[Senate Hearing 116-051]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                                                        S. Hrg. 116-051

                       STRATEGIC THREATS, ONGOING
                        CHALLENGES, AND NATIONAL
                    DEFENSE STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 5, 2019

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services





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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman  
                  
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi          JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                 JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                  KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota             RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut            
JONI ERNST, Iowa                      MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii  
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina           TIM KAINE, Virginia          
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                  ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota            ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts        
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona               GARY C. PETERS, Michigan  
RICK SCOTT, Florida                   JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee           TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois     
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                 DOUG JONES, Alabama             
                                     
                     John Bonsell, Staff Director  
            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director 

                                  (ii)

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

                            C O N T E N T S

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                            December 5, 2019

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Strategic Threats, Ongoing Challenges, and National Defense           1
  Strategy Implementation.

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     3

                           Witness Statements

Rood, Hon. John C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy........     4
Allvin, Lieutenant General David W., USAF, Director for Strategy,    12
  Plans and Policy, Joint Staff.

Questions for the Record.........................................    42

                                 (iii)

 
                       STRATEGIC THREATS, ONGOING 
                        CHALLENGES, AND NATIONAL 
                    DEFENSE STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, 
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, 
Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 
testimony on strategic threats, ongoing challenges, and the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). We will be talking a lot about 
the National Defense Strategy, and we have already kind of 
acknowledged that is something that is kind of rare. We had the 
top leadership of the Democrats and the Republicans agreeing on 
certain things that have to be in the NDS and we have adhered 
to it, and it has served us very well.
    Two years ago, the National Defense Strategy, NDS, shifted 
America's military focus to the new era of great power 
competition. One year ago, the NDS Commission report provided a 
bipartisan blueprint for effective implementation of the NDS.
    These documents demand tough choices to achieve urgent 
change at significant scale. We must reshape our military, 
reform the Department of Defense (DOD), and recommit to 
strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. This is 
exactly what our National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is 
designed to do.
    The good news is we have made progress toward this goal. 
The bad news is that we have got a long ways to go, especially 
as we look ahead to the fiscal year 2021 budget request. When 
it comes to tough choices, we have heard a lot from the 
Pentagon leaders about what they are doing to implement the 
NDS. I would like to hear more about what they are not doing, 
what missions have been cut or are now a lower priority than 
they were. In fact, I will have one question at the time for 
questions of both of you on that
subject.
    We have also heard a lot from the Pentagon leaders about 
prioritizing China and Russia, but with 14,000 troops deployed 
in the Middle East since May, we must ask if the urgency is 
once again overweighing the importance.
    I would comment on this. It is true that 14,000 troops have 
been over there, but this article that came out I think 
yesterday saying an additional 14,000 troops is something I had 
not heard. Senator Reed, I actually talked as recently as this 
morning to the Secretary of Defense who denied this. But we 
will ask for some clarification on that from the witnesses 
today.
    I would like to hear from the Department about how it is 
prioritizing Russia and China. Prioritizing Russia and China 
means making tough choices about where we stand our forces in 
the world. Not every theater can be prioritized. But as we 
right-size our posture in theaters like Africa and places that 
have not had adequate attention in the past, we have got to 
keep a lot of these things in mind.
    Defining an acceptable level of risk is never easy. People 
do not understand. When you talk about risk, you are talking 
about American lives, and you have got to face the risk as 
these decisions are being made.
    NDS implementation is not just a job for the Pentagon. It 
is a job for Congress. The defense authorization and 
appropriations bills are critical to resourcing and overseeing 
the implementation of our strategy whether it is recovering 
readiness, modernizing our nuclear arsenal, investing in 
cutting-edge technology, or making sure our troops and their 
families live in safe housing.
    We had a very large hearing just a few days ago on this 
issue. I think it might have been the largest one I have ever 
attended or chaired anyway on the housing issue. It is a 
serious problem. That is one more reason that we have got to 
get on with our defense authorization bill. We have got some 
solutions to these problems that we have to get started on.
    As we speak, Congress has failed to pass the defense 
authorization and appropriations bills on time. The NDAA is 
being held hostage to partisan politics. Worse yet, most 
remaining issues have nothing to do with defense.
    China is not waiting for us to get our act together. China 
is increasing their military spending. You know, during the 
last 5 years of the Obama administration using constant 
dollars, we actually reduced our defense appropriations by 25 
percent. At the same time, China was increasing by 83 percent. 
People are shocked when they find that out. But it is a fact, 
and it is something we are going to have to deal with.
    Let us get real. If we are serious about competing with 
China and Russia, we have to show that our democracy can give 
our troops what they need and when they need it.
    Finally, the Pentagon and Congress need to do a better job 
of including the American people in this conversation. During 
the Cold War, I think we did a good job during the Cold War, 
and we had people fully aware of the problems that we were 
facing, and they were controllable problems. But the people 
were aware of the threat that we were facing. It has been my 
personal experience that that is not true today, and that is 
one of the areas where we need improvement.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
join you in welcoming our witnesses. Let me also thank the 
Chairman for scheduling this important hearing to review the 
strategic threats and ongoing challenges to our national 
security. Today's hearing is an opportunity to hear from our 
military leadership about how the Department is implementing 
the National Defense Strategy, or NDS, to meet these threats 
and challenges.
    The NDS marked a shift in our strategic priorities from a 
focus on counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and 
South Asia to prioritizing the long-term strategic competition 
with Russia and China. The NDS called for increased investment 
in the strategic competition with near-peer competitors while 
moving to a more resource-sustainable approach for countering 
North Korea and Iran, defeating terrorist threats, and winning 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    The Department has begun to shift its focus to these 
strategic competition issues, but much remains to be done. As 
the independent, nonpartisan National Defense Strategy 
Commission assessed, the Defense Department and White House 
have struggled to clearly state how the United States will 
prevail in this strategic competition and still lack a whole-
of-government approach for countering our adversaries in gray 
zone operations below the level of traditional military 
conflict. In addition, the administration's impulses to 
alienate allies and embrace authoritarian strongmen have 
undercut our military's ability to pursue a coherent defense 
strategy and have undermined U.S. national security interests 
globally.
    In the Middle East, there is a clear disconnect between the 
objectives stated in the NDS and our recent actions in the 
region. Despite the NDS shift to a more resource-sustainable 
approach to threats posed by Iran and counterterrorism, we have 
deployed more than 14,000 troops to the region since May. In 
the case of Iran, the administration has pursued a so-called 
maximum pressure campaign that has only succeeded in isolating 
us from many of our allies, made conflict more likely, and 
given Iran cover to violate constraints placed on its nuclear 
program by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 
Furthermore, Defense Department efforts to consolidate 
counterterrorism gains by the anti-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria] coalition have suffered a major setback as a result 
of the administration's hasty withdrawal of United States 
Forces from a Turkish-declared safe zone in northeast Syria and 
abandonment of our partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF).
    With regard to Russia, the National Defense Strategy 
stresses that one of our greatest military advantages is our 
alliances and partnerships, particularly NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization]. A bipartisan, overwhelming majority of 
the Senate has endorsed the fundamental value of NATO to United 
States national security interests. Yet, the President's 
failure to recognize the security benefits of these 
transatlantic ties and his diversion, for example, of European 
Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funds to pay for the wall along the 
United States southern border has caused some of our allies to 
openly question the reliability of the United States as we go 
forward.
    Turning to Asia, the National Defense Strategy identifies 
China as our most challenging long-term competitor. China's 
global economic and military expansion will challenge United 
States primacy in the decades to come. We can no longer assume 
we will have economic leverage over China, yet I fear we are 
not developing the tools of statecraft to adequately address 
the significant national security implications of China's 
economic rise.
    Even in Western democracies, the space to criticize Chinese 
aggression and human rights violations is narrowing. China is 
willing to punish any country that criticizes its authoritarian 
and coercive activities, whether it is the ethnic cleansing of 
Muslin Uighurs in western China or political interference in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. In addition, we are spending pennies on 
the dollar compared to China's multi-billion dollar propaganda 
campaign to whitewash its behavior in the public sphere.
    We need to be working with likeminded allies and partners 
to push back on China's coercive behavior, human rights 
violations, and predatory economic tactics targeting the 
sovereignty of its smaller neighbors. We have to work much more 
closely with our partners, particularly in the Pacific with 
Japan and Korea, rather than engaging, as we are at present, in 
discussions about increased burden sharing and other aspects of 
our relationship.
    Again, let me thank our witnesses for their service and for 
their testimony today, and I look forward to their testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We will now hear from our witnesses. Try to keep your 
remarks down to about 5 minutes because we want to have time 
for all of our questions to be asked. We will start with you, 
Secretary Rood.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
                             POLICY

    Secretary Rood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Reed, other Members of the Committee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    I look forward to discussing DOD's efforts to implement the 
National Defense Strategy, or NDS, in an era of great power 
competition and addressing your questions, along with 
Lieutenant General Allvin.
    I have a longer statement, Mr. Chairman, that I ask be 
included in the record, and I will just summarize it here.
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
    Secretary Rood. The fundamental problem we face today, as 
identified in the NDS, is the erosion of United States 
competitive military advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia while 
continuing to address threats from rogue regimes like Iran and 
North Korea and violent extremist organizations like ISIS and 
al Qaeda.
    It is critical that we continue our work to reverse this 
trend, to regain our competitive advantage, but especially in 
high-end warfare. Doing so will ensure the United States can 
continue to deter aggression and coercion from those that would 
seek to supplant the United States and challenge the free and 
open international system that supports our freedom and 
democracy.
    The NDS remains the guidepost for our Department. Secretary 
Esper and his management team are taking action to reinforce 
the strategy and his predecessor's efforts by structuring and 
overseeing implementation efforts within the Department to 
focus on great power competition and warfighting today and 
tomorrow. We are actively assessing the threat environment and 
our progress towards NDS priorities and refining our planning 
and resourcing efforts.
    To this end, the Department recognizes it is one piece of a 
larger puzzle. The DOD supports interagency partners to contest 
China and Russia's malign diplomatic, informational, economic, 
and military efforts to undermine global security and reshape 
the rules-based international order in their favor. This 
endeavor is dependent on cooperation with allies and partners 
to ensure regional balances of power remain favorable.
    The Department's primary job is to provide combat-credible 
forces to deter war or to win, should deterrence fail. 
Bolstering our military's deterrent capability is therefore job 
number one.
    Since the NDS launch, the Department has made significant 
progress to modernize and restore high-end readiness in the 
joint force towards this purpose as evidenced in the 
President's fiscal year 2020 budget submission. For example, 
the fiscal year 2020 budget requested $14.1 billion to maintain 
our edge in space. The administration also submitted a proposal 
to Congress to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of 
the armed forces to focus and accelerate establishment of space 
doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future 
threats. With congressional approval, the Department also 
created an operational command, United States Space Command, 
focused on the daily operations of our space assets and 
warfighters.
    The President's fiscal year 2020 budget also requested $9.6 
billion for cyber capabilities, which would be a 10 percent 
increase over the fiscal year 2019 budget, if approved. We are 
investing $3.7 billion in capabilities for our cyber forces, 
including teams focused on stopping cyber threats outside U.S. 
networks. Within the past year, DOD has published a new 
classified cyber strategy. We have completed the cyber posture 
review, which looked at our gaps and shortcomings. We have 
revamped our authorities and continue to build out the cyber 
mission force. There are more examples that are in my written 
testimony.
    We must continue to balance this prioritization of great 
power competition with ongoing operations globally that affect 
military resourcing and readiness, including the challenges 
posed by Iran, Syria, North Korea, and terrorism. Investments 
alone, however, will not deter China and Russia. Great power 
competition also means DOD must develop new concepts and 
organizational approaches for force employment and design, 
posture, and warfighting.
    DOD is building increased flexibility and responsiveness 
into our global force posture, allowing us to dynamically flow 
strategic capabilities to hotspots on short notice.
    The Department is also strengthening and leveraging the 
U.S. network of allies and partners. This network is a pillar 
of the National Defense Strategy and one of our greatest 
strategic advantages. As our competitors seek to advance their 
own revisionist view of the world, consistent with their 
authoritarian model, we understand their strategies involve 
isolating and trying to gain leverage over countries through 
predatory approaches and intimidation. In some cases, 
bolstering defense relationships does necessitate hard 
conversations with allies on things like burden sharing and 
targeted capability development as we take steps together to 
address shared challenges.
    Our allies are stepping up their efforts. Just this week, 
NATO announced that 2019 defense spending by allies increased 
in real terms by 4.6 percent, the fifth consecutive year of 
growth. By the end of 2020, allies will have invested $130 
billion more than they did in 2016, and this accumulated 
increase in defense spending is projected by NATO Secretary-
General Stoltenberg to rise to $400 billion by 2024. As 
Secretary-General Stoltenberg said, ``this is unprecedented 
progress and it is making NATO stronger.''
    In the Indo-Pacific, DOD is strengthening and evolving 
United States partnerships. For example, with India, we are 
committed to a common vision for a United States-India major 
defense partnership that we will advance at the 2 Plus 2 
ministerial on December 18th. We have agreed to expand 
military-to-military cooperation and improve interoperability, 
including by establishing a new tri-service amphibious 
exercise, Tiger Triumph.
    Additionally, no country in Southeast Asia does more than 
Singapore to enable a United States forward presence in the 
region. More than 100 United States ships and 800 to 1,000 
United States aircraft transit through Singapore each year.
    In Vietnam, we are building a productive defense 
relationship and overcoming the legacy of the Vietnam War. Last 
year, the United States Navy conducted the first United States 
aircraft carrier visit since the Vietnam War, and we have also 
transferred a high-endurance Coast Guard cutter. Secretary 
Esper announced 2 weeks ago in Hanoi that the United States 
would be transferring a second high-endurance cutter to 
Vietnam.
    DOD is also investing $521 million over the next 5 years in 
programs like the Maritime Security Initiative to build the 
capacity of our partners in the region, including to conduct 
maritime security and maritime domain awareness operations, and 
to advance interoperability with U.S. forces.
    Mr. Chairman, let me say in conclusion the NDS represents a 
major shift. We still have important work ahead of us to design 
a more lethal, resilient, and ready force, solve tough 
operational problems, build a combat-credible forward presence 
and work with allies and partners. The NDS remains our 
guidepost, and we are determined to deliver on its priorities.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this 
morning.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rood follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Honorable John C. Rood
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look 
forward to discussing the Department of Defense's (DOD) effort to 
implement the National Defense Strategy or NDS in an era of great power 
competition and addressing your questions.
    My objectives today are two-fold: first, to address how we frame 
the challenge of great power competition with China and Russia; and 
second, to illuminate the hard work the Defense Department has been 
undertaking over the last two years in order to implement the NDS and 
assess our progress.
                          growth of the threat
    The NDS was clear in setting out that great power competition is 
now the pre-eminent challenge facing the Department, stating:

        ``The central challenge to United States prosperity and 
        security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition 
        by . . . revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that 
        China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their 
        authoritarian model--gaining veto authority over other nations' 
        economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.''

    As the complex security environment has evolved, the Department has 
sought to keep Congress and the public apprised of the threats posed by 
great power competitors such as China and Russia as well as rogue 
regimes through regular reporting. For example, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's annual reports to Congress, China Military Power 
and Iran Military Power both released this year, and Russia Military 
Power, released in 2017, highlight the following:
      China: The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) remains 
focused on realizing a ``world-class'' military.
        China possesses one of the largest militaries in the 
world; it continues to add to its capabilities and is increasingly 
provocative, such as its activities in the South China Sea and in 
Africa, where China established its first overseas base ever in 
Djibouti in 2017. Of note, China's official defense budget has grown 
850 percent over the past 20 years from $20 billion to $170 billion in 
2018, and I would note the real figures are significantly higher than 
China's official budget.
        China has also sought to spend funding in ways that are 
specifically targeted at key United States military advantages with new 
capabilities in such areas as space, cyber, electronic warfare, 
undersea warfare, fighter aircraft, bombers equipped with long-range 
cruise missiles, and other anti-access, area denial (A2AD) 
capabilities. For example, China is using cyber capabilities to advance 
its military and strategic ends.
        China's ground forces alone exceed 1 million personnel. 
A large maritime militia supplements its 300-ship navy and 250-ship 
coast guard. Its air forces operate over 2,600 aircraft. It maintains a 
ballistic missile arsenal consisting of 750-1500 short range, 150-450 
medium range, and 80-160 inter-mediate range variants. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Office of the Secretary of Defense ``Annual Report to Congress: 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of 
China''--May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chinese development of nuclear capabilities is 
extensive. The People's Liberation Army Navy intends to increase the 
number of operational SSBN class submarines from four to six. The 
Rocket Forces maintain approximately 90 Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles, including road mobile delivery systems. Rounding out their 
nuclear triad is the People's Liberation Army Air Force's operational 
H-6K, and the prospect of a future nuclear capable stealth strategic 
bomber, estimated to debut in 2025. These delivery systems equipped 
with nuclear weapons give China several ways of reaching the United 
States, and exemplify the PRC's large-scale effort to build larger and 
more capable forces armed with nuclear weapons. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Office of the Secretary of Defense ``Annual Report to Congress: 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of 
China''--May 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Developments in this year's report illustrate that 
China's activities, such as militarization of the South China Sea, 
development of offensive cyber and space capabilities, and legal and 
illicit efforts to acquire sensitive or advanced dual-use technologies 
to support its military objectives, are inconsistent with the rules-
based international order, which has benefited all nations, including 
China.
      Russia: Over the last decade, we have seen this threat 
grow considerably.
        Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its 
doctrine and conduct large-scale exercises. Russia is forecast to spend 
approximately $28 billion by 2020 \3\ to upgrade the capacity of its 
strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and 
strategic bombers. Russia maintains approximately 2,000 non-strategic 
nuclear weapons, including air-to-surface missiles, short-range 
ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and other delivery systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence ``Russia 
Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power 
Aspirations''--June 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia has invested heavily in A2AD capabilities 
intended to prevent an adversary from operating in a particular region, 
including capabilities such as strategic air operations, integrated air 
defense systems, surface to-air-missiles, and coastal defense cruise 
missiles. Russia has also undertaken considerable upgrades of its 
conventional forces while investing heavily in cyber, space, electronic 
warfare, and hybrid warfare capabilities.
        Russia has coupled its investment in new capabilities 
with a litany of destabilizing activities across the world, which in 
many cases result in a loss of innocent lives. For example, Russia 
invaded Georgia in 2008, invaded Crimea in 2014, and continues to 
perpetuate an active conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia continues to 
intervene in the Syrian civil war, propping up the brutal Assad regime, 
and Russian agents used chemical weapons in the attempted assassination 
of Sergey Skripal on the soil of a NATO Ally, the United Kingdom. 
Russia is also using cyber capabilities to advance its military and 
strategic ends.
        Since 2016, Russia has attempted to shape democratic 
elections and referendums in multiple countries.
      Iran: \4\ While Iran is not a great power like China or 
Russia, it continues to improve its military capabilities and work 
through proxy forces with the objective of spreading its influence 
across the Middle East.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ DIA Iran Military Power Report--Unclassified--August 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Over the past six months, Iran has taken aggressive 
steps to seek to disrupt freedom of navigation and the global economy 
with attacks on oil tankers, and sought to destabilize its neighbors 
through both direct attacks and attacks via proxy forces in Yemen, 
Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Iran continues to use violence and seek to 
spread its malign influence--all while continuing to develop, test, and 
field advanced weapon systems.
        The capabilities of the Iranian military have 
progressed although Iran continues to rely on its unconventional 
warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities. Iran has developed and 
fielded a substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles, as well as cruise 
missiles and UAVs designed to target United States forces and our 
partners in the region. Iran is also using cyber capabilities to 
advance its military and strategic ends.
    The fundamental problem we continue to face, as identified by the 
NDS, is the ``erosion of United States competitive military advantage 
vis-a-vis China and Russia,'' while continuing to address threats from 
rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea, and violent extremist 
organizations like ISIS and Al Qaeda.
    It is critical that we continue our work to arrest and reverse this 
trend to regain our competitive military advantage, especially in high-
end warfare. It is also critical that DOD efforts and capabilities 
support USG efforts to counter-Chinese influence activities. We must 
win the competition, as well as the high-end warfare fight. Doing so 
will ensure the United States can continue to deter aggression and 
coercion from those that would seek to supplant the United States and 
challenge the free and open international order that forms the 
foundation of our continued freedom and prosperity.
                     nds validity & implementation
    We are pleased the NDS remains a solid strategy as examined by 
independent reviews. For example, the independent, Congressionally-
established National Defense Strategy Commission's evaluation of NDS in 
2018 determined that it was the right approach for the Department to 
pursue, stating:

        ``[the Commission] supports its [NDS's] candid assessment of 
        the strategic environment, the priority it places on preparing 
        for major power competition and conflict, its emphasis on the 
        enduring value of U.S. alliances and partnerships, and its 
        attention to issues of readiness and lethality.''

    In addition, and in accordance with Congressional mandate, DOD 
conducts a thorough annual review of the NDS and the Department's 
progress in implementing it. In former Acting Secretary Shanahan's 
statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March of this year, 
he stated:

        ``I say with conviction: the NDS remains the most effective 
        aligning mechanism for the Department. Its implementation is 
        our most critical mission . . . Our three primary lines of 
        effort--increasing our military's lethality, strengthening our 
        network of alliances and partnerships, and reforming DOD's 
        business practices--remain the most effective avenues for 
        addressing this challenge [of great power competition].''

    That position has not changed, and the NDS remains the guidepost 
for our Department. Secretary Esper is taking action to reinforce the 
strategy and build upon his predecessors' efforts by rigorously 
structuring and overseeing NDS implementation within the Department to 
focus on great power competition and ``warfighting, today and 
tomorrow.'' Through his guidance, we are actively adjusting to the 
threat environment and reassessing our progress toward NDS priorities. 
This work has resulted in refinements to our approach and changes in 
resourcing.
    The Department's primary job is to provide combat-credible military 
forces to deter war, or to win should deterrence fail. Bolstering our 
military's deterrent capability is therefore job number one. Since the 
NDS's launch, the Department has made significant progress investing to 
modernize and restore high-end readiness in the Joint Force toward this 
purpose, as evidenced in the Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget 
request. We must continue to balance this prioritization of the 
military competition with ongoing operations and activities globally 
that affect military resourcing and readiness--including the security 
challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, terrorism, and other 
contingencies.
    Despite an increase in the scope and scale of the military 
challenges confronting the United States, our military has been 
steadily shrinking over time. At the end of the Korean War in the mid-
1950s, the United States military consisted of approximately 2.9 
million Active Duty forces. Following the conclusion of the Vietnam 
War, the United States had about 2.1 million forces. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States divested additional 
forces until it reached a 1.4 million-person force. Today, our force is 
composed of approximately 1.3 million Active Duty service personnel.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget was the first budget developed since 
the NDS's release and it made significant progress on a range of fronts 
to compete with China and Russia by prioritizing modernization, 
innovation, and high-end readiness. For example:
      Space: The fiscal year 2020 budget requested $14.1 
billion to maintain our competitive edge in this new warfighting 
domain. The Administration also submitted a proposal to Congress to 
establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of the armed forces in 
order to unify, focus and accelerate the establishment of space 
doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats. The 
Department has also created an operational command: U.S Space Command 
focused on the daily operations of our space assets and warfighters, 
and stood up the Space Development Agency to speed development and 
fielding of critical space capabilities;
      Cyber: The President's fiscal year 2020 budget requested 
$9.6 billion, which equates to a 10 percent increase over the fiscal 
year 2019 budget if approved. We are investing $3.7 billion in 
capabilities for our cyber forces, including our teams focused on 
stopping cyber threats outside U.S. networks.
    Within the past year DOD has published a new classified cyber 
strategy, completed a review of our gaps and shortcomings called the 
Cyber Posture Review, revamped authorities, and continued to build out 
the cyber mission force. Additionally, in 2018, alongside DHS we 
initiated the Pathfinder Programs in two critical infrastructure 
sectors--finance and energy--to experiment with innovative ways to 
improve public-private information sharing and collaboration. Most 
critical infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by 
the private sector; we are figuring out how best to work with them to 
improve overall national resilience.

Readiness Initiatives:
      Improving the ability of the Joint Force to be ready to 
fight and win against much larger and more capable force is vitally 
important. Here too the Department has made significant progress 
although more work remains to be done. Some highlights follow.
        Air Force: Of units expected to fight in the first 
weeks of any major combat operation, over 90 percent are ready to 
``fight tonight.'' Since 2017 and as of September 2019, overall Air 
Force readiness increased 17 percent and pacing unit readiness 
increased by 35 percent since April 2018.
        Army: As of March 2019, the Army increased the number 
of brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades at their highest 
state of readiness by 36 percent and 100 percent, respectively, since 
2017.
        Marine Corps: The Marine Corps increased aviation 
readiness--for example, the F/A-18 A-D aircraft mission capable rates 
increased by 12 percent and the number of available mission capable 
aircraft for the CH-53E platform increased by 52 percent. The F-35B 
Joint Strike Fighter completed its first extended 7-month shipboard 
Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment, sustaining a 74 percent mission 
capable rate, and executing its first combat operations.
        Navy: The Navy instituted Performance to Plan (P2P) to 
improved aviation mission capable rates. For example, by the end of 
fiscal year 2019, the Navy achieved its mission capable aircraft target 
goals for F/A-18 E/F Strike Fighter aircraft and EA-18G Electronic 
Attack aircraft to 349 and 96 aircraft, respectively. This was a 19.5 
percent and 14.5 percent increase to mission capable rates for the F/A-
18 E/F and EA-18G, respectively from October 2018.
      Research & Development: Prioritizing the research and 
development of new capabilities. The Department's fiscal year 2020 
budget request for R&D was the largest percentage of the defense budget 
devoted to R&D in 70 years. This includes $7.5 billion in funding to 
develop and field technologies that will create key military advantages 
such as unmanned/autonomous vehicles, hypersonics, Artificial 
Intelligence and machine learning, and directed energy.
      Post-Inf Treaty: New conventional strike options offering 
significant operational utility are now available to be pursued, 
following the August 2019 United States withdrawal from the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty due to Russia's material 
breach. The President's fiscal year 2020 budget submission reflects the 
Department's initial efforts to leverage the military advantages of 
conventional ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles. In August, 
the Department successfully tested a conventional ground-launched 
cruise missile and will soon test a conventional ground-launched 
ballistic missile. These are initial capability demonstrations. The 
Department is concurrently examining options for both the near-term 
adaptations of existing systems, as well as longer-term developmental 
efforts. President's Budget 2020 includes $76 million in fiscal year 
2020 for further work on adapting and testing ground-launched cruise 
missiles.
      Nuclear Enterprise: The U.S. nuclear deterrent is 
dependent on aging nuclear delivery systems, weapons, and Nuclear 
Command, Control, and Communications built during the Cold War. 
Repeated decisions to defer recapitalization have led to a deterrent 
force in which most systems were extended for decades beyond their 
initial design lives. The portfolio of nuclear modernization and 
sustainment programs is extraordinarily complex and interconnected, and 
entails high risk as we transition from legacy to modern systems. In 
recent years, both the Obama and Trump Administrations have funded the 
nuclear program of record and, for fiscal year 2020, the President's 
Budget Request funds DOD Nuclear Enterprise Program of Record at about 
$24.9 billion, which includes $8.4 billion for modernization/
recapitalization and $16.5 billion for sustainment and operations.
    Competitive investments alone will not deter China and Russia. 
Great power competition also means that the Department must develop new 
concepts and organizational approaches for force employment and design, 
posture, and warfighting. DOD is building increased flexibility and 
responsiveness into our global force posture, allowing us the ability 
to dynamically flow capabilities to global hotspots on short notice. 
Our aim is to be strategically predictable, yet operationally 
unpredictable.
                         working with wider usg
    The Department recognizes it is one piece of the Federal 
Government. DOD supports its interagency partners to ensure that we 
challenge and mitigate China's and Russia's malign diplomatic, 
informational, economic, and military efforts to undermine global 
security and reshape the rules-based international order in their 
favor. This endeavor is highly dependent not only on collaborating 
across our government, but also on our close cooperation with allies 
and partners, to ensure regional balances of power remain favorable to 
our mutual interests. The measure of success in competition will lie in 
the United States' ability to compete with these two powers from a 
sustained position of strategic military and economic advantage.
                           allies & partners
    The Department is also strengthening and leveraging America's 
network of allies and partners to compete with China and Russia. The 
NDS highlighted:

        ``Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to 
        our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic 
        advantage that no competitor can rival or match . . . By 
        working together with allies and partners we amass the greatest 
        possible strength for the long-term advancement of our 
        interests, maintaining favorable balances of power that deter 
        aggression and support that stability that generates economic 
        growth.''

    Building a constellation of strong allies and partners is therefore 
a foundational pillar of the Strategy, one of our greatest strategic 
advantages over our competitors, and it requires care and attention. As 
our competitors seek to advance their own revisionist view of the 
world, consistent with their authoritarian models, we understand that 
their strategies involve isolating and trying to gain leverage over 
countries through predatory approaches and intimidation.
    To remain competitive in this environment, the Department is 
pursuing several measures to bolster our defense relationships. In some 
cases, this necessitates hard conversations to ensure appropriate 
burden-sharing and targeted capability development, as we take steps 
together to address shared challenges.
    Our Allies and Partners are stepping up their efforts. Just this 
week, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that 2019 
defense spending across European Allies and Canada increased in real 
terms by 4.6 percent, the fifth consecutive year of growth. By the end 
of 2020, these Allies will have added an additional $130 billion since 
2016, and this accumulated increase in defense spending is projected by 
the NATO Secretary General to rise to $400 billion by 2024. As 
Secretary General Soltenberg has said, this is `` . . . unprecedented 
progress and it is making NATO stronger.'' We continue to encourage our 
Allies to direct defense spending increases to enhancing capabilities 
and readiness.
    At the December Leaders Meeting, NATO recognized the Alliance needs 
to address the opportunities and challenges presented by China's 
growing influence and international policies. NATO is also devoting 
attention and resources to face 21st Century challenges such as hybrid 
threats. In 2018, NATO agreed to establish Counter Hybrid Support Teams 
(CHST), which provide tailored, targeted assistance to Allies, upon 
their request, in preparing for and responding to hybrid activities. 
The first CHST deployed to Montenegro in November 2019.
    In the Indo-Pacific, DOD is strengthening and evolving U.S. 
partnerships into a security architecture that helps uphold a ``free 
and open'' order characterized by 1) respect for sovereignty and 
independence of every nation, no matter its size; 2) peaceful dispute 
resolution without coercion; 3) free, fair, and reciprocal trade and 
investment; and 4) adherence to international rules and norms. For 
example:
      Japan: In Japan, we are integrating NDS implementation 
with Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines and participating in 
ongoing defense dialogues to re-evaluate roles, missions and 
capabilities while increasing operational readiness and training. DOD 
is also increasing cooperation in space, cyberspace, the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and artificial intelligence as well as cross-
domain operations.
      India: With India, we are committed to a common vision 
for the United States-India Major Defense Partnership, which we will 
advance at a ``2+2'' Ministerial on December 18 in Washington, DC. We 
have agreed to expand military-to-military cooperation and improve 
interoperability, including by establishing a new tri-service 
amphibious exercise, TIGER TRIUMPH.
      Singapore: No country in Southeast Asia does more than 
Singapore to enable a United States forward presence in the Indo-
Pacific. More than 100 United States ships and 800-1,000 United States 
aircraft transit through Singapore each year. Singapore supports our 
rotational deployment of our littoral combat ships and P-8 aircraft. 
Singapore forces have four active training units stationed in the 
United States. We expect to agree soon on a permanent Singapore fighter 
training presence in Guam. Singapore also is a top purchaser of 
advanced United States weapons systems.
      Taiwan: Consistent with the policy articulated in the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the United States continues to make available to 
Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain sufficient self-defense capability. This year DOD has approved 
over $10 billion in defense sales such as M1A2 Abrams tanks and F-16s 
fighters to recapitalize its force. We are supporting their development 
of more mobile, survivable, and asymmetric capabilities. The ultimate 
goal is to develop a more combat credible force.
      Vietnam: In Vietnam, we are building a productive defense 
relationship and overcoming the legacy of the Vietnam War. For example, 
last year the U.S. Navy conducted the first aircraft carrier visit to 
that nation since the end of the War. The United States has also 
transferred a high-endurance Coast Guard cutter to Vietnam and 
Secretary Esper announced during his visit to Hanoi two weeks ago that 
the United States will provide a second such cutter to Vietnam.
      Pacific Islands: In the Pacific Islands, DOD is enhancing 
our engagement to promote our status as a security partner of choice.
    DOD is also planning to invest $521 million over the next five 
years in programs like the Maritime Security Initiative to build the 
capacity of our allies and partners in the region, including developing 
partners' ability to conduct maritime security and maritime domain 
awareness operations, and advancing interoperability with U.S. Forces.
                               conclusion
    The NDS represents a major shift, unachievable in just one year. We 
still have important work ahead of us to design a more lethal, 
resilient and ready force; solve tough operational problems; build a 
combat-credible forward presence, and work with allies and partners. 
Innovative concepts, analysis, and additional investments will be 
critical. The NDS remains our guidepost and we are determined to 
deliver on its priorities.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and Lieutenant 
General Allvin and I look forward to your questions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    General Allvin?

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID W. ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR 
          FOR STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT STAFF

    Lieutenant General Allvin. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member 
Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning, 
and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 
appreciate the chance to update you on the global strategic 
challenges and National Defense Strategy implementation.
    As the Secretary's National Defense Strategy details global 
strategic challenges and provides the guidance for the entire 
Department, the national military strategy describes how the 
joint force implements that direction.
    In addition to addressing our great power competitors, it 
provides the joint force with the guidance that crosswalks the 
mission areas of assuring and strengthening allies and 
partners, competing below the level of armed conflict, 
deterring conventional attacks, deterring strategic attacks, 
and responding to threats. Great power competition remains the 
joint force priority, demanding that we make planning, force 
employment, force development, and force design decisions that 
ensure long-term United States competitive advantage against 
the revisionist powers of China and Russia.
    The joint force is addressing these challenges by focusing 
on building a more lethal force, modernizing our key 
capabilities and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. 
However, the joint force must remain postured to respond to 
more than just those priority challenges. For example, the 
dynamic threats within United States Central Command AOR [area 
of responsibility] jeopardize the regional stability and demand 
focus as well.
    Dealing with these threats has resulted in the reallocation 
of some resources within the year of execution, with potential 
ripple effects on readiness across the future year's defense 
program. This creates a strategic tension between our response 
to emergent threats and our ability to sustain investments in 
future readiness and that competitive advantage. Addressing 
this tension is a continuous and dynamic endeavor.
    Underpinning the joint force's approach to this strategic 
environment of today and tomorrow is the foundation of global 
integration. Simply put, the character of war is changing. 
Adversaries operate across regions and domains and they seek 
gaps and seams that they can exploit to gain asymmetric 
advantage. On the joint staff, we are adapting our processes 
and our products to adjust to this reality, and we are working 
closely with the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff 
to ensure that our efforts are complementary and mutually 
support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
    With the support of all the services and all the combatant 
commands, we have completed three globally integrated base plan 
reviews and are currently conducting a fourth. These reviews 
look beyond just the typical single contingency plan and view 
the potential conflicts from a global perspective, accounting 
for the global nature of the threat, as well as understanding 
the activities outside the main conflict area that will compete 
for resources.
    With the completion of each review, we have incorporated 
lessons learned into the Department's NDS implementation 
efforts and identified tasks to improve readiness on a global 
scale. In his role as the global integrator, Chairman Milley 
remains focused on capturing a comprehensive review informed by 
the combatant commanders and the joint chiefs so that he may 
provide military advice to Secretary Esper and the President 
that reflects the global nature of the threats and the inherent 
tensions that exist across geographic boundaries and time 
horizons.
    Once again, thank you for the opportunity to speak today, 
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you both.
    In my opening remarks, I referred to the 14,000 in what I 
believe was an erroneous article in a newspaper. Do you want to 
clarify that for us, Secretary Rood?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, Senator. That is an erroneous item.
    First, we are observing Iran's behavior with concern. As 
you know, in recent months they have conducted some attacks on 
shipping, on the Saudi oil facilities, and on an American UAV 
[unmanned aerial vehicle]. We continue to see threat reporting 
that concerns us as well.
    We have deployed 14,000 troops over the last 6 months, many 
of those on ships and air bases and other things in the region. 
The Secretary and others are continuing to look at that threat 
picture and have the ability to dynamically adjust our force 
posture, but we have not made a decision to deploy an 
additional 14,000 troops.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That is clarification. We had a lot 
of calls on that, and I appreciate that.
    To both of you, we know that some of the missions will have 
to be scaled back and some programs will be cut, but they need 
to be the right missions and the right programs. We do not want 
a repeat of the past where we cut programs like the F-22 and 
ever since then, we knew that we made a mistake, and we gave up 
long-range artillery only to realize our mistake years later.
    Can you give us specific examples of missions or programs 
that DOD has already either scaled back or are planning to 
scale back in the future?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, as you know, we are investing 
additional resources in new areas of investment. I highlighted 
some of those in my prepared testimony, written testimony, for 
things like hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed 
energy.
    There are some older legacy systems where the Department 
has made decisions--the services have made decisions not to 
pursue them. For example, last year in the budget request, the 
Navy chose to move forward with new aircraft and retire older 
ones, F/A-18C and D models as an example. The Navy made a 
decision not to move forward with additional Nimitz-class and 
instead to look to the future--Nimitz-class carriers I should 
say. There are other examples like that in the Army and Air 
Force where decisions were made for older legacy systems to 
purchase fewer of them or to phase them out in favor of newer 
capabilities for the future.
    Chairman Inhofe. You know, this is a little off subject, 
but it is closely related. I recall the time that you were the 
commander of Altus Air Force Base, and right down the road at 
Fort Sill, we were undergoing all kinds of problem at that 
time. The Crusader--I will never forget. We were all prepared, 
ready to do. Oh, it is going to be good. We spent $2 billion. 
Wham. It was axed. Then the Future Combat System came up. Same 
thing. In fact, you were there at the time, not that you had 
anything to do with it because you were next door. But 
nonetheless, that was $20 billion. But that is the kind of 
thing that we have to make sure does not happen again. 
Hopefully, we learned the lesson.
    We cannot keep up business as usual with our competitors, 
especially China because the threat is changing so quickly. For 
example, few predicted the spread of China's overseas military 
presence starting in Djibouti. Prior to that, most of the 
activity began within the city limits of China. This is where 
everything was starting. It was Djibouti, the first time that 
actually they started such an effort in a foreign country. Now 
that has spread all the way down as far south as Tanzania and 
other places.
    Then you skip over and you see what they are doing at the 
same time in the South China Sea. We had a group of us, some of 
us up at this dais, that were over there observing when they 
first started all of the building of the islands and these 
things.
    You have to wonder where they come up with all these 
resources. How can they continue to do this all over? A lot of 
times people who are adverse to supporting a strong defense 
will come up and they will talk about how China and Russia 
together do not spend half of what we spend over here. But the 
biggest expense, as we all know, is end strength. It is our 
people. After last week's hearing on how we are taking so much 
of a concern over our people, they do not have that problem. 
They give them a gun and say go out and kill people.
    Anyway, that is something of a great concern, and I know 
that you are concentrating your efforts there and that is 
justly where you should be doing that. Thank you for that.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    As the NDS has indicated, Russia is now one of our major 
peer competitors. Some of the most sophisticated techniques 
they are using are hybrid warfare, not direct conventional 
conflict, but hybrid warfare. The most relevant example of that 
is the 2016 election. We have had three independent analyses: 
our intelligence community, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence 
Committee, and also the Mueller report concluding that there 
was, in the words of Mueller--``sweeping in a systematic 
fashion, involvement of Russia in hybrid operations with the 
intent of affecting the outcome of our election.'' Indeed, the 
public reports in 2018 based upon National Defense Act 
authorization, CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] took offensive actions 
to disrupt these operations.
    One issue, though, that has come kind of recently into 
focus is whether or not the 2016 election was interfered with 
in the manner described by the intelligence community. 
Secretary Rood, do you concur with the intelligence community, 
the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, and the Mueller 
commission that this was done in a systematic way with the 
purpose of disrupting our election?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, the intelligence community 
concluded that Russia had an effort to influence the 2016 
elections, as you know. As I have testified before, I have no 
reason to question the intelligence community's judgment. I did 
not serve in government at that time, but I assume that their 
conclusions are accurate and endorse them.
    Senator Reed. Also it prompted in some respects, given our 
authorization, the activities of CYBERCOM before the 2018 
election. Is that accurate?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. As you know, prior to the midterm 
elections last year, the various organs of government, led by 
the Department of Homeland Security, had a concerted effort to 
protect those elections from outside interference. The Defense 
Department played a much larger role than in the past, led by 
Cyber Command. While the particulars are classified, I would 
say we made no secret of that prior to the election we were 
going to do that.
    One of the areas I find quite satisfying is if you look 
back in all of our memories of how did we regard those 
elections, we regard them by the results. That is the main 
thing everyone is focused on. There is a reason that the 
results happened without interference, and we are very proud of 
the work of the United States Government to ensure that.
    Senator Reed. The Department of Defense is anticipating 
that the Russians will be engaged in this 2020 election.
    Secretary Rood. We certainly hope they will not do that, 
but we are prepared for that eventuality and we are engaging 
with our other interagency partners to provide capability.
    Senator Reed. Let me turn to Syria now. The Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) made an assessment, in their words, 
that ISIS has exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent 
drawdown of United States troops from northeastern Syria to 
reconstitute its capabilities and resources both within Syria 
in the short term and globally in the long term. That is one 
conclusion.
    Second conclusion. ISIS will likely use the security vacuum 
in northeast Syria to target the West because it will likely 
have more time and space to plan attacks and provide support to 
its 19 global branches or networks.
    Finally, their conclusion. Absent counterterrorism pressure 
in Syria, ISIS would probably have an opportunity to regain 
control of some Syrian populations and be better postured to 
launch external attacks and expand its global footprint.
    Again, Secretary Rood, do you agree with those assessments 
by DIA?
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Reed. Is the residual United States presence that 
we have in country adequate to thwart those aspirations by 
ISIS?
    Secretary Rood. Well, time will tell, but where we are at 
right now is we have made some adjustments, as Secretary Esper 
and others have noted. We have a residual presence there. As he 
mentioned yesterday, about 600 troops will stay.
    A key thing to mention, Senator, is our campaign in Syria 
is by, with, and through our Syrian Democratic allies. We are 
working very closely with those partners to improve their 
capabilities, and counter-ISIS operations are underway. But our 
key strength of our effort will be the degree to which we can 
enable our partner force to continue those activities backed by 
United States and other allied capabilities. But we do intend 
to continue the Defeat ISIS mission, sir.
    Senator Reed. Just a final question, as my time expires.
    One of the factors that was introduced by the withdrawal 
was at least discussions between the Syrian regime and the SDF 
Kurdish forces for some if not cooperation, at least the less 
antagonism. Let me put it that way. Have you sensed that the 
SDF is in play, i.e., between the Syrian regime supporting them 
and continuing working with us?
    Secretary Rood. We are aware that the SDF has been engaging 
in dialogue with the Syrian regime. They have told us about 
that. That is part of the benefit of the partnership is that 
they are open with us. That is a matter for the SDF to make 
their own decisions, and after all, these are people who are 
from Syria. They live in Syria. They were born there, raised 
there. Their self-identity is as Syrians. It would be natural 
that they would want to live in a Syrian state.
    From our perspective in the United States, our partnership 
is about the defeat of ISIS with those folks. But we are aware 
of and understand that they are having this type of dialogue 
with the Syrian regime.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, the National Defense Strategy Commission's 
report recommended between a 3 and a 5 percent annual real 
growth in defense spending would be necessary to adequately 
resource the NDS. That report was released about a year ago, 
and since then we have passed a budget deal that keeps defense 
spending essentially flat between fiscal year 2020 and fiscal 
year 2021. Also, we are still on a continuing resolution (CR) 
almost a quarter of the way through the fiscal year. We still 
do not have a defense authorization bill.
    First, do you believe that we will be able to meet the 
goals of the NDS on flat budgets?
    Secretary Rood. We are planning for a situation that we are 
likely to face with flat budgets as our planning assumption. 
Obviously, additional funds make it easier to do things than 
fewer funds, but the administration understands there are a 
number of things in play. What we have been allocated from the 
Office of Management Budget and others is a certain portion of 
the overall Federal budget, and we are planning for something 
that will be flat.
    Senator Fischer. Will the goals be met of the NDS within 
the time frame of it?
    Secretary Rood. Well, that is the challenge before us. You 
mentioned continuing resolutions. That is one of the things 
that makes it much more difficult. In addition to having to 
live in this present case at $19 billion at the continuing 
resolution level below last year's funding level, it is also 
highly disruptive to the planning and operation, and 
substantially reduces, by the time you are done with the year, 
the purchasing power of the government. One hundred dollars 
does not buy $100 worth of products at the end of the year if 
provided later in the fiscal year and with the disruption 
caused by CRs.
    Senator Fischer. I know the Department is looking to 
generate savings by reorienting resources away from activities 
that do not support NDS. Is that correct?
    Secretary Rood. That is correct. We are trying to emphasize 
the priorities in the NDS much more substantially than those 
that are lower priority items. One of the virtues of the NDS is 
it does make hard choices.
    Senator Fischer. Can you talk about the role that you play 
in that effort? Is there policy direction that guides 
determinations about whether missions or activities support the 
NDS?
    Secretary Rood. There is policy guidance that has a bearing 
on that, although I am certainly not the only stakeholder that 
has an influence on that in the Department. There are quite a 
few officials that play very substantial roles.
    Senator Fischer. Has that been given to the services and 
the combatant commands on how they should prioritize their 
activities?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, from the Secretary of Defense I would 
add, Senator, not from me individually. The Secretary of 
Defense each year promulgates guidance that my office takes the 
lead in preparing for him for those resource allocations.
    Senator Fischer. That will be true of the fiscal year 2021 
budget as that is being built as well?
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Fischer. Looking at the realities of revenue and 
making tough decisions on how we can even implement the NDS?
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Fischer. General Allvin, can you talk about the 
Joint Chiefs' role in this process?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Yes, Senator. The Chairman 
really gathers the inputs from the combatant commands as they 
understand through the National Military Strategy with the 
guidance of the NDS on how they would execute those priorities 
and the requirements that they have. The Joint Chiefs also 
heavily participate, as they have feet in both camps, in 
understanding the organize, train, and equip in Title 10, and 
in understanding the requirements of the combatant commands.
    Now, there is an extensive series of dialogues that go 
through. You probably heard of the tanks. We have a tank 
process. It is a bureaucratic process that terminates with the 
Chairman, with the Joint Chiefs, and all of the combatant 
commanders discussing those combatant command priorities in the 
context of the overall National Defense Strategy. When we talk 
about global integration, as I mentioned in my opening 
comments, this is why it is critical for the Chairman to be 
able to have that comprehensive view so when he makes a 
recommendation to the Secretary, it really is understanding the 
entirety of the NDS and some of those hard choices the 
secretary already alluded to. There is a strong advisory role 
and a continuous dialogue with the Joint Chiefs.
    Senator Fischer. As we move forward and look at really the 
importance of having that joint command between all of our 
services in dealing with the challenges we face in this world, 
I hope you will all come before this Committee and stress the 
needs that we have for the resources in order to meet those 
challenges. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary Rood and General Allvin, for being 
here and for your service to the country.
    During the NATO meetings this week, President Trump 
suggested that one of the biggest threats to the world is 
nuclear weapons. At least that is what I inferred him to say. 
He mentioned that Russia wants to make a deal on arms control.
    What is DOD's position on the extension of the New START 
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty, which could be done 
any time before it expires in February 2021 just by mutual 
agreement without needing to come back to Congress?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, at DOD we work in support of the 
broader government approach on this area. As the President 
said, his desire is to negotiate a nuclear arms deal with both 
Russia and China that would limit arsenals. We have been in 
support of that broader objective and the State Department 
takes the lead there.
    With respect to your question on New START, of course, it 
expires, as you mentioned, in February of 2021. We do have some 
time until that time. In accordance with the terms of the 
treaty, it may be extended by mutual agreement of the parties, 
no need to renegotiate the portions of the treaty, simply to 
agree on the period of time from 0 to 5 years that it would be 
extended by mutual agreement.
    Senator Shaheen. Why would we not want to go ahead and 
extend New START before it expires and allow ourselves the time 
to continue to negotiate with China, with some of the other 
issues that we would like to bring into any new arms control 
agreement, which will take a significant amount of time? As I 
remember the negotiations around New START were over 2 years 
long. Why would that not be beneficial to the United States? 
Because it would continue not just the opportunities it gives 
us for transparency to look at the verification pieces that are 
part of New START with what Russia is doing but also to try and 
keep the weapons limits at what they are today under the 
treaty.
    Secretary Rood. Well, Senator, if the United States were to 
agree to extend the treaty now, I think it would make it less 
likely that we would have the ability to persuade Russia and 
China to enter negotiations on a broader agreement. China has 
not participated in these similar arms control agreements, as 
you know, in the past.
    We do retain time until February 2021. To state the 
obvious, today it is 2019. There would not need to be a lot of 
negotiation required if there was a decision by the United 
States and Russia to extend the treaty, just merely agreeing on 
the time period.
    Senator Shaheen. But Russia has also suggested that they 
are interested in doing that, and if we are both interested, 
then we could work together to try and bring China in. I will 
not ask you to respond again because you have indicated your 
position on it. But it just seems to me like it would make 
sense for us to give ourselves more time to negotiate, and the 
suggestion that we cannot extend it I think is sort of a red 
herring.
    But I want to go to South Korea and Japan. Would you agree 
that those are our two strongest allies in the Far East?
    Secretary Rood. I would agree they are very strong allies 
in the Far East.
    Senator Shaheen. Reports have suggested that the 
administration has asked for more than a five-fold increase in 
payments from South Korea in the special measures agreement 
negotiations and that one of the things we have seen--I think 
there is some suggestion that there is a correlation--is that 
it has produced some demonstrations in South Korea against the 
United States and our continued presence in South Korea. There 
are reports that if we cannot agree on the cost sharing 
negotiations, that the Pentagon may pull out a brigade from 
Korea.
    Can you comment on that? Is that accurate? What is your 
assessment of the situation there?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, on the point you made about 
potentially withdrawing troops, Secretary Esper addressed that 
in public remarks within the last few days stating that that is 
not accurate and that is not something that we are planning to 
do.
    With respect to the negotiations, there are negotiations. I 
would point out they are led by the State Department on a 
special measures agreement, the next version of it. While the 
specifics of it I will not go into in a public forum, in open 
forum, it is fair to say the United States is asking our allies 
to increase the portion of the burden that they bear.
    But I do want to hasten to add the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
has been a close and longstanding partner of the United States. 
We enjoy a very good, very close military-to-military 
relationship. That is very, very important to us in the 
Pentagon, in the United States to preserve the vitality of that 
as the Koreans like to say. It is very unique, as you know, to 
have a combined command between the ROK forces and United 
States forces. They are the ones with much larger forces on the 
Korean Peninsula. As our Korean colleagues like to say, the 
saying of the command is we go together, and that is our 
approach.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I am glad to hear you say that and 
appreciated your remarks in your opening statement about the 
importance of our allies to helping to ensure our national 
security. I think it would be disappointing if we could not 
reach an agreement with South Korea on the sharing of the cost 
of keeping troops there and supporting security both for us and 
for South Korea.
    Secretary Rood. I fully agree and I believe it is the 
Senate custom to say I associate with those remarks, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today.
    This is a very important hearing. As we know, America's 
place in the world is being threatened, of course, by our peer 
adversaries, and they have spent decades studying us, studying 
our behaviors. All the while, they have been able to modernize 
their forces and continually improve their own warfighting 
doctrine.
    It is really incumbent that we do everything we can to 
maintain our military and our technological edge, and I would 
like to focus in a little bit on that through my line of 
questioning. As we are doing that, the technologies that I 
would like to focus on, things that I have been very interested 
in, of course, artificial intelligence, making sure that we are 
acquiring the right systems, and of course, making sure that 
while we are doing that, we are also eliminating waste and 
protecting our taxpayer dollars. That will be important as we 
move forward because we struggle in Congress with things like 
this year, passing the National Defense Authorization Act and 
getting a spending bill for the Department of Defense approved 
and passed. We do have to get that done. We owe that to our 
servicemembers.
    I would like to start again by discussing some of these 
issues and tying them to spending. I have said over and over 
again, we can be both a defense hawk and a fiscal hawk. I think 
that is really important.
    Now, Mr. Rood and General, you have discussed some of the 
programs that the services are cutting back on. You mentioned 
the F/A-18 Charlie and Delta, the Nimitz-class carriers, and 
other legacy systems. But are we seeing any obstacles to doing 
that, retiring legacy systems? I would like to focus a little 
bit on our inability to pass a spending bill and how that ties 
to a continuing resolution. How can we retire legacy systems 
when we cannot invest in the new types of technologies that we 
need? We cannot start new programs.
    Mr. Secretary, could you address that please?
    Secretary Rood. Well, Senator, you are exactly right. That 
is one of the substantial problems with continuing resolutions, 
particularly if they extend for continuing periods of time, 
because hard decisions are made on different budget choices. 
Believe me, that is a very vigorous debate inside the Pentagon. 
But to get to the point where hard decisions are made to retire 
older systems, to begin moving forward with new systems, you 
are prohibited from doing it, as you know, in a new start under 
continuing resolutions.
    Secondly, the delay in time in the fiscal year, if the 
money is approved, let us say, at the halfway point of the 
fiscal year, from the time that we complete then the 
apportionment of it within the executive branch to the time it 
reaches the program manager to get to the right vendors to do 
the work, there is a substantial time lag, which reduces the 
amount of time to actually do the transformation to do the 
work. This is why I say it reduces the purchasing power of the 
United States substantially.
    We every day in the Defense Department write thousands of 
contracts, thousands of change orders. Each and every time 
there is a change to those funding authorities, contracting 
people like a giant machine are churning out things to 
accommodate for each and every one of those changes. It is an 
enormous amount of work that is disruptive. Predictable, stable 
funding is quite valued.
    Senator Ernst. Yes. It sounds like we put you in a very 
difficult position when we cannot get these spending bills 
done.
    Lieutenant General Allvin, again, talking about things that 
I think would improve efficiency within the DOD, things like 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, our near-peer 
adversaries like Russia and China have really focused on those 
types of technologies.
    Can you talk a little bit about where we can see cost 
savings if we were to use things like artificial intelligence?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Senator, I think a couple 
examples come to mind, but I think I would also like to talk a 
little bit about the actual warfighting advantages, which are 
significant.
    Senator Ernst. Please do.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. On the savings part, obviously 
there are certain things we are doing, whether it be in the 
entire intelligence scheme of things where there are man-hours 
that are being committed to analyzing things that perhaps 
through recognition software and other algorithms that machines 
can do that can limit the humans to do the things that only 
humans can do through our cognitive domain, which would save 
massive amounts of resources and time and human resources.
    But also with respect to the capabilities that it provides, 
you mentioned in your opening, Senator, that they have spent 
decades studying what we have done. When we look at where our 
adversaries are going, they are trying to take advantage of 
doing things early before we can take our forces and get ready 
to deploy in a very decisive operation. Speed is key. The idea 
that artificial intelligence can aid us in decision speed and 
in execution speed puts us inside of their decision loops and 
puts them on the horns of dilemmas with decision paralysis, if 
you will. That is very, very key because this 21st century 
warfare that we are leaning into with these two competitors is 
going to be largely about who can generate speed, tempo, 
agility, and resilience. Artificial intelligence and some of 
these other capabilities are part and parcel and central to 
that proposition.
    Senator Ernst. Outstanding. Exceptional response, General.
    Thank you very much, gentlemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood, did I hear you correctly 
that our counter-ISIS, our Syria strategy is by, with, and 
through our partner force?
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Heinrich. The administration abandoned our partner 
force. I do not understand how you can say that with a straight 
face. How did it impact our strategy to stand down as the Turks 
pushed our Kurdish allies out of northern Syria?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, what I would say to you is, as we 
speak, we are continuing our partnership with the Syrian 
Democratic Forces and, in fact, in recent days have conducted 
combined operations.
    Senator Heinrich. How has that impacted our credibility as 
we stood down while Turkish forces pushed our allies out of 
northern Syria? Did it positively impact our strategy in the 
region?
    Secretary Rood. What I would say to you is that we have 
maintained our relationship with the SDF. When the Turks were 
preparing to conduct their military operation into Syria--I 
want to be clear--we discouraged the Turks from taking that 
military----
    Senator Heinrich. Was that effective?
    Secretary Rood. Well, I would say, Senator, the Turks began 
threatening to do that incursion a year ago, and we engaged in 
discouragement. It was effective for much of the year, but 
ultimately----
    Senator Heinrich. I would make the point that it sends a 
very dangerous message to our allies and our partners in the 
region if this is how we stand up for them when the chips are 
down.
    Lieutenant General Allvin, I could not agree more with what 
you said about artificial intelligence. One of the things I am 
concerned about is given the theft of intellectual property 
that we have seen from some of our near-peer competitors, how 
does the Pentagon make sure that the things that we develop to 
get inside those decision feedback loops do not simply get 
stolen? Particularly when open source algorithms are put on the 
Web, that we do not develop the leading-edge technology and 
simply see that adopted by our competitors?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Senator, I can speak somewhat to 
that I think because largely it becomes a relationship between 
us and the defense industrial base. I do not know if the 
Secretary has anything to add to this, but it really becomes 
understanding this relationship about what is there in the 
commercial industry that in and of itself maybe does not 
qualify as classified, but when it is aggregated with others, 
can put together pieces that in the aggregate can be 
classified.
    I know that within the Department with the DOD CIO [Chief 
Information Officer] and our Joint Staff J-6 working very hard 
to understand where those gaps might be to work with policy on 
how we may be able to work with the other elements of OSD to be 
able to, when we interact with industry, have them have a 
better understanding of the part that they play in the whole 
where they may be unwitting or certainly not malign in their 
intent, but that their activities, when put together with other 
activities, generate that threat. That is something we have 
been seriously working on.
    I do not know if the Secretary has anything to add to that.
    Secretary Rood. Only that, Senator, as you know, there is a 
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that the Department 
has stood up headed by a three-star general that has the 
primary responsibility for this. The challenge you mentioned is 
one of the things that they are certainly trying to address.
    Senator Heinrich. It seems to me that the place we should 
be moving fastest with regard to AI today is imaging. You know, 
when you have a human being looking at images for hours and 
hours, it gets harder and harder for a human to focus, whereas 
when AI looks at images, it is clear that it actually learns 
and gets better over time.
    How effectively are we employing the kind of artificial 
intelligence that is straightforward that we know works, 
particularly with regard to imaging, so that we can save those 
human eyes for when it really matters?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, I know that that is one of the 
things that has been looked at and work is underway. I have to 
say it is beyond my area of responsibility.
    I will say, though, on your general point, you are exactly 
correct. I began my career as an imagery analyst in the 
intelligence community and literally spent all day looking at 
images. I can say every time I discovered something new, the 
first thing I did, after I got the aha moment, was go back in 
time because I was certain I had missed it before to see where 
I had been able to find that because I was taught in school--
you probably were too--to find a trend, you need at least three 
points to draw a straight line. By the time the third or fourth 
one registered in your mind that there was a pattern of 
activity, I went backwards. Artificial intelligence holds 
substantial promise.
    In terms of your specific question as to how much work the 
Department is doing in that area, we would have to check with 
the JAIC folks and others to get a response to you, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. I would appreciate that. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Scott?
    Senator Scott. Thanks to both of you for being here.
    We all watched over the last--I think it started in this 
summer--the protests in Hong Kong, and then Congress rightfully 
passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. Then I 
guess the first thing that Communist China has done since is 
not allow our Navy vessels into Hong Kong.
    How do you think any of those actions, what the protest 
did, the President's signing of the bill, and China's actions 
with regard to not allowing military ships into Hong Kong--how 
is that going to change the dynamics in that part of the world?
    Secretary Rood. Well, I will start, and General Allvin, if 
you have anything to add, please do.
    With respect to the port visit by a United States carrier 
and others, we were disappointed that the Chinese indicated 
that they would not allow for that in Hong Kong. But I would 
hasten to add this is not the first time that we have 
experienced this. The Chinese Government periodically over the 
years has either allowed or not allowed port visits that we 
have requested by our naval vessels. In that sense, it was not 
noteworthy in its denial. But nonetheless, we obviously made 
the request and we would like to conduct those visits.
    I think we are watching, all of us, with concern what is 
going on in Hong Kong, and certainly the President was 
supportive of the legislation passed by the Congress or he 
would not have signed it. The concern that we have about seeing 
the aspirations and the rights of the people, their respect is 
certainly strong. Now, I would hasten to add it is the primary 
mission of the State Department that they have taken a lead on 
that, but we in the Defense Department are watching that very 
carefully.
    Senator Scott. With regard to Taiwan, what should we be 
doing that we are not doing to make sure we continue to support 
them so hopefully China will not take any military action 
against Taiwan? What else should we be doing that we are not 
doing, and how else can we be supportive? Is there anything 
Congress should be doing to be supportive of Taiwan?
    Secretary Rood. Certainly consistent with the Taiwan 
Relations Act, we are continuing to provide armaments and other 
training to our colleagues in Taiwan. That remains an important 
area to deter potential attack to support, as the Taiwan 
Relations Act identifies, the legitimate defense needs of the 
people in Taiwan. We continue with that activity in addition to 
working directly with the Taiwan authorities. Of course, we in 
the Defense Department are doing a number of things in and 
around that region to make clear that, for instance, freedom of 
navigation must be continued to demonstrate our resolve to 
deter aggression and to be present for our allies, Senator.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. I fully agree with Secretary 
Rood. I would say for balancing out the last point, which 
really it is not so much about Taiwan itself--obviously, Taiwan 
is, as Secretary Rood said--we are acting in accordance with 
the Taiwan Relations Act. But really in the region, the 
activities that we are doing in the region--this is really part 
of the competition, understanding that the freedom of 
navigation in the internationally recognized waters. This is, 
by the way, not only just the United States. This is part of 
working with allies and partners to show that this is an 
international norm that we are reinforcing. This is this 
competition of the ideas of there is a rules-based order and 
there is the other. With INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], with 
Admiral Davidson leading INDOPACOM, leveraging not just at 
Taiwan but in that surrounding region, that this is an area 
against which a free and open Indo-Pacific is important. Taiwan 
is just one element of that understanding. It could be a hot 
button issue for the Chinese, but also there is a Taiwan 
Relations Act that we are supporting.
    Senator Scott. Do our naval vessels visit Taiwan just like 
they visit Hong Kong?
    Secretary Rood. Not on a regular basis, but we have had 
them visit there before.
    Senator Scott. Does it make sense to, when China says we 
cannot go into Hong Kong, make sure that we take those vessels 
and have visits to Taiwan to show support of Taiwan?
    Secretary Rood. We always evaluate where--and I will say 
that ``we'' being typically the Indo-Pacific Command 
leadership--would be an appropriate stop for crew rest, for 
port visits and those type of things. I do know if, General 
Allvin, you want to add anything.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. This is probably getting into 
Admiral Davidson's business, but to the Secretary's point, 
there is a broad range of issues, whether it is the refueling 
and refitting, the capability for the port to be able to accept 
it, et cetera. Acknowledging your point, Senator, that there is 
sort of a diplomatic message that could be sent, I think there 
is also a practical concern about leveraging those port visits 
throughout the theater.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rood, the United Nations (UN) Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons reached a general agreement that 
meaningful human control over lethal autonomous weapon systems 
is necessary. With these systems that may be impossible to 
understand how engagement decisions are made, as I believe you 
know. The software and algorithms of these systems are 
proprietary information, and other nations are unlikely to 
disclose information to prove that there is meaningful human 
control involved in the deployment of them. We have concerns 
about that because if you take the human out of the loop, you 
may achieve significant tactical advantage in a battle 
situation.
    In November, Secretary of Defense Esper confirmed that 
China is exporting drones to the Middle East that they claim 
have lethal autonomous capability. The Chinese company Ziyan 
markets the Blowfish A3, which is basically a helicopter drone 
armed with a machine gun. Ziyan quotes--this is their quote: 
``autonomously performs more complex combat missions, including 
fixed point timing detection, fixed range reconnaissance, and 
targeted precision strikes in an autonomous fashion.''
    My question to you, sir, is what would the benefits and 
pitfalls be of entering into some sort of arms control 
agreements to establish transparency and ensure that our 
adversaries do, indeed, have meaningful human control over 
these lethal autonomous weapons?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, certainly as you know in the way 
that we are approaching pursuit of more autonomous systems, 
they are not all for lethal purposes as discussed. For example, 
Senator Heinrich had a very good example of one that is 
analytic in nature. As artificial intelligence proceeds, it is 
very important that we maintain our ethics and maintain our 
standards, and that is the approach we have tried to take 
within the Defense Department and how we are approaching that. 
Our leader of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center has the 
lead for that, but in discussing this with him and listening to 
him, I believe that those are the principles that are being 
applied by us in the Defense Department.
    Separately led by the State Department, the United States 
does engage in dialogue with other countries. You mentioned one 
of the fora at the UN where these kinds of conversations are 
had because it is an emerging field and we do think it is 
important that there are certain global standards and ethical 
approaches that we try to promote.
    Senator Peters. You agree, though, taking a human out of 
the loop does give a technical advantage to that weapon system 
because of the speed of action?
    Secretary Rood. I would not say that in all cases. For 
instance, I saw some demonstrations in industry where land-
based robotic systems set to do things were easily out-foxed by 
their human counterparts because they were doing things as 
programmed very rapidly or trying to adapt, but the humans 
still had the edge on them. I would not agree in all cases that 
that is the case.
    But you cannot postulate a future and we will both see 
together what AI could be a bigger concern.
    Senator Peters. That is a very realistic future. I mean, 
you are talking about capabilities today which I think people 
would agree. But this future is coming at us a lot quicker than 
most people realize.
    You alluded to the fact that an international agreement may 
be something that we should look at. How would such an 
agreement be enforced, and what are the contours of that 
agreement as you are thinking that through?
    Secretary Rood. Well, I want to be clear and clarify. I 
think there is definitely a value in these conversations in 
these international fora to try to establish certain standards. 
I do not know whether that would necessitate itself into some 
internationally binding agreement or something of that nature 
yet. Again, that would be something that would be led by our 
State Department. But I do understand your point about 
maintaining our ethics and the human dimension of how our 
approach to conflict to use of force is applied, if I am 
understanding you correctly, Senator.
    Senator Peters. Lieutenant General Allvin, I would like you 
to weigh in as to how you think these lethal autonomous 
weapons, as they develop in the years ahead, may influence our 
views on doctrine and the future of legacy weapons in this 
rapidly changing environment.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Yes, Senator, I will try and be 
brief because that is not only fascinating but also a hugely 
important topic about how we move forward with our doctrine in 
the context of these advanced weapons.
    Obviously, as the Secretary alluded to, there is a renewed 
emphasis on the ethics of it, as these go from human in the 
loop to human on the loop to that sort of a trajectory. I think 
our doctrine is going to need to adjust to understanding the 
increased speed. Part of it is about speed. But the Secretary's 
point, if it becomes just speed for speed's sake, you may not 
have accuracy. That is where the humans come into understanding 
the operational strategic impact of tactical speed.
    I think our doctrine needs to be more sophisticated as we 
move forward understanding that that decision speed is also 
key, not just execution speed, the ability to understand the 
second and third order impacts of this. One can imagine, as 
these advanced weapons are being developed, leveraging big data 
and algorithm development for better decision-making, not 
decision-making in lieu of a human, but presenting information 
for better human decision-making faster.
    I think we should be ready for the speed of everything 
increasing, but not be sacrificing some of those fundamental 
law of armed conflict and ethical pieces that are always going 
to be inherent in warfare.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here.
    I want to circle back, Secretary Rood, to The Wall Street 
Journal article and chat about that for just a second because I 
represent and when I was in the House, represented Fort 
Campbell. As you know, the 101st has been deployed more than 
anybody else as we have faced these challenges in the Mideast. 
What the Journal reported was that this was being considered, 
not that a decision had been made. I would like some 
clarification from you on that.
    Are you considering sending 14,000 troops to the Mideast? 
Are you considering sending a smaller number of troops to the 
Mideast? Are you not considering this at all? Should I be 
completely shocked if I were to wake up one morning in the near 
future and hear on the news that we are deploying a significant 
number of troops back to the Mideast? If this were under 
consideration, where would you be pulling those troops and 
resources from in order to meet that obligation?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, with respect to the Journal 
article, as mentioned, the Iranians--we are watching this 
situation where the Iranians both have conducted attacks in 
recent months, and we are concerned about the threat stream 
that we are seeing. I would note I am going to come brief the 
Committee in closed session in a week on that very topic where 
we have offered that and obviously in closed session can go 
into much greater detail for you.
    But with respect to that threat situation, we are concerned 
about what we are seeing.
    Senator Blackburn. You are considering it?
    Secretary Rood. Yes. What I would say to you is there a 
dynamism both to the threat situation, and there needs to be 
a----
    Senator Blackburn. Is 14,000 the correct number, or is 
there a lesser number?
    Secretary Rood. The Secretary of Defense has not made any 
decisions to deploy additional troops.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay. It is being considered and you are 
looking at additional troops.
    Then where would you move those from? Would you reposition 
troops that are currently deployed, or would this be a cut in 
dwell time that would cause some of our troops to be deployed?
    Secretary Rood. The Secretary of Defense is consistently 
and continues to evaluate with the advice of others what the 
appropriate number of forces to be deployed to the Middle East 
is. He has not made a decision----
    Senator Blackburn. You are saying we should not be shocked 
and get a surprise announcement between now and a briefing in a 
different setting in the next week or so. Is that correct?
    Secretary Rood. I would respond differently by telling you 
that we are evaluating the threat situation, and the Secretary, 
if he chooses to, can make decisions to deploy additional 
forces based on what he is observing there. That said, we have 
not made those decisions yet.
    I would just answer your question even more directly. Based 
on what we are seeing with our concerns about the threat 
picture, it is possible that we would need to adjust our force 
posture. I think that that would be a prudent step depending on 
what we observe because our objective is to deter Iranian 
aggression. Deterrence is not static. It is a very dynamic 
activity. It is not as though it stays at a certain level at a 
certain point in time. We will need to make dynamic adjustments 
to our posture.
    In terms of your question, Senator, as to where forces 
would come from, of course it depends on the nature of the 
forces. A number of those, roughly half of those that have been 
deployed, the 14,000 in the last 6 months have been on naval 
vessels, cruisers, destroyers, carrier battle groups. Others 
have been air assets. For example, in recent months, we have 
been asked to deploy additional fighter aircraft squadrons to 
Saudi Arabia for that purpose. Bomber squadrons. A lot depends 
on the nature of the forces.
    As you mentioned, the 101st has been terribly busy, has 
been a very highly deployed unit. I certainly resonate with 
your concern.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
    I recently was in Africa, and I had the opportunity to be 
in Mogadishu and also in Djibouti. I have a series of questions 
I had wanted to ask, and I will submit these for the record 
because I am about out of time. But I do have questions about 
our approach to security cooperation on the continent and how 
that may need to change to prioritize strategic competition as 
we look at the presence of China and Russia there. I will 
submit those for the record and yield back my time.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hirono?
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rood, would you agree that China's goal is to be 
the top military force in the world?
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Hirono. What is Russia's goal as you note in your 
testimony as it continues with its litany of destabilizing 
activities across the world, which in many cases result in a 
loss of innocent lives? What is Russia's goal if China's goal 
is to become the top military force in the world?
    Secretary Rood. I am not sure they share the same goals or 
agree with each other on many things, Senator. But the short 
answer, I think that Russia's objective is to be a substantial 
player. They would like to return to as much of the influence 
as they held during the Cold War in the Soviet Union period of 
time as they could. They do wish to exercise a level of 
influence in order to affect the affairs of state in certain 
parts of the world or at least to exercise a veto in certain 
cases over what different countries are doing.
    Senator Hirono. Russia's goal and its efforts to be the 
destabilizing player are not particularly good for our own 
national security. Is it?
    Secretary Rood. No.
    Senator Hirono. You noted in your testimony that we knew 
that Turkey wanted to go into northern Syria to push the Kurds 
out. As long as the United States troops were there, it stayed 
Erdogan's hand, but the minute the President says we are 
withdrawing our troops, Erdogan made his move. I think there is 
a definite cause and effect there.
    While we like to think that the kind of decisions that are 
made as to where our troops will be deployed or where they are 
leaving will be done in some sort of a rational way, that is 
not always the case I think with this President.
    Even if Secretary Esper had provided reassurances that we 
will not be withdrawing troops from South Korea, if the 
President wants to do that, I do not know what you all are 
supposed to do about it. It is an ongoing concern as to the 
decision-making process regarding what our military does or it 
does not do.
    The Department faced some criticism when it omitted the 
mention of climate change in the National Defense Strategy, and 
the Chief of Naval Operations in 2009 created a task force on 
climate change to make recommendations for policy and strategy 
to address climate change because it is real and it is having 
an impact worldwide.
    In January 2019, the Worldwide Threat Assessment was 
released, identified climate change as a major threat to 
national security, and in January 2019, again a GAO [Government 
Accountability Office] report identified military installations 
most threatened by climate change, three of which installations 
are in Hawaii.
    Aside from these multiple reports, what is actually being 
done on the policy side to address these threats? Because 
policy changes should drive implementation actions.
    Secretary Rood. Sure. Things like military installations 
are a different Under Secretary. Under Secretary for Personnel 
and Resources, as well as the Under Secretary for Acquisition 
and Sustainment often take the lead in issuing that policy, 
Senator.
    But that being said, in terms of your other question, is 
there an impact on military installations and do we need to 
plan for that, absolutely. As climate change occurs, we must 
adapt to those realities in order to continue to do the 
military operations that are our missions.
    Senator Hirono. My time is running out.
    At least on our own military installations that have seen 
some devastating impacts of climate events, that is happening.
    But what about things like our violent extremist 
organizations taking advantage of water insecurity and food 
scarcity to gain influence? We are moving into the worldwide 
arena now. Or has drought, combined with incompetence, led to 
water shortages of Venezuela, and how has that influenced 
stability there? How is water scarcity influencing both 
partners and adversaries in the Middle East and North Africa? 
There are all these kinds of events that are linked to climate 
change going on worldwide, and what are our policies with 
regard to those concerns?
    Secretary Rood. Well, certainly as you mentioned, resource 
scarcity and competition for resources and using natural 
resources, food and other things, as weapons is one of the 
things we sometimes see violent extremist organizations or 
terrorist groups do. We also see nations compete over this, and 
this produces a lot of tension.
    Certainly it is a part of our policy approach to consider 
how do we address those underlying security concerns and in 
many cases try to engage in diplomacy, again led by the State 
Department typically, on those activities such as--I was just 
in Egypt. As an example, Egypt has real concerns about this 
with their neighbors right now.
    Senator Hirono. I am glad you mentioned--if I may, Mr. 
Chairman. I am glad you mentioned diplomacy because we need to 
have much more of a robust effort not just on the military 
side. But many of our ambassadorships are not filled. They are 
being filled by people who are political appointees with little 
diplomatic experience or experience in the countries to which 
they are sent. That is not very helpful at all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rood, I have to confess that you have confused me 
in your responses first to the Chairman and then to Senator 
Blackburn. I think you just said to Senator Blackburn that the 
Pentagon is considering sending additional troops to CENTCOM 
[Central Command]. Now, that confuses me because the Pentagon 
spokesperson said last night in direct response to me that the 
Pentagon is not considering sending additional troops to 
CENTCOM.
    Let me ask you again. Is the Pentagon considering 
additional troops to CENTCOM?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, we are always considering changes 
to our force posture not only in CENTCOM, but in other----
    Senator Hawley. The Pentagon spokesperson, in responding to 
me last night publicly, misspoke. Is that what you are saying? 
Let me just read to you what she said. She said, to be clear, 
the reporting about the ``Wall Street Journal'' report is 
wrong. The United States is not considering sending 14,000 
additional troops to the Middle East. But you just told Senator 
Blackburn that that is under consideration. That was in direct 
response to me. I would like a direct answer. Are you 
considering it or not?
    Secretary Rood. The direct answer I would give you, 
Senator, is that we are always considering and, in fact, based 
on the threat situation in the Middle East, are watching that. 
As necessary, the Secretary of Defense has told me he intends 
to make changes to our force posture there.
    With respect to that statement by the spokesperson, we have 
not made a decision to deploy 14,000 troops.
    Senator Hawley. Well, that was not what she said, though. 
You are telling me now that she misspoke.
    I think at this point, it would be helpful to hear from the 
Secretary on this issue, and I would like to hear from him 
today on this issue. I assume that he signed off on the 
official spokesperson's comments, direct public comments last 
night to me which she repeated over and over again and you have 
directly contradicted here this morning multiple times. I think 
some clarification is in order, and I would like to have it. I 
would like to have it in public because the Pentagon has now 
made multiple contradictory public statements. Can we do that? 
Can we get that done today?
    Secretary Rood. I will talk to the Secretary of Defense 
about that.
    But I do want to say, Senator, I would not agree with your 
characterization that I have directly contradicted the 
spokesperson.
    Senator Hawley. Well, how can that be the case when she 
says the United States is not considering sending additional 
troops to the Middle East, and you just said that you are?
    Secretary Rood. I believe her statement was we are not 
considering sending 14,000 troops.
    Senator Hawley. I am sorry. What is your testimony then? 
Your testimony is different from that? Because you just told 
Senator Blackburn that that is under consideration.
    Secretary Rood. For example, Senator, there is not some 
pending document with the Secretary of Defense that states 
deploy 14,000 troops. Do you approve? Yes or no? I am not 
trying to be argumentative, sir. I am just trying to point out 
there is dynamic security situation in the Middle East, and it 
is a custom that we do--and we did not do it just because of 
recent events--where we regularly evaluate the appropriate 
number of----
    Senator Hawley. All right. Well, I am hearing what you are 
saying, but there is a pretty direct contradiction here. You 
are telling me, have told me, have told Senator Blackburn that 
this is under consideration, and the Pentagon spokesperson said 
last night that it is not. I will let you all circle up and 
talk to one another and then issue a public statement today 
clarifying this, preferably from the Secretary.
    Let me ask you this. You said earlier that you have sent 
14,000 troops already in the last 6 months. What have those 
achieved in that theater in CENTCOM?
    Secretary Rood. The purpose of the deployment of those 
troops, sir, was to defer further Iranian aggression.
    Senator Hawley. Has that worked in your estimation?
    Secretary Rood. I think it has had a deterrent effect in 
that we have not seen those type of attacks that Iran was 
conducting before continue. One of the things that we were 
concerned about, sir, was potential planning for attacks on 
American Forces. I would note we have not had American Forces 
attacked by the Iranians in that period to produce deaths or 
casualties, things of that nature.
    Now, I think where you are going is deterrence--have they 
been dissuaded? Have they been deterred to the point where they 
no longer feel aggressive impulses towards the United States or 
have those activities? That is where I mentioned in my 
testimony we are concerned about what we are observing about 
the potential for further----
    Senator Hawley. Actually what I am wondering about is I 
just am wondering what the aims of deterrence actually are, and 
I am wondering about the connection to all of these troops. 
Fourteen thousand is a lot. You said now that you are 
considering sending maybe many, many more. I just am wondering 
what it is exactly that we are aiming to deter, question number 
one. Question number two, what the connection is with this very 
large troop buildup. I do not think I understand actually what 
our strategy is here.
    Secretary Rood. Our strategy is to seek stability, to deter 
further Iranian aggression----
    Senator Hawley. When you say 'stability,' you mean what? 
Stability of the region?
    Secretary Rood. For example, the absence of attacks on 
Americans----
    Senator Hawley. Well, that is different. I mean, regional 
stability and the absence of the attack on American Forces are 
two very different--I mean, what is regional stability exactly, 
and how would we aim to achieve that?
    Secretary Rood. Well, that has been a longstanding American 
policy not just of this administration to promote stability in 
the Middle East. The absence of conflict, more peaceful 
relations--those are forms of stability. We engage in stability 
assistance throughout the region. This has been something that 
the United States has pursued again not just during this 
administration. It is a longstanding objective of ours.
    Senator Hawley. Well, my time has expired. I would just 
note that if our aim is absence of all conflict in the region, 
then we are going to be sending a lot more than 14,000 or 
28,000 or 100,000 ground troops.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Rood, one of the very first things you said was a 
deterrent capability is job one. I think you said our primary 
strategy is deterrence, and if deterrence does not work, to 
win.
    Let me focus on a particular issue of deterrence that I 
have been doing a lot of work on and am puzzled about, and that 
is cyber deterrence and particularly cyber deterrence, I would 
call it, below the threshold of catastrophe. In other words, a 
cyber attack that disables our entire electric I think everyone 
would agree deserves a clear and unequivocal response.
    What about a cyber attack that freezes the voter 
registration lists in Florida a week before the election? How 
do we deter those kinds of attacks? My sense is we have had 
Sony, we have had OPM [Office of Personnel Management], we have 
had 2016 with very little, if any, substantive response in that 
our adversaries do not fear us, to put it most bluntly, in 
terms of cyber attacks on this country. Give me some thoughts 
about cyber deterrence? The National Commission on the Defense 
Strategy last year said the United States is not deterring its 
adversaries as effectively as it should in cyberspace. I am 
realizing we are on very limited time, but give me a minute or 
so of your thoughts on that and perhaps then you could follow 
up.
    Secretary Rood. Yes, Senator. I recall you raising this 
with me during my confirmation visit with you, and it is 
something you have been a leader on in pursuing this type of 
activity.
    I would say since that time you and I met 2 years ago, we 
have put in place now a cyber strategy, and one of the primary 
aspects of that is it calls defending forward. We will no 
longer wait for observing indications of planning for an attack 
for an adversary to spring that attack if they are doing the 
equivalent of stockpiling of cyber weapons to deploy at a later 
date. We will not wait to receive that attack in our networks 
and then try to deal with it, but rather we will defend 
forward. That is one of the ways that we think we can deter by 
denial of objectives.
    You are exactly right. There needs to be, part of any 
deterrence, the ability to impose costs on an attacker or an 
adversary in order to dissuade them.
    Senator King. The adversary has to feel there is some risk 
in order to affect their calculus of whether or not to attack. 
Is that correct?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, and at risk can be both through cyber 
means and other means. That is part of our approach. Where you 
mentioned some of the difficulties we are even puzzling through 
that is, as you say, getting the right threshold and thinking 
through questions of proportionality, thinking through 
questions of how do you produce the right effects, how do you 
evaluate the effects essentially of your attack. We call it in 
the physical world, if a bomb was dropped, bomb damage 
assessment. The use of cyber tools evaluating the effect of 
those actions and making sure that there is not collateral 
damage is also quite important, sir.
    Senator King. I appreciate that and hope that perhaps we 
can follow up with this conversation because this is a very 
important topic I believe.
    A different question. General, are we adequately 
confronting new threats, drones, swarms, hypersonics, cyber? 
Here is an example, and it gets back to money. We are talking 
about how much we are spending. We are spending twice as much 
as China and Russia combined. I take the Chairman's point on 
that. But still, we are spending 10 times what Russia spends. 
Putin can hire 12,000 hackers for the cost of one jet fighter. 
I think all would agree that what he did in 2016 was a pretty 
effective attack on our country.
    Are we putting our money in the right places in terms of 
emerging threats? Hypersonics is a perfect example.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Senator, I would say that the 
last two budgets started to move that way. Having the National 
Defense Strategy as a touchstone, as sort of the north star, it 
acts as our conscience. As we look at the development of these 
systems, I think we are headed in the right direction. Are we 
going fast enough?
    Senator King. But it bothers me that we are spending 10 
times what Russia is and they are the ones that are fielding a 
hypersonic missile this year and we are 4 or 5 years away. How 
did we miss that?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. I think we have a broader set of 
global objectives that we need to achieve. I think there was 
also the focus that we have had over the past 20 years before 
the NDS, and we are transitioning into this new prioritization 
on great power competition. I think there are a lot of elements 
that we have within----
    Senator King. Well, I think we have catch-up to do, as I 
think you both testified. But I think the area of technology 
and confronting emerging threats is a real area where there has 
to be some good strategic thinking and investments.
    Final question for the record because I am out of time. We 
have not talked about it here today. I am concerned about the 
possibility of an emergent China/Russia axis. They have been 
split apart for many years. I am concerned that to the extent 
they decide to cooperate against us as a common enemy, that can 
be a force multiplier. I am not asking for an answer now, but I 
would hope you could give me some thoughts for the record on 
the danger and what the intelligence tells us about cooperation 
and coordination between China and Russia. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. I think 
you are doing a good job in a tough position. We appreciate 
this.
    I think you see a lot of wisdom on this panel. My friend 
from Maine always asks very intelligent questions. I certainly 
agree with him on what he was just asking you on cyber and this 
issue of deterrence. We have to make sure that people fear us 
and have at the front of their mind the fact that there will be 
costs.
    I also agree with some of the comments earlier with regard 
to allies. I think you do, Mr. Secretary. That is one of our 
biggest strategic advantages in the world. We are an ally-rich 
nation. Our adversaries, potential adversaries, China, Russia, 
North Korea, Iran, are ally-poor. Not many countries looking to 
join the North Korea team or Iran team. If you can just keep 
that in mind.
    Finally, I do want to ask a question. Senator Hirono talked 
about resources. You know, something else that does not come up 
nearly enough is another area. I would like your view on it 
quickly. I have a number of questions for you.
    We are now the world's energy super power once again. We 
are the largest producer of natural gas, largest producer of 
oil, largest producer of renewables. I think this is a win-win-
win for America. It is also good for the environment since we 
have the highest standards of producing energy in the world on 
the environment.
    Can you just briefly tell us what that does for the 
national security of our country? The media never reports on 
that. It is a remarkable achievement that we are now once again 
the world's energy super power. How does that help our national 
security?
    Secretary Rood. Well, Senator, as you very correctly point 
out, we are, in the United States, in a very different position 
than we were a few years ago.
    Senator Sullivan. We can dominate this sector for decades. 
Correct?
    Secretary Rood. Well, it is not my area of expertise, but 
the things I have seen--this will go for quite some time. The 
things that that has done to provide more energy independence 
for the United States has just lessened our reliance on oil 
from the Middle East, as an example, sources from elsewhere.
    Senator Sullivan. Russia blackmailing countries that we 
want to help like the Baltics and Ukraine. Correct?
    Secretary Rood. Energy is key to prevent blackmail. Energy 
security is key to prevent having to take decisions that you 
would not like. I think it is very important.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. You know, I 
do not think this administration gets enough credit on the 
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. 
If you polled the United States Senate, I bet you would have 95 
Senators saying the general orientation of that to refocus, 
reorient on great power competition with regard to China is 
really, really important. I think that that is positive, the 
bipartisan support for the NDS that I have certainly seen in 
the Senate.
    One area I do want to talk about, not surprisingly, where 
there has become a really big area of great power competition--
Secretary Pompeo had a very good speech on this in Finland on 
this--is the Arctic. Mr. Secretary, I am excited about you 
coming up to Alaska this weekend and seeing America's Arctic 
because we are an Artic nation because of my State.
    I am going to submit for the record--just in the last 3 or 
4 months, these are the headlines from everything from 
``National Geographic,'' ``Newsweek,'' ``Washington Post.'' The 
West is losing the battle for the Arctic. Arctic melt heightens 
United States rivalry with Russia on the northern front. A 
thawing Arctic is heating up a new cold war. China is mixing 
military and science to redraw the Arctic. I mean, there is 
literally an article a week, almost a day. I am going to submit 
this, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information follows:]
      
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    Senator Sullivan. But I am a little bit worried the 
Pentagon has been slow to the punch here. As I mentioned, 
Secretary Pompeo is focused on it. This Committee has been very 
focused on it. You may have seen a lot of bipartisan work, new 
Arctic strategy, the need for a strategic Arctic port.
    Can you comment on this? What can we do to make sure that 
aligned with the National Defense Strategy--if you look at our 
rivals, China, Russia, North Korea, one thing they have in 
common is contested space in very cold, mountainous, difficult 
climes. Our Navy can barely even operate in the Arctic anymore. 
We used to be able to do that quite well.
    I am looking forward to having you up in Alaska like I 
said. But can you talk about this and what your view is as the 
top policymaker for the Pentagon?
    Secretary Rood. Yes. First of all, I agree with you. The 
United States is an Arctic nation. The Arctic is very important 
to our future both militarily, economically, and given the 
political competition in that region, we need to be quite 
conscious of that. As you know, I am very much looking forward 
to learning more when I am with you in Alaska.
    We have some substantial military capabilities or military 
presence in terms of facilities, aircraft, air bases, and so on 
in the region. Recently--and I think it was your provision, if 
I recall correctly, Senator, required a submission of an Arctic 
strategy per the NDAA which we provided to the Congress that 
discussed some of our plans.
    But our interests are in a free and open area of commerce. 
We are trying to make improvements in our ability to operate in 
cold weather. Our colleagues in the Coast Guard, not the DOD, 
of course, have an icebreaker acquisition program, which we 
think is quite important to that area. I know our Navy is 
looking at ways they can improve their activities.
    I do not know. General Allvin, would you like to add 
anything?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. I would just pile on on the 
importance. I mean, obviously our most valuable and useful 
Arctic training, the cold weather training, is up there at Fort 
Wainwright, et cetera. I think not only with respect to the 
Arctic but the location of Alaska writ large as we are looking 
at global competition, global challenges, if you just took the 
globe from scratch, you would see Alaska is very critical with 
respect to both of our great power competitors. As we look 
forward to, we definitely see not only the Arctic competition, 
but the geostrategic position of Alaska as being actually quite 
important.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We are commemorating now, as everybody knows, the 70th 
anniversary of NATO. I assume you would agree that NATO is 
important to our own strategic security. The record may reflect 
that you are nodding.
    Secretary Rood. Yes.
    Senator Blumenthal. It is such a self-evident truth that 
nodding is the appropriate response.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Blumenthal. But I am deeply concerned about at 
least one of our NATO allies, Turkey. As you know, there is 
currently no mechanism to remove NATO allies. Disciplining a 
NATO ally certainly seems problematic. Yet, what we have seen 
over the last year or so--Turkey's invasion into northeastern 
Syria slaughtering our Kurdish partners, a moral revulsion, as 
well as a strategic nightmare; the purchase of Russian S-400 
surface-to-air missiles greatly exacerbating tensions with the 
United States, as well as with NATO partners, in fact, almost 
making a mockery of our common strategic military interests; 
the increasingly close ties between President Erdogan and 
Vladimir Putin. All these actions seem to fuel concerns about 
Turkey as an ally.
    I have introduced a bipartisan bill with my colleagues, 
including Members of this Committee, Senators Shaheen, 
Blackburn, as well as Senators Graham and Van Hollen, who are 
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to impose strict 
sanctions on Turkey. The bill would sanction Turkish political 
leaders, including the current president, and sanction the 
military and energy sector, and ban arms sales to Turkey.
    Secretary Rood, would you support this legislation?
    Secretary Rood. Well, Senator, first let me say I 
understand your concerns, and we have been engaging with the 
Turks about our concerns about a number of the things that you 
mentioned. For instance, we continue to press them to not move 
forward with the S-400 acquisition. It is simply not compatible 
with an interoperable NATO. That system is not, cannot, and 
will never been interoperable with the rest of the NATO air 
defense architecture. As you know, interoperability is core to 
the ability of NATO to operate effectively as a military 
alliance. We have discouraged our allies in Turkey from 
proceeding.
    It is their sovereign decision whether they wish to proceed 
with that, but we have pointed out to them sovereign decisions 
have consequences. I have personally been to Ankara to support 
the negotiation, the ceasefire, that the Vice President and 
Secretary of State negotiated. When this topic comes up, we 
always point out to them our expectation that if the 
administration did not move forward with actions, the Congress 
would, including sanctions.
    Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that that 
missile system is inoperable. Actually it is more than 
inoperable. It is directly contradictory. It is inconsistent 
with NATO's common defense. That is the reason why we are not 
selling the F-35 to them. It enables them to shoot out of the 
skies the planes that NATO would otherwise sell to them, 
otherwise use, that they would use. But it is simply one more 
action by Turkey inconsistent with their being a NATO ally.
    I just wonder what more we can and should be doing. 
Sanctions is what our bill would do, and if it is not 
sanctions--and I am not going to cross examine you, for the 
lack of a better word, on why you are not answering the 
question about sanctions. I fully understand that there are a 
lot of complexities here. What more can we do?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, we remain engaged with the Turks 
both at the highest levels. The President spoke to President 
Erdogan, as you know, in recent days. The Secretary of State is 
engaging very much with his counterpart, and we have had people 
visiting Turkey. We have not given up on this activity and 
persuading the Turks of some of the disadvantages and why we do 
not think it is in their long-term interest, nor ours, for them 
to move forward with the S-400. But there are, as you 
mentioned, other areas of concern in the relationship. It is a 
very complex one.
    We also are working with our other allies within the rest 
of NATO--many of them have the same or very similar concerns--
and partners in the region who also have those concerns.
    I cannot sit before you today and tick off 10 specific 
steps that would produce 10 changes in behavior, regrettably. 
But it is something that we are really trying to solve and 
improve the relationship.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am very glad that we are having this discussion. I do 
think that the NDS has been very useful in focusing the 
energies of the Department of Defense and the rest of 
government, this body included. You know, I look forward to 
hearing more from the witnesses on how we can improve upon the 
implementation of NDS. But I do think that there are some blind 
spots within the NDS as it is, and I would like to discuss how 
DOD will address these shortfalls.
    Some of the deficiencies I notice are that the NDS devotes 
significant space to addressing the need to build a more lethal 
and agile force, but it spends very little time addressing the 
vital resources that would be needed to project power and 
sustain that power during a conflict, things like railcars and 
transport ships.
    Secretary Rood and General Allvin, would you support 
developing a supplemental or addendum to the NDS that focuses 
on developing resilient transportation networks and logistic 
systems that can survive in contested environments?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Senator, you certainly make a 
great point about the centrality. The importance of 
transportation and logistics is sort of a historical redheaded 
stepchild. We cannot afford that. Yes, ma'am.
    What I would say is that what we have done, largely in 
response to the National Defense Strategy, is we have put 
increased emphasis on the transportation piece. I think you 
noted that on the sealift, the Navy is looking to how they 
might recapitalize for sealift to be able to have a more 
relevant capability to project power.
    I think you mentioned in contested environments how we 
would make sure to protect our power projection. I will tell 
you that in our readiness reviews for some of our larger 
operations plans--I talked about in my opening statement about 
a global integrated base plan. We are really looking at the 
real costs and real risks overall. For the first time I would 
say in decades, we have looked at how one might project power 
under contested environments. Things like identifying, which I 
will not go into any more at this classification level, but 
would be happy to follow up with you, things about areas in 
which we would want to have physically hardened and, of course, 
resilience in cyber in nodes and ports, as well as 
understanding the potentiality for attrition of those forces 
while they are being deployed into theater.
    The idea that the logistics and transportation enterprise 
is really starting to move up into a position of importance I 
would say is a positive trend. I think we have been able to see 
those when we look at the larger globally integrated base plan. 
I would say that there is attention being paid, and there is 
significant work being done by U.S. Transportation Command, 
supported by our Joint Staff J-4, about how would one look at 
which nodes to harden, which capabilities, not only to get to 
the theater but intra-theater as well. I would say looking at 
it, even though it is not specifically in pen and ink in the 
strategy, there has been a lot of effort that reflects that 
reality.
    Senator Duckworth. Yes, but that is my point. It is not in 
pen and ink, and that is a problem because it can be 
overlooked. I mean, the Navy's Ready Reserve fleet is nowhere 
near ready. In fact, over a dozen of those ships have lost 
their Coast Guard safety certification. I do not think we have 
enough railcars. I do not think we have enough heavy lift or 
refueling. It is not just oceangoing, but it is also air 
capability and ground capabilities as well.
    Are you saying that you do not think we need an addendum to 
the NDS on moving forward to really focus on these issues?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Well, Senator, I do not have an 
opinion whether it should be in the NDS addendum. I do 
absolutely concur with the fact that it needs to have increased 
attention. I guess I am trying to convey that it has more 
attention than one might think, that we actually are 
identifying those as we speak. But I do not have a particular 
opinion as to which product it should be in that would ensure 
accountability for ensuring that those ideas and those 
initiatives move forward.
    Senator Duckworth. But I have not seen a similar level of 
investment in these capabilities. I see the investments in 
things like long-range precision fires and submarines and 
strike aircraft, all of which I fully support. But what I have 
not seen is a corresponding rise in investments in the less 
flashy but still critical transportation and logistics systems. 
I think that this is going to lead us to a more lethal force, 
which is good, but much more unsustainable and fragile in many 
ways because we cannot sustain the lethality that we have.
    If you do not think that we need to write this down, will 
you at least commit to reversing the trend and try to align 
future budgets with all of NDS' aims, including the logistical 
support, the sustainability and the security of the logistics 
network?
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Actually, Senator, that is 
certainly part of the thought process. Actually when we look at 
the entirety of what it takes to execute the National Defense 
Strategy, that is part and parcel to it, and that is when I 
mentioned these readiness reviews. They are designed to suss 
out the specifics rather than just in general we need more X or 
Y. Understanding which of those are the most critical that we 
can put those investments in early on to make the biggest 
difference the soonest is where we are headed. I guess I am 
trying to convey that we are putting attention to it.
    Senator Duckworth. I am not seeing it in the budget 
request, though, and that to me is the ultimate. I mean, you 
can say that all you want, but over half of your Ready Reserve 
fleet is over 40 years old, and most of them are going to reach 
operational life within the next 15 years. You do not have 
enough tankers. You cannot even transport stuff on railcars 
across Europe in the way that we need to be able to. How are we 
going to be active in the Asia-Pacific region if we do not have 
the capability? I do not see that same focus in terms of, hey, 
we need to spend money here like we do on the F-35. As much as 
we love the F-35, how are we going to support it?
    I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                           open skies treaty
    1. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, how much value do we get from 
the Open Skies Treaty given our overhead and commercial satellite 
capabilities?
    Secretary Rood. The Open Skies Treaty establishes a regime of 
unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of all 34 
Treaty members and produces unclassified imagery. The Treaty provides 
value through promoting greater openness and transparency in military 
activities, although Russia continues to diminish that value through 
its ongoing violations of its Open Skies Treaty obligations. The United 
States has other sources of information from National technical means 
and commercial imagery that we principally rely on.

    2. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, what counter-intelligence risks 
do we face from Russian flights over the United States?
    Secretary Rood. Counter-intelligence risks are an inherent risk of 
allowing Russian surveillance flights over the United States. I would 
refer questions regarding a further assessment of these counter-
intelligence risks to the Director of National Intelligence.

    3. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, what information do you have of 
Russia's violation of the treaty this last September?
    Secretary Rood. In September 2019, the Russian Federation denied a 
Treaty-compliant United States-Canadian Open Skies Treaty flight 
segment over the TSENTR military exercise in Russia. I defer questions 
on further details of Open Skies Treaty compliance and violations to 
the Department of State.

    4. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, with our current pilot shortage, 
how costly would the recapitalization of our pilots be?
    Secretary Rood. I would defer additional questions on this item to 
the Air Force for their assessment.

    5. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, besides benefits to our allies, 
what other benefits does this treaty currently give the United States?
    Secretary Rood. In my view, the principal benefit from U.S. 
participation in the Open Skies Treaty is the opportunity for 
cooperation with our allies to collect unclassified imagery. Many of 
these allies lack national capabilities of their own, while the U.S. 
retains substantial national intelligence capabilities that surpass the 
data collected by Open Skies flights.
                 intermediate range nuclear capability
    6. Senator Cotton. Secretary Rood, it's been almost half a year 
since the United States exited the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces) treaty. When will you have identified a service to host a new 
penetrating, land-based medium strike option in the Western Pacific and 
how long before you implement it?
    Secretary Rood. DOD remains committed to developing and fielding 
conventional ground-launched missiles once prohibited under the INF 
Treaty, as evidenced by the demonstrations of cruise and ballistic 
missiles in August and December of this year, respectively.
    The Army and Marine Corps are fully involved and are leading 
aspects of these efforts; others are OSD-led. DOD's plan is to fully 
pursue these capabilities, both through near-term adaptation of 
existing systems and through longer-term development of new systems, 
and transition them to the Services when ready.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                defense policy review initiative (dpri)
    7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Rood, Senator Schatz and I recently 
sent you a letter outlining the current stale nature of the Marine 
Corps force laydown in the Indo-Pacific region and the need for an 
expedited review of the Defense Policy Review Initiative. We also 
mentioned when looking at basing locations for Marines in the region, 
the need to consider strategic presence, good training opportunities, 
strong host-nation support, long-term sustainable costs, and potential 
for growth. In your response you stated, ``In collaboration with the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense [DOD] recently reviewed 
the United States Indo-Pacific Command [USINDOPACOM] Theater Posture 
Plan, which lays out in detail both the status of the realignment plan 
implementation and the broader global force posture planning within 
which it resides.'' Secretary Rood, what did you discover after 
reviewing the Theater Posture Plan and how did the review appropriately 
consider the basing criteria Senator Schatz and I outlined in our 
letter?
    Secretary Rood. As part of USINDOPACOM's Theater Posture Plan 
submission, each of the factors outlined by you and Senator Schatz are 
taken into account and addressed, while the posture planning process is 
continuously guided by the National Defense Strategy. Each of the 
factors outlined are critical and essential metrics to gauge global 
force posture planning and force movements, including the realignment 
of Marines in the context of the Department's overall Indo-Pacific 
posture region-wide.

    8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Rood, what is the status of the 
realignment plan implementation? What progress has been made?
    Secretary Rood. The Department continues to make steady progress on 
construction on Guam to support the United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
realignment, particularly with projects to support the USMC located at 
the Andersen Air Force Base North Ramp, Apra Harbor, and foundation and 
environmental abatement at Marine Corps Base Guam.
    The Abe Administration continues to provide critical political 
support to furthering and supporting the USMC relocation pursuant to 
the 2012 Joint Statement revision to the 2006 United States-Japan 
Roadmap for Realignment. In particular, the Abe Administration has 
continued to provide significant support toward making progress on the 
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), a central feature of the closely 
related adjustment of our force posture on Okinawa. To date, $2.2 
billion in Government of Japan funding has been transferred through 
direct cash deposits into the United States. Treasury, which are 
designated for the construction of facilities and infrastructure to 
support the relocation of Marines to Guam.

    9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Rood, were any alternatives or 
modifications to the current realignment plan considered? If so, please 
describe.
    Secretary Rood. The Department continues to prioritize achieving an 
improved and integrated Indo-Pacific defense posture for each of the 
Services to ensure the Department is best-postured to achieve its 
strategic objectives in the region. The Department remains constantly 
engaged with USINDOPACOM, military department and service components, 
and the Department of State to proactively adjust and align U.S. access 
and presence, where necessary, across the Indo-Pacific region to ensure 
our defense posture reflects the realities of great power competition 
and is optimized for deterrence of adversaries, ally and partner 
assurance, and warfighting, if necessary.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                            arctic strategy
    10. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, the Department of Defense's June ``Arctic Report to Congress'' 
highlighted that one of the lasting effects of climate change is the 
growing complexity of Arctic security. With higher temperatures and 
melting sea ice come heightened interest in the region. Despite having 
no territorial claims in Arctic, China is seeking a role in its 
governance. Last year, China unveiled its vision for a ``Polar Silk 
Road'' across the Arctic as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. China 
has made significant investments in Russia's arctic oil and gas 
industry, and, China (already with 90 percent of global rare earth 
extraction) is ramping up rare earth mining in cash-strapped Greenland. 
This week China was on NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization's] 
agenda, for the first time ever. As Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General 
of NATO, recently said, ``We have to address the fact that China is 
coming closer to us.'' Just as the Arctic is warming, so is the Russia-
China relationship also warming. Parts of the Trump administration 
refuse to acknowledge the havoc climate change may have on increasing 
strategic threats in climate fragile regions like the Arctic. How 
concerned should we be?
    Secretary Rood. The Department seeks a secure and stable Arctic 
region in which United States national security interests are 
safeguarded, the Homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively 
to address shared challenges. The Arctic security environment is 
complex, and while the immediate prospect of conflict is low, our 
competitors are increasingly active in the region in ways that could 
adversely affect United States interests. China declared itself a Near 
Arctic State with a role in regional governance matters in its January 
2018 Arctic Policy, despite having no territorial claims in the region. 
China seeks increased commercial maritime opportunities, as well as 
access to natural resources and strategic infrastructure. China is 
increasingly more open about linking overseas commercial interests with 
its military presence, and its research and commercial presence in the 
Arctic could support and enable PLA activity. The Department will work 
with allies and partners to uphold the international rules-based order 
in the Arctic and to deter competitors from coercive or aggressive 
behavior in the region.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. A secure and stable Arctic region 
benefits the United States and necessitates a rules-based order, 
reflecting Arctic nations' respect for national sovereignty and 
constructive engagement to address shared challenges. Although we 
currently assess the risk of conflict in the Arctic as low, Russia and 
China present certain challenges to this rules-based order. Russia 
views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic nation by 
landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle. 
Russia regulates maritime operations in the Northern Sea Route in a 
manner contrary to international law. However, Arctic nations, 
including Russia, have generally followed international law and 
procedure in establishing the limits of their extended continental 
shelf. Meanwhile, China is not an Arctic nation, but is attempting to 
gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international 
rules and norms. There is a risk that its predatory economic behavior 
globally may be repeated in the Arctic. China is increasing its 
presence through economic and scientific activities, including 
investments in Arctic states' strategic sectors. In response to this 
rapidly evolving security environment in the Arctic, the Joint Force 
will present a credible deterrent to aggression and coercion in the 
Arctic, maintaining its flexibility to respond promptly and effectively 
to contingencies in the region.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                ukraine
    11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, you stated that the 
Pentagon's budget request will include another $250 million in security 
assistance to Ukraine. Can you elaborate on what exactly this security 
assistance pays for?
    Secretary Rood. The $250 million requested for the Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative (USAI) will continue to support a variety of 
activities to build Ukraine's capacity to defend itself, deter further 
Russian aggression, and advance comprehensive defense reforms to 
develop Ukraine's combat capability and enhance interoperability with 
NATO and Western forces. Specifically, these funds support ongoing 
training programs and operational needs, including capabilities to 
enhance: the defensive capacity and survivability of Ukraine's Land and 
Special Operations Forces; maritime situational awareness and 
operations to support Ukraine's Navy and Naval Infantry; and the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces' command and control, electronic warfare 
detection, night vision, secure communications, military mobility, and 
military medical treatment.

    12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, can you elaborate on why 
this aid is so critical to Ukrainian security--and, by extension, our 
own national security interests?
    Secretary Rood. The USAI is a component of the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) line of effort to strengthen Allies and partners on the 
front lines of the strategic competition with Russia. Supporting 
Ukraine's Armed Forces enables them to better defend the Ukrainian 
people, deter Russia from any further aggression against the United 
States and our Allies, and to uphold the universal values and core 
democratic principles that have maintained global stability for 
decades.

    13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, could you elaborate on our 
military partnership with the Ukrainians? How is the United States 
supporting their defense against Russian aggression?
    Secretary Rood. The United States maintains a robust strategic 
defense partnership with Ukraine. Since 2014, the United States has 
provided more than $1.6 billion in security assistance to help Ukraine 
defend its territorial integrity, deter further Russian aggression, and 
progress toward NATO interoperability. Alongside key NATO allies, the 
United States is also training and advising Ukrainian security forces 
in western Ukraine through the Joint Multinational Training Group-
Ukraine to help improve Ukraine's internal defense capabilities and 
develop an institutional training capacity in accordance with NATO 
standards. The United States and Ukraine also co-host two annual 
military exercises: Exercise Rapid Trident, an annual, multinational 
exercise focused on situational training and field training, and 
Exercise Sea Breeze, a multinational maritime exercise held in the 
Black Sea to strengthen regional maritime security.

    14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, given the importance of the 
United States support to Ukraine, did you object to this hold on 
security assistance?
    Secretary Rood. I supported Congress and the administration's 
effort to provide Ukraine security assistance. Of note, on May 23, 2019 
I certified to Congress that the conditions had been met for release to 
Ukraine of the remaining $125 million.

    15. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, if security assistance is 
withheld from Ukraine or other countries for unknown reasons in the 
future, how will you respond?
    Secretary Rood. I will continue to be an advocate for security 
assistance for our key Allies and partners in support of NDS 
objectives.

    16. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, if security assistance is 
withheld from Ukraine or other countries for unknown reasons in the 
future, how would you recommend Secretary Esper respond?
    Secretary Rood. I would recommend that Secretary Esper continue to 
be a strong advocate for security assistance for our key Allies and 
partners in support of NDS objectives and closely adhere to legal 
restrictions and authorities.

    17. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, to what extent did 
withholding security assistance jeopardize our military relationship 
with the Ukrainians?
    Secretary Rood. The United States and Ukraine maintain a robust 
strategic defense partnership and the United States stands firmly in 
support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The mil-to-
mil relationship remains strong.

    18. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, are you concerned that they 
are losing trust in the United States as they are actively engaged in 
war with Russia?
    Secretary Rood. No. Since 2014, the United States has provided more 
than $1.6 billion in security assistance--including more than $250 
million last year--and we stand firmly in support of Ukraine's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    19. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, has withholding security 
assistance compromised the Ukrainian negotiating position in next 
week's peace talks between Presidents Zelensky and Putin?
    Secretary Rood. This administration has provided Ukraine with 
enhanced defensive capabilities, including Javelin anti-tank weapons 
and sniper rifles, to help Ukraine defend itself and strengthen its 
negotiating position with Russia. The United States remains committed 
to building the capacity of Ukraine's forces and to working with our 
Allies and partners to keep pressure on Russia to live up to its 
commitments under the Minsk agreements and to restoring Ukraine's full 
sovereignty.
    The United States will continue to reinforce strong public 
messaging in support of Ukraine's sovereignty and to condemn Russia's 
actions as well as encourage our Allies to increase their support for 
the Ukraine security assistance mission.

    20. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, beyond ensuring security 
assistance is appropriated and distributed annually, how should the 
United States continue to support Ukraine in preventing Russian 
aggression and protecting territorial sovereignty?
    Secretary Rood. In addition to providing equipment to support 
operational needs, the United States should continue to train and 
exercise with Ukrainian forces and continue to support Ukraine's 
ambitious defense reform agenda to ensure Ukraine can provide its own 
security over the long term.

    21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, do you agree with Dr. Fiona 
Hill's testimony that the Russians--not the Ukrainians--interfered in 
the 2016 presidential election?
    Secretary Rood. I am not fully aware of Dr. Hill's testimony, but I 
agree with the Intelligence Community's assessment regarding the 2016 
presidential election.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act], Section 1234 expanded the use of 
the Secretarial Designee Program to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers are 
able to receive treatment at DOD military facilities when Ukraine 
cannot provide the necessary care in country. There are reports that 
EUCOM [European Command] approved 10 Ukrainian soldiers to receive such 
treatment, but there is a lack of funding to cover the costs of non-
medical care. Will you commit to ensuring that the Department of 
Defense has the necessary funding and authorities to implement this 
program and provide medical care to qualified Ukrainian soldiers?
    Secretary Rood. DOD remains committed to supporting Ukraine's 
wounded warriors. Since 2014, DOD has accepted 25 Ukrainian wounded 
warriors into United States military medical treatment facilities, both 
overseas and within the United States.
    The use of United States security assistance funding for non-
medical costs for Secretarial Designee applications has not been 
identified as a priority by Ukraine. The Multinational Joint Commission 
on Ukraine, led by USEUCOM and the Ukrainian General Staff, prioritizes 
needs and provides recommendations on the allocation of the security 
assistance resources appropriated by Congress. In coordination with the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, DOD has focused on using USAI funds to 
assist Ukraine with train and equip priorities to build their capacity 
to defend against Russian aggression. When coupled with assistance 
through other authorities, DOD is providing significant support for 
building Ukraine's military medical capabilities with a focus on the 
development of a self-sustainable rehabilitation program through 
institution building and advisement.
    While we will continue to consider Secretarial Designee requests on 
a case-by-case basis when we can provide specialized care for some of 
Ukraine's most critically wounded soldiers, developing Ukraine's 
capacity to care for wounded warriors in country is the long term 
solution. DOD also consistently encourages our European allies to 
provide additional support for Ukraine's wounded warriors.
                                 syria
    23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how did the abrupt withdrawal, and re-deployment, of United 
States troops impact the counter-Islamic State mission in Syria?
    Secretary Rood. The enduring defeat of ISIS is a top priority for 
the Department of Defense. Turkey's decision to launch a unilateral 
military incursion into northern Syria had repercussions for this 
mission, and the Department opposed Turkey's decision. At the 
President's direction, we retain a residual United States military 
force in key areas of northeast Syria, such as Hasakah and Dayr az-
Zahr, to continue the fight against ISIS, including by denying ISIS 
access to critical energy resources. Preserving our partnership with 
vetted local partners, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 
remains essential to our ability to execute our mission.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The repositioning of United States and 
Coalition forces in Syria required significant emphasis on force 
protection of personnel in Syria and the retrograde of some equipment. 
Coalition partners considering troop commitments in Northeast Syria 
paused those efforts in order to adjust to the changing operational 
environment, but continue to look for ways to contribute. Large scale 
counter-ISIS operations and training efforts were temporarily reduced 
as the Coalition and local partners focused on force protection and 
adapted to the new operational picture, but have since resumed previous 
operational levels.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The repositioning of United States and 
Coalition forces in Syria required significant emphasis on force 
protection of personnel in Syria and the retrograde of some equipment. 
Coalition partners considering troop commitments in Northeast Syria 
paused those efforts in order to adjust to the changing operational 
environment, but continue to look for ways to contribute. Large scale 
counter-ISIS operations and training efforts were temporarily reduced 
as the Coalition and local partners focused on force protection and 
adapted to the new operational picture, but have since resumed previous 
operational levels.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what role was the United States military playing in the 
repatriation of ISIS fighters and detainees prior to the withdrawal?
    Secretary Rood. The United States military provided transportation 
and logistics assistance to the SDF and certain countries of origin 
that requested United States assistance and wanted to repatriate and 
prosecute their ISIS fighters. Prior to providing such support to any 
country, U.S. Departments and Agencies assessed whether that country 
met certain criteria, including providing credible assurances that 
individuals will be treated humanely.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The U.S. Military coordinated with DOS 
on repatriations as DOS requested. This included advisory, logistic, 
and/or security support depending on the nature of the request and 
environmental circumstances at the time of a particular repatriation.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what role is the United States military playing now to 
facilitate the repatriation of ISIS fighters and detainees prior to the 
withdrawal?
    Secretary Rood. The U.S. Military will continue to provide 
transportation and logistics assistance to the SDF and certain 
countries of origin that request United States assistance and want to 
repatriate and prosecute their ISIS fighters. Prior to providing such 
support to any country, U.S. Departments and agencies assess whether 
that country meets certain criteria, including providing credible 
assurances that individuals will be treated humanely. It is not, 
however, the sole responsibility of the United States either to find 
solutions for all ISIS fighters in SDF custody or to facilitate the 
repatriations of all ISIS fighters to their countries of origin. 
Countries of origin must take responsibility for their nationals in SDF 
custody.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The U.S. Military continues to respond 
to DOS requests for support and provide as in the past according to the 
circumstances.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, is the United States military securing and facilitating access 
for diplomatic missions and government representatives to reach ISIS 
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] detention facilities?
    Secretary Rood. The SDF controls the detention facilities that 
house ISIS fighters. On a few occasions, the United States military has 
provided logistics assistance to connect diplomatic missions or 
government representatives to certain SDF ISIS detention facilities.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The U.S. Military secures/facilitates 
access to detention facilities as the operational environment allows.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, is additional financial or legal support necessary to support 
repatriation?
    Secretary Rood. At this time, the United States military has 
sufficient capability and authority to support repatriations of ISIS 
fighters to their countries of origin.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Assessments to determine additional 
financial and legal support from the U.S. are being conducted at this 
time. More importantly, the political will from other nations is 
required to commit to receiving their citizens back home, as well as 
international financial support to improve facility security while 
repatriation efforts continue.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what is the U.S. Military doing to prevent a coordinated prison 
break?
    Secretary Rood. The United States military continues to train and 
equip the SDF and to repair and renovate SDF detention facilities that 
house ISIS fighters to increase the capacity of the SDF to detain ISIS 
fighters securely and humanely, including to help prevent prison 
breaks.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The U.S. Military is coordinating with 
the SDF to ensure they maintain positive control over prisons outside 
the OPS area.

    29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, are you confident that the Syrian Democratic Forces have the 
resources to prevent dangerous fighters from escaping?
    Secretary Rood. The SDF has been a reliable and capable partner and 
has shouldered the burden of detaining thousands of ISIS fighters. The 
longer ISIS fighters are held in SDF prisons--rather than being 
repatriated to their countries of origin--the greater the potential 
that they will organize breakouts. We have been clear that returning 
ISIS fighters to their countries of origin is the best way to keep them 
from re-engaging in terrorism. Although some governments have taken 
steps to repatriate their foreign terrorist fighters and other 
nationals from Syria, many countries have declined to do so. States 
need to follow the example of those that have responsibly repatriated 
their citizens and not look to others to solve the problem for them.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The SDF currently maintains positive 
control over the prisons and camps they monitor. However, significant 
upgrades to infrastructure, security systems, guard training, and 
administration are necessary to prevent future concerted escape 
attempts.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, are you concerned with the potential for increased 
radicalization within these camps as we have seen before in places like 
Iraq?
    Secretary Rood. ISIS systematically indoctrinated its members and 
supporters. It sought to position minors to be the future guardians and 
warriors of the ISIS cause and entrusted women with their upbringing 
and development. While not everyone in these camps is affiliated with 
ISIS, many of the women and minors there are. The potential for 
radicalization and a continuation of radical ideology in camps is a 
long-term strategic risk in the Defeat-ISIS campaign. Repatriation and 
reintegration of ISIS-affiliated individuals--whether in Syria or Iraq 
or in their country of origin where they can be more effectively 
rehabilitated or otherwise disengaged from ISIS' radical ideology is 
critical to the enduring defeat of ISIS.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Yes, ISIS operatives have taken, and 
will likely continue to take, advantage of the camp conditions and 
environment to attempt to radicalize. Additionally, without much needed 
upgrades to detention facilities and camps, detainees/residents will 
remain difficult to control.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what role is DOD playing to prevent this radicalization?
    Secretary Rood. Preventing radicalization is a Department of State-
led responsibility. DOD supports efforts by the Department of State and 
coalition partners to prevent radicalization at camps in Syria, 
including by training and equipping the SDF to ensure the security of 
detention facilities. DOD also continues to support repatriation of 
ISIS-affiliated individuals from these camps to their home areas or 
countries where more effective disengagement and rehabilitation 
programming can occur.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD is focused on D-ISIS operations 
outside the camps to create positive conditions which prevent 
radicalization root causes. Within the camps, we continue to support 
the SDF with resources.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how many of the detainees do you believe represent a security 
threat?
    Secretary Rood. There is a hard-core group of ISIS fighters that 
remains determined and committed to the ISIS cause. I would have to 
speculate in order to identify a number that endure as a security 
threat.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. While there are varying degrees of risk, 
all detainees are considered to represent a security threat. Biometric 
data of detainees is captured to the fullest extent possible. This data 
is then recorded into the appropriate databases to monitor and track 
future activity. Our local partners in Syria maintain custody of 
detainees at all times; should a detainee be of particular interest to 
the United States, our partners will coordinate the appropriate 
interaction with us.

    33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, is the U.S. Military working to identify non-combatants, 
particularly children?
    Secretary Rood. The United States military is present in Syria to 
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. Identifying non-combatants, 
particularly children, is outside the scope of the DOD mission in 
Syria.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Yes. DOD always takes every possible 
precaution to identify non-combatants from combatants in accordance 
with international law.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how do you think repatriation should be handled for any non-
combatants?
    Secretary Rood. Countries of origin should take responsibility for 
their citizens, including non-combatants, by repatriating them.
    Lieutenant General Allvin.DOS should continue to coordinate through 
each nation's diplomatic channels.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, how do you think the 
betrayal of our Kurdish partners will impact United States military 
cooperation with other partners in the region, and globally?
    Secretary Rood. In Syria, United States Forces work closely with 
all of our allies and partners to defeat ISIS. Our allies and partners, 
both local and as part of the Defeat ISIS Coalition, understand that we 
remain committed to our common mission to defeat ISIS.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, recent reports indicate 
that our Kurdish partners are making a deal with Russia--with Russian 
troops and flags moving into Kurdish-controlled territory last weekend. 
What do these shifting alliances mean for United States security 
interests in the Middle East?
    Secretary Rood. The United States has consistently told the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF) that these are their decisions to make. No one 
can deny that the situation in Syria is very complex, and there are no 
easy solutions and no easy choices. We remain committed to the United 
States partnership with the SDF, but have made clear to the SDF that 
our ability to partner with them would be severely limited in certain 
areas should the SDF choose to work with the Syrian regime or Russia.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, how do you anticipate that 
increased Russian involvement in negotiating an end to the conflict in 
Syria will influence the outcome?
    Secretary Rood. The Department of Defense, along with our State 
Department colleagues, has repeatedly affirmed that the only solution 
to the conflict in Syria is a political one. Russia's ongoing military 
support to the Syrian regime, including for the Syrian regime's ongoing 
horrific attacks in Idlib, demonstrates that Russia still believes a 
military solution is possible. However, this fails to recognize that 
the vast majority of Syrians remain opposed to Assad's rule, and the 
international community remains committed to a political solution in 
line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Russia has influence 
over the Syrian regime and could use that influence toward achieving a 
negotiated political resolution to the conflict in Syria, but Russia 
has yet to demonstrate it has the will to do so.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how is the United States promoting accountability for Turkish 
violations of international law, and prioritizing protecting civilians 
and infrastructure--including health and water facilities?
    Secretary Rood. The Department of Defense has monitored the 
implementation of the October 17th ceasefire negotiated by the Vice 
President. Secretary Esper was clear with his counterpart that Turkey 
is responsible for its actions in northeastern Syria and Embassy Ankara 
regularly engages with Turkey regarding any concerns.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. During Turkey's incursion into Syria, 
DOD received through operational channels several allegations of 
possible LOAC violations committed by Turkish military or Turkish 
Supported Opposition forces. The details of those allegations are 
classified. Notification of these alleged violations were provided to 
senior Turkish military leadership through our senior defense official 
at the United States Embassy in Turkey. Our country team at the Embassy 
continues to follow-up with the Turkish military regarding this matter.

    39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what United States-origin defense articles been used in the 
Turkish offensive in Syria?
    Secretary Rood. All approvals of arms transfers and defense sales 
of U.S. origin defense articles and services to foreign partners are 
reviewed in the context of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. The 
Turkish military, as a member of NATO, operates United States origin 
defense systems. Consistent with our end-use monitoring agreements, if 
there are credible allegations of misuse of U.S. origin defense 
equipment, the United States Government will investigate and notify 
Congress consistent with the laws and regulations that govern arms 
exports. Additional details on Turkish operations in Syria can be 
provided in a classified environment.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. To DOD's knowledge, no United States-
origin defense articles have been used in the Turkish offensive.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, would any such use be in violation of the applicable end use 
agreements? If so, what would be the consequences of a violation?
    Secretary Rood. We have been clear with Turkey that they must abide 
by any end use agreements with the United States.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD has no knowledge of any such 
violations of applicable end use agreements.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what is the United States' strategy for ensuring the sustained 
delivery of humanitarian assistance in Northeast Syria including in 
areas controlled by Turkey and by the Government of Syria respectively?
    Secretary Rood. The United States continues to work closely with 
all relevant stakeholders to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
those in need in northeast Syria, particularly to camps for internally 
displaced persons. The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development lead these efforts for the U.S. Government. 
We are particularly concerned at Russia's and China's recent veto of 
the renewal of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, which 
allows for cross-border humanitarian assistance in Syria. This 
resolution is essential for ensuring humanitarian aid reaches millions 
of people in Syria.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD has supported and will continue to 
support delivery of humanitarian assistance when requested. DOD defers 
to DOS for further details.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, will the United States take steps to ensure continued 
unfettered humanitarian access through Fishkabur crossing?
    Secretary Rood. The Fishkabur crossing between Syria and Iraq 
remains under SDF control, and supplies and international non-
governmental organization staff are able to travel between the two 
countries. The United States continues to monitor access to the 
Fishkabur crossing to ensure it remains accessible to humanitarian 
support.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD will support unfettered humanitarian 
access through Fishkabur as necessary/requested. The SDF continues to 
control the Fishkabur crossing and it remains DOD's primary ground line 
of communication for logistic support. The DOD defers to DOS for 
further details on any diplomatic efforts concerning this topic.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what is your engagement with Kurdish authorities on this 
matter?
    Secretary Rood. My staff and I frequently engage with our local 
Syrian partners and General Mazloum to ensure we have full knowledge 
and coordination pertaining to this matter.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD engages with the SDF and various 
Kurdish authorities daily. We continue to work with our Kurdish 
partners and all partners in the region to ensure they will continue to 
protect United States Forces in garrison and on combined operations. 
This protection will extend to delivery of humanitarian aid when U.S. 
Forces support such missions.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, can you confirm that United States personnel are patrolling 
near Quamishli in order to maintain SDF control of the Fishkabur 
crossing?
    Secretary Rood. In accordance with the President's direction, 
United States Forces have shifted their posture in northeast Syria, 
including to deny ISIS access to critical energy resources close to 
Quamishli.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. United States Forces are securing key 
terrain in NE Syria near the vicinity of Qamishli in order to secure 
key terrain as directed by POTUS on 31 October 19. Current operations 
are focused on force protection of United States Forces.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, I understand that the United States was previously providing 
significant logistical support for the repatriation of foreign 
nationals--held at Al Hol and other IDP camps--and this capacity has 
since decreased. What alternate diplomatic engagement or support is the 
United States providing to ensure the repatriation of foreign nationals 
in northeast Syria to their countries of origin given the urgency of 
the situation?
    Secretary Rood. The U.S. military provided transportation and 
logistics assistance to the SDF and certain countries of origin that 
requested United States assistance and wanted to repatriate and 
prosecute their ISIS fighters. I would refer you to the Department of 
State for further details on diplomatic engagement regarding 
repatriation of foreign nationals in Al Hol or other IDP camps.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The U.S. military continues to respond 
to DOS requests for support and provide as in the past according to the 
circumstances. DOD's logistical support capacity has not constrained 
repatriation. The willingness of countries to receive their citizens 
has been the critical limitation. DOD defers to DOS for further detail 
on diplomatic efforts to influence these decisions.

    46. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what is the scope and remit of the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS to address this critical issue?
    Secretary Rood. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS provides a 
venue to discuss the need for countries to take responsibility for 
their citizens by responsibly repatriating them. Along with the State 
Department, we use the Coalition venues to discuss and encourage 
nations to repatriate their citizens.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS 
maintains a Foreign Terrorist Fighter working group to address the 
issue of repatriations of foreign nationals through diplomatic means. 
Militarily, the United States and CJTF-OIR is postured to support all 
diplomatic efforts to repatriate foreign nationals within existing 
policy guidance and logistics limitations.

    47. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what diplomatic efforts is the United States undertaking, 
particularly with the Government of Iraq, to ensure and maintain the 
freedom of movement of affected populations and their right to seek 
protection and access assistance outside of their country of origin?
    Secretary Rood. The United States is committed to supporting the 
freedom of movement of persons displaced or otherwise affected by ISIS. 
I would defer to the Department of State for further details on our 
engagement with allies and partners, such as the Government of Iraq, on 
this matter.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD provides no direct support to 
specific movements. DOD defers to DOS for further detail on specific 
diplomatic efforts concerning this topic.

    48. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what diplomatic efforst are you undertaking to ensure that any 
return of Iraqi refugees from Syria is voluntary?
    Secretary Rood. It is the position of the United States that any 
Iraqi refugees returning from Syria be able to do so in a safe, 
dignified, and voluntary manner. I would refer you to the Department of 
State for further details on this subject.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. DOD openly supports voluntary returns of 
any refugees to their place of origin, but defers to DOS for further 
detail on specific diplomatic efforts concerning this topic.

    49. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, given the evolving role of the United States military and the 
ever-changing numbers and placement of American troops in Syria, how 
can the United States create a safe, enabling environment for 
humanitarian organizations to operate?
    Secretary Rood. The United States Government continues to support 
humanitarian assistance for persons in need in all of Syria. We call on 
all actors in Syria, including the Syrian regime, Russia, and Turkey, 
to provide unhindered access for international humanitarian 
organizations and to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to all conflict-affected populations including those 
displaced by the violence. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria 
today remains the same as it was when we first began operations in 
2014: to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. In the context of this 
mission, the Department is committed to enabling unhindered 
humanitarian access to the greatest extent of our ability.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The military focus remains the enduring 
defeat of ISIS. The enduring defeat of ISIS will enable an environment 
suitable for humanitarian organizations to operate.

    50. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what is the current status of the U.S. forces that President 
Trump has kept in the region to ``secure'' the oil facilities?
    Secretary Rood. The mission in Syria remains the same as it has 
been since 2014: to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. The United 
States military remains present in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat 
of ISIS, including to deny ISIS access to critical resources.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. U.S. personnel are currently focused on 
force protection and securing key infrastructure. These forces are also 
advising, but not accompanying, partner forces that are executing D-
ISIS operations across eastern and northeastern Syria.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how many troops remain in the area for this purpose?
    Secretary Rood. There are currently more than 500 United States 
servicemembers in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, 
including to deny ISIS access to critical resources.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Approximately 500-600 troops remain in 
east and northeast Syria to ensure continuity of the D-ISIS campaign. 
This does not include personnel at At Tanf Garrison.

    52. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, the President seems to believe that the United States can 
``keep'' Syrian oil and earn revenue--which would be a violation of 
international law. Do the Kurds continue to earn oil revenue?
    Secretary Rood. We are continuing our partnership with the SDF in 
the fight against ISIS, including by ensuring ISIS cannot retake the 
oil fields in northeast Syria that ISIS once controlled and used to 
generate revenue. DOD lacks information or estimates of revenue earned 
from the oil fields and defers to other organizations, including the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, for any assessment of revenue 
from oil resources.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Yes. While at a fraction of prewar 
levels, more than 90% of current oil production in Syria is controlled 
by the Kurds and it remains an important source of employment for 
residents east of the Euphrates. The United States intent is to secure 
Syrian oil to prevent ISIS from regaining access to a revenue source it 
once held and ensure the people of east and northeast Syria maintain 
control of this vital resource.
                                 turkey
    53. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, to what extent do you think that the United States should 
continue trying to embrace versus isolate Turkey, particularly given 
President Erdogan's increasing alliance with President Putin?
    Secretary Rood. Turkey has been an important strategic Ally since 
it joined NATO in 1952, but we are concerned with a potential deepening 
relationship with Russia--as best demonstrated by Turkey's acquisition 
of the Russian S-400. We have been clear with Turkey that we object to 
this acquisition both from a United States and NATO standpoint. We have 
warned Turkey, as they know firsthand from their complicated history 
with Russia, to be wary of Russian intent, and that Russia will not 
serve their best interest. We believe Turkey risks isolating itself if 
it continues down this path, which is not in the interests of the 
United States, Turkey, NATO. While being upfront with our Turkish Ally 
on our disagreements and taking firm actions regarding S-400 to protect 
DOD equities, we are also working to keep the door open to Turkey and 
preserve our relationship to ensure a lasting and strategic 
relationship, especially through our traditionally-strong military-to-
military ties (e.g., NATO/Coalition operational deployments, 
International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military 
Sales) that also support National Defense Strategy priorities.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The United States should avoid any 
policies that continue to isolate Turkey. Policies that isolate Turkey 
are directly contradictory to the Strategic Approach of Strengthen 
Alliances and Attract New Partners detailed in the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy. Turkey is a NATO ally with the second largest land 
forces that adds military value to the Alliance through its 
contributions to NATO operations, Command Structure, basing and defense 
spending. Turkey's contribution to NATO and the bi-lateral relationship 
outweighs the transactional relationship President Erdogan has with 
President Putin. Continued isolation of Turkey puts at risk United 
States basing and overflight interests that could impact access to 
ongoing military operations in the Middle East. Isolation of Turkey 
could also limit access to the Black Sea through Turkey's enforcement 
of the Montreux Convention which could have a negative impact on Great 
Powers Competition.

    54. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood, on Wednesday, December 4, 
you told reporters that the Pentagon remains engaged with Turkey with 
the aim of persuading them not to pursue the path of acquiring the 
Russian S-400. If the Administration continues to refuse to impose 
sanctions, what other leverage does the United States have to achieve a 
change in Turkey's behavior in the international arena--beyond 
expulsion from the F-35 program?
    Secretary Rood. We continue to engage Turkey directly on the S-400 
and other bilateral issues. We remind them of their obligations to NATO 
and the need to resolve this issue. We have also engaged other NATO 
Allies and regional partners to also urge Turkey to meet its Alliance 
obligations and that Turkey's decisions to acquire the S-400 are 
inconsistent with NATO.

    55. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, as you know, there is currently no mechanism to remove NATO 
members, and no standards to reevaluate membership. How do you think 
that NATO as an organization--as well as individual member countries--
should respond to recent Turkish aggression against our Kurdish 
partners, and the decision to purchase the Russian S-400?
    Secretary Rood. We have urged key Allies and partners to engage 
Turkey as we have to discourage Turkey from actions in Syria that 
disrupt the D-ISIS campaign and to highlight that Turkey's acquisition 
of the S-400 is inconsistent with NATO. We all must work to strengthen 
our engagement with Turkey to encourage that they remain a strong, 
reliable, responsible Ally.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Turkey is an important, highly valued, 
and reliable member of NATO. However, NATO recognizes that each nation 
has the sovereign right to make decisions that are in that nation's 
best interest. While Allies do not always agree with one another on 
every issue or national decision, they take the time to discuss them, 
understand each other's position, and work toward a positive solution. 
This is exactly how the Alliance responded to Turkey's decision to 
purchase the S-400 and Turkey's military operation in northeast Syria.
              climate change: worldwide threat assessment
    56. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, do you agree with the Administration's Worldwide Threat 
Assessment that ``global environmental degradation, as well as climate 
change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic 
distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond?''
    Secretary Rood. The Department agrees with the intelligence 
community's assessment that environmental factors can affect the 
strategic environment and exacerbate trends, such as resource scarcity, 
that contribute to increased insecurity and instability.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. I agree with the intelligence 
community's assessment of current and future national security risks 
posed by climate change. Changes in climate are likely to have adverse 
impacts that breed instability which may increase conflict.

    57. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, what regions of the world should we be watching most closely 
for climate change-driven instability?
    Secretary Rood. According to the intelligence community, the Middle 
East, Southeast Asia, and Africa are among the world's regions most at 
risk from instability resulting from the effects of a changing climate. 
These effects include greater scarcity of already-stressed natural 
resources, increasing the chance of conflict. Populations reliant on 
agriculture, for example, may be vulnerable to increasingly erratic 
rainfall. Countries in these regions with already modest governance 
capabilities may be challenged to adapt to these effects.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Extreme weather events, many worsened by 
accelerating sea level rise, will particularly affect urban coastal 
areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. 
Changes in frequency and variability of heat waves, droughts, and 
floods--combined with poor governance practices--are increasing the 
risk of instability in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, and 
Jordan. Diminishing Arctic Sea ice may increase competition over access 
to sea routes and natural resources.

    58. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, the Worldwide Threat Assessment highlights the impacts of 
extreme weather on urban coastal areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia 
and the Western Hemisphere, with damage augmented by sea level rise. 
What are the impacts on United States national security when such areas 
endure natural disasters?
    Secretary Rood. The United States has an interest in the security 
and stability of the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Many 
countries in these regions lack the capacity and capability to manage 
the effects of natural disasters and extreme weather events on their 
populations, including the large-scale loss of lives and livelihoods. 
The Department of Defense conducts foreign disaster relief at the 
request of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the State Department. The Department's humanitarian assistance program 
focuses on building capacity of partner nations, including in relation 
to disaster preparedness, risk reduction, and relief response. 
Geographic Combatant Commands regularly conduct humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief initiatives to improve the resiliency of partner 
nations to natural and manmade disasters and to mitigate the effects of 
disasters once they have occurred.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Natural disasters negatively impact U.S. 
posture in affected countries. Extreme weather associated with changing 
climatic conditions may result in the U.S. military being tasked to 
assist with an increasing number of humanitarian and disaster relief 
missions. These missions, like any other operational requirement, 
affect readiness and reduce our capacity to respond to other world 
events. Also, disaster relief has become an area of competition with 
near peer competitors.

    59. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, the Worldwide Threat Assessment states that heatwaves, droughts 
and floods--combined with poor governance practices--are increasing 
water and food insecurity around the world. The assessment calls out 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq and Jordan. Can you discuss the implications of 
social unrest, migration, and interstate tension in these nations?
    Secretary Rood.
    Egypt: Egypt continues to recover from its 2011 uprising and is 
managing growing demographic pressures and the threat of water 
scarcity. This threat of water scarcity could be exacerbated by the 
construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Department of State have been leading 
efforts to mediate tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan 
regarding the GERD. The Department of Defense stays closely aligned 
with its interagency partners to encourage a negotiated agreement that 
satisfies all affected parties.
    Ethiopia: Resolving tensions with Sudan and Egypt over the GERD's 
fill rates remains Ethiopia's priority. Ethiopia plans to use the 
energy generated by the dam to provide electricity to 100 million 
people, and it believes the use of the Nile's natural resources should 
be fair and equitable.
    Iraq: Water insecurity and inconsistent essential services, 
especially in southern Iraq, are a driver of civil protests in the 
country. Stability, infrastructure, and effective governance are needed 
to provide these services. The Department of Defense supports a whole-
of-government effort to improve security sector reform, stability, and 
effective governance in Iraq.
    Jordan: Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in the 
world. In addition to a lack of resources, Jordan's infrastructure 
faces further strain due to the influx of hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees. The Department of Defense works closely with 
interagency partners to help improve Jordan's security and to advance 
Jordan's economic development.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Instability resulting from water/food 
scarcity almost certainly would risk sustained government control for 
Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. For Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan reference the 
answer to 61 for more details. Instability resulting from water/food 
scarcity almost certainly would risk sustained government control for 
Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. For Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan reference the 
answer to 61 for more details. Ethiopia's ethnic federal governance 
model has invited ethnic conflict, which was exacerbated by years of 
ethnic marginalization under a repressive regime. Beginning in earnest 
in 2015, ethnic tensions drastically increased, resulting in multiple 
state-wide states of emergency and violent crackdowns by Ethiopian 
security forces. Prime Minister Abiy rose to power in 2018 with a 
promise to address ethnic tensions though his efforts have ultimately 
failed to limit or address longstanding grievances. Ethiopia's 
approximately 3.1 million internally displaced persons is the highest 
in the world. Ethiopia also hosts over 900,000 refugees from regional 
countries such as Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan. Aside from its 
internal issues, Ethiopia is an important regional power and exporter 
of security assistance, serving United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Ethiopia claims sovereignty over 
Nile water emanating from within Ethiopian territory, which prompted 
Ethiopia to begin the five billion dollar construction of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will be Africa's largest 
hydroelectric dam. The impending disruptions to the Nile's flow when 
the GERD is completed has caused Egyptian-Ethiopian tensions to 
increase, though negotiations to settle the dispute diplomatically are 
ongoing.
                    climate impact on other threats
    60. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how are violent extremist organizations exploiting water 
insecurity and food scarcity to gain influence?
    Secretary Rood. Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) may exploit 
water insecurity and food scarcity by using the water and food 
resources they control to help recruit members and raise funds. 
Populations in areas dealing with systemic water insecurity and food 
scarcity may be more susceptible to VEOs' recruitment efforts, as VEOs 
offer alternative livelihoods and economic incentives. VEOs may also 
actively damage water infrastructure to create water stress and gain 
influence.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. VEOs--including ISIS, al Qaida, and 
their affiliates--have exploited water and food scarcity and insecurity 
globally to undermine local governments, recruit new members, generate 
revenue, and gain the loyalty of affected populations. VEOs often 
capitalize on drought, famine, and other food and water crises to 
demonstrate that local governments are illegitimate and ineffective and 
to present themselves as a preferable alternative to the status quo. 
VEOs have also attempted to influence and gain control of humanitarian 
aid. This approach allows VEOs to provide scarce resources to their own 
members and to advertise their capabilities as service providers while 
leaving local populations dependent on VEOs for assistance. Examples 
include:
      Groups like ISIS in Syria and Iraq, as well as the 
Somali-based al-Qaida affiliate al-Shabaab have distributed food, 
cooking oil, and other items to needy families in an effort to boost 
support among local communities. These service delivery efforts, which 
often come amid severe food and water crises, aim to reinforce the 
VEO's narrative that they represent legitimate governance authorities.
      Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) exerts control over 
humanitarian aid in Syria's Idlib Province, including food 
distribution. Through HTS's governance organization, it controls taxes 
and prices on many food staples, such as bread, and has faced protests 
over periodic price increases.
      In West Africa, Boko Haram routinely targets civilians in 
remote villages of northeast Nigeria, seizing food and livestock and 
contributing to a regional internally displaced persons (IDP) crisis. 
The group has also used food and other economic incentives to recruit 
impoverished young men. VEOs have also targeted food and agricultural 
resources to intimidate the local population, exacerbate sectarian 
tensions, and expand influence. Examples include:
      In mid-2019, ISIS conducted a systematic crop-burning 
campaign across northeast Syria and parts of northern Iraq, scorching 
thousands of acres in an effort to intimidate local farmers and 
demonstrate that government security forces are ill equipped to protect 
local populations.
      When ISIS captured parts of northern and central Iraq, it 
subsequently closed several floodgates at key dams, like those in 
Ramadi and Fallujah in Anbar Province, reducing water access for 
downstream Shia communities and their farmland.

    61. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how is water scarcity influencing both partners and adversaries 
in the Middle East and North Africa?
    Secretary Rood. From a defense perspective, DOD agrees that the 
issue of water scarcity can exacerbate social unrest, migration, and 
interstate tension. For example, the construction of Ethiopia's Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has heightened tensions between Egypt, 
Ethiopia, and Sudan. The United States Departments of Treasury, State, 
and Defense have encouraged Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to reach an 
agreement on filling the dam that satisfies the needs of all parties. 
The State Department can address the broader implications of water 
scarcity on U.S. interests.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, ``The Near East and North Africa 
fresh water resources are among the lowest in the world: they have 
decreased by 2/3 during the last 40 years and are expected to fall over 
50 percent by 2050.'' ``Over 60 percent of water resources in the 
region flows from outside national and regional boundaries.'' Violent 
Extremist Organizations (VEOs) can leverage water scarcity by 
controlling water access in order to subjugate populations and 
demonstrate power. Water scarcity also fosters VEO recruitment due to 
loss of economic livelihood. In terms of our allies, water scarcity 
concerns could result in strain on international agreements, however, 
water scarcity alone is unlikely to draw nations into direct conflict. 
Water scarcity can also result in destabilizing secondary effects that 
could lead to conflict. Water scarcity can cause food and energy 
shortages and in cases of prolonged water scarcity can lead to mass 
migration. Large numbers of migrants moving into new communities can 
overwhelm existing social systems contributing to economic challenges. 
These conditions can lead to localized violence and empower VEOs or 
criminal organizations that could result in a larger conflict which 
could destabilize governments. The Middle East and North Africa suffer 
from water scarcity more than anywhere else in the world with less than 
1.5 percent of the world's renewable fresh water resources. 
Internationally, there is increasing concern with adversaries targeting 
water desalinization plants, dams or other water sources. In fact, the 
increasing use of cyber weapons by adversaries may expose both water 
distribution and sanitation to malicious actors. Additionally, Egypt, 
Sudan, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan have on-going 
tensions over water access as dams and diversions installed upstream 
reduce water flow. The pressure to allocate an increasingly scarce 
resource affects intra-state security. Protests linked to water have 
also reduced broken out in Iraq and Iran. The lack of water has reduced 
arable land, leaving farmers with food and income insecurity in 
addition to water shortages.

    62. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Allvin, how is the Department working to adapt to the ``increasingly 
complex global environment'' and adjust our strategic priorities 
accordingly?
    Secretary Rood. The Department regularly assesses the global 
security environment to account for changes and understand the 
implications of our decisions. This evaluation informs adaptations to 
our defense priorities, focus, and approach. The National Defense 
Strategy prioritizes military modernization and readiness to deter 
aggression from China and Russia as our primary effort.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. In recent years, we've seen the return 
of great power competition as China and Russia attempt to assert their 
authoritarian grip on world affairs as well as a concomitant change in 
the character of warfare. Previously, we viewed threats against the 
U.S. as regionally constrained, so we focused our strategy and planning 
on two simultaneous major theaters of war. Today we recognize that our 
adversaries will compete with us across the globe and in all domans, to 
include space and cyber. Competing in this increasingly complex global 
environment required a change in how we operate as a Joint Force, and a 
corresponding adjustment of our strategic priorities. First, we changed 
the way we plan, shifting from regionally-focused plans to respond to 
specific contingencies in limited geographic areas to plans which are 
globally oriented on each of the challenges addressed in our National 
Defense Strategy: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent 
extremism. We also focused our capability to assess our plans and 
activities. We no longer look simply for risk to proposed operational 
or contingency plans but perform a clear-eyed assessment across the 
five priority challenges for how effective we are at competing day-to-
day. Those global assessments allow us to balance strategic risk and 
coordinate our activities in space and time to remain operationally 
unpredictable to our adversaries. Second, we have improved our 
situational awareness of the location, capabilities, and readiness of 
globally-deployed major force elements to enable senior leaders to make 
informed decisions about force employment very quickly. Third, we 
changed the way we manage the force. We start with top-down 
prioritization and allocation of resources against the strategic 
priorities established by our senior civilian leaders, which is then 
refined from the bottom up by opportunities identified by our combatant 
commanders. Finally, we changed the way we develop and design the force 
of tomorrow. It is a process driven by the Secretary of Defense, who 
prioritizes the force investments necessary to be ready for the future 
operating environment. We have created a concept-driven, threat-
informed development process that uses materiel and non-materiel 
solutions to compete and win across all domains and out-pace 
competitors' ability to deter us from our objectives. The bottom line 
is we have changed the Joint Force today by planning and assessing a 
globally integrated system of employment and we are continuously 
adapting our existing capabilities while looking ahead to ensure the 
force of the future is lethal, agile, and dominant. We do all of this 
to enable the Secretary of Defense and the President to make better 
decisions at the speed of relevance in today's complex security 
environment.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                             pit production
    63. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood, as a member of the Nuclear 
Weapons Council you are familiar with the Institute for Defense 
Analyses' [IDA's] March 2019 independent assessment of NNSA's [National 
Nuclear Security Administration's] strategy for production of plutonium 
pits. As you know, IDA concluded NNSA's current strategy will not meet 
the military's requirement of 80 pits per year in 2030 and called on 
the Department to evaluate how best to respond to the requirement 
shortfall. Under Secretary Rood, in response to IDA's report on NNSA's 
plutonium strategy, has the Department completed an assessment of the 
impact to military requirements and the possible options to mitigate 
the expected shortfall in pit production?
    Secretary Rood. In order to avoid age-related risks and provide 
sufficient production capacity to sustain U.S. nuclear deterrent forces 
in the long-term, it remains DOD's requirement that National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) be able to produce at least 80 pits per 
year by 2030. The NNSA strategy to produce at least 80 pits per year by 
2030 remains aligned with DOD's requirement. As the IDA report 
indicates and the DOD acknowledges, timely execution of this pit 
production strategy is not certain. Consistent with Senate Report 116-
48, accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2020, the Department of 
Defense, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, is finalizing a briefing 
to the congressional defense committees regarding risk mitigation 
options if the production of at least 80 pits per year by 2030 is not 
achieved. An interim response to this reporting requirement was 
provided to the congressional defense committees on 16 December. Though 
slightly delayed the briefing is nearly finalized and we're committed 
to providing the Department's assessment as soon as possible.

    64. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood, is restoring the capacity to 
produce 30 plutonium pits per year at Los Alamos by 2026 still the 
military's top priority?
    Secretary Rood. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective U.S. 
nuclear deterrent is the highest priority of the Department of Defense, 
and producing 80 pits per year by 2030 is essential to DOD's ability to 
do so. Achieving the interim capacity to manufacture at least 30 pits 
per year at Los Alamos by 2026 is the first critical step in any 
credible and timely strategy to achieve a production rate of at least 
80 pits per year.
                        impact of climate change
    65. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
of the National Defense Authorization Act includes a requirement for 
the Secretary of Defense to develop a climate vulnerability and risk 
assessment tool to assist the military departments in measuring how the 
risks associated with climate change impact installations, facilities 
and other DOD equities. Can you cite a few examples of how the impacts 
of climate change are already impacting military installations and 
facilities both domestically and internationally?
    Secretary Rood. The Department of Defense works to build the 
resilience of its installations and infrastructure in the face of a 
wide range of challenges, including the effects of a changing climate 
and extreme weather events. The Department previously undertook an 
assessment of the vulnerability of defense installations to climate and 
extreme weather impacts, and delivered a report to Congress in January 
2019 on ``Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense''. 
Examples of climate/weather impacts on military installations in both 
the United States and overseas include permafrost thaw, recurrent 
flooding, sea-level rises, and desertification.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The Joint Staff has not received any 
overseas basing actions in response to changes in environmental 
conditions. Future environmental impacts on stateside basing will be 
identified by the services (Title X responsibility) and adjustments to 
basing will then be requested accordingly. To date, there have been no 
reported impacts to stateside or overseas basing. The Joint Staff will 
continue to coordinate with the Services to identify and respond to 
changes in environmental conditions that threaten to impact stateside 
or overseas basing. Funding to make required adjustments will then be 
requested through the appropriate processes for inclusion in future 
National Defense Authorization Acts.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                             nuclear issues
    66. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, if New START [Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty] expires in February 2021 with nothing to replace it, 
there will be no constraints on Russia's existing arsenal of hundreds 
of long-range delivery systems and warheads. Would that increase or 
decrease the threat Russia poses to the United States?
    Secretary Rood. During the past decade, Russia has been modernizing 
its existing nuclear forces as well as developing new systems. Our 
assessment of the growth of Russia's total nuclear forces is driven 
primarily by a significant projected increase in the number of Russia's 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons--i.e., weapons that are not subject to the 
New START Treaty. Russia is also pursuing novel nuclear delivery 
systems, most of which are also not currently subject to the New START 
Treaty. Therefore the nuclear threat from Russia is projected to grow 
even if the New START Treaty was extended.

    67. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, New START maintains a cap on 
the Russian nuclear arsenal, which allows the United States to forgo 
the expense and danger of a further nuclear build-up. Is the Trump 
Administration seeking to increase the size of the deployed U.S. 
nuclear arsenal above the New START limits?
    Secretary Rood. No. Our focus is on maintaining, and restoring as 
necessary, modern and effective nuclear forces, as well as the 
infrastructure needed to support them. These capabilities are critical 
to preserving U.S. ability to deter the most dangerous threats to the 
Nation.

    68. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, if the Trump Administration is 
not seeking to increase the size of the deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal 
above the New START limits, why would we not want to maintain the 
current verifiable cap on strategic weapons?
    Secretary Rood. We cannot ignore Russian efforts to expand and 
improve its nuclear forces outside the New START Treaty constraints--
principally its large arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the 
new ``novel'' strategic systems President Putin unveiled last year. 
These capabilities, combined with Russia's provocative nuclear saber-
rattling since 2014 and overall malign behavior are all cause for great 
concern regardless of whether the New START Treaty is extended past 
February 2021. The President seeks arms control that delivers real 
security to the United States and its allies and partners. Russia will 
have little incentive to negotiate limits on these capabilities of 
concern if the United States first extends a treaty that does nothing 
to limit them.

    69. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, what is your assessment of how 
United States allies, including European allies, would react if New 
START goes away with nothing to replace it?
    Secretary Rood. Our European allies highly value nuclear arms 
control and have supported this Administration's approach to Russia's 
violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. I believe 
our European allies will support a course of action regarding New START 
that increases our collective security in the long-run.

    70. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, several administration 
officials have argued that New START does not limit the new long-range 
nuclear delivery systems Russia is developing, such as a new heavy ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile] (the Sarmat), a new hypersonic 
glide-vehicle (the Avangard), a new nuclear-powered cruise missile (the 
Skyfall), and a new nuclear-powered torpedo (the Poseidon). However, 
this month Russia formally announced that the Sarmat and Avangard, both 
of which could be fielded within the next two years, would in fact be 
limited under the Treaty. Russia exhibited the Avangard to United 
States inspectors per the terms of the treaty. Is there an alternate 
viable path to limiting Russia's new long-range nuclear systems, other 
than extending New START?
    Secretary Rood. Russia has no choice but to count Sarmat and 
Avangard under New START because both systems meet the treaty's 
definition of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Russia's 
announcement that they would be limited under the treaty is not a 
concession. While there may be alternate viable paths to limiting the 
other Russian systems, extending New START is not one of them because 
they do not conform to any existing treaty definition.

    71. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, if the United States wants to 
control new Russian delivery systems, is the United States willing to 
forgo seeking any similar technologies?
    Secretary Rood. Any new agreement that limits new Russian long-
range nuclear delivery systems would almost certainly also apply to the 
United States, but would not necessarily force the United States to 
forego similar capabilities. An arms control agreement can be 
negotiated to place numerical limits on such systems while preserving a 
country's ability to develop and deploy such systems within those 
limits.

    72. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, with respect to the Trump 
Administration's desire to bring China into the arms control process, 
China has expressed no interest in becoming a party to such an 
agreement. China is believed to possess approximately 300 total nuclear 
warheads, while the United States and Russia are believed to possess 
over 6,000 total warheads each. What precisely does the Trump 
Administration want China to do on arms control?
    Secretary Rood. We expect China to accept its share of 
responsibility, as a nuclear-armed great power, for reducing the risk 
of a nuclear conflict and avoiding unnecessary nuclear arms 
competition. The President has called for China to join the United 
States and Russia in discussions on pursuing an arms control agreement 
that can reduce this risk and avoid such competition. The 
Administration is currently developing tripartite arms control 
proposals for the President's consideration.

    73. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, is China's participation in New 
START a precondition for extending the Treaty?
    Secretary Rood. The United States has made no decision on whether 
or not to extend the New START Treaty. Consequently, the United States 
has not declared any preconditions to extend the Treaty.

    74. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, has the Trump Administration 
begun negotiations with Russia and China on a more comprehensive arms 
control agreement?
    Secretary Rood. No.

    75. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, would China be allowed to build 
up to the New START limits were it to join the Treaty or would the 
United States and Russia be required to reduce their forces to China's 
level?
    Secretary Rood. China's obligations in a future arms control 
agreement would be the subject of negotiations which would determine 
limits.

    76. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, would extending New START buy 
time to engage both Russia and China on a more comprehensive approach?
    Secretary Rood. Russia and China will have little incentive to 
begin negotiating a more comprehensive nuclear arms control agreement 
if the United States immediately extends a treaty that does not limit 
certain capabilities of concern in either Russia's or China's nuclear 
arsenal.

    77. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, given that China represents a 
small fraction of the global nuclear stockpile compared the more than 
90 percent represented by the United States and Russia together, what 
specifically would motivate China to come to the negotiating table 
before New START's expiration?
    Secretary Rood. I believe China has an interest in avoiding a 
United States that is completely unconstrained in its ability to field 
nuclear forces.
                               open skies
    78. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, Deputy Secretary of State John 
Sullivan told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in testimony this 
year that any United States decision to withdraw from the Open Skies 
Treaty would require the unanimous support of NATO ``to make sure we 
didn't do damage to our NATO alliance.'' Do you agree with this 
statement?
    Secretary Rood. United States Allies have heard our concerns, which 
include Russian violations, and understand the United States desire for 
accountability. Ultimately it is a U.S. national decision on whether to 
remain in the treaty.

    79. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, Deputy Secretary of State 
Sullivan also stated this year that the United States ambassadors to 
NATO and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
support the United States remaining a party to the Treaty. Is that also 
your understanding?
    Secretary Rood. I cannot comment on the opinions of other 
Administration officials.

    80. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, in a letter to Senator Fischer 
in May 2018, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis wrote that ``it is in 
our Nation's best interest to remain a party to the Open Skies 
Treaty,'' noting that it ``contributes to greater transparency and 
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, which benefits both the United 
States and our allies and partners.'' Do you agree with Secretary 
Mattis?
    Secretary Rood. I agree with the President's position that the 
United States should remain committed to agreements that advance U.S., 
Allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and 
include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. The 
Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the Open 
Skies Treaty, which diminishes the value of the Treaty for all 
participants.

    81. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, regarding the Open Skies 
Treaty, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry stated to the Wall Street 
Journal in an article dated October 27, 2019 ``Ukraine is interested in 
maintaining and implementing this Treaty.'' Do you agree that the 
Treaty has been an important tool for United States efforts to 
constrain Russian aggression in Ukraine?
    Secretary Rood. The United States has used its Open Skies Treaty 
flights to reaffirm United States commitment to Ukraine and other 
partner nations, as demonstrated in the December 2018 extraordinary 
Treaty flight over Ukraine following? Russia's unprovoked attack on 
Ukrainian naval vessels in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait.
     online disinformation and foreign malign influence operations
    82. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, a Voice of America article 
dated December 8, 2019, entitled ``Pentagon Concerned Russia 
Cultivating Sympathy Among United States Troops,'' stated, ``the second 
annual Reagan National Defense Survey, completed in late October, found 
nearly half of armed services households questioned, 46 percent, said 
they viewed Russia as an ally.'' Furthermore, the article stated, 
``While a majority, 71 percent of all Americans and 53 percent of 
military households, still views Russia as an enemy, the spike in pro-
Russian sentiment has defense officials concerned.'' On November 12, 
2019, 19 Senators, including the Ranking Member, joined me in sending a 
letter to Secretary Esper requesting an update on current DOD efforts 
to educate servicemembers regarding attempts by Russia and other 
foreign adversaries (e.g., governments and their proxies and agents) to 
influence servicemembers as part of their malign influence campaigns, 
and I requested a response to that letter by December 6, 2019. When can 
I expect a written response to that letter?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, a written response to your letter has been 
mailed to your office and the offices of the 19 other Senators that co-
signed the original letter to the Department.
                                  iran
    83. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, 14,000 troops have been 
deployed to the Middle East since May in response to spikes in Iranian 
aggression and concerns about escalation. Since DOD believed that such 
a significant deployment of United States Armed Forces was necessary 
and Iran's government has not appeared to moderate its malign behavior, 
what evidence is there that the Trump Administration's ``maximum 
pressure'' campaign has been successful?
    Secretary Rood. DOD deployments to the region are intended to 
defend our forces and reassure our partners. Maximum Pressure is 
designed to urge Iran back to the negotiating table. As Secretary 
Pompeo said ``The regime and its proxies are weaker now than when our 
pressure began. Iranian-backed militias have stated that Iran no longer 
has enough money to pay them as much as in the past and has enacted 
austerity plans. Iran's proposed military budget for 2019 included a 
28% cut to its defense budget and a 17% cut to the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps.''

    84. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
would you say that the threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon has 
increased, decreased, or remained relatively unchanged since the United 
States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA]?
    Secretary Rood. Iran has taken a number of provocative actions that 
violate the specific restrictions of the JCPOA since May 2019. Those 
actions do not necessarily mean that Iran has made the strategic 
decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran is incrementally improving 
the capabilities required to enrich uranium, but has not taken all the 
steps necessary to develop a weapon. In any case, the President has 
been clear that Iran must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon 
and one of the key objectives of the Maximum Pressure Campaign remains 
to deny Iran all paths to developing a nuclear weapon. The Department 
of Defense will support all efforts to do so.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The threat of Iran developing a nuclear 
weapon clearly remains, based upon their capability and intent. 
Although Iran's recent violations of JCPOA restrictions incrementally 
increase its capability to pursue weapons-grade enriched uranium, we 
have seen no direct evidence to indicate the regime desires to pursue 
the development of a nuclear weapon.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                            missiles defense
    86. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
North Korea has conducted a fair number of missile tests this year. 
Would you say the threat from North Korea is increased, is the same, or 
is lower?
    Secretary Rood. The threat from North Korea is increasing due to 
its continued development and testing of its missile capabilities, but 
the United States is also modernizing its own missile defense forces in 
response, to keep pace with the threat.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. We must treat North Korea as a credible 
military threat. The threat from North Korea's artillery and missile 
systems is increasing and Pyongyang has continued to advance its short-
range ballistic missile and conventional weapons programs as 
demonstrated through multiple test events in 2019. North Korea retains 
its WMD capabilities.

    87. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, if 
the threat from North Korea is increasing, what are the implications 
for our missile defense programs?
    Secretary Rood. North Korea's missile force is increasing 
quantitatively and qualitatively, which validates the high priority of 
sustained investment in United States Homeland and regional missile 
defenses in recent years. Just as North Korea adapts its missiles to 
become more lethal, so too must the United States adapt its missile 
defenses against the threat. United States missile defenses support the 
deterrence of North Korean attacks, assure allies and partners, and, 
should deterrence fail, will limit the damage North Korea can inflict 
on the Homeland, allies, partners, and forces in the field. U.S. 
investments in multiple missile defense and supporting systems indicate 
its commitment to these missions. The investments include the Next 
Generation Interceptor (NGI) for Homeland defense, a space sensor 
layer, a new long-range discriminating radar, and options for layered 
defense capabilities to include exploration of the performance of the 
Standard Missile-3 Block IIA against an ICBM.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. An increasing threat from North Korea is 
not unexpected. To help position us to counter this evolving threat, we 
are expanding our current intercept envelope through modification of 
existing regional systems such as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and 
investing in technologies that could lead to a space-based sensing 
layer and a long term replacement for the current ground-based 
interceptors (GBIs) known as Next Generation Interceptor (NGI).

    88. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
Dr. Griffin has cancelled the RKV [redesigned kill vehicle] program and 
started over with what he's calling the NGI [Next Generation 
Identification]. Of course, this is going to delay fielding the planned 
20 new interceptors and upgrading the old ones. What should we do in 
the meantime?
    Secretary Rood. As the United States develops the Next Generation 
Interceptor, there are multiple lines of effort in the sensor and 
shooter arenas that will improve our ability to defend the Homeland. 
First, the Department is exploring options for layered Homeland missile 
defense capabilities to complement the existing Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense system. For example, in fiscal year 2020 the Missile Defense 
Agency will conduct a flight test of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA 
against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) to determine if 
the SM-3 Block IIA could provide the capability for an underlay defense 
for the Homeland. Second, Congress has appropriated funds to improve 
reliability and extend service life so that the fielded Ground-Based 
Interceptor fleet remains viable until replaced by NGI. Third, the 
United States is improving its missile defense sensors, including the 
development and launch of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space 
Sensor program to provide greater threat-tracking ability. Finally, the 
United States is investing in advanced concepts and research for future 
capabilities. Maintaining the sustained support for Homeland and 
regional defense will greatly contribute to deterring current and 
future threats by increasing North Korean uncertainty that any attack 
would be successful and assuring our allies and partners that we can 
and will come to their aid if attacked.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. All of the United States is defended and 
has sensors and interceptors capable of engaging current long-range 
missile threats to the Homeland, including Hawaii. To address the 
cancellation of the RKV Program, the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) 
development was initiated to meet survivability and reliability 
requirements, and to address the original RKV allocated threats in 
addition to the updated threats represented in Intelligence Community 
estimates. In addition, the Department is exploring the utility of 
regional interceptors for terminal homeland defense along with various 
methods to deploy them. A layered defense consisting of mid-course 
intercept and terminal defense is complementary. The terminal layered 
Homeland Defense provides an additional layer of protection not 
available today.'' Rationale: As written, the statement is over-
promising. The Department has not funded the efforts to enhancing 
existing missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors, advancing 
F-35 to track and target offensive missiles, and exploring options for 
kinetic interceptors for boost-phase defense. Policy should not be 
overstating the Department's funded position.

    89. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
with respect to hypersonic missiles, from a missile defense 
perspective, what is the biggest challenge and what should our top 
priority be?
    Secretary Rood. The biggest challenge remains detecting, tracking, 
and maintaining custody of hypersonic missiles of varying types (cruise 
or boost-glide for example). For this, we must prioritize investments 
in layered missile defense programs including a space sensor layer 
which is key to reducing reliance on terrestrial sensors and enables 
layered defense in the boost-, varying midcourse-, and terminal-phases 
of threat missile flight.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. Hypersonic threats pose a significant 
challenge and developing a layered defense may be our best option to 
deal with them. In the near term we should maximize the capability of 
legacy air and missile defense systems against them through 
improvements in sensor software and battle management algorithms. At 
the same time we need to invest in risk reduction efforts in sensor and 
interceptor technologies to support engagement of these threats further 
from their impact point.
                           open skies treaty
    90. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
the President has abandoned the INF and the JCPOA. During the hearing, 
Senator Shaheen asked you about the Administration's possible decision 
not to renew the New START Treaty. The Administration also has given 
indications that it is considering scrapping the Treaty on Open Skies. 
What is your recommendation about whether it is in the United States' 
best interests to do so?
    Secretary Rood. The United States should remain committed to 
agreements that advance U.S., Allied, and partner security; are 
verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply 
responsibly with their obligations. The Russian Federation is in 
violation of its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty, which 
diminishes the value of the Treaty for all participants.
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The United States continues to implement 
the Open Skies Treaty and remains in full compliance with its 
obligations under the Treaty. The United States is currently reviewing 
the Treaty's merits, as well as concerns with Allies and partners. The 
results of this review, and discussions with Allies and partners, will 
shape my recommendation on whether it is in the United States' best 
interest to remain in the Treaty.
                                 space
    91. Senator Jones. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Allvin, 
any disruption to our space-based capabilities would affect all aspects 
of military operations. Rightly recognizing space as a warfighting 
domain requires the development of clear policy, rules of engagement, 
and operations plans to govern our decision-making. What is the status 
of the development of policies governing 1) how we deter attacks on our 
space-based capabilities, 2) under what circumstances and how we will 
respond to indications & warnings of such an attack; and 3) how we 
respond in the event of such an attack?
    Secretary Rood. Deterring and being prepared to respond to threats 
to our space-based capabilities is a priority for the Department right 
now, as part of our broader efforts to compete, deter, and win in an 
era of great power competition. Establishing the United States Space 
Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces was a huge step in preparing 
the Department for future conflicts and transforming our approach to 
space from a support function to a warfighting domain in its own right. 
We are pursuing a multi-pronged strategy to build space forces that can 
defeat threats, integrate space into joint operations, shape the 
strategic environment, and partner with other nations and the private 
sector. As part of implementing this strategy, we are working with U.S. 
Space Command to ensure authorities are delegated to the appropriate 
level, standing rules of engagement for space are clear, and space is 
integrated into all combatant command campaign and operational plans. 
As the National Security Strategy States, ``any harmful interference 
with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture . 
. . will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, 
and domain of our choosing.''
    Lieutenant General Allvin. The Department is developing the 
capabilities needed to provide mission assurance for for the space-
based effects the Joint Force relies on. With the establishment of U.S. 
Space Command on 29 August and U.S. Space Force on 20 December, the 
nation is applying the necessary focus, energy, and resources to the 
task of deterring potential adversaries and protecting America's 
interests in space. Per the President's direction, the National 
Security Council is working with the Department of Defense, Department 
of State, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure 
Commander of U.S. Space Command has the appropriate operational 
authorities. In addition, the Joint Staff and U.S. Space Command are 
updating the Standing Rules of Engagement for space activities to 
better guide the protection of space capabilities from evolving 
threats. U.S. Space Command and its subordinate organizations--Combined 
Force Space Component Command and Joint Task Force Space Defense--are 
developing concepts of operations and operational plans to guide the 
employment of space forces under the new command and have begun work to 
integrate space planning elements into other Combatant Commands. The 
Joint Staff is supporting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-led 
efforts on new space strategic messaging guidance that aims to provide 
additional deterrence and messaging options across the spectrum of 
conflict. Finally, should deterrence fail, any response to aggression 
or attacks in space will not necessarily drive a response in space. Per 
the National Strategy for Space, the President has established the 
overarching policy that ``any harmful interference with or an attack 
upon critical components of our space architecture . . . will be met 
with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our 
choosing.''

                                 [all]