation
    by the Chinese government. This ongoing initiative, coupled with
    China's growing interest and investment in European ports and
    infrastructure, complicates steady-state and contingency operations. We
    continue to articulate this risk to European defense counterparts and
    highlight shared values, interests, and business practices that
    distinguish the United States as a partner of choice. We see
    encouraging signs from European nations as they become increasingly
    wary of strings attached to Chinese capital and investment.
         useucom operations, activities, investments, and opportunities
    Strategy Implementation
        We confront challenges in the USEUCOM AOR by adapting our thinking
    and approach to meet assigned missions as detailed in capstone strategy
    documents and maintain laser-sharp focus on expanding the competitive
    space with Russia. USEUCOM acts as Coordinating Authority for the
    Russia problem set by overseeing the global coordination of day-to-day
    operations, activities, and investments. In this role, USEUCOM advises
    the Secretary of Defense on resource, force structure, and
    synchronization of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and
    curb its global malign activities.
        USEUCOM tirelessly works with the U.S. interagency, Allies, and
    partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our adversaries.
    In this increasingly competitive security environment, we remain
    vigilant to ensure any challenge or challenger is met with a lethal,
    responsive, and resilient force, in all domains, in every strategic
    direction, and with a capable set of Allies and partners.
    Support NATO's Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
        USEUCOM's primary mission is to deter and ``posture'' to respond to
    aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. In 2019, NATO
    took significant steps toward improving command and control and other
    military capabilities to meet the challenges and complexities of a
    dynamic security environment. NATO's Military Committee approved a new
    NATO Military Strategy, Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response. NATO
    continued implementation of the adapted NATO Command Structure with the
    establishment of two additional NATO headquarters: Joint Forces Command
    Norfolk, focused on maintaining trans-Atlantic lines of communications,
    and the German-led, Joint Support Enabling Command, focused on rear-
    area security and logistics coordination. These headquarters increase
    our ability to command and control and will organize and enable the
    deployment and sustainment of NATO forces in crisis or conflict. The
    EU, NATO, and USEUCOM have made progress improving infrastructure and
    transit permissions to facilitate the rapid movement of forces and
    logistic support across the Euro-Atlantic. We will ``leverage'' and
    ``proof'' many of these advancements during the United States led
    Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring. The NATO Readiness Initiative
    will ensure NATO's ability to respond to aggression rapidly by
    identifying 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat
    vessels, for use in 30 days. Finally, the forthcoming accession of
    North Macedonia as the 30th member of NATO demonstrates the vibrancy of
    the Alliance through its Open Door Policy while continuing to show the
    strength of purpose in defending shared values in the face of Russian
    malign influence.
        NATO members contribute to common defense through capability
    investments, support to Alliance members, and continued participation
    in operations, missions, and exercises. Poland's acquisition of F-35s
    and Patriot air defense capability, Romania's acquisition of High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long-range fires capability,
    and the fielding of F-35s by Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United
    Kingdom are increasing interoperable combat power across the AOR. NATO
    members provide host nation support to forward-stationed United States
    Forces across the region and participate in Alliance and U.S. multi-
    lateral exercises focused on enhancing responsiveness and
    interoperability. NATO members contribute forces to ongoing NATO and
    United States-led coalition missions advancing and securing our common
    interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. NATO members help
    underwrite infrastructure investments, defraying costs of United States
    military construction in theater through the NATO Security Investment
    Program.
        As NATO fortifies its position against a resurgent Russia,
    ballistic missile threats from Iran, and the continued threat of
    international terror groups, United States leadership within the
    Alliance is critical for ongoing activities to address competition and
    ensure combat-credible military forces are trained and postured to
    deter any would-be aggressor. USEUCOM plays an important role in
    exercising this leadership through our support to ongoing NATO
    operations, missions and engagements as NATO adapts to ensure it is an
    Alliance fit for purpose.
        USEUCOM's participation in NATO operations and activities
    demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. United States soldiers
    stand ready in Poland as part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence
    mission in one of four battlegroups holding the line against Russian
    aggression in Poland and the Baltics. United States aircrews fly
    alongside Allies as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission, helping to
    safeguard the sovereignty of Baltic airspace against Russian
    incursions. A U.S. destroyer operates as the flagship of Standing NATO
    Maritime Group One, responding to maritime challenges in the Atlantic,
    Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea. The European Phased Adaptive
    Approach, including the Aegis Ashore in Romania and United States Aegis
    destroyer presence in the Mediterranean, provides the foundation of
    NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense capability.
        The support Congress provides through the European Deterrence
    Initiative (EDI) has been critical to our deterrence and posture
    successes in the USEUCOM AOR. Through EDI, we have enhanced our
    presence in the theater to assure Allies and deter adversaries.
    Increases of forward-stationed and rotational forces continue to
    improve our posture and enable us to compete and win in a multi-domain
    crisis or conflict. EDI funding for exercises, training, and building
    partner capacity programs enhance the readiness and interoperability of
    U.S. and Alliance forces. EDI funds have also improved our ability to
    respond using prepositioned stocks and improved theater infrastructure.
    Together, these improvements enable the rapid deployment and
    sustainment of forces. Section 333-funded Security Cooperation
    initiatives are pivotal components to EDI. Programs such as the Black
    Sea Maritime Initiative and enhancing Baltic Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense are potent, regionally-focused, components of a resilient
    theater posture.
        We continue to improve the infrastructure to enable swift response
    in any contingency. On the ground, we are establishing a U.S. armored
    division capability through the combination of forward-stationed and
    rotational forces. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Europe hold equipment
    and logistics for an Armored Brigade Combat Team and key enablers,
    facilitating increased lethality by rapidly integrating deployed units
    into operations. United States Army Europe, with extensive
    participation by NATO member states, will exercise this capability in
    the first deployment and exercise of a division echelon formation on
    NATO's eastern flank since the end of the Cold War in Exercise
    DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring.
        In the air domain, we are improving the mix of 4th and 5th
    generation fighter aircraft stationed in the theater along with
    rotational forces from the U.S. to enhance our IAMD networks and
    underwrite our Allies' efforts to enhance air defense systems. The
    build-out of European Contingency Air Operation Sets and Deployable Air
    Base Sets enhance the resiliency of our forces.
        In the maritime domain, we see predictable Carrier Strike Group and
    Amphibious presence as key elements of an agile theater posture. The
    reactivation of U.S. Second Fleet provides necessary maritime command
    and control capability in the Atlantic, while reinforcing NATO's
    western flank.
        In the space domain, we are building an integrated planning element
    to leverage the capability USSPACECOM is building to ensure our ability
    to plan and execute multi-domain operations.
        We have leveraged the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model to re-
    affirm our commitment to Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities
    within the AOR to improve our deterrent posture, and demonstrate
    operational unpredictability to adversaries. DFE deployments have
    included posturing the HARRY S. TRUMAN strike group from the
    Mediterranean to the High North, deploying a Terminal High Altitude
    Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and Romania, Bomber Task Force
    missions throughout the AOR, and an F-35 deployment to exercise with
    European Allies, demonstrating our ability to rapidly generate
    significant combat power across the AOR.
        Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    maintain a presence on the ground in strategic locations across the
    theater. These forces work alongside Allies and partners to deter
    aggression and build host nation defense capacity, interoperability,
    and readiness. DFE enables us to improve posture and unit readiness
    simultaneously. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat
    Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed as part of Operation
    ATLANTIC RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required.
    Rotational Marine Forces in Norway have improved an important position
    on NATO's northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions
    alongside our Norwegian allies. Additionally, the tangible improvements
    by individual European nations and the EU to enhance military mobility
    throughout Europe is increasing responsiveness and combat capability.
    The EU, in consultation with NATO and USEUCOM, is investing 6.5 billion
    euros for improvements to civilian and military dual-use transportation
    infrastructure across the continent.
        As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear
    Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to
    preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The strategic
    forces of the Alliance are the supreme guarantee of the security of
    Allies and underwrite every U.S. military operation in Europe. Since
    2015, the Alliance has placed increased emphasis on the role of nuclear
    capabilities in its overall deterrence and defense posture, and
    continues to adapt its posture to ensure its nuclear capabilities
    remain credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to the changing
    environment.
        USEUCOM fully supports the continued modernization and
    recapitalization of our nuclear forces. Congress has recognized the
    importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred
    recapitalization and has substantially funded these programs. USEUCOM
    fully supports recommendations in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to
    deploy the W76-2 Low Yield Ballistic Missile and to pursue development
    of a modern, sea-launched nuclear cruise missile. These actions would
    address a perceived deterrence gap, raise the Russian threshold for
    nuclear use, and disabuse the Russian Federation of the misconception
    there is any path to victory through nuclear escalation.
    Counter Russian Malign Influence
        Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to challenge and counter
    Russia's below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-
    faceted and capable military power which underwrite its malign
    approach. We bring potent assets to this ongoing contest through
    coordination with the U.S. interagency and multi-national partners. A
    key platform for competing with Russia on this front is the Russian
    Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with United States
    Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to
    promote Whole of Government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and
    counter Russia malign activities. Congressional funding for information
    operations activities enables USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives
    and disinformation on a daily basis. Our SOF forces are another vital
    element of this approach working with European Allies and partners to
    enhance defense institutions, border security, and resilience to
    Russian malign attacks.
        In the Cyber domain, our Cyber Component (Joint Forces Headquarters
    Cyber (Air Force)) and USEUCOM's Joint Cyber Center, in coordination
    with USCYBERCOM, continue to mature manning, facilities, and
    authorities to actively counter Russian cyber attacks. Together, these
    elements also assist with the enhancement of Allied and partner cyber
    capabilities. Recognizing worldwide cyber capabilities of China, Iran,
    and North Korea, we work with other combatant commands and interagency
    partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability to impose
    costs on aggressive adversary behavior.
        National Guard and Reserve forces maintain vibrant relationships
    and unique access with Allies and partners through the twenty-six-year-
    old State Partnership Program (SPP). With more than 500 engagements,
    through 22 active programs annually, the SPP provides unique
    opportunities to cultivate regional expertise and strengthen personal
    relationships to improve readiness and alignment across the AOR.
        Recognizing the state of competition between Russia and the West,
    escalation control/management must be foundational to our approach as
    military forces deter and posture to defend. We make extensive use of
    authorized military-to-military channels for safety deconfliction and
    to maintain strategic stability while remaining operationally
    unpredictable.
    Assist in the Defense of Israel
        USEUCOM underwrites the United States commitment to Israel's
    inherent right of self-defense from growing regional threats and our
    defense ties remain an important anchor of United States-Israel
    relations. USEUCOM conducts a robust series of exercises, activities,
    and senior leader engagements. We work closely with Israel's Defense
    Force to help maintain their qualitative military edge over any
    potential competitor. This assistance demonstrates our unwavering
    commitment to Israel, support for stability in the Levant, and the
    containment of Iranian malign activity.
    Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships
        Our strong bilateral and multi-lateral ties with European Allies
    and partners are invaluable and enable advancement of our shared
    interests in Europe and further abroad. USEUCOM's strong military-to-
    military relationships with defense counterparts across Europe signal
    continued United States commitment and are foundational to these
    national ties, particularly with countries such as Turkey, Ukraine,
    Georgia, and our Arctic partners.
        Turkey remains a key United States and NATO ally. Turkey's military
    strength and strategic position further United States and NATO
    interests. Our military-to-military relationships remain close.
        Along Russia's border, key United States partners see a brighter
    future to the West and resist Russia's efforts to hold them in a sphere
    of influence. Despite an ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence
    campaign, violence by Russian-sponsored forcesin the Donbas region, and
    the purported annexation of Crimea, Ukraine continues to seek closer
    partnership with the United States. Security cooperation funding
    provided through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative enhances
    the capability of Ukrainian formations and EUCOM's stated mission to
    deter Russian aggression. American servicemembers on the ground in the
    Joint Military Training Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with
    Ukrainian forces, helping to build competence and confidence. NATO
    partnership mechanisms and funds reinforce these programs and present a
    unified and coherent approach in our collective support to Ukraine.
    Maintaining this positive momentum and continued USAI funding for
    lethal aid are essential to enabling Ukrainian forces' ability to
    defend their sovereignty against well-armed, Russian-backed forces.
        In the Caucasus, where Russian forces occupy the Georgian regions
    of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia continues to be a steadfast
    partner and contributor to global security. Georgia is the largest non-
    NATO contributor to Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT--NATO's ongoing
    Afghanistan mission. Georgia's commitment of 870 soldiers in support of
    United States operations in Afghanistan demonstrates the enduring
    strength of our strategic partnership. USEUCOM assists Georgian forces
    in preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program.
    We continue to support Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity
    by improving their capability to generate and sustain capable defense
    forces through the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.
        In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new
    opportunities for exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports
    Whole of Government efforts to preserve the region as a place nations
    act cooperatively to address shared challenges and where U.S. national
    interests remain secure. USEUCOM leverages its close relations with
    USNORTHCOM and European Arctic nations to build Arctic awareness,
    increase operations, and strengthen the free and open order to secure
    the Arctic. These bilateral and multi-lateral strategic relationships
    enhance Alliance efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared
    interests.
    Enable U.S. Global Operations
        Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a
    free and open international order. USEUCOM's unique geographic location
    is essential to enable global operations through synchronization,
    access, basing, and overflight permissions within Europe. From this key
    terrain, USEUCOM acts in support of multiple Combatant and Functional
    Commands, Allied, Coalition, and U.S. interagency operations. Basing,
    access, and overflight permissions are built upon mutual respect and
    trust between the U.S. and our sovereign Allies and partners, and
    should not be taken for granted. We work within the Whole of Government
    to maintain these relationships, permissions under bilateral
    agreements, and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic investments.
    Absent these agreements, we would be unable to meet our treaty
    obligations or protect vital national interests. Beyond strategic
    position, the shared values, trust, and longstanding relationships we
    have in Europe, with some of our most capable and willing Allies and
    partners on the planet, enable the U.S. to generate coalitions for
    worldwide operations in support of shared national interests.
        Most recently, European Allies and partners proved essential in our
    national efforts to deter Iranian aggression. Our Allies and partners
    enabled USEUCOM's rapid posture shift of United States Forces in
    response to potential contingencies in the Levant. Key partners
    provided indispensable access, basing, and overflight permissions that
    enabled our ability to protect American citizens and diplomats in
    harm's way, had the security situation deteriorated. This recent
    example highlights the value of European support to enable United
    States global operations that preserve and defend our national
    interests worldwide.
    Conclusion
        The United States' position in Europe is an invaluable cornerstone
    of national security, built by our predecessors upon the wreckage of
    two world wars. Today, U.S. servicemembers in Europe continue to
    generate global peace and prosperity alongside our Allies and partners
    in the face of growing challenges. Revisionist actors, most notably
    Russia and China, present formidable, long-term challenges to
    preserving a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace.
        We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your
    continued pledge to meet them through support, funding, and authorities
    . . . particularly potent are support for European Deterrence
    Initiative and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). EDI
    enables USEUCOM's ability to enhance U.S. and Alliance readiness and
    posture to quickly respond in crisis or conflict. USAI ensures Ukraine
    has the resources and training to deter further Russian aggression.
    USEUCOM sits in a strategically significant part of the world and the
    dedicated men and women of the command unceasingly strive to be good
    stewards of the trust our Nation has placed in us. Together with the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of
    USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to
    defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the one billion
    people living in the Euro-Atlantic.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        General Lyons?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                     STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General Lyons. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Inhofe,
    Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee, it
    is my honor today to represent the men and women of the United
    States Transportation Command who at this very moment are
    employed around the globe conducting mobility operations 24
    hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
        Our mission at TRANSCOM is enduring, and that is to project
    and sustain the force globally at our time and place of
    choosing, thereby representing multiple options for our
    national leadership and multiple dilemmas for potential
    adversaries.
        With 85 percent of the force element stationed in the
    United States, it is TRANSCOM's job to move forces and materiel
    in support of the Secretary of Defense's strategic priorities.
    Our National Defense Strategy underscores the importance of
    advancing our national security interests, deterring potential
    adversaries, and should deterrence fail, responding with
    overwhelming force to win. Power projection is a distinct U.S.
    comparative advantage, but we are not alone in this effort. Our
    vast global logistics networks are underpinned by a deep bench
    of allies and likeminded partners that facilitate critical
    access basing and overflight activities.
        Today, I am confident in our ability to successfully
    execute our mission. This past year, with a no-notice alert, we
    moved the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to CENTCOM
    [Central Command] in less than 5.5 days. In total, we moved
    over 42 Army brigades, refueled multiple bomber task force and
    fighter movements, delivered 1.9 million passengers, over 6,000
    patients, over 100,000 containers, and over 26 million square
    feet of cargo. Much of this activity largely went unnoticed.
    This is good news and a sign of sustained success across DOD's
    mobility enterprise.
        However, as the Chairman pointed out, our world is
    changing. The National Defense Strategy describes a future in
    which TRANSCOM must be able to project the joint force under
    all-domain persistent attack. We acknowledge that our success
    today does not guarantee success for tomorrow, and we are
    actively preparing to meet tomorrow's challenges working
    through contested environment war games, enhancing cyber
    defenses and resiliency, and improving the integration of the
    sustainment warfighting function across the joint operations.
        To maintain readiness today, our aerial refueling and
    sealift forces require attention so they can continue to meet
    current and future challenges.
        Before I close, I want to highlight the Department's
    ongoing work to improve the personal property program, an area
    of great interest for Congress. As directed by the NDAA, we
    have submitted a business case analysis and worked closely with
    the GAO [Government Accountability Office] on their report.
    Both reports underscore the need for change. The Department can
    no longer afford to operate a disparate confederation of
    government activities supervising its similarly disparate
    collection of hundreds of transportation providers. We are on
    track to restructure our relationship with industry through the
    award of a global household goods contract that will begin
    moving DOD families ahead of the 2021 peak season.
        My message for DOD families: we heard your call for
    improved accountability, transparency, and quality capacity,
    and we are committed to deliver.
        My message for industry providers: if you provide quality
    service for our military members, you have a place in the
    future program. We need every quality moving service, to
    include our small businesses, and appreciate all that you do.
        It is an exciting time to be the commander of USTRANSCOM,
    and I could not be more proud of the team of professionals that
    create the strategic comparative advantage called the joint
    deployment and distribution enterprise.
        I am pleased to join General Tod Wolters today and look
    forward to your questions. Thank you for your leadership and
    support to our amazing servicemembers.
        [The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
                           delivering for our nation
        U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) exists as a combatant
    command to project and sustain combat power at a time and place of the
    Nation's choosing. Powered by dedicated Active Duty, National Guard,
    Reserve and civilian men and women, we underwrite the lethality of the
    Joint Force, we advance American security interests around the globe,
    and we provide our Nation's leaders with strategic flexibility to
    select from a range of options while creating multiple dilemmas for our
    potential adversaries.
        USTRANSCOM's mission is to conduct globally integrated mobility
    operations, lead the broader Joint Deployment and Distribution
    Enterprise, and provide enabling capabilities in order to project and
    sustain the Joint Force in support of national objectives. We
    accomplish this by balancing strategic mobility requirements for the
    Secretary of Defense and executing the Unified Command Plan roles and
    responsibilities assigned by the President. USTRANSCOM's mission is
    executed through three component commands and one subordinate command:
    the U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command,
    the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Air Force's Air
    Mobility Command, and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.
        The National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the Joint Force to be
    strategically predictable with allies and partners while being
    operationally unpredictable to competitors. USTRANSCOM was custom built
    for such a mission. We enable dynamic force employment and deliver
    options daily. In 2019, USTRANSCOM executed 43 brigade-sized overseas
    movements totaling over 26 million square feet of military cargo in
    support of all six Geographic Combatant Commands. In the air,
    USTRANSCOM operated from all seven continents. We transported 1.9
    million passengers and 1.3 million tons of cargo, and during air-to-air
    refueling operations we dispensed 956.6 million gallons of fuel. Our
    aerial evacuation crews executed 6,609 patient movements, including 84
    with battle injuries. One evacuation in particular stands out as
    highlighting how USTRANSCOM integrates the incredible capabilities of
    our Joint Force to protect American interests globally. Last August, a
    U.S. soldier with life-threatening wounds required immediate evacuation
    from Afghanistan to a stateside hospital for complex trauma treatment.
    A team of 18 joint medical professionals--armed with key life-saving
    capabilities--made a 19-hr non-stop flight from Afghanistan to Texas
    aboard a USTRANSCOM aircraft. The soldier is alive today because of the
    U.S. values embodied in the Joint Force and enabled daily by
    USTRANSCOM.
        As envisioned in the NDS, our operational focus has shifted from
    routine force rotations in Southwest Asia to posturing for Great Power
    Competition globally. Our accomplishments from 2019 underscore
    USTRANSCOM's ability to respond anywhere in the world at scale, in
    order to assure our allies, deter our adversaries, and ensure our
    national leaders always have options.
                             strategic environment
        The world is changing. In the past, we were able to deploy our
    forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and employ them
    how we wanted. In the future, the NDS calls us to be able to project
    and sustain the Joint Force under persistent, all-domain attack. Our
    competitors, such as China and Russia, clearly recognize the United
    States' ability to rapidly scale and deliver the Joint Force globally
    as a strategic comparative advantage, and they seek to deny it. Today,
    adversaries are active in the cyber domain. They infiltrate contract
    value chains. They invest in critical global choke points. They attempt
    to erode geopolitical access. They develop increasingly potent anti-
    access and area-denial weapons. These are clear indicators of their
    intent and reflect the changing character of war. In the future,
    strategic mobility will remain critical to delivering dynamic and
    credible response options to guarantee our national security interests.
    Strengthened by a historic past but with a critical eye towards the
    future, USTRANSCOM aims to remain ready to answer our nation's call.
                       ustranscom's warfighting framework
        The key to conducting globally-integrated mobility operations is
    the dynamic synchronization of our 1) global mobility posture, 2)
    global mobility transportation capacity, and 3) global command,
    control, and integration. These critical elements create USTRANSCOM's
    warfighting framework and allow USTRANSCOM to respond to strategic
    priorities in both time and space.
                            global mobility posture
        Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection,
    starting in the Continental United States (CONUS) with Department of
    Defense (DOD) installations and the seaports, railways, and the
    highways that connect them. In close coordination with the Department
    of Transportation, the Strategic Seaport Program, Strategic Corridor
    Rail Network, and Strategic Highway Network provide 23 strategic
    seaports, 15 alternate seaports, 37,000 miles of strategic railways,
    and over 62,000 miles of interstate and major highways to project
    combat power from the fort, to the port, and on to the battlefield.
        Beyond our nation's borders, USTRANSCOM relies on a deep bench of
    allies and like-minded partners that have stood with us for over 75
    years in defense of freedom. These allies and partners provide access
    to key regions and support a substantial basing and logistics system
    which expands our nation's global reach. Through a flexible, redundant,
    and resilient global posture, USTRANSCOM enables the DOD to project and
    sustain a combat credible force that can deter adversaries, protect our
    national security interests, and when necessary, respond to win
    decisively.
                            global mobility capacity
        Global Mobility Capacity includes the transportation conveyances
    and platforms used to move troops, fuel, and equipment within global
    transportation networks, including rail, motor transport, sealift,
    aerial refueling, and airlift. 60-70 percent of USTRANSCOM's mobility
    capacity resides in the reserve component, underscoring the importance
    of a Total Force approach.
        USTRANSCOM is inextricably linked to the commercial transportation
    industry which provides important augmentation in peace and war.
    Utilizing commercial partners expands USTRANSCOM's global reach as well
    as access to valuable commercial intermodal transportation systems and
    freight management capabilities, but carries with it vulnerabilities we
    will need to mitigate. Emergency preparedness programs like the Civil
    Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
    (VISA) augment USTRANSCOM's global mobility capacity during contingency
    operations. Incentive programs like the Maritime Security Program
    offset costs incurred to maintain a U.S.-flagged fleet, strengthening
    the American sealift industry for both economic trade and national
    defense. Currently, these programs are fully subscribed and funded.
    This year, on behalf of the Department, USTRANSCOM is leading a
    Congressionally-directed study on U.S.-flagged fuel tanker vessel
    capacity, evaluating accessibility to domestic and international
    tankers in order to satisfy the demands of the NDS in times of war.
        With 85 percent of the Joint Force based in CONUS, Global Mobility
    Capacity is critical in projecting overwhelming military force at a
    time and place of our Nation's choosing, and it serves as a deterrent
    to conflict by demonstrating our ability to credibly defend our
    security commitments. Overall, we assess USTRANSCOM's global mobility
    capacity as adequate, but with elevated and increasing risk. NDS
    requirements in daily competition and in times of war place high
    demands on aging mobility capabilities. When coupled with adversaries
    that have the capability and intent to contest our operations across
    all domains, it creates a daunting environment for future operations.
    Specifically, USTRANSCOM assesses elevated risk in our two highest
    priorities: Aerial Refueling and Sealift.
                                aerial refueling
        The aerial refueling fleet is USTRANSCOM's most-stressed capability
    and number one readiness concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues
    to underpin the Joint Force's ability to deploy an immediate force
    across all NDS mission areas and is comprised of KC-135, KC-10, and KC-
    46 aircraft.
        The KC-46 is an important aspect of tanker modernization as it will
    enable us to project and employ the force in a complex battlespace
    against a high-end adversary. However, delays in delivery of capable
    KC-46s combined with reductions of KC-10s and KC-135s create a critical
    and deepening gap in taskable aerial refueling aircraft and aircrews
    for the next 5-7 years. This combination of factors elevates risk to
    not only wartime missions, but also in day to day global operations
    across multiple combatant commands. Reduced capacity limits options and
    constrains decision space for senior leaders in crisis, as they are
    confronted with an earlier mobilization timeline to generate adequate
    capacity. For Combatant Commanders to compete daily, the Department
    must retain sufficient operational aerial refueling capacity to provide
    adequate support to the Joint Force during the transition to the KC-46.
    As the timeline to field taskable KC-46s continues to evolve,
    USTRANSCOM recommends re-evaluating aerial refueling force structure
    plans annually.
                                    sealift
        USTRANSCOM's number two readiness concern is the Strategic Sealift
    Fleet. The sealift fleet is responsible for moving approximately 90
    percent of wartime cargo. Sealift readiness rates have declined to 59
    percent compared against a goal of 85 percent, with vessel material
    condition and age as the primary factors. Most sealift ships are
    reaching the age where maintenance and repair costs are escalating and
    service-life extensions will not yield proportional increases in
    readiness. Starting in the mid-2020s, the sealift fleet will lose 1-2
    million square feet of capacity each year as ships reach the end of
    their useful life. That's enough space to move two to four Brigade
    Combat Teams in a single voyage. By the mid-2030s, over half the
    sealift fleet will be unusable, placing an unacceptable risk on the
    Joint Force, especially the Army, to deliver large-scale combat power
    over the ocean. To prevent this detrimental loss of capacity, the
    Department needs to recapitalize the fleet with newer and more reliable
    vessels. USTRANSCOM continues to support the Navy's plan to acquire
    used vessels as the near-term solution that yields the greatest value.
    Currently, Congress has provided authority to purchase seven vessels,
    and the Navy has provided funding for two in fiscal year 2021. This is
    an important first step to improve fleet reliability, but we have much
    work ahead to lay out a long-range plan.
        In September the DOD conducted the largest no-notice sealift
    activation exercise in the command's history, assessing the entire
    fleet and activating over half the surge sealift vessels. The exercise
    validated known concerns regarding the degraded readiness of the
    Organic Surge Fleet. Simply put, the surge fleet is challenged today to
    be immediately available for large-scale inter-theater force deployment
    without delays or impacts to force closure. These findings reinforce
    the need for recapitalization, appropriate levels of resourcing for
    maintenance and repair, and continued emphasis on readiness
    improvements.
                    global command, control, and integration
        Global Command, Control, and Integration is central to our ability
    to make decisions at echelon to create desired mobility outcomes. It
    creates shared understanding in order to align scarce mobility
    resources consistent with the highest strategic priorities. Global
    Command, Control, and Integration is imperative to retain our strategic
    comparative advantage to project and sustain the Joint Force globally.
    As we prepare to confront the contested environments described in the
    NDS, we are working on several initiatives to strengthen mission
    assurance in the cyber domain, and advance decision making across the
    USTRANSCOM enterprise.
                         cyber domain mission assurance
        Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which
    capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's
    ability to project the Joint Force globally. We continually evaluate
    our large and complex attack surface, evolve key cyber terrain, secure
    our cyber area of operations, and actively defend our ability to
    conduct global command and control. USTRANSCOM maintains a strong
    relationship with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the Intelligence
    community, providing increased understanding of adversaries' intent.
    Several rigorous exercises matured our ability to request active
    defensive measures from USCYBERCOM, leveraging their unique authorities
    to assure our global command and control in a contested environment. In
    addition USTRANSCOM is pursuing numerous technical solutions to harden
    our key cyber terrain, to include a trusted transaction pilot with
    USCYBERCOM.
        In Great Power Competition, we acknowledge our commercial partners
    are both a strength and a potential target. Since 2017, we've
    contractually required our CRAF, VISA, and Universal Services Contract
    providers to perform annual self-assessments based on National
    Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for
    cybersecurity, and we use these self-assessments to identify
    vulnerability trends and share best practices with industry. We
    continue to provide targeted recommendations to help our commercial
    partners improve their own cybersecurity. Lastly, we are reviewing data
    sharing requirements to limit our exposure to adversaries, and we're
    strengthening cybersecurity language in our information technology and
    software development contracts. Overall, we assess our transportation
    providers are taking cybersecurity seriously, and the NIST standards
    will help them improve their security and resiliency - but commercial
    companies will always be challenged to keep out advanced persistent
    threat actors.
                            advance decision making
        Information technology and computational processing continues to
    advance rapidly as we approach game changing capabilities like
    artificial intelligence, machine learning, and advanced analytics, all
    of which have enormous potential to improve USTRANSCOM mission
    outcomes. As we evolve to meet tomorrow's challenges, we are enhancing
    our ability to understand the operational environment, improving our
    ability to develop options, and advancing our ability to make decisions
    at echelon. Cloud computing, balanced cybersecurity, information
    sharing, innovation at echelon and warfighting outcomes serve as our
    guiding principles as we modernize our digital portfolio.
        The foundation for our success starts with data. USTRANSCOM fully
    endorses the DOD's Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure cloud
    capabilities and is an early adopter of cloud technology. We have
    migrated 14 programs to a commercial cloud environment. We are
    establishing an Enterprise Data Environment within the cloud, coupled
    with analytic technologies, to speed decision making, free up human
    capital, accelerate learning, reduce costs, and improve productivity.
                               defender-europe 20
        DEFENDER-Europe 20 exemplifies how USTRANSCOM employs this
    warfighting framework and addresses the contested environment described
    by the NDS to deliver national objectives. Over the next 4 months
    USTRANSCOM is executing the largest projection of force to Europe in 25
    years. 20,000 troops and 1.6 million square feet of military cargo will
    flow from 26 CONUS origins through a diverse network of ports, move
    across simulated contested waters under the watch of Second and Sixth
    Fleets, and arrive as a combat credible force in EUCOM. As we exercise
    the global posture, mobility capacity, and global command and control
    required to favorably shape Great Power Competition, DEFENDER-Europe 20
    is a powerful opportunity to deter potential adversaries, strengthen
    alliances and partnerships, and evaluate future contested environments.
                    defense personal property program (dp3)
        After assuming command in August 2018, I received letters from 15
    members of Congress and more than 40 staff inquiries detailing
    servicemember concerns with the Defense Personal Property Program.
    Issues with industry accountability, a shortage of quality capacity in
    summer months, and a general lack of transparency within the Department
    were common--and accurate--criticisms. Since that time--and after
    personal consultation with Service leaders and industry executives--
    USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our relationship with
    industry to generate the quality capacity to meet DOD's peak demand and
    enable the Department to affix the accountability and responsibility
    missing in today's program.
        The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included several DP3-related provisions,
    including a requirement for a Business Case Analysis (BCA) on the
    Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) and a GAO report on the effects
    of this contract on DOD Families. The BCA underscored the value of
    restructuring DOD's relationship with industry, while GAO's draft
    report makes helpful recommendations on overall DP3 management but
    highlights no flaws in our approach with GHC. The source selection
    process is underway and our initial review of proposals is encouraging,
    with credible candidates offering solutions to benefit DOD families at
    costs in-line with spending on today's program. We remain on track to
    award GHC to a single move manager this spring. Military Families have
    been our North Star throughout this process. Thank you for your
    continued support to improve the relocation experience for DOD
    families.
                               executive summary
        In summary, USTRANSCOM provides the DOD with the ability to project
    and sustain the Joint Force, deploying combat power to the right place,
    at the right time, and in the necessary scale to be immediate, lethal,
    and decisive. Operating around the globe and around the clock, our
    ability to project military forces is a distinct advantage unmatched by
    any nation, and it serves as the cornerstone of the Joint Force's
    ability to meet national objectives.
        Today, USTRANSCOM assesses our ability to execute the NDS as
    adequate, but with elevated and increasing risk, specifically in the
    areas of Aerial Refueling and Sealift. Improving mission assurance
    within the cyber domain remains a USTRANSCOM top priority. I thank
    Congress for their past and continued support of this organization as
    we work together to defend the Nation and advance American interests.
        Our purpose is enduring, but our success is not guaranteed. We must
    remain vigilant. Underwritten by the dedicated soldiers, sailors,
    marines, airmen, coast guardsmen, civilians, and commercial partners
    performing USTRANSCOM's mission, I am confident in our ability, and I'm
    proud to stand with them in our collective commitment to our nation's
    defense and dedication to America.
        Together, We Deliver!

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Lyons. I appreciate
    your bringing up that issue. We spent a lot of time on that in
    the defense authorization bill addressing that, and I think you
    are carrying it out exactly as we had intended you to do that.
        As I mentioned, General Wolters, we appreciate the briefing
    that we got in Germany, and you covered something I think that
    might be worth repeating here. In October 2019, the news report
    suggested that Russia deployed as many as 10 submarines for
    some of the largest fleet maneuvers since World War II. Can you
    describe, as you did this last week, how the pace and scope of
    Russia's maritime activity has changed in recent years and what
    implications that has for EUCOM?
        General Wolters. Yes, Chairman. We took note of the Russian
    undersea activity in the summer/fall of 2018 and compared it to
    what Russia executed in the summer/fall of 2019. What we saw
    was a 50 percent increase in the number of resources in the
    undersea that Russia committed to both those out-of-area
    submarine patrol operations.
        What we also witnessed was an improved degree of good order
    and discipline on behalf of the Russian sailors. This
    observation is one more reflection about how important it is to
    continue to improve our competitive edge to buy down the risk
    to ensure that we can operate with freedom.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That is good.
        On that same trip we went through Rota, Spain, when they
    were talking about adding two United States destroyers to the
    four that are already there. Is that something you support?
    Where does that fall into what level of request you have for
    additional forces in EUCOM?
        General Wolters. Chairman, it is precisely in line with our
    request for two additional destroyers, and what I am also proud
    to report, with the support of this Committee through EDI, we
    have been in a position to where we have been able to improve
    and mature the infrastructure at Rota. If you asked me to
    accept two more destroyers tomorrow, we actually possess the
    infrastructure at Rota to be able to house those two additional
    destroyers, a reflection of the value of the funds for
    deterrence.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes. They made that very clear.
        All right. General Lyons, I commented in my opening
    statement about the KC-46. Some of us went from here in
    Washington up to Seattle to fly the first ones down to Altus
    Air Force Base, and I remember at that time, we had the
    Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah James, there. I recall
    making an observation, and that was that in 1959, two wonderful
    things happened. Number one, I got married, and number two, the
    first KCs were actually delivered to Altus Air Force Base. At
    that time, we did not know that there was any problem. At
    least, I did not know, and I do not think anyone else did
    either because we were just rejoicing. The fact that that had
    lasted 60 years, and she even commented it looks like that is
    going to enhance the prosperity of Altus Air Force Base for the
    next 60 years. So that was something we were not aware of, and
    so now you got a problem, and that problem, of course, is what
    are we going to do to fill that function. I know you have given
    a lot of thought to it. Why do you not let us know where you
    are right now? You know, we have been doing this for years,
    getting rid of old things before we got the new ones online
    ready to perform. So kind of tell us where we are. What is that
    going to do with the preparations that we have already made for
    the KC-135's and the KC-10's to actually be downgraded?
        General Lyons. Chairman, thanks.
        As you mentioned in your opening comments, aerial refueling
    as a force element is the most stressed force element in the
    TRANSCOM portfolio, both for day-to-day operations, as well as
    for high-end conflict operations.
        I will defer to the Air Force on the particular
    programmatics and technical aspects of the KC-46 as it comes
    online.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and I mentioned that to you before
    this meeting that we will be having the Air Force's posture
    hearing, and we will want to talk about that at that time too.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir.
        What I can describe is operationally. As we bring the KC-46
    on and we take on more jets and we convert more crews, when
    that capability is not usable and it is not today presentable
    to the joint force for some technical deficiencies, that means
    a dip in operational capability for the joint force in day-to-
    day operations in the active component if in fact we continue
    to retire the KC-135 and the KC-10 at the rate that was
    proposed by the Air Force. So we are working very, very closely
    with the Air Force and the Department to retain a level of
    capability, of legacy capability, so we can continue to support
    joint operations.
        Chairman Inhofe. So you are retaining some that you had not
    planned on retaining had we not had the problem with the KC-46,
    I assume.
        General Lyons. Sir, we are working Air Force now. There was
    some number of planes that were retired, were programmed for
    retirement in fiscal year 2021, as you saw in the budget
    submission, that we believe must be retained, 13 KC-135's and
    10 KC-10's that we believe must be retained during the
    conversion.
        Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Wolters, the European Command's strategy document
    states meeting the challenge of countering the Kremlin-
    sponsored malign influence campaign necessitates a whole-of-
    government solution. So do you assess currently that we have a
    synchronized campaign prosecuted in a unified manner to address
    malign influence, particularly directed at the 2020 election?
        General Wolters. Senator, I think our campaign momentum is
    improving in that area. As you are familiar with, we
    established 2 years ago the Russia integration group that bears
    the responsibility to represent USEUCOM with the United States
    and with many NATO nations to align a whole-of-nation, whole-
    of-government activity and activities below the level of actual
    kinetic conflict to ensure that we can have better control of
    the information domain.
        I think we are to a point to where we expect to do better,
    and I think that is a good place for military leaders to be. I
    will tell you that I am pleased with the campaign momentum. I
    have had the opportunity to visit with many of the U.S.
    entities and national entities that represent whole-of-
    government and whole-of-nation activity to provide more
    influence in the information domain, and I am pleased with the
    progress.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Can you just give me your assessment of the current state
    of alliance cohesion within NATO? I would assume that at a
    military level, there is one sort of analysis and at a
    political level, another. Can you touch on both?
        General Wolters. Senator Reed, the mil-to-mil [military-to-
    military] alignment that I see with the United States and NATO
    with the North Atlantic extension through the Euro-Atlantic is
    as strong as I have ever witnessed. I have had the opportunity
    to serve in NATO since 1983.
        I am pleased to report that at the political level, as a
    result of recent documents that were approved at NATO at the
    political level, we are seeing greater cohesion as well. For
    the first time in over 6 decades, we at NATO approved the first
    NATO military strategy. It is a document that is classified
    NATO secret that codifies the threat and codifies the
    activities that we need to embrace to more comprehensively
    defend. All 29 nations agreed to that NATO military strategy,
    and I think that is a reflection at the political level and the
    military level of improving cohesion.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Lyons, we talked about the shipbuilding program.
    Can you just give us a quick sort of summary of where are at
    and where we have to go?
        General Lyons. Yes, Senator, I sure can.
        As you know, we depend on sealift to carry about 90 percent
    of our cargo capacity in a wartime scenario. Our current
    readiness of the fleet is below where we need it to be. You
    indicated that it is rapidly reaching end of useful life. We
    are working very closely with the Navy. You mentioned the
    authorization to buy seven used vessels. I anticipate we will
    purchase two, the first two, in 2021, working very, very
    closely with MARAD and the Navy. My view is we should have that
    first vessel in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.
        Senator Reed. But we are far below what we would need for a
    surge--a significant military operation at this point. Correct?
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. That is correct. We need a much
    longer plan.
        Senator Reed. The Chairman touched upon the air refueling,
    which I think is another critical weakness. We talked about
    that in the office.
        One of the areas that is ubiquitous everywhere is cyber,
    and you are in the position where you not only have to have a
    military organization that you have to keep sort of ahead of
    the curve, but you have literally hundreds of private
    companies, some large, some small. Can you give us an idea of
    the cyber challenges that you are facing, and do we have a
    significant vulnerability there?
        General Lyons. Senator, the way I would characterize the
    cyber vulnerability is probably the most consequential to the
    mobility enterprise as we look at it. So we spend a lot of time
    on this particular issue looking at resiliency, looking at a
    number of other issues to harden our defenses, et cetera.
    Particularly with regard to the commercial carriers which is I
    think what you are asking, we have included contract language
    in all of our contracts. We check compliance. We have self-
    reporting mechanisms. We believe that their level of cyber
    hygiene has increased significantly from this level of effort.
        I would not come here today and tell you that they could
    survive a threat from a persistent threat actor, and so we have
    sufficient resiliency in our contracts as well.
        Senator Reed. Just to follow on, do you have the ability to
    check, you know, send in teams, no-notice inspections? You
    know, the old line, a unit only does what the commander checks.
    If you are not checking, you could have everything in the
    contract you wanted and you would have nothing.
        General Lyons. Senator, we do not have the authority that
    you are describing.
        Senator Reed. Do you need that?
        General Lyons. There are some second and third implications
    on those kinds of activities.
        Senator Reed. Can you get back to us on that?
        General Lyons. I can, yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Lyons. I often get asked the question as to whether
    we need additional authorities to 'inspect' commercial partner
    cyber compliance (implied is access to their networks, etc.).
    From a practical point of view, we don't have the technical
    expertise or bandwidth for such a mission, nor does USCYBERCOM.
    USTRANSCOM is not advocating for the authority to conduct
    nonconsensual intrusions into an industry partner's network.
    Our current authority is based upon our contractual
    relationship that our industry partners agree to voluntarily.
    There are several issues that impact the inspection of
    contractor networks. For instance, these carriers are U.S.
    companies and there are limits on the collection of U.S.
    persons. Additionally, the companies have Constitutional rights
    in their systems under the 4th Amendment, and the Posse
    Comitatus Act prevents DOD from serving in a law enforcement
    capacity unless authorized by law. However, all these issues
    are resolved if the contractor provides consent to inspect its
    network. Therefore, if we include the ability to inspect as
    part of the contract, the company is consenting to our
    inspection, and we are conducting that inspection for valid
    purposes unrelated to law enforcement or intelligence. The
    downside to gaining access via consent, including consent
    gained through contract, is that the company can withdraw their
    consent at any time. While that withdrawal may result in the
    government taking action under the Contract Disputes Act and
    may include termination, it will not result in government
    access to the network. Thus, the more stringent we make our
    access requirements, the more it may limit competition since
    some contractors may not compete for contracts if it means
    allowing full access to and monitoring of their IT systems. The
    Government can perform onsite NIST 800-171 compliance
    assessments without obtaining access to a contractor's
    networks. The NIST Handbook 162 provides guidance on how to
    perform assessments by reviewing policies and procedures,
    interviewing staff, observing contractor IT personnel
    performing their duties, and inspecting physical security and
    hardware environments. If we wanted to perform these
    assessments, we would need to update our contract language with
    the option to perform an inspection if the contractor provides
    consent. We are encouraged by the newly released Cybersecurity
    Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and its provisions for
    third party assessments. As the CMMC program matures, we will
    consider adding the CMMC requirement in our contracts and
    requiring third party assessments of our contractors'
    compliance with NIST 800-171.

        Senator Reed. I am not surprised the 1st Brigade of the
    82nd conducted an outstanding operation. Thank you.
        General Lyons. Airborne, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your great service to the United
    States.
        Let me ask you, General Wolters. The proposed OMB [Office
    of Management and Budget] fiscal year 2021 budget requests
    $705.4 billion for DOD. This represents three-tenths of 1
    percent over the current fiscal year. In other words, the
    proposed budget buys us fewer resources than the current year
    considering inflation. Am I correct there?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Let me just ask you this. Do we need fewer
    security resources in the European Command next year than we do
    this year?
        General Wolters. Senator, we need more.
        Senator Wicker. In addition to that, the Secretary of
    Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Defense
    Strategy Commission have all endorsed 3.5 percent real growth.
    Is that also your opinion, General Wolters?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. General Lyons, is that your opinion also?
        General Lyons. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. I appreciate the distinguished Chairman
    mentioning early on in his questioning Rota, Spain, and I am
    glad that he and his team visited there--a bipartisan
    delegation visited there just the other day.
        The DDGs are the workhorse of the Navy. General Wolters, in
    European Command how does a mere three-tenths of 1 percent
    increase over the current fiscal year affect what we are going
    to be able to do there with the DDGs, with the two extra DDGs?
        General Wolters. Senator, every cent counts. Those two
    additional DDGs would allow us the opportunity to continue to
    improve our ability to get indications and warnings in the
    potential battle space and also dramatically improve our
    ability to better command and control. Because of the
    flexibility of those resources, they can comprehensively defend
    in all geographical areas in support of Europe. Those
    destroyers are critical to improve the campaign to deliver
    peace, particularly in the areas of indications and warnings
    and command and control.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you for that. We are going
    to certainly try to help you I think up and down the dais here
    on a bipartisan basis on the resources that we need to defend
    America and Americans.
        It is interesting that the leader of EUCOM would mention in
    the first few seconds of his statement not only Russia but
    China. Could you enlighten us about where you are seeing
    increased problems with China and increased influence in the
    European theater from China?
        General Wolters. Senator, two areas. The first is seaport
    equities, and the second is 5G Huawei.
        What we have seen in several critical nations on the
    periphery of Europe is an economic majority on behalf of China
    and investment for seaports in critical nations like Belgium,
    Italy, France, and Greece. That is a large concern to all of
    the NATO nations. When you start to do the collective math, you
    discover that China has access to 10 percent of the shipping
    rights into and out of Europe. Those are daunting figures that
    should lead one to believe that we need to continue to be
    vigilant with respect to seaport equities on the economic side.
        The second issue happens to be Huawei and 5G. I am firmly
    aware of several European nations who have a tendency to lean
    towards Huawei and 5G. My concern goes back to the soldiers.
    Without the appropriate network protection, there is a
    potential compromise of technical data and personal data, and
    that is not to the good order and discipline of our United
    States soldiers and our NATO soldiers.
        Senator Wicker. Finally, General Wolters, a number of us
    have been involved on a member-to-member basis with our
    parliamentary brothers and sisters in the OSCE [Organization
    for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Parliamentary
    Assembly. We have a great new Ambassador to the OSCE,
    Ambassador Jim Gilmore. To what extent is the OSCE organization
    important to you and to providing you information that you
    need?
        General Wolters. Very important, Senator, and I think it
    builds incredible trust for the Euro-Atlantic link. Your
    hearings that you held in Gdansk last year were a huge boost in
    trust not only between the United States and Poland but
    throughout all of NATO.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and thank you for being
    here.
        Many of my colleagues and I have received briefings as
    recently as this morning from other departments and agencies in
    the administration about the coordinated response to the
    coronavirus. I am also concerned about the Department of
    Defense response to protect servicemembers and family members
    that are stationed at military installations abroad, the rapid
    spread of this virus, as well as the number of diagnoses and
    deaths in countries where Americans are stationed. A lot of
    Americans are stationed in, for example, South Korea. This is
    very, very concerning. I am focused on ensuring that the
    Department is reevaluating and updating procedures and actions
    necessary to keep our servicemembers and their families safe.
        General Lyons, your command manages the inter-theater
    movement of our servicemembers in and out of areas that have
    been impacted by the coronavirus, making you really uniquely
    positioned to address this issue. What action has your command
    taken to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and ensure the well-
    being of our servicemembers and their families? Do you need
    additional resources? Is there more we can do to help you? What
    more do you think should be done?
        General Lyons. Senator, I agree with your concern. The
    Secretary of Defense has indicated that protection of the force
    is his number one priority regarding the coronavirus.
        U.S. Northern Command is the lead for the Department,
    working very closely in support of Health and Human Services.
    We are connected with them on a daily basis, a frequent number
    of times a day, and we are watching this very, very closely for
    any implications on global mobility.
        Senator Blumenthal. What specific actions are you taking?
        General Lyons. Inside the transportation enterprise,
    locations like Travis Air Force Base has become a receiver for
    potential folks coming out of the theater, particularly the
    Indo-Pacific. We are not taking particular health protection
    measures inside the command other than to protect the force,
    but in a more board sense, we are in support of Health and
    Human Services and that is done through the lead of USNORTHCOM.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, do you feel you have
    been given the necessary resources and other tools to protect
    American servicemen and women and their families in Europe?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator, and we have also been given
    the appropriate authorities. As we speak in Europe today, we
    have over 300 cases, and the nation that is of most concern is
    Italy with 6 reported deaths. We have restricted travel to
    certain zones, and we require all mil air arrival flights to be
    screened for the virus.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you taking any additional steps to
    constrain travel by service men and women or their families on
    leave and so forth?
        General Wolters. We have in what we feel are the affected
    areas, in particular two states inside of Italy.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you have plans to restrict travel in
    any other states?
        General Wolters. We anticipate the need may arise in
    Germany, but that is still to be determined.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, in your posture
    statement, you highlight American servicemembers on the ground
    in the Joint Military Training Group Ukraine work, and you note
    they serve shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian forces. Can you
    expand on the important efforts to deter Russian aggression
    there?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator. The Joint Military Training
    Group initiated military training team activity on a rotational
    basis starting in 2016, and they also began about 6 months
    later to rotate military training teams in the special
    operations category. There are several phases of the long-range
    plan, and here we are 3\1/2\ years later and we are to phase 3,
    which puts those military training teams that represent the
    Joint Military Training Group--Canada and UK [United Kingdom]
    are other participants. Those teams are now in observer status
    because of the demonstrated expertise of the Ukrainian armed
    forces and the conventional force in the SOF [Special
    Operations Forces] side of the house. We are very pleased with
    the progress of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the stronger
    that they are and the more that they embrace democratic values,
    the greater the alignment with the West, which is exactly where
    need to head.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much,
    gentlemen. My time has expired. Thanks for your service.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to thank both of you gentlemen for your
    service and also to thank the men and women who serve under
    you.
        General Wolters, how would you assess the progress that has
    been made in implementing the NDS [National Defense Strategy]
    and its emphasis on prioritizing strategic competition with
    Russia?
        General Wolters. Senator, I am very pleased. As I mentioned
    earlier on one of the questions from your colleagues, for the
    first time in many decades, we approved the NATO military
    strategy, and it looks very similar to the United States'
    National Defense Strategy. I believe this is one area that
    reflects the powerful alignment and a willingness on behalf of
    NATO to lean forward with respect to what we do across the full
    spectrum from competition to crisis to conflict, which is
    exactly what we called for in the NDS. So I am pleased with the
    ever-improving alignment in NATO and with our European nations.
        Senator Fischer. What do you think is the biggest challenge
    that you have in fulfilling the goals of the NDS in Europe?
        General Wolters. It is to do what we can to cure the malign
    influence on behalf of Russia, and that requires a more
    concentrated effort in the competition phase of embracing a
    potential foe. What we have heard throughout many of the
    questions today are the activities that we have to embrace in
    21st century military below the actual activities of kinetic
    conflict and understanding what we are doing and what the
    return on investment is, and we are making rapid improvement in
    those areas.
        Senator Fischer. So in order to improve, basically you need
    to work together more on your training?
        General Wolters. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Do you feel that you have come together or
    are coming together with other NATO partners in facing what the
    threats are?
        General Wolters. We are, and the reflection of that is the
    approval of a NATO military strategy that actually codifies
    those threats and agreement on behalf of the 29 nations to
    identify those threats.
        Senator Fischer. You and I yesterday--we discussed the
    growing recognition that there is among the NATO partners on
    the important role of our nuclear deterrence in keeping the
    peace. Obviously, we all understand that our deterrent, the
    triad, is the bedrock of the security of this country.
        Can you tell us a little bit about what you are hearing
    from our NATO partners when it comes to the deterrence in
    private conversations, if you can share that, but also in
    public the support that you see?
        General Wolters. Senator, there is a greater degree of
    awareness of the importance of deterrence, and as we look at
    the success that NATO has had for the last 7 decades to deliver
    peace, one of the elements has to be the triad that exists from
    the United States and its representation to nuclear deterrence
    on the European continent. It has been very, very effective,
    and the nations understand more and more about that with each
    passing day as a result of embracing deterrence to a greater
    degree than we have in the past.
        Senator Fischer. Would you say that our partners in their
    embracing of this deterrence are also becoming better
    messengers within their own countries about the importance of
    not just a strong NATO, but of having that strong nuclear
    deterrence, that umbrella, that is so vital in their freedom as
    well?
        General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator. It has to do with the
    responsibility that we feel in NATO to generate peace not just
    inside of the boundaries of Europe but on the periphery. As we
    embrace missions for NATO mission Iraq and as we embrace
    Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, we see how important
    it is to proliferate deterrence to the max extent practical to
    achieve greater peace.
        Senator Fischer. What are your views, sir, on adopting a
    so-called no-first-use policy? Do you believe that that would
    strengthen deterrence?
        General Wolters. Senator, I am a fan of flexible first-use
    policy.
        Senator Fischer. Do you believe developing ground-launched
    conventionally armed intermediate range weapons will enhance
    your ability to deter Russia?
        General Wolters. It will. It dramatically complicates an
    enemy's task.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses. I appreciated the opportunity to
    visit with you each before the hearing today.
        General Wolters, I want to ask you a question. In your
    testimony--I think it was maybe in a back and forth with
    Senator Reed--you talked a little bit about increased Russian
    sub activity in the Atlantic. The President's Budget proposes
    to cut the Virginia-class sub program 50 percent by only
    funding one of the two in the block buy. On February 13, the
    DOD used its general transfer authority to move $3.8 billion of
    Pentagon money to the general drug account for use on the
    southern border.
        Part of those funds that were moved was a reduction of $180
    million from the P-8 Poseidon aircraft program. As you know,
    that airplane is a modified Boeing 737 that is used as a sub
    hunter. It usually operates from Iceland or elsewhere in Europe
    to work with the fast attack subs like the Virginia-class to
    track Russian sub activity coming from the Greenland-Iceland-UK
    gap.
        Without commenting on the budget, I would like you to talk
    about the importance of both the Virginia-class sub and the P-8
    Poseidon in countering Russian sub activity.
        General Wolters. Senator, they are vital capabilities, and
    what they contribute to overall maritime patrol activity has
    proven over time to be very, very successful.
        We are lucky to be part of NATO. We lean on our brothers
    and sisters from a national perspective to ask them to take a
    look at the resources they can contribute when we are in
    situations with respect to some decrements in the maritime
    patrol area. Norway has been a great contributor on the P-8
    side of the house, and we see the effectiveness of that system.
    They are vital resources and very much needed to improve our
    overall deterrence posture.
        Senator Kaine. Both of those platforms, the Virginia-class
    and then the P-8 Poseidon.
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. General Lyons, I want to ask you a question.
    On pages 5 and 6 of your written testimony, you talk about
    military sealift issues. Again, Senator Reed asked you a little
    bit about it. There was an IG [Inspector General] report about
    military sealift command and readiness reporting, and one of
    the areas that they focused on was that the readiness reporting
    was coming from the ship captains and they were sort of doing a
    self-report about readiness. These are our assets, but the
    operation of the ship was contracted, and there was sort of a
    question about whether there was an incentive for the captains
    really to accurately report readiness. What is their incentive
    to say, hey, we are really not ready?
        What are you guys doing? You talk about in TRANSCOM the
    current readiness measurement, but what are you doing to make
    sure that the reporting of readiness from the ship level up is
    as accurate as it can be?
        General Lyons. Senator, it is a great question, and I
    concur with that assessment. A lot of activity has taken place
    and I think we have made a lot of improvements to elucidate the
    readiness that we see today. Part of that is the reason we are
    seeing such low readiness rates in the 50th and 60th percentile
    about our Ready Reserve Fleet readiness to generate as we
    discovered during our no-notice activation back in September.
        What I would say is really back about 3 years ago, in 2017,
    the military sealift commander really started to take this
    very, very seriously, deep diving. He has come up with a
    comprehensive readiness plan. The DOD IG reflected his findings
    in 2017 in a 2018 report that you are referring to, and there
    is a lot of work still to be done.
        Senator Kaine. Just to your written testimony, there is a
    goal of 85 percent readiness, but the current measure is at 59
    percent, and vessel material, condition, and age are the
    primary factors, and those continue to degrade readiness. You
    have some additional testimony about the sealift fleet will
    lose 1 million to 2 million square feet of capacity each year
    as the ships reach the end of their useful life.
        So tell the Committee a little bit in my remaining minute
    just about what are the plans to restore that readiness and
    hopefully get more near the 85 percent goal?
        General Lyons. It is a significant issue. It is a top
    priority for TRANSCOM. We are working very, very closely with
    the Navy on this.
        We have a fleet that is about 43 years old on average. If
    you compare that to the civilian industry, they are going to
    wash out their ships between 15 and 25, depending on the
    business case. It is no secret that when you retain a large
    fixed plant facility like one of our large sealift platforms,
    it becomes increasingly more expensive the older it gets.
        What we would like to see very much is a little bit less in
    terms of service life extension, in other words, extending
    these ships beyond 50 to 60 years. That is not returning the
    investment that we thought it would. We are a very strong
    advocate of the acquired use strategy. You granted the
    authorization to do seven. We need to execute what you granted
    us the ability to do, and then I think we need to come back to
    you with a long-range plan to consistently recapitalize over
    the next 15 to 20 years.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
        Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    and for your service.
        General Wolters, let us talk a little bit more about
    coronavirus and its impact in the European theater. I am
    reading here from a Stars and Stripes report on Sunday saying
    that at Vicenza, there has been a temporary closing Monday
    through Wednesday of all dependents schools, activity centers,
    fitness centers, theaters, and chapels. Is that report
    accurate?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Are there any updates from that report on
    Sunday in Stars and Stripes?
        General Wolters. Those facilities remained closed and
    travel to the two states are still prohibited in Italy.
        Senator Cotton. Do you expect that those facilities in the
    Vicenza community will reopen on Thursday as initially planned,
    or do you think that closure might have to be extended?
        General Wolters. Senator, I would give it about a 50/50
    right now about potentially extending the closure.
        Senator Cotton. How many United States troops do we have at
    Vicenza roughly speaking?
        General Wolters. We have got about 6,000 or 7,000.
        Senator Cotton. How many of those have accompanied spouses
    or children?
        General Wolters. Seventy to eighty percent.
        Senator Cotton. So maybe about 4,000 to 4,500 husbands and
    wives and then some larger number of children probably?
        General Wolters. Absolutely, and over 35,000 United States
    military members in Italy.
        Senator Cotton. And they are all mostly just sitting at
    home right now trying to avoid the coronavirus?
        General Wolters. Not mostly but there is a fair amount,
    yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Coronavirus has been present in Germany as
    well. In fact, that was one of the first European nations in
    which it appeared. It has not appeared in the numbers yet that
    have exploded in Italy in the last few days.
        First off, has there been any such closures at our military
    bases in Germany?
        General Wolters. Not yet, Senator, but we are anticipating
    an increase in the number of cases reported in Germany and we
    are prepared to execute.
        Senator Cotton. It is a troubling situation.
        Let us move to another troubling situation, which you have
    spoken about briefly as well, Huawei, the Chinese telecom
    company. You state in your written testimony that 5G networks
    by Huawei will place intellectual property, sensitive
    technology, and private personal information at heightened risk
    of acquisition and exploitation by the Chinese Government. You
    further say that this ongoing initiative, coupled with China's
    growing interest and investment in European ports and
    infrastructure, complicates steady state and contingency
    operations.
        It sounds like you consider the use of Huawei and 5G
    networks in Europe to be a threat to our national security. Is
    that correct?
        General Wolters. It is certainly a threat to the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines in Europe.
        Senator Cotton. My next question was, is it a threat to the
    troopers that you lead?
        General Wolters. Affirm, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Unfortunately, some European nations are
    moving forward with Huawei technology in their networks, most
    notably our NATO allies in the United Kingdom and Germany. What
    are we to do about that and how can we guarantee the security
    of our troopers, as well as our NATO command and control
    systems?
        General Wolters. Senator Cotton, it is vigilance,
    education, and going back to the basics with respect to network
    protection of the critical data on the technical side of the
    house and the personal side of the house for our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines, not just in the U.S. but all of
    our NATO forces.
        Senator Cotton. Do your military counterparts understand
    the threat that Huawei poses?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. So the problem may be at the political
    leadership level. A statement, not a question.
        Finally, I want to conclude on a somewhat related matter.
    We discussed this yesterday in our meeting. I want to bring
    everyone's attention to an alarming poll by the Pew Research
    Center among 16 NATO countries. Happily it shows that NATO's
    favorability rating is pretty strong, 2 to 1 in fact, 53 to 27
    of the peoples of these 16 countries have a favorable
    impression of NATO. Not surprisingly, NATO scored pretty low in
    Russia.
        Somewhat disappointingly though, when asked who should
    fight Russia if there were a conflict between a NATO ally and
    Russia, only 38 percent of peoples in these nations said my
    nation should fight Russia, whereas 50 percent said the United
    States should fight Russia. In some of the biggest NATO allies,
    it was even more alarming. In Italy, 25 percent said we will
    fight them. Seventy-five percent said you Americans go fight.
    In Germany, it was 34-63. That is a little better I guess but
    not too much.
        General Wolters, can the Europeans expect Americans to care
    more about their security and their kids than they care about
    their security?
        General Wolters. Senator, in my consultations at the mil-
    to-mil level with chiefs of defense and ministers of defense, I
    see a very, very eager desire and willingness to fight the
    Russians, and those nations that I continually communicate with
    show that desire, if required, to protect themselves.
        Senator Cotton. I hear the same thing when I consult with
    European defense leaders, not surprisingly. These are men and
    women who have dedicated their lives to the service of their
    country and the defense of their country. So it is a really a
    political problem at the level of political leadership in
    Europe both in the leaders and the leadership that they show to
    their peoples to demonstrate that they have to be willing to
    fight as hard for their future and their security as they
    expect Americans to fight for them.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today and for
    your service as well.
        General Wolters, I would like to focus on the Baltics. In
    2017, I visited Latvia and Lithuania to observe the United
    States Army's Europe Operation Saber Strike exercise. The
    Michigan National Guard regularly participates in this exercise
    as Latvia's counterpart in the National Guard State Partnership
    Program, as you know.
        Similarly, Latvian forces participate in the Michigan
    National Guard's annual Northern Strike exercise, which is a
    joint multinational exercise hosted at Camp Grayling in
    Michigan.
        The Latvian military particularly benefits from this
    training in Michigan because it offers an opportunity for them
    to certify as JTACs [Joint Terminal Attack Controller], and as
    a result of this program, Latvia is one of only eight allied
    countries that are certified to call in United States close air
    support in combat. Part of the reason the Michigan National
    Guard and the Latvian military have a strong relationship is
    because the Latvian military is built around integrating
    reserve and their regular forces as a major component of their
    national defense strategy.
        So my question to you, sir, is, could you discuss how EUCOM
    tailors its training and partner strategies to support the
    Baltic States' reliance on these reserve forces and
    specifically the State partnership with our National Guard and
    how integral that is to all of this?
        General Wolters. Senator, I can.
        First of all, for the Baltics writ large the insertion of
    the four battalion-sized battle groups into Estonia, Latvia,
    Lithuania, and Poland in the summer of 2016 has dramatically
    improved our all-domain security awareness. In particular, as
    you well know, with the participation of your Michigan Air
    National Guardsmen who have been very, very integral in the
    air-land integration piece, the lead nation in Latvia at that
    battalion-sized battle group happens to be Canada. We have many
    force elements that are intermixed amongst the other nations.
        The overall improvement day in and day out of those battle
    groups to be able to see the battle space and defend their
    sovereign territory is palpable, and they are doing so in all
    domains and all functions. Our next step is to make sure that
    those battalion-sized battle groups that represent generating
    peace in the Baltics are aware of all the activities in the
    southeastern sector of Europe, as well as the western portion
    of Europe. So we are very, very pleased with the continued
    transparency and alignment and very, very pleased with the air-
    land integration that we have seen improving in Latvia for the
    last 2 years.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you.
        My next question is related to the development of the next
    generation combat vehicle which is now taking place in Michigan
    with a cross-functional team. The first platform was intended
    to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle that the Army has just
    recently restarted the program. Much of the debate has
    basically focused on the tradeoff between armor and mobility
    and specifically how readily the vehicle can be positioned in a
    crisis zone.
        However, in the European theater, the size and weight of
    the vehicle could be equally problematic for its
    maneuverability through European terrain and civilian
    infrastructure, particularly the bridges there.
        General Wolters, you seemed to address this issue in your
    written statement where you mentioned the EU, in consultation
    with NATO, is investing 6.5 billion euros in the improvement of
    civilian and military dual use. However, I am concerned this
    approach may not address the core issue that I just mentioned.
        But my question to you is, what is more realistic? Should
    the next generation of combat vehicles be built to accommodate
    European infrastructure limits, particularly in Poland and the
    Baltics, or is the solution to reinforce transportation
    infrastructure throughout eastern Europe?
        General Wolters. Senator, I hate to give you this answer,
    but I think it is a little bit of both, and I know that General
    McConville leading our United States Army has his experts
    taking a peak at that. I know that he steps up even one more
    level. It gets into a discussion about armor versus mobility,
    and I think from a global perspective, there are some tradeoffs
    and from a regional perspective, there are some tradeoffs. It
    all has to do with the demonstrated capability of the nations
    in Europe, as well as other regions. I know that we are taking
    a very, very serious look at that.
        Senator Peters. My follow-up question is, how do our
    western European allies, who also produce heavy military
    equipment, how do they accommodate limitations in civilian
    infrastructure particularly in Poland and the Baltics?
        General Wolters. A greater degree of education on the
    challenges that we face from a bridging perspective in eastern
    Europe versus western Europe. It was an issue that all of
    Europe was very, very aware of in the mid-1980s, and they are
    getting themselves reacquainted with it today and they
    understand the imperative of making sure that we have bridging
    programs in the regions in the northeast and the southeast of
    Europe to ensure that we can shoot, move, and communicate fast.
        Senator Peters. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much.
        General Lyons, we have already discussed a little bit of
    the KC-46's. So I will not dive into that. But just for note,
    our Iowa Air National Guard does have the 185th air refueling
    wing that operates the KC-135's. Certainly we want to make sure
    that this incredible unit is able to sustain operations
    ongoing, so it is something we will definitely want to discuss
    with the Air Force during their posture review.
        But, General Wolters, I am going to pick up where my
    colleague, Senator Peters, left off. He was talking about the
    State Partnership Program that his Michigan National Guard has
    with those Baltic State members while Iowa, our National Guard,
    has a partnership with Kosovo. I am just always very excited
    about that and have relationships that I have carried on for
    about the decade of time that the Iowa Army National Guard has
    been involved with those partners.
        As the only force that both the Kosovars and Serbians
    trust, how can KFOR [Kosovo Force] best posture itself to
    ensure that there is enduring stability between the two sides,
    Kosovo and Serbia?
        General Wolters. Thanks, Senator, and I cannot thank you
    enough for the contributions of your State to Kosovo.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        General Wolters. As we sit today, KFOR is very, very active
    and engaged more so than they were 1 year ago as a result of
    the continued involvement of United States operations
    activities and investments in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the
    NATO investments of operations activities.
        We typically rotate in NATO military training teams, but
    when they land at those locations, to be able to have a soft
    landing with the force element from your National Guard State
    Partnership Program affords us the opportunity to reintegrate
    at a much faster pace. We are very, very concerned about the
    security disposition in the Balkans. We are very, very pleased
    with the efforts of KFOR, and KFOR is far more capable today as
    a result of learning from the experiences of the State
    Partnership Program like yours as they reveal themselves in
    Kosovo.
        Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you, and obviously, a number of
    us here do support those State Partnership Programs.
        What is NATO's role for peacekeeping as the KSF [Kosovo
    Security Force] transitions into a full army? Will it be able
    to guarantee Kosovo's territorial integrity? Do you see that in
    their future?
        General Wolters. That is certainly the goal, Senator, and
    again, it is by, with, and through in a very, very tough
    neighborhood. As you probably know better than I, there are
    some very, very serious tendencies that exist between Serbia
    and Kosovo that we are seeing improve over the course of the
    last several weeks. Ambassador Grenell has been very, very
    aggressive on getting those security apparati to communicate
    with each other. So we hope for continued good news in that
    area with respect to the Kosovo-Serbia relationship with
    respect to taxation.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and I think that there is undue
    pressure obviously coming from Russia in that region as well.
        General Lyons, if we could talk a little bit about
    autonomous vehicles and how that impacts logistics and
    delivery. I am really excited. I chair the Subcommittee on
    Emerging Threats and Capabilities, and we have talked
    extensively about autonomous systems and how that can help our
    operators. Like I had wonderful truck drivers that were out on
    the roads and how it would reduce their risk.
        Can you describe a little bit how you are leveraging and
    integrating these emerging technologies into some of the
    modernization efforts?
        General Lyons. Senator, I agree with you. There is enormous
    potential here for autonomous, and it can be a combination of
    manned/unmanned. Each of the services are working distinct and
    separate material development kinds of initiatives. You
    mentioned the one in the Army, which was a bit of a combination
    teaming. I think there is enormous potential to expand what we
    are doing in the air domain and then even potentially space
    domain in the future.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and what is the best way to
    speed delivery of those types of systems into operations today?
    We oftentimes see large defense contractors--they are very slow
    moving, but this is a great emerging technology. How can we
    deliver that quicker?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, it is a great question. As indicated,
    each of the services are working these in the programmatic
    sense. As a combatant commander, I have the requirements out
    there, but the services present capability and so I cannot
    speak specifically to the timelines that they are working. But
    it is a great question.
        Senator Ernst. If you come up with the answer to that, let
    us know because I think we really need to be much more nimble
    on delivering emerging technologies to our men and women in
    uniform.
        General Lyons. I agree.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service. We really appreciate you
    being here today.
        General Wolters, we have taken the first steps to begin the
    Defender-Europe 20 military exercise, the largest of its kind
    in 25 years. I think there are 18 countries participating
    across 10 countries.
        What are the biggest challenges you see in executing the
    Defender 20 program, and what are the key takeaways you hope to
    see coming out of the exercise?
        General Wolters. Senator, on the logistics side of the
    house, the environment in Europe has to be mature enough to be
    able to absorb 20,000 soldiers and get those soldiers to the
    right prepositioned locations to be able to grab the
    appropriate gear that they are supposed to get and get to their
    foxhole and be able to execute. What we want to do is count
    every second that it takes to get the soldier from the first
    point of entry all the way to his or her foxhole to be
    successful to adequately defend.
        We anticipate that there will be some snags. I want to
    applaud this Committee on the fact that 2 years ago we could
    not exercise Defender-Europe 20. We were not mature enough with
    respect to the prepositioned stockpiles to have a soldier show
    up at location X and be able to grab resources. Today we can do
    that. We know the fitness of the resources, and now we will be
    able to examine their speed with which they can get to the
    foxhole and be able to execute.
        Senator Jones. Is Turkey participating?
        General Wolters. Senator, they are as observers and they
    are in certain areas with respect to activity on the periphery
    of Georgia.
        Senator Jones. Just to follow up real quick, what, if any,
    response, reaction are you seeing from Russia, or do you expect
    from the Russians or any of our other adversaries?
        General Wolters. Senator, we have seen a fair amount of
    response from Russia. They are not overly pleased with
    Defender-Europe 20. We are concerned mostly about the readiness
    of our forces, and we are doing all that in accordance with
    international law in sovereign space, in sovereign seas, in
    sovereign land.
        Senator Jones. Thank you.
        General Lyons, we have got a air refueling wing in Alabama
    too, the 117th, winner of an Omaha trophy this year. In your
    remarks to the Atlantic Council, you were quoted as saying
    across TRANSCOM, the aerial refueling force element is the most
    stressed and probably the one that is pushing the red line or
    exceeding the red line.
        Now, were you speaking strictly about the number available
    aircraft there or also about the demands or the need for more
    crew?
        General Lyons. Senator, it is a combination of both. I
    spoke earlier about the iron, the tails, that we have to
    retain, legacy tails, during the conversion before the KC-46
    becomes available to the joint force. But I would also comment
    that--and this is true across all components, Reserve and the
    Guard--the high tempo of our airmen that are running these
    missions. Particularly in the Guard, I would say we do come
    very, very close. In some cases we penetrate the mob to dwell
    in that particular force element, and I would highlight,
    Senator, that the contributions that the Air Force Reserve
    makes in day-to-day competition is absolutely extraordinary
    between volunteerism--involunteerism that still exists in the
    CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] and then long-term MPA
    [Mentor-Protege Agreement] pilots who we have flying every day.
        Senator Jones. I take it you could use more crew? Is that
    fair?
        General Lyons. Senator, crew is a friction point. There is
    no question about that.
        Senator Jones. What can we do to try to get more crew to
    the air refueling in the Guard or wherever it might be?
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, we are doing that today. The
    Air Force is working some of this as a combination of what the
    KC-46 will bring. Some of this is a function of what we must
    retain. Then there is obviously a certain level of friction
    between what systems, how many systems you can crew and then
    the associated output to the joint force.
        Senator Jones. Thank you.
        I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield the
    remainder.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your years of service.
        General Lyons, I want to start with you on the HHG
    [household goods] program. It is not in your lanes, but I have
    got a little history with military housing and trying to fix
    that problem and improve accountability and really put the
    family at the tip of the spear in terms of our focus. So I like
    the idea that you are moving forward with the program. It
    should reduce costs and improve service. That is really what we
    set out to do with military housing. We did it for a while.
        So with this program, can you tell me a little bit about
    how it is going to execute, what your expectations are for
    performance in the upcoming PCS [permanent change of station]
    season? And more importantly, I would like to know the
    mechanics. How does that family member who is coordinating the
    move--the spouse may be deployed somewhere--to what extent are
    they going to have power over really assessing the completeness
    and the satisfaction of the move?
        General Lyons. Senator, all great questions. You brought up
    the housing issue, and part of what got us into the housing
    issue was a lack of clear accountability with the private
    sector and the appropriate governance structure to manage that
    large contract. That is exactly what is driving us here in the
    household goods industry to restructure our relationship so
    that we do have defined levels of accountability, key
    performance parameters if you would, and that is the design of
    the global household goods contract. It is not designed to put
    any providers out of business. It is designed to gain
    accountability, clarify responsibility inside the Department,
    and then through a longer-range relationship with industry,
    incentivize the growth of capacity to meet the peak season. I
    think for family members, we owe them that.
        Now, we will not in the 2020 peak season see this come to
    fruition. We intend to award in 2020 and prepare for the 2021,
    and then there will be a rather long transition to grow this
    capacity over time. But key will be accountability and
    transparency for family members.
        Senator Tillis. I think that is important because we do a
    lot of housing town halls down at Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune,
    and I have heard some rumblings about a less than satisfactory
    experience with the status quo. So I think you are right. I
    appreciate you taking the lead and trying to get it right and
    have a consistent experience across the globe. So I appreciate
    the work on that.
        I am interested. We will do it maybe with a meeting in my
    office if I could get with some of the people who are working
    on the contracting. I would like to see how they are going
    after key performance indicators, customer satisfaction, those
    sort of things built into it. Now we are trying to retrofit
    that into the housing program. It looks like you are going to
    be ahead of it. So I thank you for your work there.
        General Wolters, tell me a little bit about how well your
    area of responsibility, your partners are closing the gap on
    their cyber capabilities, how well we are actually
    coordinating, and your assessment of our--if you take a look at
    Russia, they are all over the place. Anytime I have traveled to
    that part of the world, you are talking about Russia,
    information campaigns, and their malign activities. Give me
    some hope on how we are either creating a gap or filling holes
    that we have right now.
        General Wolters. Senator, we are improving our strategic
    transparency and alignment in the cyber domain. I would say
    that over the course of the last 2 years, the NATO nations have
    done a much better job of understanding the challenges that
    they face on the defensive side of the house from a hygiene
    perspective. Once they have got their back yard in order, now
    they are in a position to understand where they start with
    respect to network protection. That truly has come about as a
    result of our USCYBERCOM's willingness to lead from the front.
        Senator Tillis. As you move into that answer, I would also
    like for you to talk about Huawei, ZTE, and whether or not we
    have gotten to a good place where clearly they are going to
    allow that infrastructure to be present. But in terms of
    critical infrastructure, are we getting to a good place?
        General Wolters. Senator, that is a great point and that is
    exactly where I was headed. The hygiene piece, the defensive
    cyber piece has to be applied with respect to what is about to
    become an issue in Europe with respect to proliferation of 5G
    activity in Huawei. Network protection is going to be job one.
    So we are right back to the basics. As you well know from your
    time with General Nakasone, he is keen on that, and we have
    seen a marked improvement in the manning for defensive cyber
    ops on the United States side in Europe, and we have seen an
    increase in manning on the defensive cyber ops side of the
    house for the NATO nations in Europe.
        Senator Tillis. Well, thank you, and thank you both. I have
    got a lot of questions. But, General Lyons, we will be in touch
    so I can get a little bit more insight into the direction of
    HHG. Thank you both for your time.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. Happy to do so.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lyons, we have touched several times on the
    transition of the KC-46. I want to put a finer point on it. In
    your testimony, you say this is your number one shortfall, and
    you go on to say it will create a critical and deepening gap in
    taskable aerial refueling aircraft and air crews for the next 5
    to 7 years. You do a very good job of outlining the problem,
    but then at the end of your prepared remarks, you say we
    recommend reevaluating aerial refueling force structure plans
    annually. Frankly, that does not reassure me.
        I want to know what is the plan. You have identified a
    serious problem here. We cannot project force if we cannot
    refuel those airplanes, and you have identified a 5 to 7-year--
    you characterize it as a deepening gap. What do we do? Perhaps
    you do not need to give me a full answer here, but for the
    record, I would like to see an action plan not just
    reevaluation.
        General Lyons. Senator, we will be happy to work with the
    Air Force and come back to you on that with a joint plan.
        In the near term, we had agreed with the Air Force to
    retain 28 legacy aircraft to mitigate the conversion for the
    KC-46. The KC-46, as we receive that aircraft, as the Air Force
    receives that aircraft, will take some time to work through the
    technical, the Cat-1 deficiencies, as well as convert crews,
    and so you can appreciate there is going to be tension between
    crews. In some scenarios we are tail limited; in some scenarios
    we are crew limited. It is a bit of a combination. It is a very
    complex program for the Air Force to work. They are pushing as
    hard as they can with Boeing.
        Senator King. If you could give to the Committee a detailed
    analysis of what you identify as the gap, how many tails, how
    many crews, and what the solution is because if we have a
    crisis and need that capacity, saying well, you know, it was a
    complicated problem is not going to cut it.
        General Lyons. Senator, I agree, and the issue is not when
    there is conflict. Actually it is in day-to-day competition. So
    just to be clear, in today's day-to-day competition, that is
    where we are taking the reduction.
        Senator King. We are stressed right now.
        General Lyons. We are stressed today and that is where the
    10 and the 13 that are in the current fiscal year 2021
    reduction that we are working with the Air Force and the
    Department to bring those back.
        Senator King. I look forward to working with you on that.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to work with the United
    States Air Force (USAF) to retain sufficient aerial refueling
    capacity to support daily demands and crisis response to
    mitigate delays in KC-46 operational capability. Since my
    testimony, two significant events have occurred which have
    solidified the Department's way forward for the air refueling
    mission area. First, in early April Boeing and the USAF agreed
    on a fix to the most serious KC-46 deficiency for the Remote
    Visual System (RVS). With a known technical solution in hand,
    the USAF now believes they will deliver an RVS 2.0 solution to
    retrofit some KC-46 aircraft in fiscal year 2023 and have a
    fully capable KC-46 in production by fiscal year 2024. In light
    of this outcome, in March and April USTRANSCOM worked closely
    with the USAF to develop an acceptable reduction in KC 10
    capacity while sustaining KC-135 aircraft that I believe
    creates an acceptable action plan which I will describe more
    fully below. USTRANSCOM's ultimate objective is to balance
    retention of usable KC-135/KC-10 air refueling capacity while
    simultaneously building the foundation to rapidly assimilate
    fully capable KC-46s into the air refueling fleet. Over the
    last several years, the USAF identified a measured pace of KC-
    10 retirements, as the KC-46 program progressed, provides a
    high-benefit cost savings given budget constraints. I support
    modest reductions in the KC-10 fleet which means accepting some
    near-term risk in air refueling capacity. I am now more willing
    to accept these measured reductions in April knowing a KC-46
    RVS 2.0 solution is identified and we're on a path to producing
    fully manned and operationally capable KC-46s. USTRANSCOM
    agrees with the USAF on a force structure profile that includes
    reductions in KC-10 aircraft. The agreed upon Primary Mission
    Aircraft Inventory profile; consists of not less than 50 KC-10s
    in fiscal year 2021, not less than 38 KC-10s in fiscal year
    2022, and not less than 26 KC-10s in fiscal year 2023 with full
    retirement of the KC-10 fleet in fiscal year 2024. Any further
    delays in fielding operationally capable KC 46 aircraft would
    cause USTRANSCOM to reassess this profile. The USAF has
    committed to retaining current KC-135 Total Aircraft Inventory
    of approximately 393 aircraft for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal
    year 2023 with adequate aircrews to mitigate the risk to daily
    competition missions. KC-135 reductions in fiscal year 2024 and
    beyond are conceptually on a one-for-one basis after we reach
    the current requirement of 479 capable air refueling aircraft.
    USTRANSCOM continues to support USAF efforts to recapitalize
    the air refueling fleet which will consist of 300 KC-135s in
    fiscal year 2029, at an average age of 67-years, and the full
    complement of 179 KC-46s. These adjusted retirement profiles
    assume funding is made available by Congress or the Department.
    We are working with the Department's senior leaders to realize
    this air refueling profile that accepts some modest risk in the
    near-term and delivers a more modern, capable air refueling
    fleet in the long-term.

        Senator King. General Wolters, a quick question. Do we have
    sufficient visibility of Russian submarines in the Atlantic? Do
    we know where they are?
        General Wolters. We do but not for 100 percent of the time.
        Senator King. I do not want whatever the missing percent is
    to be off the coast of Maine.
        General Wolters. I agree, Senator.
        Senator King. Or New York, not to be too parochial about
    it.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I think it is unlikely--I hope I am right--
    that Russian tanks are going to roll across the border into the
    Baltics. But what is our thinking and strategic thinking about
    a hybrid kind of activity involving Russian language, a kind of
    Crimea model? Is that a concern, and do we have a strategic
    response?
        General Wolters. It is very much a concern, Senator, and it
    has to do with the posture of our forces as we sit today in
    competition and attempt to effectively deter. We are improving
    in our ability to do so, and we have to do so to a point to
    where we compel any potential enemy of us to not take those
    first steps against us. NATO agreed in the NATO military
    strategy to also recognize a whole-of-government, whole-of-
    nation approach, and that will allow us to dramatically improve
    our posture so that we can better see the battle space from an
    indications and warnings standpoint and better be able to more
    proactively deploy to defend.
        Senator King. And be prepared for a different kind, for not
    a traditional tanks rolling over the border invasion.
        General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator King. I think we should--I am sure you are--a lot
    of study on Crimea and how that played out and what the
    response could have been or might have been.
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator King. Final question. The attacks on the Saudi
    tanker field and also the Iranian missile in Iraq after
    Soleimani's death to me raise concerns about our ability to
    defend against--I do not know what you want to call them--
    cruise missiles, low-level missiles, intermediate range, and I
    believe the Iranian missile was an ICBM. What is our capability
    to defend against those kinds of attacks? Because it did not
    work in Iraq and it did not work in Saudi Arabia.
        General Wolters. Senator, it is improving, but it has to
    get better. We have a plan that prefers to integrated air
    missile defense that comprehensively takes into account what
    happens at long ranges and long altitudes and short ranges and
    lower altitudes. It all has to be nested together from an
    indications and warnings standpoint and command and control
    standpoint.
        Senator King. So you would agree that this is a significant
    gap in our defense that we really need to get to work on in a
    hurry.
        General Wolters. It is a shortfall, Senator, and we need to
    continue to work on it.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your service.
        With our NATO members that are now picking up the--you
    know, spending the money they were supposed to spend in the
    past, does it give us any opportunity to reduce our funding, or
    does it give us any opportunity to reduce our troop deployment
    in Europe?
        General Wolters. Senator, it could in the future.
        Senator Scott. Does it concern you that countries like
    Germany still do not want to pay their fair share, and does it
    impact our ability to defend? And does it give us a need to
    start thinking about where we should have troops and where we
    should not have troops? And are we thinking about should we be
    in Poland more than we should be in Germany?
        General Wolters. Senator, I believe all those are a
    concern, and in my mil-to-mil consultations with my German
    counterparts, they are just as concerned about meeting the 2
    percent as we are.
        Senator Scott. But there is no action that we need to be
    taking?
        General Wolters. I think the vigilance that we continue to
    show with respect to requirements collocated with defense
    spending needs to continue. Today what we have observed between
    fiscal year 2016 and 2020 is an actual increase across NATO of
    an additional $130 billion of funds for defense. That is
    positive and we need to continue on that track.
        Senator Scott. With Turkey buying the S-400 and it seems
    like cozying up to Moscow, does it impact your ability to rely
    on them as a partner?
        General Wolters. Senator, it has not to this point. Turkey
    remains a very reliable NATO ally.
        Senator Scott. And with Huawei, have you had to make
    changes on the types of information you are willing to share as
    a result of knowing that these countries are going to continue
    to use Huawei in 5G but also even in their existing
    infrastructure?
        General Wolters. Senator, we have not at this point because
    of the current posture with respect to 5G and Huawei and in
    particular UK. But my guess would be in the near future, we
    have to be more vigilant with respect to network protection and
    Huawei and 5G.
        Senator Scott. The investment that Communist China is
    making in Europe and all around the world--is that impacting
    our ability to be--not just the United States but other members
    to be able to defend against a Russian invasion but even what
    China is doing?
        General Wolters. Senator, it is not an impact today, but it
    could be in the future if we continue to see that economic
    equity increase with respect to seaports on behalf of China in
    Europe.
        Senator Scott. For them, it is mostly the seaports that is
    impacting in Europe?
        General Wolters. Today that is the biggest issue, Senator.
        Senator Scott. How about the supply chain? How dependent
    the world is on China as a member of the supply chain--does
    that cause you any concern?
        General Wolters. It does cause a concern, Senator. I have
    not seen those reflections yet in Europe, but I anticipate that
    we could.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service and your
    testimony.
        General Lyons, I think you mentioned at the outset your
    combatant command does so much great work. I think Alaska we
    have more understanding of that than most places and how you do
    it professionally, quietly, but critical to the whole military.
        I also thought the anecdote that you mention in your
    testimony about saving the life of one soldier was very
    powerful. So please tell the whole TRANSCOM civilian and
    military members that we respect and appreciate all that you
    are doing.
        I am glad you mentioned the personal property program in
    your opening statement. I am going to have a number of
    questions for the record that if you and your team can get back
    to me on relatively soon, I would appreciate that a lot.
        You know, you talk about also the most stressed capability
    and number one readiness concern is on the aerial refueling
    fleet and the tankers. So I mentioned this a number of times in
    this Committee. Billy Mitchell, when he was testifying in front
    of this Committee in the 1930s, the father of the United States
    Air Force, mentioned that Alaska was the most strategic place
    in the world because of our location to Asia, to Europe, to
    other places.
        Secretary Esper, when he was testifying here several months
    ago, said that we are going to have over fifth generation
    fighters located in Alaska starting in April with the F-35's
    coming to Eielson Air Force Base to collocate KC-46's with 100
    fifth generation fighters. The Secretary of Defense said that
    would provide the warning to our adversaries, particularly
    China and Russia, that we have extreme strategic reach.
        Right now, the Air Force is looking at their OCONUS
    decision on where to put the OCONUS KC-46 fleet. Almost
    everything is focused in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command] with
    the exception of Alaska which, as you know, could be INDOPACOM,
    EUCOM, any com because where we are on the top of the world.
        Can you give me your sense on that? To me, this seems like
    a no-brainer. But I think it would help you with your most
    stressed capability and number one readiness concern if you put
    tankers in a place that can service EUCOM, PACOM, STRATCOM,
    NORTHCOM versus place them all in Guam, which is kind of
    conventional wisdom but in my view does not make any sense.
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks. There is no question about
    the strategic significance and location of the State called
    Alaska. As you and I have discussed before, the Air Force does
    have a basing methodology and a basing plan for the KC-46 as it
    comes online. I will defer to them on those particular
    discussions.
        Senator Sullivan. I am not telling you to make--but do you
    have a view on that? You call it the most stressed capability,
    aerial refueling. Does it help to have capability in a place
    that can help TRANSCOM reach other COCOMs other than just
    INDOPACOM?
        General Lyons. Senator, I would have to look at the
    analytics.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I think the answer is yes. Maybe
    you can get back to me on that. It seems to me pretty damned
    clear.
        General Lyons. Senator, I will come back to you.
        Senator Sullivan. We want to help you with your most
    stressed capability and number one readiness concern. I think
    there is a way to do that, which is to make this decision,
    which to me seems like a no-brainer.
        General Wolters, I appreciated your reference on Arctic
    issues in your testimony. Even though that is not necessarily
    Alaska, we are kind of in the seams. Right? We got INDOPACOM
    forces. We got the threat from Russia. We got STRATCOM. We got
    TRANSCOM, NORTHCOM, everybody.
        Let me just mention, this Committee has been very focused
    on Arctic issues. The Chairman mentions great power
    competition. There has been an important Arctic focus. The
    problem is the Pentagon has been pretty slow to address some of
    these challenges and recognize it.
        We have two icebreakers right now. One is broken. That is
    the American capability. Russia has 54, and this article for
    the record, they just recently announced they have nuclear
    icebreakers and a Russian shipyard launches a cruise missile-
    capable icebreaker.
        Can you talk to the challenges of the Arctic with regard to
    Russia and how you are addressing it?
        General Wolters. Senator, it is of great concern. As we
    crafted the NATO military strategy, its title is
    ``Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response.'' One of the
    realizations was the fact that we need to be as focused in the
    Arctic as we are in the Baltics, as we are in the Black Sea, as
    we are in the Mediterranean, as we are in the central portion
    of the Atlantic. The Arctic needs to ensure that it gets the
    appropriate scrutiny and the appropriate resourcing.
        We are excited about the fact of NORTHCOM serving as the
    executive agent for capability development in the Arctic. We
    are also pleased that in the summer of 2019, DOD delivered
    their Arctic strategy. I know you drove that, Senator, and we
    appreciate that.
        It is vital. We see a lot of activity on behalf of Russia
    in the Arctic, and we also see activity on behalf of China in
    the Arctic. We think most of that has to do with money and
    commercial fishing activity.
        So it is of great concern and security exists on the
    periphery in Europe, and the Arctic is a big reason why we have
    to make sure that we maintain our vigilance.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and generals, both of you, thanks
    again for your service.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to both you, General Wolters, and you, General
    Lyons, for your service and for being here this morning.
        I want to begin, General Wolters, with the continuation of
    the discussion we had yesterday. I appreciated your taking time
    to meet with me. But earlier this month, the President informed
    Congress that he was going to divert another $3.8 billion from
    the Pentagon toward the border wall. This is on top of the $3.6
    billion that he took from military construction (MILCON)
    projects last year. These reprogrammings would eliminate, among
    other things, the military weapon systems. I know Senator Kaine
    referred to one of those. But that includes eight MQ-9 Reapers,
    which are an ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] asset, and my recollection of previous
    conversations is that ISR assets are at a premium within the
    European theater and other areas.
        So can you discuss how the elimination of these weapon
    systems and MILCON projects are going to affect your campaign
    momentum?
        General Wolters. I would like to address the fact that we
    had 44 projects that were MILCON-related that were deferred
    because we could not get those projects on contract by
    September of 2019, and the total value of the 44 projects was
    approximately $1.3 billion, and they came in two buckets. One
    was a set of projects--25--that were European Deterrence
    Initiative MILCON projects. The other projects were baseline
    MILCON, 19. The EDI MILCON was about $771 million, and the
    MILCON base was about $550 million.
        When you take a look at all 44 of those deferred projects,
    which we hope will reappear one day, what you see is three
    major areas of reduction of campaign momentum. The first has to
    do with advanced airfield infrastructure on some of the NATO
    airfields in the farther eastern side of Europe. The second has
    to do with the infrastructure that supports prepositioned
    stockpiles for fuel and for ammunition. The final area of
    impact for campaign momentum is the modernization of
    infrastructure that supports a couple of military headquarters
    and schools. All those are important to campaign momentum. It
    slows the campaign momentum.
        Despite all that, Senator, we still maintain positive
    campaign momentum in the critical areas of indications and
    warnings, as you alluded to ISR, command and control and
    mission command. It just slows down the progress.
        Senator Shaheen. As you read the National Defense Strategy,
    what is a bigger threat to our national security? Is it a
    threat from Russia and China and the great power competition?
    Or is it a threat from immigrants coming across our southern
    border?
        General Wolters. Senator, both are threats. As the
    Commander of USEUCOM, I will tell you that I am most concerned
    about Russia.
        Senator Shaheen. That was a very diplomatic answer, and
    thank you. I am sorry. I should not have put you in that
    position. But I think it is an important point to make, that
    the threat that you are dealing with is one that has
    significant implications for our future when we look at Russian
    aggression and its potential to impact the United States.
        I want to go back, General Lyons. I know there have been a
    number of questions around the KC-46 and the delays in the
    aircraft and what that challenge means for us, and it is an
    issue for our National Guard, the 157th air refueling wing,
    which lost its last KC-135 because we thought the 46 aircraft
    would be arriving this year, and obviously, due to problems, it
    has been delayed.
        But last month, General David L. Goldfein sent a letter to
    Boeing asking them to review the remote vision system, which is
    probably the most prominent problem at this point, to give a
    design review by March 2020 and a flight demonstration by 2020.
        Can you tell us whether we have heard from Boeing at this
    point and what they have said with respect to that review of
    the remote vision system?
        General Lyons. Senator, I really appreciate General
    Goldfein's focus on this particular area, and I have relayed
    that to him as well.
        I know there have been many contacts between Boeing and the
    Air Force, and I do not want to get into the programmatics. I
    know there are some design issues that they are working
    through. I do not have a complete answer yet, and I will defer
    to the Air Force on the particulars of the program.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, can I ask, do we expect an answer
    from Boeing by the end of March?
        General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. I believe General Goldfein
    expects an answer. He said that explicitly and I believe that
    will come to fruition.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay, thank you.
        General Wolters, I want to go back to NATO because with
    Senator Tillis, he and I chair the Senate NATO Observer Group,
    which is an effort to try and make sure that the Senate is
    aware of what is happening with NATO and what we need to do.
        I wonder if you could give us an update on the new Cyber
    Operations Center that NATO is planning to be fully functional
    by 2023.
        General Wolters. We are very pleased, Senator. As you know,
    it all originated in Estonia, and it started with the
    involvement of the United States and the declaration by the
    United States CYBERCOM to have one United States single
    military commander responsible in the military for the domain
    of cyber, and the Europeans have embraced that. We are excited
    about the future, and NATO headquarters on the political side
    is also very excited.
        Senator Shaheen. I am out of time, but I will do a follow-
    up question for the record on this.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. General Wolters, let us talk a little bit,
    if we could, about the European Deterrence Initiative. I assume
    that you would characterize this as a success. Is that fair to
    say?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator, I would.
        Senator Hawley. Can you give us some specific examples of
    things that EUCOM would not have been able to do without EDI?
        General Wolters. Senator, the first largest example is we
    had started Defender-Europe 20, an exercise that brings over a
    division-sized force. We could not do that a year ago. We could
    not do it 2 years ago. We can do this exercise as a result of
    the benefit of EDI funds.
        Senator Hawley. Why would EUCOM have struggled to do some
    of these things without EDI? What specific obstacles has EDI
    helped you overcome in your judgment?
        General Wolters. First of all, it has funded the rotational
    brigade combat teams that go to Poland, and that teaches all of
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines how to lift and
    shift larger quantities of forces across the Atlantic and do so
    without any harm. That in itself is very important.
        We have also through EDI been able to fund our Army
    prepositioned stockpiles, our emergency contingency operation
    sets for the Air Force, and our deployable airbase systems for
    the Air Force.
        We have also been able to dramatically improve the airfield
    infrastructure and the reception infrastructure in the eastern
    part of Europe to where it is equipped today to safely receive
    those resources and effectively get those resources where they
    need to go for our soldiers and sailors and airmen and coast
    guardsmen and marines to be effective.
        Senator Hawley. That is an impressive record of success,
    and it is one of the reasons I think we need something similar
    in other theaters, INDOPACOM in particular as I have long
    advocated for.
        General, staying with you, Whiteman Air Force Base. My home
    State of Missouri, of course, is the proud home of B-2 and the
    proud future home of the B-21. Can you just speak to the role
    that you see the B-2 and one day the B-21 playing in deterring
    Russia from using nuclear weapons as part of any attempted fait
    accompli in the Baltics?
        General Wolters. Senator, those airframes are part of the
    critical triad, and I am firmly convinced that the nuclear
    deterrence umbrella that sits over Europe is part of the great
    success that we have had for the last 7 decades in NATO to be
    able to generate peace. I am excited about the future of the B-
    21 because I think it will do more of the same with even a
    greater impact.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        Let me shift to China for a moment, if I could. In your
    written testimony, General Wolters, you said that China's
    efforts to build 5G networks in Europe, coupled with its
    growing interest and investment in European ports and
    infrastructure, complicate steady state and contingency
    operations.
        Can you just say more about that? How specifically do these
    Chinese activities complicate steady state and contingency
    operations?
        General Wolters. The equities that they have on the
    shipping capacity inside and outside of Europe is very
    alarming, and when you control the ability to take in and
    regulate resources, you have a large impact on what actually
    exists on the continent with respect to its ability to
    effectively generate peace and security. That is the concern.
        Senator Hawley. How do our European allies respond when you
    raise these concerns with them, as I am sure you do?
        General Wolters. With vigilance. In some cases they are
    surprised to the degree of equities that China has with respect
    to seaports, but in most cases, very concerned and vigilance
    increases once we get past the education stage.
        Senator Hawley. You also wrote that you are seeing
    encouraging signs--those are your words--from European nations
    as they become increasingly aware of the strings attached to
    Chinese capital investment. Can you give us a sense of what
    those encouraging signs are?
        General Wolters. Several nations not willing to accept 5G
    Huawei, and we have had reports of that in other nations being
    a lot more stingy and scratchy with respect to their
    willingness to engage in deliberations on port equities.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you for a second about our
    allies' contribution to NATO, which is something that has come
    up, rightly so, a number of times already this morning.
        I think that the progress towards the 2 percent mark is
    very important but only just a first step because the division
    of labor within NATO has to fundamentally change, and I think
    as this Committee has been saying now for some time. What is
    your assessment about what would need to happen for our
    European allies to get to the point where they are able to
    assume primary responsibility for their security in your
    theater?
        General Wolters. Senator, I think we need to continue on
    the current campaign that we are on. As you know, from 2016 to
    2020, in the cash portion of contributions for burden sharing,
    we have had a net increase of $130 billion. There is also the
    examination of contributions in capabilities, and in NATO we
    have been very, very vigilant with respect to our focus on
    improving our readiness, the ability of force elements to be
    more resilient, more responsive, and more lethal. That is all
    part of the equation with respect to European contributions to
    adequately defend, and we are improving.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, General. I look
    forward to seeing you both this afternoon.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Duckworth?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lyons, thank you for making the time to sit down
    with me earlier this month to talk about TRANSCOM and logistics
    more broadly.
        I want to touch again on the state of the sealift fleet in
    the U.S., and I know that Ranking Member Reed asked about the
    state of sealift in his question line. But I sort of want to go
    a little further into this. You said that our current readiness
    is lower than where we need to be, but you are working to
    recapitalize on sealift capability when you answered Ranking
    Member Reed.
        How do you ensure that this plan continues to be
    prioritized with the Navy and the DOD leadership when they are
    always balancing other higher cost programs and initiatives? I
    feel like this is sort of the plain sister and it needs a
    little bit more attention. How do you make sure that that
    priority is also placed on your particular recapitalization
    plan?
        General Lyons. Senator, first let me just publicly thank
    you for your leadership and leading our logistics efforts
    across the Department. I appreciate your particular interest
    here.
        I think this is a hard decision for the Navy. They have a
    lot of competing requirements, and Sealift is one of many.
        My own view on this, if you go back to the original
    recapitalization of sealift back when John Lehman was Secretary
    of the Navy, we had something which we have today, but we do
    not use, the National Defense Sealift Fund. I think the way
    that we are going to move in a positive direction is we are
    going to have to have an appropriation that feeds the National
    Defense Sealift Fund. It allows us the flexibility to
    capitalize on opportunities in the open market to continue the
    acquired use strategy, and I think that is what we need to do
    over a long period of time, over the next 15-plus years where
    we have 46 vessels aging out.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Another category of concern that I have in logistics is
    based around fuel. We have talked in the past about solutions
    for alleviating stress on the Air Force's tanker fleet, but
    this time I would like to focus on bulk fuel capacity for
    distribution and storage as an example.
        How would you work with the services' logistics arms to
    properly identify each of their needs and how to meet those
    needs as they come around and reframe to face near-peer
    competitors under the NDS? Because I feel like there is not a
    lot of really good communications between the services on what
    those bulk fuel needs and capacities. What do you need to do to
    push it forward into theater?
        General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. I mean, you are alluding to
    something that is very important across the department and fuel
    is liquid gold essentially. We require it for everything that
    we do in every single domain. We have got a study directed by
    Congress that we will complete this year in terms of assessing
    our ability to access maritime tankers, for example, in an end-
    to-end value chain, to look also at the nodes. The way we look
    at it today in terms of global posture is very large, fixed-
    base facilities. We need to see if that is the applicable way
    to go for contested environments and then assess where we need
    to go for the future for global posture and maritime
    transportation, as well as aerial refuel that we talked about.
        Senator Duckworth. I feel like this sort of reflects the
    struggle we had just a couple years ago when I was in the House
    about ammunition, you know, across the services, and that we
    were not talking to each other well enough before we did a
    whole audit. I feel like we are getting to the same issue with
    fuel. I mean, you cannot fight and win without class 3 and
    class 5. Right? I feel like we are sort of in the same problem
    with fuel. Am I correct in this sense that we have to do better
    with communicating among the services?
        General Lyons. Senator, I think you are absolutely correct.
    I think we need what I would characterize as a global
    innovative view of the end-to-end liquid energy supply chain to
    make sure that we have sufficient not just supply and posture
    but resiliency to continue to operate under a contested
    environment. I agree with you wholeheartedly.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        General Wolters, I would like to bring you into the
    discussion here. We have been hearing a lot about Defender-
    Europe and what we hope to learn from this exercise. I am
    looking forward to hearing about not only the successes but
    perhaps more importantly the challenges that the exercise helps
    identify as well.
        How would you classify your level of concern going into
    Defender-Europe 20 whether from an overall capacity standpoint,
    from a lack of previous exercise familiarity, or due to other
    factors inside and outside our control, and how are you going
    to leverage that into lessons learned going forward?
        General Wolters. Senator, a great question, and I would
    like to extend a personal thanks to you for your support in the
    logistics area.
        As we speak, there are soldiers downloading at Bremerhaven
    for Defender-Europe 20 at this very moment.
        I am concerned about the bandwidth to be able to accept
    this large force, and I am also concerned about road and rail
    from the center portion of Germany to the east, all the way to
    the eastern border. Because we have the appropriate resources,
    we now possess a white team capability to examine our speed of
    move from west to east. We also have enough white cell
    individuals to assess how safely we get stuff through
    Bremerhaven and to the next point.
        Bandwidth with respect to size and speed are my greatest
    concerns.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I know you all are so happy to see me because I am the last
    one, and you will get to finish up and head off.
        I want to go back, General Wolters. You told Senator Reed
    that the Chinese controlled 10 percent of the shipping rights
    in and out of Europe. I would like for you to expand on that
    just a little bit, talk about do you think it is pretty much
    going to stay at that level, if it is going to increase, the
    rate of increase, a little bit more insight into what you think
    this means.
        General Wolters. The Chinese investment covers 10 percent
    of European shipping capacity, and I would contend that is a
    whole-of-government, whole-of-nation concern to make sure that
    Europe has the appropriate equities with respect to shipping
    capacity.
        Senator Blackburn. So you see that as a floor or a ceiling?
        General Wolters. I see that as the conditions that exist on
    the ground today, and I think the nations need to understand
    what that means with respect to their ability to effectively
    ship what their nation needs for their national interest, and
    an education process needs to follow fast.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I think we see the need for that
    education process not only when it comes to infrastructure but
    the Belt and Road Initiative, the implications that that may
    have as we look at 5G and the rollout there, the implications
    that it has.
        So what is NATO going to do to address this? Because it
    does not matter if it is shipping and that infrastructure or
    building roads and connectors or 5G with that infrastructure.
    There is an issue, and being able to communicate with our
    allies over a Huawei network is a very difficult thing to do.
    So give me kind of a timeline and the steps that you all are
    taking to implement an education process.
        General Wolters. In the NATO political paradigm, there is a
    growing realization that this is an issue, and there will have
    to be a common understanding at the political level at NATO
    that this is an issue that NATO should embrace. I think that is
    the start of success to ensure that the national interest of
    the 29 nations in NATO are protected with respect to China
    proliferation, and we are at that phase. As a military member
    supporting NATO, it is my job to report the facts and that is
    what we are doing.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. So who is receptive to this
    message? The first part of solving a problem is defining a
    problem. So you say there is awareness in defining this
    problem. Correct?
        General Wolters. Correct, and the first task is to ensure
    of the 29 nations which ones have concern and which ones still
    need more --
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and out of those 29 nations, who
    is receptive to this and who are you getting pushback from? Are
    you at a 50/50 on this, or what is the standing there?
        General Wolters. Senator, I can only speak at the mil-to-
    mil level not the political level for the 29 nations, and I
    would say that the majority of the nations are incredibly
    concerned about China proliferation.
        Senator Blackburn. I hope we can talk a little bit more
    about that this afternoon, if that would be okay.
        General Lyons, let me move to a couple of things with you,
    the NDS and cyber and space. Have they been identified as
    contested warfighting domains? Talk to me a little bit about
    how TRANSCOM is working with its private sector partners to
    improve their cybersecurity, their ability to defend because
    Senator Ernst asked you about autonomous vehicles and as we
    look at building out Space Command and artificial intelligence
    and autonomous vehicles, we know that the cyber component is
    going to be more relevant in those discussions. So talk with me
    for just a couple of seconds about that.
        General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        For USTRANSCOM, cyber is a very, very high priority. You
    asked specifically about our commercial providers. We have
    worked over the last several years now to instill contract
    language that I would characterize as at least brings our
    commercial providers up to a basic level of minimum cyber
    hygiene. I think we have been successful in that. I think we
    have been successful in gaining the attention and focus of the
    C-suite as an issue that they have to contend with whether it
    is for national defense or whether it is for their private
    equities, and so we are making progress.
        But as I said earlier, I would also say that when
    confronted with an advanced persistent threat actor, I do not
    think any of our commercial providers necessarily are in a
    position to protect themselves in that particular scenario. We
    very intentionally have multiple providers in each of the
    commodity areas so that if we lose one, we can count on others.
        Senator Blackburn. Are you increasing the standards of
    compliance for them?
        General Lyons. Yes, Senator, we are, and as you may have
    seen, the Department's cyber maturity model that they just
    rolled out will do significant good in that area.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        The Committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                             household goods moves
        1. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, what are your expectations on
    accountability and transparency of moving companies in the household
    goods process this upcoming permanent change of station (PCS) season?
        General Lyons. Accountability and transparency are indispensable to
    the success of the Defense Personal Property Program. My expectations
    of moving companies on these principles are straightforward. I expect
    industry to abide by our program's business rules; to be forthcoming
    with DOD customers with information on the status or condition of their
    shipment; and to follow established processes to `make families whole'
    when things go wrong. When moving companies do not abide by these
    principles, my staff will follow business rules to hold them
    accountable. I also believe industry has a reasonable expectation of
    these principles from USTRANSCOM. I am committed to transparency with
    industry when it comes to the program's direction and will similarly
    hold my organization accountable for following our business rules.
    Ultimately, it is DOD families that are owed accountability and
    transparency. The Defense Personal Property Program exists for one
    reason, and one reason only: to provide a safe, quality relocation
    experience for DOD families as they prepare to serve at their next duty
    assignment.

        2. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how different will family's
    experience be in the quality of service?
        General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes
    to Defense Personal Property Program business rules that address long-
    standing pain points for DOD families. From a safety perspective, we
    require that all moving companies perform background checks on
    employees and meet local installation access requirements (whether they
    are serving homes on or off base). Recognizing that many issues center
    on communication, we require moving companies to be more responsive to
    customer inquiries, provide more lead time to customers before delivery
    appointments, and offer more information to customers on the status of
    their shipment while it's in transit. In instances of loss or damage,
    we'll give families more time to file claims and require that moving
    companies settle claims under a certain threshold faster. While many of
    these changes were inspired by our requirements for the Global
    Household Goods Contract (GHC), the structure of our current model
    limits the quality improvements we can make and many of our processes
    deter companies from participating in the program. Our current
    construct is a constraint to innovation and advancement, as we are tied
    to the capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in the program.
    Additionally, the current model prevents us from capitalizing on
    existing capabilities in industry such as digital inventories, near
    real-time event status updates as shipments are in-transit, and mobile
    applications to provide families modern tools to manage all aspects of
    the move process (including claims). The GHC is an opportunity to raise
    the standard for DOD families, attract additional quality capacity to
    the program, and incorporate modern capabilities (which we take for
    granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal
    Property Program.

        3. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, where are you still experiencing
    shortfalls or limitations in improving household goods moves for
    military families?
        General Lyons. I see three limiting factors to improving the
    personal property relocation process for DOD families. The first
    relates to our existing business model. The transactional nature of our
    relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers prevents us
    from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in generating
    additional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry accountable,
    and inhibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (the kind of
    convenient technology we take for granted in every aspect of our
    personal lives) into the Personal Property Program. The second relates
    to the similarly fractured nature of the DOD's management framework.
    The Department is taking steps to align and integrate activities, but
    more work is required to evolve from our current series of service-
    centric activities into a truly Department-wide Personal Property
    Program. The third relates to the sustained, day-to-day executive
    leadership required to drive Personal Property reform across the
    Department. I've temporarily reallocated a member of the Senior
    Executive Service (SES) from my own staff to lead the Personal Property
    Program at USTRANSCOM. Meanwhile, I've submitted a request to the
    Department for an SES allocation to permanently lead the Personal
    Property Enterprise.
                    global mobility capacity and positioning
        4. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, in light of force operational
    changes proposed by each of the services, how is your OCONUS [outside
    contiguous United States] mobility capacity or positioning impacted?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's posture of forces globally is
    consistent with the National Defense Strategy and Globally Integrated
    War Plans. Our global mobility posture is critical and allows us to
    shift rapidly to the highest priority DOD missions. USTRANSCOM's robust
    global network relies heavily on access, basing, and overflight
    privileges we leverage as a result of our extensive network of allies
    and like-minded partners around the globe. We continually assess our
    global mobility capacity against requirements as war plans are updated
    in conjunction with the ever-changing geopolitical environment. The
    Mobility Capability and Requirements Study directed in the latest NDAA
    will evaluate the demands placed on the mobility enterprise, both in
    terms of capacity and forces. We will provide a status update to
    Congress in June and are scheduled to deliver the final report in Jan
    21.
                  information warfare/ strategic communication
        5. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, it is great to hear that our
    allies in the region are maturing in their knowledge and expertise in
    the cyber and information domain, where can we improve to gain even
    more proficiency, effectiveness, or functionality, in light of Russia's
    propaganda activities?
        General Wolters. We must continue to array our resources and
    leverage a whole-of-government approach to best defend critical cyber
    infrastructure and compete to win in the information domain. A key
    platform for competing with Russia on these fronts is the Russian
    Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with U.S. Department of
    State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to promote whole-of-
    government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and counter Russia
    malign activities. Our military-to-military security cooperation
    programs engage Allies and partners to improve alignment and strengthen
    our collective ability to compete in the cyber and information domains.
    Increased flexibility with security cooperation resources, policies,
    and processes to offer more tools, training, and equipment to Allies
    and partners would help sustain our positive momentum in these 21st
    century domains.

        6. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, you stressed your concerns of
    Chinese efforts to expand 5G Networks in Europe through Huawei and ZTE.
    Take a few seconds to explain regional or national security
    significance of your concern.
        General Wolters. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to gain
    influence abroad and access to sensitive information through the One
    Belt and One Road initiative, and other national means. CCP leaders are
    leveraging Chinese vendors, such as Huawei and ZTE, in this pursuit.
    Fielding 5G networks in Europe could provide an intelligence and
    information advantage to the CCP and other challengers in competition,
    crisis, or conflict. Leveraging these advanced technologies is one way
    the CCP is attempting to tilt the free and open international order in
    their favor.

        7. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, it is a positive achievement to
    note that European nations are becoming increasingly wary of strings
    attached to Chinese capital and investment. What do you need to double
    your efforts in this area to achieve intentional impact or broader
    messaging?
        General Wolters. In our increasingly interconnected and data-driven
    world, we must double efforts to communicate the vital importance of a
    trusted 5G network by leveraging a whole-of-government approach.
    Trusted networks and infrastructure are a critical requirement to
    protect sensitive information and competitive advantage. We must remain
    vigilant with respect to Chinese investment in shipping and logistics
    hubs across Europe and its potential implications to military mobility
    into and across the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Improving AOR-wide
    transparency on these activities helps Allies and partners fully
    understand the economic and security risks associated with continued
    increases in Chinese capital and investment.
                             relationship building
        8. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, in your view, how do we best
    operationalize the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and
    Economic) model to strategically foster stability and relationships
    with countries in the South Caucasus, Balkans, or others? In other
    words, how do we pivot from a transactional to a more transformational
    relationship?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government
    approach across the theater. Our security cooperation exchanges, which
    bring leaders from across the AOR to the U.S. through the International
    Military Education and Training programs, and our well-established
    State Partnership Programs are both transformational examples of DIME
    in action. These programs develop multi-year cultural and regional
    expertise as well as foster lifelong relationships. This expertise and
    these relationships provide unique access and positively affect our
    ability to compete, deter, and defend in the South Caucasus, the
    Balkans, and across the Euro-Atlantic.
            north atlantic treaty organization (nato) observer group
        9. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, as the co-chair of the Senate
    NATO Observer Group with Senator Jeanne Shaheen, I am interested in
    maintaining consistent communication between Congressional leaders and
    the military leadership of our NATO allies. In your role as United
    States European Command (EUCOM) commander, how can Congress continue to
    ensure that U.S. NATO commitments continue to be upheld, and that the
    shared strategic objectives of alliance members are promoted?
        General Wolters. Sustained Congressional interest and support of
    NATO reassures Allies across the Euro-Atlantic and strengthens our
    ability to preserve peace. Congress' steadfast support of the European
    Deterrence Initiative continues to underwrite the positive momentum we
    have maintained with respect to readiness. EDI has been pivotal to our
    efforts to strengthen U.S. and NATO readiness by supporting operations,
    activities, and investments, which generate options for Allies and
    dilemmas for our challengers.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                    defense personal property program (dp3)
        10. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, as you know I have paid close
    attention to the United States Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM)
    proposal to replace the current Defense Personal Property Program (DP3)
    with a sole-source Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) and worked to
    include a provision to conduct a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    report on the validity of this contract in the fiscal year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Historically, I have
    observed that when the Department of Defense (DOD) awards large sole-
    source contracts it results in less competition for industry, the
    potential for greater cost, and decreased customer satisfaction with
    their service. How will the proposed GHC contract encourage competition
    to decrease cost and increase the value for the servicemember?
        General Lyons. DOD families are our North Star and are the reason
    we seek to change the program. The GHC is one aspect of a broader DOD
    reform plan to improve the relocation process for DOD families.
    USTRANSCOM, on behalf of the DOD, seeks to award the Global Household
    Goods Contract (GHC) to a single move manager in order to improve
    access to--and management of--quality capacity to meet peak demand and
    enable the Department to affix the accountability and responsibility
    currently lacking in today's program. While pursuing the GHC was never
    about saving money, I am encouraged by the bids we've received as they
    are in line with DOD spending in the current program. I acknowledge--
    and will comply with--the DOD Appropriations language to provide a
    report on the impact of GHC to Service budgets. Regarding competition,
    the GHC single move manager will have the latitude to partner with
    companies it believes add value to the program on the terms and
    conditions those companies think make sense (versus being bound by the
    DOD's overly-complicated rule set, which is often cited as a deterrent
    to participation). The DOD currently pays competitive rates, but we're
    often told our program isn't worth the hassle. Far from excluding
    capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more
    agents, packers, and truckers to meet our demand. Revenue distribution
    is a common complaint in our current program, with agents and drivers
    routinely highlighting that non-asset owning companies retain in excess
    of 20 percent of billed revenue. Such `pass-thru' companies add cost to
    the DOD without adding value, and siphon income from the men and women
    who perform the hard work of moving military families. We've built a
    transparent pricing model to capture cost at a granular level for all
    services at origin, destination, and in-transit. This model includes a
    separate management fee paid directly to the single move manager
    contractor for each move processed. Additionally, it clearly identifies
    the revenue we expect the single move manager to generate and the
    revenue we expect to flow to those doing the work. Potential bidders
    are required to comply with all laws--including the Service Contract
    Act (SCA)--when submitting proposals; we expect SCA to increase wages
    for contractor employees performing services `at the curb.' The move-
    manager will also be required to ensure a minimum of 40 percent of the
    total acquisition value of the domestic work performed flows down to
    subcontracted small businesses. DOD acknowledges that non-asset
    companies are at risk as a result of GHC. Many of these niche companies
    exist solely to exploit the gaps and seams in the current program and
    do so at the expense of the Services' MILPERS accounts without adding
    value.

        11. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your opening statement you
    stated, ``My message for industry providers, if you provide quality
    service for military members, you have a place in the future program.
    We need every quality moving service to include our small businesses
    and appreciate all that you do.'' How will the GHC contract continue to
    utilize the supply of quality small business moving companies around
    the country that currently exist in the DP3 program?
        General Lyons. Companies that provide quality capacity to the
    program will be relied upon for as long as DOD moves families around
    the globe. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the
    barriers of entry and attract more agents, packers, and truckers to
    meet DOD demand. The majority of today's capacity comes from small
    business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity will remain
    critical under the new construct. The GHC single move manager will have
    the latitude to partner with companies it believes add value to the
    program on the terms and conditions those companies think make sense
    (versus being bound by the DOD's overly-complicated rule set, which is
    often cited as a deterrent to participation). The DOD currently pays
    competitive rates, but we're often told our program isn't worth the
    hassle. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers
    of entry and attract more agents, packers, and truckers to meet our
    demand.

        12. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, when evaluating which moving
    companies are slated to stay in the new GHC program, what criteria will
    be used to eliminate bad actors, while retaining companies that have
    performed well in the DP3 system?
        General Lyons. When it comes to selecting companies for the GHC,
    USTRANSCOM will only select the single move manager contractor and--
    with few exceptions--cannot dictate to the single move manager which
    subcontractors it hires. For example, the GHC single move manager is
    prohibited from subcontracting with a company that has previously been
    disqualified from DOD business in the past three years. Similarly, we
    will not mandate what companies they must use. Companies that enable
    the single move managers to meet the contract requirements and key
    performance indicators will thrive; conversely, companies that fail to
    meet contract standards will likely (and ideally) not be used to handle
    DOD shipments. Within the contract, we will apply a combination of
    financial penalties and incentives to drive industry performance. The
    most notable `penalty' will come in the form of inconvenience claims,
    where the GHC single move manager will compensate DOD families directly
    in instances of late pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most
    notable incentive will come in the form of `award terms.' If--and only
    if--the GHC single move manager meets all Key Performance Indicators
    (KPIs), the contractor can earn two additional years of contract
    performance without competition. The contract's KPIs were developed by
    USTRANSCOM and the Military Services to address longstanding pain-
    points identified by DOD families. As the award terms may represent in
    excess of 25 percent of the GHC's lifecycle revenue, the GHC single
    move manager has a strong incentive to meet them--and, as previously
    mentioned, can only meet them if they employ quality companies.

        13. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how will TRANSCOM protect
    high-performing small businesses in the transition to the GHC contract
    to help ensure that these businesses do not go out of business?
        General Lyons. Moving and storage companies achieve--and retain--
    any `high-performance' label through their own merit. USTRANSCOM will
    take action to place companies that do not abide by DOD business rules
    into a `non-use' or `disqualified' status. Under GHC, all
    subcontracting decisions will be made by the GHC single move manager.
    Companies that enable the single move manager to meet the contract
    requirements and key performance indicators will thrive; conversely,
    companies that fail to meet contract standards will likely (and
    ideally) not be used to handle DOD shipments. Companies that provide
    quality capacity to the program will be needed as long as DOD moves
    families around the globe. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to
    eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents, packers, and
    truckers to meet DOD demand. The majority of today's capacity comes
    from small business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity
    will remain critical under the new construct.

        14. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your opening statement you
    stated, ``after personal consultation with Service leaders and industry
    executives--USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our
    relationship with industry to generate the quality capacity to meet
    DOD's peak demand and enable the Department to affix the accountability
    and responsibility missing in today's program.'' How has TRANSCOM
    worked with industry to develop the GHC contract and how will DOD
    ensure that best practices from industry are implemented by the winner
    of the GHC contract?
        General Lyons. DOD coordinated extensively with industry to develop
    GHC. The USTRANSCOM staff hosted two industry days to exchange
    information (which included opportunities for one-on-one meetings with
    interested companies); posted two requests for information to solicit
    formal industry input; posted two draft Requests for Proposal (RFP) for
    industry to share insights on; answered nearly 800 questions from
    industry on GHC; and posted the answers to those questions on the U.S.
    Government's official contracting website for all parties to review.
    Additionally, I personally hosted two sets of meetings with industry
    CEOs and association leaders to outline my vision for GHC. The GHC
    postures DOD to capitalize on industry best practices and innovation in
    a way the current construct simply cannot. The transactional nature of
    our relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers prevents
    us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in
    generating additional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry
    accountable, and inhibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (to
    include the modern, convenient technology we take for granted in every
    aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal Property Program. Until
    we fundamentally restructure our relationship with industry, the
    program will never generate the quality service DOD families deserve or
    the accountability Congress demands.

        15. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how will the GHC contract
    affect rural and isolated states like Hawaii and Alaska where there are
    fewer shipping companies and higher transit costs?
        General Lyons. Taking Alaska as an example, the GHC rate structure
    enables bidders to propose Alaska-specific rates (and regional rates
    within Alaska). Under the current program, Alaska is divided into five
    distinct `rate zones' to allow providers to account for key
    considerations (logistical, labor, etc.) across the state. The rate
    zones under GHC are identical to the current program, meaning the GHC
    single move manager can account for differences in handling household
    goods shipments in Alaska. GHC represents an opportunity for quality
    providers in Alaska to sustain--or grow--their business. The majority
    of today's capacity comes from small business. This capacity will
    remain critical under the new construct. Far from excluding capacity,
    we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents,
    packers, and truckers to meet our demand.

        16. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how has TRANSCOM considered
    these factors in the planned award of the GHC contract?
        General Lyons. The GHC outlines standard levels of performance,
    both at the program level (overall Key Performance Indicators) and at
    the individual service-member level. While GHC is clear on required
    service levels, DOD avoids being prescriptive in how industry should
    meet those standards; similarly, DOD does not force industry to apply
    common pricing across all markets. Many move managers and asset-based
    providers (as well as industry associations that represent them, like
    the American Moving and Storage Association) agree that DOD's business
    model is outdated and recognize the business opportunities associated
    with this change.

        17. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, once the GHC contract is
    awarded, there will likely be a destabilization of the industrial base
    as small contractors and vendors assess opportunities outside of the
    construct of the revised DP3 program. This destabilization may occur
    during the peak summer moving season when capacity needs are at their
    highest for the DOD. How will TRANSCOM ensure they have a stable base
    of contractors during the transition phase of the GHC contract,
    particularly during the initial peak summer moving season?
        General Lyons. Although it's the GHC single move manager
    responsibility to meet its contractual requirements, I agree USTRANSCOM
    shares the responsibility to establish the conditions in which the
    single move manager can succeed. One of the ways USTRANSCOM is setting
    favorable conditions is through the deliberate, responsible transition
    plan we've established. The current timeline envisions the GHC
    contractor managing shipments in the continental United States
    beginning in February of 2021--a full 9 months after contract award.
    The single move manager is required to handle 25 percent of total
    volume beginning in February 2021 and roll in additional shipments (25
    percent per month thru May 2021) until they are postured to support 100
    percent of continental U.S. shipments during the 2021 Peak Season. With
    an award planned for no earlier than 30 April 2020, this timeline gives
    the single move manager a full year to prepare (IT integration,
    staffing, training, etc.) for the 2021 peak season. We will wait until
    October 2021 (following peak season) to continue the transition to GHC
    and incorporate international shipments. While I believe a 9-month
    transition period before requiring the single move manager to accept
    any bookings is a responsible timeline, DOD will remain flexible and
    adjust the transition plan as needed. During transition and
    implementation phases, we will be driven by improvements and not the
    calendar.

        18. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, TRANSCOM currently uses a
    performance incentive program in the DP3 system in which companies are
    given financial penalties to regulate poor behavior. How will TRANSCOM
    maintain control and accountability over a large company that is
    awarded the GHC contract where financial penalties may not be as
    effective?
        General Lyons. To be clear, the DOD does not have effective
    performance management measures in the current program. DOD does not
    have a formal contract with any of our current providers and cannot
    hold them accountable in a meaningful way. Over time, DOD allowed the
    program to evolve in a manner that now favors industry, with suppliers
    exploiting business rules to generate revenue at the expense of
    military families & Service budgets. Implementing the GHC offers the
    Department the opportunity to set terms and conditions that favor DOD
    families and an avenue to hold industry accountable. As we restructure
    our relationship with industry, we will similarly restructure and align
    the DOD's management framework (the Service-owned Personal Property
    Processing and Shipping Offices around the globe) to provide the
    rigorous, centralized oversight required of a program that directly and
    personally impacts DOD personnel. Just as our transition period
    postures the GHC single move manager for success, the timeline also
    postures the DOD for success; we will use that time to appoint and
    train Quality Assurance Evaluators, Alternate Contracting Officer's
    Representatives, Ordering Officers, and Invoicing Officers to
    effectively manage and oversee the contract. These offices are the
    center of gravity for holding industry accountable. Within the
    contract, we will apply a combination of financial penalties and
    incentives to drive industry performance. The most notable `penalty'
    will come in the form of inconvenience claims, where the GHC single
    move manager will compensate DOD families directly in instances of late
    pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most notable incentive will come
    in the form of `award terms.' If--and only if--the GHC single move
    manager meets all KPIs, the contractor can earn two additional years of
    contract performance without competition.

        19. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, it is my understanding that
    TRANSCOM is now preparing comments on the GAO report regarding the GHC
    contract that myself and Senator Tim Kaine requested last year. Do you
    believe that TRANSCOM will need to postpone the awarding of the GHC
    contract to respond and address concerns in the GAO report?
        General Lyons. No, the GAO report does not delay our planned GHC
    award. After 10 months of detailed data exchanges and more than one
    hundred requests for information, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO had
    access to all the relevant information in order to conduct an
    exhaustive review of our work on GHC and broader personal property
    reform efforts. GAO makes three recommendations in their report: 1)
    that DOD develop a process to track data during the first three years
    of GHC operations to more precisely determine overall Defense Personal
    Property Program (DP3) manpower requirements; 2) that DOD develop
    metrics for DP3 activities that fall outside of the GHC (for example,
    things like Service-retained counseling and processing timelines within
    the Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the linkages
    between metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are
    sensible and are consistent with USTRANSCOM's vision to evolve the
    program from a series of disparate Service-owned activities into a
    truly integrated, synchronized Departmental program. Moreover, the
    report confirms many of the issues USTRANSCOM has highlighted to the
    Department and Congress over the last two years. It is important to
    note that GAO issued no negative findings or recommendations regarding
    the single move-manager construct, nor did GAO recommend any changes to
    the acquisition strategy or overall timeline for GHC award and
    implementation.
                                  kc-46 basing
        20. Senator Sullivan. General Wolters, on October 24, 2019, the Air
    Force announced the start of the Strategic Basing process for the Main
    Operating Base (MOB) 5 beddown of KC-46 aircraft. Alaska has the
    existing infrastructure to support aerial refueling operations, a
    robust current need for aerial refueling capability, and a strategic
    location which is in close proximity (but not too close) to three of
    five main threats prioritized within the 2018 NDS. These factors make
    my state an ideal platform from which to deploy a larger amount of
    combat power to multiple areas of operation. What benefit would EUCOM
    potentially gain from the basing of these aircraft in a geographically-
    central and strategic location such as Alaska?
        General Wolters. From the perspective of USEUCOM's role as global
    coordinator for the Russia Problem Set, basing KC-46s in Alaska could
    further support dynamic employment of forces into and out of the
    USEUCOM AOR and increase strategic and operational dilemmas for Russia.
    Service Secretaries are the decision authority for basing of forces
    within the United States, in the case of KC-46s and Alaska, the
    decision rests with the Secretary of the Air Force.

        21. Senator Sullivan. General Wolters, what message might it send
    Russia - the main threat in EUCOM - if the United States Air Force were
    to co-locate the next generation tanker with over 100 5th Generation
    fighters in a place like Alaska?
        General Wolters. Co-locating next-generation tankers with a large
    number of 5th generation fighters in Alaska would send a strong message
    to Russia. Arraying combat power in this manner is one way to
    communicate our preparedness to defend the Homeland, and our ability to
    respond rapidly and at scale, to a violation of U.S. airspace along our
    Western borders. Such positioning of assets should be balanced with
    Russia's elevated threat perception and long-term counteraction.

        22. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your testimony under
    ``Aerial Refueling'' you state, ``USTRANSCOM's most-stressed capability
    and number one readiness concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues
    to underpin the Joint Force's ability to deploy an immediate force
    across all NDS mission areas and is comprised of KC-135, KC-10, and KC-
    46 aircraft.'' Given the substantial need for added aerial refueling
    assets and U.S. Air Force's desire to grow the number of its tanker
    squadrons as a part of the 386 squadron construct, does it not make
    sense for the U.S. Air Force to pursue additive basing actions (as
    opposed to replacement basing actions) for KC-46 tankers, especially
    when the tankers to be replaced are KC-135s?
        General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging
    KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided
    using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is
    led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process
    accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is
    designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include
    routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
    strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent
    possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure
    the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the
    Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best
    to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important,
    USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset
    capable of supporting global missions.

        23. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, in your personal opinion,
    would the basing of a squadron of KC-46s at Kadena Air Force Base or
    Anderson Air Force Base result in them - largely or almost exclusively
    - being tasked for operations in a single area of operation?
        General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging
    KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided
    using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is
    led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process
    accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is
    designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include
    routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
    strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent
    possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure
    the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the
    Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best
    to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important,
    USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset
    capable of supporting global missions.

        24. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, from your perspective, does it
    make strategic sense to pigeon-hole a low-density, high-demand aerial
    refueling asset like the KC-46 to one area of operation, or more
    importantly, to largely a single operation plan (OPLAN) within that
    area of operation?
        General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging
    KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided
    using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is
    led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process
    accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is
    designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include
    routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
    strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent
    possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure
    the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the
    Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best
    to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important,
    USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset
    capable of supporting global missions.

        25. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, would you agree with Secretary
    Mark T. Esper when he said that basing KC-46s in a place like Alaska
    would provide ``extreme strategic reach''?
        General Lyons. I would agree with the Secretary on the value of
    ``extreme strategic reach,'' with the context that strategic mobility
    assets like our air refueling fleet provide that every day around the
    globe. The home station of our mobility aircraft is but one component
    of global responsiveness. Across the broad spans of the Indo-Pacific
    region the elements of access, basing, and overflight to en route and
    forward locations are essential to position and employ combat
    capability and as important if not more so to where we home station
    mobility assets. The ability of USTRANSCOM to control and rapidly shift
    assets anywhere in the world to address emerging and high priority
    needs is also foundational to global responsiveness. So, using the
    notion of ``extreme strategic reach,'' mobility assets must operate not
    only across broad regions such as INDOPACOM, but globally with the
    responsiveness to fully leverage the combat power of the Department
    when and where it is needed - USTRANSCOM is uniquely capable of
    performing these tasks and that is my primary focus.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                                port of savannah
        26. Senator Perdue. General Lyons, the U.S. Department of
    Transportation recently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6
    million grant for critical infrastructure improvements at the Port of
    Savannah, building on the President's budget request of $93.6 million
    in federal funding in support of the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project.
    The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in North
    America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness
    Network. The Port of Savannah is also one of the commercial ports used
    to transport U.S. forces from the United States to Europe as part of
    the Defender-Europe 2020 exercise. The Port of Savannah's participation
    in this exercise emphasizes the increased capabilities an expanded Port
    of Savannah can provide for the future deployment needs of the U.S.
    military. To what extent does the expansion of major commercial ports
    like the Port of Savannah improve military readiness and support your
    command's mission of efficiently transporting large U.S. troop
    formations in times of war and times of national emergency?
        General Lyons. There are two primary operating terminals at the
    Port of Savannah, Garden City Terminal and Ocean Terminal. Garden City
    Terminal is a purpose-built container terminal, and Ocean Terminal is a
    dedicated breakbulk, heavy-lift and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) facility.
    The DOD Strategic Seaport Program Port Readiness Plan (PRP) for the
    Port of Savannah currently only includes infrastructure at Ocean
    Terminal. As you may already be aware, the Savannah Harbor Expansion
    Project is essentially a dredging effort which will increase the
    shipping channel depth from 42 feet to 47 feet. The primary objective
    of this project will be to allow the port to berth and service the
    larger container vessels coming through the Panama Canal from Asia,
    more than likely bound for Garden City Terminal. DOD surge deployments
    would rely on a variety of military and commercial vessels to deploy
    unit cargo and combat equipment. The largest of these is typically the
    Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) from the U.S. Navy's
    Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) vessels from
    the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force. The maximum
    water draft of these vessels ranges from 35 feet to 37 feet which means
    that the current (pre-Harbor Expansion Project) channel depth of 42
    feet already meets DOD's needs. In general, most port expansion efforts
    are understandably focused on enhancing the infrastructure supporting
    contemporary commercial port business, which is predominantly
    containerized cargo. The cargo DOD must move through our Strategic
    Seaports is mostly oversized, overweight equipment, rolling stock,
    tracked vehicles and some containers. As a result, the most suitable
    facilities for DOD movements are typically breakbulk, heavy-lift and
    RORO facilities like Savannah's Ocean Terminal, rather than purpose-
    built container facilities like the Garden City Terminal. The condition
    of the existing Strategic Seaport facilities which DOD relies upon is
    currently being assessed as directed within the fiscal year 2020 NDAA.
    We anticipate this report will be delivered to Congress by the end of
    July 2020. Additionally, USTRANSCOM periodically assesses the
    sufficiency of the existing Strategic Seaports to meet DOD's
    requirements, to determine if there is a need to bring additional ports
    into the Strategic Seaport Program. Based on the current assessment, we
    have access to sufficient seaport capacity on each coast (East / West /
    Gulf) to meet rapid deployment needs.
             joint surveillance target attack radar system (jstars)
        27. Senator Perdue. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft have been
    active in supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS) around the
    world. The 116th Air Control Wing, based out of Robins Air Force Base,
    deployed to Germany this past fall. With the return of great power
    competition, the 116th Air Control Wing's deployment to Germany
    provides needed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    capabilities in support of our military's forward-deployed forces in
    Europe. The 116th Air Control Wing's deployment sends an additional
    signal to our NATO allies that the United States remains committed to
    the collective defense of the Alliance in the face of both near-peer
    and emerging threats. To what extent does the forward deployment of
    JSTARS aircraft and its ISR capabilities in the EUCOM area of
    responsibility (AOR) improve United States and NATO readiness in the
    face of near-peer competitors?
        General Wolters. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS) is a critical contributor to USEUCOM and NATO's Indications
    and Warnings framework. It provides a unique capability to establish
    and maintain patterns of Russian movement within the AOR and provides a
    distinctive capability to reassure our NATO Allies and deter Russia.

        28. Senator Perdue. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft also need
    avionics upgrades in order to become fully-compatible with European
    defense systems. Can you provide an update on what upgrades are
    necessary to ensure JSTARS can remain fully operational in the EUCOM
    AOR?
        General Wolters. Three specific avionics upgrades must be completed
    for JSTARS to be fully compatible with European defense system
    mandates. By European Union mandate, VHF radios must be upgraded with a
    8.33kHz channel spacing frequency, aircraft must be equipped with the
    Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out capability, and the
    aircraft's Identification Friend or Foe equipment must be equipped with
    Mode 5 capability.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                          nato cyber operations center
        29. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, can you provide an update on
    the operational status of the NATO Cyber Operations Center, as well as
    your expectations regarding its long-term impact?
        General Wolters. As a component of NATO's Command Structure, the
    Cyber Operations Center (CyOC) maintains positive momentum towards full
    operational capability in spring 2022. The CyOC is integrated with
    baseline activities and current operations across the Alliance. It
    plays a critical role in NATO's comprehensive deterrence and defense
    activities. At full capability, the CyOC will provide NATO an
    operational theater cyberspace component. In this role, it will be
    responsible for persistent, centralized, and comprehensive cyberspace
    situational awareness and a focal point for the coordination of NATO
    military activities in cyberspace.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                         european deterrence initiative
        30. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, the United States
    continues to build interoperability is through deliberate efforts like
    the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which you highlight in your
    posture statement. You state that this initiative is ``critical to our
    deterrence and posture successes'' and allows you to ``enhance the
    readiness and interoperability of U.S. and alliance forces.'' But the
    President's budget request cuts security cooperation funding within the
    EUCOM AOR by around 40-percent. Additionally, funding for EDI was cut
    by over 1 billion dollars in this year's proposal. Are you concerned
    about these drastic funding cuts?
        General Wolters. To ensure alignment of ends and means, EDI must
    continue to be an annual request until either the base budget fully
    accounts for ongoing activities to compete with Russia, or the security
    environment changes significantly. Maintaining EDI funding levels
    sustains positive momentum with respect to posture and readiness. EDI
    funding is pivotal to fully implement the National Defense Strategy and
    our efforts to compete with Russia and counter malign influence.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how will these proposed
    cuts impact your ability to partner with, and conduct exercises with,
    our EUCOM allies?
        General Wolters. EDI resources enable USEUCOM to compete and deter
    adequately. USEUCOM will work with Allies and partners to balance and
    prioritize exercise objectives and to determine appropriate levels of
    participation in due course of our exercise planning process. We will
    continue to work relentlessly to get the most out of resources
    available. Where required, we will adjust the scale and scope of our
    operations, activities, and investments to best meet the objectives
    laid out in the National Defense Strategy with available means.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how does security
    cooperation within EUCOM--including joint exercises, subject matter
    exchanges, and other military-to-military engagements--contribute to a
    strong and peaceful European continent?
        General Wolters. Security cooperation reinforces efforts to
    preserve peace and improves collective preparedness should conflict
    occur. These efforts improve partners' ability to participate in
    Coalitions and project security. Security cooperation bolsters
    relationships between U.S., and partner nations, and provides a network
    of valuable security relationships to be leveraged in competition,
    crisis, or conflict.

        33. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, General Wolters said in his
    posture statement that, ``European Deterrence Initiative funds have
    also improved our ability to respond using prepositioned stocks and
    improved theater infrastructure. Together, these improvements enable
    the rapid deployment and sustainment of forces.'' Can you expand on how
    the EDI has improved TRANSCOM's ability to project and sustain combat
    power in Europe?
        General Lyons. Infrastructure improvements initiated first by the
    European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and continued through EDI largely
    serve to expand the scalability and resiliency of the Global
    Distribution Network in Europe. Any one particular project cannot
    showcase the impact; it is a layered approach that improves the state
    of our network as improvements are made over the years. To list a few
    improvements as examples, added multimodal infrastructure capacity in
    Romania enables transload of combat power from large vessels to
    aircraft in a region where such a capability was limited in the past.
    Improved transit facilities in Italy mitigated an ammunition
    distribution capability shortfall in that region of the AOR. Placement
    of deployable air base systems and rapid airfield damage repair kits in
    Germany, Denmark, Romania, Norway, Spain, Iceland, and Hungary will
    significantly increase our ability to deliver to both dispersed
    airfields and those damaged by enemy fire.
        General Wolters.
      transcom modernization and survivability in the era of great power
                                  competition
        34. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, TRANSCOM has consistently
    delivered over nearly 20 years at war, deploying and sustaining our
    forces across the global. General Lyons, you rightfully highlight in
    your posture statement that while this is an impressive logistical
    display, it has been done largely uncontested. You point out the
    critical requirement that TRANSCOM must `` . . . be able to project and
    sustain the Joint Force under persistent, all-domain attack.'' How are
    we modernizing Maritime Sea Lift Command and Air Mobility Command to be
    more resilient to the realities of a contested mobility environment?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the operational
    environment and explore modernization opportunities in the near, mid,
    and long-term in order to maintain our comparative military advantage
    in power projection. Our ability to project the force under persistent
    all domain attack requires us to understand adversarial capabilities
    and intent, upgrade platforms with defensive countermeasures, modernize
    C2 architecture, and most importantly, integrate the sustainment
    warfighting functions with the other warfighting functions like
    protection, fires, and maneuver. The Mobility Capabilities and
    Requirements Study, as well as wargames and global exercises, continues
    to highlight the need to balance force modernization efforts with
    mobility capacity in order to operate in contested environments as
    described in the National Defense Strategy. For maritime sealift, the
    DEFENDER 20 exercise afforded the opportunity to integrate Military
    Sealift Command sealift forces with Commander, Second Fleet and
    Commander, Sixth Fleet surface forces to ensure freedom of movement.
    The U.S. Air Force is working to improve integration of Mobility Air
    Forces with electronic warfare training and Joint All Domain Command
    and Control. As a joint force, we are training to operate in a new
    environment where our logistics are consistently under attack, and to
    mitigate the effects to our joint deployment and distribution
    enterprise. Operating in a contested environment now and in the future
    requires USTRANSCOM to drive required force development efforts through
    established planning and budgetary processes to mitigate risk and
    enable our transport platforms to operate successfully.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how have we adjusted our
    land based and maritime pre-positioned stockpile posture to address the
    challenges created by great power competition?
        General Lyons. USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM have enhanced pre-positioned
    stockpiles, including ammunition and deployable air base systems, in
    their respective AORs. Pre-positioning these assets enables TRANSCOM
    high demand / low density strategic mobility assets to be available for
    other critical movements during conflict. We continue work with
    INDOPACOM to analyze fuel posture in the Indo-Pacific AOR and identify
    any necessary fuel posture changes to overcome the challenges posed by
    great power competition. In addition to fixed fuel posture, we are also
    looking at ways to optimize our afloat pre-positioned fuel posture as
    part of the same study.
                   climate change and artic power projection
        36. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what is TRANSCOM doing to
    adjust to the realities of climate change as it relates to the United
    States' ability to conduct power projection into the Artic and utilize
    previously unavailable sea lines of communication?
        General Lyons. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for
    capability development in the Arctic. USTRANSCOM supports the DOD
    Arctic Strategy as well as geographic combatant commands and Service-
    led efforts to ensure access to Arctic waters and infrastructure as it
    relates to our nation's ability to project power. As described in the
    DOD Arctic strategy, Russia and Canada both claim the right to regulate
    Arctic waters in excess of the authority permitted under international
    law. There is also increased activity in the region to include Russian
    commercial and military investment and Chinese presence.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what are the unique
    challenges that you face when deploying and sustaining forces in the
    Artic?
        General Lyons. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for
    capability development in the Arctic. The harsh environment and, in the
    USNORTHCOM AOR, limited infrastructure in the high north is expected to
    complicate deployment and sustainment of forces in support of homeland
    defense. USTRANSCOM supports USNORTHCOM planning through scheduled
    OPLAN reviews and development of the Theater Distribution Plan, a key
    element of the Campaign Plan and associated bi-annual review.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how are we coordinating with
    our partners and allies that provide us with critical nods in the
    Global Deployment Network--such as airfields and seaports--to ensure
    they are investing in climate resilient infrastructure?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM coordinates through the Services to
    ensure that host nation funded construction planned for DOD OCONUS
    installations is designed and constructed to the same standards as U.S.
    funded construction, including provisions for climate resiliency. As an
    example, we coordinate with the Services to ensure that new host nation
    funded infrastructure at DOD OCONUS installations is constructed
    outside of the 100-year flood plain where possible. Regarding
    commercial airfields and seaports, the DOD's ability to influence
    investment in climate resilient infrastructure is very limited. Many of
    our partners and allies recognize the importance of investing in
    climate resilient infrastructure and have taken appropriate action to
    do so. Factoring in climate resiliency in construction, renovation, and
    area development plans has become a standard engineering practice that
    my command benefits from. This will ensure the viability of the
    commercial deployment and distribution nodes that are so very critical
    to USTRANSCOM missions.
                          conflict in eastern ukraine
        39. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, in your posture statement
    you point out that, ``Russia and its proxies continue their campaign to
    destabilize Ukraine's defense, economic, and political sectors with the
    intent of cementing Ukraine into the Kremlin's sphere of influence.''
    United States reassurance and efforts to strengthen our partnership
    with Ukraine is essential to their ability to resist malign efforts to
    undermine their sovereignty. Can you provide this Committee with an
    update on what EUCOM is doing to deter Russian aggression - both
    kinetic and non-kinetic - and to counter Russia's propaganda and
    misinformation campaign?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government
    approach to competition and deterrence. A key platform for countering
    malign Russian influence is the Russian Influence Group (RIG). The RIG
    is an interagency network co-led by USEUCOM and the U.S. Department of
    State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The RIG operates along
    six lines of effort: support democratic governance and the rule of law;
    assess and respond to disinformation/propaganda; strengthen NATO's
    capability, capacity, and resolve; disrupt the Kremlin's mobilization
    of local support; constrain informal actors with opaque funding, and
    counter the Kremlin's coercive use of the energy sector.
        Our military-to-military security cooperation programs engage
    partners to improve alignment and strengthen our collective ability to
    compete and deter. As a member of the Multinational Joint Commission-
    Ukraine, Strategic Communications Sub-Committee, USEUCOM coordinates
    and provides training on core strategic communications competencies.
    The Joint Multi-national Training Group-Ukraine is a United States-led,
    dedicated training mission focused on improving Ukrainian forces'
    ability to conduct wide-area security and combined arms maneuver at the
    brigade level. Ukraine participates in multiple United States-sponsored
    joint exercises in the Black Sea, improving interoperability with NATO
    air and maritime forces, and strengthening deterrence and defense in
    the Euro-Atlantic.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, what progress has been
    made in the last year specifically in the cybersecurity realm to
    improve the capabilities of Ukrainian forces?
        General Wolters. In March 2019, United States DOD delivered,
    installed, configured, and tested equipment for a Cyber Security
    Operations Center (CSOC) to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) currently
    being accredited by Ukrainian authorities. It is scheduled for initial
    operational capability later this year, and the CSOC will provide an
    ability to protect and monitor classified and unclassified networks. In
    November 2019, U.S. DOD facilitated the assignment of a Defensive
    Cybersecurity Advisor to the AFU to accelerate the development of their
    defensive cybersecurity program. Cyber training and education centers
    are in the early stages of development and will be the platform to
    train and educate Ukraine's cyber force.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, what metrics should
    Congress use to measure the effectiveness of United States efforts in
    Ukraine?
        General Wolters. The key metric of effectiveness is Ukraine's
    continued independence, sovereignty, and the ability to conduct free
    and fair elections. Continued progress on civilian oversight of the
    military, reforms to command and control, human resources, and defense
    industry practices are other appropriate metrics for assessing the
    success of United States efforts in Ukraine.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. General Wolters, how would you assess our
    current support for Ukrainians?
        General Wolters. United States servicemembers at the Joint Military
    Training Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian forces
    to inform and support Ukraine's military planning efforts and increase
    combat capability. Ukraine continues to benefit from International
    Military Education and Training funding, and we view this as a critical
    investment in Ukraine's future. Sustained Congressional support for
    assistance to Ukraine continues to be impactful. Since 2014, Congress
    has appropriated more than one billion dollars to Ukraine in security
    assistance funds. This consistent, visible support is a demonstration
    of our commitment to Ukraine. Earlier this year, Ukraine concluded it's
    first-ever Foreign Military Sales purchase of defensive Javelin anti-
    tank missile systems. The flexibility Congress has provided by allowing
    50 percent of fiscal year 2020 Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
    funds to be committed over two years has been significant. This
    provision has improved our ability to target Ukraine's defensive
    equipment needs, including the acquisition of Mark VI Patrol Boats,
    which enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities. The flexibility to
    obligate all of the fiscal year 2021 Ukraine Assistance Initiative
    funds over a multi-year period would further enhance the Department's
    ability to better support Ukraine's capability needs.
                       defense personal property program
        43. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, in January the DOD Inspector
    General released their report on the Personal Property Relocation
    Program. It stated that, ``TRANSCOM can improve how it holds Moving
    companies accountable for poor performance in its current structure of
    the moving program.'' Have you identified a viable candidate in the GHC
    selection process who can fully handle the entire PCS process?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is working through the process of
    evaluating proposals to make an award no earlier than 30 April, at
    which time we will determine and announce the winning company. During
    this time, information cannot be shared about the selection process.
    However, USTRANSCOM is confident the proposals received include the
    requisite details to handle the elements of the PCS process that
    industry has historically supported (i.e., packing, transport, delivery
    of household goods, etc.). The GHC integrates those functions performed
    by commercial entities now, as the government will continue to maintain
    ordering of services and a strong accountability program for contractor
    performance.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what contingencies exist if
    the GHC goes thru and results in a similar failure of performance to
    that seen in the privatization of military housing?
        General Lyons. A contract alone is not a solution--the success or
    failure of a contract ultimately comes down to an organization's
    ability to manage and oversee the contract. Learning from military
    housing issues, DOD has made a single organization--USTRANSCOM--
    responsible for management and oversight of GHC. To be clear, DOD does
    not have effective performance management measures in the current
    program. DOD does not have a formal contract with any of our current
    providers and cannot hold them accountable in a meaningful way. Over
    time, DOD allowed the program to evolve in a manner that now favors
    industry, with suppliers exploiting business rules to generate revenue
    at the expense of military families and Service budgets. Implementing
    the GHC offers the Department the opportunity to set terms and
    conditions that favor DOD families and an avenue to hold industry
    accountable.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, I have read that TRANSCOM
    may be looking to end the Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel,
    in what many believe is a premature move, as this panel would be
    beneficial to help disseminate information during the GHC transition
    and provide feedback from family members. Why do you believe this is a
    good plan?
        General Lyons. In the fiscal year 202020 NDAA, Congress directed
    DOD to establish a Military Relocation Advisory Committee consisting of
    members of USTRANSCOM, military services, moving companies, and
    consumer representatives who are either members of the Armed Forces or
    spouses of members of the Armed Forces. At my request, OSD delegated
    establishment and management of this Committee to USTRANSCOM. My staff
    is currently coordinating with the Services to identify their nominees
    for this Committee, which may include the representatives they have
    currently designated to participate in the PPRAP. We will continue to
    host PPRAP sessions until the Military Relocation Advisory Committee is
    fully operational.

        46. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, last year, I asked you to
    commit to prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider
    reforms to DP3 and that you to provide Congress an update on how
    families' input is being implemented to improve the process. Can you
    provide an update on where your command stands on this issue?
        General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes
    to Defense Personal Property Program business rules to address long-
    standing pain points for DOD families. Key actions include: From a
    safety perspective, requiring that all moving companies perform
    background checks on employees and meet local installation access
    requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The
    safety and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that
    many issues center on communication, we require moving companies to be
    more responsive to customers. Moving companies must maintain a call
    center during specified hours; respond to customer inquiries within 30
    minutes; provide e-mail updates on the status of the shipment
    throughout the process; and provide a single point of contact for all
    aspects of the moving process. Requiring moving companies to provide
    pre-shipment weight estimates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to perform
    automatic shipment reweighs in the event the actual shipment weight is
    within 10 percent of a customer's weight entitlement. This provides
    families with the information to avoid exceeding weight entitlements
    and excess cost scenarios. Providing more lead time to customers before
    delivery appointments. Previously, moving companies were only required
    to provide two-hour notice--and if a family didn't respond fast enough
    to accept the shipment, it was placed into storage. For Peak Season
    2020, companies are required to provide 24-hour notice and make at
    least two attempts to schedule the delivery before it goes into
    storage. We have established a baseline for inconvenience claims (where
    none currently exists) and streamlined the process for customers.
    Inconvenience claims are payable with moving companies miss their
    assigned pick-up or delivery dates. When applicable, customers will be
    paid the baseline rate--which is tied to the local meals and incidental
    per diem rate--without having to document and provide receipts for each
    expense. We've preserved the process for customers to seek
    reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the event their expenses
    exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and beyond that baseline
    may be reimbursed when supported with receipts). We are providing more
    time for families to submit loss and damage claims (from 75 days to 180
    days) and requiring that moving companies settle claims faster (any
    claim under $1,000 within 30 days, and any other claim within 60 days).
    Historically, moving companies made the decision on whether to repair a
    broken item or pay the customer an amount equivalent to repair costs.
    For Peak Season 2020, we empower DOD families to make that decision.
    Finally, we clarified rules that the moving company (and not the
    subcontracted agent) was responsible for any damage to a family's
    residence (customers have up to 5 days to identify damage to real
    property). Although moving will never be an enjoyable process for
    families, the GHC does posture the Department to improve availability
    of quality capacity to meet peak demand; communication throughout the
    process; service standards `at the curb;' clear accountability when
    things go wrong; and improved claims process in the event of loss,
    damage, or inconvenience. To the point of your question, we are wholly
    focused on delivering an improved relocation experience for DOD
    families. While pursuing the GHC was never about saving money, I am
    encouraged by the bids we've received as they are in line with DOD
    spending in the current program. I acknowledge--and will comply with--
    the requirement in the fiscal year 202020 NDAA to provide a report on
    the impact of GHC to Service budgets. We remain on track to award the
    GHC no earlier than 30 April.

        47. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what specific actions have
    you taken in the interim to address the issues military families face
    moving under the current system?
        General Lyons. For the 2020 Peak Season, we've instituted changes
    to Defense Personal Property Program business rules to address long-
    standing pain points for DOD families. Key actions include: From a
    safety perspective, requiring that all moving companies perform
    background checks on employees and meet local installation access
    requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The
    safety and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that
    many issues center on communication, we require moving companies to be
    more responsive to customers. Moving companies will be required to
    provide pre-shipment weight estimates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to
    perform automatic shipment reweighs in the event the actual shipment
    weight is within 10 percent of a customer's weight entitlement.
    Providing more lead time to customers before delivery appointments. For
    Peak Season 2020, companies are required to provide 24-hour notice and
    make at least two attempts to schedule the delivery before it goes into
    storage. Established a baseline for inconvenience claims (where none
    currently exists) and streamlined the process for customers.
    Inconvenience claims are payable with moving companies miss their
    assigned pick-up or delivery dates. USTRANSCOM preserved the process
    for customers to seek reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the
    event their expenses exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and
    beyond that baseline may be reimbursed when supported with receipts).
    Finally, we will provide more time for families to submit loss and
    damage claims (from 75 days to 180 days) and requiring that moving
    companies settle claims faster (any claim under $1,000 within 30 days,
    and any other claim within 60 days).

        48. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, have the metrics improved?
        General Lyons. Customer Satisfaction Scores--the metric typically
    associated with DP3--have improved--2017: 90.8 percent (full calendar
    year)--2017 Peak Season: 83 percent to 85.8 percent--2018: 91.4 percent
    (full calendar year)--2018 Peak Season: 84.3 percent to 86.9 percent--
    2019: 93.7 percent (full calendar year)--2019 Peak Season 89.3 percent
    to 91 percent. Although we saw improvements in satisfaction this past
    year, our current model limits the quality improvements we can make.
    Our current construct is a constraint to innovation and advancement, as
    we are tied to the capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in
    the program.

        49. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what oversight and
    accountability measures have you implement to incentive better
    performance?
        General Lyons. In addition to adjusting business rules to address
    longstanding pain-points identified by DOD families, USTRANSCOM has
    taken steps to improve accountability where possible within our
    currently flawed framework. Rather than relying on a disparate network
    of Shipping Offices to be the primary enforcers, the Personal Property
    Staff at USTRANSCOM has taken on a much more active role in
    investigating and holding industry accountable for poor performance and
    violations of business rules. In the first 3 months of 2020, for
    example, we've put moving companies into a non-use status for
    defrauding the U.S. Government by impersonating servicemembers to
    complete satisfaction surveys; for failing to declare Common Financial
    and Administrative Control in the international market, which
    disadvantaged its competitors; and for failing to maintain insurance on
    storage facilities, which put DOD families' possessions at risk. In
    several cases, military investigative services and the Department of
    Justice are involved. Regarding oversight, USTRANSCOM holds routine
    workshops with the Services to develop and refine business processes,
    hold monthly calls with Military Spouses, and reinvigorated the General
    Officer Steering Committee to ensure senior Service leaders have
    visibility and oversight of program operations. Most notably, I've
    reorganized staff to improve program oversight. I've elevated the
    Defense Personal Property Program to an independent staff section
    within USTRANSCOM and have assigned a member of the Senior Executive
    Service to lead it. That Director reports to directly to me and is
    responsible for advocating for DOD families during the relocation
    process, and for integrating the operational, financial, contractual,
    policy, and IT aspects of the Defense Personal Property Program.

        50. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2020 NDAA
    directed GAO to conduct a study on this issue in order to inform the
    best way forward and ensure we avoid the same challenges that we did
    with the transition to privatization housing, and your posture
    statement mentions a draft of such a study. When do you expect that
    this study will be completed and transmitted to the Senate Armed
    Services Committee?
        General Lyons. The GAO report was released on 6 April.

        51. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, can you share some of the
    GAO's preliminary findings?
        General Lyons. After 10 months of detailed data exchanges and more
    than one hundred requests for information, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO
    had access to all the relevant information in order to conduct an
    exhaustive review of our work on GHC and broader personal property
    reform efforts. GAO's report contains two findings: 1) USTRANSCOM did
    assess cost implications of moving to GHC but may not have accurately
    calculated some costs because of unanswered questions on counseling and
    how overseeing contractor performance will be performed. 2) USTRANSCOM
    has developed performance metrics for some, but not all DP3 activities.
    GAO makes three recommendations in their report: 1) that DOD develop a
    process to track data during the first three years of GHC operations to
    more precisely determine overall Defense Personal Property Program
    (DP3) manpower requirements; 2) that DOD develop metrics for DP3
    activities that fall outside of the GHC (for example, things like
    Service-retained counseling and processing timelines within the
    Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the linkages between
    metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are sensible
    and are consistent with USTRANSCOM's vision to evolve the program from
    a series of disparate Service-owned activities into a truly
    synchronized Departmental program. Moreover, the report confirms many
    of the issues USTRANSCOM has highlighted to the Department and Congress
    over the last two years. It is important to note that GAO issued no
    negative findings or recommendations regarding the single move-manager
    construct, nor did GAO recommend any changes to the acquisition
    strategy or overall timeline for GHC award and implementation.

        52. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, did you agree with GAO's
    preliminary findings and recommendations?
        General Lyons. I agree with GAO's findings. Like all things,
    though, context is critical--my staff is working with the GAO team to
    ensure the findings are framed correctly. I do agree with the three
    recommendations. Although USTRANSCOM concurred with--and will take
    action on--all recommendations, USTRANSCOM did submit a list of 31
    technical issues to correct in GAO's narrative; while none alter GAO's
    very sensible recommendations, the edits are necessary to ensure an
    accurate report. At GAO's request, USTRANSCOM also performed a
    sensitivity review to remove all acquisition sensitive information,
    thus ensuring a publicly releasable report.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                         russia's goals in the pacific
        53. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, in addition to Russia's
    influence in your area of operations, it has expanded influence into
    the Pacific as well. What is your assessment of Russia's strategy and
    goals in the Pacific?
        General Wolters. Russia seeks to regain its status as a global
    power by expanding its diplomatic, security, and economic footprint,
    and challenging United States dominance. Russia's strategy for
    projecting power in the Pacific region includes increasing bilateral
    engagements, pursuing defense sales agreements, participating in
    combined military exercises, and endorsing expanded membership in
    regional and international organizations, such as the Shanghai
    Cooperation Organization. As the global coordinator for the Russia
    Problem Set, USEUCOM's Russia Strategic Initiative works closely with
    USINDOPACOM to coordinate our strategy across geographic combatant
    commands.
                              sealift requirements
        54. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps has released new planning guidance recognizing the need for
    distributed operations because of adversary precision strike
    capabilities. To support these operations, he calls for the use of
    ``inter-theater connectors and commercially available ships and craft
    that are smaller and less expensive'', thereby increasing affordability
    and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. How do you envision
    engaging American carriers who operate ships in the Pacific trades,
    including U.S. flag ships not enrolled in the Maritime Security
    Program, to not only support the Commandant's desires but also ensure
    the TRANSCOM mission has adequate sealift capabilities in the Pacific?
        General Lyons. The Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the
    Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) provide DOD with assured
    access to commercial U.S. sealift ships, mariners, and global
    intermodal capability that, when augmented with our reserve organic
    fleets, allow us to project and sustain the force with substantial
    inter-theater sealift capability. Additionally, American carriers
    participating in the VISA program provide 300+ non-MSP vessels, which
    are generally smaller and more uniquely capable to support smaller
    scale missions, shorter range requirements, and when required, support
    to distributed operations. Specifically, seven VISA participants
    operating in the Pacific provide over 1 million combined square foot of
    capacity and can help support the Geographic Combatant Commands' more
    localized intra-theater requirements. USTRANSCOM will continue to
    leverage both MSP and VISA in meeting Combatant Commander requirements
    as well as to fill inter-theater and intra-theater gaps identified
    through exercises, wargames, and other planning events. USTRANSCOM will
    continue to engage industry for their support and solutions through our
    industry outreach events we conduct throughout each year.
                                 military moves
        55. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, thank you for your attention to
    DP3 and your efforts in ensuring our military members receive their
    belongings in a timely manner. Can you provide an update on the fiscal
    year 2020 NDAA requirements for the business case analysis on the GHC?
        General Lyons. The Business Case Analysis (BCA) on GHC was
    submitted to defense committees as directed on Friday, 17 January 2020.
    The BCA underscores the value of restructuring the Department of
    Defense's relationship with industry and implementing a single move-
    manger construct to generate quality capacity to meet peak demand,
    improve industry accountability, and enable DOD to properly align
    responsibility within the Department. The BCA also highlights risks
    associated with this construct and outlines the steps we have taken--
    both during the source selection process and in realigning DOD's
    overall management framework--to mitigate them. We shared the Business
    Case Analysis with the GAO to assist in their report on the Global
    Household Goods Contract, and GAO assessed the BCA using its own
    Assessment Methodology for Economic Analysis. GAO's methodology
    identifies five key components of an economic analysis: objective and
    scope; methodology; analysis of effects; transparency; and
    documentation. GAO assessed that the BCA informed decision-makers and
    stakeholders, while fully meeting four of the components and partially
    meeting the fifth (documentation). A summary of GAO's assessment of the
    BCA is in Appendix II of its report.
                                aerial refueling
        56. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are the current plans in
    terms of follow-on tankers based with the Hawaii Air National Guard
    (i.e., replacement/recapitalization plans for the eight KC-135s); will
    they be KC-46s or KC-Y/Z?
        General Lyons. As the KC-46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging
    KC-135 and KC-10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided
    using the United States Air Force's Strategic Basing Process, which is
    led by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). This SECAF-led process
    accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the tanker fleet and is
    designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to include
    routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
    strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent
    possible, while accounting for global air refueling demand to ensure
    the posture support Combatant Commander requirements. I appreciate the
    Secretary's transparent process and the efforts to identify where best
    to base the KC-46 to meet global demand. Although basing is important,
    USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC-46 will be an air refueling asset
    capable of supporting global missions.
                               pearl harbor c-17s
        57. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on having
    the C-17s at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational control
    of INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] versus TRANSCOM?
        General Lyons. The C-17 is a global asset. TRANSCOM's Operational
    Control (OPCON) of C-17s allows agile global support to all Combatant
    Commanders. Our current Command to Command agreement with INDOPACOM
    concerning C-17s allows INDOPACOM to perform their mission and allows
    TRANSCOM to support global requirements.

        58. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on
    swapping ``ownership'' of the C-17s at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
    from Active Duty tails to Hawaii Air National Guard tails, similar to
    the transfer of the C-17s at Elmendorf Air Force Base from Active Duty
    to Air National Guard that occurred in Alaska?
        General Lyons. Assigning C-17s to the 176th Airlift Wing at Joint
    Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) was the result of a unique situation
    with force structure changes at JBER. In order to maintain maximum
    access to limited C-17 resources, I suggest retaining forces at Joint
    Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam as is.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                  coronavirus
        59. Senator Warren. General Wolters, the AOR for EUCOM includes
    Italy, which reportedly has over 500 cases of the Novel Coronavirus
    (COVID-19) and 14 deaths as a result. Other countries in the EUCOM AOR
    with confirmed cases of COVID-19 include Austria, Belgium, Croatia,
    Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
    and the United Kingdom. In your testimony regarding the protection of
    servicemembers and their families in Europe, you noted that EUCOM has
    ``restricted travel to certain zones and we require all mil-air arrival
    flights to be screened for the virus'' and ``in particular, two states
    inside of Italy.'' You also noted that that you ``anticipate the need
    may arise in Germany, but that is still to be determined.'' While the
    most senior global health security position at the National Security
    Council (NSC) has been vacant since 2018, on February 27, 2020, Vice
    President Mike Pence appointed Dr. Deborah L. Birx, the Coordinator of
    the United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and U.S.
    Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, to serve as the
    White House Coronavirus Response Coordinator. Given the global public
    health threat posed by COVID-19 and the need for an integrated inter-
    agency response, how will your commands work with Dr. Birx's office to
    protect servicemembers and their families residing in the EUCOM AOR?
        General Wolters. In the time since this question was posed, the
    health crisis brought about by COVID-19 has gripped the world. USEUCOM
    coordinates daily with counterparts in the Joint Staff and Office of
    the Secretary of Defense to synchronize our efforts, preserve the
    health of the force and families, and supports the whole-of-government
    response to COVID-19.

        60. Senator Warren. General Lyons and General Wolters, please
    explain the established procedures that your commands would follow in
    the event that servicemembers or their families are found to be
    infected with the Novel Coronavirus.
        General Lyons. Per USTRANSCOM Force Health Protection Guidance for
    Novel Coronavirus and current CDC recommendations, Servicemembers and
    their families would be directed to self-isolate and contact their
    health care provider for further medical care related guidance. In
    parallel, appropriate public health officials will be contacted to
    initiate contact tracing and additional notification of exposure if
    necessary. Servicemembers are also directed to contact their supervisor
    for formal notification to Command Leadership. Further, the command is
    actively engaged in social distancing through telework and alternate
    means of communication in order to reduce the risk of transmission
    within the organization.
        General Wolters. USEUCOM has activated its existing pandemic
    response plan, and on March 7, 2020, we confirmed our first case of
    COVID-19. Our military treatment networks are fully integrated with
    host-nation health authorities to share information, evaluate, and
    treat servicemembers, civilians, and family from across the USEUCOM
    AOR. Public health teams, throughout the USEUCOM AOR are closely
    monitoring those infected, those shielded, and those most at risk to
    determine when they should return to duty and normal activities.

        61. Senator Warren. General Lyons and General Wolters, the most
    recent unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence, published in January 2019, observed,
    ``The growing proximity of humans and animals has increased the risk of
    disease transmission. The number of outbreaks has increased in part
    because pathogens originally found in animals have spread to human
    populations.'' The Director of National Intelligence also assessed that
    ``the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next
    flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could
    lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely affect the
    world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on
    the United States for support.'' Have your commands assessed the
    potential adverse impact to the readiness of U.S. Forces due to the
    Novel Coronavirus outbreak?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM working with our Components are closely
    watching the COVID-19 pandemic development and continue to provide
    applicable force health protection guidance as the situation unfolds in
    order to safeguard mission assurance. In addition, USTRANSCOM will
    continue to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Joint
    Staff to assist in determining the risk to force presented by the Novel
    Coronavirus.
        General Wolters. USEUCOM remains laser-focused on the deterrence
    and defense of the Euro-Atlantic. We have taken prudent measures to
    preserve the health of our force and our families. USEUCOM has
    supported national efforts to combat COVID-19 and stands ready to
    continue to assist national efforts. While we have prudently modified
    some activities to prevent the spread of the virus, we continue to
    sustain our essential deterrence and defense activities, and our
    conventional and nuclear forces remain ready. Best practices and
    lessons identified during COVID-19 will continue to strengthen our
    future posture and readiness to confront the invisible threat of a
    pandemic.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                              in flight re-fueling
        62. Senator Jones. General Lyons, given the proposed divestment of
    aerial refuelers, can you imagine a scenario, short of full-scale
    conflict, that the in air refueling apparatus fails? If so, describe
    the scenario.
        General Lyons. No, I do not see a scenario where the air refueling
    apparatus fails. While the air refueling mission is the most stressed
    mission in USTRANSCOM and is my #1 warfighting readiness priority, I
    have full confidence that the men and women from the Active Duty,
    Reserve, and Guard components that execute the air refueling mission,
    will continue to find a way to get the job done. However, additional
    divestments in legacy air refueling platforms prior to the fielding of
    an operational taskable KC-46 exacerbates the challenges for this
    already stressed mission set; additional divestments will result in
    reduced output to meet global demand until the KC-46 is fully
    operational. Retaining capacity until the KC-46 is usable is crucial to
    be able to project the force around the globe in times of crises. Hard
    choices would be made on supporting the highest priority global
    missions that would elevate risk and early mobilization of Reserve
    Forces may be required, but not approach mission failure.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Roger F. Wicker,
    presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and
    Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Well, this hearing will come to order.
        Senator Inhofe's plane will arrive later this morning, and
    I am privileged to open the hearing in his behalf today and to
    recognize the ranking Member, Senator Reed.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal year 2021 budget
    request.
        This is Senator Inhofe's statement, which I am happy to
    read on his behalf.
        We welcome Barbara Barrett, Secretary of the Air Force, and
    General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Thank
    you both for your distinguished service and your continued
    willingness to serve our great Nation.
        The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
    to prepare for the return of great power competition. This
    means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat
    our near-peer adversaries like Russia and China.
        In order for the Air Force to achieve that goal, it must be
    properly manned, trained, and equipped. At the end of the Obama
    administration, the Air Force was at a historic low in
    readiness and size. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons
    were ready to deploy and even less were prepared for a peer
    fight.
        We commend the progress you have made in rebuilding
    readiness, but more needs to be done. A high state of readiness
    is crucial for our Nation to demonstrate peace through
    strength.
        While our force has suffered from being ill-prepared, our
    adversaries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional
    and nuclear forces with alarming speed. China and Russia
    present a credible threat to America and our allies. In fact,
    in some areas they have even surpassed us.
        You both have testified that the Air Force is too small and
    too old to do what the Nation asks. We agree with you and the
    many independent studies that show the Air Force needs to grow
    and modernize. But, we are concerned that your current budget
    is inadequate to allow you to reach the requirement of 386
    squadrons.
        Given the need to grow, there is concern that this year's
    budget request takes a risk by divesting the aircraft we need
    today in the hopes of buying modern capability in the future.
    Historically, that approach has failed to achieve the desired
    results.
        We understand that much of those decisions were caused by a
    flat budget that falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent growth
    recommended by the National Defense Strategy Commission report.
    In fact, it does not even keep up with inflation.
        Any successful modernization strategy needs to focus on
    results and meeting the needs of tomorrow's fight, but should
    also maintain forces capable of deterring and defeating an
    adversary today.
        We look forward to working with you to ensure that we meet
    the needs of today's warfighters while modernizing to ensure we
    regain our advantages for the future.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcome Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein
    to the Committee this morning to testify on the plans and
    programs of the Department of the Air Force in our review of
    the fiscal year 2021 President's Budget request. We are
    grateful certainly to all the men and women of the Air Force
    for their service and to their families for their continued
    support.
        I want to particularly note that this will probably be
    General Goldfein's last appearance before the Committee as Air
    Force Chief of Staff. I want to thank you, General Goldfein,
    for your many years of distinguished and dedicated service to
    the men and women of the United States Air Force and to this
    Nation. Thank you very much, sir.
        In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced
    difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernize and keep
    the technological advantage over near-peer competitors and the
    need to support ongoing operations and sustain today's
    readiness. This budget request tries to maintain that balance
    by increasing funding to address readiness concerns and
    munitions shortfalls but also funding technologies for the
    future fight and modernization of our strategic deterrent
    capability. I am interested in the witnesses' views on what the
    most difficult decisions were. I also understand that the
    Secretary of Defense has asked the military departments to
    undertake a review to find resources, and I would like to know
    the status of that review.
        I would also note that because significant levels of
    funding are being transferred to build the wall on the southern
    border, some Air Force modernization efforts will not proceed
    as planned, making it harder to find savings to apply to high
    priority programs and activities. I am interested in hearing if
    the Air Force has a plan to mitigate this issue.
        This year, the Air Force is proposing to retire and realign
    a number of aircraft systems, presumably to free up resources
    for other programs. The budget request would reduce or alter
    force structure for A-10's, B-1's, C130's, KC-135's, KC-10's,
    Global Hawks, and Reapers. Any Air Force proposal deserves our
    careful consideration, but we must consider it against the
    recent history of abrupt Air Force changes of direction on such
    programs as A-10, U-2, Global Hawk, JSTARS, Compass Call,
    AWACS, light attack aircraft, and C-27 airlift aircraft,
    several of which I will admit were reversed by congressional
    action. I hope the witnesses will provide the Committee with
    their reasoning for these retirements and realignments and
    assurances that decisions are well thought out before
    disruptions to the force structure begin.
        Perhaps most troubling to me among the force structure
    adjustments is the planned reductions in the air refueling
    tanker force in the near term. The Commander of TRANSCOM
    recently testified before this Committee that the scarcity of
    available tankers has sorely taxed his command's ability to
    keep up with the peacetime demand, let alone manage support for
    major contingency operations.
        As we all know, while the KC-46 is being accepted by the
    Air Force and taking air crews, it is only operating with
    significant restrictions. Coupling that with the early
    retirement of KC-135's and KC-10's creates significant risk in
    our refueling capability. I want to hear why you have proposed
    this in the face of TRANSCOM's significant concerns.
        I am also interested in hearing about your continuing
    effort to improve the shortfalls within the remotely-piloted
    aircraft operator community and how the Air Force has addressed
    shortfalls within the larger pilot community and maintenance
    personnel. Certainly, if the Air Force were to retire a large
    number of Global Hawks and Reapers, that action would help the
    shortfall by reducing demand for pilots. However, I am
    interested to know whether you have had a reduction in demand
    for Reaper support from the combatant commanders and how their
    input has affected your decision.
        Two years ago, the Air Force budget request proposed to
    truncate the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System,
    or JSTARS, modernization program and replace it with a
    combination of other systems, including unmanned systems and
    overhead sensors. That program has since been named the
    Advanced Battle Management System, or ABMS. I look forward to
    receiving an update on progress of the ABMS system.
        Again, there are many issues to cover, and I thank both
    Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein for being here today and
    look forward to your responses.
        Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you submitted a
    joint statement, which will be entered into the record at this
    point.
        Would each of you like to make a brief 5-minute opening
    statement? Secretary Barrett?

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA M. BARRETT, SECRETARY OF THE
                               AIR FORCE

        Secretary Barrett. Thank you very much. Chairman Wicker,
    Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for
    inviting us to appear before you today.
        I also would like to acknowledge and thank David Goldfein
    whose final appearance before this Committee for this purpose
    will be today. I would like to thank him for the incomparable
    service that he has provided to the United States Air Force,
    making the Air Force better and our Nation better. It has been
    a great privilege to serve with General Goldfein.
        The international security environment changes
    unpredictably. China and Russia challenge American capabilities
    with new technologies and new systems. Iran and North Korea
    threaten regional and global stability, while violent extremism
    remains a global menace.
        The National Defense Strategy calls for the Air Force as a
    critical component of a joint force to deter and, if needed,
    defeat these threats. This fiscal year 2021 budget request sets
    the course for the Air Force we need to accomplish these aims.
        Specifically, the United States Air Force invests in a
    future force that allows us to connect the joint force,
    dominate space, generate combat power, and conduct logistics
    under attack. We will continue to present ready forces to
    combatant commanders as we defend the Homeland, ensure
    strategic deterrence, and counter violent extremism.
        Finally, we will strengthen the foundation of our forces,
    our airmen, as we develop and care for our people and their
    families. This budget submission shifts force design to create
    irreversible momentum toward achieving the mission of the NDS
    [National Defense Strategy] while growing strong and resilient
    leaders and families.
        The top policy priority for the department is the
    successful launch of the United States Space Force. The space
    domain is integral to the joint team success in all warfighting
    domains. The Department of the Air Force supports a lean, agile
    service to preserve access to space for America and our allies
    while deterring and, if necessary, defeating malicious actions.
        Our most important investment is in connecting the joint
    force. We are developing the technologies to connect every
    sensor, every shooter, and every echelon of command to enable
    seamless, joint, all-domain operations. This battle network is
    essential to defeating current and future threats.
        We are also directing pivotal resources to recruit and
    retain the best people our Nation has to offer. We are an
    inclusive and diverse force and are modernizing our promotion
    system while investing in the professional development of
    airmen.
        The Air Force is expanding ongoing efforts to support and
    care for families. We are tackling privatized housing and PFAS
    challenges. Along with our sister services, we encourage State
    reciprocity for occupational licensing for spouses and for
    quality schools for our children. We are investing in
    professionally designed and advised programs to reduce suicides
    and sexual assaults.
        To fund the Air Force we need, we must divest some aging
    legacy systems. This budget retires limited numbers of
    aircraft, consolidating resources to increase readiness in
    remaining aircraft, or invest in recapitalization and
    modernization efforts.
        We thank the Committee and the entire Congress for fully
    funding the recovery efforts to rebuild Tindall and Offut Air
    Force bases.
        We will seek additional support as our installations and
    personnel assist with the ongoing novel coronavirus quarantine
    and responsive efforts.
        With your continued support, America's Air Force stands
    ready to deter, defend, and defeat any adversary.
        We look forward to your questions.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        General Goldfein?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Goldfein. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to
    present my last budget submission for the first time with
    Secretary Barbara Barrett, the 25th Secretary of the Air Force.
    She is an inspiring leader who cares deeply about airmen and
    their families, and this hearing allows me the opportunity to
    publicly thank her on behalf of all active, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian airmen who stand the watch, own the high ground, and
    follow her lead. Thank you, ma'am.
        So my bottom line up front. This budget, building on the
    last three, offers the most aggressive package of strategic
    trades we have made as a service in over 2 decades to achieve
    complete alignment with the National Defense Strategy and
    secure our Nation's military superiority over the next decade.
        Secretary Esper's guidance for this budget build was
    crystal clear. Build an Air Force that can compete, deter, and
    win shoulder to shoulder with our joint teammates and our
    allies and partners against a nuclear peer in an era of great
    power competition. This budget is designed to achieve this
    objective and we are asking for your support to make the tough
    but necessary trades we will discuss today.
        In numerous war games against our best assessment of the
    threat in 2030 and beyond, as Secretary Barrett stated, we
    found that investment in four key areas produced the Air Force
    needed to prevail.
        First, this budget connects the joint force in ways we are
    not today connected in order to truly fight as a joint team.
    Under the leadership of our Chairman, General Mark Milley, the
    Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders are fully engaged in
    developing a new doctrine of warfare called joint all-domain
    operations. Under this warfighting construct, the Air Force is
    the designated lead service to connect platforms, sensors, and
    weapons from all domains, all services, and our allies and
    partners so we can truly operate at the speed of relevance. We
    call it joint all-domain command and control, or JADC2 for
    short, and we are moving out quickly with advanced battle
    management, sir, as the pathfinder.
        Every 4 months, we host a demonstration and link joint
    capabilities that are not currently connected to advanced joint
    all-domain operations to the next level, and I look forward to
    describing what we have achieved to date and where we are
    headed during questioning.
        Second, we must dominate space, and while you will have a
    follow-on hearing in April with Chief Jay Raymond and Secretary
    Barrett focused on the Space Force and Department of the Air
    Force investments, I want you to know that it is my top
    priority to make Chief Raymond and his new service successful.
        Our third area of focus is generating combat power
    beginning with our nuclear enterprise. This budget moves us
    forward to recapitalize our two legs of the triad and the
    critical nuclear command and control that ties it all together.
        Fourth, this budget invests in a new way of approaching how
    we keep our joint team deployed and sustained in contested
    combat environments. We must assume our logistics enterprise
    will be under attack.
        The foundation of this budget submission is the greatest
    treasure in our Nation's arsenal, our airmen. We look forward
    to working with this Committee to ensure that we keep the faith
    with the airmen that will defend the Nation, and we support
    their families entrusted to our care.
        As this Committee is aware and was stated, the 2021 top
    line is relatively flat from last year, well short, as the
    chairman stated, of the 3 to 5 percent growth required to
    properly support the National Defense Strategy. In a flat
    budget environment, if a service is to move forward, it must do
    two things. It must make better use of what it has by
    connecting all platforms, sensors, and weapons in a battlefield
    network, JADC2, and it must find internal savings to pay for
    new capabilities.
        So we held our own night court and identified $21 billion
    across the FYDP by retiring the oldest of our legacy weapon
    systems that are either not survivable or do not contribute
    significantly to the 2030 peer fight, and not one of these
    trades is easy. Every weapon system we are asking to retire has
    performed well in the current fight, but many are at the end of
    their service life or have no future in a nuclear peer fight.
    This is today's hard reality, and not surprisingly, of the
    services, the Air Force has the largest classified portfolio of
    investment. This makes the story harder to tell since most of
    what we are retiring is unclassified and visible, while many of
    our game-changing investments are classified.
        I want to thank many of you for taking our classified
    briefing and offer it to any of you or your staff between now
    and end game. When you see what we are trading for, our budget
    submission will make more sense.
        If we are to achieve truly meaningful gains for our
    Nation's security through implementing the NDS in a flat budget
    environment, we must work together on these hard choices.
        Chairman, I am honored to be the 21st Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force, and if we go to war against a nuclear peer, I am 100
    percent confident that we have what we will need to win. I can
    say that because of decisions made by my predecessors, men like
    John Jumper and Mike Ryan, such as the lead time required for
    building an Air Force. I believe one of my jobs is to ensure
    that when Chief 24 sits in front of this Committee in 2030,
    that Chief will be able to state with equal confidence that our
    Nation's Air Force has what it needs to win. With your support,
    we can achieve this goal.
        Secretary Barrett and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Barrett and General
    Goldfein follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Barbara Barrett and General
                               David L. Goldfein
                  air force design for great power competition
        The international security environment is rapidly changing and
    becoming increasingly complex. China and Russia present real and
    growing threats to the national security of the United States and our
    allies. They continue to employ aggressive tactics to coerce neighbors,
    suppress dissent, and undermine freedom. Iran and North Korea seek
    outsized regional influence through violent extremism or the pursuit of
    nuclear weapons. These and other nations are pursuing capabilities
    specifically designed to limit or negate the advantages of the United
    States and our allies.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reoriented United States
    defense strategy to focus primarily on great power competition with
    China and Russia. This shift profoundly changes the conversation on
    United States defense strategy, plans, and programs. We are developing
    new operational concepts to focus on more fully integrating joint
    military capabilities across warfighting domains. We will employ U.S.
    military forces in more distributed ways as we build technologies to
    connect those forces into advanced battle networks.
        The United States Air Force has been working to align with the NDS
    for several years. In 2018, we needed Congress' help to recover from
    the damaging effects of sequestration and halt declining readiness
    across the force. The NDS and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were also
    released in 2018, and we began to align future conventional and nuclear
    forces design with the guidance in these documents.
        In 2019, we continued readiness recovery, making significant gains
    across multiple aircraft and spacecraft fleets and mission sets. The
    Air Force also worked with Congress to make essential decisions on two
    important programs--the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS) and the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) satellite system--
    that set the tone for future modernization. The plan for recapitalizing
    these platforms had to change as they would not have survived in future
    conflict given the emerging threats. We moved away from developing
    large, vulnerable aircraft and satellite systems, and instead pursued
    the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and Next-Generation OPIR.
    These systems are essential to robust Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control (JADC2) and the networked future force.
        The Air Force's 2020 budget submission was our first informed by
    and focused directly on 2018 National Defense Strategy implementation.
    The demands this strategy placed on the Air Force drove Congress to
    ask: what forces are required to successfully execute the NDS? The Air
    Force We Need study assessed the baseline capacity required to meet NDS
    objectives, assuming current capabilities and concepts, at medium risk
    based on Combatant Commander Operational Plans and Timelines. As we
    established this baseline, we also made key organizational changes to
    drive toward future capabilities and concepts. Significantly, we helped
    launch the U.S. Space Force which now stands as an equal branch of the
    military.
        In preparation for the 2021 submission, the Department of the Air
    Force conducted an exhaustive review of our portfolios and made hard
    decisions to better align with the NDS. Some choices required
    investments in the future at the expense of legacy platforms. In doing
    so, we will accept calculated short-term risk to pursue the Secretary
    of Defense's goal of irreversible momentum toward NDS implementation.
    We conducted multiple, complex wargame scenarios to assess alternative
    warfighting approaches against a peer adversary. We shared the results
    with Congress over the past year and talked openly about the
    implications for our Air Force. This 2021 budget reflects current
    analysis on the Air Force We Need for the future.
        To achieve the objectives of the NDS, the United States Air Force
    will pursue an integrated design and field modernized forces that can:
          Connect the Joint Force so we can more seamlessly
    integrate as a Joint team,
          Dominate Space through support of our sister service, the
    United States Space Force,
          Generate Combat Power to blunt any attack against the
    U.S. or our allies, and
          Conduct Logistics Under Attack to sustain high-tempo
    operations as long as needed.
        In each of these areas, we will work with Congress and our sister
    services, industry, academia, allies, and partners to develop and field
    innovative solutions. While focusing on the four key investment areas
    above, we will also continue to provide Combatant Commanders with Ready
    Forces to conduct Strategic Deterrence, Homeland Defense, and Counter
    Violent Extremism.
        Finally, Developing and Caring For Our People and Their Families is
    an enduring imperative. American parents have entrusted their sons and
    daughters to our care. It is our sacred duty to ensure they are
    properly organized, trained, equipped, and courageously led. It is also
    our responsibility to take care of their families. With the enduring
    support of Congress, we will continue to provide them the resources and
    support they deserve.
                   united states air force design priorities
    Connect the Joint Force
        Modern warfare is increasingly all-domain. Conflicts are not
    limited to the air or space or land or sea or cyber. Rather, they
    involve engagement in and effects across many or all domains,
    simultaneously. To prevail, the future joint force must be prepared to
    employ Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), where individual military
    activities are more than synchronized or deconflicted. Instead,
    activities in one domain enhance the effectiveness of those in other
    domains and compensate for vulnerabilities.
        Joint All Domain Operations as a new Joint Warfighting Concept
    creates simultaneous dilemmas for adversary forces, overwhelming them
    with too many threats to counter successfully. The Air Force will
    generate windows of superiority in air and cyberspace, with the joint
    force converging on the most important targets at speed and scale. When
    the Air Force employs in concert with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Space Force capabilities, opponents will have to defend their forces
    across all domains, all the time.
        The Air Force will enable JADO by helping connect all forces into a
    cohesive battle network in ways they are not connected today. For
    example, our fifth-generation aircraft cannot easily share data with
    some legacy fighters, sensors on many Navy ships cannot cue Army Air
    Defense Artillery batteries, and soldiers and marines in battle cannot
    always access real-time video feeds from our international partners.
    The key to this effort is to build on our Advanced Battle Management
    System investments. ABMS is the foundation of true Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control which enables convergence of joint combat power.
    JADC2 connects sensors, systems, and weapons from different services
    and nations to allow the seamless sharing of information to all
    friendly forces. Our fiscal year 2021 budget includes funding to
    develop the network, connectivity, and infrastructure for this critical
    capability while working closely with joint, interagency, and
    international partners.
        The Air Force is leading efforts to develop JADC2, and early
    experiments are already yielding positive results. A recent
    demonstration in Florida connected Air Force aircraft, Space Force
    sensors, Navy surface vessels, and Army Air Defense Artillery units to
    successfully defeat a simulated cruise missile attack. This joint team
    achieved 26 of 28 connectivity objectives and a series of firsts in
    this initial effort to effectively employ JADC2 in an operational
    setting directly supporting the Commander of USNORTHCOM/NORAD in
    defense of the Homeland. This fiscal year 2021 budget accelerates JADC2
    experimentation, and the next demonstration is planned for April 2020.
        To achieve true JADC2, this budget invests in digital engineering
    and common data architecture to connect our Air Forces with Army, Navy,
    Marine Corps, Space Force, and international teammates. Success in
    modern warfare requires a digital infrastructure with more open data
    systems than we have today. As part of these efforts, we will continue
    investments in the Digital Air Force initiative as we transition from
    in-house communications networks to an Enterprise Information
    Technology as a Service framework, using best practices of industry.
    This allows airmen to focus more on warfighting and less on maintenance
    of our networks. The fiscal year 2021 budget expands investments in
    technology solutions that streamline non-essential tasks for our
    airmen.
    Dominate Space: The United States Space Force
        Maintaining a position of advantage in space is essential to
    winning in future conflicts. The President formally declared space a
    warfighting domain in March 2018 with the announcement of the new
    National Space Strategy. On 20 December 2019, the President and
    Congress established the United States Space Force as the newest branch
    of the Armed Forces, an historic milestone for our Nation. The standup
    of the U.S. Space Force is a critical priority for the Department of
    the Air Force. The Air Force will aggressively support our sister
    service as they develop the capabilities, warfighting doctrine, and
    expertise needed to outpace future threats.
        While the Space Force will eventually drive budgets, personnel, and
    operations of our space capabilities, the Air Force retains many
    systems and personnel in the near term. We will work with our joint
    teammates to support the transition of space systems and the
    professionals who employ them.
    Generate Combat Power
        To prevail in future conflict, the joint force must generate
    sufficient combat power to blunt an attack against the U.S. or its
    allies. The Air Force will deliver rapid, lethal warfighting capability
    to combatant commanders. Air forces are expected to arrive first
    because we fly into theater and are then called to halt enemy activity
    while follow-on joint and allied forces are brought to bear. This
    budget continues critical recapitalization across multiple missions to
    include the B-21, KC-46, F-35, F-15EX, HH-60W, and T-7 fleets along
    with the critical munitions and sensor suites required for Joint All-
    Domain Operations.
        In addition, this budget modernizes existing platforms that will
    fly well into the next two decades. Examples include a modernized B-52
    with new engines and upgraded radar technology and munitions delivery
    options; updated F-16s with advanced fire control radars and datalinks;
    and the venerable A-10 which will provide close air support to ground
    forces well into the 2030s. Connecting these platforms, sensors, and
    weapons through ABMS and JADC2 will maintain their viability and combat
    lethality.
        The fighter force is one example of how this budget invests in a
    new way of generating combat power. The Next-Generation Air Dominance
    (NGAD) program is maturing novel technologies for the networked, multi-
    domain joint force. NGAD will integrate legacy and future platforms
    with a mix of manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned aircraft.
        This budget continues to fund Air Force investments in the
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms,
    systems, and capabilities that enable current joint force operations.
    At the same time, it lays the foundation for an architecture that will
    eventually link sensors, shooters, and decision makers. The Air Force
    seeks to balance both near- and long-term risk by right-sizing the ISR
    available to dominate today's fight, while building the ISR enterprise
    necessary to provide decision superiority to the joint force in the
    future.
        This budget takes full advantage of breakthroughs in digital design
    technology by investing in three critical areas: digital engineering,
    agile software development, and open systems architectures. Recent
    application of digital design technology in the T-7 program resulted in
    an 80 percent reduction in assembly hours versus conventional aircraft
    design and manufacturing methods. This engagement with industry will
    allow us to develop smaller fleets of new aircraft much faster with
    rapid technological innovation and adaptation. It is not good enough to
    procure better airplanes and satellites; rather, we must design and
    build systems differently today.
        This budget submission pursues advanced technologies and
    incorporates them into our weapons and platforms. These technologies
    include hypersonic, directed energy, autonomy, cyber, propulsion, and
    mass weapon payload systems. These future capabilities will complement
    existing systems to allow us to achieve effects against enemy targets,
    kinetically or non-kinetically, in all domains, at speed and scale
    previously unseen.
        Even as we generate combat power in new ways, humans will still
    operate in many of our combat aircraft. This will place them in harm's
    way and potentially require their rescue from hostile areas. Recovering
    isolated personnel remains a no-fail mission, so we are continuing our
    efforts to modernize our rescue aircraft. In 2019, we began testing our
    first HH-60W aircraft. This budget continues acquisitions as we
    recapitalize the helicopter fleet. In 2021, we will retire the first 27
    legacy HH-60 aircraft.
    Conduct Logistics Under Attack
        Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on
    established, fully-supplied, and well-defended bases. Today, American
    forces are extremely efficient in deploying large numbers of people,
    materiel, and weapons systems across the globe to fight from a small
    number of forward operating bases with well-developed infrastructure.
        Our assessment, in line with the NDS, indicates that future
    battlefields will not allow us to fight this way, so we must be
    prepared to move to win. The Air Force will invest in forward-based
    stocks to enable forces to rapidly deploy to distributed forward
    locations. These locations will vary in size, setup, and security, so
    we must be postured to protect our forces and make it difficult for
    enemies to target them.
        Logistics will need to be lean and agile, allowing us to rapidly
    move people and materiel to and within a theater. As we reinvent
    logistics, the Air Force is investing in future transportation
    platforms and autonomous capabilities. We will continue to develop and
    field future vertical lift to move smaller amounts of equipment quickly
    to many more places than in the past. In these efforts, we are closely
    engaged with our sister services and industry to reimagine what is
    possible. These capabilities will be integrated with our battle
    networks, so we are taking steps to reinforce supply chain security
    with the components, subcomponents, materials, and software
    incorporated into defense systems and equipment.
        In addition to developing future capabilities, we will continue
    investing in our existing and modernized mobility aircraft fleets. The
    joint force will depend upon the KC-46 to provide force extension and
    power projection. The Air Force continues to work closely with the
    contractor to reach full mission-capable status. This budget retires
    sixteen KC-10s and thirteen KC-135s in fiscal year 2021 while
    maintaining the required 479 tanker aircraft. We are also looking
    closely at the right mix between modernized and legacy tactical airlift
    platforms.
    Ready Forces
        The United States Air Force fields capabilities the Nation relies
    upon every day. Airmen are always on duty: standing the watch in
    missile launch facilities; conducting intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance missions; patrolling and defending the cyber domain;
    delivering nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities;
    and guarding our skies. As we modernize to counter growing threats, we
    must also ensure that forces remain ready and able to offer options to
    our Nation's leaders.
        The demand for Air Force capabilities across the globe remains
    high. Over 28,000 airmen deployed worldwide last year as part of the
    joint team to deliver America's air, space, and cyber power. In 2019,
    our servicemembers flew more than 75,000 strike sorties and employed
    more than 11,000 weapons in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Mobility
    forces conducted more than 27,000 airlift and refueling sorties across
    the United States Central Command area of responsibility, offloading
    more than 590 million pounds of fuel and moving more than 226 million
    pounds of cargo. Air Force personnel deployed in support of NATO
    collective defense missions in Poland and the Baltic States, filled
    continuous bomber rotations in the United States Central Command and
    United States Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility, and brought
    humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need around the world.
        Despite this operations tempo, a major success story over the past
    several years has been the improved readiness across our force
    following the harmful effects of sequestration. We have increased
    mission capable rates across our pacing squadrons--our most in-demand
    units--and are continuing our efforts across all fleets. This budget
    requests $17 billion in sustainment and support for weapons systems and
    $9 billion for 1.2 million flying hours to train and hone combat
    proficiency.
        The Air Force is also expanding investment into harnessing the
    power of data and the efficiencies it brings to operations. Predictive
    maintenance initiatives have yielded faster and cheaper maintenance for
    our C-5 and KC-135 fleets, and this budget expands the initiative to
    other aircraft. We are digitizing data from years of maintaining legacy
    platforms, such as the B-52, to preserve and extend some of our oldest
    aircraft.
        In 2018, we faced major readiness deficits which negatively
    impacted the morale of our airmen. With the support of Congress, we
    have made major improvements to readiness over the past three budget
    years and are now more ready than at any time in the last decade. The
    momentum is undeniable.
    Strategic Deterrence
        Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the
    Department of Defense--our deterrent underwrites every U.S. military
    operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our
    national defense. As the steward of two-thirds of the nuclear triad,
    the Air Force needs the continued support of Congress to maintain the
    Nation's credible and effective strategic deterrent. This need is even
    more critical today, due to the on-going evolution and fielding of
    other countries' strategic nuclear capabilities, including hypersonic
    weapons, which continue to challenge U.S. and allied security.
        The Air Force is making significant investments in modernization
    and recapitalization programs that address both delivery platforms and
    weapons. Modernized versions of existing weapons, such as guided bombs,
    and modern replacements for existing capabilities, such as the Long-
    Range Standoff Weapon, will be joined by new technologies that provide
    advanced capabilities to the joint force. These systems are being
    fielded on a tight schedule that depends on stable requirements and
    resources to ensure our national strategic deterrence mission does not
    fail.
        The Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapon system has
    served as the bedrock of nuclear deterrence since 1962. However, this
    system's service life can no longer be extended. The Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent developed in this budget represents a modern,
    sustainable design with the capabilities to ensure the Nation maintains
    its most responsive leg of the nuclear Triad well into the 21st
    century.
        Our nuclear-capable bomber force represents the most flexible leg
    of the nuclear triad. The Air Force's future bomber, the B-21 Raider,
    is proceeding on schedule and on cost, and the initial test aircraft is
    progressing toward first flight. The Raider will be the core of our
    future nuclear-capable bomber fleet, and we are committed to fully
    funding the program in its current development phase to maintain our
    aggressive and critical timeline for bringing it online. Combined with
    the Long Range Standoff Weapon, investments in this budget for B-21
    development and B-52 modernization will maintain America's capability
    to deter adversary aggression, assure allies, and project combat power
    across the full spectrum of conflict.
        To modernize the Nation's strategic and bomber forces, we propose
    an acceptable reduction in near-term capacity to increase overall
    capability. The B-1 fleet is nearing the end of its service life. For a
    period of time last year, only 12 of the 55 aircraft in the B-1 fleet
    were fully mission-capable. We propose retiring 17 B-1 aircraft in
    fiscal year 2021 to invest in the most mission-capable bombers.
        2020 is the Year of Integrated Base Defense, focusing on training
    and equipping our airmen to defend bases as our primary power
    projection platforms as we guard our Nation's critical installations
    and infrastructure. This fiscal year 2021 budget continues developing
    and deploying the technology to fully integrate the command, control,
    and communications capabilities essential to effective base defense.
        Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear
    forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has fully funded
    these programs. We request continued support to modernize and sustain
    the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
    Homeland Defense
        Our ready forces that support the Homeland defense mission include
    radars and early warning systems, alert aircraft and aircrew, and
    supporting infrastructure. This fiscal year 2021 budget invests across
    all these areas. The centerpiece of the overall Department of Defense
    budget, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, is the most essential
    investment we can make to enable the Commander USNORTHCOM/NORAD to have
    the situational awareness and the ability to bring joint all-domain
    capabilities to bear. We continue to partner with this team daily on
    the number one mission in the NDS: defense of the Homeland.
        Defense of the Homeland includes defeating malicious threats
    online, where we must counter direct aggression as well as indirect
    sources of influence. Air Force cyber warriors are constantly at work,
    under the newly-reactivated 16th Air Force, to ``Defend Forward'' with
    actions to deter adverse action and defend friendly networks and
    information. We are also closely examining all friendly systems and
    capabilities to identify and mitigate potential cyber vulnerabilities
    and reduce the potential for adversary exploitation.
        To successfully execute the Homeland Defense mission, the Air Force
    will continue upgrading limited numbers of existing aircraft to include
    modernizing the radars in some F-16s. These updated legacy aircraft
    will be complemented by new-build F-15EX aircraft which are
    significantly more capable and cost-effective than the F-15Cs they will
    replace, aircraft already many years past their designed specifications
    and no longer candidates for service life extensions. The F-15EX will
    help eliminate the gap between the fighter aircraft we have and the
    fighter aircraft we need while leveraging other Nations' investments in
    updating the F-15 program. Ultimately, the Air Force must field a
    robust fighter force, anchored by the F-35, able to detect and defeat
    threats across a wide spectrum. Homeland defense requires a mix of 4th-
    and 5th-generation capabilities, and we are investing to achieve that
    future force.
        Engagement across the globe also contributes to the Homeland
    Defense mission. As we build a network of partners, allies, and
    emerging security partners, we enlist help in deterring aggression and
    containing threats. We will continue to provide training and assistance
    to foreign nations through military equipment sales, training programs,
    and personnel exchanges. The Air Force remains committed to
    collaboration with key allies and partners, and we have accelerated and
    expanded combined participation in air and space operations, exercises,
    wargames, and education.
        Residing at the intersection between the United States Homeland and
    two critical regions--Indo-Pacific and Europe--the Arctic is an
    increasingly vital region for United States national security
    interests. The Air Force has more missions and investments in this
    region than any other U.S. military service. We are a cornerstone of
    the Nation's defense in this region with installations positioned
    across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland and composed of large air bases,
    training complexes, and a constellation of more than 50 early-warning
    radars and missile defense facilities. We are continuing our
    investments to include the upcoming beddown of the F-35 at Eielson AFB,
    placing more 5th-generation aircraft in Alaska than anywhere else in
    the world. In addition to modernizing the world-class Joint Pacific
    Range Complex, we continue to build interoperability with Arctic allies
    and partners. Sustained future investment in modernized missile
    defense, enhanced space capabilities, and improved domain awareness
    will ensure the Joint Force can respond to contingencies in, and from,
    the Arctic.
    Counter Violent Extremism
        Countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) is a critical and
    complex mission that requires interagency and international
    cooperation. The military is one source of power available for this
    task, and the Air Force is at the leading edge of these efforts. Airmen
    of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are engaged worldwide
    to counter VEOs. They are coordinating airstrikes, conducting direct
    action missions, employing munitions, and providing persistent armed
    overwatch and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities.
        We are also working to build partner capacity and help foreign
    forces combat VEOs in their own homelands. The Air Force, working with
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has split the Light Attack
    experiment into two separate but linked efforts. First, building on the
    fiscal year 2019 approval to procure several AT-6 and A-29 aircraft, we
    are establishing two experimental detachments at Hurlburt Field and
    Nellis AFB. Using these aircraft as prototypes, we will continue
    development and fielding of a coalition-friendly battle network that
    increases interoperability and allied and partner contributions.
    Second, we will partner with U.S. Special Operations Command through
    our air component, AFSOC, to build requirements and rapidly field armed
    overwatch aircraft to support ongoing and future counter-VEO and
    counter-terrorism missions.
        These two efforts are complementary as the Light Attack experiment
    feeds technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures for this fight
    while we improve support for our Special Operations Forces engaged in
    combat operations. We appreciate the support of Congress as we continue
    this important work.
    Developing Our Airmen
        Our platforms and systems may be the best in the world, but our
    most valuable assets are our people. With the support of Congress, we
    have grown our force over the last three budget years by 7,820 airmen
    on the way to an active force of 333,700 for a total force of 699,013
    authorized end strength to include Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian airmen. Our fiscal year 2021 budget adds 1,500 additional
    personnel in F-35 and refueling operations, maintenance, and combat
    support.
        Additionally, we are currently developing detailed plans to
    transfer more than 6,000 personnel into the U.S. Space Force in fiscal
    year 2021. We will continue developing this cadre of Space
    professionals across more than 15 career fields who will eventually
    form the core of a Space Force that will protect U.S. interests in
    space well into the future. During the transition, members eligible for
    transfer will be provided options, depending on their specialty code,
    their preferences, and Service needs. We also anticipate that airmen
    will continue to provide support to the Space Force across numerous
    other functions, to include legal, chaplain, and medical career fields.
        The Air Force is continuing our efforts to develop the joint
    leaders essential to our future force. In order to develop and promote
    the right kind of leaders, we have established criteria by which we
    assess performance and potential. Underpinned by a foundation of
    impeccable character, we ask of our leaders:
          How well do they accomplish their mission?
          How well do they lead their airmen or space
    professionals?
          How do they manage the resources they have been assigned?
          How have they improved their unit?
        We have also reformed our promotion boards, expanding the Line
    category into six competitive sub-categories in order to better match
    personnel with requirements. Furthermore, we are eliminating below the
    primary zone promotions to better align the experience and rank of our
    officer corps with those of our sister services while allowing our
    leaders more time to develop the excellence and expertise they will
    need.
        Diverse, resilient, and ready airmen are the bedrock of the
    Department's readiness and lethality. We are continuing efforts to
    increase representation of diverse servicemembers through a number of
    initiatives. These include the Rated Diversity Improvement Strategy,
    the Air Force Junior ROTC Flight Academy, recruiting efforts at
    Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and the Aviation-
    Inspiration-Motivation (AIM) High Outreach Program which engages young
    females through interaction with Air and Space Force role models.
    Increasing the overall diversity of our force is a warfighting
    imperative, and we are committed to fielding and developing a diverse
    Air Force.
    Caring for Our People and Their Families
        While we develop our people, we must also care for them and their
    families. The Air Force, along with our sister services, continues to
    address numerous challenges. These include suicide and sexual assault,
    aircrew retention, personnel retraining, spouse employment
    opportunities, quality of schools and Privatized Military Housing, and
    PFAS issues affecting our installations and the communities that host
    them.
        Suicide and sexual assault continue to be insidious threats to our
    force. Suicide devastates families and units, and it affects the entire
    Service. Sexual assault is a crime against a fellow airman, one which
    is unacceptable and unthinkable. We will continue to devote resources
    and invest in programs, such as the True North initiative, which are
    designed to increase resiliency and connectedness among our airmen. We
    will reinforce a culture of dignity and respect where our people feel
    protected, valued, and supported.
        Shortages across our aircrew career fields persist as threats to
    readiness. We have seen signs of progress in addressing these complex
    and critical issues, but much work remains. We must increase
    production, absorption, and retention of aircrew and their families.
    The Air Force is employing lessons learned from Pilot Training Next,
    now in its 3rd major iteration, to streamline undergraduate pilot,
    combat systems officer, and air battle manager training programs.
        Absorbing new aircrew into mission-ready units and providing
    necessary experience remains a challenge. Total Force partnerships help
    us place newly-trained members in highly-experienced units as we strive
    to balance experience levels across the force. These efforts require
    retaining aircrew, especially pilots, in higher numbers than in recent
    years. We are expanding the Career Intermission Program to provide
    flexibility and choice to our aircrews as they reach critical career
    decision points.
        Our investments in this budget will involve some mission changes
    for some units, to include our Reserve and Air National Guard forces.
    Aircraft type or mission changes will require new skills, and we are
    committed to retaining and retraining personnel as we adjust
    capabilities. We are expanding efforts to ease transitions from Active
    to Reserve and Guard components, allowing increased flexibility along a
    continuum of service. Even with changing aircraft or missions, there
    are no plans to inactivate any wings at this time.
        Airmen could not make the necessary sacrifices to serve without the
    support of their families, and the Air Force is making investments to
    address crucial quality of life concerns. Alongside our sister
    services, we will continue to advocate for reciprocal professional
    licensing for spouses and improved quality of schools. We have recently
    implemented the Support of Military Families initiative, which will
    explicitly consider such issues when the Department of the Air Force
    makes basing decisions.
        A vital part of caring for our airmen and their families is
    providing a safe, secure environment for them to live and work. We are
    addressing serious challenges with Military Privatized Housing and have
    directed considerable resources toward correcting substandard living
    conditions. This budget increases manning at the base level, providing
    personnel required for proper oversight of our Project Owners and
    advocacy for our residents. We will also continue to address the root
    causes of mold or moisture issues in many of our housing units. Along
    with our sister services, we are preparing to institute a Privatized
    Housing Tenants' Bill of Rights to further empower residents. We are
    committed to regaining the trust of families who have been let down,
    and we will continue this work for as long as it takes to get it right.
        PFAS is a national issue that requires national solutions. The
    Department has already spent $447.5 million identifying, investigating,
    and responding to PFAS releases; taken drinking water response actions
    at 23 installations to improve safety; and completed 165 of 189
    required CERCLA PFAS Site Inspections. To enable our continued work,
    this budget requests $304 million for the Environmental Restoration
    program as part of the total $851 million Environmental Program request
    at Active and Guard bases.
    Moving Forward
        The message of the National Defense Strategy is crystal clear: a
    more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined
    with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain
    American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that
    safeguard the free and open international order. Failure to meet our
    defense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence,
    eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and a loss of military
    advantage.
        To align the U.S. Air Force with this direction, we are putting
    forward an aggressive budget based on a new blueprint for joint
    warfighting. Joint All Domain Operations and the command and control
    networks required to connect the joint team form the centerpiece of
    this strategy. If we are to achieve the vision of the NDS, the joint
    force must fight together and deliver all-domain capabilities in a way
    that overwhelms our adversaries. We must acknowledge that all global
    military operations are connected to and rely on a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear arsenal. We appreciate Congress' support with on-time
    budgets and the willingness to take prudent near-term risk to build a
    winning, networked force of the future. With this budget, the Air Force
    makes significant contributions to achieving irreversible momentum
    toward implementing the National Defense Strategy.

        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much to both of you.
        We will begin now with a 5-minute round.
        General Goldfein, these savings of $21 billion found in
    night court, is that within the Air Force or the total defense
    budget?
        General Goldfein. Air Force and it is over the whole FYDP.
        Senator Wicker. Well, in doing what you had to do with the
    budget submission and understanding that you had to make some
    tough decisions, where do you see the most risk in this budget?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I think the two hardest decisions we
    made at end game were two weapon systems that we are asking to
    retire some number of them, and I will talk about both, KC-
    135's, KC-10's, and also the A-10.
        When it came to the KC-135 and the tanker portfolio, this
    is the classic tension between a combatant commander that is
    looking at a 2-year problem to solve and a Service Chief that
    is trying to build a force that wins in 2030. That tension has
    always been there and it always will be there.
        When we looked across the portfolio of tankers, the
    congressional mandate is that we never go below 479. Secretary
    Mattis used to say, hey, before anybody says the ``risk'' word,
    you have to answer three questions: to who, for how long, and
    what is your mitigation. This is risk to the combatant
    commander who testified about that risk. This is going to be
    until the KC-46 comes on line, which we expect to be in 2023 to
    2024. Our mitigation is that the retirement we are asking for
    in the KC-135 represents 3 percent of the overall KC-135 fleet,
    and we have committed to the combatant commander and the
    Secretary of Defense that if we go to a high end contingency,
    we will put every KC-46 we have into the fight. We will not use
    it for day-to-day operations, but it will be made available for
    a contingency. So we think it is a reasonable risk portfolio
    going forward.
        On the A-10, also as we looked at that right at end game,
    on the A-10 we are putting almost a billion dollars into that
    weapon system, about $880 million, to re-wing, new avionics. We
    are going to keep that weapon system flying, albeit with
    smaller numbers, well into the 2030s.
        Those are the two areas that I think are a significant
    risk.
        Senator Wicker. On the tankers, what will happen between
    2021 and 2023?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we will manage the force like we do
    all other areas where we have shortfalls. What the TRANSCOM
    commander was laying out for you was the stacked requirements
    that he has to deal with day to day, and so just like we are
    short in bombers, fighters, tankers, ISR, command and control,
    the Secretary of Defense managed those forces against all of
    the demand signal, and in certain areas, he tells the combatant
    commanders they can have less of what they are asking for. We
    will do the same thing in the tanker force between now and when
    the KC-46 comes on line.
        Senator Wicker. Secretary Barrett, with a budget decrease
    of approximately $12 billion from last year, are you
    comfortable with how the funding is allocated among personnel,
    equipment modernization, and operations and maintenance?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator, while we would like very much,
    of course, to have more funds, the reality is with these funds
    we believe that the allocation is appropriately designed.
        Senator Wicker. General Goldfein, the Air Force requires 72
    fighter aircraft per year to begin to recap its nearly 30-year-
    old, on average, aircraft. General Goldfein, you have said this
    is a minimum.
        When do you believe we will be able to achieve this number,
    and given the importance of extending the range of our aircraft
    in any potential conflict and the comments from TRANSCOM, how
    do you balance the current air--you have spoken about the air
    refueling already. But if you would comment on the first
    portion of that question.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Seventy-two is the number we
    need to be able to drive aircraft age down to about a 17 to 18-
    year average age which we think is sustainable. Without the 3
    to 5 percent growth or some growth in the budget, to be honest
    with you, sir, I do not know at what point we would ever get to
    72 fighters a year.
        I will thank this Committee, though, because there was some
    lean years there where we were buying 20 to 30 airplanes total
    in several years, and so at least we are up into the 50s and
    the 60s now, so we are doing better. But I do not know at what
    point we will get to the 72 aircraft per year, if the budget
    stays flat.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow up a bit on the tanker issue. First, thank
    you for your thoughtful response, General. It was very
    insightful.
        Madam Secretary, I presume that you are really focused on
    getting the KC-46 in the air and operational working with the
    contractor Boeing. Can you give us some insight as to what you
    are doing, and can we be confident that in 2023 it will be
    fully operational?
        Secretary Barrett. We are meeting every day on that topic.
    It is really one of the highest priorities in the building,
    including meetings just yesterday afternoon. The Chief has been
    very much involved as well and working directly with the
    company.
        At the moment it is not meeting all the requirements. It is
    able to be used for passenger transport, for cargo transport,
    and for aeromedical evacuation purposes and for some training.
    But we do look forward to having the remote visual system
    repaired to be usable, and we are looking to have some solution
    even by the end of this month on a way forward, and the Chief
    has been very much involved in that.
        Senator Reed. General, I understand from your response to
    Chairman Wicker that part of the contingency plan would be to
    essentially put the KC-46 in operation if there was a stress to
    the system. Doing the numbers, would that give us the capacity
    to engage in a significant contingency operation?
        General Goldfein. Sir, it would definitely reduce the risk.
    I think the TRANSCOM Commander, if he was here to tell you, we
    are living every day with the tanker shortage, and the KC-46 is
    not going to completely fill that in. However, because we are
    buying at 12-15 per year, every one of those tankers with crews
    would be made available in a high end contingency. It would
    certainly be able to overcome, for that period of time that we
    use them, the retirement that we are asking for.
        If I could just add on to----
        Senator Reed. Yes, please.
        General Goldfein.--Secretary Barrett's point.
        I wrote a letter to the CEO 3 days ago, and he came to see
    me--Mr. Calhoun, and he committed to me that the KC-46 was his
    top military priority and he was going to do what was required
    to fix it. I have seen a change in the behavior of that company
    since he took over, and so that is why we are more confident
    sitting here today that we have a serious fix on the table. We
    are in final negotiations so we cannot go into any more detail
    than that. But I will say that it is looking better today than
    it was even 6 months ago.
        Senator Reed. Just to follow up. I have no expertise with
    aircraft as you do. But today we will not use them in
    operational because of the visual system, et cetera. But in a
    contingency operation, we are prepared to use them. Would that
    require a significant modification in the way the aircraft
    approaching to refuel would operate? Again, are we just at this
    point being abundantly cautious or there is still some profound
    problem with the system?
        General Goldfein. No, sir. There are profound problems with
    the system. I would not be comfortable putting them into----
        Senator Reed. This contingency would be--there would be no
    other choice. We got to throw these in the mix, but it is going
    to be hope for the best.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will tell you I have been
    pulled out of a really lot bad places by some courageous tanker
    crews really low on gas. We want that tanker to be able to plug
    that receiver.
        Senator Reed. We had a chance, General, to speak yesterday
    about the sustainment costs of the F-35. I think most people
    would be--I know I was a bit surprised when the current
    sustainment cost is about $39,000 an hour. I know you are
    working to get it down. But that raises the question of can we
    afford to buy more aircraft if we cannot afford to fly them.
    Can you comment very briefly on sustainment costs?
        General Goldfein. I can, sir. I met with all of the CEOs,
    to include Lockheed Martin and all of the subcontractors, and I
    told them in no uncertain terms both as the largest customer,
    as a Joint Chief that represents my fellow Chiefs who also have
    bought this aircraft and my international Air Chiefs who have
    bought onto this, the current flying hour costs are
    unsustainable.
        We met. I gave them a list of requirements. They did a 180-
    day sprint with the Joint Program Office. I then went down and
    spent an entire day at Lockheed Martin with the leadership
    there and brought 27 stars with me. We went through a full day,
    and like what we have seen in Boeing. I believe Lockheed Martin
    has taken a serious look at sustainment costs, and their plan
    right now is to lower sustainment costs to $25,000 per hour by
    2025. We are going to hold them to that.
        Senator Reed. Well, we are going to keep watch on your
    efforts and wish you well.
        I will submit a question for the record, General, with
    respect to the MQ-9 industrial base. We talked about it
    yesterday. We looked and it appears to us that after fiscal
    year 2020, there are no MQ-9's in the budget, and we just want
    to get a better picture of where we are going with that asset.
    I will send it for the record.
        Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. General, what can the KC-46 not do in the
    next 2 years?
        General Goldfein. For normal refueling, what is happening
    with the remote visual system is a couple things. One, the boom
    operator struggles to see about the last 10 feet between the
    boom and the aircraft. It is a focus issue on how the system
    was designed. What is happening then is you start--there is the
    high potential for striking the aircraft around the receptacle
    if you cannot actually see it very closely at end game. That,
    as you might imagine, is not a good thing. While I would accept
    that with a highly trained crew in a high end contingency, I
    would not accept that for day-to-day operations. This is a
    hardware problem requiring a hardware fix.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, first of all, thank
    you so much for your service to this country.
        I also want to express my appreciation for the robust way
    this budget funds nuclear modernization.
        I want to thank you both for the attention that the Air
    Force has paid to the rebuilding of Offut Air Force Base as
    well. Your teams have been valuable partners as we have worked
    together to secure the funds necessary to repair, replace, and
    rebuild following the historic flooding that occurred in
    Nebraska a year ago.
        Secretary Barrett, the 55th wing is the number one provider
    of large, fixed-wing Air Force ISR in the Nation. This is a
    capability that is in constant demand. I hear it from our
    combatant commanders. The newly contested environments that we
    are faced with now mean that we need to think creatively about
    integrating these platforms like the RC-135 into future
    networks.
        Given that fact, how are you working to ensure the
    continued capability of the RC-135 as we look into the future
    time frame?
        Secretary Barrett. Thank you, Senator.
        The RC-135 is pivotal to our ISR capabilities. As you know,
    training capability was lost during the floods at Offut. So I
    want to thank you for the funding to help get that back up so
    that we can renew the training.
        The other key thing that is happening with that platform
    and others is the computer connectedness, building that as an
    element, a node on the network for our combatants.
        Senator Fischer. The Air Force laid out a future road map
    for the ISR mission in the ISR dominance flight plan. What
    progress has been made in implementing the points of that plan?
    General?
        General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
        The most progress we have done is actually how we have tied
    to distributed ground system where we do all the analytical
    work in the ISR into this battlefield network, this advanced
    battle management, because it used to be that we would have
    platform sensors or weapons from all of our services that were
    operating independently, and then the universal translator
    across weapon systems was a phone or a chat room operating at
    human speeds. That is not going to work in the next fight. We
    have got to be able to work seamlessly at machine speeds, and
    that is what advanced battle management system does, and the
    RC-135 is a significant player in that.
        Senator Fischer. You had mentioned the ABMS and the JADC2,
    and the fiscal year 2021 budget makes significant investments
    in that next generation networking capability. How is the Air
    Force working to ensure integration of existing platforms with
    these new capabilities that are coming on line?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. That is the foundation of
    this, is how do we take existing capabilities, in addition to
    new capabilities, and connect them in.
        When this Committee supported our move from Joint STARS
    into a battlefield network solution for the future, we took
    those savings and we put it into demonstrations and connected
    capability that is no longer PowerPoint slides with lightning
    bolts that are aspirational. We turned this into real
    capability. We are no longer talking about cloud capability. We
    actually built a cloud. We contracted with industry and all the
    services are connected in. We are not just talking about common
    data architecture. We built the unified data library, and now
    we are connecting and sharing.
        Every 4 months, we connect portions of the enterprise, and
    we do a demonstration. We operate at machine speeds. What we
    are learning is that each of the weapon systems that we are
    connecting now jumps in its capability when you can connect it
    into a common architecture.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Secretary Barrett, the Air Force is still conducting an
    analysis of alternatives, and I believe this is the second
    study that we have had for that for the recapitalization of the
    E-4B. It is my understanding that the AOA will conclude soon.
        What is the Air Force's plan to move forward after the AOA
    finishes? I ask this because this has been an issue of constant
    study, and I believe the first AOA was directed back in 2008.
    The challenges of maintaining that outdated airframe are only
    getting harder, and I think it is vital that the Air Force move
    forward after this AOA concludes and this issue should not be
    studied indefinitely. Can you speak to this, please?
        Secretary Barrett. We have found that sometimes studies are
    a never-ending process. I can assure you that we will review
    that study at its conclusion and make a decision based on its
    recommendations.
        Senator Fischer. We always want to make sure that we have
    all the information available at the time, but we do need to
    move forward. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here. General Goldfein, we
    appreciate your service and we will miss you, even though you
    may not miss us and these hearings.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Shaheen. I want to go back to the KC-46 because
    that is a continuing concern for us in New Hampshire with the
    157th air refueling wing, and we lost our last KC-135's over a
    year ago now. While the 46's have replaced them and we are
    seeing the planes come in and we hope to have all 12 new
    tankers by the summer, as you know, they are not flying and we
    are hearing from our Air Guard that they would like to fly some
    missions.
        So I have two questions. The first is, is the biggest
    challenge still remaining the remote vision system? Do you have
    any sense from Boeing based on your communications back in
    January when this is going to get resolved and how long it will
    take to address that in the tankers that have already been put
    out?
        General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
        So right now, we are in final negotiations with the company
    on the fix. So I have got to be a little careful about how much
    detail I go into.
        But I did have a conversation, a follow-up conversation,
    with the CEO and told him that not only the quality of a
    serious hardware fix is important but also time because the
    longer we wait to get that aircraft operational, the longer we
    are having to extend KC-135's, KC-10's, and it continues to add
    up. So, we are going to be holding them not only to a really
    serious fix but also to time. Right now we are targeting
    initially about the 2023 to 2024 time frame to have the fix in
    place and operational. Then there will be some kind of retrofit
    time plan that we will have to work.
        Senator Shaheen. So that is significant.
        General Goldfein. It is.
        Senator Shaheen. I know that last week, Dr. Will Roper
    testified that--and General Lyons said that we are below the
    mark on both tanker capacity and tanker capability right now.
        So if we are talking about 3 or 4 years before we are going
    to get up to capacity, what are we assuming is going to happen
    with the units like the 157th that would like to do missions?
    Are there other things that they can do as we look at the
    potential to utilize the KC-46 for medical missions or other
    things?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So two missions that we are
    in the process of certifying now. It can do lift. We bought it
    for not heavy lift, but it can do lift missions and it can also
    do aeromedical. We are still in the process of certifying it
    for that. As soon as it is certified, we will start using it
    for those missions as we then go into the long-term fix for the
    remote visual system.
        To your units, as you know, we took the Active Duty
    manpower out of the total force unit and moved it. Our plan is
    to have that available right now for the tankers that are
    operational and then as soon as we get the KC-46 online and the
    fixes in place, that manpower comes back.
        Senator Shaheen. So that manpower is not going to come back
    until 2023-2024?
        General Goldfein. As soon as we can get a fix, and I will
    just tell you that Boeing has heard loud and clear that time is
    of the essence.
        Senator Shaheen. Three or four years does not sound like
    time is of the essence to me, so I hope that this Committee
    will do what we can to address that as well because that is
    unacceptable. I mean, it really is.
        Secretary Barrett, I want to go back to PFAS, which you
    mentioned in your opening statement, which we know is a
    concern. Again, I appreciate the commitment that the Air Force
    has made to address the situation at the former Pease Air Force
    Base. But I wonder if you have gotten an update from the Navy,
    who is the lead in developing a fluorine-free fire fighting
    foam, and where they are on that. The NDAA that we passed this
    year said that we needed to phase out all of the fluorine-
    containing foam by 2024. Do you know where we are on that?
        Secretary Barrett. I know the Navy is working and doing
    experiments with other foam additives. They have not yet, it
    seems, come upon a solution that meets the requirements to
    extinguish fires, intense fires, in contained areas. Of course,
    the Navy is very concerned about fires aboard ships. So they
    are very attentive. Right now, so far the PFAS formula is the
    one that is most effective at fire extinguishing.
        We no longer use the PFAS in our training. When we do use
    any containing product, we contain it, and we are working
    diligently to clean up the problem that has been caused by the
    Air Force as every community around the country has been doing.
    But we take it very seriously. The health and safety of our
    communities is among the most important things that we work
    with.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        My time is up, but I just want to also thank you for
    committing, as did former Secretary Wilson, to address the
    occupational health study at Pease, and if there are more
    resources needed and we can be helpful with that, I hope you
    will share that with our office.
        Secretary Barrett. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, thank
    you for your appearance here again today.
        General Goldfein, I want to go back to something you said
    in your opening statement. I want to see if we can put it a
    little more bluntly and just not beat around the bush on it.
    You and Secretary Barrett and your whole team have done a lot
    to try to identify what our Air Force needs to fight the future
    fight. That is going to require some divestments, some cuts in
    current programs.
        An issue is that over here in current programs, you got a
    bunch of stuff that flies around right now that we can all see,
    or maybe more importantly, that sits on the ground in our
    States and employs people in our States. Over here, you have a
    bunch of stuff that is super secret, very classified, very
    cutting edge that we cannot see. Is that right? So you are
    talking about making cuts to the stuff that we can see and
    spending money on the stuff we cannot see. Is that the crux of
    the matter that you are getting at?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I do not think anyone doubts that we need
    all this super secret stuff over here. We have had a number of
    hearings on it. We created Space Force in part to address it. I
    just think it is important that we lay that out there and make
    it very plain so when we get down to brass tacks on the NDAA or
    we get down to brass tacks on the defense spending bill, that
    we all on this panel remember and that the other Senators in
    the Senate remember that the secret stuff is very needful and
    the public stuff that has been with us for a long time and very
    comfortable may need to be trimmed back to pay for the secret
    stuff.
        That is not a strategy issue. That is a political issue for
    all of us to deal with, and that is not endorsing any single
    kind of cut that you may have to make here or any single kind
    of program you may spend here. We may have different thoughts
    on that. We may want to tinker around the edges. But, I think
    it is really clear that we just be up front about the dilemma
    that the Air Force faces, which is at root a political dilemma
    that we all should handle in a responsible and sober fashion
    given the threats that we face in the future.
        General Goldfein. Thanks, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I now wanted to speak about spectrum,
    specifically the mid-band spectrum. Secretary Esper said that
    DOD is willing to explore sharing that spectrum, and we know
    that some of your systems like AWACS operate there. Can you
    talk to us about what mid-band capabilities that you are
    concerned about and how critical the spectrum is to those
    capabilities? I will throw that open to either one of you.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, and I will back up exactly what
    Secretary Esper says. We cannot vacate, but we can look at
    sharing. It does affect in the mid-band our AWACS and other
    command and control assets, and it certainly impacts where we
    are going with battlefield networks. But we do think that there
    is a strategy ahead for sharing.
        Senator Cotton. So talk to us a little bit more about what
    not vacating but sharing would look like.
        General Goldfein. Meaning we have to operate in that
    spectrum. So there may be ways to parcel and share some
    portions of it, but we cannot leave it. There are some that are
    asking us to give that up, and that is not something I could
    ever advise you to do.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        Secretary Barrett, did you want to----
        Secretary Barrett. I would just say that sharing it has to
    be--the only sharing we can do is a sharing where the fidelity
    of our signals is not intruded. So what use others would have
    of it can only be made where it does not intrude in the signal
    that we are using.
        Senator Cotton. Any thoughts on the kind of costs we are
    looking at here?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I know that they are taking a look
    at it. I have not seen any costs that I could give you yet. We
    can take that one for the record, if you like.
        Senator Cotton. Yes, please do.
        Secretary Barrett, did you want to add?
        Secretary Barrett. No, thank you.
        Senator Cotton. One final question that is really on point.
    Unfortunately, some of our allies are moving forward with
    Huawei products in developing their 5G wireless systems, even
    countries where we have some of your airmen positioned. What
    are your concerns about their personal and operational security
    if the countries in which they are based are developing 5G
    systems using Huawei products?
        Secretary Barrett. It is a great disappointment to have
    allies that are using Huawei. Alternatively, we have not been
    forthcoming with good alternatives to the Huawei system. So we
    need to up our game to have as competitive a system, a more
    competitive system so that we are providing that. But it does
    put our signals at risk and our airmen at risk.
        Senator Cotton. Yes, I agree. I will say that we have not
    been particularly effective at providing alternatives. I mean,
    we--I would say the entire West, the United States Government,
    allied governments, and our businesses--although I would say in
    all their defenses, it is hard to compete against a company
    like Huawei, which is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party and
    enjoys effectively unlimited subsidies. So when our allies are
    saying things like, well, we have to go with a reasonable cost
    provider, the only reason why Huawei is a reasonable cost
    provider is not that they are the best company or they have the
    brightest minds or most effective manufacturing techniques. It
    is because their bills are paid by the Chinese Communist Party,
    and that is something that we as policymakers should take into
    account when we are trying to identify possible alternatives.
        General, I know this is your last posture hearing. Maybe it
    will not be your last hearing. I am sure you hope it is. But if
    it is not, it has been an honor to be able to serve with you
    these last few years, and we thank you for your service to the
    Nation.
        Senator Wicker. General, we customarily invite retired
    experts with a lot of wisdom to come back. So I dare say this
    will not be your last hearing, but it will be on a voluntary
    basis.
        Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Chairman.
        I want to join in expressing my appreciation and thanks--I
    am sure everybody on the Committee shares it--for your
    extraordinary service to our Nation and look forward to seeing
    you back again voluntarily.
        Madam Secretary, I appreciate your focus on PFAS
    contamination and leading that effort. Is there a specific
    budget item for cleanup involving Air Force bases and
    facilities?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator Blumenthal, we have spent almost
    a half billion dollars in cleanup to date and will continue. I
    do not know what the exact number is for this year, but we will
    continue that cleanup effort and work with the communities for
    cleanup.
        Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you could provide that number.
        The second point on this issue. Have you made a
    recommendation to the FAA that they eliminate their current
    requirement, as I understand it, that PFAS be used in the fire
    fighting foam on civilian airports around the country?
        Secretary Barrett. We have not made that recommendation to
    the FAA.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you make it?
        Secretary Barrett. It looks like something we would look
    at. Let me say that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I hope you will look at it
    and make that recommendation because I think it could be
    important in speeding their consideration of ending the PFAS
    requirement.
        I am very interested in the discussion that you had with
    Senator Cotton about the classification issue. I will just
    restate--you may have heard me say it in our classified
    briefings--that the American public needs and deserves to know
    more so that it can appreciate the threats to the Nation and
    what you are doing to address those threats. I share your view
    that a lot of the super secret stuff is vitally important. The
    Nation needs to understand more about it and I think could well
    be told more about it without compromising our security.
        I want to go from the super secret to the more mundane at
    the Air National Guard in Connecticut where NP-2000 propellers
    are currently in use. I am sure you are familiar with this
    issue because it is longstanding. The replacement of those
    legacy propellers is essential to the safety--literally the
    safety--of the men and women of our Air National Guard who fly
    those C-130H aircraft. Can the replacement of those propellers
    be expedited and accelerated, General?
        General Goldfein. Yes, thank you, sir. I will tell you I
    have been down there. I have looked at the propeller. I have
    watched it going in. It is an excellent propeller. We have, as
    you know, replaced all of the pre-1971 C-130H engines with that
    new propeller. At the same the same time, on the post-1971, we
    have adjusted our overhaul and our depot procedures to cover
    the safety issues associated with the older propeller. But we
    are studying and looking at whether we want to look at the MP-
    2000 for expanded use, and we look forward to working with you
    on that.
        Senator Blumenthal. I hope that we can follow up on that
    issue. I do not have time to cover it fully here, but I hope
    that we can talk more about it.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. On again the Air National Guard at
    Bradley, as you may know, $60 million has been invested in that
    Air National Guard base, and yet the C-130H modernization is
    going to be impaired by the diversion of $169 million going to
    the border wall instead of two cargo planes for that base. I
    want to know what can be done to overcome the obstacles that
    are created. These obstacles are presented in longer form by
    letter that I have received from General Evon of our
    Connecticut Air National Guard, the acting general. I would
    like to put it in the record if there is no objection, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

        Senator Blumenthal. I am sure you are familiar with the
    situation. So I would like to ask you what is the impact of
    diverting $169 million of C-130J procurement.
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are working through all of the
    mitigation efforts relative to the money that has gone towards
    the wall. I think the best I could tell you is that when the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was asked to describe the impact,
    his answer was this amount of dollars relative to the
    strategic, immediate defense of the Nation did not have a
    significant impact I believe were his words. That is where we
    as Joint Chiefs are now relative to that issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. Finally, although my time has expired,
    I would like to ask a question for the record, not to be
    answered here but in writing, about also the impact on the F-35
    program of apparently diverting money from the 48 F-35's
    requested in the budget. I know that you put 12 additional F-35
    aircraft on the unfunded priorities list. I think that we need
    to explore what the impact is going to be on procurement
    timelines in that program. Senator Reed has rightly raised the
    issue of the sustainment costs, but the building and
    manufacturing costs I think also need to be considered.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, and we will
    look forward to that answer on the record.
        Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Secretary Barrett. Good to see you as always.
    General Goldfein, thank you very much for your service. We
    certainly do appreciate it.
        As we just spoke, General Goldfein, I would like to address
    the issue of the KC-135's. A lot of discussion here today about
    the 46's and the 135's, and I would like for you to state just
    so the folks back home in Iowa understand where we sit. The
    185th Air National Guard, the air refueling wing is one of the
    highest performing units in all of the Air National Guard. If
    you could just explain for those folks where they sit with
    their KC-135's, and at this point, we are a little bit thankful
    we do not have the 46's right now. So thank you.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I can tell you that there
    will be no impact or no change to the 185th in terms of the
    135's relative to the planned retirements.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much for that. We
    discussed that with TRANSCOM last week as well. I think many of
    us are very, very concerned about that, and then how we do get
    to a point where we are transitioning to those 46's. That is
    yet to be seen, but we do appreciate your attention to that
    matter.
        Secretary Barrett, we are in an exciting time where we have
    a lot of new and emerging technologies out there, and these
    technologies can augment our Air Force capabilities, which will
    help us anticipate and respond to various threats. We are
    pretty lucky that tech development in our civilian sector has
    boomed, and the Air Force now has a new way of taking a look at
    some of this technology, and as we move into acquisitions. It
    is kind of like an Air Force Shark Tank. Can you maybe tell us
    a little bit about that and how that is developing and how we
    are able to see some of those technologies and apply them to
    today's modern Air Force?
        Secretary Barrett. Thank you very much, Senator. In fact,
    just last week I participated as a judge--we both participated
    as judges in Spark Tank, which was an evaluation of innovations
    that members of the air staff throughout the Air Force had come
    forward with ideas that were money saving or new inventions,
    new capabilities. That is inside the Air Force.
        In addition, we are working very closely with pitch days
    for businesses and innovations outside of the Air Force.
        Both of these are developments, ideas from the creative
    mind of Dr. Will Roper in acquisitions to think of ways of
    inspiring innovation and creativity and rewarding people that
    are initiating new ideas. So both internally within the Air
    Force, externally to small companies outside who have maybe in
    the past found doing business with the Department of Defense
    daunting but are excited about presenting their technologies,
    and instead of having months and years to get a contract with
    the Defense Department, one participant described it as they
    can get a contract from the Defense Department faster than they
    can order a beer in New York City. So there are some new
    processes that inspire people to want to do business with the
    Defense Department especially with new technologies and
    innovations.
        Senator Ernst. That is outstanding. Can you describe some
    of the businesses that are taking advantage? Are they large
    businesses, small businesses?
        Secretary Barrett. These are almost all very small
    businesses. They are small businesses with good ideas.
        The internal ones were people that saw damage being done to
    equipment and to stores and figuring out a way of loading cargo
    aircraft without doing damage, people that saw in test ranges
    the ability to move the threat that had been positioned--there
    were four standing threats but much easier, much better
    training if they can move those threats. There were a number of
    great ideas of ways to make the training better, cut costs,
    reduce waste, and have a better Air Force.
        Senator Ernst. So you do believe this is a positive step
    forward.
        Secretary Barrett. Absolutely.
        Senator Ernst. Fantastic.
        Just very briefly, General Goldfein, autonomy. We have been
    discussing this with your colleagues in the Navy as well. The
    Air Force labs also do great work in this area. Can you
    briefly--very briefly--explain some of the technologies we are
    seeing come from that?
        General Goldfein. I will describe one very quickly,
    Skyborg, which is the Valkyrie drone system that we use
    successfully. In the upcoming demonstration in April, we are
    going to use it to be a universal translator between fifth
    generation capability in Navy and Army, and so Loyal Wingman
    technology where the manned platform and the unmanned platform
    are actually working as a team is where our future lies.
        Senator Ernst. Excellent. My time has expired, but I would
    love to visit more about that at another point. Thank you,
    General Goldfein, for your service. We certainly do appreciate
    it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Secretary, General, Space Force Vice
    Commander Lieutenant General David Thompson recently indicated
    that the U.S. Space Force will propose the consolidation of
    current space acquisition organizations under an entity called
    Space Systems Command. As you are aware, Congress specifically
    mandated that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office act as an
    independent agency. We did that to ensure that it continues to
    be able to adapt and innovate quickly.
        What consequences would this kind of consolidation have on
    the organization's ability to innovate as Congress intended?
        Secretary Barrett. Our mission will be to design the
    systems so that we optimize creativity and adoption of
    technology in the use of our space assets.
        Senator Heinrich. So I am sorry. Say that again.
        Secretary Barrett. We will be designing things with that
    intent to have optimized technology for our space resources.
        Senator Heinrich. So you think by consolidating Space RCO
    into this broader capabilities office, you are actually going
    to be improving their ability to----
        Secretary Barrett. So I am not speaking to specifically
    that consolidation, with which I am not really familiar.
        Senator Heinrich. Because my concern is that one of the
    reasons why Congress has historically--General, do you want to
    jump in here?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. We have been trying to protect this
    entity because it innovates quickly, and bureaucracy has a
    tendency to want to swallow things that innovate quickly.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Amen.
        The Secretary's direction to us has been crystal clear.
    While there will be a lot of discussions about administrivia
    and bureaucracy, our job is to deliver capability and deliver
    it fast at the speed of relevance because that is exactly what
    the threat countries are doing. Space RCO, as designed--and you
    had a huge hand in putting that together--needs to stay
    independent and it needs to be able to move fast without a lot
    of lines and boxes that all get a chance to vote on what they
    are doing. So we specifically built that on the model of our
    Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, same board procedures,
    same authorities to move fast, and so we want to keep it
    independent.
        Senator Heinrich. That was the answer I was hoping I might
    hear.
        I want to move on to PFAS, and, Secretary Barrett, I do not
    know how to say this other than I am--you know, I heard you
    earlier say that you are working with communities. But in the
    case of Clovis, New Mexico, I am sort of beyond frustrated by
    the utter lack of communication and any level of coordination
    at this point between Air Force leadership and local government
    elected officials for the City of Clovis. We recently received
    a response letter to the entire delegation. It was wholly
    inadequate. This is a community that has bent over backwards
    for decades with great pride to host the Air Force in their
    community, and they feel like they are getting absolutely
    stonewalled right now.
        So I want to ask you if I can have your commitment that you
    will direct whoever the appropriate Air Force personnel are to
    establish direct communications with local officials in Clovis
    to work together to remedy the PFAS situation there.
        Secretary Barrett. You have my commitment.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
        I also want to ask you with regard to the authorities that
    were given to the Air Force in the most recent NDAA, if you
    will work with New Mexico and State and local officials to find
    a permanent PFAS solution and actually use those authorities
    that Congress gave the Air Force in the NDAA.
        Secretary Barrett. We are doing research now and will
    continue to do that. It is a Navy lead, but the Air Force is
    working it as well.
        Senator Heinrich. Because one of the things we did when
    this issue popped up is ask the former Secretary, you know,
    what can you do and what can you not do. She was very blunt
    about what she could not do. We changed much of that in the
    NDAA, and we would like to see you use those authorities.
        I want to move on to MQ-9's, and Congress obviously
    appropriated a lot of money for MQ-9 training. That money was
    taken by the President to pay for a third century technology
    being deployed along our southern border. I want to know what
    the plan is because these folks are training in very
    substandard conditions over a sinkhole in a building that could
    not pass code enforcement in a third world country.
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are working through the
    mitigation right now. As you know, it has been fairly recent
    that we are working our way through this.
        I just go back to the question we were asked as Joint
    Chiefs, which is describe the impact relative to defend the
    Nation and the immediate significant strategic impacts. That is
    where the Chairman gave his answer, and so that is where the
    Joint Chiefs are right now.
        Senator Heinrich. Yes. I understand the strategic impacts.
    I think it is just reprehensible when you walk through that
    facility to see our best and brightest training in a facility
    that is not safe, that you could not get to pass code in any
    community in the United States, where there is duck tape on the
    walls, and these are our best and brightest.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank both of you for being here and both of you for your
    service. A special thank you to General Goldfein again. I never
    ceased being amazed at the talent that replaces really good
    talent, but I also never cease being concerned by the loss of
    excellent talent. I am concerned but grateful to you for your
    service.
        Also thank you for last week. I did take advantage of the
    invitation to participate in the classified discussion, and I
    would encourage all of my colleagues who have not taken
    advantage of that to do that. It was very helpful. It created a
    lot of answers but a lot of questions as well.
        So with that in mind, I am just throwing a few of them and
    let each of you respond, if you will.
        With regard to the here-to-there strategy--and you
    referenced I think quoting General Mattis the ``risk'' word and
    talked a little bit about it. But my specific parochial
    interest, of course, is the ISR mission specifically, the
    Global Hawk wing at Grand Forks, to some degree as well the MQ-
    9's, but particularly the Global Hawk wing at Grand Forks and
    the retirement of the block 20s and block 30s at Beale and how
    that affects the folks in Grand Forks and in North Dakota and
    would love to hear anything you can tell us and tell them about
    the future of that base and its mission.
        Also, while you are talking about that, maybe ask the
    question about the Arctic and the Arctic fight. We have had a
    lot of discussions in this room, with others as well, but I
    would give you the opportunity as well to maybe give us some
    insight into what is being planned.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will do ISR and then the
    Secretary will take Arctic.
        On the ISR portfolio, so as you saw when we sat down, there
    are certain capabilities that we are bringing together in a
    classified realm and we are connecting capabilities that today
    are not connected. Because almost every platform out there,
    whether it flies, orbits, submerges, runs, rolls, it is a
    sensor. But we have not been able to tie together those sensors
    to be able to fuse data in ways that can make this common
    operational picture, and so now, as we tie things together, we
    are finding that we get far greater fidelity on what it is that
    we are doing. So a combination of space capabilities, you know,
    missions that we are doing in the air today that we are
    migrating into space, classified capabilities, and pulling
    these all together with common digital engineering and common
    data architecture is actually improving our ISR and allow us
    now to take some risk when it comes to individual platforms.
    That is our strategy for the future.
        Senator Cramer. So can you expand a little bit then on what
    the future to Grand Forks specifically may look like in light
    of this?
        General Goldfein. So what you will see in this budget is
    the retirement of the older Global Hawks, and with all of
    these, we want to make sure that we work with the communities
    and with you, sir, and with all of the Senators to make sure
    that we minimize impact on the base as we go forward because
    Grand Forks, like many other bases, is key strategic terrain.
    It is key to the Arctic strategy because of its location. It
    also supports some of our ground-based intercept radar feeds
    that are so important to us. So we want to make sure we
    mitigate the impacts to Grand Forks.
        Senator Cramer. Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Barrett. The Arctic is of increasing importance
    to the United States, and it has been important for a long
    time, but ever more increasing now. As a result, the Arctic
    strategy is a key element of the Air Force and the Department
    of Defense's effort, but the Air Force more than other elements
    because 80 percent of the Arctic defense is provided by the Air
    Force or Department of Air Force elements.
        So you know from my background, I have paid quite a bit of
    attention to the Arctic. One of my first visits was to Thule. I
    spent time in Finland and later this week, I will be visiting
    the Minot operations and later this month be in Alaska also
    looking at those facilities. So it is a very important topic
    and of increasing importance to us.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you.
        In my remaining seconds, I might just ask in general as we
    look at the DOD budget--and I know you have a heart for a
    discussion about the pass-through part of your budget and how
    that may work and how people view the budget. I mean, the Air
    Force always seems to me, with its being the tip of the spear
    and the highest priority in DOD operations, to sort of be at
    the short end of the stick budget-wise. I mean, are you
    generally satisfied with what we have in terms of the entire
    budget for the Air Force?
        Secretary Barrett. Well, we have to live within the top
    line, so we have had to make a lot of trades that we wish we
    would not have to. The pass-through is an especially
    disconcerting matter because it does create a misperception. We
    are looking at that as something that we will come to Congress
    with a proposal in the next budget on how that should be
    treated in recognition of a Space Force and the reconstruction
    that will be occurring through the Department of the Air Force.
        Senator Cramer. It is a conversation whose time has come.
    Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony today.
    General Goldfein, I would like to join some of my colleagues in
    wishing you all the best in the years ahead. It has been a
    pleasure working with you these past years, and we will look
    forward to your next adventure, whatever that may be.
        Secretary Barrett, I would like to discuss the issue of
    PFAS with you, as several of my colleagues have mentioned. As
    you know, PFAS is very dangerous to human health, and the
    contamination has been identified at the former Air Force base
    at Wurtsmith in Oscoda, Michigan. It is something you and I
    have discussed many times in my office, and I appreciate your
    openness to that discussion. Also, I have discussed this with
    Assistant Secretary Henderson who visited the former base on my
    invitation, and we have also discussed it a great deal.
        I want to just say I appreciate your recent letter
    confirming the little over $13 million will be going towards
    cleanup at Wurtsmith. That is $13 million out of the $60
    million that we appropriated for the country. So I appreciate
    that commitment to the former base.
        My question to you is, could you provide me an update on
    how the remediation money is going to be spent and will that
    have an impact on the timeline at the former Wurtsmith Air
    Force Base?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator, I do not know the sequence of
    the spending and the impact on Wurtsmith. But I know that we
    are working closely with the communities. Our mission is to
    preserve and protect the safety and health and to involve all
    of government so that we have solutions that engage with the
    needs of the community as well.
        Senator Peters. Well, if I may ask if you could have
    someone get back to us as to specifically how you see that
    money spent and what the timeline would be, it certainly would
    be very much appreciated by the community. The community
    appreciates the additional resources and they are anxious to
    see what the details are regarding the money.
        Secretary Barrett, I also would like to talk to you a
    little bit about the F-35 basing decision, something we have
    also talked about a great deal, and the basing of F-35's at the
    Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan. Since we have
    been in these discussions, President Trump has made a number of
    comments, and I would like to get an update, if I could, from
    you. President Trump recently said--and I am going to quote
    from President Trump--and that is why we are giving strong
    consideration to deploying some of our mighty F-35's to
    Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and you know what that
    means. Right? You know what that means. That is a big deal.
        He goes on to say, quote, so Selfridge, you are going to
    see a lot of very fast planes. Actually they are totally
    stealth. So maybe you will not see them coming in. Okay? You
    will not see them come in but they are coming in. End of quote.
        That certainly got a lot of folks very interested in Macomb
    County especially in Michigan, and I know the Air Force
    recently finalized the environmental impact statement relating
    to the basing decision. So I know the choice is with you.
        If you could just provide us an update on the Air National
    Guard's F-35 basing process, where we are on it.
        Secretary Barrett. I think as we have discussed, there is a
    very deliberate process with criteria and a down select
    process. We are in that process now, and therefore it is
    inappropriate for me to go into detail about the participants
    in the search. But we are going through a very deliberative and
    pre-established and approved. That does include an evaluation
    of the environmental impact, the costs that are going to be
    required, the facilities that are there, and we are looking at
    the community interest and involvement.
        Senator Peters. The environmental impact study has been
    finalized, so you are well down the path.
        Secretary Barrett. Yes, and comparing those of the various
    contestant bases.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        The last question. I am concerned about the recent
    reprogramming of the $1.3 billion from the National Guard and
    Reserve equipment account that was reprogrammed to support the
    construction of the southern border wall. As both of you know,
    that funding provides the National Guard resources to mitigate
    key readiness shortfalls. Two specific programs that benefit
    from those funds that are being shifted to the southern wall
    are MQ-9 upgrades to support domestic operations and the KC-135
    modification to improve survivability. Those are two platforms
    that we have in Michigan. The 127th wing operates eight KC-
    135's. The 110th wing supports MQ-9. They are both, as we
    discussed here today already, in high demand and play a very,
    very important role in national defense. It makes me skeptical
    as to the impact on readiness.
        Will the Air Force reprioritize how it approaches National
    Guard modernization priorities when these funds have been
    reprogrammed away from key National Guard units?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator, we will be evaluating the
    impact. All of the deferred projects are important, but the
    President's has declared an emergency on the southern border.
    The Chairman has indicated there is no immediate, significant
    strategic diminution of readiness as a result of this
    transition. But the application of reassigning the resources
    is--nothing further is expected beyond what has been announced.
        Senator Peters. I am out of time. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Senator McSally? I am sorry. Senator Perdue
    scooted away from the dais, and I was looking for you.
        Senator Perdue. Well, first of all, I have used 5 seconds
    now already.
        Senator Wicker. Reset the clock.
        Senator Perdue. I want these two to know--I am going to say
    this for the public record. They know personally privately how
    much I personally think of each of them in their careers and
    appreciate so much each of them individually. You guys are at
    the turning point in the U.S. military right now in so many
    ways.
        I just have three issues I want to get at real quick, but
    just two quick questions. One is I think this whole thing that
    you are in the middle of, this transition, is what we have
    already said, visible current capability versus classified
    replacement capability. Obsolescence--we know we have maturing
    assets all over the Air Force. I am very concerned about one
    specific thing I will get in just a second.
        The second thing, in terms of the JSTARS capability moving
    to an ABMS, picking up--ABMS capability picking up the JSTARS
    capability, is this whole development of new technology versus
    an old acquisition structure. You got AI in here, and AI, as I
    understand it--it is machine learning, so the more data you
    give it, the faster it learns. Well, that does not necessarily
    fit an acquisition structure.
        So Will Roper just recently--he is the Acquisition Chief,
    as you know, Chief. We have come so far in ABMS, that we
    realize it is bigger than just replacing the capability that
    JSTARS provides. If get ABMS is right, you just built the
    military's Internet of Things. That is super exciting, et
    cetera. But this does not fit the traditional acquisition
    structure.
        The third thing is how do we interact. Given all of that,
    Congress is funding--we have an oversight called the NDAA. We
    try to give direction. We do not want to become bureaucratic.
    But right now, I am very concerned. So in the first few months,
    you have had one demonstration in December. You got another one
    coming in April. My concern is in the first two gates we had--I
    think it was August 30th or somewhere in there--the AOA was to
    be completed. Within 6 months after that, Secretary, you are to
    give us an update, as I understand that. Now, I understand this
    is somewhat fast moving.
        The next thing is a briefing in January of some sort here.
        I realize this is a classified topic but, Secretary, I need
    your commitment today that the Air Force will abide by the
    current NDAA, the public law that exists today that relates to
    JSTARS and ABMS, specifically section 236 and section 147, and
    that we can expect to receive the AOA, or analysis of
    alternatives, and the capability development document. Can you
    commit to that today?
        Secretary Barrett. I am not confident that I can commit to
    it today, but we will evaluate it. May I get back with you even
    later today?
        Senator Perdue. Well, absolutely, but what we are talking
    about is a new NDAA. We are preparing for the new NDAA. So if
    changes need to be made to the structure of oversight, now is
    the time. You are new in this. This is your first cycle. It is
    the Chief's last cycle. So we have got the best of both worlds
    here, but let us get this right, because this cannot be an
    acquisition process that we wake up in 3 years and realize it
    is 3X in cost and 10 years late, just to be blunt. It's really
    unacceptable that we do not get these reports on time when we
    have asked for that and we had commitments of predecessors to
    do that.
        The second thing, Chief, the events that we are doing now,
    the demonstrations, the capability that JSTARS has--the two I
    am concerned about is GMTI, ground-moving target indicators, as
    you have spoken before about, and then battle management. We
    get some feedback from other services that, well, we are headed
    in the wrong direction or we need to adapt this. Can you talk
    about specifically those two capabilities, and then what does
    that mean in terms of the organic force structure at Robbins to
    help facilitate the headquarters development there of ABMS?
        General Goldfein. Sure. I will hit the last part first.
    There is no intent to reduce the size of the force at Robbins,
    and we are committed to working with you on that.
        Senator Perdue. I apologize to interrupt. But you are
    talking about the force of JSTARS, and there is a gap as JSTARS
    matures out and you replace it with ABMS, there is a gap of
    capability. We know it exists today. But in terms of organic
    force structure, I accept your answer. I appreciate that. Can
    you address the other part of that?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. But to the gap, once we
    determined that we could fly Joint STARS well into the late
    2020s and into 2030, that actually filled the gap. So this
    whole plan is to ensure there is no gap because there can be no
    gap for the warfighter.
        Senator Perdue. Very good.
        General Goldfein. But we have to ensure that we can get
    them this information on day one of the fight, which you were
    very helpful.
        What we are trying to do here is incredibly disruptive, and
    it is disruptive in the eyes of the adversary. What we did to
    bring on a new way--this goes to your point about the current
    acquisition system. We brought in 12 pioneers from industry and
    put them on the advanced battle management system. We have the
    designer of Uber on our payroll, and so we are using industry's
    best practices, and industry is in here with us doing this.
        The next demonstration we are going to do at Nellis Air
    Force Base where all the Joint Chiefs will go to it, we are
    going to be doing live fly connective capability at Yuma, at
    Eglin, off the shore, at White Sands, at Nellis Air Force Base.
    We are going to have three supported commanders, and we are
    going to have a number of firsts. If we do this right, about 60
    percent of it will work.
        Senator Perdue. So will the next demonstration have GMTI
    and battle management demonstrated in that demonstration?
        General Goldfein. It will but it will do it, not from where
    we want to eventually take it. It will do it in an interim
    step.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
        General Goldfein. I will just leave it at that.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Next is Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I add my thanks to you, General, for your service and my
    best wishes on your impending retirement.
        Madam Secretary, I was pleased to hear about your pitch
    days where you encourage small businesses to pitch their ideas.
    Where do these pitch days occur?
        Secretary Barrett. They have been taking place around the
    country. I attended one in San Francisco. They are in a variety
    of cities around the country.
        Senator Hirono. Nothing in Hawaii yet.
        Secretary Barrett. Not that I know of.
        Senator Hirono. Think about that.
        Secretary Barrett. Yes, I will put that on the list.
        Senator Hirono. I want to add my concerns to those
    expressed by some of my colleagues about the reprogramming of
    DOD money to go to the wall on the southern border. So I just
    want to express that. At some point, I think it does have a
    negative impact on readiness and other aspects of what the DOD
    is supposed to be focused on.
        Madam Secretary, the National Defense Strategy highlights
    great power competition with China and Russia and it includes
    North Korea, Iran, and transnational violent extremism. Four of
    these five threats are in the Indo-Pacific AOR. I am glad to
    see the focus on the region given its growing importance to our
    national security.
        What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific
    region as the Secretary of the Air Force?
        Secretary Barrett. A key issue there is the vastness of the
    territory, and logistics, being prepared to position, station
    our capabilities through that area.
        Senator Hirono. Yes. It is the biggest AOR.
        Do you believe then that additional assets and investments
    are needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive
    advantage against our adversaries in this part of the region--
    or this part of the world?
        Secretary Barrett. There is a significant review of how we
    are positioned for the greater peer threat.
        Senator Hirono. When is that review going to----
        Secretary Barrett. I think there is continual review.
        Senator Hirono. So do you think that this review will
    result in more concentration of certain assets in the Indo-
    Pacific Command area?
        Secretary Barrett. I do not want to predict the outcome of
    it, but I would anticipate that the realities will be a
    significant part of how those assets will be decided.
        Senator Hirono. I hope so. General, do you agree?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So the Chairman is leading us
    through global integrated exercises that is looking at global
    campaigns because a China or a Russia campaign will not be
    confined within that geographic area of responsibility. So we
    are working our way through what does the command and control
    look like which is why this JADC2 is so important for how we
    look at this new way of warfighting going forward. We are doing
    that review now.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        This is for Secretary Barrett. Last fall, the Air Force
    indicated Barking Sands, a specific missile range facility, in
    Kauai as the preferred location for a Pacific-based space
    controlled squadron operated by the Hawaii Air National Guard.
    I have not heard much else since that initial announcement. Can
    you advise what the status of the space controlled squadron is
    and when will the unit be activated?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator, I do not know the answer to
    that. May I get back with you?
        Senator Hirono. Yes, thank you.
        So for both of you, as the Air Force prepares for a future
    possibility of conflict with a near-peer adversary, I
    understand you are investing in agile combat employment where
    you would launch, recover, and maintain aircraft away from main
    bases using partner nations, military fields, or civilian
    airfields. Secretary Barrett, what nations in the Pacific
    theater, if any, have been approached thus far as possible
    locations for these agile combat employment teams and assets?
    Or if the General would like to respond.
        General Goldfein. Well, I would just say we are really
    blessed that my successor has been nominated publicly, and that
    is General Brown. This is his concept of operations that he
    will no doubt, if confirmed, bring into the seat. I actually
    went to his Pacific Air Chiefs conference, and this was a
    central topic of discussion. I will tell you that from the
    Philippines to Singapore to--I mean, I could go around the
    region, and all of them are talking about this new concept of
    employment.
        Senator Hirono. Great. We will have an opportunity to talk
    with General Brown about that.
        General Goldfein, what are your thoughts on having the C-
    17's at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational
    control of INDOPACOM versus TRANSCOM?
        General Goldfein. I think the decision has been made to
    actually chop all of the strategic lift to TRANSCOM for the
    purposes of global mobility. This is part of the global
    integrated exercise. We have just been working through this as
    well in Central Command as well. So TRANSCOM through the last
    directive from the Chairman has been given operational control
    of strategic lift. You know, General Lyons is the one that
    manages that for the globe.
        Senator Hirono. I do have some questions for the record
    relating to how we are dealing with the issues of suicide and
    sexual harassment. So I will submit those for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. We will look
    forward to those answers on the record.
        Senator McSally?
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you both again and thanks for your service. I
    appreciate all you are doing to ensure our Air Force is ready
    for the high end fight, but we also have an obligation when our
    troops are on the ground to have the best capability overhead
    for combat search and rescue and close air support. So on to
    our beloved A-10.
        General Goldfein, is the Air Force committed to complying
    with all laws on the books and the intent of Congress related
    to the A-10?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am, we are.
        Senator McSally. Thanks.
        When I first got to Congress, if they had gotten their way
    in the last administration, we would have no A-10s flying right
    now. So we stopped that in fiscal year 2016. In fiscal year
    2017, I took a different approach. I said we need to make sure
    that we think about this as we develop the F-35 and we have a
    thoughtful sequential approach.
        So we required in section 134 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
    two reports. I wrote this and it made it into law. The first
    was for the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to
    submit the F-35 IOT&E report to Congress and to you. Then the
    second was a report by the Secretary of the Air Force
    specifically after the IOT&E report was delivered, not later
    than 180 days--and I am going to read this--the Secretary of
    the Air Force shall submit to Congress and the defense
    Committees a report that includes the views of the Secretary
    with respect to this report, including any issues or concerns--
    I am kind of summarizing here--a plan for addressing any
    deficiencies, carrying out the corrective actions, and the
    short-term and long-term strategies for preserving capability
    of close air support and combat search and rescue.
        This also included the fly-off competition that I mandated,
    and that has been conducted between the A-10 and the F-35.
        So the final paragraph in that fiscal year 2017 NDAA says,
    the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire, prepare to
    retire, or place in storage or on back-up aircraft inventory
    any A-10 aircraft--any A-10 aircraft--until a period of 90 days
    has elapsed following the report, the second report.
        So, first, IOT&E after the fly-off competition, then the
    Secretary of the Air Force report. No A-10 can even be planned
    to be put into storage. I wanted to add ``thought about,'' but
    we could not enforce that. But I think you get the point.
        The question is--and these are just kind of yes and no,
    General Goldfein, have you received the initial operation test
    evaluation report for the F-35?
        General Goldfein. No, ma'am.
        Senator McSally. Neither have we, so you have not been able
    to then inform any planning by the Secretary for the second
    report because we do not yet have the first report. Right?
        General Goldfein. Correct.
        Senator McSally. So this Committee and the Air Force does
    not have any plan for addressing deficiencies potentially from
    the IOT&E report.
        General Goldfein. Correct.
        Senator McSally. And also we do not have the plan for
    corrective action. Right?
        Finally, neither the Air Force or the Committee has the Air
    Force's short-term and long-term strategies for preserving
    close air support and combat search and rescue. Correct?
        General Goldfein. Right.
        Senator McSally. So based on your answers and based on the
    law we wrote, I just think it is premature to plan to retire
    even one A-10, never mind the 44 that are planned to retire in
    this year's budget. So how do you justify the planning starting
    for this when we have not met the intent of the law yet?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. The DOT&E report--the fly-off
    is complete. They are holding that report until they
    deliberate. The director informed me that he would deliver that
    to this Committee in September, the first month of the fiscal
    year. We understand the timeline that is in the law, and we
    will absolutely comply with the law.
        What we put in the budget was where we will need to work
    with you on because--and the question is timing, as you brought
    up. Will there be time in that fiscal year to be able to move
    forward on any retirements and still be in compliance with the
    law? So that was our thinking.
        Senator McSally. Yes, I got it. Look, we made it, I
    thought, very clear, like we should not even start having a
    conversation to plan anything related to the floor we have of
    the number of A-10 now until this is all complete. What is your
    plan going forward related to the A-10?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. I will tell you straight up.
    You saved the A-10. Nobody else can make that claim, and as a
    result of your efforts and the efforts of this Committee, we
    are putting almost a billion dollars into the A-10. We are
    going to be doing the wings, the avionics, the radios, and we
    are going to keep that airplane in the inventory flying well
    into the 2030s.
        The challenge we faced is what I said in my opening
    statement, which is we have to transition to the future while
    we are continuing to apply fire power against the current
    fight. There is no better weapon system to do that than the A-
    10. So the investment that we are making is a good investment.
    We just got to take a look at what the cost would be if we keep
    the entire fleet, and that is what we have got to work with you
    on to do that.
        Senator McSally. And we will. Thanks.
        In my remaining time, I want to talk about the President
    recently reprogrammed resources. Look, as a veteran, as a
    border Senator, we need to support our military and secure our
    border. These should not be choices and obstruction to stop
    happening.
        But I want to specifically ask about the F-35, the money
    that is being reprogrammed. We plused up from your 48, we
    plused up 14, so we funded 62. What is the impact on the Air
    Force F-35 and specifically any impact to Luke Air Force Base?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. There will be no impact to
    Luke Air Force Base. The money that was diverted was for long
    lead items for aircraft that actually did not come through in
    the budget. So we put 12 in the unfunded request for this year,
    but that was long lead items for certain parts. It was not
    procurement for the aircraft. So no impact on Luke.
        Senator McSally. So we are still going to have 62 come off
    the production line this year.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thank you. Appreciate it.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator McSally.
        General, did your attorneys advise you that you are
    compliant with Senator McSally's provisions in the NDAA with
    regard to the A-10?
        General Goldfein. Sir, they did, and they did that based on
    again time. The fact that the report that Senator McSally is
    referring to was going to be delivered in the first month of
    the fiscal year and the number of months ahead of that, there
    was time to work with this Committee on the retirement of those
    aircraft in this timeline.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, and thank you, Senator McSally.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank both of you for your service and congratulations on
    your retirement, General. Some day I hope to be there.
        Anyway, as you can imagine, the 13 States that qualify for
    the C-130J recapitalization as appropriated in fiscal year 2017
    and 2019 are eager to hear where the Air Force is in this
    process. Our staffs were told in November we would get some
    kind of an update this winter. It has not come yet.
        In the meantime, I have inquired about the Air Force's
    strategic basing scoring process for the decision both because
    I am interested from an oversight perspective and as someone
    who has to prioritize what I push for as an authorizer and an
    appropriator. I asked the Air Force if Congress would be
    allowed to know the score of its National Guard location
    particularly as it relates to others, and I was told no. The
    Air Force responded to my request for information the strategic
    basing process uses score sheets to determine a location's
    viability for a basing bed-down decision.
        However, the score sheets alone do not provide the full
    context of decision criteria and are no longer used in the
    basing process once candidate locations have been selected.
    Once selected, site surveys are conducted in each candidate
    location as part of the holistic assessment of its suitability.
    The Secretary of the Air Force also leverages inputs from Air
    Force corporate leaders, Chief of Staff, and military judgment.
        I understand what you need to do what is best for the Air
    Force, and we all need to support you to do what is best for
    the Air Force, and I am not one who ascribes, just because I
    have something in my State, that is the best. If they are not
    performing, I am the first to say either get with it or get out
    of it.
        So with that being said, I am very proud of the 130th air
    wing in Charleston where we score really high on the score
    sheet, but might not be selected. So I want to make sure that
    we have a fair shot at this.
        So my question to you, Madam Secretary, is the Air Force
    needs to show its work. Do you understand the Air Force process
    limiting my ability to do oversight? Do you think it is too
    subjective what I am asking in response?
        Secretary Barrett. Senator, the process is a complex one
    and goes through a variety of criteria, some of which are not
    easily measurable in quantifiable terms.
        Senator Manchin. If I could just say--I do not mean to
    interrupt you, but time is limited. In that, I know any type of
    performance is based on past performance, how well the
    readiness, maintenance, being able to complete the missions,
    and that is what I think to me would be at the top of the list
    of looking if they have been performing, not just saying I am
    going to do it better if you do this for me, but have they
    performed in the past. We are hoping that is a high score too,
    but we would like to see that.
        Secretary Barrett. Past performance is deeply valued, and
    West Virginian's demonstrated their ability to produce and
    perform. So we appreciate it very much.
        The criteria are spelled out for the initial cut, and then
    there are site visits and things that are lot less----
        Senator Manchin. Will we be able to see any of that as an
    appropriator and as legislators? Will be able to see the
    process you are going through, or is that not available?
        Secretary Barrett. I do not know whether it has been made
    available in the past, but I would be happy to take a look----
        Senator Manchin. Would you consider that? Maybe you could
    get back with me on that?
        Secretary Barrett. I would be happy to.
        Senator Manchin. First of all, I want to say I am for the
    wall. I am just not for the executive branch appropriating
    money as they see fit, and here is my concern. What really
    angers me is the $1.3 billion cut from the National Guard and
    Reserve equipment account; $205 million, which is cut from the
    Air Force Reserve; $395 million cut from the Air National
    Guard.
        So, Secretary, I would ask you, did you agree to the
    reprogramming request or were you involved in that decision?
        Secretary Barrett. The Air Force worked with the Department
    of Defense to minimize the disruption that would be caused by
    the reappropriation of those funds.
        Senator Manchin. Were Governors and the TAGs--were they
    consulted on the reprogramming?
        Senator Manchin. I do not think they were.
        Senator Manchin. Yes, I do not think so. From what we are
    hearing, they were not either.
        The reprogramming of the $365 million. That is four fewer
    C-130J's for fiscal year 2020, affect the ability to support
    TRANSCOM airlift missions in the event of a conflict. It really
    puts us in jeopardy and behind the 8 ball there because we are
    flying 0-H's now, and we are hoping that you are going to
    refurbish them with new avionics, propellers, and engines and
    things that need to be done. We are behind. I am really
    concerned about this.
        General, you might want to state on that I guess. What are
    your plans to ensure there are no gaps in readiness?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I will tell you that we are
    right now still working through the impacts. The Chairman was
    asked to give his assessment of the impacts on not only
    readiness but the strategic ability to defend the Nation, and I
    think you saw his response and that is where the Joint Chiefs
    are.
        Senator Manchin. Well, there is no doubt there is going to
    be an impact. We all know that. How severe is going to be--we
    will be back here next year, if money is taken again from what
    we appropriate, we go through and do our job, and then all of a
    sudden it vanishes and we are back to square one again. I do
    not have a problem voting for the wall. I sure have a problem
    with money being taken for what is needed for us to defend our
    country.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here. Thank
    you for your service.
        General, let me start with you. My home State of Missouri
    is very excited and proud to receive the B-21, which will form
    a critical part of our nuclear triad and also our conventional
    global strike capability.
        Let me ask you this, how do you envision the B-21 helping
    to defeat a Chinese fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan
    when you consider both its nuclear and its conventional
    capabilities?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. You know, very often I tell my
    slide builders, the next slide I see that has a big red dome
    over China or Russia, I am going to execute choke on on the
    slide builder. China cannot put a big red block of wood over
    itself. It can put a block of Swiss cheese over itself, and our
    job is to know where the holes are and how to get in and how to
    hold targets at risk. That is what the B-21 does.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about the number. You
    previously stated, General, that the Air Force requires at
    least--I think your words were--at a minimum 100 B-21's. You
    have also said you are in lockstep with various analyses
    showing the Air Force may need more than 100 B-21's. So give us
    your best estimate. How many B-21's does the Air Force actually
    require to cover now and above its nuclear and conventional
    missions?
        General Goldfein. Our assessment--and that has been backed
    up by independent assessments--is that a moderate risk force is
    220 bombers, of which 145 would be B-21's.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        General, Missouri is also home to the 139th airlift wing,
    which does incredible work to ensure that the joint force has
    the tactical airlift it needs. We are very proud of that as
    well. Can you tell us how you see the Air National Guard
    airlift with units like the 139th enabling distributed
    operations in the Indo-Pacific and Europe?
        General Goldfein. That unit, like all of our Guard units--
    that is one of the beauties of the way the Air Force is
    organized. You know, when I have traveled around as the Air
    Component Commander in Central Command, I would go to the
    cockpit of a C-17 or a C-130, and I would say, okay, who is
    Active, who is Guard, who is Reserve? And all three hands would
    go up. Such is the nature of how we are integrated.
        We could not do the Nation's business without our Guard and
    Reserve. Could not do it.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about modernizing the C-130H
    and the expanding number of C-130J's. How might doing those
    things for the Air National Guard enable those units to support
    the kind of operations we have been talking about?
        General Goldfein. Well, both in the C-130J, which is just a
    phenomenal weapon system--I think we are running out of letters
    in the alphabet for the C-130. So the C-130J is just
    incredible. The upgrades we are doing on the C-130H with the
    new avionics is going to keep that weapon system flying as
    well.
        When we get back to Senator Hirono's point about agile
    combat employment, part of your ability to be able to move to
    win is your tactical lift. We are taking a fresh look at where
    do the C-130's live and how do they play relative to being able
    to move very quickly around a battlefield. I think that is
    going to become more important as we go forward.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        Let me ask you about the LRASM missiles. The fiscal year
    2021 budget, General, says the Air Force is planning to buy, I
    think, 129 LRASMs between now and fiscal year 2025. I am just
    curious. Does the Air Force have any other advanced anti-ship
    weapons in its inventory besides the LRASMs?
        General Goldfein. That is the only one I can talk about in
    the unclassified realm, and I will tell you, sir, that the
    munitions story is actually a really good news story. Based on
    additional money that was given to us, we have been able to
    grow the munitions bins and some preferred munitions in ways
    that we have not done for years. Just to give you an example,
    in fiscal year 2018, we were at 44 percent for JDAMs. We are
    now at 88 percent. Just to give you an example of how we have
    done the munitions bins.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you just about the LRASMs in
    particular. Considering the vital role that they play,
    particularly in defeating Chinese surface forces, do you think
    129 is enough? Do we need to be buying more?
        General Goldfein. We always need to be buying more. Sir, I
    will tell you that we balanced that against all the other
    requirements. Right now, I will tell you that some of the
    lowest stock numbers we have are in air-to-air missiles, and so
    we have been focusing there recently.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you--General, shifting topics
    just slightly. Over the last 5 years, the Air Force has, I
    think, pretty dramatically improved its ability to conduct
    distributed operations in the European theater. Is it fair to
    say that a lot of those improvements were made possible by the
    European Deterrence Initiative? Is that a fair statement?
        General Goldfein. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Can you just speak just briefly about how
    EDI has helped the Air Force adopt a more resilient posture in
    Europe?
        General Goldfein. So the Army focused on prepositioned
    stocks. We focused on access and basing because an air force is
    expected in the operational plan to arrive quickly because we
    can fly into theater, halt enemy activity, and stabilize the
    situation for follow-on activity. So therefore we need bases
    that we can operate from. So we put our money into access and
    basing, and that has allowed us to have a much larger
    footprint.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
        I will just say, Mr. Chairman, this is why I continue to
    believe that something similar to a dedicated funding stream is
    vital for INDOPACOM. Thank you.
        Thank you, General. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am not sure to whom to address this question, but I am
    curious about $77 million for Space Force OCO. I think of OCO
    as overseas contingency operations. Are we 77 million people up
    in space? I am just curious. What is the $77 million for OCO
    for Space Force?
        Secretary Barrett. Well, in just our conference, it seems
    likely that is places like Thule, the Arctic. Alaska is
    considered OCO, so those would be----
        Senator King. People manning space-related facilities? Is
    that what we are talking about?
        Secretary Barrett. So the space-related facilities and the
    manning of them.
        Senator King. If you could give me a little more robust
    information, I would appreciate it.
        Secretary Barrett. I would be happy to.
        Senator King. Madam Secretary, how are we doing on the
    sustainment cost of the F-35? Are we going to be able to afford
    to keep it?
        Secretary Barrett. It is one of the topics of great
    attention. It is being driven down, but it is, from our
    perspective, too slowly and still too high. We have a
    commitment that by the year 2025, it would be at $25,000 per
    hour, and we anticipate that that will be achieved.
        Senator King. But you continue to make this a priority? It
    is a serious ongoing issue. We are not going to be able to
    sustain this important asset indefinitely at the kind of costs
    that we are talking about now.
        Secretary Barrett. Agreed.
        General Goldfein. Sir, if I could jump in as well. I met
    with the CEO for Lockheed Martin and all the CEOs who are
    partners in this and told them that the current flying hour
    costs are unaffordable, and the sustainment enterprise was not
    scaled to the size of the fleet. So we worked through about a 3
    to 4-month sprint both with the Joint Program Office and the
    company, and I went to Lockheed and walked through all the
    things they are doing in the sustainment enterprise. I will
    tell you that they made some significant changes to the point
    where I am more confident that we are going to be able to drive
    to that lower flying hour cost than we were 6 months ago.
        Senator King. Could you supply for the Committee some data
    and material on this issue?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Because I think it is one we just do not want
    to let it get away from us.
        General Goldfein. I would be happy to.
        Senator King. Madam Secretary, I noticed there is an
    increase in end strength of about 1,500 people. I hope some of
    those are maintenance personnel because I understand that is a
    bottleneck in terms of readiness. How are we doing on
    maintenance personnel, techs to keep these airplanes flying?
        Secretary Barrett. Historically that has been a confining
    topic. Some good news is that in the Active Duty Force, our
    maintainers are up to speed. At this point, we are still
    working on the Guard and Reserve account.
        Senator King. How are we doing on recruiting? Are you
    meeting goals? General?
        General Goldfein. We are, sir.
        The good news on that on the maintenance is we have
    actually filled in what was a 4,000 shortfall. We got that down
    to zero. We still have some work to do in the Guard and Reserve
    on maintainers.
        When it comes to recruiting, we are meeting our numbers.
    One of the things we have done recently is we have gone to
    total force recruiting. We pooled Guard and Reserve and active
    into one recruiting command, and so now when you go to a strip
    mall, you do not see three different storefronts. You see one,
    United States Air Force. Because, quite frankly, for the
    Secretary and I, when a young man or woman wants to join the
    Air Force, we do not really care which component they join.
    They are joining us.
        Senator King. Because we have an integrated force in
    reality.
        General Goldfein. Because it is an integrated force.
        Senator King. Now, the Army is doing some work on
    diversifying the geography of their recruiting. As you know, in
    New England or in the northeast, there are very few military
    facilities left, and we really do not want the military to be
    regionalized. Are you attending to that issue?
        General Goldfein. We are, sir, and we are also looking at
    it especially through how do we hire civilians. You gave us
    authority to direct hire civilians faster, and so this is a
    competitive market. This is a fight for talent, and so now with
    those authorities, we are able to go to universities, many of
    them in New England, and direct hire folks into the Air Force.
    Especially I think as Chief Raymond looks at how he builds the
    Space Force, there are some really creative things that we
    might be able to do there with the authorities that you have
    given us.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, and if you need additional
    authorities or if there are other bottlenecks, let us know.
        One final question. General Lyons was here a week or 2 ago
    and talked about the impending gap in refueling capacity, which
    he identified as one of the most serious threats that we face.
    We cannot project power unless we have refueling capacity. Is
    there a plan? How are we going to meet that 5- to 7-year
    problem that appears to be imminent?
        General Goldfein. So the first thing is, in terms of
    mitigation, we have committed to him and the Secretary of
    Defense that if we were in a major contingency, every KC-46
    would be put into the fight. We are comfortable that it is
    capable of doing operations in a high-end fight.
        Senator King. Even with the deficiency.
        General Goldfein. Even with the deficiency. I would not put
    it into day-to-day operations, but I would put it in a high end
    fight.
        When we took a look at the retirement numbers, what we are
    talking about is 3 percent of the entire KC-135 fleet. We are
    managing risk across the board. We are managing shortages in
    bombers, tankers, ISR, fighters, command and control, and so
    tankers is one area that we are having to manage, and so that
    is why in the beginning, I mentioned that that was one of the
    most difficult decisions we had to make end game was to ask for
    us to take risk in the tanker business.
        Senator King. I appreciate--and I had asked some General
    Lyons some further backup on the plans----
        General Goldfein. Yes.
        Senator King.--because for want of a nail, the horse was
    lost--you know, the battle. We do not want to lose a battle
    because we cannot get our airmen and their horses to the
    battlefront.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. General, we talked about this earlier, and
    Senator King brought it back up. The Ranking Member and I are
    just wondering. The refueling can be done. It is just trickier?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So I flew in the airplane
    twice, and let me describe it for you.
        Senator Wicker. Did you do a refueling?
        General Goldfein. We did. Actually I refueled a C-17. I got
    to fly the remote visual system, got to see it in all different
    lighting conditions.
        There are operational workarounds that allow me to tell you
    that I would put it in the fight, but I would not accept that
    aircraft today in terms of what we are paying the company to
    deliver, and so what happens is that the receptacle on the
    airplane, at the last 10 feet or so as you are now trying to
    connect with an airplane, the last 10 feet, it is difficult for
    the boom operator to actually focus in and see those last 10
    feet. So we are seeing more strikes around the receptacle
    before it actually plugs in.
        The worse case conditions would be blue skies, sun at your
    back because what happens is there is a glare that now bounces
    off the airplane that makes it harder to see. Well, you check
    about 20 degrees away, and you can mitigate that risk. But I
    ought not be having to mitigate that risk in daily operations.
    We ought to get what we paid for.
        Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I flew the boom on a tanker
    once.
        Senator Wicker. That does not give me a comfort level.
        Senator King. No. It will because there was not another
    airplane attached.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Wicker. If the other Senators will defer to Senator
    Reed.
        Senator Reed. Just to very briefly. There are two aspects
    to this. One if flying the tanker. The other is the aircraft
    that is approaching to refuel.
        General Goldfein. Right.
        Senator Reed. If we are not training on a regular basis
    these aircraft to refuel with the KC-46, to suddenly put it
    into the fight is not going to be particularly effective
    because all the other aircraft will be coming up there for the
    first time, and it will be a problem.
        General Goldfein. These airplanes, though, sir, will be
    involved in tests. So they will be doing refueling as we work
    through the tests of the fix that we are hoping to get to. So
    we would not be starting nor would I put a crew in that was not
    trained for the mission. In terms of mitigation on why we would
    retire some tankers, part of the mitigation is that we would
    put the KC-46 into the fight.
        Senator Reed. This is a continuing conversation, but the
    concern I have, just briefly, is that in the fight, which will
    be sudden and quick and now these aircraft, the KC-46, is
    suddenly a primary refueler, you would have literally hundreds
    of aircraft and pilots who have never approached this before.
    That is not the way you usually operate.
        Senator Wicker. They would have in training. Would they
    not?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. But I will tell you if you are
    up at the receiver, quite frankly I have refueled on every
    different kind of tanker out there, plus I have refueled on
    remote visual systems off a Dutch tanker. When you are on the
    receiving end, all you need is a stable boom. Because you are
    training on refueling all the time, the boom is the boom is the
    boom. It is not going to matter that much for the receiver. We
    just got to make sure that when that fighter, bomber, what have
    you comes off and they are low on gas and they are in really
    bad territory like I have been that that connection happens and
    they get the fuel passed that they need.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you for allowing us to interject
    there.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Goldfein, I do want to thank you, like many others,
    for your exceptional service to our Nation. I think you are
    going to be sorely missed, and you really, really, really have
    done a great job. I do hope you come back, and I appreciated
    the breakfast and the briefings just a couple of weeks ago as
    well.
        Madam Secretary, we look forward to getting you to Alaska,
    hosting you. The whole State is looking forward to having you
    up there. You will see why Billy Mitchell called it the most
    strategic place in the world, see our great airmen and JPARC.
    You can probably see Russia too if it is a clear day. So we are
    really looking forward to that.
        I am going to continue the theme here on the KC-46. This
    might be a really dumb, basic question, but for now, just
    following up on this discussion we just had, like is there any
    way to just take the boom hardware from the KC-135? I mean,
    that works. You cannot do that as an interim replacement until
    they figure out what the heck--you know, as Senator Shaheen
    said, time is of the essence. You said it. But 4 years does not
    seem like time is of the essence. Is there no fix to help? I
    mean, the KC-135 is a workhorse. It works pretty well.
        General Goldfein. Sir, there is no option to just swapping
    the boom because the boom is not the problem. The visual system
    that allows the boom operator to be able to connect with the
    receiver is the problem. So what we have to have----
        Senator Sullivan. You cannot use a KC-135.
        General Goldfein. No.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        General Goldfein. No, because in the 135 there is a huge
    window in the back where the boom operator is laying down
    looking at----
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask on the other issue. You will
    not be surprised to hear my continuing advocacy on the issue,
    but it is not just me. On the OCONUS bed-down decision on the
    KC-46. You know, this Committee has weighed in in a number of
    NDAAs--so the Congress has weighed in because they become law--
    talking about characteristics. General Goldfein, I raised this
    in the last hearing. You know, strategic location, the ability
    to serve several COCOMs, how the air combat power, 24/7 NORAD
    mission that routinely intercepts Russian bombers, world class
    training, three Red Flag exercises a year, 100 fifth generation
    fighters, C-17, C-130's, F-16's. These are all characteristics
    that this Committee has said are important.
        I just had breakfast this morning with the SECDEF. He in
    his confirmation hearing mentioned that you collocate 100 fifth
    generation fighters and KC-46's in a very strategic location,
    that would send the message of extreme strategic reach to our
    adversaries, particularly our great power adversaries.
        Do either of you care to comment on this upcoming decision
    as it relates to these congressionally mandated
    characteristics, which certainly favor in my view one of the
    locations you are looking at?
        Secretary Barrett. My ability--in the line of decision-
    making, I will await the input and analysis. But those, no
    doubt, are going to be elements that will be considered.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Just building on that--and again, General Lyons recently
    testified--it just last week I think. As you have already
    heard, he said the air refueling fleet--that is the most
    stressed capability and number one readiness concern, the
    ability to deploy the force across all national defense
    strategy mission areas.
        Again, to me, if you put the KC-46's in a place that can
    strategically reach not just PACOM, but PACOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM,
    NORTHCOM, which is what Alaska presents, it helps with that
    stress. I think that is actually an important concern.
        Would either of you care to comment on that? He did in the
    classified briefing, just for the record. You can take a look
    at what he said, which was I think along the lines of what I
    have been arguing.
        General Goldfein. No, sir. I would align with that.
        Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary, do you want to wave that
    one off too?
        Secretary Barrett. No further comment on it.
        Senator Sullivan. Just as you are making the decision, take
    a look at his testimony also I think helps.
        General Goldfein and Madam Secretary, I just want one final
    quick question on the JPARC and the fifth generation center of
    excellence. You know, I just asked my staff. I did not know
    that numbers are this big, but as you probably know, JPARC is
    13 times larger than Nellis, and as we have increasing offsets
    that are needed for good training with the fifth generation
    aircraft and the ability to expand that air space, which in
    Alaska we are doing, and it is not that controversial as it is
    in the Lower 48 to expand air space. Can you comment on that?
        General Goldfein. Sure. I will just say it is critical
    strategic terrain, and the larger air space becomes more
    important as we end up engaging at longer ranges, which is what
    fifth generation is all about and what comes after that. So I
    see actually more of an effort to ensure that we can replicate
    the higher end threat at JPARC and Nellis and Utah in these
    ranges.
        The good news is that software-defined radios are giving us
    more inexpensive ways of replicating higher end threats, which
    has been challenging in the past. So one of the things we are
    looking at right now is how do we scale very quickly in that
    range space to put a robust array out to be able to replicate a
    high end threat. I think over the next couple of years we are
    going to be able to do it.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here, and, General Goldfein, I
    wish you the very best in what I hope is just a change of jobs,
    not a real retirement.
        But I want to start back maybe on the KC-46. We know we are
    going to have some down at Seymour Johnson. We have got the
    hangar project. I know that it was originally slated for later
    this year--where we are with the hangar project, where we are
    with the deployment. There was one project that was affected
    with some of the reprogramming of the MILCON money. I think it
    was a relatively low dollar item, but I believe it did have to
    do with the ultimate deployment of the tankers. So if I can get
    an update on that, I would appreciate it.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Right now I have not been
    briefed that it would have any impact on the bed-down timing,
    but let me take that to make sure. Can I get back to you?
        Senator Tillis. Yes. I know at the time that we were going
    through those discussions, it did not look like it was on the
    critical path. I would like to know when it would be as we work
    to backfill that funding. Thank you.
        I know that we recently, I think as recently as last week,
    put out the tenant bill of rights for our military housing
    situation. It looks like it may be a good start, but there are
    some who feel like it needs to go further. Can you give me an
    update specifically with Air Force, what progress we are making
    and what priority this is for you. Secretary Barrett?
        Secretary Barrett. It is a very high priority. My first
    visit as Secretary was to go to a base and to do a walk-through
    of housing. I have gone through a number of base housing
    facilities and have been very much involved in this process.
        We signed out the bill of rights, but only 15 of the 18
    elements. The three elements that were not on the bill of
    rights, in contrast with what were the directed 18, were three
    things that we could not unilaterally do. They were mandate the
    disclosure of maintenance records back 7 years. In some cases,
    there are not 7 years of records, so we have to work on that.
    The dispute resolution technique, because again in some cases
    the housing provider has bonds that they cannot reach in the
    dispute resolution process. The third item is withholding of
    the rent. So those three items we are working through as a
    contractual matter, and we will anticipate having solutions to
    those as well as time goes on.
        In the meantime, we are withholding payments to these
    contractors, in some cases, significant amounts of payments. So
    there is a financial involvement. We I believe do have their
    attention at this point, and there is apparently a good faith
    effort to move this forward.
        Senator Tillis. Very good. After the NDAA, I know that you
    all tried to move forward with the promulgation of the tenant
    bill of rights. We are looking for feedback on additional
    things that we should put into this NDAA to help us get rid of
    what I think is an unacceptable situation with a lot of our
    military families in housing. So thank you for that.
        One other parochial issue and if I have time, I may have
    one other question, otherwise I will submit it for the record.
    North Carolina has the most historically black colleges and
    universities is the Nation. We have 11. We have the largest at
    NCA&T, and we have the most affordable down at Elizabeth City
    State. They have got a program specifically focused on aviation
    science. They are doing a good job there. They have got a great
    collaboration with the Coast Guard. We are working right now to
    help out with maybe some runway upgrades, and they also have
    the college student pre-commissioning initiative there that I
    think has been very good for talent building.
        One thing that I would be interested in getting your
    commitment to is just considering whether or not we could have
    an Air Force ROTC program down there, just to take a look at
    it. I had some of my staff down visiting with the chancellor
    recently. It is an impressive program. We have got a record of
    collaboration with the Coast Guard and I would like you all to
    give that a look. Can I get your commitment to take a look at
    that?
        Secretary Barrett. Full commitment.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Last thing. I will submit the question I had on the EQ-4
    and some movement to manned versus unmanned platforms for the
    record.
        I got a great briefing from the Army on their taking
    advantage of some of the provisions in the NDAA around talent
    management. They look like they are really moving aggressively.
    Can you all give me an idea of how we are going to look a year
    from now or in the coming months with the Air Force?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are going through the largest
    overhaul of our officer talent management and enlisted talent
    management since about the early 1980s. So, not only are we
    using technology for the purposes of managing career paths, but
    we have busted the single line of the Air Force promotion
    category into six categories. We are defining what behaviors
    that we desire and what constitutes a competitive career for
    the purposes of promotion. So a year from now, it is not going
    to look anything like it does today.
        Senator Tillis. Good. If we can get an opportunity, I would
    love to have maybe a briefing in the office. I thought it was
    very helpful for us to do that. We can get into greater detail.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both.
        Senator Wicker. And thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Thank you to our distinguished witnesses. We look forward
    to continue working with you.
        This marks the conclusion of our hearing, and the hearing
    is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                               talent management
        1. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, the National Defense Strategy
    called for ``broad revision of talent management among the Armed
    Services.'' The Army has taken the lead on this effort by deploying its
    Talent Management Task Force. When should we expect to see a similar
    shift in Air Force culture and subsequent execution of Air Force talent
    management reform?
        Secretary Barrett. Over the past several years, the Air Force has
    implemented significant changes and new processes to its talent
    management system. Similar to the Army's Talent Management Task Force,
    the Air Force has the Talent Management Innovation Cell: a small, full-
    time team focused on creating innovative adjustments to policy and
    procedures to drive mission-focused behaviors and cultural change.
        One of our first moves revolutionized the assignment matching
    process with a new platform called Talent Marketplace. Modeled after
    the Nobel Prize winning National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), this
    platform created greater transparency, agility, and responsiveness in
    how we manage assignments while increasing each airman's voice and
    optimizing how we develop and employ our talent.
        Additionally, this past year we established six distinct
    competitive categories for active component field grade line officers.
    The new structure builds developmental agility to meet evolving mission
    needs, ultimately providing our joint partners and allies with better
    professional warfighters across our full spectrum of capabilities. The
    change also recognizes and caters to the need to deliver the
    appropriate education, training and unique career field experiences to
    build the bench of officers we need at all levels. This was the first
    major change to the officer development and promotion process since the
    establishment of the Air Force as a separate service in 1947.
        Another significant change made last year was implementing a board
    only process by removing the testing requirement for enlisted personnel
    meeting E-7 thru E-9 promotion boards. This optimizes our ability to
    select the best senior noncommissioned officers based on the whole-
    person concept, with emphasis on performance. Similarly, for officers,
    this year we will exercise the authority to re-order officer promotion
    lists based on merit, helping us incentivize performance on a much
    greater scope than previously possible. Through all of this, we are
    modernizing our performance evaluation systems to better assess airmen
    according to what we value in performance; provide better insight into
    performance through lifetime evaluator averages; and yield more
    transparent feedback to airmen.
               air force rotc at elizabeth city state university
        2. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, North Carolina has the most
    Historically Black College and University (HBCU) out of any state. Of
    our 11 HBCUs, Elizabeth City State University offers a four-year
    Bachelor of Science in Aviation Science Program that produces pilots,
    navigators, avionic technicians, and flight instructors to name a few.
    Elizabeth City State University and the U.S. Air Force could benefit in
    a myriad of ways with an Air Force ROTC Program. Do I have your
    commitment to consider establishing an Air Force ROTC program at
    Elizabeth City State University?
        Secretary Barrett. I am pleased to let you know this year Air Force
    Junior ROTC has partnered with Elizabeth City State University,
    enabling the Air Force to capitalize on the school's great aviation
    programs and continue to develop tomorrow's aviators. The Air Force is
    committed to diversity in our programs and currently has formal
    relationships with 46 HBCU's nationwide. This includes seven host Air
    Force ROTC Detachments and 39 cross-town relationships. North Carolina
    is well represented and leads in this area with two HBCU hosts
    (Fayetteville State University and North Carolina A&T State University)
    and six HBCU cross-town relationships.
                                  isr programs
        3. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, what is the replacement costs
    of the EQ-4 for a similar but manned platform, the EQ-11? Particularly,
    how is the MQ-9 Reaper and its longevity affected by this program
    replacement?
        Secretary Barrett. The cost to procure an E-11A Bombardier Global
    6000 aircraft and integrate the Battlefield Airborne Communications
    Node (BACN) payload onto the aircraft is $101.9 million. There is no
    correlation between the E-11A and the MQ-9 mission sets, thus there is
    no impact to MQ-9.
        The E-11A has multiple advantages over the EQ-4B to include
    operational flexibility allowing rapid deployments to anywhere in the
    world with a runway greater than 6,500 feet; the capacity to double its
    current payload size as new warfighter requirements emerge; and it has
    ample available power supply (four 40 kVA generators on E-11A versus
    one 25 kVA generator on an EQ-4B) to operate a larger and more capable
    payload. The EQ-4B requires time consuming mission planning and site
    setup to deploy, and it offers no additional space and power for
    equipment.

        4. Senator Tillis. Secretary Barrett, if we are expanding the
    mission set of EQ-11s, how will this affect their planned service life/
    longevity, lifecycle of logistics, and survivability?
        Secretary Barrett. The E-11 role will not significantly increase,
    even with the retirement of EQ-4 Block 20, since it flies the majority
    of BACN support today. Retiring the EQ-4 remotely piloted aircraft in
    favor of the E-11A manned platform consolidates the current mixed
    fleet. A single aircraft fleet will provide enhanced capability and
    improved reliability to combatant commanders and reduce operating
    costs. Our budget request procures five additional E-11A aircraft at a
    rate of one per year, purchases/integrates BACN payload capability, and
    provides initial maintenance and sustainment support as required. The
    E-11A is more suited to the BACN mission and is survivable in this
    role.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                             tyndall air force base
        5. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, can you give us an update on
    the rebuilding efforts at Tyndall AFB after the devastation of
    Hurricane Michael?
        Secretary Barrett. Rebuilding efforts at Tyndall Air Force Base are
    on schedule. We are spending over $362 million in Facility Sustainment,
    Restoration, and Modernization-funded, in-progress, repair projects,
    and the installation is transitioning from planning and design to
    acquisition of the $3 billion military construction program this
    spring. We expect to begin awarding construction contracts later this
    year. The Tyndall Program Management Office is closely monitoring what
    effects COVID-19 will have on reconstruction timelines; for now,
    reconstruction continues to proceed.

        6. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force still plan
    to make the rebuilt Tyndall a more modern and technologically-advanced
    base, and do you have the resources for that?
        Secretary Barrett. We will rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base as the
    Air Force's first Twenty First Century Installation. The base will
    benefit from modern construction techniques and the rebuild will
    incorporate advanced technologies. The end state will result in an
    installation resilient to future climatic threats. Presently, the Air
    Force is resourced to deliver the new Tyndall Air Force Base, but will
    keep Congress informed as contractor bids open this summer.
                                military housing
        7. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, can you give me an update on
    the base housing problems and how the solutions are working out to
    date?
        Secretary Barrett. The most important part of taking care of our
    airmen and space professionals and their families is providing a safe,
    secure environment for them to live and work. We continue to work
    closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other
    Services to share ideas, develop policies, and implement strategies to
    improve housing for our Service Members. Since my 3 December 2019
    hearing before this Committee, we have taken a number of steps to
    address housing concerns through our Military Housing Privatization
    Initiative Improvement Program. This program includes five lines of
    effort: empower residents, integrate leadership, improve
    communications, improve oversight, and standardize policies. Air Force
    leadership reviews a 51 item action plan on a weekly basis and we have
    addressed 38 (74 percent) of the actions to date. We will complete nine
    additional items in 2020, and complete the final four by March 2021.
        Empower Residents
        As of 3 April 2020, the Air Force toll-free housing call center has
    received 49 calls from residents and has resolved all but one issue,
    which is still being worked. As of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of our
    63 installations can submit work orders electronically, and residents
    at 60 of our 63 installations can view the current status of their work
    order requests online. We are working with the other project owners to
    provide those capabilities at the remaining sites.
        In our fiscal year 2020 budget, we added a Resident Advocate
    position at each installation with more than 100 housing units. We
    classified and funded these positions in January 2020, and
    installations are currently in the process of hiring.
        Integrate Leadership
        We continue to emphasize that the health and safety of members is
    commander's business and we have codified commander roles and
    responsibilities in the new Air Force Instruction on housing published
    on 18 March 2020.
        Additionally, the Air Force is negotiating a revised incentive fee
    structure that raises the bar for project performance and provides a
    greater voice to installation commanders in determining whether project
    performance warrants the payment of incentive fees.
        Improve Communications
        The Air Force is revising the annual resident satisfaction survey
    to ensure residents are being asked consistent and precise questions
    about their experiences with privatized housing. Effective this year,
    the Air Force, rather than project owners, will administer the annual
    resident satisfaction survey, thereby allowing the Air Force greater
    visibility into the survey process and results.
        The Air Force revised its housing policies to require clear
    identification of the Military Housing Office staff, established
    Resident Councils, and clarified roles and responsibilities of the Air
    Force Military Housing Office personnel, project owner personnel, and
    Resident Advocates.
        Improve Oversight
        Our fiscal year 2020 budget also adds 148 new permanent positions
    for the Military Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the
    entire privatized housing portfolio. Those new positions have been
    added to the installation's unit manning documents and hiring is
    underway.
        Quality and Performance Challenges
        In October 2019, the Air Force directed Balfour Beatty Communities,
    LLC (BBC) to submit a performance improvement plan to address its
    maintenance and work order practices at each of the 21 Air Force
    installations it manages. The Air Force approved the plan in February
    2020, and the Air Force will hold face-to-face progress reviews of the
    plan to ensure compliance and meaningful implementation and
    improvement.
        We have identified a fourth installation where facility design,
    construction, or materials are a key contributor to moisture and mold
    growth: Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. The Air Force now has
    additional oversight resources at four installations--Randolph Air
    Force Base, Texas; Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; Keesler Air Force
    Base, Mississippi; and MacDill Air Force Base, Florida--to assist in
    ongoing housing quality improvement efforts.
        At MacDill Air Force Base, Clark Realty has experienced systemic
    moisture issues due to breaches or a lack of vapor barriers in 241
    housing units constructed by the Air Force prior to privatization.
    Since 2017, Clark Realty has treated the mold and completed $4.7
    million in repair projects to correct the underlying causes of systemic
    moisture issues in 294 homes. An additional 68 homes are scheduled for
    repair with work to be completed in 2022 at a cost of $6.8 million.
    Additionally, the Air Force has put a Corrective Action Plan in place
    at MacDill to address work quality issues.

        8. Senator Scott. Secretary Barrett, the Tenant's Bill of Rights
    falls short of the expectations we laid out in last year's NDAA. Air
    Force families in Florida have faced and are still facing numerous
    problems with base housing. What are you doing to make sure military
    families are being fully supported?
        Secretary Barrett. On February 25, 2020, I joined the Secretary of
    Defense and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy in jointly issuing the
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative Tenant Bill of Rights. In
    doing so, we committed to work expeditiously to develop the processes
    to implement 15 of the 18 tenant rights established by the Fiscal Year
    2020 NDAA, to work with the project owners to incorporate these rights
    into appropriate legal documents, and to ensure all tenants are aware
    of their rights. Fourteen of these fifteen tenant rights are now
    available to our tenants. The remaining right is an electronic work
    order system for tenant requests; this capability is available at 61 of
    63 Air Force installations and will be available at the remaining two
    installations by 1 October 2020. The remaining three rights require
    additional work. Specifically, maintenance history, dispute resolution,
    and withholding of rent present implementation challenges as they
    require project owner, bond holder, and investor consent. We are also
    working closely with the DOD, the other Services, and project owners in
    an effort to implement these rights as expeditiously as possible.
        Since my 3 December 2019 hearing before this Committee, we have
    made progress on several additional measures to ensure military
    families have safe and habitable housing. Perhaps most significantly,
    in our fiscal year 2020 budget and as supported by the NDAA, we have
    added a Resident Advocate position at each of our installations with
    more than 100 housing units to assist our military residents with
    disputes, to connect them to the proper resources for their various
    needs, to include Exceptional Family Member Programs, and to
    communicate their needs to the installation leadership team. These
    positions were classified and funded in January and installations are
    in the hiring process at this time.
        Our fiscal year 2020 budget also added 148 permanent positions to
    our Military Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the
    privatized housing portfolio. Those positions have been added to the
    installation's unit manning documents and they are hiring the permanent
    personnel at this time.
        The Air Force toll free housing call center has been in place since
    May 2019 and as of 3 April 2020 has received 47 calls from residents,
    resolving all but 1 issue which is still being worked.
        We have also been working with project owners to ensure residents
    can submit work orders electronically and can view the status of their
    work order requests. As of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of 63
    installations can submit work orders electronically and residents at 60
    of our 63 installations can view the current status of their work order
    requests on-line. We are working with other project owners to provide
    these capabilities at the remaining sites.
        Finally, the Air Force has developed a pamphlet for housing
    residents that provides information on dispute resolution resources (to
    include legal assistance), clarifies the availability of legal
    assistance, and provides contact information for legal assistance.
    Additionally, on 1 May 2020, the Air Force implemented an interim
    policy on displaced families.
        As we move forward in this endeavor, our focus will remain on
    oversight, sustainment, and the long-term success of the privatized
    housing portfolio in order to provide safe and healthy housing for our
    air and space professionals.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                     isr-t
        9. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what are the Air Force's plans
    for developing an ISR architecture that is persistent and resilient
    enough to provide targeting data for large numbers of targets near
    Taiwan in the early days of a potential war with China?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid
    Concept as part of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain
    Operations. The concept includes the need for a resilient architecture
    that supports numerous targets in a wide range of scenarios and
    integrates data from an assemblage of sensors, platforms, people,
    devices, content, and services. This architecture will deliver accurate
    and timely characterization of the environment, to include
    identification and tracking of targets, enabling the Joint Force to
    maintain decision advantage during joint operations. In order to fully
    build out the concept, we are evaluating technologies against a range
    of threats in a range of scenarios through studies, modeling and
    simulation, experiments, and recurring combatant command-sponsored
    demonstrations. As our ``build, demonstrate, and adapt'' approach is
    getting underway, it will help us realize a Sensing Grid and Joint-All
    Domain Command and Control vision preparing the USAF for the next war
    rather than for a specific war.

        10. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what is the right mix of
    stealth and attritable assets in an ISR architecture that is persistent
    and resilient enough to provide targeting data for large numbers of
    targets near Taiwan in the early days of a potential war with China?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid
    Concept as part of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain
    Operations. The concept will also require a yet undetermined mix of
    stealth, attritable, and manned/unmanned platforms to characterize
    numerous targets in an equally wide range of scenarios. We are
    evaluating technologies against various threats in a range of military
    operations under various environmental constraints. Studies, modeling
    and simulation, experiments, and recurring combatant command sponsored
    demonstrations will inform what the right mix is to enable the Sensing
    Grid concept and Joint-All Domain Command and Control vision. This will
    prepare the USAF for the next war rather than for a specific war.
                           advanced anti-ship weapons
        11. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, what advanced anti-ship
    weapons does the Air Force have in its inventory besides LRASM?
        General Goldfein. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is the only
    anti-ship weapon in the Air Force inventory.

        12. Senator Hawley. General Goldfein, how many non-LRASM advanced
    anti-ship weapons does the Air Force have or plan to procure within the
    FYDP?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force does not plan to procure additional
    non-LRASM advanced anti-ship weapons within the FYDP. LRASM is the sole
    anti-ship weapon the Air Force is procuring.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                     f-35a
        13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, given the importance of
    the F-35A for the Air Force, I was pleased to see that the Air Force
    included procurement funding for 12 additional F-35A aircraft on its
    unfunded priorities list. But if the F-35A is such a priority, why is
    the Department diverting $156 million in F-35A advanced procurement
    funding--already appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 2020--to the
    border wall?
        Secretary Barrett. Although the Air Force cannot speak to OSD
    priorities, the $156 million for F-35A advanced procurement were un-
    executable fiscal year 2020 dollars and therefore had no significant
    impacts on F-35 procurement timelines.

        14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, how will this diversion
    increase risk to procurement timelines for the F-35A?
        Secretary Barrett. We do not foresee any increased risk to
    procurement timelines.

        15. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, how will this impact the
    readiness of our fifth-generation fleet?
        Secretary Barrett. We do not foresee any impacts to the F-22 or F-
    35A fleets at this time.

        16. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, as adversaries like
    Russia and China build their 5th generation aircraft inventories, do
    you believe the air superiority the Air Force has previously enjoyed is
    challenged?
        General Goldfein. While adversary build-up of 5th generation
    aircraft doesn't preclude our ability to gain and maintain air
    superiority in and of itself, it does change the landscape and we
    should be mindful. Conceptually speaking, air superiority is much more
    involved than just aircraft platforms. This is why we remain focused on
    developing a family of capabilities that operate in and across the air,
    space, and cyberspace domains, so that we can wield air superiority at
    a time and place of our choosing.

        17. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on the
    role and capability that a 5th generation tactical fighter aircraft
    like the F-35A provides in a near peer fight?
        General Goldfein. The role and capabilities of the F-35A and F-22
    are critically important to U.S. success in a near peer fight. These
    weapons systems enable air dominance in highly contested battlespaces
    that challenge our legacy fleet. Fifth generation aircraft use stealth
    to enable freedom to maneuver where legacy systems cannot, and use
    sensor fusion to quickly and accurately locate and identify threats and
    increase battlespace awareness across multiple domains. All these
    capabilities are essential to enhance our lethality across the Joint
    operational spectrum.

        18. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on how our
    allies acquiring the F-35 facilitates interoperability, and strengthens
    our ability to deter and respond to the growing 5th generation fighter
    threat?
        General Goldfein. Integrated operations with allies and partners
    that employ the F-35 will be dramatically more lethal, survivable, and
    sustainable. A highly capable and connected force that can train and
    fight together with common capabilities and tactics is critical to
    outpacing and deterring our advancing adversaries.

        19. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, within our own Joint
    Force construct, can you speak to the capabilities gained by all the
    services moving to an F-35 variant and what advantages that affords us
    on the battlefield?
        General Goldfein. The F-35 is the quarterback of the joint force,
    using stealth and sensors to provide battlespace awareness for Joint,
    all-domain operations. With all three Services operating the F-35 we
    can deploy from main and forward operating air bases, the deck of an
    aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, or takeoff from austere
    locations and provide the Joint Force integrated fifth-generation
    combat power virtually anywhere on the globe.

        20. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, can you provide an
    update on the plan to improve the Advanced Pilot Training program and
    ensure our 5th Generation pilots remain ready and capable of operating
    the F-35A?
        Secretary Barrett. The Air Force is actively pursuing innovations
    to modernize pilot training in light of the changing capabilities
    provided by 5th generation aircraft, as well as changing student
    learning methods and adaptation of technology to learning. The Advanced
    Pilot Training program (APT-X) explores how incorporating the T-7 into
    undergraduate pilot training drives instructional changes. APT-X is in
    the developmental phase, currently focused on developing syllabus
    requirements. Rather than simply plugging the T-7 into the existing
    training structure, adapting instruction to the new aircraft
    capabilities will enable undergraduate pilot training to prepare
    students to meet changing operational needs.
                              c-130h modernization
        21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, last week, TRANSCOM
    Commander Gen Lyons testified that 60-70 percent of TRANSCOMs mobility
    capacity resides in the reserve component, including 50 percent of all
    tactical airlift. In 2006, the Air National Guard began exploring a
    modernization effort to install the NP-2000 propeller system made by
    Collins Aerospace in Windsor Locks onto the C-130H aircraft to
    modernize an outdated propulsion system. Over a decade later, the NP-
    2000 program has been implemented at a snails pace. As you know, the
    legacy propellers are the same propellers that failed on a Marine Corps
    KC-130T in 2017 causing the death of 17 of our servicemembers. Last
    year, I sent a letter along with 16 of my Senate colleagues to the
    department of the Air Force asking you to expedite the approval of the
    new blades for the Air National Guard C-130H fleet. The current
    modernization pace will have this effort completed by 2034, considering
    the risk and proven undependability of the legacy system, this is
    unacceptable. In light of previous mishaps and the subsequent
    revelation of the serious risk to our Air Force C-130H aircrews while
    flying the legacy propeller, what is the proposed timeline for
    installation of the NP-2000 propeller on the C-130Hs like the ones we
    have in Connecticut?
        Secretary Barrett. Currently the NP2000 program is approved to
    produce, install, and sustain 44 total C-130H aircraft. The Air Force
    has already modified 12 aircraft. NP2000 installations for the
    remaining 32 aircraft started in March 2020, beginning with the Air
    National Guard unit in Reno, Nevada. Modification schedules are based
    on deployment timelines and mission profiles. At current funding
    levels, we project completing these remaining 32 aircraft in fiscal
    year 2022. If we continue to receive funding at the current rate beyond
    that, we are projected to complete NP2000 installs on the remainder of
    the C-130H fleet (up to 115 additional aircraft) in fiscal year 2034.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, due to the risk
    associated with the legacy propeller, would you support an increase to
    3-4 aircraft per month if Congress appropriated additional funding to
    support the increased production costs?
        Secretary Barrett. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it
    is possible the Air Force could accelerate the modification.

        23. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, the fiscal year 2021
    President's Budget plans to retire 45 C-130Hs and 5 squadrons--4 in the
    Guard and 1 in the Air Force Reserves. What are the impacts to
    TRANSCOM's ability to meet the 300 tactical airlift identified by the
    Mobility Capability Requirements Study as required to meet the National
    Defense Strategy?
        General Goldfein. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
    2018 (MCRS-18) identified the current fleet of 300 Total Aircraft
    Inventory (TAI) as ``sufficient'' to meet the requirements of the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS). Within all AF core functional areas
    (as directed/guided by the NDS) there is a spectrum of risk that can be
    assessed based on simultaneity, theater specificity, and joint/
    coalition collaboration. Theater risk thresholds are currently being
    refined and will inform the congressionally mandated MCRS-20. United
    States Transportation Command (USTC) and the Air Force are working in
    concert to balance the risk we take in reducing the tactical airlift
    fleet with being able to reasonably meet NDS intent and theater
    requirements.
        The AF's decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300
    TAI is based on taking an acceptable amount of risk within this mission
    set (as established by MCRS-18 and as anticipated by MCRS-20
    preliminary findings) as well as the need/direction to focus resources
    on the future force and near-peer competition.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, can you expand on the
    rationale behind this decision and what risk is being assumed?
        General Goldfein. The NDS has provided clear guidance that our
    focus should be on winning the future fight against near-peer
    competition, and that we should not be funding programs on legacy
    platforms that do not contribute to that guidance. Specifically stated
    ``we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with
    yesterday's weapons or equipment'' (NDS, pg. 8)
        Investing in capabilities to win future high-end competition
    requires the Air Force to take risk in force structure that has a less
    defined role in high-end competition. Given the current capability of
    the tactical airlift fleet, the AF is taking a measured amount of
    acceptable risk that we believe is excess capacity in terms of the
    fleet's contribution to the future fight.
                    c-130j funding diversion to border wall
        25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, in addition to my
    concerns about C-130H modernization and the need for upgraded NP2000
    propellers in order to improve the safety of our Air National Guard
    aircrews, I am also deeply concerned about the diversion of
    congressionally-appropriated fiscal year 2020 funds for the C-130J. One
    hundred sixty-nine million dollars that will go to the border wall,
    instead of two cargo planes for the Air National Guard. The Adjutant
    General in Connecticut--General Evon--expressed that this diversion
    will negatively impact the Connecticut National Guard, and unfairly
    disadvantage the Air National Guard as a whole. In addition to
    supporting the tactical airlift required to meet the needs of the
    National Defense Strategy, the Air National Guard provides a unique
    capability to provide domestic support during natural disasters. What
    is the impact of the recent decision to divert $169 million of C-130J
    procurement funding to the border wall on the readiness and
    capabilities of the Air National Guard?
        Secretary Barrett. The diversion of C-130J procurement funding
    reduces the total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially
    delays the Air National Guard's ability to recapitalize a fourth
    operational C-130H unit to the C-130J. A basing action currently
    underway in the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process will recapitalize
    three of the ANG's existing 13 operational C-130H units.
        Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised
    of eight total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and
    one Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight
    preferred based on training/readiness, mission taskings and depot/
    modernization) is required in order to recapitalize a unit. Procurement
    totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at existing ANG
    C-130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit
    readiness. Mixing C-130Hs & C-130Js at the same unit is not feasible
    since C-130H and C-130J aircraft have significant differences and
    separate qualifications for Operations and Maintenance personnel.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, how will this decision
    degrade our ability to meet the 300 tactical airlift requirement
    identified to execute the National Defense Strategy?
        General Goldfein. The diversion of C-130J procurement funding
    reduces the total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially
    delays the Air National Guard's ability to recapitalize a fourth
    operational C-130H unit to the C-130J. A basing action currently
    underway in the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process will recapitalize
    three of the ANG's existing 13 operational C-130H units.
        Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised
    of eight total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and
    one Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight
    preferred based on training/readiness, mission taskings and depot/
    modernization) is required in order to recapitalize a unit. Procurement
    totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at existing ANG
    C-130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit
    readiness. Mixing C-130Hs & C-130Js at the same unit is not feasible
    since C-130H and C-130J aircraft have significant differences and
    separate qualifications for Operations and Maintenance personnel.The
    Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 (MCRS-18) identified
    the current fleet of 300 TAI as ``sufficient'' to meet the requirements
    of the NDS. Within all Air Force core functional areas (as directed/
    guided by the NDS) there is a spectrum of risk that can be assessed
    based on simultaneity, theater specificity, and joint/coalition
    collaboration. Theater risk thresholds are currently being refined and
    will inform the congressionally mandated MCRS-20. United States
    Transportation Command (USTC) and the Air Force are working in concert
    to balance the risk we take in reducing the tactical airlift fleet with
    being able to reasonably meet NDS intent and theater requirements.
        The AF's decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300
    TAI is based on taking an acceptable amount of risk within this mission
    set (as established by MCRS-18 and as anticipated by MCRS-20
    preliminary findings) as well as the need/direction to focus resources
    on the future force and near-peer competition.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, will this cut in funding
    impact the C-130H modernization efforts?
        General Goldfein. No. This TAI reduction does not change the Air
    Force's four-pronged approach to C-130H modifications (safety,
    compliance, modernization, partial recapitalization).

        28. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, given the constrained
    fiscal environment and recent cuts to the C-130J program, would you
    agree that C-130H modernization and the installation of the NP-2000 is
    a good way to meet National Defense Strategy requirements?
        General Goldfein. The NP-2000 propeller does not affect the Air
    Force's ability to meet the requirements of the National Defense
    Strategy.
                      hypersonic research and development
        29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, both Russia and China
    are developing credible hypersonic weapons programs that present
    significant challenges to the United States ability to maintain
    strategic deterrence. The fiscal year 2021 President's Budget allocates
    $3.2 billion towards the development of hypersonic weapons. The Navy,
    Army, and Air Force are all involved in the development of hypersonic
    weapons, including the Air Force's Hypersonic Conventional Strike
    Weapon and the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon. I am fully
    supportive of maintaining our qualitative edge in this technology, and
    accelerating hypersonic defense capabilities. From an oversight
    perspective, the rapid growth in hypersonic research has the potential
    to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
    capabilities and increase costs. I am very interested in how these
    efforts are being economized, how information is being shared between
    services, and your thoughts on the role hypersonic should play in the
    future of our National Defense Strategy. Given the lack of defined
    mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, can you speak to how the
    Air Force is conducting responsible and coordinated research,
    development, training, and evaluation to ensure that there are not
    redundant efforts in development and cost?
        Secretary Barrett. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is
    committed to minimizing redundant efforts in research, development,
    training, and evaluations by collaborating with the Department of the
    Army (DA), Department of the Navy (DON), Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
    Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), and Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon
    (ARRW), our flagship hypersonic weapon prototype program, is built upon
    a hypersonic glide vehicle made possible through decades of Air Force
    Research Laboratory (AFRL) Science and Technology (S&T) investment most
    recently matured through a joint AFRL/DARPA Tactical Boost Glide
    advanced development demonstration program. The ARRW program is
    dependent on the success of the Tactical Boost Glide program to deliver
    the glide vehicle which is concurrently being integrated with a
    tactical booster and warhead to demonstrate and deliver an
    operationally relevant prototype by fiscal year 2022. As part of the
    DAF/DARPA efforts, an Executive Steering Group has been developed to
    ensure an efficient transition of the glide vehicle design and test
    data to the ARRW prototyping program.
        To reduce the risk, the Air Force invested in a second hypersonic
    prototype, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW). This
    prototype was based on the flight-tested OSD Conventional Prompt Strike
    (CPS) Hypersonic Glide Vehicle and is also the basis of near term Army
    and Navy Hypersonic Weapon programs. To ensure cooperation and
    reduction in duplication or competition for scarce resources across the
    Services, the DAF signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between OSD,
    DA, DON, DAF, and MDA for Hypersonic Boost Glide Technology
    Development. The MOA created a multi-service and agency board of
    directors that has resulted in a sharing of knowledge, analysis, and
    test results, as well as early industry involvement to transition
    laboratory designs to industry for the CPS Hypersonic Glide Body. In
    fiscal year 2020, the DAF made a decision to halt HCSW after conclusion
    of the Critical Design Review and focus resources on ARRW. With the
    decision to halt the HCSW program, the DAF continues to support the
    Army Hypersonic Project Office by developing co-use agreements for the
    accredited HCSW classified Local Area Network/Wide Area Network and
    development infrastructure that currently connects the prime contractor
    Lockheed Martin facilities at Sunnyvale, Denver, and Huntsville.
        Additionally, the DAF works closely to harmonize S&T investments,
    critical test infrastructure investments, and lessons-learned across
    on-going hypersonics programs across the DOD.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, what are you doing to
    develop and implement an integrated science and technology roadmap for
    hypersonics that promotes information sharing?
        General Goldfein. The DAF has a robust continuing investment in S&T
    as well as a targeted acquisition-focused weapon prototype program. The
    Air Force Research Lab's (AFRL) High Speed Strike Weapon (HSSW)
    Technology Maturation portfolio manages a deliberate technology and
    experimentation investment in hypersonics. For example, in HSSW, AFRL
    is investing in multiple enabling technologies such as tactical solid
    rocket boosters; air-breathing hypersonic propulsion systems; fuzes for
    hypersonics applications; and guidance, navigation, and control
    components for hypersonic vehicles. These investments also include
    advanced technology demonstrations such as the AFRL/DARPA Tactical
    Boost Glide and the AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept
    development demonstration program.
        Furthermore, the DAF is working with OUSD(R&E) on the completion of
    the Hypersonics S&T Roadmap. The effort includes the combined S&T
    activities throughout the DOD from DAF, DA, DON, MDA, and DARPA to
    minimize duplication of efforts and ensure the services are informed
    investors across the FYDP.
        Finally, the DAF is working with academia and international
    partners to ensure collaboration amongst our national academic
    institutions and with our allies. In the S&T community, the Air Force
    Office of Scientific Research is leading the way with the Boundary
    Layer Transition (BOLT) project which looks to provide better design
    tools for hypersonic vehicles. BOLT consists of researchers from
    universities, NASA, and international partners such as The German
    Aerospace Center. Additionally, the DAF is partnering with OSD's Allied
    Partner Initiative to further develop the AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-
    Breathing Weapon Concept demonstrator towards a scramjet powered
    hypersonic weapon prototype.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General Goldfein, how do you assess that
    the fielding of offensive hypersonic weapons affect strategic
    stability?
        General Goldfein. Strategic stability fundamentally depends on the
    ability of the United States and its strategic competitors, China and
    Russia, to either deny the benefit of aggression or impose unacceptable
    costs. The nuclear deterrent capabilities of the United States, China,
    and Russia are the basis of strategic stability. My assessment is
    hypersonic weapons are unlikely to impact the effectiveness of our or
    their nuclear deterrence postures, and that strategic stability will be
    sustained even as hypersonic weapons are fielded.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Barrett, what more do you think
    that Congress should be doing to ensure that we are keeping pace with
    our near peer adversaries in hypersonics? Do you agree that we are
    approaching a ``hypersonics arms race'' with Russia or China?
        Secretary Barrett. Though the United States has a long history in
    hypersonic research and development, we may no longer maintain the
    technological advantage to field the first operational hypersonic
    weapon. China and Russia are developing and testing their own
    hypersonic weapons and are close to fielding an operational capability.
        The Air Force needs steady and predictable funding for the ARRW to
    stay on track to deliver an early operational capability in Fiscal Year
    2022, which we anticipate will be the Nation's first operational
    hypersonic weapon.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                           air force power projection
        33. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, please explain the concept of
    Agile Combat Employment.
        General Goldfein. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational
    concept, first championed by PACAF and now evolved across every MAJCOM,
    which enables distributed employment of air power. ACE focuses on the
    ability to disperse, recover, and rapidly resume operations in a
    contested or austere environment. It involves rapid deployment to a
    variety of locations, and involves a fusion of operations with command
    and control, logistics, protection, and base operating support
    functions. It is a modern effort facilitating a shift away from the
    hyper-efficient, specialized operations of recent decades towards the
    redundancy, resiliency, decentralized control and decentralized
    execution required to enable an effective campaign against a near-peer
    adversary.

        34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett, regarding Agile Combat
    Employment, what nations in the Pacific theater have been approached
    thus far as possible locations for these forward projected teams and
    assets?
        Secretary Barrett. At this time, we are examining and refining
    potential location options through analysis and wargaming support.
    Factors in play in the trade space are bases, force structure, platform
    ranges and Air Base Defense design among other factors. That said, the
    Air Force has already engaged key allies and partners like the FVEYs,
    Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore to discuss the Concepts of
    Operations for Agile Combat Employment and where opportunities may
    exist for aligning concepts and capabilities.

        35. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, will the Hawaii Air National
    Guard receive KC-46s or KC-Y/Z as backfills for their current 8 KC-
    135s?
        General Goldfein. The Hawaii Air National Guard is not slated to
    recapitalize within the first 179 KC-46As.

        36. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, if not, what is the
    replacement or recapitalization plan for the 8 KC-135s the Hawaii Air
    National Guard operates?
        General Goldfein. The KC-135 aircraft will continue to remain a
    critical part of our tanker inventory for the foreseeable future.
    Across the total force, we will work to ensure the KC-135s are
    modernized. This effort includes all Total Force units, to include the
    Hawaii Air National Guard.
                         suicide rates in the air force
        37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the Air
    Force had 137 suspected suicides last year, the highest number since
    the service began tracking suicide in 2008. This 2019 figure includes
    Active Duty, Reserve, Guard and Air Force civilians and compares to 103
    suicides across the service in 2018 a 33 percent increase. The report
    noted that aircraft maintenance and security forces are consistently
    the career fields with the highest number of suicide deaths. I
    understand you have been beta testing the ``True North Task Force'' on
    a few bases. What does this task force do?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The Air Force takes the
    physical and mental health of our airmen and space professionals
    seriously and is committed to suicide prevention. Airmen, space
    professionals and their families face various situations that impact
    their Comprehensive Airman Fitness (physical, mental, social, and
    spiritual). We seek to provide our forces with the resources and
    culture to seek help and successfully decrease the risk of harming
    themselves and others, increase mission readiness, and ultimately save
    lives.
        In December 2016, Task Force True North was created to beta test
    initiatives that bring resiliency resources closer to our airmen and
    drive a culture that accepts, embraces, and drives help-seeking
    behavior. The three primary elements of the concept are to 1) engage
    forces and families early; 2) normalize help-seeking behavior as a
    strength; and 3) decentralize--push help to where our forces are (at
    the squadron or group).
        The Task Force identified four beta test installations. At the
    Maintenance Groups and Mission Support Groups at each of those
    installations, they embedded a contract Licensed Clinical Social Worker
    at each squadron, a contract Mental Health Technician at each group,
    and a Religious Support Team (a Chaplain and Religious Affairs Airman)
    at each group. Additionally, they installed an installation Program
    Manager at the Wing, and provided funding assistance to create an
    integrated installation Welcome Center with Wing Commander-owned
    sponsorship and on-boarding program.
        In September 2018, the Air Force Community Action Board, Chaired by
    the VCSAF, directed the Task Force to begin program actions to initiate
    a DAF wide expansion beginning in fiscal year 2021. The first expansion
    set in fiscal year 2021 rolls it out fully to all four beta test
    installations and targets an additional 12 installations. The fiscal
    year 2021 budget begins a long effort to scale the program across the
    DAF. The key to scaling the program is two-fold: 1) identify the
    installations within the DAF with the historically highest risk for
    negative outcomes; and 2) identify the unit types within the DAF with
    the historically highest risk for negative outcomes. The roll-out
    begins at the top of the installation priority list and couples that
    with the highest priority units and builds the embedding effort to fill
    those unit needs first. Once those highest priority units are addressed
    in the first group of expansion installations, the roll-out progresses
    to the next highest priority units at those installations, and so
    forth.

        38. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, have
    there been any indicators of success thus far?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The True North team has
    certainly reflected indicators of success. True North Team's impact is
    assessed in two ways: 1) output numbers of airmen seeking help; and 2)
    a qualitative assessment provided by the RAND Corporation.
        The output numbers are collected via monthly reports submitted by
    the embedded mental health providers and the Religious Support Teams at
    each installation. These monthly reports reflect the immediate impact
    of embedded behavioral health providers, demonstrating a clear demand
    signal on the part of our personnel. Although anticipated that it could
    take up to 6 months for personnel to begin engaging the services of the
    embedded provider, reports from some units reflected that within a
    month unit personnel were waiting in line to speak with the embedded
    provider. By the one year point, across the 12 groups in the beta test,
    the embedded Licensed Clinical Social Workers were conducting 300-600
    individual engagements per month, spending 240-385 hours per month in
    counseling sessions. Likewise, the Religious Support Teams were
    conducting 170-270 individual engagements per month.
        The key issues addressed by the embedded providers and the
    Religious Support Teams were: relationships, anxiety, depression, life
    skills, work stress, coping skills and substance (i.e. alcohol) use.
    Engaging these types of issues early--before they become toxic--is
    critical to reducing negative outcomes such as suicide, domestic
    violence, workplace violence and child maltreatment.
        Additionally, the DAF contracted RAND to conduct a qualitative
    analysis of the beta test impact. After interviewing leadership
    (squadron, group and wing), providers, and airmen, they concluded there
    was great value in the combined effect of the welcome centers, mental
    health providers and spiritual providers. The DAF is awaiting release
    of the final report.
        Other indicators of success, such as genuine decreases in negative
    outcomes, lasting culture change, and potential decreases in long-term
    VA care costs, must be measured over many years and the data are
    therefore many years away.

        39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when
    will results of the beta test be available?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. As of Friday, 19 June, RAND
    reported that they were in the process of sending the draft final
    report to SAF/PA. This is part of the review process, because in order
    for it to be released, it needs three AF reviewers that are outside of
    the sponsoring office and SAF/PA assists. This part of the process
    typically takes little time, so they expect the actual report to
    release soon. They did not provide a date for release.

        40. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do
    you need from Congress to help save lives?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Funding promising solutions
    to increase airmen and space professional resilience, connection, and
    help seeking are critical to saving lives. The fiscal year 2021 True
    North budget begins a long effort to scale the program across the DAF.
    Funding for the program has increased significantly from $9.9 million
    in fiscal 2019 and 2020 to $53.3 million in the fiscal year 2021 budget
    request. This is just the start. We are preparing to assess the True
    North needs of our Guard and Reserve Total Force members while pursuing
    a comprehensive approach to suicide prevention that leverages
    partnerships with academia, industry, and other government
    organizations. We need Congress to continue to fund these efforts to
    increase the readiness and lethality of our Force.
                       sexual harassment and retaliation
        41. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, a
    recent Pentagon report on sexual assault at the Air Force Academy
    estimated that 90 percent of sexual assaults went unreported and that
    reporting rates consistently declined over the past 6 years. I am on
    the Board of Visitors at the Air Force Academy and I remain concerned
    that not enough has been done to combat this culture. How will the Air
    Force fix this issue at the Academy and across the Air Force?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. USAF Academy reporting was
    consistent from academic year 16/17 to 17/18 (23 reports each year)
    with a rise in academic year 18/19 (40 reports). With the rise in
    prevalence, the DAF began a comprehensive, integrated, and holistic
    approach to violence prevention that addresses common factors
    underlying interpersonal and self-directed violence (ISDV): sexual
    assault, domestic violence, child maltreatment, suicide, and workplace
    violence. The DAF initiated a 3-phase sexual assault prevention
    strategy that focuses on systematically addressing risk factors for
    sexual assault using proven policy and programs.
        1. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan including proactive
    universal and selected development and interventions to address ISDV
    prevention at various points across the DAF lifecycle for airmen and
    space professionals (accession, basic and tech training, operational
    unit, and Professional Military Education (PME); delivering more
    effective problem solving skills (e.g. coping and emotion regulation)
    and fostering a culture of connectedness to prepare air and space
    professionals to face any adversity;
        2. Relying on evidence-based research/interventions to reduce
    perpetration, victimization, and re-victimization. As an example,
    research shows these adapted interventions can reduce sexual assault
    victimization and perpetration by 50-60 percent; and,
        3. Ensuring integrated policy, processes, and assessments, while
    providing functional leadership for installation-level prevention
    strategists and collaborating with others to mobilize best practices
    and maximize results.
        This approach is a paradigm shift for how the Department has been
    addressing sexual assault prevention. It focuses on what Air and Space
    professionals are, can, and will do rather than relying on what leaders
    tell them to do. The DAF is focused on reducing prevalence while
    increasing victim reporting to seek care.
                 air force's advanced battle management system
        42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the DOD
    Budget for fiscal year 2021 requests investment in Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control JADC2 to ``create an agile, interoperable Joint
    Force that can fight with a fully networked platforms, sensors,
    weapons, and command and control capabilities'' even in contested
    environments. The backbone of this JADC2 effort appears to be the Air
    Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The Air Force has
    requested a budgetary increase to pay for increased experimentation and
    technology advancement of the JADC2 system. Will the Air Force continue
    to be the lead on the supporting infrastructure for the entire Joint
    Force? If not who will maintain and continue to build out the JADC2
    system?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. The Department of the Air
    Force leads the development of the Advanced Battle Management System
    (ABMS), the battle network of the joint force that enables Joint All-
    Domain Command and Control (JADC2). ABMS also connects with
    complementary networks across each of our sister Services. The
    Department of the Air Force is working closely with the Department of
    Defense's JADC2 Cross Functional Team--led by DOD Chief Information
    Officer Dana Deasy and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen
    John Hyten--as they ensure each Service builds interoperable
    capabilities that support JADC2. The Department of the Air Force is
    also the lead for the development of the DOD Concept for Global Command
    and Control on behalf of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.

        43. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, how do you plan to mitigate
    cyber attacks on the JADC2 system?
        General Goldfein. The ABMS is being developed with security from
    the beginning rather than as a consideration once the technology has
    been built. All ABMS software will be developed using our platformONE
    approach, following the software principles described in the ``DOD
    Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design'' published in August 2019, where
    DevSecOps refers to the continuous iteration of development, security,
    and operations. This reference design incorporates security into the
    development pipeline and enables a continuous Authority to Operate (c-
    ATO) and the transportability of reliable code across multiple
    platforms in secure software ``containers.''
        Software developed for ABMS will include continuous monitoring and
    robust authentication measures at all layers. Further, the meshONE
    network is software defined, meaning it is rapidly configurable which
    will provide added security protection to re-form the network or
    isolate potential threats. Finally, ABMS is also developing zero trust
    capabilities that extend beyond the traditional, but limited,
    ``perimeter defense'' approach to an in-network defense approach.
    Together, these methods ensure a robust and multi-faceted approach to
    technological development, deployment, and execution of the
    capabilities that will make up the battle network for JADC2.

        44. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, are you getting support for
    this effort from the whole of government?
        General Goldfein. Secretary Barrett, Chief Raymond, and I could not
    develop these critical capabilities nor develop them at the speed of
    relevance were it not for the continued support and leadership of
    Congress. The authorities and resources provided to the Department of
    the Air Force from Congress for the ABMS have enabled us to truly
    pursue the required integration of our capable, but too often
    disconnected, platforms our warfighting leadership and combatant
    commanders need to fight and win in the National Defense Strategy
    environment. The ABMS team is also partnering with the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community agencies, and
    the Coast Guard on key initiatives.

        45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force have all
    the authorities it requires to succeed with JADC2?
        Secretary Barrett. At this time, the Department of the Air Force
    has all the authorities it requires to pursue JADC2 through ABMS
    development. In the event additional authorities are required, the
    Department will propose them through the appropriate channels.
                             space control squadron
        46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, last
    Fall, the Air Force indicated Barking Sands Pacific Missile Range
    Facility in Kauai as the preferred location for a Pacific-based Space
    Control Squadron operated by the Hawaii Air National Guard. What is the
    status of this Space Control Squadron?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. We are currently conducting
    the environmental analysis and anticipate completion in the summer of
    2021. After a thorough review of the environmental impacts, we
    anticipate a final basing decision in late summer or early fall of
    2021.

        47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when
    will the unit be activated?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. We anticipate activating
    the squadron in fall of 2021.
                              space force creation
        48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, with
    the creation of Space Force, is the Air Force currently adequately
    manned to cover the personnel needs of both the Space and Air Force?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Even with the creation of
    the Space Force, the Department of the Air Force is too small for what
    our Nation needs. Our Air and Cyber, as well as Space, missions require
    more personnel than requested in the Fiscal Year 2021 President's
    Budget but our approach and budget request recognize fiscal realities
    and the need to balance manpower with readiness and modernization.
        Over the Future Years' Defense Plan, we plan for moderate end
    strength growth for both the Air and Space Forces while balancing those
    missions amongst cost limitations. For the Space Force, we project
    additional growth and end strength transfers from the Air Force, Army,
    and Navy to meet the demands of today's space missions and the mission
    growth required to effectively protect, defend and provide space
    capabilities in a contested domain.
        The Department will continue evaluating and striking a balance for
    the right number of personnel against mission, readiness,
    modernization, and fiscal dynamics.

        49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you
    can't grow airmen with specialized Space control education overnight
    and will need to train airmen in space operations. What do you
    anticipate the need for increased personnel to be and by when?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Last year, we briefed we
    needed an additional 1,900 billets to stand up the Space Force. This
    number represents essential requirements to stand up not only our
    Headquarters but mission-focused capabilities, which we are addressing
    through establishing key Centers or Center-equivalents for the space
    domain--Doctrine Center; Warfare Center; Intelligence Center;
    Professional Military Education (PME) Center; Test Center; and
    Personnel Center.
        As the question states, there are additional manpower requirements
    coming in the next several years based on the need to add space control
    units and capabilities to account for cand forecast threats. As our
    servicematures and threats by our adversaries grow, our projections
    will be similarly updated to best reflect the resources required to
    protect and defend our interests in space.
        We are taking a ``clean sheet'' approach to infuse innovation and
    improvement, streamlining processes to reduce costs, save money, and
    appropriately steward Department resources. Across the FYDP, we are
    using existing resources to establish the Space Force within existing
    DOD topline, made possible by the support of Congress and the DOD.

        50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when
    will Space Force achieve budgetary independence from the Air Force or
    will it?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. Program Objective
    Memorandum process will allow Gen Raymond to independently advocate for
    Space Force mission requirements, funding needs, and other key
    resources essential for a separate service. Having an independent
    budget will allow us to continue to advocate for DOD resources so we
    can protect and defend the space domain.
        Moving forward, the Space Force must have stable and consistent
    funding to enable it to address growing threats in the space domain.
    The Space Force is committed to minimizing cost and bureaucracy, but
    its end strength and budget should reflect rising threats from our
    adversaries.
        Under one Department, the Space Force will continue to have close
    ties to the Air Force. The Space Force will leverage the Air Force for
    more than 80 percent of its enabling functions like business systems
    management, financial management, and auditing to significantly reduce
    cost and avoid duplication of support functions.

        51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do
    you envision the role of the Air National Guard to be under the Space
    Force?
        Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein. National Guard and Reserve
    space units play a critical role in space missions today. Both Reserve
    and Guard units provide strategic depth for U.S. space operations,
    while also recruiting and retaining personnel with unique civilian
    experiences across this enterprise.
        At this time, existing Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
    space units are aligned with and can continue to integrate effectively
    with the U.S. Space Force for the foreseeable future.
        We have the unique opportunity to consider a clean sheet, 21st
    century approach to Active Duty /Reserve Component roles and human
    capital management specially designed for our mission set. We are
    currently developing and analyzing innovative options for the new
    Service, and will discuss the options with Congress once our analysis
    is complete.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                              jrotc flight academy
        52. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, in last year's NDAA, Congress
    encouraged the Air Force to continue and to expand the JROTC Flight
    Academy program, and Congress appropriated funds for the program in the
    fiscal year 2020 bill. This very successful program provides a
    phenomenal opportunity for a diverse pool of young people to gain
    pilot's certifications and to help address the pilot shortage in both
    civilian and military aviation.

        Please provide an update on the fiscal year 2020 Flight Academy
    program.
        Secretary Barrett. The Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training
    Corps (JROTC) Flight Academy is in its third year of execution. The Air
    Force funded 200 Air Force JROTC cadets to attend the Flight Academy in
    summer fiscal year 2020 (fiscal year 2018 funded 120 and fiscal year
    2019 funded 150). Additionally, this year approximately 20 ROTC and 10
    Civil Air Patrol Cadets will attend. The program has also grown to 17
    partnering universities, of which 4 are Historically Black Colleges and
    Universities. Moreover, this year the program reached 51 percent
    overall diversity for the first time (fiscal year 2018 equals 40
    percent and fiscal year 2019 equals 45 percent), the largest growth in
    demographic groups was young women. This number remains significant as
    AFJROTC boasts almost 900 high schools and 125,000 cadets. As you know,
    overall AFJROTC cadets are 58 percent minority and 40 percent female.
    Air Force JROTC has requested $250,000 through the Air Force Rated
    Diversity initiative, for communication and marketing as the Air Force
    continues to work to reach these underrepresented communities and to
    pull a more diverse talent pool towards aviation.

        53. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, is the Air Force committed to
    funding this program for fiscal year 2021?
        Secretary Barrett. Yes, the Air Force remains committed to adding
    $8.4 million in fiscal year 2021 which provides for 400 scholarships:
    300 AFJOTC cadets, 20 ROTC, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for the first
    time, 10 USAFA cadets and 50 young people who will compete for slots
    through a collaborative effort between Air Force JROTC, Air Force
    Recruiting Service and several Nation-wide ``affinity'' groups such as
    Women in Aviation and the Organization of Black Aerospace
    Professionals.

        54. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, have you considered its
    expansion and if so, please describe your plans.
        Secretary Barrett. The Air Force continues to look for ways to
    develop a diverse talent pool. As such, the Air Force views JROTC as an
    ``untapped human resources asset'' for the Nation. Investing in these
    cadets brings a positive return on investment for the Air Force and the
    Nation. The long-term goal for the program is to maintain funding for
    500 scholarships annually, with 400 earmarked for Air Force JROTC and
    100 allocated for other Air Force student groups.
                         space command basing decision
        55. Senator Jones. Secretary Barrett, Space Command was
    reestablished in 2019 as a combatant command. The Air Force has still
    not announced the location of that combatant command's headquarters. By
    every measure, Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville is the best choice to be
    the home of SPACECOM HQ. Can give me an update on the process and
    timeline for this basing decision?
        Secretary Barrett. With the establishment of the United States
    Space Force, the Department of the Air Force, on behalf of the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, re-evaluated the basing action for United
    States Space Command. Our revised approach leveraged best practices
    from the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process and the
    Army's recent Futures Command stationing action.
        We announced the revised approach with the screening and evaluation
    criteria on 15 May. The revised approach expands the number of eligible
    locations for the USSPACECOM headquarters, and gives communities an
    opportunity to self-nominate based on the approved screening and
    evaluation criteria.
        We anticipate making a final selection for the preferred location
    and reasonable alternative(s) in early 2021 subject to compliance with
    the National Environmental Policy Act. In the meantime, Peterson Air
    Force Base, Colorado, will remain the provisional location for the
    headquarters of U.S. Space Command until a permanent headquarters
    location is selected and facilities are ready in approximately six
    years.
                          aerial refueling shortfalls
        56. Senator Jones. General Goldfein, in order to alleviate the
    already high stress on the aerial refueling fleet and to assure we have
    the capacity to meet the needs of a high-intensity conflict if we are
    going to retire our tankers before their replacements are operationally
    ready, has the Air Force considered options to increase capacity,
    rather than just ways to manage a decrease in capacity, such as
    aircraft leases or commercial air refueling service contracts?
        General Goldfein. Yes, the Air Force is actively considering
    options to increase the aerial refueling fleet capacity. We are
    currently working in coordination with United States Transportation
    Command and Air Mobility Command on assessing the feasibility,
    affordability, and advisability of using contractor-operated aerial
    refueling aircraft to support Air Force receiver requirements. A
    business case analysis is required to analyze the current tanker air
    refueling shortfall to determine whether commercial contract air
    refueling might be a viable option for the Air Force.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Cramer, McSally, Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Defense (DOD) Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request.
        I welcome our witnesses and thank them for their service,
    both Dr. Mark Esper and General Mark--we've got a pair of
    ``Marks'' this morning.
        This Committee's top priority is ensuring the effectiveness
    and implementation of the National Defense Strategy. That's our
    vote that we have been adhering to for a long period of time
    now, about 3 years.
        Unfortunately, under the last administration, we asked our
    military to do more with less, and that got us into trouble.
    Between 2012-2017, we lost $150 billion to sequestration, our
    defense budget and the readiness of our forces were devastated.
    I think we all understand that. As a result, when President
    Trump came to office, he inherited an American military in
    crisis. Thankfully, he delivered on his promise to begin
    rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces.
        Last year, President Trump negotiated the highest level of
    defense spending ever, a downpayment towards getting our
    military back to where it needs to be. But, that's not enough.
    We face a more dangerous world today than we anticipated we
    would. Since then, the Russians have invaded Crimea, backed
    Assad in Syria, sent mercenaries to Libya, and violated the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty]. China
    began building islands in the South China Sea, harassing its
    neighbors more frequently, and accelerating its military and
    nuclear modernization.
        The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission Report
    said, if we're going to adequately fund the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) and take on these threats, it's going to take a
    3 to 5 percent net increase above inflation each year. Now,
    we're not doing that, but that's what we committed to. We had a
    meeting here. Everyone adheres to the logic of this contract
    that we agreed to. But, we're not carrying through with it.
    That should mean the budget request would have been, if we had
    adhered to that, $775 to $790 billion this year. Instead, we've
    got a budget agreement that provides $740.5 billion for all
    that we've got to do for our military defense. That's not your
    fault, not you guys, but the Congress needs to do more, be more
    realistic about what it's going to take to maintain a force
    capable of deterring and, if needed, defeating our enemies.
        We're trying to do more while spending less, and the math
    just doesn't work that way. That's why we've--you've seen so
    many stories about how we can't buy necessary equipment. That's
    why we can't do the training that we need to do. That's why we
    can't give our troops the tools that they need to keep the
    peace. It's all in the NDS.
        We can pay them now, or we can pay them later, and leave
    the debt to our children and grandchildren to pay. They'll be
    doing so in the more dangerous world if we don't fix the budget
    tragedy that we're facing right now.
        I know you've tried to do the best you can within the
    limits of what you have been given. I appreciate that you're
    already have found a lot of savings, and you are to be
    applauded for that. That's hard to do with the decreasing
    budget which we have today.
        On that happy note, I look forward to continuing to work
    with you to make sure our troops have the resources that they
    need to fight and win.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today, thank
    them for their service to the Nation, and I look forward to
    their testimony.
        Before we consider the details of the budget request, I'd
    like to address some broader concerns I have with the
    Department.
        The National Defense Strategy Commission Report, released
    in November 2018, expressed significant concern about the
    balance of power between civilian and military leadership at
    the Department of Defense. Specifically, the Commission Report
    stated, ``Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues
    at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy,
    undermining the concept of civilian control.''
        Unfortunately, the situation has only gotten worse since
    the Commission issued its report. The Office of the Secretary
    of Defense is without Senate-confirmed leadership in many of
    its most important positions. In the Policy Office, of the
    seven positions requiring Senate confirmation, there are only
    two confirmed individuals, and one of these is now serving as
    the Acting Under Secretary. We just received the nomination for
    Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness, after a 2-year
    vacancy. Then, on Monday, the administration withdrew the
    nomination of Elaine McCusker to be the Department's
    Controller. These vacancies continue to challenge the
    Department's ability to effectively respond to national
    security challenges and undermine civilian inputs into the
    decision making process.
        With political appointees largely absent, a large amount of
    work in the Department is now being done by career civil
    servants, and they, too, are beleaguered. Congress shares the
    blame in adding to civilian workforce woes with headquarters
    cuts. However, pay freezes, hiring freezes, exemption from
    collective bargaining, and having career civil servants carry
    the weight of defending political decisions is likely to lead
    to a hollowing out of the workforce whose experience and
    expertise we desperately need.
        Furthermore, October 23rd of last year, I should say--last
    year, not this year--I joined Chairman Inhofe and our House
    Armed Services Committee (HASC) counterparts in sending you,
    Mr. Secretary, a letter expressing concern about the
    Department's failure to properly empower and staff the Office
    of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low Intensity Conflict in order to fully exercise its
    congressionally mandated responsibilities for oversight and
    advocacy of Special Operations Forces. This is another position
    that has had an Acting Principal for more than half the
    administration, and it's unacceptable, frankly, that we still
    haven't received a response to our letter, more than 4 months
    later.
        Now, turning to the budget request before us, the fiscal
    year 2021 budget, the Department of Defense seeks $636.4
    billion for the base budget and $69 billion in overseas
    contingency operations funds, of which $16 billion is
    designated to pay for base requirements. In its base budget
    request, the Defense Department highlights resources targeted
    for the modernization of a more lethal force that is prepared
    for a high-end fight against near-peer competitors and to
    operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including
    investments in the space and cyber domains, the
    recapitalization of our nuclear deterrent, and the largest-ever
    research and development (R&D) budget for artificial
    intelligence, directed energy, and hypersonic weapons. The base
    budget request also supports the quality of life for our
    servicemembers by sustaining family support initiatives and by
    authorizing a 3 percent pay raise. However, it is clear that
    the base budget request will not cover all the Defense
    Department's requirements. So, once again, we have been
    presented with an overly generous use of the OCO account. I
    acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations have
    included elements of base funding in OCO accounts in the past,
    but overloading the OCO request with $16 billion worth of
    activities that truly belong in the base budget is difficult to
    justify.
        I would also highlight that this year's budget reflects the
    outcomes of the Secretary's defense-wide review. The Department
    submitted a report to Congress in January that stated, ``In an
    era of flattening budgets, it is more important than ever that
    we find creative ways to fund NDS-driven activities.'' The
    review identified more than $5 million in savings from defense
    programs that were deemed a lower priority or inconsistent with
    the priorities of the NDS. Mr. Secretary, let me commend you
    for taking this review on. It's a tough job, and you did it
    thoroughly, and you did it with quite a bit of energy.
        Now, these savings will be taking, however, from, among
    other things, health affairs, DOD schools, and cooperative
    threat reduction programs. So, I'm interested in hearing more
    about the analysis behind the programs that were cut or
    eliminated, and the areas in which these resources were
    reinvested.
        Scrutinizing current programs to determine which ones
    support the Department's priorities and which ones should be
    reduced or eliminated is appropriate and necessary, and again,
    I commend you. However, it is somewhat disingenuous to argue
    that flat defense budgets have forced the Department to realign
    funds internally to support NDS implementation, when the
    Department is making affirmative decisions to divert funding
    from NDS priorities. For example, the Department recently
    approved the transfer of $3.8 billion from National Guard
    equipment, additional combat aircraft, ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets, and amphibious ships
    in order to pay for the President's border wall. In addition,
    the budget request before us proposes significant cuts to
    initiatives like the European Defense Initiative (EDI). This is
    after funding for several military construction projects in EDI
    was taken out last year to, again, pay for the wall. Our close
    bond with our European allies and partners is one of our
    greatest strategic advantages and key to countering the near-
    peer competitor competition of Russia. However, the cut to EDI
    sends exactly the wrong message to our allies and our
    adversaries.
        It is the responsibility of this Committee to ensure the
    men and women we send into harm's way have the resources
    necessary to complete their mission and return home safely, and
    I'm proud that this Committee, under the Chairman's leadership,
    has always worked in a bipartisan fashion during this process.
    I look forward to working with all the Committee Members to
    come to a reasonable agreement again this year.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We will now have opening statements from Secretary Esper
    and General Milley. Your entire statement will be made a part
    of the record, and you are recognized.

         STATEMENT OF HON. MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Esper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members
    of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in
    support of the President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021.
    I'm joined today by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Mark Milley.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides a clear roadmap
    for the Department of Defense to address the reemergence of
    long-term strategic competition from near-peer competitors,
    China, then Russia. Throughout the Pentagon and across the
    Joint Force, the NDS guides our decisions and actions as we
    adapt the force to simultaneously contend with the threats of
    today while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow. We do
    this by increasing the readiness and lethality of our
    warfighters, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and
    reforming the way the Department does business. Additionally,
    we have placed renewed emphasis on taking care of our
    servicemembers and their families.
        The Department is grateful for the strong support provided
    in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) and DOD appropriations, which allowed us to make vital
    investments in our military's modernization, enabled the
    creation of the Space Force, and provided our servicemembers
    with the largest pay increase in a decade. Our continued
    success is contingent upon predictable, adequate, sustained,
    and timely funding, and I encourage Congress to pass a full-
    year spending package for all fiscal year 2021 on time to avoid
    the debilitating effects of another continuing resolution.
        The Department's total fiscal year 2021 budget request is
    $705.4 billion. This represents a minor increase from fiscal
    year 2020 enacted amount of $704.6 billion, but does not keep
    pace with inflation. Given this flattened funding level, we
    were required to make many tough decisions to ensure our
    highest priorities were adequately funded. To enable our
    decision maker, we conducted a comprehensive defense-wide
    review aimed at reallocating resources from programs and
    activities that offer a low return on investment relative to
    the goals and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4-month period, we
    conducted over 20 review sessions examining almost $100 billion
    in programs, agencies, and activities that make up the fourth
    estate. This review generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021
    savings that were reinvested back into readiness and lethality
    efforts.
        Each of the military services is also instituting a similar
    review process across their budgets to achieve the same outcome
    of realigning resources and finding savings that can be
    reinvested into higher priorities.
        Additionally, I have initiated the process of conducting
    full reviews of all combatant commands to properly align our
    global military posture to the NDS. This effort will enable the
    Department to shift greater emphasis to our highest-priority
    region, the Indo-Pacific, or allow us to return troops home to
    build readiness. Thus far, we have ongoing reviews of AFRICOM
    and SOUTHCOM, and will expand to other commands over the coming
    months.
        My recent decision to deploy elements of an Army Security
    Force Assistance Brigade to Africa to replace units from an
    Infantry Brigade Combat Team is an example of how this process
    is enabling us to better match resources to the mission of each
    combatant command.
        The Department's fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects
    the same disciplined adherence to the NDS. To preserve our
    overmatch, we have made significant investments into several
    critical technologies that will alter the future battlefield.
    Our RDT&E budget is the largest in our history and prioritizes
    hypersonics, microelectronics, 5G communications, autonomous
    systems, and artificial intelligence. We are moving forward
    with a long-overdue recapitalization of the Nation's nuclear
    triad, with key investments in the ground-based strategic
    deterrent, the B-21 stealth bomber, the Columbia-class
    submarine, and improved nuclear command, control, and
    communications systems, to name a few. We are also enhancing
    our missile defense capabilities to protect against the growing
    threat of advanced enemy missile systems.
        This budget request expands our capacity to defend our
    interests in space as we consolidate much of our space
    enterprise into the Space Force. It also advances the
    Department's cyber capabilities, allowing us to protect our
    digital infrastructure while disrupting covert foreign malign
    activity. This includes defending the integrity of our
    democracy by assisting in the security of our elections.
        Finally, in the traditional air, land, and sea domains, we
    are focused on modernizing our formations by divesting from
    platforms and equipment that are no longer suited for the
    emerging strategic environment. The Department appreciates this
    Committee's advocacy of the National Defense Strategy, and we
    value Congress's guidance on reform.
        I now ask for your support so that we may fully implement
    our decisions and move forward with the investments needed to
    ensure America's military maintains our competitive advantage,
    continues to deter war, and preserves our Nation's security.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Esper follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
    Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2021.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides a clear roadmap
    for the Department of Defense (DOD) to address the re-emergence of
    long-term strategic competition from near-peer competitors: China, then
    Russia. Throughout the Pentagon and across the Joint Force, the NDS
    guides our decisions and actions as we adapt the force to
    simultaneously contend with the threats of today, while preparing for
    the challenges of tomorrow. We do this by increasing the readiness and
    lethality of our warfighters, strengthening our alliances and
    partnerships, and reforming the way DOD does business. Additionally, we
    have placed renewed emphasis on taking care of our servicemembers and
    their families.
        The DOD is grateful for the strong support provided in the Fiscal
    Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Fiscal Year
    2020 DOD Appropriations Act. This legislation supported vital
    investments in our military's modernization, enabled the creation of
    the Space Force, and provided our servicemembers with the largest pay
    increase in a decade. Our continued success as a Department is
    contingent upon predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding.
    We encourage Congress to pass a full-year spending package for fiscal
    year 2021 on-time to avoid the debilitating effects of another
    Continuing Resolution.
        The DOD's total fiscal year 2021 budget request is $705.4 billion,
    consisting of $636.4 billion for base requirements with an additional
    $16 billion categorized as overseas contingency operations for base,
    and $53 billion for overseas contingency operations. After removing
    disaster relief emergency funding, this year's budget request
    represents a minor increase from the fiscal year 2020 enacted amount of
    $704.6 billion, but does not keep pace with inflation. Given this
    flattened funding level, we made many tough decisions to ensure our
    highest priorities were adequately funded.
        To guide our decision making, we initiated a comprehensive Defense-
    Wide Review (DWR) aimed at reallocating resources from programs and
    activities that offer low return on investment relative to the goals
    and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4 month period, we conducted over 20
    review sessions, examining almost $100 billion in programs, agencies,
    and activities that make up the ``Fourth Estate.'' This review
    generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021 savings for reinvestment in
    areas such as nuclear modernization, space, missile defense, hypersonic
    weapons, artificial intelligence, and 5G communications.
        Additionally, to make room for investments in future capabilities,
    each of the Services has divested some legacy systems. These were
    necessary measures to ensure our highest priority programs were
    sufficiently resourced. I urge Congress to support these tough choices,
    as the alternative is to underprepare for the challenges of great power
    competition.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request is directed toward
    achieving irreversible implementation of the NDS by focusing on
    strengthening military readiness and lethality; advancing critical
    modernization efforts across all domains: air, land, sea, space, and
    cyber; prioritizing nuclear deterrence recapitalization; enhancing
    missile defense capabilities; and providing our servicemembers and
    their families with the quality of life they deserve.
                             strategic environment
        Today's global security environment remains complex and volatile.
    The re-emergence of great power competition has challenged the United
    States military's long-held competitive advantage in certain key areas.
    Meanwhile, rogue regimes continue to foster regional instability, while
    terrorist organizations seek out sanctuary in new parts of the world.
    It is critical that the DOD maintains the momentum provided by the last
    few budgets, which enabled vital investments in modernization and
    lethality, and enhanced our military's deterrence capability.
        The Department's highest priority remains China, as its government
    continues to use--and misuse--its diplomatic, economic, and military
    strength to attempt to alter the landscape of power and reshape the
    world in its favor, often at the expense of others. The Chinese
    Communist Party (CCP) continues to invest heavily in the modernization
    and expansion of its military in areas such as space, cyber, electronic
    warfare, undersea warfare, fighter aircraft, bombers, long-range
    missiles, and other anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
        China's goals are clearly stated: by 2035, the CCP's leaders seek
    to complete its military modernization, and, by 2049, become a
    preeminent global military power. What is most troubling is that China
    is pursuing these objectives by any means necessary, including forced
    technology transfer, intellectual property theft, cyber espionage, and
    commercial acquisitions. Once Beijing obtains and develops these
    technologies, it leverages them to intimidate or coerce smaller states,
    while simultaneously narrowing the United States' competitive
    advantage. When American companies fall victim to state-backed cyber
    theft, are forced to surrender intellectual property, or are undercut
    by a Chinese corporation selling below cost, it erodes our important
    industrial and innovation bases and diminishes our military overmatch.
        As part of its efforts to manipulate the long-standing free and
    open international order to its advantage, Beijing continues to
    militarize features in the South China Sea, threatening freedom of
    navigation and the free flow of commerce throughout the region. Through
    its Belt and Road Initiative, China is expanding its political and
    economic ties across Asia, Europe, South America and Africa, with the
    less publicized objective of expanding the People's Liberation Army's
    influence and reach.
        Meanwhile, Russia remains intent on upending international norms
    and reasserting regional dominance by violating the sovereignty of
    neighboring states, breaking treaty obligations, and engaging in
    malicious cyber operations on a global scale. Moscow continues to press
    forward with the rapid modernization of its military. Its sophisticated
    coordination of drones and cyber attacks during its invasion of
    Ukraine, as well as its recent public display of new nuclear hypersonic
    systems, validate our concerns about Russia's burgeoning military
    capabilities and intentions to undermine the NATO alliance.
        Concurrently, North Korea seeks to build legitimacy through the
    development of a variety of nuclear, conventional, and unconventional
    weapons, and by growing its ballistic missile capabilities. Our forces
    on the Korean Peninsula remain at a high state of readiness, alongside
    our Republic of Korea counterparts. While we support continued
    diplomatic efforts to bring about lasting peace in Korea, we remain
    prepared to fight and win tonight, if required.
        In the Middle East, the United States remains committed to working
    alongside our allies and partners to advance our strategic priorities
    for the region: ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting a
    strong and independent Iraq, and deterring Iranian aggression. The
    United States' actions over the past year, including the deployment of
    additional defensive forces to the region, the defeat of ISIS' physical
    caliphate, and the operations that resulted in the deaths of terrorist
    leaders Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Qasem Soleimani, were essential to
    restoring deterrence and degrading our enemy's military capabilities.
        Guided by the NDS, the DOD seeks to right-size our force
    disposition in all theaters over the long-term to better compete with
    China and Russia. Concurrently, we must sustain efforts to counter
    rogue regimes such as Iran, while bolstering the capability of our
    allies and partners to maintain regional stability. Enhancements to our
    posture in the Middle East in recent months are consistent with this
    strategy.
                           build a more lethal force
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request is focused on designing a
    future force that is dominant in all warfighting domains. This is
    particularly important at a time when our strategic competitors are
    developing advanced capabilities to challenge our areas of traditional
    military overmatch. We must continue to invest in modernization to
    solidify our competitive advantages and build new areas of asymmetric
    advantage.
    Nuclear Modernization
        The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the need for the nuclear
    triad, validating DOD's long-overdue recapitalization of the nation's
    nuclear armed missiles, submarines, bombers, dual-capable aircraft, and
    related infrastructure to keep the U.S. nuclear deterrent secure,
    effective, and reliable for decades to come. Most of the Nation's
    strategic nuclear delivery systems, built in the 1980s and prior, are
    reaching the end of their service life in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe,
    with all currently fielded systems having been extended well beyond
    their original service lives. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests
    $28.9 billion to sustain and modernize all three legs of the triad with
    key investments in the ground-based strategic deterrent, the B-21
    stealth bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and enhanced nuclear
    command, control and communications (NC3) systems.
    Missile Defeat and Defense
        The Department is committed to implementing the 2019 Missile
    Defense Review, which calls for comprehensive missile defense
    capabilities, flexibility and adaptability, tighter offense-defense
    integration and interoperability, and highlights the importance of
    space. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget funds enhancements to U.S.
    Missile Defeat and Defense (MDD) capabilities to defend the Homeland,
    deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex
    adversarial missile threat. This budget request increases missile
    defense capacity and capability to keep pace with adversary missile
    systems, while investing in new approaches to a layered defense of the
    Homeland.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget includes $20.3 billion for MDD,
    which includes $9.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), $7.9
    billion in regional and strategic missile defense capabilities outside
    of the MDA, and $3.2 billion in missile defeat or left-of-launch
    activities. Notable investments include the development of the next-
    generation interceptor, and increased funding for the Aegis Ballistic
    Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
    Ballistic Missile Defense.
    Critical Technologies
        We are in the midst of rapid technological change that has the
    potential to fundamentally alter the character of war. Our adversaries
    are systematically and strategically developing and fielding advanced
    systems, eroding the advantage the United States military has
    maintained in conventional warfare. Maintaining technological
    superiority is essential to our future security. To ensure we lead in
    the development and fielding of new systems that harness these
    advancements, we must prioritize critical technology investments.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget reflects this commitment by
    investing $106.6 billion in research, development, testing, and
    evaluation (RDT&E), the largest RDT&E budget in our history. The DOD's
    focus on research and technology efforts to bring advanced capabilities
    to the field will ensure we maintain overmatch against near-peer
    competitors. This budget request maximizes the amount of money we can
    effectively and responsibly spend on these critical and emerging
    technologies. Select efforts include:
          Hypersonics--Accelerates development of Army Long Range
    Hypersonic Weapon; increases funding for Navy Conventional Prompt
    Strike, and Air Force Advanced Rapid Response Weapon ($3.2 billion).
          Microelectronics/5G--Accelerates our access to both
    advanced commercial and specialty microelectronics while adopting a
    zero-trust security paradigm; hastens our mastery of ``ubiquitous
    connectivity,'' so that we can fully leverage the power of 5G
    technologies for our mission, while preventing our adversaries from
    using it against us ($1.5 billion).
          Autonomy--Enhances speed of maneuver and lethality in
    contested environments; develops human/machine teaming ($1.7 billion).
          Artificial Intelligence (AI)--Continues the AI
    investments that focus on next-generation AI R&D (research and
    development) at DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency],
    expands the intelligence AI pathfinder Project Maven, and accelerates
    fielding of AI capabilities at scale to meet warfighter needs through
    the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) ($0.8 billion).
        More so than any other emerging technology, AI is transforming our
    society and affecting the ways in which we do business, interact
    socially, and conduct war. Our competitors have also recognized the
    transformative potential of AI and are investing heavily in it as they
    modernize their military forces. Maintaining a competitive advantage in
    AI is essential to our national security.
        The DOD is committed to employing AI in a responsible and lawful
    manner that promotes our Nation's values. As such, I have approved the
    implementation of the DOD's AI Ethics Principles to ensure the
    development and use of AI is guided by an ethical framework. These
    principles will help guide, inform, and inculcate the responsible use
    of AI--in both combat and non-combat systems--by the Department to help
    maintain our technological edge, while upholding our values. By
    adopting these Principles, DOD will lead the way in the responsible use
    of AI across the entire government and with our allies and partners.
    Space
        The NDS recognizes that space is fundamental to U.S. prosperity and
    national security. Great power competitors are increasingly developing
    weapons to disrupt satellites and other space-based capabilities. The
    Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA created the sixth branch of the military, the
    United States Space Force (USSF), within the Department of the Air
    Force, to organize, train, and equip military and civilian personnel to
    maintain freedom of operation in, from, and to space. As the first new
    military service established in over 70 years, the USSF will protect
    and defend our military capabilities and economic interests in the
    space domain as our near-peer competitors continue to expand their
    presence in space.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests $18 billion in the space
    warfighting domain. These investments will enable the expeditious
    building of USSF, reduce risk to satellite communications jamming,
    build resiliency in global positioning systems, improve space-based
    missile warning capabilities, and increase our space launch capacity.
        To manage DOD space forces efficiently and holistically, the
    Department's vision remains to consolidate the preponderance of space
    missions, units, resources, and personnel from the existing Military
    Services into the new USSF. These transfers are critical to unifying
    today's disparate space-related research, development, acquisition,
    fielding, and operations into a single organization led by a single
    leader. The DOD's goal is to transfer the appropriate space-related
    assets into the USSF no later than fiscal year 2022, consistent with
    law.
    Cyber
        Cyber attacks represent a long-term threat to our national strength
    and military advantage. Persistent and sophisticated adversaries are
    continuously targeting our systems and networks through malicious cyber
    activity. This challenge is equally applicable to public and private
    networks across the United States. A proactive DOD cyber approach is
    necessary to guard against these threats by defending forward to
    protect our infrastructure and disrupt covert foreign malign activity.
    This includes defending the integrity of our democratic processes by
    assisting in the security of our elections.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget invests $9.8 billion into
    cyberspace activities that continue to build on the goals laid out in
    the DOD Cyber Strategy. This request improves cybersecurity by
    mitigating key cyber deficiencies and strengthening our defensive
    capabilities to counter adversary efforts to exploit U.S. technology.
    While robust defensive cyber capabilities are our priority, the joint
    force is also improving offensive capabilities to engage threats at a
    time and place of our choosing.
        The Cyber Operations budget includes $2.2 billion to support the
    Cyber Mission Force (CMF), consisting of 133 teams working as the
    operational arm of U.S. Cyber Command, to carry out cyberspace
    operations in defense of the Nation's interests. Cyberspace domain
    investments, underpinned by digital modernization efforts, provide our
    CMF the tools necessary to execute offensive and defensive cyberspace
    operations.
    Air
        In the air domain, we continue procurement of the Joint Strike
    Fighter aircraft and modernization programs for existing Navy and Air
    Force strike fighter aircraft and bombers. We also include a cost-
    effective mix of 4th generation fighter aircraft by procuring 24
    additional F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and capitalizing on existing Foreign
    Military Sales production lines to procure 12 F-15 EX aircraft. This
    will increase readiness of the Navy and Air Force fighter fleet and
    relieve pressure on the aging legacy platforms. Additionally, we
    continue procurement of the KC-46A aerial refueling tanker, which will
    replace aging legacy tankers.
    Sea
        In the sea domain, the DOD remains committed to building a Navy of
    at least 355 ships. The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget request procures
    eight surface and subsurface battle-force ships, including one
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and one Virginia-class
    submarine. Importantly, we remain focused on the readiness of our
    current fleet--our top priority--by allocating an additional $3.4
    billion into the Navy's operations and maintenance account relative to
    fiscal year 2020 (excluding disaster relief emergency funding).
        To maintain our maritime dominance and freedom of maneuver, we are
    exploring a range of alternative ``future fleet'' designs that are
    capable of meeting the demands of the NDS, while remaining compatible
    with future warfighting doctrine, threat developments, and budget
    constraints. In concept, the future fleet must prioritize integrated
    Navy and Marine Corps operations; distributed awareness and lethality;
    survivability in a high-intensity conflict; adaptability in a complex
    world; the ability to project power, including through precision long-
    range fires; and demonstrate presence, providing a visible deterrent to
    potential adversaries while reassuring our allies and partners.
        The composition of the future force will emphasize fewer large
    surface platforms, more and smaller surface combatants, lightly/
    optionally-manned ships, and an ample submarine force. Just as the Air
    Force and Army are integrating more remotely piloted aircraft and
    optionally manned ground vehicles, the Navy must begin to integrate and
    deploy lightly/optionally-manned ships. Future analysis and
    experimentation will drive the NDS-based force structure for the Navy
    and Marine Corps, and will inform the direction of future shipbuilding
    plans.
        One of my top priorities is ensuring that the Department has a
    robust, data-driven review of the future integrated naval force. To
    that end, I have initiated a war game and analysis process led by the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate proposals from across the DOD,
    to possibly include experts from the Naval War College, Naval
    Postgraduate School, and Marine Corps University. The Department of the
    Navy intends to continually iterate the recent Integrated Naval Force
    Structure Assessment and align what it learns with the annual planning,
    programming, and budgeting process.
    Land
        In the land domain, the DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget improves the
    lethality and survivability of ground forces by divesting legacy
    systems and investing in modernized combat systems that will be needed
    by the future Joint Force. Building on the research and development
    investments made over the past 2 years, we continue to prioritize
    funding for the development and testing of long-range precision fires,
    future vertical lift, ground combat vehicles, air and missile defense,
    the network, and soldier lethality systems to replace many of the
    Army's aging platforms. This budget will ensure our ground forces
    remain ready and lethal by upgrading 89 M-1 Abrams main-battle tanks,
    procuring over 4,200 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and 72 Amphibious
    Combat Vehicles, and upgrading over 150 Stryker Vehicles.
    Joint Warfighting Concept
        In addition to developing these capabilities we must also modernize
    how we fight. Our budget request supports the creation of a new Joint
    Warfighting Concept to enable our transition to All-Domain Operations
    by aligning our personnel, equipment, training, and doctrine.
        This concept builds on the recent experimentation conducted by the
    Services as we develop a new approach to integrating our warfighting
    capabilities. As part of this effort, the Air Force is leading the
    Department's new Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
    initiative, which is critical to linking any sensor to any shooter on
    the battlefield in real time.
    Dynamic Force Employment
        Our military's force posture must be adaptable to account for the
    uncertainty that exists in the strategic environment. Dynamic Force
    Employment (DFE) provides options for proactive and scalable use of the
    Joint Force in response to emerging security requirements. DFE will
    allow the DOD to compete more effectively by employing military forces
    outside of the steady-state pattern of deployments our adversaries have
    come to expect. This concept will induce unpredictability into our
    operational decisions, and demonstrate the capability to rapidly
    reposition forces in response to changing security conditions.
                   strengthen allies and attract new partners
        The United States' competitive advantage is not only a result of
    our unrivaled warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons and equipment,
    but also our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. Forged
    over decades of shared values, interests, and sacrifice, these
    relationships provide us a strategic edge our adversaries cannot match.
    The United States military works every day to strengthen and expand the
    alliances and partnerships that form the backbone of the free and open
    international order, which has enabled security and prosperity for
    millions around the world.
    Indo-Pacific
        The Indo-Pacific remains the DOD's number one priority region. We
    have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in
    which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and
    able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international
    rules and norms. We are committed to enhancing this shared vision
    alongside our allies and partners in the region.
        However, an increasingly aggressive China continues to undermine
    regional stability through its coercion of neighboring states,
    illegitimate maritime claims, and predatory economic practices. Unlike
    the Communist Party of China, the United States respects the
    sovereignty of all nations, regardless of their size or strength. Our
    approach continues to prove itself superior to Beijing's, as evidenced
    by our growing partnerships across the region.
        For example, last November in Vietnam, I announced the provision of
    a second high-endurance cutter to enhance the Vietnamese Coast Guard's
    capabilities and build greater trust between our Nations. In Thailand,
    I signed Joint Vision 2020 with the Prime Minister in order to chart a
    course for increased interoperability and expanded exercises and
    training between our forces. In December, I signed a Memorandum of
    Understanding with Singapore announcing the establishment of a fighter
    training detachment in Guam, which will deepen our defense cooperation.
        That same month, the United States hosted the second ever India 2-
    Plus-2 Ministerial, where the world's two largest democracies continued
    to strengthen our ties and finalized important agreements that will
    expand our ability to co-produce and co-develop critical technologies.
    Our burgeoning defense relationship, evidenced by the new Tiger Triumph
    annual amphibious exercise, will be crucial to improving our military
    interoperability.
    NATO
        The United States' leadership has been critical to getting the
    world's strongest military alliance back on the right trajectory.
    President Trump succeeded in elevating the issues of burden sharing and
    readiness, securing widespread agreement that NATO members must do
    more. As a result, our NATO allies invested an additional $130 billion
    into defense since 2016, and are projected to reach $400 billion by
    2024. Additionally, the number of member states that currently meet the
    2 percent GDP commitment has doubled over the past 3 years.
        Last December, NATO reached its goal of identifying 100 percent of
    the contributions for the NATO Readiness Initiative. This plan provides
    the alliance with the capability to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30
    combat vessels, and 30 air squadrons ready to fight in 30 days.
        In fiscal year 2020, the United States military will deploy over
    20,000 troops to participate in Defender 2020, one of the largest
    military exercises in Europe in the last 25 years. Defender will
    demonstrate our force projection capabilities, exercise the Army's
    ability to conduct Division-level maneuvers, and enhance
    interoperability with our allies and partners in the region, thereby
    deterring conflict.
    Middle East
        In the Middle East, we remain committed to supporting a regional
    constellation of strategic partners to ensure the enduring defeat of
    ISIS, deter Iranian malign activities, and support a strong and
    independent Iraq.
        The United States maintains its leadership role in the 82-member
    Defeat-ISIS coalition. Together, the United States and its partner
    forces have destroyed ISIS's physical caliphate and liberated millions
    from its barbaric rule. United States troops deployed to Iraq and Syria
    continue to work alongside our allies and partners to ensure the
    enduring defeat of ISIS.
        After months of escalating acts of aggression from the Iranian
    regime, the United States military took decisive action to protect our
    personnel and interests, which included a no-notice deployment of 3,500
    soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne. The DOD also helped
    internationalize the response by leading the development of the
    International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in September 2019,
    which protects freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of
    Oman. The IMSC currently includes contributions from seven nations and
    continues to deter malign activity in the Strait of Hormuz.
        In Afghanistan, we remain committed to ending the war through a
    political agreement that ensures Afghanistan cannot be used as a safe
    haven for terrorist groups to attack the United States. On February 29,
    the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that paves the
    way for intra-Afghan negotiations in pursuit of a permanent ceasefire
    and lasting peace. If the Taliban honors the arrangement, the United
    States will reduce its military presence to 8,600 troops within a
    matter of months, in line with commensurate reductions from other NATO
    allies that contribute forces. If progress continues, the United States
    and its partners will further reduce our presence over the next 14
    months until all United States and coalition forces are out of
    Afghanistan. The entire process will be conditions-based, and should
    the Taliban renege on its commitments, we will adjust our withdrawal
    timeline accordingly. Throughout the course of our drawdown, we will
    retain the necessary capabilities to protect our servicemembers and
    support the Afghan security forces.
    International Professional Military Education
        The DOD is committed to expanding our International Professional
    Military Education (IPME) to deepen our defense relationships and build
    partner capacity. IPME, provided principally via the International
    Military Education and Training program, is a low-cost program that
    builds long-term relationships with future foreign leaders,
    strengthening our alliances and partnership throughout the world. In
    concert with the State Department, I plan to increase participation by
    10 percent in fiscal year 2021. As we do so, we will ensure rigorous
    vetting of the students selected to participate, much like we do for
    the U.S. recruits with whom they train.
                             reform the department
    Defense-Wide Review
        The DOD is aggressively pursuing reforms to free up time, money,
    and manpower to reinvest back into our highest NDS priorities. Our most
    significant reform effort, the Defense-Wide Review, consisted of an
    extensive review of 50 Defense-Wide organizations and activities. In 4
    months, we made over 120 programmatic decisions generating $5.7 billion
    in fiscal year 2021 savings, $0.2 billion in Working Capital Fund
    efficiencies, and another $2.1 billion in activities and functions
    realigned to the Services, demonstrating the DOD's commitment to
    responsible stewardship of American taxpayer dollars.
        Moving forward, we will institutionalize the Defense-Wide Review to
    ensure we remain focused on increasing performance, decreasing cost,
    and remaining aligned with our priorities. To this end, we have
    established a new governance model over most Defense-Wide agencies and
    activities led by the DOD's Chief Management Officer who will now:
    review current year budget execution and develop a consolidated annual
    program and budget for Defense-Wide organization and accounts; conduct
    bottom-up reviews of Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFAs); and
    reform business operations and evaluate DAFA performance against
    measureable business goals.
        Additionally, each of the Military Services has instituted a
    similar budget review process to achieve the same outcome of realigning
    resources and finding savings that can be reinvested into higher
    priorities.
        We value Congress' guidance on reform, and we now ask for its
    support to fully implement our decisions. We look forward to working
    with Congress to ensure that necessary adjustments are made in the
    Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA and the Fiscal Year 2021 DOD Appropriations Act
    so that we may realize these savings and continue investing in NDS
    priorities.
    Operational Reviews
        The DOD has also initiated a full review of all military forces,
    programs, and activities within each combatant command to ensure
    alignment with NDS priorities. This effort will enable the DOD to shift
    greater emphasis to our top concern--China--or allow us to return
    troops to home station to build readiness. Thus far, we have ongoing
    reviews of United States Africa Command and United States Southern
    Command. My recent decision to deploy an Army Security Force Assistance
    Brigade to Africa to relieve a Brigade Combat Team is the first of many
    decisions to rebalance the force for great power competition.
        In parallel with this initiative, we are reviewing all major
    operational plans to ensure they are aligned with our policy
    objectives, starting with China and Russia. This integrated civil-
    military review process will ensure we remain ready for any crisis
    today, while also identifying key gaps, shortfalls, and limitations in
    our plans that need to be mitigated.
                                     audit
        The DOD owes accountability and transparency to the American
    people, as the taxpayers deserve a level of confidence that their money
    is being spent effectively. In 2018, the DOD completed its first-ever
    consolidated financial statement audit, covering almost $2.8 trillion
    in assets. Now an annual institutionalized process, a second audit was
    subsequently completed in 2019, which showed that over 25 percent of
    the first year's findings have already been corrected, and there was no
    evidence of fraud or abuse.
        The audit is about more than just compliance and financial
    management. Qualitative changes are happening every day that will, over
    time, result in real change to the way the Department does business.
    The DOD workforce's understanding of audit requirements continues to
    grow, and, as efficiencies are gained, value is being realized. The
    audit is helping galvanize change that advances cybersecurity, property
    management, inventory, and readiness, for the benefit of the warfighter
    and the American people.
                                     people
        We recognize that our people--servicemembers, military families and
    DOD civilians--are our most valuable resource and the key to
    accomplishing the objectives outlined in the NDS. It is critical that
    we remain committed to taking care of our people so they can focus
    maximum attention and energy on accomplishing the mission. Everything
    we do depends on the dedication and skill of the men and women who
    sacrifice their own comfort and safety to safeguard the freedom we
    enjoy every day.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget supports a three percent military
    pay raise and an increase in end strength of approximately 5,600
    personnel. To enable our ability to continue to attract, develop, and
    retain a highly talented workforce, we are pursuing several initiatives
    to improve quality of life for our people.
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative
        The DOD has an obligation to ensure our servicemembers and their
    families have access to safe and secure housing. Under the Military
    Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) legislation enacted in 1996,
    the DOD began privatizing installation family housing. Following
    significant initial improvements to on-base housing units many years
    ago, the DOD reduced its oversight activities over a period of several
    years, resulting in cases of sub-standard living conditions for some
    residents living in privatized housing.
        Since early 2019, we have taken extensive action to improve the
    quality of installation housing. Senior DOD leaders now meet regularly
    with key executives from each of the MHPI partners to ensure our
    initiatives continue to progress. Improvements to date include the
    development of a universal lease framework, increased training for
    installation commanders and housing personnel, and the hiring of
    additional housing staff across the Military Departments, to include
    resident advocates. Additionally, the DOD recently released a Tenant
    Bill of Rights to protect and empower our servicemembers and their
    families. Fifteen of the 18 rights will be fully available by May 1,
    2020. The three remaining pertain to legal agreements between the
    Department and the housing providers that the DOD cannot unilaterally
    change. We are working aggressively to resolve these issues, and, if
    needed, will request Congressional support. In the meantime,
    servicemembers and their families can leverage their military
    department's procedures to address and resolve issues, while we work
    toward formal, uniform solutions.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget increases funding for Military
    Housing Privatization Support by $54.6 million, an 82 percent increase
    over the fiscal year 2020 budget request. This funding increase enables
    enhanced oversight of MHPI housing consistent with the Fiscal Year 2020
    NDAA requirements, to include staff augmentation and additional
    training, improved quality control measures, and database development
    and management.
    Military Spouse Employment
        Military spouses living in the United States face an average
    unemployment rate of 24 percent, nearly 7 times the current national
    rate. Many employers are hesitant to hire military spouses due to the
    frequent permanent change of station moves associated with military
    life. Furthermore, military spouses face significant financial hurdles
    when they are required to renew their occupational licenses following a
    move to a new state. These employment challenges impact the readiness
    of the force and adversely affect servicemember retention.
        The DOD continues to work with State governments to develop
    policies and legislation that grant state-to-state licensure
    reciprocity or other methods to ease credentialing for military
    spouses. Many states have enacted positive changes, and we are calling
    on them to continue this trend. To support spouses' careers and
    encourage a high quality of life for military families, I recently
    directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to include
    military spousal hiring assistance and other family considerations as
    criteria in future basing decisions.
    Access to Childcare
        Childcare is a workforce issue that directly impacts the
    efficiency, readiness, and retention of the total force. Earlier this
    month, I issued a directive prioritizing uniformed servicemembers for
    childcare at on-base Child Development Centers. The Department is
    committed to ensuring quality care and meeting the increased demand for
    child care services due to frequent deployments and high operational
    tempo. I will be pursuing other initiatives along these lines in the
    coming months.
                                   conclusion
        We cannot lose sight of the significance of the challenges we now
    face. It is clear by the actions of today's revisionist powers and
    rogue regimes that the free and open international order, which has
    provided peace and prosperity for decades, is under duress. America's
    adversaries are intent on eroding our military's longstanding
    overmatch, undermining our robust architecture of allies and partners,
    and degrading our standing as the global partner of choice.
        The Department of Defense is up to this challenge. With the support
    of Congress and delivery of on-time appropriations, we will have the
    means to continue to aggressively implement the NDS. By building a more
    lethal force, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and carrying
    out aggressive reforms, we will ensure America's military maintains our
    competitive advantage, continues to deter war, and preserves our
    Nation's security.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Esper.
        General Milley.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Milley. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
        It's my distinct honor and privilege to represent the
    almost 3 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    coastguardsmen, and civilians of the United States Armed
    Forces, the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led military
    force in the world, and it would not be possible without your
    continued support.
        This budget is a strategy-driven budget. It is driven by
    the NDS, which you are fully aware of and I fully support. We
    stand really and capable to deter war, defend our Homeland from
    attack, support our allies; and, if deterrence fails, we are
    fully capable today to fight and win our Nation's wars against
    any potential adversary, anywhere on the Earth's surface, at
    any time.
        But, our competitive advantage has eroded, and no one
    should have any doubt about that. China and Russia are
    increasing their military capabilities to outmatch the United
    States and its allies in order to exert their global influence,
    and China's objective is to do that by mid-century.
        North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations fuel
    regional instability and pose direct threats to partner nations
    and United States citizens. While the nature of war is
    constant, advanced technologies have stressed our Industrial
    Age capabilities, concepts, and processes, and the changing
    character of war is happening in a very, very fundamental way.
        Additionally, we are recovering from readiness shortfalls
    and modernization deferments from 20 years of continuous
    warfare and a decade of fiscal instability. This year's budget
    builds on previous readiness and modernization gains, and I
    believe the fiscal year 2021 budget submission is the best
    allocation of resource in a balanced way to support the
    National Defense Strategy. It builds a more lethal force. It
    strengthens allies and partners, and it reforms the Department
    for greater performance and affordability. It also prioritizes,
    as the Secretary said, the Indo-Pacific region to deter Chinese
    aggression, maintain stability, and ensure access to common
    domains in order to preserve a free and open international
    system, for which my parents fought for in the second World
    War. It continues in Europe to counter Russian aggression, and
    it will continue to allow the United States military, in
    concert with our allies and partners, to deter a provocative
    North Korea and Iran from aggressive action in their regions.
    All the while, it provides money to continue our
    counterterrorist operations in various parts of the world. In
    short, President's Budget 2021 supports a ready, agile, and
    capable joint force that can compete, deter, and win across all
    domains today and in the future, and it targets specific
    investments in readiness, modernization, leader development,
    support to our people and their families. It invests in our
    readiness recovery that was built over the last 3 years. With
    this Committee's support, all the services are scheduled to
    meet their readiness recovery goals in this Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP). It funds modernization for great-power
    competition across all warfighting domains, and it improves the
    safety, security, and reliability of our very critical nuclear
    enterprise. It invests in and stands up the Space Force, and
    increases resiliency, deterrence capability, and warfighting
    options in both space and cyberspace. It funds joint all-domain
    command-and-control to improve our interoperability across all
    the services and with our allies, and it invests in the
    advanced technologies that the Secretary mentioned to address
    the more complex threats and the faster pace as the character
    of war changes.
        This budget also invests in our most valuable asset. The
    most valuable asset of the United States military is our
    people. It also funds the facilities, infrastructure, family
    support, and quality-of-life programs in a balanced way. It
    invests in education and talent management in order to develop
    our junior leaders with the values and intellectual agility to
    fight and win future conflicts. The lieutenants and ensigns of
    today will be the generals and admirals of tomorrow.
        Ultimately, our military needs sustained, predictable,
    adequate, and timely funding to retain its competitive
    advantage in this era of great-power competition, with the
    understanding that we must be good stewards of the resources
    entrusted to us by the American people and by Congress.
        I want to thank this Committee for your continued support
    to all of our military. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this
    Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today on the
    President's Budget for fiscal year 2021.
        It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the United States Armed
    Forces--the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led military force in
    the world. America's servicemen and women stand watch in the air, land,
    sea, space, and cyberspace defending our Nation and protecting the
    values bestowed upon us in the Constitution.
        The United States military is a vital component of U.S. national
    power to deter great power war and protect the security of our Nation.
    Should deterrence fail, we are prepared to fight and win our Nation's
    wars against any potential adversary.
        The last four defense budgets Congress passed have done much to
    address readiness shortfalls, and reduce the backlog of deferred
    procurement and modernization, resulting from sequestration in the
    Budget Control Act of 2011, repeated continuing resolutions, and
    simultaneously fighting two contingencies. Still, readiness and
    modernization challenges remain. Our competitors are making steady
    gains and are closing the gap in all warfighting domains. It requires
    sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely budget authorizations and
    appropriations to effectively compete in an era of great power
    competition.
        I applaud the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2018 and 2019 for improving
    predictability by authorizing a funding baseline in two-year periods. I
    especially thank Congress for an on-time fiscal year 2019
    appropriation. Unfortunately, continuing resolutions for fiscal year
    2020 reduced predictability again. I urge Congress to continue
    providing two-year funding baselines to improve our planning, and to
    pass an on-time appropriation for fiscal year 2021 so our Department
    can most effectively apply taxpayer dollars to our national defense.
        The President's Budget for 2021 requests $705.4 billion, consisting
    of $636.4 billion for base requirements and $69 billion for Overseas
    Contingency Operations. It is a product of many hard funding choices.
    It aligns resources to the strategic objectives outlined in the
    National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and
    National Military Strategy (NMS), and delivers a ready, agile, and
    capable Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win across all domains
    today and in the future.
        Specifically, the Department's President's Budget 2021 request
    makes investments in four priority areas: improving Joint warfighting
    readiness, developing the future Joint Force; developing Joint leaders;
    and supporting our troops and their families. These investments
    prioritize capability and capacity while reforming the department for
    better performance and accountability. They also reaffirm our
    commitment to existing Allies and partners, while helping attract new
    partners to advance U.S. interests around the world. President's Budget
    2021 provides the best balance of resources to address the security
    challenges we face today and in the future.
                             strategic environment
        As we begin the third decade of the 21st century, we are in an era
    of great geostrategic change and face a complex range of challenges.
    International institutions and norms are under attack and the free and
    open order that has brought prosperity and great power peace since the
    Second World War is being challenged every day. We face threats to the
    Homeland and our national interests from state and non-state actors
    across every domain--land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. While the
    nature of warfare is constant, the character of war frequently changes
    due to advances in technology and how humans apply technology in the
    conduct of war.
        The NDS provides guidance for how we use military force today and
    in the future. It emphasizes the return of great power competition and
    prioritizes our efforts for long-term competition with China and
    Russia. It also directs us to deter and counter the regional influence
    of North Korea and Iran while consolidating our gains against violent
    extremist organizations (VEOs). This strategic framework--not meant to
    be predictive of future conflicts--informs our planning, capability
    development, risk assessments, and investments. Each of the challenges
    outlined in the NDS threaten our national interests to preserve great
    power peace, and protect the American people, our Homeland, and the
    American way of life.
        China seeks to undermine the free and open Indo-Pacific, our global
    alliance structure, and the status quo of powers around the world, by
    ignoring international norms, standards, and laws. Additionally, the
    Chinese Communist Party exports authoritarian practices around the
    world to undermine United States interests. They assert control of
    disputed spaces in the Indo-Pacific region through a campaign of low-
    level coercion and use of ``through a campaign of low-level coercion
    and use of ``through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of
    ``through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of ``
        Russia is attempting to undermine the credibility of our NATO
    alliance, and United States credibility globally. Opportunism is a
    cornerstone of their behavior in the strategic environment to exploit
    political instability and uncertainty. Moscow uses information warfare,
    cyber operations, and political influence to achieve their objectives
    around the world. We have seen examples of revanchist behavior in their
    invasions of Georgia and Crimea, activities in the Donbas, and backing
    of authoritarian regimes in Syria and Venezuela. Since 2016, we have
    worked to counter their efforts to sow doubt in democratic processes
    and to exacerbate societal divisions in Europe and the United States.
        China and Russia have invested in capabilities designed to nullify
    our strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses--specifically targeting
    our ability to project power and operate freely around the world.
        Despite the diplomatic thaw between the United States and the
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea threatens our
    regional Allies and our Homeland with nuclear and ballistic missile
    capabilities. We must have a force posture to deter and defend against
    these threats, as well as Pyongyang's extensive conventional forces.
    The Joint Force must maintain readiness on the Korean Peninsula, as
    well as in defense of our Homeland, to be prepared for multiple
    contingencies.
        Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, including
    groups that threaten United States personnel overseas and in our
    Homeland. Iran has taken advantage of instability to expand its
    influence through partners and proxies to challenge the interests of
    the United States and our Allies and partners. Tehran also uses covert
    and overt military action to restrict our military and economic access
    to the Middle East, especially threatening freedom of navigation along
    commercial maritime routes. Recently, the Iranian regime's attacks have
    become more aggressive and they are taking steps to resume development
    of nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop cruise and ballistic
    missiles, improve their intelligence capabilities, and undertake
    malicious cyber activities intended to challenge our competitive
    advantage. to develop cruise and ballistic missiles, improve their
    intelligence capabilities, and undertake malicious cyber activities
    intended to challenge our competitive advantage.
        Violent extremism is a generational, transregional struggle
    requiring sustained political, fiscal, and military solutions. While we
    have achieved significant progress in our counterterrorism efforts, the
    threat to the United States and our Allies remains. With a coalition of
    like-minded nations, we continue to apply military pressure against
    VEOs in Afghanistan and Syria to protect the American people from
    terrorist attacks against the Homeland. Our military strategy remains
    to work by, with, and through Allies, partners, and local forces;
    however, a coordinated, whole-of-government approach is necessary to
    address the underlying conditions of violent extremism.
        To meet these priority challenges, the Department requires a
    flexible and agile Joint Force with the capability and capacity to
    respond to any contingency now and in the future. We must be able to
    adapt quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced technologies to
    compete and win against potential adversaries. Our President's Budget
    2021 request targets specific investments in readiness, modernization,
    leader development, and support to our people and families to retain
    overmatch in an era of great power competition.
                      improve joint warfighting readiness
        The U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to defeat any adversary that
    threatens the Homeland or its vital national security interests around
    the world. Investment in readiness is essential to maintain this
    posture, and readiness continues to be a focus of our budget request
    this year.
        The President's Budget 2021 builds on readiness improvements from
    fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2020 with a funding profile that meets
    readiness recovery goals for all Services within the Future Years
    Defense Plan (FYDP). The President's Budget 2021 requests $125.1
    billion to robustly fund readiness across the Joint Force, augmented by
    cooperation with our Allies and partners. This represents an increase
    of $9 billion, or 7.8 percent, over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels to
    continue readiness recovery and meet global readiness needs. The
    President's Budget 2021 funds major readiness accounts to grow
    operational availability and recover from years of wartime operations
    and budget instability. It will replace aging equipment with
    accelerated procurement of newer gear, improve training of ground and
    aviation elements, and invest in manpower with critical skills.
    Specific readiness status and major priority investments by Service
    follow.
        U.S. Army: Recent budgets have reversed readiness declines and
    facilitated modest gains, achieving and sustaining the Army's highest
    readiness levels in the last 3 years. Since 2016, the Army's non-
    deployable rate has decreased from 15 to 6 percent, and over the last
    year, active component Brigade Combat Team average readiness is holding
    steady at 74 percent. Despite significant progress recovering core
    mission readiness, global operational demands continue to challenge the
    Army's ability to sustain its gains and to achieve the readiness levels
    needed to meet contingency planning requirements.
        The President's Budget 2021 budget enables the Army to maintain its
    current tactical readiness levels while improving its strategic
    readiness. The President's Budget 2021 budget produces modest end
    strength growth to build cyber operations and electronic warfare (EW)
    capabilities, and increases funding for ground and air readiness--
    resourcing training strategies at 100 percent for the Active Component
    and 80 percent for the Reserve Component. The budget proposal also
    enables the Army to improve training, support, and command facilities
    through the activation of a 4th Corps headquarters.
        U.S. Navy: Navy readiness bottomed out in June 2018 and has trended
    slowly upwards after the implementation of a readiness recovery
    strategy. By October 2019, the Navy improved mission-capable rates for
    all aircraft types and achieved the desired 80 percent mission capable
    rates for F/A-18 E/F and EA-18G primary mission aircraft inventory.
    However, complete readiness recovery requires continued sustained
    implementation and funding of the recovery initiatives to address
    challenges in supply, munitions, and infrastructure. In the long term,
    the Navy must balance sustainment of the current and growing force with
    the need to increase capacity and field new capabilities.
        The President's Budget 2021 implements the NDS and prioritizes
    readiness recovery of force elements required in a major contingency
    while sustaining a combat-credible force forward. The Navy prioritizes
    funding for its people--growing its end strength by 3,970 personnel
    over the 2020 projected level. This growth will eliminate shortfalls in
    critical warfighting readiness specialties, align manpower to force
    structure as the Navy grows the Fleet, and reduce manpower gaps at sea.
    The Navy is focused on data-driven process improvements that drive the
    implementation of industry best practices for aviation readiness and
    ship maintenance. Maintaining and improving public and private shipyard
    infrastructure capacity is essential to shipbuilding and conducting
    required maintenance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval Shipyard
    investments and completion of Naval Shipyard optimization analyses are
    a necessary step to minimize maintenance delays, increase on-time
    deliveries, and incentivize private shipyards to grow much-needed
    shipbuilding capacity. maintenance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval
    Shipyard investments and completion of Naval Shipyard optimization
    analyses are a necessary step to minimize maintenance delays, increase
    on-time deliveries, and incentivize private shipyards to grow much-
    needed shipbuilding capacity.
        U.S. Marine Corps: Funding increases have enabled the Marine Corps
    to sustain its role as a ready, agile, and expeditionary force ready to
    meet global demand. Current unit readiness remains high for deployed
    forces and total force readiness continues to trend upward. However,
    the Marine Corps has entered a period of transformation to build a
    force that is postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving
    future operating environment and align with the NDS.
        As an inherently naval force, President's Budget 2021 enhances the
    Marine Corps' capability through naval integration. It prioritizes
    investments that incorporate revolutionary warfighting concepts, such
    as littoral operations in contested environments, expeditionary
    advanced base operations, and distributed maritime operations. The
    President's Budget 2021 invests in ground combat capabilities by
    divesting known legacy and low-demand programs that do not meet future
    operating requirements and reinvests these funds in capabilities that
    enable a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness to operate inside
    contested maritime spaces. Marine aviation continues to advance through
    ongoing and comprehensive readiness recovery efforts to increase the
    capacity and quality of mission capable aircraft.
        U.S. Air Force: Fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019 funding
    contributed to readiness improvements across various platforms by
    investing in pilot training and production, depot maintenance, and
    aviation spare parts, while increasing flying hours. Increased aircraft
    mission capable rates have resulted in over 75 percent readiness of the
    Air Force's pacing squadrons. However, aging programs, such as the
    legacy tanker fleet, and programs that lack sufficient sustainment
    capacity to support total inventory, prohibit additional improvements
    in the Air Force's readiness. The President's Budget 2021 divests of
    programs like these and reinvests in new procurement and advanced
    technology to improve readiness, address future threats, and lower
    aircraft sustainment costs.
        The number one priority of the Air Force is multi-domain command
    and control. This investment allows current and future platforms to
    instantly share important data, and increases effectiveness,
    survivability, and lethality. The Air Force is also continuing to
    leverage data analytics, innovation, industry best practices, and
    cutting-edge technologies to reduce sustainment costs, increase
    efficiency, and improve weapon system reliability. The President's
    Budget 2021 addresses operational training infrastructure shortfalls
    through targeted near-term investments and a long-term funding strategy
    to upgrade both its live and synthetic training infrastructure.
        U.S. Space Force: We are expeditiously building the newest branch
    of the Armed Forces--the Space Force--as a co-equal Service under the
    Department of the Air Force. To complement U.S. Space Command, which
    the President established as a unified combatant command in 2019 to
    integrate Joint Force operations in the space domain, the Space Force
    will focus on the title X responsibilities of manning, training, and
    equipping U.S. Forces to maintain a competitive advantage in space. We
    expect the Space Force to be an agile and lean organization that will
    initially grow its membership from the U.S. Air Force, and eventually
    other Services pending Congressional approval. There is much work to do
    to establish the mechanisms to commission, enlist, appoint, train,
    equip, and support members of this new military service. We look
    forward to working with Congress in these areas to create the world's
    most capable Space Force.
                       developing the future joint force
        To effectively compete and deter in a time of great power
    competition, we must modernize existing capabilities, accelerate the
    evolution of advanced technologies, and develop and implement joint
    warfighting concepts.
        Analytical assessments, like the Joint Military Net Assessment, the
    Chairman's Risk Assessment, and Contingency Planning Guidance, allow us
    to assess risk, estimate the future operating environment, and make
    comprehensive, threat-informed decisions. Based on these assessments,
    the Joint Force has prioritized the following capability areas as
    critical to achieve the NDS objectives and counter tomorrow's expected
    challenges.
        Nuclear Deterrence: As the Department's top priority, President's
    Budget 2021 robustly supports the nuclear enterprise under the NDS and
    the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. It invests in nuclear modernization to
    improve the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear
    enterprise, and supports simultaneous recapitalization of capabilities
    across all three aging legs of the nuclear triad and sustainment of
    legacy systems. Key investments are in the Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent, the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, Long-Range
    Stand Off Weapon, missile warning, and resilient assured Nuclear
    Command, Control, and Communications.
        Space: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding to increase our
    resiliency, deterrence capability, and warfighting options in the space
    domain. It includes funding to modernize existing space assets,
    diversify offensive and defensive space control capabilities, and
    improve space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR). The budget also requests continued funding for the Space
    Development Agency's first project to develop a new data transport
    layer to enhance connectivity among our warfighting platforms. As they
    move forward, they will set an example of how the Department can move
    quickly and leverage industry best practices and innovation in
    developing new space capabilities.
        Cyber: The President's Budget 2021 request prioritizes the defense
    of DOD Information Networks, improves offensive and defensive
    cyberspace operations capabilities, and matures our cyberspace command
    and control structure. It continues to build, train, and equip Cyber
    Mission Forces. It also makes investments in next-generation encryption
    to secure DOD communications, and invests in secure, cloud-based
    information technology for the Department's business and mission
    operations through the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure Cloud
    contract.
        Command and Control: The President's Budget 2021 increases
    investment in Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) to create an
    agile, interoperable Joint Force that can fight with fully networked
    platforms, sensors, weapons, and command and control capabilities, even
    through contested environments. The Air Force's Advanced Battle
    Management System (ABMS) and our collective digital modernization
    efforts across the Department increase our speed, agility, and
    capability to fight and win in all-domain operations.
        Air: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding to modernize air
    capabilities, while divesting legacy air programs. It maintains
    tactical aviation capacity through continued procurement of both 4th
    and 5th generation aircraft, including F-35, F/A-18 E/F, and F-15EX
    aircraft. It invests in developing Next Generation Air Dominance
    platforms to meet future Joint Force requirements. President's Budget
    2021 reduces the size of the B-1 fleet, but funds selective legacy
    bomber upgrades, to improve aviation readiness, while investing in
    development of the future nuclear-capable bomber, the B-21 Raider. It
    also requests funding to build the future tanker fleet.
        Sea: The President's Budget 2021 requests funding for a battle
    force of 306 deployable ships in fiscal year 2021, including funding to
    recapitalize the Columbia strategic ballistic missile submarine, our
    Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent. The President's Budget 2021
    invests in a more lethal and innovative maritime force through
    increased research and development for maritime strike tomahawk, the
    hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned systems, a
    family of lasers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and
    Marine Corps expeditionary equipment. Our budget request also includes
    key readiness investments in ship depot maintenance and ship
    operations. research and development for maritime strike Tomahawk, the
    hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned systems, a
    family of lasers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and
    Marine Corps expeditionary equipment. Our budget request also includes
    key readiness investments in ship depot maintenance and ship
    operations.
        Land: Further developing long-range fire capabilities remains a
    priority in the land domain. The Army and Marine Corps intend to field
    an initial ground-launched cruise missile capability in the next few
    years. The President's Budget 2021 also invests in the recapitalization
    of combat vehicles with the fielding of the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle, which provides increased protection and restored payload
    characteristics compared to the legacy High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled
    Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet. Army Combat Vehicle and Marine Corps Amphibious
    Combat Vehicle investments will help meet the Joint Force's operational
    needs in the face of the changing character of modern land warfare.
        Missile Defeat and Defense: The President's Budget 2021 strengthens
    missile defense of the Homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and
    partners. It supports continued investment in the modernization of
    critical near-term layered capabilities to meet the threats of today
    while building additional capacity and lethality to outpace evolving
    threats. Additionally, this budget is aligned with the Missile Defense
    Review which places emphasis on Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense and
    reduces risk by pursuing multiple developmental efforts. These
    investments support a flexible, adaptable, and expanded missile defense
    architecture on the ground, in the air, and from the sea that leverages
    space technology.
        Advanced Technologies: Great power competition requires the
    Department to be on the cutting edge of advanced technologies.
    Hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomous
    systems are a few of our key advanced technology investment areas.
    President's Budget 2021 represents the Department's largest-ever
    investment in research, development, testing, and evaluation. Through
    this infusion of funding, we will draw on the power of America's
    industrial base and technology sector as partners in our modernization
    and innovation efforts.
        The President's Budget 2021 increases our investment in hypersonic
    weapons development. This request supports promising long-range
    conventional and advanced rapid-response strike capability development
    in each military department, including the Army's Long-Range Hypersonic
    Weapon, the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike, and the Air Force's
    Advanced Rapid Response Weapon. Hypersonic weapons provide an offensive
    capability against time-sensitive and high-value targets. They
    challenge adversary sensors and interceptors, and complement existing
    cruise and ballistic missile capabilities. Hypersonic weapons provide
    an offensive capability against time-sensitive and high-value targets.
    They challenge adversary sensors and interceptors, and complement
    existing cruise and ballistic missile capabilities.
        President's Budget 2021 also increases our investment in AI
    research, prototyping, and fielding. The Joint Artificial Intelligence
    Center (JAIC) and Project Maven are leading cross-Service AI efforts,
    while each Service leads projects focused on their unique needs.
    Funding for the JAIC provides a common foundation upon which multiple
    organizations can develop, test, certify, and share AI capabilities.
    JAIC also provides a single point of contact for government, industry,
    academia, and other Allies interested in collaborating with DOD on AI.
    Project Maven's application of AI to full-motion video exploitation
    demonstrates how the Department can to rapidly develop, test, and field
    AI capabilities to address operational problems. We are rapidly
    expanding our AI efforts to logistics, cyber operations, command and
    control, and semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles, while we refine
    how humans will interact with this technology in our future.
        The President's Budget 2021 also requests funding for autonomous
    and remotely piloted systems in the air, on and under the sea, on land
    and in space. These systems increase the capacity of our force, allow
    us to focus human efforts on more complex tasks, and enhance our speed
    of maneuver and lethality in contested environments. Combined with
    developments in piloted and optionally-piloted platforms, our advanced
    autonomous systems will enhance our speed of maneuver and lethality in
    contested environments.
        Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC): Advances in technology and great
    power competition are driving us to refine our Joint Warfighting
    Concept. The JWC will provide a threat-informed capability development
    roadmap for all-domain joint maneuver warfare. We will harness the
    innovation within our force, the intelligence community, industry, and
    other sectors of America to develop and test this concept to ensure it
    reflects the best ideas for the future fight. President's Budget 2021
    invests in Joint wargames and experiments so we can accelerate our
    learning and adapt concepts and capabilities faster than our
    adversaries.
                             develop joint leaders
        In order to retain our competitive advantage into the 2030s and
    beyond, we are refining Professional Military Education (PME) and
    talent management to develop Joint Leaders with the skills, values, and
    intellectual agility to fight and win the wars of tomorrow.
        Our President's Budget 2021 complements measures we are taking to
    reorient the PME enterprise to prepare Joint leaders to operate
    globally, across all domains, and in an environment where the character
    of war is constantly changing. Measures include shifting PME curricula
    from a predominantly topic-based approach to instead focus on outcomes,
    and modifying instruction to emphasize ingenuity, military
    professionalism, and historical insights in the art and science of
    warfighting. The Joint Chiefs and I are committed to ensuring our PME
    enterprise can continuously assess, adapt, and innovate.
        Our collective talent management enterprise, based on individual
    Service personnel processes, must likewise continuously assess, adapt,
    and innovate. The positive benefits of adaptation and innovation in our
    PME enterprise are sub-optimized if we do not wisely identify and
    nurture the development of the human talent in the Joint Force. Our
    best and brightest must be identified, assigned to schooling, and
    employed in such a way that maximizes both their potential and the
    benefit for the Joint Force. Careful selection of who goes to school
    and when, who teaches them, assessments of cognitive abilities, and
    purposeful post-PME assignments require adaptation and innovation to
    realize this vision.
        The increased speed, complexity, and ambiguity of today's strategic
    environment require that we develop strategically-thinking joint
    warfighters who can critically and creatively apply military power to
    inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and
    fight under conditions of disruptive change. Through rigorous,
    specialized military education combined with enhanced talent management
    approaches, we will provide the Joint Force intellectual overmatch and
    competitive advantage in all domains.
                              troops and families
        The United States military is the strongest in the world because of
    our people. We maintain a resilient and adaptable military by providing
    unwavering support, care, and leadership to our troops and families, to
    include our extended family--the civilian employees who serve across
    the Joint Force. troops and families, to include our extended family--
    the civilian employees who serve across the Joint Force.
        The President's Budget 2021 requests funding for family support
    initiatives, to include child care for over 160,000 military children
    and various youth programs serving more than 1 million dependents.
    President's Budget 2021 also requests a significant investment in a
    variety of military spouse programs. These include family advocacy,
    financial readiness, and the Military OneSource network. We are also
    implementing programs to offset the costs of acquiring and transferring
    professional licenses for our military spouses.
        In broad terms, President's Budget 2021 focuses on improving our
    facilities infrastructure and maintenance to support operational and
    training readiness, while also providing our military families safe,
    high-quality residences. In recognition of the deficient conditions
    with some of our base housing, each of the Services has enhanced
    oversight of their public-private housing partnerships consistent with
    the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA requirements.
        America's military operates globally and at a high operational
    tempo. We must keep the trust of our servicemembers and their families
    by ensuring that they continue to receive superior quality of life
    benefits. Our All-Volunteer Force will continue to be the greatest in
    history only if we continuously affirm how much we value the service
    that our military and civilian members provide their country.
                                   conclusion
        The United States Armed Forces is a flexible and adaptable force
    ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. The President's
    Budget 2021 budget request increases the lethality of the force by
    improving readiness, developing the Joint Force of the future,
    developing Joint leaders, and taking care of our troops and their
    families. I appreciate the support of Congress to provide sustained,
    predictable, adequate, and timely funding so America's Armed Forces
    will achieve all-domain dominance now and into the future.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
        Because of a scheduling problem, we'll begin our questions
    with Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    consideration. I have to go preside over the Senate in 10
    minutes, known as presiding officer duty, which Lieutenant
    Esper and Lieutenant Milley could relate to staff duty, back in
    their days. It's a duty, not an honor, and only the most junior
    personnel get to pull it.
        Secretary Esper, I want to commend your remarks at the
    Munich Security Conference about the threat that Huawei poses
    to the United States and our NATO allies. Unfortunately, it
    doesn't seem like all of our NATO allies got the message or
    agree with it. Could you talk about the threat that Huawei's
    presence in Europe, especially in nations where we have troop
    presence, threatens our security and NATO security?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. Since my first NATO
    Ministerial--Defense Ministerial, in June of last year--so,
    I've been to three or four now--I've had a common message, one
    of many, and this is the threat that Huawei technology imposes
    on our networks. The message has been that if countries--if our
    NATO allies incorporate Huawei technology, it may very well
    have a severe impact on our ability to share information, to
    share intelligence, to share operational plans, and for the
    alliance to conduct itself as an alliance. The fact of the
    matter is, some countries get it, many more don't. It's a
    continual process, where we're trying to work. I think we also
    need to work together, some countries, on alternatives to
    Huawei, because otherwise we will find the alliance
    compromised, in due course.
        Senator Cotton. Should some of our allies in Europe move
    forward with Huawei in their networks, will we have to at least
    consider our force posture in those countries, given what it
    means for the security and privacy of our troops and their
    families?
        Secretary Esper. I think, Senator, depending on how they
    move forward, we're going to have to assess what they've done
    and how they've done it, and make an assessment for each
    country, and then, from there, decide what we're going to do
    with regard to those things I mentioned--information-sharing,
    intelligence-sharing, and so forth.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Last month, there were media reports
    that the Department of Defense had reservations about a
    regulation related to Huawei that the Commerce Department has
    proposed. That regulation has now moved forward--those
    objections. Could you just make clear for us, and maybe all the
    people that work for you directly, what the Secretary's
    position is on Huawei?
        Secretary Esper. Well, I'm very concerned about Huawei and
    other Chinese technologies, so I think we need to take a very
    careful eye with regard to our export controls--Chinese
    technology in general, Huawei specifically--and I think we need
    to be very conscious of Chinese technology in our system. By
    the same token, I also want to--I need to balance the equation
    and make sure we understand our own technology companies and
    ensuring that we have access to that, as well. But, overall,
    I'm very concerned about Chinese technology, espionage,
    cybertheft, you name it, that's ongoing, and has been for many
    years in our country.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        On the topic of espionage, let's turn to Russia, and
    specifically the Open Skies Treaty, and how they use that, and
    how they cheat on it in their own country. Specifically,
    refusing to allow us to fly Open Skies flights over
    Kaliningrad, their strategically located enclave in Europe, and
    also around and near Georgia. Other witnesses in the past in
    front of this Committee, like General Dunford, General Milley's
    predecessor, Vince Stewart, former head of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA), have testified that Russia has been
    cheating on the Open Skies Treaty, that we don't get much
    benefit out of it as long as they're cheating, that--even
    called it a relic of the past. Do you think that the Open Skies
    Treaty still serves United States interests, given the fact
    that Russia continually cheats on that treaty?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, they have been cheating for many
    years. I raised this at the Defense Ministerial last month with
    all of our NATO partners, that we need to speak out more
    clearly about Russian noncompliance. You mentioned Georgia and
    Kaliningrad. Those are two good examples. We've also been
    denied access to military exercise over-flights. There are some
    other issues, that we cannot discuss in this session, which we
    should come and talk to you about. But, I have a lot of
    concerns about the treaty as it stands now.
        Senator Cotton. So, I noted the President's Budget did not
    include money to recapitalize the Open Skies Treaty aircrafts,
    the OC-135s. But, I've also heard that there may be, as early
    as next month, the possibility of contracts announced to
    modernize those aircraft. What can you tell us about that use
    of funds?
        Secretary Esper. At this point in time, until we make a
    final decision on the path forward, I'm not prepared to
    recapitalize aircraft. I want to make sure we understand what
    the direction is. I would note that many of our allies that are
    in the Open Skies Treaty--and I've talked to them a lot; this
    is important to many of our NATO allies--that they have the
    means to conduct the over-flights. We still have the means to
    conduct over-flights. I was at Offutt Air Force Base just last
    week. I had a chance to walk on--to walk about one of the OC-
    135s and talk to the crew and take a look at the aircraft. But,
    at this point in time, we're holding until we get better
    direction.
        Senator Cotton. Good.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
        Mr. Secretary, let me return to some of my comments in the
    opening statement about the vacancies in the Department. There
    are two significant issues. One, as I highlight, civilian
    control of the military, which you need civilians to do that.
    Also, institutional capacity, people who have been on the job,
    have the credibility and the legitimacy of being confirmed and
    are not acting. Can you tell us why we have so many unfilled
    positions and acting personnel? We've--speaking for the
    Chairman--I think he's done a remarkable job of getting people
    through when they get up here. So, could you comment?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. Let me, first, give you a
    rundown on the numbers.
        So, of 60 confirmed slots--it was 58 until the NDAA was
    passed, we added 2 new Space positions--so, of 58, 39 are
    currently filled, we have 2 nominees waiting on the floor for a
    vote, we have 4 nominees in committee, we have 2 intents to
    nominate, we have 4 more that are right behind them, and then
    we have 5 more in the process. So, of the balance, there are--I
    think that's six in the balance that we have to identify
    positions for.
        Now, as you know, many of us have been in this town a long
    time. You--it becomes more challenging as you get into the
    fourth year of a first term, in terms of finding people. That
    is a challenge, and we also have challenges with moving people
    through the process. These are long processes. So, with regard
    to where we are, I don't think the situation is as dire as some
    may think, and we have very capable people in the positions.
    I've gotten the chance to work with them, both in their current
    role and my previous role as Secretary of the Army, and we have
    very capable DOD civilians--career civilians who also help out.
        At no time have I had any concerns about civilian control
    of the military, to be frank. I know that's part of the NDS
    review. When I came in, my first week or two on the job, I
    instituted a number of changes, where the uniform and civilian
    leadership works together, sits together in weekly meetings.
    We, together, review our National Defense Strategy
    implementation. We, together, review OP PLAN implementation or
    development. We have a much better integration today between
    civilians and military than we did, I think, 9 months ago.
        Senator Reed. In regard to the nominations that are coming
    up to us, I don't think I'm alone when I was surprised that
    Elaine McCusker's nomination was withdrawn. From everything I
    have heard, she's a very capable and experienced individual. In
    fact, that's why she was nominated in the first place. To your
    knowledge, can you tell us why her nomination was withdrawn?
        Secretary Esper. Well, Elaine is a very capable and
    dedicated public servant, but the President has the right to
    choose his members, who he's going to nominate.
        Senator Reed. So, it was the presidential decision, not a
    recommendation by you or anyone else in the Department of
    Defense.
        Secretary Esper. Well, it was a PPO decision. At this
    point, I don't have any more fidelity at this juncture.
        Senator Reed. Well, again, I think one of the concerns we
    go back to is that your role, as Secretary of Defense, you
    should have a critical voice in all these nominations. That
    goes with the territory, and----
        Secretary Esper. Sure.
        Senator Reed.--you should have it, and if you didn't have
    it in this case, I think that is a problem, which I hope we can
    address.
        The other area I spoke in my opening remarks was a Special
    Operations and Long-Intesity Conflict (SOLIC) position, and you
    realize that, over several years, through several NDAAs, we've
    tried to build up the capacity of the SOLIC to be a secretary-
    like individual. Again, we have a--someone who's an acting
    position. That's been since last June, when Secretary West
    retired. So, can you promptly provide the Committee with a plan
    for implementing, not just getting a person in place, but
    making that person act like a Service Secretary?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. First of all, thanks again.
    I think you brought this up a month ago when we sat down
    together, and I was not tracking it. That's on me. I have a
    high regard for SOLIC. Believe it or not, I worked as an IMA
    [Individual Mobilization Augmentee] reern bservist in SOLIC
    many, many years ago. But, since then, we've taken a number of
    actions, so we're pushing forward on the nominee. We are
    looking at--we are going to reconsolidate SOLIC back in the
    Pentagon. I have tasked the SOLIC to provide a number of
    recommendations on section 922 implementation. We will begin
    frequent meetings between the SOLIC and myself and/or the
    deputy on a routine basis. So, we're--and then, also committed
    to recruiting and retaining more talent in SOLIC. So, I think
    we're taking a number of steps to integrate SOLIC and to
    achieve what was in law that you talked about.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper. And I look forward to updating you on this
    as we go forward.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Just a different topic here, but due to exceptional staff
    work on both the majority and minority side, we discovered,
    about 2 years ago, that many of our allies were not paying for
    fuel, the Saudis and Emirates, for example. It was about a $300
    million bill. The Emirates, when confronted with it, paid up.
    The Saudis are still paying. But, just today, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report indicating
    that the Department has failed to secure reimbursement for more
    than $1 billion worth of support to other nations. I have no
    time left, but can you, briefly--very briefly--comment, and
    also indicate what you're going to do to collect the money,
    basically?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I've tried to track that number
    down. I can't find the billion-dollar number. I am tracking
    that with regard to payments. They are caught up at this time.
    They've reimbursed us for approximately $113 million. There is
    still approximately $38 million outstanding in flying costs.
    But, I want to pull the thread a little bit more on that
    billion-dollar number to make sure I'm not missing something,
    and that----
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper.--GAO report is helpful.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary and General Milley, there's been a lot of
    reporting about the reduction in funding for the Virginia-class
    submarine in connection with the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) budget increase. Critics of nuclear
    modernization are equating concern for the Navy's shipbuilding
    plan with opposition to funding the NNSA, and are using some
    recent comments made by Acting Secretary Modly and also you,
    General Milley, to suggest that DOD does not support the
    current budget request for NNSA. Now, I share the concern for
    the Navy's shipbuilding budget, and Congress will have an
    opportunity to look at that. But, I know that you are both very
    strong supporters of nuclear modernization, and also, Admiral
    Richard was before this Committee when he was here several
    weeks ago testifying that there was no excess margin in the
    NNSA's budget. So, I just want to be clear on this. Do you both
    support the requested level of funding for nuclear
    modernization at the NNSA?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I do, and if you don't mind, I'll
    give a little bit explanation. I think it's vitally critical
    that we recapitalize our nuclear triad. That's why we placed
    that as number-one defense priority, in terms of our funding.
    That means not just the platforms--the B-21, the ground-based
    strategic deterrent, and the Columbia-class submarine--but also
    nuclear command/control, and a few other things, like long-
    range strike. But, you also have to have the packages, the
    warheads, et cetera, the plutonium pits go with that. So, it's
    critical that those be funded and moved quickly forward so we
    can have them paired up in time to recapitalize, ensure that
    the strategic deterrent is modeginning in the year 2030.
        Senator Fischer. And there's no room for pausing----
        Secretary Esper. Ma'am, there----
        Senator Fischer.--the production----
        Secretary Esper.--there is no room for margin. I have been
    working with our folks at OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense] and Admiral Richard to try and actually build margin
    into our current fleet so that we have some room. But, it's
    critical that we meet that timeline.
        Senator Fischer. General Milley?
        General Milley. I absolutely support fully funding the
    nuclear enterprise. It's the number-one priority. It's kept the
    peace--world peace, actually, from great-power war for going on
    7\1/2\ decades. So, I absolutely support that. I think what
    we're talking about is the HASC's testimony from last week. I
    was not involved in the decision to move the money from the SSN
    (attack submarines), but I fully support fully funding our
    nuclear enterprise.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it's important that the
    record reflect that.
        Mr. Secretary, section 1039 of the 2013 NDAA requires the
    Nuclear Weapons Council to certify NNSA's budget and ensure
    it's adequate to meet requirements. Conferees clearly stated,
    in the accompanying report, their expectation that, through
    this provision, the Nuclear Weapons Council will, ``take an
    active role in shaping and reviewing the NNSA budget as it is
    prepared for submission to Congress and negotiated with the
    Office of Management and Budget during the budget review
    process''.
        This year, the certification letter submitted pursuant to
    this provision read, ``NNSA is unable to provide detailed
    budget information to support certification in advance of the
    budget release of the President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget
    Request by the Office of Management and Budget. The NWC cannot
    perform the analysis required to produce a budget certification
    letter without this information''.
        I think it's obvious that the process is not working but
    what is your view of the situation, and how can we resolve this
    to ensure the intent of the provision is being met?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I completely agree. I think
    this--we need to let the Nuclear Weapons Council work. I think
    that looking at budgets needs to begin very, very early,
    arguably in the late summer of the year before. I would like to
    have a look at that, as well. I want to make sure that we're
    prioritizing the right thing so that we have a capable
    strategic deterrent. I think if that were the case, then we
    would have been in a much different situation. We have already
    got agreement from NNSA to do that in DOE [Department of
    Energy], and I got an agreement also from OMB to support us on
    that. So, I think it's very important, and we intend to
    implement that, going forward.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. As you stated earlier, this has
    to work together. It has to be on time in order to meet our
    number-one priority of the NDS.
        Also, Mr. Secretary, in the time since the budget was
    released, we've heard complaints, including many here in
    Congress, about things that either weren't included or were
    perceived to be underfunded in this budget: ships, aerial
    refueling tankers, Stars and Stripes, rumors about a withdrawal
    from Africa, the European Deterrence Initiative, the list goes
    on and on. You've heard those. What's forgotten, sometimes, is
    that it is Congress that sets the funding level, not the
    administration.
        So, Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that these tradeoffs
    are the result of the lower top-line that was approved by
    Congress?
        Secretary Esper. They are, Senator. I would still scrub my
    budget really hard year after year, regardless, because I think
    it's necessary to do defense-wide reviews. But, as the Chairman
    mentioned up front, we have to get back on the trajectory of 3
    to 5 percent annual real growth if we're going to modernize the
    force and implement the NDS.
        I was shown a number, a few days ago, that if you'd go back
    to the Budget Control Act--I think it was August 2011--and the
    amount of funding we would have had if we hadn't gone that
    course, it's somewhere between 450 to 550 billion dollars lost
    that we could have put into modernization, and so, that's the
    catchup we have to look at, at this point in time.
        Senator Fischer. Okay.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here, and for your service.
        Secretary Esper, I appreciate all of the comments that
    you've made about your efforts to find additional funding
    within your budget, given the constraints that you're looking
    at. But, as you're aware, I'm sure, last year the Department
    realigned $6.1 billion for its budget towards constructing a
    border wall along the United States southern border with
    Mexico. More recently, the administration is going to divert
    another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon toward the border wall.
    They're taking that from a number of programs, in--as Senator
    Reed outlined in his opening statement, including eight MQ-9
    Reapers, which I--we heard, from General Walters, are very
    important as they're looking at ISR [Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] along the eastern European
    border.
        So, I guess--explain to me how we can feel comfortable with
    raiding the Defense budget at a time when you're telling us you
    have needs and are expecting a shortfall based on a flatter
    budget for 2021. Why should we assume, if you can divert that
    kind of money for the border wall, that we should give you
    additional funding to address other areas of need?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, as you know, the southwest border
    was declared a national emergency by the President, based on
    what has been happening down there.
        Senator Shaheen. And, as I'm sure you know, the Congress
    actually voted that we did not agree with that designation,
    and, in fact, it's only because the President vetoed it that
    that didn't change. I think there are some real questions about
    whether taking money that has been appropriated by the
    Congress, signed into law for another use, is actually legal
    and constitutional.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator, I understand. It's with the
    declaration of the national emergency and--we were asked to
    support Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Border security
    is national security. With that, it is our understanding under
    the law that, as directed, we were able to transfer that money
    to support that, much like we do many other things, whether
    it's fighting wildfires or helping with floods, whatever the
    case may be. But, I think the larger issue is with regard to
    modernizing the force. We're talking about making some big
    investments that are going to require a divestiture of things
    we've done in the past in order to invest in the things we need
    in the future. I think the demands there pale in comparison to
    what is being used to support DHS on the wall.
        Senator Shaheen. We had the Acting Secretary of DHS before
    the Appropriations Subcommittee last week, and he showed us
    numbers that indicated there are significant dollars there for
    additional construction on a border wall that they are not
    likely to use in the next year. So, it's hard for me to
    understand how we can justify taking money that we need from
    our military to construct a wall along the southern border. I'm
    not going to ask you to respond to that, because I'm going to
    be running out of time, but I think it's a very real question.
    I certainly hope that we won't see, past this year, any further
    effort to take money from our military. I hope you will commit
    to that.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, at this time, we don't foresee
    the need, at this time, to draw upon these sources next year,
    and I will follow up with the Secretary to find out, because we
    want to support DHS, but not over-support DHS, if that makes
    sense.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I want to commend you on, the day that you were sworn in,
    appointing a commission to deal with PFAS [Per- and
    Polyfluoroalkyl Substances] contamination. It is an issue for
    us in New Hampshire, as I know you're aware, as it is in so
    many other States. I'm sure you know that the Fiscal Year 2020
    NDAA included a provision to phase out the use of fluorine-
    containing firefighting for military use by 2024. Can you give
    us an update on where the military is in finding an
    alternative?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. We're working that issue hard.
    It's--to replacement, it's, what, the AFFF [Aqueous Film
    Forming Foam], I think. It's an acronym.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        Secretary Esper. The three things we're focusing on is the
    replacement for that; number two, making sure we're taking care
    of our people and then the communities that they live in or
    near; and then, number three, making sure we understand the
    health effects on humans from these foams. So, the task force
    has been working very hard since I launched them, integrating
    well with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other
    parts of the Government. I hope to have a report come up here
    very soon, within a week or two, to update you on that and the
    progress we're making. I know we have some hard marks to make,
    in terms of replacing the current foam with a new mechanism.
    But, we've been putting a lot of dollars into researching that.
    I want to say, we went from $139 million last year to $200
    million this year requested to tackle PFOS
    [perfluorooctanesulfonic acid], PFOA [perfluorooctanoic acid].0
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate your
    continued commitment. I think it's something that we all need
    to work on.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first, let me begin by thanking you and your
    families for your decades of service. It is not unnoticed, and
    we most certainly appreciate what you have done.
        General Milley, I'd like to begin with you. I--part of the
    discussion--and Senator Shaheen has started this discussion
    with regard to the resources that we have, and the need for
    those resources--I'd like to give you an opportunity to talk a
    little bit about modernization, but also I want to talk about
    readiness today.
        I want to preface it by simply sharing that, over the last
    number of years, this Committee has received reports about the
    challenges we have in readiness of our Armed Forces today, and
    the fact that, over a period of years, and the fact, as you've
    both alluded to, we've had--or we've been at war for 20 years,
    and that takes its toll. When it comes to the equipment that
    our young men and women use, I'm just going to list them out,
    and I'd like to have you, if you could, give us an update:
        B-1s: May of last year, we had six of them that were
    actually operational.
        F/A-18s: At one point a little over a year ago, it was
    reported that less than 40 percent, or at about 40 percent,
    were operational.
        F-15Cs: You were limited to about 2 Gs, in terms of
    maneuvering, less than what a King Air would do in regular
    aviation.
        You've got approximately--on F-22s, you've got perhaps 125
    remaining that might be operational at a time, a percentage of
    those.
        With regard to your nuclear submarines, your attack
    submarines, you've got four of them right now that are at dock.
    I believe the Boise may be in drydock now, but, nonetheless,
    clearly we've got a shortfall there of nuclear attack
    submarines that are sitting, waiting for their half-life to
    begin.
        Along with that right now, I think you've got somewhere
    around 31 BCTs [Basic Combat Training] in the Army. I'd like to
    know--I think, at one point, we had as few as--less than single
    digits, the numbers that were ready to ``fight tonight.''
        General Milley, are we making progress? And can you give us
    an update, just on these particular ones, with regard to where
    we may have improved on those numbers over the last couple of
    years?
        General Milley. Thanks, Senator, for the opportunity.
        What I'd like to do, if I could, is get you the specific
    numbers. They're on this card, but this card's classified. So,
    actual readiness data, by type weapon system, with numbers that
    you're talking about, is classified information. We don't want
    the enemy of our country to know all that. On the one hand.
        On the other hand, I can tell you that it has improved, and
    I would put it in the--about a third or so--as I look at these
    numbers, about a third improved over the numbers that you
    probably saw anywhere between 12 and 24 months ago. So, there
    is--there's two steps forward, one step backward in some of
    this stuff, in terms of readiness, and we monitor it very, very
    closely every month. It has improved, and I can get you the
    exact data, if you'd allow me to do that in a classified way.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Rounds. Well, that's fine, sir, but I just want to
    make it clear, the numbers that I gave you, I received in a
    non-classified session. Matter of fact, in open session, just
    like this.
        General Milley. Okay.
        Senator Rounds. The reason for my point is not to be
    critical, but, rather, to point out how important it is that we
    have the resources available to you----
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Rounds.--to continue to make those improvements,
    and----
        General Milley. Well, readiness is our number-one--in terms
    of the amount of money that we're putting towards this budget
    and in past budgets, we're trying to radically improve the
    readiness of the force, the ``fight tonight'' sort of thing,
    and, at the same time, you have to have balance for
    modernization, for the changing character of war, against those
    investments that the Secretary talked about earlier.
        Senator Rounds. Well, and I think the fact that we're
    modernizing our nuclear weapon systems is probably absolutely--
    --
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Rounds.--it is absolutely critical, because right
    now, based upon our nonmilitary capabilities----
        General Milley. Right.
        Senator Rounds.--they fear our military because of our
    nuclear capabilities as much as anything else.
        General Milley. There's no question about it, that the--
    ``peace through strength'' is not just a bumper sticker. It
    matters in the whole idea of deterrence. You have to have the
    capability, and the will to use it, and your enemy's got to
    know that you have the capability and the will. So, the
    capability's important. That goes right into the readiness
    piece, and we want to make sure that our enemies know that we
    are ready. In my opening statement, I said we are ready. I
    don't expect you to take it on faith. I'd like to report out,
    in a classified way, exactly how ready, by type system, if I
    could.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, if I may, what you're looking at,
    it is a tradeoff between current readiness and future
    readiness, and Senator Fischer draw this out. I talk about the
    $450 to $550 billion of lost funding. That's really important
    when you're trying to recapitalize, whether it's the Army,
    Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, but particularly big capital
    projects, like shipbuilding. If you don't have that funding, if
    it's not predictable and steady for the industrial base, they
    just can't--you just can't build. What you do is--so, what
    you're doing is--as you know, it's like driving an old car; you
    reach the point where you're putting so much maintenance into
    the old car, you've got to buy the new one, or else it's a
    losing battle.
        Senator Rounds. No question, sir, and you're making the
    point that I think we want to have made----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Rounds.--which is--and you can't do it without
    continued resources on an expected basis year to year. I think
    you are making progress, and I was hoping to be able to share
    some of that progress, but to say, if given the appropriate
    resources, we are making improvements, and will continue to.
    But, I agree, it's readiness versus modernization in many, many
    cases, and that tradeoff is tough to handle once in a while.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We're all monitoring the coronavirus closely, and I
    appreciate the Department taking this seriously and working to
    keep our servicemembers and their families safe. While in
    Hawaii we do not have any confirmed cases, we are a gateway for
    travelers from China, South Korea, Japan, so we must be
    exceptionally vigilant and coordinated.
        Mr. Secretary, will you commit to me that the DOD will act
    quickly on requests made by the State of Hawaii to assist with
    response, in the event it is needed--I know there are some
    factors we have to meet--pursuant to the National Response
    Framework and DOD Directive 3025.18?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, under title 10. Of course,
    title 32 would require action by the Governor first.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, I understand.
        Secretary Esper. Okay.
        Senator Hirono. That's my question.
        So, Mr. Secretary, you say in your posture statement that
    the Indo-Pacific remains DOD's number-one priority region. I
    have a series of questions about the threat in this region,
    and, as I have only, now, 4 minutes left, I'd really appreciate
    your answers to be very brief, and a yes or no would be great.
        In your statement, you say North Korea is seeking to build
    legitimacy through the development of a variety of nuclear,
    conventional, and unconventional weapons, and by growing its
    ballistic missile capabilities. Is the threat of North Korea's
    ballistic missile capabilities becoming increasingly dangerous?
        Secretary Esper. It's becoming increasingly complicated as
    they seek to modernize the----
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        Secretary Esper.--full range of missile systems.
        Senator Hirono. So, I'd say that's a yes.
        You say in your posture statement that the fiscal year 2021
    budget request is directed toward achieving an ``irreversible
    implementation of NDS'' which includes enhancing missile
    defense capabilities pursuant to the 2019 Missile Defense
    Review. That's correct, isn't it?
        Secretary Esper. Yes. We are putting additional money into
    missile defense and defeat.
        Senator Hirono. And do the North Korean long-range
    ballistic missiles pose a threat to the United States, which,
    of course, includes Hawaii?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, if our intelligence is correct, they
    would.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, and you also state, your budget
    request, ``increases missile defense capability and capacity to
    keep pace with adversary missile systems,'' while investing in
    a layered defense of the Homeland. But, Mr. Secretary, in spite
    of 4 years of authorizations and 3 years of appropriations from
    Congress, and your own 2019 Missile Defense Review, you have
    zeroed out the HDR Hawaii, which is the radar for Hawaii, which
    is part of a system that provides layered defense of the
    Homeland. Is this decision to zero out the funding for HDRH
    [Homeland Defense Radar Hawaii] a decision to not build this
    radar at all in Hawaii?
        Secretary Esper. Not necessarily, Senator. As you know,
    there--for many years now, we've had a problem with State and
    local authorities giving us permission to get onto that site
    and do what we need to do, if I recall correctly, and it
    seemed--the latest report we had at the time of building the
    budget is, we probably wouldn't see any resolution for another
    year or two or three.
        Senator Hirono. So, does that mean that we can expect you
    to request--I am very familiar with certain delays with regard
    to the siting. So, does this mean that we can expect a request
    of money for the HDRH in fiscal year 2022?
        Secretary Esper. I think, when we see a light at the end of
    the tunnel with regard to getting clearance to build, yes,
    ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Okay. That's good to know.
        Because, otherwise, the decision to zero out the HDRH and
    reprioritizing the funds from DOD's number-one priority region,
    as you say, for another purpose, really doesn't make sense.
        I'd also like to have a commitment from you now that you
    will not seek to repurpose F-20 funding for this radar that is
    still being used to continue the HDRH Hawaii contract.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I'm not sure I can make that
    commitment, because I'm not sure I fully understand what you're
    asking. But, again, our----
        Senator Hirono. Well----
        Secretary Esper. What we're trying to do is, in the era of
    tight budgets, make sure we don't put money against something
    that has no possibility of being effected in the near term.
        Senator Hirono. Well, I don't know what you mean by the
    ``near term,'' because----
        Secretary Esper. Well, in the----
        Senator Hirono.--this radar----
        Secretary Esper.--upcoming fiscal year----
        Senator Hirono.--this radar is part of a system, and was
    supposed to be pretty much operational by 2023, which means
    that it's--aside from the delays that I understand that's
    occurred, we're supposed to be on track, because that's what
    the National Defense Strategy calls for. So, in 2020, there was
    some $188 million. This is being expended right--even as we
    speak. So, I would like to know that you are not going to
    repurpose this funding that's already there----
        Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, if I recall the----
        Senator Hirono.--for other purposes.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. If I recall the issue
    properly, it's--developing of the system is one thing, but if I
    develop a system and I can't put it somewhere, that it has no
    effect, it's wasted money.
        Senator Hirono. Well, you know that this contract is--as
    far as I know, Lockheed Martin is already building this radar.
    So, there is already a contract for them. This thing was
    supposed to be, in fact, operational in 2023. So, if we don't
    go ahead with this, I think that you're going to have some
    contractual things to deal with. But, you know, what I'm
    hearing from you is, aside from the delays that were caused by
    the siting, mainly, of this radar, that you have a commitment
    to pursue the radar and have it built in Hawaii as a part of
    our missile defense system.
        Secretary Esper. I am making a commitment to you that we,
    of course, intend to defend all 50 United States and
    territories with radars and effectors as necessary. What I
    don't under---what I need to come back to you with is a better
    understanding where things lie. It's one thing to build a
    radar, but if I invest hundreds of million dollars in the radar
    and then not--cannot place it somewhere, then it's wasted
    money.
        Senator Hirono. Of course I realize that. That's not what
    I'm asking.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst is recognized.
        Senator Fischer is presiding.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being with us this
    afternoon.
        There are a few things that I'm very interested in as the
    chair of Emerging Treats and Capabilities, and, of course, one
    of those is hypersonics. Secretary Esper, if I could focus on
    that for a moment. A key component of our NDS is assessing and
    recalibrating our posture with regards, of course, to the
    great-power competition. China has a leg up--I can't--we can't
    dispute that--in developing technologies like a hypersonic
    aircraft and missiles. The technology could give users the
    tactical long-range capability to hit targets yet with such
    speed and surprise that defending against them is very, very
    difficult. Great concern to all of us.
        So, how is the DOD investing in deconflicting research
    priorities across the services--we have a lot of research going
    on out there--to limit the duplicative spending on hypersonics?
        Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator.
        First of all, you're correct, hypersonics is one of our top
    priorities, in terms of developing capability, lethality in
    that field. We are doing very innovative work. I would tell you
    it's more innovative than what you would see coming out of
    Russia or China. I can----
        Senator Ernst. Right.
        Secretary Esper.--assure you of that.
        Senator Ernst. Good.
        Secretary Esper. We have maximized every dollar. We put
    into this year, I think it's $3.2 billion, and over the FYDP,
    to make sure that we get inventory out in the field as soon as
    possible. Each of the services has a variety of programs. DARPA
    [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] has programs, as
    well. Through either collaboration between the services or
    through work through our R&E shop under Dr. Griffin, we're
    working very hard to make sure there's not duplication, but,
    more importantly, sharing. We see a lot of sharing between the
    services. So, I'm very confident that, in the next few years,
    we'll be deploying hypersonic weapons, as the commanders need
    them, throughout the theater, but in the Indo-Pacific theater
    in particular.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Just to be clear, you said it's $3.2
    billion over FYDA----
        Secretary Esper. No, ma'am, it's $3.2 billion this year.
        Senator Ernst. This year, okay, and is that--you feel that
    that is sufficient----
        Secretary Esper. I asked multiple times to make sure, ``Is
    that every single dollar we can put against it and effectively
    use?'' In other words, there's no more--one more extra dollar
    would be a wasted dollar. I was assured multiple times that
    that was the max we could put into that.
        Senator Ernst. Okay, and--thank you, Secretary. How does
    this fit into our nuclear modernization efforts?
        Secretary Esper. It certainly gives us--we're talking about
    conventional systems here--it gives us a--an incredible strike
    capability below the nuclear threshold, which is important, to
    reach out at long ranges to strike somebody with precision, at
    speeds of 5, 10 times the speed of sound, with great
    capability. It's going to give us a lot of reach, which is what
    we'll need in the--in a conflict against a near peer.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I know that we're embracing innovation at
    every level possible--and I appreciate that--within the DOD,
    and we're modernizing to give our warfighters that tactical
    advantage over our adversaries. Of course, another area I'm
    interested in is quantum information systems technology. Again,
    one of Mr. Griffin's areas. But, we are exploring options for
    quantum integration in a variety of areas. However, we hear,
    from various industry, that DOD requirements are too broad for
    the current scope of research. What the industry leaders are
    recommending is that the DOD refine their requirements, and
    this can help drive unified efforts to advance rapidly first in
    the narrow area instead of slowly across a very large spectrum.
    Can you speak a little bit to some of the advances we're seeing
    in quantum information systems?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. Quantum definitely is a top
    priority. It's probably in the top tier, if you will. Dr.
    Griffin's very passionate about this. I'll have to go back and
    get you an answer. Typically, what we ask of industry, though,
    is--they ask us not to give them requirements, per se, and they
    ask us to tell them the solution we're looking for, help us--
    tell them the problem we're trying to solve, and help them--let
    them help us develop the solution. So, this is a little bit
    different than what I typically hear, so I'd like to----
        Senator Ernst. Okay.
        Secretary Esper.--run this down and come back to you on it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. Where there is a clear mission payoff, and
    technology is mature enough that we have clear performance
    metrics that will get us to that mission payoff, the Department
    is ready to push ahead and advance quickly. But the state of
    the art for most quantum technologies is not there yet. In some
    cases, our system analysis shows us that the speculated
    potential of the technology does not translate directly into a
    military mission payoff. In other cases, where we still
    anticipate a clear military mission impact, the technology
    readiness level is not yet mature enough to warrant immediate
    acceleration.
        The most significant advances, from a military standpoint,
    are the refinement and miniaturization of portable atomic
    clocks. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to military
    timing needs, and progress has been made on a number of form-
    factors and performance levels. Small, low-power versions of
    high-performance atomic clocks have recently been developed
    under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Atomic
    Clocks with Enhanced Stability Program. Other, chip-scale
    atomic clocks are now available commercially due to years of
    Department of Defense research investments, and we continue to
    fund even higher performance atomic clocks for new military
    applications. These will play an important part for position
    navigation and timing resilience of our joint forces in GPS-
    denied environments.
        Several quantum sensors have demonstrated amazing precision
    in laboratory experiments and are on a path toward rapid
    maturity for military application. As one example, we have seen
    impressive progress with quantum gyroscopes and accelerometers.
    These have the potential to be incorporated in future strategic
    grade inertial guidance systems at a fraction of today's cost.
        In quantum computing, both academic and commercial progress
    in quantum computing hardware continues to be a national
    strength. Google, IBM, Microsoft, Honeywell, and several
    venture-capital-backed startups have been making significant
    investments in the field. Because there are big open questions
    about the military utility of these machines, and because the
    computer science of quantum algorithm development is so early
    in its development, our research labs are partnering with
    industry leaders to understand which military computational
    problems can be addressed using these new quantum computing
    machines.
        Finally, in the defensive role, great progress is being
    made to develop new public cryptographic standards and update
    our cryptographic systems to ensure that the U.S. military is
    not vulnerable to attack from a quantum computer should our
    adversaries ever gain access to a large enough machine.

        Senator Ernst. And certainly, we'd love to partner on that.
    It's just critical that, in some of these areas that we see in
    Emerging Threats and Capabilities, a lot of the discussions
    that we have, that are very focused on advancing technology and
    working with industry partners, small businesses, and so
    forth----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Ernst.--in that area.
        But, I do appreciate you both, gentlemen, very much for
    being here today, and look forward to working further with you.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer [presiding]: Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you both for being here, and for your
    service. I really appreciate your opportunity to come here.
        Secretary Esper, it would come as no surprise to folks here
    that I have been advocating Redstone Arsenal to be the head of
    Space Command. You and I have talked about that----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Jones.--a good bit, and in May of 2019, before you
    were even the Acting Secretary, the list was winnowed down.
    There was a series of visits, an extensive process that was
    winnowed down to a few sites, and Redstone Arsenal was a part
    of those. Space Command was supposed to be announced in the
    fall. It wasn't, and we're still--now we're in March, it's
    still not, and then, yesterday, Lieutenant General Thompson
    testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the
    Air Force had been directed--and he emphasized the word
    ``directed''--to go back and open this up. He said open up the
    aperture and look at all of them, including some nontraditional
    locations, and that they would establish the criteria, which I
    thought had already been established months, if not a couple of
    years, ago, and that none of these--the list--Redstone Arsenal
    and others were on there. So, you know, a cynical person would,
    in today's world, think that there was some political electoral
    politics coming into this--into play into this, because
    Congress has wanted to do this, and we've been supportive, but
    now we're going to get delayed again in opening this process
    up.
        So, I have a series of questions. Number one, did this come
    from the White House? If so, who? If it didn't--or if it did,
    was there pushback? If not, if it came from you or others--tell
    me how that process up to open this up again, because a lot of
    folks have been looking at this for a long time.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. It came from me.
        Senator Jones. All right.
        Secretary Esper. I'm the responsible party. During my talks
    on the Hill, prior to my nomination--more particularly, after
    my hearing here--I visited the House, and I heard from members,
    on both sides of the aisle, that they felt that the process
    that had been run was unfair and not transparent, and there
    were a number of complaints. So, I directed, at that time, that
    we pause in place. I took a briefing on it, along with Deputy
    Secretary Norquist, and we did not feel, as well, that it was
    transparent enough, that enough States, Members, et cetera, had
    a chance to participate. So, we directed that it be revisited
    and a different approach be taken, where they outline the
    criteria, the screening criteria by which a place would meet as
    a qualifying material, that we would go out to all members and
    offer them to nominate locations, if you will. We'd screen from
    there. But, do a very iterative, transparent thing, where
    members can also comment on the criteria, we would update at
    various points in time, and then keep narrowing it down, much
    like we did on Futures Command, till you get to the final site,
    so that everybody had confidence that it was fair and there
    were no politics involved in it, and that it was the best site
    for the mission at hand.
        I regret to say that that process began late. I had another
    revisit with them, about a month ago, which is what probably
    prompted that testimony. But, I'm the one that did it. It was
    my initiative, simply to make sure that there was transparency
    and buy-in and consent from members who were----
        Senator Jones. How long will the process take now?
        Secretary Esper. It's going to take several months. I
    think--I don't see anything being announced--if it helps to
    assure you, I don't see anything being announced before the
    election.
        Senator Jones. All right. Great.
        Secretary Esper. In fact, I would probably--regardless, I
    think it's best to keep it out of the election, for the reasons
    that you cited.
        Senator Jones. All right.
        Let me ask you about some--a concern that I think has been
    raised by a couple of folks here, and that is the transfer of
    funds to build the border wall. Taken out of that was $261
    million out of Mobile, Alabama, at Austal, to build an EPF
    [Expeditionary Fast Transport], which is, I think, a very, very
    important ship, and it was one that is in part of this
    transition. Austal, as you know, is the only shipbuilder that's
    delivering ships to the Navy on time and on budget. Was any
    consideration given to how that might impact folks like down in
    Mobile when these decisions were made? And the first part of
    that question, though, is--I want to make sure I understood the
    reasons. The reasons for this part of the money is strictly for
    trying to close off drug smuggling. It has nothing to do with
    immigration, but drug smuggling. Is that correct?
        Secretary Esper. It's--under this authority, the 284
    authority, it's directed at counterdrug, narcotrafficking
    routes, if you will, in support of DHS. That's the provision of
    law under which it falls.
        Senator Jones. All right, and I'll----
        Secretary Esper. I'm sorry.
        Senator Jones. Talk to me about Austal.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. So, what we tried to do in this
    process is to make sure that we could find, as best as
    possible, a way to look at the problem that was objective and
    apolitical, and that we could stand behind. The staff came up
    with--as they looked at it, is the fact that the items that
    were either not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget or
    items that were ``early need,'' either. So, either ``excess to
    need'' or ``early to need'' was a very clean-cut line that
    took--did not take politics or anything like that into account,
    and it was very objective. That was the standard by which we
    went. I consulted with my Service Secretaries. The Chairman
    consulted with the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and that
    was the basis upon which we made the decision, recognizing
    fully that there are a lot of different players and equipment
    and things caught up in that, but that was the way we
    approached it.
        Senator Jones. All right. Well, I will--out of time, but I
    will have some questions for the record, including maybe a
    little bit more of an explanation on the Space Command, and
    also a report, the current conditions of facilities used by the
    Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps at minority-serving
    institution, another on the commitment to the Junior ROTC Pilot
    Program--Scholarship Program that we're doing, and also----
        Secretary Esper. Great program, by the way.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, and also, review a report about
    the Department of Defense Child Development Center. So, I'll
    have those for the----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Jones.--questions for the record.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary and General, for your service, for
    your appearance today.
        A special thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your recent trip to
    Minot, and please thank Leah, as well. It was an exceptional
    day for the airmen and missileers in Minot. I hope you took
    something away from it, as well.
        Since we're on the topic, and since the----
        Secretary Esper. I went there in the winter, so----
        Senator Cramer. You--well, the fact you came in February
    does add to your ``street cred,'' without a doubt, but you also
    got to see them at their best, in the toughest conditions,
    working with some very old equipment----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Cramer.--as you noticed, no doubt--some very old
    airplanes flown and maintained by some very young airmen, and
    some very old missiles maintained by some very young
    missileers, and so, we appreciate that--the priority of
    modernization, obviously.
        With regard to the missiles, specifically, you know, `
    since the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] has been on
    the planning board, I've pressed pretty hard about the
    timeline, and particularly knowing there are detractors here
    and there, and, of course, the lack of competitive--added to
    that. If you could just give an update on GBSD, the progress,
    and what you see, if any, challenges there might be, and what
    risks we run if there is a delay.
        Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we continue to
    move forward on GBSD. It's vitally important as the land-based
    leg of the triad, as you know. What concerns me most is the
    same thing that I discussed with Senator Fischer, is, we have
    no margin left with regard to the timeline. It's utterly
    important that we move out quickly. I share your concerns about
    lack of competition, so we're going to have to be very clever.
    Under Secretary Lord is working on a number of ways by which we
    keep the pressure on the contractor to stick to cost and stick
    to performance and timeline, to schedule associated with that,
    because there is no margin with regard to replacing that. We
    tend to have this recapitalization problem coming all together
    at around the same time.
        But, that said, I'm also looking for ways to build margin
    in that leg of the triad. Are there different things we can do
    to extend it? And then, as you know, I have--personal concern
    after speaking to folks there is to make sure we maintain the
    health and vitality and readiness of the missile force, itself.
    A very important mission, and a very tough mission, when you
    have a chance to get down one of those silos and experience
    what they go through.
        Senator Cramer. It is that.
        General Milley, with regard to this, I think the Secretary
    referred to the divest--to divest of some of the things of the
    past, to invest in things of the future. We hear a lot lately
    in this budget about the risk associated with getting from here
    to there, and the divestiture of some of those legacy systems.
    One of the things that comes up often, of course, is the ISR
    demands in the theater. I think pretty much every combatant
    commander I've talked to says we're woefully short, and yet,
    some of the legacy systems that are being targeted for
    retirement to make room for modernization include some very
    important ISR assets. I'd be interested in, your take on all
    that, if you're comfortable with, for example, Global Hawk,
    future MQ-9, whether the risk is worth it, or what the risk
    might even be.
        General Milley. Well, it depends on what adversary or enemy
    you're talking about. So, many of the ISR systems that we have
    today that are in very high demand are very, very useful
    against terrorists, insurgents, against fixed sites, et cetera,
    and they have clear penetration capability when there's no
    significant air defense threat or there's no other types of
    threats. If you're talking about great-power competition, which
    is what this NDS talks about and what this budget is all about,
    that's a different type of ISR. So, we're trying to divest
    ourselves of the ISR that is not particularly useful against a
    Russia or China, or even high dense air defense systems of an
    Iran or a North Korea, and invest in those ISR systems that do
    have penetration capability. That's why you see some of the
    ``divest in order to invest.'' Now, there's no need--it makes
    no sense to me to continue to buy stuff that isn't in alignment
    with the NDS. So, it's a ``depends'' question on what your
    enemy is.
        With respect to the quantity or capacity relative to the
    COCOMs [combat commands[, you'll never find a combatant
    commander who has enough ISR. It's just not going to happen. We
    are--we have been, every single year, year in and year out for
    20 years, always been short of ISR. We continue to build it.
    You're never going to buy your way out of the problem, because
    it has to do with information and having to do with knowledge
    and decision-making. So, we will always be chronically short of
    ISR. But, the key, though, for the ``divest to invest'' is, it
    depends on who you're going against. We need to invest in the
    capabilities that are worthwhile against a China or a Russia.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, both of you. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Thank both of you all for your service. I appreciate very
    much your being here today.
        Secretary Esper, I support the wall, and I have always
    supported the wall. But, I really have a problem with the
    funding, which I think you all know our position on. It should
    be appropriated by us. That's our job. The reprogramming of the
    $3.8 billion of appropriated funds to support the border wall--
    and the reason it troubles me is that it's--$1.3 billion of
    that is taken out of the National Guard and the Reserve
    equipment. The National Guard is--every one of us have an
    affinity with our National Guards.
        So, how do we justify the disproportionate cuts to the
    Guard despite knowing the vital and ever-growing role in
    aspects of national security? And I know about Homeland
    security. But, the Guard's our front-line defense in Homeland
    security.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I--thank you, I appreciate that,
    and I think, with regard to your first remark, we would agree,
    our preference would be that this be funded through DHS.
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        Secretary Esper. But, that said, we are where we are, and
    DOD will support DHS in this regard. As I was saying to Senator
    Jones, when we try to find a clear line, objective line by
    which to draw the sources, we came up with the one with regard
    ``either to need'' or ``excess to need.'' And, as things popped
    out, it became obvious that the impact would be on the National
    Guard. It's no pleasure for me----
        Senator Manchin. Yeah.
        Secretary Esper.--to have to make that----
        Senator Manchin. I know.
        Secretary Esper.--decision, as a former guardsman myself,
    but it--we tried to not play----
        Senator Manchin. Well, also, Secretary, you have said that
    your Night Court Program has been very successful at freeing up
    money. Could nothing be freed up there, on the Night Court?
        Secretary Esper. Well, we--I spent 22 sessions over 4
    months, and we found $5.7 billion out of $99 to free up. I--
    we're going to--we've started again this year. So, I did find
    $5.7 to put into our NDS priorities, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Well, let me--another thing I would just
    say, since the TAGs and the Governors are so intertwined----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Manchin.--have they had any forewarning of this
    whatsoever?
        Secretary Esper. No, sir. The only forewarnings that went
    out were the consultations I had with the Service Secretaries
    and that the Chairman had with General Lengyel and the Service
    Chiefs.
        Senator Manchin. I'll--another question is, I've just been
    briefed on the Afghan fighting that's going on, attacks from
    today--I think the 4th. I just got briefed on that. Maybe you
    could bring me up to where we are in Afghanistan with the
    Taliban right now. Also, the peace agreement, do you think it
    might hold? Because it hasn't helped very long, and what
    direction and what do I tell West Virginians and people that
    have been upset about the problems in releasing 5,000 enemy
    fighters? That did not go over well in the State of West
    Virginia.
        Secretary Esper. Sir, I'm not sure I can do it justice in 2
    minutes and 12 seconds, but I'll say this much. It's my view--
    and I--I'll let the Chairman--I'll save time for the Chairman--
    --
        Senator Manchin. Sure.
        Secretary Esper.--to speak. But, my view is, the best, if
    not only, path forward is through a political agreement. We
    have an historic opportunity here. We signed, on Saturday in
    Qatar--I was in Kabul at the same time--this agreement that
    lays out a framework by which we could proceed toward an
    eventual intra-Afghan negotiation. It was supposed to happen,
    at this point, 5 days from now, and the results, so far, have
    been mixed.
        Senator Manchin. What kind of signals will we get today?
    I'm pleased to see at least we've supported defending the
    Afghan fighters. We didn't just leave them.
        Secretary Esper. Which is what--what has allowed us, under
    the document, under the agreement, to defend them. It's the
    commitment I made to the Afghans when I was there on Saturday.
        Senator Manchin. Right.
        Secretary Esper. We will continue to defend the Afghans,
    support them. The Taliban, to their--are honoring their piece,
    but--in terms of not attacking United States and coalition
    forces, but not in terms of sustaining a reduction of violence.
    Our Special Envoy is over there now. He's going to be pulling
    the parties back together. The critical thing, in the next 5
    days--few days, will be getting the conditions set for them to
    sit down with regard to negotiations.
        Senator Manchin. Will we see any retreat whatsoever once we
    hit the Taliban today? From their aggressiveness against the
    Afghan fighters?
        Secretary Esper. You know, the Chairman and I spoke to
    General Miller earlier on this.
        Do you want to comment?
        General Milley. Yes, Senator. Bottom line is, there was a
    variety of attacks over the last 24 to 48 hours. They're all
    beaten back. They're at small little outposts. We did use
    United States air in support of our Afghan allies.
        What is important, though, for the agreement--we're on day
    4. This was small, lower-level attacks out on checkpoints, et
    cetera. But, the Taliban have signed up to a whole series of
    conditions, of which--I believe the Committee and all the
    Members of the Congress have all the documents associated with
    this agreement. You can go through all of it, and, of
    significance, there's no attacks in 34 provincial capitals,
    there's no attacks in Kabul, there's no high-profile attacks,
    there's no suicide bombers, there's no vehicle-borne suicide,
    no attack against United States Forces, no attack against
    coalition. There's a whole laundry list of these things that
    aren't happening. Yes, there were significant numbers of
    attacks, small attacks. They were all beaten back, and we will
    continue to support----
        Senator Manchin. Well, we've seen that they've been able--
    we've seen that they've been able to control their field
    fighters, right?
        General Milley. We saw that over the 7 days, where they
    were able to----
        Senator Manchin. So, but----
        General Milley.--go from a high of about 125 attacks a day
    down to about 15 a day. They issued out instructions not to
    attack. That's correct.
        Senator Manchin. So, we don't know what the cause is.
        Secretary Esper. Well, keeping that group of people on
    board is a challenge. They've got their range of hardliners and
    softliners, and so they're wrestling with that, too, I think.
        Senator Manchin. Please keep us informed. I appreciate it.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here.
        General Milley, I want to address--and both of you,
    actually, on this thing--you mentioned ISR just now, and I
    agree 100 percent. One of those--perfect examples. I want to
    lead into my question about asset allocation. As JSTAR [Joint
    Surveillance and Target Attack Radar] is going to ABMS
    [Advanced Battle Management System], and then the JDC2 [Joint
    All-Domain Command and Control] development, this is a lot of
    moving parts, very rapidly, and I'm shocked at, really, the
    progress we've made in the last year. I know we're not in a
    classified environment; I'm not going to go there. I want to
    know--first, Secretary, if you don't mind--the allocation of
    resources, after we take about 14 or 15 percent for overhead in
    the DOD, the--what's remaining after that, we allocate almost a
    third, a third, a third. Is that consistent with the NDS
    refocus on the maritime that General Mattis talked about, back
    in 2016--or 2017, relative to standing up to our major
    competitor, China?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. It's--first of all, it's not
    cleanly a third and a third and a third. There is a traditional
    background. Normally, Navy----
        Senator Perdue. It's very close.
        Secretary Esper.--Navy has the highest, Army usually has
    the lowest, Air Force in between, and there's a lot of
    different things----
        Senator Perdue. Well, actually--I'm sorry to correct, but
    I--the 2021 budget, Army and Navy are almost equal.
        Secretary Esper. Oh, I--no, sir, they're quite different--
    --
        Senator Perdue. Okay. Well, let's--we'll take that
    offline----
        Secretary Esper. Okay.
        Senator Perdue.--but, I'd like to see that, because the
    numbers I have are a little bit different.
        Secretary Esper. The Navy's at 207----
        Senator Perdue. Correct.
        Secretary Esper.--billion, and the Army at 177.
        Senator Perdue. Okay. Go ahead. I'll----
        Secretary Esper. So, anyways, I--that said, it--that is
    where it is. What--as the Chairman and I have talked about
    this, we've talked about with the chain of command, what we
    need to do, I think, is, first of all, have--update our war
    plans--they haven't been updated--and have OP PLANS that are
    relevant in the post-NDS environment, number one.
        Number two--and the Chairman's working on this--we need a
    new joint warfighting concept that takes into account all
    domains of warfare. The Joint Staff is working on that right
    now. I think, once we have updated war plans that--and we have
    a new warfighting concept, and we have a good sense of what
    future systems will look like, I do think we need to look at
    that reallocation. But, to kind of scramble it up right now, I
    think would be premature.
        Senator Perdue. That's a great characterization. I accept
    that. I have all the respect in the world for you two, and I'm
    not questioning your authority at all. I know this is a moving
    target right now.
        The shipbuilding plan, though, was due with the budget. I
    know it's on your desk, and I know that--I think I understand
    all the reasons why. It's a tough decision. You've got the
    Columbia-class requirement sitting right there as the number-
    one priority. I wouldn't argue with that at all. That's going
    to be about 25 percent--in some years, as much as 30-plus
    percent--of the total shipbuilding budget.
        But, I want to highlight some numbers that are just
    shocking today. I mean, today China has about 345--I think
    these numbers are correct--345 service ships, ours to 295. Over
    the next 15 years, their plan right now, based on what we are
    seeing publicly, is, they're taking it to 435, and we have a
    355 plan, comes from 16. Is the 355 consistent with the NDS?
    And, secondarily, is that being looked at seriously in the
    shipbuilding--the 30-year shipbuilding plan that we're going to
    see when it comes out of your office?
        Secretary Esper. Well, on the plan, I think the Navy's
    going to brief me sometime in the next few days on what their
    proposal is with regard to the plan.
        With regard to the number, I'll echo what the CNO [Chief of
    Naval Operations] says. The--the CNO says he--355 is the
    number, but we need to look at effects and capabilities. But,
    if you want to stick to the number, I actually--my gut feeling
    is, we need more than 355, not just to deliver effects, but we
    need presence.
        Senator Perdue. But, is that a function of lethality, as
    well, given we're not hamstrung by INF anymore, and with ranges
    and new capabilities that we're also----
        Secretary Esper. I think, as I've laid out in my plan, my
    thinking--because we're going to do--we're going to run some
    internal wargames to look at our range of options. The Navy has
    some ideas. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has
    some ideas. Some think tanks have done some good work. I think
    some core principles we've worked around is, we have to have
    more ships, but smaller. We need to have, I believe, more
    attack submarines. We need to move more quickly into unmanned,
    and, in all cases, we need to have distributed sensors and
    shooters, we need to have the ability to be survivable in this
    environment, and there are a number of other things. But,
    again, I was just meeting with the CNO and the Acting Secretary
    yesterday on this. We agree that you--lethality is critical at
    range, but, for the Navy, it's also presence. You have to have
    enough surface combatants available at any one time to have a
    presence, to show + assurance, deterrence, et cetera, which is
    why my instinct is that we need more than 355.
        Senator Perdue. Well, we have many more combatant
    commanding areas at other than the Indo-Pacific that we are
    responsible for today.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Many responsibilities, whether
    it's counterdrug----
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Esper.--or maintaining freedom of the seas, and
    all that. We have the world's greatest Navy, and we need to
    keep it that way.
        Senator Perdue. General Milley, going to one other thing.
    We're talking about finding every billion dollars, right? And
    you've railed about this, and I have, too, so has the
    Secretary. You've got 23 seconds. Go after CRs [continiuing
    resolutions]. Tell us exactly what continuing--12 of the last
    13 years, we have hamstrung the military with a continuing
    resolution for at least the first quarter of the fiscal year.
    We're in the 6th month of our fiscal year, we haven't even
    started this process yet. So, we're facing down another CR this
    year. It'll be the 13th in 14 years, and so, we are estimating,
    now--your service directors--surface commanders have told us,
    roughly, in aggregate, it's about $5 billion per quarter.
        General Milley. Per quarter.
        Senator Perdue. Per quarter.
        Secretary Esper. Lost buying power.
        Senator Perdue. So, General Milley, tell us how it really
    affects our readiness and our recapitalization efforts.
    That's--over 10--that's $50 billion. I mean, that takes care of
    a lot of these long-term shipbuilding issues that we're talking
    about.
        General Milley. Well, I'm already over time, and I haven't
    even started, but----
        Senator Perdue. No, you go, sir.
        General Milley.--I would just tell you that it's a very
    ineffective, inefficient way of managing the taxpayers' money,
    because industry can't rely on a steady cashflow and stream and
    predictability in industry. Then we, in terms of programming
    and acquisition, et cetera, our program managers can't rely on
    steady building, as well. So, it's a very inefficient way.
    We're budgeting, basically, 9 out of 12 months, or 6 out of 12
    months of a year, and that's just no way to run a railroad
    station, sir. It's just not a good way to do it.
        Senator Perdue. Well, thank you.
        General Milley. CRs are not good.
        Secretary Esper. I do.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Esper. Just a quick follow-up. I--one thing the--
    that the DOD is going to come with you soon, Senator, is a
    legislative provision. Other departments of the Federal
    Government have it. It would seek legislative authority to
    transfer any expired Navy funds, which otherwise would go back
    to Treasury, back into the SCN account. Our conservative
    estimate is, this would free up another billion dollars a year
    that we can go back and--put back into shipbuilding. Otherwise,
    it goes back into the Treasury, and it would be money that
    you've already appropriated and authorized to us for this
    purpose.
        Senator Perdue. I want to indulge the Chairman for one last
    comment on this.
        We're working with OMB, too, and I think there are
    opportunities in there. We're going to give some freedom, and
    our appropriators to give you some freedom, within the current
    rules, that they've never envisioned before, because they never
    realized how expensive this is, to give you some latitude that,
    when you are in a CR, you're not as hamstrung as you are today.
    But, I agree with General Milley, this is an absolute travesty.
        Secretary Esper. Particularly important for the shipyards.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you, to our two witnesses, to the Chairman and the
    Secretary. I appreciate each of your service.
        Testimony today has been about this budget being directed
    toward the National Defense Strategy. General Milley said,
    about something, ``Why would I purchase something not aligned
    with the National Defense Strategy?'' And we've also heard,
    ``in an era of tight budgets.'' So, where in the National
    Defense Strategy is there a phrase ``a border wall on America's
    southern border''?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, there's--Homeland security is in
    the National Defense Strategy. It's----
        Senator Kaine. It is, but is there a mention of a border
    wall on the southern border?
        Secretary Esper. I don't believe so, but nor is there----
        Senator Kaine. You're right.
        Secretary Esper.--mention of dealing with floods and
    putting out wildfires and----
        Senator Kaine. Right. I just read the NDS, and you're
    talking about--this is a budget that is focused on the NDS. The
    National Defense Strategy has a 14-page synopsis. The border
    wall on the southern border is not mentioned. The southern
    border of the United States is not mentioned. There's one
    mention of a border in the 14-page public synopsis, and it is
    this: ``Russia has violated the borders of other nations.''
        So, when you come and tell me that this is focused on the
    NDS, I've got a real problem with that, and I know that that's
    maybe above decisions or other people's decisions, but $6
    billion came out of the Pentagon's budget last year, 3\1/2\ for
    MILCON and 2\1/2\ coming to--from the--into the counterdrug
    fund and then into the border wall.
        You have done a reprogramming, I believe, of $3.9--There
    have been earlier questions about that--$3.8 into this
    counterdrug fund. There's also been a report in the Washington
    Post that there's another shoe to drop, and about $3.7 billion
    is likely to be taken out of MILCON. Is that accurate? Should
    we expect to see that?
        Secretary Esper. That is not an accurate number, but it is
    a possibility that that could happen. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. So, the number may not be accurate, but it
    is--is it likely that we're going to see another tranche taken
    out of MILCON?
        Secretary Esper. We could. I don't want to put an estimate
    on it, at this point in time.
        Senator Kaine. So, I mean, it's just--I can't imagine a
    scenario in which this Committee--I'll just say it bluntly--
    would allow a Democratic President to take money out of the
    Defense budgets used for nondefense priority. I cannot imagine
    it. I appreciate, Secretary Esper, that you, in response to
    Senator Manchin, said the preferred way would be to have a
    tough appropriations battle, appropriate money for the border
    wall, and then spend the money appropriated for the DOD within
    DOD accounts. I think that makes perfect sense. But, you know,
    it's just--it's hard for you to look us in the eye and say,
    ``This is very focused on the NDS,'' when I can't find mention
    of the border wall or the border in the NDS, and when earlier
    witnesses have testified, though this be an emergency, it's not
    a military emergency.
        Let me dig into another issue. When you do the--just using
    the $3.8 figure--you do that transfer within the DOD into the
    counterdrug fund, and then use that for the wall. Is that
    transfer subject to the transfer authority that we give you,
    where there's a general transfer authority in the
    Appropriations Act, where you can transfer up to $4 billion a
    year within DOD accounts, with notice to Congress, but without
    approval. Is that $3.8 transfer within that $4 billion transfer
    authority?
        Secretary Esper. I think so, Senator, but I'd want to come
    back with you to affirm it.
        Senator Kaine. I'd love that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. The $2.2 billion of the transfer was
    within the $4 billion in general transfer authority provided in
    section 8005 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
    2020.
        The $1.6 billion was within the $2 billion special transfer
    authority provided in section 9002 of the Department of Defense
    Appropriations Act, 2020.

        Senator Kaine. But, my belief that it is, too. So, you have
    $4 billion of transfer authority. We're a few months into the
    fiscal year. It's often the case that transfer authorities are
    most needed at the end of the fiscal year. You've used $3.8
    billion of the transfer authority by the beginning of March,
    when we have a whole lot of months left in the fiscal year. So,
    for example, how much in the President's Budget for DOD is
    coronavirus response if we need to maintain people in place on
    South Korean bases and on bases in Italy, bases in Germany,
    bases in other places around the world, our troops and our
    families? It's probably not in the President's Budget. But,
    that would be the kind of thing for which we give you transfer
    authority. But, you've now almost bumped up against the limit
    of your transfer authority out of that $4 billion to build
    money at the wall, and we still have, you know, 8 months left
    in the fiscal year. Isn't that right?
        Secretary Esper. Your assessment is correct, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Would it make your job easier if we
    eliminated your transfer authority and said, any transfer
    authority, you had to come to us for permission? The $4
    billion, you can do it without our permission. Over $4 billion,
    you have to get our permission. If we had said you can't do any
    transfers without Congress's position, would that actually help
    you? Because it would enable us to say you've got to get it
    through appropriations. If you want something for a wall, if
    you want to fight climate change, if you want to fight gun
    violence, you've got to get it through appropriations. Because
    if you had to come back to us to ask for authority to do that
    $4 billion transfer, then we could actually keep the money in
    the budget that is directed toward the National Defense
    Strategy.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, as--there's no head of any
    organization that wants his or her hands tied by narrowing the
    options. You always want to expand your options in your
    maneuver space. So, no, not necessarily.
        Senator Kaine. But, in an odd way, aren't your hands kind
    of tied in this way? I mean, if money can be taken out of your
    budget to use for DHS or to battle climate change or gun
    violence, if it can be taken out of your hands, that's sort of
    a tying of your hands, in terms of putting together a budget
    that promotes the National Defense Strategy, isn't it?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I recognize what you're saying.
    Like I said, the President has declared a national emergency.
    We've been tasked to support DHS, and it's--if it's legally
    available, we intend to support DHS.
        Senator Kaine. I appreciate your answers.
        Thanks, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Senator McSally.
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Good to see you again, Secretary Esper and General Milley.
        I want to talk about the killing of terrorist leader Qasem
    Soleimani. It's been about 2 months. I agreed with that
    important decision to take out that terrorist leader who has a
    lot of American blood on his hands. Despite the ridiculous
    politicizing that we saw at the time, people almost cheering
    that we were about to go to war with Iran. Unfortunately, it
    should have been a unifying issue. It's now been 2 months. Can
    you share at all what you've seen? I believe that that was a
    body blow. We heard, from you and others, that it was a body
    blow, the impact that that's having on Iran's terrorist
    activities, their threats in the region, their proxy forces,
    and the threat to us and Israel?
        Secretary Esper. I think, Senator, that--as you well know,
    the--he, Soleimani, was a terrorist leader of a terrorist
    organization who killed many, many Americans, wounded thousands
    more, killed his own people, killed people throughout the
    region, a very capable adversary. But, I think it's clear that
    taking him off the battlefield has set back the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian Government
    with regard to spreading their malign activity throughout the
    region. I think, by the same action, we have restored
    deterrence, to a degree. For all those things, I still believe
    it was the right call made by the Commander in Chief.
        Senator McSally. As do I. Thanks.
        General Milley, you got anything to add to that?
        General Milley. I would add that--absolutely think it was
    the right goal, and I second the idea that we reestablished
    deterrence. I think that's really critical. We can talk about
    that in a classified forum, exactly what makes me believe that.
    But, I do believe that's been reestablished.
        Senator McSally. Thanks.
        Staying on Iran, the reports of coronavirus there--again,
    another talitarian opaque country. I don't believe anything
    they're reporting or the way they're going to handle it. But,
    there's been reports that 23 members of Parliament, 10 percent
    of their Parliament, a senior advisor to the Supreme Leader,
    Vice President, Deputy Health Minister, all contracted the
    virus. Are you seeing anything related to the impact,
    especially with Iraq, with our forces in the region, or how
    that may further put pressure on the regime, both internally
    from their own people as they are failing to deal with this?
        Secretary Esper. I think that, Senator, becomes a factor.
    Obviously, as we see this unfold, authoritarian countries
    having a problem with transparency and being forthright with
    their folks. Quite honestly, though, my attention has been
    focused on the three priorities I've been outlining internally
    to my commanders. One is protection of our force, our
    servicemembers and their families. Number two, safeguarding our
    mission capability, and number three, supporting the
    interagency.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I want to totally change topics here on military sexual
    assault. So, last year I worked with your predecessors, and I
    championed reforms that made it into the NDAA specifically
    focused on improving the process from a report forward, the
    investigative process and the support, going forward, after a
    report has been made. When I went to Yuma, in Arizona, I had
    heard they had no special victims counsel there full-time, that
    oftentimes victims were waiting a significant amount of time
    before they get to meet with a special victims counsel (SVC),
    which they often wanted before their first, you know, meeting
    with investigators. So, I put in the bill that they needed to
    have an SVC available within 72 hours, every single victim. We
    now have a full-time one at Yuma, for example, but we're seeing
    this all over the country now. Victims are able to get their
    special victims counsel quicker, and have a more immediate
    response. We're also hearing other reports of just increases to
    NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service] and how that's
    having a positive impact.
        So, just a question. Given the successes, we still need to
    prioritize implementation of those provisions. Can you report
    back to me on anything else you're seeing in the field and the
    implementation?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. First of all, your efforts and
    assistance in establishing the Sexual Assault Accountability
    Investigative Task Force are directly helping servicemembers.
    We have a lot of good information data so far, both factually
    and anecdotally. The Department has approved all 22
    recommendations in the four critical focus areas. They are all
    now policy, which I'm pleased to report, and we're in the
    process of implementation across the board. The task force
    continues to meet the track implementation. So, a lot of this
    is moving on. It's critical to reducing timelines for cases and
    ensuring the best evidence for consideration. I'd love to come
    back or send a team up to update you. But, it's all, it seems
    to me, moving in the right direction, generally, and it's
    having an impact.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
        The next thing we want to now focus on, obviously, is
    prevention, stopping these crimes----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator McSally.--from happening in the first place, and
    we've talked extensively about this. I don't know, General
    Milley, if you want to pipe in and--you know, in your long
    experience in the military, how we get to the front end in
    preventing these crimes from happening, in the age groups where
    it's happening. We know exactly what we need to get after, but
    what we've been doing for training and prevention is just not
    working.
        General Milley. I--again, I want to thank you for your
    personal leadership. But, the key here is the chain of command,
    and commanders and noncommissioned officers, starting at the
    senior levels, but also going all the way down to team
    sergeants and team leaders and first-line supervisors. Everyone
    is, as the Sergeant Major of the Army used to say, ``not in my
    squad'' sort of thing, or ``not in my squadron,'' or ``not in
    my battalion.'' This takes ownership, and you have to embrace
    it completely, and it's a function of good order and discipline
    of the force for which commanders, and commanders alone, are
    personally responsible and should be held accountable, for the
    good order and discipline of their force. Regardless of whether
    it's sexual assault or drugs or crimes of violence or whatever
    the--whatever it is, the key here to success is commanders.
        Senator McSally. Thanks.
        I'm over my time. I look forward to continuing to working
    with you on this issue.
        Thanks.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Madam Chair.
        Thank you both for your service and for being here today.
        I sent a letter last month, along with Senator Murphy, to
    express my frustration that the Navy budget included funding
    for only one Virginia-class submarine, and reports that you
    signed off on a decision to shift $1.6 billion in funding from
    Virginia-class submarine construction to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration. I'm not here to ask any questions
    about it, because I hope that you continue to believe, as you
    expressed when you pivoted--Groton--the last time you were
    there, Mr. Secretary, that the undersea warfare superiority of
    the United States cannot and should not be compromised, that we
    need to meet the goals for submarine production, and that,
    hopefully, two Virginia-class submarines for fiscal year 2021
    will be accomplished. But, I'm concerned, also, about the delay
    in delivering the Force Structure Assessment and 30-Year
    Shipbuilding Plan that apparently is still on your desk or
    somewhere in the Pentagon for approval. I expect that both will
    be delivered to Congress and the Navy as soon as possible, both
    in a classified and unclassified version. I hope that's true.
    Would you confirm that it is?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I've been briefed, about a week
    ago, on the INFSA, the Integrated Naval Force Structure
    Assessment. I have yet to be briefed on the 30-Year
    Shipbuilding Plan. Of course, they cover different timelines,
    different horizons.
        But, what I want to do is step back and look at, not just
    one view, in terms of the future fleet, but I want to take in a
    range of views. So, I regret that it's late. I don't have a
    good reason why. But, what I want to do is give you a full,
    good assessment of what I think the future is, and I'll give
    you a quick note on this.
        I am a big believer in attack subs. I believe it's an
    advantage we have, a distinct advantage we need to grow, both
    in terms of capability and capacity. I was very impressed by
    the trip I had up to Groton. But, the numbers I see right in
    that--in at least the INFSA right now for attack subs, I think
    the number needs to be higher. So, what I want to do is take a
    broad look at this, in light of an approved OP PLAN, in light
    of other ideas out there, and make sure that, before I sign off
    on it, albeit late--while it may be late, I want to make sure I
    get it right, or at least I'm comfortable with it, because I do
    think we need a bigger fleet, and I think we need to put more
    emphasis on attack submarines.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, you couldn't find a more
    enthusiastic and passionate supporter of a bigger submarine
    fleet, and I hope we have an opportunity to discuss it----
        Secretary Esper. The Chairman's with me, too, on that.
        Senator Blumenthal.--before our markup in May on this
    Committee.
        I want to shift slightly to a point that's been raised by
    at least one of my colleagues, Senator Hirono, the coronavirus
    impact on not only our servicemen and women and their families,
    grave and important as it is, but also on, for example, F-35
    production. Right today, the supply line in Japan was
    completely shut down. That's just one example of our defense
    industrial base that could be gravely impaired by coronavirus.
    I'd like, from you and the Chairman, an assessment of what the
    impact is likely to be, what you're doing about it, and what
    your plans are to be more specific.
        By the way, I was disappointed by a report that I saw--I'm
    not vouching, necessarily, for its accuracy--that you indicated
    that American military commanders were warned overseas, ``not
    to surprise President Trump on the coronavirus''. So, maybe you
    can respond.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. First of all, that--I was
    disappointed by that story, as well. It's completely wrong.
    It's bad reporting, at its worst. I've been very clear with my
    commanders, both privately and publicly--I said this at a press
    conference Monday--our three priorities, in this order, are:
    protection of our servicemembers and their families; number
    two, safeguarding our missions, which could include production;
    and then, number three, support the interagency. The commanders
    have all the authorities they need, and I'm providing them
    resources, to make decisions. They've made any number of
    decisions. I don't think I've had to make one. My one request
    of them--and the Chairman will vouch for this--is, ``If you're
    going to make a very big decision, a high-profile decision,
    give me a heads-up, because I want to make sure that we're
    integrated across the interagency, that HHS [Health and Human
    Services] knows, that State knows--indeed, the White House
    knows, and that Congress knows,'' because that's what I've got
    to do. I've got to make sure we're integrated across. So, that
    was a bad report, completely false.
        Chairman, if you want to add anything on that----
        General Milley. Senator, thanks. Two things. One is, I was
    in the VDC. All the Secretary said--it was to Abrams, General
    Abrams, over in Korea--all he said was, ``Hey, look-it, if
    you're going to make the decision of imposing this emergency
    declaration that he has authority to do, please give me a
    heads-up so I can make sure everybody here in DC is informed.''
    That's all it was. It wasn't any kind of thing where--trying to
    squelch people. So, that was a mischaracterization. I read the
    article, and I was in the thing, and I--it struck me as very
    odd.
        But, more importantly is the impact on the military. On the
    uniform military, we have a demographic that's different than
    society at large--young, healthy, fit. To date, we've only
    got--unless there's some new ones today or something--but, the
    reporting I've got as of 24 hours ago is, we've got one uniform
    member that's come down with it over in Korea. A couple of
    family members. We're screening lots of people. So, in terms of
    the numbers relative to the whole, very small impact.
        Secondly is on exercises. There are exercises, mostly in
    Indo-Pacific, that we're taking a hard look at. One of the CPXs
    [Command Post Exercises], for example, at the request of the
    ROK [Republic Of Korea] Chairman, was canceled over on the
    Peninsula of Korea. There are some other exercises that are
    being looked at to scale down or canceled or postponed. So,
    there might be some impact on exercises.
        But, broadly speaking right now, the impact on the
    uniformed military is very, very minimal. Break. We are also
    preparing to help whatever the Nation needs, and we've got all
    kinds of plans, and we're able to support other agencies, as
    necessary and as required by the President and Congress.
        Secretary Esper. To include our medical research
    institutes, et cetera. We're all--all hands are in, in terms of
    supporting this effort to come up with the solutions.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. I want to thank you
    both. I want to suggest, respectfully, that telling the
    American people more about those plans, to use your word, would
    be reassuring. You know, the enemy here really----
        Secretary Esper. It's panic. It's lack of information.
        General Milley. Lack of information, lack of panic, and----
        Senator Blumenthal. Exactly.
        General Milley.--and these aren't classified plans and all
    that kind of stuff. This is stuff that we could easily----
        Senator Blumenthal. It's not like the enemy----
        General Milley. No, that's right. We could easily let
    people know.
        Secretary Esper. Right. Completely agree.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan is going to ask questions now.
        Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your exceptional
    service. I appreciated our meetings yesterday. I think both of
    you are doing an excellent job for our Nation.
        General Milley, I wanted to just get a little bit more. You
    have stated publicly--you stated in our classified hearing on
    the Soleimani strike, which I think was not only
    constitutional, but in the Nation's interest--you mentioned
    about your duty, how you saw that strike after you read the
    intel. As we all know, General Soleimani wasn't in Iraq on
    vacation, he was there targeting the killing of more American
    servicemembers, which he has a long history of doing. Almost
    half the servicemembers in Iraq at the time were Alaskan-based
    forces, so this was something that particularly of interest to
    me.
        Can you succinctly say what you've said otherwise--because
    I think it's very important to hear directly from you, someone
    with over 35 years of military experience, service to your
    country--about what you thought your duty was after reading the
    intel?
        General Milley. Well, what I had said publicly, and I
    reiterated it in classified sessions, was--and reiterated in
    more detail--was, I believe the intelligence was compelling. I
    believe it was imminent. Not only was Soleimani have a long
    track record, going all the way back to the Beirut bombing and
    being involved in that, but, more importantly, his command-and-
    control role and what he was about to do. I believe that I,
    Secretary Esper, the President, and many, many others would
    have been culpably negligent had we not take the action we did,
    because I think many Americans would have died as a result. So,
    I believe it was the right thing to do then, and I believe it
    was the right thing to--I still believe that. I believe we
    contributed to reestablishing deterrence with aggressive action
    from Iran.
        Senator Sullivan. So, I appreciate that. I think
    reestablishing deterrence anywhere, in any theater, is actually
    really hard to do, and you've been able to do it, so far, and I
    appreciate that.
        Mr. Secretary, we had a good discussion yesterday on this
    issue of the DPRI [Defense Posture Realignment Initiative], and
    I'd like to get your views--you know, there was language in the
    NDAA from last year that, essentially, has the two of you
    focusing on the DPRI. The issue of, I think, the National
    Defense Strategy is warmly and strongly received here in the
    Senate, in a bipartisan way. But, if you look at our force
    posture, particularly in the Asia Pacific, it's stale. A lot of
    it exists, really, after World War II or the Korean War. How
    are you thinking about that, and how should we be thinking
    about that here in the Senate?
        Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. I do think we need to
    take a fresh look at our force posture in the Pacific. By the
    way, I think we need to take a fresh look at our force posture
    everywhere, which is why we're doing these COCOM reviews. So,
    I'll be working my way through these to look at just these
    things. We're--by the way, we're finding some things already
    that just don't make sense.
        But, with regard to INDOPACOM, absolutely, we should think
    about what it means to--if we have to face off against China in
    the year 2035 or 2049. DPRI is one example of something that
    was developed many, many years ago. I know it's a little bit
    tricky. There's a lot of diplomacy involved in this. But, I
    think that's something also we should take a look at to make
    sure that we are well postured, particularly our Marine
    capabilities, our Marine forces, to not just be able to respond
    flexibly, but also be able to train and sustain our forces in
    the region for an extended period in light of----
        Senator Sullivan. So, can I dig into that a little bit with
    you? The issue of training, I think, is a really important one,
    whether it's on Guam, whether it's other places--Okinawa, for
    example. We don't get the opportunity to do a lot of training
    in those places, and, I think, to have sustainable deployments,
    but also keeping our forces sharp, we need good training areas.
    Would you agree with that?
        Secretary Esper. We absolutely--I mean, training is the--
    it's the lifeblood of a unit's effectiveness, his ability to
    train, maintain, and equipment their force.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we look forward to working with
    both of you on that continued important reassessment that
    you're doing.
        The other issue that I know--I've been raising quite a long
    time--Mr. Secretary, you might remember, in your confirmation
    hearing, you mentioned that if the Air Force, in its upcoming
    OCONUS [outside the continental United States] decision on
    where to place the next squadrons of KC-46s, did it in an area
    that was co-located with over 100 fifth-generation fighters,
    that it would provide the United States with extreme strategic
    reach, and it would show that to our potential adversaries. The
    TRANSCOM Commander testified last week that one of the most
    stress-capable aspects and their number-one readiness concern
    was the air refueling fleet. My question to him, and to you,
    and the Secretary of the Air Force yesterday--having a
    deployment of KC-46s in the OCONUS bed-down in an area that can
    reach multiple COCOMs, like a place like Alaska, with the 100
    fifth-gen fighters--from your perspective, what message does
    that additionally send to our adversaries? You've already
    talked about the issue of extreme strategic reach when I asked
    that question earlier.
        Secretary Esper. Well, I do think two critical needs for
    our forces right now are to have that strategic lift,
    refueling, and sealift, by the way. But, the location of Alaska
    gives you great reach, in terms of whether you go across the
    Pole into Russia or toward China. When you couple it up with an
    amalgamation of forces, it does put the enemy in a different
    posture, your adversaries in a different posture, because you
    now have that reach, that lethality at hand, and ready to do
    what it might need to do, if called upon.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much.
        General Milley. Senator, if I might.
        Senator Sullivan. General, please.
        General Milley. I also don't want any adversary to walk
    away thinking that the United States of America cannot project
    power because of stress on the tanker fleet. We can, and they
    should have no doubt about it. Yes, we're giving up 10 KC-10s,
    and 13 KC-135s, but we still have almost 500. We can get there,
    ``the firstest with the mostest.'' And no one should doubt
    that.
        Senator Sullivan. But, certainly one of the best ways to
    relieve the stress is to have----
        General Milley. It is.
        Senator Sullivan.--tankers in places that can reach
    several----
        General Milley. It is.
        Senator Sullivan.--COCOMs.
        General Milley. But, we can get there.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        General Milley. I don't want anybody to think we can't.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I appreciate
    it.
        Senator Sullivan. I know you're going to ask a question on
    the Arctic, so----
        Senator King. I am, as a matter of fact.
        Senator Sullivan. Excellent.
        Senator King. You left it for me.
        Secretary Esper, first, I want to thank you personally for
    the participation of the Department in the National Cyber
    Solarium Process. Over a year, we've worked very hard. Ken
    Rapuano and David Norquist made significant contributions in
    intellectual firepower and criticism and thoughtfulness. I just
    want to thank you for your authorization for that
    participation. It was very meaningful.
        Secretary Esper. Thank you, Senator. I'm very encouraged by
    that--by all that, too. It's--there's a lot good coming out of
    it.
        Senator King. Well, we'll be releasing our report next
    Wednesday, as a matter of fact, and----
        Secretary Esper. Oh, great.
        Senator King.--and I think it's a good piece of work, and,
    indeed, we've spent a whole session here and really haven't
    talked about cyber, which is a--an essential--that's not the
    right word--a very real domain of warfare today. That's what
    we'll be talking about extensively next week. So, I just wanted
    to thank you.
        Secretary Esper. Well, thanks, and we're in cyber
    competition, if not conflict, every single day.
        Senator King. Exactly. We're at war today.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. General Milley--I guess this is a question
    for both of you--I'm very concerned about a gap in defense
    against hypersonic weapons. Both of our principal adversaries,
    China and Russia, have developed these weapons, have actually
    deployed them, and this puts at risk our--particularly, our
    naval resources. Talk to me about what we're doing to counter
    that threat.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, as part of our hypersonics
    research, we are putting money into defensive systems. One of
    the early things that we know we need, that money is going
    directly into, is a low-Earth orbit (LEO) missile tracking
    system, if you will, that would be able to track hypersonic
    systems moving through the atmosphere or----
        Senator King. Because one of the problems with hypersonics
    is, they don't leave a radar signal. They move so fast, they
    create a plasma shield. So, we need the tracking.
        Secretary Esper. We've determined that you need a low---a
    LEO tracking system to do that. So, that's one of the
    priorities of our R&E [Research and Engineering] efforts to do
    that, and then, of course, you have to figure out the effectors
    by which you would knock one out of the sky, if you will. There
    are a variety of things that we're exploring. But, it is
    critical to have that defense, because it is such--the
    maneuverability, the speed, the effectiveness of these systems
    is remarkable.
        Senator King. Another----
        General Milley. Two things----
        Senator King. Yes, sir.
        General Milley.--Senator King, on that. One, on the
    defense, if it can be seen, it can be hit, and there is no
    defense against hypersonic. It goes 5 to 10 times the speed of
    sound. You're not going to defend against it. So, what you have
    to do is be invisible. There's all kinds of techniques and
    procedures that we're working on in order to make our forces
    very difficult to see, from an acquisition standpoint, of enemy
    radar. So, that's on the defense.
        On the other part, you're not going to shoot the arrow.
    Those things are going so fast, you're not going to get it.
        Senator King. Right.
        General Milley. You've got to shoot the archer. You've got
    to go deep downtown, and you've got to get on the offense. If
    you want to defeat hypersonics, you've got to go to the source,
    the launch pads----
        Senator King. And you have--ISR in order to----
        General Milley. That's right.
        Senator King.--know where----
        General Milley. You've got to have the ISR to get in there.
    If you're launching hypersonics at the United States, then
    you're going to war with the United States, and you're going to
    pour it on, and pour it on with mass and firepower, and fast
    and hard.
        Senator King. But, I thought you made an important point
    earlier in the hearing, where you talked about ISR. We've sort
    of had a vacation on ISR.
        Secretary Esper. That's right.
        Senator King. Because we've been acting against enemies----
        Secretary Esper. That's right.
        Senator King.--that don't have any--that capacity. It's a
    whole different ball game when we're talking about a peer-state
    competitor.
        Secretary Esper. That's right.
        General Milley. And you want to invest in ISR that can
    penetrate----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        General Milley.--the airspace of these great-power
    competitors.
        Secretary Esper. It's also why we talk--as I've laid out
    the shipbuilding principles, if you will, going forward, is
    to--and the Navy agrees with this--is a move away from very
    large platforms into smaller platforms, a more distributed
    force so that you complicate the enemy's plans, particularly
    with regard to the employment of hypersonics.
        Senator King. Well, you raised shipbuilding. We talk about
    the Indo-Pacific as being the most important region. We talk
    about the National Defense Strategy, and yet, the budget talks
    about knocking out four destroyers and, I think, an amphib in
    the future plan. How was that decision made? How firm is it?
    Can we revisit it? I want to get a little bit of thoughts on
    that.
        By the way----
        Secretary Esper. Yeah.
        Senator King.--one thought--the other thought is, you know,
    we're doing this recapitalization out of operating costs. In
    any other organization, you'd have a capital budget and a--and
    you're building 40-year--an asset--a Columbia submarine is a
    40-year asset, and yet we're building them out of cashflow
    instead of some kind of long-range attributing to the cost over
    the life of the object. But, to get back--talk to me about----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator King.--the shipbuilding.
        Secretary Esper. Well, as I said earlier, I think we need--
    to me, I don't focus as much of the number, but that number,
    355, is out there. I think we need to be--have a fleet larger
    than 355. My gut tells me that. I'm convinced of that.
        Senator King. Senator Purdue had a chart this morning at
    the Seapower Subcommittee that, if you saw it, the--it shows
    what China is doing--you'd feel vindicated.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. But, we do have a qualitative
    capability over them. There are some other things out there.
    But, nonetheless, it's--if it's not just capability and
    lethality, it's presence. You have to have the presence, and
    so, I do think we need to get on that path. I think there are a
    number of things that we need to do.
        First of all, I completely support what the CNO did. The
    CNO decided to reallocate $4 billion or so out of SCN and put
    it into O&M to get readiness up. We have a readiness challenge.
    It's been well documented.
        Senator King. The ship's no good if it's in the dock.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I think the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) said, last year, in 2019, due to
    maintenance challenges, the equivalent of 19 ships didn't go to
    sea, and so, we've got to fix the readiness challenge and then
    put more money into shipbuilding. If we can get the legislative
    approval change, Secretary Modly is digging in deep. He's doing
    what the Army and Air Force did to find $40 billion over 5
    years. That'll free up a good chunk of what they think they
    need, and then we've got to get this higher top-line moving in
    the right direction.
        Senator King. Well, but we also have to--I mean, what
    worries me about what you're talking about--and I'm sorry, I
    know I'm over time--but, I worry about--there's a--you can't
    turn the industrial base off and on with a switch. If we drive
    it down, and you have a loss of personnel, loss of welders,
    loss of skilled shipbuilders in Bath, Maine, or Pascagoula or
    Marinette, Wisconsin, you can't turn them back on.
        Secretary Esper. Completely agree, Senator. I--that's why I
    think we need to look more, particularly with large capital
    investments like ships, multiyear, and even--I think the Navy,
    we discussed yesterday, is, Can you multiyear O&M so that
    your--you don't have the same perturbations in your maintenance
    cycle?
        Senator King. Right.
        Secretary Esper. Because you can't afford to go--you know,
    take a ship out of maintenance and then have a month or 2-month
    gap, and I know they're struggling with this up in Groton right
    now, with the sub--with the maintenance up there. So, you've
    got to figure out a way to smooth that out so workers will be
    incentivized to stay in the trade.
        Senator King. Are you suggesting that consistent funding
    from Congress might be a benefit?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I'm shocked.
        Secretary Esper. Consistent and timely.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Esper, General, thank you for being here. Thank
    you for your service.
        Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. In your confirmation
    testimony last summer, you wrote that we needed a distributed
    and resilient force posture in the Indo-Pacific. I'm concerned
    about the concentration of our forces currently in Japan and
    South Korea. Give me your assessment about our ability to
    compete effectively with China, given that concentration.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. What we--those forces are there
    for--you know, for a variety of reasons. I think Senator
    Sullivan mentioned it. You know, we have a presence that
    largely reflects where we've been for many, many years, and so,
    I do think we need to step back and look at that. I know
    Admiral Davidson is looking at that to make sure we have more
    distribution. I'm trying to get out there. I've traveled to the
    INDOPACOM two or three times now to visit nontraditional
    partners. I've been from Mongolia to Vietnam, I'll be going to
    Indonesia. I think there's much more ground we can cover and to
    build more relationships with more countries.
        Senator Hawley. You anticipate my next question, which is
    whether we can disperse U.S. Forces to other locations in the
    Pacific to improve survivability and reduce risk to operations.
    You think that we can?
        Secretary Esper. Improve survivability, but also grow more
    partners and more people, in terms of standing up and telling
    the Chinese they have to obey the international rules of order,
    and abide by that. That's going to take a lot of investment.
    So.
        Senator Hawley. What investment do we need to be able to
    disperse our forces along those lines?
        Secretary Esper. Well, I think we need to think creatively,
    Senator, about--you know, as you think through the war plans,
    how we might fight in the future, is--where do we need to be?
    Does it require MILCON, does it require--I'm--the Chairman and
    I are big believers in IMET [International Military Education
    and Training]. So, get more countries from the Indo-Pacific,
    even nontraditional partners, into our schoolhouses, grow that
    relationship over a career. There are a number of things that
    we should do that, by the way, the DOD is doing. We're
    committed to a 50 percent growth in IMET over 5 years.
        Senator Hawley. Just sticking with the question of
    investment. At your confirmation hearing, you said that you
    were open, in principle, to using something like EDI to
    accelerate investment in INDOPACOM. I don't see anything like
    that, however, in your budget. Why is that?
        Secretary Esper. The more I think about that--I mean, we've
    discussed this a lot, and sometimes I get concerned, if you
    bucket a certain amount of money for a certain region, it can
    be both limiting and--in other words, if you put so much money
    in there, people say, ``That's it, and that's all you need,''
    or you get trapped by that fund. I actually appreciate the
    flexibility of putting more or less in, depending on how
    circumstances change. But, clearly, I think--and we're talking
    to the commander out there about, ``What are your investment
    plans, focusing them more, in terms of future presence, what do
    we need to do, where do we need to grow relationships?''
        Senator Hawley. EDI has been so successful in that theater
    and for our needs there. I continue to believe that something
    like that mechanism----
        Secretary Esper. The one fact--the only thing I'd say,
    Senator, is, sometimes it takes the pressure off of countries
    to invest their own dollars into supporting us and providing
    host-nation support. Because they see that fund out there, and
    they go after that instead of going to their parliaments and
    saying, ``How can we support the U.S. presence?''
        Senator Hawley. I just want to make sure that we are
    getting the resources we need to what is our priority theater,
    I believe, under the NDS, in a timely fashion, if we're going
    to be postured successfully. I mean, we are behind the curve, I
    think.
        Secretary Esper. I'm impatient. I think we can and should
    do more. That's why I'm trying to do these COCOM reviews to
    free up time, money, and manpower, to invest more into that
    future fight.
        Senator Hawley. I applaud your COCOM reviews, by the way,
    and let's talk for a second about AFRICOM. The AFRICOM
    Commander, General Townsend, recently testified that he thought
    our European allies could send more forces to West Africa and
    take over some of the missions currently being done by our
    forces, like airlift, for instance, and aerial refueling.
        Secretary Esper. Sure.
        Senator Hawley. Do you agree with that assessment?
        Secretary Esper. Absolutely, and I've talked to the allies
    about this, and we've talked a few times about aerial
    refueling. We provide that to the French for free, if you will,
    and that's one of the areas where I've talked to the French to
    say, ``Look, I'm having a problem with air refuelers right now.
    If somebody else can pick up that mission, that helps us all
    out a lot.'' That's part of the review, is looking at, How do
    we do the same mission, but maybe do it differently?
        Senator Hawley. Yeah. Well, this seems to me like a clear
    situation where we can and should expect our allies to do more.
    Again, I applaud your COCOM reviews.
        General Milley, let me switch topics. Let's talk about
    Iran. If Iran resumes provocations in coming months, what is
    your assessment of how many troops we can send to that theater
    without risking our situation in INDOPACOM, without undermining
    deterrence, if you like, in the Indo-Pacific?
        General Milley. I don't think I could answer that in an
    open session. I'd rather come back to you in a classified
    session, point one.
        Point two, just to be clear, though, there is a significant
    amount of force in Indo-Pacific--300,000 troops, 7 aircraft
    carriers, the--I mean, there's a lot of force in the Pacific,
    and in Central Command, you're looking at about 70,000 troops
    currently, right now. There's an adequate amount of force in
    Central Command to maintain deterrence. If deterrence breaks
    down, we'll analyze the situation, and we'll do whatever is
    required to achieve whatever national security objectives are
    necessary, relative to Iran. I'd rather get back to you in
    classified session on exactly what that would be.
        Senator Hawley. You bet. I'll pursue that with you in a
    classified setting.
        My last question on this, Mr. Chairman, is just to your
    comments about the relative balance between CENTCOM and PACOM.
    Is it your sense that there's a little bit of slack, then,
    General, in INDOPACOM? I mean, is that--am I----
        General Milley. Well, I mean, again, it's a ``depends'' I
    mean, if you think that, you know, you're close to a war with
    Korea or China, then probably not, but--so, it depends on what
    the situation is in INDOPACOM at the moment in time. It--we
    will do whatever is required to achieve U.S. national security
    interests, no matter where it's at in the world, and if
    something were to happen, very significantly more than what's
    current in the Middle East, then decisions will be made by the
    President and Secretary of Defense to move the right amount of
    forces to achieve our objectives.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me
    recognize Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed.
        To our--both the gentlemen, thank you for testimony here
    today, and your service.
        Secretary Esper, briefly, I'd like to discuss prescription
    drug prices under TRICARE. This is an issue that Senator Rounds
    and I have been working on, along with some of the other
    Members of the Committee here. This Committee previously
    authorized a pilot program that would lower the cost of
    prescription drugs for TRICARE beneficiaries, including
    servicemembers, their families, and our military retirees. I
    know that the Department has begun the process of preparing for
    this prescription drug parity pilot program, but it still has
    not begun. So, my question is, Can you commit to working to--
    with us on action to lower the cost of prescription drugs for
    our servicemembers under TRICARE, and particularly expanding
    their opportunities to purchase these drugs?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Without knowing--having too much
    detail, I'm always committed to improving quality and access.
        Senator Peters. Great.
        Secretary Esper, last week, Senator Cotton and I sent a
    letter urging you to establish a United States-Israel
    Operations Technology Working Group. This group would
    coordinate and canalize military research and development
    efforts between the United States and Israel, focusing on the
    shared threats that our countries face, and capitalizing on,
    clearly, the world's leading national security innovation base
    in both countries, both the United States and Israel. So, this
    is to both Secretary Esper and General Milley. What is your
    view on enhancing the security cooperation with Israel,
    particularly in the areas of technology research and
    development? How can we strengthen that between our two
    countries?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, without having seen your letter
    yet, I would tell you that, you know, we have a very good
    innovative base. They have a very good innovative base, and I
    think the more we can cooperate together as allies and partners
    to come up with common solutions, the better. We do a lot of
    work with them now on a number of things. Certainly, at the
    industrial level, they compete to against--against and with
    American companies. So, I think if there are ways to improve
    that, we should pursue it.
        General Milley. And we--as you know, we work very closely
    with Israel on a lot of areas, and specifically in R&D and S&T.
    In combat developments, for example, we have the active
    protective system on our armored vehicles. That's an Israeli-
    produced system. We've looked at the Arrow for our ballistic
    missile defense system, and a wide variety of other systems.
    So, there's a--there's an exchange of ideas and knowledge,
    research, development between us and the Israelis on a regular
    basis.
        Senator Peters. Secretary Esper, on February 24th of this
    year, the DOD officially adopted a series of ethical principles
    for the military use of artificial intelligence. The principles
    were designed to complement existing ethical frameworks, and
    you structured the ethical framework around five specific areas
    for military use of AI: responsible, equitable, traceable,
    reliable, and governable. I've had longstanding concerns about
    the consequences of the United States and our allies adopting
    ethical standards without similar and equitable standards being
    adopted by our competitors and adversaries that operate under a
    different framework than we do. My question is, Is the U.S.
    placed at a competitive disadvantage at the tactical and
    operational level by adopting AI ethical standards not shared
    by our adversaries? And, if so, how do we compensate for that
    disadvantage?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. First of all, it's a lot of
    good work done by the Defense Industrial Board with a lot of
    outreach to a wide range of persons and organizations to
    develop these. I was briefed on them. I had a number of
    discussions with a lot of leaders about them. But, look, I
    think this is an area where we lead, and I think the
    principles, from what I've read and studied and learned, I
    think they put us in a leadership position. So, I think we are
    establishing the standard, if you will, and I think it will
    make us better. The more we can get other countries to come on
    board and align themselves to those, the better.
        Senator Peters. In the past, the U.S. has successfully used
    international agreements and arms control treaties to provide
    some stability, particularly with emerging technologies and in
    the attempt to minimize potential catastrophic mistakes that
    could occur. In terms of AR, are we at a stage where AI
    requires the equivalent of an arms control treaty to ensure the
    current rules-based international order? And, if so, how would
    that look?
        Secretary Esper. It's a good question, Senator. I'd have to
    think about it and get back to you and consult with people, and
    I just don't know. It's not something I would take off the
    table, but it's a fair question. Again, I think we want to
    develop some common standards, if you will, and I--we try to
    set the bar by my signing out those AI ethical principles and
    to set a high bar from the beginning, and urge others to come
    on board.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. No, we are not at a stage where Artificial
    Intelligence (AI) requires the equivalent of an arms control
    treaty to ensure maintenance of the current rules-based
    international order. It will likely be difficult to apply
    traditional arms control approaches to AI. AI is an enabling
    technology that is inherently ``dual-use,'' useful for both
    military and civilian applications. Depending on how one
    defines ``AI,'' it may very well become ubiquitous and manifest
    in multiple systems on every platform and vehicle, as well as
    in the devices carried by ordinary civilians and military
    personnel. AI does not involve objects such as missiles or
    warheads that can be readily counted, nor does it require
    analogs to the distinctive precursor chemicals or machinery
    that we monitor as part of our efforts to control the
    proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.
        Although the Department of Defense (DoD) does not support
    negotiating an AI ``arms control treaty,'' we believe that it
    would be productive to begin with discussions about
    international norms and standards of behavior. DoD is committed
    to leading in military ethics and AI safety. To that end, we
    are working to ensure that we adopt AI-enabled capabilities in
    a manner consistent with American values, U.S. domestic law,
    and U.S. obligations under international law. For example,
    working with the Defense Innovation Board, which consulted with
    experts and stakeholders across DoD, academia, and the private
    sector, DoD developed a set of AI ethical principles. Those
    principles, which are consistent with the AI principles
    developed and unanimously endorsed by the Organization for
    Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), were adopted and
    promulgated as guidance for the Department of Defense in
    February 2020. Efforts such as these will allow DoD, along with
    like-minded allies and partners, to employ AI-enabled
    capabilities in a responsible manner that is consistent with
    our values and enhances compliance with the Law of War.

        Senator Peters. General Milley, any thoughts?
        General Milley. I think artificial intelligence, as I've
    testified before, is sort of the mother of all technologies out
    there. It's extraordinarily powerful, and there's no doubt in
    my mind that it's going to be used for military purposes in the
    not-too-distant future. There's a wide variety of ethical
    concerns with that. I don't know if arms control agreements are
    the right mechanism or not. But, all countries, not just the
    United States, are going to have to come to grips with the
    introduction of artificial intelligence for use in military
    operations. It is extremely powerful, and it's going to have to
    be dealt with.
        Senator Peters. Great.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Reed. On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize
    Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to thank both of the witnesses for appearing
    before the Committee today.
        I'd like to follow up on what my colleague, Mr. Hawley,
    touched on, which is the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I feel very
    strongly that this is a part of the world we need to spend more
    attention on. I have heard, from both of you, the emphasis on
    INDOPACOM and our role--and the importance of our role there.
    While I applaud the Department's messaging about prioritizing
    great-power competition in this region over other activities, I
    do remain concerned that we've not matched our rhetoric with
    our actions. How are we able to divert some $7 billion to
    border wall construction and yet we're not--the Pacific region
    is our main effort? And, you know, Secretary Esper, I agree
    with you that IMET is certainly very important. In fact, I
    recently met with General Aparit Kongsompong, who is the Thai
    Army leader, and he talked very fondly about how his time that
    he spent at U.S. training facilities. In fact, he said it was
    his joint experience, training at United States facilities, as
    that of General Andika, from Indonesia, that led them to form a
    friendship based on their experience in the United States, that
    then led to this recent agreement they just signed, 2 months
    ago, on information-sharing.
        But, I think it takes more than IMET. I think you need to
    put some MILCON in this. I think we need to look at staffing
    and resources increasing for the INDOPACOM in order to really
    deter Chinese aggression. So, I'd love to hear from both of you
    as to when we're going to see more of a plus-up in this region,
    beyond just talking about how great this is.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I think the--first of all, you
    know I agree with the importance of INDOPACOM, and its--because
    it's number-one in our strategy, to say the least. But, if you
    look at the simple disposition of forces, INDOPACOM has five
    times as many forces as any other theater, over 350,000. The
    next-closest theater is 70,000. If you added up every other
    theater, INDOPACOM would still be twice as big as all of them,
    combined. So, we have a lot of forces in the theater. I think
    the challenge isn't necessarily putting more forces in, it's
    making sure that we look at our disposition on the ground and
    think, How do we use them more effectively to grow partners and
    allies, and how do we exercise with them, et cetera, et cetera?
    That's my quick assessment. I don't----
        Senator Duckworth. I mean, I don't disagree with you that
    it's not about--it's not just about the number of troops that
    are on the ground, it's about resourcing INDOPACOM so that they
    can go out--I think we need to be--you know, I mean, you're
    already talking about this--more basing agreements.
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Duckworth. I was very impressed with what was done
    in South Korea when we didn't have enough ammunition, and you
    guys, took that out of Hyde and plussed them up. But, the
    reason that you have more troops is because it's a larger
    geographic region than, say, CENTCOM is. You know, I'll--maybe
    AFRICOM would have more geographic area. But, the geography is
    different.
        General, you were going to----
        General Milley. Well, the--you're exactly right, the
    geography is completely different, the politics are different,
    the international politics, the threats are different, the
    allies are different. All of that is different, and you have to
    factor all of that in. But, in terms of main effort versus
    supporting efforts and economy-of-force efforts--in the NDS,
    the Central Command area, AFRICOM, and SOUTHCOM are all
    designated as economy of force, and you're familiar with that
    term from your military experience, and EUCOM is a supporting
    effort, and PACOM is, ``the main effort.'' It's all part of a
    globally integrated level of effort with all the resources the
    Department of Defense has.
        With respect to INDOPACOM, you know, the Secretary
    mentioned 350,000 troops. He's also got, you know, 200 ships, 7
    aircraft carriers. He's got three ARG/MEUs. He's got 1,600
    high-performance aircraft. This is a highly resourced--from a
    military standpoint, highly resourced theater. So, it's not so
    much the numbers of the ships, planes, trains, and automobiles
    sort of thing. It's how we use it, where we put it, and what
    our broader strategy is with respect to what we think is going
    to be the most significant adversary for the next 100 years,
    which is China, and the rise of China, how we, as a nation,
    deal with that. Military is one aspect of a much broader
    strategy that we've got to come to grips with.
        But, I do think that INDOPACOM is well resourced, from a
    departmental standpoint, in terms of military capability, right
    now.
        Senator Duckworth. But, the Chinese are really moving ahead
    of us----
        General Milley. They are.
        Senator Duckworth.--when it comes to basing issues there,
    and----
        General Milley. They are.
        Senator Duckworth.--we have to have more than a little
    toehold there in order to----
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Duckworth.--ensure freedom of navigation----
        General Milley. That's right, and access, basing, over-
    flight, all of that stuff plays into it.
        Senator Duckworth. So, adjacent to this issue, I want to
    shift slightly to the other--if there was a bet on what I--
    questions I was going to ask you, I'm sure this was one of the
    ones that would have come up, which is logistics. I'm deeply
    concerned about our ability to transport and sustain our forces
    overseas, especially in places like INDOPACOM. Contested
    logistics is something I believe we need to pay far more
    attention to. This year's cuts to the tanker fleet and anemic
    investment in sealift replacement and maintenance really worry
    me.
        Secretary Esper and General Milley, can you tell me how
    this year's Defense budget request preserves or improves our
    ability to transport and sustain our forces in a----
        Secretary Esper. Yeah.
        Senator Duckworth.--contested environment? The days that
    we're going not be able to send ships full of what we need
    without our enemy trying to attack, take the ship out, are
    behind us.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, you're exactly right. I don't
    know if you were here earlier, but I mentioned this. You know,
    I'm concerned that--two important things that often get
    overlooked because they're not sexy are things like airlift and
    aerial refueling and strategic sealift. You know, we've
    invested in two surge ships this year, but if you--I've had a
    lot of conversations with General Lyons--we need to do more,
    and we need to do more, soon. That's why we've talked a few
    times about the shipbuilding plan, but one of the things the
    shipbuilding plan doesn't incorporate is strategic lift,
    sealift. So, I sent a letter to the committees, and I said,
    when I look at the shipbuilding plan, I think we should factor
    in strategic sealift, because it also competes for budget
    dollars, and I--it's a critical factor. So, between that--I'm
    very concerned about the delays in the KC-46. I had the chance
    to crawl through one about a week--2 weeks ago, and look at the
    problems. We--so we're going to have to look restoring some--
    maybe some 10s, some 135s, so we keep that--at least 479
    aircraft going. But, it's a very capable airplane, it's just
    going to take some time. But, the--those are critical things,
    particularly when you see the distances from CONUS or Alaska
    all the way into theater, into INDOPACOM theater, and then
    forward basing is another way you offset that, of course.
        Senator Duckworth. Yes. You're right, because it's not just
    about the sealift, it's--the tanker fleet, as you were
    mentioning----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Duckworth.--but it's also fueling.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. We've got to have forward fueling
    capability. We can't just be shipping our fuel there for
    everything that sucks gas. Right?
        Secretary Esper. That's right.
        General Milley. And you're right. You're over--we're over
    time, so I can get you an answer for the record, but----
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        General Milley.--you're absolutely right to be concerned
    about the maritime sealift. We've given that up, as a nation,
    for the most part, over the last many, many years, and the
    tanker fleet and the airlift fleet.
        On the tankers, though, I just want to be clear again, you
    know, we've got almost 500 tankers, so, in this budget, there's
    10 KC-10s and 13 KC-135s. Yes, there's stress on the force. No
    question about it. You've heard from General Lyons and others.
    But, at the same time, I don't want people who are watching
    this, especially in certain countries, to think that the United
    States of America cannot project power overseas, when needed.
    We can, and we will, if required.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Milley. In an effort to better define future
    warfighting requirements, the Secretary of Defense has directed
    the development of a Joint Warfighting Concept against peer
    adversaries in the 2030 timeframe. A subset of this requirement
    is the development of a corresponding Joint Concept for
    Contested Logistics. Strategic Sealift requirements for
    projecting the Joint Force in contested, all-domain
    environments from the Homeland, through the approaches, and to
    the tactical edge are fundamental to the success of any future
    large-scale military operation. The outcomes of the Joint
    Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Contested Logistics
    in December 2020 will help to inform future Strategic Sealift
    force composition requirements and long-range shipbuilding
    plans for the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
        In fiscal year 2021, TRANSCOM will invest $26.3 million of
    RDT&E funding towards Joint Deployment and Distribution
    challenges in a contested environment. These challenges include
    improvements to transportation and sustainment of our forces
    through cyber assurance, global posture, transportation
    capacity and fleet readiness. They plan to invest $30 million
    in fiscal year 2022. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM joint
    exercise program receives dedicated funding through the
    Combatant Commanders' Exercise Engagement and Training
    Transformation (CE2T2) program. For fiscal year 220, USTRANSCOM
    is allocated $31.3 million for six joint exercises.
        The Joint Exercise Transportation Program (JETP) is a sub-
    program of CE2T2 that funds the strategic transportation of
    personnel and equipment to worldwide combatant command
    sponsored joint exercises. This program provides an opportunity
    to stress strategic transportation and C4I systems and evaluate
    their readiness and supportability across the full range of
    military operations. USTRANSCOM Service Components execute the
    majority of JETP funding to deploy and re-deploy units
    participating in CE2T2-funded joint exercises. In fiscal year
    2020 the JETP budget is $207.3 million.

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Gentlemen, let me thank you for your
    testimony, and thank you, particularly, for your service.
        On behalf of the Chairman, Chairman Inhofe, let me call the
    adjournment of the hearing.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        [Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
                                 funding levels
        1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission and senior Pentagon leadership have
    all endorsed 3 to 5 percent real annual growth to implement the
    strategy. Every year since the NDS was published in 2018, leadership
    has said the next budget will implement the NDS. Now we hear it won't
    be until fiscal year 2022. Has the U.S. military fully recovered from
    lack of funding that existed under the Budget Control Act, particularly
    from 2013 to 2017?
        Secretary Esper. The Department lost $400 billion in buying power
    from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2017. While the Congress has
    enacted funds for the Department at levels that reverse the loss in
    topline, the Department has not fully recovered from the lost buying
    power under the Budget Control Act.
        General Milley. The last four defense budgets have done much to
    address the shortfalls resulting from the lost buying power under the
    Budget Control Act, but readiness and modernization challenges remain.
    The Department requires sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely
    budget enactment to fully recover from the Budget Control Act and
    effectively compete in an era of great power competition.

        2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how much
    money in dollars above inflation do you need over the next 5 years to
    implement the NDS with low risk?
        Secretary Esper. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense
    fiscal year 2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of
    2019 requires an additional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five
    percent real annual growth would require an additional $395 billion
    over the next 5 years.
        General Milley. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense
    fiscal year 2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of
    2019 requires an additional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five
    percent real annual growth would require an additional $395 billion
    over the next 5 years.
        electromagnetic spectrum: balancing military and commercial use
        3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, spectrum is critical to the
    execution of all DOD missions from radios to radars--including defense
    of the Homeland. In your February 26, 2020, testimony to the House
    Armed Services Committee (HASC), you commented on mid-band spectrum (3
    to 4.2 gigahertz): ``Private sector wants that. We need that . . . ''
    and ``We're willing to share it.'' Why does the military need to share
    bandwidth with U.S. 5G companies rather than just moving out of those
    bands altogether?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts
    operational missions, warfighting exercises, training, and testing in
    the 3.1-3.55 gigahertz (GHz) spectrum range using a variety of land,
    air, and sea weapons systems, and command and control platforms. These
    capabilities do not tune to other parts of the spectrum to accommodate
    vacating the 3.1-3.55 GHz band. Being that industry wants this band
    fast and DOD fully supports U.S. leadership in 5G and the economic
    potential, we are willing to share the band. To accelerate the
    availability of this mid-band spectrum for 5G, spectrum sharing is the
    only viable option. Modifying all the necessary DOD equipment to vacate
    a band is an undertaking that is enormously complex, costly and time-
    intensive. DOD systems are optimized for the original frequency band
    they were developed to operate in and are fully integrated into the
    vehicle, ship, or aircraft. DOD originally selected the 3.1-3.55 GHz
    band for the operation of certain mission-critical capabilities such as
    radars for many reasons to include threats, the technical
    characteristics of this spectrum, regulatory considerations and more.
    Today, there are a limited number of bands with similar physical
    characteristics for relocation and many of are either already intensely
    used or have been identified for study for reallocation. This further
    underscores that sharing is the most feasible option.

        4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, do we have the technology to
    share?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has the technology
    today, in varying stages of development, to enable us to share all or
    portions of the mid-band spectrum range. DOD, in partnership with
    stakeholders across industry and government, is already expanding the
    technological boundaries of sharing, including in the mid-band 5G
    spectrum of 3.55-3.65 gigahertz (GHz). This is an important air search
    radar spectrum band for the operational Navy. Since 2012, DOD,
    industry, the Federal Communications Commission and the National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration have worked on a
    sharing solution based on advanced technology that allows commercial
    services to share 3.55-3.65 GHz without modifications to Navy
    capabilities.
        DOD also is assessing, as part of 5G experimentation with industry
    partners, the potential for dynamic spectrum sharing to enable co-
    existence between radar systems and commercial 5G technology in mid-
    band spectrum. This is part of an overall approach the Department has
    embraced to lean forward with smart technology and informed policy that
    protects our mission capabilities while allowing for sharing with 5G.
    The shift to a sharing and maneuver focus will align with efforts
    across DOD to achieve U.S. military readiness, integration across
    warfighting domains, and increased lethality of U.S. forces. DOD is
    ready to work through the machine learning and artificial intelligence
    analysis required to achieve effective machine-to-machine
    communications for near-real time sharing. These tools will improve 5G
    and enable military operations and 5G and beyond systems to cohabitate
    in congested spectrum. Overall, information technology modernization
    will better deconflict operations and enable more sharing in more
    bands, including those valuable for 5G.
              united states africa command (africom) troop levels
        5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you agree
    that Africa is key terrain to implement the NDS given the intersection
    of Russian and Chinese influence as well as al Qaeda and ISIS threats?
        Secretary Esper. First, I want to clarify that National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) implementation is a Department of Defense-wide effort to
    improve lethality, expand and establish partnerships, and empower
    reforms. These efforts drive our engagements and force posture across
    the world, so yes, it will include parts of Africa as it is an emerging
    frontier for global power competition and an area plagued by
    transnational threats.
        Second, consistent with the NDS, the Department will emphasize
    relationships as key to achieving these goals. This means the
    Department will primarily work by, with, and through local partners and
    allies to combat transnational threats and minimize malign influence of
    non-African powers. The NDS reinforces partner-centric strategies and
    approaches to strengthen our partners' defense capabilities. The
    Department will continue to use a variety of tools to work closely with
    African and other international partners to achieve several policy
    goals including capacity-building programs, security assistance,
    military equipment sales, education, and exercises.
        General Milley. Africa is home to some of the fastest growing
    economies and populations in the world and sits at the crossroads of
    international commerce and trade. Africa is also a key nexus for many
    of the strategic challenges identified in the National Defense
    Strategy.
        Malign actors' coercive and exploitative activities undermine and
    threaten many African countries' stability. If left unimpeded, Russia
    and China threaten to erode United States influence and access in
    Africa over time.
        Al Qaeda and ISIS linked violent extremist networks are expanding
    in Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and
    disenfranchised populations. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the
    United States in the region, and some aspire to strike the U.S.
    Homeland.
        The Department of Defense will remain engaged in Africa because
    America's future security, prosperity, and strategic access in times of
    crisis relies upon free, open, and secure sea and air lines of
    communication around Africa.
        Our efforts in Africa to address priority security challenges and
    compete with Russia and China will also require continued investments
    across the whole-of-government.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, as the
    threats grow in Africa, should we be looking at troop increases instead
    of troop cuts?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is evaluating United States Africa
    Command's force posture through the combatant command review process.
    The review process will ensure United States Africa Command is
    appropriately sized to enable United States war plans and contingency
    plans, compete with China and Russia through a whole-of-government
    approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that have the
    capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa
    Command is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an
    increase or decrease is needed to meet the above objectives. These
    reviews are ongoing.
        General Milley. The United States Government's commitment to Africa
    is demonstrated across the spectrum of national power--including
    diplomatic, military and economic efforts.
        Persistent United States military presence is not the only measure
    of the Department of Defense's commitment in Africa, but we will
    continue to do our part.
        DOD's continued commitment in Africa is demonstrated through its
    counter-terrorism training and operations, military training exercises,
    dynamic force employment, intelligence sharing, crisis response, and
    emergency humanitarian assistance.
        While the results of the United States Africa Command review are
    not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately
    resourced to accomplish its priority missions.

        7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are you
    doing to ensure that AFRICOM has the resources it needs to accomplish
    its mission and implement the NDS?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is evaluating United States Africa
    Command's force posture through the combatant command review process.
    The review process will ensure United States Africa Command is
    appropriately sized to enable United States war plans and contingency
    plans, compete with China and Russia through a whole-of-government
    approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that have the
    capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa
    Command is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an
    increase or decrease is needed to meet the above objectives. These
    reviews are ongoing.
        General Milley. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities
    and resources across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with
    the National Defense Strategy. United States Africa Command has been
    the first to undergo this review.
        The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to
    ensure DOD is aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the
    National Defense Strategy, such as great power competition and
    countering violent extremist organizations that threaten the Homeland.
        While the results of the United States Africa Command review are
    not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately
    resourced to accomplish its priority missions.
                           pentagon budgeting reform
        8. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, the Pentagon still uses systems
    designed decades ago to manage its processes--namely, the Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system for developing its
    budget. Do you believe the current Pentagon budgeting system is
    flexible enough to implement the NDS?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities
    and resources across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with
    the National Defense Strategy. United States Africa Command has been
    the first to undergo this review.
        The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to
    ensure DOD is aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the
    National Defense Strategy, such as great power competition and
    countering violent extremist organizations that threaten the Homeland.
        While the results of the United States Africa Command review are
    not yet final, I am confident that the command will remain adequately
    resourced to accomplish its priority missions.

        9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, is it time to consider both
    fundamental and incremental changes to the PPBE process?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is constantly improving the way it
    conducts its PPBE process. This year, I have tasked my Chief Management
    Officer to conduct a consolidated program and budget review of the
    Defense Agencies. This review will provide a comprehensive review of
    the Fourth Estate and its contributions to the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS). All savings from this process will be invested to
    further the full implementation of the NDS for the Department.
                     china and posture in the indo-pacific
        10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, General Wolters recently told
    this Committee that the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) fixed a
    lot of our posture problems in Europe. Do you agree we need that same
    focus now on posture in the Indo-Pacific?
        Secretary Esper. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding has
    enabled the Department to increase our force presence in Europe,
    improve critical capabilities, establish pre-positioned equipment sets,
    and execute readiness-building exercises. All of these efforts have
    contributed greatly to United States European Command's warfighting
    capabilities and correcting posture problems in Europe. The United
    States must now focus on posture in the Indo-Pacific region and
    continue our efforts to broaden our posture across the Indo-Pacific
    region. Adapting our current posture that is concentrated in Northeast
    Asia to a more distributed laydown is an important element of our
    objective of denying adversaries sustained air and sea dominance in the
    region.

        11. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, is the posture we have today in
    the Indo-Pacific the posture we'll need in the future to deal with a
    China that is more and more aggressive?
        General Milley. In accordance with the NDS, DOD is focused on
    adapting to a battlefield where US operations will be challenged in all
    domains--air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace--with increasing speed
    and reach. If left unaddressed, these trends would erode our military
    advantage and challenge our ability to deter aggression.
        To counter these trends, DOD is emphasizing investments in
    capabilities and posture to be able to deploy, survive, operate, and
    maneuver while under attack. These include: survivable and resilient
    communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    systems; survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; cost-
    effective missile defenses capable of defeating sophisticated air,
    cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats; and smaller, more dispersed,
    geographically diverse and resilient bases that incorporate active and
    passive defenses, promote interoperability and cooperation with allies
    and partners and enhance logistics flexibility and resilience.

        12. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, you mentioned in your
    testimony that funding like EDI can reduce the willingness of allies to
    meet burden sharing commitments. Isn't it true that EDI investments
    totaling over $20 billion have coincided with significant increases in
    defense spending across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    alliance, including over $100 billion in new defense spending since
    2016?
        Secretary Esper. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) improves the
    readiness, responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of United States
    forces in Europe in order to strengthen our deterrence posture and
    enhance our defense capabilities. It is indicative of the ironclad U.S.
    commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but I
    continue to make clear to Allies that EDI, in and of itself, will not
    maintain the world's strongest military alliance. NATO Allies have
    responded to the call for increased burden sharing with sustained
    increases in defense spending. Defense spending across European Allies
    and Canada increased in real terms in 2019 by 4.6 percent, the fifth
    consecutive year of growth. By the end of 2020, European Allies will
    have invested $130 billion more since 2016, and the accumulated
    increase by the end of 2024 will be $400 billion.

        13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your
    testimony, you both referred to the number of forces assigned to United
    States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)--300,000 in 1 instance and
    350,000 in another. How many forces are assigned to INDOPACOM?
        Secretary Esper. There are 300,780 military personnel assigned to
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
        General Milley. There are 300,780 military.

        14. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many
    civilian personnel are assigned to INDOPACOM?
        Secretary Esper. There are 53,972 government civilians &
    contractors assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
        General Milley. There are 53,972 GS & contractor.

        15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, please
    detail the number of forces currently assigned to INDOPACOM by location
    (i.e. in foreign countries, U.S. states, and U.S. territories).
        Secretary Esper. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command forces are spread across
    44 Foreign Countries, all 50 States and Washington, DC and 4 U.S.
    Territories.
        General Milley. Forces are spread across 44 Foreign Countries, all
    50 States and Washington DC and 4 U.S. Territories.

        16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many
    forces assigned to INDOPACOM are stationed west of the International
    Date Line and how many forces assigned to INDOPACOM are stationed east
    of the International Date Line?
        Secretary Esper. There are 110,458 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
    personnel west of the International Dateline. There are 244,294
    personnel east of the International Dateline.
        General Milley. West: 110,458. East: 244,294

        17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in each of
    the last three annual DEPORDs/GFMAPs (including the current), how many
    forces assigned to INDOPACOM were allocated to other combatant commands
    (COCOMs)?
        Secretary Esper. [Deleted.]
        General Milley. [Deleted.]

        18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, please consider the example of
    denying a fait accompli in a Taiwan scenario. Given the tyranny of
    distance you referenced in your testimony, would you agree that the
    responsiveness of forces assigned to INDOPACOM in such a scenario would
    vary significantly based in part on their location in the INDOPACOM
    area of responsibility (AOR)?
        Secretary Esper. The location of U.S. forces within the U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is a
    critical element of any response to a regional crisis or contingency.
    Our regional force posture has shifted our approach to warfighting to a
    posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
    and politically sustainable. In particular, the Department's Global
    Operating Model is designed to orient activities against the
    adversary's theory of victory--particularly a fait accompli scenario.
    The mix of activities in the contact and blunt layers is designed to
    focus the Department's military operations, especially in concert with
    allies and partners, to prevent adversary activities that may seek to
    achieve a fait accompli. Our effective operation in the contact and
    blunt layers of the Global Operating Model, as implemented in the
    USINDOPACOM AOR, is a combination of combat-credible forward forces
    deployed to the region (including in Guam, Korea, and Japan) and U.S.
    operations conducted at greater distance. Our responsiveness is also
    contingent upon the continued prioritization of investments in the
    logistics backbone of operations--including prepositioned forward
    stocks, munitions, strategic mobility assets, and maintenance.

        19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Esper, as one example, in the context
    of such scenario, would you consider ships stationed on the West Coast
    of the United States to be part of the contact, blunt, or surge layer
    of the Global Operating Model described in the NDS?
        Secretary Esper. Through the layers of the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy's (NDS) Global Operating Model, the Department seeks to
    identify the general attributes and key functions U.S. forces must be
    capable of performing to advance NDS objectives, and specifically the
    requirement to arrest the erosion of military advantage against our
    primary competitors in key theaters. For example, U.S. forces in the
    blunt layer must be combat credible and positioned to ensure they can
    help delay, degrade, or deny an armed attack by a U.S. competitor for
    limited objectives. In the scenario provided, the ship's capabilities
    and mission are the critical factors determining which layer of the
    Global Operating Model they support.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                                spectrum sharing
        20. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your
    HASC testimony on February 26, 2020, you said the Department is willing
    to share spectrum with 5G networks in the ``Mid-Band'' (3 to 4.2
    gigahertz). Can you describe some of the ways that the Department
    relies on spectrum to support warfighter requirements?
        Secretary Esper. Spectrum is imperative to Department of Defense
    (DOD) operations. DOD must have the ability to gain and maintain an
    advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum when and where it is needed.
    To its meet national security and homeland defense missions, DOD relies
    on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command and control; voice and
    data communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting systems; electronic
    attack and electronic protection; and battlefield situational awareness
    and protection (e.g., air traffic, weather, counter unmanned aerial
    systems or UAS). Without spectrum access, DOD is unable to train and
    equip its forces nor meet operational mission requirements. DOD has
    several types of important capabilities in the 3.1-3.55 GHz frequency
    range including major weapons systems. These include shipboard and
    ground based radars supporting multiple strategic and tactical
    ballistic missile defense missions, systems providing counter-mortar
    weapons and counter-air and UAS capabilities for homeland defense and
    critical site protection, and airborne command and control. The
    Department also relies on the use of airborne radars in this band to
    provide intelligence and protection of national security events.
        General Milley. To meet national security and homeland defense
    missions, DOD relies on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command
    and control; voice and data communications; intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting
    systems; cyber; electronic attack and electronic protection; and
    battlefield situational awareness and protection (e.g., air traffic,
    weather, counter unmanned aerial systems or UAS). Without spectrum
    access, the Department is unable to train and equip its forces nor meet
    its operational mission requirements.
        The White House, DOD, DOC and FCC have formed a task force to
    develop the details of a nationwide spectrum sharing solution by August
    1, 2020. The collaborative agreement will enable sharing in the 3450-
    3550 MHz range, providing 100 MHz of nearly contiguous access across
    the Nation to enable America to lead the world in 5G development.

        21. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are
    some of the future spectrum warfighter requirements that will be
    essential to competing with Russia and China on a future battlefield?
        Secretary Esper. Military operations will see the integration of
    all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use
    of all domain sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging
    advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine
    learning for near real-time assessment and decision making. The
    military will significantly expand the number of autonomous air and
    ground systems that operate at extended distances for longer periods of
    time, providing persistent and high-quality situational awareness,
    tracking, guidance, and force. Winning in the future battlefield
    requires the ability to see and strike adversaries first while
    preventing adversaries from detecting the Department's presence.
        This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically
    dispersed heterogeneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through
    the effective and efficient use of spectrum. Future spectrum
    requirements are shaped by overarching new capability requirements that
    include increased operational agility; expanded throughput via
    traditional line-of-sight radio frequency and data links that are on
    platforms; smart and adaptive global distribution networks; expanded
    space-based capabilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf
    technologies. In addition, to keep pace with the rapid dispersion of
    technology and new concepts of warfare and competition, the Department
    is developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and methods to allow
    access to the spectrum regardless of adversary attempts to deny access.
        General Milley. Military operations will see the integration of all
    domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use of
    sensors, radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging advanced quantum
    computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning for near real-
    time assessment and decision making. The military will significantly
    expand the number of autonomous air and ground systems that operate at
    extended distances for longer periods of time, providing persistent and
    high-quality situational awareness, tracking, guidance, and force
    employment. Winning in the future battlefield requires the ability to
    see and strike adversaries first, while preventing adversaries from
    detecting DOD's presence.
        This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically
    dispersed heterogeneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through
    the effective and efficient use of spectrum. Future spectrum
    requirements are shaped by next-generation capabilities that include
    increased operational agility, expanded throughput via traditional
    line-of-sight RF and data links that are on platform. Additionally,
    they include smart and adaptive global distribution networks, expanded
    space-based capabilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf
    technologies. Finally, to keep pace with the rapid dispersion of
    technology and new concepts of warfare and competition, we are
    developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and methods. These will
    allow DOD to maximize the use of available spectrum to exploit
    battlefield opportunities while preventing interference to other
    authorized users.

        22. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what help
    is needed from Congress in this area?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) appreciates the
    Committee's continued support of our 5G plans, including our engagement
    as part of a ``whole-of-government'' approach to make the President's
    5G goals a reality. A specific area in which Congress could assist is
    spectrum information technology (IT) modernization, as proposed in
    Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section
    214. This provision will modernize the Department's spectrum IT
    infrastructure, standardize modeling and simulation tools, standardize
    spectrum data, and allow interoperability between DOD, Federal users
    and national regulators (Federal Communications Commission and the
    National Telecommunications & Information Administration). This support
    will accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, resulting in an
    improved ability to deconflict operations and enable more sharing,
    including for 5G and beyond. This aligns with the greater reliance on
    sharing as part of a ``whole-of-government'' approach enables us to
    gain flexibility to be resilient against coercive,
        General Milley. DOD appreciates SASC's continued support of our 5G
    plans, including our engagement as part of a ``whole-of-government''
    approach to make the President's 5G goals a reality. The U.S. has great
    momentum and SASC's continued support of the National Spectrum IT
    Modernization initiative will enable interoperability between DOD,
    Federal users and national regulators (Federal Communications
    Commission and the National Telecommunications & Information
    Administration), accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, resulting
    in an improved ability to deconflict operations and enable more
    sharing, including for 5G and beyond. A specific area in which Congress
    could assist is to increase funding in DOD's RDT&E activities,
    specifically its recently established Next Generation Information
    Communications Technology Program (Early-stage R&D program). This
    program comprises a new initiative known as ``5G to Next G.'' DOD's
    current efforts are focused on developing 5G-enabled military
    applications and spectrum sharing between national 5G and military
    systems. The new program would add a focus on technologies beyond 5G,
    working with agencies such as the National Science Foundation and
    National Institute of Standards and Technology on millimeter-wave
    technology, multi-antenna systems, dynamic spatial spectrum reuse, and
    ``special/spectral/network security techniques.'' DOD's operations have
    become increasingly dependent on electromagnetic spectrum access across
    all domains. To improve national security readiness, effectiveness, and
    efficiency, Congress must encourage coordination across all federal
    agencies. We have lost our edge in this critical domain and need to
    quickly restore readiness in the electromagnetic spectrum to ensure we
    can execute the National Defense Strategy.

        23. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, if DOD was
    required to ``vacate'' or leave that band of the spectrum instead of
    sharing, what are the potential dollar costs to the military?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot vacate the
    spectrum, because there is no comparable spectrum or technology to
    which military systems can transition that is as mission effective as
    this band. As a consequence, spectrum sharing is the only viable option
    at this time to accelerate the availability of this band for commercial
    5G systems. As part of our proactive engagement in ensuring that mid-
    band spectrum is available to meet national 5G priorities for the U.S.,
    DOD is studying the issue of dollar costs if comparable spectrum were
    available. That study is expected to be out later this year.
        General Milley. Currently the DOD cannot vacate this band of
    spectrum due to weapons systems and our National Security in the near
    term. For instance, we have nearly 100 Aegis ships, each with an Aegis
    radar at the cost of $1 billion each. We also have a fleet of AWACs
    aircraft in this band of spectrum. These two platforms make up a
    significant portion of our National and Homeland defense. There are
    many other radar weaons systems that would be effected which is why our
    sharing strategy is so essential to our National Security and in the
    vital interest of our 5G efforts.
        I, collaborating directly with the White House Chief of Staff, will
    co-chair a steering group to identify a solution that allows commercial
    industry nationwide 5G access while preserving critical DOD readiness
    and operations. The steering group is scheduled to present results to
    the President by August 1, 2020.

        24. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how long
    would it take to move to a different area of the spectrum?
        Secretary Esper. Initial estimates for relocation timelines range
    from well over a decade to several decades, depending on the cost that
    would be acceptable and if comparable replacement spectrum were
    identified and made available, as required under current statutory
    safeguards.
        General Milley. In the immediate future, the White House has
    identified access to 100 MHz of contiguous mid-band spectrum as
    essential to the U.S. efforts to lead the world in 5G development.
    There will be a two-phase sharing plan to expedite commercial access.
    The short term solution will be sharing spectrum via adjustments to
    Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
    and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs.) The long term solution
    will include identifying comparable spectrum, and making modifications
    to DOD equipment and/or operating concepts to improve the sharing
    environment. The final plan is scheduled to be delivered to the White
    House by August 1, 2020 with an aim to announce the associated spectrum
    auction no later than October 1, 2020.
                       close combat lethality task force
        25. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper, one of Secretary Mattis'
    signature efforts was to create the Close Combat Lethality Task Force
    (CCLTF). The charter of this task force recognizes that, after WWII,
    close combat forces suffered 90 percent of all combat deaths, despite
    comprising only 4 percent of the total force. Senator Duckworth and I
    offered an amendment that was included in the Senate Report
    accompanying the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA), urging the department to continue its support of this task
    force and for its direct reporting relationship to the Secretary of
    Defense. Secretary Mattis called this task force his #2 priority, only
    behind the NDS. Will you give me your commitment to continue your
    direct oversight of this important task force, so that our ground
    combat forces, from all services, have a champion in its Secretary?
        Secretary Esper. The work of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force
    (CCLTF) is very important and having been an Infantryman myself the
    purpose of the task force is of vital importance to me. That is why I
    want to ensure this critical effort continues well into the future.
        I am focused on implementing the National Defense Strategy and
    efforts like the CCLTF are a key part of ensuring our Nation's
    readiness now and in the future. That is why I have asked the Secretary
    of the Army to explore how this successful endeavor can be improved and
    institutionalized. Our Army provides the majority of the close combat
    forces and in order to prevent duplicate efforts across the Department,
    I decided the Department of the Army would be the lead in formalizing
    the critical mission of the task force.
                               dod cyber strategy
        26. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, one of the
    five objectives in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy is to deter, pre-empt
    and defeat malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical
    infrastructure. The National Guard and Reserve Components are uniquely
    positioned to respond to cyber incidents of national significance, yet
    they continue to experience difficulty in cyber recruitment and
    retention. Can you describe your cyber talent management strategy; any
    innovative efforts that DOD is using to recruit and retain National
    Guard and Reserve cyber forces?
        Secretary Esper. Similar to the Active Component, recruiting and
    retaining National Guard (NG) and Reserve personnel with cyber skills
    is challenging given the competition with other sectors and private
    industry. The Military Departments are working to attract and retain
    the best cyber talent by utilizing bonuses, direct commissioning,
    constructive credit, continuing education programs, and assignment
    incentive pay. The NG provides servicemembers the opportunity to
    continue their industry and government careers and competes to retain
    personnel with cyber skills. Continued congressional support for
    Department of Defense recruiting programs such as direct commissioning,
    training and education, retention pay, bonuses, and other incentives is
    critically important to recruiting and retaining NG and Reserve
    personnel with cyber skills.
        General Milley. There is a recognized nation-wide shortage of
    highly skilled cybersecurity professionals, and each of our DOD
    components, Regular and Reserve, are competing with external agencies
    and industry for the same small pool of talent. The Regular and Reserve
    components have been out in front addressing this issue and the
    National Guard is working to stay fully integrated with the solutions
    as we determine are successful methods of recruitment and retention.
        I'd like to thank congress for providing enhanced recruiting and
    retention authorities to both the Regular and Reserve components, and
    note that officer direct appointment authority and constructive service
    credit enhancements have created more agile military personnel
    programs. The military pay and incentive system has agility built into
    it as well. Continued Congressional support for Reserve Component
    (Guard and Reserve) parity with Regular component authorities for
    recruiting and retention programs such as direct commissioning, tuition
    assistance and educational benefits, retention pay, critical skills
    bonuses, and Tricare, among others, is critically important. Our
    strategy is to leverage all traditional and non-traditional recruiting
    methods to attract talent and then retain that talent through use of
    incentives, both monetary and non-monetary.
        While I believe we have the authorities we need to successfully
    recruit and retain cyber talent, we are closely watching market trends
    for talent in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning; there are
    early indicators that this may become an area where additional
    recruiting and retention authorities and/or special pay authorities are
    needed.

        Examples:
        With our Reserve component for example, in addition to traditional
    recruiting methods our reserve components have developed programs to
    leverage officers participating in Scholarship and Fellowship Programs.
    These programs include the Federal Executive Fellowship, SECDEF
    Executive Fellows, SECNAV tours, Industry Fellowships (e.g. Amazon,
    Apple, Microsoft, JP Morgan Chase), and universities (e.g. Harvard,
    MIT, CMU, Stanford). Our professionals build bridges with these
    officers to develop leads with promising candidates. We also seek both
    enlisted and officer candidates by liaising with regional colleges and
    universities offering information technology and cybersecurity
    certifications and degrees.
        Following the Defense Digital Services model, more often today we
    have software developers recruiting software developers and engineers
    recruiting engineers. In fact, we have a USMC reservist in one of our
    cyber units who works at Google full time as an engineer. Reserve
    component (Guard and Reserve) members are uniquely positioned in their
    civilian occupations and industries to recruit similarly talented and
    skilled individuals through business cards and LinkedIn profiles.
        Also, the National Guard Bureau consistent with their Cyber
    Strategy laid out in 2018, is establishing Cyber Workforce Forums
    (CWFs) to bring together representatives from the private sector,
    academia (including K-12), industry partners, and public organizations
    to create innovative solutions and improve management of the national
    cyber work force to meet both military and mission partner
    requirements. CWFs will be established at a variety of levels including
    state, regional and national levels and will necessitate states to
    facilitate interactions with partners. A robust and well integrated
    cyber workforce is a national asset vital for sustaining our economy by
    meeting both the Nation's defense and mission partner cyber security
    needs.
        Not only is our reserve component a cost-effective model, but it's
    filled with tremendously talented individuals, the vast majority of
    whom serve for less pay than they receive in their civilian positions.
    Understanding why they do this is key to both recruiting and retention.
    The Covid-19 pandemic has brought forth additional challenges that have
    highlighted the innovation of our professionals and provided new
    examples of agility that will help move us forward.
        For example, in April 2020, a Marine Corps Reserve cyber group in
    the 6th Communication Battalion, Force HQ Group, innovatively
    redesigned a full drill weekend to a virtual format in a secure Cloud
    environment, ensuring every element of training and mission tasks were
    completed. They culminated the training event with a Cyber Operator
    Competition scenario called Capture the Flag, which was a tremendous
    success. The feedback from reservists was very positive and has caused
    us to re-think some of the ways we're able to organize reserve training
    and drills in a more flexible manner that may also improve retention
    without expending any additional resources. We're taking a hard look at
    this and other examples, to find benchmark programs that continue to
    improve our ability to attract, recruit and retain talented
    professionals.

        27. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 2018
    DOD Cyber Strategy refers to the integration of cyber and information
    operations as a line of effort. Some services have integrated their
    cyber forces into new information warfare commands. Can you describe
    the steps DOD has taken to integrate cyber, space, electromagnetic
    warfare, and information operations?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the
    important developments on the global threat landscape, particularly
    involving China's and Russia's emphasis on domination in the
    information environment. DOD is undertaking several steps to address
    these threats effectively and to support the further integration of our
    military cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information
    operations. Among these efforts is a focus on designating a Principal
    Information Operations Advisor to oversee a cross-functional team,
    develop or update the DOD information operations strategy and conduct
    the first-ever information operations posture review, designate
    Information Operations Joint Providers and Information Operations Joint
    Force Trainers for the Department, develop and manage a joint lexicon
    for relevant information operations terms, and determine the relevant
    set of capabilities for these operations across domains. Other ongoing
    efforts include improving DOD organization, such as at the Military
    Department level; updating DOD doctrine, joint planning, and guidance,
    including by designating information as a joint function; identifying
    and addressing any gaps or seams in policies or authorities; and
    enhancing the Cyber Mission Force's ability to conduct integrated
    operations. DOD is continuing to assess the effectiveness of its
    current and planned efforts and to identify any additional steps that
    should be considered.
        General Milley. DOD is undertaking several steps to support further
    integration of cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and
    information operations. Across the Joint Force, we're analyzing the
    successes of the Services, such as the Navy, Air Force, and Army, who
    have aligned many commands and organizations to fuse cyber, space,
    electromagnetic warfare, and information operations most effectively to
    gain and maintain information advantage and to increase lethality.
    Specifically, the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces, the Navy's 10th
    Fleet, and the Air Force's 16th Air Force are examples of larger
    optimization and integration efforts. You have also seen the Department
    form the U.S. Space Force, and the Space Force will optimize its forces
    and organizations to support the Department and the National Defense
    Strategy most effectively. We are continuously innovating and seeking
    to optimize the warfighting capabilities delivered to the combatant
    commands. Lastly, my staff is reviewing the Department's and the Joint
    Staff's organization to determine how to evolve in this era of Great
    Power Competition most effectively, and evaluating the fusion of
    information warfare internally, across the U.S. Government, and with
    our U.S. and international partners.

        28. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, does this
    entail or should this entail a single organization and command
    structure across the department?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) is open to making
    adjustments to its organization or resource allocations to enable the
    necessary integration of cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and
    information operations; however, any such decision is premature pending
    the results of ongoing DOD assessments, including the forthcoming
    information operations strategy and posture review. Presently,
    effective operational integration to enable simultaneous effects from
    the strategic to the tactical levels is occurring through established
    procedures across combatant commands, leveraging authorities delegated
    to multiple combatant commanders in their assigned mission areas.
    Current OSD and Joint Staff organizations and processes also regularly
    provide valuable support to enable this integration.
        General Milley. The Department recognizes the changing threat
    environment and is examining all options. We are driving toward
    operational integration from the strategic to the tactical level across
    combatant commands and leveraging authorities delegated to multiple
    combatant commanders in their assigned mission areas. Department of
    Defense and Joint Staff organizations are assessing ways to provide
    support to enable this integration further and simultaneously with the
    Department configuring a Principal Information Operations advisor and
    Cross Functional Team. Services are experimenting, innovating, and
    adapting the concepts to their own unique operating requirements. We
    expect our efforts with Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
    and the associated joint concept of Information Advantage to result in
    a comparative advantage in all-domain operations. We will continue to
    engage with the combatant commands to identify gaps in information
    warfare capabilities and capacities and to collaborate with our allies
    and partners to accelerate delivery of effective and affordable
    solutions.
                          readiness and modernization
        29. Senator Rounds. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the
    personnel in the Armed Forces and the equipment utilized by those
    personnel have sustained a substantial strain from being at war for 20
    years. Please speak at the unclassified level about your modernization
    and readiness strategy to maintain a lethal force in a contested and
    disruptive battlefield in alignment with the NDS and subsequently your
    agency's objectives.
        Secretary Esper. Since the release of our National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested in new equipment,
    improved operational readiness, and modernized our nuclear deterrent
    forces. For example, DOD is modernizing all three legs of the nuclear
    triad, modernizing our space capabilities, investing in missile defense
    to protect the Homeland, procuring advanced aircraft, developing next
    generation precision guided munitions across the services and
    modernizing our electronic warfare systems. DOD also continues to
    invest in advanced technologies that will help maintain tactical
    advantage, such as artificial intelligence, directed energy, and
    hypersonic weapons. DOD's fiscal year 2021 budget focused on the
    development of these crucial emerging technologies to expand our
    warfighting advantages over strategic competitors and enhance our
    fighting capabilities in the increasingly complex battlefield of the
    future.
        The Navy's strategy of sea control and implementation of
    distributed lethality as an operational and organizational principle
    for achieving and sustaining sea control at will is evident with their
    aggressive strategy of shipbuilding the next generation of submarines,
    aircraft carriers, and surface combatants. Specifically, the SSBN-826
    Columbia-class submarine, the Navy's Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarine replacement; the on-going construction of three CVN-78 Gerald
    R. Ford-class nuclear powered aircraft carriers; the DDG-1000-class of
    guided missile destroyers to provide offensive, distributed, and
    precision firepower at long ranges; the SSN-774 Virginia-class fast-
    attack submarine to be capable of targeting, controlling, and launching
    MK-48 torpedoes and Tomahawk land-attack missiles; the FFG(X) multi-
    mission guided missile frigate, to maximize the Navy's small surface
    combatant survivability and capabilities in surface warfare, submarine
    warfare, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and air warfare mission
    areas; and the FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE variants of the Littoral Combat
    Ship to defeat asymmetric ``anti-access'' threats such as mines, quiet
    diesel submarines and fast surface craft. Sea control is the
    precondition for the Navy's surface warfare, submarine warfare, and air
    warfare operational areas, while distributed lethality reinforces fleet
    initiatives that drive collaboration and integration across warfighting
    domains. The Navy's distributed lethality requires increasing the
    offensive and defensive capability of surface forces, and guides their
    deliberate resource investment for modernization and for the future
    force, thus providing more capabilities across surface forces and
    yielding more options for geographic combatant commanders in peace and
    war.
        The Army's multi-domain operations uses calibrated force posture,
    multi-domain formations, and convergence as three key tenets to
    eliminate multiple layers of near peer stand-off in all domains--land,
    sea, air, space and cyberspace. Their strategy incorporates cross-
    domain fires as an evolution of combined arms maneuver, where the
    combination of complementary effects complicates an enemy's ability to
    act, producing an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual
    parts. Multi-domain formations deliver cross-domain fire capabilities
    through surface warfare aviation platforms such as future vertical
    lift, ground combat platforms such as Paladin Integrated Management,
    and integrated air and missile defense systems. Success against
    significantly large and lethal near-peer enemy forces, will not rely
    exclusively on a technological advantage, but also on the superior
    execution of concurrent single-domain mission threads with the ability
    to refocus and execute converging new multi-domain mission threads with
    speed and agility. Space and cyberspace domains provide layered
    offensive and defensive capabilities to increase stand-off and provide
    gray-zone/hybrid capabilities between unconventional warfare and
    conventional surface warfare.
        The Joint Force has the necessary capability, capacity, and
    readiness to contend with today's threats at an acceptable level of
    operational risk, but our adversaries' demonstrated desire to contest
    U.S. military advantages will, if left unchecked, increase the risk to
    our national defense strategic objectives. In order to ensure the long-
    term readiness of the Joint Force, we must continue to modernize and
    expand our margin of dominance, while balancing the risks to mission
    success and a service's force generation ability. The fiscal year 2021
    request reflects an increase in readiness funding from $114.5 billion
    in fiscal year 2018 to $130.4 billion, an increase of 14 percent over
    four years. Focused investment in readiness allowed the Department to
    halt readiness declines across the Joint Force and initiate readiness
    recovery that has provided demonstrable improvements. The Department is
    consistently improving readiness reporting to identify leading
    indicators and systemic issues preventing accelerated readiness
    recovery, and improve the linkage between resources and readiness
    outcomes to ensure effective allocation of Department funding. We are
    strengthening our warfighting approach, improving how we develop,
    posture, and employ the Joint Force to implement the NDS most
    effectively, while prioritizing modernization, future high-end
    readiness, and the development of new operating concepts.
        General Milley. The NDS provides the framework for the department's
    readiness and modernization strategy to deliver a ready, agile, and
    capable Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win across all domains
    today and in the future. President's Budget 2021 funds major readiness
    accounts to grow operational availability and recover from years of
    wartime operations and budget instability. We must be able to adapt
    quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced technologies to compete and
    win against potential adversaries. Our President's Budget 2021 request
    targets specific investments in readiness, modernization, leader
    development and support to our people and families to retain overmatch
    in an era of great power competition.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                    covid-19
        30. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, I wrote a letter to you
    concerning Coronavirus. Can I get an update on how you're educating the
    Force about the risks associated with COVID-19, communicating DOD's
    emergency and preparedness plan, and how that plan is being executed?
        Secretary Esper. The Department has issued a series of documents
    that provide force health protection guidance. This guidance provides
    information to the force on coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) risk,
    informs DOD Component plans, and communicates COVID-19 health
    protection measures and guides actions on medical treatment and
    laboratory diagnostic testing.
          Memorandum (dated January 30, 2020) addresses risk to
    personnel, individual prevention and protection measures, healthcare
    information, patient screening and isolation information, as well as
    information on diagnosis, treatment, and reportable medical events.
          Supplement 1 (dated February 7, 2020) directs
    identification, restriction of movement, and monitoring for
    servicemembers returning from mainland China.
          Supplement 2 (dated February 25, 2020) provides a risk-
    based framework to guide commanders on implementing health protection
    measures based on their local circumstances. This document allows a
    tailored response to the local needs to ensure the protection of our
    force and their families. These plans can include preventive hygiene
    measures, meeting and event cancellations, or access restrictions,
    among other actions.
          Supplement 3 (dated March 10, 2020) provided guidance for
    use of personal protective equipment and implementation of non-materiel
    solutions during the COVID-19 outbreak (rescinded and superseded by
    Supplement 7).
          Supplement 4 (dated March 11, 2020) directs and
    recommends actions for all DOD travelers in alignment with CDC Travel
    Health Notices.
          Supplement 5 (dated April 7, 2020) serves as a COVID-19
    specific supplement to DOD policy on patient movement, the DOD Fire and
    Emergency Services Program, and public health and medical services as
    part of defense support of civil authorities providing best practices
    for the evaluation, treatment, and management of COVID-19 and
    associated patient movement guidance.
          Supplement 6 (dated April 7, 2020) provides laboratory
    diagnostic testing guidance to protect at-risk populations while
    maximizing critical testing capability and enabling optimal public
    health decision making.
          Supplement 7 (dated April 8, 2020) updates existing
    COVID-19 guidance for use of cloth face coverings in addition to
    personal protective equipment, and non-pharmaceutical interventions
    during the COVID-19 outbreak.
          Supplement 8 (dated April 13, 2020) provides guidance for
    protecting personnel in workplaces during the response to COVID-19
    including restricting workplace access, collecting information
    necessary to protect the workplace and provides a series of frequently
    asked questions and answers concerning Occupational Safety and Health
    issues.
                                    housing
        31. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, what is the plan to address
    the three remaining provisions still missing from the Resident Bill of
    Rights?
        Secretary Esper. The remaining three rights--Maintenance History,
    Dispute Resolution, and Rent Withholding--will require more work, to
    include additional coordination, resolution of legal concerns, and
    determining underlying processes, before implementation. The Department
    remains fully committed to continuing to work with the Military Housing
    Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies to ensure the benefits of
    these rights are fully available to servicemembers and their families
    residing in MHPI housing. However, implementing these three rights does
    not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department. Agreement
    needs to be reached with the MHPI companies and their third party
    lenders to operationalize these rights, including making necessary
    changes to existing MHPI project legal documents. We are engaging with
    these parties now to obtain agreement on processes to implement the
    three rights.

        32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, is this indicative of ongoing
    challenges in the implementation or identification of the most
    qualified office/individual to work the mechanics of those missing
    provisions?
        Secretary Esper. The delay is indicative of ongoing implementation
    challenges due to three remaining rights pertaining to legal matters
    that do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department. The
    Department is working to reach agreement with the Military Housing
    Privatization Initiative companies and their third party lenders to
    operationalize these rights.

        33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, as you retrofit the military
    housing program, what are you doing to improve the fundamentals of
    DOD's business model in housing?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken a number
    of actions to improve DOD's business model for providing oversight of
    our housing program, to include:
          Establishing a Chief Housing Officer to provide overall
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program oversight.
          Hiring additional housing-related staff to increase
    oversight and responsiveness to tenant concerns and increasing training
    for leadership and housing-related staff.
          Enhancing installation communication with tenants.
          Implementing measures set out in the Fiscal Year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act, to include; hiring/identifying
    military tenant advocates; requiring MHPI landlords implement
    electronic work order systems to improve transparency and tracking of
    tenant requests for repairs; developing a comprehensive work order
    approach to evaluate property management performance and better
    incentivize MHPI landlords; and an improved dispute resolution process.
          Implementing a comprehensive work order approach to
    evaluate property management performance and better incentivize MHPI
    landlords.
          Improving policy and processes when residents raise
    health concerns that may be related to their housing.
          Reviewing the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rate
    setting process to ensure BAH rates, which serve as the basis for MHPI
    housing rents and project revenue, appropriately reflect the local
    military housing market rents.

        34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, how are you refocusing DOD and
    the housing industry to fix our housing issues?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a dual focus
    on ensuring a positive living experience for residents and financially
    viable projects that deliver safe, quality, well-maintained housing.
    During the past year, the Department has taken a number of actions to
    address Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) housing
    issues, to include increasing leadership engagement with MHPI
    landlords, hiring additional housing-related staff, making work order
    progress transparent and assessable to residents and housing staff, and
    increasing leadership and staff training. In addition, the Department
    has issued policy requiring that Military Departments revise
    performance fee metrics to better incentivize the privatization
    projects to improve conditions on the ground; and has required that
    Military Departments undertake reviews of their MHPI project business
    processes, as well as their internal processes, to identify where
    practices required improvement. Consistent with the Fiscal Year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act, in February 2020 the Department
    designated a Chief Housing Officer (CHO) to provide oversight of the
    MHPI program. The CHO's responsibilities include leading DOD's efforts
    to work with MHPI landlords to improve housing conditions and address
    resident concerns; ensuring implementation the Tenant Bill of Rights
    and other MHPI requirements in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA; and
    monitoring the long-term financial viability of the MHPI projects.

        35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, how confident are you in the
    underlying structure of the proposed Global Household Good Contract
    (GHC) to coordinate and shift capacity requirements?
        Secretary Esper. While the Global Household Good Contract (GHC)
    will not be in place until the 2021 move season, implementing it offers
    the Department the opportunity to set terms and conditions that favor
    Department of Defense (DOD) families and an avenue to hold industry
    accountable. It's important to note that we have no formal contractual
    relationship with our disparate industry-base today; in addition to
    improving accountability, this construct provides industry with the
    rationale to invest in quality capacity to meet DOD's peak demand.
    Changing our relationship with industry is necessary to improve access
    to--and management of--quality capacity to meet our peak summer demand
    and enable DOD to affix the accountability and responsibility lacking
    in today's program. The current disaggregated program will never
    deliver the quality our families deserve or the accountability the
    Congress demands. Recent studies validate this approach. The Business
    Case Analysis U.S. Transportation Command submitted to the Defense
    Committees in January underscores the value of the GHC. I was similarly
    encouraged by the GAO's report on this subject--the GAO made sensible
    recommendations to improving the program, but recommended no changes to
    the Department's acquisition approach or timeline.

        36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, I have concerns about (1)
    resiliency, (2) peak season transition phase, (3) system
    accountability, and (4) driver recruitment. Are we prepared to provide
    quality service to our military families this upcoming PCS season?
        Secretary Esper. This summer's permanent change of station (PCS)
    season will be particularly challenging due to the outbreak of COVID-19
    and the impacts on the household goods industry. We will continue to
    execute this season under the existing framework with the Global
    Household Goods Contract implementation after the completion of the
    peak season. The service personnel and logistics communities are
    working closely with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and my
    staff to understand demand and capacity. With this understanding, we
    will appropriately review report dates and move schedules to meet
    service and servicemember requirements. USTRANSCOM continues to work
    closely with the moving industry to understand challenges and
    communicate the dynamic nature the Department's demand signal. With the
    Stop Move order remaining in place, the normal summer peak season will
    be approximately half over before we begin relocations on a large
    scale. As we resume travel and relocation, our main priority will be
    the safety of our members and their families.
        1.  Resiliency. The household goods relocation industry has been
    impacted by the COVID-19 outbreak with many States restricting
    operations and a significant drop in the number of military moves. As
    the outbreak reduces in severity and the military resumes moves on a
    larger scale, there may be some capacity issues but USTRANSCOM's
    engagement with industry indicates that with sufficient lead time and a
    ramp up period, industry can get `back to normal' capacity levels to
    support military moves.
        2.  Peak season transition phase. Once the stop move order is
    lifted, we expect to see a short ramp up period and then will have high
    volumes for several months due to the high number of moves that have
    been delayed. USTRANSCOM is communicating with the moving industry and
    services on a weekly basis to provide a consolidated view of Department
    of Defense demand as well as inform the Service's decisions on
    prioritizing and staggering PCSs to avoid exceeding capacity. Due to
    the late start of the peak season, we expect a higher number of movers
    to be moving in the early fall as the backlog is cleared.
        3.  System accountability. We are committed to ensuring that
    servicemembers and their families receive the support they need during
    the PCS process. Through our quality assurance inspections,
    servicemember counseling, and program management, we will do everything
    we can to increase the likelihood of a positive move experience.
        4.  Driver recruitment. The trucking industry as a whole has been
    significantly disrupted due to changing demand patterns and an overall
    decrease in commercial activity. Through timely communication with our
    industry partners, we are supporting their efforts to match demand with
    capacity. We expect industry will be able to react to that demand and
    deliver near historical capacity.
                       dod communication and transparency
        37. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, military families insist that
    DOD needs to improve how it educates and communicates with the force.
    This question extends beyond communication issues between families and
    housing companies, it's also about improving the culture of DOD,
    particularly how well it communicates and informs servicemembers and
    their families. Do I have your commitment to addressing those concerns?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, you have my commitment to address these
    concerns. As indicated in my letter to the SASC and HASC on day one,
    and as a personal challenge, I added a fourth line of effort of taking
    care of Service members and their families as part of our National
    Defense Strategy. We deliver critical family readiness information that
    helps our families live their best military lives through the
    Department's flagship program for supporting our people--Military
    OneSource--and I commit to continue using this and other platforms to
    communicate and inform families.
                                  afghanistan
        38. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, could you please provide an
    assessment of how you think the recent peace deal with the Taliban will
    effect operations, troop levels, and future United States policy toward
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Esper. Since the signing of the United States-Taliban
    Agreement on February 29, 2020, the United States has proceeded with a
    plan to reduce United States forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 in 135
    days. During this time period, the Department of Defense has remained
    focused on conducting two missions in Afghanistan: training, advising,
    and assisting the Afghan security forces and executing counterterrorism
    operations against ISIS-K, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups.
    Further implementation of the agreement will occur if the Taliban
    adhere to the conditions of the agreement, which will be assessed
    continually. Consistent with the 2017 South Asia Strategy, the best way
    to end the war in Afghanistan is a political settlement between all
    Afghans. The signing of the United States-Taliban Agreement and the
    release of the United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration were the
    first steps in this process.

        39. Senator Tillis. Secretary Esper, what risks do we, the United
    States, assume in entering into this agreement?
        Secretary Esper. As with all agreements, there are risks. However,
    the United States has mitigated the risks to our national security
    interests in the United States-Taliban Agreement by embedding
    conditionality in the agreement. If the United States assesses that the
    Taliban is not complying with the terms, we could nullify the
    agreement. This could result in a resumption of offensive operations
    against the Taliban and halting, or potentially reversing, the
    withdrawal of U.S. forces. We continue to urge the Taliban to choose
    the path to peace.
                            russia-turkey relations
        40. Senator Tillis. General Milley, Russia-Turkey relations is in
    contention over provocative acts by Moscow against the Turkish
    military. How does that change the calculus of capability and capacity
    in the joint environment, particularly with NATO forces?
        General Milley. We deeply regret the loss of Turkish soldiers in
    Idlib due to pro-Regime air strikes. Idlib is a unique case. For
    political reasons, Turkey does not have air superiority in Idlib--pro-
    regime forces do. Additionally, this is in many ways a proxy fight
    between pro-regime forces and Turkish Supported Opposition. For these
    reasons, we cannot draw real conclusions with respect to NATO
    capability and capacity from Syria. Russia continues to act as a
    destabilizing element in Syria and remains an unreliable partner. The
    conflict in Syria has highlighted the untrustworthiness of Russia to
    the entire NATO alliance.

        41. Senator Tillis. General Milley, what does this mean for
    regional focus and strategy?
        General Milley. Russia has proved to be an unreliable partner for
    Turkey in several regions. In Syria, Russo-Turkish friction reinforces
    the need for a political resolution under the auspices of UNSCR 2254.
    In Libya, Russian involvement is prolonging the conflict and preventing
    a diplomatic resolution. For Turkey and for our other Allies and
    Partners, Moscow's provocative acts underscore the unreliability of
    Russia as a partner. As the global ally and partner of choice, the
    United States will work through the UN, with NATO, and in other
    multilateral and bilateral fora to counter Russian aggression and
    malign influence.
                      leader development/talent management
        42. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in your testimony, you
    mentioned the leadership development aspect of maintaining our military
    competitive advantage. Within your Talent Management Enterprise, how
    are you maximizing the human talent in the joint force?
        General Milley. The Joints Chiefs and I have an ambitious vision to
    create a fully aligned Professional Military Education and Talent
    Management system that identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically
    minded, critically thinking, and creative joint warfighters skilled in
    the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal
    military power. Our intent is to produce leaders at all levels who can
    achieve intellectual overmatch against strategic competitors and
    adversaries. In the Talent Management space, this entails rewarding
    continuous intellectual development and growth; holding individuals
    accountable for academic performance in their records; targeting those
    who have performed well academically for follow-on assignments that
    hone newly acquired skills; and by better matching the cognitive
    abilities of individuals with appropriate PME opportunities and
    positions of responsibility.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                    defense policy review initiative (dpri)
        43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how is your combatant
    commands review of INDOPACOM--and as a subset, DPRI--taking into
    consideration the criteria of strategic presence, training
    opportunities, host-nation support, cost, and potential for growth?
        Secretary Esper. The combatant command review for U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command (USINDOPACOM) has not yet commenced. The Department shares your
    appreciation for the importance of the criteria you outline. These,
    along with other critical posture criteria, will be a part of the
    overall review process calculus, ultimately guided by the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy and optimized within political, geographical, and
    budgetary constraints, all of which will best position our military
    forces to compete, deter, and, if needed, win in this theater.

        44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how would you optimize DOD's
    force posture in INDOPACOM?
        Secretary Esper. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes the
    need to make investments that will solidify our competitive advantage
    and modernize how we operate, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
    To that end, the Department continues to adapt our current posture that
    is concentrated in Northeast Asia to a posture that is more
    geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
    sustainable. The Department also faces key deficits in resilient and
    agile logistics. The Department will make investments to prioritize
    prepositioned forward stocks and munitions and mobility assets, and
    will seek partner and allied support, to ensure logistics sustainment
    can be maintained while under persistent multi-domain attack.

        45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, what specific changes would
    you potentially look to make?
        Secretary Esper. The Department seeks to transition from large,
    unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient basing that
    incorporates active and passive defenses. The most critical investments
    for increasing joint force lethality and resilience in the Indo-Pacific
    theaters include: survivable and resilient communications and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems;
    survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; and cost-
    effective missile defenses capable of engaging sophisticated air,
    cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats. In particular, the
    Department will have to make significant investments to maintain and
    extend the joint force's advantages in the undersea, air, space, and
    cyber domains.
                                missile defense
        46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are
    the strategic and tactical risks of waiting a decade to fill the twenty
    empty ground-based interception (GBI) silos in Missile Field 4 at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, as you work to field the Next Generation Interceptor
    (NGI)?
        Secretary Esper. The United States continues to strengthen its
    homeland missile defenses and is pursuing more advanced capabilities to
    stay ahead of rogue state threats and reduce the risk of attack. Today,
    the U.S. is defended by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
    which includes 44 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). To improve the
    current GMD system, the Fiscal Year 2021 budget request includes funds
    for: Improvements to existing sensors; a new discrimination radar in
    Alaska; and refurbishing the COBRA DANE radar.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) is pursuing more advanced
    capabilities to continue providing effective protection for the Nation.
    First, it is modernizing the GMD system. This effort includes the
    development of a new interceptor to meet evolving missile threats--the
    Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Department is planning to field
    the NGI beginning in 2028 and will continue delivering new interceptors
    into the fleet until we meet the appropriate mix of 64 interceptors.
    Second, DOD is improving reliability and extending service life of the
    existing GMD system until replaced by the NGI by conducting a Service
    Life Extension Program (SLEP) with older GBIs and by continuing
    Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) and Service Life Extension (SLE)
    testing to inform SLEP upgrade decisions. Third, to strengthen the
    defense of the Homeland, especially between now and when NGI becomes
    operational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a layered
    homeland missile defense architecture. For example, the Missile Defense
    Agency will conduct a flight test later this year of the SM-3 Block IIA
    against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-class target to determine
    its potential contribution as an additional layer for the homeland
    defense architecture. Within a layered defense architecture, the SM-3
    IIA could offer additional opportunities to defeat missile threats in
    the late mid-course phase to complement the existing GBIs. With these
    efforts, the U. S. will be postured to effectively meet the evolving
    missile threats to the Homeland.
        General Milley. As outlined in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, it
    is imperative that U.S. Homeland missile defenses outpace rogue state
    missile threats. Our missile defense posture includes active and
    passive defensive capabilities, as well as offensive options, that
    together comprise a comprehensive and layered missile defense
    architecture. I believe North Korea will continue to develop its
    intercontinental ballistic missile program to hold the U.S. Homeland at
    risk. Due to the uncertainty of how that threat will advance over the
    next decade, we must optimize our investment strategy to ensure that we
    can protect the Homeland against these potential rogue threats not only
    today, but also well into the future.

        47. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the
    planned NGI gives the Department the capabilities needed to defend
    against future rogue nation threats but not until a decade away in
    2030. In addition to fielding the NGI, would you prefer to see an
    interim solution--or an earlier version of NGI--fielded years sooner in
    order to boost the limited homeland missile defense capability?
        Secretary Esper. The Missile Defense Agency has worked with U.S.
    Northern Command and other Department of Defense (DOD) stakeholders to
    define the requirements for Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) that
    enable earliest possible fielding while still providing the needed
    capability to defend against the projected threats to the Homeland in
    2030 and beyond. NGI contract incentives have been included to
    incentivize delivery of NGI in less than the 10 years referenced above.
    To strengthen the defense of the Homeland between now and when NGI
    becomes operational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a
    layered homeland missile defense architecture. Existing defensive
    systems, to include the Aegis Weapon System using the Standard Missile-
    3 Block IIA missile and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system
    could offer additional opportunities to defeat limited missile threats
    and augment the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Without
    sacrificing critical requirements that enable a credible homeland
    defense capability, any interim solution to replace the Ground-Based
    Interceptor would be on a similar timeline to NGI.
        General Milley. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
    currently provides effective defense of the United States against rogue
    threats. We are implementing several measures that will bolster
    protection of the Homeland to include improvements to existing sensors,
    adding a new discrimination radar in Alaska, and refurbishing the COBRA
    DANE radar. We are also investigating the feasibility of further
    augmenting our current system with additional sensors and weapons that
    could possibly provide additional engagement opportunities against
    inbound threats. A layered architecture of sensors and interceptors,
    one that potentially includes the SM3-IIA and/or a modified THAAD
    interceptor, could complement existing Ground Based Interceptor
    capability to provide additional protection of the Homeland against a
    rogue nation ICBM attack.

        48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, would you
    prefer to see more, but slightly less-capable, interceptors sooner, or
    more, perfectly-capable interceptors much later?
        Secretary Esper. The Department has coordinated with U.S. Northern
    Command to define the minimum set of Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)
    requirements to enable earliest possible fielding of NGI while still
    providing the needed capability to defend against the projected threats
    to the Homeland. Without sacrificing critical requirements that enable
    a credible homeland defense capability, any interim solution to replace
    the Ground-Based Interceptor would be on a similar timeline to NGI.
        General Milley. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review directs, I
    prefer to maintain a capability that continues to outpace the rogue
    missile threat against the Homeland. Ultimately, we must balance cost,
    schedule, technology, and performance trade-offs when developing an
    acquisition strategy with finite resources. That strategy must be able
    to address projected challenges in both capacity and capability in
    order to stay ahead of the threat. We assess that our chosen strategy
    best balances those risks over the next decade. It also important to
    note that our long-term strategy is dependent upon improvements in our
    terrestrial and space-based sensor portfolios to maximize our
    capability to defend against emerging threats in all phases of flight.
                             strategic arctic port
        49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, a provision in the Senate-
    passed fiscal year 2020 NDAA allows the Secretary of Defense to
    designate sites for a Strategic Arctic Port. What is the status on your
    decision to designate sites for a Strategic Arctic Port?
        Secretary Esper. The Department has initiated work on the Strategic
    Arctic Port assessment. That evaluation has not yet reached a point
    where I have been presented with a recommendation.

        50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, how are you factoring the
    emergence of greater power competition from both Russia and China in
    the Arctic into your decision?
        Secretary Esper. The Department applies the guidance contained in
    the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Arctic Strategy when
    evaluating Arctic-related issues associated with great power
    competition.
                             arctic communications
        51. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper, in testimony this week,
    General Terrance O'Shaughnessy stated, ``Over the last year, our
    commands have worked alongside the military services and the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our warfighting requirements
    are met, with particular emphasis on improving joint domain awareness
    and communications. In order to reclaim our strategic advantage in the
    high north, it is critical that we improve our ability to detect and
    track surface vessels and aircraft in our Arctic approaches and
    establish more reliable secure communications for our joint force
    warfighters operating in the higher latitudes.'' What exactly are the
    military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense doing in
    this regard and what specific progress are they each making?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently completed
    a Report on Arctic Capabilities and Resource Gaps that detailed issues
    related to domain awareness and communications.
        On Domain Awareness--DOD has the ability to sense and otherwise
    detect and track contacts in the region through a number of U.S.
    military installations and platforms. These capabilities are further
    bolstered by cooperation with allies and partners. DOD is researching
    options that will support enhanced domain awareness in the Arctic. For
    example, the Air Force is working with U.S. allies, partners, and the
    private sector to examine mutually beneficial partnerships to address
    common space challenges in the Arctic.
        On Communications--DOD has the ability to execute core
    communications requirements. DOD is working with U.S. interagency
    partners to address communications challenges in the Arctic, including
    through the Department of Homeland Security's Arctic Domain Awareness
    Center. Capability requirements in these areas may change as the Arctic
    region becomes more accessible.
                                 arctic threats
        52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what do
    you see as the key threats to U.S. interests and security in the Arctic
    region?
        Secretary Esper. Both Russia and China pose threats to United
    States interests and security in the Arctic. I have provided the
    Committee an intelligence assessment with additional classified
    details.
        General Milley. DOD seeks a secure and stable Arctic region where
    U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended,
    and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. We currently
    assess the risk of conflict in the Arctic as minimal. However, DOD
    recognizes that Russia and China are actively challenging the Arctic
    rules-based order. Russia views itself as a polar great power and is
    the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military
    presence above the Arctic Circle. It is recognized that Russia could
    attempt to use its military capabilities to deny access to disputed
    Arctic waters or resources.
        China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may
    undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its
    predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic.
    Moreover, China is increasing its presence through economic outreach,
    investments in Arctic states' strategic sectors, and scientific
    activities.
        The Arctic is a rapidly evolving security environment in which the
    Joint Force must present a credible deterrent to conflict, maintaining
    its flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to contingencies in
    the region.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                iran deterrence
        53. Senator Hawley. General Milley, what is the process used by the
    Joint Staff in its role as global integrator for determining the number
    and composition of U.S. military forces that can be sent to United
    States Central Command (CENTCOM) in a given period of time for the
    purpose of deterring Iranian aggression without undermining INDOPACOM's
    ability to deter Chinese aggression, EUCOM's ability to deter Russian
    aggression, or both?
        General Milley. The Global Force Management Process allows me to
    provide risk informed military advice to the Secretary of Defense for
    his decisions. This process solicits risk inputs from all stakeholders,
    so as a global integrator, I can fully understand not only the short-
    term risks but longer term considerations as well.
        While the need to send forces to CENTCOM to support operations
    deterring Iranian aggressions was needed--this is temporal. Our focus
    is on near-peer competitors, specifically China and Russia. Part of our
    strategy is Dynamic Force Employment, which builds readiness over time
    while enabling rapid response as required.

        54. Senator Hawley. General Milley, if Iran resumes provocations in
    the coming months, how many troops can the United States deploy to the
    CENTCOM AOR for the purpose of deterring further Iranian aggression
    without undermining INDOPACOM's ability to deter Chinese aggression,
    EUCOM's ability to deter Russian aggression, or both?
        General Milley. There are adequate forces in the Central Command
    Area of Responsibility to deter Iran. However, if deterrence breaks
    down, I will analyze the situation and recommend to the Secretary any
    necessary actions to achieve the security objectives relative to Iran.
    These decisions may or may not include additional force allocation.
    Force posture is but one of the tools the Joint Force leverages to
    compete and achieve NDS Priorities. Within the construct of the NDS,
    the Joint Staff constantly evaluates the force posture within each
    combatant command and is prepared to recommend options for the
    Secretary based on the global threat situation, Commander's request,
    and Service considerations.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
       administration anti-union memo/delegation to secretary of defense
        55. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, the Administration recently
    issued a Memorandum, blatantly anti-union, purporting to authorize you
    to exempt the entire Department of Defense, and all its constituent
    parts, from collective bargaining requirements under the Federal
    Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. You testified to the House
    last week that you neither requested this authority nor knew it was
    coming. A significant portion of DOD's civilian workforce enjoys
    protections afforded by their ability to collectively bargain. To
    clarify again, did you request this authority, or know about it before
    you saw the Memorandum?
        Secretary Esper. I did not request this authority. The Presidential
    Memorandum delegates the President's authority to exempt certain
    agencies and subdivisions based on critera set forth in the statute. I
    assure you my approach should I choose to exercise this authority, will
    be deliberative, with full application of the statutory criteria to
    ensure no employees lose their rights to collective bargaining except
    under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the Federal Service
    Labor-Management Relations Statute.

        56. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, what is your view of the
    professionalism and quality of DOD's civilian workforce?
        Secretary Esper. I have a positive view of the professionalism and
    quality of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) civilian workforce. DOD
    civilian employees are high performing, and serve as an integral part
    of our National Defense Strategy. We cannot accomplish our mission
    without them.

        57. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you believe that DOD's
    civilian workforce contributes to the National Defense and enhances
    national security?
        Secretary Esper. Yes. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) civilian
    workforce contributes to the National Defense and enhances national
    security. DOD civilian employees are essential for DOD's warfighting
    success, working side-by-side with our military members to protect
    America from existing and emerging threats across every operating
    domain.

        58. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, there have been numerous
    disruptions to DOD's civilian workforce over the past decade--including
    furloughs, multiple pay freezes, and hiring freezes at all levels. Do
    you believe these disruptions have helped or hurt DOD in executing its
    mission?
        Secretary Esper. While furloughs, pay freezes, and hiring freezes
    have caused disruptions to the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian
    workforce over the past decade, my experience has been that the
    Department has effectively managed the workforce to successfully
    achieve DOD mission objectives.

        59. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you believe removing
    collective bargaining rights from those who have them now would be a
    disruption to their employment and to the execution of DOD's mission?
        Secretary Esper. An employee whose agency or subdivision is
    excluded based on the statutory criteria set forth in the Federal
    Service Labor Management Relations Statute would no longer be covered
    by the federal labor-management relations program. However, this will
    not cause a disruption to the employee's employment or the execution of
    the DOD mission.
                  tenant bill of rights for privatized housing
        60. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, last week you finally approved
    your version of a Tenant Bill of Rights for families living in
    privatized housing. Yet you chose to omit three key tenets required in
    the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. Your accompanying statement incorrectly
    claimed that the three rights related to dispute resolution,
    maintenance history, and withholding of rent ``were not anticipated by
    DOD.''
        In fact, back in May of last year, your own department shared with
    our Committee a working draft, which included a dispute resolution
    process and the ability to withhold rent. In June of last year, you
    were aware of the right to maintenance history once the Senate bill
    became public.
        Secretary Esper, is it true that you and DOD were in fact aware of
    these tenant rights, had them in your own working drafts, and were
    certainly aware of them after the Senate bill was publicly released in
    June of last year?
        Secretary Esper. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act were far more prescriptive than
    originally set out in the Senate bill or incorporated into our working
    drafts. The requirements for the three remaining rights raised concerns
    that the Department is working through in coordination with the
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies, given that
    the MHPI companies and their third party lenders must agree to
    incorporate these rights and procedures into appropriate project legal
    documents. The Department will work with Congress as necessary to
    ensure these rights are provided to MHPI tenants. The Department is
    working with the MHPI project landlords on an approach to expedite
    provision of these remaining rights.

        61. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, do you agree that even if these
    three basic housing rights are not in your Bill of Rights, that they
    are still in fact now legal protections for military families and
    rights by law as codified by the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA?
        Secretary Esper. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions
    of previously executed legal agreements. The Military Housing
    Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies must agree to incorporate the
    three remaining rights into existing MHPI project legal documents and,
    for the dispute resolution and rent withholding processes, the MHPI
    projects' third party lenders must approve those changes; the three
    remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the
    Department. The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies
    and, as necessary, will work with Congress to ensure the benefits of
    these rights are fully available to military members and their families
    who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short term, the Department is
    leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to provide the
    benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary
    changes to the project legal agreements.
                           joint operational concepts
        62. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, section 1708 of the Fiscal Year
    2020 National Defense Authorization Act included a requirement that the
    Secretary of Defense provide a report to Congress on the implementation
    of the National Defense Strategy. The report must include an
    explanation of the joint operational concepts developed by the
    Department of Defense; the required force posture changes to implement
    the NDS; any necessary adjustments to program budgets; an assessment of
    personnel and organizational changes; and the resources necessary to
    implement operational concepts.
        In addition, the law requires that the Secretary of Defense provide
    for two independent studies on the development of joint operational
    concepts. A federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)
    will perform one study, and an independent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3)
    organization will perform the other study.
        The Committee understands that the Department of Defense has not
    made progress on fulfilling this congressional mandate.
        Secretary Esper, please provide a status update on what actions the
    Department has taken to date in order to comply with the reporting
    requirement in section 1708.
        Secretary Esper. Since the release of the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), we have been making strides in aligning our posture, resources,
    and personnel with the NDS priorities. These efforts will be shaped by
    the development of our new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), which will
    greatly influence future force development and design. To date, the
    Joint Staff and Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
    (OUSD(P)) have had several conversations with the House Armed Services
    Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff
    members on section 1708. During these conversations, we agreed to
    provide periodic updates on the JWC development and NDS implementation
    beginning in May 2020, and to provide the final reports in early 2021.
    OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff have identified lead components for
    answering the reporting requirements, and have identified several
    potential federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs)
    and non-FFRDC think tanks to meet the independent assessment
    requirements.

        63. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, which component within the
    Department have you chosen to be the lead for meeting the reporting
    requirement in section 1708?
        Secretary Esper. We have chosen the Office of the Undersecretary of
    Defense for Policy, working in close coordination with the Joint Staff
    and the other Office of the Secretary of Defense components, to be the
    lead component for meeting the section 1708 reporting requirements.

        64. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, have you determined which FFRDC
    and independent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3) organization will perform
    the independent studies mandated by the law?
        Secretary Esper. We have identified several potential federally
    funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and non-FFRDC think
    tanks to perform the independent assessments required by section 1708.
    We have not yet put any single organization on contract to perform the
    assessments while we work with the House Armed Services Committee and
    Senate Armed Services Committee to delineate more clearly the specifics
    of the assessment requirements.
                             afghanistan agreement
        65. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, how is it that the
    implementation and monitoring documents that have been signed and
    communicated widely to members of the Taliban are classified Secret?
        Secretary Esper. I defer to the State Department on questions
    pertaining to negotiations with the Taliban and the associated
    documents.

        66. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the
    Taliban announcement of a resumption of violence against our Afghan
    partners, what expectations have we communicated to our Afghan Security
    Force partners with regard to conducting offensive operations going
    forward?
        Secretary Esper. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan
    security force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security
    forces against Taliban attacks, and Coalition forces continue to
    support our partners through the train, advise, and assist mission.
    Afghan security leaders have directed their forces to take appropriate
    measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Consistent with
    the United States-Taliban Agreement, the United States will continue
    its pause in offensive operations against the Taliban so long as the
    Taliban adhere to their end of the deal. If the United States
    Government assesses that the Taliban is not complying with the
    agreement, the Department has the authorities and capabilities to
    resume offensive operations against the Taliban.
        General Milley. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan
    security force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security
    forces against Taliban attacks and Coalition forces continue to support
    our partners through the train, advise, and assist mission. Afghan
    security leaders have directed their forces to take appropriate
    measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Per the United
    States-Taliban agreement, the United States is pausing offensive
    operations against the Taliban so long as they adhere to their end of
    the deal. If the United States Government assesses that the Taliban are
    not complying with the agreement, the Department has the authorities
    and capabilities to resume offensive attacks against the Taliban.

        67. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what support
    are U.S. and coalition military advisors and intelligence professionals
    authorized to provide for any such offensive operations?
        Secretary Esper. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission,
    United States and Coalition forces provide training, advice, and
    assistance to our Afghan security force partners, focusing on
    leadership development and institutional capacity building, including
    advising Afghan forces on planning operations and providing enabler
    support to those operations. The agreement with the Taliban has not
    affected the Department's authorities used to provide such support. The
    United States continues to defend the ANDSF against Taliban offensive
    attacks.
        General Milley. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, United
    States and Coalition forces provide training, advising, and assistance
    to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), focusing on
    leadership development and institutional capacity building, including
    advising Afghan forces on planning operations and providing enabler
    support to those operations. The agreement with the Taliban has not
    resulted in any reduction in authorities for U.S. forces conducting
    Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. The United States continues to defend the
    ANDSF against Taliban offensive attacks.

        68. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the
    sizeable air support we provide Afghan Security Forces, from moving
    personnel and cargo, to ISR, to close air support, what commitments
    have we made to our Afghan partners in terms of this support going
    forward?
        Secretary Esper. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in
    any reduction in operational authorities for United States Forces--
    Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to provide those kinds of combat enabler support.
    As agreed upon in the United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration:
    ``The United States re-affirms its commitments regarding support for
    the Afghan security forces and other government institutions, including
    through ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of Afghan security
    forces to deter and respond to internal and external threats,
    consistent with its commitments under existing security agreements
    between the two governments. This commitment includes support to Afghan
    security forces to prevent al Qaeda, ISIS-K, and other international
    terrorist groups or individuals from using Afghan soil to threaten the
    United States and its allies.''
        General Milley. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in
    any reduction in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM'S
    SENTINEL to provide those kinds of combat enabler support.

        69. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, more
    specifically, when will we be able to come to their aid and when will
    we be restricted from doing so under this agreement?
        Secretary Esper. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in
    any reduction in operational authorities for USFOR-A. We have
    reiterated our commitment to the ANDSF to defend them from attacks.
        General Milley. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in
    any reduction in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM'S
    SENTINEL. It is at the discretion of the Commander USFOR-A to determine
    when to employ forces to come to the aid and defense of the ANDSF, and
    we have reiterated our commitment to the ANDSF to defend them from
    attacks.

        70. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, what is your understanding as to
    how the 14-month withdrawal timeline was reached?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense provided advice on the
    appropriate time and conditions for a safe and orderly withdrawal that
    protect our forces, but I defer to the State Department on questions
    pertaining to the specifics of negotiations with the Taliban.

        71. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you
    believe that 14 months is sufficient time to assess the seriousness
    with which the Taliban will address terrorist threats emanating from
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, I do. I have provided the Committee with an
    intelligence report with additional classified information regarding
    how the Department intends to assess this issue.
        General Milley. We have assessed that 14 months is sufficient to
    assess the Taliban's compliance with the agreement. That period can be
    extended or halted as necessary depending on compliance. The United
    States will closely monitor the Taliban's compliance with its
    counterterrorism commitments under the United States--Taliban agreement
    over the next 14 months and beyond.

        72. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you
    believe coalition forces will be able to both conduct the rigorous
    monitoring and verification needed and also carry out a full scale
    withdrawal?
        Secretary Esper. The United States Government has developed a
    robust process for monitoring implementation of the agreement and
    verifying Taliban compliance. The agreement is not based on trust; it
    is based on whether we can verify Taliban compliance. This process
    compiles information and intelligence from United States Forces-
    Afghanistan and interagency partners to support monitoring and
    verification of the agreement.
        General Milley. The United States Government has developed a robust
    process for monitoring implementation of the agreement and verifying
    Taliban compliance. The agreement is not based on trust; it is based on
    whether we can verify Taliban compliance. This process compiles
    information and intelligence from Resolute Support and across the
    interagency to support monitoring and verification of the agreement.
    The process will adjust as forces are drawn down. Monitoring and
    verification is not limited to military forces. It is a whole-of-
    government effort.
                   acquisition and cross-servicing agreements
        73. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, oversight efforts by the
    Committee uncovered that the Department had not properly sought
    repayment from Saudi Arabia and UAE for approximately $300 million in
    aerial refueling support provided by the United States for operations
    in Yemen. I understand UAE has fully reimbursed DOD, but Saudi Arabia
    still owes approximately $67 million.
        Given the accounting errors the Committee uncovered, we asked the
    GAO to investigate the Department's broader provision of reimbursable
    support around the world. According to a GAO report released on March
    4, the Department has failed to secure reimbursement for more than $1
    billion in support provided to other nations.
        What steps will the Department be taking to recover the more than
    $1 billion it is owed by foreign partners?
        Secretary Esper. Since ceasing aerial refueling support to the
    Saudi-led Coalition operating in Yemen in November 2018, the Department
    has worked with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to
    recoup the costs for our support. As indicated, the United Arab
    Emirates has paid in full. Saudi Arabia's costs for aerial refueling
    support are divided into two categories: Costs for flight hours and
    fuel costs. Saudi Arabia has paid 4 installments totaling $151.2
    million for costs for flight hours in Fiscal Years 2015-2017. However,
    Saudi Arabia has not yet paid a $6.3 million charge for the flight
    hours costs for Fiscal Year 2018. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has not
    paid for any of the fuel costs during Fiscal Years 2015-2018 because we
    have not yet invoiced Saudi Arabia for any of the fuel costs for Fiscal
    Years 2015-2018. The Department is preparing invoices for the fuel
    costs for submission to Saudi Arabia.
        The Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to work with the
    Military Departments to close its open ACSA transactions by making
    final payments and seeking final reimbursement for Logistic Support,
    Supplies, and Services provided by the Military Departments to
    international partners.

        74. Senator Reed. Secretary Esper, how is the Department improving
    its accounting practices to ensure such oversights don't happen again
    in the future?
        Secretary Esper. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is
    assessing options to improve the accountability of Military Department
    execution and reconciliation of ACSA transactions and will provide me
    with recommendations for implementing new accounting oversight
    procedures.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                             collective bargaining
        75. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, in New Hampshire and across
    the country, the DOD civilian workforce proudly supports our Nation's
    military and national security interests. The Department has
    historically had a productive relationship working with the labor
    unions that represent these dedicated employees. However, a January 29
    memo signed by President Trump authorized you to waive the collective
    bargaining rights of the nearly 750,000 civilian workers in the
    Department of Defense, citing the need for increased flexibility when
    carrying out DOD's national security mission. Do you plan to exercise
    this authority to exclude Defense civilians from the right to bargain
    collectively?
        Secretary Esper. Should I choose to exercise the authority
    delegated to me by the Presidential Memorandum, I assure you my
    approach will be deliberative, with full application of the statutory
    criteria to ensure no employees lose their rights to collective
    bargaining except under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the
    Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

        76. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, under what circumstances
    would this flexibility be necessary for national security, and do you
    believe we are experiencing these circumstances now?
        Secretary Esper. The President has statutory authority to limit the
    scope of collective bargaining based on national security if specific
    statutory criteria are met. Every President, including former President
    Barack Obama, has exercised the authority to limit these rights since
    Congress granted Federal employees the right to collectively bargain.
    If I decide to exercise this authority as granted by the Presidential
    Memorandum, I will do so following the criteria under the law and with
    the same level of rigor that has been exercised in the past.
        If and when this authority is utilized, it will be exercised as
    outlined in the statute for those agencies and subdivisions that have a
    primary function of intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative,
    or national security work; and where the provisions of the statute
    cannot be applied to that organization in a manner consistent with
    national security requirements and considerations.

        77. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, if implemented, how could
    this departure from the long-standing practices and culture at DOD
    impact our Nation's military readiness?
        Secretary Esper. The Department respects the rights of its
    employees to collectively bargain under the law and is committed to
    maintaining productive labor-management relationships with its labor
    unions, some of which have existed for nearly 100 years and predate the
    establishment of the Department of Defense. Any decision to implement
    the authority granted by the Presidential Memorandum will not be a
    departure from our long-standing practice to carefully analyze where
    collective bargaining interferes with our national security, following
    the criteria that Congress has provided for the President. In no way
    will the Department implement this authority in a manner that
    negatively impacts our Nation's military readiness.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                               covid-19 readiness
        78. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, given the rapid spread of
    the 2019 Novel Coronavirus, I am deeply concerned about actions the
    Department of Defense is taking to protect U.S. servicemembers,
    personnel, and family members stationed at military installations
    globally. I am also concerned about the threat to the global supply
    chains that support our defense industrial base. Just today, F-35
    production in Japan was halted in Japan due concerns about COVID-19.
    Last week, I sent a letter to Under Secretary Donovan to request a
    briefing on the comprehensive DOD response to COVID-19 and an
    assessment of any impact on military readiness. But I was extremely
    disappointed--and frankly, horrified--by reporting earlier this week
    that indicated you warned American military commanders overseas ``not
    to surprise President Trump on the coronavirus.'' Did you, in fact,
    direct commanders not to make any decisions related to COVID-19 that
    might surprise the White House or run afoul of President Trump's
    messaging on this rapidly spreading disease?
        Secretary Esper. My direction to military commanders is outlined in
    the Department's top three priorities for dealing with COVID-19. First,
    we must protect our forces and their families. Second, we must maintain
    mission readiness. Third, we will continue to support the interagency
    whole-of-government approach to combating the virus. I will continue to
    ensure that commanders have the resources necessary to achieve the
    priorities outlined above.

        79. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, are you concerned that
    tying the hands of commanders will compromise their ability to protect
    Americans under their command?
        Secretary Esper. We will continue to empower commanders and take
    all necessary precautions to ensure that our servicemembers are safe
    and able to maintain a high state of readiness. To that end, I signed a
    memorandum on April 1, 2020 titled, ``Guidance for Commanders on the
    Implementation of the Risk-Based Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic,''
    which empowers leaders at all echelons to take proactive steps to
    protect local Service members, civilians, and families. This includes
    the option to implement additional Force Protection Health Condition
    measures.

        80. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what specific actions will
    you take if President Trump--or other Administration officials--make a
    decision related to COVID-19 that you fear could jeopardize the health
    and safety of American servicemembers and military families?
        Secretary Esper. My top priority is to protect our Service members,
    civilians, and their families. Accordingly, I have published
    comprehensive Force Health Protection Guidance with eight supplements
    to date. Additionally, the Department closely follows Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance in order to combat and
    help stop the spread of COVID-19 in the Department of Defense and in
    our local communities.

        81. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, do commanders across
    military services have all the necessary authorities to best protect
    servicemembers and military families?
        Secretary Esper. Yes. COVID-19 is a dynamic and evolving pandemic
    which requires an equally dynamic response. Between guidance under my
    signature and that of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness, we've set policy guidance across the spectrum
    of personnel, travel, health, and readiness, among others. We also
    published a memorandum reiterating processes to ensure Child
    Development Programs are taking appropriate actions to ensure safety of
    children. To date, we've published 31 guidance memos and are continuing
    to update, extend or draft new guidance as required.

        82. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, does United States
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have all necessary authorities and
    resources to continue to serve as the global integrator for DOD efforts
    and entities?
        Secretary Esper. Yes. The published guidance for the Department
    provides U.S. Northern Command with the necessary policy guidance to
    perform their role as the Department's synchronizer for our COVID-19
    response efforts.

        83. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, I have seen reports that
    the American Federation of Teachers has urged the Department of Defense
    Education Activity (DODEA) to protect 700 teachers represented by the
    unions at schools on military installations globally. What are you
    doing to implement a comprehensive protocol to protect all Americans
    working on military installations threatened by COVID-19?
        Secretary Esper. All Department of Defense Education Activity
    schools are now closed out of an abundance of caution for COVID-19. Our
    protocol while in session, and even now that they are closed, is to
    follow the guidelines from their local military commanders. On April 1,
    2020 I signed a memorandum titled, ``Guidance for Commanders on the
    Implementation of the Risk-Based Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic.''
    It states that COVID-19 impacts are different in the many places the
    Department operates. As a result, leaders at all echelons are expected
    to take proactive steps to protect local Service members, civilians,
    and families; assure the readiness of their units consistent with
    necessary force protection measures; and provide support to the U.S.
    Government's domestic and international responses to the pandemic. I
    further directed Commanders to take local force protection measures
    suitable to the needs of their organizations, as determined by their
    assessments and reflective of the health conditions of their
    surrounding communities and direction from Centers for Disease Control
    COVID-19 public health guidance.

        84. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will you provide a
    briefing to members of this Committee on specific actions the
    Department is taking to prepare for COVID-19--specifically how you will
    tailor protective guidance for each area of responsibility, and
    military installation?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, the DepartmeoD COVID-19 Task Force will
    prepare a brief that includes an overview of our preparations and
    actions to date, to include our support through U.S. Northern Command
    to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-
    government response, direction, policy, and support to services /
    components / commanders / servicemembers and their families, and
    medical, logistics and engineering support to FEMA and Health and Human
    Services.

        85. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, do Military Treatment
    Facilities have all the necessary equipment--including testing kits,
    supplies, and sterile spaces--to screen, diagnose, and treat all
    potential or confirmed COVID-19 cases?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is actively monitoring and ensuring
    necessary medical equipment is delivered to the military medical
    treatment facilities (MTFs) as the need arises. While currently, there
    are no shortages for screening, diagnosing and treating COVID-19 cases
    at the MTFs, the demand continues to evolve and expand. Additionally,
    the support through U.S. Northern Command to the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-government response will further
    increase demand for medical equipment and place added stress on the
    personal protective equipment supply chain. As a result, we will
    actively and continuously monitor and re-assess medical equipment and
    supplies at the MTFs.
                    military housing--tenant bill of rights
        86. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
    included urgently needed reforms to address the military housing
    scandal--and I would like to thank Chairman Inhofe and Ranking Member
    Reed for their leadership in conducting oversight hearings and
    championing critical provisions. However, we were all extremely
    disappointed that your proposed Bill of Rights does not go nearly far
    enough to protect our military families--it failed to include tenants'
    rights codified by Congress, and signed into law by the President. This
    Bill of Rights should have included three basic items: the right to
    dispute resolution, the ability to withhold rent, and access to a
    home's maintenance history. I fail to understand why the Bill of Rights
    omitted these key provisions--arguably, some of the most important to
    protect military families. Why did you inexplicably decide to drop
    these three crucial protections for military families, after sharing a
    draft Bill of Rights with this Committee that included these key
    protections back in May 2019?
        Secretary Esper. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
    were far more prescriptive than originally set out in the Senate bill
    or incorporated into our working drafts. The requirements for the three
    remaining rights raised concerns that the Department is working through
    in coordination with the Military Housing Privatization Initiative
    (MHPI) companies, given that the MHPI companies and their third party
    lenders must agree to incorporate these rights and procedures into
    appropriate project legal documents. The Department will work with
    Congress as necessary to ensure these rights are provided to MHPI
    tenants. The Department is working with the MHPI project landlords on
    an approach to expedite provision of these remaining rights.

        87. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what legal action will you
    take in order to require companies to comply with these protections, as
    required by law?
        Secretary Esper. I expect the Military Departments to hold the
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) landlords accountable
    for abiding by the terms of their MHPI legal agreements; this includes
    the legal requirements for any of the Tenant Rights covered in the
    project legal agreements or in the tenant's rental agreement lease with
    the landlord, to include state or local tenant rights specific to the
    project's geographic location. If a project fails to abide by the terms
    of the project legal agreements, the existing deal structures provide
    the mechanisms for the Military Departments to hold the private-sector
    MHPI partners accountable. However, legislation cannot alter the terms
    and conditions of previously executed legal agreements and, therefore,
    the Department of Defense cannot impose a unilateral requirement for
    the MHPI Landlords to abide by requirements set out in the Fiscal Year
    2020 NDAA. The Department is diligently working solutions with the MHPI
    Landlords to resolve challenges posed by the three remaining tenant
    rights so we can expedite implementation of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
    requirements.

        88. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, can you confirm that--
    according to the law--military families have the right to dispute
    resolution, withhold rent, and access maintenance history And that
    private housing companies must legally comply with these requirements?
        Secretary Esper. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions
    of previously executed legal agreements. The Military Housing
    Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies must agree to incorporate the
    three remaining rights into existing MHPI project legal documents and,
    for the dispute resolution and rent withholding processes, the MHPI
    projects' third party lenders must approve those changes; the three
    remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the
    Department. The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies
    and, as necessary, will work with Congress to ensure the benefits of
    these rights are fully available to military members and their families
    who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short term, the Department is
    leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to provide the
    benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary
    changes to the project legal agreements.

        89. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, across the services, how
    many allegations of fraudulent activity by private contractors have
    been referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal or civil
    investigation?
        Secretary Esper. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation has
    referred one Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) company,
    Balfour Beatty Communities (BBC), to the Department of Justice for
    investigation.

        90. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, has DOJ notified you that
    it has undertaken any civil or criminal investigations in response to
    your referrals?
        Secretary Esper. No.

        91. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, have the services stopped
    paying incentive fees to any contractor suspected of fraud, or referred
    to DOJ for investigations into potential fraud?
        Secretary Esper. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy are
    withholding Performance Incentive Fees (PIFs) from all Balfour Beatty
    Communities (BBC) projects. In addition, the Air Force is withholding
    PIFs at four Hunt Military Community project sites and two Corvias
    Military Housing project sites. Reviews by the Army are ongoing but
    have not identified Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI)
    project business anomalies indicative of potential fraud such that
    would justify withholding of PIFs.

        92. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, given this betrayal of
    military families, how will you work to restore their trust and assure
    them that your Department will recommit to ensuring that they have safe
    housing that is free from health hazards?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) focus has
    been, and continues to be, on corrective actions to enhance the
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program, consistent
    with our commitment to ensure housing privatization projects provide
    safe, quality, well-maintained housing for military members and their
    families, and to rebuild trust with our military families. The recently
    released Tenant Bill of Rights and Tenant Responsibilities are visible
    and important commitments in DOD's larger effort to regain resident
    trust. This is just one of many completed and ongoing improvements to
    restore the trust of military families. Other completed actions include
    ensuring housing privatization project owners increase transparency and
    reporting of maintenance and repair work orders; revising project
    performance incentive fees; enhancing oversight and leadership
    engagement with the housing privatization project owners; increasing
    government housing staff and training; and improving leadership
    communication with residents.
     reduction in security cooperation funding and the importance of allies
        93. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, in your posture statement,
    you highlight that ``The United States' competitive advantage is not
    only a result of our unrivaled warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons
    and equipment, but also our unmatched network of alliances and
    partnerships.'' I agree completely and believe that security
    cooperation and interoperability built through deliberate efforts like
    EDI and NATO are essential to fulfilling our NDS. Despite the benefits
    of partnerships like this being clear in places like EUCOM, the
    President's budget request cuts security cooperation funding across all
    the COCOMs, and specifically within EUCOM by around 40 percent.
    Additionally, funding for EDI was cut by over $1 billion in this year's
    proposal.
        Secretary Esper, are you concerned about these drastic funding cuts
    and the ability to credibly deter Russian aggression and support our
    Eastern European allies?
        Secretary Esper. The Department has a range of security cooperation
    tools to support Allies and partners in the United States European
    Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). In fiscal year 2021,
    the ``National Defense Strategy Implementation (NDS-I) Account,''
    previously the DSCA Security Cooperation Account, was created to
    reflect the role security cooperation plays in advancing the National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) by consolidating multiple funding lines to
    provide greater flexibility in executing programs based on NDS
    objectives. This consolidation will result in greater efficiencies and
    cost savings through increased scrutiny combined with active
    prioritization of security cooperation programs. In fiscal year 2021,
    the Department plans to allocate approximately $286 million of NDS-I
    Account funds to building partner capacity efforts in the USEUCOM AOR,
    which is largely consistent with fiscal year 2020 levels and reflects
    funding for validated requirements.
        Thanks to consistent congressional funding over the last several
    years, the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has reinvigorated
    United States defense posture in Europe to deter an increasingly malign
    Russia. EDI is designed to enhance the capability and readiness of
    United States Forces, NATO Allies, and regional partners for a faster
    response to any aggression in Europe and to transnational threats by a
    regional adversary against the territory of NATO Allies. The Department
    has made significant progress in EDI's five lines of effort: presence,
    exercises and training, prepositioning, infrastructure, and building
    partnership capacity. The planned reduction in EDI funds from fiscal
    year 2019 ($6.5 billion) to fiscal year 2021 ($4.5 billion) reflects
    the substantial progress the Department has made in establishing needed
    infrastructure, building Army and Air Force prepositioned equipment
    sets, and refining exercise scheduling. The proposed fiscal year 2021
    funding levels build on our prior year investments and effectively
    deter Russian aggression in Europe and maintain our EDI-funded
    rotational force presence across the eastern flank of NATO. Our
    European Allies and partners have steadily increased their defense
    spending, providing a more effective collective deterrent to Russian
    aggression, and they have more equally distributed the burden of
    European defense among all Allies and partners.

        94. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, how should our allies in
    Europe and elsewhere interpret this reduction in security cooperation
    funding?
        Secretary Esper. Our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) remains ironclad, and our Allies in Europe
    recognize this in our continued collective efforts to strengthen the
    Alliance. Our European Allies and partners do not see any decrease in
    United States commitment to Europe and NATO. Instead, Allies see our
    continued extensive security cooperation activities with them as a
    vital component of the reestablishment of a robust United States
    presence in Europe.

        95. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, how will these proposed
    cuts to security cooperation impact the Department of Defense's ability
    to ``strengthen allies and attract new partners,'' as you discuss in
    your posture statement?
        Secretary Esper. The new National Defense Strategy-Implementation
    account provides the Department greater flexibility in prioritizing and
    executing programs in accordance with National Defense Strategy
    objectives to build partner capacity sustainably and holistically. The
    Department prioritizes these initiatives based on a strategy-driven
    process to ensure security cooperation plays a critical role in
    advancing the National Defense Strategy's emphasis on strengthening
    alliances and attracting new partners.

        96. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, how does security
    cooperation--including joint exercises, subject matter exchanges, and
    other military-to-military engagements--contribute to a strong and
    peaceful Europe?
        General Milley. Security Cooperation activities build capability,
    capacity, and interoperability with our European allies that ensure we
    can fight and win against aggression in Europe. This is clearly
    demonstrated by the regular joint exercises that we conduct throughout
    Europe. These highly visible exercises deter our adversaries while
    simultaneously assuring our most vulnerable allies. Our training with
    allies and partners builds the mutual understanding and skills needed
    for us to work together, and grows our collective defense capacity,
    increasing the deterrent effect. The training effects are reinforced
    and institutionalized by our mil-to-mil engagements. These engagements
    build ties at all levels that establish personal relationships and
    trust necessary to be successful during a crisis situation. Security
    Cooperation activities produce real deterrence effects through actual
    capabilities and assures our allies of our commitment to their
    security. This creates the foundation of peace and stability in Europe.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                missile defense
        97. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, we have established that North
    Korean long-range ballistic missiles are a threat to the Homeland--of
    which Hawaii is part of. In spite of 4 years of authorizations and 3
    years of appropriations from Congress, and the Department's own 2019
    Missile Defense Review, you have zeroed out the Homeland Defense Radar-
    Hawaii (HDR-H) for fiscal year 2021. The HDR-H contract has been let,
    the radar is being built. Fiscal year 2020 funds are currently being
    obligated for this radar. There are no known operational impediments to
    the Missile Defense Agency continuing their process to site the HDR-H.
    They have several sites where they will conduct environmental impact
    statements as part of that process. I need a commitment from you that
    you will not put a stoppage on the fiscal year 2020 funding for the
    HDR-H or terminate that contract.
        Secretary Esper. The Department is committed to continuing work to
    the extent possible on Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) efforts
    with Fiscal Year 2020 funding. As I committed during my testimony, the
    Department's priority has been to identify a suitable site upon which
    to build the HDR-H, and phasing the program in line with construction
    at that site. To this end, in October 2019, the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) revisited the viability of fielding the HDR on Department of
    Defense property at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kauai,
    Hawaii, at locations not previously explored in the HDR-H siting
    analysis due to potential operational impacts. In January 2020, MDA
    conducted additional siting studies at PMRF and is in the process of
    analyzing data collected. MDA anticipates making a site viability
    determination in third quarter fiscal year 2020, which will allow for
    the official inclusion of PMRF into the Environmental Impact Statement.
    Initial analysis indicates potential viability of at least one site on
    PMRF. MDA is continuing siting analysis, advanced planning surveys and
    environmental efforts to determine a suitable site, and to minimize
    further delay if HDR-H is funded beyond fiscal year 2020.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        98. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, when you were here for your
    confirmation hearing last July, I asked you about your advocacy for
    accession to the Law of the Sea Convention in regards to emerging
    maritime disputes such as the South China Sea and in the Arctic. You
    advised that you would review the issue. Now that you've been the
    Secretary for 8 months, do you support United States accession to the
    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?
        Secretary Esper. The United States does not have to be a party to
    the Convention on the Law of the Sea to recognize its provisions and
    exercise the rights and freedoms under the Convention. Since President
    Reagan's 1983 Statement on Ocean's Policy, the United States has
    recognized that the navigation and overflight provisions of the
    Convention reflect customary international law. The Department's
    commitment to the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight is
    evident in our practices. The Department's operations respect
    international law in all of its operations, including Freedom of
    Navigation Operations (FONOPs), and we expect others to do the same.
            decision regarding operational control of c-17 aircraft
        99. Senator Hirono. General Milley, in the Air Force posture
    hearing on Tuesday, the Air Force Chief of Staff mentioned that the
    decision for all C-17 strategic airlift assets be assigned operational
    control to TRANSCOM instead of to the COCOMs. What was the rationale
    behind that decision?
        General Milley. C-17s are a global strategic mobility asset and
    COCOMs have agreed that CDRUSTRANSCOM is in the best position to most
    effectively control the employment of these assets in support of global
    priorities. Accordingly, TRANSCOM's Operational Control (OPCON) of C-
    17s allows agile support to all COCOMs and allows them to perform their
    mission while allowing TRANSCOM to support global requirements.

        100. Senator Hirono. General Milley, why weren't affected
    Congressional offices notified?
        General Milley. It is within the Secretary of Defense's purview to
    realign the Operational Control (OPCON) of forces from one combatant
    command to another. It should also be noted that in this instance, the
    change had no impact on force structure or basing, matters which often
    do require Congressional notification.
                            military family housing
        101. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the
    Military Family Housing Tenants Bill of Rights was directed in the
    Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. While I laud your efforts to put something in
    place, the bill of rights you signed left out three of the required
    items: the right to dispute resolution, the ability to withhold rent,
    and access to a home's maintenance history. Can you explain the
    rationale and how you intend to fix the bill of rights as directed by
    this Congress?
        Secretary Esper. The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act set out 18 rights of Military Housing Privatization
    Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of which can be implemented without
    additional guidance or with development of policies, processes, and
    procedures within the control of the Department of Defense. The three
    remaining rights have financial implications and, therefore, can only
    be implemented if the MHPI project landlords and their third party
    lenders agree to modify existing project legal agreements. The
    Department is working with the project landlords on an approach to
    expedite provision of these remaining rights. For the short term, the
    Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to
    provide the maximum benefit of these rights to tenants that we can now
    while working to finalize necessary changes to the project legal
    agreements. If we encounter a challenge that requires assistance from
    Congress, we will engage with the appropriate committees quickly.
        General Milley. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA set out 18 rights of
    Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of which
    can be implemented without additional guidance or with development of
    policies, processes, and procedures within the control of DOD. The
    three remaining rights have financial implications and, therefore, can
    only be implemented if the MHPI project landlords and their third-party
    lenders agree to modify existing project legal agreements. The
    Department is working with the project landlords on an approach to
    expedite provision of these remaining rights. For the short term, the
    Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to
    provide the maximum benefit of these rights to tenants now, while
    working to finalize necessary changes to the project legal agreements.
    If we encounter a challenge that requires assistance from Congress, we
    will engage with the appropriate committees quickly.
                     the close combat lethality task force
        102. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in March
    2018, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Close Combat
    Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) in an effort to make combat units more
    lethal. He had concerns about the erosion of close combat capability
    relative to threats identified in the NDS. The Task Force recently
    fielded some new cutting edge capability in regards to training and
    night vision for Special Operations Forces and Army soldiers. How will
    the CCLTF remain a priority to you and an asset to the entire force if
    they report to the Secretary of the Army vice the Secretary of Defense
    as they support the NDS?
        Secretary Esper. I am focused on implementing the National Defense
    Strategy and efforts like the Close Combat Lethality Task Force are a
    key part of ensuring our Nation's readiness now and in the future. That
    is why I have asked the Secretary of the Army to explore how this
    successful endeavor can be improved and institutionalized. Our Army
    provides the majority of the close combat forces and in order to
    prevent duplicate efforts across the Department, I decided the
    Department of the Army would be the lead in formalizing the critical
    mission of the task force.
        General Milley. As the Secretary has said, the CCLTF is not going
    away. The Secretary of the Army is drafting a plan to institutionalize
    the CCLTF for the department.
        The Secretary of the Army has established and is leading a joint
    planning team with the USMC and SOCOM to ensure the work of CCLTF
    continues to serve the close combat formations, as it always has in the
    past.
                      compact of free association renewal
        103. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in
    testimony provided to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
    Committee, DOD testified that the Department strongly supports
    extending Compact financial assistance to the Freely Associated States,
    and that failing to do so could weaken the United States' position in
    the Indo-Pacific. I share the Department's assessment, and want to work
    with DOD to ensure that Compact assistance grants are extended past
    2023. What impacts on national security does the Department foresee if
    Compact financial assistance to the Freely Associated States is not
    extended beyond 2023?
        Secretary Esper. Failure to extend the economic provisions of the
    Compact Agreements has the potential to create an opening for China and
    other malign actors to exploit vulnerable Pacific island countries by
    replacing the economic and social support the United States is
    currently providing. The Compact States provide a strategic and
    logistical highway to the Pacific. If lapsed, China could seize the
    opportunity to bifurcate our sea lines of communication in the South
    Pacific, further weakening our national security interests. Without the
    financial assistance provided to these countries through the Compacts,
    the United States could face a requirement to reduce its footprint due
    to reduced access in places like Kwajalein Atoll or Palau. These
    reductions in capabilities would reduce our interoperability with
    allies and partners and directly impact operational plans and
    strategies.
        General Milley. Extending the economic provisions of the Compacts
    of Free Association (COFA) remain a priority. Extension demonstrates
    U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and assures the Department
    of Defense maintains access to the land, waterways, and airspace of the
    Freely Associated States. The Freely Associated States provide a
    strategic and logistical highway to the Indo-Pacific, vital in the
    event of a significant military engagement in the region. While the
    immigration, defense, and foreign affairs provisions remain as long as
    the COFAs are in force, the economic provisions are due to expire in
    2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federation States
    of Micronesia and 2024 for Palau. If the economic provisions expire,
    there is an opportunity for China, and other malign actors, to exploit
    vulnerable Pacific Island Countries. China could extend financial
    support and gain influence in absence of United States assistance. This
    would allow the PRC to divide United States sea lines of communication
    in the South Pacific, weakening our national security interests.
    Failure to extend the COFAs may require the United States to reduce its
    footprint by reducing access in places like Kwajalein Atoll, the
    location of our Ronald Reagan Test Center, or the planned construction
    of the Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR), which
    provides a High Frequency (HF) radar system for persistent, long-range,
    detect and track capability of air and surface targets. These two
    facilities are key to our military shaping in the Pacific.
    Additionally, if lapsed, the U.S. could lose its right to exclude
    foreign militaries' access to the Freely Associated States, severely
    impacting our Nation's national security.

        104. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, what steps has DOD taken to
    date to work with the Department of State and the Department of the
    Interior, and the FAS to renew economic assistance under the Compacts
    of Free Association?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently
    working with the National Security Council staff and interagency
    counterparts to finalize the negotiating instructions to extend the
    economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Association. DOD
    representatives from the offices of the Undersecretary of Defense for
    Policy and Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) have met with
    multiple offices in the Department of State and the three U.S.
    Ambassadors to the Freely Associated States to discuss renewal of
    economic assistance.

        105. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, has DOD and its interagency
    partners set a timeline for Compact renewal prior to the end of Compact
    economic assistance?
        Secretary Esper. The economic provisions for the Republic of the
    Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia expire in 2023.
    The economic provisions for the Republic of Palau expire in 2024. The
    National Security Council staff has a goal of completing negotiations
    as soon as possible. We recognize the important role that Congress will
    play in this process and welcome the opportunity to work with Congress
    to secure long-term U.S. strategic interests in this vital region.

        106. Senator Hirono. Secretary Esper, what additional steps need to
    be taken by DOD and its interagency partners before Congress can
    consider enacting legislation that would implement the renewal of the
    Compacts?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense is involved in the
    National Security Council staff's coordinated effort on this issue,
    along with the Department of the Interior, the Office of Management and
    the Budget, and the Department of State. Next steps are to finalize
    negotiating instructions so that the U.S. lead negotiator can begin
    negotiations with the Freely Associated States before taking the final
    agreement to Congress for vote and final passage.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                            space force organization
        107. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Esper, Space Force Vice-Commander,
    Lt. Gen. David Thompson, recently indicated that the U.S. Space Force
    will propose the consolidation of current space acquisition
    organizations under one entity called Space Systems Command. General
    Goldfein agreed emphatically that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
    should remain an independent organization during yesterday's Air Force
    posture hearing. What consequences would such a consolidation have on
    the organization's ability to adapt and innovate?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is considering all options to
    streamline the Space Force's acquisition system, but we have not
    proposed legislative changes to the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
    (SpRCO) at this time. The Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO) was
    established in statute by Congress. Consistent with current law, the
    SpRCO reports to the Commander, U.S. Space Force (formerly Air Force
    Space Command). In the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
    Act, Congress established the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
    Space Acquisition and Integration who will oversee and direct the
    SpRCO, along with the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the
    Space Development Agency (SDA). We expect this change will go far to
    improve the integration and synchronization of space programs.
                              technology transfer
        108. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Esper, I was encouraged to see the
    types of investments the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget proposed
    in technologies of the future like Directed Energy, hypersonics, and
    Artificial Intelligence. As you know, investments like these are only
    of use to our servicemembers in the field if we are able to transition
    them out of the laboratories. What kind of investments does the budget
    make in our Nation's test and range infrastructure to speed up the tech
    transition process?
        Secretary Esper. It is essential that our training capabilities and
    our ranges support live, virtual and constructive (LVC) training with
    these new systems. For example, in fiscal year 2021, the Department has
    requested funding for spectrum awareness tools, prototyped an advanced
    air combat training system, fielded advanced electronic warfare
    replicators, and developed an automated spectrum access management tool
    largely funded by the Spectrum Access Research and Development Program.
    Additionally, the Department plans to field a 5G capability to select
    locations providing a virtual reality capability targeting the training
    audience. Key live ranges are investing in communication networks and
    security protocols to digitally connect ranges providing a larger
    geographic footprint for hypersonic platforms and extended range
    weapons. The Department is developing a training infrastructure
    strategy to identify current training gaps with corrective actions that
    will be reflected in future budgets. fiscal year 2021's investments
    coupled with the training strategy provides the baseline to incorporate
    new technologies into training.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                  coronavirus
        109. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, in response to the
    coronavirus, you have articulated three priorities: to protect our
    forces and their families, to safeguard our mission capabilities, and
    to support the efforts across federal agencies. You have also stated
    that NORTHCOM is the global integrator for all DOD efforts to combat
    the disease. I understand that you have indicated that DOD civilian and
    military leadership, including all the service secretaries and COCOM
    commanders, have worked together to ensure the Department is ready for
    short- and long-term scenarios, as well as domestic and international
    situations. A March 3, 2020, Star and Stripes report indicates that
    ``[a]ll Army recruits entering basic training will be screen for
    coronavirus, a precaution to curtail the spread of the illness[.]'' A
    March 5, 2020, CNN report indicates that ``the coronavirus is now a
    particular concern for the US Navy, Air Force and Army who have
    implemented new screening procedures as the virus spreads.'' That
    report also indicated that the ``Navy [ . . . ] began screening for the
    coronavirus in the initial processing of recruits in January'' and that
    the ``Air Force is also screening recruits when they leave processing
    centers before they enter training.'' At this time, can you confirm
    that recruits for each of the military services are being screened for
    the coronavirus, and if not, do you believe it is appropriate to
    conduct such screening?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, the Military Departments are ``screening''
    recruits via non-test based procedures or other methods to reduce the
    potential that COVID-19 infected recruits will enter the training
    pipeline. Surveillance testing is being examined and refined as a test-
    based method in conjunction with social distancing, restriction of
    movement, and other procedures to achieve this end.

        110. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, the most recent unclassified
    Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI), published in January 2019, observed, ``The growing
    proximity of humans and animals has increased the risk of disease
    transmission. The number of outbreaks has increased in part because
    pathogens originally found in animals have spread to human
    populations.'' The DNI also assessed that ``the United States and the
    world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale
    outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of
    death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain
    international resources, and increase calls on the United States for
    support.'' Have you performed an assessment of the potential adverse
    impact to the readiness of U.S. forces in the event of the coronavirus
    outbreak being declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization
    (WHO), and if not, do you plan to conduct such an assessment?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense (DOD) continually
    monitors and assesses the readiness of our military forces and their
    ability to support the priorities outlined in the National Defense
    Strategy across multiple lines of effort, to include personnel,
    training, equipment, and supply. Since the coronavirus outbreak was
    declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization, DOD has focused
    on providing military manpower and equipment--both capacity and
    capability--to state and local authorities to help combat COVID-19.
        The Department's participation and leadership in the Nation's
    efforts ensure that we are apprised of the most current information and
    able to adjust to emergent requirements. I have given the Department
    three priorities for our focused response to the pandemic: protecting
    our people and their families, maintaining military readiness, and
    supporting the whole-of-government interagency response. To do this, we
    must ensure that we take prudent measures to limit COVID-19's spread,
    while also ensuring the men and women of our All-Volunteer Force are
    trained and ready to defend this Nation.

        111. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, a March 5, 2020, Stars and
    Stripes report indicates, ``[Department of Defense Education Activity-
    Europe] has canceled the first two weeks of its upcoming spring sports
    season due to concerns over the spread of the coronavirus.'' I
    understand that DODEA Schools in Korea, Italy, and Bahrain have
    initiated temporary closings. According to DODEA's website, ``DODEA
    operates 163 schools in 8 Districts located in 11 countries, 7 states,
    and 2 territories across 10 time zones.'' On its coronavirus website,
    DODEA says, ``[o]ur school nurses and staff will be working with
    students to promote good hygiene and to keep everyone healthy and safe.
    We also work with our custodial providers to ensure our schools receive
    thorough cleaning every day. Parents are asked for help in reinforcing
    healthy practices at home with children.'' Consistent with your three
    priorities in response to the coronavirus, what steps are specific
    DODEA schools are taking to protect DODEA students, personnel, and
    their families from the coronavirus?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity
    (DODEA) is an integral part of our mission. Quality education is a key
    factor in quality of life and servicemember retention of the most
    talented members of the force. At this time, all DODEA schools are
    closed as a result of Health Protection conditions on the installations
    DODEA serves, but the mission of DODEA continues. I am proud to say
    that all schools are providing continuity of education in an online
    environment. As teachers around the world continue their work online,
    our facilities and maintenance personnel continue to maintain our
    schools and DODEA will continue to work with Commands to ensure that
    when conditions allow it, schools are ready again to be central
    learning environments for our communities.

        112. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what criteria are DODEA using
    to make decisions regarding school closures and activity cancellations
    in response to the coronavirus?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity
    (DODEA) has worked closely with installation commanders and public
    health officials as well as our host nation partners to make
    coordinated decisions about activity cancellations. These decisions
    have been based on a combination of Health Protection conditions on the
    base, host nation public health guidance and restrictions, and
    information about any cases in the community.

        113. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what steps have you taken or
    do you plan to take to ensure that disruptions do not negatively affect
    students' academic progress?
        Secretary Esper. From Daegu, South Korea, which was the first
    Department of Defense Educational Activity (DODEA) school to close on
    February 20th, to Guantanamo Bay Cuba, which closed on March 25th, all
    DODEA schools have had continuity of education plans in place focused
    on a virtual learning platform within 4 school days of initial closure.
    DODEA has signed out thousands of computers and procured and
    distributed hundreds of internet hotspots for students needing
    connectivity. Students meet at least twice weekly with their teachers,
    and teachers are hosting office hours and providing assignments to
    students. Students with disabilities continue to be served in this
    model in the most comprehensive way possible, and DODEA has taken
    special consideration to ensure families are able to remain engaged.
    ``Counselor Watch'' programs are designed to engage with families whose
    students are not accessing learning materials or are otherwise
    struggling in this new structure. DODEA teachers and leaders in the
    field continue to analyze and adjust the model to ensure student needs
    are met based on feedback from the community.

        114. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, what effect, if any, has the
    coronavirus had on DOD child care centers, and what is DOD's plan to
    address situations in which such facilities must close due to concern
    about the outbreak?
        Secretary Esper. The impact of coronavirus on Department of Defense
    child care programs is very fluid. We have experienced a number of our
    facilities being closed, especially at our OCONUS locations. Most of
    our child care programs that are open are supporting mission essential
    personnel only. Installation commanders, working with local public
    health professionals and senior leadership, have the authority to make
    these decisions based on the local situation. Facilities will reopen as
    local officials feel the timing is right to do so.

        115. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, in the event that a
    deployable vaccine to the coronavirus is developed, can you guarantee
    that all DOD military, DOD civilian personnel, and their families will
    receive a vaccination for free?
        Secretary Esper. If a vaccine for COVID-19 is approved by the
    Secretary of Health and Human Services, the vaccination will be
    considered a preventive service and covered at no co-pay or cost-
    sharing for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries who use network
    providers and network pharmacies. Health coverage for civilians that
    are not eligible DOD beneficiaries is available through the Federal
    Employee Health Benefits Program, which has different governing
    statutes, regulations, policies, and contracts.

        116. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, according to a March 3, 2020,
    Politico report, the Overseas Federation of Teachers says that teachers
    at DODEA schools in Italy and Bahrain that closed due to coronavirus
    concerns have nonetheless been required to report to school to
    supervise students' online learning. I am concerned that this puts
    educators' health and safety at risk and creates significant childcare
    challenges for their families. In areas where DODEA schools are closed,
    will you commit to allowing teachers and other school personnel to
    telework in order to protect their health and safety?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of Defense Educational Activity
    (DODEA) prioritizes the health and safety of all employees. In the
    beginning of the continuity operations model in most schools, it was
    important to provide training and for teachers to be able to work
    together in small groups to engage in new online learning platforms. At
    that time, all civilian employees were still reporting to work on
    installations.

        117. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, have DODEA officials sought
    input from unions representing DODEA teachers and school staff on
    decisions related to closures, telework, and working conditions? Please
    describe which unions DODEA has consulted, the nature of DODEA
    outreach, and the specific feedback obtained from these stakeholders.
        Secretary Esper. At the headquarters-level, all unions are being
    sent government/Department-wide COVID-19 guidance from the Department
    of Defense, Office of Personnel Management, Centers for Disease Control
    and Prevention, etc. for informational purposes. The Department of
    Defense Educational Activity established a headquarters labor meeting
    to better keep national level union officials informed about component-
    level responses and policy development regarding operational and
    personnel decisions and to allow them to comment on actions taken and
    planned. In this regard the following unions were invited to
    participate in component-level meetings: Federal Education Association
    (FEA); Federal Education Association-Stateside Region (FEASR); Overseas
    Federation of Teachers (OFT); Antilles Consolidated Education
    Association (ACEA); American Federation of Government Employees, Local
    1770; American Federation of Government Employees-Consolidated; and
    National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE). By way of specific
    feedback: FEA and OFT have submitted questions concerning the
    application of the Authorized Departure. At the Regional level and
    District levels, the unions have been very active in working with their
    Management counterparts (Directors for Student Excellence (DSEs) and
    Superintendents) to make and sustain the transition to the digital
    teaching platform. They have provided invaluable feedback from teachers
    and helped in communicating Management decisions to teachers. FEASR met
    with the DSEs to deliver a list of issues from teachers whose
    resolutions were intended to enhance mission delivery.
                             traumatic brain injury
        118. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, based on public reporting,
    there appears to have been significant difficulties encountered by DOD
    personnel tasked with efficiently assessing servicemembers who were
    exposed to blast during the Iranian missile strike on Al Assad air base
    on January 8, 2020, for potential traumatic brain injuries. Why is the
    Department not broadly leveraging technologies that quantitatively
    measure and record blast overpressure exposures?
        Secretary Esper. The Department is leveraging technology as much as
    possible to assist in evaluating Service members who may be involved in
    potentially concussive events. We are committed to further implementing
    our Comprehensive Strategy for Warfighter Brain Health which has
    numerous components that support a better understanding of brain
    exposures, to include blast overpressure, as well as monitoring and
    mitigating such exposures. As technology has evolved, we are working
    towards a blast monitoring program that is able to interface with our
    information technology systems in a seamless and secure fashion. The
    outcome will be a blast monitoring system that utilizes accurate data
    to record personnel level exposures and guides decisions aimed to
    reduce the effects of blast exposures.

        119. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, the Committee understands
    that such technologies have been fielded successfully in the combat
    environment as early as 2011 through the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency. In your opinion, are there strategies that Congress
    and this Committee can undertake to ensure that these technologies are
    more rapidly fielded?
        Secretary Esper. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    (DARPA) does not need any additional authorities at this time to field
    new technologies. If, in the future, DARPA becomes in need of any new
    authorities, the Department will engage and discuss with the Congress
    and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the best way forward.

        120. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, section 734 of the Fiscal
    Year 2018 NDAA mandated blast overpressure monitoring for
    servicemembers at risk of these exposures in training and operations.
    Can you provide an update on the progress of this congressionally
    mandated initiative, including the number and types of units/personnel
    that are bring monitoring by the 734 program, the amount and type of
    data collected, and any relevant findings related to blast overpressure
    exposure rates to date?
        Secretary Esper. We have incorporated the new legislation in the
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020; section
    717 and section 742 into our longitudinal medical studies of blast
    overpressure in high overpressure weapon systems, which focuses on
    documenting blast overpressure data into a Service member's record as
    well as being able to retrieve that data when being evaluated for a
    potentially concussive event. There have been 58 units representing all
    the Services, outfitted with wearable blast gauges that are part of a
    pilot research surveillance project called CONQUER (COmbat in TraiNing
    QUerable Exposure Repository). The types of units include but are not
    limited to: special operation forces, snipers, breachers, explosive
    ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and infantry and artillery units. We
    have been able to collect blast overpressure information for shoulder
    mounted weapon systems, .50-caliber weapons, indirect fire systems and
    multiple breaching charges. We are working towards being able to
    provide mitigation strategies through analysis of this data.
    Additionally we are studying the health and performance effects from
    blast overpressure. We will translate this information as quickly as
    possible into our safety and training platforms so that we can maximize
    the readiness and effectiveness of our Warfighters.
                                white supremacy
        121. Senator Warren. Secretary Esper, section 530 of the Fiscal
    Year 2020 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to ``study the
    feasibility of, in background investigations and security and
    suitability screenings of individuals who seek to enlist in the Armed
    Forces--(1) screening for extremist and gang-related activity; and (2)
    using the following resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
    (A) The Tattoo and Graffiti Identification Program and (B) The National
    Gang Intelligence Center.'' By no later than June 17, 2020, the
    Secretary must submit an unclassified report to Congress with his
    conclusions on this study. However, there is no explicit requirement
    that DOD include white supremacy extremism in this study. Given the
    threat posed by white supremacy extremism to our military and our
    country, do you believe that the Department should include white
    supremacy extremism in its upcoming study on its process for screening
    recruits to the Armed Forces pursuant to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA?
        Secretary Esper. White supremacy extremism is an element of
    domestic extremism and will be included in our report.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                           space command headquarters
        122. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please set forth the new site
    selection criteria for Space Command headquarters and explain how those
    criteria differ from the previous criteria.
        Secretary Esper. The Department of the Air Force is currently
    working to finalize screening and evaluation criteria to expand the
    number of cities and installations analyzed. The Department of the Air
    Force will consult with the Defense Committees on these criteria once I
    have had the opportunity to review them.

        123. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain why any
    criteria have been changed in the site selection process for Space
    Command.
        Secretary Esper. I have asked the Department of the Air Force to
    take a different approach by breaking down the selection criteria into
    its foundational components and conducting a more holistic and
    iterative selection process that considers the concurrent establishment
    of the U.S. Space Force.

        124. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain the problems
    with transparency you identified in your hearing testimony which led to
    your decision to re-open the site selection process for Space Command.
        Secretary Esper. Based upon feedback I received from members of
    Congress and my review of the process, the screening criteria were
    insufficient and resulted in a limited number of eligible locations
    without the data to support the exclusion of many others. Also, the
    initial criteria had not considered the impacts caused by the
    establishment of U.S. Space Force. Therefore, I asked the Department of
    the Air Force to take a different approach.

        125. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, please explain in detail the
    new process and timeline for the Space Command headquarters site
    selection.
        Secretary Esper. We will use a revised basing process that
    leverages best practices from the Department of the Air Force strategic
    basing process and the Army's recent Futures Command stationing action.
    This will expand the number of locations under consideration for the
    U.S. Space Command, and give eligible installations and communities an
    opportunity to provide input based on approved requirements and
    evaluation criteria. The Department of the Air Force will consult with
    the Defense Committees on their schedule and revised evaluation and
    screening criteria this spring. I anticipate a final decision sometime
    next year.

        126. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, you testified that the new
    process ``would allow all members to nominate locations'' for the
    headquarters of Space Command. Is that a change to the normal process
    for basing decisions?
        Secretary Esper. This is a modification to the Department of the
    Air Force basing process. Since U.S. Space Command is a combatant
    command with unique and complex warfighting requirements, I have asked
    the Department of the Air Force to revise its process for this action
    in a way that leverages best practices from the Department of the Air
    Force strategic basing process and the Army's recent Futures Command
    stationing action.

        127. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, did the sites previously
    identified as finalists for Space Command headquarters not satisfy the
    basing criteria and if so, in what ways?
        Secretary Esper. The six original candidate locations that the
    Secretary of the Air Force approved in May of 2019 met all basing
    criteria laid out in the original basing decision.
             report regarding condition of rotc facilities at hbcus
        128. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the
    report required by the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA regarding the current
    condition of facilities used by units of the Senior Reserve Officers'
    Training Corps at minority-serving institutions and when can Congress
    expect the report?
        Secretary Esper. Facilities used for Reserve Officer Training Corps
    (ROTC) purposes are all fully owned and operated by the universities
    and colleges that host our programs. Facility maintenance is managed by
    the host institution, as laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding
    each school signs when an ROTC program is established, and conditions
    vary greatly depending on multiple factors. The Department is exploring
    alternative means to meet this congressional reporting requirement
    because it does not have the authority to compel historically black
    colleges and universities to provide facility reports. As soon as a
    viable information source is determined, we will coordinate the data
    collection and transmit the report.
                            air force pilot academy
        129. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, is DOD committed to continuing
    and growing the Air Force's Pilot Academy program for JROTC students?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, the Air Force remains committed in Fiscal
    Year 2021 to providing funding for 400 scholarships which include 300
    Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (+AFJROTC) cadets, 20
    Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for
    the first time, 10 U.S. Air Force Academy cadets and 50 young people
    from affinity groups. The affinity group students will compete for
    slots through a collaborative effort between AFJROTC, Air Force
    Recruiting Service and several nation-wide ``affinity'' groups such as
    Women in Aviation (WIA) and the Organization of Black Airline Pilots
    (OBAP). In addition, the Flight Academy is included in Program
    Objective Memorandum 22 to ensure long-term stability and growth of
    this highly successful program. To date, 217 out of 270 (80 percent
    success rate) have earned their Private Pilot Certificate and all have
    earned College Credit. This program specifically targets the strategic
    imperative of a diverse fighting force directly linked to the National
    Defense Strategy.
                 report regarding dod child development centers
        130. Senator Jones. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the
    report the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA required to be provided by March 1,
    2020, regarding child development centers and when can Congress expect
    that report?
        Secretary Esper. An interim report was provided in February of this
    year, indicating that a final, comprehensive report would be submitted
    by June 1, 2020. The final report combines nine separate child care
    reports requested by the Congressional Defense and Appropriations
    committees.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  NAVY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    McSally, Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        Let me apologize to my fellow Senators. You know, I had
    just gotten back from Iraq, Erbil, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia,
    Mauritania, felt fine, but I hit the ground here and I got non-
    contagious bronchitis. So anyway, it is much better today than
    it was yesterday. Much better, much better.
        The Committee today will receive testimony on the posture
    of the Department of the Navy and the fiscal year 2021.
        We welcome our guests today: the Acting Secretary of the
    Navy, Tom Modly; Admiral Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and
    David Berger, Commandant of the Navy. Thanks for coming. Thanks
    for your long-term service. We appreciate you very much.
        With the alarming speed of modernization of both
    conventional and nuclear forces, China and Russia present a
    credible threat. I always make reference to this because when
    we put this together, this was equal Democrats and Republicans,
    people who no one could question their capabilities, and so we
    have been trying to follow this. So I will make several
    references to this, as will other members. The major thing
    there is that China and Russia have passed us in areas that we
    did not want to be passed.
        I am encouraged by some of our witnesses' public statements
    and guidance and their subordinates related to reorienting to
    great power competition.
        Thanks to President Trump's leadership, we reset defense
    spending in 2017, and we are beginning to rebuild the military
    after many years of neglect. But the hole is deep and the work
    has just begun.
        I commend our witnesses for submitting a budget that
    continues to trend the funding in the readiness accounts that
    support today's Navy and Marine Corps. However, it is clear to
    me that the Department of the Navy's proposed budget is only
    sufficient to support a fleet of about 300 ships. That is
    clearly inadequate to the 355 as we find in the manual I just
    referred to.
        Along these lines, I must also point out that the
    Department has yet to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which
    by law was required to be submitted to Congress with the budget
    last month. The absence of this plan makes it impossible to
    understand how the Department plans to reach its goal and the
    national policy of a 355-ship Navy. We have got to be smart and
    not hasty as we modernize our military. I urge each of you to
    take a long view. Recent history should be our guide because
    without better acquisition performance, we will fall behind or
    further behind, I should say, China and Russia.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    join you in welcoming Acting Secretary Modly and Admiral
    Gilday, and General Berger to the Committee this morning to
    testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy
    in our review of the fiscal year 2021 authorization request. I
    particularly want to welcome each of you to your first posture
    hearing before the Committee. We are grateful for your service,
    for the service of the men and women under your command, and
    for the support of all the Navy and Marine Corps families. So
    please express to these wonderful Americans.
        As the leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps, you face
    significant challenges as you strive to balance the need to
    support ongoing operations and sustain readiness with the need
    to modernize and keep the technological edge so critical to
    military success.
        In addition, because significant levels of funding are
    being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, you
    will have fewer resources for modernization.
        The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems
    caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying
    hours, and canceled training and deployments. We remember too
    well the collisions of the McCain and Fitzgerald and the loss
    of life that resulted. I will be interested in hearing about
    the progress the Navy is making in continuing to implement
    changes that will ensure such incidents will not happen again.
        All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely
    high operations tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack
    submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and
    strike fighter inventories. The Navy is now in its eighth year
    of operating with fewer than the legally required 11 aircraft
    carriers. The Ford is listed in the Navy inventory, but that
    carrier is more than 5 years behind schedule and will not be
    ready to deploy for many, many months. In addition, during the
    next decade, the Navy will need to buy the new Columbia-class
    ballistic missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class
    submarines. This is an extremely expensive undertaking that is
    on a very tight schedule.
        The Navy is using authorities such as multiyear procurement
    authority to conduct modernization programs more efficiently.
    Congress has approved multiyear procurement authority for both
    attack submarines and Aegis destroyers. These vessels represent
    the largest inventory shortfall compared to the goals in the
    2016 Force Structure Assessment, with the actual Navy fleet 15
    boats below the attack submarine goal and 14 destroyers below
    the goal for large surface combatants.
        The Navy just recently signed the multiyear procurement
    contract for the block 5 of the Virginia-class attack
    submarine. This contract provides for buying nine boats of the
    5-year period, fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2023. The
    contract also provides an option to buy a 10th boat if the Navy
    has the resources and the contractors improve performance on
    the program. Yet, the fiscal year 2021 budget, which had the
    best opportunity for funding the 10th boat, did not exercise
    the option. I am concerned that the window of opportunity for
    buying a 10th boat could close if funds are not provided to the
    Navy this year to allow them that opportunity. I see that the
    number one item on the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations]
    unfunded priority list is funding for the second Virginia-class
    submarine in fiscal year 2021, and I would obviously be
    interested in your thoughts on this issue.
        Modernizing ground vehicles remains a priority for the
    Marine Corps. The amphibious combat vehicle will provide
    increased force protection and enhanced lethality to our
    marines, and it will replace the aging inventory of assault
    amphibious vehicles. The Marine Corps is also partnering with
    the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle, or JLTV,
    to replace the Humvee, and they have targeted investments in
    the high mobility artillery rocket system, HIMARS, in order to
    provide marines with ground-based indirect fire support. I
    would welcome an update from our witnesses on how they are
    balancing the procurement of new systems while upgrading
    existing platforms to meet current operational needs.
        In 2016, Admiral Richardson released a Force Structure
    Assessment that identified a new force structure goal. We had
    been promised a new Force Structure Assessment by the end of
    2019 that would address implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy, but that has not arrived. I also understand that the
    Department has not provided the 30-year shipbuilding plan as
    required by law. I look forward to hearing when the Department
    will deliver these important documents.
        Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
    and I look forward to their testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We have opening statements. Your entire statement will be
    made a part of the record. We will start with Admiral Gilday.
    You are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Gilday. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today with Secretary Modly and General
    Berger. We are thankful for your enduring support of the Navy
    and Marine Corps team.
        Today, three carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready
    groups, along with 30 percent of our fleet, are deployed
    forward around the globe. Our Navy and Marine Corps team needs
    no permission to operate at sea, and their power does not rest
    in any single location, but rather in our ability to maneuver
    anytime and anywhere the seas reach operating across the
    spectrum of military operations.
        Without question, our sailors remain our most important
    asset. We have taken a hard look at what they need to be
    successful, the equipment and the training that they need to
    fight and win, as well as support required to take care of them
    and their families. Over the past 8 months, we have engaged in
    a deep examination of these issues.
        Our balanced approach in our budget submission this year
    provides a Navy ready to fight today while committing to the
    training and the maintenance and the modernization to provide a
    Navy that is ready to fight tomorrow.
        Naval power is critical to implementing the National
    Defense Strategy, but naval power is not just a function of
    fleet size. It is a combination of the readiness, the
    lethality, and the capacity of that fleet. Our number one
    priority remains the Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarine. This request also heavily invests in our readiness
    accounts such as ship and aircraft maintenance and
    modernization, in manpower, in live virtual constructive
    training, in steaming days, and in flying hours. It invests in
    new systems to make our fleet more lethal, including increasing
    our weapons inventory, filling our magazines, bolstering the
    range and the speed of those weapons, exploring directed energy
    weapons, and incorporating new technologies like hypersonics.
    This request grows our fleet in size, generating sustainable,
    capable capacity.
        Importantly, naval power is not just determined by what we
    operate and fight with, but how we operate and fight. We are
    pursuing an integrated approach with the United States Marine
    Corps in fleet operations and exercises in war games and in
    experimentation. The net result we believe is integrated
    American naval power.
        I could not ask for a better partner, a better shipmate in
    this endeavor than General Berger.
        Thank you again for your support which has allowed us to
    make significant gains in readiness and lethality already. It
    also allows us to answer our nation's call every day. On behalf
    of your Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian sailors and their
    families who serve our nation, I thank you, and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday,
    and General Berger follows:]

      Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Thomas B. Modly, Admiral
                 Michael M. Gilday, and General David H. Berger
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
    Committee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts to build the strength
    and readiness of our integrated naval force. As the nation's forward-
    deployed, global maneuverable team, the entire Department of the Navy
    (DON)--sailors, marines and civilians--must be ready to respond as a
    single unit wherever and whenever there is need. We must deliver the
    personnel, platforms, and operational capability necessary to secure
    vital sea lanes, stand by our allies, and protect the American people.
        Accomplishing this in today's global strategic environment demands
    planning, clear-eyed assessments, and hard choices. We must design a
    future integrated naval force structure, advance our intellectual
    capacity and ethical excellence, and accelerate the digital
    modernization of our force. That's why this budget prioritizes a
    strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment, informed by
    relentless examination of our present capabilities and realities. It
    builds on prior investments while adjusting fire where necessary to
    deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness. It sustains the
    industrial base, and maintains our competitive advantage. Overall, this
    budget will deliver a more integrated, survivable, and affordable
    future force.
        Our testimony details the combined perspectives of the DON civilian
    and military leadership. We begin with the challenges we face, followed
    by our overall strategic vision, then the specific priorities of the
    Navy and Marine Corps to meet the requirements of this vision and
    execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which remains the
    guidepost for all of our decisions. The Department of the Navy sustains
    progress along each of the NDS lines of effort through adequate and
    timely funding from our partners in Congress. We are proud to work in
    partnership with this Committee in defense of our nation, and look
    forward to that work continuing.
                              the global challenge
        The reemergence of long-term great power competition, the evolving
    character of that competition, and the accelerating advancements in
    technology are spurring a period of transformation in the strategic
    environment, requiring us to adapt our integrated naval force design
    and operating concepts to new realities. As the National Defense
    Strategy states, ``there can be no complacency--we must make difficult
    choices and prioritize what is most important.''
        Thus far this century, terrorist groups and rogue states have
    dominated our perception of the threat environment. These threats were
    lethal, but did not pose an existential threat to our national
    security. China and Russia present a different challenge, as each
    continues to develop sophisticated military capabilities backed by
    sizable economies. Their investments in surface, air, and undersea
    platforms have significantly increased the potential for kinetic
    conflict, while the leadership of both nations demonstrate increasing
    contempt for international law and the rules-based order that ensures
    the prosperity and security of all nations.
        China's battle fleet has grown from 262 to 335 surface ships over
    the last decade, and China's commercial shipbuilding grew over 60
    percent year over year from 2007-2017. It continues to take coercive
    actions against its neighbors and violate international law in the
    South China Sea. Russia's irresponsible aggression continues on NATO's
    eastern and northern flanks as well as the Black Sea, the Arabian Gulf,
    and the broader Indo-Pacific. China also invests heavily in submarines
    with advanced stealth capabilities and the platforms and infrastructure
    needed to dominate the emerging Arctic.
        Meanwhile, warfare has evolved to new battlefields including
    cyberspace. China and other dangerous actors like Iran brazenly target
    the command, control, and communications (C3) systems and logistics
    networks on which our integrated naval force depends. China's nefarious
    activity also includes widespread cyber theft of intellectual property
    and sensitive information targeting our entire government, our allies,
    and our industry partners throughout the acquisition and supply chain.
        As we prepare for the maturing threat of great power competition,
    we must remain on high alert for the actions of malign regimes such as
    Iran, and the continual asymmetric threat to our people, allies, and
    interests posed by non-state actors such as ISIS. In a recent example
    highlighting the impact of our integrated naval force, 5th Fleet and
    CTF-51/5 responded to crisis earlier this year by securing the United
    States Embassy in Baghdad with the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground
    Task Force--Crisis Response--Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) and
    simultaneously coordinated additional naval support in theater. We
    stand ever-prepared to respond with every part of our integrated force
    to instability, terrorist threats, and rogue states throughout the
    world.
        Our integrated naval force also has a critical role in preserving
    the infrastructure and access that powers the increasingly
    interconnected and interdependent United States and global economies.
    Our nation's continued prosperity and economic growth increasingly
    depend on open and secure access to the sea lanes. Maritime traffic has
    increased four-fold over the last two decades, with 90 percent of all
    global goods transiting shipping lanes, including new trade routes
    opening through the Arctic. Meanwhile, the undersea cables that power
    the digital economy and the global communications framework represent
    an overlooked but critical point of vulnerability for
        American interests at home and abroad. Overall, the maritime system
    is more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever
    before--and it has never been more important.
        A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of the
    National Defense Strategy in a changing world. But as we address these
    external concerns, we must also confront our business process
    challenges. These include a shrinking industrial base and vulnerable
    supply chain, inefficiencies due to legacy business operations, and
    antiquated acquisition processes which together result in increased
    costs and delays for both new development and overall maintenance.
    Despite the best efforts of this Committee, we must also continually
    prepare for the challenge posed by funding uncertainty.
        Most importantly, we must never forget that our greatest resource
    is the men and women who wear the uniform, who comprise our civilian
    workforce, and the families that serve alongside them. We are committed
    to ensuring our sailors, marines, and civilians are trained and
    equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that their
    families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and
    education they need.
        As detailed in the following pages, our integrated naval force has
    made significant strides in addressing the external and internal
    challenges we face. But we can never be satisfied, and will always
    press forward with a sense of urgency to deliver the people, the
    platforms, and the capabilities necessary to protect the American
    people and our interests around the world.
           meeting the challenge with an agile integrated naval force
        To meet these challenges, the NDS requires a dominant, agile,
    accountable, and globally positioned integrated naval force. We will
    plan, resource, and execute the NDS with specific focus on the
    following:
    Integration
        We must transform from our present two-service model into one true
    expeditionary force in readiness, with the Navy and Marine Corps
    operating together with integrated planning, design, training, and
    execution at every echelon and in every domain. This priority has been
    emphasized in messages to the fleet and planning documents by each
    member of DON leadership and is a guiding principle for every aspect of
    our planning and resourcing.
    Velocity
        Our integrated naval force must maintain the readiness and
    lethality to respond anywhere at any time. We will achieve this through
    a global operating model that ensures the continual posture, presence,
    and readiness of our personnel and platforms. We will dominate the
    fight to get to the fight, with forward basing, distributed maritime
    capability, fully integrated logistics, and continual aviation
    readiness. We also must increase the speed at which we do everything
    across the Department to match the rapid changes and unpredictability
    of the future environment.
    Collaboration
        A primary line of effort in the NDS is to build and maintain a
    robust constellation of allies and partners. Our integrated naval force
    is committed to training, operating, and learning alongside our allies
    and partners in every part of the world through every day interaction
    and regular operational exercises such as Trident Juncture, Talisman
    Saber and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Afloat and ashore, our allies
    and partners are crucial force multipliers and enablers of our global
    reach, particularly in evolving regions such as the Indo-Pacific and
    the Arctic. We must also break down organizational silos across our own
    Department and build more collaborative relationships with the other
    Military Departments and the Interagency to support whole-of-government
    approaches to security that will become more prominent in the future.
    Visibility
        While cutting edge ISR, cyber, aviation, and undersea assets ensure
    our global reach and awareness, there is no substitute for sustained
    presence and engagement. Through frequent port visits, stand-in forces,
    and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), we will continue to
    demonstrate our enduring commitment to the defense of our people and
    interests, as well as our readiness and will to stand alongside our
    allies and partners. We will also focus on increasing transparency and
    information sharing in order to facilitate more rapid, and informed
    decisions.
    Innovation
        We will transform the strategic space to our advantage through next
    generation research and development, industry partnerships, and naval
    education. We are embracing the challenge of next generation technology
    and determined to dominate the design, development and effective
    deployment of major technological breakthroughs such as hypersonic
    weapons. We are making the key investments and forging the key
    partnerships to own the next ``Sputnik Moment.'' We will become more
    comfortable with trying new ways of doing business, and more forgiving
    of incremental failures made in support of change and progress.
    Adaptability
        Where we cannot change the strategic environment through
    innovation, we will adapt to it quickly and efficiently through agile
    thinking and nimble platforms. This will allow us to protect our people
    and interests through unpredictable shifting security environments, and
    ensure the broadest range of options are available to the Commander in
    Chief and the Secretary of Defense. We will invest in an adaptable
    force structure, foster adaptable approaches to problems, and nurture
    the development of adaptable people comfortable with uncertainty and
    unpredictability.
    Humility
        We will address our challenges with a sense of humility, taking
    full account of the deficiencies we have, but with confidence that they
    can be corrected. We will be realistic in our planning and budgeting to
    assure we do not trade growth for readiness. We will not allow
    ourselves to build a hollow force, but we will be honest with the
    Congress and the American people about what we see the areas in which
    we need their full support in order to build the integrated naval force
    that is required to maintain the nation's security.
          gray hulls: building and maintaining the right capabilities
        In order to meet the many demands of the global strategic
    environment and ensure our warriors are always prepared to dominate the
    fight, we must design a future integrated naval force structure aligned
    to the threats we face, both today and in the future. This budget
    prioritizes the readiness of those platforms and systems that will
    enable the United States to maintain and expand its competitive edge
    over all adversaries while we examine ways to grow the fleet in a
    reasonable timeframe, all while remaining responsible stewards of
    American taxpayer dollars.
    Divesting from 20th Century Legacy Systems
        In keeping with the Department of Defense-wide priority to
    modernize from low-value legacy systems to fund combat-overmatch
    lethality tuned to the challenge of great power competition, this
    budget divests from multiple legacy or surge-based capabilities that do
    not align with the requirements of the NDS. It shifts capabilities from
    a counterinsurgency focus to systems that enable our personnel to
    exploit positional advantage and defend key maritime terrain for
    persistent forward sea control and denial operations. This budget also
    aligns with Secretary Esper's commitment to become more of a ``fast
    follower'' of commercial technology, and to dominate the future
    development and employment of artificial intelligence (AI) and
    hypersonics funding.
    Building to a 355 Navy
        Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of this Committee, the goal of a
    355 ship Navy is now the law of the land. We will be working with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a consensus perspective
    on this future force structure through robust analysis and wargaming
    and the inclusion of expertise from our academic institutions (Naval
    War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University) and
    independent naval experts. This process will be iterative and
    continuous. In order to meet the nation's national security needs and
    remain within budget constraints, we must consider how to shift costs
    away from high-end platforms to a larger number of smaller, but still
    highly capable ships. Such a shift will allow broader presence, reduced
    manning, and longer reach through a significant increase in hypersonic
    weapons, greater stealth, and advanced anti-ISR capabilities.
        We are also considering how unmanned surface and subsurface
    platforms should figure into our force mix. These platforms will not
    only allow us to distribute and conceal lethality, but to do so at a
    reduced cost and greater integration and interdependency with the Joint
    Force. While some perspectives vary on the ultimate composition of this
    future force mix, there is clear agreement that certain new classes of
    ships that currently do not exist today must be designed and built
    rapidly in the next ten years. The exact mix will be the subject of
    continuous evaluation and analysis, but it will not impede our
    immediate investment in the development and initial production of these
    new vessels.
    Fielding a Ready, Relevant, Responsive Integrated Naval Expeditionary
            Force
        A key aspect of our transformation will be a shift to greater naval
    expeditionary force capabilities and a restoration of the Fleet Marine
    Force. The potential for rapid change in the global environment,
    particularly in the Indo-Pacific, demands a rebalance from the current
    Marine Corps force land and surge based posture to a more distributed,
    rapidly deployable and fully integrated force. This budget continues
    investment in key Marine Corps development programs such as the Ground
    Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground Based Air Defense, CH-53K helicopter,
    and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, supporting Marine Corps efforts to
    enhance Long Range/Precision Fires, Protected Mobility/Enhanced
    Maneuver, and Air Defense.
    Generating Readiness and Sustainability
        This budget optimizes Marine Corps readiness to achieve 80 percent
    serviceability of reportable expeditionary equipment, and implements
    the Commandant's Infrastructure Reset Strategy so our warriors are
    always prepared and present to defend our people, our interests, and
    our allies. It sustains the shipyards and supporting industrial base to
    maximize repair and modernization capacity and minimize turnaround and
    downtime. To provide continual presence and readiness for the fleet,
    this budget funds 58 days underway while deployed and 24 days underway
    while non-deployed per quarter, with an increase of 6.5 percent over
    last year for ship operations funding. Leveraging private sector best
    practices through the Naval Sustainment Strategy, this budget continues
    to invest in Aircraft Depot Maintenance to achieve the goal of 80
    percent mission capable rates for strike fighter aircraft. This budget
    also increases the Flying Hour program by 5.8 percent and aligns the
    funding for air operations to the mission capable rates to ensure that
    all squadrons deploy combat-ready.
    Producing Next Generation Superiority
        The Columbia-class submarine program enters the first year of
    incremental procurement funding for the lead ship, and this budget
    resources the program for on-track delivery to meet the first
    deployment in 2031, with a second ballistic missile submarine starting
    in fiscal year 2024 and serial production begins in fiscal year 2026,
    furthering the recapitalization of our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
        Additionally, we continue to resource the development of the Fast
    Frigate, and Future Large Surface Combatant, both of which will greatly
    enhance our distributed capabilities and forward deployed lethality.
    This budget also continues advanced capabilities in the F-35B and F-35C
    Joint Strike Fighter for both the Navy and Marine Corps. We also
    maintain investment in weapons development to provide for longer range
    and hypersonic weapons, with increasing investments in areas like
    Conventional Prompt Strike and our Standard Missile family. Finally, we
    will look to Congress for support in our effort to expand training and
    testing opportunities through range expansion aboard Naval Air Station
    Fallon in order to fully develop and train with these lethal
    capabilities.
                 gray zones: winning the fight before the fight
        The future battlespace extends well beyond the field of kinetic
    action. Ensuring our warriors are the best equipped and prepared in the
    world starts with accelerating our digital modernization across the
    force, streamlining our business processes and maintaining the highest
    level of efficiency. Agile and accountable naval forces are impossible
    without agile and accountable business processes that support them.
    With the support of this budget submission, the following are just a
    few of the reforms we are implementing throughout our integrated naval
    force to dominate the future fight, from the E-Ring to the front lines.
    Executing the Business Operations Plan
        The President's Budget Submission will allow us to accelerate our
    business process modernization across the naval enterprise through the
    use of advanced digital tools and technologies to substantially improve
    performance, speed, accuracy, and security. The DON Business Operations
    Plan (BOP) details the steps we are taking to transform our business
    operations in alignment with the NDS, with 6, 12, 18, and 24 month
    milestones to provide DON leadership the ability to better manage and
    monitor progress on the path to a more agile and accountable business
    enterprise. The plan provides clear direction for military and civilian
    leaders throughout the DON to maximize investments and effort in
    alignment with the NDS. It also provides greater transparency and
    oversight opportunities for our partners on this Committee as well as
    the American people.
    Transforming the Digital Enterprise
        Information management is a core strategic function of the DoN.
    Cyber security, data strategy and analytics, AI, and quantum computing
    have all combined to create massive opportunities--as well as
    vulnerabilities--across our entire enterprise. A critical element of
    mission readiness is the ability of our personnel to have access to
    relevant, reliable, and secure global communications and information,
    at every echelon and in every domain. In fiscal year 2019 we
    consolidated information management functions in a restructured Office
    of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), driving transformation and
    operational capability through the following lines of effort:
          Modernize DON infrastructure from its current state of
    fragmented, non-performant, outdated, and indefensible architectures to
    a unified, logical, modern infrastructure capable of delivering an
    information advantage.
          Innovate operational capabilities through technologies
    like 5th Generation (5G) wireless and AI, and accelerate software
    development through Digital Innovation Centers, leveraging private
    sector and industry best practices to fuel our digital transformation.
          Defend networks and assets through continuous active
    monitoring across the enterprise to increase cyber situational
    awareness. We will institute a security culture where a personal
    commitment to cybersecurity is required to gain access to the network.
    We will transform from a compliance-centered culture to one of constant
    readiness, and we will work with our industry partners to secure naval
    information wherever it resides.
    Managing Finance and Operationalizing the Audit
        We have completed the second full scope financial audit of the
    entire DoN, revealing more opportunities to improve our financial
    management and business processes as well as many other aspects of our
    enterprise. The financial audit is the lynchpin to both monitoring and
    catalyzing improved business operations performance. Our senior
    leadership has repeatedly emphasized to all personnel that active
    participation in the audit process is not just a financial exercise,
    but a management tool that must involve the combined effort of all of
    our personnel in order to identify ways to improve our organization's
    effectiveness and accountability.
        We are on track within the next two years to achieve qualified
    financial audit opinion for the Marine Corps, with an unqualified
    opinion the following year. This will make the Marine Corps the first
    military service in the Defense Department to receive such an opinion
    in the history of the United States. Achieving this for the Navy will
    be more challenging, but we continue to see improvements year to year.
    The DON has also conducted a Zero-Based Budget review designed to
    ensure alignment of goals and resources, achieve full value for every
    taxpayer dollar, and increase transparency in our resource allocation
    process. Finally, we have implemented Performance-to-Plan reviews that
    provided a fleet-focused and data-driven approach, accelerating
    readiness.
    Modernizing Naval Supply Chain and Logistics
        Our integrated naval force requires unified logistics operations
    and secure, reliable supply chains in order to maintain the
    distributed, forward maneuverable force demanded by the global
    strategic environment. Through the audit and other reform efforts, we
    have identified multiple areas where our supply chain and logistics
    processes are disjointed and divided, with areas of poor visibility and
    accountability that impact our forward inventory and readiness.
        These efforts have also revealed areas where greater integration
    between the services is needed and where our multiple supply chains
    require consolidation and optimization. We are developing a long-term
    strategy to address these deficiencies, beginning with a new modern
    vision for future integrated naval logistics and supply chain
    management, and will proceed with executing reforms consistent with
    this vision this year.
                       gray matter: developing our people
        We cannot solely define American seapower by ship counts and high-
    end systems. In the end, our core strength will always reside in the
    gray matter between the ears of our people as much as it does in the
    gray hulls out in our fleet. Recruiting, retaining, educating and
    caring for the best military and civilian force possible has always
    been and will always be our greatest edge against all competitors. We
    will meet this challenge through transformative investments in
    education, greater connections with partners and allies, a competitive
    human capital strategy, a recommitment to high quality housing for our
    naval families, and a determination to eliminate the scourge of sexual
    harassment and assault throughout our total force.
    Prioritizing Learning as a Strategic Advantage
        As stated in the 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report, the
    intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine Corps team and our
    ability to operate as a continuous learning organization will serve as
    the enduring foundation of our credible deterrent to war. In the year
    since the E4S report was completed, we have established the office of
    the Chief Learning Officer (CLO) and moved quickly to introduce
    sweeping changes in the structure, integration, and prioritization of
    naval education. These changes include:
          U.S. Naval Community College--Our highest priority is to
    create a new United States Naval Community College (USNCC) that offers
    advanced, online technical and analytic education to our enlisted force
    in critical areas like IT, cyber, and data science. Free for every
    sailor and marine, the USNCC will fill a long-neglected gap in our
    educational continuum and provide a recruiting and retention incentive
    through degree-granting relationships with major four-year public and
    private universities across the nation.
          Naval Education Strategy 2020--Our recently released
    Naval Education Strategy 2020 is the first ever comprehensive education
    strategy for our integrated naval force. The strategy will lay out a
    clear road map to develop a lifelong learning continuum for our entire
    force, reform our personnel systems to better recognize and reward the
    value of education, and invest in our schools and education programs.
          Strategic Education Requirement for Flag and General
    Officers--The opportunity to wargame future scenarios and technologies,
    study naval strategy and debate alongside peers is vital experience for
    the leaders who will guide our integrated force through the future
    strategic landscape. That is why we are now requiring in-residence
    strategic studies graduate education for promotion to Flag or General
    Officer rank.
    Recruiting, Curating and Retaining the Best Talent
        This budget provides the resources to fuel a new human capital
    strategy to better access and curate best-in-class talent for our Navy,
    Marine Corps, and civilian work force. We developed this strategy
    leveraging leading private sector business practices designed for the
    new economy. Initial pilot programs in support of this strategy will
    begin this year. The Navy's Sailor 2025 initiative and comparable
    initiatives in the Marine Corps have contributed to successful
    recruiting and retention in what should be a very challenging market.
        Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and
    customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the
    needs of the individual warfighter and their family, making continued
    service a viable and attractive option. We are increasing avenues for
    civilians with prior service through the Targeted Reentry Program, and
    expanding opportunities to serve in meaningful civilian capacities. We
    are also increasing opportunities for our personnel to learn, operate,
    and innovate alongside partners in the private sector, across the joint
    force, and alongside our partners and allies.
    Setting Our People Up for Success
        Through USMC Global Force Management, we will continue to field an
    elite Active and Reserve Marine force, maintaining a 1:2 deployment to
    dwell ratio while working towards a necessary 1:3 ratio to preserve
    constant readiness and availability of personnel while also reserving
    time for training, refitting and family support. This budget increases
    funding and training for Marine Forces Pacific in support of the
    Commandant's Planning Guidance and the NDS. The DON has also
    implemented over 100 of the recommendations from the Readiness Reform
    and Oversight Council (RROC) in order to maximize opportunities for our
    personnel to succeed. Among many other changes, we have increased
    opportunities for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while
    adjusting manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of
    life and professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway.
    Standing Up for Our Military Families
        Our people must be confident that their leadership will look out
    for their interests and advocate tirelessly for their safety and well-
    being. Unfortunately, as Congress correctly identified last year, we
    have not always lived up to that responsibility, particularly with
    respect to our administration and oversight of the Military Privatized
    Housing Initiative (MPHI) program. We are committed to making sure we
    assess, monitor, and remediate issues of concern quickly and
    effectively through active and engaged leadership and reinforced
    Department-level oversight to restore the trust of our residents. Over
    the past year, Navy and Marine Corps leaders reached out to all of our
    sailors, marines, and their families to inquire about on-base housing
    concerns and offered home visits to better understand those concerns.
    We are also leveraging technologies such as an app for residents to
    report issues and track their resolution and an Electronic Data
    Warehouse that allows leaders at every level the opportunity to spot
    trends and issues quickly and effectively. This budget also provides
    resources for additional personnel to advocate for resident needs. In
    total, the Navy and Marine Corps housing programs are hiring 277 more
    housing management specialists, housing inspectors, quality assurance
    specialists, and project and business managers.
    Combating Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
        We are each determined to eliminate the scourges of sexual assault
    and sexual harassment from every part of our force. These behaviors
    stand as a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to serve and of
    every person who wears the uniform, military and civilian. Our Sexual
    Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is coordinating
    education, outreach, care and prevention efforts across the force. We
    have reached out to university presidents and other civilian education
    leaders through our first annual symposium held at the U.S. Naval
    Academy in April 2019, as well as regional discussions in New York City
    in September 2019 and in Albuquerque, New Mexico in early February
    2020. We are examining new prevention and education efforts including a
    renewed focus on junior enlisted leaders and the role of alcohol in
    sexual assault and harassment. We will continue to work with this
    Committee to pursue and share the best practices and ideas,
    relentlessly pursuing a future where no sailor, marine, or civilian
    teammate ever has to fear for their own safety while protecting us all.
    Building a Robust Constellation of Partners and Allies
        As extraordinary as the people of our integrated naval force are,
    we recognize that we cannot meet the global challenge alone. The
    strategic maritime defense partnerships we maintain with our partners
    and allies around the world extend the reach and power of our force,
    but more importantly they underscore the importance of cooperation and
    coordination in maintaining the rules-based international order that
    enables so much of our global prosperity and security. Our personnel
    regularly train and operate alongside their foreign counterparts, test
    the interoperability of our systems, and build our collective
    readiness. Operational exercises, international port calls, joint
    Marine force training, aviation training and other interactions all
    build the personal contact that generates understanding and respect
    across national and functional lines. Our personnel know that through
    their service they are front-line diplomats for our nation, promoting
    through their professionalism and dedication the connections that
    strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that
    send the message that the United States is a partner worth having.
                              u.s. navy priorities
        The President's fiscal year 2021 budget request seeks nearly $160
    billion for the U.S. Navy, an investment that will continue the
    momentum built since the release of the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS). The competition articulated in the NDS will continue for the
    foreseeable future and demands purposeful action over a long time
    horizon. As a result, consistent, sustained, and predictable funding is
    critical to ensure that taxpayer investments already made in the Navy
    are fully realized. We are grateful for the predictable funding we have
    received in recent years.
        We are proud of our intensely collaborative effort to deliver
    Integrated American Naval Power to the people we are sworn to defend.
    This integration will sustain the naval forces that our nation demands
    and our Joint Force expects. This integration will also place the
    United States in the best position to compete and win against the
    pacing threats we face.
        The guiding principle of the Navy's portion of this budget request
    is to deliver decisive naval power, blending readiness, lethality, and
    capacity together to create a naval force that is agile and ready to
    fight today while also committing to the training, maintenance, and
    modernization to ensure the Navy can fight and win tomorrow. This
    budget submission materially advances the efforts that fall under these
    three objectives.
    Readiness
        The CNO's initial guidance to the Navy stated, ``Mission One for
    every Sailor is a ready Navy...a Navy ready to fight today.'' The Navy
    must be able to conduct prompt and sustained combat at sea, but current
    readiness also supports the indispensable roles the Navy performs on a
    daily basis: securing American commerce, which is more heavily entwined
    with the seas than ever; telegraphing resolve; and deterring conflict.
    These roles are enduring and timeless, but they are also deeply
    connected to the priorities articulated in the NDS.
        It is important to consider the historical context for this intense
    focus on readiness. The readiness landscape today differs significantly
    from twenty years ago. In 2000, the Navy had 318 battle force ships.
    Today, we have 293 after growing from a recent minimum of 271 battle
    force ships a few years ago. However, the number of deployed ships
    across the timespan from 2000 to today remained roughly constant.
    Today, we have 68 battle force ships deployed around the world.
    Sustaining this level requires many more than that number to deploy
    each year.
        These demands for naval forces have led us to forward deploy a
    greater proportion of the force and significantly increase the length
    of rotational deployments. The extended deployment of the Abraham
    Lincoln is an example of this trend: her 294-day deployment was the
    longest for an aircraft carrier since the mid-1970s. While her
    extension was the best decision we could offer to support the demand
    for forces, it does not come without consequences. When ships,
    aircraft, and submarines are deployed longer, they require more
    maintenance to return to sea as ready as they were before. Moreover,
    our statistics show that this relationship is sometimes non-linear:
    ``surge'' deployments and heavier operational use can exponentially
    increase the time and cost required to recapitalize these valuable
    assets.
        Our approach to implementing the NDS has already led us to guard
    readiness more carefully by ruthlessly prioritizing requests for
    forces. The growth of the Navy over the past several years has also
    increased the denominator in the readiness equation, relieving some
    pressure on the force.
        Yet there is much more to do, and we are committed to finding and
    closing readiness gaps. The American taxpayer and the Congress have
    generously funded ships, submarines, and aircraft, and we owe it to the
    people we are sworn to protect and defend to be good stewards of those
    investments.
        We are committed to funding readiness at the maximum executable
    level. President's Budget 2021 makes a strong commitment to current
    readiness, acknowledging the sustained effort required to mitigate the
    effects of decades of intensive use of our ships, aircraft, and
    submarines. The funding requested for individual accounts such as Ship
    Depot Maintenance and Aircraft Depot Maintenance have increased over
    fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, reflecting purposeful choices about
    what we need to be ready today.
        The Navy is already moving aggressively to ensure these funds are
    well spent. No reform is too small. Our relentless pursuit of reform
    has already paid dividends: our achievement of 80 percent mission-
    capable tactical aircraft this past year is one example. Acknowledging
    the challenges in depot-level maintenance and modernization, the CNO
    has directed Navy leaders to find the key levers of productivity that
    will allow us to deliver depot-level availabilities on time and in
    full. Although there is much to do, we are encouraged by the trends we
    are beginning to see. Our public shipyard workload has led us to
    increase hiring, increasing public shipyard end strength by 16 percent
    from 2013. We are working aggressively to improve estimates of the
    length of time our platforms need to be in maintenance, level-load
    depot-level maintenance across our network of industrial partners,
    better integrate different maintenance organizations within the Navy,
    and utilize predictive analytics. In concert with continued discipline
    in guarding readiness, we believe that we can deliver our platforms in
    maintenance on time and in full. We are also grateful for the strong
    support we received from Congress in our enacted 2020 budget for a
    pilot program for private contractor shipyard maintenance in the
    Pacific, and request that this pilot continue. We value our close
    partnership with industry and recognize that predictability on our part
    will help incentivize our partners to grow, providing critical capacity
    to complement the work in our public shipyards.
        President's Budget 2021 robustly funds ship and aircraft
    operations, another essential element of readiness. As previously
    mentioned, it provides for 58 underway days per quarter per ship and
    bolsters flying hours for our aircraft. This directly contributes to
    readiness by allowing our sailors to train to complex, high-end naval
    warfare scenarios at sea and creating the maritime expertise our nation
    expects. While there is no replacement for operating at sea, the Navy
    is working rapidly to integrate Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC)
    training into the mix. LVC training allows units at all stages of force
    generation to maximize training for high-end warfare, and prevents the
    degradation of key warfighting competencies when platforms are
    undergoing maintenance.
        This budget request also recognizes the truth that we cannot
    neglect our shore infrastructure in favor of future force structure or
    other priorities without an impact to readiness. This year's budget
    requests the largest amount of funds for Navy shore infrastructure in
    the past four years, allowing us to create readiness at sea through
    increased readiness ashore. Congressional support for this request will
    also help the Navy meet its obligations to sailors and their families,
    increasing the quality of public-private venture housing through
    increased oversight funded by approximately $35 million each year of
    the FYDP, addressing perfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination
    with $44 million requested for clean-up programs, and rebuilding Navy
    facilities in the wake of recent natural disasters.
        Readiness at sea also depends land-based training ranges,
    especially for aviators and special warfare operators. These include
    the Navy's training center in Fallon, Nevada. Expansion of this range
    is critical to maintaining our readiness today as newer weapons,
    released from distances much greater than those of just a few years
    ago, require a larger safety zone around target areas. Expanding this
    range will allow us to send our sailors into combat fully prepared,
    providing realistic training and the skills they will need to win. We
    are committed to work with federal, state, tribal, and local partners
    to do so in a way that addresses the concerns of all.
        Finally, a ready Navy depends on our true asymmetric advantage: our
    people. President's Budget 2021 increases Active Duty manning to keep
    our human capital synchronized with our force structure, raising our
    end strength by 7,300 sailors. This reduces gaps and shortfalls at sea,
    directly contributing to readiness. Manning ships, aircraft, and
    submarines at sea remains a top priority, and we will continue to
    operate effectively and sustainably over time as the battle fleet
    grows. The budget also sustains the suite of efforts under the Sailor
    2025 initiative and continues to transform our Manpower, Personnel,
    Training and Education (MPT&E) system to provide auditable, responsive
    services to our sailors and responsibly reduce costs. It funds expanded
    educational efforts to obtain warfighting advantage. Recognizing our
    ethical obligation to create a strong, positive environment for our
    sailors, as well as the positive effect such an environment has on
    recruiting and retaining talent, we are committed to eliminating
    destructive behaviors such as sexual assault. We are focused on
    creating and sustaining a Culture of Excellence, where our sailors do
    not merely avoid doing what is wrong, but actively pursue what is
    right. The Culture of Excellence program also leverages predictive
    analytics to intervene before destructive behaviors occur, breaking the
    cycle of simply responding to events.
        We are witnessing very good trends in recruiting and retention.
    This has enabled us to fill gapped billets at sea, reducing them from
    6,500 in December 2018 to 4,900 in December 2019. We met our retention
    goals for all zones in 2019, retaining 76 percent of the force. We're
    reforming our recruiting efforts, saving millions of dollars by
    processing forms for new accessions using biometric signatures. Our
    recruiters are exceeding their goals: 2019 saw the Navy sign the
    second-largest number of Active Duty contracts, 40,756 new accessions,
    in the last 15 years. In an environment with low unemployment levels,
    these statistics are encouraging and demonstrate the America's young
    people see great value in joining the Navy team.
    Lethality
        Deterring our competitors from malign activity requires fielding a
    forward-deployed, lethal naval force. Our competitors are heavily
    investing in technologies aimed at our naval forces. Across the Navy's
    Total Obligation Authority (TOA), the capability investments directly
    enhancing current and future lethality comprise approximately 21
    percent of the Navy's annual budget. This investment can be further
    sub-divided into future capability (811 percent) and modernization (810
    percent).
        Relative to the entire Navy budget, the value proposition of our
    modernization investments are often overlooked when compared with
    resources applied to major ship and aircraft procurement accounts. Each
    dollar is thoughtfully applied to specific key capabilities based upon
    a rigorous analysis of iterative wargames, exercises, and
    experimentation. Offensive and defensive modernization efforts enable
    our ships and aircraft to operate in the face of today's advanced anti-
    ship and anti-aircraft systems.
        In particular, we increased our investments in directed energy and
    hypersonic weapons. In terms of directed energy, we request to apply
    $170.3 million in fiscal year 2021 to our directed energy programs,
    which will rapidly advance our ship's defensive capabilities. In terms
    of hypersonics, we request to increase our investments from $642
    million in fiscal year 2020 to $1.4 billion. President's Budget 2021
    continues our focus on developing long-range, offensive fires launched
    from ships, submarines, and aircraft, including: Conventional Prompt
    Strike, the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended
    Range (JSOW-ER), the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and the
    Standard Missile--(SM-) 6. We are moving quickly to extend the range of
    the carrier air wing with the rapid development of the MQ-25, the
    Navy's first unmanned carrier based aircraft. MQ-25 does more than
    extending our reach; it lays the foundation for integrating unmanned
    air power into our carrier fleet. The combined effects of these
    modernization efforts extends the lethal strike range of the CVW into
    denied areas while enabling the CVN to operate outside the threat
    ranges of adversary anti-ship missile threats.
        The fiscal year 2021 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal
    year 2020 to pursue a networked fleet by investing $82 million ($395
    million across the FYDP) in artificial intelligence and machine
    learning technologies that improve decision quality and speed in
    combat. This networked fleet requires a resilient operational
    architecture to integrate our command and control, sensors, shooters,
    and weapons. To accomplish this, we will leverage our work on the Navy
    Tactical Grid to build the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
    alongside our Joint teammates. Protecting our networked forces requires
    building cyber resilience and security into our platforms from the
    beginning. To meet this need, the Navy will fund $4.17 billion across
    the FYDP to protect our operations, equipment, and industrial base from
    intrusions and ensure we have the means to fight through and recover
    from cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, we will integrate our cyber forces more
    closely with fleet operations to deliver catastrophic cyber effects as
    part of an integrated all-domain naval force.
        These investments all support a highly maneuverable fleet that
    controls the high-end fight. Nuclear powered aircraft carriers remain
    crucial to this effort and the Carrier Strike Group remains the
    cornerstone of the Navy's forward presence, sea control, and power
    projection capabilities. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN),
    associated air wing (CVW), surface combatants, and sub-surface
    combatants represent the most survivable and lethal maritime fighting
    force in the world, providing long-range kinetic and non-kinetic
    effects from distributed mobile platforms at sea without the need for
    foreign basing rights. The CVN and embarked CVW are vital to the
    Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operating concept, providing the
    flexibility and endurance to hold large swaths of land or sea at risk
    for extended periods of time. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a
    generational leap in the aircraft carrier's capacity to project power
    on a global scale. Ford-class carriers are designed to generate a 30
    percent higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than a
    Nimitz-class carrier. This translates to $4 billion savings over the
    life of the program generating more decisive naval power. With the
    successful completion of CVN 78's Post Shakedown Availability and
    subsequent Independent Steaming Events, finishing our work and
    delivering this capability to the fleet as quickly and effectively as
    possible is one of DON's highest priorities. The Navy has learned with
    each test and is consistently bringing each of the innovative systems
    online. Ford is currently undergoing final air compatibility testing,
    bringing the entire carrier air wing onboard and progressing towards
    her maiden deployment. We will continue to learn, iterate and improve,
    driving down cost on each subsequent ship of her class. We are grateful
    for the Committee's support of the program with the historic two-
    carrier award for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and are confident that the Ford-
    class will provide the foundation for highly maneuverable and lethal
    combat power projection well into the second half of this century.
        Our naval logistics enterprise undergirds the effective employment
    of our forces in a dispersed, forward-deployed manner across the
    spectrum of conflict from daily operations into sustained major combat
    operations. Our logistics forces must provide forward-deployed repair
    and resupply as well as combat medical services to revive our forces on
    station. In addition, we will begin designing two new vessels, the Next
    Generation Medium Amphibious Ship and the Next Generation Medium
    Logistics Ship that will support our expeditionary forces operating in
    contested maritime spaces.
                                    capacity
        To increase America's naval power, we will continue to build more
    ships, submarines, and aircraft. There has been a long-standing
    consensus across the government that the Navy needs to grow. We are
    focused on responsible growth, a rate of growth that ensures our
    ability to effectively maintain the fleet and to properly man, train,
    and equip that fleet.
        We appreciate the strong support from Congress for naval
    shipbuilding, funding last year's request for 12 ships. We reaffirm our
    commitment to reach the 355-ship goal in a reasonable and strategically
    relevant timeline, and to augment a future 355-ship Navy with
    developmental and unmanned vessels. The pace of growth will depend on
    both our ability to find savings within our own topline. While this
    budget request slows the growth to 355 slightly to ensure we properly
    maintain the fleet we have, we are seeking ways to support increased
    rates of growth in the coming years. The challenges extend beyond the
    shipbuilding accounts, as we must also consider what increases in
    operations and maintenance accounts will be required to continue the
    momentum we have built in regaining readiness. We cannot, and will not
    build a hollow force simply to reach the 355 ship number. Because of
    the rate of change in technology, we will continue to refine the
    required number of ships in an iterative fashion, in coordination with
    the Secretary of Defense, and as informed by wargaming and
    experimentation.
        The fiscal year 2021 budget requests $21 billion in ship
    construction for 8 battle force ships and plans to build 44 battle
    force ships (plus 17 unmanned ships) over the FYDP. This procurement
    includes one Columbia and one Virginia-class submarine each, two
    Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer, one Guided Missile Frigate, one LPD
    Flight II, and two Towing, Salvage, and Rescue ships.
        Deterring a nuclear attack on the homeland remains the Navy's most
    sacred duty and our number one acquisition priority. President's Budget
    2021 fully funds the first year of construction of the lead ship of the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. Over the FYDP, we plan to
    start construction on the second ship of the class in fiscal year 2024
    and, beyond the FYDP, to begin serial production in fiscal year 2026.
    The Columbia-class guarantees the most survivable leg of the nuclear
    triad remains on patrol into the 2080s, ensuring the secure second-
    strike capability that is the foundation of strategic deterrence.
        This budget request also supports one additional Virginia-class
    submarine in fiscal year 2021, continuing the Block V multiyear
    contract awarded in December 2019, which will then procure two per year
    from fiscal year 2022 through the FYDP. Additionally, the Guided
    Missile Frigate [FFG(X)] program is proceeding well, and will provide
    the fleet with a lethal small surface combatant that is optimized
    towards distributed maritime operations. The Navy plans to award the
    lead ship of the class in July 2020 and the second ship of the class in
    fiscal year 2021.
        We are committed to experimenting with unmanned systems, moving
    them beyond their current conceptual stage, and continuously assessing
    how they should be counted within the battle force. While we do not
    count unmanned ships at present, we will continue to procure our large
    unmanned surface vessel, buying 10 over the FYDP. These ships are
    envisioned to host both sensors and weapons. This procurement will
    transition to SCN funding by fiscal year 2023. We will also procure 6
    extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles in the FYDP which will help
    provide solutions for specific fleet needs.
        This budget also procures 277 fixed and rotary wing aircraft
    (including 121 F-35C) and 25 unmanned aircraft across the FYDP. We are
    completing the acquisition of several type/model/series aircraft and
    continuing to purchase essential capabilities, such as the advanced
    early warning provided by the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and a new, flexible
    logistics capability in the CMV-22 Osprey.
        We in the Navy are honored to defend American prosperity and
    American values around the world every day. We are excited to be
    working closely with the Marine Corps to deliver Integrated American
    Naval Power to perform these critical and timeless roles. We are
    conscious that every tax dollar spent to increase readiness, lethality,
    and capacity represents more than buying power, but the trust and
    confidence of the American people. We do not take that trust lightly
    and will seek every means to spend those dollars in a deliberate,
    methodical, and responsible fashion, maximizing naval power to the
    fullest extent that those funds enable. Thank you for your strong
    support and continued partnership in providing and maintaining a Navy.
                          u.s. marine corps priorities
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the
    Committee, this statement is my first report to Congress and represents
    my assessment of the current state of the Marine Corps and priorities
    for the future.
        The future operating environment will place heavy demands on our
    Nation's Naval Services, demands that the Marine Corps is not currently
    organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet. Modernizing the
    Marine Corps for the era of great power competition will require
    significant adjustments to long-term Service investments, new
    integrated naval warfighting organizations and concepts of employment,
    and better training and education for marines; changes that only
    Congress can help us realize. The fiscal year 2021 budget puts the
    Marine Corps on the path toward modernization, supports irreversible
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and sustains and
    builds our readiness to deter, fight, and win.
        My top priority as Commandant is to build the Marine Corps that
    will define integrated American naval power in 2030, even as it must
    remain ready to confront the challenges of today. I seek no additional
    resources for this effort. It is attainable with a stable budget and
    sustained by the leadership and oversight of Congress. Service
    modernization will require several years of dedicated analysis,
    wargaming, and experimentation on a level that we have not experienced
    in recent memory. We are committed to this effort and have already
    begun charting a new course. The Marine Corps is grateful to the
    Congress for its leadership and support during previous periods of
    modernization and seeks its continued support today.
        Before addressing the issues of force design, readiness,
    resourcing, and the latest fiscal year 2021 budget submission, it is
    important that I start with a few comments on our individual marines
    and the health of the Corps. I strongly believe that everything we do
    begins and ends with the individual marine--the heart and soul of our
    institution. On any given day, the vast majority of your 225,000
    marines, representing every state and territory, serve honorably and
    perform their duties at home and abroad in an exemplary manner. I am
    extremely proud to serve alongside them, and based on my discussions
    with members of this Committee, I know that my pride in them is shared.
    Regrettably, as several high profile incidents have revealed over the
    past several years, not all within your Marine Corps consistently
    adhere to our rigid standards, satisfy my expectations for professional
    behavior, or fulfill their obligations as marines. Addressing the
    corrosive effects of misconduct and criminality by this small yet
    destructive minority is a top priority, and I offer the following
    observations:
        The presence of the malignant individuals and sub-cultures within
    the institution produces a well-known and well-documented pattern of
    misogyny. A 2018 publicized report commissioned by my predecessor
    clearly supports these observations as facts. I have begun the process
    of exposing and eliminating these malignant subcultures from our ranks
    and will seek Congress' continued assistance to that end.
        Eradicating sexual harassment and sexual assault remains a
    challenge across the military and the Marine Corps. I acknowledge what
    many of you already suspect or know--after many years of trying, and
    despite our best efforts and intentions, remedial actions taken to date
    have not caused the desired outcomes. I seek to address this problem
    head on.
        There are some within our ranks who remain hesitant to accept
    gender-integrated training at our enlisted recruit depots. I would
    remind those marines that the Corps has conducted gender integrated
    training at Officer Candidates School for more than two decades, with
    outstanding results. I have every reason to believe that we can
    replicate that model in our enlisted recruit depots, and have already
    begun moving forward expeditiously, with the continued support of
    Congress. I understand the direction and the effort the Marine Corps
    must take to comply with the specified timelines for both MCRD Parris
    Island and MCRD San Diego in the 2020 NDAA that will meet the intent of
    Congress and the needs of the Marine Corps.
        The Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. We exist for that
    one purpose; to fight and to win. All that we do is standards-based in
    order to produce a premier expeditionary warfighting force for the
    Nation. In some occupational specialties within our Corps, there are
    legitimate operationally-derived physical requirements that every
    marine must meet. marines who meet these standards, regardless of
    biological sex or gender, will face no artificial barriers to their
    service or advancement.
        Appropriately addressing all of these issues becomes even more
    paramount as we design a future Marine Corps that is optimized to meet
    the challenges of 2030 and beyond. As we consider the skills,
    education, and capabilities required of the next generation of marines,
    we must be able to recruit and sustain a force that draws from 100
    percent of our Nation's collective reservoir of talent, innovation,
    creativity, and patriotism. I take it as a personal responsibility to
    do everything within my authority to ensure that the Marine Corps does
    not create any artificial barriers to service or advancement.
        Force Design is my top priority as stated in my Commandant's
    Planning Guidance. Over the next 3 to 5 months, we will continue to
    refine and deepen the analytical depth of our initial planning through
    an iterative process of wargaming, analysis, and experimentation. That
    work will directly support the redesign of our Corps. Our collective
    Fleet Marine Forces, as well as our HQMC organization and many of its
    processes, to include the existing Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
    and Execution (PPBE) process, require a comprehensive overhaul to
    create the necessary level of naval integration across the Department.
    Naval integration with the CNO's Staff, with the fleets, and within the
    Department remains a top priority for me, the CNO, and the Secretary.
        Thanks to your continued support, your Marine Corps remains the
    Nation's most ready force. We have made forces available for deployment
    to meet combatant commander requests around the globe, often on short
    notice. Those deployed Marine Units reinforce our commitment to U.S.
    allies and partners and serve to uphold the international rules-based
    order. Wherever deployed globally, your naval expeditionary forces
    facilitate conventional deterrence, prevent fait accompli scenarios
    from developing, and successfully compete against malign maritime gray
    zone activities to assure our allies and partners of our continued
    commitment. This will not change.
        With your support, over the previous two years we have been able to
    satisfy increased global force management demands, including those made
    on our legacy fixed-wing aircraft squadrons.
        However, we should be careful not to confuse availability with
    operational suitability. Readiness must be more than a mere measure of
    availability. True readiness, which we define as the readiness of a
    unit to be employed against a peer threat to achieve decisive tactical
    and operational outcomes, requires investment in modern capabilities
    commensurate with those of the threat. This will require a significant
    shift from our most recent fiscal year 2021 budget submission. I would
    also respectfully submit that it may require a reassessment of our
    existing processes and metrics for assessing unit readiness--true
    readiness as described above. Within the Marine Corps, I am sustaining
    and reinforcing initiatives started by my predecessors that will
    increase the realism of pre-deployment training to more closely align
    with scenarios identified in the NDS. In addition, following a path
    that I readily acknowledge has been charted over the course of decades
    by the Army, we have added an extensive program of force-on-force
    training to our long-standing live-fire combined arms training exercise
    program.
        With these goals in mind, over the coming months, we will make
    significant changes to the organization of our Training and Education
    Command, which will require the support and consent of civilian
    leadership for full implementation. Additionally, it is not lost upon
    me that our desert training facilities, superbly adapted as they have
    been to preparing for the challenges of the last three decades, are
    less than ideal for the kind of integrated naval training and
    experimentation that we need to prepare for great power competition in
    contested littoral environments. Identifying and developing first class
    littoral training areas will be one of my priorities going forward, for
    which I will ask your guidance and support.
        Regarding this fiscal year 2021 budget submission, I am well aware
    that our budget requests since the release of the NDS two years ago
    have changed only marginally year-to-year. While the cumulative impact
    of those marginal changes is in some cases substantial, many were
    budgetary actions that merely shifted funding within existing programs.
    This is not the kind of substantive change now needed, nor will it
    result in the premier naval expeditionary force required to implement
    the NDS and realize our evolving naval and joint concepts. In fact, our
    major programs of record prior to the formulation and release of the
    NDS--F-35, CH-53K, MV-22, ACV, and JLTV--have actually grown. As I
    stated in my Commandant's Planning Guidance, these and other programs--
    all of which were constructed to support a long-standing but now
    obsolescent conception of large-scale amphibious forcible entry--
    require a critical review. I expect that review will likely recommend
    major revisions and reductions to some of our major programs. We must
    then reinvest those resources into capabilities more relevant to the
    future security and warfighting environment, many of which we are
    developing but have yet to procure.
        This necessary divestment and subsequent reinvestment process is a
    complex effort, and one that prudence dictates be conducted in the most
    thoughtful and analytically defensible manner possible. While it may be
    shocking to some for a Service Chief to openly criticize existing
    programs and priorities, our shift to the future is in no way an
    indictment of previous decisions or conclusions of those who once sat
    at this table or of any who provided oversight in the past. The simple
    fact that the strategic environment has changed significantly and that
    we are now in an era of great power competition, mandates that we must
    make the necessary adjustments to our naval warfighting concepts and
    accompanying investment plans to create true readiness--operationally
    relevant and available naval forces that create overmatch over
    anticipated adversaries. I understand there are both structural
    impediments to change as well as strong interests resisting change;
    however, as I stated during my confirmation--I will always provide my
    best military advice and ultimately defer to and support the decisions
    of the civilian leadership within the Department and Congress.
        The timing of this fiscal year 2021 budget submission coincides
    with an inflection point for the Marine Corps. Subsequent annual
    submissions will reflect that significant change in focus, and indeed I
    anticipate there will be opportunities even during the execution of the
    fiscal year 2020 budget to make in-stride adjustments with the consent
    and support of Congress. Simply put, with peer competitors striving to
    supplant the role of U.S. military forces regionally and globally, we
    cannot afford to delay modernization when we see opportunities to make
    prudent adjustments from prior plans. If we are to avoid being
    outpaced, agility in reprogramming becomes an essential tool to apply
    where it makes sense to do so.
        This budget also supports our assertion that marine forces--
    operating as part of an integrated naval force--must seamlessly
    integrate into and play a complementary role within a larger joint
    force. Over the next few years, we must strive to reduce duplication of
    warfighting capabilities to only those areas that make sense tactically
    and operationally. Marine Corps contributions should largely be unique,
    complementary, and tailorable to the joint mission.
        Beyond the issues germane to my role as Commandant of the Marine
    Corps--to organize, train, and equip Marine Corps forces in support of
    the fleets and combatant commanders--I offer the following observations
    as a senior naval officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Today's environment of renewed great power competition demands a
    truly integrated naval force; we no longer enjoy the luxuries of
    internal Service focus and inefficiency that the ``unipolar moment''
    allowed. The imperative now to accelerate naval integration is driven
    not by historical example nor traditional bonds between our naval
    Services--it is driven by the global environment described in the
    National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Our ability
    to operate as an integrated naval expeditionary force within contested
    areas provides the joint force with an asymmetric advantage, an edge
    that we must preserve and strengthen in this era of great power
    competition.
        We need adequate numbers of naval platforms and surface combatants
    with the lethality to contribute to sea control and sea denial and
    appropriate defensive capabilities and sensors to operate in a
    distributed manner without imposing undue burdens on other platforms.
    Those platforms must also be affordable from both a procurement and
    sustainment perspective, as well as generate the kind of availability
    needed to meet future force generation requirements. Included in that
    future fleet must be adequate numbers of traditional amphibious ships
    as well as next generation amphibious ships that will enable the Fleet
    Commanders to employ the naval expeditionary force throughout a
    contested littoral area in a more distributed, lethal, and defensible
    manner.
        While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that
    Congress expects nothing less from the Marine Corps. With your
    continued leadership and support, we will achieve our shared goals and
    modernize our warfighting capabilities and culture to best support the
    Navy, the Joint Force, and the Nation.
                               closing statement
        On behalf of our entire integrated naval force and every sailor,
    marine and civilian in the Department of the Navy, the three of us
    would like to once again thank the leadership and membership of this
    Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing support of our men
    and women in uniform. We are also grateful to the Committee for the
    recent passage of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA). By passing this legislation you have enabled many of the
    priorities identified within this document, and you've sent a strong
    signal of support to our people--and a stern warning to our
    adversaries.
        We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability of the
    past several years. This has given our force the agility and
    flexibility necessary to address emerging threats and the needs of our
    integrated naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial and
    relevant spending. This stability has saved money for the American
    taxpayer. We owe it to them to ensure that every single dollar is
    invested in the most effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred
    oath.
        We urge the Committee to do everything possible to ensure continued
    funding stability so that we may implement the needed reforms and
    spending priorities discussed in this document to meet the great power
    challenge, protect the maritime commons, and stand in defense of the
    United States of America. On behalf of the world's finest marines and
    sailors, we thank you for your time and ongoing efforts, and we look
    forward to your questions.

        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Admiral.
        Secretary Modly, I probably should have started with you,
    but you are recognized now.

    STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS B. MODLY, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Secretary Modly. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for your
    bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, marines, and
    civilians of the Department of the Navy.
        It is an honor to be here today with Admiral Gilday and
    General Berger, both of whom have demonstrated a great
    commitment to each other and to each other's respective naval
    service as they worked collaboratively over the last several
    months to lead our integrated American naval force. Consistent
    with that spirit, we have taken a different approach to the
    written testimony this year by submitting one unified document
    instead of three separate documents, which you have seen.
        Staying ahead in today's rapidly changing global strategic
    environment demands that our naval forces commit to unified
    planning, clear-eyed assessments, and sometimes some very, very
    hard choices. In this process, we must harmonize competing
    priorities, sustain our critical industrial base, and not allow
    our maritime competitive advantage to erode relative to global
    competitors and, more accurately stated, aggressive adversaries
    who wish to hasten our decline as a global force for liberty
    and for decency.
        In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of
    the hard choices we had to make this year, but it is centrally
    about the safety, security, and wellbeing of our sailors,
    marines, and their families. Ultimately I ask that you
    recognize that in this submission, we could not make trades
    that put our sailors and marines on platforms with equipment
    that are not ready for a fight, if a fight is what is going to
    be required of them.
        While this budget slows our trajectory to a force of 355 or
    more ships, it does not arrest that trajectory. You have my
    personal assurance that we are still deeply committed to
    building that larger, more capable, more distributed naval
    force within the strategically relevant time frame of no more
    than 10 years. I look forward to working with this Committee
    and the entire Congress in the coming months as we develop some
    realistic plans to do that.
        Our budget also demonstrates a clear commitment to the
    education of our people as we implement the recommendations of
    the Education for Seapower Study that I led as the Under
    Secretary of the Navy for the last 2 years. We are establishing
    a naval community college for our enlisted personnel as part of
    a bold and unified naval education strategy that recognizes
    that the intellectual and ethical development of our people is
    critical to our success as a naval force.
        We are also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn
    commitment to our military families through significantly more
    engaged oversight and accountability of our public-private
    venture housing program.
        Finally, I would like this Committee to understand that as
    leaders of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and
    united in our determination to prevent sexual assault and
    sexual harassment throughout our force. Every sailor, marine,
    and Navy civilian deserve individual respect, dignity, and
    protection from this great naval institution. We have some work
    to do in this regard, but you have my personal commitment that
    we take it very, very seriously.
        We are grateful to the Congress for passing this year's
    NDAA which enables many of the priorities identified within
    this document. In passing this legislation, you have sent a
    strong signal of support to our people and a very, very stern
    warning to our adversaries.
        We also appreciate the funding stability and the
    predictability of the last several years. This has saved money
    for the American taxpayer and given our force the agility and
    flexibility to address emerging threats while investing in our
    integrated naval force.
        We urge the Committee to do what it can to continue the
    stability so that we can implement the reforms and investments
    required to meet great power challenges, protect the maritime
    commons, and defend the United States of America.
        Thank you for your time, and we look forward to your
    questions.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Berger?

     GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

        General Berger. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of this Committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and
    our priorities for the future. I am joined by the Sergeant
    Major of the Marine Corps behind me, Sergeant Major Black, and
    my wife Donna.
        I will start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral
    Gilday's thanks for timely funding, as well as your enduring
    commitment to the marines, sailors, and families through
    efforts like the hurricane recovery, which you authorized,
    provided for last year, and your revisions and oversight to our
    work on the public-private venture housing program which the
    Secretary mentioned. Your bipartisan support is critical to
    ensure that we continue to prioritize people as our greatest
    resource.
        Thanks to predictable funding over the last few years, the
    Marine Corps has made significant progress restoring both
    availability and readiness. We are now at an inflexion point.
    We have to pivot now toward modernization while sustaining the
    readiness that this Committee has worked hard to authorize and
    resource. This pivot in my opinion cannot wait until next year
    or the following. We must move now or risk overmatch in the
    future by an adversary, and that is a risk we will not take.
        As the National Defense Strategy directs and Secretary
    Modly recently emphasized in his first vector to all hands, we
    have to pursue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines
    have always sensed when it is time to move out smartly. We do
    not hesitate. This is that time.
        Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance
    requires acknowledging that there are fundamental changes in
    the operating environment and how we must organize, train, and
    equip the force. I am confident that most leaders recognize
    that significant change is required, yet the scope and the pace
    of that change is seemingly at odds with some historical
    resource allocations and some of our major acquisition programs
    which predate the National Defense Strategy.
        This budget submission marks the beginning of a focused
    effort to better align resources that you provide with
    strategic objectives. Our future budget submissions will build
    on those investments with informed recommendations for force
    design, modifications, and adjustments to our programs of
    record. Together in partnership with my battle buddy, Admiral
    Gilday, and under the direction of Secretary Modly, we are
    committed to delivering the integrated naval fleet marine
    forces your nation requires.
        As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our
    findings along the way, and we will keep each of you and your
    staffs informed as we progress. As always, we will be frugal
    with the resources we are given. We will ask for no more than
    we need. With Congress' commitment and support, we will ensure
    that your marines continue to have every advantage when we send
    them into harm's way.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General.
        I was going to start off talking about the fact that we do
    not have the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I am sure somebody will
    do that. There are two things that I wanted to get to, though,
    and one obviously is--it would not be unexpected--the USS
    Gerald Ford. I think most of us around this table here have
    been down there, have walked it, understand it, but we are also
    fully aware that that ship--the original plan to deliver the
    ship was September of 2015. The ship was going to be delivered
    fully capable at the cost of $10.5 billion. Now the projected
    full delivery of the ship would be April of 2021, the cost
    being at $13.2 billion.
        Secretary Modly, today is your lucky day. You get to make
    the next prediction. I would like to have you kind of share
    with us where you think it is right now. It is my understanding
    that a lot of the things--it is not just the elevators--we talk
    about those--but also the catapults, arresting gear, the radar,
    and I understand now that the non-skid situation is taken care
    of from visiting with you in my office. But kind of go over
    where we are today, what your predictions are, and when this is
    going to happen.
        Secretary Modly. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity to
    talk about the Ford. I think the history that you laid out
    about the Ford is not a good history, and it is one that we
    should never allow to happen again. It is not the way that we
    should be delivering ships to the U.S. Navy.
        That being said, we are where we are with that ship. One of
    the first things I did as the Acting Secretary was to basically
    put the fleet on notice that it is all hands on deck to make
    that ship ready for sea and ready for a fight, if that is what
    we needed to do.
        So, we have taken several proactive steps over the last
    several months to get that ship ready. A lot of this work was
    going on already, but one of the main things we did is we moved
    the two-star admiral who is responsible for the PEO for all
    carriers. We moved him to Norfolk to basically be there. It is
    symbolic but it is more than symbolic. It requires a lot of
    attention to detail on many of the things that were lacking on
    the ship.
        I have been down there twice since I have been the Acting
    Secretary, once as a surprise on my second day just to see what
    it is like, and I did not want any admirals there with me. I
    walked around, talked to the crew, got a good sense for where
    the ship was. I also rode the ship in after their last short
    deployment where they went out and did aircraft compatibility
    testing.
        It has been night and day for me in terms of my perspective
    and my perception of what is happening with that ship. They
    have made substantial progress on the elevators. The elevators
    that are working and certified--I think there are four of
    those. They have done thousands and thousands of cycles with
    those with no problems. They launched close to a thousand
    aircraft and recovered them with no problems on the EMALS
    [electromagnetic aircraft launch system] either--so significant
    progress.
        The most encouraging thing to me walking around that ship
    is talking to the crew. The crew loves the ship. The way the
    crew and how their jobs have changed, several of them coming
    from the Nimitz-class carrier to this carrier--it has
    completely changed the way they do their work.
        Chairman Inhofe. I understand that, and I also talked to
    the crew. Those are their feelings exactly.
        I wanted to get one more thing in in my time here. In a
    recent interview, you stated, quote, I do not know if we are
    going to buy any of the Ford-class after the CVN 81, which
    would be the fourth one. We are certainly thinking about the
    possibility of other classes. Can you elaborate on that
    statement?
        Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. I think we have a duty to look
    at what will come after the Ford. The fact that we made a two-
    carrier buy for the last two, it gives us some breathing room.
    It gives us a few years before we would have to award the next
    one, which would be in the 2027-2028 time frame.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That answers the question.
        General Berger, on the CH-53K, which would be replacing the
    CH-53E, we are familiar with the cost of this thing and some of
    the overruns. I would kind of like to get an update in this
    brief period of time from you as to where we are, why it is
    really necessary, and just give us your opinion on that.
        General Berger. Thank you, sir.
        The requirement for a heavy lift helicopter remains valid,
    in fact probably more valid in the adversaries, the competitors
    that we need to face and where you want your forward marines.
    You have to have the ability to move that force around and its
    sustainment from ship to shore or shore to shore or back to
    ship again. We have a valid requirement.
        A year ago, the 53-K was in a different spot. We had both
    technical, as you know, engineering problems and cost problems.
    Today we are in a much better place engineering-wise,
    technologically. It looks like the 53-E on the outside, but
    like you know, you pop the hood, it is a completely different
    aircraft. Everything from the exhaust, gas recirculation, to
    the other 100-plus engineering challenges, we have either
    solved or Sikorsky has a solid path forward. So I am very
    confident that the aircraft is on the right trajectory. Now it
    is function of cost, as you pointed out, sir, both procurement
    and the cost to operate----
        Chairman Inhofe. Why does it cost more than an F-35?
        General Berger. Pardon me, sir?
        Chairman Inhofe. Never mind. No, I was making a comment
    that it costs more than an F-35. When you are talking to the
    general public, they do not know much about your--they know
    about the F-35. Go ahead. So why does it cost more than an F-
    35?
        General Berger. It is a brand-new fly-by-wire aircraft.
        Chairman Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As I indicated in my opening comments, the Navy is
    critically short of attack submarines, 15 below the goal
    established previously and accepted by the Navy, and 14
    destroyers below that objective.
        Admiral Gilday, is there any chance that this demand will
    lessen over time or increase?
        Admiral Gilday. Senator, given the pace of the Chinese
    right now, I do not think that that threat is going to subside.
        I also think, particularly in the undersea, we have an
    advantage, a significant advantage, and so we want to maintain
    that overmatch. We do not want to take our foot off the pedal.
        Senator Reed. No. I appreciate that.
        I think also to, with respect to Russia, their
    sophistication undersea is another challenge. It is not just
    simply numbers. It is also more sophisticated vessels. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, much more sophisticated. As you
    know, the capabilities that we are putting into the Virginia-
    class, the block 4's and the block 5's, are significant. They
    are a significant leap forward for the United States. Our
    intention is to continue to press with that technology and
    improve it.
        Senator Reed. Now, on the block 5 buy, there was a 9-ship
    commitment, plus an optional ship. One of the concerns I have
    is the window for this option will close very quickly and that
    this might be the best year to exercise the option. Can you
    comment on that? Because I see pressure not only in the
    construction of the additional block 5 vessels but from all we
    have talked about here before, the aircraft carriers,
    everything else, destroyers. This might be the best year. Is
    that right?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I believe so.
        In terms of the workforce, I was just up in Groton at
    Electric Boat a week or so ago, and I left that shipyard
    confident about the capability of that yard to produce boats at
    the rate of two a year. They are planning for the significant
    increase of the work when the Columbia build begins in earnest.
    But that is a passionate, well-trained workforce up there, and
    I think that they can handle two boats a year based on what I
    have seen.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, the chairman alluded to
    this issue, but we are still awaiting these two significant
    reports, the Force Structure Assessment and also the
    shipbuilding plan. Based on Secretary Esper's testimony
    yesterday, I believe it is at his desk literally. We are
    waiting for that, and when will we get it?
        Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. I am very anxious to get over
    here and talk that through with the Committee. Secretary Esper
    wanted a little more time to digest it. It is informed by the
    2021 budget but also by the integrated Force Structure
    Assessment that Admiral Gilday and General Berger put together,
    and I think he just wanted more time to understand it. We will
    bring it over here as soon as he feels that he is ready to do
    that.
        Senator Reed. I think the Committee encouraged him to take
    adequate time but not a lot of time. So we hope that will be
    the case.
        General Berger, you have programs with the Army with
    respect to the JLTV, the joint light tactical vehicle. The Army
    is making some changes in the program. Are you adjusting to
    them, or how are you adjusting to them I should ask.
        General Berger. Senator, I am aware of the adjustments that
    they are making. We have not made any changes yet to our
    procurement, and if we did, it would be based on the Marine
    Corps' needs. But we are absolutely tracking the changes, the
    adjustments that they are making. So far, sir, I have seen it
    down in North Carolina where my son is. It is a phenomenal
    vehicle.
        Senator Reed. I have had the chance to look at it at the
    facility, and it is much more significantly--well, it is a good
    vehicle. I will stop right there.
        Secretary Modly, the Committee in the last few years has
    created the National Sea-based Deterrence Fund because we
    understand the industrial base is significant, and there are
    problems with the industrial base for every type of platform.
    We think that by going into the industrial base through the
    prime contractors not only can we increase quality, protect
    from cyber intrusion, but also generate savings from doing the
    work right the first time.
        Can you just briefly comment? I do not have much time.
        Secretary Modly. Senator, I agree. We have had some
    vulnerabilities in the supply chain across the entire Navy. It
    is a vulnerability that our adversaries have figured out, that
    is easy for them to get in, and they can piece information
    together, and they get a bigger picture even when a supplier
    may think that small piece of information is not relevant. So
    we are investing heavily in this. We are developing new
    strategies for how we do this, how perhaps we develop
    capabilities to perhaps create cloud areas for them that are
    secure. But it is a big concern of ours and we are addressing
    it.
        Senator Reed. In addition to that, it is a simple fact that
    quality construction at the sub prevents rework at the prime.
        Secretary Modly. Absolutely.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        I appreciate the service of all three of you. I know you
    have had to deal with a budget number that you did not arrive
    at yourselves, and I appreciate you doing that difficult task.
    We hope we can use our power of the purse here in this
    Committee and in the Congress to help you out on that.
        I think Ranking Member Reed expressed, with regard to the
    30-year shipbuilding plan, the sentiment of most people on this
    Committee that the Secretary should take enough time but not
    too much time. So I want to subscribe my views to what he said
    about that.
        Admiral Gilday, with regard to the submarines, let me make
    sure. You said that the threat will not diminish. Actually the
    threat is increasing, and you nodded. But that is correct.
    Right?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I agree.
        Senator Wicker. That is not only with regard to the
    specific question, Admiral, that Senator Reed asked about
    submarines, but it is actually across the entire fleet. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Gilday. I would agree with that as well, sir.
        Senator Wicker. All right. Thank you very, very much.
        I appreciate the fact that the NDAA tasked the Navy last
    year to review alternative acquisition strategies. The Navy
    came back with a report that said significant savings could be
    achieved by procuring various combinations of amphibious ships.
        So let me ask you, Secretary Modly, and General Berger
    about these findings, particularly as they are related to the
    three LPDs and the LHA-9. Can you speak to the timeline for
    awarding the funding of these ships and what are the benefits
    of procuring these four ships together? Let me just get all my
    questions out there, and we will see what we can do in less
    than 3 minutes.
        What are the specific capabilities and what is the specific
    importance, General Berger, of the amphibious ships that I
    mentioned?
        General Berger. Sir, the amphibious ships capabilities-wise
    in the past, pretty conventional view of what they did in terms
    of the Navy, the force projecting the marines ashore. The way
    that we are going to need to operate in the future, even more
    challenging, and the role of the amphibious ship I think goes
    up. Why? Because in order to operate a force inside a contested
    area, at the unclass level, inside there, you have got to have
    the mobility and you need the ability to sustain that force for
    a long period of time in austere conditions and move that force
    around. Amphibious ships--people have spoke of them as sort of
    the Swiss Army knife. They are because you can move a force
    from the air, on the water. You got multiple means to do the
    job. So I think their value to the naval force and their value
    to the joint force goes up in the future.
        Secretary Modly. With respect to business considerations,
    Senator, we are looking at all types of options to be able to
    bundle our buys of ships in order to drive down the costs,
    provide more stability to the industrial base and that supplier
    base, which extends far beyond just the shipyards that are
    doing the primary construction. So I talked to Secretary Geurts
    about this this morning about how we might be doing this
    particularly in the amphib area, and we are going to be
    thinking about that and developing some plans to do that.
        Senator Wicker. Specifically the United States currently
    has four DDGs based in Rota, Spain. These platforms provide an
    advanced multi-mission defense capability. I think we are
    getting the right testimony with regard to the need there. Do
    we need the two additional DDGs in Rota, Spain? And tell us
    about the plans to accomplish that.
        Admiral Gilday. Senator, we support the two additional DDGs
    to Spain. Right now, we are working with United States European
    Command. They are putting together their strategic lay-down of
    the theater. So, when that is complete, you will be briefed up
    here in the Congress, and then in parallel, we will be moving
    through the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense coordinating with the Department of
    State and then finally the Government of Spain so they can line
    everything up to get additional DDGs at some point to Rota. But
    we are very supportive right now. Our assessment is that the
    Spanish want us there in greater numbers, and certainly the
    Commander of United States European Command does.
        Senator Wicker. Just briefly, General Wolters has testified
    that we actually have the infrastructure there at Rota that is
    able at this point to house the two additional destroyers. Is
    that correct, Admiral?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here, for your service, and thank
    you, General Berger, for your wife's presence here today.
    Donna's presence I think points to the importance of our
    military families and the service and sacrifice that they make
    so that we can be the greatest and strongest military force in
    the world.
        In that connection, I would just like to mention I did not
    have a chance to question General Milley or Secretary Esper
    yesterday about the tenant bill of rights for military housing
    which, frankly, is somewhat mystifying to me in failing to set
    forth three of the essential rights that we incorporated in the
    NDAA last year. I want to emphasize again the importance of
    military housing and raising it to the standards that we think
    are important. I am going to be submitting questions in writing
    to them. I do not want to take time on it this morning, but any
    responses in writing you have on that issue I would certainly
    welcome.
        General Berger, I appreciated your response to Senator
    Inhofe about the CH-53K, and I agree with you totally on the
    importance of this aircraft. In fact, as you may know, today
    literally marks the birthday of Connecticut's Sikorsky
    Engineering, which was established March 5, 1923. It has
    provided 97 years of capability for our nation's defense,
    including the CH-53K, which is a marvel of engineering.
        I want to suggest that the cost of each aircraft would come
    down if the pace of production is increased. If we go from
    seven to nine, which I would advocate, the cost per copy would
    come down. Would you agree with that point?
        General Berger. I would agree with the math, yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Admiral Gilday, I want to thank you for your visit to
    Groton which was enormously meaningful and inspiring, and your
    very insightful questions--and I agree with you completely that
    we have one of the great, passionate, dedicated workforces in
    any engineering facility there at Groton.
        But I am deeply concerned by the graph that you and I saw
    of the worker demands, the production, and employment
    capabilities that we are going to see and the troughs, the deep
    dips in employment and particularly during 2023 to 2024. I
    would like to know what the Navy can do to mitigate those
    troughs. I know that time will not permit you to give a full
    answer, but I am going to ask for a full briefing. I asked for
    the charts and some of the underlying data while we were there,
    and I wonder if you could respond to that point.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes. I would just say with the lack of an
    additional submarine in fiscal year 2021, what we would do and
    we are doing right now is to take a look with Electric Boat at
    how we might be able to put some of their workforce that would
    otherwise potentially be furloughed to work whether that be at
    Portsmouth, New Hampshire in our facility up there or down at
    Newport News, Virginia.
        I will tell you this, that we believe that the defense
    industrial base, particularly the work that is being done with
    ships and submarines is absolutely the crown jewel in the
    defense industrial base. We want to work very closely to make
    sure that we do not hit a trough that we cannot recover from
    quickly because that industry just is not very elastic. We
    lived through this before, and we have to be more responsive.
        Senator Blumenthal. As you know, there has been a furlough
    of about 300 workers in the last few months, but that is
    minuscule compared to the thousands that we will see going down
    and then coming back in terms of the demands on that workforce.
    So the lack of that second submarine in 2021 is really going to
    be impactful. You are absolutely right. It is the crown jewel,
    and I think we are really playing with fire if we fail to make
    sure that workforce is sustained.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        General Berger, I want to return to the chairman's question
    about the 53 kilo. Given its costs, can you just tell us in a
    little more detail what is the long-term outlook for this
    helicopter?
        General Berger. Sir, our program of record is 200 aircraft.
    That is our requirement, and the two costs, as most folks in
    here are really well aware of, are the APOC, the individual
    cost upfront, and then the flyaway recurring cost. The math, as
    outlined accurately before--when we get on schedule for a buy
    and the learning curve continues up, then the cost starts to
    come down. But we have to close that gap because I owe you an
    honest answer that this is an aircraft that we can afford. This
    is an aircraft that we can sustain over the lifespan of it.
        So far, again, the engineering part I am very comfortable
    with. Now it is a function of closing the gap to where I can
    convince you that this is the best use of our resources for an
    aircraft we definitely need.
        Senator Cotton. So you are saying that you owe us an answer
    and you need to convince us. It does not sound like you are yet
    fully convinced yourself?
        General Berger. I think there is room still to close the
    gap, and Sikorsky agrees as well. The learning that happens on
    the first of anything, of course, they are going to drive down
    the cost just because they are going to produce it more
    efficiently and the engineering cost that is going to the first
    batch of research and engineering models is going to go down.
        Senator Cotton. When do you think we might get that answer?
        General Berger. The next contract is due to be awarded I
    think in the August-September time frame. We will know then.
        Senator Cotton. I want to turn to another item that was in
    the President's budget request, which I found interesting. You
    are going to buy Tomahawk missiles this year. Specifically, I
    see the Marine Corps in fiscal year 2019 asked for zero
    Tomahawk missiles. In fiscal year 2020, you asked for zero
    Tomahawk missiles, and in fiscal year 2021, you have requested
    48 Tomahawk missiles. I presume you are not planning to launch
    those off any of your amphibious ships. So could you tell us
    what you plan to do with those 48 Tomahawk missiles?
        General Berger. Yes, sir. Part of the homework that the
    Navy and Marine Corps have done over the past 6 months is how
    we think we are going to need to operate in the future as an
    integrated naval force. That means the Marine Corps assumes the
    role, which we have not had in the past 20 years, which is how
    do we contribute to sea control and sea denial. The Tomahawk
    missile is one of the tools that is going to allow us to do
    that.
        Now, it is much like the MQ-9 Reaper for us. It could be
    the answer. It could be the first step towards a longer-term
    answer 5, 6, 7 years from now. But what we need is long-range
    precision fires for a small unit, a series of units, that can
    from ship or from shore hold an adversary's naval force at
    risk, and that missile is going to help us do that.
        Senator Cotton. And is it safe to say that this decision is
    a result of our withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear
    Forces Treaty that you can explore these options?
        General Berger. I would assume so. I had not linked the two
    together. We just knew we need long-range precision fires
    beyond the range that we were restricted to before. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. And most particularly in the western
    Pacific, given China's long-range precision fires since they
    were never a party to that INF Treaty?
        General Berger. Absolutely, yes.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. I am glad to see that you are
    exploring those options. I am sure a lot of your marines would
    think it would be awesome of you launched them from amphibious
    ships, but probably not what you have in mind. But obviously,
    we face a pretty significant fire power gap in the western
    Pacific given China is stockpiling thousands of missiles, and
    it is good to see your service beginning to address that. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, in a hearing like this, you always get comments and
    questions about things that are left out. I want to start with
    a compliment, the fact that you have increased the R&D budget,
    because we are in not only a competition of forces and ships
    and troops, but a competition of innovation. If we are going to
    stay ahead in terms of the technology of future conflicts, R&D
    is going to be critical. Directed energy I think is an
    enormously important potential part of our naval force.
    Hypersonics we have discussed, and I think that is something we
    are going to be discussing or I am going to be talking,
    Admiral, with you and your staff on in a classified setting.
    Unmanned craft. I mean, there is just a lot of new technology
    that has to be developed over the next several years, and I
    compliment the Secretary and the Department for putting some
    emphasis on R&D and innovation.
        Now, for the other side of the coin, I am concerned that we
    are talking about trying to get to a 350-ship Navy, or
    actually, Mr. Secretary, I think you have talked about a 390-
    ship Navy. We are also talking about developing a new large
    surface combatant, and yet in the new FYDP, we are losing four
    destroyers, which are sort of the workhorse of the surface
    combatants. I am worried about a gap. I am worried about a
    fall-off not only in shipbuilding but in the industrial base.
    Can you speak to that concern?
        Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question. I think
    one of problems we have this year is we have sort of a
    confluence of bad timing on a lot of different things. We
    started on this integrated Force Structure Assessment last
    summer. It was delivered to me in January, and it sort of came
    to me after we had already completed most of the work on the
    2021 budget submission.
        So what we found in this Force Structure Assessment is that
    there is a demand for a 355-plus type of scenario.
        Senator King. And part of that 355 are large surface
    combatants.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, they are.
        Senator King. Like DDGs.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, they are. Most of everything that we
    have right now is going to be part of it, but there are new
    things that General Berger alluded to, a new, smaller amphib, a
    new, smaller combat support vessel that can help support
    distributed maritime operations. Of course, the new frigate
    will be a key element of that strategy and in that new force
    structure, and then the unmanned platforms, both undersea and
    on the surface, will be part of that future force mix. We are
    just in process of trying to educate and help the Secretary
    understand what this might mean, and then we will move out with
    a strategy for how we get there. That is a challenge for us.
        But in any scenario, we are talking about a significant
    expansion in the size of the fleet, and we are looking at a
    flat top line, and that mathematical equation is difficult for
    us to bridge.
        Senator King. Well, one of the problems is that we are
    trying to recapitalize through operating budgets. Any other
    business in the world would say a 40-year asset like a
    Columbia-class submarine is a capital investment as opposed to
    a drain on current operating cash flow. It is the bulge in the
    process of the modernization and the rebuilding of the nuclear
    deterrent that is really causing a lot of this squeeze as I
    see. Admiral, do you agree with that assessment?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I do. The Secretary has
    challenged us with finding $8 billion this year in our existing
    budget so that we can put that towards not only shipbuilding,
    but all the other pillars that support it, the manpower, the
    weapons, the training, et cetera, so that we can increase our
    numbers.
        With respect to the legacy ships that we are looking at
    decommissioning, we get to a point, sir, where the return on
    investment--we are just not going to get the return with
    respect to lethality, and some of these hulls are over 30 years
    old. So numbers are important, but in the end, we would rather
    have a ready, capable, lethal fleet over----
        Senator King. Of course. Lethality is the measure not
    absolute numbers. I understand that.
        By the way, if you are talking about decommissioning ships,
    give them a few more years. Then send them to Caribbean and
    Pacific where we can interdict some of these drug shipments. We
    are now interdicting 25 percent of the drug shipments we know
    of--we know of--and 75 percent are going by, even though we
    know they are there because of a lack of assets. So, if you got
    spare ships, Admiral, I know where you might want to send them.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are sending ships to Southern
    Command and in discussions right now about what those numbers
    ought to look like. In fact, we are deploying two littoral
    combat ships this year.
        Senator King. Because that is a war we are in right now and
    Americans are dying in that war.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. And I sincerely hope you and SOUTHCOM and the
    Coast Guard can really get together and make a dent in that
    traffic.
        I am out of time, General, but perhaps for the record, you
    could give me your thinking on the reduction of your end
    strength by 2,100 marines, given the demands on the Marine
    Corps. So, I will look for that. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        General Berger, there have been reports that the Secretary
    of Defense will move the Close Combat Lethality Task Force from
    an element the director reports to him to one that reports to
    the Army. This is an organization that is examining the full
    range of capabilities from material solutions to physiological
    performance to improving policies in order to provide the
    overmatch to the 4 percent of the members of the joint force
    who have experienced 90 percent of our combat deaths since the
    end of the Second World War. This is obviously a joint problem,
    one that the Army, Special Operations Command, and the marines
    need to have full visibility on and where solutions need to be
    joint and Department-wide.
        Can you provide me with your best professional military
    advice on what about this move could work and what about this
    might not work for the Marine Corps?
        General Berger. Sir, I am very familiar with it.
        When it was initially stood up and since, it was run by a
    retired marine colonel, who I know really well, from Fallujah,
    Iraq. So for the Marine Corps, we have been involved in the
    task force from day one and still are.
        The move to shift it into the Army I am not concerned
    about. We work laterally on a lot of programs like the joint
    light tactical vehicle. It is not an issue at all. But parking
    it in a service is a good thing because they know how to run a
    program. They know how to resource it, and there are great
    working relationships between services already. We remain tied
    in on that task force. We have marines as part of that task
    force within the Army now. That will continue for all the
    reasons that you said. That is where the casualties occur.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
        Today in the way that we fight our wars, the
    electromagnetic spectrum is essential in terms of how we do
    battle, and we use multiple parts of the spectrum. I want to
    refer to the Secretary's HASC testimony on February 26th.
    Secretary Esper said that the DOD [Department of Defense] is
    willing to share--and I emphasize share--spectrum with 5G
    networks in the mid-band range of 3 to 4.2 gigahertz.
        Secretary Modly, what systems does the Navy have that might
    be affected and how could sharing that spectrum space impact
    homeland defense? I would like to specifically point out we are
    talking about sharing and not vacating that space.
        Secretary Modly. Senator, it would have a profound impact
    on our Aegis system, and of course, we cannot abandon that
    spectrum. It would have profound negative implications for that
    system. So as the Secretary stated, we are willing to share it,
    but we have to be very protective of that because it is
    critical to our ability to defend ourselves as a nation.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Admiral Gilday?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I have nothing to more to add to the
    Secretary's comments. I completely agree. We need to protect
    that portion of the spectrum for Aegis for homeland defense.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Let me go back a little bit and talk about submarines. We
    have talked about building new submarines. I would like an
    update, if I could get it, with regard to the mid-life
    refueling on the submarines, the nuclear attack submarines,
    that we have right now. I want to point out--and I have done
    this in the past--we are talking about the USS Boise. Now I
    understand there are three more that are waiting at dock to be
    able to sequence into dry dock to be actually refueled and made
    available for service again. The need I believe is still there,
    and you can correct me if I am wrong, but with these particular
    submarines, we still want them. This could mean that the USS
    Boise may very well have been out of service for a period of 8
    years waiting for refueling before it is back in operation
    again.
        Can you tell me what we are doing to expedite the process
    to bring these submarines back on and where we are at in that
    process?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are going to begin maintenance on
    Boise this May and then we will get under contract for extended
    maintenance.
        At the time that these decisions were made on Boise, we had
    a capacity issue in our public yards, and so we started to then
    send some of that work to private yards. We are now at the
    point--and I know you are aware of this--in the public yards,
    we have increased that workforce by 10,000 workers in the past
    10 years and some 4,000 in the last 3 years I think, and so we
    have the capacity back. We are actually taking one of our
    availabilities from a private yard and now moving it back into
    the public yard.
        I do not want to imply that we are out of the woods yet. We
    are watching it very closely. I think we are in a better place
    now than we were 2 and 3 years ago.
        Senator Rounds. If I could say, we will not have the same
    problem with the next three in line that we had with the Boise?
        Admiral Gilday. We do not anticipate it, sir, but I will go
    back and take a look and we will brief you in more detail on
    what that lineup looks like and any challenges that we think we
    may face.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for visiting Hawaii, and
    I especially would like to thank your wife for the time that
    she spent with the family of the people who were shot at the
    shipyard and also the survivor. Please extend my thanks to her.
        Over the past few weeks, I have met with several of your
    colleagues, including Assistant Secretary Geurts--in fact, that
    was only 2 days ago I think or yesterday--to discuss the
    importance of modernizing our shipyards. Of course, the delay
    in repair and all of that was just touched upon by the admiral.
    I cannot overemphasize the importance of us continuing to go
    through with the modernization plan.
        Just to let everybody know, the Pearl Harbor Shipyard,
    which is one of the four public shipyards in our country,
    contributes nearly $1 billion to Hawaii's economy every year
    and employs close to 6,500 personnel, including nearly 1,000
    engineers. It is the largest employer of this kind in Hawaii.
        Due to the current inefficient arrangement at the shipyard,
    it is necessary that the optimization plan be implemented to
    provide much needed updates. I know you are very well aware we
    need a new dry dock and a production facility.
        Funding the critical shipyard modernization program will
    require a significant portion of the Navy's budget. Does the
    Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget fully fund the shipyard
    modernization plan so that it will be implemented on time? And
    I am talking about the four shipyards, not just the one in
    Hawaii.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. This is a high priority for
    us in the Navy, and it is a 20-year commitment of $23 billion I
    believe over 20 years. So as long as we are here, we will
    continue to push for this. We are sequencing in the work in the
    most logical possible way that we can to address the things
    that you mentioned, which is how the work flows through the
    shipyards to make sure that we do not do work now that then we
    are going to have to take out as part of the longer-term
    strategy. So, yes, it is funded. I believe we are spending
    almost $600 million on this this year, and that will continue.
        Senator Hirono. Is $600 million enough to keep to the
    timelines that we have for the modernization program?
        Secretary Modly. I believe it is. I think when we looked at
    this and we thought about the work and how we would push it
    through the four different yards, it made sense to do it in
    this way. Obviously, we would love to have more to be able to
    do more, but we also had to think about how we do not disrupt
    the current work that is in there at the same time.
        Senator Hirono. Now, of course, in Hawaii I would like to
    see some concrete actually being poured for the dry dock and
    the production facility sometime soon.
        Mr. Secretary, in conversations that I have had with
    subcontractors that support our shipbuilding programs, I have
    heard that the guidance associated with the cybersecurity
    maturity modernization certification, CMMC, has been somewhat
    confusing making it difficult for businesses and contractors to
    comply. What can you tell me about the current state of the
    CMMC framework? I am told by the subs that there are changing
    requirements that come down the pike and they do their best to
    try and comply, but with regard to the new one, which is the
    CMMC, what timelines are in place for educating, certifying,
    and auditing our defense industrial base, keeping in mind that
    there are thousands of suppliers? And I assume that all of them
    need to provide certification regarding the security
    requirements.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. That is a great question.
        If you would allow me to get you specifics on where we are
    on the implementation to that, I will do that.
        We have elevated our cybersecurity awareness to the highest
    levels in the Department with a new office there. I am sure
    they are monitoring this, and I can get you specific details.
        We understand there is pushback from the supplier base,
    particularly the smaller subs who see this as an additional
    cost for them, and we are trying to figure out ways that we can
    help them perhaps create some shared services for them that
    they could use at that level. But let me get you a specific
    answer.
        Senator Hirono. I think that is really important because we
    have literally, as I said, thousands and thousands of
    suppliers. I know there is always that weak link possibility if
    we do not provide them with the kind of support they need to
    comply.
        Last week, Admiral Aquilino--he is the Commander of PAC
    Fleet--issued guidance instructing Navy vessels departing from
    port visits to remain at sea for at least 14 days before
    pulling into another port in order to monitor sailors for
    coronavirus symptoms. This week, the 6th Fleet followed suit.
        How is the Navy preparing for coronavirus, and how do you
    anticipate that the virus will impact the Navy's ability to
    operate overseas? Admiral?
        Admiral Gilday. Senator, we are following the Department's
    guidance, which essentially tries to minimize contact,
    particularly in those areas where we know there is a heavy
    concentration of coronavirus. It manifests in different ways in
    different geographic locations. We are receiving excellent
    reporting from the World Health Organization through to CDC and
    down to the Department on specific areas. Italy and Bahrain are
    really good examples. The Korean Peninsula is another good
    example. We are trying to be preemptive and preventative in
    terms of limiting numbers of large gatherings as an example. On
    a day-to-day basis, we are making decisions on closing DOD
    schools based on what we are seeing in terms of caseloads at
    local hospitals.
        All of our medical personnel have been trained in the
    symptoms, and if they suspect that somebody does have corona,
    we test for it and then we send that off to a lab to be
    confirmed. But we also quarantine those people and their
    families until we ascertain whether or not they are actually
    infected.
        Senator Hirono. Do you have test kits?
        Admiral Gilday. No, we do not. We do not yet. But that is
    not just a problem for DOD. But I think that we are getting to
    a better place in terms of the production to allow us to be
    able to distribute those out to the force.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence
    and allowing me to go over. I do have some other questions for
    the record. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today, and,
    Secretary, I will start with you.
        Many businesses across America depend on predictable
    shipbuilding requirements to maintain a trained workforce and
    develop manufacturing lines. You are probably not surprised to
    learn that in Iowa we do not build ships. We do not. But my
    landlocked home State of Iowa is part of the Navy's inventory
    and pipeline of talent, and Carver Pump, which I love to
    highlight, and its team of 110 hardworking Iowans supply pumps
    to almost every Navy ship in the Active fleet. They are being
    installed in many ships currently in production, and in total,
    Iowa is home to eight submarine industrial base suppliers. So
    we are very proud of that. While we are not providing the end
    product, the finished ship, we do have those suppliers.
        I do understand that the Navy must utilize its funds and
    invest in assets that reflect the NDS of today, the goals to
    modernize our fleet. How are those conversations going with
    industry to ensure that their production capabilities can meet
    the requirements in this new era of great power competition?
        Secretary Modly. Well, we have an amazing supplier base in
    the country, but it is under pressure to some extent, and so we
    have to ensure that we are maintaining a steady flow of work
    through them. The carrier program alone, if you look at the
    Ford program right now, employs almost 60,000 people across the
    United States in 46 different States, and so when you think
    about a program like that, not just the employment but the type
    of employment, this is all high technology. We are bringing in
    workers, young people, training them in a trade that they can
    continue to contribute to this process over time.
        We have to be really, really careful when we talk about
    decisions in this space because that national asset that they
    create is the ship that we see, but the national asset they
    contribute to is the national asset of manufacturing capability
    and high technology that exists in the country that follows
    them. So, we have to continue to worry about that and think
    about it.
        When I go out and speak to industry, what I find more often
    is that I find businesses that are not currently doing defense
    work that are really interested in doing defense work, and how
    do we make it easier for them to do that? And so we are working
    on that.
        Senator Ernst. Right, absolutely, and I do appreciate that.
        We look at examples like the Ford. We get very concerned
    about that because as Members of Congress, we are watching
    those taxpayer dollars. So, we are reliant on industry as well
    to make the recommendations to make sure we are producing the
    necessary requirements for our fleet but get it out in a timely
    manner, and on time, on target is always best. But always
    having those discussions with industry is important. So thank
    you for that.
        We are all familiar as well, Mr. Secretary, with this
    Committee's concern for the health and wellbeing of all of our
    service members. Last year, when Congress passed the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2020, we included a provision that directed the
    Department of Defense to document blast exposure history in the
    medical record of all service members.
        We have made significant improvements in this area on how
    we are treating, documenting, and understanding the effects and
    causes of traumatic brain injuries. The progress is
    encouraging. We still have more that we can do and where we can
    potentially negate the impact of TBIs.
        Can you maybe explain to this Committee what the Department
    of the Navy and the Marine Corps is doing to improve the
    understanding and prevention of traumatic brain injuries and
    specifically those coming from blast injuries?
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I can say about 80 percent of the
    TBI injuries that we see are off-duty related. Because military
    medicine has benefited greatly from what we have experienced
    from Iraq and Afghanistan, so we are able to return about 85
    percent of those sailors back to work just based on the high
    proficiency of our medical teams.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I know that in SOF, we are
    actively baselining many of their members, which is something
    that we would love to do across the conventional forces as
    well.
        General Berger, would you like to address it, please?
        General Berger. Just three quick parts to that.
        First, the protect part, the equipment that we wear, the
    vehicles, the aircraft, a lot of improvement over the last 3 or
    4 years. We have a lot of room still to go there.
        Second is the detection part, which you mentioned. Really
    difficult, which relies wholly on baseline up front, which we
    do as well. All of us who have been to Iraq and Afghanistan in
    the last 6-7 years, all baselined. We did not do that the first
    deployment. I was not either. You have to do that because you
    cannot measure any change from that.
        The last part is the treatment, which the CNO mentioned,
    and it cannot stop initially. This is an enduring--the impact
    of that could be lifelong. So it is different than some other
    ailments, some other issues that we have. We have to treat it
    as a long-term issue.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
        General Berger, you are spot on. It does create
    complications further down the road especially if we are not
    treating that TBI.
        So thank you, gentlemen, very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to the witnesses for being here today and for
    your service.
        Secretary Modly, I want to ask you about the frigate. You
    mentioned the frigate as a key element in our future ship
    fleets. I have got folks down at Austal down in Alabama trying
    to put together a great design and compete for that contract,
    but it seems that the process timeline has been a little bit of
    a moving target. Can you tell us right now where we are in that
    process and the timeline for the frigate contract award?
        Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question.
        The plan had been to award the contract sometime in the
    latter half of this fiscal year. I have asked Secretary Geurts
    to look at possibly pulling that forward if everything is done
    properly and everything is thoroughly vetted and evaluated, and
    so he is looking into that. So there is some possibility that
    we may pull that award a little bit sooner.
        Senator Jones. All right. Could you let me know if that is
    the case?
        Secretary Modly. Yes, sir.
        Senator Jones. I noticed in the FYDP that it includes only
    nine frigates, although originally there were going to be 10 in
    the first block. Does this mean that the total ship procurement
    is being reduced or just the procurement timeline?
        Secretary Modly. No, sir. I think this is part of the
    discussion that we have been talking about earlier about the
    new integrated Force Structure Assessment and how the frigate
    plays in that. Based on current plans and current thinking,
    this is where we are. But I anticipate as we look at this in
    more depth and the Secretary of Defense can get comfortable
    with it, we are going to look at ways to possibly purchase more
    of these over time. But right now, that is sort of where we are
    in terms of our thinking.
        Senator Jones. Okay. The total numbers have not changed,
    just in this first block. Is that a fair statement?
        Secretary Modly. No, sir. Nothing has changed.
        Senator Jones. All right. Thank you.
        Sticking with Austal for a minute, I would like to talk a
    little bit about the expeditionary fast transport, the EPF. Can
    you give me an idea, Admiral Gilday, where those are being used
    and how they are being used right now, the EPFs?
        Admiral Gilday. So those ships are great. We put adaptive
    force packages on them, and so some of them are highly
    classified missions. Others are to move troops or we just used
    two in an exercise called Pacific Partnership in the Indo-
    Pacific where we used them for humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief.
        The two that we have in the budget--what we are trying to
    do with those ships is to give them the medical capability
    where they would actually have a 750-room hospital, as well as
    12 operating rooms. Because of the cubic space that you have in
    those ships, you can really do a lot with them, including their
    flight deck.
        Senator Jones. Well, I am asking because you got two in
    this budget, but the President just took away one that was set
    to be awarded I think in April of this year. It was a $260
    million contract again. I am curious as to if that particular
    ship could have been used the same way, why was it taken out?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I cannot tell you directly why it was
    taken out. I know that those decisions were made at a higher
    level based on strategic priorities, and so I just do not have
    the direct answer for you on the why.
        Senator Jones. All right. I may submit a question because
    Secretary Esper's answer was just not satisfactory yesterday,
    especially in light of your testimony today, and I want to
    emphasize again I just think taking the funds away from our
    sailors, soldiers, and airmen is just wrong. It hurts our men
    and women in uniform, and it quite frankly hurts my community
    in Mobile where we are taking away that because we got a lot of
    folks down there that are dependent on Austal and the ships
    that they build.
        Secretary Modly, let me just ask you real quick. You
    mentioned last week--I want to just talk about the 355 ships
    may no longer be the right number for our force, and you
    mentioned that it could be as high as 390. Can you kind of give
    me some ideas of where all this is coming from and how you are
    making those assessments and what you are looking for?
        Secretary Modly. Well, sir, it is strategy-based. It is
    based on the threat, what we see the threat that is emerging,
    how we would want to counter that threat not just in terms of a
    warfighting scenario but in terms of deterrence and presence.
    That is what is driving it.
        What is driving the change in the numbers is some of the
    things that I mentioned earlier in terms of the requirement for
    a new, smaller amphib, a new combat support vessel as well,
    possibly more frigates, as you mentioned earlier. That is where
    sort of the numbers are elevating when we start looking at the
    difference between this and the 2016 assessment.
        Senator Jones. All right. Are we going to be able to see
    that 30-year shipbuilding plan and Force Structure Assessment
    pretty soon?
        Secretary Modly. I hope so, sir. I have seen it. I just
    need to make sure the Secretary of Defense is comfortable with
    it.
        Senator Jones. Well, I would encourage you to try to get
    that to us as soon as possible, please. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here.
        You know, these concerns and the wringing of the hands
    about this budget would have a whole lot more credibility if we
    had heard that when the three times in the last 50 years we had
    three Presidents in the late 1970s, in the mid-1990s, and just
    recently cut our military spending by 25 percent. That is what
    this is about. Today we are trying to recover. You have done a
    marvelous job in the Navy and the Marines getting our readiness
    back. I want to commend you guys for that. Today I want to talk
    about shipbuilding.
        When we get this budget, we are supposed to get a
    shipbuilding plan. Secretary Modly, when should we expect that?
        Secretary Modly. Sir, I am hoping to get it over here as
    soon as possible, but frankly, it is not my call. I am waiting
    for the Secretary of Defense to allow us to bring it over.
        Senator Perdue. I understand.
        Admiral Kilby, this week, yesterday, as a matter of fact,
    did a great job explaining his requirements, Admiral. He talked
    about four priorities: Columbia-class, readiness recovery,
    lethality, and capabilities we can afford. I respect that.
        The question that--I want to highlight the NDS. The 335-
    ship number was developed in 2016, prior to the NDS. Is the 355
    number consistent with the NDS requirements put on the Navy and
    Marines?
        Admiral Gilday. It is low, sir.
        Senator Perdue. An honest man.
        Admiral Gilday. Thank you, sir.
        The short answer. Since the time that that assessment has
    been done and if you consider the fact that we are integrating
    much more closely with the Marine Corps and within the joint
    force, you have to consider not only what we are going to fight
    with, the capabilities, but also how we are going to fight.
    That is translated against a threat that has increasing
    capability into a larger number of ships, a larger number of
    more capable lethal ships.
        Senator Perdue. It has to do with several things. Right?
    What is your responsibility against emerging threats. You said
    that. How are you going to fight the force, and then what kind
    of lethality you have. So you are working on that we are not
    hamstrung by INF. We know that China--they out-stick us today.
    Is that fair?
        Admiral Gilday. In some areas, sir, yes.
        Senator Perdue. Secondly, they have about 350 boats today
    to our 296 by my math. I think that is correct. If you look at
    what they have said publicly, by 2030 they will have 425, and
    if that same gradient goes out, by 2034, which is our planning
    period behind the current shipbuilding plan, we would be at 355
    by 2034. That is the 2016 plan. That may change in the current
    shipbuilding plan I understand. We have an 80-boat shortage
    right now, and we have responsibilities in multiple AORs. They
    pretty much have one. Are you concerned that our shipbuilding
    plan is not going to be able to do what we need to do over that
    15-year period, particularly against the buildup that we see
    China--they deployed more boats in the last 30 months than they
    have in the last 30 years. We see their activity. They are
    telling us what they are doing.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So, it simply really comes down
    to our top line, and that is our biggest constraint in terms of
    growing a bigger Navy. Since I have been in uniform, the size
    of the United States Navy has been dwindling. Over the last few
    years, we have come up in numbers a bit, but not a lot. We
    believe, based on the NDS and for all the reasons we just
    stated, that it is time to reinvest in the naval force.
        Senator Perdue. And it would be one thing if we could fund
    it. What I am worried about--let us take submarines, for
    example. Your number one priority is Columbia-class. I am proud
    that Georgia hosts one of the two nuclear bases that hosts
    those. But we lost in the last decade 17,000 submarine vendors,
    down to 3,000 vendors. Even if we were to push the money toward
    this goal to get to where we need to be, can we rebuild the
    supply chain fast enough to accommodate that?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, based on what we know, we think we
    can. Based on what we are projecting in terms of submarines, as
    an example in terms of what we are procuring, that vendor
    infrastructure is in place to support that.
        Senator Perdue. Can I move on to one other thing? The Air
    Force is developing ABMS right now, and it looks like they have
    had one demonstration across the services. I think there is
    another one coming up in April. How involved is the Navy in
    looking at this from the service needs, as well as the data
    that the Navy will be creating? Obviously, as I understand
    this, this is a very classified development. Can you give us an
    update about the Navy's involvement and the Marines'
    involvement on that?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, so the problem set is that we have
    netted weapons and we have netted platforms and netted C2
    nodes, but we do not have a net. All the services have come
    together under a concept called joint all domain C2, and we are
    putting heat on it, a Manhattan Project like effort, so that we
    are not delivering this in the mid-2030s but in the 2020s. All
    the Joint Chiefs are flying out to Nellis in early April to
    take a look at this together to make sure we understand how we
    are going to get after it.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you so much. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, I am quite encouraged
    to see the priority that the Navy continues to place on
    hypersonic weapons. As you know, Sandia National Lab has played
    a critical role in developing this technology over a number of
    years now. How would you characterize the combined Navy and
    inter-service effort to transition hypersonic glide bodies out
    of the labs?
        Secretary Modly. Well, thank you for that question. I
    actually was in Sandi a few months ago and got to see what they
    are doing out there, and it is really amazing work. I am
    actually very encouraged about the fact that we are working
    together with the Air Force and the Army on this because it is
    an expensive proposition, and we need to pool our resources and
    our brain power to get after it. So I think that the progress
    is good.
        We have asked for a significant step up in funding this
    year in order to do this. As I look at the test schedule, it
    looks aggressive, but I think it is doable.
        So that is probably all that I can talk about in an open
    forum. I would be more than happy to come over and have our
    team brief you on how we are doing on that.
        Senator Heinrich. Would there be value in collocating the
    development and the production of those capabilities so that we
    could fully leverage synergies, expertise, and frankly shorten
    the feedback loop in that transition from development to
    production?
        Secretary Modly. Well, I think anything that we can do that
    can accelerate the process of getting these fielded would be
    important. I think one of the biggest challenges we have right
    now is not the technology and how to develop these missiles,
    but it is the production. How do we get this into scale over
    time? And that is a challenge because we do not have an
    industrial base that can really do that right now. So, we are
    looking at ways that can help accelerate that through some
    incentives, et cetera to put some funding out there so that we
    can accelerate the creation of the industrial capacity to
    produce at scale.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I hope you will consider us a
    partner in that effort.
        I want to switch gears now to the Navy has been conducting
    live fire tests of its experimental electromagnetic railgun at
    White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico over the past year. But
    the fiscal year 2021 budget includes pretty minimal funding for
    this capability. What is the Navy's plan to continue developing
    this program and, for that matter, to mount it on a ship for
    at-sea testing as well? Admiral?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So the testing is going rather
    well. What I would like to do, sir, is come back to you in a
    classified setting and talk to you in more detail about where
    we are with that and where we want to go.
        Senator Heinrich. Okay. In this setting, can you comment on
    the resourcing in this particular budget?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, the resourcing right now we think is
    adequate based on the amount of effort that we have ongoing.
    So, we saw more money in the budget last year based on what we
    needed to do in terms of R&D, but we are more at a steady state
    at the moment going into 2021.
        Senator Heinrich. Okay.
        Let us talk Columbia-class for a moment. I think this
    Committee understands the importance of that modernization to
    the nuclear triad. What are your contingency plans if the Navy
    does not make the already very tight timeline for Columbia, and
    where would you accept risk?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, that would be best handled in a
    classified setting. I will say that we have had those
    discussions with the Secretary of Defense, and you cannot just
    consider one leg. You have to consider the triad and how you
    balance risk across that triad based on challenges you would
    face in the modernization efforts across each of those legs. We
    are having those discussions, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service.
        General Berger, I will ask you just one detailed question.
    I got a few others hopefully I will have time to get to.
        With some of the military construction money--I think it
    was somewhere around $40 million--affecting Camp Lejeune as a
    result of the executive order, I understand there were two
    projects down there that have been pushed somewhat to the
    right. Can you give me the current status of those projects and
    whether or not we are in any critical timing in terms of
    backfilling the funding?
        General Berger. I am familiar with both projects. Both were
    deferred. We will have to postpone the second radio battalion
    building and the second project as well. Right now, not
    critical, but if they got pushed farther, then it would become
    a significant issue.
        Senator Tillis. If I could get just for the record specific
    dates on when that really hits the critical path, I would
    appreciate it. Then-Secretary Spencer assured me that it was
    not a challenge now, but it could be. I would like to know the
    specific timing. Thank you for that.
        Now, I have got something that would be for Admiral Gilday
    and you, General Berger, and maybe the Secretary as the
    tiebreaker, and it is the discussion we are having with FRC
    East [Fleet Readiness Center-East], getting the funding to be
    best prepared for the F-35. We have got a bit of a stalemate
    there. We made some progress with the security fence with the
    lift fan facility, but a lot of the infrastructure is sort of
    Navy-owned facility, marine requirement. Every time I ask a
    question about who is going to actually own that and how we are
    going to get the funding, I get you need to talk to the Navy or
    you need to talk to the marines. Do we have a definitive answer
    on that and where this sits on the priority list?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I can say that FRC--of our three, it
    is part of the optimization plan that we have, and we are
    putting money against all three of those facilities right now.
        With respect to the potential finger-pointing, I would like
    to get you a deeper brief on that. The Commandant and I, our
    staffs can come together, and if there is an issue, we will
    definitely resolve it.
        Senator Tillis. You answered my question before I asked it.
    What I would like to do, if we could, is just in a meeting, if
    we could get the stakeholders in the room and I can get a
    definitive readout, I would appreciate that. So I have your
    commitment to making sure that happens.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you very much.
        General Berger, you mentioned about some of the review that
    you are doing for the acquisition programs review. What is the
    current status of that? When should we see a report out?
        General Berger. We are done the first part of it, Senator.
    The next step is for me to explain where we stand with the
    chair and Ranking Members of the four Committees here, and I
    will do that this weekend next if we can get through the
    scheduling part of that.
        After that, then we will obviously go broader in terms of
    explaining the details. But it is important that I explain to
    those senior leaders in Congress first what the outcomes are.
    We are done the first part.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you.
        Because my time is going to expire here fairly quickly, I
    am going to submit some questions for the record about end
    strength, a few other questions. We will just look forward to
    hearing back from you.
        In my remaining time, I would like to talk about military
    housing. We have spent a lot of time and effort to make sure--
    on the one hand, we were concerned with the nearly $40 million
    that is sliding to the right. On the other hand, we have
    succeeded in getting billions of dollars down to help with
    recovery.
        What is the status of that recovery, and specifically, how
    is the military housing situation? I will let you know and
    everybody else that I will be doing another town hall down
    there to hear directly from the military families. I think that
    is very helpful because for some strange reason, I announce it
    6 weeks in advance. All the service requests tend to be done by
    the time I get there. But I am hoping they are beginning to do
    it on a more consistent basis. So if I can get an update on
    both those projects, recovery with respect to Camp Lejeune
    broadly and then specifically for military housing.
        General Berger. Camp Lejeune broadly. First of all, the
    town halls are--you are spot on. Unannounced is better and you
    are going to get unfiltered kind of feedback from families, the
    way it should be, the way that we want them to be. So I thank
    you for that because it takes time.
        On the housing, there are about 520, give or take, empty
    family housing units at Camp Lejeune that the private partner
    owns. Some of them are reparable; some are not, and that is
    part of the discussion that goes on right now, not negotiation,
    but the dialogue between the Department and the vendor about
    what to do about the 500 vacant houses.
        There are about 15 families--I think 15--right now that
    remained in damaged homes at their choice. We offered to move
    them. They elected to stay there. The damage, in other words,
    from the hurricane--they were okay because they are going to
    move anyway, so they just stayed. So we allowed them the choice
    either way.
        The funding for the last two tranches of supplementals--all
    of the, I think, $837 million from last year put on contract.
    So far, I think about $157 million this year. We will be able
    to obligate all that you provided from the second tranche in
    this fiscal year. So I think by the end of this fiscal year,
    both tranches will be fully under contract.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you to the witnesses for your service.
        I wanted to just pick up on a point that Senator Perdue
    made a few minutes ago. He expressed some concern about hand-
    wringing over the budget and said, you know, I wish I had seen
    concerns in the past when budgets were being cut, and look, to
    the extent that Congress has done bad things in budgets in the
    past, we need to own it. My first speech as a Senator in
    February 2013 was a speech on the floor saying we should not do
    the sequester and budget caps. It is a bad idea.
        I think the reason there is hand-wringing now is that
    Congress has learned our lesson and we are trying to do good
    budgets for the military, and what we are seeing is the drain
    of billions of dollars out of the budget for a non-military
    emergency at the southern border.
        Here is what we are doing within 1 year. Within the last
    year, the administration took first $6 billion, $3.5 billion
    from MILCON and $2.5 billion from other programs, into the
    counter-drug fund to use for the wall. So that was $6 billion
    out of the DOD budget.
        The administration has now announced another $3.8 billion
    that is being cannibalized out of various accounts, put into
    the counter-drug fund. So now that $9.8 billion.
        Yesterday Secretary Esper in the hearing announced that
    there will likely be another tranche taken from MILCON. It has
    been reported that would be $3.7 billion, but just round it
    down and say that number is too high. It looks like the total
    within a year will be $13 billion, more than a billion a month
    taken out of Congress' appropriated budget for your needs, for
    the nation's needs to use for a non-military emergency that is
    not mentioned in the National Defense Strategy.
        Let me just put that into context. What does $13 billion
    mean to seapower, to our Navy and Marines' $13 billion. It is
    one carrier or it is four Virginia-class subs. We are arguing
    about whether there should be a second sub this year. Thirteen
    billion bucks in a year is four subs. It is six destroyers. It
    is four amphibious assault ships. Senator Hirono asked about
    the shipyard industrial optimization plan. That 20-year plan is
    $26 billion. So the $13 billion would be half of the 20-year
    plan to modernize our shipyards.
        Or the other way to look at it is when you all submitted
    your budget this year, you submitted the amount of unfunded
    priorities you have. That total unfunded priority list for the
    DOD is $17 billion. Thirteen billion dollars in 1 year taken
    for a non-military emergency when your total unfunded priority
    list is $17 billion.
        I am going to state right now if there is a Democratic
    President who tries to take money out of the DOD for a non-
    military emergency, I am going to say go get it through the
    appropriators. Do not ransack the Pentagon's budget for a non-
    military emergency. I stood up against Democratic or Republican
    Presidents if I thought they were taking us to war without
    coming to Congress. I am going to stand up against the
    Democratic President who tries to raid the Pentagon budget for
    non-military emergencies.
        You are here saying we are trying to be focused on the
    National Defense Strategy. It is resource-tight environment. It
    is sort of hard to take that at face value when we are allowing
    $13 billion to walk out the door for a non-military emergency
    in 1 year.
        I want to offer you a compliment, General Berger. You made
    I think a challenging call but the right call recently when you
    announced that Confederate paraphernalia would be removed from
    Marine bases as just a good order and discipline. I saw that
    announcement and as a Virginian with a child in the Marines, I
    applaud that leadership move.
        Secretary Modly, I want to ask you to share a story that
    you shared with me with all my colleagues. Secretary Modly was
    in the Federated States of Micronesia recently, and this is a
    story about United States and China, what we are doing.
    Micronesia is a really important asset for us, where it is
    situated in the Pacific. Just share what is happening in terms
    of United States investment versus Chinese investment from your
    recent visit, if you would.
        Secretary Modly. Sir, thanks for remembering the story.
        I was there about a year ago, and I made a trip through
    several of the Pacific islands. I went to Micronesia and went
    to the far side of the island, and there was a Navy Seabee team
    there, a great group, 24 Seabees building a school for the
    local citizens there. Very traditional construction, concrete
    pilings, corrugated steel roof, plywood sides, making great
    relationships with the locals.
        As you leave this facility and you drive down the street,
    there is a big sign. Micronesian Agricultural Center being paid
    for and built by the People's Republic of China, and it just
    gave me the impression that in some of these areas where we
    have traditional long-term friendships with these nations who
    want us to be their partners and we are playing small ball.
        Senator Kaine. We removed all Peace Corps volunteers from
    Micronesia in 2017 and from Palau.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, sir. In the embassy building there, I
    saw a bunch of signs for the old Peace Corps, and I said why
    are these here? They said, well, we shut down the Peace Corps
    here. They had been there since the beginning of the Peace
    Corps, and people in Micronesia know Americans because of the
    Peace Corps.
        So it may not extend to the entire Pacific region, but it
    was an example to me of particularly how we need to step up our
    involvement there not just militarily, but in other ways.
        Senator Kaine. Thanks for sharing that story.
        Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        F*irst of all, I thank each of you for your service.
        Secretary Modly, thank you for engaging with us after the
    terrorist attack in Pensacola, trying to come up with the right
    plan to make sure this does not happen again. I will be talking
    on the floor today about the three individuals that lost their
    lives there, and it was devastating to them, their families,
    but also to that base and that community. But thank you for
    engaging with the sheriff and everybody down there.
        We had a hearing yesterday. Senator Ernst chaired a hearing
    on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and we
    talked about Pensacola and what can we do differently. My
    concern is that we went right back to normal work pretty fast.
    We talked about it. Twenty-one students got sent home for a
    variety of things, and we are now vetting differently. But
    should we have a complete reset of the program so we know it is
    not going to happen again? We got 850 Saudi students here and
    we want to build our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I talked
    to the Saudi Ambassador and said the worst thing for you would
    be if we had another instance like this soon. I mean, I think
    the American public would be up in arms. You cannot keep doing
    this.
        So I am working on a proposal with Senator Ernst that--and
    I would like to get you all's feedback, but how to vet the
    students, how to give them the right kind of visa, and make
    sure we are not doing programs here that we could do in another
    country less expensively and with less risk.
        So what do you all think about the fact that we still
    have--and we have--what--5,000 students from around the world
    there. But my focus right now, because of what happened at
    Pensacola, is the Saudi students. Very few were actually sent
    back. Are we really able to do a real vetting process of the
    ones we still have here? Are we vetting their families? How
    safe are our bases?
        When I was in the U.S. Navy, I never would have thought
    that there would have been any risk on the base I was on.
        Secretary Modly. Senator, thanks for the question.
        I think we are doing all we can I think to step up the
    vetting process for these students and to have a better sense
    for not just vetting them before they come in, but to develop
    some process in collaboration with those countries to perform
    more continuous vetting particularly of social media or some of
    the things they are doing that does not require us to do
    anything illegal to do that. We can monitor things that are in
    the public sphere. We just have not applied the resources to
    it, and we are looking at a variety of different ways that we
    can do that.
        One of the key elements I think also is part of the purpose
    of these programs is to bring these people in and have them
    understand us as a nation better. I do not think we are doing
    such a great job with certain countries in bringing them in,
    sponsoring them, having local families getting to know them,
    particularly with the Saudi students because there were so many
    of them. They were very insulated and not really a part of the
    broader community, and so we have to really focus on that as
    well.
        Senator Scott. So do you think you will be able to measure?
    Because that is what I have been told. I have been told that in
    many of these countries, like they said, you know, if it is an
    Italian student, that everybody get to know him and there are
    long-term relationships. But I have not talked to anybody in
    the military to date that says they have a long-term
    relationship with somebody that was a Saudi student. They might
    have it later if they are in the position of leadership, but
    based on the relationship as a Saudi student--I mean, I have
    not talked to anybody in the military that has one. So it makes
    you question why are we doing this and having this risk.
        How are you doing dealing with families that come? Are we
    vetting them, and are we continuing to vet them when they are
    here?
        Secretary Modly. I think that is all part of the process
    that we are doing in terms of getting a better understanding of
    who is coming in, what their backgrounds are, and just doing it
    a little bit more--a little deeper dive into that than we used
    to do.
        Senator Scott. Well, I look forward to working with you. We
    have been working with Senator Ernst and some others about
    coming up with a better way to do it to make sure these bases
    are safe. So thank you very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
        General Berger, you have discussed the need for an
    appropriate balance between manned and unmanned systems,
    including incorporating unmanned aerial combat vehicles and
    low-cost attributable aircraft technologies into the Marine
    Corps. In a commentary you authored for War on the Rocks in
    December of 2019, you listed 11 naval expeditionary
    capabilities and capacities that support fleet operations,
    which the Marine Corps is under-invested in. Notably, that list
    started off with three different types of unmanned platforms
    for every physical domain in which you fight. I agree with your
    assessment and know that we will need a mix of fifth generation
    manned platforms like the F-35 that provide a stealth
    capability, along with an array of sensors teamed with unmanned
    systems that can address survivability challenges and further
    confound our adversary's decision-making through these new
    technologies working together.
        The Marine Corps stated requirements for the manned F-35 is
    certainly a matter of record, but I have not seen your
    requirements for lethal unmanned systems. Do you still intend
    to pursue a large number of lethal unmanned aerial systems per
    your Commandant's Plan and Guidance and recent public remarks?
    And if so, can we expect to see those desired capabilities
    articulated in the next Marine Corps aviation plan?
        General Berger. The homework that went behind what are we
    going to need in the future that we spoke of before that both
    the Navy and the Marine Corps have worked on for the past maybe
    8-9 months drove me towards that conclusion.
        Will see it in the next budget, and will we see it in the
    next AVPLAN, aviation plan? I do not know. I think yes, but the
    first step would be to figure out how you are going to fight
    and then reorganize the Marine Corps for that purpose, which we
    have to do, which is part of the rounds that I need to make to
    the senior congressional leadership to explain that part to
    them. I would hope that it is in the 2022 and 2023 budget, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Secretary Modly, the National Defense Authorization Act for
    fiscal year 2020 requires you as the Secretary of the Navy by
    January 31st of 2023 to--and I am quoting from the law--publish
    a military specification for a fluorine-free fire-fighting
    agent for use at all military installations and ensure that
    such agent is available for use by not later than October 1st
    of 2023. I would like to note that although it is October 1st
    of 2023, of course, you are free to publish it before that
    time, and we would encourage you to do that.
        It is my understanding that there are large-scale
    commercial airports around the world that have adopted PFAS-
    free fire-fighting agents already. I recognize the military
    context is different and it is essential that we put the safety
    of our men and women first and foremost, number one. But I am
    optimistic the Navy will be able to find an appropriate
    solution given what is happening around the rest of the world.
        Could you provide us with an update on the progress towards
    publishing that specification and what work has been done to
    date on that effort?
        Secretary Modly. I share your optimism on that. I think we
    will figure this out. It is a global challenge, as you
    mentioned, in the United States specifically as well. All of
    our fire-fighting civilians, our fire-fighting folks use this
    material, and it is a challenge for us. However, there is a lot
    of attention in the scientific community looking at this. Our
    Office of Naval Research is looking at this, and I am confident
    we will come up with an answer on this. So far, we have not,
    and so particularly on our ships, we are continuing to use it.
    But my sense is that we will make progress on this and we will
    get an answer.
        Senator Peters. And I am sure you are working with our
    allies who are also actually deploying some of these agents. So
    I appreciate that.
        General Berger, last question. For the defense technology
    and innovation industrial base in this country in the remaining
    seconds here, what would be your message on the technologies
    and capabilities to pursue and invest in that you are going to
    want to require for the Marine Corps in the future?
        General Berger. First is the how part. I think we need to
    be better listeners than spend a year or two developing a
    detailed set of requirements and dump it on industry and then
    ask them, what do you think. That collaboration has to start
    from the very beginning, and it is much better than it was, I
    would say, 5 years ago.
        What do we need? We need, from the individual marine to the
    small unit, things that make them more survivable, more
    effective and lethal in a very austere environment without the
    big logistics tail behind them, which has been our challenge so
    far, because we assume that that logistics tail like the
    command and control, that the threat is going to go right after
    it. They are going to go after those two aspects of our
    warfighting capability. So, it has got to be tools that a
    marine can use forward, can fix forward, not call a contractor,
    but he can sustain them forward, he can repair them forward,
    and that is not so logistically burdensome that it is really
    difficult to keep that unit reinforced forward.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, it was great to see you three at the Army-Navy
    game. I was going to comment about the result when Senator Reed
    was here, but since he left, I thought I would leave it at
    that.
        General Berger, I want to compliment you on the
    Commandant's Plan and Guidance. I read every word of this. It
    is outstanding, innovative, bold. I want to thank you and your
    team for the exceptional work that you put into that.
        One topic I wanted to briefly discuss, General. I have had
    good discussions this week both in meetings and then in the
    hearing that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman had
    yesterday on the force posture that we have in the Asia-Pacific
    given the National Defense Strategy, including the DPRI that
    has been a subject of a lot of focus of the Marine Corps for I
    think 2 decades now. They are very focused on a broader
    strategic look that can sustain our force posture and strategy
    for the next 50 to 100 years, which I think is important. You
    may have seen in the NDAA that was just passed, 2019, there is
    a provision that says we need to do that as well. The Secretary
    of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The marines will be
    critical in that.
        Can you briefly comment on your thoughts on that?
        General Berger. Thanks, Senator.
        I do not want to speak for you, but I have heard you speak
    before that--and I have said the same--we are postured
    perfectly out there for another Korea in 1950.
        Senator Sullivan. Or the end of World War II, which is
    where our force posture----
        General Berger. That is exactly right. It was an ideal
    posture for that, not ideal for what the National Defense
    Strategy outlines as the major threats going forward in the
    Indo-Pacific. So, we have to adjust it. I do not see any
    alternative.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, the Secretary and the Chairman were
    very bullish on looking hard at this as well, and I know the
    Marine Corps has done some good work on this, and we want to
    help you--I mean, not help you, but work with you. This
    Committee has been very interested in this issue from Senator
    McCain to Senator Inhofe and myself. So, we will look forward
    to working you on that.
        I want to turn to the Arctic. Senator Kaine and I had a
    Readiness Subcommittee hearing this week, quite a good hearing.
    I want to compliment the Navy and the Marines on their recent
    Arctic expeditionary exercise out at Adak and Seward, difficult
    training. I know that was not easy. Crappy weather. But clearly
    the Arctic has become a theater of great power competition. I
    have a slide that I think some of you have seen. This is the
    Russian buildup in the region--and it is not just forces. It is
    ports and airfields and infrastructure to have force power
    projection. We do not really have much there.
        I want to give you sense of questions here, three
    questions, and then, Mr. Secretary, maybe you can take this on.
        You know, the DOD Arctic strategy says there should be
    FONOPs. I do not think we have the capability right now. We
    have two icebreakers. One is broken. The Russians have 54.
    There are also twice now mandates to look at strategic Arctic
    ports, which have kind of been ignored by the Pentagon, and
    General Neller had some plans in addition to what was going on
    in the region with regard to the Marines in the Arctic.
        Can the three of you just discuss these? Mr. Secretary,
    maybe we will start with you.
        Secretary Modly. Yes, Senator. Thanks.
        I recently within the last 2 weeks had a conversation with
    Secretary McCarthy and Secretary Barrett about how the Navy and
    the Army and the Air Force Departments can get together to come
    up with a combined strategy in terms of basing, presence, et
    cetera to address this Arctic challenge. Clearly your home
    State would be critical to this in terms of where it is
    strategically located. So we are developing this team now to
    take a look at this, and obviously, once we get that assembled,
    we would love to come over and talk to you about it.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. I appreciate your initiative on
    that. I got your note. So, thank you very much on that.
        Admiral, any thoughts on the FONOPs? We have talked about
    this before. I have a--I think I have mentioned it to you in
    hearings--but a proud history in my family, five uncles and
    great uncles who served in World War II, including my great
    uncle Tom who was a lieutenant in the Navy and did three
    Murmansk runs. I worry that we do not have that capability
    right now, no ice-hardened ships.
        Of course, this Committee has authorized the purchase of
    six polar class icebreakers, which is a start. But without any
    kind of strategic port--and we do not have anything near the
    Arctic. The closest thing is Anchorage. That is 1,500 nautical
    miles away. We cannot project power and we need to defend our
    strategic interests, particularly the Navy.
        What is your thought on that, sir?
        Admiral Gilday. My thought on that is that I think if we
    are going to talk about force structure, infrastructure in
    Alaska, I really think like DPRI it has got to be a subset of a
    broader INDOPACOM strategic lay-down.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree with that.
        Admiral Gilday. From a joint perspective, we are making the
    right decisions.
        Then secondly, with respect to operations in the Arctic,
    ICEX right now, two United States submarines, one British
    submarine, we are just on the tail end of an exercise with the
    Norwegians--the Navy and the Marine Corps--as well as another
    multinational exercise ongoing. We are seeing an increasing
    drum beat of operations in the high north. I think we need to
    continue that. I think that FONOPs will be important. I think
    that the Bering Strait will become as strategically as
    important as the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz at
    some point.
        Senator Sullivan. Putin certainly thinks so.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, based on what is going on with
    the icecap.
        So it is getting more focused, sir. I do think that taking
    a pause and looking at it strategically would be a good move.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Duckworth?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Modly, I want to follow up on a conversation I
    had with General Lyons of TRANSCOM last week. When discussing
    sealift readiness, he stated that our current readiness level
    was lower than where it needed to be, but noted that TRANSCOM
    is working to recapitalize sealift capabilities. We agreed that
    while sealift is just one of the Navy's many requirements that
    you must balance, it is essential for TRANSCOM to be able to do
    its job and help get our forces to the fight when we need it.
        General Lyons raised a possibility with me of using the
    National Defense Sealift Fund to make progress towards our
    sealift recapitalization goals. But I believe that the Navy has
    not added anything to that fund since fiscal year 2019. Could
    you please share your view on reinvigorating the National
    Defense Sealift Fund? If you disagree with that approach, what
    would be the alternative approach of prioritizing
    recapitalization of sealift capabilities?
        Secretary Modly. Senator, I absolutely agree that we have
    to recapitalize our sealift capability. Where the funding comes
    from is the challenge for us. This is another one of these
    pressures that we have in the Department of the Navy
    particularly because we are reaching a point in history where
    we have to recapitalize our nuclear deterrent, at the same time
    recover from some pretty big holes in readiness, and also do
    this, which is to recapitalize our sealift. So we are making
    choices. We are making some trades, but we are going to need
    some help I think from a budget perspective to be able to do
    that as aggressively as I think the TRANSCOM Commander would
    want us to do.
        Senator Duckworth. What do you think about using the fund
    as an avenue for----
        Secretary Modly. Senator, I do not that the fund has
    funding. I do not know if it is similar to the Strategic
    Deterrence Fund that we have as well that is a fund that gives
    us some authorities but it does not really have any funding
    attached to it. So I will have to get back to you on that
    specifically in terms of what is there or what we need to put
    into it.
        Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
        I was disappointed that this year's budget baseline
    proposal omits key investments in sealift and logistics that we
    should be prioritizing now, and we sort of talked about this.
    As you said, there are a lot of unfunded priorities, but the
    list of unfunded priorities includes tens of millions of
    dollars for emergency repairs to sealift ships identified by
    TRANSCOM and advanced communications gear for the military
    sealift command ships.
        Then in your February 18 memo that kicked off the Navy's
    stem to stern comprehensive review, you highlighted naval
    logistics as an area that could be, quote, streamlined when
    searching for billions of dollars' worth of savings.
        So can you help me reconcile this? How can it be a priority
    but then you are talking about this where you can cut? Or am I
    misunderstanding what you mean by naval logistics would be
    streamlined? I mean, how do you plan to build up and sustain a
    growing fleet of ships without prioritizing a strong logistics
    network? Who picks up the slack?
        Secretary Modly. Well, Senator, I think that particular
    memo went out to the entire Department of the Navy to look at
    every possible way that we can look at doing things better and
    more efficiently. I do not think anyone would argue that our
    Department from a logistics and supply chain is world class
    with respect to cost, distribution, the business systems that
    support it. We have multiple redundant business systems, and
    every one of them takes a budget line every year. So, we have
    to think about how we can do this better, more efficiently,
    more closely approximate some of the advances that have been
    made in supply chain management in the commercial sector over
    the years, and that is what I was talking about when I talked
    about logistics. Logistics demands are going to keep going up.
    If we keep doing it the way we are doing it now, it is going to
    cost us way too much.
        Senator Duckworth. We understood and agreed with that. On
    the other hand, we need to make sure that we actually put
    further investments in our logistics capabilities. We are not
    talking with just sealift but also heavy lift aircraft. We also
    need to be talking about how we project fuel forward.
    Everything that sucks gas needs fuel. If we are going to be
    present in the Asia-Pacific region, then we need to be able to
    project into the region beyond the first 72 hours, and so that
    is a real concern that I have.
        Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your
    service.
        General Berger, let me start by saying that I really want
    to applaud your decision to refocus the Marine Corps on the sea
    denial mission. So thank you for your leadership in that area.
    Thank you to you and your staff for keeping Congress informed
    and on board with this as you have led the Marines in this new
    direction. Thank you very much for that.
        Let us talk a little bit about Fort Leonard Wood in my home
    State, if we could for a second. General, Admiral Gilday, Fort
    Leonard Wood has had the opportunity to train many of your
    marines and sailors at its engineering, police, and CBRN
    schools. Can you give us a sense of how this opportunity for
    joint training has benefited your respective services both from
    a training and resource management standpoint?
        Admiral Gilday. Senator, not in detail except that I have
    not heard any problems.
        Senator Hawley. Well, that is good.
        Admiral Gilday. But I cannot comment on that training.
        General Berger. Just a couple words, sir.
        First, the Marine Corps is the smallest service, sir. We do
    not own all our schools. Most of our marines go to other
    service schools.
        The benefit in the particular case you are talking about is
    you are learning the trade to a military occupation, but it is
    a trade. You are learning alongside somebody you are probably
    going to serve with later on from another service. So, the
    benefits are, one, you do away with the myths. Two, there is
    some standardization in how engineers operate, how military
    police view a problem because you are operating side by side.
    You are not in four different schools doing it.
        I think for us there is an economic benefit. We cannot
    afford our own school. Two, the standardization thing is great,
    and three, it may be the only time, but if not, it is the first
    time they are going to operate alongside somebody from another
    service. So it tamps down all the myths about them.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. We are,
    obviously, very proud of Fort Leonard Wood and the work that
    they do there. I am glad that they are serving you well.
        General, back to sea denial, can you give us an update on
    your rogue fires and ground-based anti-ship missile programs in
    terms of where they are now and their timelines for fielding?
        General Berger. Both of the capabilities you speak of in
    war games and in simulation have proven--game-changer is
    probably an over-the-top characterization, but it definitely
    changes the calculus of an adversary because right now that
    capability is something we do not have, and posed with that,
    they have to act differently.
        Rogue fires in particular, on a great glide path. We are
    investing in it. Who knows if that is the solution 10 years
    from now, but we are going down that path right now.
        Ground-launched cruise missiles and everything long-range
    precision fires that is in a small enough format that a small
    marine unit can embark it, can use it, we are after it. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        From an ISR and C2 standpoint, what would you say, General,
    are the most important programs for ensuring that Marine Corps
    fire units have the targeting data they need to perform the sea
    denial mission?
        General Berger. Some will say--and I think there is logic
    to that--that they are kind of agnostic. I do not care where I
    get my fire data solution from or what ISR platform. I just
    need the data, and there is truth in that.
        On the other hand, we need organic naval ISR so that that
    expeditionary naval force that is operating either in EUCOM or
    in the first island chain or wherever has the means to pick up
    the targets forward in an expeditionary manner, and they got to
    be able to launch and recover from naval platforms, from shore,
    and they got to be small enough, if they are going to be
    embarked with us, that we can sustain them. Right now, we have
    used MQ-9's for the last year and a half in Helmand province in
    Afghanistan as a learning platform for us, how to close that
    kill chain organically.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, I will come back to you.
    Admiral Davidson recently testified that about half of his
    attack submarine requirement--only half--is being met in the
    Indo-Pacific and a problem that he forecasts will worsen in the
    2020s as our attack submarines are retired faster than they are
    being replaced. Talk to us about this. How is the Navy planning
    to mitigate the anticipated shortfall here in the Indo-Pacific
    in particular?
        Admiral Gilday. Senator, we are buying submarines at the
    rate that both Electric Boat and Huntington-Ingalls can produce
    them. So we are buying at the maximum output right now with the
    exception of the fact that one submarine dropped from the
    budget in 2021.
        It really comes down to a ruthless prioritization. So we
    are meeting the Secretary of Defense's direction for the
    numbers of ready submarines to get to sea, and we have been
    doing that. Then it really comes down to prioritization
    principally between Russia and China in terms of how those
    submarines are then allocated across the combatant commanders
    and employed.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you finally, Mr. Chairman,
    aside from growing the submarine force, are there other
    investments that are needed to extend our undersea warfare
    advantage?
        Admiral Gilday. Unmanned, and so we are making great gains
    in unmanned under the sea.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        We thank all three of you for the time you spent with us.
    Excellent testimony.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                          mcas cherry point & frc-east
        1. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, there appears to be some
    disagreement between the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible
    for paying to upgrade facilities at FRC-East [Fleet Readiness Center-
    East]. I am concerned this argument is delaying progress. Which service
    is responsible for funding the needed construction and modernization
    efforts at FRC-East and how will you lead in the department to make
    sure that the necessary investments are made?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy is working with the Marine Corps to solve
    this critical issue. The Navy's January 2018 Fleet Readiness Center
    (FRC) Infrastructure Optimization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress laid
    out a ten-year 8$3.5 billion Department of the Navy (DON) plan for both
    facility and equipment investments/improvements. The plan includes
    future projects for F-35 aircraft heavy maintenance: the modernization
    and restoration of two existing facilities at FRC-SW, a maintenance
    hangar at FRC-East, Cherry Point, NC, and a second phase project for
    this hangar. The Navy's Strike Fighter procurement plan is a mix of 4th
    and 5th generation Strike Fighters to provide complementary capacity
    and capability from our flight decks that is needed to meet the threat
    through the 2030s. The Navy plans to procure up to 273 F-35C aircraft.
    The USMC is transitioning to a 100 percent 5th generation aircraft
    fleet to support Marine Aviation operational needs. The USMC plans to
    procure up to 420 F-35B/C aircraft (F-35B: 353 / F-35C: 67). The Navy
    is working with the USMC to evaluate the appropriate service MILCON
    cost share based upon utilization and the best timing for these
    projects within the entire DON portfolio. In the interim, capacity is
    being expanded within existing FRC spaces to conduct required F-35
    maintenance. The Department of the Navy is committed to the success of
    the F-35 and has funded the F-35 Support Equipment Storage Facility, F-
    35 Training and Simulator Facility, F-35 Flight Line Utilities
    Modernization Phase II, and F-35B Vertical Lift Fan Test Facility at
    MCAS Cherry Point.

        2. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, we've been at a costly stalemate
    with FRC-East, so I'd like to set up a meeting with the primary
    stakeholders from the Marine Corps and Navy to finally identify the
    sticking point on this.
        Admiral Gilday. The DON is optimizing F-35 depot maintenance as
    evidenced by the F-35 Lift Fan test facility at Cherry Point, NC. The
    Navy and Marine Corps stakeholders are currently meeting to discuss and
    resolve this issue. Once DON approves the plan, we will provide the
    Committee an update. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss FRC-
    East and its support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation.
                      communication spectrum--5g networks
        3. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, Secretary Esper said, ``DOD is
    willing to share spectrum with 5G networks in the ``Mid-Band'' (3 to
    4.2 gigahertz). What systems does the Navy have that might be affected
    and how could it impact Homeland defense?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy uses this frequency range for both Air
    Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense in support of maritime operations
    and homeland defense. There are at least nineteen USN/USMC
    capabilities, to include every major capital ship, that use this band
    in accordance with current spectrum allocation. We will work closely
    with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing partnership that supports the
    Nation's 5G goals while also ensuring the hundreds of billions of
    dollars invested in national defense are not wasted. We can provide
    more details at a higher classification upon request.

        4. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, if DOD was required to
    ``vacate'' or leave that band of the spectrum instead of sharing, what
    are the potential dollar costs to the military?'' How long would it
    take to move to a different area of the spectrum?
        Admiral Gilday. Moving capability from one band of the spectrum to
    another assumes that frequencies can be identified to relocate. There
    are at least nineteen USN/USMC capabilities, to include every major
    capital ship, that use S band and they are all highly-sophisticated
    weapon systems that took decades and hundreds of billions to develop.
    We would expect many decades and billions of dollars to re-engineer
    systems. We will work closely with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing
    partnership that supports the Nation's 5G goals while also ensuring the
    hundreds of billions of dollars invested in national defense are not
    wasted. We can provide more details at a higher classification upon
    request.

        5. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, can you describe some of the
    ways that the Navy relies on spectrum to support warfighter
    requirements? What are some of the future spectrum warfighter
    requirements that will be essential to competing with Russia and China
    on a future battlefield?
        Admiral Gilday. DOD considers the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to
    be both a tool for communications, and a weapon to control our
    adversaries' use of the EMS. In other words, spectrum and its use is
    vital to the defense of our nation and national interests, and those of
    our allies. The Combat, Communications, Command and Control over
    spectrum is foundational to all aspects of warfighting. The Navy and
    Marine Corps use the EMS, from Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) to
    Extremely High Frequency (EHF) to detect, track and attack the
    adversary. The implementation of EMS via command and control supports
    our own national interest, and those of our coalition partners and
    their forces, to fight, spoof and otherwise manipulate our adversaries.
    The criticality of spectrum to Navy/DOD missions cannot be understated.
    As the United States pursues further sharing arrangements with the
    commercial world it is essential we have full Congressional support in
    protecting Defense only spectrum in order to ensure national security.
        Our Naval Forces' ability to support diverse operations and crises
    is dependent on their ability to use the EMS for offensive and
    defensive purposes, e.g., intelligence; communications; position,
    navigation, and timing; sensing; command and control (C2); cyber,
    electronic and kinetic attack; air, space and surface ranging; unmanned
    air systems (UAS) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs); data
    transmission and information storage and processing. The Navy and
    Marine Corps are deployed globally and rely on the electromagnetic
    spectrum to remain highly maneuverable, flexible, and tactically
    effective. The ability to access and maneuver in the EMS is a key
    enabler and underlying tenet of these concepts. Speed of command will
    differentiate between victory and defeat in future engagements by
    controlling the precise placement and timing of forces and effects.
    Using and controlling the Radio Frequency spectrum is a vital required
    condition to achieve speed of command in today's Information Warfare-
    dominated word.
                          mcas cherry point & frc-east
        6. Senator Tillis. General Berger, there appears to be some
    disagreement between the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible
    for paying to upgrade facilities at FRC-East. I am concerned this
    argument is delaying progress. Which service is responsible for funding
    the needed construction and modernization efforts at FRC-East and how
    will you lead in the department to make sure that the necessary
    investments are made?
        General Berger. The Navy and Marine Corps are working together to
    solve this critical issue. The Navy's January 2018 Fleet Readiness
    Center (FRC) Infrastructure Optimization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress
    laid out a ten-year 8$3.5 billion Department of the Navy (DON) plan for
    both facility and equipment investments/improvements. The plan includes
    two unfunded projects for joint F-35 aircraft heavy maintenance: a
    maintenance hangar at FRC-East, Cherry Point, NC, and a second phase
    project for this hangar. We are evaluating the appropriate service
    MILCON cost share based upon utilization and the best timing for these
    projects within the entire DON portfolio. In the interim, capacity is
    being expanded within existing FRC spaces to conduct required F-35
    maintenance.

        7. Senator Tillis. General Berger, we've been at a costly stalemate
    with FRC-East, so I'd like to set up a meeting with the primary
    stakeholders from the Marine Corps and Navy to finally identify the
    sticking point on this.
        General Berger. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss FRC
    East and its support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation. My incoming
    Deputy Commandant for Aviation will be fully prepared to discuss this
    matter with you at your convenience.
                           usmc acquisition programs
        8. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in your written testimony you
    state that you're going to do a review of major acquisition programs
    like F-35, JLTV, ACV etc.--and that you expect that review will likely
    recommend major revisions and reductions to some of our major programs.
    Where are you with that review?
        General Berger. Phase II of our overall Force Design 2030 effort
    concluded in March of this year, and those findings and recommendations
    were publicly released shortly thereafter. While we will continue to
    refine some elements of our overall force with additional integrated
    planning teams, the vast majority of the focus will transition to a
    rigorous wargaming and experimentation phase (phase III) where we will
    further test our conclusions and recommendations. Based on the results
    of those Phase III efforts, we will have a much better understanding of
    the operationally suitable cuts that may be required to major
    acquisition programs such as the F-35B/C, CH-53K, ACV, and JLTV. Based
    on our initial findings, all of those capabilities are still required
    and will make the total force more ready; we simply might need fewer of
    them.

        9.Senator Tillis. General Berger, Marine Corps Air Station New
    River will be the home of over half of all the new CH-53Ks for the
    Marine Corps. I believe they just completed the log demo there and have
    the pilot training simulators installed as well. The CH-53E is an
    established aircraft but it is old and has maintenance challenges.
    Given the fact that your requirement for the CH-53K is 200 aircraft and
    yet you only have about 140 CH-53Es, how important is it for you and
    the Marine Corps to get these new CH-53Ks sooner rather than later?
        General Berger. As noted in my testimony before your Committee, and
    in your QFR, the existing program of record is for 200 aircraft.
    However, that requirement was anchored on an Active Duty force much
    larger than today's force: 202,000 marines with 27 Active component
    infantry battalions. Since the requirement for 200 CH-53Ks was
    initially established over two decades ago, the overall force structure
    has been reduced significantly. In 2010, we reduced the force to 24
    Active component infantry battalions, and as part of Force Design 2030,
    plan the reduction of three additional infantry battalions. With only
    21 Active component infantry battalions to support, the requirement for
    heavy-lift helicopters has decreased by three full squadrons, a total
    of 48 aircraft. If such a reduction is implemented, then the resultant
    152 aircraft capability will still exceed the current inventory of 8140
    CH-53Es. More importantly, these aircraft will relieve pressure on
    surface connectors--both land and sea--and provide a much needed
    upgrade to our future naval expeditionary forces--specifically the
    redesigned Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and new Marine Littoral
    Regiment.
                              usmc budget (pb-21)
        10. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in your written testimony you
    state that the timing of this POM (Program Objective Memorandum)
    submission coincides with an inflection point for the Marine Corps.
    Yet, looking over the Marine Corps' budget I really don't see much
    change. Why isn't there more significant change in President's Budget
    2021?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps' President's Budget 2021 budget
    request was submitted prior to the completion of our initial Force
    Design effort which just concluded in March 2020. The President's
    Budget 2022 budget request is informed by our initial Force Design
    conclusions as noted in our Force Design 2030 report and will reflect
    more significant changes related to new requirements to include
    capabilities such as Group 5 UAS and other unmanned capabilities.
                               usmc end strength
        11. Senator Tillis. General Berger, why didn't you inform the
    Congress of your plans to reduce end strength during the NDAA
    conference process? The ink on the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA has barely
    dried. We had plenty of time to adjust the numbers during conference
    negotiations.
        General Berger. At the time of Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA conference
    negotiations, the initial phases of our Force Design effort were
    underway yet had not been completed. As such, we were not prepared to
    provide concrete recommendations for a reduction in end strength, and
    needed additional time to ensure that any cut was grounded in a
    defensible analytic foundation.

        12. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in light of your plans for
    fiscal year 2020, why should we trust the end strength numbers you
    included in the fiscal year 2021 budget request?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps strives to maintain an open and
    transparent dialogue with Congress, providing the most accurate
    information it can in as timely a manner as possible. Congress can
    ``trust'' our numbers because those are based on a solid analytic
    foundation, and informed by rigorous wargaming and experimentation.
    Over the next ten years, Congress can expect Marine Corps end strength
    to align with our ongoing Force Design effort, the initial stages of
    which were completed in early 2020. While this effort will be iterative
    and responsive to the rapidly evolving security environment, we are
    confident that further reductions to end strength will be required to
    enable investment in future capabilities. Moving forward, we will
    continue to update Congress on our Force Design progress and any
    required organizational changes to enable it.
                          camp lejeune toxic exposure
        13. Senator Tillis. General Berger, I understand that the Agency
    for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has identified a
    number of buildings at Camp Lejeune that are still threatened by toxic
    chemical plumes with high detectable levels of the cancer causing TCE.
    During Hurricane Florence, TCE remediation was temporarily halted due
    to storm damage at the barracks at HP 57 in Hadnot Point. HP 57 houses
    female marines of child bearing age, and TCE is proven to cause fetal
    defects if pregnant women are exposed to it. Are there any current
    efforts underway to move female marines of child bearing age from the
    HP 57 barracks? If not, what steps are currently underway to ensure
    that remediation of TCE in this location does not occur again?
        General Berger. Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune does not plan
    to move female marines from HP57 because effective measures have been
    implemented to prevent vapor intrusion (VI). Beginning in 2007, MCB
    Camp Lejeune conducted a base-wide VI evaluation, including building
    HP57, in coordination with the United States Environmental Protection
    Agency (USEPA) and the North Carolina Department of Environmental
    Quality (NCDEQ). The Marine Corps has shared this information with
    ATSDR for their ongoing MCB Camp Lejeune VI Public Health Assessment.
    ATSDR has assured us that if they identify any health risks they will
    immediately notify installation officials. To date, they have not done
    so. In 2014, testing indicated elevated contaminant vapors in a
    mechanical room at HP57. A prompt investigation determined that the
    vapors were coming from an uncapped sewer pipe which was promptly
    repaired. Since that repair, no air quality tests have detected TCE
    vapors from VI above residential indoor air screening levels. As a
    precautionary measure, MCB Camp Lejeune installed an active sewer
    venting system as a secondary engineering control. Based on historical
    test results, including test results prior to the installation of the
    active sewer venting system, MCB Camp Lejeune does not expect VI to
    occur at HP57 even during electrical interruptions as briefly occurred
    because of Hurricane Florence. The EPA and NCDEQ both concur with these
    primary and secondary engineering controls and agree that this approach
    protects human health.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                 southeast alaska acoustic measurement facility
        14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Modly, the Southeast Alaska
    Acoustic Measurement Facility (SEAFAC) is the Navy's only West Coast
    asset for making high fidelity passive acoustic signature measurements.
    It is my understanding that the majority of the workforce for this
    facility does not live--full time--in Ketchikan, Alaska, and instead
    commutes--at cost to the Navy--to conduct operations at the facility.
    What is the Navy's rationale for this transient workforce and what is
    the yearly cost to the Navy?
        Secretary Modly. The SEAFAC Site Director and year-round operations
    and maintenance staff are local personnel who live in Ketchikan. The
    operations and maintenance crew consists of 16 personnel who work a
    standard workweek throughout the entire year at SEAFAC, ensuring the
    facility is updated, maintained, and ready to support acoustic tests.
    In an average year, approximately 10 acoustic trials are conducted. A
    typical trial lasts 72 hours, bringing the total average number of
    testing days at SEAFAC to approximately 30 days per year. When a test
    is scheduled, a trial analyst team of experts, assembled from across
    the NAVSEA organization, travels to SEAFAC to conduct around-the-clock
    operations for the duration of the trial. The trial analyst team
    consists of subject matter experts in sonar, acoustics, signal
    processing, submarine stealth, and other specialties. Following the
    test, the analyst team members return to their home laboratories where
    the computer infrastructure, advanced analysis tools, and other
    communication and support capabilities exist to analyze the data and
    produce products for the Fleet. The trial analyst team of subject
    matter experts is not required at SEAFAC other than during these tests,
    and they support similar testing at SEAFAC's sister facility, the South
    TOTO (Tongue of the Ocean) Acoustic Measurement Facility (STAFAC),
    located in the Bahamas, for Atlantic Fleet submarines. These experts
    also support a significant amount of work at Navy submarine bases, as
    well as two primary Navy laboratories, Naval Surface Warfare Center,
    Carderock Division, located at Bethesda, MD, and Submarine Base Bangor,
    in Silverdale, WA. The laboratories serve as home base for the trial
    analyst team. It is much more cost effective (estimated savings of
    $3.7M of travel costs annually) to have a nationally distributed team
    of experts supporting the Navy globally than to locate them all in
    Ketchikan, where they are only required 30 days per year.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Modly, has the Navy explored the
    possibility of local hires in Ketchikan to staff the facility? If so,
    what was the result? If not, why not?
        Secretary Modly. The year-round operations and maintenance
    personnel at SEAFAC have been local Ketchikan people since SEAFAC's
    construction in the 1990s. Throughout the life of SEAFAC, the Navy has
    been a strong advocate for using local Ketchikan personnel to a large
    extent and whenever possible. Contract actions for support of SEAFAC
    are always open for submittals from local entities, and they encourage
    the use of local personnel.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                              f/a-18 super hornets
        16. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, the fiscal year 2021 budget
    request includes funding for 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, but eliminates
    36 aircraft from future years, halting production in fiscal year 2022.
    As a result, the F/A-18 line could face a closure decision next year.
    What is the Navy's tactical aviation shortfall this year, and how would
    it be impacted if the Super Hornet line is closed after this year?
        Secretary Modly. The strike fighter inventory management modelling
    accounts for procurement block III Super Hornets and Joint Strike
    Fighter, service life modification of block III Super Hornets,
    maintenance repair, and projected aircraft utilization based on the
    optimized fleet response plan. Inventory modeling with President's
    Budget 2021 shows a maximum strike fighter shortfall of 58 aircraft in
    fiscal year 2021, with continual improvement throughout the future
    year's defense program. The Department of the Navy is committed to
    achieving a mix of 4th and 5th Generation assets by 2030 with the F/A-
    18E/F and F-35C fleet while developing Next Generation Air Dominance to
    replace the F/A-18E/F as it reaches end of service life.

        17. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, what is the Navy's strategy
    for engaging our international partners and how that could help extend
    the F/A-18 production line?
        Secretary Modly. The Department of Navy (DON) actively engages with
    our international partners on F/A-18 opportunities. The DON is
    currently in formal strike-fighter competitions with the governments of
    Canada (88 aircraft), Finland (64 aircraft), Germany (90 or 45
    aircraft), India (57 aircraft) and Switzerland (40 aircraft). Formal
    international commitments are not expected prior to calendar year 2021,
    with deliveries in 2024 and beyond.

        18. Senator Hawley. Secretary Modly, as a complement to new
    production, the Navy also invested in the F/A-18E/F Service Life
    Modification (SLM) program to extend the Super Hornet fleet and
    maintain tactical aviation readiness. The SLM program will certainly
    yield positive results to lengthen the service life of aircraft.
    However, even successfully remanufactured aircraft inherently increase
    the average age of the tactical air force. Additionally, SLM relies on
    a production line of new Super Hornets for on-time parts and production
    expertise. Has the Navy assessed the impact of eliminating new Super
    Hornets on SLM cost or effectiveness or the long-term cost of
    sustaining an increasingly aging fleet, and if so, what is the Navy's
    assessment?
        Secretary Modly. The Service Life Modification (SLM) program
    supports Strike Fighter Inventory Management while a greater number of
    5th generation fighters join the Fleet. SLM is a standalone contract
    with dedicated programmatic, engineering, quality and touch labor
    resources (i.e. not shared with production), and does not negatively
    impact the production line. Production ceasing in fiscal year 2021 may
    present opportunities to acquire experienced touch labor to augment the
    SLM program. The Department of Navy has assessed the cost
    effectiveness, and recognizes the increased operating and sustainment
    cost associated with operating aging fleets. It has divested from
    legacy Hornets at the operational edge, with the Reserve component and
    Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center to follow in 2025.
    Currently, the Super Hornet is less expensive to procure and operate
    than the Joint Strike Fighter. However, it is expected that the cost
    per flight hour of 4th and 5th Gen platforms will equalize near the end
    of the Future Year Defense Program as a greater number of F-35C are
    operated in the fleet.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                               privatized housing
        19. Senator Reed. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General
    Berger, regarding privatized homes that are ADA (Americans with
    Disabilities Act of 1990) compliant, my understanding is that roughly
    five percent of homes must be made accessible for ADA families. And if
    ADA families do not have an ADA home when they move to an installation,
    they are placed on a waiting list. Also, if a family moves into an ADA
    compliant home, they must sign a form saying they will vacate the home
    if a family requiring ADA compliance needs one. We have received
    reports of military families unable to move into an ADA home, instances
    of families who have not moved out when an incoming family requires an
    ADA home. Are you aware of any such instances? And if not, can you
    please look into it and report back to us?
        Secretary Modly. All but one of the Department of the Navy's (DON)
    privatized family housing business agreements include specific
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance language to address
    alterations for ADA accommodation. In addition, all projects are
    required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws and
    certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II
    does not currently include ADA language in the business agreement and
    will be updated when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA
    changes. On Navy installations, some ADA families have not immediately
    moved into an ADA compliant home and have been put on a wait list. They
    are moved into an ADA home when one becomes available or when the
    property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of the family.
    CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing to
    move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the
    local property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps
    Base Hawaii indicated that there have been instances when a non-ADA
    family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to
    accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no record of this being an issue
    at any other installation. With the exception of MCB Hawaii, most
    Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign a
    form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is
    required for an ADA family.
        Admiral Gilday. All but one of the Department of the Navy's (DON)
    privatized family housing business agreements include specific
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance language to address
    alterations for ADA accommodation. In addition, all projects are
    required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws and
    certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II
    does not currently include ADA language in the business agreement and
    will be updated when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA
    changes. On Navy installations, some ADA families have not immediately
    moved into an ADA compliant home and have been put on a wait list. They
    are moved into an ADA home when one becomes available or when the
    property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of the family.
    CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing to
    move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the
    local property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps
    Base Hawaii indicated that there have been instances when a non-ADA
    family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to
    accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no record of this being an issue
    at any other installation. With the exception of MCB Hawaii, most
    Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign a
    form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is
    required for an ADA family.
        General Berger. MCB Hawaii indicated there have been instances when
    a non-ADA family was relocated at the PPV partner's expense in order to
    accommodate an ADA family. MCB Hawaii does require that non-ADA
    families sign a form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a
    home if it is required for an ADA family. This has not been an issue at
    any of our other installations, thus most Marine Corps installations do
    not require non-ADA families to sign a form prior to occupying an ADA
    home. We will review current policies across our installations and
    ensure all are in compliance.
           operational energy alignment to national defense strategy
        20. Senator Reed. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General
    Berger, according to the Navy's recently analysis sent to this
    Committee, a hybrid electric drive (HED) can reduce fuel use as much as
    37 percent compared to a ship without one. Another type of operational
    energy improvement called stern flaps, save the Navy $125 million per
    year. These and other types of operational energy improvements increase
    on-station time for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships and can help
    address the tyranny of distance fuel logistics problem in the Pacific.
    These are all aspects of the Navy's alignment with the National Defense
    Strategy. Can each of you please briefly talk about how operational
    energy improvements increase combat capability and lethality of the
    Navy and Marine Corps and what kind of other investments you all are
    making for ships and deployed forces?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy's warfighting strategy, aligned to the
    NDS, employs a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases
    the importance of forward logistics capability, platform endurance, and
    operational reach. Navy's operational energy improvements target
    technologies that extend energy supplies into contested environments
    and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the naval
    operational energy network to enable distributed operations: The MQ-25A
    is a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that will extend the reach of the
    carrier strike group's air wing Afloat refueling projects, including
    the Seabased Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS) and Improved Modular
    Fuel Delivery System (IMFDS), will enable a more reliable and robust
    fuel distribution network, and provide options for getting fuel over
    the shore to marines. The Integrated Power and Energy Systems project
    is developing the next generation shipboard power and energy
    architecture and subsystems needed to optimize electrical energy
    distribution and enable future high energy weapons Advanced batteries
    and fuel cells are enabling more unmanned capabilities and extending
    reach and endurance of naval weapons systems The Mobility Fuels program
    continues to provide testing and certification capabilities to ensure
    the Navy has access to reliable sources of fuel worldwide Energy
    Command and Control tools, including the Global Energy Information
    System (GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP), and Maritime
    Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), will support tactical and campaign
    level energy management.
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy's warfighting strategy, aligned to the
    NDS, employs a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases
    the importance of forward logistics capability, platform endurance, and
    operational reach. Navy's operational energy improvements target
    technologies that extend energy supplies into contested environments
    and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the naval
    operational energy network to enable distributed operations:
          The MQ-25A is a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that
    will extend the reach of the carrier strike group's air wing.
          Afloat refueling projects, including the Seabased
    Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS) and Improved Modular Fuel Delivery
    System (IMFDS), will enable a more reliable and robust fuel
    distribution network, and provide options for getting fuel over the
    shore to marines.
          The Integrated Power and Energy Systems project is
    developing the next generation shipboard power and energy architecture
    and subsystems needed to optimize electrical energy distribution and
    enable future high energy weapons.
          Advanced batteries and fuel cells are enabling more
    unmanned capabilities and extending reach and endurance of naval
    weapons systems.
          The Mobility Fuels program continues to provide testing
    and certification capabilities to ensure the Navy has access to
    reliable sources of fuel worldwide.
          Energy Command and Control tools, including the Global
    Energy Information System (GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner
    (RASP), and Maritime Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), will support
    tactical and campaign level energy management.
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is investing approximately $51
    million in fiscal year 2021 to address Operational Energy (OE)
    challenges, $18 million to increase future warfighting capability, and
    $33 million to enhance mission effectiveness of the current force. For
    example, we are investing in advanced power sources and new power
    generation and harvesting methods, with supporting research and
    development in renewable energy sources, mobile electric power, new
    advanced battery chemistries, and alternative energy sources (e.g.
    hydrogen fuel cells or aluminum based fuels). We are also seeking novel
    methods to execute bulk fuel distribution, for example, investing in
    manned and unmanned systems that expand the distribution network via
    low-cost, risk-worthy platforms, while enhancing network redundancy and
    inverting the energy cost curve. OE investments reduce both the
    footprint and logistics tail required to support forward forces--
    essential if we are to realize the potential of Distributed Maritime
    Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                 portsmouth naval shipyard joint land use study
        21. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, Portsmouth
    Naval Shipyard and the town of Kittery, Maine recently unveiled a
    ``Joint Land Use Study'' to address traffic and congestion issues as
    the shipyard continues to expand. How is the Navy involved in this
    process?
        Secretary Modly. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery,
    the Southern Maine Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along
    with the States of Maine and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard (PNSY) to strengthen their current partnerships. This includes
    the ability to understand and address the issues impacting both the
    Navy and communities throughout the region, including traffic
    congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support military
    readiness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public
    outreach and engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process.
    The JLUS is a collaborative community planning effort between PNSY,
    state and federal officials, and various community stakeholders.
    Communication and coordination between the shipyard and the community
    are more robust through the study process. The process encourages them
    to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility issues caused by
    future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the SMPDC
    sponsored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of
    Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment.
        Admiral Gilday. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery,
    the Southern Maine Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along
    with the States of Maine and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard (PNSY) to strengthen their current partnerships. This includes
    the ability to understand and address the issues impacting both the
    Navy and communities throughout the region, including traffic
    congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support military
    readiness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public
    outreach and engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process.
    The JLUS is a collaborative community planning effort between PNSY,
    state and federal officials, and various community stakeholders.
    Communication and coordination between the shipyard and the community
    are more robust through the study process. The process encourages them
    to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility issues caused by
    future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the SMPDC
    sponsored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of
    Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment.

        22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, there is a
    military construction (MILCON) project in the fiscal year 2023 budget
    plan that would acquire the rail spur land near the Route 1 bypass and
    Route 103 heading towards the shipyard to temporarily hold supplies for
    the shipyard and create satellite parking. How will the Navy commit to
    ensuring the needs at the shipyard are addressed?
        Secretary Modly. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur
    land near the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard
    as a temporary holding space for supplies and to create satellite
    parking for the shipyard. No discussions have taken place between the
    Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study committee stakeholders
    regarding any projects that would support any such initiatives. The
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P-1170 project
    request for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following
    internal Navy processes, the project is being resubmitted for
    consideration in future Navy programming actions. The Navy will ensure
    the needs at the Shipyard are addressed through the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using a digital-
    twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all
    projects needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The
    digital-twin effort at PNSY will be completed during the second quarter
    of fiscal year 2021, with an updated Area Development Plan expected to
    be completed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2022.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur
    land near the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard
    as a temporary holding space for supplies and to create satellite
    parking for the shipyard. No discussions have taken place between the
    Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study committee stakeholders
    regarding any projects that would support any such initiatives. The
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P-1170 project
    request for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following
    internal Navy processes, the project is being resubmitted for
    consideration in future Navy programming actions. The Navy will ensure
    the needs at the Shipyard are addressed through the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using a digital-
    twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all
    projects needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The
    digital-twin effort at PNSY will be completed during the second quarter
    of fiscal year 2021, with an updated Area Development Plan expected to
    be completed by the third quarter of fiscal year 2022.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                 virginia-class
        23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, yesterday, Secretary
    Geurts testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the Virginia-
    class does not have an execution issue, and there's no concern about
    the contractor's ability to deliver--it is truly an affordability
    issue, which is why one Virginia-class submarine is the top priority on
    the Navy's unfunded requirements list. Do you agree with this
    assessment?
        Secretary Modly. Yes, this was not an execution issue. The
    construction schedules which had been lagging on Virginia-class
    submarines are stabilizing, and the Navy can execute a 2nd ship if it
    is funded in fiscal year 2021. During the budget process, strategic
    decisions had to be made across the entire Navy portfolio to balance
    requirements versus the top line budget. A second submarine is the
    Navy's next priority and, for that reason, is at the top of our
    unfunded priorities list.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, why did the Navy budget
    request only include one submarine in fiscal year 2021, exacerbating
    the shortfall in fast-attack submarines?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures,
    and funding for additional fast attack submarines must compete with
    other important demands, such as readiness and force level requirements
    of other classes of ships, including Columbia. Although SSN force
    structure remains below the Navy requirement, the Navy is able to
    manage force requirements to execute our required missions during this
    time, while expanding the industrial base to support growing a larger
    more lethal SSN force structure.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, are you concerned about
    the potential harm to the submarine industrial base and workforce if
    only one Virginia-class submarine is funding?
        Secretary Modly. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting
    the shipbuilding demand outlined in President's Budget 2021 and the
    Navy greatly appreciates the support Congress has given us to stabilize
    and enhance that industrial base and shipbuilding programs. The Navy
    must have a stable industrial base in order to not only ramp up for the
    future, but also to sustain the employment and the skill levels already
    in place. While it is imperative that the Navy retain and expand our
    competitive advantage and improve capacity and capability, the Navy
    faces budgetary limitations and competing priorities. The industrial
    base should not be harmed by funding only one submarine in fiscal year
    2021. However, maintaining the two per year build rate is the most
    effective way to stabilize the industrial base and increase SSN
    capacity. For this reason, the Virginia-class ship is the number one
    priority on the Unfunded Priority List. The Virginia-class Submarine
    (VCS) Block V Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract includes a priced
    option for one additional SSN with VPM executable in either fiscal year
    2021, fiscal year 2022, or fiscal year 2023. Additionally, as required
    by public law 115-232, the contract contains unpriced options for an
    additional ship in fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023. The
    President's Budget 2021 request and prior year budgets (fiscal year
    2018 to fiscal year 2020) include funding to support critical spare
    materials for a tenth VCS Block V hull. Funding for these materials
    early in the MYP is critical to level loading supplier's work orders
    and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring a single submarine in
    fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option is not exercised the
    material would be assigned to subsequent SSNs. Additionally, the Navy
    continues to implement the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP), which
    coordinates the key actions required to accomplish integrated
    construction across the nuclear shipbuilding enterprise, including VCS,
    Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP includes a substantial focus on
    meeting labor demands and both shipyards have contributed workforce
    acquisition and development strategies. The Navy will continue its
    efforts to sustain a viable submarine industrial base and its
    workforce.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Gilday,do you believe that our
    current pace of submarine construction is sufficient for the United
    States to maintain undersea dominance--particularly with regard to
    near-peer adversaries Russia and China?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, it is imperative that the Navy retain and
    expand our competitive advantage, both in capacity and capability. The
    Navy will continue to re-examine our force structure and Shipbuilding
    plans, improving SSN capacity where feasible given budgetary
    limitations and competing priorities. Of particular importance is to
    preserve our industrial base and establish an aggressive, forward-
    looking, competitive posture. Virginia-class submarines use modular
    construction with an open architecture to enable capability
    improvements. Each successive submarine block continues to include
    capability enhancements keeping us ahead of the threat and restoring
    operational margin.
                      electric boat and groton work force
        27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, I would like a staff-level
    brief on Navy efforts to stabilize the submarine workforce, but
    specifically I'd like to know: When do you expect to have a contract in
    place for Electric Boat workers to help public shipyards with
    maintenance or other availabilities to ease the workforce dip?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy is evaluating all contract opportunities
    and structures for augmenting the nuclear ship maintenance workforce
    from private shipyards. Therefore, the Navy cannot provide specific
    information on the number people or the specific companies that would
    be involved. The Navy will reach out to your staff to schedule a
    briefing at the earliest opportunity.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, how many workers will this
    help, and which public shipyards are participating?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy is evaluating all contact opportunities
    and structures for accomplishing the nuclear ship maintenance workload
    with our private industry partners. The Navy will reach out to your
    staff to schedule a briefing at the earliest opportunity.

        29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what other policies or
    authorities are required in order to ease the trend of furloughs and
    new hires to stabilize the submarine industrial base workforce?
        Secretary Modly. A skilled, experienced industrial base workforce
    is key to the efficient construction and maintenance of submarines. The
    Navy closely oversees workload and workforce requirements necessary to
    meet submarine construction and maintenance schedules. As Columbia lead
    ship construction begins this year and ramps up to serial production in
    fiscal year 2026, the submarine construction workforce will need to
    expand from current levels. There are no new policies or authorities
    required however. The Columbia program will continue to benefit from
    authorities in the National Sea Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) to help
    level-load the industrial base and the associated workforce. NSBDF
    authorities of particular benefit to the workforce include: Economic
    Order Quantity in support of Multi-Program Material Procurement,
    Advance Construction, and Continuous Production which reduce
    construction schedule risk through consistent demand signals and level
    loading enabling construction efficiencies & facilities optimization.
    In addition, Congress has appropriated $573 million to the Virginia and
    Columbia programs since fiscal year 2018 for submarine industrial base
    expansion and risk reduction. These funds are critical for actively
    managing supply base risks and aiding with supplier development. An
    additional key enabler for de-risking the workforce and industrial base
    is the on-time award of the Build I contract (SSBN 826 and 827). The
    Department of Defense has submitted a legislative proposal requesting
    authority to award the incrementally funded Build I contract. In order
    to exercise the Build, I option on schedule, the authority to award the
    incrementally funded contract is required by October 2020. In the event
    of a fiscal year 2021 Continuing Resolution, an anomaly will be
    required, including new start language and incremental funding
    authority. Even with plans to mitigate workload shortfalls and manage
    green labor, peaks and valleys will continue to occur in the work force
    due to submarine construction and repair schedules. To address these
    near term ebbs, the Navy has assigned some submarine maintenance
    availabilities to private shipyards. The Navy will continue to evaluate
    future opportunities to help manage the workload in private shipyards
    and to ease the workload ramp to Columbia serial production.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what is the plan for
    maintenance on the USS John Warner? When do you anticipate this
    maintenance availability will be awarded?
        Secretary Modly. The USS John Warner's Extended Drydocking Selected
    Restricted Availability is scheduled for accomplishment in fiscal year
    2023. As the Navy continues to balance its workload across the entire
    industrial base, it will continue to consider the available capacity
    within the public and private sectors. The Navy anticipates making a
    final decision by the end of the second quarter of calendar year 2021.
                              ch-53k funding cuts
        31. Senator Blumenthal. General Berger, would you support funding
    for 9 CH-53Ks in the fiscal year 2021 budget?
        General Berger. We budgeted for 7 aircraft in fiscal year 2021. If
    8$240 million of additional funding were made available to the Marine
    Corps, we would prefer to apply those resources toward higher Service
    acquisition priorities aligned to Force Design 2030 such as Group 5
    MALE UAS. We remain committed to the HMH program as articulated in the
    Force Design 2030 report, and think that our current pace for
    procurement remains appropriate.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. General Berger, What role does the CH53K
    play in the expeditionary advanced basing operations concept of
    employment, and supporting distributed maritime operations?
        General Berger. Beyond its traditional role as heavy-lift support,
    the CH-53K's exact function in our emerging naval concepts of
    Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base
    Operations (EABO) requires additional study. We aim to advance our
    understanding of the aircraft's role in DMO and EABO during rigorous
    experimentation and exercises as part of our ongoing Force Design
    effort. As noted in our Force Design 2030 report, we are confident that
    5 CH-53K squadrons will provide the modern heavy-lift capabilities that
    our stand-in naval forces require. We see the CH-53K as one of several
    key capabilities within a larger system of naval and joint capabilities
    whose role is largely dependent upon the presence or absence of other
    assets such as surface connectors, as well as the size and weight of
    our base firing elements--HIMARs, LW155, or future Rogue Fires. The CH-
    53K has the ability to move more fuel, equipment, critical supplies,
    and marines at greater distances than any current rotorcraft; thus,
    should provide our forward deployed forces with a key capability for
    maritime gray zone competition against peer or near-peer adversaries.
    In addition, it will provide Fleet Commanders and ARG/MEU Commanders
    with a modern capability in support of our traditional crisis response
    role. As our EABO experimentation progresses, I will provide you and
    the Committee with updates, and look forward to discussing this program
    with you in the near future.
                      work force development funding cuts
        33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, last year the Defense
    Acquisition Workforce Development Account appropriated over 400 million
    for work force development across the Department of Defense.
    Additionally in support of the Columbia program, 123 million was
    appropriated for submarine industrial base expansion to ensure that
    second and third-tier contractors can meet increased production
    requirements. Can you provide this Committee an update on the funding
    provided last year to support supplier and work force development?
        Secretary Modly. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Development
    Account funds the recruitment, training, and retention of Department of
    Defense personnel. This fund does not provide funding to support
    private shipbuilder workforce development. The fiscal year 2020
    Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $8 million in the Industrial
    Base Analysis and Sustainment Support line for submarine workforce
    development. In previous years, the federal government provided
    assistance to benefit the submarine industrial base through Department
    of Labor grants to manufacturing workforce development programs.
    Programs in Connecticut and Rhode Island leveraged this funding to
    recruit and train the increasingly green force. Funding appropriated by
    Congress in fiscal year 2020 will be used to support similar programs.
    The fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the fiscal
    year 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $123 million for
    submarine industrial base expansion and risk reduction. Similar to the
    fiscal year 2019 $225 million provided, the fiscal year 2020 funding
    will be applied to developing alternate source suppliers, developing
    strategic sourcing suppliers, and improving capacity and capability at
    existing suppliers. A separate brief will be provided with detailed
    information regarding funding appropriated for submarine supplier
    development.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, the Defense Acquisition
    Workforce Development Account in the fiscal year 2021 budget has been
    reduced by over \3/4\ from fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, from 400
    million to 92 million. Are you concerned about how this drop in funding
    will impact the sustainment of the industrial base and submarine
    construction schedules?
        Secretary Modly. The successful sustainment of the submarine
    industrial base and its associated weapons systems relies on a highly
    skilled and trained acquisition workforce, including the supporting
    personnel assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce. The
    acquisition workforce, in coordination with our industry partners,
    plays an integral role in supporting and enabling submarine
    construction schedule efforts. The Defense Acquisition Workforce
    Development Account supports training and development of the
    acquisition workforce and is a critical element of both effective
    execution of the acquisition programs and ensuring a pipeline of
    qualified employees. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures,
    and funding for training and development of the acquisition workforce
    must compete with other important demands such as readiness. However,
    the Navy is prioritizing efforts with the funding that remains to
    minimize impacts to the industrial base and submarine construction
    schedules. We are focusing on attracting talent to the civilian
    workforce--targeting critical skill gaps such as STEM and Information
    Technology--and continue to leverage section 1111 hiring authorities to
    hire highly qualified acquisition and technology experts with a focus
    on Submarine Supply Chain challenges. The Navy is also continuing to
    provide training to improve the understanding between industry and
    government relationships. Funding will also be set aside to support the
    congressional directives in prior NDAAs such as supporting program
    manager development, industry exchange programs, and increased
    experiential learning.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, as you know, Columbia
    construction begins this year. What still needs to be done to improve
    supplier and work force development?
        Secretary Modly. Since fiscal year 2018, Congress has appropriated
    $573 million for submarine industrial base expansion in the Virginia
    and Columbia funding lines. The Navy will continue to use these funds
    to actively manage supply base risk and aid with supplier development.
    As Columbia lead ship construction begins this year and ramps up to
    serial production in fiscal year 2026, the submarine construction
    workforce will need to expand from current levels. The Navy, through
    the various program offices, closely oversees workload and workforce
    requirements necessary to meet construction levels and schedules,
    including the shipbuilders' long-term, coordinated workforce
    development plans. Key aspects of these plans are to find a sufficient
    number of qualified workers and to manage and maximize the
    effectiveness of green labor. In recent years, the Federal Government
    has contributed to state and private investments in manufacturing
    workforce development programs. These programs have increased the
    qualified labor pool for the submarine industrial base and increased
    the preparedness of workers as they enter the workforce. Continued
    funding of these programs would be beneficial to the Navy and its
    partners.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what is the impact of the
    Virginia-class ramp deduction from two to one this year in respect to
    ensuring we have the right trained and educated work force?
        Secretary Modly. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting
    the shipbuilding demand outlined in in the fiscal year 2021 budget
    request, and the Navy greatly appreciates the support Congress has
    given us to stabilize and enhance that industrial base and shipbuilding
    programs. The Navy must have a stable industrial base and workforce in
    order to not only ramp up for the future, but also to sustain the
    employment and the skill levels already in place. While it is
    imperative that the Navy retain and expand our competitive advantage
    and improve capacity and capability, the Navy faces budgetary
    limitations and competing priorities. The industrial base and workforce
    should not be harmed by funding only one submarine in fiscal year 2021
    however, maintaining the two per year build rate is the most effective
    way to stabilize the industrial base and increase SSN capacity. For
    this reason, the Virginia-class ship is the number one priority on the
    Unfunded Priority List. The Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) Block V
    contract was structured to include a priced option for one additional
    SSN with VPM executable in either fiscal year 2021, fiscal year 2022,
    or fiscal year 2023. Additionally, as required by public law 115-232,
    the contract contains unpriced options for an additional ship in fiscal
    year 2022 and fiscal year 2023. The President's fiscal year 2021 budget
    request and prior year budgets (fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2020)
    include funding to support critical spare materials for a tenth VCS
    Block V hull. This material includes non-nuclear CFE components bought
    with two-year and one-year AP and non-nuclear EOQ material. Funding for
    these materials early in the MYP is critical to level loading
    supplier's work orders and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring
    a single submarine in fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option
    is not exercised the material would be assigned to subsequent SSNs.
    Additionally, the Navy continues to implement the Integrated Enterprise
    Plan (IEP) which coordinates the key actions that are needed to
    accomplish integrated construction across the nuclear shipbuilding
    enterprise, including VCS, Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP
    includes a substantial focus on meeting labor demands and both
    shipyards have contributed workforce acquisition and development
    strategies. These plans and strategies are tied directly to long-term
    submarine construction plans elsewhere in the IEP.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, what implications does
    this have for the delivery schedules of both Virginia and Columbia-
    class over the FYDP?
        Secretary Modly. Procuring one Virginia-class submarine (VCS) in
    fiscal year 2021 has no impact on the delivery schedules of VCS and
    Columbia (CLB) over the FYDP. The shipbuilders are focusing on
    returning to a two per year VCS rate at a 6 month cadence. It is
    expected that VCS Block V construction start and deliveries would
    continue at a 6 month cadence independent of whether Block V included
    nine or ten submarines. CLB is the Navy's top acquisition priority and
    the Navy is working to ensure that the schedule for the CLB remains on
    track. The workforce and facilities being utilized by the CLB program
    are being established in concert with those of VCS, with some dedicated
    CLB portions. As such, any changes in the VCS program should not impact
    the CLB program.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, are there any additional
    policies or authorities that you need in order to ensure greater
    stability within the submarine industrial base and among our submarine
    workforce?
        Secretary Modly. There are no additional authorities needed to
    ensure greater stability within the submarine industrial base and among
    the submarine workforce. The Department greatly appreciates the
    authorities provided in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund and the
    Congressional support provided in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020
    to expand the industrial base. Both have enabled savings and
    efficiencies and supported improving the health of the submarine
    industrial base. The Department does need Incremental Funding Authority
    to execute the Build I contract for SSBN 826 and SSBN 827, planned to
    be awarded in October 2020.
                reduced procurement and funding for shipbuilding
        39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, in addition to being
    concerned about technological encroachment and competition by our
    adversaries, I am concerned that we are self-defeating at our current
    procurement and funding levels. The Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget
    requests the procurement of eight new ships, but this figure includes
    LPD-31, which Congress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated
    procurement funding for) in fiscal year 2020. Excluding this ship, the
    Navy's proposed fiscal year 2021 budget requests the procurement of
    seven new ships rather than eight, which is less than the 10 ships that
    the Navy projected it would request under its fiscal year 2020 budget
    submission. This number is also significant because a rate of seven
    ships is less than the average ship procurement rate that would be
    needed over the long run, given current ship service lives, to achieve
    and maintain a 355-ship fleet. In funding dollars, the Navy is
    requesting a total of about $19.9 billion for its shipbuilding account
    for fiscal year 2021, about $3.9 billion (16.3 percent) less than the
    Navy requested for fiscal year 2020. How should this Committee
    interpret these trends?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To
    get there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer
    large platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned,
    eventually moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain
    compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness,
    lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more
    aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then
    quickly moved to production. Given the budget topline constraints, the
    fiscal year 2021 budget prioritizes a more capable and lethal force
    over a larger force that would be less capable, less ready and less
    lethal. It includes procurement of 44 battle force ships within the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and shows a realistic approach to
    planning the future force within projected budgets. The plan remains
    mindful of the need to keep the shipbuilding industrial base loaded at
    an effective level that encourages industry investment in capital
    improvements, capital expansion, and a properly sized world-class
    workforce.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Gilday, is this drawback in funding
    and production rate an indicator that the 355 ship, and 66 submarines
    target is no longer the goal of the U.S. Navy?
        Admiral Gilday. No. The Department of Defense remains committed to
    building a Navy of at least 355 ships (inclusive of 66 submarines).
    With flat budget toplines that do not increase with inflation, Navy had
    to prioritize funding the force most likely to win across the spectrum
    of conflict versus China and Russia. Risk was taken in capacity in
    order to prioritize readiness, lethality, and modernization. The fiscal
    year 2021 budget resources capable capacity growth for which attendant
    requirements to modernize, man, train, and operate can also be
    resourced.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, can you
    discuss what you believe the risk to the shipbuilding industrial base
    will be due to these cuts in production and funding?
        Secretary Modly. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we
    took the resources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts
    to expected procurement dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020
    dollars that were determined to be either ahead of need or excess to
    need, in other words, not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget by
    the Department. The sources were reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was not of
    significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense
    of the United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards
    and the associated workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to
    get to 355 ships. With adequate resources, and with budget
    predictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and
    capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.
        Admiral Gilday. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we
    took the resources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts
    to expected procurement dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020
    dollars that were determined to be either ahead of need or excess to
    need, in other words, not requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget by
    the Department. The sources were reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was not of
    significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense
    of the United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards
    and the associated workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to
    get to 355 ships. With adequate resources, and with budget
    predictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and
    capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, what
    plans do you have to mitigate the negative impacts to the industrial
    base?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To
    get there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer
    large platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned,
    eventually moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain
    compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness,
    lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more
    aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then
    quickly moved to production. A healthy industrial base, including
    shipyards and the associated workforce, is critical to this effort.
    With adequate resources, and with budget predictability and stability,
    the industrial base has the capacity and capability to support getting
    to 355 ships in 10 years.
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To get
    there, the composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer large
    platform and more smaller platforms that are lightly manned, eventually
    moving to optionally manned. The fleet needs to have certain
    compositional characteristics, including distributed awareness,
    lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more
    aggressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then
    quickly moved to production. A healthy industrial base, including
    shipyards and the associated workforce, is critical to this effort.
    With adequate resources, and with budget predictability and stability,
    the industrial base has the capacity and capability to support getting
    to 355 ships in 10 years.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Modly, can you explain why LPD 31
    is accounted for in the fiscal year 2021 budget, despite being
    authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2020?
        Secretary Modly. The Navy is very appreciative of the strong
    Congressional support for shipbuilding. LPD 31 is an incrementally
    funded ship that received Advance Procurement funding in fiscal year
    2019. Congress appropriated the preliminary increment of full funding
    in fiscal year 2020. The Navy planned to procure LPD 31 in fiscal year
    2021, and has requested the preponderance of funding in fiscal year
    2021. Therefore, the Navy counted the ship in fiscal year 2021.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              marine corps culture
        44. Senator Warren. General Berger, the Marine Corps University's
    Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning was tasked by your
    predecessor in July 2017 to conduct a study on Marine Corps culture in
    the wake of the Marines United scandal. The final report provided more
    details on gender bias and leadership in the Marine Corps and noted
    that ``[M]any women were unsurprised by the behavior of those on
    Marines United because they live out related struggles every day.''
    Have you read this report in its entirety?
        General Berger. Yes--and as the Committee surely recognized in my
    official written statement, per that reports findings, I acknowledged a
    well-known malignant sub-culture of misogyny within our ranks that must
    be eradicated.

        45. Senator Warren. General Berger, what conclusions did you draw?
    What are the most important takeaways
        General Berger. I believe the most important takeaway is that the
    Marine Corps is a learning institution. Seen in context, this Report
    comprises the response by a Marine educational institution to a query
    asked by the Corps itself. While the report clearly indicated that our
    culture is flawed and imperfect, I am encouraged that marines felt free
    to offer their opinions without fear of repercussion, and with the hope
    that the institution would address its cultural challenges. The Corps
    must be prepared to ask itself whether its norms and culture serve the
    central purposes of the organization, including meeting its mission to
    train marines, and to matriculate them into a warrior culture that
    simultaneously exists within a civil society. Marine culture values
    honor and courage coupled with decisive action as well as flexibility
    in adjusting to any environment. Counter behaviors and cultures need to
    be called out, addressed, and eliminated. We continue to work to create
    the best warriors prepared to do combat for the Nation and who
    represent the best of the society they have sworn to defend. We cannot
    ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to
    designing and preparing the force for the future. This is the force
    that will always adapt and overcome no matter the circumstances. Over
    the next 12 months, you will observe clear evidence of change within
    our manpower system as we modernize it in accordance with a more
    responsive and suitable talent management system. Those reforms will
    further seek to eliminate both conscious and unconscious bias from the
    system, further ensuring an equality of opportunity for all marines.

        46. Senator Warren. General Berger, do you believe that it should
    be required reading for all marines? Will you commit to adding the
    final report to your reading list?
        General Berger. I believe the report should be required reading for
    all senior Marine Corps leaders, both uniformed and civilian, and as a
    consequence, have directed as much. As with all of our educational
    products, the report will be made generally available to and through
    our educational system.

        47. Senator Warren. General Berger, the report lists a publication
    date of 30 March 2018, but it was not published on the CAOCL website
    until September 2019. Why was the public release delayed for a year and
    half?
        General Berger. Regrettably, I cannot comment with any precision as
    to why a report published in March 2018 was not immediately released to
    the public. Our internal review processes do not always prioritize
    correctly, nor move as fast as they should; however, fixing processes
    like these and fostering an environment of transparency are priorities
    of mine as Commandant.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                                    PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                         UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (presiding) Chairman of the Committee.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer,
    Cotton, Ernst, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, and Manchin.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive the testimony of the
    United States Central Command. I would like to welcome our
    witness, General Frank McKenzie, Commander of the United States
    Central Command.
        I want to add that immediately following this morning's
    open hearing, we will move to SVC-217 in the Senate Visitors
    Center for a closed session, which will be an opportunity for
    General McKenzie to answer some of the questions. You might
    make a note of questions that come along that are not
    appropriately answered in this setting so that we can do it
    later.
        I would like to begin by recognizing two United States
    marines, Gunner Sergeant Diego Pongo and Captain Moises Navas,
    who were killed earlier this week during a mission against the
    ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] stronghold in Iraq. I
    also want to recognize the two additional Americans who were
    killed yesterday, whose names have not yet been released. That
    was in a rocket attack in Taji. Their loss is a painful
    reminder that even where we have been successful, such as in
    destroying ISIS, the caliphate, we still have troops in harm's
    way. When Senator Rounds and I had the opportunity to meet with
    some of our troops 2 weeks ago in visiting Iraq, we had a
    chance to really talk over some of the things like this with
    them.
        General, later this month, you will be commemorating your
    1-year anniversary as CENTCOM Commander, and I sure you agree
    it has been a tough ride. Since May of 2019, we have seen Iran
    and its terrorist proxies escalate their asymmetric aggression
    against the United States and our partners throughout the
    region. In May, they hit our partners' oil tankers. In June,
    they downed an American drone. In September, they attacked
    Saudi oil facilities, threatening the global energy supply.
    Throughout this up-tick, President Trump announced new
    sanctions on Iran, bolstering protection for our troops in the
    region, but he sought to avoid a military escalation and even
    offered to negotiate with Tehran.
        Then in December, Iran's proxies killed a United States
    citizen and attacked the United States embassy in Baghdad.
    These actions crossed the President's redline, which we knew
    that by his very nature, he is going to adhere to his own
    redlines, unlike some others in the past, and the President
    responded by ordering a strike that ended up killing Soleimani.
        Iran countered by firing ballistic missiles that thankfully
    missed our troops in Iraq, though over 100 soldiers sustained
    concussions. Since then, the situation seems to have
    deescalated.
        Yet, despite the deployment of approximately 14,000 new
    troops to the region to deter Iran, your written testimony
    says--and I am quoting from your written testimony, General--
    quote, ample intelligence exists indicating that Iran's regime
    desire to continue malign operations that threaten lives, and
    early media reports suggest that Iran-backed groups were
    responsible for yesterday's attack at Camp Taji.
        If the deployment of approximately 14,000 troops in the
    region will not deter them, I am sure a good question would be,
    what will deter them? We will have ample opportunity to respond
    to that question.
        I ask because this Committee's top priority is effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy, which says to
    focus on China and Russia as the central challenge to the
    United States prosperity and security and, as you highlight in
    your written statement, to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM
    AOR.
        Countering Iran is an important aspect of American
    credibility in the Middle East, and bolstering American
    credibility is vital to preventing our partners from looking
    toward China and Russia for their security needs.
        But every battalion that we send to the Middle East is a
    battalion that is not being sent to support other priorities in
    Europe and the Pacific. Moreover, this ramp-up in the Middle
    East comes while other priorities such as counterterrorism and
    security cooperation in Africa are being under-sourced.
        I hope you will address how these new deployments to the
    Middle East are changing Iran's behavior for the better. Or, if
    conflict with Iran remains likely in your view, we would like
    to know--you explain to us--what these new deployments are
    achieving.
        With that, I will turn to Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming General McKenzie back before the
    Committee, and we look forward to your testimony and our
    discussion. Thank you, General.
        Let me also join the Chairman in expressing my condolences
    for the loss of the three coalition personnel at Camp Taji last
    evening and two of whom were reported to be American personnel,
    and the death of the two marines conducting operations against
    ISIS in Iraq earlier this week. Our thoughts are with their
    families and those who were injured in those two incidents.
        The agreement between the United States and the Taliban,
    announced on February 29th, was a notable step toward bringing
    our nation's longest war to a close. It is important to keep in
    mind, however, that it is only a first step, and the path to
    long-term stability in Afghanistan will only be found through a
    negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan
    Government. With that in mind, I am concerned that we are not
    appropriately leveraging U.S. and coalition military presence
    to support a settlement that protects U.S. security interests
    primarily and values, including the hard-fought gains on issues
    in Afghanistan like women's rights and education. By announcing
    a timetable for the complete withdrawal of United States and
    international forces before inter-Afghan negotiations have even
    begun, I am concerned that we are in some respects undermining
    the Afghan Government and validating the Taliban's longstanding
    perception that they can wait us out.
        Despite the specific timeline contained in the agreement,
    some in the administration have said that the 14-month
    timetable is aspirational and that we will have ample time to
    assess the Taliban's intent and capability to uphold their
    security commitments. General McKenzie, I hope you will help us
    better understand how we intend to monitor and verify Taliban
    compliance. In particular, do you believe it will be possible
    for United States Forces to conduct the rigorous monitoring and
    evaluation necessary to ensure that terrorist threats will not
    re-emerge in Afghanistan, while simultaneously carrying out a
    full-scale withdrawal?
        I would also like to hear more about the commitments we
    have made to our Afghan partners and how our efforts to build
    credible security forces and institutions will be sustained.
    The Afghan Security Forces have been nearly completely built
    and funded by United States and coalition funds. Additionally,
    until the signing of the United States-Taliban agreement, the
    Afghan Security Forces also received robust advising and
    enabling support from United States and coalition forces on the
    ground and in the air. Even with a peace agreement, there is
    little to suggest that the Afghan economy will, within a
    foreseeable time frame, provide enough revenue to fully fund
    the country's security forces. Notably, the administration's
    fiscal year 2021 budget request contains funding for Afghan
    training and equipping programs that will extend well beyond
    the date of the planned departure of the last United States
    military personnel. It is important for this Committee to
    understand the plan to ensure those resources are invested in
    sustainable and responsible ways, especially given the
    likelihood of increased Taliban participation in the Afghan
    Government.
        Despite the focus of the National Defense Strategy on a
    more resource sustainable approach to the national security
    challenges in CENTCOM, we have deployed more than 14,000 troops
    to the region since May in response to malign Iranian activity.
    While I understand the need to ensure U.S. personnel,
    facilities, and key strategic interests are protected, I
    question the extent to which we can deter asymmetric attacks by
    Iran through the deployment of additional conventional United
    States military forces to the region. Indeed, the rocket attack
    on Camp Taji in Iraq last night, reportedly carried out by
    Iranian-backed militia, would seem to challenge the notion that
    we have reestablished deterrence with respect to Iran. Overall,
    I believe that the administration's so-called maximum pressure
    campaign has isolated us from our allies, given Iran a pretext
    to violate constraints placed on its nuclear program by the
    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and may in fact have
    increased the likelihood of conflict.
        The killing of the leaders of ISIS and al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula were significant counterterrorism operations,
    and the administration should be commended for those
    operations. But the Turkish incursion into northern Syria,
    fallout from the killing of General Soleimani, and political
    unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere have disrupted our
    efforts against ISIS. I remain concerned about the long-term
    disposition of the more than 10,000 ISIS fighters being held by
    the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the unknown number of
    internally displaced people that retain an allegiance to ISIS.
    General McKenzie, I look forward to an update on CENTCOM's
    operations to ensure these groups are not able to re-emerge.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        General McKenzie, we will recognize you for your opening
    statement. As you know, your entire statement will be made a
    part of the record.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
                     UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        General McKenzie. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to provide
    an operational update and testimony in support of the fiscal
    year 2021 budget request pertaining to CENTCOM's area of
    responsibility (AOR).
        My senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master Chief Jamie Erdell
    of the Navy, is also with me here today, seated immediately
    behind me.
        I appreciate very much your remarks about the sacrifices of
    Captain Navas and Gunnery Sergeant Pongo, as well as Corporal
    Zavala, a marine who was killed in a vehicle rollover during an
    exercise in UAE [United Arab Emirates] just a couple of days
    ago. Additionally, the two United States servicemembers and the
    United Kingdom servicemember who died in the attack at Taji
    yesterday in Iraq--they will be remembered.
        Today there are nearly 90,000 men and women serving
    throughout the 20 nations comprising United States Central
    Command, as well as our headquarters in Tampa. I am proud of
    their remarkable dedication and humbled by their personal
    sacrifice, and it is my honor to serve with them. They are
    young Americans in the line of fire, working to prevent attacks
    on the Homeland, counter destabilizing regional influence,
    prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
    ensure the freedom of navigation through international
    waterways. Your annual and timely passage of both the National
    Defense Authorization Act and the Defense appropriations bills
    honors their courage and sacrifice, and I encourage you to
    maintain this tradition.
        Keeping a pledge from my confirmation hearing before you
    here in December 2018, I appear now and offer you my best
    military advice. While my written statement highlights several
    nations and areas of interest within the Central Command area
    of responsibility, my opening statement today will focus on
    Iran.
        The National Defense Strategy directs us to work with
    partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear
    weapon and to neutralize Iranian malign influence. This is no
    easy task. Iran's regime is persistent and resilient, growing
    its arsenal of ballistic missiles despite international
    condemnation. Iran remains the world's largest state sponsor of
    terrorism. Since May 2019, Iranian proxies and Shiite militia
    groups in Iraq have increased attacks on United States
    interests and conducted scores of aerial unmanned system
    reconnaissance flights near United States and Iraqi security
    force bases. The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign
    vessels in the Gulf, sponsored attacks by Houthi forces from
    Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued the export of lethal aid to
    destabilizing groups throughout the region, and in September
    2019, carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS
    attack against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.
        In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic
    missiles in a deliberate attack against United States and
    coalition forces at two bases in Iraq. This state-sponsored
    missile strike crossed the threshold compared to previous
    attacks and has probably set a lower bar for future actions by
    the regime.
        Yesterday, hostile forces, most likely Shiite militia
    groups, launched more than a dozen rockets at United States and
    coalition forces at Camp Taji in Iraq, killing two United
    States and one British servicemember, as well as wounding
    several more. While we are still investigating the attack, I
    will note that the Iranian proxy group Kata'ib Hezbollah is the
    only group known to have previously conducted an indirect fire
    attack of this scale against United States and coalition forces
    in Iraq.
        While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion
    of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence and indeed
    yesterday's actions indicate the Iranian regime's desire to
    continue malign activities that threaten lives, destabilize
    sovereign nations, threaten freedom of navigation, regional
    commerce, global energy supplies, and the global economy
    itself.
        At CENTCOM, we recognize that so long as the United States
    applies diplomatic and economic pressure, the joint force must
    be postured to deter Iran from employing the military element
    of power to counter our actions. Our presence sends a clear
    message about our capabilities and our will to defend partners
    and U.S. national interests. Going forward, it is CENTCOM's
    objective to posture forces in the region with the operational
    depth to achieve a consistent state of deterrence against Iran
    and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats.
        The Department's fiscal year 2021 budget supports CENTCOM's
    ability to keep our forces agile, lethal, and adaptable.
        As we work with our partners to safeguard our mutual
    interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger
    together. Key to building and maintaining partnerships is the
    authorization, funding, and employment of security assistance
    programs. Additionally, the National Guard State Partnership
    Program cultivates relationships and improves interoperability
    with six nations across the CENTCOM AOR, with more applying for
    entry this year. Again, the 2021 budget supports building new
    partnerships and enabling the formation of an enduring Middle
    East coalition.
        As CENTCOM continues ongoing operations, we appreciate the
    efforts of our DOD [Department of Defense] civilian leadership.
    We acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and we thank
    the Members of Congress and your staffs, without whose
    consistent backing we would be unable to accomplish our
    mission. In order for America's armed forces to sustain all-
    domain dominance, the Department requires your support, as well
    as predictable, adequate, and timely funding.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Committee Members, thank
    you again for all you do for our troops and families, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.
                                  introduction
        When United States Central Command (CENTCOM) formed in the 1980s,
    the United States military trained and equipped to fight high-end
    warfare against the Soviet Union under conditions of limited
    communications and the routine employment of nuclear weapons. Times
    changed; the wall fell. The United States welcomed change in Russia
    while retooling heavy conventional forces to fight an 18-year
    protracted global counterterror campaign. Simultaneously the Islamic
    Republic of Iran, emerging from its 1979 revolution, embarked on a
    deliberate and extended campaign of terror and violence across the
    Middle East, directly engaging or sponsoring partners in a 40-year-long
    struggle against the U.S. and our allies.
        Today the rise, fall, and rise again of Russia; the continuing
    asymmetric campaign of violence and coercion by Iran; and the emergence
    of China as our pre-eminent economic and military power competitor
    signal that while the nature of war is unchanging, the character of war
    has evolved. CENTCOM acknowledges our nation does not have the luxury
    of a single strategic focus. The Joint Force must posture globally with
    the ability to balance multiple priorities and tasks, from combat with
    peer competitors to expeditionary counterterrorism operations,
    understanding that the nation's top defense priority must relentlessly
    focus on adversarial great powers that possess the power and means to
    destroy our country.
        While Iran lacks the capability to destroy us, its regime's hatred
    of the United States and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber
    reach, and depth and breadth of its terror networks clearly position it
    as a priority, although clearly and inarguably not the main one. The
    U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the United States to work
    with partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon
    and neutralize Iranian malign activity. While this is only one aspect
    of the NDS, it is directive for the Department of Defense and a key
    task for both CENTCOM and EUCOM.
        The current United States policy of maximum pressure against Iran
    is supported by the deterrence provided by our United States force
    presence, which helps to stabilize the region and acts as a
    counterbalance against the Iranian regime's overt and covert military
    responses. The ramifications of this policy have led to direct and
    indirect Iranian military threats and actions against United States
    interests in the region, and similar threats to U.S. national security
    interests globally. Iran's lack of effective economic or diplomatic
    levers to counter the United States maximum pressure campaign has
    caused it to resort to pursuing overt and covert military options
    against the U.S. and our partners. The Iranian regime's strategy seeks
    to undermine international and regional support for U.S. policies with
    attacks and threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners
    and allies.
        CENTCOM plans and executes missions across its area of
    responsibility (AOR), but embraces a global planning perspective
    supporting national objectives and the execution of global military
    campaigns. Adjustments in U.S. global force posture to support the NDS
    compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR. We
    recognize significant future conflicts will be trans-regional, cutting
    across multiple global combatant commands, and involving multiple
    domains. The ongoing global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and
    other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) provides a stark example
    of this threat.
        As CENTCOM approaches its missions, acknowledging priorities
    outlined in the NDS, we also remain keenly aware that our adversaries
    in the region retain a willingness to contest our actions. Iran's
    regime is not a peer competitor to the United States, but it does
    possess the ability to negatively affect global commerce, trade, and
    the world's energy supply. These malign actions, while not posing a
    direct threat to the U.S. Homeland, significantly threaten our national
    interests abroad, those of our allies and partners, and negatively
    affects the U.S. military's long-term posture as we react to immediate
    threats. During my year in command, I have observed multiple
    Congressional engagements to the CENTCOM AOR. Your oversight,
    partnership and advocacy, based on first-hand knowledge, lays the
    foundation for enduring success.
                               centcom priorities
        Deterring Iran. The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR
    are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The
    Iranian regime's quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic
    ambitions, misbehavior, and threats to the United States and its
    regional partners have been consistent elements of its policy for
    decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing
    activities in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is
    CENTCOM's top priority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran
    decides to be a responsible member of the international community,
    CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain military deterrence with
    Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic and diplomatic
    maximum pressure campaign.
        Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked
    United States interests dozens of times and conducted scores of
    unmanned aerial system (UAS) reconnaissance flights near United States
    and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases. The Iranian regime has attacked
    or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks by Houthi
    forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to
    destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to
    attack Israel, supported the Assad regime's brutal conflict against its
    own people, and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS
    attack in September against Saudi oil facilities that destabilized
    international energy markets. In early January, Iran launched more than
    a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against United States
    and Coalition forces in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile attack, in
    response to the United States killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
    Corps Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold
    compared to previous ``grey-zone'' attacks and may set a lower bar for
    future actions by the regime. While periods of decreased tension may
    provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence exists
    indicating the Iranian regime's desire to continue malign operations
    that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations,
    and threaten freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy
    supplies, and the global economy.
        CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to
    apply diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force
    must be postured to deter Iran from using the military element of power
    to counter our actions. While our steady-state posture does not require
    offensive forces in theater to achieve overmatch or unintentionally
    provoke Iran's regime, our presence sends a clear and unambiguous
    signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend
    partners and United States national interests. This exemplifies the
    concept of deterrence.
        Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and
    political construct obtained from the effect demonstrated capabilities
    have on the mind of a potential opponent. Deterrence can be contested--
    Iran's regime retains the ability to interfere with our efforts to
    deter. Historically, Iran has never doubted the United States
    capability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing
    on deniable, hard to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata'ib
    Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly demonstrated United States will.
    Our posture--the bases, forces, and activities that we undertake--
    maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability.
        Reduction of United States forces in the AOR combined with a
    perception of United States disinterest in the Middle East fueled
    thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the United States was no
    longer committed to defending our national interests in the region.
    That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that crested
    in January 2020. In order to maintain the contested deterrence our
    recent military actions have re-established, Iran's regime must
    continue to see the United States has enough forward-deployed forces
    for a credible military capability, that we are willing to employ that
    capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction, and any
    decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome.
        Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to
    maintain. CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously,
    scattered across the breadth and depth of the region, all in areas
    suffused with Iranian-backed forces continuing their decades-long
    struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and maintaining
    deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of
    forces required to fight in full-scale conflict: the failure of
    deterrence. CENTCOM's objective is therefore to posture forces with
    operational depth in the region to achieve a sustained state of
    deterrence against Iran's regime without undue provocation, and to be
    adaptable to future Iranian threats while the United States maximum
    pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of
    deterrence is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
    While presence can fluctuate based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR
    is necessary to identify subtle changes that shape posture and ensure
    we align our presence appropriately.
        Negotiated Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan. All wars must
    have a political end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the
    Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan represents the best
    option for bringing the 18-year-long fight in Afghanistan to a
    favorable conclusion, while meeting long-term United States security
    requirements. CENTCOM efforts support the United States South Asia
    Strategy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of United States
    Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador
    Zalmay Khalilzad.
        Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our
    overriding national interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the
    Homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia.
        Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a
    counterterrorism platform under any of the multiple political
    eventualities that may take shape. United States Forces-Afghanistan
    continues to examine efficiencies in force structure to reduce our
    military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterterrorism
    pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the
    future. We also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and
    Security Forces develop and refine their force generation processes for
    campaign sustainability. Without continued pressure, groups such as the
    Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) will regain the ability to mount or
    sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your
    support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security
    Forces Funding, Commander's Emergency Response Program, Coalition
    Support Fund, and others have remained paramount during this
    transition.
        Maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq. Similar to
    Afghanistan, most of the United States intelligence community predicts
    that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the
    potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the
    current capabilities of the United States to neutralize it without a
    capable, partnered ground force. Syria remains a dynamic situation with
    multiple parties and agendas involved. The Syrian regime, with support
    from Russia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are
    seeing this play out in northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian,
    and Iranian campaign of violence has escalated since
        December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons,
    innumerable people injured or killed, with many more in critical need
    of assistance, and dangerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and
    the Syrian regime. We likewise see the Assad regime continuing its use
    of chemical weapons in blatant violation of its commitments to the
    Chemical Weapons Convention--deterring this use in the future remains a
    CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, United States and Coalition forces
    under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
    assist with ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding
    energy sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation.
    Moving forward, we must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and
    our D-ISIS partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while
    maintaining deconfliction with Russia, which, along with the Assad
    regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission in various ways.
        Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains
    a threat in Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing
    networks; assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security
    forces; and extending its influence in rural areas throughout eastern
    Syria and Iraq.
        Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is
    key human and geographic terrain. We remain in Iraq at the request of
    the Government of Iraq (GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS.
    Hindering our ability to work with the ISF toward this objective are
    rogue elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces more beholden to
    Iran's regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced
    weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but
    to undermine existing security and threaten United States and Coalition
    forces partnered with the GoI. Given ISIS' demonstrated tenacity and
    ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus from the D-
    ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does
    not mean the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless.
    Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to
    develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain
    and defeat ISIS without external assistance.
        Countering the UAS Threat. In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air
    dominance across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to
    counter the growing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive
    and easy to proliferate, UASs provide adversaries the operational
    ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and partner facilities,
    providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale, critical
    infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while
    affording deniability and a disproportionately high return on
    investment.
        CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and
    enable U.S. Forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed
    by UASs, coupled with our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to
    counter them is the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM
    AOR since the rise of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Just as
    the IED threat galvanized operational, industrial and scientific
    communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like the
    Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching
    a juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat.
    Your support and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our
    success in the Great Power Competition.
        Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.
    The manipulation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to
    gain a political, military, or economic advantage is not historically
    uncommon. However, in vast swaths of Syria and Iraq the systematic
    indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations who are hostages to
    the receipt of ISIS ideology is an alarming development with
    potentially generational implications.
        There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for
    hard-core ISIS believers. This radicalized population currently numbers
    in the thousands and preys on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and
    refugee populations already highly susceptible to extremist
    indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps, the more
    likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military
    solution for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for
    stability and security necessary for these populations to return to
    their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over
    their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees presents a
    challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term
    stabilization can take root.
        Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF
    detention facilities in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist
    fighters (FTFs). While CENTCOM and our coalition partners are working
    to address and mitigate security challenges at the facilities, this
    serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solution. The
    United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations
    by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and
    providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure.
    Ultimately, the best way to alleviate this problem is to reduce the
    numbers of detainees through repatriation. The ISIS detainee and IDP
    populations represent more than 60 nations. While some countries have
    made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution
    requires a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This
    problem will not go away by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by
    the international community working together to accept its shared
    responsibilities.
        As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-
    radicalization and repatriation of FTFs. They are international
    problems requiring international solutions. The longer these conditions
    persist; the IDP population becomes more and more ensconced in ISIS
    philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists. Action now by
    the international community is imperative to protect our Homeland and
    our allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with
    the potential to spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction
    of the physical caliphate we and our allies and partners have worked so
    hard to accomplish. Your support to increase Special Immigrant Visas in
    Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much appreciated by me, our
    troops, and our partners.
         basing and posture in the centcom area of responsibility (aor)
        Fragile security environments across the AOR reflect a variety of
    contributing factors, including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions,
    economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt governance, and exploitation by
    VEOs which have clearly indicated their desire and intent to attack the
    Homeland, United States interests abroad, and the interests of our
    partners and allies. At the same time, the AOR is growing increasingly
    crowded with external nation-states, such as a resurgent Russia and
    expansionist China, pursuing their own interests and attempting to
    shift historical alliances. These dynamics necessitate that CENTCOM
    explore options with regional partners to posture itself in depth
    across our AOR to create efficiencies, and increase strategic depth,
    resiliency and operational agility. With the enactment of the Fiscal
    Year 2020 NDAA, Section 1263, I look forward to the posture review and
    reporting back to Congress with the findings.
        Over the past year, CENTCOM has re-evaluated its posture, taking
    action to close, consolidate, or in some cases expand some of its air,
    land, and sea bases; as well as access, basing, and overflight rights
    with our partners. Some of these actions represent immediate, near-term
    adjustments for survivability and to improve our deterrence
    capabilities--like the buildup of Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom
    of Saudi Arabia. Other decisions are driven by long- term efforts to
    achieve cost savings, and increase interoperability or partner burden
    sharing--like the establishment of CENTCOM Forward-Kingdom of Saudi
    Arabia. This forward deployed element assesses requirements and
    integrates U.S. Forces into an international collective defense effort.
        The Western Sustainment Network is a newly-created logistics system
    extending from the Red Sea and Mediterranean Ports to the Arabian Gulf,
    designed to mitigate the potential impact of chokepoint closures at the
    Bab Al Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. To build sustainment depth over the
    last year, CENTCOM has increased deployment and redeployment traffic
    across the Arabian Peninsula, shipped ammunition to Kuwait from the Red
    Sea, negotiated movement of materiel and supplies across borders
    affected by the Gulf Rift, and developed the port of Duqm in Oman.
    Developing this operational depth enhances protection of critical
    infrastructure while providing reduced cost options for deployment and
    obviating the need to transit potentially contested maritime
    chokepoints. This network increases our agility, enables Dynamic Force
    Employment, and reduces deployment timelines in the event of a
    contingency, thereby reducing risk and providing additional strategic
    options. Taken together, the result is a tailored, responsive basing
    network, connected by dependable lines of communication with AOR-wide
    reach, supported by prepositioned equipment and supplies to facilitate
    the rapid movement and employment, of U.S., allied, and partner forces.
        Armed with the knowledge that resources are at a premium, and a
    pragmatic appreciation that each country is working through its own
    challenges with economic and social reforms, CENTCOM supports
    initiatives that approach defense from a cooperative perspective. This
    is the only practical way to approach the problem. The reality on the
    ground is that every partner country cannot afford to have their own
    Patriot battalion, nor should they; just like every U.S. combatant
    commander cannot retain their own heel-to-toe carrier strike group.
        The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which
    achieved initial operating capability in November 2019 and full
    operating capability in January 2020, provides an instructive example
    of this kind of regional cooperative effort. Participating nations
    include the United States, U.K., Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi
    Arabia, and UAE, working together to support freedom of navigation and
    maritime domain awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and assist in
    attribution of malign actions in these vital waters. The vessels and
    aircraft of IMSC member nations provide vigilance, surveillance, and
    assurance, supporting the free flow of commerce through the critical
    choke points of the region.
        In the air domain, CENTCOM operates in an environment where our
    partners possess and operate the majority of air and ballistic missile
    defense capabilities in the theater. This compels CENTCOM to lead
    efforts to establish a framework to coalesce and optimize each Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) nation's individual ballistic missile defense
    capabilities into a regional, integrated air and missile defense
    construct to defend against the shared threat posed by Iran and the
    proxies it controls. Our GCC partners contribute to interoperability
    through purchase and use of Patriot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
    and the development of the GCC Ballistic Missile Early Warning System--
    a collective system of systems across the Arabian Peninsula designed to
    establish an effective early warning and supporting architecture to
    benefit all GCC Partners. The Link-16 system provides a combined,
    integrated air picture through a shared network of sensors and systems
    across the AOR to receive, populate, and share information among
    partners. CENTCOM builds confidence and proficiency among our partners
    through combined, distributive IAMD exercises that leverage virtual and
    simulated technologies to bridge the geographic distances across the
    region.
        As we work with our partners along collaborative lines of effort to
    safeguard our mutual interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are
    stronger together, and our strategic strength has never rested on the
    volume of materiel we bring to the fight, but the partnerships and
    whole-of-government efforts no other country in the world can match.
    Key to building and maintaining these partnerships in the region is the
    enduring authorization, funding, and combined employment of the
    Department of State's (State) security assistance (SA) and DOD security
    cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) programs. The Defense
    Security Cooperation Agency administers the Department of State's
    Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, with our partners' capabilities,
    interoperability, and burden sharing. Foreign Military Sales in CENTCOM
    totaled nearly $23 billion in 2019, accounting for more than 42 percent
    of all FMS globally. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)
    cultivates relationships and improves interoperability with six nations
    across the CENTCOM AOR currently, with more considering entry.
        CENTCOM supports the execution of over $2 billion annually in SA
    funds, consisting of $1.7 billion in Department of State Foreign
    Military Financing to obtain articles, services, or training; $265
    million in Department of Defense Section 333 funds authorizing the U.S.
    to help partner nations build capacity; $17 million in Department of
    State International Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve
    interoperability and establish relationships with future leaders; $4
    million for the Counter Threat and Irregular Warfare Fellowship
    Program; and $3.6 million for the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). Taken
    together, these State and DOD programs help maintain U.S. influence,
    improve our posture and interoperability with partners, and create
    opportunities to advance U.S. objectives. The State IMET, and DOD WIF
    and SPP programs in particular often yield a far greater return on
    investment compared to the resources allocated against them. On
    average, over 5,500 students receive U.S. military education and
    training through our SA and SC programs annually.
                                   conclusion
        The U.S. must posture itself globally to contend with an array of
    security challenges detailed in the NDS. While Iran represents but one
    of those national security challenges, deterring the Iranian regime is
    the primary security challenge for CENTCOM and critical for ensuring
    the Department can focus on near peer competition rather than an
    expansion of conflict in the Middle East. The rapid escalation from
    grey-zone conflict to open, kinetic strikes between the United States
    and Iran in January of this year underscores the immediacy of this
    threat, and the need for vigilance paired with the proper capabilities
    on hand necessary to deter the Iranian regime.
        Readiness and capabilities allocated toward this mission are
    supportive of the NDS not only with regard to Iran, but also in the
    context of supporting great power competition as it manifests itself in
    the Middle East. As the United States reorients itself globally, our
    leadership, presence, and demonstration of commitment to our allies and
    partners in the region are crucial, now more than ever. We have an
    opportunity at this moment in history to establish the foundations of
    collective, effective collaborative security apparatuses throughout the
    region with the U.S. serving not as the core member, but a contributing
    member in a burden-sharing construct.
        For more than 37 years, the men and women of CENTCOM--about 90,000
    uniformed military and civilian strong today--have devoted themselves
    to securing United States national interests in the Middle East that
    help protect the Homeland. They operate in real time, against real
    enemies. Across 18 years of extended combat operations, the missions
    they have executed yielded tangible results. The steadfastness and
    sacrifice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen,
    civilians and their respective families--is both humbling and
    inspirational. Public support for our mission, troops, and families is
    precious and not taken for granted. Your communication with your
    constituents is key in maintaining public support that serves as the
    bedrock and fosters morale, enabling the mission going forward.
        As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its ongoing missions, we appreciate
    the efforts of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense,
    acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and thank the members of
    Congress and their staffs, without whose consistent and timely support
    we would be unable to accomplish our mission.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General, very much.
        For any of the Members who came in a little bit late, we
    announced that we are going to have a closed session
    immediately following this in SVC-217.
        General McKenzie, in the past year, in response to the
    Iranian provocations, we have deployed some 14,000 additional
    troops to the regions,and you have indicated in your statement
    that more attacks from Iran are likely. If so, in what sense
    are these new deployments to the Middle East deterring--what
    level of deterrence do they provide? And is there another form
    of deterrence that might work?
        General McKenzie. Chairman, I believe that deterrence is
    borne of an appreciation in the mind of the adversary of both
    capability and will, and we, over the last few months, have
    demonstrated both of that. As a result of that, I believe we
    have reestablished a rough form of deterrence, what I would
    call contested deterrence, with Iran at the level of state-on-
    state attacks. By that, I am referring to things like,
    obviously, attributable ballistic missile attacks from Iran
    launched against United States forces. They have stood their
    missiles down. They are no longer--I do not think that is an
    imminent threat.
        What has not been changed is their continuing desire to
    operate through their proxies indirectly against us, and that
    is a far more difficult area to deter because they believe they
    can generate a measure of non-attribution with those attacks.
    We would not agree because we believe eventually we will be
    able to distill who is behind these attacks going forward. So
    we are in a period where state-on-state I believe we have
    achieved deterrence, but with their proxy activities--and while
    they are principally in Iraq, they are not limited to Iraq, and
    there are other areas where they are active as well. That is
    the period that we are in now with Iran, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. I appreciate that.
        As it is right now, we have kind of a deal with the
    Taliban. We are bringing our troop level down from 12,000 to
    8,600, and they, in turn, have commitments to us. I would have
    two questions. Are they keeping their commitments? Does it
    appear that they are keeping their commitments to us, and if
    not, what would be the next step after our withdrawal down to
    8.6?
        General McKenzie. So, Chairman, obviously my answer will
    concentrate on the military equities because that is what I am
    knowledgeable about. But I would tell you in terms of what we
    see the Taliban doing militarily, they are honoring some, not
    all of their commitments.
        Let me give you an example. Attacks continue. Attacks
    continue at an unacceptably high rate across the country. Those
    attacks, although at a high rate, are not delivered into city
    centers, urban areas, or against coalition forces. Instead, the
    attacks are largely generated against Afghanistan outposts,
    checkpoints, and isolated combat units. So those attacks
    continue, and I would say that that level of attack by the
    Taliban is not consistent with an organization that intends to
    keep its word going forward. However, in other areas they have
    not attacked into the urban areas. They have not attacked
    coalition forces, so we have a pretty good picture of what the
    Taliban is doing and is not doing. We have very good ways----
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, we have a picture right now, but
    anticipating--let us say they do not keep them and they start
    going the other direction. What would be our action at that
    time?
        General McKenzie. Sir, so we are on a glide slope to go to
    8,600 U.S. Forces with our NATO partners in the country by the
    middle of the summer. At that level, we will still be able to
    pursue all of our objectives in Afghanistan.
        Chairman Inhofe. So if they do not and it becomes obvious
    they are not keeping their commitments, we would maintain the
    8.6 as opposed to going any lower.
        General McKenzie. Chairman, that would be not a military
    decision but a policy decision.
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, yes.
        General McKenzie. But we believe that we are going to have
    ample opportunity to see if they are going to keep their word.
    In some areas they are; in some areas they are not. I am
    troubled by these attacks that continue to occur. There are
    obviously some political things that have to go forward that I
    am not the best person to talk about in terms of the Afghan
    Government, prisoner releases, and things like that. All of
    those things have to occur in order to find a path forward.
        Chairman Inhofe. Let us go into Barzani. Senator Rounds and
    I had the opportunity to go through not just Iraq but Erbil and
    go up and spend time with him. Of course, there are kind of two
    groups they deal with--the Kurds are dealing with there, and
    one of them--a lot of people were upset and maybe I think
    misunderstood what the President was doing when he was talking
    about the Turks coming down into that area.
        But as far as the senior--that would be Masoud Barzani--he
    is one that a lot of people are saying or trying to project
    that he has passed a lot of things to his son and to, I guess,
    his nephew. It has been my opinion that he is still in charge,
    and I am not going to ask you whether you agree or disagree
    with that. But I got a very clear message when we spent most of
    a day with him up in Erbil, and he is very satisfied that we
    are keeping our commitments now.
        I really believe he is--I think we need to keep reminding
    people how many Kurds have lost their lives working with us.
        So would you agree that he is now in pretty good shape with
    the United States in terms of our keeping our commitments to
    him?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I could not agree with you more. I
    believe that is the case. As you know, we have a vision of a
    unified, single Iraq going forward and support that, and we
    believe he is a key element in that equation going forward.
        Chairman Inhofe. We are talking about the senior Barzani.
        General McKenzie. Sir, we are.
        Chairman Inhofe. I agree with you. Thank you.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just to clarify a point that the Chairman has raised, the
    number that publicly has been released about the increase in
    forces in CENTCOM since approximately last May is about 14,000.
    Is that accurate?
        General McKenzie. Sir, it is a little less than that, and
    it varies as carriers come in. You know, when a carrier comes
    in, you are bringing 5,000 people in. Today I have actually two
    aircraft carriers in the theater. So the number is artificially
    a little higher. The number goes up and down.
        Senator Reed. But within a range of, say, 1,000 personnel?
        General McKenzie. I would say it is over 10,000.
        Senator Reed. I know you are working on attribution of the
    attack last evening at Camp Taji. Have you finished that
    attribution?
        General McKenzie. We are working it very hard right now in
    my headquarters as we speak now.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        With respect to the agreement between the Taliban and the
    United States, looking at the public documents that are
    available, there is no reference to a prohibition of violence
    by the Taliban against the Afghan Government. There is at least
    an interpretation that what they are doing now, attacks against
    Afghan personnel in or outside cities, is within the scope of
    the agreement, that we would continue to go forward. Is that
    accurate?
        General McKenzie. So when I have an opportunity to give
    advice on this subject--and I do have an opportunity to advise
    on this--I would not consider what the Taliban is doing as
    consistent with any path to going forward to come to a final
    end state agreement with the current Government of Afghanistan.
    Those attacks are going to have to come off considerably.
        But we are never going to be a bloodless state in
    Afghanistan. As you know, there are pockets in Afghanistan that
    probably still think the Russians are there. So it is never
    going to be perfect, but we need to get way below where we are
    now.
        Senator Reed. There is, though, a possibility that they
    could, at least until we withdraw, maintain their CT
    commitments but continue active operations against the Afghan
    Government. In fact, it could escalate to what would be either
    a major or a significant civil war in the country. Would we
    still be in the position or still be predisposed to depart?
        General McKenzie. Sir, just speaking looking at the
    military equity, it is difficult to see how if the Taliban is
    still pursuing large-scale operations against the Afghan
    Government, against Afghan Government forces, it would be
    possible for us to maintain a CT platform there without a
    significant presence. It is just hard to see how you would get
    to that level.
        Going smaller requires integration, requires intra-Afghan
    dialogue and some way forward involving both parties.
        Senator Reed. Implicit in what has been discussed by the
    administration about the arrangement is that the final
    departure will be conditions-based. But those conditions have
    not yet been specified. Would you decide the conditions, or how
    will those conditions be established?
        General McKenzie. So what would happen is General Miller
    through me--we would report the military conditions on the
    ground, and that would be an input into the larger element of
    that. But for military conditions, I think again we have got a
    very clear vision of what is happening there. Taliban attacks
    against the government would have to go down to a far lower
    level than they are now. That would be probably the principal
    thing. Intra-Afghan dialogue should ideally lead to some
    condition where the Taliban can never be part of some future
    Afghan military. That would be a matter for the Afghans, not
    for us. But it is hard to see how you can go forward without
    some intra-Afghan dialogue that takes you to that.
        Senator Reed. Well, just one point is it takes two sides to
    have a dialogue, and the current Government of Afghanistan is
    in some disarray. You have two individuals claiming that they
    are president. You have dual inaugurations. It is slightly
    outside your lane, but that is a complicating factor I think.
        General McKenzie. Sir, it is.
        Senator Reed. With respect to our involvement, even with an
    intra-Afghan dialogue and even on a sort of an optimistic
    thing, you would assume that if there is that dialogue, there
    will be some jointness in the government. Taliban elements
    coming into the government.
        It comes down to sustainability over the long run, and as
    you well know, their defense budget is about $6 billion a year.
    We and our coalition partners provide $4.5 billion a year. If
    we were to pull that money or decrease it significantly, their
    ability just to function as a military and police force in the
    nation would probably be gutted. Is that fair?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would agree with that assessment.
        Senator Reed. We are going to be faced--this is the best
    scenario--with a government that might be Taliban, et cetera
    not fully consistent with all of our values and views, and we
    would still be asked and need to provide billions of dollars.
    Is that fair?
        General McKenzie. Sir, it would. But my advice--and
    obviously, many of those things are outside of my competence.
    My advice would be are we able to do the thing we are there to
    do, which is to prevent the generation of attacks against the
    United States and our Homeland and those of our allies from
    ISIS and al Qaeda, typically in eastern Afghanistan. Is what
    you have described going to yield that result? And that would
    be the basis for any advice that I would give.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General. Thank you for
    your service.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. General, thanks for coming back. This is
    the first appearance since your troops killed Qassem Soleimani.
    I want to commend you for your role and their role in removing
    the world's worst terrorist mastermind from the face of the
    earth.
        Is it fair to say that Iran's leaders were somewhat
    chastened by the killing of Qassem Soleimani?
        General McKenzie. I think it is. Just a little earlier, we
    talked about capability and will. They have never doubted our
    capability. They often doubted our will, and I think that gave
    them something to think about.
        Senator Cotton. Back in the day in the 2000s, Qassem
    Soleimani traveled with extreme operational security. Is that
    correct?
        General McKenzie. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. During much of the 20 teens, did he shed
    that operational security and travel more openly to the point
    of posting pictures of himself on social media?
        General McKenzie. Well, I think he communicated a lot to a
    lot of different people. I would just leave it at that.
        Senator Cotton. Suggesting that he felt a degree of
    impunity to travel around and wreck havoc against the United
    States, impunity that he did not have after all.
        Let us stay on Iran, and let us talk about coronavirus in
    particular. We obviously know that it has impacted some of the
    senior leaders in their regime. We have seen it on television
    news. Do you have an assessment of just how extensive it is
    among Iran's leadership?
        General McKenzie. Certainly. You know, we have seen public
    admissions of various senior leaders that are ill and a couple
    that have actually died. I think it is having an affect on how
    they make decisions, and I think it slows them down.
        There are a couple pressures on Iranian leadership right
    now. One is the outrage after the shoot-down of the aircraft
    after their attack on Al-Asad. That coupled with their
    inability to effectively respond to the coronavirus is, I
    think, inducing pressure on and inside the leadership. Of
    course, we watch that very closely. It is a very opaque state,
    very hard for us to see in there. But I believe the numbers are
    probably significantly under-reported in terms of coronavirus
    victims in Iran. So we look at that pretty hard going forward.
    Because the permeability and porousness of the borders, Iran
    sits in the middle of a theater. So their ability to pass that
    infection to other states is very worrisome.
        Senator Cotton. I suspect it actually may be the worst
    outbreak anywhere in the world, contrary to what Iranian media
    would say. Does that presumably apply to Iran's troops as well,
    both their regular military and IRGC troops, if their society
    is facing this wide-scale outbreak? Do you assess that their
    troops are as well?
        General McKenzie. I would say it is going to have some
    affect on the military instrument. We look at it as hard--we
    can talk a little bit more about this in closed session, sir,
    and I would like to do that. But we watch that very closely.
        Senator Cotton. What do you assess to be the impact of the
    oil price collapse over the last 4 days on Iran's Government
    and its military capabilities?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I think it probably hurts them. They
    are under grave pressure right now through a variety of
    economic instruments, you know, the sanctions that are applied
    against them. I do not think this particularly helps in any
    way. I think they have an active policy of trying to find ways
    to swap tankers around the do that, which is marginally
    successful. So I do not think it means anything good for them.
    Aside from that, I would just like a little more time to take a
    look at it. But I do not think it is a good thing for Iran.
        Senator Cotton. There has been some talk around the world
    about providing more humanitarian aid to Iran. Secretary Pompeo
    recently called for Iran to release all foreign national
    prisoners before our Nation provides them humanitarian aid. Do
    you think that is a reasonable step?
        General McKenzie. I defer to the Secretary of State on that
    one.
        Senator Cotton. What about coronavirus among our troops?
    What steps are we taking there?
        General McKenzie. In the theater right now, we have one
    contractor with symptoms. We have another person who actually
    picked it up at the airport after he returned from a trip
    outside the theater who is in quarantine as well. So we watch
    that very, very closely.
        Right now, we believe we have good precautions in place. We
    have cut back significantly on intra-theater travel. For
    example, someone in--pick a place--Kuwait who wanted to go to
    UAE maybe for a weekend of elective liberty--we do not do that
    anymore. So that travel is mission-essential only. Just
    yesterday, we put some restrictions in going into Bahrain as
    well from outside the theater.
        So what we are trying to do is maintain isolation so that
    we protect the critical functions that we have to do. There are
    some things where we just cannot accept the risk of an
    infection. So we look very hard at those things and try to
    maintain good physical separation.
        Senator Cotton. One final question. You say on page 9 of
    your written testimony that unmanned aircraft systems are,
    quote, the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM
    area of operations since the rise of the improvised explosive
    device. Anyone who knows what those improvised explosive
    devices did to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would find
    that a very troubling statement.
        We have spent billions of dollars in the Department of
    Defense on counter-drone systems. I am concerned that we are
    still under grave threat to them. But I am also encouraged to
    see that your command has been experimenting with so many new
    and more effective counter-drone systems. I am worried that
    they are not widely fielded yet. So I am just wondering if you
    could talk to us a little bit about whether your needs are
    being met and what this Committee could do to be more effective
    on counter-drone systems.
        General McKenzie. Sir, the Department is working very hard.
    As you know, executive sponsorship for this program has gone to
    the Army, which I think is good. It will focus it and be even
    more responsive to our requirements.
        I think the key thing is right now, we are simply at a
    stage in the development of these systems, and you see it in
    the back and forth of warfare where the advantage is with the
    operator and with the offense. We will catch up. It is going to
    take us a little time to do that, and really, it is what we
    would call the group 1 and group 2's that concern me the most,
    the small ones that you can go and buy at Costco, you know,
    duck tape a grenade or mortar bomb to and fly it into an
    objective. The larger ones--we have ways to deal with them
    because they are more like aircraft in a traditional way,
    although they are still very concerning.
        So we have not yet integrated a solution to this. The Army
    has a lot of great ideas, and there are a variety of other good
    things out there that are working. We just have not yet managed
    to bring it all together. We work this every day, and I believe
    the energy is there, but we are still solving the dynamic.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here, General, and thank you for your
    service over many, many years.
        You have not been here, as has been remarked, since the
    hearing on December 4th, 2018. So we are very glad to have you
    back. A lot has happened.
        Unfortunately, a lot of the information that this Committee
    receives is behind closed doors in a classified setting.
    Reference was just made to it by the Chairman to follow this
    meeting. I am very concerned that the American people, as well
    as servicemembers and military families, are lacking the kind
    of transparency and accountability that they really deserve and
    that is necessary for the American people to assess how we are
    doing in CENTCOM and other places around the world. I do not
    know whether you have any comments on that. But the over-
    classification, the excessive secrecy denies the American
    people the opportunity to know about the brave and dedicated
    service of the troops in your command and what they have
    accomplished, as well as the challenges going forward.
        I might just also say that your testimony today at 15 pages
    is considerably shorter than the more than 40 pages of written
    testimony that your predecessor, General Votel, provided. I am
    not judging the quality by the quantity of pages, but I wonder
    whether you have any plans to submit additional comments or
    background that would elaborate on some of the conclusions,
    particularly as to the issue that Senator Cotton just raised
    which I think is very important, unmanned aerial aircraft, and
    the threat they pose, analogous to the IEDs [Improvised
    Explosive Devices] which were easy to make, proliferated in the
    region, caused more than 50 percent of the deaths and a major
    part of our casualties. I can see the same happening with these
    off-the-shelf kind of items that similarly pose a threat of
    many repeated small-scale attacks on our troops or
    Afghanistan's.
        Let me just ask you on the issue of transparency, I am at a
    loss to know why the annexes to our agreement have not been
    made public. Obviously, they are known to the Taliban. Is there
    any reason why we cannot make them public so the American
    people can see them?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I am going to defer that to the
    Department of State. They are actually the classifying
    authority in this case. So I would defer to them.
        Senator Blumenthal. In your military opinion, just from a
    military standpoint--I realize there may be other factors--do
    you see any obstacle to making them public?
        General McKenzie. So obviously as I work the military side
    of the problem, I have visibility with the annexes. They are
    useful for me to have. But I would defer the question to wider
    publication to the Secretary of State.
        Senator Blumenthal. I know you are deferring the ultimate
    decision, and I apologize for belaboring this point. But
    strictly from the readiness, the preparedness, the
    effectiveness, and the ability to accomplish missions in the
    field, I am at a loss to see any reason why they cannot be made
    public.
        General McKenzie. So from a purely military perspective,
    that is correct. But there are other issues beyond the military
    that need to be considered, and I would not be competent to
    pass judgment on that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Let me ask you in terms of COVID-19 and its impact on Iran,
    is it likely that the crippling effect of this disease on
    certainly the political structure, the economy, and possibly
    the military are delaying any reprisals for the killing of
    Soleimani?
        General McKenzie. Sir, we spent a lot of time talking about
    that very point, and the short answer is I just do not know. I
    would tell you that totalitarian, authoritarian regimes, when
    they are under extreme pressure, typically react by looking to
    an external threat. There is very little evidence in the
    history of warfare of a regime that has a crippling internal
    problem that decides to focus on solving the crippling internal
    problem that is the source of all their problems rather than
    looking for something to unify the masses of its people against
    an external target. So I am informed by that view, and that I
    think is a possibility.
        They are fractured now, and they are having difficulty
    dealing with a number of things. So I think it probably makes
    them, in terms of decision-making, more dangerous rather than
    less dangerous. But that is just my assessment. There are
    competing views from smarter people than me on Iran.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I thank you for that very well
    informed assessment and appreciate your being here. Thank you,
    General.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for being. Thank you for your service.
        I want to take this opportunity at the outset to extend
    again my sincerest condolences to the families of those four
    American heroes and I think a British ally who have given their
    lives in Iraq since last Sunday. Thank you for all that you are
    doing.
        Can I come back to this question of deterrence that the
    chairman and Senator Reed both raised with you? You mentioned
    that we are having some issue with establishing deterrence
    against asymmetric aggression. So can I just ask you about the
    strategy for deterring Iranian asymmetric aggression? What is
    your thinking on that to date and where are we with it
    strategically?
        General McKenzie. So ultimately you want to convince the
    ultimate source of the aggression that the object they pursue
    is too costly to pursue. So when you think about that, you
    think about going to the source. So you really look to Iran.
    Iran needs to understand that we hold them ultimately
    responsible for SMG [sub-machine gun] attacks in Iraq. There is
    a relationship. The Shiite militia groups in Iraq and other
    proxies across the region--and there are other places across
    the region where they are active--they are not entities unto
    themselves. They all have some form of causal relationship with
    Iran, and so I think the best way to convince Iran to cease
    giving orders to those activities is to convey to them it is
    not going to get them what they want and may, in fact, have
    significant consequences for them.
        There is one element that the command and control between
    Iran and their Shiite militias groups in Iraq in particular but
    others as well--it is not perfect. It is not 1.0. It is not
    like our chain of command where I am pretty confident if I give
    an order, it is going to be followed. That is not the way it
    works, as you know, with those groups. There is a gap there
    between intent and execution. So it is not perfect control. But
    I think the key thing is if you want to stop attacks in the
    gray zone, you need to convince the ultimate person behind
    those attacks that it is not in their long-term interest to
    continue them.
        Senator Hawley. Let me come back to this question about the
    pretty sizable conventional force buildup that we have had in
    CENTCOM since last May. If that has so far not succeeded in
    deterring these asymmetrical attacks, what in your judgment is
    it going to take? Do we need additional, in your judgment,
    conventional forces? I mean, how do we go about practically
    reaching this asymmetrical deterrence question?
        General McKenzie. So you may ultimately live with a low
    level of proxy attacks in the region. You may not be able to
    completely do away with that. I would tell you certainly I
    would believe a redline for the United States is going to be
    the death of U.S. servicemembers or those of our partners and
    allies. So that is a redline.
        As you know, there have been a variety of attacks over the
    last month where we had no casualties, small, low level
    attacks. Of course, the attack yesterday is a tragedy.
        I believe that the way to actually deter those in the long
    term is to convince the source of those attacks that they are
    not going to reach their object through those attacks. Let me
    give you an example.
        In Iraq, I think an Iranian goal is to eject the United
    States from Iraq as part of a larger view that they want us to
    leave the theater. Iraq is a good place to start because there
    are certain political constructs in place there that would aid
    them. So they were fairly quiet for a while as they pursued the
    political track.
        Now, I only can talk about the military side of it, but I
    believe ultimately we are going to be able to reach a situation
    with the Government of Iraq where we remain and will not leave.
    That is my judgment, I could be wrong. Again, it is ultimately
    not a military decision. So I think when Iran realizes that--
    and I think maybe they have--then their attacks will begin to--
    they have sort of laid their attacks low. Now they will begin
    to pick up a little bit.
        Senator Hawley. If we are going to have to live with some
    continuing asymmetrical threat--that is just part of what it
    means to be in the theater. Let us talk about the 14,000 troops
    or so. You said maybe it was closer to 10,000 who have been
    sent to theater since May. In your judgment, how long should we
    expect that troop buildup to need to last in theater? Is this
    something you think is going to need to continue on a
    relatively permanent basis? Give me your assessment about that.
        General McKenzie. Senator, I think so long as we continue a
    maximum pressure campaign against Iran that places diplomatic
    and economic pressure against them, it is in our best interest
    to convince Iran that activities they carry out in the military
    domain--because that is really the only way they have to
    operate. They have no really effective way to operate against
    us diplomatically or economically. Therefore, there response
    almost by definition has to be in the military domain. What
    these forces do and what CENTCOM's objective is is to convince
    Iran it is not in their best interest to act out either
    directly or indirectly through proxies or by state actions
    against us to try to reset the balance of the maximum pressure
    campaign.
        So that gets to your question of how long. My answer would
    be so long as the maximum pressure campaign continues.
        Senator Hawley. Talk to us about the tradeoffs involved
    here from a National Defense Strategy perspective where we
    think about, again as the Chairman mentioned, about the shift
    to INDOPACOM as the pacing theater. We have this threat in
    CENTCOM. I mean, what is this going to mean? If we have to
    sustain the conventional troop buildup in CENTCOM, what will
    this mean for other NDS priorities?
        General McKenzie. Sir, actually the conventional troop
    buildup in CENTCOM, to include the ships and airplanes, is a
    fairly small fraction of the total United States military. In
    my last job, I was the Director of the Joint Staff, and before
    that, I was the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy. So I am
    intimately familiar with the NDS, and I am a believer in the
    NDS. I recognize that in the long term, we need to be postured
    against China and we need to be postured against Russia.
    However, being a global power requires you to be able to do
    several things at once, and these are not binary choices.
        Again, we have chosen to execute a maximum pressure
    campaign against Iran that was not in the NDS. That came along
    after the NDS was written. The NDS actually I believe is
    analytically broad enough to accommodate what we are doing
    against Iran while maintaining pressure against the real
    existential threats that we face.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks, General McKenzie.
        Just to follow up on a point with Senator Hawley, did I
    understand your point to be that Iran really does not believe
    it has a response to the maximum pressure campaign other than a
    military response? They do not really have diplomatic pressure
    levers, and they do not have an economic pressure level of any
    kind.
        General McKenzie. Senator, from where I sit, that is my
    judgment.
        Senator Kaine. So the Iranian activities that are military
    in nature are directly connected to the maximum pressure
    campaign. I would agree with you on that.
        One of the activities that interested me was the joint
    naval drill by Iran, Russia, and China in the Gulf of Oman
    recently. Had Iran, Russia, and China done joint exercises of
    that kind together in the past, as far as you know?
        General McKenzie. They have done bilateral exercises. I
    think it is the first time they have done an exercise of that
    nature, although, Senator, it would tell you it is not an
    exercise in the way that we would do an exercise with NATO or
    we would do an exercise in the theater.
        Senator Kaine. Not as full scale.
        General McKenzie. Yes, sir. That would be an understatement
    actually.
        Senator Kaine. But in CENTCOM and more generally, we should
    be very, very attentive to instances where our adversaries are
    doing anything in combination.
        General McKenzie. Senator, you are absolutely right.
        Senator Kaine. Many of us on the Committee are about the
    ability to handle the mining of the Straits of Hormuz. A couple
    years ago in the NDAA, we had an amendment that required the
    Navy to halt decommissioning of older Avenger-class
    minesweepers because we were worried about this. What is your
    view of our current capacity to handle the mining of the
    straits or to stop scuttling of ships that would block freedom
    of navigation through the straits?
        General McKenzie. Senator, today we have four minesweepers
    in the AOR. The British, our coalition partners, have four
    minesweepers in the AOR, and I have four minesweeping
    helicopters. There are a variety of other things that we can
    employ as well.
        Should the straits be mined, it would take us a while to
    clear that channel. It would depend on were we clearing them
    under conditions of drifting mines that were placed out there,
    which is the least attributable and probably the most likely
    way Iran might choose to act in that waterway, or would it be
    as a condition of a larger war, in which case we would not
    begin to do that clearing until we could guarantee the safety
    of these vessels, which are not really capable of defending
    themselves? So we have the capability to clear the strait. The
    time it would take would be dependent on the Iranian action
    that was the precursor for it.
        Senator Kaine. I see.
        One more question about Iran. I have not seen the answer to
    this. Is there an assessment that the coronavirus spike in Iran
    is driven by like a lot of back and forth travel between Iran
    and China, or what is the assessment about why Iran has become
    an epicenter, say, along with Italy outside of China?
        General McKenzie. There is a lot of travel between Iran and
    China. But I would not go beyond that. I am just not enough of
    an expert to tell you.
        Senator Kaine. Got it. Okay.
        A question on Afghanistan. What is your current assessment
    of kind of in the mil-to-mil space the helpfulness of Pakistan
    and us doing the work we need to do in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Sure. So I maintain a close relationship
    with General Bajwa, the Chief of Army Staff. We talk
    frequently. I have been to visit him a couple of times in
    Pakistan. Their support has been very important in directing
    the Taliban to come to negotiations, and their continued
    support is going to be very important as we go through this
    difficult period of deciding is the Taliban actually serious
    about this and are they going to live up to their commitments.
        Senator Kaine. Do you see that level of United States and
    Pakistan cooperation on the mil-to-mil side with the
    Afghanistan mission sort of getting better? It has always been
    good? I mean, how would you assess it kind of historically?
        General McKenzie. So we have always had at U.S. Central
    Command--and I have about 10 years of experience in this
    organization. We have always seen a relationship with Pakistan
    as critical. Whether at the political level, there is turmoil,
    up and down, we always try to keep the military channel open.
    There are good reasons to do that, to prevent fratricide, to
    prevent miscalculation, and things like that. So we work very
    hard to keep that channel open.
        Senator Kaine. Let me ask one last question, and it seems
    like it is kind of outside of your area of authority. It is
    about Venezuela, but it deals with a partner in CENTCOM, the
    UAE. We do a lot of work together with UAE. But the UAE
    together with India, Turkey, Russia have assisted the Maduro
    regime in avoiding United States sanctions. Have you ever
    interacted with UAE about their interaction with the Maduro
    regime in Venezuela?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I have not.
        Senator Kaine. All right. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General McKenzie, thank you so much for your service to our
    Nation, and I echo the thoughts and prayers from the rest of my
    colleagues on the losses that we have had in the recent week.
    So please extend that to those families, if you would, sir.
        I do take very seriously Congress' role in authorizing the
    use of military force. We have to ensure that our troops have
    the correct authorities to do the missions that we ask them to
    do. Now, there has been a lot of debate, not just within this
    Committee, but with a number of our colleagues outside of this
    Committee about repealing an AUMF and maybe putting a new one
    in place.
        Can you tell us what the operational impact would be of
    repealing either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF [Authorized Use of
    Military Force]? And in your view, do you believe a new
    authorization for the use of military force is necessary to
    adequately cover down and conduct operations in your AO?
        General McKenzie. Ma'am, many of those questions are above
    my level of competence. But I would tell you I believe I have
    the authorities I need now to execute operations in CENTCOM.
        Senator Ernst. Utilizing the current AUMF----
        General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst.--you are able to operate.
        General McKenzie. That is correct.
        Senator Ernst. Well, I appreciate that. Again, the debate
    that we have has been pretty extensive on what we could do with
    or without that AUMF. So thank you for that feedback. That is a
    debate for us, but we do need that input to know whether you
    are able to adequately operate.
        Moving on to a different topic with our special operators,
    The Washington Post had an article on the 5th of March that
    stated, quote, a new network of special operations forces will
    serve as the backbone of a smaller United States military
    mission in Afghanistan. End quote. Of course, the purpose of
    our special operations network is to continue rooting out ISIS
    in that area and apply pressure to the Taliban if they fail to
    live up to their end of the peace agreement.
        So what can you tell us about this new special operations
    network?
        General McKenzie. Ma'am, I begin by saying I do not think
    it is actually new. I think it is the way we have done business
    for quite a while in Afghanistan. We have embedded CT forces
    that operate against that specific mission, have done it for
    many years, and it would be the way that we would go forward.
        It is important to understand that for special operations
    forces to be most effective, they need to operate within a
    conventional force structure, and that provides the ecosystem
    that they use to move around. If they get in trouble, there is
    someone that can come to help them. So we always tend to think
    in that way, not only there but in other places across the
    theater as well. Special operations forces are vitally
    important to us, but they exist best when they are flourished
    within a network of U.S. conventional forces and then a host
    nation force as well.
        Senator Ernst. Which, yes, was going to be my next question
    about the conventional forces. So I was just trying to
    understand within this article what was new about what they
    were being required to do.
        General McKenzie. Ma'am, I often take up with The
    Washington Post articles to understand exactly what it is they
    are saying. In this case, I do not see anything particularly
    new.
        Senator Ernst. Okay, outstanding.
        Of course, then our special operators--will they need to
    maintain different strategic locations than where they are now,
    or will they largely remain in place?
        General McKenzie. It will depend on if we go to the force
    level that I have been told to go to, 8,600. We have a good
    lay-down for that. Going below that level would require
    guidance to me and it would depend on the permissiveness of the
    environment. If you go lower and go to fewer bases, typically
    you are going to do it because the security situation is
    permissive. You do not have to defend yourself against Taliban
    attacks even as you are executing operations against ISIS and
    al Qaeda. So it would be strictly dependent on the overall
    permissiveness of the situation, and those days are still ahead
    of us. We have a variety of ways for looking at that, and we
    will look at that very closely as we go ahead.
        Senator Ernst. Wonderful. A number of us did travel to
    Afghanistan prior to Thanksgiving, and we were able to visit
    some of the commando training with the Afghan forces. Do you
    feel that they are now getting to a point where they will be
    able to nest with great capability with our special operators
    on the ground?
        General McKenzie. We have made great strides with the
    commando forces in Afghanistan. Your sense is exactly right.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I have realized that the questions I am about to embark
    upon are more policy and that your job is executing policy, but
    I just want to get some of your thoughts.
        In your testimony on page 4, you said, since May 2019, Iran
    supported groups in Iraq, have attacked United States interests
    dozens of times, conducted scores of unmanned aerial system
    reconnaissance flights. They have attacked and seized foreign
    vessel in the Gulf. You go on to list all the things Iran is
    doing. I think you testified in response to Senator Hawley's
    question that they are not being deterred in the asymmetric
    area, in the proxy area. It has always been a proxy war. I
    mean, that is what it has always been.
        Here is my problem. In 2017, we left the JCPOA [Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action], which they were abiding by. All
    intelligence unequivocally said that Iran was in compliance
    with all the provisions of the JCPOA. We put on the maximum
    pressure campaign, but as you have testified, it does not seem
    to be working because they are still doing what they were doing
    before.
        The major difference today is--and I do not want to get
    into classified material, but Iran is significantly closer to
    break-out to a bomb than they were when we left the agreement
    in--I think it was 2018. I do not get it. It is exactly what
    many of us were worried before the JCPOA. You have got a malign
    Iran acting irresponsibly throughout the region getting close
    to a nuclear weapon. Help me out here. I do not really
    understand it. They are still doing it, and we probably will
    find out that the attack last night was a Shiite militia
    supported by Iran. I mean, I think that is probably where the
    evidence is going to head. I do not have any intelligence on
    that, but I am speculating. Give me some thoughts.
        General McKenzie. Senator, so the maximum pressure
    campaign, in terms of its effect on the Iranian economy, there
    are other people----
        Senator King. Well, there is no question it has had an
    effect on the Iranian economy, but it has not had any effect on
    the activity we were hoping to deter. You have testified to
    that.
        General McKenzie. I would argue actually, as a result of
    the buildup in Iranian activity over the course of the summer,
    the establishment of the International Maritime Security
    construct actually shifts--the Straits of Hormuz are no longer
    harassed. They are passing without any problem at all back and
    forth not because we are taking actions aimed directly at Iran,
    but rather because we and an international coalition are
    shining a spotlight when that activity occurs. So the activity
    is not occurring.
        Senator King. Interesting you mentioned the international
    coalition. I completely agree with you, which we blew up when
    we left the JCPOA. The international coalition that put that
    agreement in place did not agree with our decision. We took it
    unilaterally, but that is another discussion.
        Again, do you believe that they are being deterred from
    their proxy attacks throughout the region?
        General McKenzie. I believe that we are deterring them from
    state-on-state attacks.
        Senator King. But that is not the issue. It has not been a
    state-on-state situation. The attacks have always been through
    proxies.
        General McKenzie. Sir, actually on January the 7th, we had
    a clear state-on-state attack.
        Senator King. After we killed Soleimani. Correct? That was
    the missile attack.
        General McKenzie. That is the missile attack.
        Senator King. Yes, okay. But we killed Soleimani and then
    they responded. But historically the attacks have always been
    through proxies, and my point is they are still doing it. The
    only difference is they are also headed toward a nuclear
    weapon, and I do not get how that is in the best interest of
    the United States or the region.
        Senator King. Sir, I understand your argument. Many of
    those issues are not CENTCOM issues.
        I would tell you that I come back to what I think my
    military task is. As the maximum pressure campaign continues,
    my military task is to prevent Iran from taking actions
    directly or indirectly that would challenge the activities that
    are ongoing.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, and you are doing an
    excellent job. It is a tragedy what happened yesterday and the
    last week to our troops. I think everyone here recognizes that.
        Just in a few seconds left, is there a plan B if the
    Taliban does not abide by this agreement in Afghanistan? In
    other words, do they believe that we are going to leave come
    hell or high water, or do they still have some worry that we
    are going to stay there if they do not act right? Because as
    you testified, they are doing plenty of attacks right now. I
    worry that after 17, 18, 19 years, we are going to end up
    exactly where we were in 2001 with the Taliban in charge of the
    country and open season for terrorists.
        General McKenzie. Senator, I had the opportunity to give
    advice on the plan that we are executing now, and my advice was
    to proceed with it. The principal reason that I supported it
    was the conditionality that is inherent in it. So we are going
    to have an opportunity to see what the Taliban do.
        Senator King. Do we know what the conditions are?
        General McKenzie. Sir, on the military side, I know very
    clearly what the conditions----
        Senator King. Do we? Does the American public know?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I am not sure that I would be the
    one to answer that.
        Senator King. Well, thank you for your testimony. I
    appreciate it. Again, I understand your job is to execute
    policy, but you are the nearest thing we have to a policymaker
    on this issue here this morning. I appreciate your candid
    answers to my questions.
        General McKenzie. Thank you, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your service and for being here. I
    too express my condolences to you and to the families for the
    loss of your/our two soldiers and, of course, our friend from
    the United Kingdom.
        General, this year, of course, the Air Force is asking us
    in their budget proposal to divest in critical ISR assets and a
    way to allow for more room to invest in new technologies and
    future ISR assets. I am very aware of the critical role that
    these ISR assets, some of these legacy assets have played in
    CENTCOM, including some from my home State of North Dakota. I
    would like your take on, first of all, what the Department of
    Defense and/or the Air Force have told you to expect with
    regard to meeting your ISR obligations or requirements if this
    fiscal year 2021 budget is enacted.
        General McKenzie. Thank you, sir. I actually possess most
    of the ISR assets the Department has, and I am cognizant of
    that. At the same time, as we were talking just a few minutes
    ago, as for the former Director of the Joint Staff and the J-5,
    I am very much aware of the need to prepare and turn to face
    the threat from China and the threat from Russia. Those are
    existential threats and we need to capitalize. We need to
    invest. We need to move in that direction.
        For me, it actually comes down to a platform, and that
    platform is the MQ-9. That is the platform of choice in the
    CENTCOM AOR. It is a platform that can gather intelligence. It
    can strike. It can do all kinds of things. It is a jack of all
    trades. I would prefer that the Air Force not divest of that
    resource right now to the degree that they are doing. I
    acknowledge that the Air Force has some tough decisions to make
    as they take a look at the future of the China threat. The MQ-9
    is not necessarily a platform that is useful in a dense air
    defense environment. I recognize that. But for right now and
    for the threats that to me are much closer actually than the
    longer-term threats of China that are deeper and graver, I
    favor retaining those assets as long as possible.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate your answer, and I agree. The
    MQ-9 is really quite a remarkable asset. We are just trying to
    assess the risk and whether the risk is worth it and how we
    transition because I also agree that we need to get to another
    place.
        With that in mind, I want to transition then in the
    discussion to the Space Force. Of course, we understand that
    many of the new technologies we are talking about would be
    space assets. I am just wondering, first of all, are you
    expecting to get some benefit in CENTCOM from space, ISR
    assets? I would expect the answer would be yes. But then the
    question becomes the gap between here and there and the risk in
    the middle of it. Are we preparing to adequately mitigate that
    risk?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I use space assets every day,
    every hour in U.S. Central Command, and they provide unique
    capabilities. The total ISR picture is best built when it is
    complemented by air-breathing platforms as well. But for all of
    my life and particularly in U.S. Central Command, we cannot
    survive without space assets.
        Senator Cramer. I think you have answered my questions,
    including a couple that I have not asked yet. So I appreciate
    that and appreciate the time and am happy to yield back some
    time.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, as long as we are on the subject of ISR, are your
    general ISR requirements being met?
        General McKenzie. Yes, they are.
        Senator Hirono. Are you able to leverage the ISR capacity
    of partners and allies in the region?
        General McKenzie. I am able to leverage both partners in
    the region and partners and allies out of the region that
    deploy into the region.
        Senator Hirono. Regarding the peace agreement with the
    Taliban, you had testified on March 10th, not too long ago,
    before the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. had not
    developed military plans for the full withdrawal. Based on what
    you testified today and also how you testified before that you
    did not have much confidence that the Taliban would honor its
    commitments, so at this rate are we ever going to meet the
    timeline of complete withdrawal by the end of the year?
        General McKenzie. Senator, that will be a condition----
        Senator Hirono. By the end of the year or pretty much in
    any foreseeable future.
        General McKenzie. I am confident we are going to go to
    8,600 by the middle of the summer. I think a decision to go
    below that level is a political not a military decision. I will
    have an opportunity to give a recommendation on that and then
    will be directed what to do.
        Senator Hirono. There are not very many indications that
    the Taliban is going to stop pursuing its attacks. So as you
    say, they would have to decrease those attacks against Afghan
    forces substantially before we would go much below the 8,600
    troops. It seems to me that we are going to be in Afghanistan a
    long, long time. We certainly cannot predict when we are going
    to be out of there, and this war has already cost us $2
    trillion, killed more than 3,500 Americans and coalition
    troops. So this is a really troubling area of the world. The
    entire Middle East is.
        So you would agree the stability, such as it can be, in the
    Middle East is a good thing for the United States.
        General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree.
        Senator Hirono. Yes. Meanwhile, Senator King had pointed
    out that Iran is pursuing its nuclear ambitions and that they
    could very well have a nuclear weapon. Would Iran having a
    nuclear weapon not add to the instability of the region? Would
    it not encourage other countries in the region to also develop
    nuclear weapons that would end up being an even more unstable
    region than we currently have?
        General McKenzie. Senator, my understanding of the object
    of our policy is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
    weapon.
        Senator Hirono. Well, they are going ahead with it from
    what we can see, and our departure from JCPOA has only hastened
    that situation. I think all around, the impact of our
    withdrawal from the JCPOA is certainly being manifested.
        I have a question about China and Russia. As they continue
    to make significant investments in the area of your
    responsibility, so they are cultivating relationships and
    providing financial support. In particular, China has invested
    an estimated $200 billion--$200 billion--in the Middle East in
    the past 15 years, and both Russia and China continue to
    develop relationships with leaders in the region such as Syrian
    President Bashar Assad.
        What risk does the United States face as Russia and China
    increase investments and influence in your area of
    responsibility, knowing full well that Russia and China are our
    near-peer competitors?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I think the greatest risk,
    although it is in the future, is from China, and you noted very
    correctly they are leading with their economics. Although they
    have established a significant military presence in Djibouti,
    their military presence throughout the rest of the theater is
    actually quite small. But I think we are seeing the leading
    edge of economic in-roads.
        I think Russia is a little more complicated. They are not
    spending as much money. We see more Russian military
    deployments, but I think it is harder for them to sustain, with
    the exception of Syria.
        Senator Hirono. So what can we do? What are we doing?
    Because China really employs a whole-of-government approach to
    what they are doing not only in this area of the world, but
    clearly in the Indo-Pacific area. So what are we doing? Are we
    pursuing a whole-of-government approach to counter particularly
    China's activities in both regions?
        General McKenzie. Senator, again, this is not an area of my
    particular expertise. But I believe we are looking at whole-of-
    government responses to China in the AOR and in the bridge
    really between CENTCOM and USAFRICOM, which is where their road
    actually takes them as well.
        Senator Hirono. That may sound reassuring, but you know, I
    really question whether or not we are pursuing the kind of
    whole-of-government approach that China is.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for being here and your testimony here
    today. I would also like to join my colleagues in offering my
    sincere condolences to the loved ones and families of those
    members who we lost recently.
        You have command in a very dangerous region. Over the past
    several months, our servicemembers and installations have
    suffered several rocket attacks. I am concerned about the
    serious miscommunication to the American people and, quite
    frankly, to the men in uniform and their families about the
    damage assessment following an attack in January that we had
    against our facilities. We were initially told that there were
    no injuries. Then we were told about a dozen soldiers suffered
    traumatic brain injuries. Then several dozen--the latest
    reports show that more than 100 troops have been diagnosed with
    a brain injury from this attack, many of whom were transferred
    out of country for treatment.
        My question to you, sir, is how did this miscommunication
    occur? Was CENTCOM forced to give a rushed assessment, or did
    the White House make an announcement without having any facts?
        General McKenzie. Senator, thank you for the question. I
    actually would like to talk about that.
        I am solely and completely responsible for the first
    notification that there were no casualties. I am the officer
    who gave that report based on my assessment of what happened at
    Al-Asad. There was no pressure on me to give that report. That
    was we thought in the immediate hours after the attack because
    it was not evident to us that there had been concussion
    injuries. Maybe if we were smarter, we would have picked up on
    that, but there were no kinetic injuries. No one was bleeding.
    No bones were broken. So it was out assessment and the
    assessment of my commanders on the ground. But I am the single
    person who passed that report. So I bear total responsibility
    for that with no one else.
        So, therefore, after that, concussions presented
    themselves. TBI [traumatic brain injury] presented itself. As
    you know, Senator, that is not an injury like a broken arm or a
    broken leg that can be immediately diagnosed on the spot. These
    injuries come back and forth. Sometimes they manifest
    themselves over time. Sometimes it takes months to do that.
        Two things I can tell you. I was never under any pressure
    from anyone at any time to shade this reporting. The Secretary
    of Defense never said anything to me about it. The Chairman
    never said anything to me about it. The President never said
    anything to me about it. We were driven solely by medical
    diagnosis on scene. So that is one point.
        The second point is I am completely confident that every
    American service man or woman that was at Al-Asad got the very
    best medical treatment that really our system can provide, and
    so the numbers changed. So they did as people were presented,
    as people were evaluated, I took the trouble to actually dig
    into what is called the MACE-2, which is the clinical tool that
    is given on site to develop some of the initial indications of
    are you concussed and what is it. It is a pretty good tool. I
    wanted to make sure I understood it fully and the difficulty of
    administering it.
        You are right. One hundred ten people were diagnosed. We
    evacuated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A further
    28 have come back to the United States. Some people have gone
    back to duty. We continue to take a look at that.
        I would never minimize the significance of traumatic brain
    injury. I mean, just the description of the injury itself is
    concerning. We still have a lot to learn about it, but I
    believe that people that were injured and received injuries of
    that nature at Al-Asad have gotten very good medical treatment
    as a result of it.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you for that answer, and you
    have answered some of my next question. The President said--I
    think he said, quote, they had headaches, a couple of other
    things, but I would say and I can report it is not very
    serious. End of quote. That is what we heard from the President
    that they had headaches.
        The question to you. There are hundreds of thousands of
    U.S. military veterans that are suffering from TBI, as you are
    well aware. Do you agree that those injuries are serious and
    not merely headaches?
        General McKenzie. I believe any injury to the brain is a
    serious injury.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        General, in your written statement, you assert despite the
    death of Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria
    and most of its activities focused on reestablishing networks,
    assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security
    forces and extending its influence in rural areas throughout
    Syria and Iraq. You state, similar to Afghanistan, most of the
    United States intelligence community predicts that without
    sustained pressure, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute
    itself in both Iraq and Syria.
        The President seems to have a different view and says that
    basically--well, he takes credit for 100 percent defeat of ISIS
    and used that as justification to withdraw troops from Syria
    back in October of 2019.
        My question to you as commander, because there is
    inconsistency in what we are hearing from the President and
    from you, how do you navigate between the Department of Defense
    and the IC's [Intelligence Community] very ominous assessment
    of the ISIS threat with the President's more optimistic
    assessment?
        General McKenzie. I will tell you based on guidance that I
    have been given, which came from the Secretary of Defense, we
    have repositioned ourselves in eastern Syria, what we call the
    Eastern Syria Security Area, where we are carrying on
    operations against ISIS with our SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces]
    partners. Those operations are actually very effective, and I
    think as long as we maintain pressure on them, we will be at a
    place where it is going to be difficult for them to generate
    and deliver external attack plotting, external attack plotting
    meaning attacks against the United States or Europe. As long as
    we have the ability to do that--and we do have the ability to
    do that now both with the forces that are there and the
    positions that we are in--we are going to be able to keep that
    pressure on.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for being here, and I join with others
    in expressing our condolences to those last night, the two
    Americans and the Brit that we lost in the attacks.
        Just to be sure that we have got our notes right, it is not
    14,000 troops that were added. It was 10,000?
        General McKenzie. The number goes up and down based on--
    forces flow in and out of the theater all the time. I would say
    the number is closer to 10,000. But it is difficult to put a
    single figure on it. When a carrier comes in, 5,000 people come
    in. That is roughly correct. I would not want to give you a
    single number.
        Senator Blackburn. All right. That is fair.
        Let us talk a little bit about what you are doing to deter
    gray zone attacks. I think that we need to hear a little bit
    from you on that, if you will.
        General McKenzie. Sure. As the maximum pressure campaign
    against Iran continues, they are unable to really respond
    economically or diplomatically, the two channels that we are
    using to place pressure on them. As they seek to find a way to
    respond, the only way that is left is the military component.
    The military component--they can do it one of two ways. They
    can do it directly, a state attack, and they have done that
    with the attack on Al-Asad, or they can do it indirectly, which
    the proxy attacks, gray zone attacks, as you indicate there.
        There is evidence over the course of the summer and the
    fall that Iran wanted to pursue those gray zone activities in
    order to force us to reconsider the maximum pressure campaign,
    in order to make us back off from that. Where we are right now
    is we believe as a result of the ballistic missile attack on
    Al-Asad, in the wake of that, rough state-on-state deterrence
    has been reestablished and that Iran does not seem to want to
    engage in another exchange of that nature because that would
    ultimately be a very bad outcome for them, and I think they
    recognize that.
        However, they are still of the opinion that they can pursue
    their objectives through attacks that they would hope would
    either be unattributable or be below the level where we will
    respond. That poses a very grave danger for them because I am
    not certain they do have an exact understanding of what our
    redlines are and where we are not going to be pushed. So we see
    that in Iraq. We also see it in other places in the theater.
    But we see it principally in Iraq because Iran is pursuing a
    dream of American ejection from the theater, and they would
    like for that to begin in Iraq. That is where we see it most
    readily.
        Senator Blackburn. Then let me ask you this. When we are
    talking about Iran, do you think they are more bold or less
    bold than they were a year ago?
        General McKenzie. So they were very bold in the late
    spring/early summer of 2019, and they were bold because they
    have never doubted our capability, but they doubt our will. So
    additionally in the spring and summer of 2019, the theater had
    been significantly drawn down in terms of capability. So they
    could observe that CENTCOM did not possess the forces that it
    had in the past. So a confluence of a judgment about our will
    and a judgment about our capability led them, to answer your
    question, to be pretty bold.
        I believe they are less bold now probably most
    significantly impacted by the death of Qassem Soleimani.
        Senator Blackburn. So then as we talk about their presence
    in Iraq and their goal of ejecting us from that theater, then
    outside of adding personnel, which I think it is fair to say
    you do not have the personnel to add, then what can we do in
    Iraq that is going to end up enhancing our force protection?
    How do we do that so that we keep Iran in a diminishing posture
    instead of a bolder posture?
        General McKenzie. First of all, you look to the source. If
    the source is Iran, to reestablish deterrence, you want to
    establish the idea in the mind of the opponent that the object
    they seek will be more painful than its attainment. So it is
    more painful to get there than it is to actually hold it, and
    so you do that by being very clear to them about things that we
    are going to tolerate and things that we are going to not
    tolerate. So that is one path.
        The other path at the same time----
        Senator Blackburn. So in other words, they have to see our
    will, or as my kids would say, put the hurt on them.
        General McKenzie. That is a very good way to state it,
    ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes, okay.
        General McKenzie. So meanwhile in Iraq, we are in Iraq at
    the invitation of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government
    has responsibilities to provide protection for us. Actually
    practically the best way to get at this problem is to continue
    to work with our Iraqi hosts and partners to get after the SMG
    threat because it threatens them as well.
        Senator Blackburn. I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. General McKenzie, excellent testimony. We
    appreciate it very much. As we stated at the beginning of this
    hearing, we are going to go now down to SVC-217 for a closed
    session. We will see who shows up.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                    lebanon
        1. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of
    Hezbollah's role in the new Lebanese Government?
        General McKenzie. Hezbollah possesses greater influence in the new
    government with a majority representation in the ruling coalition
    controlling/nominating the heads of the three major branches of
    government. Despite wielding this enhanced influence, Hezbollah almost
    certainly does not want to face public scrutiny for failed legislation
    or policies like the ongoing economic crisis.

        2. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, does Hezbollah have more or
    less influence than in previous governments?
        General McKenzie. Hezbollah has more influence in the new
    government and parliament compared to the previous government.

        3. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is the trend for the
    opinion of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) among the Lebanese
    population?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are the most
    respected government entity inside Lebanon, viewed as an apolitical
    organization. The LAF are consistently viewed as the sole national
    defense force. While Hezbollah is a significant actor in the security
    spectrum, it is not considered an alternative to the LAF as a national
    defense force.

        4. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, is their credibility and
    favorability as an institution increasing or decreasing overall?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) institutional
    credibility is unchanged in the wake of recent anti-government
    protests, which favorably showcased the LAF's non-partisan, apolitical
    standing.

        5. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, is their credibility and
    favorability as an institution increasing or decreasing vis-a-vis
    Hezbollah?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese population does not typically view
    Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as competitors. Hezbollah
    is widely recognized as a sectarian political and militia entity, while
    the LAF is seen as a national, apolitical institution. Lebanese views
    on Hezbollah or the LAF almost certainly vary depending on religious
    sect and political alignment.

        6. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the
    performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the ongoing series of
    protests against the government?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) forms the
    backbone of United States influence in Lebanon and hedges against
    Iranian, Russian, and all other malevolent interests in the country.
    The LAF performed well balancing the safety and security of the
    protesters as well as their demands to illustrate professional and
    neutral behavior, permitting democratic freedom of expression.

        7. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the
    Lebanese Armed Forces in light of the new Lebanese Government?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) views itself as
    apolitical but prioritizes protecting the Lebanese people against all
    threats. In December 2019, LAF Chief of Defense (CHOO) Aoun openly
    opposed the government's lack of credible response to the anti-
    government protests. The CHOO referred to the protests as a
    ``revolution of the hungry.''

        8. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the
    LAF and their ability to maintain end use monitoring of United States
    assistance?
        General McKenzie. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) take end use
    monitoring responsibilities very seriously and have maintained 100
    percent accountability annually. Of the 4,529 items requiring annual
    inventory in Lebanon, only two were not physically observed in the past
    fiscal year. However, these two items were satisfactorily accounted for
    through accurate and up to date hand receipts while deployed at the
    time of inventory. Additionally, the LAF passed their last Compliance
    Assistance Visit with a ``satisfactory'' rating, which is the highest
    possible rating. The Office of Defense Cooperation Beirut and the LAF
    have an excellent relationship, with unhindered access for end use
    monitoring at any time.
                                egypt and sinai
        9. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the
    Egyptian Government's performance against the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist organizations in the Sinai?
        General McKenzie. The Egyptian Armed Forces have contained most of
    the ISIS-Sinai and other Violent Extreme Organizations violence in the
    northeastern Sinai Peninsula. Cairo has sustained counterterrorism
    operations despite consistent casualties, while beginning to implement
    limited reforms to address societal and economic grievances.

        10. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of
    the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and its role in supervising
    the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli
    Treaty of Peace and working to prevent any violation of its terms?
        General McKenzie. For the past 40 years, the Multinational Force
    and Observers (MFO) is the only dedicated organization to monitor the
    Egypt-Israel treaty. Aside from treaty supervision, MFO's presence
    serves to reinforce the commitment of the international community in
    maintaining peace. The MFO also allows Egypt and Israel to discuss
    shared diplomatic, economic, and security interests in good faith.

        11. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of
    the value of MFO as a platform for communications between Egypt and
    Israel in the event that tensions increase between the two countries?
        General McKenzie. I defer to Ambassador Beecroft, Multinational
    Force and Observers' (MFO) Director General, on MFO's role in
    facilitating diplomatic communications between Egypt and Israel. I do
    believe that MFO symbolizes the international community's support for
    the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Task Force Sinai, the United
    States contribution to MFO, likewise sends a strong signal of the
    nation's support to Egypt and Israel.
                                     syria
        12. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of
    the situation in Idlib?
        General McKenzie. The cease fire in Idlib continues to hold but
    remains fragile. There is evidence that Syria, Russia, and Turkey
    continue to posture military forces and deploy additional troops to the
    area, signaling a potential resumption of hostilities in the future. We
    remain concerned about the large number of people who have been
    displaced in Northwest Syria due to the fighting and significant
    humanitarian need.

        13. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, do you see any evidence that
    Idlib could be a friction point between Russia and Turkey?
        General McKenzie. Russia likely seeks to avoid actions that would
    intentionally start a conflict with Turkey, preferring to engage
    diplomatically with Ankara and avoid a direct confrontation with NATO.
    Russia almost certainly will look to leverage it's diplomatic,
    economic, and security relationship with Turkey in order to maintain
    the Asad regime's control over Syrian territory.
                                     yemen
        14. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of
    the Houthi missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to United
    States personnel, citizens, and partners in the region?
        General McKenzie. Houthi missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles pose
    a significant threat to United States interests, citizens, and partners
    particularly as seen by the targeting of Saudi Arabia and United Arab
    Emirates (UAE) civilian critical infrastructure to include airports.

        15. Senator Inhofe. General McKenzie, what is your observation of
    the impact of Houthi missile and UAV threats to the utilization of Air
    and Missile Defense assets by partners in the region such as Saudi
    Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE)?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        16. Senator Inhofe. If the United States withdrew all support for
    the Saudi-led coalition, would the Houthi threat to United States
    personnel, citizens, and partners increase or decrease?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        17. Senator Inhofe. Is it possible for the Houthi missile and UAV
    systems to become a threat to Israel?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                        prisoner release and the taliban
        18. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, why would we want the
    Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to release
    5,000 of 15,000 Taliban prisoners before we have a complete, confirmed
    peace deal--especially given the lack of reduction in violence since
    the agreement was announced?
        General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the
    release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
    led effort we support the peace process and confidence building
    measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

        19. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, what details can you provide
    about each of these prisoners. I understand that the response to this
    question may be classified.
        General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the
    release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
    led effort we support the peace process and confidence building
    measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

        20. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, what arrangements do we have
    to ensure that prisoners do not support al-Qaeda (AQ) or ISIS after
    they are released?
        General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the
    release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
    led effort we support the peace process and confidence building
    measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

        21. Senator Cotton. General McKenzie, would prisoners be monitored
    after release, and how?
        General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the
    release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
    led effort we support the peace process and confidence building
    measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                           iran-deterrence strategies
        22. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``The long-term
    challenges the United States faces in the CENTCOM (United States
    Central Command) AOR (area of responsibility) are the destabilizing and
    escalatory actions of the Iranian regime.'' Particularly, ``its
    hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threat to the United States and
    its regional partners.'' What is a more effective strategy or response
    to Iran's defiance of our current economic and diplomatic strategies to
    CENTCOM's ``maximum pressure campaign?''
        General McKenzie. The Maximum Pressure Campaign is a whole of
    Government effort, led by the State Department at the direction of the
    President and focused on bringing diplomatic and economic pressure to
    bear on the Iranian regime; it is not a United States Central Command
    (USCENTCOM) campaign. USCENTCOM's efforts are concentrated on deterring
    Iran from responding militarily to the diplomatic and economic pressure
    against us or others in the region, and we will maintain our support to
    our regional partners and allies.

        23. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``Our presence
    sends a clear and unambiguous message signal of our capabilities and
    most importantly, the will to defend partners and U.S. national
    interests. This exemplifies the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is
    diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect
    demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent.''
    What have we learned with respect to the ``mind of our opponents'' in
    the CENTCOM AOR, such that we can claim wins in CENTCOM's current
    deterrence philosophy?
        General McKenzie. I believe our resolve to directly respond to
    strikes by Iranian proxies against United States personnel and bases
    and strike against former IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani demonstrated to
    Iran our willingness to act in self-defense to defend our interests.
    Our ability to deter Tehran is dynamic and I remain concerned further
    force posture reductions in the region will only embolden the regime to
    take more aggressive actions in the region.

        24. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, exactly how clear and
    unambiguous of a signal are we sending to our adversaries in the
    CENTCOM AOR?
        General McKenzie. Very clear. United States Central Command, as one
    element of the broader whole of United States Government approach to
    preserve and enhance the credibility and influence of the United States
    in the region, continues to send a clear message to our partners,
    competitors, and adversaries through consistent synchronization of
    information and actions including lethal and non-lethal operations
    across the U.S. Government. Through focused and integrated efforts to
    understand and engage key audiences, we are able to create, strengthen,
    and preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States
    Government interests, policies, plans, and strategic objectives.
                 reduction of u.s. forces & regional stability
        25. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, you stated, ``Reduction of
    United States Forces in the AOR combined with a perception of United
    States disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the
    spring of 2019 that the United States was no longer committed to
    defensing our national interests in the region. That misconception led
    directly to the cycle of escalation that created in January 2020. How
    would shifting the balance of power in the CENTCOM AOR, by reducing
    United States Forces in Afghanistan, impact stability in the region?
        General McKenzie. I do not see reducing United States Forces in
    Afghanistan as negatively affecting stability in the region. First, we
    have been ordered to conduct an orderly withdrawal. Second, as we
    reduce our forces in Afghanistan we maintain the Counter Terrorism
    Platform which includes the whole ``ecosystem'' of enabling
    capabilities and factors in a capable Afghan National Security Forces
    necessary to continue our mission.
        weaponization of internally displaced persons (idp) and refugees
        26. Senator Tillis. General McKenzie, if given the proper
    resources, what initiative or type of task force would you stand up to
    develop a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort to mitigate
    or respond to the ISIS detainee and IDP hostage situation?
        General McKenzie. One of my top priorities is combatting the
    weaponization of internally displaced and refugee populations. The
    greatest concern in terms of potential radicalization is the population
    being held in the foreign annex of the Al Hol Internally Displaced
    Person (IDP) camp. The United States military does not currently have
    authority to access Al Hol or the foreign annex. Legally, the
    Department of Defense (DoD) can only provide security to facilitate a
    stable environment in support of UN and international non-governmental
    organizations (NGOs) efforts to support Internally Displaced Persons
    (IDP) needs within Syria. USAID is the lead for this mission with
    United States Central Command playing a supporting role.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
        27. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, The Trump Administration
    insisted that the world was safer in the aftermath of the strike on
    Qassem Soleimani. Reports from earlier this week indicated that the
    military had begun to drawdown troops the additional troops deployed to
    the Middle East just after the strike--indicating confidence that
    immediate tension in the region declined. But yesterday, 2 American
    servicemembers, and 1 servicemember from a coalition partner nation,
    were killed during a rocket attack in northern Iraq that also wounded
    12. I understand that investigations are ongoing, but it seems likely
    that an Iranian-backed Shiite milita group is responsible for these
    attacks. This kind of symbolic retribution from Iranian proxy forces is
    exactly what many feared. I understand that the Pentagon was in the
    process of bringing air defense systems and ballistic missile defense
    systems into Iraq to increase force protection measures against
    potential attacks by Iran and its proxy forces. Were these force
    protection measures too late?
        General McKenzie. In January, an Operational Needs Statement was
    submitted for additional Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar systems.
    The lack of immediate availability in the Army inventory required a
    prioritization of the assets already in theater, resulting in a number
    of systems that were remissioned from Afghanistan to Iraq. Some of
    these systems are still in transit while others have reached initial
    operational capability.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what additional force
    protection measures are you considering given the most recent attack?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        29. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what other advanced
    planning is ongoing to guard against additional strikes?
        General McKenzie. Over the last few months the U.S. has deployed
    additional capability into theater while realigning positioning to
    protect forces from a range oflikely threats. Concurrently we are
    working with our partners and allies to integrate existing assets
    across the peninsula to provide a more comprehensive defense of the
    region.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, we can all understand why
    additional United States troops were necessary due to increased
    tensions after the strike on Soleimani. But what threat assessment led
    to the decision to drawdown these additional troops?
        General McKenzie. There was no threat assessment that led to the
    drawdown nor was there any additional assessment requiring us to
    maintain greater force presence, it was a reduction that coincided with
    the original intent to reduce U.S troop presence.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in the aftermath of the
    Soleimani strike, there was a symbolic vote within the Iraqi parliament
    to expel United States troops.
        General McKenzie, how did our military relationship with the Iraqis
    change in the aftermath of this strike?
        General McKenzie. The Coalition's presence in Iraq is based on
    formal, diplomatic requests and bilateral security agreements with
    Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Representatives vote
    has not been implemented, and further legislation would be required to
    remove Coalition forces.
        [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, where do we stand in
    terms of our authority to keep American troops stationed in Iraq?
        General McKenzie. The authority for the American troop presence in
    Iraq remains unchanged. United States Forces are in Iraq at the
    invitation of the Government of Iraq, for the purpose of defending the
    United States, its coalition partners, and Iraq, from the continuing
    threat posed by ISIS. We remain focused on ensuring the lasting defeat
    of ISIS as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISP) regenerate the capacity to
    defeat the threat posed by ISIS. United States Forces continue to
    conduct operations pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
    Military Force (AUMF), the 2002 AUMF, and the President's authority
    under Article II of the Constitution.
                             traumatic brain injury
        33. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, could you provide an
    update for this Committee on the status of the servicemembers suffering
    from Traumatic Brain Injury as a result of these attacks?
        General McKenzie. First, I would like to start out by saying that I
    am solely and completely responsible for the first notification that
    there were no casualties. I am the officer who gave that report based
    on my assessment of what happened at Al Asad. There was no pressure on
    me to give that report. That was what we thought in the immediate hours
    after the attack because it was not evident to us that there had been
    concussion injuries. You know maybe if we were smarter we would have
    picked up on that but there were not kinetic injuries, no one was
    bleeding, no bones were broken. So it was our assessment and the
    assessment of my commanders on the ground but I am the single person
    who passed that report. So I bear total responsibility for that with no
    one else. Second, to answer your question there were 110 people
    diagnosed. We evacuated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A
    further 28 have come back to the United States and 75 servicemembers
    have returned to full duties within the U.S. Central Command Area of
    Responsibility. These servicemembers will be followed through the
    normal Periodic Health Assessment and Deployment Health Assessment
    processes. The medical status of the 28 servicemembers evacuated to the
    U.S. will be followed by their respective service headquarters.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what additional resources
    do you need for the servicemembers under your command in order to
    properly detect and treat traumatic brain injury?
        General McKenzie. Over the last several years the Department of
    Defense has made significant and needed strides in detecting and
    treating this often unseen injury. We need to continue ongoing research
    into a number of areas. First, we need improved capabilities to provide
    both the initial diagnosis and the ability to objectively return
    someone to duty. Once injured, diagnosis is currently based on the best
    available medical evidence, but still requires significant provider
    judgement. An objective test (laboratory test, handheld device, some
    other solution) would allow commanders to know who in the force
    requires rest or advanced treatment and who is ready to back to the
    fight. Improved capabilities to provide our personnel equipment and
    bunkers, which help, protect from incurring the injury.
                  afghanistan & so-called ``peace agreement''
        35. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, reports indicate that
    nationwide violence--including deadly assaults against Afghan forces--
    have actually increased since the so-called ``Peace Agreement'' between
    the United States and the Taliban. According to Afghan officials, the
    Taliban carried out at least 76 attacks across 24 Afghan provinces in
    the 4 days after the agreement was signed--and the US has conducted
    airstrikes in response. But the drawdown of US troops is already
    underway. Intra-Afghan negotiations between the Afghan Government and
    the Taliban were supposed to begin this Tuesday, March 10--but the
    prisoner exchange, renewed violence, and political disputes are proving
    difficult obstacles to these talks. And the agreement to remove all
    troops from Afghanistan within 14 months was brokered in exchange for a
    largely undisclosed and ill-defined set of counterterrorism actions.
    Given the uptick in Taliban violence in the aftermath of the peace
    agreement, are you concerned about force protection for our troops
    withdrawing from Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Yes, I am concerned; therefore, the United States
    Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Resolute Support (RS) started
    providing layered force protection to US and NATO bases and personnel
    in Afghanistan using a combination of manned and unmanned sensors,
    ground-based fire support systems, perimeter and ground defense area
    (GDA) patrols, and manned and unmanned combat air patrols. In addition,
    local-national partnered forces from the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces (ANDSF) provide an outer layer of security to these
    facilities.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what force protection
    measures are in place to ensure safety during withdrawal?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        37. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, administration officials
    are describing this withdrawal as ``conditions-based.'' What conditions
    would halt, reverse, or alter the 14-month timeline for withdrawal?
        General McKenzie. The conditions that would halt, reverse, or alter
    the 14-month timeline would include any attacks from the Taliban
    against United States or Coalition forces; failure of the Taliban to
    meet the conditions agreed to under the United States-Taliban Peace
    Deal; or increases in Taliban violence directed against the Islamic
    Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as destabilizing to Afghan
    governance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued
    increased level of violence against Coalition and Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); lack of lntra-Afghan negotiations;
    Government of Afghanistan continued instability or a combination of
    these. It should also be noted that while the Commander on the ground
    and I will certainly make a recommendation, it is ultimately a
    political decision.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what metrics are you
    using to measure Taliban compliance with the agreement?
        General McKenzie. There are 14 key points laid out in the United
    States-Taliban Peace Deal, and these points will continually be
    assessed for compliance.

        39. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, General Milley has said
    that he does not see the renewed violence as a ``deal breaker.'' What
    would be a ``deal breaker'' for you?
        General McKenzie. Increased Taliban attacks against the Afghan
    National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are one of the conditions
    that would halt, reverse, or alter the 14-month timeline for
    withdrawal. The Taliban are trying to enter Intra-Afghan negotiations
    from a position of strength in order to push for maximum concessions
    from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during those
    talks.
        Examples of a ``deal breaker'' would include any attacks from the
    Taliban against United States or Coalition forces; failure of the
    Taliban to meet the conditions agreed to under the United States-
    Taliban Peace Deal; or increases in Taliban violence directed against
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as destabilizing to
    Afghan governance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued
    increased level of violence against Coalition and Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); lack of lntra-Afghan negotiations;
    Government of
        Afghanistan continued instability or a combination of these. It
    should also be noted that while the Commander on the ground and I will
    certainly make a recommendation, it is ultimately a political decision.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, the United States-Taliban
    Agreement stipulated that intra-Afghan talks would begin this Tuesday,
    March 10. But talks are not scheduled. Will the United States continue
    to withdraw troops even if intra-Afghan negotiations do not occur?
        General McKenzie. Yes. General Miller has determined that he can
    complete the assigned Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Resolute Support
    Mission with 8,600 U.S. personnel. NATO and Coalition forces are also
    drawing down by roughly 25 percent. The current troop level reduction
    in Afghanistan does not affect our ability to maintain pressure on the
    Taliban to uphold the Peace Agreement.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how is the political
    uncertainty within Afghanistan surrounding the presidential election
    results impacting the security and stability within Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. The presidential uncertainty does not in itself
    represent a serious threat to Afghan security. President Ghani's
    political opposition has not demonstrated willingness to challenge his
    victory through violence or large-scale demonstrations, and despite an
    ethnic component to the political impasse, Afghan security forces
    remain unified and loyal to Kabul. There are no indications of near-
    term Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ethno-political
    fracture that the Taliban or other armed factions might exploit.
    Heightened political tensions in certain parts of the country have not
    demonstrably altered the years-long trends of violence and insecurity.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, public discussion of the
    prisoner exchange articulated in the peace agreement has been extremely
    conflicted, and President Ghani has flat-out rejected this exchange.
    Can you clarify the terms of this prisoner swap, and whether the United
    States military will play any role to facilitate the exchange?
        General McKenzie. The United States has no direct role in the
    release or reintegration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-
    led effort we support the peace process and confidence building
    measures necessary to bring about a conclusion to this conflict.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I read the classified
    annexes that accompany the peace agreement. Frankly, I was stunned by
    the lack of detail. The deal seems intentionally vague in terms of
    metrics for compliance and evaluating success. But I was even more
    shocked to learn that while these annexes are classified, and
    unavailable to the American people, the Taliban have read the secret
    annexes. Why does the Taliban have access to the annexes that accompany
    the peace deal, but the American people do not?
        General McKenzie. United States Central Command was not involved in
    the United States-Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I
    recommend this question is referred to the State Department.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, will you work to provide
    more information to the American people about the terms and conditions
    of this agreement?
        General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
    Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this
    question is referred to the State Department.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I understand that the
    Trump Administration has decided that the status of women and
    minorities is ``up to the Afghan people to decide.'' This seems like an
    abrupt reversal of almost two decades of United States policy, and
    approximately $137 billion invested in Afghanistan reconstruction
    efforts.
        General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
    Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this
    question is referred to the State Department.

        46. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, if women and minorities
    lose the rights they have gained--particularly with regard to educating
    women and girls in Afghanistan--how will this impact the security and
    stability of Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. United States and EU funding for Government of
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are based on the
    recognition of the rights of minorities, women, and girls. If GIRoA
    does not live up to its agreements, there is a risk of losing foreign
    assistance and Afghan Security Force Funding, which could negatively
    affect Afghan security and stability.

        47. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, do you think that future
    funding for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts should be conditioned on
    commitments to protect the status of women and girls in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Reconstruction is outside my role as the United
    States Central Command Commander, and therefore I recommend this
    question is referred to the State Department and the United States
    Agency for International Development.

        48. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, given that the United
    States is withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, will our diplomats and
    other civilian employees need additional protection?
        General McKenzie. While specific questions on embassy security
    should be referred to the State Department, United States Central
    Command is committed in supporting security request made by the State
    Department to ensure the safety of our diplomats and civilian employees
    as the withdrawal occurs.

        49. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in my questions for the
    record at your nomination hearing, I asked you ``how would a
    precipitous withdrawal of United States Forces from Afghanistan lead to
    attacks on the United States Homeland.'' You replied: ``Such a
    withdrawal of forces would be inherently destabilizing to Afghanistan
    and the region... Any withdrawal should be conditions-based and enable
    lasting effects to protect the Homeland and our vital national
    interests.'' Do you believe that the current withdrawal of forces is
    precipitous?
        General McKenzie. No. I do not believe that the current withdrawal
    of forces is precipitous. First, we have not been given guidance to
    execute a precipitous withdrawal; we have been ordered to conduct an
    orderly withdrawal. Second, as we reduce our forces in Afghanistan we
    maintain the forces necessary to pressure the Taliban should they
    decide not to abide by the terms of the U.S-Taliban Peace Deal. Third,
    we have been closely coordinating with both our Coalition partners and
    the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during this
    drawdown so that neither Afghanistan nor the region is destabilized.

        50. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the current withdrawal
    ``conditions-based,'' with clearly defined conditions?
        General McKenzie. Yes, the current withdrawal is ``condition-
    based.'' The standard is that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe
    haven for terrorist to attack the United States, period and if any
    point in time it's completely conditions based we stop.

        51. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, does the current
    agreement with the Taliban, and plans for withdrawal, protect our vital
    national interests and minimize risk of attack on our Homeland?
        General McKenzie. Yes, the conditions of the withdrawal are that no
    terrorist organization can use Afghanistan to conduct attacks on the
    United States nor can the country of Afghanistan provide refuge to such
    organizations or people. As long as the Taliban meet the conditions
    outlined in the United States-Taliban Peace Deal, United States vital
    national interests will be protected.
                                syria withdrawal
        52. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I was ashamed by the
    abrupt withdrawal of almost all 1,000 United States troops from Syria
    in October--even if the President later partially reversed course to
    keep some troops in Syria to secure oil fields to ensure the Kurds
    could continue earning oil revenue. But this abrupt withdrawal, and
    halfway reversal, posed real security risks to Kurdish troops and
    civilians. To what extent was the Islamic State able to exploit the
    vulnerabilities during this chaotic withdrawal period?
        General McKenzie. There was no noticeable increase in ISIS activity
    during the United States withdrawal period, likely due to continued
    United States and Coalition support to the Syrian Democratic Forces
    (SDF) and the SDF's focus on the D-ISIS mission.

        53. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how has our military
    partnership with the Kurds been compromised since this withdrawal?
        General McKenzie. The relationship between the Syrian Democratic
    Forces (SDF) and United States Forces remains strong, especially in
    executing the D-ISIS fight despite the challenges by carrying out the
    partial withdrawal.

        54. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what is the United
    States' long-term strategy in Syria, and how does the current mission
    to protect oil revenue for the Kurds contributes to this overarching
    goal?
        General McKenzie. The United States is seeking to support our
    Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in becoming self-sustaining in the
    counter ISIS fight as we pursue a political solution to the Syria
    conflict.

        55. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, I understand the Kurds
    are seeking to negotiate with the Assad regime via Moscow. Are you
    concerned that the United States has relinquished our diplomatic
    influence in shaping a political settlement in Syria?
        General McKenzie. Leaving diplomatic efforts to the State
    Department, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to
    coordinate very closely with Ambassador Jeffrey on how best to
    militarily support United States objectives in Syria broadly and in the
    Eastern Syria Security Area more specifically.

        56. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, in northeastern Syria,
    there are prisons and detention camps with thousands of men, women, and
    children. While these camps house dangerous terrorists, they also house
    many innocent women and children, some of whom were living--against
    their will--under the ISIS reign of terror. Humanitarian groups working
    in Syria report that 94 percent of almost 70,000 detainees (68,744
    people) being held at the Al-Hol detention camp are women and children.
    How many of the detainees do you believe represent a security threat?
        General McKenzie. Al-Hol is an IDP camp managed by an NGO called
    Blumont through a contract with USAID. Al-Hol and other IDP camps are
    designed to house and care for IDPs; they are not detention centers.
    Al-Hol is separated into several annexes, one of which houses a more
    radicalized population. It is our belief that the greatest security
    threat emanates from the foreign annex in Al-Hol camp which holds
    approximately 9,600 radicalized persons.

        57. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the US military
    working to identify non-combatants, particularly children?
        General McKenzie. The United States military is not working to
    identify non-combatants in the prisons, as these individuals are being
    held by the Syrian Democratic Forces and are not under United States
    control. I recognize the threats posed in both of these situations
    which is why we have been working closely with Department of State and
    foreign governments to get detainees and refugees repatriated. Our
    forces are providing assistance to the SDF in the form of training and
    equipment to ensure detainees are held securely and properly treated.

        58. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, how do you think
    repatriation should be handled for any non-combatants?
        General McKenzie. It is in the best interest of all parties to get
    IDPs and refugees returned to their homes as quickly as the security
    situation permits. This is a regional and global problem that will
    continue to require a whole of USG effort to work with nations to
    repatriate their citizens as quickly as possible. As approximately 85
    percent of the population in Al-Hol is Syrian and Iraqi, it is
    important to have these populations returned home at the earliest safe
    opportunity as it will relieve pressure on the camps as we continue to
    work the more complicated repatriations.

        59. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, is the military
    facilitating the repatriation of women and children to home countries?
        General McKenzie. United States Central Command continues to
    support the Department of State in returning foreign fighters and their
    families to their country of origin.

        60. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, are you concerned with
    the potential for increased radicalization within these camps as we
    have seen before in places like Iraq?
        General McKenzie. Yes. Which is why it is so important that we get
    the people back to their homes and countries of origin as soon as the
    security situation permits. Radicalized ISIS supporters within camps
    such as Al-Hol in Northeast Syria remain a threat and a challenge. Many
    of the camp residents are family members-wives and children, generally-
    of ISIS fighters. A large percentage of the children have witnessed-or
    participated in-acts of violence in support of the ``caliphate.''
        ISIS radicalization efforts will likely continue until residents
    can be returned to their homes or countries of origin while the
    hardcore ISIS cadre, regardless of their citizenship, are moved to a
    more secure environment.

        61. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, what role is DOD playing
    to prevent this radicalization?
        General McKenzie. The Department of Defense is not tasked with the
    de-radicalization of civilians. We have demonstrated through our
    actions a compassion and kindness in the care and treatment of these
    populations. I recognize this is a critical effort to help prevent
    future fighters. While we are not in the camps, we help provide
    training to the SDF who provide security. We provide logistical support
    to enable the important work that is going on in the camps in support
    of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
    International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), and other Non-governmental
    Organizations (NGOs).
               turkish use of chemical weapons in syria offensive
        62. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, there were many media
    reports that Turkish proxies were deploying munitions loaded with white
    phosphorus, and that civilians and children in Ras al-Ain were
    suffering from chemical burns. The intentional use of this weapon
    against civilians undeniably constitutes a war crime, and is
    particularly alarming given the stated Turkish goals of ``demographic
    change.'' Have you been able to confirm these allegations of Turkish
    deployment of white phosphorus munitions?
        General McKenzie. We are unable to confirm or deny the use of white
    phosphorus munitions by Turkish forces at this time.

        63. Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, have any United States
    origin defense articles been used in connection with the Turkish
    offensive in Syria--including with the use of chemical weapons? Was any
    such use in violation of the applicable end use agreements?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                       ballistic missile threat from iran
        64. Senator Heinrich. General McKenzie, in the weeks since the
    Iranian attack on Al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, you've led an effort to
    increase air and missile defense capabilities in the region to protect
    our servicemen and women from the continuing threat of Iranian missile
    and drone attack. How are you working with the military services to
    transition proven systems that use directed energy and high-powered
    microwave technology to form part of a layered defense against these
    threats?
        General McKenzie. The decision to make the Army the Executive Agent
    (EA) for Counter UAS (CUAS) is significant. United States Central
    Command (USCENTCOM) directly coordinates and supports the EA through
    ensuring our requirements are captured and resourced as appropriate.
    USCENTCOM serves on the EA' s Board Advisory Council (BAC), currently
    in the process of down-selecting the ``best of breed'' systems and
    capabilities for further investment. Furthermore, USCENTCOM serves as
    the operational ``test-bed'' for counter-unmanned aircraft system
    fielding. Specifically, with the application of directed energy and
    high-powered microwave technology, USCENTCOM works with the Services to
    expedite the validation requirements for the employment of these new
    systems in an operating setting.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                   law of war
        65. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, President Trump threatened to
    destroy Iranian sites ``important to . . . the Iranian culture'' and
    threatened future retaliation in ``a disproportionate manner'' on
    January 4 and January 5, 2020. The Department of Defense (DOD) Law of
    War Manual states that ``[c]ultural property, the areas immediately
    surrounding it, and appliances in use for its protection should be
    safeguarded and respected.'' On January 6, 2020, Secretary Esper
    expressed that the United States ``follow[s] the laws of armed
    conflict.'' Do you agree with the DOD Law of War Manual and Secretary
    Esper's remark?
        General McKenzie. All United States Central Command operations are
    conducted in compliance with United States law, Department of Defense
    policy, and applicable international law, including the Law of War.

        66. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, with the caveat the United
    States reserves the right of self-defense, does the 2001 Authorization
    for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the 2002 AUMF against Iraq give
    United States Central Command the authority to use military force
    against the government of Iran?
        General McKenzie. As stated most recently in the January 27, 2020
    Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2456, the 2002
    Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) has long been
    understood to authorize the use of force to address threats emanating
    from Iraq, including threats directed by Iran against United States
    Forces in Iraq and Syria. Iran conducts and directs the actions of
    several terrorist groups in Iraq, including Kata'ib Hezbollah. Iran and
    its proxies continue to plan and execute attacks against United States,
    Coalition, and Iraqi forces. The 2002 AUMF provides critical domestic
    legal authority for United States Forces to defend themselves, and our
    Coalition and Iraqi partners, against threats to, or stemming from, the
    territory of Iraq.

        67. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, former National Security
    Advisor and retired Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster recently
    observed at a public forum on March 3, 2020, ``I don't really care what
    international law said,'' regarding the killing of Iranian Major
    General Qasem Soleimani and that his killing was ``the righteous use of
    violence.'' In your experience, does the U.S. military regard
    international law as something that should generally be adhered to or
    disregarded?
        General McKenzie. It is long-standing Department of Defense policy
    that members of the U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War during all
    armed conflicts, and in all other military operations. The Law of War
    is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
    hostilities, including all relevant international law binding upon the
    United States by treaty or as customary international law. The Uniform
    Code of Military Justice provides criminal sanctions for serious
    violations of the Law of War, and other relevant international law
    binding upon the United States. U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War
    and all other related international law binding upon the United States
    during the conduct of military operations as a matter of course, as a
    trained and disciplined armed force representing the United States and
    our values.
                                      iran
        68. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, recent reports indicated that
    between March 11, 2020 and March 13, 2020, two Americans and one
    coalition servicemember were killed and other United States personnel
    were wounded in two separate rocket attacks on Camp Taji, Iraq, and
    that these attacks were supposed to have been carried out by proxy
    groups backed by the Iranian Government. In a March 4, 2020, DOD Fiscal
    Year 2021 budget posture hearing, Secretary Esper and stated that the
    killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani ``restored deterrence
    to a degree.'' In your view, how has the killing of Soleimani restored
    deterrence to further Iranian malign activities through its proxy
    forces?
        General McKenzie. I agree with the Secretary. Our actions have
    demonstrated our resolve to confront those that attack and kill
    Americans. However, I believe Iran is prepared to engage in escalatory
    action in Iraq to compel the departure of United States Forces.

        69. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, on December 5, 2019, I asked
    Lieutenant General David W. Allvin, USAF, Director for Strategy, Plans
    and Policy, Joint Staff the following question for the record: ``Would
    you say that the threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon has
    increased, decreased, or remained relatively unchanged since the United
    States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?''
    On February 24, 2020, he responded: ``The threat of Iran developing a
    nuclear weapon clearly remains, based upon their capability and intent.
    Although Iran's recent violations of JCPOA restrictions incrementally
    increase its capability to pursue weapons-grade enriched uranium, we
    have seen no direct evidence to indicate the regime desires to pursue
    the development of a nuclear weapon.'' Do you agree with Lt. Gen.
    Allvin?
        General McKenzie. Yes, in my opinion the threat of Iran developing
    a nuclear weapon remains largely unchanged since the United States
    withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There is
    no evidence the Iranian regime desires to pursue the development of a
    nuclear weapon. Should their decision calculus change, Tehran very
    likely retains the expertise and rudimentary production capabilities to
    restart processes essential to the development of a nuclear device, to
    include likely dual-purpose nuclear procurement and research
    activities.
                                  afghanistan
        70. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, how many United States
    contractors are in Afghanistan as of the date of your hearing (March
    12, 2020)?
        General McKenzie. Nine thousand nine hundred seventy-four United
    States Department of Defense contractors are in Afghanistan. This is
    the contractor population accounted for in SPOT, the Department of
    Defense's program of record.

        71. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, assuming the Taliban
    implements its commitments to the February 29, 2020, United States-
    Taliban agreement and the United States withdraws all of its forces
    along the 14-month timeline outlined in the agreement, how many United
    States military contractors will remain in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        72. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, what impact, if any, does the
    absence of the Afghan Government as a party to the United States-
    Taliban agreement have on the prospect of the long-term success of the
    agreement?
        General McKenzie. The State Department led the United States-
    Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend that this
    question be referred to the State Department because it concerns the
    substance of Intra-Afghan Negotiations.

        73. Senator Warren. General McKenzie, what is your understanding of
    the extent to which the withdrawal of United States Forces depends on
    the outcome of political settlement--or lack thereof--between the
    Afghan Government and the Taliban?
        General McKenzie. The current United States drawdown is independent
    of a political settlement between the Afghan Government and the
    Taliban. Any follow-on force reductions will not occur until we are
    ordered to do so.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                        iraqi security self-sufficiency
        74. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, your posture statement says,
    ``Given ISIS' demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we
    cannot afford to divert focus from the D-ISIS mission, understanding
    that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not mean the absence of ISIS.
    The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may continue in the form
    of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability of
    the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external
    assistance.'' When do you see us achieving this goal of enabling the
    Iraqi security forces to contain and defeat ISIS on their own?
        General McKenzie. Until recently, we were on a solid glide path for
    the Iraqi Security Forces to independently contain and defeat ISIS by
    early-to-mid year 2021. However, significant changes in the operational
    environment in Iraq created a pause in training and partnering
    operations due to a focus shift to force protection, impacts of the
    COVID-19 pandemic, and disarray of the Iraqi Government have made it
    very difficult to identify when we can expect to achieve our Iraqi
    Security Forces goals at this time.

        75. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, is it realistic to expect the
    Iraqis to protect our national security interests when it comes to the
    ISIS threat?
        General McKenzie. Yes, I do think it is reasonable to expect the
    Iraqis to help meet our national security interests concerning the ISIS
    threat. They are our security partners to help defeat a common enemy,
    ISIS. However, the current challenges in the Iraqi Government including
    lack of a viable Prime Minister Candidate and Iranian influence in the
    Council of Representatives is currently hindering Iraqi support to our
    broader security interests.
                        afghan security self-sufficiency
        76. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, do you see the Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces being able to handle their own security in
    the near future, and if so, when?
        General McKenzie. Yes. Assuming the Government of the Islamic
    Republic of Afghanistan and Taliban are able to reach a political
    settlement, the main threat to the Afghanistan National Defense and
    Security Forces - the Taliban - will be neutralized, and the remaining
    security threats will primarily consist of Violent Extremist
    Organizations such as ISIS-K and criminal organizations.

        77. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, if not, what will happen if
    the United States pulls all its troops out in 14 months, or on some
    other time frame, according to the February 29th agreement with the
    Taliban?
        General McKenzie. I do not deal in hypotheticals. Our withdrawal of
    forces is ultimately a political decision that we will execute if and
    when ordered. As I have stated previously, any withdrawal of U.S.
    Forces will be conditions-based to protect our national interests.

        78. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, how will we ensure that
    Afghanistan never again is host to terrorist groups who can launch 9/
    11-style attacks on the United States, which is our mission in
    Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. First, by verifying that the Taliban fulfill
    their counter-terrorism commitments contained in the United States-
    Taliban Peace Deal. Second, by continuing to develop the Afghan
    National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) capabilities so that the
    ANDSF matures into a sustainable professional force that is capable of
    managing terrorist threats within Afghanistan's borders. Third, by
    pursuing a counter-terrorism partnership and normalized security
    cooperation relationship with Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
                               taliban agreement
        79. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, according to the agreement, if
    conditions are met, the U.S. is to withdraw all troops in the next 14
    months. You told the House Armed Services Committee that ``to date,
    Taliban attacks are higher than we believe are consistent with an idea
    to actually carry out this plan. Does the Taliban leadership have the
    ability to influence their entire organization in order to comply with
    the terms of the agreement?
        General McKenzie. Yes, I believe the Taliban leadership does have
    the influence to effectively command and control its fighters. This was
    evident during the seven-day Reduction in Violence (RiV) and previous
    local cease-fires, when the Taliban was able to enforce adherence to
    terms. The recent rise in violence is the result of a deliberate,
    publicly announced Taliban plan to resume violence against Afghan
    targets while refraining from attacks against Coalition forces. While
    not conducive to the eventual withdraw of troops, this resumption in
    violence should not be seen as the Taliban's inability to control its
    fighters, but as a matter of Taliban policy to pressure Kabul before
    and during Intra-Afghan Negotiations.
                               iran force posture
        80. Senator Jones. General McKenzie, your prepared statement says
    that we must posture the Joint Force to deter Iran from using its
    military to counter our diplomatic and economic sanctions, so long as
    those are in place. If those sanctions were to end, what posture would
    we need to have with regard to Iran, taking into account the elements
    of Iran's policy you listed, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
    regional ambitions, and threats to the United States and our partners?
        General McKenzie. U.S. posture in the region will depend upon the
    conditions that exist when the sanctions end. If the United States and
    Iran come to a broader diplomatic agreement that curbs Iran's nuclear
    weapon ambitions and malign actions across the Middle East, then our
    force posture may require Jess personnel, military capabilities, and
    basing. Should sanctions be removed with no fundamental change in
    Iranian behavior and/or calculus, or a change in United States
    strategic direction for the region, then we will be required to
    continue retaining sufficient posture in the region to deter Iranian
    aggression and assure our partners and allies.

       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR
                     FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2020

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  ARMY POSTURE

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM INHOFE, CHAIRMAN

        To receive testimony on the posture of the Department of
    the Army in review of the Defense Authorization Request for
    Fiscal Year 2021.
        The Committee is conducting this hearing to receive
    testimony on the posture of the U.S. Army and its fiscal year
    2021 budget request.
        We welcome the testimony of Ryan McCarthy, Secretary of the
    Army, and General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army,
    on these matters, and thank both for their distinguished
    service.
        Today, our Nation is facing an unprecedented health crisis.
    The entire Federal Government--including the Department of
    Defense and all of the Services--is working non-stop to halt
    the spread of the novel coronavirus and mitigate its effects.
        Of great concern to me today is how the Army is handling
    this emergency. First and foremost--how are our soldiers and
    their families being protected and taken care of?
        In addition, I want to better understand the operational
    effects, and what steps you are taking to minimize its impact
    to the national security missions of the Army.
        I commend you both, Secretary Esper, and the entire
    Department for taking every precaution to protect our
    servicemembers from COVID-19 so far--and I am confident that
    you will continue to prioritize the health and safety of our
    soldiers, as well as the success of our missions.
        While we are dealing with this enormous and urgent
    challenge, we've also got to keep an eye on our persistent
    national security objectives and challenges.
        The National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs our Nation's
    military to address the return of great power competition. This
    means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat
    potential near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.
        For the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must be manned,
    trained, and equipped appropriately.
        The Army continues to make significant progress in
    rebuilding readiness across the force, but there is still much
    work to be done. Maximizing readiness, both tactical and
    strategic, is crucial for our Nation to maintain peace through
    strength.
        Russia and China have modernized both conventional and
    nuclear forces with alarming speed, and now present a credible
    regional threat to America and our allies--as well as an
    increasing threat around the world. In some areas, they have
    surpassed us.
        It's past time for action. After 3 years of significant
    increases in defense budgets thanks to President Trump, this
    year's defense topline falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent
    growth recommended by the National Defense Strategy Commission
    report. In fact, it represents a $15 billion decrease in
    purchasing power. This isn't your fault, but you will have to
    deal with the repercussions.
        This will mean homing in on top priorities--like readiness
    and modernization. Several of these priorities are housed at
    Fort Sill in Oklahoma, including Air and Missile Defense and
    Long-Range Precision Fire. In addition, any successful
    modernization strategy must focus on results. We cannot allow
    the past acquisition failures to be repeated.
        The Army recently undertook a second iteration of the
    detailed and exhaustive look at every single program to ensure
    that each supports the National Defense Strategy--an important
    task started by now-Secretary of Defense Esper.
        You have made hard decisions to prioritize programs that
    effectively implement the NDS. This resulted in reallocating
    funding for modernization efforts that will help the Army
    regain a qualitative and quantitative advantage over our
    adversaries.
        Continuing to make smart and informed choices will require
    an open and transparent dialog with Congress along the way. We
    look forward to working with you to make our shared
    modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvents itself to
    become a 21st century fighting force prepared for the more
    lethal and dynamic battlefields that define today's reality.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, RANKING MEMBER

        Our Nation is in the grips of an extraordinary and
    unprecedented crisis due to the novel coronavirus pandemic and
    the spread of COVID-19. Right now our most immediate concern is
    ensuring the public's safety by practicing social distancing
    and promoting vigorous personal hygiene, while taking care of
    those that have tested positive for the disease. At the same
    time, Congress must continue to do our job, and I thank the
    Chairman for ensuring this Committee performs its oversight
    function while we safeguard the health of the witnesses, our
    staff, the general public, and the Members of this Committee.
        In addition, I want to express the condolences of this
    Committee on the death of a defense contractor from COVID-19,
    as well as everyone who has lost a loved one during this
    pandemic. We are also keeping the servicemembers, dependents,
    civilians, and contractors who have been diagnosed with COVID-
    19, as well as all Americans suffering from this disease, in
    our thoughts and prayers. As a Nation, we must do everything we
    can to stop the spread of COVID-19 and protect families,
    workers, and businesses.
        Before turning to the Army's Fiscal Year 2021 budget
    request, I want to commend the Army for their efforts to assist
    in the response to the novel coronavirus pandemic. The U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers is assisting the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) with the planning and construction of
    alternative medical facilities in New York. The Corps is also
    supporting planning missions for the New England region,
    Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Baltimore. In addition, the National
    Guard soldiers who have been called up for duty by the
    Governors have been instrumental in our response. They have
    provided logistics and transportation, support for medical-
    testing facilities and State emergency operations centers, and
    special help with disinfecting and cleaning missions.
    Furthermore, the Department of Defense announced that 16 of the
    military's laboratories, many of which are Army medical
    facilities, will begin coronavirus testing for civilians.
    Finally, the Army has issued orders to hospital centers at Fort
    Carson, Fort Campbell, and Fort Hood to deploy units to Seattle
    and New York in order to provide medical support to civil
    authorities. On behalf the Committee, we thank you.
        While the Department of Defense, and the Army in
    particular, has been a strategic resource during the novel
    coronavirus outbreak, there are policy decisions that need to
    be immediately revisited. First, this pandemic will not be
    stopped by a wall on our Southern border. Right now our
    hospitals are contending with a shortage of ICU [intensive care
    unit] beds and will soon be at patient capacity in some areas.
    Our healthcare workers are in dire need of personal protective
    equipment for their own safety, and hospitals lack respirators
    and ventilators to treat patients. And yet, earlier this week
    the Army awarded a $524 million contract to replace additional
    sections of the border wall.
        To continue to funnel billions of dollars and military
    manpower to this project instead of providing resources to
    health care providers, first responders, and State and local
    governments as thousands of Americans fall ill and need urgent
    and immediate life-saving acute care is unconscionable.
    President Trump must immediately reorient all resources that
    have been diverted to the wall and make them available for
    Covid-19 support efforts.
        In addition, the Army has a long history of scientific
    excellence concerning biological agents, and much of that work
    occurs at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
    Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick. However, in
    recent years the Department of Defense has not prioritized this
    incredibly critical mission, and in fact has cut funding for
    the program in the Fiscal Year 2021 budget. We need to
    understand immediately what the Army plans do to ensure
    USAMRIID remains a world class institute, with a particular
    focus on how the Army plans to bring the new High Containment
    Laboratory, which is one of the world's most advanced
    facilities for dangerous pathogen research, on line in the
    quickest and safest manner possible.
        The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021
    includes $178 billion in funding for the Army. Of that amount,
    $150.3 billion is for base budget requirements, $2.8 billion
    for base budget requirements included in the Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) account, and $24.9 billion for
    traditional OCO activities. The Army is reorienting budget
    resources to align with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
    the national security challenges facing our country. For the
    second consecutive year, senior Army leadership scrutinized
    existing programs to determine which ones supported the Army's
    modernization priorities, and which programs should be reduced
    or canceled so that savings could be reinvested for other
    priorities. While this Committee may not agree with every
    budget decision made by the Army, and we will be closely
    scrutinizing their budget request, the Army did make tough
    decisions to prioritize funding for the future fight.
        However, implementing the NDS requires more than a
    reallocation of budget resources to engage in strategic
    competition against China and Russia. It will also require that
    the Army train for full spectrum operations and develop new
    warfighting concepts, as well as ensuring our soldiers have the
    equipment necessary for a high end fight.
        To support this effort, Army Futures Command, and the eight
    cross functional teams tasked with overseeing the Army's major
    modernization priorities, have transformed the processes by
    which warfighting capability is delivered to our soldiers. The
    Army has ramped up efforts to mature technology and build
    experimental prototypes, as well as conduct soldier touch
    points to provide feedback on the effectiveness of these new
    systems in the field. The Army is pursuing this overhaul of its
    acquisition process to ensure we keep pace with our near peer
    competitors by delivering cutting edge capabilities to the
    warfighter on an expeditated timeline.
        The fiscal year 2021 budget request funds 19 combat
    training center (CTC) rotations for brigade combat teams. These
    rotations are critical to ensuring our soldiers are properly
    trained and ready to fight. However, we will likely see
    significant negative impacts to readiness levels as training
    exercises are postponed due to the COVID-19 crisis. The Army
    has already made the decision to cancel three CTC rotations as
    a result of COVID-19, and they are currently evaluating future
    schedules. The safety of our troops must remain our highest
    priority, and the Committee will be closely monitoring this
    situation in the weeks and months ahead.
        Finally, the President's Budget requests an across-the-
    board pay raise of 3 percent for all military personnel.
    However, the President has decided that civilians should only
    receive a 1 percent pay raise, and the budget freezes
    significant locality adjustments for civilians that would
    otherwise be due them under existing statute. At a time when we
    need civilians the most, this budget request sends the message
    that their work and contributions to our national defense are
    not valued, and it hinders the Army's ability to recruit the
    very best civilian workforce we need. If this pandemic has
    taught us anything it is the need for a strong and competent
    Federal workforce--which the President's budget does not
    support.
        Again, I want to thank the Chairman and our witnesses for
    their willingness to participate in this unusual hearing method
    during these unprecedented time. I look forward to working
    closely with the Army as we move forward. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        [The joint prepared statement by Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy
    and General James McConville to follow:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        [Paper Hearing Questions for the record with answers
    supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
           budget and supporting the national defense strategy (nds)
        1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, because the NDS Commission
    advocates 3 to 5 percent real growth per year to implement the NDS
    while the Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request represents a $15 billion
    reduction in purchasing power, where were you forced to assume risk?
        Secretary McCarthy. If there was the 3 to 5 percent real budget
    growth as recommended in the NDS in the fiscal year 2021 topline, the
    Army would have been able to increase its investments in the critical
    legacy systems required to fight and win in the future against Russia
    or China. As there was a reduction in real buying power in fiscal year
    2021, the Army chose to fully fund our next generation modernization
    priorities at the cost of investing as we would have liked in those
    critical legacy platforms. For example, the Army reduced Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle procurement by $1.3 billion over the FYDP which
    results in HMMWV's being in formations longer than if we had 3 to 5
    percent real budget growth. We also reduced investment in the Army
    Tactical Missile System Service Life Extension program by 8$600 million
    to shift resources to the Precision Strike Missile, which will replace
    the ATACMS round with enhanced performance. Additionally, the Army
    delayed procurement of the Enhanced Heavy Equipment Transporter (EHET)
    which means we'll be dependent on less capable heavy equipment movers
    for a longer period of time. In order to prioritize modernization
    investments, the Army assumed risk in endstrength by slowing the rate
    of growth toward our objective force endstrength levels. The Army must
    grow to both meet current combatant commander demand and resource the
    new structure required to fight and win in the future.
                               readiness concerns
        2. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, in the effort to meet NDS
    requirements, the Army successfully achieved in 2019 one of its stated
    2023 readiness objectives by having 66 percent of regular Army BCTs
    brigade combat teams] ready to ``fight tonight,'' allowing the Army to
    transition its focus from BCT readiness to ``strategic readiness.'' How
    does this budget invest in strategic readiness while also maintaining
    66 percent of regular Army BCTs and their supporting elements at the
    right readiness levels?
        General McConville. In fiscal year 2021, Army will maintain its
    current tactical readiness levels and seek to improve its strategic
    readiness. The Army training focus at the tactical level is on building
    highly trained and cohesive teams that are disciplined and fit. We are
    increasing our focus on individual and small unit readiness. Home
    Station Training and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation levels of
    effort are consistent with recent years that enabled Army to achieve
    and maintain readiness goals. The Army fiscal year 2021 budget request
    supports 24 CTC rotations and home station training IAW Army training
    strategy. The Army is seeking to improve its global posture at the
    strategic level by positioning formations and equipment (APS) in key
    strategic locations to deter adversaries and assure partners; investing
    in its Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improving mobilization through
    MFGI investments and exercises; building proficiency through repetition
    in deploying/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)
    and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs), sustaining its
    generating and operating forces; aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS
    priorities; and, investing in the industrial base.
                   modernization efforts (fort sill focused)
        3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, because the U.S. Army's
    surface-to-surface fires are currently outranged and outgunned by many
    similar Russian and Chinese systems, the Long Range Precision Fires
    (LRPF) Cross Functional Team is working on programs to address these
    shortcomings. How will the Extended Range Cannon Artillery and the
    Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) programs help the joint force implement
    the NDS and regain a comparative advantage over Russian and Chinese
    competitors?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA)
    system includes improving the self-propelled howitzer, projectiles,
    supercharge propellant, and course correcting fuzes for accurate fires
    at 70KM, almost twice the range of our current howitzers. These
    improvements will provide the division commander with a deep fires
    capability to shape the close fight in large scale combat operations,
    enabling combined arms overmatch. Fiscal year 2021 is an essential year
    to order long lead time parts to support final prototype development
    and building for delivery to the first battalion in fiscal year 2023.
    ERCA Prototype 0 is assembled and executed a successful live fire
    demonstration on March 6th, achieving 65KM in range with target hits.
    We continue efforts to achieve the 70KM range.
        The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is the Long Range Precision
    Fires Army modernization priority program to replace the Army Tactical
    Missile System (ATACMS). PrSM will be fired from existing launcher
    platforms with greater range, lethality, survivability, and at a lower
    cost than ATACMS. PrSM will allow the operational force to neutralize
    enemy integrated air defense systems and long range artillery to enable
    cross domain maneuver. The accelerated program delivers a base missile
    with a range greater than 500KM in fiscal year 2023 (compared to the
    ATAMCS range of 160 KM), followed by technology spirals for emitting
    multi-domain targets, enhanced lethality, and extended range. PrSM has
    executed two successful flight tests since December, achieving target
    hits at 240KM and 180KM; the next flight test is planned for 30 April.
        4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McCarthy, the Army currently lacks a
    reliable cruise missile defense capability which leaves the joint force
    vulnerable in some theaters. What is the Army's plan to defend against
    more advanced threats, such as hypersonic and supersonic cruise
    missiles, in the future?
        Secretary McCarthy. The best defense against hypersonic and
    supersonic cruise missiles is to have robust offensive and defensive
    capabilities. From an offensive perspective, we are placing significant
    emphasis and investment into our own hypersonic capability. The current
    schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in
    fiscal year 2023 remains in place. From a defensive perspective, we
    must also attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency
    is exploring defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating
    Patriot against the supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic
    threats are also an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
    objective requirement, while subsonic remains a threshold requirement.
        5. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, the Army is procuring two
    Iron Dome batteries in fiscal year 2020 as an interim solution for
    cruise missile defense. What efforts are underway to integrate the
    batteries into the Air & Missile Defense network and what is the plan
    for the associated force structure?
        General McConville. The Iron Dome is a combat proven system and the
    Army will field two interim, stand alone, batteries. Moving forward,
    the Army will hold a competition for an enduring solution, which is
    compatible with Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
    System (IBCS), and allows all of industry to participate in a shoot off
    and best value competition. The Army is also going to a layered defense
    for air and missile defense. We see in the future the ability to tie
    every sensor to every shooter--multiple radars tied into the IBCS,
    which will be able to apply the appropriate shooter as a response based
    on the threat. That response could be a missile, a kinetic projectile,
    or high powered microwaves and directed energy systems. Based on the
    specific solution, the Army will design and develop the appropriate
    force structure
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                                 modernization
        6. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy, what steps are you taking to
    produce tangible results that will accelerate or enable greater
    defensive and offensive capabilities for directed energy weapons in the
    next 3 to 5 years?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed
    Energy (DE) weapons, including high energy lasers and high power
    microwaves for maneuver unit and semi-fixed/fixed support. DE provides
    defensive capability against rocket, artillery, mortar, UAS, and
    rotary/fixed wing threats. The Army is prototyping a 50kW-class laser
    for a platoon of Stryker vehicles to be delivered no later than fiscal
    year 2022 for Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and
    transition into a program of record. We are prototyping a 300kW-class
    laser in the new Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser
    (IFPC-HEL) for fixed and semi-fixed locations. Directed Energy S&T
    efforts are funded through fiscal year 2022 to inform IFPC-HEL
    prototyping fielding in fiscal year 2024. The Army is also teaming with
    USAF for High Power Microwave (HPM) as electronic warfare paired with
    HEL for semi-fixed /fixed base support with prototyping by fiscal year
    2024.
        7. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy, a recent study by the Center
    for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled, ``Assessing the
    Affordability of the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Portfolio''
    stated that affordability of the two FVL programs was feasible but
    would require strict program management and oversite. What is the Army
    doing to ensure continued affordability of the two programs?
        Secretary McCarthy. AFC, in consultation with ASA(ALT), are
    committed to requirements stability and preventing requirements creep.
    This team approach will identify appropriate trade space to ensure
    requirements are both achievable and affordable. The Army is conducting
    ``fly before we buy'' prototyping efforts such as the successful Joint
    Multi Role Technology Demonstrator, Future Attack Reconnaissance
    Aircraft Competitive Prototype, the Future Tactical UAS demonstration,
    and Air Launched Effects early experimentation and prototyping. All
    four of these efforts will fly an air vehicle before we go final on
    requirements to ensure we have effective weapon systems. These efforts
    reduce risk, promote competition, and produce well informed, realistic,
    achievable, and affordable requirements. We have also reduced
    requirements creep by developing and implementing an Army Futures
    Command (AFC), Commanding General (CG) approved requirements
    prioritization methodology and scoring forum. This best practice has
    allowed the AFC CG to see how all in-development and in-progress
    requirements align to critical Army Senior Leader criteria and
    guidance. The results of this scoring shape the Army Capabilities
    Integration and Development System/Army Requirements Oversight Council
    (AROC) calendar for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Staff
    of the Army, and AFC CG AROC decisions.
                                     cyber
        8. Senator Wicker. General McConville, does the consolidation of
    capabilities under Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) mean that cyberspace
    operations will be prioritized over other information capabilities, and
    if all of the information-related activities are already being utilized
    by commanders in the field, why consolidate the capabilities in one
    command?
        General McConville. No. The Army will deliver trained and ready
    forces with capabilities and capacity balanced to mission need. The
    consolidation of mission and capability is going to drive a Total Force
    for MDO including Information Warfare, of which Cyberspace Operations,
    Electronic Warfare, along with other capabilities, are subsets.
    Cyberspace operations and the employment of Cyber Operating Forces will
    remain a core mission for the command.
                              information warfare
        9. Senator Wicker. General McConville, do you feel that overtly
    announcing a move toward information warfare, which you have stated is
    key in the competition phase prior to conflict, overly militarizes the
    information element of national power, and does this send a negative
    signal to adversaries, which will then cause escalation of information
    warfare against, most-likely, non-military targets in the United
    States?
        General McConville. I do not. Russia and China are already
    contesting international norms and U.S. interests in Cyberspace and the
    Information Environment. Deliberately leveraging information and
    aspects of information inherent to military operations in concert with
    information efforts of other Federal Government departments and
    agencies adds to the effectiveness of the overall governmental effort.
    Our adversaries leverage information capabilities against U.S. military
    and non-military targets to seek advantage over the U.S. or limit our
    ability to counter their operations. Stating our intent to develop this
    capability establishes a check on adversaries' bold use of information
    against military and non-military targets.
                               strategic sealift
        10. Senator Wicker. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    U.S. Government's current approach to strategic sealift has yielded an
    aging and inactive government fleet that depends on a shrinking pool of
    merchant mariners and ships that have trouble getting underway. I'm
    concerned that a resilient maritime logistics strategy doesn't exist.
    Given that 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps equipment will travel by
    sea to a major conflict, is there sufficient sealift available now, and
    for the foreseeable future, to support combatant commander operational
    plans (OPLANS) per the National Defense Strategy?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The present assessment
    is that the current strategic sealift fleet is sufficient to meet the
    current demand, but by 2024, it will be inadequate without
    recapitalization efforts. USTRANSCOM and the Navy are using a three-
    pronged strategy to recapitalize: (1) service life extensions when cost
    effective; (2) acquiring used vessels with congressional approval; and
    (3) building new vessels.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                                partner training
        11. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, do
    you believe that the current mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker
    brigade combat teams is appropriately balanced between the Active Army
    and Army National Guard, and are there missions or platforms you
    believe should be shifted between the Active, Reserve, and Army
    National Guard to make the total force more aligned with the National
    Defense Strategy?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The current mixture of
    brigade combat teams between the Regular Army and Army National Guard
    is appropriately balanced to support the National Defense Strategy.
    When balancing brigade combat teams across components, the Army
    considers responsiveness to meet Combatant Commander requirements along
    with Title 10 and Title 32 Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
        12. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army recently announced the deployment of the 1st Security Force
    Assistance Brigade to Africa, the first such deployment to the
    continent. National Guard units are similarly conducting partner
    training in Africa, including units from the Nebraska National Guard
    partnered with Rwanda through the State Partnership Program. How is the
    Army working to enhance its partner training capacity to provide a
    better alternative to similar efforts by Russia and China?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In Africa, the U.S. Army
    actively seeks to build partner networks through military and medical
    exercises, security cooperation, engagements including the African Land
    Forces Summit, and the State Partnership Program. The National Guard's
    State Partnership Program includes 14 other African nations partnered
    with U.S. States in addition to the Nebraska National Guard's
    partnership with Rwanda. The Army supports six U.S. DOD-directed
    operations in Africa and is deploying the 1st Security Force Assistance
    Brigade (SFAB) to assume the train, advise, and assist mission with our
    partners. The Army is also reviewing an increase in ally and partner
    Invitational-Professional Military Education (I-PME) participation by
    10 percent for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022, and up to 50
    percent over fiscal year 2022to fiscal year 2025, and continues to
    utilize the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) to
    strengthen relationships and build capacity globally as a means to
    compete with Russia and China.
                                 modernization
        13. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    what are your biggest modernization priorities, and what lessons have
    you learned from past Army acquisition efforts and from the other
    services that you are incorporating into your own modernization
    efforts?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is 2 years into
    a major transformation to ensure we are prepared for future conflict--
    we are finishing what we started. The Army's modernization efforts are
    a continuation of its fiscal year 2019/fiscal year 2020 efforts. Fiscal
    year 2021 marks a pivotal year for Army modernization as we have
    matured our processes and established momentum across all 6
    modernization priorities: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation
    Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Network, Air and Missile
    Defense, and Soldier Lethality. Army modernization is a holistic
    approach--changing doctrine for how we fight and equipping our
    formations with the best equipment possible--but also organizing and
    training the force differently, leading and managing people
    differently, and ensuring Army facilities and infrastructure support
    these changes. The establishment of Army Futures Command is enabling
    the Army to set priorities, efficiently resource, synchronize the
    execution of modernization efforts, and assess progress set forth by
    the framework within the published Army Modernization Strategy.
        The Army learned many lessons from past acquisition efforts. Three
    major lessons are: (1) the Army must understand and orient on the
    future threat; (2) the Army must understand what is technologically
    feasible for design and materiel solutions before developing a
    timeline; and (3) the Army must clearly prioritize desired capabilities
    and avoid requirements creep throughout the acquisition process.
    Additionally, we learned that joint programs are usually most
    successful when the requirements from the different services are common
    (i.e., JLTV)
        14. Senator Fischer. Secretary McCarthy, you were recently quoted
    saying that, ``as long as we can continue to work under these
    conditions, we can continue to proceed'' with the Army's modernization
    priorities. How much of an impact do you believe COVID-19 will have on
    the readiness and modernization of the Army?
        Secretary McCarthy. It is too early to determine the full extent of
    the impact COVID-19 will have on readiness and modernization, though we
    expect COVID-19 will impact several, if not many, programs. We are
    working with our industrial base partners to determine their ability to
    perform within the current COVID-19 environment, and we are assessing
    effects on the Army's ability to test, field, and train on systems.
    Whenever possible, we are seeking solutions to mitigate effects to
    preserve the readiness of the force. The health and safety of the
    workforce and soldiers is the Army's paramount concern.
        15. Senator Fischer. General McConville, you were recently quoted
    saying that some high-priority tests will continue while ``other ones
    will slow down.'' How are the decisions being made on which programs
    will proceed apace and which ones will be postponed amidst the
    pandemic?
        General McConville. The Army is closely monitoring the pandemic to
    ensure the health and well-being of our soldiers, civilians, families,
    and their communities. Army Futures Command is coordinating with
    ASA(ALT) and Army Test and Evaluation Command to determine which tests
    are most critical to meet current readiness requirements and critical
    developmental milestones. We are also working closely with FORSCOM to
    ensure necessary Soldier involvement in these events. Our current
    assessment, which will change as conditions change, is that 9 events
    will be canceled, 65 postponed, and 42 will continue as scheduled. In
    all cases, the decision to continue or delay an event is made by
    commanders and senior leaders at the 4-star or Assistant Secretary-
    level after considering the risk as part of a cost-benefit analysis.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                              coronavirus phase iv
        16. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy, does coronavirus make your
    Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) look any different, and where can we
    target more procurement dollars to best support both the National
    Defense Strategy and sustainment/recovery of the defense industrial
    base?
        Secretary McCarthy. It is too early to tell the long term impacts
    of COVID-19 and any adjustments that would need to be made to our UFR
    list. The Commands and the Army Staff are conducting a review and are
    updating the requirements as necessary.
                       coronavirus and defender-europe 20
        17. Senator Cotton. General McConville, coronavirus diminished
    DEFENDER-Europe 20--how can you backfill the training and deterrence
    value of that exercise, and what do you need from us to do it?
        General McConville. The purpose of DEFENDER-Europe 20 was to build
    strategic readiness by deploying a combat credible force to Europe in
    support of NATO and the U.S. National Defense Strategy. The exercise
    was modified in response to COVID-19, but the Army was still able to
    exercise its ability to coordinate large-scale movements with Allies
    and partners. Since January, the Army deployed approximately 6,000
    soldiers from the United States to Europe including a division
    headquarters and an armored brigade combat team. It has moved
    approximately 9,000 vehicles and pieces of equipment from Army
    Prepositioned Stocks and approximately 3,000 pieces of equipment via
    sea from the United States. In coordination with Allies and partners,
    it also completed movement of soldiers and equipment from multiple
    ports to training areas in Germany and Poland. The Army plans to
    continue its planned DEFENDER series exercises in Europe and the
    Pacific during fiscal year 2021 and beyond.
                     counter unmanned aerial systems (cuas)
        18. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of Defense
    has spent millions in research, development, test & engineering (RDT&E)
    in search of solutions that already exist in the private sector. Have
    you explored commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities like kinetic
    intercept for CUAS, and will you commit to using a commercial solution
    if an effective one exists for CUAS?
        Secretary McCarthy. Yes, we have and will continue to explore both
    commercial off the shelf and the development of systems based on new or
    emerging technologies. Filling a capability gap is a process. We first
    look at if there are Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that can close
    the gap, and if none are adequate to fill the gap, we look to
    commercial off-the-shelf materiel solutions. If no commercial solution
    can address the gaps, we look to materiel solutions from other
    government or non-developmental items that can be modified to meet our
    needs. Our last resort is initiating a full development program. In
    that vein, we have fielded commercially viable capabilities. The Drone
    Defender; Mobile Low, Slow Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defense System
    (MLIDS); and Coyote systems are all examples of urgently fielded
    commercial CUAS systems.
                   optionally manned fighting vehicle (omfv)
        19. Senator Cotton. General McConville, I understand the Army made
    a difficult decision to pause OMFV, and that you don't want adherence
    to a fielding date to drive poor decisions in development, as well as
    the need for industry to have inputs into what timeline is possible,
    but when do your troops need this very necessary capability?
        General McConville. The bottom line is that our troops need this as
    quickly as we can deliver the transformational capabilities they
    deserve. The Army remains committed to OMFV as Next Generation Combat
    Vehicles are our second highest modernization priority. We will field
    the Bradley replacement to support a Multi-Domain Operationally Ready
    force. Fortunately, we learned early in the process of developing the
    OMFV that industry could not deliver the requirements needed in the
    time we wanted. AFC published broad vehicle characteristics at
    industry's request, to allow for industry innovation and trade-space.
    These characteristics will be refined through a series of industry
    engagements, digital design competitions, and soldier touch points to
    inform and sharpen the OMFV prototypes for testing, before we establish
    the final vehicle requirements. This approach will enable us to explore
    the solution space in an environment of rapid and inexpensive learning,
    leading to requirements verification through physical prototypes,
    Soldier input, and testing.
                           long-range precision fires
        20. Senator Cotton. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, your
    opening statement highlights funding requests and capabilities for
    long-range precision fires. What is your vision for their integration
    into units inside and outside of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), as
    well as where you expect them to be postured in peacetime to support
    strategic deterrence?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We see these long range
    precision fires layered from the tactical to strategic level, and
    postured both CONUS and OCONUS to provide adequate response and
    deterrence value. Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) will provide
    the division commander with a deep fires capability to shape the close
    fight, while the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) allows the operational
    force to neutralize enemy integrated air defense systems and long range
    artillery to enable cross domain maneuver, and the Long Range
    Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) allows us to penetrate across the world in
    minutes instead of hours. These capabilities will be in traditional
    Army formations as well as Multi-Domain Task Forces that will have long
    range precision effects that can operate below the level of armed
    conflict, and long range precision fires for use during armed conflict.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                          covid-19 and u.s. leadership
        21. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your opening statement, you said that the ``Army must continue to
    compete for and retain allies and partners, as our adversaries will
    attempt to do the same.'' The COVID-19 response requires almost
    unthinkable resources and a supreme commitment to the American people.
    However, the Army still must execute its many missions, even while
    supporting our citizens at home and expending great effort to protect
    our soldiers wherever they serve.
        I was concerned to see a Reuters story this week that stated the
    Russian military will send medical support to Italy and am curious to
    know what efforts the U.S. Army has taken--or is planning to take--to
    help our allies, even while the overwhelming majority of this
    government provides for the American people at home.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We continue to provide
    an assessment to the SECDEF of available assets and capabilities that
    may be available to support our domestic or overseas responses. The
    commanders of USFK, USAREUR and USARAF have all demonstrated tremendous
    partnership in sharing information and force protections techniques
    with their host nations to control the spread of the virus within their
    areas of operations. We are in contact with our allied counterparts to
    discuss a coordinated response.
                              strategic readiness
        22. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I
    had a very enjoyable and illuminating meeting with Lieutenant General
    Christopher Cavoli, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe, on March
    4. The DEFENDER-Europe 20 exercise, has been greatly curtailed, but one
    of its primary objectives is to demonstrate and learn lessons about the
    Army's strategic readiness to deploy capabilities, despite the presence
    of contested domains, and provide these capabilities to the right place
    at the right time. Can you discuss your assessment of the Army's
    current strategic readiness posture--and describe to the American
    people what is needed, and why it is needed, as the United States
    engages in a great power competition that characterizes the current and
    future operating environments?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Army strategic readiness
    incorporates assessments across manning, equipping, sustaining,
    training, installations, and capacity and capability to meet the
    requirements of the NDS. Army strategic readiness begins with a
    responsive force posture, the ability to mobilize and project power
    into contested environments, and the ability to sustain forces in
    large-scale combat operations. The Army's ability to continually
    generate and project ready formations (at scale) for the combatant
    commander is critical to the defense of our Nation and our interests
    worldwide. Recent events in the Middle East demonstrated how necessary
    strategic readiness is to allow the Army to be globally responsive with
    ready units. As the United States engages in great power competition,
    the Army must assure current and future readiness by: (1) balancing
    current global demand; (2) preparing forces for potential conflict;
    and, (3) modernizing the force to respond to future adversaries.
              secretary of the army's civil works responsibilities
        23. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy, I want to thank you for the
    good job the Corps of Engineers has done managing the Missouri River,
    over the last year, under some very difficult conditions. I commend the
    outgoing Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, for his
    energetic leadership across the Corps' many mission sets--including the
    current COVID-19 response, and Major General Scott Spellmon, for
    leading the Civil Works mission. Nevertheless, I would like your
    commitment to continue robust oversight of the Corps of Engineers--and
    to assuring that major progress on the snowpack monitoring system
    deployment is made this year. We are a nation facing many challenges
    right now, but a large portion of the safety, security, and economic
    well-being of the Missouri River basin states depends on you executing
    your Civil Works responsibilities in an exemplary manner. In addition
    to your commitment, I would appreciate it if you could describe the
    importance of this mission to your overall responsibilities as
    Secretary of the Army.
        Secretary McCarthy. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is committed
    to executing the snowpack monitoring efforts in the Upper Missouri
    River Basin. The Corps is working closely with several State partners,
    including Montana, Wyoming, and South Dakota, on initial equipment
    purchases. The Corps is also working closely with a larger five-State
    region, including Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
    Nebraska, to identify existing sites in the Mesonet environmental
    monitoring network for initial retrofits. Enhancing the Corps' and
    State partners' understanding of the extent and magnitude of the
    snowpack is important to safety, livelihood, and economic well-being of
    this region, and is a critical mission for the Corps and the Army Civil
    Works program.
                       title 32 and the covid-19 response
        24. Senator Rounds. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, it
    is vital during this time of the COVID-19 crisis that there be a great
    deal of uniformity in how our National Guard is activated across the
    Nation. There have been calls by numerous Governors advocating that
    these activations be made in a 502f status, so the activation is funded
    with Federal dollars, with the Governors retaining command and control.
    Our States do not possess the resources to address this unimaginable
    crisis without that kind of support from the Federal Government. Can
    you describe your perspective on this matter and how you will approach
    advising the President of the United States?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army National Guard
    (ARNG) has tremendous capabilities to support their states and
    Governors during crises. 32 USC 502(f) allows Governors to employ the
    ARNG with Federal funding. This is important as many states do not have
    the resources to fully mobilize their National Guard forces.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                   army integrated visual augmentation system
        25. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army is planning to invest $906 million in the development and fielding
    of the Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) giving our soldiers
    tactical advantage over our adversaries on the battlefield and
    establishing deterrence through superior technology. What is your
    assessment of the progress of the program, and is it meeting your
    requirements?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The IVAS program is
    progressing exceptionally well. The partnership between the Army and
    Microsoft, and the speed with which engineers make refinement based on
    soldier feedback, has allowed us to take the IVAS program from Middle
    Tier Acquisition/Rapid Prototyping in November 2018 to delivering four
    capability sets within the next 27 months.
        26. Senator Ernst. General McConville, when will our soldiers start
    to receive and begin large-scale operational testing of IVAS?
        General McConville. The Army has scheduled Touch Points to provide
    an opportunity for soldiers to use the equipment in real world training
    and provide feedback to the engineers and developers. The IVAS Soldier
    Touch Point 3 is scheduled for fiscal year 2020 and Soldier Touch Point
    4 is scheduled for the spring fiscal year 2021. We will begin fielding
    IVAS to units in fiscal year 2021 to enable large-scale operational
    testing. Temporary closure of engineering and production facilities for
    the prototype systems, due to local responses to COVID-19, may cause
    delays. The initial fielding dates may shift from fiscal year 2021 to
    fiscal year 2022. We cannot assess the full impact until we know when
    the facilities will reopen.
                                 modernization
        27. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, China
    and Russia are reaching parity with us in areas like field artillery
    and air defense artillery. I commend Futures Command for looking at
    ways to modernize, but want to emphasize the need to ensure our current
    systems are maintained and ready to support the warfighter. For
    example, some components of our field artillery systems--such as the
    breech on a howitzer--are legacy systems. How are you ensuring the
    required hardware and software updates, availability of parts, and ease
    of maintenance as you move forward with the artillery modernization
    process?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We will continue
    investments in upgrading and sustaining key systems in the near term--
    such as our in howitzer fleet--to fill gaps until the technology is
    ready for our next generation systems. We made a conscious decision as
    part of the Paladin Integrated Management program to first replace the
    chassis to allow the system to keep pace with the Bradley and Abrams
    tank, without changing the turret, gun or breach. We are pursuing two
    lines of effort to further modernize the howitzer. The first is
    extending the range thru upgrading propellant, such as the Modular
    Artillery Charge System (MACS) Charge 5, which we have found adversely
    affects the reliability of the Paladin breech. We have initiated
    upgrades to the currently fielded Paladin breeches that are in the A6
    fleet and testing shows that the capability addresses the issues caused
    by the MACS Charge 5, with excellent results. In concert with these
    fixes, we are stocking up on breech parts at the unit level to minimize
    down-time for readily replaceable components. The second line of effort
    involves upgrades to the turret gun and breech via the Extended Range
    Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program. The combination of ERCA and upgrades
    to the breech will go far in establishing higher reliability as well as
    increasing standoff for our artillery systems.
        28. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, new
    systems like the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program have
    switched from a traditional hydraulic system to electric/high voltage.
    This requires highly trained contractors to make repairs on high level
    maintenance, not the typical soldier. How will you ensure the timely
    deployability and maintenance of modern systems writ-large when our
    warfighters are down range?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army fields most
    major systems with validated maintenance manuals and appropriate levels
    of maintenance (usually field level and depot level). Soldiers
    performing field level maintenance receive necessary training for the
    maintenance tasks they can perform at the unit level, frequently with
    assistance from Field Service Representatives. In cases where a
    capability is urgently fielded and organic maintenance expertise is not
    yet in place, the Army often employs Contractor Logistic Support.
        While the M109A7 has moved from a hydraulically operated turret to
    an electronically operated one, the performance of our soldier
    operators and maintainers has not diminished. Our soldiers who operate
    the howitzer continue to excel and exceed standards for their
    performance with the system. Maintainers have not missed a beat in
    maintaining the system, on the rare occasions when maintenance is
    required. Universally, comments from the 3 ABCTs fielded to date have
    shown nothing but praise for the electronic components of the howitzer.
                               hypersonic testing
        29. Senator Ernst. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, on
    March 19, DOD announced that the Army and Navy conducted a joint test
    of the Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) at the Pacific Missile
    Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii. The successful test marks a
    significant progress in the development of hypersonic technology and a
    step forward in the Army achieving long range precision fires. Can you
    provide an update on the Army's development on hypersonics,
    specifically on development timelines and key testing milestones?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is on track to
    deliver a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023
    as part of the Joint Service Conventional Prompt Strike program. The
    fiscal year 2021 budget request fully funds the Long Range Hypersonic
    Weapon effort and the long-lead items necessary for the prototype and
    all associated flight tests, as well as initial unit fielding and
    training.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                      force modernization and end strength
        30. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Marine Corps has seemingly continued business as usual during this time
    (COVID-19 Containment Phase). The Marine Corps Commandant announced his
    plans to move forward with force modernization by cutting infantry
    battalions, downsizing artillery batteries, and divesting of tanks,
    which inevitably shifts to the Army. Is the Army prepared or positioned
    to pick up those ground force capability gaps in its modernized force
    layout and how will this impact recruitment goals or demands for
    soldiers to fill ground combat arms military occupational specialties
    (MOSs) in the Army and the Army's end strength needs?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army designs its
    force size, structure, and capabilities to meet the requirements asked
    of us by the NDS, the CJCS, and Combatant Commanders. The Army will
    need to conduct a detailed assessment of the Marine Corps plan to
    determine capability and capacity mix across the services. The outcome
    of that assessment and associated decisions would inform possible
    changes to our recruitment goals and end-strength requirements.
                    strategic power projection and readiness
        31. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, at
    Fort Bragg, a recent Army audit found its airfields as being the
    poorest infrastructure in the Army. These infrastructures serve as
    primary training air fields for USASOC [United States Army Special
    Operations Command], JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command], and
    others, including the Immediate Response Force. Is the Army adequately
    funding power projection and installation readiness, which also extends
    to rail, stationing requirements, and facility issues that undermine
    training and readiness?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Our fiscal year 2021
    budget submission addresses several strategic readiness requirements.
    The budget helps the Army increase Army power projection capabilities
    to support combatant commander and Dynamic Force Employment
    requirements. The Army has also designated 14x installations as
    Secondary Contingent Deployment Locations and 4x Mobilization Force
    Generation Installations being utilized; and we are working with the
    National Guard Bureau to improve states' pre-mobilization and unit
    movement support capabilities.
        Specifically, at Fort Bragg, since 2011 the Army has invested over
    $115 million to repair runways, aprons and airfield lighting systems at
    Pope Army Airfield (PAAF). In fiscal year 2020 we have an approved
    project of $25 million for airfield lighting repair and in the fiscal
    year 2021 budget, we plan to spend $65 million to repair the PAAF
    runway and Taxiways. Army Materiel Command is currently reviewing the
    full scope of additional requirements in support of this critical Power
    Projection platform as part of our comprehensive Facilities Investment
    Strategy.
                         personnel and family readiness
        32. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, last
    month, in previous posture hearings, I announced my plans to show up
    unannounced at military installations for a progress report on PPV
    [public-private venture] housing repairs and outstanding issues. Have
    you personally visited PPV housing units on any Army installation this
    year and can I get your help in ensuring Army families have quality/
    safe housing and not subjected to unhealthy living conditions?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have personally
    visited housing on Ft Bragg, Ft Carson, Fort Stewart, Fort Campbell,
    Fort Meade, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Drum, Ft Belvoir and Hawaii,
    and you have our commitment that we will do everything within our power
    to ensure our People have safe, quality housing. The Army has
    implemented several fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions and all require
    close coordination with privatized companies. The Army has implemented
    the requirement for a reliable, accessible online work order system;
    timelines for repair; and incentive fee policies; and are developing
    action plans for the remainder. The Army is also incorporating the
    fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions into our Army Housing Campaign Plan to
    establish priorities for implementation and oversight.
                           dod coronavirus task force
        33. Senator Tillis. Secretary McCarthy, how is the DOD Coronavirus
    Taskforce taking steps to disseminate information through all service
    branches down to the unit level, and are you encountering any
    difficulties in enforcing consistency in responding to the COVID-19
    threat?
        Secretary McCarthy. Senior leaders across the Department of Defense
    communicate multiple times a day to synchronize our response to COVID-
    19. Throughout the Army, we have multiple senior leader touch points
    and are publishing orders from HQDA down to the unit level. A key
    factor in mitigating the spread of the virus is ensuring personnel have
    the most up-to-date information on appropriate measures to prevent the
    further spread of COVID-19. The Department, Commanders, and leaders at
    all levels are taking positive action to educate the force and
    implement appropriate force protection measures.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senators Tillis and McSally
        34. Senators Tillis and McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General
    McConville, COVID-19 is a threat to the well-being of our troops and
    their families. During the March 24, 2020 DOD COVID-19 virtual town
    hall, it was recommended that servicemembers in the middle of a
    permanent change of duty station (PCS) should request their commanders
    put them into an awaiting transportation status, so they receive per
    diem and preserve their TLA/TLE [temporary lodging allowance/temporary
    lodging expense] entitlement. How are you handling the ``stop move
    order'' for all non-essential travel to limit the spread of the virus,
    and what measures are being taken to provide for servicemembers and
    their families caught up in the PCS process to avoid financial
    hardships?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In response to the
    challenges soldiers and their families are facing during the stop
    movement order, the Army is adhering to DOD's guidance for non-
    essential travel.
        Additionally, the Army, with DOD's support, has implemented a
    series of new entitlements. These new authorities are aimed at
    minimizing, to the greatest extent possible, the financial impacts of
    this unprecedented situation. These include Hardship Duty Pay for
    Restriction of Movement, (HDP-ROM), Isolation Allowance, temporary duty
    status, advanced PCS allowances, and Army Emergency Relief (AER) loans.
    Further, to provide soldiers the utmost support and flexibility, if a
    soldier is scheduled to PCS during this time and experiences hardship
    due to COVID19, they can request an extension--for up to 1 year--at
    their current duty station.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                          the future army--recruiting
        35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your joint testimony you mention ``the Army has overhauled its
    Recruiting and Marketing enterprise, exceeding revised end strength
    goals in fiscal year 2019, while simultaneously retaining quality
    soldiers.'' How is COVID-19 affecting the current recruiting efforts
    and what specific precautions do you have in place to protect
    recruiters as well as applicants?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. U.S. Army Recruiting
    Command is taking precautions to protect the health of the force and
    minimize exposure to coronavirus disease. As of March 18th, all
    recruiting stations within U.S. Army Recruiting Command are shifting to
    mobile and virtual Operations with the public to limit in-person
    contacts. These precautions allow our recruiting force the ability to
    continue to make solid contacts with those interested in joining the
    Army while protecting both the recruiters and the applicants.
    Recruiters remain accessible to those interested in a career with the
    U.S. Army by communicating through text, phone calls, direct messages,
    or video chat rather than face-to-face. Contracts/leads have decreased,
    but we do not attribute this to the shift to virtual recruiting. Many
    of our leads are generated from Recruiters attending events and larger
    gatherings and conducting high school visits. Due to COVID 19, all
    events have been canceled and we no longer have access to schools due
    to closures. Contract/leads from virtual recruiting, however, have
    increased.
        Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, USAREC was on pace to achieve
    its fiscal year 2020 accessions mission including a Delayed Entry Pool
    for fiscal year 2021 of 13,500. In an effort to protect the recruiting
    force and the Army's training base, USAREC has a goal to ship to half
    of the Army's training capacity. The determination of which future
    soldier will ship is dependent on the level of risk in the area in
    which each future soldier resides. As more and more areas become
    restricted, USAREC continues to analyze each individual situation in an
    effort to determine a safe to ship status. All Future Soldiers are
    being prescreened at 15 days, 72 hours and 24 hours prior to shipment
    for symptoms and potential exposure to COVID-19 to mitigate the spread
    of the disease. Additionally, they are screened again upon arrival at
    the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Depending on the
    level of risk in certain areas of country, recruiters are working with
    the Future Soldiers to either complete all necessary steps and MEPS
    processing so the Future Soldier can ship to basic training or the
    recruiter is working with the Future Soldier to reschedule them to ship
    at a later date. We are shipping from 218 stations.
        USAREC does not ship a certain number each month. Recruiting ebbs
    and flows based on the time of year. We typically see our highest
    number of shippers in June, July, and August, which have not yet been
    impacted by COVID 19. Prior to COVID 19, USAREC was on track to ship
    5,897 in March. We actually shipped 5,157. In order to minimize risk
    and exposure, our goal for April and May is to ship to half of the
    training capacity's base.
                          army force posture/structure
        36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, to
    address potential great power threats, what types of force structure(s)
    are required for the Army to deter and, if necessary, defeat a near-
    peer competitor like Russia and how is the Army changing its force
    posture to better support United States Indo-Pacific Command's
    (USINDOPACOM) efforts to compete with an increasingly aggressive and
    modernized Chinese military and how are these two efforts complementary
    and how are they different?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will calibrate
    its force posture, develop new organizations, and field new
    capabilities to provide the necessary support to USINDOPACOM in order
    to deter competitors in the region.
                        fort wainwright suicide response
        37. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as
    you know Fort Wainwright is located in Fairbanks, Alaska and has
    experienced a concerning number of suicides over the last 18 months.
    What specific initiatives and projects have you taken this year and in
    coming years to enhance the morale, welfare, and recreation of soldiers
    stationed along the Arctic's front lines, especially at Fort Wainwright
    and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson? Please provide separately to my
    office the specifics for each initiative, the schedule for delivery,
    and the anticipated impact or benefit on morale, welfare, and
    recreation of soldiers.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army established a
    Quality of Life Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the
    development and implementation of policies/projects to enhance the
    quality of life of our soldiers and families. Specific to Alaska, we
    have established an intensive outpatient behavioral health program,
    approved Remote and Austere Conditions Assignment Incentive Pay (RAC-
    AIP), improved transportation and shuttle services, established more
    predictable training schedules, improved junior leader development on
    the risk reduction tools and engaging behavior skills training, and
    refreshed MWR facilities. We are also taking actions to increase
    effective command messaging, improve barracks living conditions,
    increase indoor recreational facilities for soldiers and families, and
    improve the dining facilities (hours, quality of food). As
    circumstances permit, I am prepared to brief you on specifics regarding
    scheduled delivery of each initiative.
                       long-range precision fire testing
        38. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as
    technology for long-range precision fire weaponry increases, the size
    of test ranges will also need to increase. How long do you think it
    will be until the current Army long-range precision fire ranges are
    outpaced by the range requirements of the weaponry being tested and to
    what extent are you considering JPARC-with it over 1 million cubic
    miles of training space--as a potential testing site for long-range
    precision fire weapons, to include hypersonics? Please elaborate.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army uses the
    Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and the Reagan Test Site in
    the Republic of the Marshall Islands for initial testing of
    developmental capabilities. Test demand at some point will exceed the
    capacity of these two ranges to handle the workload which will require
    additional ranges to support this mission. The Defense Test Resource
    Management Center is conducting a study to determine alternate options
    for all the Services including JPARC
                         multi-domain task force (mdtf)
        39. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    with the world-class training opportunities offered by the Joint
    Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and the strategic platform offered
    for expeditionary forces such as the 4th Brigade Combat Team 25th
    infantry in Alaska, would you say that Alaska is a prime candidate for
    the stand-up of the U.S. Army's third Multi Domain Task Force? Why or
    why not? Please expand.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is analyzing
    potential locations across the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility to
    station the third Multi Domain Task Force (MDTF) in support of
    INDOPACOM and USARPAC operational requirements. MDTF #3 will activate
    in 2022 and will serve as the second MDTF in support of INDOPACOM.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                         squad x robotics--fort benning
        40. Senator Perdue. General McConville and Secretary McCarthy,
    since 2018, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have worked with industry to
    enhance unit interoperability with unmanned systems and artificial
    intelligence (AI) through Squad X experiments, allowing Army and Marine
    Corps squad units to better utilize the capabilities of unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) to track and engage
    hostile forces. While Squad X experiments have shown remarkable
    progress in developing these capabilities, monthly, large-scale
    experiments incorporating Army and Marine Corps leadership are
    necessary to ultimately field these capabilities on the battlefield.
    Collocating the unmatched resources and capabilities of the Army's
    Maneuver Center of Excellence with these squad-level robotics
    experiments will provide a long-term asymmetrical advantage for our
    warfighters and allow for the rapid build-test-build of AI capabilities
    that will greatly enhance small unit lethality. Additionally,
    overcoming advances our potential adversaries have made in their own
    squad-level robotics and AI development is crucial, and the Maneuver
    Center of Excellence is uniquely suited as an ideal location to develop
    and integrate the future of infantry squad-level robotics and AI
    capabilities. What role do the Squad X experiments play in increasing
    the lethality, maneuverability, and survivability of the squad unit,
    and how could collocating industry innovators with the warfighter at
    the Maneuver Center of Excellence best enable the future development of
    AI-supported robotics for Army squad units?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is aggressively
    pursuing manned-unmanned teaming and artificial intelligence (AI)
    through a number of promising programs and experiments. These programs
    and experiments link the Army to academic and industry leaders across
    America to capitalize on best-of-breed innovation in those fields.
    Examples include the Army AI Task Force (TF) and National Robotics
    Engineering Center at Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology; and the University of Texas. Experiments like
    Squad X enable capability developers and Soldiers to explore new
    solutions in four key areas: precision engagement; non-kinetic
    engagement; squad sensing and threat detection; and squad autonomy. Co-
    location of industry and academic innovators with warfighters can help
    accelerate the development of operationally relevant solutions to
    soldiers and units.
                       advanced battle management system
        41. Senator Perdue. General McConville, as you know, the new
    Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) conducted its first
    demonstration of capabilities in December, and the system is scheduled
    to hold another demonstration in June. You recently called ABMS ``Air
    Centric'' and not a universal solution to the problem of sharing data
    between platforms, units, and services. Additionally, Lieutenant
    General Eric Wesley, the Chief of the Army's Futures and Concepts
    Center, recently said, ``ABMS cannot be the sole solution, because it
    doesn't account for, in some cases, the scale or the unique
    requirements of all the other services.'' You have also noted that
    waiting for a future Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) system
    cannot mean setting aside current systems completely. How can upcoming
    ABMS field demonstrations address questions of scalability and the
    Army's unique needs for such a network that you and other senior Army
    leaders have voiced?
        General McConville. The goal is to allow us to see, understand, and
    act faster than our adversaries and to leverage the rest of the Joint
    Force to achieve overmatch. You will see a continuous series of
    experiments culminating in annual demonstrations to iterate, learn, and
    improve upon the previous year's outcome. Joint All-Domain Command &
    Control (JADC2) is an effort--actually a growing commitment--by the
    Joint community to develop a 21st century command and control
    capability that optimizes the contributions of the elements of the
    Joint Force, as well as those of our multinational partners. We are
    working closely with our sister Services and the Joint Staff to
    identify and achieve its full potential.
           joint surveillance and target attack radar system (jstars)
        42. Senator Perdue. General McConville, JSTARS aircraft continue to
    be active in executing the National Defense Strategy around the world.
    JSTARS aircraft were deployed for 18 straight years in the United
    States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in
    support of overseas contingency operations. Following an increase in
    tensions with Iran in January, JSTARS aircraft returned to the
    USCENTCOM AOR. A JSTARS unit manned by the 116th Air Control Wing,
    based out of Robins Air Force Base, also forward-deployed to Germany
    this past fall. How does the forward deployment of JSTARS support Army
    readiness and lethality in response to regional and global threats?
        General McConville. The Army utilizes a wide range of Ground Moving
    Target Indicator (GMTI)/Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) collection
    platforms and sensors to determine patterns of life, perform
    intelligence preparation of the battlefield, define the operational
    environment, and evaluate the threats in support of ground forces. The
    specific platform and sensor tasked depends on the mission, terrain,
    weather, region, and factors such as platform/sensor specifications and
    the Joint Commander's priorities. The combatant commanders' ability to
    access GMTI capability is integral to react to a dynamic and changing
    operating environment. This capability to collect GMTI data deep into
    enemy territory provides collection to support the combatant
    commanders' Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
                demolition of old martin army community hospital
        43. Senator Perdue. Secretary McCarthy, the old Martin Community
    Hospital (MACH) and associated facilities were replaced with a new
    hospital in 2014. In fiscal year 2015, Fort Benning included the old
    MACH facilities in their project for Army Installation Command's
    (IMCOM's) Facility Reduction Program (FRP). However, funding was
    redirected from the FRP for other Army priorities, and the old MACH has
    yet to be demolished. How would including the old MACH in the FRP allow
    for the most efficient use of Army resources while also providing
    better service to the soldiers and community at Fort Benning, and what
    resources and authorities does the Army need to complete demolition of
    the hospital and recapitalize the surrounding land for the base's use?
        Secretary McCarthy. Removal of the old MACH would clear a prime
    location that lies in the heart of the community hub of Fort Benning
    between the new hospital and the Commissary/PX/Dental Clinic. This
    location was identified in the garrison's master plan as the site of a
    transportation center that would link traffic and commuters from off
    post with an internal transportation system to circulate in the
    immediate vicinity as well as links to the primary cantonment areas.
    This hub would facilitate carpooling and relieve crowded traffic
    conditions along Marne Rd and across the entire Garrison. Once the old
    MACH is removed, the bulk of the work required would be ground work and
    paving. The Army has all the authorities/clearances needed to demolish
    the old MACH. The rough order of magnitude for demolition is $14
    million to $20 million.
                                port of savannah
        44. Senator Perdue. General McConville, the U.S. Department of
    Transportation recently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6
    million grant for critical infrastructure improvements at the Port of
    Savannah, building on the President's budget request of $93.6 million
    in Federal funding in support of the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project.
    The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in North
    America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness
    Network. Your posture statement cites our Nation's ports as Strategic
    Power Projection platforms that are key components in maintaining the
    Army's strategic readiness. To what extent does the expansion of major
    commercial ports like the Port of Savannah improve the Army's
    readiness, and support the Army's mission, by quickly transporting
    large U.S. troop formations in times of war and national emergency?
        General McConville. The ability to project the force rapidly and at
    scale and sustain the force during conflicts are key measures of our
    strategic readiness. Sufficient ports for national defense enable the
    Army's ability to deploy in time to meet combatant commander
    requirements. I understand the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project will
    increase the shipping channel depth to accommodate the large container
    vessels transiting the Panama Canal. DOD will continue to rely on the
    Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off vessels from the U.S. Navy's
    Military Sealift Command and Fast Sealift Ship vessels from the
    Maritime Administration's Reserve Fleet. The current channel depth is
    sufficient for these vessels. The Army is very closely linked with
    USTRANSCOM and their periodic assessments of the existing Strategic
    Seaports, and their current assessment is that we have sufficient
    seaport capacity on each coast (East/West/Gulf) to meet the Army's
    rapid deployment needs
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                                    covid-19
        45. Senator McSally. General McConville, given the Army's mission
    to organize, train, and equip soldiers, what efforts is the service
    taking to ensure it completes this vital mission while simultaneously
    working to combat the spread of COVID-19 within its ranks and do you
    foresee any impacts to readiness as a result of efforts to combat
    COVID-19 within the force?
        General McConville. It is too early to measure any significant
    impact to readiness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the
    possibility there will be a degradation in readiness. In an effort to
    protect the force, we have migrated to virtual recruiting efforts to
    sustain the Army's end-strength. Although modified for health
    protection measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and
    Commanders at all levels are assessing their local conditions and
    modifying training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our
    readiness.
                  family readiness--child development centers
        46. Senator McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I
    appreciate the value you placed on people being the greatest strength
    of the U.S. Army. I agree with the Army People Strategy that the
    ``People First'' philosophy is critical when assessing readiness. In
    your statement, you assessed 5 Quality of Life priorities which
    included improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth Services.
    When looking at this particular priority and family readiness, what was
    the process for assessing Child Development Centers (CDCs),
    specifically, how did you assess the current conditions or maintenance
    needs of each CDC and how did you assess the capability of the CDC to
    meet the demands and readiness needs of each community?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The quality of life for
    our soldiers, their families, and our civilian workforce is of utmost
    importance. Child and Youth Services, which incorporates our CDCs, is
    one of the five pillars of our Quality of Life campaign plan. As such,
    I'm prioritizing funding for our CDCs over the next 5 years. GEN Perna
    and Army Material Command hosted a Facility Investment Strategy Wargame
    in January to assess the condition of every Army facility, to include
    all 184 of our CDCs. We are now prioritizing these CDCs for renovation
    and increased maintenance (if needed). We've also identified those
    locations that need new CDC facilities due to deterioration or
    increased soldier and family demand. AMC is developing a plan to fix
    all of our CDC challenges over the next 10 years; we look forward to
    presenting that plan to Congress during upcoming sessions.
                            great power competition
        47. Senator McSally. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, you
    mention deterrence a few times in your statement--that the Army must
    ``compete with and deter near-peer competitors'' or ``deter highly
    capable adversaries''. With the rise of emerging technologies such as
    AI, 5G, quantum information systems, biotechnologies etc, what does
    deterrence look like under great power competition, and how is the Army
    utilizing these technologies to create new deterrence mechanisms?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The strength of the NATO
    Alliance and our partners in Europe, our ability to integrate and
    conduct combined operations, and the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy
    significant forces in support of our Allies is the bedrock of our
    deterrence strategy. The Army conducts frequent rotation of forces in
    support of INDOPACOM and elements of our Multi-Domain Task Force will
    be incorporated into the Defender Pacific exercises to demonstrate U.S.
    capability and commitment to deterrence in the region. The Army is also
    planning to employ modernized capabilities such as those that you
    highlighted, as well as Long Range Precision Fires and Air and Missile
    Defense, in the Western Pacific to reinforce deterrence of Chinese
    aggression and coercion of regional states.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                                  efficiencies
        48. Senator Scott. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of the Army
    under Secretary Mark Esper made great strides in becoming more
    efficient and redirect spending for new priorities. What more do you
    see that can be done and what are the lessons learned that could be
    shared across the Pentagon?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army continues to aggressively pursue
    reforms focusing on the divestment of lower priority programs and
    investment in higher priorities. Secretary Esper has worked with all
    the Military Services to establish a similar process focused on
    prioritizing spending. The Night Court process is being established
    across the other Services as well as other Department of Defense
    Agencies. The first 2 years of Army ``Night Court'' program reviews
    were driven top-down, resulting in over $30 billion realigned to our
    priorities; for the fiscal year 2021 budget, program managers led these
    fiscal reviews in a bottom up approach, resulting in another almost
    8$10 billion realigned over the FYDP to Army modernization and
    readiness priorities. We are also improving the way we do business--ex.
    the Command Accountability and Execution Review (CAER) shifted the
    culture toward commander and senior leader involvement in the
    stewardship of their fiscal resources, resulting in reduced O&M
    deobligations by 37 percent compared to historical norms, reducing lost
    purchasing power.
                                    covid-19
        49. Senator Scott. Secretary McCarthy, as training continues, what
    precautions is the Army taking to prevent servicemembers from
    contracting the Coronavirus, as it continues to plague our country?
        Secretary McCarthy. We continue to train, but the Army has
    suspended or scaled back military exercises to include DEFENDER-Europe
    20 and combat training center rotations, implemented travel
    restrictions and quarantine policies, enhanced screening procedures for
    new recruits reporting to and processing thru basic training, and
    published screening and prevention guidance to include social
    distancing guidelines, management of movements, and workforce
    limitations.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                           joint warfighting concept
        50. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, the idea of Multi-Domain
    Operations (MDO), is still largely driven from within each service. How
    is the Army supporting a more Pentagon-wide approach that would pull
    together each military branch and develop tools that function across
    all services and is interoperability a consideration?
        General McConville. The Army is nested with the Joint Staff on the
    development of the Joint All Domain Operations concept and well as the
    development of the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system
    architecture. Each service has a portion the concept development and
    all efforts are nested and coordinated thru the Joint Staff.
                            multi-domain task force
        51. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, in October 2019, you
    mentioned support for Admiral Philip Davidson's request for the
    stationing of two Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in USINDOPACOM, which
    were then listed on USINDOPACOM's Unfunded Priorities List for fiscal
    year 2021. When considering near-peer competition, where will the MDTFs
    mentioned in your posture statement be geographically focused and when
    can we expect to see them stood up?
        General McConville. The Army plans on three MDTFs, two focused on
    INDOPACOM and one on EUCOM. The first INDOPACOM focused MDTF will be
    activated by the end of fiscal year 2020 and the second will be
    activated by fiscal year 2023. The EUCOM MDTF is currently undergoing
    the OSD process for consideration of stationing units overseas.
        52. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, I've had multiple
    conversations with military leaders about the importance of Multi-
    Domain Task Forces, but this year we saw them on USINDOPACOM's unfunded
    priorities list. What specific, tangible investments will we see in
    fiscal year 2021 that the Army is delivering to strategic readiness,
    and are you building out a short, medium, and long-range plan?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army is investing to improve its global
    posture by positioning formations and equipment (APS) in key strategic
    locations to deter adversaries and assure partners; investing in its
    Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improving mobilization through MFGI
    investments and exercises; building proficiency through repetition in
    deploying/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)
    and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs); sustaining its
    generating and operating forces; and aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS
    priorities. In fiscal year 2021, Army is investing in site surveys and
    studies to refine the short, medium, and long range plans for expanding
    Multi-Domain capabilities in USINDOPACOM out through 2030.
                                   equipment
        53. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, last year I had the
    opportunity to visit National Guard soldiers from the 278th Armored
    Cavalry Regiment serving a 9 month deployment in Poland and Ukraine.
    They were at times the most forward deployed unit of our total force if
    a conflict were to break out against Russia, but I often heard from
    these soldiers that their equipment was outdated and difficult to
    maintain. How are we ensuring that we maintain deployable and
    interoperable equipment and force structure across the Active and
    Reserve components?
        Secretary McCarthy. As the Army fields modernized equipment, the
    priority will be to those forces expected to make contact with an
    adversary first--regardless of component. Nevertheless, there are plans
    to continue to provide the Army National Guard with modernized
    equipment in parallel or before the Active Component. Examples of
    systems being fielded to the National Guard in parallel or before the
    Active Component include the AH-64E Apache to replace older model
    Apaches, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to replace older UH-60A models,
    the Next Gen Squad Weapon to replace some M4 rifles, IVAS to replace
    some of their current night vision devices, Stryker double-V hull A1s
    to replace flat bottom hull Strykers, the M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams
    tanks to replace older M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks, and the Soldier Borne
    Sensor and Short Range Reconnaissance UAVs to add capability at the
    small unit level.
                                     space
        54. Senator Blackburn. Secretary McCarthy, with the recent creation
    of the Army Satellite Operations Brigade, we see that the United States
    Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) is making deliberate
    efforts to reorganize the force to support United States Space Command
    (USSPACECOM). What should we expect to see next from USASMDC, and how
    specifically does support of the newest combatant command fit in with
    Army's modernization priorities?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army has emerged as the largest integrator
    of space capabilities in the DOD, and currently leverages space
    capabilities to enable ground combat operations. As the Army
    continuously updates its doctrine, organizational designs, training,
    and capabilities to conduct multi-domain operations, the employment of
    organic army space capabilities will be a decisive factor in
    competition, crisis, or conflict. We are working the merger with US
    Space Force and will divest assets over time. However, we must retain
    necessary organic space-related capabilities to balance space
    capabilities across the force and limit operational risk.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                    covid-19
        55. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy, on March 12, a Chinese
    Foreign Ministry spokesman tweeted, ``It might be [sic] U.S. Army who
    brought the epidemic to Wuhan.'' How do you respond to the allegation
    that the U.S. Army may have been responsible for delivering the novel
    coronavirus to the Chinese city of Wuhan?
        Secretary McCarthy. There is no logical response to such an
    irrational accusation.
                  general leonard wood army community hospital
        56. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy, on January 16, 2020, I
    asked now-Under Secretary of the Army James McPherson about the Army's
    plans to rectify personnel shortages at the General Leonard Wood Army
    Community Hospital (GLWACH) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Mr.
    McPherson said that those personnel shortages were a result of the
    mishandling of personnel transfers by the Army and assured me that
    GLWACH would be ``fully staffed again'' by this coming summer. Can you
    confirm that the Army is still on track to have GLWACH fully staffed by
    this summer?
        Secretary McCarthy. MEDCOM will ensure GLWACH is staffed to
    required staffing levels pending any impact due to long-term COVID-19
    pandemic response, to include in place stop-move policies.
                            active protection system
        57. Senator Hawley. General McConville, the Army budget supports
    outfitting just four of the Army's 16 armored brigade combat teams
    (ABCTs) of M1 Abrams tanks with Active Protection System (APS) kits to
    defeat threats like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank
    guided missiles (ATGMs). What is the level of risk assumed by not
    outfitting the remaining ABCTs, as well as the Army's Strykers, with
    APS kits, and what would be the impact on the Total Army Force's
    survivability if it received additional APS kits?
        General McConville. We have procured five brigades of installation
    kits and four brigades of Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS) for
    the Abrams tank. All systems will be installed by third quarter, fiscal
    year 2021, after which the Army has decision points for future APS
    systems. We are evaluating off-the-shelf systems such as Iron Fist-
    Light for Bradley and continuing to look for appropriate solutions for
    Stryker. While additional APS sets would improve survivability, our
    future APS buys must be able to evolve with the threat and available
    technology. The Army will continue to request funding to proceed with
    technology maturation that addresses those future capabilities.
                              indo-pacific theater
        58. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    National Defense Strategy says that the Department of Defense will
    maintain combat-credible forward forces in order to deter enemy
    aggression, or if deterrence fails, blunt the enemy's attack until war-
    winning surge forces arrive. Secretary McCarthy, you seemed to allude
    to this directive in your recent remarks that ``[a]ccess and presence
    are critical in order to deter conflict . . . being on the ground
    matters.'' What are the Army's most important posture requirements for
    the Indo-Pacific theater, and how will meeting those requirements
    support the Army's ability to blunt Chinese aggression, if deterrence
    fails?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has an
    important role in the greater Indo-Pacific theater and requires access,
    presence, and posture to deter and defeat great power competitors in
    the INDOPACOM theater. The Indo-Pacific theater is a land force centric
    environment within a larger maritime theater where most of the regional
    militaries are land force centric. The Army can most effectively
    advance national interests and contribute to regional stability and the
    peaceful resolution of conflicts by establishing regional security
    partnerships in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army
    envisions a robust and resilient presence through and with regional
    security partners and allies to deter aggression and set the conditions
    for the Joint Force to flow forces in the event of a crisis. If
    deterrence fails, the U.S. Army will be postured though expeditionary
    basing to rapidly transition to conflict, all the while providing
    theater-level protection and sustainment capabilities for the Joint
    Force in combat.
        59. Senator Hawley. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army's concept document, ``The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations--
    2028,'' includes the following passage: ``Russia has increased its
    investments in anti-access and area denial capabilities and systems
    intended to deny the Joint Force entry into a contested area and set
    the conditions for a fait accompli attack.'' The multi-domain
    operations concept document subsequently defines a ``fait accompli'' as
    an ``attack . . . intended to achieve military and political objectives
    rapidly and then to quickly consolidate those gains so that any attempt
    to reverse the action by the U.S. would entail unacceptable cost and
    risk.'' It concludes that in order to ``provide a credible deterrent,''
    Army forces must demonstrate the ``[a]bility to immediately deny a fait
    accompli attack.'' While the MDO concept document focuses on the threat
    of a Russian fait accompli, the Department of Defense's ``Indo-Pacific
    Strategy Report'' warns of the threat of a fait accompli in the Indo-
    Pacific theater, as well. With that in mind, would you agree that China
    is investing in systems intended to deny the Joint Force entry into a
    contested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack, and
    if so, would you agree that in order to provide a credible deterrent
    against China, Army forces must demonstrate the ability to immediately
    deny a Chinese fait accompli attack?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Yes, it is clear that
    China is investing in weapon systems and force posture actions intended
    to increase their anti-access/area denial capabilities in the Pacific
    and deterrence is a critical component of our National Defense
    Strategy. The Army's Multi-Domain Operations concept was developed and
    matured over the course of several years as a result of significant
    analytical efforts to include wargames, exercises, and experiments. The
    Army is now applying the existing Multi-Domain Operations concept to
    the China scenario. As we do so, we will consider the capabilities and
    concepts of operations of potential adversaries and well as the
    operational environment. The Army will conduct a similarly detailed and
    robust analysis for the Asia-Pacific region as we have done for Europe
    and adapt our concepts as necessary.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
           u.s. army medical research institute of infectious disease
        60. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in my
    opening statement, I raised concerns that the Department of Defense has
    not prioritized the mission performed by U.S. Army Medical Research
    Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), and in fact, the
    Department has cut funding to the program. USAMRIID is at the forefront
    in research on COVID-19, and this Committee needs to understand
    immediately what the Army plans do to ensure USAMRIID remains a world
    class institute.
        I understand you have restricted funds for research in the current
    High Containment Facility at Fort Detrick. What are you doing to
    expeditiously fix this problem, and what specific actions is the Army
    taking in order to bring the New High Containment Facility at Fort
    Detrick online in order to replace the aging one?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army implemented an
    effective and responsive plan of action and milestones that returned
    USAMRIID to full operating capabilities in a timely manner. USAMRIID is
    now at Full Operational Capability (FOC). All work objectives in
    Biosafety Level (BSL)-2, BSL-3 and BSL-4 Federal Select Agent Program
    (FSAP)-registered space will commence to include priority work
    associated with multiple other DOD agencies and Cooperative and
    Development Research Agreement (CRADA) partners. Simultaneously, the
    Army conducted an extensive review of our medical research capabilities
    and is in the process of implementing changes that will facilitate the
    availability of these capabilities in the future.
             u.s. army corps of engineers and border wall contracts
        61. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, this week the Army awarded a $524
    million contract for the Tucson Sector Barrier Wall Replacement
    Project. The United States is grappling with a global pandemic and
    COVID-19 infections have been in reported in all 50 States. Many of the
    hospital systems across our country may soon be at capacity, and a
    border wall with Mexico would not have stopped the spread of the novel
    coronavirus. Please explain why the Army is not redirecting all border
    wall funding toward COVID-19 support efforts?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Border Security remains
    an Administration priority and supporting this effort remains a
    directed mission for the Army. COVID-19 has caused all nations to
    reexamine their border policies as part of medically advised efforts to
    limit spread. As you have seen, the Army is aggressively responding to
    the COVID-19 crisis on a daily basis. As new requirements appear, the
    Army continues to coordinate closely with OSD to identify the best
    funding solution to address all mission requirements.
                       u.s. military academy and covid-19
        62. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    U.S. Military Academy (USMA) has decided to extend the delay of the
    return of cadets to West Point until further notice due to the COVID-19
    crisis. The cadets are currently attending virtual classes and using
    remote learning platforms. Has USMA or senior Army leadership made any
    decision yet on whether or not the cadets will be allowed to return to
    finish the academic year?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have not yet made a
    decision. LTG Williams is using a deliberate planning process with
    guidance from Army Senior Leaders to make decisions about the return of
    the Corps of Cadets, remainder of the academic year, graduation, the
    impacts to Cadet Summer Training, and entrance of the Class of 2024.
    The planning process weighs risk to the Academy Mission and risk to
    protecting the entire West Point Team. Right now, the Corps of Cadets
    continues to conduct remote education to minimize disruption to the
    academic year. We will continue to keep you informed as the situation
    and our planning efforts develop.
                          u.s. army corps of engineers
        63. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as the
    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continues the planning and
    conversion of existing buildings into alternate medical care
    facilities, is USACE considering acquiring modular capabilities that
    exist within the industrial base, such as field hospital structures and
    medical shelters that are rapidly deployable to areas that may not have
    existing large capacity buildings?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In support of FEMA
    Mission Assignments and as the COVID-19 situation develops, USACE is
    working with FEMA and Health and Human Services to rapidly respond to
    emerging needs. As part of this effort and the anticipated need to
    supply large scale temporary facilities to communities where suitable
    existing buildings might not be available, USACE has conducted market
    research to identify available modular facility manufacturers and to
    gain an understanding of their capabilities, manufacturing capacity and
    projected delivery timelines. These facilities could be contracted for
    by USACE or elsewhere within DOD as well as directly by FEMA or local
    Governments.
                       close combat lethality task force
        64. Senator Reed. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, former
    Secretary of Defense James Mattis established the Close Combat
    Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) during his tenure to dramatically improve
    the effectiveness and survivability of close combat formations through
    a combination of materiel and non-materiel means, including innovations
    in recruitment, retention, training, concepts of operation, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures, and equipment. The CCLTF was designated as
    a direct report to the Secretary of Defense and as a Cross Functional
    Team (CFT) under section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017.
        Secretary Esper recently decided to reassign the CCLTF to the Army,
    ending its designation as a CFT under section 911. While the Army has
    indicated that they remain committed to the vision and success of the
    CCLTF, it remains to be seen if the Army will pursue both material and
    non-material initiatives to enable close combat lethality and
    survivability.
        What are your intentions regarding enduring support for the non-
    materiel initiatives to greatly improve close combat lethality and
    survivability?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will continue
    to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S.
    Squad-level infantry combat formations in order to ensure close combat
    overmatch against pacing threats, and strengthen the combat, lethality,
    survivability, resiliency, and readiness of infantry squads. This
    includes determining which material/non-material functions can
    transition from the CCLTF and to what command/agency. We will
    accomplish this analysis with the input of all stakeholders (USA, USMC,
    SOCOM, TRADOC, AFC, FORSCOM, and Congress). This will ensure we develop
    an executable plan that does not impede the progress made by the CCLTF
    and supporting agencies. Army and Marine efforts have been integrated
    since the inception of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF)
    and we plan to continue that model as the Army takes the lead. Both
    services will stay involved in the development and testing of new
    doctrine and concepts, as well as systems like the Integrated Visual
    Augmentation System and the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                    covid-19
        65. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as
    you are aware, there is an urgent need for assistance in combatting the
    spread of COVID-19 across New Hampshire and across our Nation. Could
    you discuss what the Army is doing to fight the spread of this virus,
    and what the Army is doing to help treat patients infected with COVID-
    19, including the use of field hospitals?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. As of 13 April, the U.S.
    Army is postured to support and decisively responding to requests for
    assistance. U.S. Army North has established its Joint Force Land
    Component Command headquarters in support of NORTHCOM and activated its
    ten Defense Coordinating Elements and four regional Task Force
    Headquarters in response to a request from FEMA. The U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers (USACE) have received 48 FEMA mission assignments totaling
    over $1.7 billion to provide initial planning and engineering support
    to address possible medical facility shortages in the U.S. due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic. USACE, and their more than 15,000 personnel engaged
    in the effort, has completed over 1,000 Alternate Care Facility (ACF)
    site assessments and have 25 ACFs on contract across 14 states to
    include the Javits Center in New York and the Detroit Convention
    Center. More than 24,000 National Guard Soldiers have been activated in
    all states to provide support to State and local governments by
    delivering food and supplies, assisting at COVID-19 testing stations,
    and cleaning public buildings. Finally, the Army has deployed three
    hospitals to support known hot spots in New York and Washington, and
    deployed 14 Urban Augmentation Medical Task Forces (UAMTFs) providing
    critical capabilities and capacity that will ease the burden of the
    regional health systems.
                   cold regions research and engineering lab
        66. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab in Hanover, New
    Hampshire, is a leader in solving strategically important problems
    faced when operating in cold weather environments such as the Artic.
    Could you discuss what the Army is doing in response to the 2019
    Department of Defense Arctic Strategy Published in in June 2019?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has and
    continues to maintain a significant footprint in the Arctic and sub-
    Arctic regions. In ensuring our Nation's defense, the Army trains,
    performs exercises, and operates in extreme cold weather environments
    to continue to meet its mission and the challenges of a changing
    region.
        We agree that the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering
    Lab (CRREL) in Hanover, New Hampshire, is a leader in solving
    strategically important problems faced when operating in cold weather
    environments such as the Artic. CRREL continues to support the Army and
    the Nation in meeting the challenges we face in performing and
    sustaining operations and in maintaining a well-trained and ready
    force. We are asking them to focus on obtaining an awareness of the
    Arctic domain and sustaining all operations.
        The Army executes six Arctic exercises annually: Vigilant Shield
    and Arctic Edge; Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Guard; and Vibrant Response
    and Guardian Response. The Army is exploring funding options for cold
    weather clothing and equipment in the Fiscal Year Defense Program to
    support the five brigades that train for cold weather operations.
                    guard and reserve military construction
        67. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    according to the 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan the
    National Guard needs over $1 billion dollars annually over the next 15
    years in order to meet 80 percent of the space requirements and
    increase their condition to fair. Could you please explain why our Army
    Reserve and National Guard facilities are continually funded
    disproportionately less than our Active Component and well below the
    amount required to adequately update them?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Over the last 3 fiscal
    years the ARNG portion as a percentage of the MILCON budget has
    increased from 11.9 percent in the fiscal year 2019 enacted to 27.2
    percent in fiscal year 2021 budget request. While this level of funding
    falls short of the $1 billion requirement laid out in the Army National
    Guard (ARNG) 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan it does,
    to the maximum extent possible in the current MILCON budget
    environment, allow the ARNG to program for the replacement of its
    highest priority Readiness Center projects. In regards to the U.S. Army
    Reserves, they also had an increase in requested funding when you
    compare the fiscal year 2019 enacted to the fiscal year 21 budget
    request (5 percent to 7.5 percent of the MILCON budget).
                    active duty and reserve force structure
        68. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    could you explain why there is disparity between Active Duty and
    Reserve Component force structure? I understand, for example, that an
    Active Duty HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) battery
    consists of 27 systems, while a Reserve battery has only 16.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The difference is based
    on modernization priorities and available systems. For example, all
    Active and Reserve Component Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket
    artillery battalions will consist of 27 systems by fiscal year 2026. As
    we modernize the Army, some units will be fielded with fewer or
    different systems until procurement of modernized systems become
    available. This is not just a difference between components, we have
    different mixes within each component while we are changing
    organizational designs and modernizing the Total Force.
                              border wall funding
        69. Senator Shaheen. Secretary McCarthy, last year the Department
    of Defense realigned $6 billion from its budget toward constructing a
    border wall along the United States' southern border with Mexico. More
    recently, the administration informed Congress that it was going to
    divert another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon to the border wall from
    various programs essential to supporting the National Defense Strategy.
    Can you discuss the impact of raiding military construction projects
    and various equipment and weapons systems accounts on the Army and its
    ability to support the NDS?
        Secretary McCarthy. I agree with the CJCS assessment that there is
    no significant, immediate, strategic negative impact to the overall
    defense of the United States of America.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
         u.s. army medical research & development support for covid-19
        70. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy, I know that the Walter
    Reed Army Institute of Research has extensive experience studying both
    severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory
    syndrome (MERS), two high-profile coronaviruses that caused deadly
    outbreaks. Can you speak to how you are leveraging this experience to
    support your civilian counterparts, and elaborate on any additional
    interagency efforts by U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
    Command to support COVID-19 treatment and vaccine development?
        Secretary McCarthy. Medical Research and Development Command (MRDC)
    and its subordinate commands are working across a broad coalition of
    civilian entities and other Federal agencies to research, develop, and
    acquires treatments and vaccines. A few examples follow:
        a. MRDC is working closely with the Vaccine Research Center/
    National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID; Dr.
    Fauci) on shared vaccine concepts for COVID-19 including standardized
    test and evaluation parameters in both animal models and clinical
    trials;
        b. NIAID, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
    (BARDA), and WRAIR are in discussion about tech insertion of vaccine
    and monoclonal antibody countermeasures developed by others into our
    combined test and evaluation competencies to speed the fielding of
    effective capabilities for prevention and treatment;
        c. MRDC is working closely with Harvard Medical School/Mass Gen
    Hospital/Beth Israel Deaconess Medical center on rapid animal model
    evaluation of COVID-19 medical countermeasures to prevent and treat
    COVID-19;
        d. MRDC has an agreement in place with Gilead for access to
    Remdesivir under an expanded access protocol to make investigational
    treatment available for servicemembers in locations where access to
    clinical trials is not feasible. Indication is for servicemembers with
    severe COVID-19 infection;
        e. MRDC has multiple cooperative research and development
    agreements in place and in process for development, testing, and
    evaluation of prevention, treatment, and diagnostic technologies
    emerging from industry, academia and USG partners. Key areas include
    therapeutic screening, vaccine human safety studies, improved rapid,
    high-throughput diagnostics tests, and point of care diagnostics.
        f. MRDC coordinates Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Research and
    Development (R&D) efforts through the U.S. Interagency MCM Task Force,
    led by HHS-BARDA.
                 covid-19 and army readiness: travel suspension
        71. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    in recent guidance issued by the U.S. Army, you made the decision to
    suspend movement and delay travel of soldiers stationed in Italy and
    Korea, both of which have been identified by the Center for Disease
    Control as alert level three for COVID-19. Just yesterday, Secretary
    Esper issued a stop movement order to halt all travel and movement
    abroad for up to 60 days. How do you plan to keep these soldiers and
    their families healthy while mitigating any readiness degradation given
    these travel delay orders?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The No. 1 priority in
    this crisis is protecting our people. Although the stop move order will
    have effects on our force, it will significantly reduce the risk of
    infection or spread of the virus. We have adjusted numerous personnel
    policies and entitlements to ensure our soldiers and their families
    have the information, pay, and resources to get through this pandemic.
    Although we have curtailed training and exercises, Commanders at all
    levels will conduct training based within the published Army and CDC
    guidance to maintain our readiness.
                  military exercise and training cancelations
        72. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    the Army recently canceled several major joint exercises in both
    USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM and rebranded them ``combined command post
    exercises.'' How does the canceling of these exercises impact the
    Army's ability to provide strategic deterrence to combatant commanders,
    and what metrics are you using to decide what training must continue,
    and what can be postponed?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. At the operational and
    strategic levels the Army has moved very quickly to respond to COVID-19
    in order to protect both the force and the Nation. The Army will
    continue to prioritize force protection in the current environment.
    Doing so will preserve current readiness and our ability to respond in
    crisis. We will continue to evaluate the need to scale back planned
    training based on a rigorous analysis of the risk to force. Commanders
    at all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying
    training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our readiness.
    Additionally, the Army has initiated planning on how to adjust our
    planned training and exercises through the remainder of the year when
    the conditions exist to execute. The longer the pandemic lasts, the
    greater the possibility there will be an impact to readiness, but to
    what degree is yet to be determined. As regular GFMAP rotations are
    postponed we are consuming readiness by not utilizing the BCTs/units
    that are/were prepared to deploy. The length of the delay in
    deployments for GFMAP rotations will determine--unit specific--what is
    needed to refresh training on prior to deployment.
                 covid-19 and military-to-military partnerships
        73. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    given the cancelation of major joint exercises for the near future,
    what actions are you taking to ensure we maintain strong strategic
    military-to-military partnerships across the globe?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. While a number of major
    exercises have been canceled in the near-term, we remain committed to
    strengthening our partnerships, and building capacity and capability in
    the mid-and long-term. We are exploring positive actions allowing us to
    test our concept of Dynamic Force Employment. The Total Army is in
    continuous contact with allies and partners at multiple levels, and
    will continue to reassure them of our commitment. As the Army continues
    to support the U.S. Government response to COVID-19, Army Senior
    Leaders are in regular contact with allies and partners through phone
    calls and email to keep lines of communication open, share best
    practices and lessons learned, and discuss any impacts on strategic
    readiness. The Army has also directed the Multinational Fusion Cell
    within HQDA to seek COVID-19 SITREPs from their respective countries
    (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, S. Korea, and New
    Zealand) and exchanges on the impact and actions being taken by their
    Armies.
                                   __________
             Questions Submitted by Senators Blumenthal and Warren
                          covid-19 and army readiness
        74. Senators Blumenthal and Warren. General McConville, recent
    guidance issued by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) provided
    specific recommendations to effectively execute social distancing, and
    many U.S. cities have issued shelter-in-place orders to mitigate the
    spread of COVID-19. What guidance are you providing to your commanders
    to implement social distancing and other protective measures as
    recommended by the CDC in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19?
        General McConville. The Army has followed CDC and the Commander in
    Chief's guidance with respect to social distancing. This information
    was provided to the force via three Army Orders/FRAGOs (#7 published on
    14 Mar, #8 published on 15 Mar and # 11 published on 20 Mar).
    Additionally, the Army directed installations, camps, and posts to
    increase their Health Protection (HPCON) to protect our soldiers and
    their families, our civilians, and contractors and ensure we can
    continue our mission by minimizing the spread of COVID-19.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                              coronavirus response
        75. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army Garrison in Hawaii now has four diagnosed cases of COVID-19. Two
    individuals are assigned to Tripler Army Medical Center and cases on
    the island continue to increase every day. How have the Army, Army
    National Guard, and Tripler Army Medical Center prepared to respond to
    an uptick in coronavirus cases and assist the local civilian response?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The U.S. Army Pacific is
    taking all necessary actions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in our
    formations through (but not limited to): maximizing telework, social
    distancing, reducing in-person meetings to six-persons or less and
    maximizing the use of video-teleconferencing, physical training is on
    an individual basis to prevent large groups of soldiers gathering in
    one place, and enforcing all post travel quarantine standards. In the
    last 48 hours, USARPAC, acting as the INDOPACOM TJFLCC, has issued our
    base Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA) in support of FEMA as
    the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the COVID-19 response. The order
    includes directives for the INDOPACOM service components to begin
    planning to provide support to FEMA, including but not limited, to
    medical resources and sea and air lift. The Hawaii based Defense
    Coordinating Officer is in constant coordination with FEMA on emerging
    requirements. Today, the TJFLCC supported FEMA with a rotary wing
    mission to Maui that transported a team from the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers to execute site surveys for potential alternate medical care
    facilities. Over the next 72 hours, TJFLCC is collecting and validating
    names for the Title 10 DDSC and staff that will support the Dual Status
    Commander once designated.
        The Governor of Hawaii named Hawaii National Guard's Adjutant
    General, MG Kenneth S. Hara, as the overall incident Commander. MG Hara
    is also the Hawaii Emergency Management Director, and is in direct
    coordination with all levels of government in planning, coordinating,
    and responding to COVID-19 in the State of Hawaii. The Hawaii National
    Guard's (HING) Joint Staff has stood up a Joint Operations Center to
    manage the HING's response and is preparing to stand up the HING Joint
    Task Force and a Dual Status Command, if required. Currently, the HING
    has 146 soldiers and airmen on State Active Duty supporting contingency
    planning and operational planning (medical support, security, traffic
    control) and conducting Joint Reception Staging, Onward movement, and
    Integration (JRSOI). This includes a Ready Reaction Force and one (1)
    heavy lift aviation asset currently on standby, prepared to support the
    State as directed.
        Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) continues coronavirus
    preparedness and response efforts through close coordination with all
    military medical facilities on Oahu and the local community as an
    Active member in the Healthcare Association of Hawaii and statewide
    Emergency Management System. TAMC provides drive thru screening and
    testing on Fort Shafter Flats (Monday-Saturday) to improve access to
    care. TAMC's drive thru screening and testing eases the demand on
    TAMC's emergency Department. TAMC continues operational bed expansion
    planning to maximize capacity. The military medical facilities in the
    Hawaii Military Health system are identifying, credentialing, and
    training military medical professionals across the Joint
        Force with critical care and emergency medicine training to support
    an expected increased inpatient demand. TAMC and Regional Health
    Command--Pacific healthcare facility planners--are identifying military
    facilities on Oahu that can be repurposed for expanded COVID-19 patient
    treatment areas.
                            army role in the pacific
        76. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as
    you continue to pivot the Army toward the National Defense Strategy
    defined by great power competition, it is important for the United
    States to project strength, reassure our allies, and build partnerships
    in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to Chinese and North
    Korean activity. Your Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request specifically
    notes the importance of funding multi-lateral exercises to meet the
    goal of strengthening alliances and partnerships. What is the current
    status of targeted multi-lateral exercises in the Indo-Pacific region
    given the coronavirus pandemic?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. U.S. and partner nation
    responses to COVID-19 have unfortunately required the cancellation or
    postponement of a number of near-term exercises with our partners.
    Exercise TIGER LIGHTNING with Bangladesh has been postponed, as has a
    South Korean Army rotation to the National Training Center. Exercise
    COBRA GOLD with Thailand was completed prior to the declaration of the
    COVID-19 pandemic. Planning conferences for exercises KEEN EDGE /
    ORIENT SHIED and YAMA SAKURA with Japan will continue on in a digital
    format. We remain in regular and close contact with our Indo-Pacific
    allies and partners on future exercises, as well as the broader U.S.
    commitment to the region.
                                military housing
        77. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, you mention in your posture
    statement that you have ``brought Army leadership back into the housing
    equation, empowering tenants and holding partners accountable.'' Our
    people deserve safe, high quality housing. How is Army leadership
    working with privatized companies to provide safe, quality housing to
    our military families?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army and its leaders are fully engaged. The
    Quality of Life (QOL) for our soldiers, families, and civilians is my
    top priority; safe and quality housing is integral to QOL efforts.
    Under the direction of GEN Perna at U.S. Army Materiel Command, the
    Army has taken the following steps to provide safe, quality housing to
    our military families:
          We are holding the privatized housing companies to
    account. We revised their Incentive Fee structure to place increased
    emphasis on maintenance quality, maintenance response times, and
    resident satisfaction.
          We've established processes to review all privatized
    housing company investment proposals, to ensure the right amount of
    money is being applied to fix the right problems (example--upgrading
    HVAC systems to prevent mold growth rather than just focusing on mold
    remediation).
          Finally, we've increased our holistic analysis of the
    financial conditions of all seven privatized companies to ensure they
    have the capital to either fix or fully renovate aging inventories. We
    are working with the administration to clarify OMB scoring rules, which
    would allow the Residential Community Initiative (RCI) companies access
    to more capital.
          In 2020, RCI Companies will invest $429 million in their
    inventories across our installations, building 106 new homes and
    renovating more than 1,100. More than $1B in RCI development funding is
    programmed through 2024.
                           child development centers
        78. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I
    note the request for $65 million for new childcare facilities and
    playgrounds at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter in Hawaii in the
    Army's Unfunded Priority List--since this is a readiness issue, I would
    have preferred to see them in the actual budget request. Access to
    safe, affordable childcare is an important quality of life issue for
    families. I added a provision to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA to
    significantly reduce the lengthy hiring process for qualified childcare
    providers on military installations by expanding direct hire authority.
    Has the streamlined direct hiring process for childcare providers been
    effective without sacrificing any of the quality and background checks
    for applicants?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The direct hire
    authority authorized in the 2020 NDAA pertained to General Schedule
    (GS) employees. Almost 100 percent of Army child and youth staff are
    non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees. Current Army policy gives
    Garrison commanders direct recruitment authority for NAF positions, and
    may delegate that authority to any level of management deemed
    appropriate. The Army uses this authority to fill positions with highly
    qualified child care staff more efficiently than other recruitment
    systems. Since 2018, on-board staffing increased from 79 percent to 86
    percent (Oct 19) and is holding steady. An online NAF transfer system,
    the Child and Youth Employee Assistance Tool (CEAT), was launched in
    October 2019 to assist military spouses and civilian direct child care
    staff by allowing them to request a non-completive transfer at the same
    grade level/pay when PCSing to a new duty location. This tool reduces
    transfer time by 2 weeks. CEAT has placed 140 military spouses and 107
    NAF civilian staff since October 2019. The tool is being expanded to
    include all CYS staff (CY, and NF-3 and below pay bands) by Oct 20.
                 women in military service to america memorial
        79. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA conference report directed the Secretary of the
    Army to establish a memorandum of understanding with the Women in
    Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., to define
    responsibilities and allocate resources for the operation and
    maintenance of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial and
    surrounding grounds. What progress has been made on this memorandum and
    are there any limiting factors?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. ANC and WIMSA have held
    multiple meetings over the last 3 months to develop the MOU as directed
    by the NDAA. A draft License agreement is currently being staffed to
    formalize WIMSA's occupancy on Federal land. Once this license is
    complete, the parties will finalize the MOU. These documents will
    establish and define each parties' responsibilities for operations and
    maintenance for the memorial.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                               acquisition reform
        80. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your testimony on soldier lethality you referenced a departure from the
    traditional requirements process as you develop the Integrated Visual
    Augmentation System. While I am encouraged by the approach, what
    oversight have you built in to ensure that the Army avoids requirement
    creep with this evolving strategy?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. IVAS is one of the
    signature efforts under the Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team
    (SL-CFT). The SL-CFT conducts quarterly touchpoints with the Secretary
    and Undersecretary of the Army, Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Army
    Acquisition Executive, the Commander of Army Futures Command, as well
    as the commanders of the other Army Major Commands. During those
    routine touchpoints, the SL-CFT Director and Program Executive Officer
    Soldier present any recommended requirements adjustments for Army
    Senior Leader decision. This rigorous process prevents requirements
    creep and ensures any changes to this high-priority program are
    approved at the appropriate level. We are ensuring IVAS meets the right
    requirements by deliberately running each IVAS Capability Set (CS)
    through Soldier Touch Points (STP). Soldier Touch Points (STPs) are
    designed to test and validate fight first capabilities in a tactical
    field environment. Each CS has multiple STPs where soldiers provide
    feedback on form, function and capability as they execute their
    tactical missions. Army Senior Leaders review the feedback from the
    STPs when making decisions on capability trades in order to impose
    rigor and accountability in the requirements decisionmaking process.
                                   personnel
        81. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, while
    I support your efforts in talent management and talent-based recruiting
    I would like to understand the Army's plan to target areas around the
    country to keep it a force that is representative of the United States
    as a whole? For example, with the many base closures in the New England
    region over the last 30 years much of the region has lost its
    connection to the military and has been a significant reduction in
    military accessions from that area and I would like to see that
    changed.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In October 2018 the Army
    began a process to prioritize our recruiting efforts and synchronize
    the Army's focus in twenty-two cities across the country to improve our
    connection to the country, and increase the diversity of the force by
    going into areas that we had not previously emphasized. Led by U.S.
    Army Training and Doctrine Command, we selected these twenty-two cities
    based upon their high population of qualified military applicants and
    low propensity to serve. The Focus 22 cities in the northeast region of
    the U.S. are Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore.
    Over the past 18 months, the Army has conducted hundreds of accessions
    events in these Focus 22 cities varying from key leader engagements
    with civic leaders, Meet Your Army events, teaming up with the NFL,
    MLB, and college sports, and participation in community events. We are
    supporting these accessions events with Army bands, drill teams,
    marksmanship units, and the Golden Knights, and more recently with our
    newly developed `e-Sports' and functional fitness teams. The
    collaboration of multiple Army organizations and the renewed focus to
    prioritize these communities has resulted in the Army reconnecting with
    the communities in these Focus 22 cities, which is contributing to
    meeting our accessions goals.
        82. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what
    plans does the Army have to combat the increasing numbers of Active and
    veteran suicides? Also, please summarize the standard process a soldier
    goes through when transitioning from Active Duty to veteran status, how
    that process helps the servicemember prepare for civilian life to
    include dealing with the mental and emotional stress of the transition,
    and where you think that process needs to improve.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. One suicide is one too
    many. We are committed to significantly reducing suicides in the Army.
    We enhanced mandatory suicide prevention training for every soldier and
    Army civilian. We invested in resilience training and performance
    enhancement capabilities, which are available to each member of the
    Army Team. We also developed visibility tools to provide leaders with
    insight to develop targeted prevention and intervention plans to both
    identify and assist at-risk soldiers. All soldiers are required to
    attend the Transition Assistance Programs' initial counseling NLT 12
    months prior to their end of service date. In that 12 month period,
    they are assessed and determine (with the help of trained counselors)
    their best transition plan and career track to help them achieve their
    individual goals. They then follow that plan through a series of
    counseling gates like resume and budget development. Finally, NLT 3
    months prior to their end of service date, they sit with a counselor
    and conduct a final review of their transition preparation. If the
    soldier does not feel prepared for their transition off of Active Duty,
    or their Commander/counselor does not think they are prepared for their
    transition, the soldier receives a `warm hand-off' to the Veteran's
    Administrations (VA) or Department of Labor (DOL). On average, about
    100,000 soldiers a year go through this process. The hand-off to the
    VA/DOL is where can improve the most by confirming the hand-off and
    later obtaining a report on transition.
                                missile defense
        83. Senator King. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what
    is the Army's strategy for developing the air and missile defense
    capabilities required to defend U.S. Forces against the increasing
    threat posed by cruise missiles and short and medium range ballistic
    missiles, also, how does the Army plan to address and defend against
    the emerging theater-level hypersonic weapon threats? Iran's attacks
    against the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last September and
    against U.S. Forces in Iraq in January should serve as a wake-up call
    for those threats.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The best defense against
    hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles is to have robust offensive
    and defensive capabilities. From an offensive perspective, we are
    placing significant emphasis and investment into our own hypersonic
    capability. The current schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype
    hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 remains in place. We must also
    attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency is
    exploring defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating
    Patriot against the supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic
    threats are also an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
    objective requirement, while subsonic remains a threshold requirement.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                         army test range infrastructure
        84. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, I was encouraged to see
    the types of investments the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget
    proposed in Army modernization in technologies of the future like
    directed energy, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence. As you know,
    investments like these are only of use to our servicemembers in the
    field if we are able to transition them out of the laboratories. What
    kind of investments does the Army's budget make in our Nation's test
    and range infrastructure to speed up the tech transition process?
        Secretary McCarthy. Investments in Army test and range
    infrastructure are fully aligned to meet the demands of Army
    Modernization and enable the rapid transition of new technologies from
    the lab to the battlefield. Investments are underway in critical test
    range infrastructure, such as wireless and fiber optic networks. Major
    families of range instrumentation, including radar, telemetry, and
    optics, are being modernized to support hypersonics and long-range
    fires testing. New instrumentation and targets for directed energy
    testing are being built. Computing resources, tools, and techniques for
    testing artificial intelligence systems are being developed.
    Commensurate investments are underway to support all Army Modernization
    priorities.
                        army long range precision fires
        85. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, over the past few years,
    the Army has tested capabilities for Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)
    at White Sands Missile Range. As you know, LRPFs are a critical part of
    the 2018 National Security Strategy's modernization goals. Of the $1.7
    billion in funding proposed in fiscal year 2021 for LRPFs, is any
    funding dedicated to testing and sustaining testing infrastructure or
    is this funding all research and development (R&D) and procurement and
    is the $1.7 billion sufficient to meet the Army's modernization
    timeline?
        Secretary McCarthy. Yes, I believe the $1.7 billion submitted as
    part of the President's budget to support the Long Range Precision
    Fires (LRPF) portfolio is sufficient to meet the Army's modernization
    timelines. Funding in the fiscal year 2021 budget requests does support
    tests and infrastructure activities across the LRPF portfolio. For
    example, $7.1 million is allocated to support Precision Strike Missile
    Engineering Development Flight Tests that are currently scheduled to
    occur in 3QFY21.
             army directed energy-maneuver short range air defense
        86. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, the Army is testing its
    Directed Energy-Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) at White
    Sands Missile Range. How does DE-MSHORAD fit into the Army's overall
    directed energy program and what is the timeline for fielding this
    capability?
        Secretary McCarthy. Yes, DE-MSHORAD is part of the Army strategy
    for Air Defense support to maneuver units. The DE-MSHORAD capability is
    intended to protect Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams from Unmanned
    Aerial Systems, rotary-wing aircraft, and Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
    threats. The Army is leveraging past S&T investments and the
    progression of the Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) Technology
    Maturation Initiative to rapidly prototype DE-MSHORAD systems and field
    to a platoon in 4QTRFY22. DE-MSHORAD is one of three directed energy
    efforts the Army is pursuing. The second is Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL), which will provide a 300 kW-
    class laser system by fiscal year 2024. Finally, the third is the IFPC-
    High Powered Microwave, which uses electrical pulses designed to
    disable/destroy electrical components of threat equipment, also to be
    delivered by fiscal year 2024.
        87. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, what can this Committee
    do to better support the Army's Directed Energy programs?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed
    Energy (DE) weapons, including both lasers and High Power Microwave
    (HPM) systems, to address near-peer threats as part of its
    modernization strategy. The Army has made Directed Energy a
    modernization priority in the Department and we would ask Congress to
    support our fiscal year 2021 budget request for all associated efforts.
    The Army Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget Request for DE includes:
    DE-Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) demonstration for a
    down select in our competitive approach in fiscal year 2021 and the
    funds for three additional 50 kW-class lasers integrated onto Strykers
    to be delivered to a platoon (four vehicles) in fiscal year 2022; and
    the Indirect Fire Protection Capability-HEL (IFPC-HEL) funding for 300
    kW-class laser system design, integration, and demonstration in fiscal
    year 2022.
                              milcon cancellation
        88. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McCarthy, I am encouraged by the
    Army's investment R&D and procurement for next-generation weapon
    systems, but remained concerned that we are not sustaining the test
    infrastructure needed to rapidly field these capabilities.
        In fiscal year 2020, $40 million in military construction funding
    for an information systems facility at White Sands Missile Range was
    redirected to fund the President's ineffective border wall. Funding for
    that facility was not included in the Fiscal Year 2021 President's
    Budget. What is the plan to fund this critical facility?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army continues to work with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense on a viable strategy to fund all the military
    construction project that were deferred; this includes the information
    systems facility project at White Sands Missile Range.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                    covid-19
        89. Senator Warren. General McConville, the Army has reportedly
    moved to virtual recruiting exclusively in order to protect recruiters
    and recruits from potentially COVID-19. What is your best assessment of
    the impact this will have on the Army's monthly recruiting goals?
        General McConville. As COVID-19 continues to impact the country, we
    are continuously assessing the environment to ensure we are making the
    necessary adjustment. USAREC was already focused on virtual recruiting
    as that is where today's youth market lives. Prior to COVID-19, digital
    and social media have been the top lead generating tools, producing
    50,000 leads ahead of last year.
        Army recruiters post career opportunities using online job
    postings, which has made it one of the largest lead production
    platforms. Virtual recruiting has produced a 40 percent increase in
    contracts from this time in fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2020.
    Further, 63 percent of all virtual recruiting contracts are quality
    applicants. While we are still analyzing virtual recruiting in today's
    environment, we are optimistic that we have put the conditions in place
    to ensure continued success in recruiting the force.
        In order to set conditions for when recruiting can turn to normal
    operations, USAREC recruiters will virtually process applicants using a
    ``soft contract'' methodology.
        Recruiters will gather leads using 100 percent Virtual Prospecting
    to identify interested applicants. Once the applicant is contacted, if
    the applicant expresses an interest in receiving more information on
    career opportunities with the U.S. Army, the Recruiter will conduct a
    virtual Army interview (Facetime or Skype) to provide them more
    information. If the applicant is still interested the recruiter will
    administer the Pending Internet Computerized Adaptive Test (PiCAT),
    which is a Virtual ASVAB. The PiCAT score is now valid for 45 days
    increased from 30 days due to COVID-19.
        If the applicant achieves a PiCAT score that enables them to
    enlist, the recruiter will begin working with the applicant to
    virtually obtain all required documents. Further, recruiters now have
    the ability to virtual witness signing of Parental Consent Forms. The
    applicant will complete the Career Explorer app thus allowing
    Recruiters to build the applicant's record virtually. The recruiter
    will then generate a Temporary Reservation that guarantees the
    applicant their MOS and incentives for 45 days, which was increased
    from 7 days due to COVID-19. The applicant will then be considered a
    ``soft contract.'' The determination of when to continue applicant
    processing is dependent on the level of risk in the area in which the
    applicant resides. Once an area is determined to be safe to continue
    processing, the applicant will be taken to a Military Entrance
    Processing Station (MEPs), which is part of Military Entrance
    Processing Command (MEPCOM), to continue processing of the Physical and
    Enlistment Contract. Once an applicant has been cleared by MEPs, the
    applicant will be given a report date for reporting to Basic Combat
    Training.
        The goal of the ``soft contract'' process is to enable USAREC to
    complete 90 percent of the applicant processing virtually to ensure the
    safety of the applicant and our recruiters. Further, we will be able to
    inform MEPCOM of ``soft contract'' applicant totals, so when recruiting
    operations return to normal, the processing will be in place to
    efficiently and effectively move applicants through the final stages of
    enlistment.
        90. Senator Warren. General McConville, what are the Army's
    contingency plans should it fail to meet its monthly recruiting goals?
        General McConville. In order to protect the Nation, we must first
    protect our force. We are prioritizing the health of the Army over any
    accessions goal. Army end strength is the cumulative product of
    accessions, retention, and attrition. If we are short on monthly
    recruiting (accessions) goals, we can adjust retention and attrition.
    For example, we are offering enlisted servicemembers the option to
    extend their current contract for a period of 3 months to 11 months
    under the Response to COVID Outbreak Extension (RCOE) policy. This new
    policy not only takes care of soldiers in a time of uncertainty, but we
    also expect it to bolster the Army's operating strength in the coming
    months. In addition, we are working to reduce soldier attrition from
    basic training.
        91. Senator Warren. General McConville, when do you expect to know
    if these contingency plans will need to be executed?
        General McConville. We are already starting to execute some of
    these contingency plans, partly because we know that retention and
    attrition management are crucial to maintaining the force that the
    Nation needs. We also monitor accessions results on a monthly basis. We
    will continue to evaluate the need for and potential timing of other
    personnel-related policies and levers that we may need to pull.
        92. Senator Warren. General McConville, are recruits being tested
    for COVID-19 before or after shipping out to basic training and what
    steps is the Army taking to ensure that the disease is not spreading
    amongst recruits and staff at recruit training facilities?
        General McConville. The Army is only shipping new recruits from
    areas of the country that are not high-risk; have been pre-screened;
    and exhibit no signs of COVID-19 to Army Training Centers. Trainees are
    continuously screened at each stage of the reception and transport
    process and then throughout their training. Upon arrival at an Army
    Training Center, trainees are screened before in-processing and enter
    into the 14-day restriction-of-movement / limited contact protocol
    where they complete administrative tasks and socially distanced
    academic training. Army Training Centers have implemented measures to
    maximize social distancing, limit the potential for spreading, and
    reduce risk. These measures include: filling classes to less than 50
    percent to maximize social distancing; adjusting POIs to reduce close-
    proximity training (e.g., combatives training is postponed); reducing
    the size of groups (e.g., on bus transportation, in barracks and
    classrooms, etc.); maximizing the use of outdoor locations; modifying
    dining facility procedures; and continuously monitoring drill
    sergeants, cadre, and trainees for health issues and temperatures.
    Additionally, family days are canceled and graduations are closed to
    the public.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Gary C. Peters
                   per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances (pfas)
        93. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army is responsible for multiple PFAS contaminationsites in Michigan,
    including at Camp Grayling and the Grand Ledge Army Aviation Support
    Facility. How is the Army working to address PFAS contamination that it
    is responsible for, including how is the Army cooperating with State
    and local governments and impacted communities?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has initiated
    response actions to assess the source and potential impacts of PFAS
    under the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and
    Liability Act (CERCLA) at both Camp Grayling and Grand Ledge Army
    Aviation Support Facility (Grand Ledge). Drinking water has been
    sampled both on and off installation at Camp Grayling. There are 17
    drinking water wells above the EPA lifetime health advisory (HA) of 70
    parts per trillion, where the Army is providing bottled water and is in
    the process of providing whole-house filtration systems or connection
    to public drinking water systems. The Army has been collaborating with
    State and local health departments, Michigan's environmental regulator
    (Environment, Great Lakes and Energy (EGLE)), and the local county and
    city governments to coordinate Camp Grayling actions. The Army is
    meeting regularly with these stakeholders who freely share information
    among organizations, and with the general public through a series of
    joint public meetings. The Army is working closely with EGLE in an
    ongoing investigation to assess if PFAS from Army Guard activities at
    Grand Ledge has reached drinking water wells. Sampling has occurred
    both on and off the installation. There have been no drinking water
    wells found to exceed the lifetime HA on or around Grand Ledge.
                       optionally manned fighting vehicle
        94. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, a
    January 16, 2020, the Army canceled the Optionally Manned Fighting
    Vehicle (OMFV) program. This was the Army's third attempt to replace
    the Bradley. OMFV is part of the Next Generation Combat Program, the
    Army's second modernization priority. What additional requirements or
    characteristics do you expect of OMFV that weren't included in the
    original program and what do you expect to be different in submissions
    from industry?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. OMFV characteristics
    will be refined through a series of industry engagements, digital
    design competitions, and soldier touch points to inform and sharpen
    OMFV final prototypes for testing yielding requirements for production.
    This approach will enable us to explore the solution space in an
    environment of rapid and inexpensive learning leading to verification
    through physical prototypes, soldier input, and testing. These
    encounters are also intended to challenge biases and confirm state-of-
    the-art technologies available to support the ABCT commander on the
    modern battlefield. This approach will deliver innovation, maximize
    competition, and ultimately produce a vehicle that will dominate in
    multi-domain operations for generations. We are not releasing a
    prescribed set of requirements--we are describing the problem set and
    giving industry the freedom to be creative and innovative in its
    approach.
                             advanced combat engine
        95. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    December 2019 the Army held a demonstration of the Advanced Powertrain
    Demonstrator, including the Advanced Combat Engine, at the Ground
    Vehicle Systems Center in Warren, Michigan. This demonstrator is
    developing capabilities which may be integrated into future systems the
    Army is developing, including those under the purview of the Next
    Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team. Can you please
    describe the need for the Army to improve its existing powertrain
    options, including the capability advantage offered by the Advanced
    Combat Engine over existing engines or commercial-off-the-shelf
    options?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army began
    development of an Advanced Combat Powertrain in 2015 based upon a
    market survey and analysis that showed available combat powertrains are
    not sufficient to meet anticipated requirements and that engines
    developed for commercial applications were not sufficient for military
    operating conditions without further development. Specifically, a gap
    in the market existed for combat vehicle platforms in the 45-60 ton
    weight range. Additional power was needed within the restricted under
    armor volume of combat vehicles to maintain pace with the force and
    provide electrical power to support protection, lethality, and
    communications systems. The Advanced Combat Powertrain, including the
    Advanced Combat Engine, has the objectives to improve the power density
    by 1.5 to 2.0x, increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increase
    electrical power available by 10x, increase mobility (range by an
    additional 100 miles, speed on grades by 50 percent and accelerate 30
    percent faster), and improved thermal management, with the Bradley
    powertrain as the baseline.
                              army in usindopacom
        96. Senator Peters. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army has begun expanding its role in the USINDOPACOM. Recently,
    Secretary McCarthy announced ``five-month extended rotations to
    countries like Thailand, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea'' and the
    first deployment of a Security Forces Assistance Brigade to
    USINDOPACOM. What long-term role do you envision for the U.S. Army in
    USINDOPACOM and what is the risk of an expanded role for the U.S Army
    in USINDOPACOM including the impact of shifting Army resources from
    more land-centric theatres like Europe and the Middle East?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army has an
    important role in the greater Indo-Pacific region based on the ideas of
    all-domain warfare and great power competition. The Indo-Pacific
    theater is a land force centric environment within a larger maritime
    theater where most of the regional militaries are land force centric.
    The Army can most effectively advance national interests and contribute
    to regional stability and the peaceful resolution of conflicts by
    establishing regional security partnerships in the South China Sea and
    Southeast Asia. The Army is currently exercising with regional security
    partners and plans to employ security force assistance formations. The
    Army must demonstrate the ability to converge warfighting capabilities
    across domains at scale to prevail in adversarial competition. The Army
    will globally posture forces in support of strategic priorities and
    joint force requirements.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senators Peters and Manchin
                               covid-19 response
        97. Senators Peters and Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General
    McConville, there are more than 10,000 National Guard servicemembers
    responding to COVID-19, as of March 25, 2020. Guardsmen in several
    States have been moved to federally supported Title 32 orders. How is
    the Army ensuring that frontline National Guard servicemembers
    responding to this national emergency have access to the personal
    protective equipment (PPE) necessary to safely and effectively carry
    out their COVID-19 response mission and what is the Army's plan to
    ensure National Guard servicemembers who may have been exposed to the
    virus have access to unique healthcare service which may be required
    because of this virus?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We are concerned about
    the health and well-being of all of our soldiers. Our soldiers are
    executing missions in support of FEMA and HHS in coordination with
    their respective State Departments of Health. As a supporting entity to
    both HHS and FEMA, ARNG soldiers are being provided PPE by HHS in
    accordance with CDC guidelines. For the few states that are using CSTs
    to execute certain missions, those personnel have specialized PPE
    optimized for CBRNE environments. We have issued directives to
    Commanders to ensure that no soldiers are being asked to conduct any
    mission for which they are not properly equipped.
        ARNG soldiers that are federally funded under 502(f) authorities,
    while serving under the State orders and guidance are authorized and
    would receive medical care through Tricare. Army National Guard
    soldiers responding in a State Active Duty (SAD) must submit a State
    Workman's Compensation claim for medical care.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                                    covid-19
        98. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, we
    are all disappointed that key parts of DEFENDER-Europe 20 are being
    postponed or canceled due to COVID-19. Do you have any data at this
    time about both the financial and readiness impacts caused by these
    cancellations and postponements?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is moving very
    quickly to respond to the COVID-19 to protect both the force and the
    Nation. Due to parts of Defender and other events being postponed or
    canceled, we have funds that have not been executed. We are working to
    understand the financial impact once the accounting is complete. We
    have not seen significant impact to readiness yet, but are concerned
    the longer the pandemic lasts the greater the possibility there will be
    a degradation. We are continuing to train at lower levels and
    Commanders at all levels are assessing their local conditions and
    modifying training to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our
    readiness.
               integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
        99. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    advanced testimony sent to this committee places an emphasis on the
    people that make up the Army. IPPS-A is one effort that is discussed as
    a way for the Army to refocus on its people. The IPPS-A fielding plan
    begins with the National Guard before moving on to the other
    components. With any type of app or software that stores personal data,
    it is vulnerable to cybersecurity issues. What measures are being taken
    by the Army and your partners to ensure the cybersecurity of this
    program?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Integrated Personnel
    and Pay System--Army (IPPS-A) Increment II has instituted both Army and
    Joint measures across its system design, development, testing,
    deployment, and sustainment lifecycles to continuously assess, test,
    and validate the cybersecurity controls implemented to protect the
    system. These measures are tested by the Systems Integrator (CACI), the
    Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and DOD's Director Operational
    Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). There are many Cybersecurity approvals,
    certifications, and tests that have been performed on the IPPS-A
    Increment II system. The IPPS-A Cybersecurity Strategy, Incident
    Response Team, Continuity of Operations Plan and the Cybersecurity
    service provider ensures that IPPS-A Increment II is employing a
    secure, defense-in-depth posture through the integration of people,
    technology, and operations.
                                 reprogramming
        100. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    the National Guard is playing an ever-growing and vital role in the
    COVID-19 response. This is in addition to their already significant
    contributions to national security alongside their Active and Reserve
    Component counterparts. Many Members of Congress were frustrated by the
    recent reprogramming action which moved funds to go to the wall because
    of its significant impact to the Guard, particularly the National Guard
    and Reserve Equipment Account. Do you believe that the reprogramming of
    the $3.8 billion overall, and specifically the $600 million in Army-
    impacted NGREA [National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account] funds,
    will affect the Army's ability to respond to the current crisis while
    continuing to safeguard our Nation's security?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. No, it will not impact
    the Army's current ability to respond to the COVID-19 crisis or
    safeguard our Nation's security. Congress has provided funding for our
    National Guard forces in the recent supplemental package which will
    enable the National Guard to respond to the current crisis.
                      concurrent and proportional fielding
        101. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    according to the testimony received by this committee prior to this
    hearing, readiness has been and still is the Army's top priority.
    Programs such as the UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopter, the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle, AH-64E Apache Helicopter, and many future programs
    and efforts are examples of ways the Army is working to do this while
    refocusing on great power competition. The National Guard represents
    approximately one-quarter of the total Army forces, both uniformed and
    civilian, and one-third of the total uniformed soldiers in the Army.
    The National Guard and Reserves combined represent over half of the
    Army's forces. When the National Guard and Reserve represent such a
    significant portion the Army's forces and capabilities and often
    perform the same missions, side-by-side with the Active Component, do
    you feel that they should be organized, equipped, and manned in the
    same manner as their Active Component counterparts?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army National Guard
    and Reserves are critical components of the Total Army Force. As the
    Army fields modernized equipment, the priority will be to those forces
    expected to make contact with an adversary first--regardless of
    component. Nevertheless, there are plans to continue to provide the
    Army National Guard with modernized equipment in parallel or before the
    Active Component. Examples of systems being fielded to the National
    Guard in parallel or before the Active Component include the AH-64E
    Apache to replace older model Apaches, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to
    replace older UH-60A models, the Next Gen Squad Weapon to replace some
    M4 rifles, IVAS to replace some of their current night vision devices,
    Stryker double-V hull A1s to replace flat bottom hull Strykers, the
    M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams tanks to replace older M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks,
    and the Soldier Borne Sensor and Short Range Reconnaissance UAVs to add
    capability at the small unit level.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                              future vertical lift
        102. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy, Congress recently added
    $76 million to the fiscal year 2020 appropriations bill for the Future
    Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program to reduce risk and
    accelerate delivery of the platform. Both platforms chosen in the
    recent downselect, the V-280 Valor and SB-1 Defiant, have significant
    test flight data from the technology demonstrator phase available for
    use. In your view, does the Army have enough flight data on these two
    platforms to alter or accelerate the competitive demonstration and risk
    reduction (CDRR) phase in order to field this platform earlier than
    projected and if additional resources were available, could the program
    absorb them in a productive manner this year?
        Secretary McCarthy. As you identified, the Army recently awarded
    two Competitive Demonstration and Risk Reduction (CD&R) OTA agreements,
    and initiated Phase I with fiscal year 2020 funding. Under these OTA's,
    the Army will be working with industry to refine the requirements and
    conceptual designs, through a digital engineering approach. This work
    with industry is vital to understanding the performance, cost,
    affordability, schedule risks, and trades needed to successfully
    execute the FLRAA program. The program is currently on schedule and the
    Army is not looking to accelerate it.
                        national guard full-time support
        103. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    as of March 24, 2020, the National Guard activated over 9,000 Guardsman
    in support of COVID-19 efforts in the United States. I've long been
    concerned about Guard readiness and continue to be so as activation
    levels continue to rise. It is my understanding that full-time support
    (FTS) levels in the Air National Guard are around 80 percent yet the
    Army National Guard FTS level is only at 64 percent. Given the
    importance of the Army National Guard's role in supporting the Total
    Force, and in particular their critical role during the COVID-19
    crisis, would you support an increase in Guard FTS billets meets at
    least 80 percent of their validated requirements?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We are committed to
    maintaining readiness in the ARNG. We are tracking the status of ARNG
    FTS levels and the impact of FTS funding to ARNG readiness. This is an
    area we will review in our fiscal year 2022 budget.
                              covid-19 quarantine
        104. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    I read several news article last week documenting the experiences of
    soldiers going through COVID-19 quarantine at Fort Bliss and Fort Bragg
    upon return from deployments to Afghanistan. I have to be frank, the
    descriptions I have read are not what I would expect from the Army. I
    get the sense that the Army's return from deployment quarantine
    planning was rushed and shoddy and may have compromised soldier safety
    and added to the worries of families awaiting the return of their loved
    ones. Will you commit to looking into reports that aspects of the
    return quarantine have been inadequately planned and haphazardly
    executed and communicating back to the Committee what you have found
    and how you plan to correct any deficiencies?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We have looked into all
    of these reports and have taken immediate action. In these cases, the
    commands immediately investigated and took corrective actions to remedy
    any deficiencies. Although we stood these facilities up quickly in
    response to the Army's order to house Active, National Guard, and US
    Army Reserve soldiers redeploying from Level 2 and 3 countries, we can
    assure you that the safety and comfort of our soldiers is our paramount
    concern. This does not absolve our Commanders of ensuring the health
    and welfare of our soldiers. In the case of Fort Bliss, the sites
    selected for our initial quarantine housing are three standard Army
    barracks on main Fort Bliss plus two training areas frequently used for
    post-mobilization training. Soldiers are housed in the barracks
    buildings; each room is 17' by 15' in size, and hosts 4 soldiers. These
    4 soldiers share a common area with kitchenette and bathroom (8 1/2' x
    15') with 4 soldiers in an adjoining 17' by 15' room. Soldiers are
    housed with other soldiers arriving on the same day and are separated
    from soldiers with different quarantine start dates to avoid
    commingling the distinct quarantine cohorts. The soldiers are allowed
    to move among their quarantine cohort, but we maintain each quarantine
    site in a manner designed to protect the safety of the force during
    their quarantine period. The command at the 1st Armored Division has
    made several improvements to our quarantine locations, including
    additional fitness facilities, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR),
    and Army and Air Force Exchange (AAFES) services. We encourage soldiers
    to raise concerns about their living conditions to the chain of
    command.
                                  indo-pacific
        105. Senator Duckworth. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    the Army has made efforts in the last several months to bolster our
    military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. As you both look at the
    INDOPACIFIC region I would like to hear from each of you what your
    thoughts are on opportunities in the region. In the next year, what
    region, sub-region, or country should the Army's primary focus be on to
    further build partnerships and strengthen the position of free nations
    in the region.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The U.S. Army is very
    committed to strengthening alliances and attracting new partners in the
    Indo-Pacific region. Since January 2020, we have been actively working
    to strengthen Army-to-Army relations with Indonesia and Thailand, and
    will continue to build on the success of recent engagements over the
    coming year. The U.S. Army is also committed to continuing our close
    relationship with the Philippine Army through engagements and
    exercises. Building partnerships is South Asia is also a priority of
    the Army, particularly with India and Bangladesh where we are working
    to expand the scope and scale of our exercises, and build
    interoperability and capacity through education, training, and security
    assistance. The Army will also maintain strong relationships with
    traditional allies and partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New
    Zealand, and Singapore) by enhancing interoperability and modernizing
    together through high-end exercises, security assistance, and armaments
    cooperation.
                            mobile long range fires
        106. Senator Duckworth. General McConville, I recently reviewed an
    Urgent Needs Statement from the 173d Airborne Brigade out of Italy. As
    you know the 173d is one of our premier light infantry units and, given
    its position in Europe, would likely be one of the first to respond to
    any crisis in Europe. They are outgunned and outranged against their
    potential Russian opponents and have requested the fielding of a light,
    wheeled mobile 105mm howitzer system. As I understand it, this request
    has not been acted on pending an Army wide review of long range
    precision fires systems. While I understand the need for measured
    decisionmaking regarding equipment it baffles me that when such a
    system is currently available the Army doesn't seem to be moving
    rapidly to field it to our forward deployed units who are in great need
    of more lethal and mobile fire support. Can you commit to me that you
    will take a look at this needs statement and consider the rapid
    fielding of such a system? I think it is critical that when we have the
    tools available we should get them into the warfighter's hands.
        General McConville. Yes, we review all urgent needs statement and
    you have our commitment to look into the specifics of this request.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                            army combat fitness test
        107. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    services were congressionally mandated to become gender integrated, and
    I believe the Army has made great progress in incorporating women into
    the ranks. I am concerned, however, that the Army's new Combat Fitness
    Test may have an unintended effect on women soldiers. The gender and
    age neutral physical standards don't account for the different
    advantages of pound for pound strength that mostly men benefit from,
    though the Army does take that into account at other times, such as
    when calculating combat load. How is the Army going to ensure that the
    new fitness standards don't reverse the gains the Army is making in
    gender integration?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army Combat Fitness
    Test (ACFT) is a predictor of a soldier's readiness for the demands of
    the modern battlefield. The assessment requires all soldiers, males and
    females, to meet basic minimum physical standards. These standards
    ensure that all soldiers are best prepared to survive and win on a
    gender-neutral battlefield. The ACFT drives balanced and focused
    physical training that will reduce overuse injuries and unplanned
    attrition. All research protocols to develop the ACFT reflected the
    Army's male to female ratio. An appropriate number of males and
    females, corresponding to the Army ratio, participated in ACFT event
    validation. Although the biological sex differences between males and
    females are unequivocal, there is no physiological reason any soldier
    cannot pass the ACFT at the Black, Gray, or Gold level with appropriate
    time, motivation, and training. Soldiers are improving their
    performance over time, with many soldiers, regardless of gender,
    achieving passing scores on each event of the ACFT at BCT and AIT.
    These results stem from appropriate physical training time and proper
    instruction. Army Senior Leaders will utilize the next year to
    determine how ACFT performance impacts personnel policies and we are
    conducting numerous internal training studies to optimize training
    opportunities for soldiers.
                                     people
        108. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your opening statement submitted for the record, you stated that, ``One
    example of investments into our people are the five focused Quality of
    Life priorities, which include housing, both family and barracks,
    transforming healthcare, improving and adequately resourcing Child and
    Youth Services.'' In examining your budget documents, I noticed that
    while the total military child population and required child care
    spaces increased from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2021, your
    request funds fewer Child Development Service spaces, resulting in a
    drop of 9 percent (78 percent in fiscal year 2020 to 69 percent in
    fiscal year 2021) of children able to access care. Can you explain how
    you are ``improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth
    Services'' if you are funding them at lower levels in fiscal year 2021?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is taking steps
    to focus on investments in our people in various ways, to include
    utilizing the Unfunded Priority List (Unfunded Requirements) process
    authorized by Congress which includes three Child Development Centers
    in both Hawaii and Alaska. While the Army programs and builds increased
    capacity, the Army intends to retain a higher percentage of child care
    professionals by increasing pay to be competitive with civilian care
    providers and providing support through the Army Fee Assistance program
    which already covers 14,000 children. While the Army appreciates the
    $50 million support from Congress to support Child and Youth Services
    in the fiscal year 2020 Enacted Budget, we were not able to adjust the
    request in time to effect the Fiscal Year 2021 President's Budget.
    Additional emphasis is underway in the POM 22-26 development to improve
    and resource Child and Youth Services.
                                     depots
        109. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your opening statement submitted for the record, you stated:
    ``Moreover, the Army's Organic Industrial Base (OIB)--26 depots,
    arsenals and ammunition plants--manufacture, repair, upgrade and
    modernize the Army's equipment, and are absolutely critical to both
    Strategic and Tactical Readiness. We are optimizing the OIB to three
    primary end states: support current unit readiness across the force;
    maintain the ability to meet wartime surge requirements; and modernize
    and retool to sustain the next generation of Army equipment. Through
    implementation of Repair Cycle Float, a new methodology that links OIB
    production and workload to Army readiness, we will fundamentally change
    and improve the way we resource and manage these critical facilities.''
    Anniston Army Depot is in Alabama. They have expressed to me a concern
    that they will soon have no workload to repair M1 tank turrets or
    conduct full assembly of the tank. What is the Army doing to ensure
    full weapon system repair and upgrade skills are workloaded and
    retained?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Our depot workload is a
    balance of modernization and sustainment requirements that meet the
    National Defense Strategy priorities. The current workload allows the
    Army to meet near-term readiness goals and the Organic Industrial Base
    to remain postured to surge in support of any contingency. We have the
    correct skills and workload to meet the Army's readiness requirements
    at Anniston Army Depot. OIB Sites have programs in place to cross-train
    personnel across multiple platforms, which enable us to maximize
    utilization of our current force, balance and retain skill sets and
    meet workload requirements, and ensure a breadth and depth of technical
    expertise is readily available. The skills required across our OIB
    sites are very dynamic and AMC is continuously evaluating them against
    the current force and future force requirements.
        The Army will continue to address weapons system repair and upgrade
    capability at the depots by requesting and obtaining access to
    technical data as weapon systems are upgraded and modernized. The Army
    will also continue to engage in Public-Private-Partnering agreements
    with the Original Equipment Manufacturers to ensure that the required
    skills sets are maintained at the depots and to maximize the
    capabilities with our long-standing industry partners.
                                 army aviation
        110. Senator Jones. General McConville, the Army continues to
    report a critical shortage of pilots and stated that it will increase
    the pilot training throughput in fiscal year 2021. Do you have
    sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget level to
    allow you to set the conditions in terms of additional instructor
    pilots and increased maintenance capability to accept additional
    students in fiscal year 2021?
        General McConville. Congress fully supported the requested aviation
    training budget for fiscal year 2020. The requested aviation training
    budget in fiscal year 2020 is not sufficient to increase the throughput
    of Aviator training. The Army is in the process of funding the final
    $122.6 million of an overall $331 million UFR. $171 million was funded
    in fiscal year 2019, $37.4 million was saved thru AH-64 modernization
    efforts at the training base, and the remainder will be funded in
    fiscal year 2020. This additional funding will enable the training base
    at Ft. Rucker to meet the required throughput of 1272 initial entry
    Aviators, and 1555 graduate Aviators to meet Army requirements. The
    increased throughput at the training base coupled with multiple
    retention efforts will address the current pilot shortage. We continue
    to assess the impacts of COVID-19 on our training infrastructure and
    ability to move students to training.
                                missile defense
        111. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    gentlemen, Alabama is the arguably the home of Army missile defense.
    Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, USA met with my office just a couple
    weeks ago, and I'm excited with the progress the Space and Missile
    Defense Command is making in developing new systems and working to
    integrate them into existing formations across the Army. I am, however,
    concerned with the Army's missile defense capacity. According to your
    budget request, you are asking for $202 million to convert two Patriot
    battalions to the new Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
    System (IBCS). I know that our Air Defenders are the most deployed
    units in the Department. Can you speak to the impact that this
    transition will have upon the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for the rest
    of the Patriot units?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The impact of IBCS
    modernization on the OPTEMPO of the Patriot Force in fiscal year 2023
    and beyond will depend on the Geographic Combatant Commander demand for
    CONUS-Based Patriot Forces. This Patriot Force consists of 11 CONUS-
    Based Battalions and 4 Forward Stationed Battalions. The Army planned
    for 2 Patriot Battalions in IBCS modernization while supporting up to 2
    Battalions Forward Deployed. If the deployed steady State exceeds 2
    Battalions, an impact to modernization and Deploy to Dwell will occur.

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                   integrated air and missile defense (iamd)
        1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army has indicated that air and missile defense is a top modernization
    priority. What IAMD efforts are underway and how are they progressing?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army Integrated Air
    & Missile Defense system performed well in Collective Training, which
    concluded earlier this month. Due to COVID-19 impacts, 3d Battalion,
    43d Air Defense Artillery's upcoming Limited User Test (LUT) has been
    slightly extended to ensure the health and safety of our soldiers, but
    should not impact the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E)
    scheduled 4QFY20. The baseline program integrates Sentinel radar and
    Patriot components and provides the open architecture upon which the
    Army will continue to expand, as a key contributor to Joint All-Domain
    Command & Control (JADC2). We are updating and finalizing the current
    software version prior to the LUT start date to ensure a successful
    test event. Finally, the Army is prioritizing follow-on weapon and
    sensor integration after the baseline Initial Operational Capability in
    2022. Those will be formally documented in a Capabilities Development
    Document Update (for Increment 3).

        2. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, can
    you update us on the Indirect Fire Protection Capability/Iron Dome way
    ahead?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army will receive
    the first battery of Iron Dome in December 2020 and the second battery
    in February 2021. Once we receive those two batteries, we will begin
    the required training of the soldiers who will man and operate them.
    Simultaneously, we will attempt to integrate the Iron Dome Systems into
    our Integrated Battle Command Systems (IBCS). Based on the technical
    data we have received, we believe that full integration of Iron Dome
    into the IBCS architecture will be challenging. We expect that we will
    end up with two very capable, but standalone, batteries. It is
    anticipated that the two Iron Dome Batteries will achieve full
    operational capability by the end of 4QFY21. The Army is currently
    executing a competitive solicitation for the Enduring Indirect Fire
    Protection Capability Increment Two solution (IFPC Inc 2). The IFPC Inc
    2 solicitation is open to all competitors to conduct U.S. Government
    and vendor models & simulations, hardware-in-the-loop activities, and a
    live-fire shoot-off demonstration in 3QFY21. As stated in our report to
    Congress on February 25, 2020, we do not intend to buy more stand-alone
    weapon systems that cannot be fully integrated with our Joint Air and
    Missile Defense capabilities. As such, I am prioritizing the use of the
    Fiscal Year 2021 funding toward achieving an enduring, integrated
    capability as quickly as possible.
                                 arctic threats
        3. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    what do you see as the key threats to U.S. interests and security in
    the Arctic region, and what will the Army do specifically--as a part of
    the joint force--to help provide options to the President to help
    counter these threats?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Russia and China
    constitute the primary competitors to U.S. interests and security in
    the Arctic. Russia likely will continue its aggressive efforts to deny
    others access and/or presence in the Arctic region, both militarily and
    commercially. Russia seeks to secure Arctic mineral resources, control
    the Northern Sea Route, and extend the range of its strategic defenses.
    China, a self-declared ``near-Arctic'' State, is also keenly interested
    in the Arctic for its natural resources, possible shipping shortcuts,
    and scientific endeavors focused on global climate change. Beijing
    considers the Arctic an area of shared international interests versus
    one defined by the sovereignty of Arctic littoral states, thus allowing
    Beijing open access. As part of the joint force, the Army, in support
    of the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, participates in exercises
    and ensures it has major combat units ready for a variety of
    contingencies in the Artic. The Army provides forces for 12 Arctic
    exercises, many of which are conducted with allies, including three
    exercises that are conducted in Alaska: ARCTIC PEGASUS, ARCTIC EAGLE,
    and ARCTIC EDGE. The Army will continue to partner with the Joint Force
    to implement the Arctic Strategy and build the readiness needed to win
    in the Arctic.
                   joint pacific alaska range complex (jparc)
        4. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
    current and past military leaders have referred to JPARC as a ``crown
    jewel'' of training ranges due to its expansive space, varied terrain,
    and nearly limitless training potential. What are your own personal
    views on JPARC and what specific steps could be undertaken to maximize
    the utilization and training of this world-class training range?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Joint Pacific Alaska
    Range Complex (JPARC) provides training capabilities for multiple
    components and services to use for a variety of training from
    individual to pre-rotational Mission Readiness Exercises, to Joint All
    Domain Operations (JADO) coordinated by US INDO-PACOM. A broad concept
    to maximize the use of the JPARC would be to provide joint funding for
    large scale exercises in Alaska. This concept would provide the Joint
    Force with a training environment of sufficient scale and scope to
    exercise multi-domain opportunities by linking USN vessels, USAF 5th
    GEN fighters, and Army assets to achieve cross-domain effects in Cyber,
    Electronic warfare, space, offensive counter-air, and Long-Range
    Precision Fires (LRPF). These exercises would improve the Joint Force's
    abilities to operate, fight, and achieve a decisive edge the MDO
    environment; would replicate future combat operational environments;
    and enable a highly trained Joint Force capable of presenting multiple-
    dilemmas to our Nation's adversaries in competition, crisis, and
    conflict.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                              army missile defense
        5. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the
    Army has made a concerted effort to integrate its missile defense
    capabilities. As the Army moves toward greater reliance on networks,
    it's clear that competitors will seek to disrupt, degrade, and defeat
    those networks. What is being done to mitigate those problems?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is pursuing a
    network modernization strategy, aligning internal science and
    technology efforts, and ensuring that the Integrated Battle Command
    System (IBCS will be designed to meet and maintain Cybersecurity
    defense standards. The network modernization strategy will deliver
    assured network transport, with multiple communication pathways,
    including leveraging military and commercial satellite services,
    increasing bandwidth and range through military and commercial
    satellite and terrestrial networks, incorporating more secure modems,
    updating gateway architecture, and integrating secure waveforms. The
    alignment is informing industry research and development efforts
    through threat-based market research and establishing cooperative
    research and development agreements to share threat data, while also
    driving network solutions to counter those threats. Finally, we are
    conducting biennial survivability and resilience exercises with the Air
    and Missile Defense architecture to ensure that we understand and
    correct potential and emerging cyber, electronic warfare, and position,
    navigation, and timing vulnerabilities.

        6. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, with
    a movement toward distributed operations, how can we ensure our forces
    are protected by air defense?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Air and missile defense
    (AMD) during distributed operations presents an inherently Joint
    challenge that requires contributions from all Services. The Army's AMD
    contribution primarily consists of THAAD, AN/TPY-2, Patriot, Avenger,
    as well as Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) units. The
    Army will field M-SHORAD and interim Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability (IFPC) in the FY21 to further expand Army AMD capability and
    capacity to support the Joint fight. The Army will field the IAMD
    Battle Command System (IBCS) in FY22 to improve interdependent AMD
    operations enabling tailorable and scalable force packages.
    Additionally, we utilize passive defense measures to mitigate the
    consequences of enemy attacks, as well as employ attack operations to
    attrit threat capability and capacity. Integration with Joint and
    Coalition forces is imperative to protect our forces and we will
    continue to work with our Allies and partners to support the AMD
    requirements of distributed operations.

        7. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how
    much are you conferring with the other Services on working out
    disparities in common operating picture issues?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. We routinely confer with
    our Service partners to resolve technical and operational Common
    Operating Picture (COP) issues at all levels--action officer to
    department headquarters. Global Command & Control System-Joint (GCCS-J)
    continues as the primary program of record providing the aggregated
    standard COP across Combatant Commands (CCMD) and the Joint Force.
    Near-term, we are increasing shared understanding of any potential COP
    issues by leveraging experimentation and routine touchpoints, such as
    the recently completed FY20 Joint All Domain Command and Control
    (JADC2) Experiments #1 and #2, Joint Warfighting Assessments, monthly
    Joint Staff (JS) led JADC2 Cross Functional Team CFT) engagements, and
    developing Joint Concepts for Command and Control (JCC2) in support of
    Multi Domain Operations.
                       close combat lethality task force
        8. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, in March 2018, then-
    Secretary James N. Mattis established the Close Combat Lethality Task
    Force in an effort to make combat units more lethal. He had concerns
    about the erosion of close combat capability relative to threats
    identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Can you tell me what
    the status of the close combat lethality task force is and if these
    efforts will continue in support of the NDS?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF)
    will continue efforts to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement
    improvements to U.S. squad-level Infantry combat formations and Special
    Operations Force equivalents, to ensure close combat overmatch against
    pacing threats, and strengthen the combat lethality, survivability,
    resiliency, and readiness of our close combat forces. The Army is
    working closely with our partners in the Marine Corps and Special
    Operations Command to plan for governance and procedures that maintain
    the joint purpose of the CCLTF and ensure we continue to make advances
    in close combat lethality so that our close combat forces are well
    prepared to support the National Defense Strategy.

        9. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy, has a decision been made on
    whether the close combat lethality task force will report to the Army?
        Secretary McCarthy. Yes, on March 27th the Secretary of Defense
    delegated the authority for the CCLTF to the Army. We have initiated
    planning to ensure we continue to support our close combat forces. The
    Army is currently drafting a framework to establish a tri-service
    governance board between the U.S. Army, the USMC, and USSOCOM to
    provide oversight, guidance, and prioritization for initiatives
    supporting our men and women at the tip of the spear and build on the
    successes of the CCLTF. Concurrently, we are preparing an Army Execute
    Order that will position the CCLTF in an Army organization with optimal
    functional alignment for internal command and control, and assign roles
    and responsibilities for Army staff, commands, and organizations.
                                   readiness
        10. Senator Hirono. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how
    have you managed to create a balance between protecting the force from
    COVID-19 and readiness?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. The Army is carefully
    and deliberately balancing force protection with efforts to sustain
    readiness. We have initiated a planning process that frames the Army's
    actions, which include responding, recovering, and restoring
    capabilities. The Army has followed the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (CDC) and the Commander in Chief's guidance with respect to
    social distancing and other protocols. The Army provided this
    information to the force via Army Orders that have been published and
    updated since the crisis began. Additionally, the Army directed
    installations, camps, and posts to increase their Health Protection
    (HPCON) to protect our soldiers and their families, our DA civilians,
    and Contractors, and ensure we can continue our mission by minimizing
    the spread of COVID-19. It is too early to measure any significant
    impact to readiness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the
    possibility there could be a degradation to readiness. In an effort to
    protect the force, we have migrated to virtual recruiting to sustain
    the Army's end-strength. Although modified for health protection
    measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and Commanders at
    all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying training
    to minimize risk to our force while maximizing our readiness.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                             defense health agency
        11. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy, do you think that continuing
    with the planned Defense Health Agency transition is prudent during the
    current COVID-19 health crisis? Please explain.
        Secretary McCarthy. No, I do not think we should continue with the
    planned transition during the current health crisis. Our Military
    Treatment Facilities and other medical structures are an integral part
    of our Army and are key to our ability to respond to national
    requirements. Effective alignment of authorities, roles, and
    responsibilities is necessary to allow for an optimal response. The
    Army was able to rapidly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic because of
    our unique medical structure. We have committed our ready medical
    personnel, Public Health Center, Army Medical Command, Medical Research
    and Development Command, as well as other medical capabilities to
    treatment, detection, and prevention efforts in support of the national
    response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic highlights
    that removing these key medical structures away from normal Service
    command and control alignment, will fracture our ability to respond.
                                     depots
        12. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your response to my paper hearing question regarding Army depots, your
    response did not address how the Anniston Depot, which is designated as
    the Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence for combat vehicles
    (except Bradley), will retain the turret, full assembly, and full tank
    test skills without full overhaul and repair of the M1 Abrams tank.
    Will you ensure this is accomplished via the public-private-partnering?
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. Yes, we will ensure the
    Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) will retain the turret, full assembly, and
    full tank test skills thru public-private-partnering. ANAD will
    continue to overhaul, repair, and fully assemble the M1 Abrams tanks to
    preserve skills and support fleet readiness. This will be accomplished
    thru public-private partnerships (P3), to include General Dynamics Land
    Systems (GDLS) and Honeywell, who have an enduring residence at ANAD.
    Under the P3 with GDLS, for example, the Repair Cycle Float (RCF)
    program is underway with PM Abrams M1A2 SEPv3modernization. To further
    ensure workforce skills retention, PM Abrams' modernization is ongoing
    at ANAD and expected to continue through FY26.
                                  space force
        13. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy, in your response to Senator
    Blackburn's question about space, you stated, ``We are working the
    merger with US Space Force and will divest assets over time. However,
    we must retain necessary organic space-related capabilities to balance
    space capabilities across the force and limit operational risk.'' I
    understand that you can only speak for the Army, but can you explain
    what types of personnel/capabilities/units/equipment you are retaining,
    whether you plan to retain those indefinitely or just until the United
    States Space Force is fully established, and whether the other branches
    are taking a similar position?
        Secretary McCarthy. The Army intends to permanently retain our
    cadre of Army space professionals who understand both traditional Army
    operations and space, and who integrate appropriate space-enabled
    capabilities into Army plans, operations, concepts, and doctrine. We
    will also retain space-enabled capabilities integrated throughout Army
    formations, as they are essential to effective combat operations on
    land, and will continue to evolve these service-unique assets to enable
    multi-domain operations in the future. The Army will transfer
    identified capabilities on a schedule that ensures sustainment of the
    associated operational missions. We believe the Navy has taken a
    similar approach regarding retention of space expertise and service-
    unique, space-enabled capabilities currently integrated in Navy
    systems.
     u.s. army medical research institute of infectious diseases (usamriid)
        14. Senator Jones. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in
    your response to Senator Reed's question regarding USAMRIID, you
    mentioned that ``Simultaneously, the Army conducted an extensive review
    of our medical research capabilities and is in the process of
    implementing changes that will facilitate the availability of these
    capabilities in the future.'' Please provide specifics about the
    changes you referenced and what this committee can do to assist the
    implementation.
        Secretary McCarthy and General McConville. In February 2020, Army
    Futures Command (AFC) and U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
    Command (USAMRDC) collaborated to develop initial options to optimize
    structure for both USAMRIID and U.S. Medical Research Institute of
    Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) based on core mission, functions, and
    capabilities all tied to resources to enable their missions. In support
    of this effort, key Army Staff agencies enable the optimized structure
    of USAMRDC, specifically focusing on USAMRIID and USAMRICD, inclusive
    of their workforce, mission, and facilities. The Army is working to
    identify a core funding plan in balance with external customers;
    pursuing a comprehensive Health Affairs Medical Research and Response
    strategy to inform core roles and functions; and identifying future
    medical research structures with potential near-termmitigations. The
    Army needs relief from the statutory requirement to transition Medical
    Research and Development to the Defense Health Agency, however, to
    achieve optimization.
                                    suicide
        15. Senator Jones. General McConville, I was intrigued by your
    response to Senator King's question regarding soldier and veteran
    suicide. You gave quite a thorough description of the transition
    process. Do you think the system for preventing suicide for soldiers,
    transitioning soldiers, and veterans needs to be improved? If so, how?
        General McConville. While we continue to invest in research and
    look to new or improved initiatives to increase individual resilience,
    coping, and communication skills, we must keep soldiers connected while
    in the Army and maintain that connection through the soldier's
    transition into Veterans Organizations' behavioral assets. Soldiers
    live in squads; squads are the building blocks of the Army's
    formations. If you drew a triangle and at the points are ``Leader,''
    ``Family,'' and ``Peers,'' this is the framework for how we need to get
    after the problem. In the Army's initiative ``This is My Squad,'' units
    focus on the positive aspects of a soldier's life and a greater
    emphasis on a collectivist culture, or a culture where the group is
    prioritized over the individual. By shifting soldiers' focus to shared
    experiences, they can form the unity needed to solve personal crises
    and combat misconduct. By engaging with fellow soldiers, squad leaders
    can also better detect personal dilemmas and crises. Leaders will
    interact with the soldiers in their squads and they will know those
    soldiers, their families, and their peers. By knowing our soldiers
    better, ourCommand Teams and Leaders can develop and adjust programs as
    required to prevent this unnecessary loss of life. Discussing and
    recognizing all lives are worth living should be part of initial entry
    training, in uniform, and especially during transition.