[Senate Hearing 116-646]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-646
NOMINATIONS TO THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-998 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 16, 2020.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 2
Letter dated May 12, 2020 to Hon. Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria
Cantwell from Harold A. Schaitberger, General President,
International Association of Fire Fighters................. 4
Letter dated June 15, 2020 to Hon. Roger Wicker and Hon.
Maria Cantwell from John Wiesman, DrPH, MPH, Secretary,
Washington State Department of Health and Laura Watson,
Director, Washington State Department of Ecology........... 6
Letter dated Sep 11, 2019 to Cynthia Decker, NOAA Federal re:
Scientific Integrity Filing................................ 8
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 141
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 143
Letter dated June 10, 2020 to Alexandra Dapolito Dunn,
Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
from: Eve C. Gartner, Managing Attorney, Toxic Exposure &
Health Program, Earthjustice; Stel Bailey, Brevard County,
FL, Emily Donovan, Brunswick County, NC, National PFAS
Contamination Coalition; Lynn Thorp, National Campaigns
Director, Clean Water Action; Tom Neltner, Chemicals Policy
Director, Environmental Defense Fund; Melanie Benesh,
Legislative Attorney, Environmental Working Group; Daniel
Rosenberg, Senior Attorney & Director of Federal Toxics
Policy, Natural Resources Defense Council.................. 145
Memorandum from Earthjustice entitled ``EPA's PFAS-related
responsibilities under the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2020''.......................................... 148
Opposition letter dated June 10, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon.
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwell from Jennifer Sass,
PhD, Senior Scientist, National Resources Defense Council,
Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University and
over 90 scientists......................................... 149
Opposition letter dated June 11, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon.
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwell from Linda Lipsen,
Chief Executive Officer, American Association for Justice.. 159
Opposition letter dated June 12, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon,
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwell from the Learning
Disabilities Association of America........................ 160
Opposition letter dated June 15, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon.
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwell from: AFL-CIO, Alaska
Community Action on Toxics, American Association for
Justice, AKPIRG (Alaska), Arizona PIRG, Asbestos Disease
Awareness Organization, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense
League, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (Rabun Gap
Chapter), Breast Cancer Action, Breast Cancer Prevention
Partners, CALPIRG, Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund,
Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Economic
Justice, Center for Environmental Health, Center for
Environmental Policy and Management, Center for Justice &
Democracy, Center for Science in the Public Interest,
Chapel Hill Organization for Clean Energy, Charlie's House,
Chicago Consumer Coalition, Citizens' Environmental
Coalition, Clean and Healthy New York, Clean Production
Action, Clean Water Action, Collaborative on Health and the
Environment, Columbia Consumer Education Council, Coming
Clean, Consumer Action, Consumer Advocates Against Reverse
Mortgage Abuse, Consumer Assistance Council, Inc., Consumer
Federation of America, Consumers for Auto Reliability and
Safety, CoPIRG (Colorado), ConnPIRG, Data for Justice,
Earthjustice, Earthworks, Ecology Center, Endangered
Species Coalition, Environmental Defense Fund,
Environmental Health Strategy Center, Environmental Working
Group, Fannworker Association of Florida, Florida PIRG,
Florida Silver Haired Legislature Inc, Food & Water Action,
Georgia PIRG, Green Inside and Out, Green Science Policy
Institute, HarperSmiles, Healthy Babies Bright Futures,
Illinois PIRG, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy,
International Center For Technology Assessment;
International Union, UAW; Iowa PIRG, KidsAndCars.org, Kids
In Danger, League of Conservation Voters, Maryland PIRG,
Massachusetts Breast Cancer Coalition, MASSPIRG, Meghan's
Hope, Mid-Pinellas Coalition of Neighborhood Associations,
Moms Clean Air Force, MoPIRG (Missouri), NC Child, NCPIRG,
NHPIRG, NJPIRG, NMPIRG, National Consumers League, National
Employment Law Project, National PFAS Contamination
Coalition, National Women's Health Network, Natural
Resources Defense Council, NC Conservation Network,
Nontoxic Certified, Ohio PIRG, Oregon Environmental
Council, OSPIRG (Oregon), Parents Against Tip-Overs,
PennPIRG, PIRGIM (Michigan), Public Citizen, Protect All
Children's Environment, RIPIRG, Safer Chemicals Healthy
Families, Safer States, Shanes Foundation, TexPIRG, Toxic-
Free Future, Toxic Free NC, Union of Concerned Scientists,
Union Veterans Council, UPSTREAM, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, WashPIRG, WISPIRG (Wisconsin), Women's
Voices for the Earth, Vermont Conservation Voters, Zero
Waste Washington........................................... 163
Oposition letter dated June 15, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon.
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwel from Diana Zuckerman,
Ph.D., President, National Center for Health Research...... 167
Opposition letter dated June 16, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to David
Strickland from Jack Fletcher.............................. 168
Opposition letter dated June 16, 2020 re: Nancy Beck to Hon.
Roger Wicker and Hon. Maria Cantwell from: Linda Shosie,
Tucson, Arizona, Environmental Justice Task Force--Tucson;
Anthony Spaniola, Oscada, Michigan, Need Our Water (NOW);
Eric Weiner, Windsor, Connecticut, Clean Water Task Force @
Windsor, Climate Action; Diane and Paul Cotter, Rindge, New
Hampshire, Your Turnout Gear and PFOA; Stel Bailey, Cocoa,
Florida, Fight For Zero; Laurene Allen, Merrimack, New
Hampshire, Merrimack Citizens for Clean Water; Lindsey
Duhe, Pensacola, Florida, Saufley Field Community; Andrea
Amico, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Testing for Pease; Lynn
Sprayberry, Summerville, Georgia, Chattooga County; Loreen
Hackett, Hoosick Falls, New York, PfoaProjectNY; Susan
Phelan, West Barnstable, Massachusett, GreenCAPE; Jack
Caldwell, New Windsor, New York, Quassiack Creek Watershed
Alliance; Ryan Riley, Salem, Massachusett, Your Turnout
Gear and PFOA; Emily Donovan, Wilmington, North Carolina,
Clean Cape Four; Arnie Leirche, Oscada, Michigan, Wurtsmith
Restoration Advisory Board, Community Co-chair; Katie
Bryant, Pittsboro, North Carolina, Clean Haw River; Hope
Grosse, Joanne Stanton, Bucks and Montgomery Counties,
Pennsylvania, Buxmont Coalition for Safer Water; Cheryl
Cail, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, SC Idle No More; Kevin
Ferrara, Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, Retired USAF
Firefighter; Shaina Kasper, Montpelier, Vermont, Toxics
Action Center; John Cranmer, Gillette, Wyomihg, USAF
Firefighter................................................ 169
Prepared Statement of Brian Wynne, Chairman, Drew Wynne
Foundation................................................. 172
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 172
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 174
Letter from Crystal Ellis.................................... 174
Letter from Janet McGee, Founding Member, Parents Against
Tip-overs.................................................. 175
Statement of Senator Lee......................................... 177
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 178
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 180
Statement of Senator Tester...................................... 182
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 184
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 187
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 189
Witnesses
Hon. Joel Szabat, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Transportation
for Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation.................. 80
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Biographical information..................................... 84
Michael P. O'Rielly, Nominee to be a Member, Federal
Communications Commission...................................... 90
Prepared statement........................................... 91
Biographical information..................................... 93
Dr. Nancy B. Beck, Nominee to be a Commissioner and Chairman,
Consumer Product Safety Commission............................. 103
Prepared statement........................................... 105
Biographical information..................................... 106
Michael J. Walsh, Jr., Nominee to be General Counsel, U.S.
Department of Commerce......................................... 120
Prepared statement........................................... 120
Biographical information..................................... 121
Mary A. Toman, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Commerce for
Economic Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce.................. 128
Prepared statement........................................... 130
Biographical information..................................... 131
Appendix
Response to written question submitted to Hon. Joel Szabat by:
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 201
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 201
Hon. Ron Johnson............................................. 202
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 202
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 205
Response to written question submitted to Dr. Nancy B. Beck by:
Hon. Cory Gardner............................................ 206
Response to written questions submitted to Michael J. Walsh, Jr.
by:
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 207
Response to written questions submitted to Mary A. Toman by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 208
NOMINATIONS TO THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Thune, Blunt, Cruz,
Fischer, Moran, Sullivan, Blackburn, Capito, Lee, Young, Scott,
Cantwell, Blumenthal, Udall, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth,
Tester, Sinema, and Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Today the Committee will consider five nominations to
important positions across the jurisdiction of the Committee.
The nominees before us today are: Joel Szabat, to be Under
Secretary of Transportation Policy; Michael O'Rielly, who has
been nominated for a new term as Commissioner at the Federal
Communications Commission; Nancy Beck, who has been nominated
to be a Commissioner and Chairman of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission; Michael Walsh, nominated to be General
Counsel of the Department of Commerce; and Mary Toman, the
nominee to be Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs.
Mr. Szabat has been known and respected by the members of
this committee for many years. He has held key positions in the
transportation sector, including his service as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Management and Budget, and Executive Director of
the Maritime Administration.
Mr. Szabat was previously considered by this committee and
unanimously confirmed by the full Senate in January 2019 to the
position of Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International
Affairs. In recent months, he has also served as the Acting
Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy and has performed
the duties of this position, giving him valuable experience for
future continued service in this role for which he has been
nominated.
Commissioner Michael O'Rielly has served as a member of the
FCC since 2013, having been unanimously confirmed twice by the
full Senate. He has now been nominated to serve a new term at
this agency. During his tenure, he has been a leader on
spectrum and video policy issues and has made other important
contributions to the work of the Commission. Prior to his
service at the FCC, Commissioner O'Rielly held a number of
staff positions in the U.S. Congress, including service with
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and on the staffs of
a number of Senators, including former and current members of
this committee.
Dr. Nancy Beck has been nominated to serve as Commissioner
and as Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. She
has an accomplished academic record, demonstrated by her
Bachelor's Degree in Microbiology from Cornell University and
her Master's and Doctorate degrees in Environmental Health from
the University of Washington. Dr. Beck has gained broad career
experience in the private sector with the Washington State
Department of Health, the Office of Management and Budget, the
American Chemistry Council, and her current position as
Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of
Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Recently she completed a
detail as a policy advisor with the National Economic Council.
Michael Walsh has built an impressive legal career,
beginning with his law degree from Columbia Law School and
continuing through associate, counsel, and partner positions at
respected firms. Mr. Walsh began his service at the Department
of Commerce as Deputy General Counsel before becoming Chief of
Staff. Additionally, he has been performing the delegated
duties of the General Counsel for almost a year, and he appears
before this committee today as the nominee for this role.
And then appearing remotely by video is Mary Toman. Her
educational and career background are part of her strong record
of achievement, which has resulted in her nomination to serve
as Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs. She holds
a degree in economics from Stanford University and an M.B.A.
from Harvard Business School. Earlier in her career, she was a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and she also was the
Deputy Treasurer of the State of California. Her current
private sector position focuses on the creation and management
of a successful stock and real estate portfolio.
I would like to thank all the nominees for testifying today
and for your willingness to serve in these key roles in our
government.
And I will now turn to Ranking Member Cantwell for her
opening remarks. Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we have five nominees for key positions at several
agencies. Let me start first with the nominee for Chairman and
Commissioner of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission has jurisdiction
over thousands of consumer products, including toys and many
other products used by infants and small children. The agency
is literally the last line of defense against defects and toxic
hazards in consumer products that can kill and cause serious
injuries.
Unfortunately, Dr. Beck's record is clear. She has
repeatedly sided with an industry to represent the American
Chemistry Council over the safety of American families. I
believe that she has a glaring failure in the lack of
meaningful address to the health risk posed by a class of
highly persistent chemicals referred to, PFAS.
PFAS are a class of toxic chemicals that have been linked
to cancers, thyroid disease, decreased response to vaccines,
birth defects, and immune system disorders. These chemicals are
found in many consumer products like carpets, clothing, paint,
nonstick cookware, as well as fire fighting foam that is used
at military bases. In fact, they have contaminated over 300
military installations across the country, including several in
the State of Washington.
Just last week, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, which is part of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, released PFAS exposure assessments for 333 people
living near Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane. The assessment
showed that almost all the people studied had PFAS levels
higher than the national average.
Washington has been a leader in the Nation in dealing with
PFAS. It was the first state to ban the use of the fire
fighting foam containing PFAS, as well as PFAS in food
packaging, but it will cost billions of dollars to clean up the
mess, much of that Federal dollars, and millions of people will
continue to be harmed from the exposures for years to come.
Dr. Beck has repeatedly stood in the way of progress on
this issue. At EPA, Dr. Beck assisted in delaying the release
of a government study which found that the EPA's current health
advisory for PFAS in drinking water was too weak to protect the
public. The propose health advisory would show that PFAS is
dangerous at a much lower level than previously thought.
And as a White House official in an e-mail to the Office of
Management and Budget, deemed the report a public relations
nightmare, impervious to the public health nightmare that was
unfolding around the country with PFAS. In fact, the final
report is still stuck at the White House where Dr. Beck was
detailed to work on environmental regulations for the National
Economic Council.
This is one of the reasons why the Secretary of the
Washington State Department of Health where Dr. Beck has worked
sent me a letter yesterday strongly opposing her nomination.
The International Association of Fire Fighters also strongly
oppose her nomination, stating, quote, ``her record promoting
the interests of the chemical industry at the expense of
workers' health and safety makes her ill-suited for this
position.'' I will put these two letters, Mr. Chairman, in the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will be placed in at
this point.
[The information referred to follows:]
Washington State Department of Health
June 15, 2020
Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Cantwell:
We write to express our grave concerns regarding the nomination of
Dr. Nancy Beck to chair the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
due to her past actions to undermine the public's health. We urge you
to vigorously oppose her confirmation.
Over the past 40 years, CPSC has kept people safe across the United
States by reducing the unreasonable risk of injuries and deaths from
over approximately 10,000 types of products, including baby strollers,
cribs, and bath seats, to cigarette lighters and lawn mowers.\1\ CPSC
has broad authority under the law to ensure consumer product safety,
including by restricting toxic chemicals like lead, formaldehyde,
asbestos, and fire retardants in consumer products.\2\ Dr. Beck is
grossly unfit to chair the CPSC after having worked inside and outside
of government to roll back regulations aimed at protecting people from
the serious risk of toxic chemicals.\3\ As someone with a clear record
of implementing policies that benefit industry at the expense of
consumer protection, Dr. Beck has no place leading an agency whose
mission is to protect consumer health and safety from being harmed by
the very products. they believe are safe to bring in their homes.
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\1\ See David Carpenter, The Consumer Product Safety Act: A Lego/
Analysis, Congressional Research Service, available at https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R45174.pdf
\2\ See David Carpenter, The Consumer Product Safety Act: A legal
Analysis, Congressional Research Service, available at https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R45174.pdf
\3\ See Eric Lipton, Why Has the E.P.A. Shifted on Toxic Chemicals?
An Industry Insider Helps Call the Shots, The New York Times, Oct 21,
2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/us/trump-epa-
chemicals-regulations.html
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Dr. Beck has repeatedly attempted to roll back or water down
Federal regulation on environmental health while working at the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) during the Bush
Administration, and more recently, at the Office of Chemical Safety and
Pollution Prevention in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
during the Trump Administration. For example:
Dr. Beck advocated for the revision of language in Federal
lead paint regulations to diminish the link to cardiovascular
disease in adults.\4\
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\4\ Id.
She helped slow down efforts to protect drinking water from
perchlorate, an ingredient in rocket fuel.\5\
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\5\ See Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science
and Technology, Nipping IRIS in the Bud: Suppression of Environmental
Science by the Bush Administration's Office of Management And Budget,
June 11, 2009, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
4113586-EPA-and-Toxic-Chemical-Rules.html#document/p94/a382944
While at OIRA, she helped draft the 2006 Proposed Risk
Assessment Bulletin that would limit how the Federal government
assesses risks to human health.\6\ The Office of Management and
Budget requested the nonpartisan National Academy of Sciences'
(NAS) National Research Council to review the guidance and NAS
published a report finding the guidance was fundamentally
flawed.\7\ Fortunately, OMB did not finalize the draft
guidance.\8\
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\6\ See Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment
Bulletin, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/proposed_
risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf
\7\ See National Research Council. 2007. Scientific Review of the
Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin from the Office of Management and
Budget. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/
10.17226/11811
\8\ Office of Management and Budget, Updated Principles/or Risk
Analysis, September 19, 2007, available at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-24.pdf
While at EPA, she attempted to implement flawed concepts of
the 2006 Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin during
implementation the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of
2016. These proposed regulations were appealed to the Ninth
Circuit and reversed, in part on grounds that the EPA's
exclusion of legacy uses and associated disposals from the
definition of ``conditions of use'' is unlawful.\9\
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\9\ Concerned Scientists Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 943 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 2019)
Dr. Beck scaled back several policies curbing Federal limits
on chemicals, including two powerful solvents linked to
neurological defects.\10\
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\10\ See Todd Frankel and Juliet Eilperin, Trump may appoint former
chemical industry executive to lead Consumer Product Safety Commission,
The Washington Post, December 10, 2019, available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/10/white-house-considering-
former-chemical-industry-executive-lead-consumer-product-safety-
commission/
She also pressured EPA to make changes to loosen a potential
regulation of PFAS.\11\
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\11\ See Senator Carper's letter to Administrator Andrew Wheeler,
dated April 17, 2020, available at https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/
cache/files/c/1/c15a8ced-03b1-4a46-bb05-aba15d1
0e36e/DC527687B68D0EF6DDE2A93C26A6D6FC.04-17-20-tc-pfas-snur-letter-to-
wheeler.pdf
The Committee should be deeply concerned by Dr. Beck's significant
connections to the very industry she is supposed to regulate. Dr. Beck
worked as a senior policy director at the American Chemistry Council
(ACC), a powerful chemical industry lobbying group.\12\ ACC has opposed
protections against numerous toxic chemicals, including flame
retardants.\13\ The CPSC granted a petition to initiate rulemaking on
the use of certain flame retardants in four categories of consumer
products, including children's products.\14\ A number of flame
retardants are linked to thyroid disruption, cancer, and learning
deficits.\15\ If Dr. Beck were appointed chair of CPSC, we firmly
believe she would fail to put the health of the American public before
industry interests.
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\12\ See Frankel and Eilperin, December 10, 2019
\13\ See American Chemistry Council, NASEM Report Confirms
Organohaolgen Flame Retardant Cannot Be Assessed for Hazards as a
Single Class, May 15, 2019, available at https://
www.americanchemistry.com/Media/PressReleasesTranscripts/ACC-news-
releases/NASEM-Report-Confirms-Organohalogen-Flame-Retardants-Cannot-
Be-Assessed-for-Hazards-as-a-Single-Class.html
\14\ See U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission webpage on flame
retardants, available at https://www.cpsc.gov/Business-Manufacturing/
Business-Education/Business-Guidance/flame-retardants
\15\ Washington State Department of Ecology, Children's Safe
Products Reporting Rule Rationale for Reporting List of Chemicals of
High Concern to Children 2011-2017, Publication Number 18-04-025, dated
November 2018, available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/
Summary
Pages/1804025
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Additionally, Dr. Beck has a record of ignoring the advice of
scientific advisors and interfering with the development of evidence-
based policy. According to press reports, she was involved in the
shelving of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
coronavirus guidance while on detail with NEC.\16\ Timely national
guidance from scientific experts at CDC would have been instrumental in
helping states, territories, and local health officials develop
guidance on how to safely reopen communities. As state officials
charged with protecting the public health, we were deeply troubled to
learn Dr. Beck was involved in this matter. CPSC needs leadership that
uses the advice of scientific experts to help guide policy.
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\16\ See Jason Dearen and Michael Biesecker, E-mails: Trump nominee
involved in shelving CDC virus guide, Associated Press, May 13, 2020,
available at https://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2020/05/13/
Emails-Trump-nominee-invotved-in-shelving-CDC-virus-guide/stories
/202005130139
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Finally, we have serious concerns that Dr. Beck's appointment could
lead to CPSC action to preempt our robust state laws.\17\ Washington
State has a number of state laws that protect children from mercury,
lead, flame retardants, PFAS, and other chemicals and that offer robust
consumer and environmental protection.\18\ Because the chemicals in
consumer products can be released into the environment during product
use and disposal, safer consumer products are important for pollution
prevention. Based on Dr. Beck's history of advocating for the national
chemical industry, which frequently takes positions against state-based
regulations, we have reason to believe she would support rolling back
our important consumer protections through Federal preemption.
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\17\ See David Carpenter, The Consumer Product Safety Act: A Legal
Analysis, Congressional Research Service, available at https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R45174.pdf
\18\ See chapters 70.95M, 70.280, 70.365 of the Revised Code of
Washington available at https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/
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For the reasons stated above, we urge you to oppose Dr. Nancy
Beck's confirmation as chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Her record makes clear that she will fail to put the health and safety
of Americans first. If you have any questions, please contact the
Director of Governor Inslee's Washington, D.C. office, Casey Katims, at
[email protected].
Sincerely,
John Wiesman, DrPH, MPH
Secretary,
Washington State Department of Health.
Laura Watson,
Director,
Washington State Department of Ecology.
______
International Association of Fire Fighters
Washington, DC, May 12, 2020
Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Cantwell,
On behalf of the more than 320,000 professional fire fighters and
emergency medical personnel of the International Association of Fire
Fighters (IAFF), I am writing to express our opposition to the
nomination of Nancy Beck to Chair the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC). We believe her record promoting the interests of the
chemical industry at the expense of workers' health and safety makes
her ill-suited for this position.
As a lobbyist and former executive for the chemical industry, Ms.
Beck opposed efforts to ban toxic flame retardants from consumer
products despite research demonstrating their negative health impacts
on vulnerable populations and workers, including fire fighters.
Additionally, in her current role as Principal Deputy Assistant
Administrator in the EPA's Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution
Prevention, Ms. Beck has actively weakened safety protections and
undermined rules on emerging hazards such as PFAS. She also
demonstrated her disinterest in protecting workers through her work to
exclude exposure to legacy asbestos in the chemical's risk evaluation
under TSCA.
Ms. Beck's professional record, while working for the chemical
industry, the EPA and in the White House, illustrates a consistent
disregard for the risks that toxic chemicals pose to workers' health.
Fire fighters are particularly concerned with the potential cancer risk
posed by toxic flame retardants, and have worked in the states to ban
their use. As CPSC Chair, Ms. Beck would be poised to undermine the
significant progress states have made to ban flame retardants and could
reverse the Commission's planned rulemaking on the use of organohalogen
flame retardants in various consumer products.
The IAFF believes if Ms. Beck is appointed as chair to the CPSC
Commission she will continue to advance the agenda of the chemical
industry and reverse health and safety protections for fire fighters
and consumers across the country. We urge you to reject her nomination.
Sincerely,
Harold A. Schaitberger,
General President.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We cannot afford to go backward on regulation of toxic
chemicals like PFAS which are often found in consumer products.
And PFAS is not the only safety issue that I am concerned
about.
Dr. Beck's efforts to implement overwhelming--efforts to
implement the overwhelming bipartisan reform of the Toxic
Substances Control Act led to the Ninth Circuit saying that the
Trump administration was ignoring clear requirements of the
law. And rather than addressing the science evidence showing
that a toxic chemical, TCE, caused birth defects, Dr. Beck
simply directed the Trump EPA to delete that evidence from the
risk evaluation in the first place.
The Associated Press reported that at OMB, Dr. Beck was
involved in a push to block the release of COVID-19 safety
guidance to states and localities from the Centers of Disease
Control.
Now, last December, we released a report about the serious
recall process at the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
including issues about strollers and serious injuries from
infant sleepers. So I want to see someone at the leadership of
the Consumer Product Safety Commission that will help us in
protecting the public.
So, Mr. Chairman, I know we will hear from the witness, and
I look forward to hearing what comments and having a chance to
ask questions about these very important issues.
In addition, Michael Walsh is here to serve as the General
Counsel at the Department of Commerce. He has previously served
as the Department Deputy General Counsel and the Chief of Staff
and has now moved to Acting General Counsel.
Mr. Walsh appears to have been involved in efforts last
summer to stifle career National Weather Service staff who
attempted to correct President Trump's erroneous statements
about Hurricane Dorian.
Just yesterday, NOAA released the findings of an
independent review of allegations of misconduct related to
Dorian, and two officials were found to have knowingly and
willfully or with reckless disregard violated NOAA's own
scientific integrity policy, and unnamed officials at the
Department of Commerce were also implicated.
So, Mr. Chairman, I ask that the assessment and that NOAA's
responses of the IG be listed in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
September 9, 2019
Cynthia Decker
NOAA Scientific Integrity Officer
[email protected]
Craig McLean
NOAA Acting Chief Scientist
[email protected]
Dear Dr. Decker and Mr. McLean:
As former NOAA leaders, we are writing to request a comprehensive
investigation into all potential violations of the NOAA Scientific
Integrity Policy (cf. NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific
Integrity, and associated Procedural Handbook) related to communication
around Hurricane Dorian. Recent actions to censor NWS scientists put
public safety at risk, are inconsistent with NOAA's scientific
integrity principles, violate the public trust, and compromise the
independence and reliability of the National Weather Service.
We also request that you encourage NOAA and Department of Commerce
political leadership to make positive, proactive statements that
reaffirm the rights of NWS experts to share their expertise publicly
regardless of the political inconvenience of that work. Public safety
depends on unfettered access to accurate scientific information, and
both NWS staff and the public are looking for affirmation that
political interference in the communication of such information will
not be tolerated.
First, an inaccurate, non-attributable press release was issued on
Friday, September 6 that repudiated correct information provided by the
National Weather Service that happened to contradict an erroneous
presidential tweet. More troublingly, according to multiple reports,
experts were told during Hurricane Dorian not to speak publicly about
risks to various states, and to route any media requests to public
affairs. It is unconscionable that government experts would be
prevented from communicating relative risk of hurricanes directly to
the public, or to go through political filters to do so, particularly
in times of emergency.
The NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy explicitly gives experts the
right to speak publicly about their scientific work without asking for
permission. Section 4.05 states that:
``To be open and transparent about their work, and consistent
with DAO 219-1 on (Public Communications) and their official
duties, NOAA scientists may freely speak to the media and the
public about scientific and technical matters based on their
official work, including scientific and technical ideas,
approaches, findings, and conclusions based on their official
work. Additional guidance for employees is available in DAO
219-1. Communication by e-mail or other electronic means in
response to inquiries from the media, and concerning scientific
or technical matters based on an employee's official work, are
considered to be the same as oral communication and not subject
to approval . . .''
The policy also gives scientists the right to review official
communications that rely on their work. Specifically, Section 7.01
requires that NOAA ensures that:
``Appropriate rules and procedures are in place and implemented
to preserve the integrity of the scientific process and the
dissemination of its scientific products and information,
including providing scientists the right to review and correct
any official document (such as a press release or report) that
cites or references their scientific work, to ensure that
accuracy has been maintained after the clearance and editing
process . . .''
We are encouraged by Mr. McLean's pledge to investigate the
circumstances around the September 6 NOAA press release. However, we
believe that the investigation should be considerably more
comprehensive to measure the full extent of losses of scientific
integrity at NOAA in order to develop a plan that prevents future
losses of scientific integrity.
Specifically, we would ask you to consider the following:
Did the White House or Department of Commerce put pressure
on NOAA to publicly undermine the NWS Birmingham social media?
Who within NOAA and NWS was involved in developing the NOAA
September 6 statement?
Who within NOAA, NWS, the Department of Commerce, and the
White House was involved in restricting the ability of NWS
staff to publicly communicate up-to-date information about
Hurricane Dorian and when were those restrictions communicated?
Why were these restrictions deemed necessary?
Maintaining high scientific integrity standards is essential to the
ability of NOAA and the National Weather Service to protect the public
and maintain their trust. Thank you in advance for considering this
request for a thorough investigation.
Sincerely,
Dr. Jane Lichen, Oregon State University
NOAA Administrator, 2009-2013
Dr. Richard Spinrad, Marine Technology Society
NOAA Chief Scientist, 2014-2017
NOAA Assistant Administrator, 2003-2010
Dr. Andrew Rosenberg, Union of Concerned Scientists
NOAA Deputy Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, 1998-2000
______
NOAA Scientific Integrity Office
Allegation 2019-009 Allegation
Carl Childs, President, Emergency Response Division Chapter
Email Message 09/11/19
Dear Sir or Madam,
I am writing in regard to the series of events that occurred last
week surrounding warnings and advisories from the federal government
about the approach of hurricane Dorian. Several of these events
constitute scientific misconduct under NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy (NAO 2O2-735D).
On the morning of Sept 1, the President tweeted that Alabama, as
well as Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia, would
``most likely be hit (much) harder than anticipated.'' This did not
agree with the National Hurricane Center (Miami FL) discussion 32,
produced at 0500 EDT on Sept 1 by Forecaster Pasch, or any later
discussions.
It is unclear what led up to the President's mistaken remarks. He
may have received an inadequate briefing by representatives of the
agency or he may have disregarded what he was told. Regardless of the
reason, the statements of the President regarding potential hazards
from Dorian in the state of Alabama were incorrect.
About 20 minutes after the President's tweets, the National Weather
Service's (NWS) Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in Birmingham, Ala.,
appeared to step in on Twitter to clear up the confusion about the
storm's effects on the state,
``Alabama will NOT see any impacts from Dorian. We repeat, no
impacts from Hurricane #Dorian will be felt across Alabama. The
system will remain too far east.''
Misleading guidance from any part of the Federal government
regarding threats to the public health and welfare are potentially
dangerous in and of themselves. The quick response of the Birmingham
WFO was entirely necessary and appropriate to counter a high profile
incorrect message affecting public safety. Additionally, this statement
as well as the forecasted hurricane impact maps constitute emergency
official communications, covered by Department of Commerce Directive
DAO-209-Section 10. As such, they may be made ``without first obtaining
approval, so long as the procedures of the relevant operating unit (if
any) are followed and applicable law is complied with.''
The White House subsequently released an altered NWS forecast of
the hurricane risk area (``the Sharpie map''). It is unclear who was
responsible for this modification. If this alteration was done by a
NOAA employee then this constitutes a clear violation of NAO 202-735D
on the grounds of falsifying data. It is also possible that this
alteration of the forecast trajectory could constitute a crime as a
counterfeit forecast under 18 U.S. Code Sec. 2074.
On September 6, with no attribution to a specific official, NOAA
public relations released the following statement
``From Wednesday, August 28, through Monday, September 2, the
information provided by NOAA and the National Hurricane Center
to President Trump and the wider public demonstrated that
tropical-storm-force winds from Hurricane Dorian could impact
Alabama. This is clearly demonstrated in Hurricane Advisories
#15 through #41, which can be viewed at the following link (not
provided here).''
``The Birmingham National Weather Service's Sunday morning
tweet spoke in absolute terms that were inconsistent with
probabilities from the best forecast products available at the
time.''
No attempt was apparently made to contact the NOAA staff who
generated the original (unmodified) hurricane forecast before the
statement release. The September 6 statement was an intentional
misrepresentation of scientific findings that damages the scientific
standing of the NWS and the entire agency. It casts unwarranted doubt
on the performance of NWS forecasters and jeopardizes public faith in
NOAA as an impartial communicator of vital public safety information.
It is clear that the statement from NOAA management serves only to
deflect criticism of the source of the misleading information at the
expense of NWS employees who safeguarded the public in manner
consistent with the best scientific information available.
NAO 202-735D: (Scientific Integrity) Section 7.01 requires that
appropriate rules and procedures are in place and implemented to
preserve the integrity of the scientific process and the dissemination
of its scientific products and information, including providing
scientists the right to review and correct any official document (such
as a press release or report) that cites or references their scientific
work, to ensure that accuracy has been maintained after the clearance
and editing process.
This was not done in the September 6 release.
Section 8.01 of the same directive says that Scientific and
Research Misconduct is defined as fabrication, falsification, or
plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing scientific and
research activities, or in the products or reporting of these
activities. Scientific and Research Misconduct specifically includes:
intentional circumvention of the integrity of the science and research
process by violation of NOAA's Code of Ethics for Science Supervision
and Management; and actions that compromise the scientific process by
violating NOAA's Code of Scientific Conduct. At minimum, there is the
appearance of violation of Section 8.01 by NOAA Public Affairs.
I am the president of the bargaining unit representing the
scientists in NOAA's Emergency Response Division (OR&R/NOS) and this
matter is of immediate and direct concern to out members. We are
charged with providing scientific assessments of the threat to the
public welfare resulting from natural disasters, oil spills and
hazardous materials releases. We cannot be expected to perform these
critical responsibilities in an environment where our own leadership
will second guess our judgementment based on trivial political
concerns. I look forward to your rapid response and the results of your
investigation into these clear violations of our Scientific Integrity
Policy.
Respectfully,
Carl R. Childs, Ph.D.,
President, BRD Chapter,
IFPTE Local 8A
______
U.S. House of Representatives
20th District, New York
September 10, 2019
Dr. Cynthia J. Decker, Scientific Integrity Officer
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Washington, DC
Dear Dr. Decker,
I am writing to request a formal investigation by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) into actions allegedly
taken by Administration appointees following President Trump's
unsupported public statements about Hurricane Dorian path projections,
in order to determine precisely whether these actions violated the NOAA
Administrative Order on Scientific Integrity.
Recent reporting in The New York Times, conducted by three veteran
political reporters who cite multiple sources with knowledge of the
acts in question, indicates that political leadership responsible for
overseeing NOAA may have communicated threats and applied political
pressure in an effort to suppress the release of vital, current
forecasting information critical to emergency preparedness. I have also
received evidence of an agency-wide directive sent on September 1, 2019
restricting National Weather Service (NWS) from releasing information
that could be seen as contradicting President Trump's false claim that
Alabama would ``most likely be hit (much) harder than anticipated,''
even as forecast guidance indicated that the state was not at risk.
This was reportedly followed by an unsigned statement on September 6,
2019 attributed only to NOAA generally that supported the president's
scientifically groundless assertions.
When the National Weather Service office in Birmingham, Alabama
identified the presence of inaccurate information about the storm, it
clarified to the public that Alabama would not see any impacts from
Hurricane Dorian. Following this correction, the office was rebuked by
NOAA in a September 6, 2019 statement attributable to an unnamed NOAA
spokesperson, who asserted that the Birmingham office ``spoke in
absolute terms that were inconsistent with probabilities from the best
forecast products available at the time.'' Since its release, numerous
former NOAA leaders as well as meteorologists around the country have
criticized NOAA's statement for its rebuke of the Birmingham office,
and voiced concerns about political interference in science. The
Washington Post reported that NOAA's acting Chief Scientist Craig
McLean found that this ``intervention to contradict the forecaster was
not based on science but on external factors including reputation and
appearance, or simply put, political,'' and that he will be pursuing
potential violations of the NOAA Administrative Order on Scientific
Integrity.
Countless state and local leaders, first responders, emergency
managers and American households depend on the communication of clear
scientifically sound information by the National Weather Service to
make critical and sometimes life-saving decisions. The NOAA
Administrative Order on Scientific Integrity has instituted measures to
ensure that such science conducted by the agency is safeguarded from
interference. The order states clearly that NOAA employees, whether
political appointees or civil servants, must not ``intimidate or coerce
employees, contractors . . . into altering or censoring scientific
findings'' or ``suppress, alter, or otherwise impede the timely release
of scientific or technological findings or conclusions unless
explicitly required by a Department or government-wide statute,
regulation, Executive Order, Presidential Memorandum, or other legal
authority.
As one of America's foremost scientific agencies responsible for
supporting public safety, NOAA's policy of upholding scientific
integrity standards is one of the most important in our Federal
government. The reported abuses by high-ranking political appointees,
in contravention of agency convention and best practices, appear to
violate the NOAA Administrative Order on Scientific Integrity. This
policy exists for the very purpose of preventing political interests
from interfering with the agency's protection of the safety and welfare
of the American people.
Accordingly, I ask NOAA to follow the guidance of your own
Administrative Order on Scientific Integrity, which says it is intended
to strengthen widespread confidence in the quality, validity, and
reliability of NOAA science, and uphold your agency's commitment to
support for science, the safety of the American people and the official
duties of your employees. I respectfully request you open an
investigation into this matter immediately.
Should any employee or contractor of NOAA experience retaliation in
relation to this matter, Congress will exercise its oversight authority
and will expect NOAA to fully investigate such subsequent violations of
your agency's scientific integrity policy.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this critical matter.
Sincerely,
Paul D. Tonko,
Member of Congress.
______
Table E-1. Rationale for Selection of Reviewed Allegations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Policies Allegedly
Violated Complainants Response
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAO 202-735 D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 4.05: NOAA Lubchenco, Allegation was accepted and
scientists may Rosenberg, subsumed as part of
freely speak to Spinrad. Allegation 1.
the media and Allegation 2019-
public about 008
scientific and
technical matters
based on their
official work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 5.02(d): McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
Ensure NOAA and 2019-007 subsumed as part of
Department of Allegation 1.
Commerce public
communication
guidance's provide
procedures by
which scientist
may speak to the
media and public
about scientific
and technical
matters based on
their official
work and areas of
expertise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sections 5.02(k): McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
Ensure the sharing 2019-007 subsumed as part of
of best Allegation 1.
administrative and
management
practices that
promote the
integrity of
NOAA's scientific
activities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 6.01: Code McLean. Allegation Allegation was dismissed, did
of Scientific 2019-007 not rise to the level of this
Conduct. inquiry. Section 6.01 focuses
on the agency's research and
scientific efforts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 7.01: NOAA McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
science managers 2019-007 discussed herein as
and supervisors Lubchenco, Allegation 2.
will adhere to the Rosenberg,
guidelines for Spinrad.
Scientific Allegation 2019-
Integrity 008
established in the Childs. Allegation
March 9, 2009, 2019-009
Presidential Memo
to Heads of the
Executive
Department and
Agencies and
NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 7.02: NOAA McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
science managers 2019-007 Tonka. discussed herein as
and supervisors Allegation 2019- Allegation 3.
must adhere to 0010
NOAA's Code for
Ethics for Science
Supervision and
Management.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 7.03: McLean. Allegation Allegation was dismissed; the
Decisions to 2019-007 September 6 Statement is not
approve or not an FRC.
approve a
Fundamental
Research
Communications
(FRCs) must be
based ONLY on
where the work is
scientifically
meritorious NOT on
policy, budget, or
management
implications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 8.01: McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted but
Scientific and 2019-007 subsumed as part of the
Research Childs. Allegation Panel's adjudication
Misconduct is 2019-009 standards (6.2 Adjudication
defined as Standards).
fabrication,
falsification, or
plagiarism in
proposing,
performing, or
reviewing
scientific and
research
activities, or in
the products or
reporting of these
activities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procedural Handbook accompanying NAO 202-735D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2.03: McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted but
Coercive 2019-007 subsumed as part of the
manipulation, Panel's adjudication
intimidation, standards (6.2 Adjudication
misrepresentation, Standards.)
censorship, or
other misconduct
that affects the
quality,
reliability of
scientific
information may
involve the loss
of scientific
integrity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Commerce DAO 219-1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 4.01: McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
Guidelines for the 2019-007 subsumed as part of
release and Allegation 1.
development of
Department of
Commerce Public
Communications
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 5.03: All McLean. Allegation Allegation was accepted and
Commerce public 2019-007 subsumed as part of
affairs employees Allegation 1, 2, and 3.
shall follow best
practices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 U.S. CodeSec. McLean. Allegation Allegation dismissed, out of
2074 False weather 2019-007 the scope of this
reports investigation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Appendix F: September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6 Statement
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix G: Weather Forecast Office Tweets Using Absolute Terms
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix H: List of Records Reviewed
The following is a record of documents received from NOAA that the
Academy Team reviewed.
Allegations Submitted to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Officer
Childs, Carl R. 2019. ``Allegation 2019-009.'' September 11.
Lubchenco, Jane, Richard Spinrad, and Andrew Rosenberg. 2019.
``Allegation 2019-008.'' September 9.
McLean, Craig N. 2019. ``Allegation 2019-007.'' September 10.
Tonko, Paul D. 2019. ``Allegation 2019-0010.'' September 10.
Interview Transcripts and their Associated Exhibits and Documents
Darden, Chris, interview by Academy Team. 2020. ``Interview of Chris
Darden.'' Calera, AL, (January 21).
Darden, Chris, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019. ``Interview of
Chris Darden.'' Calera, AL, (October 21).
Friedman, Benjamin, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019.
``Interview of Benjamin Friedman.'' Silver Spring, MD,
(October 24).
Jacobs, Neil, interview by Academy Team. 2020. ``Interview of Neil
Jacobs.'' Washington, DC, (February 3).
Jacobs, Neil, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019. ``Interview of
Neil Jacobs.'' Washington, DC, (November 6).
Levenbach, Stuart, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019. ``Interview
of Stuart Levenbach.'' Washington, DC, (October 29).
McLean, Craig, interview by Academy Team. 2020. ``Interview of Craig
McLean.'' Washington, DC, (January 23).
NWS Birmingham WFO Meteorologist. 2020. ``Written Statement from
Decision Support Services Staff Member on September 1,
2019.'' Calera, AL, (January 22).
Roberts, Julie Kay, interview by Academy Team. 2020. ``Interview of
Julie Roberts.'' Washington, DC, (January 23).
Roberts, Julie Kay, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019.
``Interview of Julie Roberts.'' Washington, DC, (October
11).
Uccellini, Louis, interview by NOAA General Counsel. 2019. ``Interview
of Louis Uccellini'' Silver Spring, MD, (November 26).
Vaccaro, Chris, interview by Academy Team. 2020. ``Interview of Chris
Vaccaro.'' Washington, DC, (January 20).
Social Media Related to This Investigation
National Weather Service Birmingham Weather Forecast Office. 2019.
Twitter post. September 1, 10:11 a.m. Eastern Time Zone.
NOAA Communications. 2019. ``Statement attributable to a NOAA
Spokesperson.'' September 6, 4:45 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
President Donald Trump. 2019. Twitter post. September 1, 9:51 a.m.
Eastern Time Zone.
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Documents
Documents released from FOIA requests.
Memoranda, Letters, and Transmittals Regarding this Investigation
Decker, Cynthia J. 2019. ``Memorandum from Cynthia J. Decker for The
Record, Subject: Scientific Integrity Allegations 2019-007/
8/9/10 Inquiry and Investigation Process.''
--. 2019. ``Memorandum to Zach Goldstein and Douglas Perry, Subject:
Request to Search E-mail Accounts in Connection with
Scientific Integrity Complaints.'' October 2.
--. 2019. ``Transmittal for the Inquiry/Investigation Team.''
Friedman, Benjamin. 2019. ``Recusal of DUS-O Benjamin Friedman,
appointing Stephen Volz the Determining Officer.''
Congressional Documents
Memoranda and Letters Regarding Other Ongoing Investigations
Gustafson, Peggy E. 2019. ``Memorandum for Dr. Neil Jacobs, Subject:
Request for Information Pursuant to the Inspector General,
Act of 1978, as Amended.'' September 7.
Johnson, Eddie Bernice. 2019. ``Letter to Peggy E. Gustafson.''
September 10.
--. 2019. ``Letter to President Donald J. Trump.'' September 5.
--. 2019. ``Letter to Secretary Wilbur Ross.'' October 10.
Johnson, Eddie Bernice, and Mike Sherrill. 2019. ``Letter to Secretary
Wilbur Ross.'' September 11.
Johnson, Eddie Bernice, Lizzie Fletcher, and Mikie Sherrill. 2019.
``Letter to Acting Under Secretary Dr. Neil Jacobs.''
September 12.
Testimony
Clement, Joel. 2019. ``Testimony of Joel Clement from the Joint Hearing
on Scientific Integrity in Federal Agencies.'' July 17.
Halpern, Michael. 2019. ``Testimony for Michael Halpern from the Joint
Subcommittee Hearing on Scientific Integrity in Federal
Agencies.'' July 17.
Johnson, Eddie Bernice. 2019. ``Opening Statement from the Joint
Subcommittee Hearing: Scientific Integrity in Federal
Agencies.'' July 17.
Pielke Jr., Roger. 2019. ``Statement of Dr. Roger Pielke, Jr. to the
Subcomittee on Research and Technology & Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight.'' July 17.
Sherrill, Mikie. 2019. ``Opening Statement from the Joint Subcomittee
Hearing: Scientific Integrity in Federal Agencies.'' July
19.
Stevens, Haley. 2019. ``Opening Statement from the Joint Subcommittee
Hearing: Scientific Integrity in Federal Agencies.'' July
17.
Tonko, Paul. 2019. ``Opening Statement from the Joint Subcommittee
Hearing: Scientific Integrity in Federal Agencies.'' July
17.
Federal Agencies' Policies, Procedures, Reports, and Other Sources
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2911. ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity.''
December 7.
--. 2015. ``Approval of Scientific Integrity Committee Terms of
Reference.'' June.
--. 2018. National Weather Service. ``2019-2022 Strategic Plan.''
--. 2017. National Weather Service Office of the Chief Learning
Officer. ``Radar & Applications Course, Storm-Based Warning
Fundamentals, Lesson 12: Impact Based Warnings: Overview.''
--. 2016. ``NOAA Framework for Internal Review and Approval of
Fundamental Research Communications''. November 8.
--. ``Our mission and vision.''
--. 2011. ``Procedural Handbook for NAO 202-735 D: Scientific
Integrity.'' December.
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Commerce. 2008. ``Department Administrative Order
219-1 Public Communications.'' April 30.
--. 2008. ``National Weather Service Central Region Service
Assessment.''
--. 2013. ``Social Media Guidebook.'' January 30.
Other Federal Agencies
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Inspector
General. 2008. ``Investigation Summary Regarding
Allegations that NASA Suppressed Climate Change Science and
Denied Media Access to Dr. James E. Hansen, a NASA
Scientist'' June 2.
National Institutes of Health, Office of the Director. 2012. ``NIH
Policies and Procedures for Promoting Scientific
Integrity.'' November.
Office of Science and Technology Policy. ``Federal Policy on Research
Misconduct; Preamble for Research Misconduct Policy.''
Federal Register 65, no. 235 (December 6, 2000.) 76260-
76264. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2000-12-06/
pdf/00-30852.pdf.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2016. ``Scientific Integrity.''
Departmental Regulation DR 1074-001. November 18.
--. 2016. ``Procedures for Responding to Allegations of Compromised
Scientific Integrity.'' Departmental Manual OM 1074-001,
November 18.
U.S. Department of Interior, Office of Inspector General. 2019. ``FWS
Alleged Scientific Integrity Violation and Retaliation.''
August 28.
--. 2016. ``Inspection of Scientific Integrity Incident at USGS Energy
Geochemistry Laboratory.'' June 15.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2012. ``Scientific Integrity
Policy.''
--. ``Basic Information about Scientific Integrity.'' https://
www.epa.gov/osa/basic-information-about-scientific-
integrity.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General.
2011. ``Office of Research and Development Should Increase
Awareness of Scientific Integrity Policies.'' July 22.
--. 2013. ``Quick Reaction Report: EPA Must Take Steps to Implement
Requirements of Its Scientific Integrity Policy.'' August
28.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Scientific Integrity Policies.
Additional Actions Could Strengthen Integrity of Federal
Research (GAO-19-265). April 2019.
Other Memoranda Regarding Scientific Integrity and Research Misconduct
General Counsel of the United States Department of Commerce. 2011.
``Memorandum for All Chief Counsels and General Counsels--
Implementation of Administration Policy on Scientific
Integrity.'' December 16.
Holden, John P. 2010. ``Memorandum to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Subject: Scientific Integrity.''
December 17.
Kerry, Cameron F. 2011. ``Memorandum to all Chief Counsels and General
Counsels, Subject: Implementation of Administration Policy
on Scientific Integrity.'' December 16.
McLean, Craig N. 2017. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2016
Scientific and Research Misconduct Annual Report.'' March
1.
--. 2017. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2017 Scientific and
Research Misconduct Annual Report.'' October 3.
--. 2019. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2018 Scientific and
Research Misconduct Annual Report.'' April 23.
--. 2015. ``Memorandum for Vice Admiral Michael S. Devany and Dr. W.
Richard Spinrad, Subject: Approval of Scientific Integrity
Committee Terms of Reference.'' July 15.
Spinrad, Richard. 2015. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2013-
FY 2014 Scientific and Research Misconduct Annual Report.''
April 15.
--. 2016. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2015 Scientific and
Research Misconduct Annual Report.'' February 1.
Sullivan, Kathryn. 2012. ``Memorandum for the Record, Subject: FY 2012
Scientific and Research Misconduct Annual Report.''
December 27.
White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. ``Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Subject
of Scientific Integrity.'' March 9.
Reports from Academic and Scientific Organizations
American Meteorological Society. 2014. Professional Guidance Statement.
``Strengthening Social Sciences in Weather--Climate
Enterprise.'' February 2.
Demuth, Julie L., Morss, Rebecca E., Morrow, Betty and Jeffrey Lazo.
2012. ``Creation and Communication of Hurricane Risk
Information.'' American Meteorological Society. August.
Morss, Rebecca E, et al., 2016. ``Understanding Public Hurricane
Evacuation Decisions and Responses to Forecast and Warning
Messages.'' Weather and Forecasting 395-417.
Morss, Rebecca E., et al., 2017; ``Hazardous Weather Prediction and
Communication in the Modern Information Environment.''
American Meteorological Society 2652-2674.
National Academies of Sciences Engineering Medicine, Integrating Social
and Behavioral Sciences Within the Weather Enterprise.
2018.
Nek, Rashida and Anita R. Eisenstadt; 2016. ``Review of Federal Agency
Policies on Scientific Integrity''. Institute for Defense
Analyses. December.
Neumann, John. 2019. ``Federal Research: Agency Actions Could
Strengthen Scientific Integrity Policies.'' July 17.
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility. 2013. ``Scientific
Integrity Report Card.''
University Corporation for Atmospheric Research. 2019. ``Ethical
Conduct Procedures''. July.
--. 2019. ``Researc Misconduct.'' January.
Union of Concerned Scientists. 2008. ``Press Releases Controlled for
Political, Not Scientific, Importance.'' July 13.
--. 2018. ``Surveying the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.'' August.
--. 2018. ``Voices of Scientists Across 16 Federal Agencies.'' August.
World Meteorological Organization. 2008. ``Guidelines on Communicating
Forecast Uncertainty.'' WMO/TD No. 1422. https://
library.wmo.int/doc_ntun.php?explnum_id=4687
Other Social Media
National Weather Service Birmingham Weather Forecast Office. 2017.
Twitter post. November 6, 9:37 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service Glasgow Weather Forecast Office. 2016. Twitter
post. June 9, 6:58 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service Hanford Weather Forecast Office. 2019. Twitter
post. March 5, 7:55 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service Mobile Weather Forecast Office. 2019. Twitter
post. May 19, 1:41 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
--. 2016. Twitter post. May 28, 11:04 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service New Orleans Weather Forecast Office. 2013.
Twitter post. September 4, 10:37 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service Salt Lake City Weather Forecast Office. 2019.
Twitter post. June 12, 6:16 p.m. Eastern Time Zone.
National Weather Service Sioux Fa11s Weather Forecast Office. 2019.
Twitter post. February 14, 12:25 p.m. Eastern. Time Zone.
Relevant News Articles Related to this Investigation
Aschwanden, Christie. 2019. ``Severe weather alerts are intended to
protect people. So why do some ignore them?'' The
Washington Post. November 24.
Baker, Peter, Frie4man, Lisa, and Christopher Flavelle. 2019. ``Trump
Pressed Top Aide to Have Weather Service `Clarify' Forecast
That Contradicted Trump.'' The New York Times. September
11.
--. 2019. Commerce Chief Threatened Firings at NOAA after Trump's
Dorian Tweets, Sources Say. The New York Times. September
9.
Other
Garner, Bryan A and Henry Campbell Black. 1999. ``Black's Law
Dictionary.'' St. Paul, Minn.: West Group.
______
NOT FOR RELEASE PREDECISIONAL AND DELIBERATIVE
Review of NAPA's Findings Regarding Scientific Integrity
Neil A. Jacobs, Ph.D.
NAPA's analysis is based on the premise that either the President's
tweet or WFO tweet was right and the statement was choosing between the
two. It did not. The statement, if read objectively, approaches it from
the perspective that both are accurate and reconciles the two
approaches--risk and probability--to conveying information. The NAPA
interview summary provides: ``Dr. Jacobs also offered his perspective
on the correctness of the September 1 tweet from the Birmingham WFO by
explaining that in a technical sense while relatively small, the
probability of Hurricane Dorian impacting a portion of southeast
Alabama existed. However, in terms of communicating the risk to the
people of Alabama, the Birmingham WFO was correct, according to Dr.
Jacobs.'' NAPA never questions or refutes the scientific veracity of
the actual statement.
Applicability of the policy to the tweet and statement
NAPA did not apply the definitions of scientific assessment and
scientific activity to include the tweet and statement within the
scientific integrity policy. NAPA never explains how the tweet or the
statement meet these definitions. Instead, they simply recite the
relevant definitions and summarily conclude that ``individuals engaged
in activities that can be considered scientific activities'' and
``deduced that the [tweet] and [statement] are examples of scientific
product.'' The summary conclusions quoted contain the full content.
NAPA conducted no analysis of the tweet or statement nor an explanation
of how the statements meet, these definitions. In fact, the only
supporting explanation is based on interviews of NOAA and GAO personnel
and creates a new standard for a scientific product to be a
communication: (i) based on scientific analysis and (ii) related to the
core mission of the agency. Rather than evaluate and apply the actual
definitions in the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy (NAO 202-735D),
NAPA created their own definition based on ``[i]nterviews with NOAA and
GAO personnel'' to analyze and apply to determine that the tweet and
statement are scientific products subject to the NOAA Scientific
Integrity Policy.
As I explained in the interview, they are not the types of science
and research to which the policy applies. It is clear that the
development of a forecast is a scientific assessment and scientific
activity. While the tweet is intended to convey the risks to Alabama
residents based on the scientific assessments used to produce the storm
forecast, it is far removed from the research and underlying science
for which the definitions, policy on integrity of scientific activity,
and codes of scientific conduct and ethics for scientific supervision
and management are predicated. The September 6 statement is even
further removed from science and research. It is a brief comment
collecting past factual information and a reconciliation of two
concepts contained in tweets in a short statement. NAPA later
contradicts their finding, based on their own definition of a
scientific product, by concluding that ``the development of the
statement was not based on science, but appears to be largely driven by
external influences from senior Commerce officials who drafted the
September 6 Statement.''
The NAPA interview summary provides: ``In regard to the September 6
Statement complying with the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy, Dr.
Jacobs expressed that the September 6 Statement did not necessarily
meet the standards of the Scientific Integrity Policy. Additionally,
Dr. Jacobs explained that his understanding is that the Scientific
Integrity Policy was written for science and research and not
necessarily press releases. Dr. Jacobs often reviews communications
originally written by non-scientists, including people from Commerce
and other parts of NOAA, when the science is incorrect. The correction
process typically requires scientists to check the validity of the
communication and ensure that in a technical sense, the communication
is accurate before it is published.'' With a Ph.D. in numerical weather
prediction, I am eminently qualified, as a scientist, to review
scientific research in this field.
Scope of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy and NAPA findings
The NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy sets out the elements for what
constitutes scientific and research misconduct. The standard for a
finding of misconduct is:
1) Scientific and Research Misconduct is defined as fabrication,
falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or
reviewing scientific and research activities, or in the
products or reporting of these activities. Scientific and
Research Misconduct specifically includes: (i) intentional
circumvention of the integrity of the science and research
process by violation of NOAA's Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management; and (ii) actions that compromise
the scientific process by violating NOAA's Code of Scientific
Conduct. Scientific and Research Misconduct does not include
honest error or differences of opinion.
2) Procedures for lodging and responding to allegations of
misconduct are provided in the Procedural Handbook to this
Order.
This is not the standard that NAPA applied. NAPA substituted
Criteria for Determining Scientific Misconduct in the procedural
handbook combined with five criteria that NAPA developed and identified
to guide their assessment of the allegations. After creating their own
five criteria, NAPA acknowledges the standard for Scientific and
Research Misconduct, but then substitutes different and in critical
areas conflicting adjudication standards contained in the Procedural
Handbook. Under the Scientific Integrity Policy, the elements of
Scientific Research Misconduct are clear: A violation of NOAA's Code of
Ethics for Science Supervision and Management must involve the
intentional circumvention of the integrity of the science and research
process. A violation of NOAA's Code of Scientific Conduct must involve
actions that compromise the scientific process (emphasis added).
Allegation II is based on a violation of the Code of Ethics for
Science Supervision and Management. The Scientific Integrity Policy
standard for a violation related to the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management requires an intentional circumvention of the
integrity of the science and research process. The adjudication
standards in the handbook completely disregard the mens rea standard
and substitute a new, lower standard of intentionally, knowingly or
reckless disregard of the Code of Ethics.
In addition, it eliminates the element that any violation of the
Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management must circumvent
the integrity of the science and research process. That critical
element is not contained in the adjudication standard nor in the NAPA
analysis or their findings. Instead of applying the standard in the
policy, NAPA used the criteria they established, applied the lesser
standard from the handbook, and completely ignored the requirement that
the violation circumvent the integrity of the science and research
process.
NAPA ostensibly found a violation of the Code Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management by not engaging the Birmingham WFO in the
development of the September 6 statement and that the failure was done
intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code of
Ethics for Science Supervision and Management. There is no finding--as
required by the NOAA Policy that there was an ``intentional
circumvention of the integrity of the science and research process.''
Therefore, there was no scientific and research misconduct.
Allegation III, while styled as external political pressure, is
also based on an alleged violation of the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management. The NAPA report focuses primarily on the
view that the second paragraph of the statement is a criticism of the
Birmingham WFO tweet. While that is a commonly held view, the statement
was not intended to imply Birmingham did anything wrong. As stated
above, the intent was to reconcile the forecaster's duty to convey
information to the public with probabilistic numerical model guidance
that was still showing a small, but non-zero, chance of impacts.
NAPA analyzed the statement as a violation of Section 7.02. Here,
NAPA fails to apply the appropriate criteria. NAPA sets out the
standard as ``suppressing or altering scientific findings.'' That is
not the standard. Under the Scientific Integrity Policy, the standard
is: ``Suppress, alter or otherwise impede the timely release of
scientific or technological findings or conclusions.'' Even assuming
the September 6 statement is viewed as improper criticism, it in no way
could have ``suppressed, altered, or otherwise impede the timely
release of scientific or technological findings or conclusion'' that
were contained in a tweet on September 1.
NAPA recognizes this fundamental flaw and in fact concludes that
``there was no direct suppression or alteration of scientific
findings.'' Instead, NAPA attempts to pivot to speculate that ``the
September 6 statement might suppress the willingness and ability of
NOAA scientific staff to express their scientific opinions without
reservation in the future.'' The policy does not in any way address a
speculative, future possibility \1\ nor is there any finding that any
NOAA scientific staff was suppressed or unable to express scientific
opinions or findings. While it is fair to criticize whether issuing
such a statement was a wise decision, there was no violation of the
Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The policy does provide that individuals covered by the policy
must not ``intimidate or coerce employees, contractors, recipients of
financial assistance awards, or others to alter or coerce scientific
findings'' and no one suggests that this was intended nor does NAPA
evaluate the actions as such.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, even if there was, the findings in allegation III also
fall short. NAPA again applied the wrong standard and there is no
finding--as required by the NOAA Policy--that there was an
``intentional circumvention of the integrity of the science and
research process.'' Therefore, there was no scientific and research
misconduct.
NAPA found that there was no ``direct suppression or alteration of
scientific findings.'' That alone should have ended the analysis for a
violation based on ``Suppress, alter or otherwise impede the timely
release of scientific or technological findings or conclusions.''
Instead, NAPA based a finding of misconduct by intentionally,
knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management issue a statement that ``is viewed by many
NOAA/NWS scientists as an inappropriate criticism of the Birmingham
office.'' However, the report also finds that I objected, but was
overridden. It cannot be both. NAPA attempts to reconcile this by
characterizing it as ``contextual.'' It is more than context; the
factual determination of objecting and being overridden is not
consistent with a finding of acting with intent, knowing, or reckless
disregard of the Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management.
Practical limitations using NAPA's interpretation
For reference, the full text of relevant portion of the policy
about affording scientists the opportunity to review is: ``Appropriate
rules and procedures are in place and implemented to preserve the
integrity of the scientific process and the dissemination of its
scientific products and information, including providing scientists the
right to review and correct any official document (such as a press
release or report) that cites or references their scientific work, to
ensure that accuracy has been maintained after the clearance and
editing process.''
NAPA takes an overbroad approach to the policy provisions that
provides scientists the right to review and correct any official
document that cites or references their report. Such a broad
interpretation is not practical or workable. For example, if we accept
the NAPA interpretation, any scientific work created by NOAA scientists
that cites work performed by another NOAA scientist (for example, a
biological opinion referencing other. NOAA science) would have to have
that work reviewed for accuracy by the scientist who completed the
study referenced.
Using NAPA's interpretation, all social media posts, including
tweets, that referenced any NOAA employee's work would have to be
reviewed by the scientist who completed the initial or previous work.
Using NAPA's own interpretation, forecasters at the Birmingham WFO
would have had to clear the tweet with the NHC before issuing their own
interpretation of the official NHC guidance. That certainly cannot be
what was intended under the Scientific Integrity Policy, as this would
create an untenable policy where thousands of NOAA employees would be
forced to sign off on each use or reference to their work. The
Scientific Integrity Policy was put in place to ensure that scientific
research was conducted objectively using the scientific method and
peer-review process. Perhaps the Scientific Integrity Policy should be
updated to include these cases, but applying an overly-broad
interpretation, as NAPA did, is neither logical or practical.
Such a broad reading also ignores the stated purpose of this
provision, which is ``to ensure the accuracy has been maintained after
the clearance and editing process.'' This implies that it is the
editing and review of the specific report and any accompanying press
release or specific characterization of that report. This purpose makes
clear that the requirement is for the release of the work itself and
accompanying materials, not a subsequent citation to the work or later
comment on it.
If we consider the peer-review process, NAPA's interpretation would
prohibit a NOAA scientist from writing a later scientific analysis
critical of the prior work without getting the approval of the original
authors to publish. This is fundamentally at odds with the scientific
process because no one could ever publish a critique or dissent of any
existing science if the scientists of the original work objected.
Conclusion
As a scientist, I appreciate the importance of scientific integrity
and fully support the NOAA policy. I do believe it needs to be updated
to address issues surrounding handling of social media and non-
research-related and publication-bound work. I fully complied with and
cooperated with the scientific integrity investigation. I encourage a
thorough and thoughtful review and can accept the critique and
criticism contained in the report. It is part of the scientific process
and how we improve both our policies and the processes. Any findings of
misconduct, however, must be based on an objective application of the
standards contained in the actual policy.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
About the Academy
The National Academy of Public Administration is a non-profit, non-
partisan, and independent organization of top public management and
organizational leaders who tackle the Nation's most critical and
complex public management challenges. With a network of more than 900
distinguished Fellows and an experienced professional staff, the
Academy is uniquely qualified and trusted across government to provide
objective advice and practical solutions based on systematic research
and expert analysis.
Established in 1967 and chartered by Congress in 1984, the Academy
continues to make a positive impact by helping federal, state and local
governments respond effectively to current circumstances and changing
conditions. Learn more about the Academy and its work at
www.napawash.org.
______
Table of Contents
Foreword
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Key Terms and Definitions
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Background
1.1 Project Scope and Deliverables
1.2 Limitations to the Panel's Assessment
1.3 Organization of Report
Chapter 2: Summary of Methodology and Process
2.1 Consideration of Alleged Activities, Allegations, and
Respondents under the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy
2.2 Methodological Approach to Review and Assess the
Allegations
Chapter 3: Summary of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and
Adjudication Procedures
3.1 Criteria for Determining Scientific Misconduct
3.2 Core Procedures for Adjudicating Alleged Violations of
Scientific Integrity
Chapter 4: Description of the Allegations
Chapter 5: Chronology of Key Events
Chapter 6: Findings and Recommendations
6.1 Criteria to Assess Allegations of Scientific Misconduct
6.2 Adjudication Standards
6.3 Findings and Recommendations
Appendices
Appendix A: Panel Biographies and Study Team Members
Appendix B: Chronology of Key Events
Appendix C: Policies
Appendix D: Summaries of Interviews Conducted and Interview
Questions
Appendix E: Allegations of Scientific Misconduct
Appendix F: September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6
Statement
Appendix G: Weather Forecast Office Tweets Using Absolute Terms
Appendix H: List of Records Reviewed
Foreword
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a
scientific agency that focuses on the study of climate, weather,
oceans, coasts, and the conservation and management of coastal and
marine ecosystems and resources. The work of NOAA not only supports the
safety and well being of the public, but also has great importance to
the U.S. economy. To maintain public trust in the agency's work, NOAA
must keep scientific integrity at the forefront of all aspects of its
scientific activities.
In September 2019, NOAA's Scientific Integrity Officer received
four complaints of alleged violations of scientific integrity related
to a specific NOAA public statement issued on September 6, 2019. To
ensure that the investigation into these complaints would be conducted
with the highest degree of objectivity and neutrality, NOAA engaged the
National Academy of Public Administration to conduct an independent
assessment of those allegations. The goal of the assessment was to
determine by a preponderance of evidence if the NOAA personnel involved
with the development and issuance of the September 6 Statement violated
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
As a congressionally chattered, non-partisan, and non-profit
organization with over 900 distinguished Fellows, the Academy is
uniquely qualified to assist NOAA with this complex assignment. The
Academy convened a Panel of four Academy Fellows with deep experience
in the field of public administration, knowledge of scientific
research, and execution of agency policy and procedure. The Panel's
determinations and recommendations have been provided to the NOAA
Determining Official for final adjudication of the allegations.
This report presents the Panel's findings and makes nine
recommendations to enhance NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy. I expect
that the Academy Panel's report will guide the Determining Official's
deliberation on the allegations and strengthen NOAA's overall framework
of scientific integrity.
The Academy is thankful to have the opportunity to serve as an
independent integrity review panel on behalf of NOAA.
Teresa W. Gerton,
President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Academy of Public Administration.
______
List of Figures
Figure 1. NOAA Organizational Chart
List of Tables
Table 4-1. Allegation 2019-007
Table 4-2. Allegation 2019-008
Table 4-3. Allegation 2019-009
Table 4-4. Allegation 2019-0010
Table 6-1. Media Guidance (September 1, 2019-September 6, 2019)
Table E-1. Rationale for Selection of Reviewed Allegations
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym or Abbreviation Definition
Academy National Academy of Public Administration
Academy Team The Panel members and study team
AMS American Meteorological Society
ARS Agriculture Research Service
Commerce Department of Commerce
DAO Department Administrative Order
DOI Department of the Interior
DSS Decision Support Service
DUS/O Deputy Under Secretary of Operations
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRC Fundamental Research Communication
FY Fiscal year
GAO Government Accountability Office
IRP Integrity Review Panel
NAO NOAA Administrative Order
NHC National Hurricane Center
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
NWS National Weather Service
OIG Office of Inspector General
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
ROC Regional Operation Center
SI0 Scientific Integrity Officer
USDA United States Food Department of Agriculture
WFO Weather Forecasting Office
Key Terms and Definitions\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Key terms and definitions denoted with an asterisk(*) can be
found in the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy (NOAA Administrative
Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity) and the accompanying Procedural
Handbook.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Term Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allegation* Any written or oral statement or other
indication of possible scientific
misconduct made to a NOAA employee or
contractor, or to an employee of a NOAA
research partner.
Complainant* The person, group, or company that makes an
allegation of scientific misconduct or
loss of scientific integrity.
Determining Official (DO)* NOAA official who makes a final
determination on an allegation of
scientific misconduct or loss of
scientific integrity and proposes
corrective administrative action, as
appropriate.
Integrity Review Panel Group responsible for conducting an
(IRP)* investigation of alleged scientific
misconduct or loss of scientific integrity
when a determination has been made by the
SIO that an investigation is warranted.
Integrity Review Panel The agency official responsible for
Chair (IRPC)* overseeing an investigation, chairing the
Integrity Review Panel, and carrying out
other responsibilities specified in NOAA's
Procedural Handbook. The IRPC is a subject
matter expert and is designated for a
specific investigation.
Official Communication\2\ Any Public Communication by an employee
that relates to the Department's programs;
policies, or operations and takes place or
is prepared: 1. At the direction of a
superior of the employee; 2. Substantially
during the official working hours of the
employee; 3. With the substantial use of
U.S. Government resource(s); or 4. With
substantial assistance of U.S. Government
employee(s) on official duty. All news
releases and similar documents are
Official Communications.
\2\ U.S. Department of
Commerce. 2008.
``Department
Administrative Order 219-1
Public Communications.''
April 30.
Preponderance of Evidence The standard of proof in making a finding
of misconduct under NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy and accompanying
Procedural Handbook. Black's Law
Dictionary (11th Ed., 2019) defines this
term as ``superior evidentiary weight
that, though not sufficient to free the
mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is
still sufficient to incline a fair and
impartial mind to one side of the issue
rather than the other.'' \3\
\3\ Bryan A. Garner and
Henry Campbell Black,
Black's Law Dictionary,
11th ed. (West Group,
2019).
Respondent* The person, group, or NOAA entity who
responds or makes a reply to an allegation
of scientific misconduct or loss of
scientific integrity.
Scientific Activities* Activities that involve inventorying,
monitoring, observations, experimentation,
study, research, integration, modeling,
and scientific. assessment. Scientific
activities are conducted in a manner
specified by standard protocols and
procedures and include any of the
physical, biological, or social sciences,
as well as engineering and mathematics, or
any combination of these.
Scientific Assessment* Evaluation of a body of scientific or
technical knowledge that typically
synthesizes multiple factual inputs, data,
models, and assumptions, and implies the
use of best professional judgment to
bridge uncertainties in the available
information.
Scientific Integrity* The condition resulting from adherence to
professional values and practices when
conducting and applying the results of
science that ensures objectivity, clarity,
and reproducibility, and that provides
insulation from bias, fabrication,
falsification, plagiarism, interference,
censorship, and inadequate procedural and
information security.
Scientific Product* Presentation of the results of scientific
activities including the analysis,
synthesis, compilation, or translation of
scientific information and data into
formats for the use of NOAA, the
Department of Commerce, or the Nation.
September 6 Statement Unattributed Public Statement from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, issued on September 6,
2019 (See Appendix F).
September 1 Birmingham Tweet from the National Weather Service
Tweet Birmingham Weather Forecast Office, posted
on September 1, 2019 (See Appendix F).
Tweet A brief communication made through the
internet-based, for-profit social media
platform, Twitter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Summary
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a
scientific agency within the United States Department of Commerce that
focuses on the study of climate, weather, oceans, coasts, and the
conservation and management of coastal and marine ecosystems and
resources.
In September 2019, NOAA's Scientific Integrity Officer (SIO)
received four complaints of alleged violations of scientific integrity
filed under the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy (NOAA Administrative
Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity). The allegations relate to a
specific NOAA public statement issued on September 6, 2019 (the
September 6 Statement) regarding a tweet previously issued by the
National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in
Birmingham, Alabama, on September 1, 2019 (the September 1 Birmingham
Tweet).
NOAA's SIO engaged the National Academy of Public Administration
(the Academy) to conduct an independent assessment of those
allegations. The goal of the assessment was to determine by a
preponderance of evidence, meaning the standard of proof of making a
finding of misconduct under NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and
accompanying Procedural Handbook, if the NOAA personnel involved with
the development and issuance of the September 6 Statement violated
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and engaged in the misconduct
intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Scientific
Integrity Policy. Pursuant to the Scope of Work, the Academy was tasked
to:
Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific
integrity has not occurred and the allegation be dismissed; or
Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific
integrity has occurred and recommend any specific action by
NOAA to restore scientific integrity.
Conducted from December 2019 through March 2020, the assessment
employed primarily qualitative research methods. The Academy Team,
comprised of a Panel of Academy Fellows and the study team, gathered
and analyzed primary and secondary data through a review of prior
testimonies and official documents related to the allegations of
scientific misconduct. The Academy Team conducted semi-structured
interviews with subject matter experts and NOAA staff including
personnel from NWS, the Office of Communications, and other senior
leaders. The Academy Team also had conversations with representatives
from NOAA's Office of General Counsel and the SIO which provided
background on the Scientific Integrity Policy. Appendix H contains a
list of all records and documents reviewed by the Academy Team.
The inquiry into the alleged scientific misconduct and loss of
scientific integrity associated with the September 6 Statement and the
September 1 Birmingham Tweet presented a challenge for the Integrity
Review Panel. The facts and circumstances surrounding these allegations
of misconduct are not a perfect fit with the existing NOAA policies
regarding scientific integrity and scientific communication and the
Department of Commerce guidance on public communications. The Academy
Team, therefore, created a process to assess the facts developed
against existing policy and to determine whether personnel and actions
were covered under NOAA and Commerce policies. Those rationales .are
provided later in the report. This process also allowed the development
of recommendations as to how policies might be improved.
In considering the allegations, the Panel recognizes that the
September 6 Statement and the September 1 Birmingham Tweet discussed
herein are inextricably linked. The September 6 Statement directly
addressed the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and the underlying science.
Second, the Panel considered both the content and process by which the
September 6 Statement was developed and released. Finally, it is the
considered opinion of the Panel, that in the aggregate, the evidence
gathered in this inquiry is appropriate and sufficient to provide a
reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions contained herein.
Additionally, the report includes a series of Panel recommendations to
safeguard against future violations of scientific integrity for the
Determining Official (DO) to consider. The following is a summary of
the Panel's major findings and recommendations:
Allegation One: Media guidance issued by NOAA leadership between
September 1 and 6, 2019, limited the ability of scientists to
communicate with the media and the public about their research
findings; Policies allegedly violated include Section 4.05; Section
4.06; and Section 5.02 (a), (d), and (k) of NOM's Scientific integrity
Policy.
Finding One: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the
evidence on the record that the allegation that the media guidance
issued by NOAA leadership between September 1 and 6, 2019, did not
constitute scientific misconduct or a loss of scientific integrity.
Recommendations:
Develop formal policy guidelines for the issuance of media
guidance to NOAA staff. Specifically, these guidelines should
clarify roles and responsibilities, institutionalize the
process, and identify the circumstances under which the agency
should issue media guidance.
Develop an interagency framework (that includes other
Federal agencies and the White House) for the sharing of
scientific data and materials concerning severe weather related
events. The framework would include protocols for the timely
update of information to reflect changing weather conditions
and the release of the information to the general public.
Allegation Two: The Birmingham WFO forecasters were not provided
the opportunity to review and opine on the September 6 Statement that
referenced the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific
activity. Policies allegedly violated include Section 7.01. of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Finding Two: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the
evidence on the record that Dr. Neil Jacobs (Acting Administrator of
NOAA) and Julie Roberts (Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of
Communications for NOAA) \4\ violated the Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management set forth in Section 7.01 of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy when they failed to engage the Birmingham
WFO in the development of the September 6 Statement. Further, the Panel
finds that they engaged in the misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or
in reckless disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of
Ethics for Science Supervision and Management in NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Julie Roberts left NOAA in December 2019 to join the Economic
Development Administration, which is in the Department of Commerce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations:
Develop a written policy statement on the right of NOAA
scientists to review, comment, and amend any Official
Communication that relies on their scientific analysis. This
policy statement will complement NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy.
Revise NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy's accompanying
Procedural Handbook to include criteria and supporting examples
to assist with the determination of scientific misconduct and a
loss of scientific integrity. For example, NOAA could cite this
case as an example of a violation of NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy and scientific misconduct with regards to
several criteria.
Allegation Three: The drafting of the September 6 Statement was
driven by external political pressure from Department of Commerce
(Commerce) senior leaders and inappropriately criticized the September
1 Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific activity. Further, the
September 6 Statement compromised NOAA's integrity and reputation as an
independent scientific agency and violated Section 7.02 of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Finding Three: The Panel determined by a preponderance of the
evidence on the record that the actions of Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie
Roberts involving the development and issuance of the September 6
Statement violated the Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and
Management set forth in Section 7 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy. Further, the Panel determined that they engaged in the
misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the
Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science Supervision
and Management in NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Recommendations:
Establish a formal intra-agency agreement to guide the
interactions between Commerce and NOAA officials in the
drafting of NOAA communications.
Establish an intra-agency policy to articulate the role of
Commerce political appointees in the communication of
scientific findings. Develop supporting procedures and identify
examples of political interference.
Incorporate key principles of scientific integrity,
including NOAA's Codes of Ethics for Science Supervision and
Management, into NOAA's annual ethics training.
Require NOAA staff and NOAA political officials to take
scientific integrity training that includes the Code of Ethics
for Science Supervision and Management. Once a staff member has
completed the training, he/she will sign a statement confirming
they will abide by these principles.
Establish protocols with the Commerce Office of Inspector
General (OIG) and/or other agencies to investigate alleged
violations of scientific integrity involving senior NOAA and
Commerce political leadership.
Chapter 1: Background
Background on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), created
in 1970, is a scientific agency within the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) that focuses on the study of climate, weather, oceans, and
coasts. NOAA's mission of science, service, and stewardship consists of
the following components:
To understand and predict changes in climate, weather,
oceans and coasts;
To share that knowledge and information with others; and
To conserve and manage coastal and marine ecosystems and
resources.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Our mission and values,'' National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, http://www.noaa.gov/our-mission-and-vision.
NOAA's wide-ranging services include, but are not limited to,
communicating forecasts and weather advisories, managing the fisheries
industry, handling operational environmental satellites, and providing
the data and products needed to support the economy as it relates to
climate, weather, oceans, and coasts. Figure 1 on the next page
provides the organizational chart of the various NOAA operations and
senior leadership that was effective on September 6, 2019.
Following a 2009 presidential memorandum calling for Executive
Branch departments and agencies to develop scientific integrity
policies,\6\ the Department of Commerce instructed NOAA to develop a
bureau-specific scientific integrity policy.\7\ NOAA adopted its
Scientific Integrity Policy (NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D:
Scientific Integrity) on December 7, 2011, and created the position of
Scientific Integrity Officer (SIO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ``Memorandum for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Subject of
Scientific Integrity,'' March 9, 2009.
\7\ Cameron F. Kerry, ``Memorandum for all Chief Counsels and
General Counsels, Subject: Implementation of Administration Policy on
Scientific Integrity,'' December 16, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SIO responds to allegations of scientific misconduct or the
loss of scientific integrity. The NOAA Scientific Integrity Committee,
comprised of NOAA Line Office Silos and Staff Office Points of Contact,
supports the NOAA SIO in this role.\8\ The SIO must ensure that the
entirety of the allegation review process is independent and has a
thorough and complete methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Craig N. McLean, ``Memorandum for Vice Admiral Michael S.
Devany and Dr. W. Richard Spinrad, Subject: Approval of Scientific
Integrity Committee Terms of Reference,'' July 15, 2015.
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Figure 1. NOAA Organizational Chart\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ This NOAA organizational chart was the version effective on
September 6, 2019. An updated chart that reflect changes in NOAA
leadership is available on NOAA's website.
For the SIO and/or Determining Official (DO) to find that an
instance of scientific misconduct or misconduct resulting in the loss
of scientific integrity occurred, the SIO must determine by a
preponderance of the evidence that a person or entity departed
significantly from the Scientific Integrity Policy and engaged in the
misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of that
policy. A loss of scientific integrity can also occur without a finding
of misconduct. For example, a loss of scientific integrity could arise
from an insufficiently rigorous scientific process with no intentional
wrongdoing on the part of the individual and/or entity conducting the
research.\10\ NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy's Procedural Handbook
does not clearly define a loss of scientific integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ This example was provided to the Academy Team by NOAA's SIO
and representatives from the Office of General Counsel during
background conversations on the Scientific Integrity Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background on the alleged violations of NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy
On Sunday, September 1, 2019, at 10:51 a.m. Eastern Time Zone (ET),
President Trump tweeted,
In addition to Florida--South Carolina, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Alabama, will most likely be hit (much) harder
than anticipated. Looking like one of the largest hurricanes
ever. Already category 5. BE CAREFUL! GOD BLESS EVERYONE!
Approximately 20 minutes later, in response to a number of ph ne
calls from individuals worried about Hurricane Dorian's impact to
Alabama and unaware of the President's earlier tweet, the National
Weather Service's (NWS) Birmingham Weather Forecast Office (WFO)
tweeted,
Alabama will NOT see any impacts from #Dorian. We repeat, no
impacts from Hurricane #Dorian will be felt across Alabama. The
system will remain too far east. #alwx''
A copy of this tweet (referred to as ``September 1 Birmingham
Tweet'') can be found in Appendix F.
On September 6, 2019, NOAA released an unattributed public
statement (referred to as ``September 6 Statement'') that stated,
From Wednesday, August 28, through Monday, September 2, the
information provided by NOAA and the National Hurricane Center
to President Trump and the wider public demonstrated that
tropical-storm-force winds from Hurricane Dorian could impact
Alabama. This is dearly demonstrated in Hurricane Advisories
#15 through #41, which can be viewed at the following link.
The Birmingham National Weather Service's Sunday morning tweet
spoke in absolute terms that were inconsistent with
probabilities from the best forecast products available at the
time.
A copy of the September 6 Statement can be found in Appendix F.
NOAA subsequently received four complaints of alleged violations of
scientific integrity related to the September 6 Statement. Copies of
the four complaints can be found in Appendix E. NOAA's SIO determined
that further investigation of those allegations was required.
In considering the posture of the Complainants and Respondents to
allegations 2019-007, -008, -009, and -0010, the SIO and NOAA General
Counsel determined that NOAA required an external independent expert to
investigate and make findings and recommendations. In order to ensure
that this investigation maintained the highest degree of independence
and neutrality, NOAA's SIO, in consultation with NOAA's General
Counsel, engaged the National Academy of Public Administration (the
Academy) to conduct an independent assessment of the four allegations
of scientific misconduct.
As the Panel undertook its assessment, two additional
investigations were underway:
Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG)
began its investigation on September 7, 2019 \11\
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\11\ Peggy E. Gustafson, ``Memorandum for Dr. Neil Jacobs, Subject:
Request for Information Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978,
as Amended,'' September 7, 2019.
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology began its
inquiry on September 11, 2019 \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Eddie Bernice Johnson and Mikie Sherrill, ``Letter to
Secretary Wilbur Ross,'' September 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Panel's review is focused on NOAA personnel and alleged
violations of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy, the House Committee
and OIG investigations are broader. The Panel conducted this inquiry
independently of the other two inquiries.
Background on the National Academy of Public Administration
As an independent, non-partisan, non-profit, congressionally
chartered organization, the Academy is uniquely situated to provide the
expertise and skills required of the external investigation requested
by NOAA. Driven by the Academy's core value interdependence, the Panel
of Fellows and professional staff (the ``Academy Team'') conducted this
investigation in an evidence-based, unbiased, and non-partisan manner.
The Panel of Fellows was appointed by the Chair of the Academy Board of
Directors, based on their collective experience in the field of public
administration, knowledge of scientific research, and execution of
agency policy and procedure. Please see Appendix A for Panel member
biographical sketches.
1.1 Project Scope and Deliverables
NOAA's SIO engaged the Academy to conduct an independent assessment
of allegations of scientific misconduct filed under the NOAA Scientific
Integrity Policy. The allegations relate to a specific NOAA public
statement issued on September 6, 2019, regarding a tweet previously
issued by the NWS Birmingham WFO on September 1, 2019. The September 6
Statement and the September 1 Birmingham Tweet are included in Appendix
F.
Pursuant to the Scope of Work, NOAA tasked the Panel with
determining whether the NOAA personnel involved with the development
and issuance of the September 6 Statement violated NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy and engaged in the misconduct intentionally,
knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Scientific Integrity Policy.
The Scope of Work tasks the Panel to:
Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific
integrity has not occurred and the allegation dismissed; or
Determine if scientific misconduct or loss of scientific
integrity has occurred and recommend any specific action by
NOAA to restore scientific integrity.
Further, the final report will include the following components:
Description of allegation(s)
Summary of process
List of records reviewed
Summaries of interviews
Recommendations
1.2 Limitations to the Panel's Assessment
In completing its assessment, the Panel did not attempt to validate
the scientific accuracy of the September 6 Statement and the September
1 Birmingham Tweet. This matter lies outside the charge to the Panel.
Further, the Panel's due diligence was subject to the following
limitations that may, in the aggregate, have limited the Panel's
ability to assess certain aspects of the allegations:
The Academy Team had no access to Department of Commerce
employees involved with the drafting and release of the NOAA
September 6 Statement.
The Academy Team inquired with NOAA about interviewing two Commerce
employees involved with the drafting and release of the NOAA
September 6 Statement. NOAA did not provide the Academy Team
access to those employees. NOAA's rationale behind the decision
to not allow the Academy Team to conduct the interviews was
that NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and Procedural Handbook
pertains to NOAA employees only and that a review of Commerce
staffs actions was outside the scope of the assessment.
The Academy Team had no access to infonnation gathered by
the Commerce OIG and the House Committee on Science, Space and
Technology investigations.
At the time that the Panel conducted its assessment, two additional
investigations were underway The Academy Team had neither
access to the individuals conducting those investigations nor
to the evidence gathered by those teams.
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and Procedural Handbook
lack clear and explicit criteria to determine a loss of
scientific integrity and only provide limited guidance.
While NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy defines scientific
integrity the policy does not provide explicit criteria for
determining a potential loss of scientific integrity.\13\
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\13\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December 7,
2011: Section 3.
The Academy Team had limited access to underlying
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
documentary evidence.
The Academy Team received an abundance of documentation from NOAA
including transcribed statements from key NOAA employees,
related e-mail correspondence, and a copy of relevant NOAA and
Department of Commerce policies, However, certain evidence
related to the events leading up to the drafting and release of
the September 6 Statement was not provided to the Academy Team
Specifically, the text messages from the two key Respondents--
Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie Roberts--were not provided to the
Panel.\14\
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\14\ The Panel was informed that the text messages from Dr. Jacobs
contained outside equities and would need to be submitted to the
holders of the privilege for a determination concerning assertion of
the privilege. Such a determination had not been made in time for the
Panel to be provided access to the text messages. Further, Julie
Roberts testified that--prior to the Panel's investigation--she had
deleted text messages sent to her. Julie Kay Roberts, ``Interview of
Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019:
Page 81-82.
In addition, certain e-mails provided to the Academy Team had also
been released to requesters pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and were redacted in accordance with
FOIA's exemptions.
1.3 Organization of Report
The report is organized as follows:
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the report, which
includes background information, project scope and
deliverables.
Chapter 2 summarizes the inquiry methodology and process.
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy and adjudication procedures.
Chapter 4 provides a description of the allegations.
Chapter 5 provides a chronology of key events.
Chapter 6 provides the Panel's findings and recommendations.
Chapter 2: Summary of Methodology and Process
For this assessment, the Academy appointed four Fellows to serve on
the Panel. The Panel provided ongoing guidance to the study team
throughout the project, including approving the project work plan;
participating in the interview process; reviewing the study team's
progress; developing, reviewing, and approving the study findings,
conclusions, and recommendations; and approving the draft and final
report. Their biographical information can be found in Appendix A.
The Panel for this study included the following Academy Fellows:
Admiral (Ret.) Thad Allen (Chair)
Dr. Shantanu Agrawal
Dr. Kaye Husbands Fealing
Dr. Elizabeth Robinson
Conducted from December 2019 through March 2020, the assessment
employed primarily qualitative research methods. This review was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted research standards
which required that the Academy Team plan and perform the study to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for the findings and conclusions based on the study objectives. The
Panel believes the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
the findings and conclusions based on the study objectives.
To identify the appropriate criteria for the assessment, the
Academy Team reviewed a broad array of publicly available literature
and official documentation including NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy
(NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity), the
Department of Commerce's Public Communication Policy (Department
Administrative Order 219-1: Public Communication), Federal guidance on
scientific integrity policies as promulgated by the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) guidance, Congressional hearings on
scientific integrity, reports authored by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and other publicly available related literature from
several Offices of Inspector General. The review provided a baseline
for the Panel's findings and additional context for the Academy Team
interviews. See Appendix H for a full list of records reviewed by the
Academy team.
Reflecting the requirements of the Scope of Work, the Academy Team
focused on several overarching issues to inform the scope of research
and selection of assessment questions:
Applicable Jurisdiction: Are the alleged activities;
allegations related to the development and release of the
September 6, 2019, NOAA unattributed public statement (the
September 6 Statement); and Respondents covered under the NOAA
Scientific Integrity Policy?
Applicable Policies: What are the applicable NOAA and
Department of Commerce policies and procedures that relate to
Scientific Integrity and Communication activities?
Applicable Assessment Criteria: What are the applicable
assessment criteria to be used to assess a possible breach of
NOAA Scientific Integrity and Communication policies?
The Academy Team gathered and analyzed primary and secondary data
through a review of prior testimonies and official documents related to
the allegations of scientific misconduct. The Academy Team conducted
semi-structured in-person interviews with NOAA staff including
personnel from NWS and the Office of Communications, and other senior
leaders. Academy Team submitted interview topics and procedures to the
interviewees prior to the interviews. .See Appendix D for a list of
interviews and interview questions. The Academy Team also had
conversations with representatives from NOAA's Office of General
Counsel and SIO which provided background on the Scientific integrity
Policy.
To provide greater context to the study and to better understand
how social science research can inform the effective communication of
severe weather event risk, including emergency preparedness, the
Academy Team interviewed subject matter experts from the University of
Colorado at Boulder and the National Center for Atmospheric Research.
The Academy Team interviewed representatives from GAO to discuss
leading practices to safeguard scientific integrity at Federal
agencies.
Subject matter experts spoke to the Academy Team under the
condition that their comments would not be for attribution. Copies of
the questions asked during the Academy Team's interviews are included
in Appendix D.
2.1 Consideration of Alleged Activities, Allegations, and Respondents
under the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy
As the first step of its assessment, the Academy Team determined
that the September 1 Birmingham Tweet ,and the September 6 Statement,
the activities underlying the alleged violations, the allegations
related to the development and release of September 6 Statement, and
certain Respondents named in the allegations were all covered under the
NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy. Further, the Academy Team determined
that the above NOAA communications were covered under the Department of
Commerce's Public Communication Policy, as NOAA does not possess its
own communication policy. Separately, NOAA's S10, Dr. Cynthia Decker,
confirmed that the four complaints met the basic criteria to be
adjudicated pursuant to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy's
accompanying Procedural Handbook.\15\
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\15\ Cynthia J. Decker, ``Memorandum from Cynthia J. Decker for The
Record, Subject: Scientific Integrity Allegations 2019-007/8/9/10
Inquiry and Investigation Process,'' 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Academy Team's analysis was informed by a review of supporting
documentation as well as interviews with NOAA staff. The following
decision points provide the underlying analysis used to determine the
status of individuals and applicability of policy.
Decision Point: Applicability of Policy to Respondents
The allegations list several Respondents. Are those Respondents subject
to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy and Commerce Public
Communication Policy?
Analysis: Although the list of Respondents presented in the
allegations includes both NOAA and non-NOAA employees, only NOAA staff
(career and political) and certain NOAA contractors are covered under
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy. The Department of Commerce Public
Communication policies extends to all employees of the Commerce
Department including NOAA staff.
Pursuant to Section 2.02 of NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy, the
policy applies to:
All NOAA employees, political and career, who are engaged in,
supervise, or manage scientific activities, analyze and/or
publicly communicate information resulting from scientific
activities, or use scientific information or analyses in making
bureau or office policy, management, or regulatory decisions;
and contractors who engage in or assist with activities
identified above.
Pursuant to Section 1.01 of Commerce's Public Communications
Policy, the policy applies to ``Department of Commerce employees
engaging in public communications.'' This policy is also applicable to
the Respondents, as they publicly communicated information resulting
from scientific activities.
Decision Point: Applicability of NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy to
the Communications
The allegations refer to the September 6 Statement and the September 1
Birmingham Tweet. Are the September 6 Statement and September l
Birmingham Tweet covered under the NOAA Scientific Integrity
Policy?
Analysis: In considering this question, the Academy Team reviewed
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and concluded that the September 6
Statement and September 1 Birmingham Tweet are covered under NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy for the following reasons:
Section 3 of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy defines a
scientific assessment as the:
Evaluation of a body of scientific or technical knowledge that
typically synthesizes multiple factual inputs, data, models,
and assumptions, and implies the use of best professional
judgment to bridge uncertainties in the available information.
The persons involved in developing the September 1 Birmingham Tweet
and September 6 Statement conducted a scientific assessment by
evaluating and synthesizing the scientific and technical knowledge
available to them. To develop the September 1 Birmingham Tweet,
Birmingham WFO forecasters evaluated models, forecasts, and other
information. In the case of the September 6 Statement, individuals
involved in developing the statement evaluated National Hurricane
Center (NHC) advisories.
A scientific assessment is included in the list of activities that
define a scientific activity per the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy.
Section 3 of the policy defines a scientific activity as:
Activities that involve inventorying, monitoring, observations,
experimentation, study, research, modeling, and scientific
assessment. Scientific activities are conducted in a manner
specified by standard protocols and procedures and include any
of the physical, biological, or social sciences, as well as
engineering and mathematics, or any combination of these.
In developing the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6
Statement, individuals engaged in activities that can be considered
scientific activities.
As defined in Section 3 of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy, a
scientific product is the:
Presentation of the results of scientific activities including
the analysis, synthesis, compilation, or translation of
scientific information and data into formats for the use of
NOAA, the Department of Commerce, or the Nation.
Therefore, it can be reasonably deduced that the September 1
Birmingham Tweet and September 6 Statement are examples of a scientific
product. The Academy Team's interviews with NOAA and NWS staff and
conversations with representatives from NOAA's Office of General
Counsel and SIO about the Scientific Integrity Policy, supported the
Academy Team's interpretation.
As scientific products based on scientific activities and
assessments, the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6 Statement
are subject to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy.
Interviews with NOAA and GAO personnel provided guidance that a
communication can be considered a scientific product if:
The communication is based on scientific analysis and
The communication is related to the core mission of the
agency.
In the case of the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6
Statement, both communications involve scientific assessments and
activities and relate to the core mission of the agency. Informed by
this guidance, the Academy Team determined that both criteria were met
and that both the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6
Statement should be considered scientific products because they are
based on scientific activities and scientific assessments. The Academy
Team determined that the drafting and public release of both
communications were consistent with these covered activities.
Decision Point: Applicability of Department of Commerce Public
Communication Policy to the Communications
Are the September 6 Statement and September 1 Birmingham Tweet covered
under the Department of Commerce Public Communication Policy?
Analysis: The Academy Team determined that the September 6
Statement and September 1 Birmingham Tweet can be considered Official
Communications and are covered under the Department of Commerce Public
Communication Policy for the following reasons:
The Department of Commerce Public Communication Policy defines
Official Communications as:
Any Public Communication by an employee that relates to the
Department's programs, policies, oroperations and takes place
or is prepared: (i) At the direction of a superior of the
employee; (ii) Substantially during the official working hours
of the employee; (iii) With the substantial use of U.S.
Government resource(s); or with substantial assistance of U.S.
Government employee(s) on official duty.
Section 8 of Commerce's Public Communications Policy provides that:
Any Official Communication intended for the media (e.g., news
releases, interviews/news conferences), all written and
audiovisual materials that are, or are prepared or received in
connection with, the Official Communication must be submitted
in a timely manner before the communication occurs to the head
of the operating unit or Secretarial office, or their
designee(s), and to the Appropriate Public Affairs Office (as
defined in Section 8.05) for approval in a timely manner.
Based on the definition of an Official Communication, the Commerce
Public Communication Policy is applicable to both the September 1
Birmingham Tweet and September 6 Statement.
Analysis: As the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and September 6
Statement are defined as ``Official Communications'' per the Commerce
Public Communication Policy, they are also subject to the provisions of
Section 7 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy which states:
Appropriate rules and procedures are in place and implemented
to preserve the integrity of the scientific process and the
dissemination of its scientific products and information,
including providing scientists the right to review and correct
any official document (such as a press release or report) that
cites or references their scientific work, to ensure that
accuracy has been maintained after the clearance and editing
process.
Section 7 of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy mandates a review
from the scientists whose scientific work was referenced in the
Official Communication. As Official Communications per the Department
of Commerce Public Communication Policy, the September 1 Birmingham
Tweet and September 6 Statement are subject to Section 7 of the NOAA
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Decision Point: Applicability of Policy to Alleged Violations
The allegations cite violations of numerous provisions of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy. Are the alleged violations covered
under the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy and Commerce Public
Communication Policy?
Analysis: In considering this question, the Academy Team reviewed
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy, Commerce's Public Communication
Policy, OSTP policies, GAO guidance, guidelines followed by other
Federal agencies, and conversations with NOAA's S10 and representatives
from the Office of General Counsel on the Scientific Integrity Policy.
The Academy Team concluded that the alleged violations are covered
under the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy and Commerce Public
Communication Policy.
Decision Point: Filing of Allegations in Accordance with Policy
Were the allegations filed in accordance with the provisions in the
NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy's accompanying Procedural
Handbook?
Analysis: In considering this question, the Academy Team reviewed
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and the accompanying Procedural
Handbook, GAO guidance and guidelines followed by other Federal
agencies, and conversations with NOAA's SIO and representatives from
the Office of General Counsel on the Scientific Integrity Policy. The
Academy Team concluded that the allegations were filed in accordance
with the provisions in the NOAA Procedural Handbook. The allegations
provided sufficient information for adjudication and were filed within
the stipulated time frame. See Sections 3.02 and 3.04 of the Procedural
Handbook for additional guidance.
2.2 Methodological Approach to Review and Assess the Allegations
The Academy Team's methodological approach to review and assess the
allegations comprised seven key tasks:
Task One: Review allegations of scientific misconduct or loss of
scientific integrity related to the development and release of
September 6 Statement.
For the purposes of this evaluation, NOAA requested the Panel to
consider the following four allegations:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complainant and Filing Date Allegation Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Craig McLean; September 10, 2019 Allegation 2019-007
Jane Lubchenco, Andrew Rosenberg, Allegation 2019-008
and Richard Spinrad; September 9,
2019
Carl Childs; September 11, 2019 Allegation 2019-009
Rep. Paul Tonko; September 10, 2019 Allegation 2019-0010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task Two: Review the applicable NOAA and Commerce policies that
relate to scientific integrity and communication activities.
For the purposes of this evaluation, the Panel considered the
following applicable NOAA and Commerce policies and procedures: \6\
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\16\ NOAA's SIO and representatives from the Office of General
Counsel confirmed that these documents encompass all scientific
integrity and communication policies applicable to NOAA.
NOM's Scientific Integrity Policy and related Procedural
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Handbook
NOAA Framework for Internal Review and Approval of
Fundamental Research Communications (FRC)
Department of Commerce's Public Communication Policy
Department of Commerce's Social Media Guidebook January 2013
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: March 9, 2009
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: December 17, 2010 (from the Director of the OSTP)
Memorandum for all Chief Counsels and General Counsels, on
the implementation of administration policy of scientific
integrity: December 16, 2011 (from the General Counsel of the
Department of Commerce)
Federal Register, Volume 65, Number 235, Notice from the
Science and Technology Policy Office on the Federal Policy on
Research Misconduct: Wednesday, December 6, 2000 \17\
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\17\ The Federal definition of research misconduct is defined as
fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or
reviewing research, or in reporting research results.
Task Three: Select and define criteria to be used to assess a
possible violation of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and Commerce's
Public Communication Policy. For the purposes of this evaluation, the
Panel considered assessment criteria drawn from the applicable
documents listed above in Task Two. Criteria include broad standards
and specific procedural guidance.
Task Four: Develop a fact-based chronology of activities and
individuals involved in the events leading up to and the development
and release of the September 6 Statement and determine in what context
the September 6 Statement was produced.
To develop the chronology, the Panel conducted semi-structured
interviews and reviewed prior testimonial evidence and related
documents.
Task Five: Develop a concise understanding of the adjudication
standards, criteria, and process.
Task Six: Determine whether the NOAA personnel involved in events
leading up to, and in the issuance of, the September 6 Statement
violated the Scientific Integrity Policy.
For the purpose of this evaluation, the Panel took the following
steps:
Map the prescribed procedures and activities related to the
September 6 Statement according to NOAA's policies. This
creates a baseline as to what procedures and steps should have
been followed to comply with NOAA and Commerce policies.
Compare the fact-based chronology of the events, activities,
and individuals determined in Task Four with NOAA policies and
procedures. Identify departures from the baseline policies and
procedures.
Determine whether the departures or variance from the
baseline procedures significantly departed from accepted
practices and rises to the level of a violation of the Code of
Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science Supervision
and Management set forth in NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Determine whether the individuals engaged in the misconduct
intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code
of Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science Supervision
and Management in NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Task Seven: In the event that scientific misconduct or misconduct
resulting in a loss of scientific integrity has occurred, determine
what steps are necessary to restore the loss of integrity.
Separately, formulate recommendations for NOAA to help safeguard
against future violations of scientific integrity related to political
interference.
For the purpose of this evaluation, the Panel considered the
analysis included in Tasks One through Seven as well as their
professional expertise and experience to develop recommendations
intended to support more effective adherence to the Scientific
Integrity Policy in the future.
Chapter 3: Summary of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy
and Adjudication Procedures
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA)
Scientific Integrity Policy (NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D:
Scientific Integrity) outlines the agency's scientific integrity
principles, code of conduct, code of ethics, and criteria to determine
scientific and research misconduct. Section 3 of the policy defines
scientific integrity as follows:
The condition resulting from adherence to professional values
and practices when conducting and applying the results of
science that ensures objectivity, clarity, and reproducibility,
and that provides insulation from bias, fabrication,
falsification, plagiarism, interference, censorship, and
inadequate procedural and information security.
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy and accompanying Procedural
Handbook provide criteria for determining scientific misconduct and
five core procedures for adjudicating alleged violations.
3.1 Criteria for Determining Scientific Misconduct
Section 2.01 of the Procedural Handbook for NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy states that:
A finding of scientific misconduct or misconduct resulting in
the loss of scientific integrity requires a determination by
the NOAA Scientific Integrity Officer (SIO) and/or Determining
Officer (DO) by a preponderance of the evidence on the record
before him or her that the person or entity has:
Significantly departed from accepted practices of the
relevant research community and violated the Code of
Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science
Supervision and Management set forth in NOM's Scientific
Integrity Policy; and
Engaged in the misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or in
reckless disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or
Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management in
NOM's Scientific Integrity Policy.
3.2 Core Procedures for Adjudicating Alleged Violations of Scientific
Integrity
The accompanying Procedural Handbook to NOM's Scientific Integrity
Policy articulates a precise process for NOM to use in responding to
allegations of scientific misconduct or a loss of scientific integrity
by a NOM employee, contractor, or recipient of NOM financial
assistance. The Procedural Handbook provides the following core
procedures for identifying and adjudicating alleged violations of
scientific integrity.
Reporting the Allegation
Allegations are to be submitted in writing to NOAA's SIO within 90
calendar days of the discovery of the alleged misconduct.\18\ If
applicable, an allegation should contain all of the following
information to evaluate the complaint:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``Procedural
Handbook for NAO 202-735 D: Scientific Integrity;'' December, 2011:
Section 3.02.
a. The name of the person or organization alleged to have committed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the misconduct;
b. A statement of facts (including dates, locations, and actions)
that support the allegation, including when and how the
Complainant first learned of such facts;
c. A list of documents supporting the allegation;
d. A list of witnesses who may corroborate the a1legation;
e. An explanation of how the criteria for scientific misconduct or
loss of scientific integrity are met, including for loss of
scientific integrity: citations or other information
identifying the accepted practices of the relevant scientific
community; an explanation of how the alleged misconduct
constitutes a significant departure from those practices and
violates the Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for
Science Supervision and Management set forth in NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy
f. An explanation of any conflicts of interest, as defined in
section 4.04(b)(i), the Complainant has with the subject of the
allegation;
g. A statement indicating whether the allegation has been submitted
elsewhere, such as the NOAA Employee and Labor Relations
Division, Office of Special Counsel, or Office of the Inspector
General.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ NOAA, Section 3.04.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Screening the Allegation
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy's Procedural Handbook provides
that the SIO is to screen the allegation to decide whether it should be
dismissed or should proceed to an inquiry and possible investigation.
The official may also form a committee for assistance with that
assessment. Pursuant to this requirement, the NOAA SIO, Dr. Cynthia
Decker, concluded that the allegations of misconduct were credible and
consulted with NOAA General Counsel on appropriate procedures to move
the adjudication forward.\20\ Detailed descriptions of the allegations
can be found in tables 4-1; 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4, all found in Chapter 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Cynthia J. Decker, ``Memorandum from Cynthia J. Decker for The
Record; Subject: Scientific Integrity Allegations 2019-007/8/9/10
Inquiry and Investigation Process,'' 2019; National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, ``Procedural Handbook for NAO 202-735D:
Scientific Integrity,'' December, 2011: Section 4.03(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investigating the Allegation
The purpose of this procedure is to determine whether scientific
misconduct and/or loss of scientific integrity occurred and to
recommend corrective action. NOAA's procedures include a step for the
SIO or other designated body to investigate the allegation and to
decide whether it should be dismissed or, if a violation occurred,
assess whether an allegation sufficiently specifies scientific
misconduct or the loss of scientific integrity and whether that
misconduct or loss can be resolved with evidence and expertise that can
be collected by the Inquiry Team, or if a more extensive investigation
is warranted.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``Procedural
Handbook for NAO 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December, 2011:
Section 4.04.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Inquiry Team determines by a preponderance of evidence that
a more extensive investigation is warranted, an Integrity Review Panel
(IRP) is formed, tasked to determine whether scientific misconduct or
loss of scientific integrity occurred, and recommends corrective
action.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ NOAA, Section 4.05.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In considering the posture of the Complainants and Respondents to
allegations 2019-007, -008, -009, and -0010, the SIO with consultation
from NOAA General Counsel determined that NOAA was not suited to
adjudicate this matter internally and required an external independent
expert to investigate and make findings and recommendations. In a
Memorandum for The Record explaining this discussion, the NOAA SIO, Pr.
Cynthia Decker, explains, ``Due to the posture of the complainant and
respondent in the proceeding, no one at NOAA ``is suited to adjudicate
this matter internally, and NOAA requires a neutral expert to
investigate and make findings and recommendations in order for a NOAA
Determining Official to resolve the complaints.'' \23\ To ensure an
unbiased proceeding, the Academy was contracted to serve as a combined
Inquiry/Investigation Team, carry out all functions the Procedural
Handbook bestows to an Inquiry Team and IRP, and submit a report with
findings and recommendations to the DO for review and further action,
as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Cynthia J. Decker, ``Memorandum from Cynthia J. Decker for The
Record, Subject: Scientific Integrity Allegations 2019-007/8/9/10
Inquiry and Investigation Process,'' 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responding to the Violation
If the DO finds that scientific misconduct or loss of scientific
integrity has occurred, the DO or Deputy Under Secretary for Operations
will refer the matter to an appropriate manager in the Respondent's
reporting structure for corrective administrative action.
Opportunity for Input from the Complainant and Respondent
During the investigation process, the Complainant and Respondent
may provide written exceptions to the findings of the final
investigation report within 10 calendar days.
Chapter 4: Description of the Allegations
Following the release of the September 6 Statement, NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Officer (SIO), Dr. Cynthia Decker, received four
complaints alleging a violation of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy
(NOAA Administrative Order (NAO) 202-735D: Scientific Integrity). These
complaints were then cataloged by the SIO and numbered as Scientific
Integrity Allegations 2019-007 through 2019-0010.
The following tables summarizes the four allegations submitted to
NOAA's SIO. The allegations can be found in Appendix E.
Table 4-1. Allegation 2019-007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complainant: Craig McLean\24\ Date Submitted: September 10, 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Craig McLean is the NOAA
Assistant Administrator for
Oceanic and Atmospheric Research.
He also serves NOAA in the acting
role of Chief Scientist.
Allegation Summary: The complaint Policies Allegedly Violated:
alleges that, ``intervention to NAO 202-735D: Scientific Integrity
contradict the forecasters was not Section 5.02(d): Guidance for
based in science but on external Scientists to Speak with the Media
factors including reputation and Section 5.02(k): Sharing of Best
appearance, or simply put, Administrative and Management
political. Our NOAA Scientific Practices
Integrity Policy and Code of Section 6.01: NOAA Employee and
Scientific Conduct found in NAO Contractors Code of Scientific
202-735D make clear that all NOAA Conduct
employees shall approach all Section 7.01: Code of Ethics for
scientific activities with Science Managers
honesty, objectively, and Section 7.02: Code of Ethics for
completely, without allegiance to All Science Supervisors and
individuals, organizations, or Management
ideology. The content of this Section 7.03: Fundamental Research
press release is very concerning Communication Approval
as it compromises the ability of Section 8.01: Definitions of
NOAA to convey life-saving Scientific and Research Misconduct
information necessary to avoid Procedural Handbook
substantial and specific danger to Section 2.03: Coercive
public health and safety. If the manipulation, intimidation,
public cannot trust our misrepresentation, etc.
information, or we debase our Department of Commerce
forecaster's warnings and Administrative Order (DAO) 219-1:
products, that specific danger Public Communications
arises.'' Section 4.01 (a)(b)
Section 5.03 (a) (b)
18 U.S. CodeSec. 2074. False
Weather Reports
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4-2. Allegation 2019-008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complainant Dr. Jane Lubchenco,\25\ Date Submitted: September 9, 2019
Dr. Richard Spinrad,\26\ Dr.
Andrew Rosenberg\27\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Dr. Jane Lubchenco is the
University Distinguished Professor
and Marine Studies Advisor to the
President at Oregon State
University. She previously served
as Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA
Administrator from 2009-2013.
\26\ Dr. Richard Spinrad is the
president of the Marine Technology
Society. He previously served as
the Chief Scientist of NOAA from
2014-2017 and as director for
various NOAA offices from 2003-
2010.
\27\ Dr. Andrew Rosenberg is
director of the Center for Science
and Democracy at the Union of
Concerned Scientists. He
previously served as the Deputy
Director of NOAA's National Marine
Fisheries Service from 1998-2000.
Allegation Summary: The complaint Policies Allegedly Violated: NAO
alleges that, ``recent actions to 202-735D: Scientific Integrity
censor NWS scientists put the Section 4.05: NOAA Scientists May
public safety at risk, are Freely Speak to the Media
inconsistent with NOAA's Section 7.01: Code of Ethics for
scientific integrity principles, Science Managers
violate the public trust, and
compromise the independence and
reliability of the National
Weather Service.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4-3. Allegation 2019-009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complainant: Dr. Carl Childs\28\ Date. Submitted: September 11, 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Dr. Carl Childs is a scientist
on NOAA's Scientific Support Team,
located within the Emergency
Response Division (ERD) of the
NOAA Office of Response &
Restoration. Dr. Childs is the
president of the bargaining unit
representing the scientists in
NOAA's Emergency Response Division
(IFPTE Local 8A).
Allegation Summary: The complaint Policies Allegedly Violated: NAO
alleges that, ``no attempt was 202-735D: Scientific Integrity
apparently made to contact the Sections 7 01: Code of Ethics for
NOAA staff who generated the Science Managers
original (unmodified) hurricane Section 8.01: Definitions of
forecast before the statement Scientific and Research Misconduct
release. The September 6 statement 18 U.S. Code Sec. 2074. False
was an intentional Weather Reports
misrepresentation of scientific
findings that damages the
scientific standing of the NWS and
the entire agency. It casts
unwarranted doubt on the
performance of NWS forecasters and
jeopardized public faith in NOAA
as an impartial communicator of
vital public safety information.
It is clear that the statement
from NOAA management serves only
to deflect criticism of the source
of the misleading information at
the expense of NWS employees who
safeguard the public in a manner
consistent with the best
scientific information
available.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4-4. Allegation 2019-0010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complainant: Congressman Paul Date. Submitted: September 11, 2019
Tonko\29\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Congressman Paul Tonko
represents New York's 20th
Congressional District. Tonko
serves on the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce; House
Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology; and the House
Committee on Natural Resources. He
chairs the Subcommittee on
Environment and Climate Change.
Allegation Summary: The compliant Policies Allegedly Violated: NAO
alleges that recent reports 202-735D: Scientific Integrity
published by media outlets, No specific sections mentioned.
``indicate that political Although Congressman Tonko does not
leadership responsible for explicitly mention a section, his
overseeing NOAA may have allegation does directly quote
communicated threats and applied Section 7.02: Code of Ethics for
political pressure in an effort to All Science Supervisors and
suppress the release of vital, Management of NOAA's Scientific
current forecasting information Integrity Policy.
critical to emergency
preparedness,'' and, ``an agency-
wide directive sent on September
1, 2019 restricting National
Weather Service from releasing
information that could be seen as
contradicting President Trump.''
These ``reported abuses by high
ranking political appointees in
contravention of agency convention
and best practices, appear to
violate the NOAA Administrative
Order on Scientific Integrity.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 5: Chronology of Key Events
The following is a chronology of key events that occurred leading
up to the formulation and release of the September 1 Birmingham Tweet
by the National Weather Service (NWS) Birmingham Weather Forecast
Office (WFO) and the subsequent September 6 Statement by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). All of the times in the
chronology below are in Eastern Time Zone. The events and accuracy of
the descriptions were validated using several different sources of
information including interviews conducted by the Academy Team and NOAA
General Counsel, text and e-mail communications, and other
documentation. Appendix B provides a more comprehensive overview
including the events, dates, parties involved; and supporting
documentation.
Wednesday, August 28, 2019
5:02 p.m.: Susan Buchanan (NWS Communications Director)
releases NOAA Communications media plan for Hurricane Dorian.
Thursday, August 29, 2019
Dr. Neil Jacobs (NOAA Acting Administrator) leads a briefing
on Hurricane Dorian at the White House. A NOAA graphic (the one
that later appears altered with a black marker) is used in the
briefing.
Saturday, August 31, 2019
4:00 p.m.: President Trump receives a briefing on Hurricane
Dorian via video teleconference while he is at Camp David.
Sunday, September 1, 2019
8:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.: NWS Birmingham WFO receives multiple
phone calls from the public. Two of the calls come in directly
after the President's tweet at 10:51 a.m.
10:51 a.m.: President Trump tweets that Alabama, ``will most
likely be hit (much) harder than anticipated.''
11:11 a.m.: NWS Birmingham WFO tweets that, ``Alabama will
NOT see any impacts from #Dorian.'' (``the September 1
Birmingham Tweet'').
12:31 p.m.: President Trump is briefed on Hurricane Dorian
at Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)
Headquarters. Ken Graham (Director of the National Hurricane
Center (NHC)) leads the briefing.
3:00 p.m.: Chris Vaccaro (Senior Media Relations Specialist
at NOAA) sent an e-mail to the NWS Public Affairs team
directing that all media inquiries be sent to him and Julie
Roberts (Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Communications
at NOAA).
3:06 p.m.: Julie Roberts sends an e-mail asking all NWS
offices to consult with NOAA Office of Communications before
responding to any social media inquiries.
4:49 p.m.: Andrew Stern (Manager of NWS Operations Center)
sends an e-mail to the NWS Operations Center staff to inform
a11 Regional Operation Centers (ROC) and WFOs to ``only stick
with official NHC forecasts if questions arise from some
national level social media posts this afternoon. Staff should
not provide any opinion about the national level post and
should direct any questions that cannot be satisfied to NOAA
Public Affairs.''
9:41 p.m.: Chris Darden (Meteorologist-in-Charge, NWS
Birmingham WFO) sends an e-mail out to all NWS Birmingham WFO
staff updating them on the day's events and to forward any
calls or questions to him.
Wednesday, September 4, 2019
12:57 p.m.: President Trump is briefed on Hurricane Dorian
at the Oval Office in front of the press. A NOAA graphic
appears to be altered with black marker. This becomes national
news.
2:42 p.m.: Julie Roberts e-mails George Jungbluth (NWS Chief
of Staff) and tells him that NOAA Communications is handling
``the situation'' and ``there should be no action taken by
anyone within the National Weather Service or the National
Hurricane Center.''
3:37 p.m.: NWS Operations Center sends out a media guidance
to all ROCs and National Centers asking that they do not
respond via social media or other modes to any questions
related the tweets.
4:45 p.m.: Chris Darden sends an e-mail out to all NWS
Birmingham WFO staff updating them that NOAA Headquarters
called Darden and asked all further media inquiries to be
forwarded to Chris Vaccaro at NOAA Communications.
Thursday, September 5, 2019
5:36 p.m.: Chris Vaccaro sends an e-mail asking NWS to
resend the September 4 media guidance. Vaccaro states in the e-
mail that forecasters should not communicate with media via
their personal Twitter accounts.
7:48 p.m.: George Jungbluth resends September 4 media
guidance to NWS personnel.
Approximately 7:00 p.m.: Secretary Wilbur Ross (Commerce)
calls Dr. Neil Jacobs and asks him to prepare a timeline of
events and communications surrounding Dorian.
10:53 p.m.: Dr. Neil Jacobs calls Julie Roberts and informs
Roberts of Jacobs' phone call with Secretary Ross.
Friday, September 6, 2019
2:30 a.m.: Julie Roberts receives a phone call from
Secretary Wilbur Ross' personal assistant and Mike Walsh
(Department of Commerce Chief of Staff, who had also been
delegated the duties of General Counsel).
2:30-3:48 a.m.: Julie Roberts compiles a summary document of
all events and communications that have happened surrounding
Dorian h03 h00 and sends the summary to Mike
Walsh and other Commerce and NOAA employees.
7:00 a.m.: Julie Roberts calls Dr. Neil Jacobs and fills him
in on the calls she received from the Secretary earlier that
morning.
8:30 a.m.: Julie Roberts and Dr. Neil Jacobs arrive at the
Commerce office and meet in the Deputy Secretary's conference
room.\30\ Commerce Officials who participated in all or a
portion of this meeting include: David Dewhirst (Deputy
General' Counsel), Kevin Manning (Press Secretary and Deputy
Director of Public Affairs), Deputy Secretary Karen Dunn
Kelley, Joe Semsar (Chief of Staff for Deputy Secretary Karen
Dunn Kelley), and Cordell Hull (Deputy General Counsel and also
performing the duties of Assistant Secretary for Legislative
and Intergovernmental Affairs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ According to Julie Roberts, the meeting was never officially
convened, ``it was just everyone sitting around the table working on
whatever we were working on at the time.'' Julie Kay Roberts,
``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel,
October 11, 2019: Page 91, Line 18-21; According to Dr. Neil Jacobs,
``when Julie [Roberts] and I showed up there was already a couple
drafts versions of the statement going back and forth floating
around.'' Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 105, Line 19-21.
Deputy Secretary Karen Dunn Kelley goes to h03
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
h00 a meeting. h03 h00
A statement is drafted on David Dewhirst's tablet.
10:30 a.m.: Julie Roberts goes upstairs and asks Scott
Smullen (NOAA Deputy Director of Communications) and Chris
Vaccaro to look at the statement.
Roberts, Jacobs, Vaccaro, and Smullen edit the September 6
Statement. Jacobs and Roberts work to ensure that the statement
is technically accurate. There was a debate about Birmingham.
Specifically, Jacobs, Roberts, Vaccaro, and Smullen wanted to
remove the Birmingham part of the statement but were told no by
Commerce officials.
Secretary Ross and his staff call to discuss the statement.
Jacobs and Roberts raise their concern about the Birmingham
part of the statement but are told they cannot take out the
reference to the Birmingham office.
3:00 p.m.: Dr. Neil Jacobs calls Stuart Levenbach (NOAA
Chief of Staff) and tells him about the statement.
3:11 p.m.: David Dewhirst e-mails Mike Walsh a copy of the
statement for approval.
Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m.: Dr. Neil Jacobs calls Stuart
Levenbach, Dr. Louis Uccellini (NOAA Assistant Administrator,
Director of NWS), and Taylor Jordan (NOAA Senior Policy
Advisor) to tell them about the statement before it goes out.
3:43 p.m.: David Dewhirst e-mails Julie Roberts a copy of
the statement after it has been approved by senior political
leaders at Commerce.
4:00 p.m.: Julie Roberts and Dr. Neil Jacobs reach out to
Benjamin Friedman (NOAA Deputy Under Secretary for Operations)
to let him know about the statement before it goes out.
4:40 p.m.: Dr. Louis Uccellini and other NOAA officials
speak over the phone with Chris Darden to give him a heads up
before the statement goes out.
4:45 p.m.: NOAA Communications releases September 6
Statement that says Hurricane Dorian could have impacted
Alabama and that the September 1 Birmingham Tweet was
``inconsistent with probabilities from the best forecast
products available at the time.''
4:52 p.m.: Chris Vaccaro sends out an e-mail to NOAA
personnel informing them that the statement has been
distributed and that inquiries ``should solely be directed to''
the NOAA Office of Communications line. E-mail gets forwarded
to other NOAA staff.
5:31 p.m.: NOAA Communications posts the statement on
Twitter.
6:00 p.m.: Chris Darden sends out an e-mail to the NWS
Birmingham WFO staff informing them of the statement and
commending them on the work they do to support Alabama. Darden
asks the staff to ``please be cautious about commenting
publicly'' on the statement.
8:22 p.m.: Stuart Levenbach e-mails Dr. Louis Uccellini and
tells Uccellini that he (Levenbach) was not involved in any
part of drafting the statement. To Levenbach's knowledge,
Roberts and Jacobs were the only people from NOAA involved in
writing the statement.
Saturday, September 7, 2019
2:26 a.m.: Stuart Levenbach e-mails Kevin Wheeler (NOAA
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy) with a summary of how the
statement was developed as Levenbach understood it from a call
with Dr. Jacobs.
3:11 p.m.: All hands e-mail sent out to NWS staff thanking
them for their work oil Hurricane Dorian.
Monday, September 9, 2019
Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Dr. Richard Spinrad, and Dr. Andrew
Rosenberg file an allegation of violation of NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy.
Tuesday, September, 10, 2019
Representative Paul Tonko files an allegation of violation
of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Craig McLean files an allegation of violation of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Wednesday, September 11, 2019
Dr. Carl Childs files an allegation of violation of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy.
Craig McLean provides more alleged violations of NOAA's
Scientific Integrity Policy to expand upon his allegation filed
on September 10.
Chapter 6: Findings and Recommendations
6.1 Criteria to Assess Allegations of Scientific Misconduct
Based on its review of applicable policies and rules, the Panel
identifies five criteria to guide the assessment of allegations of
scientific misconduct filed under NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Criteria One: Scientific research should be independent from political
interference. Political officials and agency employees should
not suppress or alter scientific findings and conclusions.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Barack Obama, ``Memorandum to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Subject: Scientific Integrity,'' March 9,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOAA is a scientific agency, and its ability to advance its mission
relies on the ``transparency, traceability, and scientific integrity at
all levels.'' \32\ The intent of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy
(NOAA Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity) is to
protect the independence of the agency's scientific research and
strengthen public confidence in the quality and reliability of NOAA
scientific activities. Scientists should feel that they can focus on
their research free of political concerns. For example, the policy
states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December 7,
2011: Section 4.01
Section 7.02. All individuals [NOAA employees and contractors]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
identified in Section 2.02 must not:
Suppress, alter, or otherwise impede the timely release of
scientific or technological findings or conclusions, unless
explicitly required by a Department or government-wide statute,
regulation, Executive Order, Presidential Memorandum, or other
legal authority.
Intimidate or coerce employees, contractors, recipients of
financial assistance awards, or others to alter or censor
scientific findings.
Implement institutional barriers to cooperation and the
timely communication of scientific findings or technology.
In addition, the Department of Commerce Public Communication Policy
(Department Administrative Order 219-1: Public Communications)
clarifies that the role of the Office of Communications is to provide
media expertise and assist with the communication of scientific
information.
Section 5.03. All public affairs employees shall adhere to the
following best practices:
Assist with presentation, style, and logistics of scientific
and engineering information, but not alter its substance in
anyway.
Criteria Two: Scientists have the right to communicate with media and
the public about scientific research findings based on their
official work.
NOAA has adopted policies and procedures to ensure a culture of
transparency and openness and facilitate the free flow of scientific
information. N0AA's Scientific Integrity Policy includes provisions
that provide scientists the right to speak publicly about their
scientific research:
Section 4.05. To be open and transparent about their work, and
consistent with DAO 219-1 on (Public Communications) and their
official duties, NOAA scientists may freely speak to the media
and the public about scientific and technical matters based on
their official work, including scientific and technical ideas,
approaches, findings, and conclusions based on their official
work. Additional guidance for employees is available in DAO
219-1. Communication by e-mail or other electronic means in
response to inquiries from the media, and concerning scientific
or technical matters based on an employee's official work, are
considered to be the same as oral communication and not subject
to approval, but are still subject to the restrictions on
protected non-public information set forth in DAO 219-1. Social
media communications are governed by the Department of Commerce
Policy on the Approval and Use of Social Media and Web 2.0, as
well as DAO 219-1.
Section 4.06. NOAA scientists are free to present viewpoints,
for example about policy or management matters, that extend
beyond their scientific findings to incorporate their expert or
personal opinions, but in doing so they just make clear that
they are presenting their individual opinions--not the views of
the Department of Commerce or NOAA. In such cases, NOAA
personnel may also note their NOAA affiliation as part of their
biographical information, provided that their NOAA affiliation
is noted as one of several biographical details, or, if the
information is being published in a scientific or technical
journal, their NOAA affiliation may be listed with an
appropriate disclaimer. Appropriate disclaimers for use by NOAA
scientists when expressing such opinions will be posted to the
Scientific Integrity Commons website.
Section 5.02. NOAA will:
(a) Ensure the free flow of scientific information
online and in other formats, consistent with privacy
and classification standards, and in keeping with the
Department of Commerce and NOAA data sharing and
management policies. Whenever appropriate, this
information will include data and models underlying
regulatory proposals and other policy decisions.
(d) Ensure that NOAA and Department of Commerce public
communications guidance provides procedures by which
scientists may speak to the media and the public about
scientific and technical matters based on their
official work and areas of expertise. In no
circumstances may any NOAA official ask or direct
Federal scientists or other NOAA employees to suppress
or alter scientific findings.
(k) Ensure the sharing of best administrative and
management practices that promote the integrity of
NOAA's scientific activities.
Similarly, Commerce's Public Communication Policy explicitly allows
scientists to engage with the media to discuss their scientific
research.
Section 4.01(d). In support of a culture of openness, and
consistent with this Order and their official duties,
Department employees may speak to the media and the public
about their official work and freely and openly discuss
scientific and technical ideas, approaches, findings, and
conclusions based on their official work.
Criteria Three: Scientists have the right to review and correct any
official document that cites or references their scientific
work to ensure the accuracy of the information.
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy requires that NOAA official
documents, including press releases, be reviewed by scientists who
conduct the research to ensure the integrity of its scientific process
and products:
Section 7.01. Science managers and supervisors will ensure:\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December 7,
2011: Section 2.02.
Appropriate rules and procedures are in place and
implemented to preserve the integrity of the scientific process
and the dissemination of its scientific products and
information, including providing scientists the right to review
and correct any official document (such as a press release or
report) that cites or references their scientific work, to
ensure that accuracy has been maintained after the clearance
and editing process.
Criteria Four: NOAA employees and supervisors should report suspected
cases of scientific or research misconduct.
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy requires that NOAA employees and
supervisors report suspected scientific misconduct:
Section 6.01(d). All NOAA employees and contractors should:
Immediately report any observed, suspected, or apparent
Scientific and Research Misconduct through means established in
Section 8 and the Procedural Handbook for this Order.
Section 7.05. NOAA science managers and supervisors will
immediately report suspected cases of scientific or research
misconduct through means established under Section 8 and the
Procedural Handbook for this Order.
Criteria Five: Any Official Communication intended for the media must
be submitted in a timely manner before the communication occurs
to the head of the operating unit or Secretarial office, or
their designee(s), and to the Appropriate Public Affairs Office
(as defined in Section 8.05) for approval.
Commerce's Public Communication Policy clearly lays out the
Department's approval process for Official Communication materials
intended for the media. The head of the operating unit and the Public
Affairs Office must sign off on Official Communication materials prior
to their public release.
Section 8.01. Approval. For any Official Communication intended
for the media (e.g., news releases, interviews/news
conferences), all written and audiovisual materials that are,
or are prepared or received in connection with, the Official
Communication must be submitted in a timely manner before the
communication occurs to the head of the operating unit or
Secretarial office, or their designee(s), and to the
Appropriate Public Affairs Office (as defined in Section 8.05)
for approval in a timely manner. The Appropriate Public Affairs
Office will be responsible for coordinating the finalization of
the communication with the originating offices, including
pertinent staff. Unless otherwise authorized by the Appropriate
Public Affairs Office, all Official Communications with the
media will be on-the-record (i.e., attributable to the person
making the remarks or providing information or materials).
6.2 Adjudication Standards
The Panel followed the procedures and processes provided by the
Scientific Integrity Policy's accompanying Procedural Handbook to
conduct this assessment. The Procedural Handbook identifies two
categories of potential violation of the Scientific Integrity Policy:
(i) scientific misconduct and (2) loss of scientific integrity.
Section 8.01 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy defines
scientific misconduct:
Section 8.01. Scientific and Research Misconduct is defined as
fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing,
performing, or reviewing scientific and research activities, or
in the products or reporting of these activities. Scientific
and Research Misconduct specifically includes:
intentional circumvention of the integrity of the science
and research process by violation of NOAA's Code of Ethics for
Science Supervision and Management; and
actions that compromise the scientific process by violating
NOAA's Code of Scientific Conduct.
Scientific and Research Misconduct does not include honest
error or differences of opinion.
The adjudication standards for scientific misconduct are set forth
in Section 2.01 of the Procedural Handbook. The evidence required to
support findings of scientific misconduct are:
Significant departure from accepted practices of the
relevant research community and violated the NOAA Code of
Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science Supervision
and Management set forth in NAO 202-735D;
Commit misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless
disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics
for Science Supervision and Management in NAO 202-735D;
The allegation is supported by a preponderance of evidence.
The Procedural Handbook does not include explicit criteria to
determine a loss of scientific integrity and only provides limited
guidance:
Section 2.03. Coercive manipulation, intimidation,
misrepresentation, censorship, or other misconduct that affects
the quality or reliability of scientific information may
involve the loss of scientific integrity,
Section 2.04. In the event the NOAA SIO and/or DO determines by
a preponderance of the evidence that a loss of scientific
integrity has taken place, but o misconduct is evident, the
NOAA SIO and/or DO will propose and ensure appropriate action
is taken to restore NOAA's scientific integrity.
6.3. Findings and Recommendations
Having conducted its analysis, the Panel selected three key
allegations for deliberation. The Panel notes that certain allegations
submitted for review were either subsumed by one of the three selected
or did not rise to the level of an actual violation. The table
following the copies of allegations in Appendix E provides a summary of
the rationale for selection of the allegations under review. For each,
the report provides the supporting facts, analysis, findings, and
recommendations. The attendant facts were drawn from the team's review
of prior testimonies, supplemental interviews, and a review of
documents listed in Appendix H.
In considering the allegations, the Panel recognizes that the
September 6 Statement and the September 1 Birmingham Tweet discussed
herein are inextricably linked. The September 6 Statement directly
addressed the September 1 Birmingham Tweet and the underlying science.
Second, the Panel considered both the content and process by which the
September 6 Statement was developed and released. The Panel
acknowledges the unique nature of the circumstances surrounding the
September 6 Statement, including the extensive involvement of the
media. Finally, it is the reasoned opinion of the Panel, that in the
aggregate, the evidence gathered in this inquiry is appropriate and
sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and
conclusions contained herein.
Allegation One: NOAA Media Guidance limited the ability of scientists
to communicate with the media and the public about their
research findings.
Media guidance issued by NOAA leadership between September 1 and 6,
2019, limited the ability of scientists to communicate with the media
and the public about their research findings. Policies allegedly
violated include Section 4.05, Section 4.06, Section 5.02 (a), (d), and
(k) of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy; and Section 4.01 of
Commerce's Public Communication Policy.
Conditions Observed
Between September 1 and 6, 2019, NOAA Office of Communications sent
out various e-mails to National Weather Service (NWS) leadership, the
NWS Public Affairs team, and Communications staff directing NWS offices
and staff to route any media request to NOAA Office of Communications
and not to respond to any questions via media and social media either
officially or through personal Twitter accounts. NWS issued several
media guidance communications instructing staff to stick with official
forecasts and direct media inquiries to NOAA Office of Communications.
Table 6-1 below summarizes the media instructions from NOAA
Communications and NWS.
Table 6-1 Media Guidance (September 1, 2019-September 6, 2019)
Times Shown in Eastern Time Zone (ET)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mails from NOAA September 1, 2019, 3:00 p.m. Chris Vaccaro, Senior
Communications Media Relations Specialist, sent an e-mail to the
NWS Public Affairs team and communication staff--
``all media inquiries about the President's tweet
and the Birmingham tweet should be directed to me
and Julie Roberts.''
---------------------------------------------------
September 1, 2019, 3:06 p.m. Julie Roberts, Deputy
Chief of Staff, sends an e-mail to the NWS Public
Affairs team and communication staff--``please
ask all NWS offices to consult with us before
responding to any social media inquiries.''
---------------------------------------------------
September 4, 2019, 2:42 p.m. Julie Roberts e-mails
George Jungbluth (NWS Chief of Staff)--``we are
handling the situation there should be no action
taken by anyone within the National Weather
Service or the National Hurricane Center.''
---------------------------------------------------
September 4, 2019, 2:44 p.m. Julie Roberts e-mails
George Jungbluth, Jeremy Andrucyk (NWS Director
of Communications), Mary Erickson (NWS Deputy
Director), and Dr. Louis Uccellini (NWS
Director)--``Please ask NWS Social Media not to
respond to the messages going out. Any media
inquiries to NWS should be directed to Chris to
handle.''
---------------------------------------------------
September 5, 2019, 5:36 p.m. Chris Vaccaro sends
an e-mail to George Jungbluth; Susan Buchanan
(NWS Public Affairs Officer); and Jeremy
Andrucyk, asking NSW to resend the September 4
media guidance. Vaccaro also states in the e-mail
that forecasters should not communicate with
media via their personal Twitter accounts.
---------------------------------------------------
September 6, 2019, 4:52 p.m. Chris Vaccaro sends
out an e-mail to NOAA personnel informing them
that the statement has been distributed and that
inquiries ``should solely be directed to'' the
NOAA Office of Communications line. E-mail gets
forwarded around between NOAA staff.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mails from NWS September 1, 2019, 4:49 p.m. Andrew Stern
Operations Center (Operations Center Manager, NWS) sends out an e-
mail to the NWS Operations Center to inform all
Regional Operation Centers (ROC) and Weather
Forecast Offices to ``only stick with official
NHC forecasts if questions arise from some
national level social media posts this afternoon.
Staff should not provide any opinion about the
national level post and should direct any
questions that cannot be satisfied to NOAA Public
Affairs.''
---------------------------------------------------
September 4, 2019, 9:41 p.m. NWS Operations Center
sends out a media guidance to all ROCs and
National Centers asking that they do not respond
via social media, or other, to any questions
related to the tweets.
---------------------------------------------------
September 5, 2019, 7:48 p.m. George Jungbluth sent
an e-mail asking all media questions to be
forwarded to NOAA Communications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria
The NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy and Commerce Public
Communication Policy affords scientists the right to freely communicate
their scientific opinions with the media in Section 4.05, Section 4.06,
and Section 5.02 (a), (d), and (k) of NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy and Section 4.01 of Commerce's Public Communication Policy.
Analysis
As presented above, NOAA and NWS leadership issued multiple media
instructions between September 1 and 6, 2019. Some Complainants
perceived the media guidance as restricting the ability of WFO
meteorologists to communicate with the media and the public about their
research findings.\34\ They allege that the media guidance violated
Section 4.05, Section 4.06, and Section 5.02 (a), (d), and (k) of
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy; Supporting this position, Chris
Darden noted in the interview that he felt he was not at liberty to
speak to the press--''we certainly felt pressure not to say anything.''
\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Jane Lubchenco, Richard Spinrad, and Andrew Rosenberg,
``Allegation 2019-008,'' September 9, 2019; Craig N. McLean,
``Allegation 2019-007,'' September 10, 2019.
\35\ Chris Darden; ``Interview of Chris Darden,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, October 21, 2019: Page 157, Line 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, staff from NOAA's Office of Communications explained
that the purpose of the media instructions was to shield NOAA forecast
offices and forecasters from aggressive media reporters--not to prevent
scientists from discussing their research with the media.\36\ Further,
as Hurricane Dorian was still active during this period, NOAA senior
management felt it was critical for the affected scientists to focus on
their work and avoid the press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Julie Kay Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview
by NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019; Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview
of Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team, January 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, an e-mail from Chris Vaccaro (Senior Media Relations
Specialist, NOAA Office of Communications) to NWS leadership instructed
forecasters not to engage with the media on their personal Twitter
accounts,'' In light of today's additional tweets, can this message be
resent as a reminder? Additionally, I hear that reporters may be
contacting forecasters on their personal Twitter accounts and they
should not engage.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Julie Kay Robert, ``Interview of Julie Kay Roberts,''
interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019: Exhibit 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In separate interviews, Roberts and Vaccaro from NOAA's Office of
Communications explained that, similar to prior media instructions,
Vaccaro's e-mail was not intended to limit scientists' ability to
communicate their views on their personal social media accounts but
rather to protect NOAA employees from the social media from surrounding
the September 1 Birmingham Tweet.
In addition, several NOAA officials stated in their interviews that
it is the agency's standard operating procedure to issue this type of
media guidance in controversial situations or if there is a high level
of media inquiries.\38\ Moreover, the officials stated that it is the
responsibility of NOAA's Office of Communications to develop a
coordinated, agency-wide communication strategy in such circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 158, Lines 13-14.; Julie Kay
Roberts; ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General
Counsel, October 11, 2019: Page 46, Line 11; Louis Uccellini,
``Interview of Louis Uccellini,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel,
November 26, 2019: Page 41-43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While NOAA and NWS Communication officials maintain that issuing
media guidance is standard operating procedure, the agency does not
have formal processes in place, and it is not clear who has the final
authority to review and approve media guidance. As Vaccaro noted, the
decision to issue media guidance is typically made in consultation with
the leaders within the Office of Communications and the impacted line
office/operating branch.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview of Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by
Academy Team, January 17, 2020: Page 31, Lines 19-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings
The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on record
that the allegation that the media guidance issued by NOAA leadership
between September 1 and 6, 2019, did not constitute scientific
misconduct or a loss of scientific integrity.
The Panel recognizes that a key component of the Scientific
Integrity Policy is to ensure the free flow of scientific information
and for scientists to communicate with the media and the public about
their research findings. Conversely, in times of an emergency, it is
important to develop a coordinated, effective communication approach
with the press and public at large.
Recommendations
The Panel proposes the following recommendations for the
Determining Officer to consider to safeguard against future violations
of scientific integrity:
Develop formal policy guidelines for the issuance of media
guidance to NOAA staff. Specifically, these guidelines should
clarify roles and responsibilities, institutionalize the
process, and identify the circumstances under which the agency
should issue media guidance.
Develop an interagency framework (that includes other
Federal agencies and the White House) for the sharing of
scientific data and materials concerning severe weather related
events. The framework would include protocols for the timely
update of information to reflect changing weather conditions
and the release of the information to the general public.
Allegation Two: Contrary to the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy,
forecasters in the Birmingham office were not permitted to
review the draft September 6 Statement prior to its release.
NWS Birmingham WFO forecasters were not provided the opportunity to
review and opine on the September 6 Statement that referenced the
September 1 Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific activity. The
policy allegedly violated is Section 7.01 of NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy.
Conditions Observed
As discussed below in Allegation 3, senior Commerce officials
largely directed the drafting of the September 6 Statement. In
addition, two senior NOAA political appointees were involved in the
development of September 6 Statement: Dr. Neil Jacobs (NOAA Acting
Administrator) and Julie Roberts (Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of
Communications). Two NOAA senior career officials, Chris Vaccaro
(Senior Communication Specialist) and Scott Smullen (Deputy Director of
Communications), reviewed an early draft of the statement and offered
their comments. However, they left the meeting before the statement was
finalized,\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Julie Kay Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview
by NOM General Counsel, October 11, 2019: Page 98, Line 1-17; Chris
Vaccaro, ``Interview of Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team,
January 17, 2020: Page 58-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly before the release of the statement, Jacobs and Roberts
contacted other NOAA officials, including Benjamin Friedman (NOAA
Deputy Under Secretary for Operations), Dr. Louis Uccellini, Stuart
Levenbach (NOAA Chief of Staff), and Taylor Jordan (Senior Policy
Advisor) to inform them of the statement. These officials were not
provided the opportunity to provide substantive input in the drafting
of the draft statement.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 160, Line 12-15; Julie Kay
Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General
Counsel, October 11, 2019: Page 109, Line 4-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Louis Uccellini and several other NWS officials contacted Chris
Darden (Meteorologist-in-Charge, NWS Birmingham Office) to advise him
that the statement would be released. However, according to Darden, by
the time he actually read the statement, it had already been
released.\42\ As such, the forecasters in the Birmingham office were
not afforded an opportunity to review the September 6 Statement before
it went out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Chris Darden, ``Interview of Chris Darden,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, October 21, 2019: Page 162, Line 21-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria
The NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy provides scientists the right
to review and correct any official document that cites or references
their scientific work to ensure the accuracy of the information.
Section 7.01 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy states:
Appropriate rules and procedures are in place and implemented
to preserve the integrity of the scientific process and the
dissemination of its scientific products and information,
including providing scientists the right to review and correct
any official document (such as a press release or report) that
cites or references their scientific work, to ensure that
accuracy has been maintained after the clearance and editing
process.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December 7,
2011: Section 7.01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis
NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy defines a ``scientific product''
as the ``presentation of the results of scientific activities including
the analysis, synthesis, compilation, or translation of scientific
information and data into formats for the use of NOAA, the Department
of Commerce, or the Nation.'' \44\ According to this definition, the
September 1 Birmingham Tweet is a scientific product, as it reflects
the forecasters' professional judgment and is based on the results of
the forecasters' scientific activities. Further, as discussed above,
Section 7.01 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy provides scientists
the right to review and correct any official document that cites or
references their scientific work to ensure the accuracy of the
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ NOAA, Section 3, Definition of Scientific Product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the September 6 Statement references and criticizes the
September 1 Birmingham Tweet, a draft of the statement should have been
provided to the Birmingham office for review and comment prior to its
release.
In contrast with this requirement, the Birmingham office was not
afforded the opportunity to review the draft September 6 Statement. By
the time Jacobs and Roberts communicated with other NOAA and NWS senior
officials and Uccellini had been in contact with Darden, the draft
statement was already in its finished form. According to Uccellini, the
purpose of the phone call with Chris Darden was not to solicit his
feedback, but rather to give him notice that the statement would be
released shortly.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Louis Uccellini, ``Interview of Louis Uccellini,'' interview
by NOAA General Counsel, November 26, 2019: Page 108, Line 3-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certain interviewees explained that while the September 6 Statement
was released by NOAA Communications, it was not a true NOAA Official
Communication as the drafting of the statement did not follow NOAA's
standard press release development process and protocols.\46\ Further,
senior Commerce officials took the lead in the development and release
of the statement. Roberts stated in her first interview that, under the
circumstances, there was no practical opportunity to engage the
Birmingham office in the development of the statement and Roberts felt
that even if she had raised the issue with Commerce officials, it would
not have made any difference.\47\ Jacobs also stated in his interview
that ``feedback probably wasn't going to make a whole lot of
difference.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by
NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019; Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview of
Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team, January 17, 2020.
\47\ Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by
NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019.
\48\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 162, Line 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The September 6 Statement was issued as a NOAA Official
Communication and distributed through NOAA's system and as a result,
NOAA's relevant polices and procedural requirements are applicable.
According to Section 8.01 of Commerce's Public Communication Policy,
the head of the operating unit and the Public Affairs office have the
authority to approve and issue Official Communication materials and
therefore are responsible for ensuring compliance with NOAA's
procedural requirements.
The Panel recognizes that the September 6 Statement is different
from a normal NOAA press release but nonetheless concludes that it is
an Official Communication. Consequently, as the NOAA Acting
Administrator and the Director of NOAA Communications,\49\ Jacobs and
Roberts had a responsibility to ensure that NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy and other procedural requirements were followed. This did not
happen during the meeting with Commerce officials or at other critical
points on September 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ NOAA does not have an Office of Public Affairs. NOAA
Communications serves as the agency's Office of Public Affairs. Julie
Roberts' title was Deputy Chief of Staff, but she also served as the
Director of Communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Jacobs stated in his interview with NOAA General
Counsel that his interpretation of the Scientific Integrity Policy is
that a NOAA press release should be reviewed by scientists, but not
necessarily he scientist who was involved in the original research.
Jacobs said he reviewed the draft statement and that in his opinion as
a trained scientist, the September 6 Statement was technically
accurate.\50\ However, section 7.01 of the Scientific Integrity Policy
requires that the scientists who actually produced the scientific work
have the opportunity to offer comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 162.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, Section 7.01 of the Scientific Integrity Policy requires
that NOAA science managers and supervisors ensure appropriate rules and
procedures are in place to provide scientists the opportunity to review
and comment on the agency's official documents. Some interviewees
stated that NOAA scientists are normally involved in the development of
the agency's communication materials.\51\ However, the Panel learned
that NOAA lacks formal procedures to ensure compliance with Section
7.01 of the Scientific Integrity Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by
NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019; Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview of
Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team, January 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings
The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on the
record that Dr. Nell Jacobs and Julie Roberts violated the Code of
Ethics for Science Supervision and Management, set forth in Section
7.01 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy, when they failed to engage
the Birmingham office in the development of the September 6 Statement.
Further, the Panel finds that they engaged in the misconduct
intentionally, knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the Code of
Scientific Conduct or Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and
Management in NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Recommendations
The Panel proposes the following recommendations for the
Determining Officer to consider to safeguard against future violations
of scientific integrity:
Develop a written policy statement on the right of NOAA
scientists to review, comment, and amend any Official
Communication that relies on their scientific analysis. This
statement will complement NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Revise NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy's accompanying
Procedural Handbook to include criteria and supporting examples
to assist with the determination of scientific misconduct and a
loss of scientific integrity. For example, NOAA could cite this
case as an example of a violation of NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy and scientific misconduct with regards to
several criteria.
Allegation Three: The drafting and release of the September 6 Statement
was driven by external political pressure.
The drafting and release of the September 6 Statement was driven by
external political pressure from Commerce senior leaders. Further, the
September 6 Statement inappropriately criticized Birmingham's September
1 Tweet and underlying scientific activity and compromised NOAA's
reputation as an independent scientific agency. These actions violated
Section 7.02 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy.
Conditions Observed
The drafting and release of the September 6 Statement did not
follow standard NOAA policies and procedures. Although NOAA policies
call for NOAA scientists and Communications officials to work
collaboratively on an Official Communication, senior Commerce officials
largely directed the drafting of the September 6 Statement.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 104, Lines 17-22; Julie
Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by Academy Team,
January 23, 2020: Page 36, Lines 10-12; Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview of
Chris Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team, January 17, 2020: Page 76,
Lines 12-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the morning of September 6, senior Commerce officials convened a
meeting to develop the public statement. The meeting took place in a
conference room of the Commerce office building. Commerce officials
(and their titles at the time of the events in question) who
participated in all or a portion of this meeting include:
David Dewhirst, Deputy General Counsel;
Kevin Manning, Press Secretary and Deputy Director of Public
Affairs;
Joe Semsar, Chief of Staff for Deputy Secretary Karen Dunn
Kelley;
Deputy Secretary Karen Dunn Kelley; and
Cordell Hull, Deputy General Counsel and also performing the
duties of Assistant Secretary for Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs.
Four NOAA officials, including Dr. Neil Jacobs, Julie Roberts,
Chris Vaccaro, and Scott Smullen, were involved in the preparation of
the September 6 Statement, Vaccaro and Smullen reviewed an early draft
version of the statement and offered comments but did not participate
in other parts of the discussion.
Jacobs and Roberts joined the meeting around 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time
Zone. At that point, the draft statement had already been drafted on
Dewhirst's tablet and was subsequently read to everyone in the room.
Jacobs and Roberts said in their interviews that they participated in
the discussion on the technical aspect of the statement to ensure it
was scientifically accurate.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 122; Julie Roberts, ``Interview
of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 11,
2019: Page 99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to several interviews,\54\ there was a discussion about
the draft statement's criticism of the Birmingham WFO. NOAA officials
(Jacobs, Roberts, Vaccaro, and Smullen) proposed to remove the
reference to the Birmingham office from the statement, but this
suggestion was rejected by Commerce officials. At some point, other
Commerce officials joined the discussion by phone.\55\ Jacobs and
Roberts raised the concern about the Birmingham reference again, but
were told that the Birmingham reference needed to stay in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 106, Line 7; Julie Roberts,
``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel,
October 11, 2019: Page 98, Line 10; Chris Vaccaro, ``Interview of Chris
Vaccaro,'' interview by Academy Team, January 17, 2020: Page 46, Lines
10-15.
\55\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019; Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie
Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dewhirst sent the draft statement to Mike Walsh at 3:11 p.m.
Eastern Time Zone and forwarded the statement to Julie Roberts at 3:43
p.m. Eastern Time Zone.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 180; Julie Roberts, ``Interview
of Julie Roberts,'' interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 11,
2019: Page 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roberts, Smullen, and Vaccaro discussed how to release the
statement.\57\ Roberts noted that there was a request from Commerce to
not only distribute the statement through the NOAA media distribution
system, Meltwater, but also post it on NOAA website.\58\ NOAA
Communications released the statement at 4:52 p.m. Eastern Time Zone:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by
NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019: Page 104, Lines 12-19.
\58\ Roberts, Page 111, Lines 7-11.
From Wednesday, August 28, through Monday, September 2, the
information provided by NOAA and the National Hurricane Center
to President Trump and the wider public demonstrated that
tropical-storm-force winds from Hurricane Dorian could impact
Alabama. This is clearly demonstrated in Hurricane Advisories
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#15 through #41, which can be viewed at the following link.
The Birmingham National Weather Service's Sunday morning tweet
spoke in absolute terms that were inconsistent with
probabilities from the best forecast products available at the
time.
NOAA Communications posted the statement to the agency's website
and through Twitter.
The second paragraph of the above statement is widely viewed by
NOAA officials and scientific staff as a criticism of the September 1
Birmingham Tweet and underlying scientific activity. For example, Dr.
Louis Uccellini stated that the September 6 Statement criticizes the
Birmingham office publicly when forecasters had done their job
according to all scientific and operational standards.\59\ Chris
Darden, Meteorologist-in-Charge, Birmingham office, said that the
impact of the September 6 Statement on his staff was harsh--``when they
feel like they're basically being told they don't know how to do their
job or they can't do a job, and that's how they perceive this, then it
was a real kick in the gut.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Louis Uccellini, ``Interview of Louis Uccellini,'' interview
by NOAA General Counsel, November 26, 2019: Page 108-109.
\60\ Chris Darden, ``Interview of Chris Darden,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, October 21, 2019: Page 166, Lines 19-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria
The principal intent of the Scientific Integrity Policy is to
remove politics from, scientific research and prevent the intentional
or unintentional suppression of scientific findings and conclusions:
Section 7.02 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy states:
All individuals identified in Section 2.02 of this Order must
not:
Suppress, alter, or otherwise impede the timely release of
scientific or technological findings or conclusions, unless
explicitly required by a Department or government-wide statute,
regulation, Executive Order, Presidential Memorandum, or other
legal authority.
Intimidate or coerce employees contractors, recipients of
financial assistance awards, or others to alter or censor
scientific findings.
Implement institutional barriers to cooperation and the
timely communication of scientific findings or technology.
Further, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Memo
enquires that agencies develop policies to:
Ensure a culture of scientific integrity. Scientific progress
depends upon honest investigation, open discussion, refined
understanding, and a firm commitment to evidence. Science, and
public trust in science, thrives in an environment that shields
scientific data and analyses from inappropriate political
influence; political officials should not suppress or alter
scientific or technological findings.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ John P. Holden, ``Memorandum to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Subject: Scientific Integrity,'' December 17,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis
Section 7.02 of the NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy prohibits
NOAA employees, including political officials, from suppressing or
altering scientific findings. As discussed below, the development and
release of the September 6 Statement violated NOM's scientific
integrity and reputation as an independent scientific agency in several
respects.
First, the development and release of the September 6 Statement did
not follow NOAA's normal process and appear to be the result of strong
external pressure. Second, the criticism of the Birmingham office in
the September 6 Statement is not consistent with the intent and
requirements of the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy. This could result
in a chilling effect on other NOAA staff who might be reluctant to
share their scientific opinions in the future to avoid similar
criticism.
The development of the September 6 Statement did not follow NOAA's
normal process.
Under normal conditions, a weather-related statement would be
drafted by NWS. The head of NWS and his/her senior staff would be
involved in reviewing the statement. If there were a contentious issue,
all of the discussions would take place at the line office level first.
NWS would then send the draft statement to NOAA Communications and NOAA
leadership for review.\62\ In this case, four NOAA officials reviewed
the draft September 6 Statement and offered comments before its
release, but none of the NOAA/NWS senior career officials or
forecasters played a meaningful role in the development of the
September 6 Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Craig McLean, ``Interview of Craig McLean,'' interview by
Academy Team, January 23, 2020: Page 16; Julie Kay Roberts, ``Interview
of Julie Roberts,'' interview by Academy Team, January 23, 2020: Page
22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The September 6 Statement appears to be the result of strong external
pressure.
The direction to develop and release the September 6 Statement came
from Commerce officials. Jacobs said in his first interview that ``I
think Dewhirst and other DOC folks had probably also spoken to him
[Walsh] earlier in the morning . . . it was pretty clear that, you
know, they were given instructions to not just fix the problems, but do
it with some type of statement.'' \63\ During the meeting on September
6, Commerce officials took the lead in developing the statement. The
draft statement was reviewed and approved by Commerce officials before
its release. The September 6 Statement was issued as a NOAA public
statement and attributed to a NOAA spokesperson. As Jacobs said, NOAA
officials thought it was not a good idea to put out this statement, and
``no one wanted to own it for obvious reasons.'' \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 104, Lines 17-22.
\64\ Jacobs, Page 124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacobs said that, during the process, no one told him directly,
``do this or you will get fired.'' \65\ However, as Jacobs noted in the
interview, given ``the amount of panic and concern, and getting called
at 3 in the morning, it was pretty well implied that this was something
that was a fireable offense if you disobeyed;'' \66\ Indeed, Jacobs'
perception was that all the political staff at the meeting thought
their jobs were in jeopardy.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Jacobs, Page 100.
\66\ Jacobs, Page 100-101.
\67\ Jacobs, Page 168, Lines 4-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several NOAA officials, such as Benjamin Friedman and Craig McLean,
mentioned that they talked to Jacobs subsequent to the release of the
September 6 Statement, and Jacobs sounded very depressed and appeared
to be under great stress.\68\ Roberts spoke with Mike Walsh, Commerce
Chief of Staff, on the phone on September 6 around 2:30 a.m. Walsh told
Roberts, ``There are jobs on the line. It could be the forecast office
or it could be somebody higher than that and that's less palatable to
me.'' \69\ Roberts said she did not think her job was on the line and
felt that the forecasters in the Birmingham office or Dr. Neil Jacobs
could lose their jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Friedman, Benjamin, ``Interview of Benjamin Friedman,''
interview by NOAA General Counsel, October 24, 2019: Page 58; Craig
McLean, ``Interview of Craig McLean,'' interview by Academy Team,
January 23, 2020: Page 61.
\69\ Julie Roberts, ``Interview of Julie Roberts,'' interview by
NOAA General Counsel, October 11, 2019: Page 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The criticism of the Birmingham office in the September 6 Statement is
not consistent with the intent and requirements of the NOAA
Scientific Integrity Policy.
The September 6 Statement's criticism of the September 1 Birmingham
Tweet's use of absolute terms was inappropriate and inconsistent with
the NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy for several reasons. First, the
use of absolute terms in communicating weather-related risks to the
general public is commonly used by meteorologists across the country. A
review of various WFOs' tweets show that it is common to incorporate
absolute terms in messages to the public. Appendix G shows examples of
these messages.
Second, the use of absolute terms is viewed as an effective tool to
communicate weather related risk--or the lack thereof--on social media.
As NOAA meteorologists posit, a key challenge for forecasters during a
severe weather event is to convert the public's perception of safety
(optimism bias) to a perception of risk and to induce them to take
appropriate measures.\70\ Conversely, a scientifically accurate weather
forecast using risk probabilities and scenario analysis may not be very
useful to the general public who do not understand probabilities,\71\
Indeed, a 2016 study on how forecast and warning messages are perceived
by the general public highlights the importance of separating the
technical details from the actions that must be taken to protect as
individual citizens are not concerned about hurricanes in a scientific
sense.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Weather Service Office of the Chief Learning Officer. ``Radar &
Applications Course, Storm-Based Warning Fundamentals, Lesson 12:
Impact Based Warnings: Overview,'' 2017.
\71\ World Meteorological Organization, ``Guidelines on
Communicating Forecast Uncertainty,'' WMO/TD No. 1422, 2008.
\72\ Julie L. Demuth et al., ``Creation and Communication of
Hurricane Risk Information,'' Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society 93, no. 8 (2012): 1133-1145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Weather Service states that its primary mission is to
protect lives and property through the timely issuance of watches and
warnings when there are hazardous weather conditions.\73\ Accordingly,
the purpose of the September 1 Birmingham Tweet was to communicate the
risks related to the hurricane to the public so the message should be
phrased in ways that allow the general public to quickly understand
it.\74\ An analysis of public hurricane evacuation decisions and
responses to forecast and warning messages conducted by scientists from
the National Center for Atmospheric Research in 2016 also found that
when issuing safety messages, NWS uses strong, personalized language in
order to get people to follow the instructions of the message,\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Weather Service, ``2019-2022 Strategic Plan,'' 2018.
\74\ Chris Darden, ``Interview of Chris Darden,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel October 21, 2019: Page 144-145.
\75\ Rebecca E. Morss et al., ``Understanding public hurricane
evacuation decisions and responses to forecast and warning messages,''
Weather and Forecasting 31, no. 2 (2016): 395-417.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a prior interview, Dr. Neil Jacobs commented that NWS is still
in the learning stage and has engaged social scientists to figure out
the most effective approach to communicating risk probability to the
general public.\76\ Supporting the benefit of engaging social
scientists to assist with risk communication, the American
Meteorological Society (AMS) posits that there is a ``clear and
compelling need to enhance the utility of weather and climate research
and the dissemination of atmospheric information using knowledge from
the social sciences about how individuals and society interact with
weather and climate.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 129, Line 10.
\77\ American Meteorological Society, ``Strengthening Social
Sciences in Weather--Climate Enterprise: Professional Guidance
Statement,'' February 2, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, if a forecast office were to issue an inappropriate or
inaccurate forecast, it would not be the agency's typical correction
process to issue a public statement. Jacobs stated that when the
wording of a forecast is not appropriate, NWS leaders or someone from
the regional headquarters will send out an e-mail to forecasters.\78\
McLean said that a forecast office will immediately issue a correction
if there is an inaccurate forecast or a local misunderstanding. NOAA
and NWS would not issue an agency-level public statement to correct an
inappropriate weather forecast and criticize a forecast office.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Neil Jacobs, ``Interview of Neil Jacobs,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, November 6, 2019: Page 114, Lines 21-22; Page 115,
Lines 1-3; Page 129, Lines 21-22.
\79\ Jacobs, Page 115, Lines 5-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally; the criticism of the Birmingham office could potentially
have a chilling effect on other NOAA staff who might be reluctant to
share their scientific opinions in the future to avoid similar
criticism. Several NOAA officials expressed their concerns about the
possible chilling effects of the September 6 Statement. For example,
Darden said that scientists in other forecast offices felt ``there is a
little bit of a fear of `this could happen to us' kind of thing.'' \80\
McLean said that NOAA is a resilient agency, but many people worry that
this kind of issue might happen again.\81\ Several NOAA officials
reported that they received hate e-mails from the public that included
threatening language.\82\ McLean noted, the September 6 Statement
``stirred a lot of people and stirred a lot of emotion.'' \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Chris Darden, ``Interview of Chris Darden,'' interview by NOAA
General Counsel, October 21, 2019: Page 168, Line 5.
\81\ Craig McLean, ``Interview of Craig McLean,'' interview by
Academy Team, January 23, 2020: Page 106, Lines 2-13.
\82\ Craig McLean, ``Interview of Craig McLean,'' interview by
Academy Team January 23, 2020: Page 92, Lines 1-6. Page 92, Lines 1-6.
\83\ McLean, Page 92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings
The Panel determined by a preponderance of the evidence on the
record that the actions of Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie Roberts involving
the development and issuance of the September 6 Statement violated the
Code of Ethics for Science Supervision and Management set forth in
Section 7 of NOAA's Scientific Integrity Policy. Further, the Panel
finds that they engaged in the misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or
in reckless disregard of the Code of Scientific Conduct or Code of
Ethics for Science Supervision and Management in NOAA's Scientific
Integrity Policy.
The Panel concludes that the development and issuance of the
September 6 Statement is not consistent with the intent and
requirements of NOAA Scientific Integrity Policy.\84\ The September 6
Statement is viewed by many NOAA/NWS scientists as an inappropriate
criticism of the Birmingham office, and the development of the
statement was not based on science but appears to be largely driven by
external influences from senior Commerce officials who drafted. the
September 6 Statement. As a result, while there was no direct
suppression or alteration of scientific findings, the September 6
Statement might suppress the willingness and ability of NOAA scientific
staff to express their scientific opinions without reservation in the
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ``NOAA
Administrative Order 202-735D: Scientific Integrity,'' December 7,
2011: Section 7.02.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Commerce Public Communication Policy, the head of
the operating unit and the public affairs office have the ultimate
responsibility to approve and issue press releases. For the purpose of
this analysis, the September 6 Statement was issued as an official NOAA
statement, and as the head of the agency and the Director of
Communications, Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie Roberts should take
responsibility for the September 6 Statement.
While Jacobs and Roberts violated NOAA's Scientific Integrity
Policy, there is a contextual factor for the Determining Official to
consider. NOAA officials--Dr. Neil Jacobs and Julie Roberts--followed
the direction from Commerce officials to issue the September 6
Statement. While they expressed their objections to criticizing the
Birmingham WFO in the statement, they were overridden by Commerce
officials. While it was Jacobs' and Roberts' choice to issue the
September 6 Statement as the pertinent leaders of the agency, they
purported to believe that it was out of their hands. It is important
for the Determining Official to take into account the circumstances
under which the September 6 Statement was developed and released when
making final determinations.
Recommendations
The Panel proposes the following recommendations for the
Determining Officer to consider to safeguard against future violations
of scientific integrity:
Establish a formal intra-agency agreement to guide the
interactions between Commerce and NOAA officials in the
drafting of NOAA communications.
Establish an intra-agency policy to articulate the role of
Commerce political appointees in the communication of
scientific findings. Develop supporting procedures and identify
examples of political interference.
Incorporate key principles of scientific integrity,
including NOAA's Codes of Ethics for Science Supervision and
Management, in the agency's annual ethics training.
Require NOAA staff and NOAA political officials to take
scientific integrity training that includes the Code of Ethics
for Science Supervision and Management. Once a staff member has
completed the training, he/she will sign a statement confirming
they will abide by these principles.
Establish protocols with the Commerce OIG and/or other
agencies to investigate alleged violations of scientific
integrity involving senior NOAA and Commerce political
leadership.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ In some Federal agencies, such the Department of the Interior
(DOI), the Scientific Integrity Officer has an informal agreement with
the DOI OIG that the OIG would handle a case that involves a senior
official in DOI or one of the bureaus. The Academy Team's interview
with GAO suggests that a formal agreement between an agency and its OIG
to address scientific integrity issues would be helpful. Some agencies,
such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have contingencies
built into their policies to handle the allegations that involve high
level political officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concluding Thoughts
Scientific integrity is the cornerstone of the public's trust in
the Nation's scientific institutions, which the Nation relies on for
accurate and honest scientific and technical information. In the ever-
changing dynamic of social media, people frequently turn to social
media platforms for life-saving information, especially in the event of
a severe weather event. The advent of social media and its ubiquity
create an immediate interactive context for all actions taken by
government that affect the public.
In this dynamic environment, public officials must gauge the
potential effects of actions and communications, including on social
media, on the public's perception and behavior. It was the concern for
public perception and public safety that motivated the September 1
Birmingham Tweet. Public servants on the frontline of communicating the
risks of storms must be able to continue to act quickly and responsibly
when warranted by the situation at hand. Future policy guidance must
reflect this dynamic and the need for local officials to act quickly
and responsibly when the need arises. Moving ahead, there needs to be a
directed effort to inform policy development through the use of the
social sciences so that public servants and government officials can
effectively convey the risk to the public so they can act accordingly.
______
Appendices
Appendix A: Panel Biographies and Study Team Members
Panel of Academy Fellows
Admiral (Ret.) Thad Allen, Panel Chair. 23rd Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard; James S. Tyler Chair, Institute for Leadership, U.S. Coast Guard
Academy; Member and Board Director, Council on Foreign Relations;
Chair, Space Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board
(NASA); Member, Homeland Security Advisory Committee; Senior Executive
Advisor at Booz Allen Hamilton, HudsonAnalytix and Fortinet; Former
Board Director, Partnership for Public Service. Former Senior Fellow,
RAND Corporation; Principal Federal Official in the responses to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005); National Incident Commander,
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2010).
Dr. Kaye Husbands Fealing. Full Professor and Chair, School of
Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology; Senior Study Director,
Center for National Statistics, National Academy of Sciences;
Professor, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota;
Program Director, Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences, National
Science Foundation; William Brough Professor (also tenured full,
associate, assistant professor), Economics Department, Williams
College.
Dr. Shantanu Agrawal. President and CEO, National Quality Forum.
Former Deputy Administrator and Center Director, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services; Managing Director, Clinical Analytics and
Efficiency, ChenMedical, LLC; Former Positions with Center for Program
Integrity (CPI), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Director,
Data Sharing and Partnership, Chief Medical Officer; Former Positions
with McKinsey & Company, Inc.: Engagement Manager, Senior Associate,
Associate.
Dr. Elizabeth Robinson. Chief Financial Officer, Air Line Pilots
Association. Former Chief Financial Officer, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration; Assistant Director for Budget, Budget Review
Division, U.S. Office of Management and Budget; Deputy Director,
Congressional Budget Office; Deputy Assistant Director for Budget
Review and Concepts, and Program Examiner for Energy Issues, U.S.
Office of Management and Budget; Staff Member, House Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives; Project
Director and Expert, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress;
Congressional Science Fellow, Geological Society of America; Assistant
Professor of Geophysics, Stanford University.
Study Team
Brenna Isman, Director of Academy Studies
Mark Thorum, Project Director
Chloe Yang, Senior Research Analyst
mise Johnson, Research Associate
Gillian Townsend, Research Associate
Appendix B: Chronology of Key Events
All times are in Eastern Time Zone.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHO WAS WHERE IS IT
DATE EVENT INVOLVED REFERENCED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, Susan Buchanan Susan Copies of Dr.
August 28, 2019, (NWS Director) Buchanan Louis
5:02 p.m. releases NOAA Maureen Uccellini's e-
Communications O'Leary mails relevant
media plan for Lauren to the
Hurricane Gaches investigation
Dorian Jasmine were provided
Blackwell to the Academy
Dennis by NOAA. This e-
Feltgen mail is page 60
Jeremy of that
Andrucyk document.
NWS
Executive
Council
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thursday, Dr. Neil Jacobs Dr. Dr. Neil Jacobs'
August 29, 2019 leads a Neil Jacobs interview with
briefing on Preside NOAA General
Hurricane nt Trump Counsel: Page
Dorian at the Vice 11, Line 2.
White House. A President Pence Julie Roberts'
NOAA graphic Admiral interview with
(the one that Pete Brown NOAA General
later appears Pete Counsel: Page
altered with a Gaynor 24, Line 19.
black marker) Julie The official
is used in the Roberts (not in White House
briefing. the Oval Office press release
for tbe and photos from
briefing) the briefing
can be found
online.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saturday, The President Dr. Dr. Neil Jacobs'
August 31, 2019, receives a Neil Jacobs interview with
4:00 p.m. briefing on Julie NOAA General
Hurricane Roberts, Counsel: Page
Dorian via Secreta 13, Line 7.
video ry McAleenan Julie Roberts'
teleconference Pete interview with
while he is at Gaynor NOAA General
Camp David. Other Counsel: Page
FEMA leadership 31, Line 6.
Gov.
DeSantis (FL)
Gov.
Kemp (GA)
Gov.
Cooper (NC)
Gov.
McMaster (SC)
Preside
nt Trump
Jeff
Bayard
Dan
Kaniewski
Members
of National
Security
Council
Senator
Rick Scott
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, National Weather Birming Phone log of the
September 1, 2019, Service ham Weather Birmingham
8:00 a.m.-11:00 Birmingham Forecast Office Weather
a.m. Weather Forecast Office
Forecast Office was provided to
(WFO) receives the Academy
multiple phone Team by NOAA.
calls from the
public. Two of
the calls are
directly after
the President's
tweet.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, President Trump Preside Tweet is on the
September 1, 2019, tweets that nt Trump President's
10:51 a.m. Alabama, ``will personal
most likely be Twitter account
hit (much) (@realDonaldTru
harder than mp).
anticipated.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, National Weather Birming Tweet is on NWS
September 1, 2019, Service ham Weather Birmingham
11:11 a.m. Birmingham WFO Forecast WFO's Twitter
tweets that ,Office account.
``Alabama will
NOT see any
impacts from
#Dorian.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, The President is Ken Dr. Neil Jacobs'
September 1, 2019, briefed on Graham (over interview with
12:31 p.m. Hurricane VTC) NOAA General
Dorian at FEMA Members Counsel: Page
Headquarters. of the Press 16, Line 1;
Ken Graham from Dr. Page 25, Line
the Hurricane Neil Jacobs 17.
Center leads Julie Julie Roberts'
the briefing. Roberts interview with
Preside NOAA General
nt Trump Counsel: Page
Gov. 36, Line 2.
DeSantis (FL) The briefing was
Gov. also open to
Kemp (GA) the press.
Gov.
Cooper (NC)
Gov.
McMaster (SC)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, Chris Vaccaro Julie Vaccaro's e-mail
September 1, 2019, sent an e-mail Roberts is Exhibit 9 of
3:00 p.m. to the Weather Chris Julie Roberts'
Service Public Vaccaro interview with
Affairs team-- NWS NOAA General
all media Public Affairs Counsel.
inquiries about Dennis
the President's Feltgen
tweet and the David
Birmingham Miller
tweet should be Jeremy
directed to Andrucyk
Julie Roberts Corey
and Vaccaro. Pieper
Scott
Smullen
Kate
Brogan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, Julie Roberts Julie Copies of Julie
September 1, 2019, sends e-mails Roberts Roberts' e-
3:06 p.m. asking all NWS Chris mails relevant
offices to Vaccaro to the
consult with NWS investigation
NOAA Office of Public Affairs were provided
Communications Dennis to the Academy
before Feltgen Team by NOAA.
responding to David This e-mail is
any social Miller page 190 of
media Jeremy that document.
inquiries. Andrucyk
Corey
Pieper
Scott
Smullen
Kate
Brogan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, Andrew Stern Andrew The e-mail is
September 1, 2019, (Operations Stern page 1 of
4:49 p.m. Center Manager, Nationa Exhibit 5 of
NWS) sends out l Weather Julie Roberts'
an e-mail to Service interview with
the National Operations NOAA General
Weather Service Center Counsel.
Operations John
Center to Murphy
inform all Mary
Regional Erickson
Operation Susan
Centers (ROC) Buchanan
and Weather Lauren
Forecast Gaches
Offices to
``only stick
with official
NHC forecasts
if questions
arise from some
national level
social media
posts this
afternoon.
Staff should
not provide any
opinion about
the national
level post and
should direct
any questions
that cannot be
satisfied to
NOAA Public
Affairs.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, Chris Darden Chris Copies of Chris
September 1, 2019, sends an e-mail Darden Darden's e-
9:41 p.m. out to all NWS NWS mails relevant
Birmingham WFO Birmingham WFO to the
staff updating Staff investigation
them on the Mike were provided
day's events Coyne to the Academy
and to forward Jose Team by NOAA.
any calls or Garcia This e-mail is
questions to Susan page 63 of the
forward them to Buchanan document.
him.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, The President is Preside The briefing was
September 4, 2019, briefed on nt Trump covered by the
12:57 p.m. Hurricane Kevin press and
Dorian at the McAleenan coverage is
Oval Office in Karl available
front of the Schultz online.
press. A NOAA Adm.
graphic appears Peter Brown
to be altered Pete
with black Gaynor
marker. This Press
becomes
national news.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, Julie Roberts e- Julie The e-mail is
September 4, 2019, mails George Roberts page 3 of
2:42 p.m. Jungbluth and George Exhibit 5 of
tells him that Jungbluth Julie Roberts'
NOAA interview with
Communications NOAA General
is handling Counsel.
``the
situation'' and
``there should
be no action
taken by anyone
within the
National
Weather Service
or the National
Hurricane
Center.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, NWS Operations NWS Exhibit 17 of
September 4, 2019, Center sends Operations Julie Roberts'
3:37 p.m. out a media Center interview with
guidance to all NOAA General
ROCs and Counsel
National
Centers asking
that they do
not respond via
social media or
other to any
questions
related the
tweets.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, Chris Darden Chris Copies of Chris
September 4, 2019, sends an e-mail Darden Darden's e-
4:45 p.m. out to all NWS NWS mails relevant
Birmingham WFO Birmingham WFO to the
staff updating Staff investigation
them that NOAA Chris were provided
Headquarters Vaccaro to the Academy
called Darden Team by NOAA.
and asked all This e-mail is
further media page 19 of the
inquiries to be document.
forwarded to
Chris Vaccaro
at NOAA
Communications.
-------------------
Thursday, Chris Vaccaro Chris Exhibit 17 of
September 5, 2019, sends an e-mail Vaccaro Julie Roberts'
5:36 p.m. asking NWS to George interview with
resend tbe Jungbluth NOAA General
September 4 Susan Counsel.
media guidance. Buchanan
Vaccaro states Jeremy
in the e-mail Andrucyk
that Julie
forecasters Roberts
should not
communicate
with media via
their personal
Twitter
accounts.
-------------------
Thursday, Secretary Wilbur Wilbur Dr. Neil Jacobs'
September 5, 2019, Ross calls Dr. Ross interview with
6/7:00 p.m. Neil Jacobs and Dr. NOAA General
asks him to Neil Jacobs Counsel: Page
prepare a 27 line 9, Page
timeline of 28 line 11.
events and Julie Roberts'
communications interview with
surrounding NOAA General
Dorian.\86\ Counsel: Page
64, line 21.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Dr. Neil
Jacobs is the
only one with
firsthand
knowledge that we
have access to
Julie Roberts has
secondhand
knowledge of this
call.
Thursday, Dr. Neil Jacobs Dr. Screenshots of
September 5, 2019, calls Julie Neil Jacobs Julie Roberts'
10:53 p.m. Roberts and Julie phone calls are
informs Roberts Roberts Exhibit 6 of
of Jacobs' Roberts'
phone call with interview with
Secretary Ross. NOAA General
Counsel.
Dr. Neil Jacobs'
interview with
NOAA General
Counsel: Page
27, line 9.
Julie Roberts'
interview with
NOAA General
Counsel: Page
63, line 16.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, Julie Roberts Julie Julie Roberts'
September 6, 2019, receives a Roberts interview with
2:30 a.m. phone call from Steven NOAA General
Secretary Barranca Counsel: Pages
Wilbur Ross's Mike 68-71.
personal Walsh Screenshots of
assistant and Roberts' phone
Chief of Staff. calls are
Exhibit 6 of
Roberts'
interview with
NOAA General
Counsel.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, Julie Roberts Julie Copies of Julie
September 6, 2019, compiles a Roberts Roberts e-mails
2:30-3:48 a.m. summary Mike relevant to the
document of all Walsh investigation
events and Joe were provided
communications Semsar to the Academy
that have Rebecca Team by NOAA.
happened Glover The e-mail is
surrounding Kevin page 12 of that
Dorian h06 Manning document. The
h00 and summary is
sends the Exhibit 7 of
summary to Mike Julie Roberts'
Walsh and other interview with
Commerce and NOAA General
NOAA employees. Counsel.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, Julie Roberts Julie Julie Roberts'
September 6, 2019, calls Dr. Neil Roberts interview with
7:00 a.m. Jacobs and Dr. NOAA General
fills him in on Neil Jacobs Counsel: Page
the calls she 83, Line 20.
received from Neil Jacobs'
the Secretary interview with
earlier that NOAA General
morning. Counsel: Page
29, Line 12.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, Julie Roberts In room prior to Julie Roberts'
September 6, 2019, and Dr. Neil their arrival: interview with
8:30 a.m. Jacobs arrive David NOAA General
at the Commerce Dewhirst Counsel: Page
office and meet Kevin 84, Line 9.
in the Deputy Manning Dr. Neil Jacobs'
Secretary's Joe interview with
conference Semsar NOAA General
room. Dr. Neil Jacobs Counsel: Page
and Julie 102, Line 13.
Roberts arrive
next.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present in the
meeting room
sporadically
throughout the
day:
Deputy
Secretary Karen
Dunn Kelley
Cordell
Hull
Chris
Vaccaro
Scott
Mullen
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, According to Julie Julie Roberts'
September 6, 2019, Julie Roberts, Roberts interview with
8:30 a.m. the meeting was Dr. NOAA General
never Neil Jacobs Counsel: Page
officially