[Senate Hearing 116-636]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 116-636

                EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND
                 THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS ON THE
               U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                 of the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           DECEMBER 12, 2019

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation





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                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

52-942 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023












       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                                 ------                                

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada








                            C O N T E N T S

                               ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on December 12, 2019................................     1
Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................     1
Statement of Senator Markey......................................     3
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................    69

                               Witnesses

Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia and the 
  Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and 
  International Studies (CSIS)...................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................    44
Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute and Environmental 
  Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson International 
  Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center for 
  Climate & Security.............................................    49
    Prepared statement...........................................    50
Dr. Michael Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience 
  Program; Director of the Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson 
  International Center for Scholars..............................    58
    Prepared statement...........................................    60
Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, United States Coast 
  Guard..........................................................    76
    Prepared statement...........................................    78









 
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS 
            ON THE U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2019

                               U.S. Senate,
                          Subcommittee on Security,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in 
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Fischer, 
Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, Blumenthal, and Sinema.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing will now come 
tos order.
    I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of 
witnesses today to share with the Subcommittee their 
perspectives on the expanding opportunities, challenges, and 
national security threats in the Arctic and how the Coast Guard 
can shape its Arctic strategy to best protect U.S. interests in 
the region.
    The changes occurring in the Arctic are monumental. For the 
first time in living history, receding sea ice is opening up an 
entire ocean to the world. This provides access to previously 
unreachable natural resources. Estimates are that 30 percent of 
the world's undiscovered natural gas, 13 percent of its 
undiscovered oil, and an abundance of rare earth and other 
minerals exist in the Arctic region.
    It opens up formerly impassable maritime traffic routes 
that are thousands of nautical miles shorter when compared to 
using the Suez or Panama Canals potentially saving shippers 
weeks in travel expenses.
    There is a whole realm of economic opportunity that did not 
exist 10 or 20 years ago, and other nations have already taken 
major steps to capitalize on this prospect.
    We can see Arctic nations like Russia who have built ports, 
icebreakers, maritime traffic infrastructure, and ice-hardened 
shipping vessels to expand their commercial activity in the 
Arctic.
    Even non-Arctic nations like China are making major 
investments in Arctic development. They are building 
icebreakers and vessels capable of operating in the high 
latitudes even though they have no sovereign territory near any 
Arctic waters.
    The U.S., one of eight actual Arctic nations, has lagged 
behind in developing the infrastructure needed to meet the 
challenges and opportunities brought on by this expanding 
economic opportunity. We only have one operational heavy and 
one medium polar icebreaker. Compare this to the growing fleet 
of over 50 Russian icebreakers, and they are building many 
more. And even China's icebreaking capacity will surpass ours 
by 2025 or earlier.
    The nearest Department of Defense strategic seaport is 
1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic. That is like putting our 
Coast Guard resources in Miami and asking them to respond to 
distress calls in Boston.
    The level of infrastructure development, domain awareness, 
hydrographic mapping, and reliable communications are far from 
sufficient to support the current and projected maritime 
traffic through the region.
    Overcoming these hurdles will take a whole-of-government 
effort, working with industry, NGO partners, Arctic 
communities, and strong international cooperation to enable the 
safe flow of commerce and protection of the natural Arctic 
environment.
    A key component of the U.S. Government strategy for 
managing the changing landscape in the Arctic is the U.S. Coast 
Guard. The Coast Guard has long been at the forefront of Arctic 
operations. They have been leading heroic rescue missions there 
for more than 150 years, including the overland relief 
expedition in 1897 that saved the lives of 265 whalers iced in 
at Point Barrow.
    Recognizing the vital service the Coast Guard provides for 
our nation, I am pleased to announce today that my Ranking 
Member, Senator Markey, and I have formed the Senate Coast 
Guard Caucus, along with a number of other Senators who will 
come together in a bipartisan manner to bolster and strengthen 
this important branch of the armed services. I am very glad 
about this, and to be honest, I am quite surprised that there 
was no Senate caucus prior to today. So that is good news.
    I am continually impressed with the valiant actions of the 
men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard and look forward to the 
great work this newly formed caucus will do to support their 
service.
    We are making progress slowly but surely on many of these 
Arctic issues. The Coast Guard, for example, in April of this 
year released an updated Arctic strategic outlook that laid out 
their lines of effort for meeting the challenges of increased 
maritime activity in the region. Those lines of effort will 
include: enhancing their capability to operate in the Arctic, 
cooperating with partners and allies to uphold rules-based 
order in the region, and innovating new solutions to provide 
crisis response, law enforcement, and maritime transportation 
management. The Coast Guard also awarded a contract for the 
construction of up to three heavy icebreakers, the first new 
heavy icebreakers to be built by the United States in over 40 
years. These are part of the six new icebreakers authorized by 
Congress in last year's NDAA, a bipartisan provision in that 
bill that I was proud to have authored. Getting these 
icebreakers is an important step in the right direction for 
building our capacity to operate in the Arctic, but we need to 
do more.
    Just yesterday, the Full Committee of the Commerce 
Committee passed the Arctic Shipping Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, which is another important step with regard to our Arctic 
strategic interests.
    I will also soon be introducing legislation to further 
advance the collaboration between the Navy and the Coast Guard 
to increase their effectiveness for carrying out sustained 
operations in the Arctic. This bill will direct the strategic 
focus, infrastructure investment, and capability development 
needed to rapidly respond to crises in the Arctic, to secure 
our sovereignty through persistent presence in this region of 
increasing great power competition. And part of the reason for 
this hearing is to help inform that bill as we are putting the 
final touches on it.
    With that, I want to thank our witnesses today. We have two 
panels. So we will be efficient in our questioning. Here to 
discuss this very important topic are some of the nation's 
foremost experts as well as the Vice Commandant of the Coast 
Guard, Admiral Ray, who I am pleased is here.
    I now want to recognize Senator Markey for any opening 
statement he may have.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
having this very important hearing.
    And to our distinguished witnesses, thank you for joining 
us this morning.
    The frozen Arctic is a hotbed of challenges for security in 
maritime transportation, international relations, and on-the-
ground community needs. I believe the primary underlying cause 
of these challenges is climate change. We cannot ignore the 
effects of the climate emergency in the Arctic. It is happening 
right before our eyes. NOAA's 2019 Arctic report card published 
on Tuesday recounts record warming and ice melt in the Arctic. 
Unprecedented wildfires raged across Greenland and Siberia this 
summer. And Arctic communities are under threat from the 
rapidly thawing ice and permafrost. The Arctic is warming at 
least twice as fast as the global average, and between 1992 and 
2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly 1 million square miles, 
an area larger than the State of Alaska. This melt is opening 
new trade routes, flooding towns, and unlocking marine 
resources faster than we can keep up.
    These changes have consequences far beyond the Arctic 
Circle. The Arctic is our planet's air conditioner. It sustains 
the ocean circulation that regulates weather on the U.S. east 
coast. And melting Arctic ice sheets raise sea levels across 
the world.
    I had the opportunity to visit Greenland in 2007 and 
learned firsthand how climate change affects Arctic ice. 
Greenland's ice sheet is thousands of feet thick and the height 
of five and a half Empire State Buildings, enough to raise 
global sea levels by more than 20 feet. The ice sheet is now 
melting twice as fast as when I visited 12 years ago. It is 
pouring almost 300 billion tons of melt water into the ocean 
every year, contributing to sea levels on the U.S. east coast 
rising three to four times higher than the global average.
    President Trump may have been unsuccessful in his bid to 
purchase Greenland, but we already have more Greenland than we 
know what to do with piling up on the shores of Massachusetts.
    As you will hear from our witnesses, climate change in the 
Arctic poses a security threat both in the Arctic and beyond. 
China and Russia are putting a new spin on the term ``cold 
war'' as they build their strategic presence in the frozen 
Arctic. Increased commercial use of a changing Arctic presents 
risk for maritime safety as ships navigate volatile new routes. 
Thawing ice and permafrost threaten Arctic communities' food 
security and their very way of life. Oil spills and other 
hazards threaten the fragile Arctic ecosystem. All of these 
threats put additional strain on our Coast Guard as they 
fulfill their many important missions in the Arctic.
    The Coast Guard must also address the vulnerability of 
their own facilities and operations to extreme storms, 
flooding, changing ice conditions, and other climate impacts.
    In this year's Coast Guard's reauthorization, I worked to 
secure language encouraging the Coast Guard to report on its 
most climate vulnerable installations as the rest of the 
Department of Defense has done. But reporting is not enough. We 
must rethink our approach to infrastructure planning from our 
southernmost to northernmost installations, and climate change 
must be at the center of our calculus.
    The 2019 NOAA Arctic report card makes the climate science 
clear. The Arctic is experiencing unprecedented warming and 
loss of snow and ice. The Coast Guard's Arctic Strategic 
Outlook makes the security risk of a warming Arctic clear. We 
are not adequately prepared to respond to the Arctic climate 
emergency. The Coast Guard must better incorporate climate 
considerations in its missions and planning, and Congress must 
support our Coast Guard to ensure they have the resources and 
facilities to do so. We must maintain leadership in our 
scientific missions to ensure we can understand rapidly 
changing conditions in the Arctic, as well as support our 
diplomatic goals. Most importantly, we need bold and 
transformative climate action now.
    And I agree with the Chairman of the Committee that it is 
important for us to, on a bipartisan basis, have a Coast Guard 
Caucus. This is going to become a very critical part of the 
long-term strategic thinking of the United States, and it is 
important that, on a bipartisan basis, we partner to create 
this caucus now.
    So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Well, I want to welcome our very distinguished witnesses 
today. On our first panel, we have Heather Conley, Senior Vice 
President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and the Director 
of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies; Ms. Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar 
Institute and Environmental Change and Security Program, the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and Michael 
Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience Program, and 
Director of the Polar Institute also at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars.
    Each of you will have five minutes for your opening 
statement. A longer statement can be included in the record, if 
you would like. We will start with you, Ms. Conley.

          STATEMENT OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE

          PRESIDENT, EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC;

            AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR

           STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

    Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, thank you and Senator Markey 
so much for holding this very important hearing. And I 
congratulate you on the bipartisan Coast Guard caucus, as well 
as continued work in bringing the Navy and the Coast Guard 
together in this joint mission.
    What a timely moment to have this hearing. It is a great 
time to take stock of what we have accomplished in 2019, but, 
more importantly, think about what must be done in 2020. And I 
think exactly the NOAA Arctic report card from two days ago, in 
highlighting so many profound changes in the Arctic, one of its 
most important points was the lack of sea ice formation in the 
Bering Sea, again very important to America's territorial 
waters and its coastline.
    So let us take a look at 2019. Absolutely the exciting news 
that we now have in process: the construction of one heavy 
polar security cutter.
    And I think the other two elements of 2019 certainly was 
Secretary Mike Pompeo's speech in Finland in May of this year, 
which was the first time a senior official placed the Arctic in 
a public speech within a great power competition framework. But 
that was very surprising and shocking to our allies. And I 
think that reminds us that we have to work more closely with 
our allies as we look at the Arctic increasingly through this 
lens.
    And of course, as you rightly note, Greenland became much 
more a topic of conversation and its strategic importance. But 
again, this is all part of the strategic awakening that we are 
having regarding the Arctic.
    But I have to say perhaps the year closed out with the most 
troubling news to me, which was 4 days ago the announcement by 
the Russian military that they are placing S-400s in each of 
their Russian military units across the Russian Arctic, calling 
it a de facto anti-missile dome. So today we are already 
potentially losing access to the Arctic because of Russia's 
growing military footprint.
    You have asked us here to assess the Coast Guard's updated 
Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. And of all of us that have 
worked so closely with the Coast Guard over the last decade as 
it is thinking about the Arctic, the Coast Guard has faithfully 
tried to protect America's sovereignty in the Arctic. They have 
warned us that they need more resources. They have detailed 
what they have required, and they have done the best with what 
they have. This is no longer sufficient. The Coast Guard simply 
needs a dedicated budget to build the Arctic infrastructure 
that it needs, and it needs strong and sustained civilian 
leadership to make sure that that infrastructure is in place.
    The challenges in the Arctic are great regarding security. 
In fact, the United States has two Arctics. We have the north 
Pacific/North American Arctic--and of course our requirements 
to support Alaska only continue to grow as we see increased 
commercial traffic--principally Chinese LNG carriers that are 
going to the Yamal Peninsula. But we also have the north 
Atlantic/European Arctic, which is vital to protecting the 
north Atlantic sea lines of communication, and we are seeing a 
dramatic up-tick in Russian submarine activity in the north 
Atlantic. So, we not only have one challenge in the Arctic, we 
have two.
    The Coast Guard frequently refers to ``presence equals 
influence.'' I could not agree more with that equation. And the 
two states that are building presence in the Arctic are, of 
course, Russia and China. Russia is, in my view, our most 
significant near-term security challenge in the Arctic. 
Although I know the U.S. Government continues to be very 
focused on China, and we do have a very important long-term 
strategic challenge there, Russia presents the near-term 
challenge. And CSIS has been in partnership with the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to detail Russia's military 
footprint using satellite imagery. And if it meets the 
Committee's approval, I would like to put for the record some 
of these satellite imageries and the analysis that we have 
included.
    Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Ms. Conley. Thank you.
    The challenge, however, is what we do not know is how 
Russia and China are going to interact together in the Arctic. 
And again, 2019 showed us increased economic activity, science 
activity, as well as military activity.
    So in my testimony, I am calling for a dedicated Arctic 
Security Initiative, a budget very similar to the European 
Deterrence Initiative, which gives us a dedicated multiyear 
budget to actually enhance our infrastructure needs, but also 
to enhance our diplomatic, our economic, our scientific 
presence because, as China and Russia's influence grows in the 
Arctic through science, economics, and security, the U.S. must 
be equally present.
    And again, I thank this Committee. The U.S. Coast Guard has 
the leadership. They know what they need. They need the budget 
to do so.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]

Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe, 
   Eurasia and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for 
               Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
    Thank you, Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Markey, for the 
opportunity to come before you this morning to discuss America's 
security strategy for the Arctic and the readiness of our frontline 
defenders, the United States Coast Guard. My testimony today could be 
as relevant for the Senate Armed Services Committee as it is for the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, such is the nature 
of Arctic security today.
    It is a particularly fitting and timely moment to take stock of 
what we have accomplished this year regarding U.S. security policy 
toward the Arctic and, most importantly, what we must do to secure and 
increase America's security in the Arctic in 2020 and beyond.
    It goes without saying that we are having this discussion today 
because of the profound transformation of the Arctic region due to 
climate change. From rapid permafrost thaw and extensive coastal 
erosion, which is breaking apart and collapsing terrestrial 
infrastructure to the extraordinary diminishment of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet and thinning and disappearance of polar ice caps, these changes 
have propelled the U.S. and all Arctic coastal states to protect and 
secure their territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
coastlines. This is particularly true for the United States which lacks 
infrastructure and capabilities to protect and defend its fourth 
coast.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``The Arctic of the Future: Strategic Pursuit or Great Power 
Miscalculation?: Keynote Address,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, remarks by Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, May 10, 
2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-future-strategic-pursuit-or-
great-power-miscalculation-keynote-address.
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    After nearly a decade of study, 2019 will be remembered as the year 
that the United States formally launched the construction of a heavy 
polar security cutter, something this Nation has not done for 42 years. 
2019 however was marked, as in many previous years, by the release of a 
plethora of U.S. government Arctic strategies: the U.S. Navy quietly 
released its Arctic strategy in January, the Coast Guard released its 
updated strategy in April, and the Defense Department released its 
mandated study of U.S. defense operations in June. We had anticipated 
the release of an Air Force Arctic strategy but that has yet to be 
released. But 2019 will perhaps be most remembered as the year of 
significant U.S. rhetorical change as Washington now views the Arctic 
through the lens of great power competition, highlighting the increased 
military and economic presence of Russia and China in the Arctic. This 
policy shift was encapsulated in Secretary of State Pompeo's speech in 
Rovaniemi, Finland in May of this year. And of course, 2019 will be 
forever known as the year that Washington rediscovered the strategic 
importance of Greenland which prompted the U.S. to announce that is 
reestablishing a U.S. consulate in Greenland's capital of Nuuk.
    In 2019, there was good news: The U.S. national security community 
is now talking more about the strategic importance of the Arctic more 
than ever before. But there is also bad news: The U.S. government isn't 
advancing its policies. Said a different way, the U.S. is acting as if 
it is still 2013 while the Arctic security environment worsens.
The Updated Coast Guard Strategy
    It is with this in mind that we must view the Coast Guard's updated 
Arctic Strategic Outlook. Its updated outlook is perhaps the best of 
the many U.S. government strategies that describe the new geopolitical 
realities in the Arctic. Without hyperbole or hype, the strategy 
clearly states Russia's and China's long-term strategic ambitions for 
the Arctic which pose challenges to U.S. interests and the United 
States' ability to maintain unfettered access in the region.
    While the Coast Guard accurately describes these new challenges, 
its strategy, as well as the U.S. government's posture, remains largely 
the same as it was in 2013. There are no other significant U.S. 
infrastructure initiatives on the horizon other than the construction 
of a new polar security cutter which will primarily be used in 
Antarctica;\2\ there is no dedicated budget or prioritization of 
infrastructure improvements. There is no deep-water port in the 
American Arctic and there are no ice-strengthened surface vessels in 
the U.S. Navy's inventory. There hasn't been a substantial investment 
in increased U.S. forward operating locations in the Arctic, 
communication and navigation assets or greater domain awareness. The 
U.S. could not conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the Russian 
Arctic today if it wanted to, and without agreement from the Canadian 
government, it could not traverse the Northwest Passage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, ``The Implications of 
U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region,'' Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, May 3, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite our rhetoric, the current minimalist U.S. presence and 
posture in the Arctic signals that we consider the region a low 
priority. But Russia and China both have a long-term strategy and a 
dedicated budget to achieve their ambitions. Without a significant 
policy response from the U.S. and its allies, Russia and China will 
largely shape the region's future.
    What makes this perennial U.S. minimalist posture in the Arctic so 
troubling is that the United States has not one but two security tasks 
in the Arctic: while the U.S. must always prioritize the protection of 
its waters and territory in the North Pacific, the narrow Bering 
Strait, and the U.S. EEZ in the Chukchi Sea, the U.S. also has Arctic 
security responsibilities in the North Atlantic, North and Barents 
Seas. Both the North Atlantic/European Arctic and North Pacific/North 
American Arctic present ``avenues of approach'' to the homeland that 
directly impact the security of the United States.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ C. Todd Lopez, ``Northcom Commander Cites Arctic as Area of 
Concern,'' U.S. Department of Defense, July 23, 2019. https://
www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1913989/northcom-commander-cites-
arctic-as-area-of-concern/.
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Prioritizing the Great Powers in the Arctic
    Russia. Russia poses the most immediate challenge to U.S. national 
security interests in both the North Pacific and the North Atlantic and 
must be the near-term priority. Russia has allocated trillions of 
rubles over the past decade to Arctic economic and military 
development, with the government declaring that it will spend 
approximately $63 billion by 2020 and $235 billion until 2035 with 
significant tax incentives. President Putin has announced that cargo 
shipments will increase to 80 million tons along the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) by 2025 and the Russian icebreaker fleet will expand to 13 heavy 
icebreakers by 2035--9 of which will be nuclear powered and some will 
be fitted with cruise missiles -as well as investments in the expansion 
and upgrading of ports, infrastructure, and search and rescue 
activities along the NSR.\4\ In the past year, Russia has made several 
important changes related to the use of the NSR, to include giving the 
Russian nuclear agency, Rosatom, bureaucratic control over the maritime 
route, and limiting foreign warships traffic without a 45-day 
notification and permission by the Russian government.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Vladimir Isachenkov and Irina Titova, ``Putin outlines 
ambitious Arctic expansion program,'' Associated Press, April 9, 2019. 
https://www.apnews.com/d0c2eb39a3b44b40ac8ddb1749ebe143.
    \5\ ``Russia Tightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,'' The 
Maritime Executive, March 8, 2019. https://www.maritime-executive.com/
article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like the United States, Russia also has ``two Arctics.'' In 
Russia's eastern Arctic, Russia has refurbished airfields, search and 
rescue, and radar stations to improve awareness in the air and maritime 
domains, which includes Sopka-2 radar systems on Wrangel Island (300 
miles from Alaska) and Cape Schmidt. These systems create a 
``protective dome'' across Russia's vast Arctic coastline and improve 
its overall operational picture to detect and track vessels and 
aircraft. For example, Sopka-2 radars also control civilian air traffic 
and provide meteorological data to better inform mariners traversing 
the route. But Russia's military footprint transforms as one moves 
toward the European Arctic. The Russian military recently announced 
that it will increase the number of S-400 missile defense units 
deployed across the Russian Arctic which tracks with its recent 
deployment of more sophisticated equipment to defend its air and 
maritime domains. Kotelny Island and Novaya Zemlya for example are 
equipped with missile defense systems like the Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1 
systems which create a complex layered coastal defense arrangement that 
secures territory deeper into the central Arctic. Such capabilities 
strengthen Russia's power projection capabilities in the Barents Sea 
and increase its ability to deny aerial, maritime, or land access to 
NATO or U.S. forces. Perhaps most worryingly is what Russia is 
practicing (and signaling) in the Arctic through its recent Grom or 
Thunder 2019 exercise, which engaged Russia's strategic nuclear forces 
and involved all four of Russia's naval fleets, 12,000 troops, and 
included the launch of two nuclear warheads in the Barents Sea as well 
as several other ballistic missiles.\6\ This military posture exceeds 
the Coast Guard's remit, and while the Coast Guard enjoys a pragmatic 
relationship with the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) in joint 
monitoring of the Bering Straits and in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, 
this challenge is of a different magnitude.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Cruise missiles played key role in Putin's 
strategic war games,'' The Barents Observer, October 18, 2019. https://
thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/10/cruise-missiles-played-key-
role-putins-strategic-war-games.
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    China. The longer-term challenge to U.S. security interests is 
China's growing economic presence in the Arctic which could prelude an 
eventual military presence. China's movement into the Arctic was both 
strategic and opportunistic, taking advantage of Russia's financial 
shortcomings after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014 as well 
as the precipitous drop in global energy and commodity prices. Beijing 
has also developed a broader Arctic engagement strategy which includes 
increased activities with international organizations and robust 
economic diplomacy with individual Arctic Council states, primarily 
related to access to Arctic protein sources, maritime access, 
infrastructure development, and enhanced information and 
telecommunications access.
    By 2015, China had described the Arctic as a new strategic frontier 
(alongside space and the sea bed) where there was ``undetermined 
sovereignty.'' China's efforts in the Arctic are designed to preserve 
its unfettered access to the international waters of the Central Arctic 
Ocean (CAO) and to construct a case for preservations of its sovereign 
rights to the region by means of discovery and by continual presence 
and influence. Over a relatively short period (approximately 5 years) 
of time, China has transformed from a low-key player in the Arctic to a 
major actor.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Anne-Marie Brady, ``China's Expanding Antarctic Interests: 
Implications for New Zealand,'' Small States and the New Security 
Environment, Policy brief no.2, June 3, 2017, http://
www.canterbury.ac.nz/media/documents/research/China%27s-expanding-
Antarctic-interests.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China continues to enhance it scientific and industrial footprint 
across the Arctic. It maintains two research stations, one on Svalbard 
and one in Northern Iceland. Plans to develop a third in Russia are 
underway. The Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on 
Chinese military and security developments presciently warned that 
Beijing could use the cover of science to gain a military foothold in 
the region through the utilization of dual-use technologies including 
satellites.\8\ In January 2018, China unveiled plans to expand its Belt 
and Road Initiative to the Arctic, establishing a Polar Silk Road 
across the region.\9\ Shortly after, in September, it launched its 
first domestically built and second non-nuclear polar class icebreaker, 
the Xue Long 2. This now gives China two polar icebreakers, matching 
the United States in terms of operational capabilities. Beijing has 
also announced plans to construct a nuclear-powered icebreaker which 
would enable China to retain a near permanent presence in the Arctic 
and could be a precursor to the development of a nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Blake Hounshell, ``Pompeo aims to counter China's ambitions in 
the Arctic,'' Politico, May 6, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/05/06/pompeo-arctic-china-russia-1302649.
    \9\ Philip Wen, ``China unveils vision for `Polar Silk Road' across 
Arctic,'' Reuters, January 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-china-arctic/china-unveils-vision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-
idUSKBN1FF0J8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. can develop a specific security policy vis-a-vis Russia's 
military posture, and it can develop specific policies for China's 
dual-use economic and scientific posture in the Arctic. But what U.S. 
policymakers are not equipped to address is the convergence of China 
and Russia's economic and military interests in the Arctic. Over the 
past 24 months, we have witnessed an acceleration of Russian and 
Chinese cooperation, which has enhanced cooperation related to the 
Yamal LNG-1 and 2 Projects, in which the Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) has invested heavily and in which Chinese firms own 
29.9 percent of the projects.\10\ The economic relationship continues 
to expand, and President Putin has suggested that the NSR, as part of 
China's Maritime Silk Road, would create a ``global and competitive 
route that connects Northeastern, Eastern, and Southeastern Asia with 
Europe.'' \11\ The two are also engaging in military affairs, as 3,200 
Chinese troops and 900 weapons units participated in Russia's large-
scale Vostok-18 exercise.\12\ While Chinese and Russian navies and land 
forces have exercised together annually since 2015, in July 2019, the 
first Sino-Russian joint air patrols occurred over the Korean 
Peninsula. If such joint actions were to occur in the Arctic, it would 
be very concerning to U.S. security interests.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Elena Mazneva, ``From Russia With Love: A Super-Chilled Prize 
for China,'' Bloomberg, October 26, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-10-26/china-to-get-first-yamal-lng-cargo-as-russia-
says-thank-you.
    \11\ Atle Staleesen, ``Putin steps up talks with Beijing over 
Arctic shipping,'' The Barents Observer, April 30, 2019, https://
thebarentsobserver.com/en/2019/04/putin-steps-talks-beijing-over-
arctic-shipping.
    \12\ Danila Galperovich, ``Analysts: Russia's Vostok '18 Troop 
Numbers, `China Alliance' Claims Questionable,'' VOA September 11, 
2018. https://www.voanews.com/europe/analysts-russias-vostok-18-troop-
numbers-china-alliance-claims-questionable.
    \13\ Andrew Osborn and Joyce Lee, ``First Russian-Chinese air 
patrol in Asia-Pacific draws shots from South Korea,'' Reuters, July 
22, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-
aircraft/first-russian-chinese-air-patrol-in-asia-pacific-draws-shots-
from-south-korea-idUSKCN1UI072.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Needs to be Done in 2020
    The Coast Guard frequently uses the following equation for the 
Arctic: presence = influence. This is absolutely correct: the U.S. must 
increase its physical presence in 2020 diplomatically, militarily, 
scientifically, and economically, primarily through public-private 
partnerships. Such a holistic approach must include the reorganization 
of the U.S. government related to Arctic issues; an increase in U.S. 
Arctic diplomatic presence and activity, strengthening science, 
research, and economic opportunities; and the development and 
positioning of increased U.S. security assets across the circumpolar 
Arctic.
    While it is encouraging that the U.S. is restoring its consulate in 
Greenland, the U.S. must enhance its Arctic diplomacy with all of our 
closest allies in the Arctic and regionally, to include Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. The 
U.S. should initiate annual meetings of the foreign and defense 
ministers of Arctic allies to cooperatively discuss and address 
emerging challenges in the region. Similarly, the U.S. should push for 
more frequent meetings of the five Arctic coastal states to discuss 
pertinent issues like the future management of the high seas in the 
Central Arctic Ocean.
    From a security and defense perspective, the U.S. must budget the 
necessary resources to enhance its presence in the North American and 
European Arctic. Just as the U.S. has responded to Russia's military 
posture in Eastern Europe through a series of bilateral defense 
enhancements funded in part by the European Deterrence Initiative 
(EDI), the U.S. should create an Arctic Security Initiative or ASI. The 
ASI would fund greater exercises and training in the Arctic to include 
search and rescue, pollution response, and maritime domain awareness 
activities, as well as the work of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Funds 
could also be used for the development of a layered homeland defense 
design; the increased deployment of strategic forces with short-
duration rotational deployment of bombers; an investment in upgraded 
sensors for indicators & warnings; and unmanned undersea vehicles and 
anti-submarine warfare equipment; Arctic infrastructure, such as 
reinforcing existing reception facilities along Greenland's west coast, 
limited reception facilities and/or sensor capabilities along 
Greenland's east coast to enhance ASW capabilities in the GIUK gap; and 
enhancements to Thule AFB such as upgrades to the early warning missile 
defense radar in Greenland as well as the eventual modernization of 
NORAD's air, radar, and satellite systems could also be viewed as an 
element of enhanced Arctic air and maritime awareness or preparedness.
    The U.S. must also leverage its strength in Arctic science. This 
includes our robust and world-renowned scientific network of 
institutions and scholars. The budget for U.S. Arctic science and 
research should increase, particularly as it relates to observational 
research infrastructure and expanded research campaigns in the Alaskan 
Arctic. Crucial to these efforts is the inclusion of indigenous voices 
whose knowledge and experience in the region are invaluable. 
Internationally, the U.S. should use the recent Agreement on Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation to establish other norms, 
code of conduct, and regulations. Doing so promotes transparency 
related to scientific collection, data monitoring, and analysis. The 
U.S. should consider the creation of an Arctic Science Infrastructure 
Fund (ASIF). Such a program would increase the number of U.S. research 
stations in the Arctic. Currently, the U.S. has only three: two in 
Alaska and one in Greenland.
    As science drives our understanding of future developments in the 
region, sustainable economic activity should follow. The U.S. must 
actively facilitate public-private partnerships with other industries 
to identify and fund new infrastructure including a deep-water port, 
search-and-rescue stations, refurbished hangars for air assets, and 
improved telecommunications systems which could be incentivized through 
the Arctic Security Initiative. Doing so would improve observational 
coverage and domain awareness while promoting safer economic activity. 
Internationally, the U.S. should promote greater trade and investment 
between the North Atlantic/European Arctic region (which includes New 
England, Canada's maritime provinces, Iceland, Denmark and the UK) and 
the North Pacific/North American region (which includes Alaska and 
Canada's northwest territories).
    And finally, organizationally, it is time for the U.S. government 
to demonstrate--clearly and on a daily basis--that the Arctic is 
strategically important to the U.S. The establishment of several senior 
positions in the national security community is required. New positions 
should include a Senior Director for the Arctic at the National 
Security Council, the re-naming of the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European, Eurasian and Arctic affairs, the establishment of a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Northern European and Arctic Affairs 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the creation of a senior 
civilian leader position in the Department of Homeland Security that is 
tasked with focusing on America's fourth coast.
    Any nation can write an Arctic strategy, but a strategically minded 
and purpose-driven great maritime power will budget for and implement 
the strategy while also successfully engaging its allies. The United 
States has proven repeatedly it can write many strategies, but it has 
not proven it can shape and influence the Arctic in the future. Russia 
and China are implementing their strategies and shaping the region, 
unfortunately to their preferred interests and outcomes.
    If we hold this hearing again at the end of 2020, what will the 
U.S. have accomplished to enhance its security in the Arctic?

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Conley.
    Ms. Goodman.

STATEMENT OF SHERRI GOODMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, POLAR INSTITUTE AND 
   ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON 
 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS; AND SENIOR STRATEGIST, THE 
                 CENTER FOR CLIMATE & SECURITY

    Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Markey, 
Senator Cantwell. It is a pleasure to be here with you today. 
And I want to also endorse your creating a Senate Coast Guard 
Caucus. I think it is very timely.
    I have over 30 years of experience as a security 
professional serving as the first Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Environmental Security. I am also the founder and 
former executive director of the CNA Military Advisory Board 
comprised of senior retired generals and admirals, including 
Coast Guard, that since 2007 has continually assessed the 
security implications of climate change, which we characterize 
as a threat multiplier.
    My bottom line for you today, my BLUF (Bottom Line Up 
Front), four points.
    First, climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the 
strategic operating environment for the Coast Guard in the 
Arctic, and around the world. As we convene in Washington at 
the end of 2019 with the global climate summit currently taking 
place in Madrid, what is happening in the Arctic is the 
clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting sea ice, 
and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape 
in which the Coast Guard and our military forces now operate. 
The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes, 
and most dramatically in the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean 
is increasingly accessible and navigable, though still 
treacherous and unpredictable, exposing a new maritime border 
for the U.S.
    Just yesterday, as was mentioned, NOAA released its annual 
Arctic report card confirming near record high air and ocean 
temperatures and melting of the Greenland ice sheet, low sea 
ice extents, and shifts in the distribution of commercially 
valuable marine species. And what happens in the Arctic does 
not stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice storage keeps our 
coastal cities like Miami and Houston above water. Changing 
weather patterns in the Lower 48 from the polar vortex creating 
extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc in 
prime agricultural regions have all Americans feeling the 
effects of Arctic climate change.
    Second, in the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening 
our competitors and adversaries, primarily Russia and China, 
creating new risks and complicating navigating conditions for 
the Coast Guard and our military.
    The changing climate is enabling great power competition in 
the Arctic today. While it has historically been a region 
characterized by cooperation and diplomacy, we have recently 
seen a zone of increased tensions over valuable energy and 
mineral resources and access to shipping routes.
    China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to gain 
access to European shipping opportunities. China has declared 
itself to be a near-Arctic state and intends to build a Polar 
Silk Road that will stretch from Shanghai to Hamburg. China is 
upgrading its icebreaking and related capabilities and 
strategically deploying scientists across the region.
    Meanwhile, Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route 
as a new access maritime road from Asia to Europe. Militarily, 
Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern Sea 
Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our 
high north allies. And just last month, Russia tested a 
hypersonic missile for the first time in the Arctic and plans 
to launch their first weaponized icebreaker by 2023.
    The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in 
the Arctic near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among 
the new risks in a rapidly changing Arctic and one that keeps 
me up at night is a potential nuclear shipping incident in 
Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear safety record is deeply 
concerning, from Chernobyl to the Kursk submarine to recent 
incidents this year.
    To help prepare for future such incidents, we need to 
conduct more exercises like the scenario demonstration we 
recently held with Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and 
others demonstrating how a table-top exercise can be used for 
emergency response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as 
a triggering event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place 
in the year 2050 in which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides 
with its Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker in a winter storm, 
not an unrealistic future planning scenario.
    Third, we have a responsibility to prepare for changing 
Arctic conditions and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its 
operating capabilities in the Arctic from additional 
icebreaking capability, improved domain awareness, 
communications, and research.
    The U.S., unfortunately, has fallen behind in equipping our 
forces to operate safely and securely in the changing Arctic. 
The three components we need are speeding the deployment of 
icebreaking capability in the form of the polar security 
cutter, aviation assets and autonomous systems; improving 
Arctic domain awareness and communications capabilities, 
including mapping and charting, and ensuring the U.S. maintains 
its competitive edge in Arctic research and development.
    And finally, Mr. Chairman, leadership in Arctic security is 
essential--and I thank you very much for your leadership--to 
America's overall security and strategic interests and must be 
a whole-of-government and partnership effort, including our 
allies, communities, private sector, and others that serve to 
strengthen the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience 
for the future.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute 
     and Environmental Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson 
 International Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center 
                         for Climate & Security
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee:

    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name 
is Sherri Goodman. I am a Senior Fellow at the Polar Institute and the 
Environmental Change & Security Program of the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center and a Senior Strategist at the Center for Climate 
& Security. I have over 30 years of experience as a security 
professional. I served as the first Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
(Environmental Security). I am also the Founder and former Executive 
Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board, comprised of senior 
retired generals and admirals--including Coast Guard--that since 2007 
have continuously assessed the security implications of climate change, 
which we characterize as a ``threat multiplier.''
    As we convene in Washington at the end of 2019, with a global 
climate summit currently taking place in Madrid, what is happening in 
the Arctic is the clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting 
sea ice, and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape 
in which the U.S. Coast Guard, and our military forces, now operate. 
The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes, and most 
dramatically within the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean is now an 
increasingly accessible, navigable, maritime border for the US. The 
Arctic region is warming at 2-3 times the global average, according to 
the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. And 
what happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice 
storage keeps our coastal cities, like Miami and Houston, above water. 
Changing weather patterns in the lower 48 states, from the polar vortex 
creating extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc 
in prime agricultural regions, have all Americans feeling the effects 
of Arctic climate change.
    My Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) today is:

  1.  Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic 
        operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and 
        around the world.

  2.  In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors 
        and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and 
        complicating navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our 
        military.

  3.  We have a ``Responsibility to Prepare'' \1\ for changing Arctic 
        conditions, and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating 
        capabilities in the Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to 
        improved domain awareness (mapping and charting), 
        communications and research capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Werrell, Caitlin and Francesco Femia. ``The Responsibility to 
Prepare and Prevent.'' The Center for Climate and Security. October 
2019. https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/01/31/interview-with-sherri-
goodman-a-responsibility-to-prepare/

  4.  Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall 
        security and strategic interests, and must be a whole of U.S. 
        government and partnership effort including allies, 
        communities, private sector, and others, that serves to 
        undergird the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience.
                                 ______
                                 
  #1: Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic 
operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and around the 
                                 world.
    The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a 
Changing Climate found that climate change is evident in the furthest 
reaches of the globe from the highest mountain peaks to the deepest 
oceans.\2\ Greenland is now melting from the top down. Here are the key 
findings that shape the strategic operating environment for the Coast 
Guard and others operating in the Arctic region:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Maddox, Marisol. ``Two Divergent Paths for Our Planet Revealed 
in New IPCC Report on Oceans and Cryosphere.'' New Security Beat. 
November 18, 2019. https://www.newsecu
ritybeat.org/2019/11/divergent-paths-planet-revealed-ipcc-report-
oceans-cryosphere/

   ``Arctic sea ice extent in September (when sea ice extent is 
        at its minimum) has declined about 13 percent per decade 
        (during the satellite era from 1979 to 2018), changes likely 
        unprecedented in at least 1,000 years. The Arctic's older, 
        thicker sea ice, which acts as a bastion against melting of 
        other sea ice, has almost completely disappeared. Only about 10 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        percent of sea ice is at least five years old.

   Ice sheets and glaciers are losing ice around the world. 
        Between 2006 and 2015, Greenland's Ice Sheet lost 278 gigatons 
        (Gt) of mass per year. Antarctica's Ice Sheet lost 155 Gt per 
        year, and glaciers around the world (beyond Greenland and 
        Antarctica) lost 220 Gt a year. Combined, the ice loss between 
        Greenland, Antarctica and other glaciers not part of ice sheets 
        was 653 Gt per year. For context, a single gigaton of water 
        would fill about 400,000 Olympic pools.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Walbolt, Kristen. ``10 things: All about ice.'' NASA's Jet 
Propulsion Lab. March 28, 2018. https://sealevel.nasa.gov/news/114/10-
things-all-about-ice

   The Arctic has warmed more than double the global average in 
        the last two decades. During the winters of 2016 and 2018, 
        surface temperatures in the central Arctic were 6 degrees C 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (10.8 degrees F) above the 1981-2010 average.

   From 2007 to 2016, permafrost temperatures increased by 
        about 0.3 degrees C (0.5 degrees F), a record level of warming 
        for permafrost. Warming of permafrost can be a ticking time 
        bomb. Arctic and boreal permafrost contains 1440-1600 Gt of 
        carbon. When it melts, that carbon is emitted into the 
        atmosphere, fueling more warming.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Levin, Kelly and Ezra Northrop. ``4 Things to Know About the 
IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere.'' World Resources 
Institute. September 25, 2019. https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/09/4-
things-know-about-ipcc-special-report-ocean-and-cryosphere

    Arctic communities have already experienced disruptions to their 
freshwater supply, infrastructure, transportation, tourism and cultural 
traditions, due to a melting cryosphere. Many species dependent on cold 
temperatures, ice, and snow are at risk, with some facing extinction. 
These changes will worsen as warming continues.
    Indeed, the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook identifies that ``the 
warming of the Arctic has led to longer and larger windows of reduced 
ice conditions,'' and that ``from 2006 to 2018, satellite imagery 
observed the 12 lowest Arctic ice extents on record.''
                                 ______
                                 
 #2: In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors 
and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and complicating 
      navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our military.
    The Arctic has emerged as a region of geostrategic competition, 
primarily because rising temperatures, melting sea ice, and collapsing 
permafrost now grant access to this region previously locked in ice 
most of year. Indeed, climate change is enabling great power 
competition in the Arctic today. While the Arctic has, since the end of 
the Cold War, been a region characterized by cooperation and diplomacy, 
it has more recently become a zone of increased tensions over valuable 
energy and mineral resources, and access to shipping routes. The 
retreating and thinning of Arctic ice have given rise to exponential 
growth in economic and military activities, including shipping, 
resource extraction, and other commerce. The Coast Guard Strategic 
Outlook stresses that ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to 
open and increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard 
services. Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating 
environment that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to 
unpredictable levels of risk.'' Rapid Arctic change is feeding into 
China's and Russia's strategic ambitions, both regionally and globally.
    As I stated in an article in Foreign Policy last year, ``China has 
large ambitions throughout the Arctic.'' \5\ This includes the 
advancement of both commercial and military objectives. For instance, 
China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to ship goods and 
other materials to and from ports in Europe. This will shorten travel 
times compared to traditional routes through the Straits of Malacca and 
Suez Canal, offering China a new strategic advantage in terms of global 
trade and freedom of navigation. In January 2018, this ambition was 
formalized in China's first public Arctic policy, wherein China 
declared itself to be a ``near Arctic State,'' and articulated its 
intention to build a ``Polar Silk Road'' that will stretch from 
Shanghai to Hamburg, first across the Northern Sea Route, and 
potentially later, across the central Arctic Ocean.\6\ In the long 
term, China foresees using the even shorter Transpolar Sea Route across 
the very top of the Arctic, when that opens in a few decades due to 
melting sea ice. This route, which might be available for several 
months each year, would save China from having to depend on Russian-
controlled waters. As Li Zhenfu, director of Dalian Maritime 
University's research Center for Polar Maritime studies, noted, 
``[w]hoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new 
passage of world economics and international strategies.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Goodman, Sherri, and Elisabeth Freese. ``China's Ready to Cash 
In on a Melting Arctic.'' Foreign Policy. May 1, 2018. https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/01/chinas-ready-to-cash-in-on-a-melting-
arctic/
    \6\ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of 
China. ``Full Text: China's Arctic Policy.'' The State Council of the 
People's Republic of China. January 26, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/
archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
    \7\ Jakobson, Linda. ``China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.'' 
Insights on Peace and Security. March 2010. https://www.sipri.org/
sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China also is deepening its Arctic presence through foreign direct 
investment in several Northern European Arctic States.\8\ China is 
exploiting climate change and the very real need for Arctic-based 
infrastructure investment to assert itself as a key partner in economic 
development and scientific exploration. This presence enhances their 
own domain awareness, and investments could plausibly be leveraged to 
influence policy to be more desirable for China's long-term strategic 
interests.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Rosen, Mark E and Cara B. Thuringer, ``Unconstrained Foreign 
Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security.'' CNA. 
November 2017.
    \9\ Goodman, Sherri and Marisol Maddox. ``China's Growing Arctic 
Presence.'' China-US Focus. November 19, 2018. https://
www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-growing-arctic-presence
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a recent article, Coast Guard Commander, William Woityra, points 
out that mistrust of China's actions and intentions in the Arctic is 
firmly rooted in a pattern of behavior that they have displayed, which 
shows that ``When it is convenient, and when there are economic 
incentives to cheat, China has a history of turning a blind eye to the 
illegal activity of its industries, or tacitly supporting them.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Woityra, William. ``China Can't Be Trusted in the Arctic. 
Proceedings. December 2019. Vol. 145/12/1,402.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia has been increasing its military presence and assertiveness 
in the Arctic--and a significant amount of it is proportionate to their 
vast Arctic territory--but their ambitions have political, military and 
commercial dimensions. On the political side, Russia has the longest 
Arctic coastline of any Arctic coastal state, and Russian identity has 
historically been tied to the Arctic. Expanding Arctic development, as 
ice and permafrost melt, is therefore likely to enjoy broad public 
support from a nation that identifies with its Arctic heritage. 
Commercially, approximately 20 percent of Russia's GDP is derived from 
Arctic activities, primarily energy, industrials and mining.\11\ 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has set ambitious cargo shipping 
goals, which would quadruple the volume to be shipped through the 
Northern Sea Route from 20 million tons to 80 million tons by 2024.\12\ 
Though this cargo increase still represents a small portion of total 
global shipping, it is still a lofty goal for an environmentally 
sensitive region which does not yet have fully developed emergency 
response capabilities. Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route 
as a new access route from China to Europe which, as the ice melts, 
will presumably be available for several months each year. This could 
cut up to 15 days off the current route via the Suez Canal and the 
Strait of Malacca. It is noteworthy that President Putin has stated 
that he sees the Northern Sea Route as a future ``global, competitive 
transport artery'' that is ``the key to the development of the Russian 
Arctic and the regions of the Far East.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Devyatkin, Pavel. ``Russia's Arctic Strategy: Aimed at 
Conflict or Cooperation? (Part I).'' The Arctic Institute. February 6, 
2018. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-aimed-
conflict-cooperation-part-one/
    \12\ Staalesen, Atle. ``It's an order from the Kremlin: shipping on 
Northern Sea Route to reach 80 million tons by 2024.'' The Barents 
Observer. May 15, 2018. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/
05/its-order-kremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-increase-80-million-
tons-2024
    \13\ Staalesen, Atle. ``Russia's Putin to turn Northern Sea Route 
into global shipping artery.'' Eye on the Arctic. May 15, 2018. https:/
/www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/05/15/arctic-shipping-russia-
policy-international-kremlin/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Militarily, Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern 
Sea Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our 
High North allies and partners. Russia has violated Swedish \14\ 
airspace, simulated attacking northern Norway \15\ and tested 
electronic warfare capabilities, including the jamming of GPS systems 
during the NATO exercise Trident Juncture, and in days since, as 
well.\16\ Russia claims its military buildup is primarily for economic 
reasons, presenting the Northern Sea Route as a maritime toll road 
through the Arctic, and seeking to monetize the route by requiring 
transit vessels to pay a ``toll'' for military escort through the 
shallow waters close to the Russian coastline. However, it is clear 
that Russia would be able to use these forces and capabilities for 
other purposes as well. Just last month Russia tested a hypersonic 
missile for the first time in the Arctic,\17\ and they plan to launch 
their first weaponized icebreaker, Ivan Papanin, by 2023.\18\ In short, 
China and Russia are opportunistically expanding their power and 
influence in direct response to a melting Arctic, and this will have 
significant consequences for U.S. interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Sweden: Russian Military Planes Briefly Violated Airspace.'' 
Associated Press. January 24, 2019. https://apnews.com/
097a3fd978f14f4e9a7f4e5cb4d1d600
    \15\ Nilsen, Thomas. ``11 Russian Fighter Jets Made Mock Attack on 
Norwegian Arctic Radar.'' The Barents Observer. February 12, 2019. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/11-russian-fighter-
jets-made-mock-attack-norwegian-arctic-radar
    \16\ Staalesen, Atle. ``GPS Jamming on Agenda as Russian Defence 
Delegation Sat down for Talks in Oslo.'' The Independent Barents 
Observer. March 18, 2019. https://thebarentsob
server.com/en/security/2019/03/gpsjamming-agenda-russian-defence-
delegation-sits-down-talks-oslo
    \17\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia Tests Hypersonic Missile in Arctic, 
TASS cites Source.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
    \18\ ``Russian Shipyard Launches Missile-Carrying Icebreaker.'' The 
Maritime Executive. October 28, 2019. https://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/russian-shipyard-launches-missile-carrying-
icebreaker
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    The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in Arctic 
waters near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among the new risks 
in a rapidly changing Arctic, one that ``keeps me up at night,'' is a 
potential nuclear shipping incident in Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear 
safety record is deeply concerning, from Chernobyl, to the Kursk 
submarine sinking in 2000, to the 2019 failed recovery of the Skyfall 
missile and the nuclear submarine which caught on fire. These incidents 
reveal a Russian tendency to not only withhold critical incident 
information about the extent and severity of radioactive contamination 
but to actually cover the incidents up in an attempt to evade 
accountability. This irresponsible practice has implications for Coast 
Guard and partner agency mission planning in responding to a crisis in 
the Arctic.
    To help prepare for future such incidents, a scenario demonstration 
was conducted earlier this year by the Council on Strategic Risks, 
Sandia National Labs and the Wilson Center's Polar Institute at the 
Arctic Futures 2050 conference. With Coast Guard and Alaskan Native 
community participation, we demonstrated ``how a table-top exercise can 
be used to bring science, indigenous and policy communities together to 
develop information, ideas and proposed actions to drive future 
research directions, policy initiatives and planning for emergency 
response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as a triggering 
event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place in the year 2050 in 
which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides with its Russian nuclear-
powered icebreaker escort in a winter storm.''
    Key takeaways from the exercise include:\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Jim Townsend, Marisol Maddox. 
``Inclusive Planning for Changing Arctic Futures: Demonstrating a 
Scenario-Based Discussion.'' Council on Strategic Risks. September 5, 
2019 https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2019/09/19/planning-for-a-
changing-arctic-a-scenario-based-discussion-paper/

   ``The initial operational response to any major Arctic 
        shipping incident will follow well established search and 
        rescue protocols and will be led by the United States Coast 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Guard.''

   ``If a nuclear incident of this type occurs, it is likely to 
        become an incident of national significance and an incident 
        command structure will be established. A nuclear accident in 
        shallow water has the potential to become a very serious 
        incident.''

   ``Important predictive capabilities for situational 
        awareness and informing response decisions does not currently 
        exist for winter Arctic conditions.''

   ``The U.S. Arctic currently lacks multiple facets of both 
        operational and research infrastructure needed to provide key 
        elements of both short and long-term response to a major 
        winter-time incident.''

   ``There must be a strong indigenous voice and participation 
        in the response effort. Arctic indigenous communities have 
        important knowledge to inform response decisions and must be 
        part of response decisions.''

   ``This incident has the potential to rapidly become a major 
        international incident. Communication lines with Russian (and 
        other countries') institutions will be important. Confidence 
        Building Measures (CBM) could help to prepare both the U.S. and 
        Russia for a future contingency.''
                                 ______
                                 
#3: We have a Responsibility to Prepare for changing Arctic conditions 
and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating capabilities in the 
  Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to improved domain awareness 
   (mapping and charting), communications and research capabilities.
    As former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated in 2018, ``We need to 
up our game in the Arctic.'' While the Coast Guard has a long and 
storied tradition of Arctic operations, for which I have deep respect, 
in the climate era we also need to enable the Coast Guard to ``up its 
game in the Arctic,'' to meet its essential missions. As the Coast 
Guard Strategic Outlook states: ``The United States is an Arctic 
Nation, and the United States Coast Guard has served as the lead 
Federal agency for homeland security, safety and environmental 
stewardship in the Arctic region for over 150 years.''
    Among the U.S.'s emerging needs in a changing Arctic is a strategic 
deep-water port. Currently, the closest deep-water port to the U.S. 
Arctic is 800 miles away in Kodiak, Alaska. That is inadequate in the 
climate era with increased navigation, tourism, and other sea-based 
traffic and the accompanying risks for search and rescue. An Arctic 
deep-water port is a strategic initiative that the U.S. government, 
engaging the private sector in a financially meaningful way, needs to 
plan for future maritime safety and other operations.
    I am pleased that the Committee has included in the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act a provision to prepare a report on the Arctic 
capabilities of the Armed Forces, including identifying gaps in 
Department of Navy capabilities to protect Coast Guard assets during 
Freedom of Navigations operations. This capability is becoming more 
important in a changing Arctic.
    The U.S. has fallen behind in equipping our forces to operate 
safety and securely in a changing Arctic. There are 3 key components to 
Coast Guard's operational capability in the Arctic. Each one requires 
additional support:

  1.  Speed the deployment of additional ice breaking capability in the 
        form of the ``polar security cutter, aviation assets and 
        autonomous systems. Today, Coast Guard has limited ice breaking 
        capability that must fulfill missions at both poles, including 
        Antarctica. As the Strategic Outlook diplomatically states: 
        ``This national fleet does not currently have the capability or 
        capacity necessary to assure access in the high latitudes.'' 
        The Administration and Congress have authorized one new polar 
        security cutter; however, the Coast Guard needs at least 6, of 
        which 3 are ``medium'' and 3 are ``heavy,'' according to its 
        own requirements. And, from an acquisition standpoint, it is 
        financially preferable to conduct a multiple buy, as a single 
        vessel will have very high unit costs. At least one vessel in 
        the Polar Security Cutter fleet should be science-ready so they 
        are able to continue serving as a platform for scientific 
        research that is critical to domain awareness and detection of 
        changes over time.\20\ Additionally, the Coast Guard needs 
        modern aviation capability for search and rescue, as well as 
        the autonomous systems that are able to substantially enhance a 
        variety of Coast Guard mission sets, from illegal fishing 
        detection to mapping and charting.
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    \20\ Congressional Research Service. ``Coast Guard Polar Security 
Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress.'' Congressional Research Service. October 4, 2019. https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf

  2.  Improve Arctic Domain Awareness and Communications capabilities. 
        Given the rapidly changing Arctic environmental and operating 
        conditions, it is essential that we improve U.S. Arctic, 
        including maritime, domain awareness capabilities. MDA is a 
        diverse set of capabilities, some of which are within the Coast 
        Guard's budget, but many of which are supported by other 
        agencies, and which also need to be harnessed from local 
        communities with direct observations of the changing Arctic 
        conditions. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states, Arctic 
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        domain awareness requirements include:

      a.  Information about national defense and security;

      b.  Information on vessel crew, passenger and cargo carried;

      c.  Pollution detection and tracking capabilities;

      d.  Weather and environmental observations, including ice 
            reconnaissance;

      e.  Assessment of living marine resources; and,

      f.  Assessment of human activity and infrastructure.

     Consider again the possible nuclear shipping incident with a 
        Russian nuclear -powered icebreaker and a Chinese LNG vessel in 
        the Bering Strait. Information on all of the above will be 
        essential in responding to such a crisis should it occur. That 
        is why we need to act today to increase our MDA and 
        communications capabilities in the Arctic which includes 
        improving national communications infrastructure for broadband 
        and satellite coverage to support security as well as 
        commercial, recreational, and subsistence-based activities.

     In that regard, I am pleased that the White House has recently 
        announced an intent to develop a national strategy on mapping, 
        exploring and characterizing the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone 
        (EEZ) and the shoreline and near-shoreline areas of Alaska. 
        Some of our current Arctic charts date back to the 1800s and 
        are wholly inadequate for today's needs. Only around 4 percent 
        of Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska have been charted to 
        modern standards.\21\ As the recent White House Memorandum 
        stated, ``Data and information about the ocean help to advance 
        maritime commerce, domestic seafood production, healthy and 
        sustainable fisheries, coastal resilience, energy production, 
        tourism and recreation, environmental protection, national and 
        homeland security, and other interests. Such activities 
        contribute more than $300 billion per year of economic 
        activity, 3 million jobs, and $129 billion in wages.'' \22\ 
        Equally important, improved mapping and charting will help us 
        prepare to operate in a changing Arctic, and to improve our 
        predictive capabilities for better decision making.
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    \21\ Cole, Dermot. ``Outdated navigational charts are an Arctic 
maritime disaster in the making.'' Arctic Today. September 10, 2018. 
https://www.arctictoday.com/outdated-navigational-charts-arctic-
maritime-disaster-making/
    \22\ ``Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska.'' The White 
House. November 19, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/memorandum-ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-
shoreline-nearshore-alaska/

  3.  Ensure the U.S. maintains its competitive edge in Arctic research 
        and development. For decades, the U.S. has supported extensive 
        research on the Arctic, from marine to terrestrial systems, 
        from space to ecosystems. This research, conducted by leading 
        universities across the Nation as well as Federal agency 
        laboratories, is a core component of America's competitive edge 
        in the Arctic. The Coast Guard's icebreakers are host to the 
        science missions conducted aboard to gather direct observations 
        and data about Arctic conditions. America's scientific 
        enterprise, and research and development capabilities, have 
        long supported both our overall security posture and our global 
        engagement strategies, as well as enabling us to better 
        understand the natural world. Nowhere is this more important 
        than in Arctic research. Today, China, Russia, and others are 
        increasing their research capabilities both within and about 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the Arctic.

     Research helps us better understand the pace of Arctic climate 
        change and prepare for this changed future. For example, as 
        global fish stocks migrate as waters warm toward the poles, we 
        need to better understand how to manage emerging and potential 
        fisheries, and growing potential for illegal and unregulated 
        fishing. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas 
        Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean signed in 2018 by 
        multiple nations, including the US, Russia, China, and others 
        is a good example of acting with the precautionary principle in 
        situations in which we do not yet have sufficient knowledge to 
        make decisions about sustainable management of a fishery in 
        this long ice-covered area.\23\ Over the next decade, however, 
        many nations will be seeking to develop this knowledge, and we 
        need to ensure there is sufficient scientific knowledge to 
        support sustainable management and prevent some of the worst 
        outcomes of climate change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ ``Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the 
Central Arctic Ocean.'' https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/
000449233.pdf

     The proposed High Arctic Research Center (HARC) facility at 
        Oliktok Point is a great example of a physical location that 
        would greatly complement the development of homeland security 
        and defense missions in the Arctic and support a re-established 
        leadership position in the region for the United States. The 
        proposed Center, ``could serve as a physical launch pad for 
        scientists, giving them year-round, multi-domain access for 
        research, development, Arctic technology testing, and domain 
        awareness. . . . Research and extensive real-time observations 
        in the Arctic could help researchers collect data that would 
        fill critical gaps in monitoring, providing real-time 
        information, enhancing forecasting, and creating better 
        simulations for planning purposes to serve security and 
        commercial enterprises.'' \24\ The High Arctic Research Center 
        would enable testing and demonstration of technologies for 
        multiple Coast Guard missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Marisol Maddox, Clara Summers. 
``Research in a Changing Arctic Must be Prioritized.'' New Security 
Beat. October 8, 2019. https://www.newsecurity
beat.org/2019/10/research-changing-arctic-prioritized/
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                                 ______
                                 
  #4: Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall 
security and must be a whole of U.S. government and partnership effort, 
 including allies, communities, private sector, and others, that serve 
       to undergird the rules-based order and support resilience.
    The Coast Guard is not alone in the Arctic. The keys to American 
leadership on Arctic Security are partnerships and unity of effort. 
This term refers to an inclusive approach that marshals all elements of 
capability, including the joint and interagency community, state and 
local government, industry, non-profit and academic organizations. Key 
partnerships for the US, in particular the Coast Guard, in the Arctic 
include:

   Native Alaskan Communities: Those who live in the region are 
        often best able to ``ground truth'' observations and will know 
        what's happening long before many in Washington do. They 
        observe trends and recognize patterns that may not be 
        distinguishable to others. That is why it is essential to ``co-
        produce'' knowledge with those closest to the Arctic domain. I 
        am pleased that both the Coast Guard and other interagency 
        partners have been including the Native Alaskan community in 
        developing both research approaches and improving domain 
        awareness. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states: 
        ``Alaska Natives are a critical layer of security in the 
        Arctic.'' The Native Alaskan communities are also on the 
        frontlines of climate disruption, from coastal erosion 
        occurring at many villages, to permafrost thaw disrupting 
        traditional livelihoods, to harmful algal blooms (HABs) harming 
        fish stocks and megafauna, to extreme weather storms disrupting 
        the critical supply chain of fuel and food delivery. These 
        changing conditions increase demands for Coast Guard support 
        and response and stretch scarce resources even further.

   Arctic Coast Guard Forum: Another important security layer 
        in the Arctic is the partnership the Coast Guard has with the 
        Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Appropriately characterized as a 
        bridge between ``diplomacy and operations,'' the Arctic Coast 
        Guard Forum enables the Coast Guards of the 8 Arctic nations 
        both to strengthen working relationships, conduct exercises and 
        combined operations, and coordinate emergency response, which 
        becomes more necessary as climate challenges mount.

   Innovation and Technology: The U.S. has always been a 
        technology and innovation leader. As the Arctic changes, we 
        need to harness that capability to advance low-carbon and 
        sustainable systems for Arctic operations, observations and 
        planning. For example, wind and solar-powered ocean drones are 
        now helping to map the Arctic. Other types of autonomous 
        systems and advanced technologies will help keep America' at 
        the forefront of Arctic, low carbon and resilience innovation 
        in the Arctic.

   International agreements and institutions that are the 
        backbone of the rules-based order: America's security in the 
        Arctic depends on key international organizations and 
        agreements. They are even more important in an era of great 
        power competition.

     Arctic Council: The Arctic Council provides an 
            important intergovernmental forum for the 8 Arctic nations, 
            Indigenous People's organizations, observer states and non-
            governmental organizations to engage on a wide range of 
            Arctic issues (other than military security). It has also 
            developed important agreements on Search and Rescue, Oil 
            Spill Preparedness and Response, and Scientific 
            Cooperation, that serve to strengthen cooperation in 
            uncertain times.

     Law of the Sea Convention: The Law of the Sea 
            Convention (UNCLOS) continues to be an important legal 
            framework for the Coast Guard, the U.S. military and others 
            operating in the region, despite the fact that the United 
            States has not yet ratified it.

     International Maritime Organization (IMO): The IMO's 
            Polar Code, adopted in 2014, establishes important 
            standards for design, construction, equipment, operation, 
            training and environment protection and safety for ships 
            operating in polar regions.
Recommendations
    To summarize my recommendations above, here are the key areas where 
Congressional support and action is needed:

  1.  Advancing the acquisition of polar security cutters, and 
        structurally equip them to carry out scientific research.

  2.  Increasing MDA capabilities in conjunction with other agencies.

  3.  Supporting continued Arctic research and development, 
        demonstration, test and evaluation across multiple agencies.

  4.  Mapping and charting Alaskan waters and near shoreline for 
        maritime safety.

  5.  Reducing further climate risk through sustainable and low-carbon 
        approaches across all domains using a Responsibility to Prepare 
        and Prevent approach.
                                 ______
                                 
           Conclusion: Arctic Leadership for the 21st Century
    As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook appropriately states:

        ``Arctic Security requires leadership and cooperation across 
        multiple national security areas of interest, including border 
        security, economic security, environmental security, food 
        security, freedom of navigation, geopolitical stability, human 
        safety, national defense, natural resource protection and 
        assertion and protection of U.S. sovereign rights.''

America's leadership on climate security is the other essential element 
to advancing America's Arctic interests in the 21st century.

    The globally-devastating Second World War precipitated the creation 
of an international system led by the United States, designed to 
protect the sovereignty of states against external aggression and 
decrease the likelihood of conflict between nations. This is the world 
order we are trying to preserve today. However, the rapid rate of 
climatic change, combined with other global threats, and the increasing 
stress on security that follows means that this system must adapt--and 
adapt quickly. The U.S. should lead that effort, just as it led the 
effort to ensure global stability after the Second World War.
    Fortunately, the difference between today and major global 
disruptions of the past is that we can spot impending disasters earlier 
and more easily. Though the risks are unprecedented, our foresight is 
unprecedented as well. Technological developments have given us 
predictive tools that enhance our ability to anticipate and mitigate 
threats. In short, we have the ability to make our communities, 
institutions and individuals more resilient to a broad range of 
threats. This foresight underscores a responsibility to advance 
resilient solutions that are commensurate to the threat. That is our 
``Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent,'' which is most evident in 
what our Coast Guard needs to do to continue operating safely and 
securely in the changing Arctic. If we don't, we will either have to 
watch our adversaries take the lead, or failing that, bear witness to 
an increasingly unstable world.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Goodman.
    Mr. Sfraga.

 STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL SFRAGA, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL RISK AND 
 RESILIENCE PROGRAM; DIRECTOR OF THE POLAR INSTITUTE, WOODROW 
            WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

    Dr. Sfraga. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator 
Markey, thank you. Senator Cantwell, thank you for your 
interests.
    I am here today to provide a bit of context for the Arctic, 
providing key issues that face the United States in the Arctic.
    As noted, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean, and 
it is a region the U.S. Coast Guard has operated in for over 
150 years. And the importance of these operations will increase 
in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible 
U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the nation?s 
interests. Presence is important. Presence is mandatory. 
Presence is influence.
    The United States Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic 
Outlook is a perfect filter through which my testimony should 
be viewed. They specifically outlined three areas of effort: to 
enhance their capability to operate effectively in a dynamic 
Arctic domain; to strengthen the rules-based order; and to 
innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity in the 
Arctic.
    The Arctic, as you noted, is experiencing rapid change. 
There are risks. There are realities. There are opportunities. 
So I tried to design a framework called Navigating the Arctic's 
7Cs, to give us seven buckets through which we can think about 
our future Arctic. These Cs are: climate, commodities, 
commerce, connectivity, communities, cooperation, and 
competition. I think the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook does a 
very good job of providing us a road map through these Cs.
    Senators, you have already covered, as have my colleagues 
here, the issue of climate, so I will not review what you have 
already noted. I simply will say that Congress should support 
the Coast Guard's request for additional Arctic research so 
that they better understand the domain in which they are to 
operate.
    Commodities is the second C. With a coastline of 34,000 
miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic, there is significant 
potential for economic development in the United States and to 
enhance our nation's Arctic security. But we worry about the 
growing interests not only for our challenges but also 
opportunities. We worry about them in terms of Arctic tourism. 
We think about moving fish stocks north. We think about the 
real threat of an oil and gas spill, and we about the many 
challenges our Coast Guard faces to address these many issues.
    We think the Congress should support the U.S. Coast Guard's 
search and rescue requirements, as noted in their Strategic 
Outlook.
    The third C is commerce. Increased access to a variety of 
resources is an opportunity and a risk, as my colleagues have 
outlined. There has been a fivefold increase in commercial 
activity along the northern sea route, primarily driven by 
resource development. If the State of Alaska or the Federal 
Government decides to develop Alaska's LNG prospects, the Coast 
Guard will need the assets to enable the Nation to not only be 
protected from oil spills, but to manage this facility or 
facilities on Alaska's North Slope.
    The Coast Guard needs significant domain awareness. The 
Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska is an 
encouraging step. Without robust maritime domain awareness, 
however, conducting safe and secure shipping is daunting 
challenge.
    So Congress should support a comprehensive and 
appropriately funded Arctic domain awareness and ocean mapping 
strategy.
    Four, connectivity. We do not have a digital divide, a data 
divide, or an infrastructure divide in America's Arctic. We 
have a digital, data, and infrastructure abyss. Closing this 
abyss will require innovative solutions with persistent public/
private investment with all Federal agencies participating. 
When you think about infrastructure in the Arctic, in America's 
Arctic, think about this in contrast. China has pursued 
investments in various Arctic nations' infrastructure, 
including an approximate 40 percent stake in the first Yamal 
LNG facility, as well as their recently opened Power of Siberia 
pipeline which connects China and Russia's energy network.
    Meanwhile, the United States does not have one single 
Arctic port.
    Congress should invest in a dual-use facility and 
capabilities in Alaska starting with a multi-use port and 
advancing development of enhanced integrated Internet 
communications and connectivity throughout the region.
    Five, communities. The indigenous communities of Alaska are 
no the forefront of a collapsing landscape. Dozens of Alaskan 
villages are threatened. Their landscape is their rhythm of 
life. The Coast Guard has supported these communities 
throughout the last decade.
    So the U.S. Coast Guard should continue to support Alaska's 
indigenous communities through initiatives like the Coast 
Guard's Cities and Communities Program.
    Six, cooperation. Continued participation and leadership by 
the United States in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Economic 
Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum is in our nation's 
interest. These entities shape and reinforce the rules-based 
governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and all Arctic 
nations.
    My recommendation is that the Coast Guard continue to lead 
in this effort.
    And finally, Mr. Chairman, seven, competition. The great 
competition between the United States, China, and Russia should 
be considered in each country's broader approach and national 
mindset. In the Arctic and elsewhere, China plays the game 
``Go,'' characterized by a long-term methodological strategy to 
exert influence and power in a calculated fashion. Russia plays 
the game ``Survivor,'' attempting to sustain an economy 
crippled by Western sanctions and a declining population with 
an over-reliance on natural resource development for both 
domestic and international markets. And finally, the United 
States plays the game ``Twister,'' trying to balance global 
leadership roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South 
China Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere 
against the challenges presented by a new and accessible ocean.
    Congress should move with urgency to see our polar security 
cutter fleet funded and in service sooner rather than later.
    And in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. It 
is no longer an isolated or remote region. It is part of the 
geopolitical, economic, social, physical, and security 
landscape globally. So I hope these Arctic 7Cs, this framework, 
helps us think through the future Arctic for the United States.
    Thank you, sir.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Sfraga follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Dr. Mike Sfraga, Director, Polar Institute, and 
      Director, Global Risk & Resilience Program, Woodrow Wilson 
                   International Center for Scholars
Introduction
    Good morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, my name is Mike Sfraga. I am 
the Director of the Polar Institute and the Director of the Global Risk 
and Resilience Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Nation's think 
tank. I am honored to testify on the subject ``Expanding Opportunities, 
Challenges, and Threats in the Arctic: A Focus on the USCG Strategic 
Outlook.'' My role today is to provide a contextual overview of the key 
Arctic issues facing the US, and other Arctic and non-Arctic nations.
    Mr. Chairman, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean: a 
fourth accessible, maritime border for the United States. The Arctic 
Ocean joins the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean 
as a critical geographic component of our country's maritime ring of 
security and opportunity. Spanning nearly five and one half million 
square miles, the Arctic Ocean covers an area roughly 1.5 times the 
size of the United States and nearly half the size of the Continent of 
Africa. It is a region that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has operated in 
for over 150 years, and the importance of these operations will only 
increase in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible 
U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the Nation's interests: 
presence is important; presence is mandatory, and presence is 
influence.
    As the primary surface presence of the United States in the Arctic, 
and the first responder to any incident that falls under their 11 
statutory missions, the USCG must be empowered to fulfill the needs of 
this country. As the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook 
states, ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to open and 
increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard services. 
Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating environment 
that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to unpredictable levels of 
risk.''
    The United States Coast Guard 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook is a 
perfect filter through which my testimony should be considered, as is 
the Department of Homeland Security's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 
2020-2024. The DHS Strategic Plan champions ``'Relentless Resilience' 
for all threats and hazards,'' which requires a whole of government 
approach. The USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook targets three lines of 
effort to further the Department's goals: (1) enhancing their 
capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain, (2) 
strengthen the rules-based order, and (3) innovate and adapt to promote 
resilience and prosperity in the Arctic.
    The Arctic, including Alaska, the state by which the United States 
is an Arctic nation, is experiencing rapidly evolving threats--and 
opportunities--that we must recognize and address. To re-conceptualize 
the realities, risks, and opportunities in the Arctic, I designed a 
framework called Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs.
    The 7Cs are: (1) Climate, (2) Commodities, (3) Commerce, (4) 
Connectivity, (5) Communities, (6) Cooperation, and (7) Competition. To 
effectively protect the homeland by addressing the challenges and 
opportunities of a transformed Arctic, the USCG must thoroughly 
consider how it Navigates the Arctic's 7Cs; their 2019 Arctic Strategic 
Outlook provides a good roadmap to do so.
1. Climate
    Global Warming is real, rapid, and palpable. According to NASA, 
September Arctic Ocean ice extent has decreased from about 3 million 
square miles in 1980 to less than 2 million square miles as of 
September of this year. Arctic sea ice extent in September (when it is 
at its lowest) has declined almost 13 percent per decade since 1979.\1\ 
The Arctic is warming more than twice as fast as the global average. 
The UN's World Meteorological Organization recently noted a surge in 
carbon emissions and stated the gap between global targets and true 
emissions is ``glaring and growing,'' and must be halved by 2030 to 
have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C. ``In order 
to have a 66 percent probability of avoiding global warming beyond 1.5 
degrees C, the IPCC says we can release no more than 113 billion 
additional tons of carbon. That's only about ten years of emissions at 
the current rate.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Arctic Sea Ice Minimum.'' NASA: Global Climate Change. 
https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/
    \2\ ``Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5'' IPCC. https://
www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
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    The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a 
Changing Climate documented the melting of high mountain glaciers and 
polar ice sheets significantly jeopardize the planet's freshwater 
supply. Another recent study declares 9 major climate tipping points 
have been triggered, 5 of which are directly related to Arctic change: 
1. the destabilization of the Greenland ice shelf, 2. reduction in 
Arctic sea ice, 3. thawing of permafrost, 4. slowdown of Atlantic 
circulation, 5. fire and pest outbreaks in boreal forests.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``Climate tipping points--too risky to bet against.'' Nature. 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0
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    Associated sea ice decline has many implications for the United 
States, including: a more accessible border along Alaska's coastline; 
increased risk to mariners; stronger and more frequent storms; threats 
to coastal communities due to coastline and permafrost degradation, 
and; shifting subsistence patterns. For the first time in history, 
warming water temperatures have led to such a precipitous decline in 
Pacific cod stock that the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 
announced they will close the Gulf of Alaska cod fishery for the 2020 
season.\4\ Sea ice decline also opens new and expanded opportunities: a 
more accessible resource base; increased shipping and commerce; and 
increases in tourism and recreational activities.
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    \4\ George, Kavitha. ``Extremely low cod numbers lead feds to close 
the Gulf of Alaska fishery for the first time.'' Alaska Public Media. 
December 6, 2019. https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/12/06/extremely-
low-cod-numbers-linked-to-the-marine-heatwave-lead-feds-to-close-the-
gulf
-of-alaska-fishery-for-the-first-time/?fbclid=IwAR0NP-
Z6BydPZ3Uo2LgO1lciKixtZp5duLJGf4_
tvGtMqKYojFRnQgbcDZw
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    Global warming is the preeminent driver of change in the Arctic and 
requires a rapid yet responsible evolution of the USCG's posture, 
strategy, and operations. It also requires the U.S. government to 
provide necessary resources to the USCG so they can execute their 
mission, and for applicable Federal agencies to shoulder a share of the 
responsibility. Indeed, a ``whole of government'' strategy and approach 
is required. But in order to more effectively meet their mission in the 
Arctic, the USCG must have accurate, reliable, and sustained 
information about the Arctic environment in which they are to operate. 
The need for additional, sustained, and appropriately funded research 
and observation systems cannot be over emphasized.
    Recommendation: Support the Arctic Strategic Outlook's call for 
additional Arctic research and associated funding. A perfect starting 
place is adoption and resourcing of the United States Arctic Research 
Commission's Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research 
2019-2020. Nine recommendations that enhance the Nation's ability to 
``Observe, Understand, and Forecast Arctic Environmental Change'' are 
identified in the document.
2. Commodities
    The rapidly changing climate is opening resource development 
opportunities throughout the Arctic, including Alaska. With a coastline 
of nearly 34,000 miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic,\5\ Alaska has 
significant potential for economic development at the community, state, 
and Federal levels. The subsequent 1,000,000 square miles of the U.S. 
Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone \6\, currently extending 200 nautical 
miles out from the Alaskan coastline, provides a vast landscape full of 
opportunities to satisfy global commodity markets, ensure our Nation's 
energy security, while simultaneously presenting a significant 
challenge to the Coast Guard's mandate to uphold American sovereignty. 
The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for managing and regulating the 
Nation's maritime borders and all actions within them--including those 
actions that promote economic prosperity and threaten U.S. sovereignty 
and its economic independence.
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    \5\ https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf
    \6\ 2019 USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook
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    As an Alaskan, I am well aware of the importance of the Alaskan 
seafood industry to the state; averaging $3 billion a year in critical 
revenue. As the Arctic continues to warm, fish stocks may move farther 
north, which may enhance the industry's profits while presenting 
challenges as well. The possible migration north of fish stocks will 
further stretch fisheries enforcement assets. The Coast Guard conducts 
patrols in the Bering Sea to counter illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported (IUU) fishing; however, the northern migration of these 
living resources may require the Coast Guard to patrol more extensive 
swathes of territory and increase the frequencies of such patrols. 
Protecting these resources and preventing international IUU fishing in 
the region will become more important in the coming years and decades.
    Arctic tourism will further complicate the Coast Guard's mission in 
the North. From mobile ``hotel'' tents positioned at the North Pole, to 
a boom in Arctic cruise adventures, thousands of people traveling a 
once inaccessible landscape pose myriad challenges for all Arctic 
nations. In 2016, the Crystal Serenity carried 1,700 people through the 
Northwest Passage, making it the first large scale cruise ship to do 
so.\7\
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    \7\ https://thinkprogress.org/arctic-biggest-cruise-ship-ever-
ea7b71e9844f/
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    Considering the USCG's Search and Rescue (SAR) mission and 
operations, an austere scenario should be considered. If a cruise ship 
accident occurred along the North Slope of Alaska, the first city with 
any capacity to assist in the disaster would be Utqiagvik, formerly 
known as Barrow. The city has a population less than 4,500, and its one 
hospital, the Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital, is a state-of-the-art 
institution with a 20-bed general medical facility \8\. This number of 
beds could not handle a large-scale disaster in the Arctic and would 
require the Coast Guard to transfer victims to Fairbanks or Anchorage--
a distance of 502 and 720 miles, respectively. However, the Coast Guard 
has neither the air nor sea assets to address a disaster on this scale; 
the tyranny of distance is amplified in the Arctic.
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    \8\ https://www.ihs.gov/sites/alaska/themes/responsive2017/
display_objects/documents/hf/Barrow.pdf
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    According to Cruise Industry News' 2019 Expedition Market Report, 
``expedition' cruising is the fastest growing market in the entire 
shipping industry.\9\ A cruise crisis, which becomes more of a concern 
grows with the predicted growth of special, Arctic designed expedition 
ships [the number currently in operation is predicted to increase from 
80 to 108 vessels by 2022 \10\] requires an increase in all phases of 
search and rescue operations. As noted by the USCG 2019 Arctic 
Strategic Outlook: ``as cruise ship and transpolar aviation traffic 
grows, so does the potential need for mass rescue operations in remote 
and icy waters. The current state of response capabilities makes this 
one of the most challenging of all possible scenarios.'' Proper 
prevention and management measures could mitigate the risk of these 
accidents and their environmental and economic impacts.
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    \9\ https://www.cruiseindustrynews.com/flip/expedition19/mobile/
index.html#p=2
    \10\ https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/travel/2018/05/arctic-
cruise-ship-boom
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    Response capabilities regarding non-living resource emergencies 
must also be expanded and enhanced. The Arctic is estimated to hold 13 
percent of the world's undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's 
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural 
gas liquids. The increased availability of these resources caused by 
continued and rapid Arctic Ocean sea ice decline has reenergized the 
global commodity market's interest in the Arctic. This interest is 
predicted to endure--particularly as geopolitical tensions continue to 
multiply in resource heavy areas around the world.
    Recommendation: Support and address the U.S. Coast Guard's SAR 
requirements as noted in USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, with 
particular attention given to robust asset allocation along the Bering 
Strait and North Slope of Alaska.
3. Commerce
    Increased access to a wide array of natural resource commodities 
has led directly to an increase in shipping and related activities in 
the Arctic, most notably in the Russian Arctic. There has been a five-
fold increase in commercial activity along Russia's Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) since 2014, primarily driven by its regional resource extraction 
and subsequent transport systems to domestic and international markets. 
According to Business Index North, 22,022 voyages with 20.1 million 
tons of freight transited the NSR in 2018--twice the tonnage of 2017. 
The number jumped again to 30 million tons in 2019 \11\. In the month 
of September this year, there were 50 voyages that originated from, or 
traveled to, international destinations using the Northern Sea 
Route.\12\
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    \11\ https://www.arctictoday.com/rosatom-looks-to-make-7-billion-
investment-in-arctic-shipping-service/
    \12\ https://arctic-lio.com/nsr-shipping-traffic-activities-in-
september-2019/
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    Russia derives an estimated 20 percent of its GDP and 30 percent of 
its exports from the Arctic--and aims to quadruple the cargo to 80 
million tons per year by 2024 by enhancing and expanding their Arctic 
infrastructure. Russia's Yamal Peninsula, an epicenter of this 
commerce, is now emblematic of globally integrated Arctic. China owns 
an approximate 40 percent stake in the Yamal 1 LNG project. Arctic-
specific LNG tankers built in the shipyards of South Korea transport 
LNG along the NSR, down the Bering Strait to Asian--Chinese markets. 
This is the new Arctic; an expanding global economic system that stands 
in stark contrast to the lack of activity in America's Arctic.
    The success of the Yamal 1 project has spurred the construction of 
a second Russian LNG facility. Novatek is Russia's largest LNG 
producer--and majority owner of the Yamal 1 complex. They recently 
reached a final investment decision (FID) of $21.3 billion for their 
Arctic LNG Yamal 2 facility.\13\ Novatek is partnering with French, 
Chinese, and Japanese companies on this project, with continued 
interest from Saudi Aramco. The facility is expected to be complete 
within the next five years.\14\
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    \13\ https://www.lngworldnews.com/arctic-lng-2-partners-make-fid/
    \14\ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-05/russia-s-
novatek-gives-green-light-to-arctic-lng-2-project
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    An integrated commercial system linking the Yamal facilities and 
other oil and gas developments along Russia's Arctic Coast will enhance 
Russia's position as a source for much needed energy resources. The 
recently proposed Sakhalin Energy Transfer Facility, located on 
Sakhalin Island, could make delivery of Russian LNG to Asian markets 
more viable and cost effective. Russia's Power of Siberia pipeline, the 
first pipeline to send Russian gas directly to China, launched 
operations on December 2nd of this year, ushering in greater 
connections between the two countries' markets.\15\
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    \15\ https://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/
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    The United States should take note of this growing Russian Arctic 
infrastructure network and its ever-growing relationship with Asian 
markets. Renewed interest in America's Arctic as a source of energy 
security has spurred conversation about the need for, and feasibility 
of, a year-round or seasonal energy and transit complex along Alaska's 
North Slope. Although much work would need to be done, a Public Private 
Partnership may be of interest as the U.S. looks to secure its own 
energy sources and take advantage of vast LNG assets along Alaska's 
coast and the ever-increasing LNG markets throughout Asia. Yet, for LNG 
development and shipping to occur in and around Alaska, it must be 
economically reasible, safe, reliable, regulated, and have a 
significant U.S. Coast Guard presence.
    The United States has a well-functioning Marine Transportation 
System (MTS), and it is at the core of the Nation's economic 
prosperity. The U.S. Coast Guard maintains the safety, security, and 
efficiency of the MTS, providing stable regulations that enables $5.4 
trillion in economic activity per year. While challenging, an extension 
and variation of the MTS could be established in America's Arctic. The 
USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook describes such an expansion that would 
require an adaptation of MTS management tools, as well as innovative 
policies and technologies that are Arctic-appropriate. This can only be 
accomplished with the support and partnership of public and private 
sector entities and would be a tangible, actionable step the U.S. can 
take to prepare for future opportunities.
    In preparation for greater U.S. commercial presence in the Arctic, 
the U.S. Coast Guard has taken steps toward improving navigational 
safety and environmental protection. A rare partnership with Russia has 
led to an agreement, entered into force one year ago, that establishes 
two-way shipping routes, promotes safe commerce, and takes into account 
subsistence patterns in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea. Additionally, 
the Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska \16\, issued on November 
19 of this year, provides encouraging steps towards expediting 
shoreline and nearshore mapping capabilities for Alaska and its Arctic 
region. This is a critical component of any future, integrated, U.S. 
Arctic strategy that considers our homeland security, national 
security, economic security, as well as social and political security 
in a dynamically changing landscape.
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    \16\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-
ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-shoreline-
nearshore-alaska/
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    The timing of the memorandum highlights how modern aids to 
navigation will be crucial in integrating the Arctic into the broader 
U.S. MTS and enhancing economic development. Less than 5 percent of the 
U.S. maritime Arctic is charted to modern international standards; we 
lack the basic information crucial to understanding our Arctic domain. 
Without robust maritime domain awareness (MDA), conducting safe and 
secure shipping for economic development remains a daunting challenge. 
As noted by the USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``MDA favorable to 
supporting economic growth and resource management requires information 
on vessels, crews, passengers and cargo carried (if applicable); 
pollution detection and tracking capabilities; weather and 
environmental observations, including ice reconnaissance; an assessment 
of living marine resources activity; and an assessment of human 
activity and infrastructure''.
    As noted, the U.S. Coast Guard's capabilities for MDA are stretched 
thin in the Arctic because there does not exist sufficient access to 
reliable, redundant, robust Internet connectivity. The result of which 
inhibits data gathering, information sharing between local, state, and 
Federal agencies and all facets of observational capabilities. This 
reality stifles commerce, SAR, national and homeland defense 
requirements, and limits Alaska communities to engage in state, 
national and international opportunities. Moreover, without reliable 
data gathering and dissemination, expansive and reliable infrastructure 
development and maintenance would be nearly impossible to realize.
    Recommendation: A comprehensive and appropriately funded ocean 
mapping strategy should be developed and executed to advance all facets 
of U.S. interests and include the development of an Arctic MTS.
4. Connectivity
    There are many ways to describe connectivity in the Arctic context. 
We tend to think of connectivity as just an Internet connection, but we 
should focus on a broader application of connectivity--addressing both 
digital and physical infrastructure.
    As noted in my past testimonies, we do not have a digital or 
information divide in America's Arctic--we have a digital and 
information abyss. This abyss is not just a U.S. Coast Guard issue, but 
a real problem that jeopardizes our national and homeland security and 
one that must be met by the collective and integrated family of Federal 
agencies. To be clear, telecommunications and information 
infrastructure in the Arctic requires a coordinated and leveraged 
approach involving governance and operations expertise from local, 
state, and Federal entities.
    Closing this abyss in the Arctic, and specifically for the U.S. 
Coast Guard will require innovative solutions that maintain levels of 
flexibility and scalability, coupled with persistent public-private 
investment. Joint efforts with local communities, state agencies, and 
other Federal institutions--including scientific and research 
organizations--would result in more reliable communication solutions.
    These solutions should incorporate investments in, and funding for, 
``ice-breaking ships, such as the Polar Security Cutter, aviation 
assets, unmanned or autonomous systems, and trained personnel'' capable 
of operating in the harsh and remote arctic environment, as stated in 
the 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook. If these investments are not made, 
the United States will continually fall behind other arctic nations. To 
date, the U.S. is the only Arctic State that has not made a comparable 
investment to these resources--it is also quickly being surpassed in 
this field by non-arctic states
    China's proclaimed ``Polar Silk Road'' is designed to ``facilitate 
connectivity and sustainable economic and social development of the 
Arctic''--by constructing and investing in infrastructure for arctic 
resource development, transportation hubs, and shipping routes.\17\ 
Already, China has pursued investments in various Arctic nations' 
infrastructure. The ``near-arctic state'' owns approximately 40 percent 
stake in the Yamal 1 facility and is considering financing port 
facilities in Arkhangelsk (Russia)\18\ and Kirkenes (Norway).\19\ The 
China Communications Construction Company [CCCC] bid on a contract for 
the construction of three Greenland commercial airports, located in 
Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq, at a cost upwards of $550 million.\20\
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    \17\ http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/
content_281476026660336
.htm
    \18\ https://www.globaltrademag.com/china-russia-collaborating-
arctic-port/
    \19\ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029125.htm
    \20\ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/07/how-a-
potential-chinese-built-airport-in-greenland-could-be-risky-for-a-
vital-us-air-force-base/
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    The country's dynamic investment interests also range from 
financing research centers like the Northern Lights Research Facility 
in Iceland, to pursuing investments in undersea fiber-optic cables such 
as the Arctic Connect cable system.\21\ A CNA report estimates that 
China's proposed investments amounted to ``over $1.4 trillion in the 
economies of the Arctic nations (including Finland and Sweden)'' 
between 2005 and 2017.\22\
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    \21\ https://www.capacitymedia.com/articles/3824070/cinia-moves-
full-speed-ahead-with-arctic-connect
    \22\ https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf
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    Russia is also bolstering its dual-use Arctic assets. Their 
extensive lattice of ports, air bases, commercial hubs, a floating 
nuclear power plant off the Arctic coast City of Pevek, and SAR 
resources have been a component of civilian-government, as well as 
military activities, including recent tests of new weapons systems and 
increased troop deployments.
    Meanwhile, the U.S. does not have a major deep-water port along 
1,500 nautical miles of its Arctic coastline: from Dutch Harbor to 
Alaska's North Slope. As the Arctic Strategic Outlook states, ``the 
closest Coast Guard Air Station to the Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK. 
This is approximately 820 nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK--a 
distance comparable of that from Boston, MA to Miami, FL.''
    Without a viable deep-water port or string of ports--in the U.S. 
Arctic--commerce, SAR, and national security interests will not be met. 
The June 2019 National Defense Authorization Act includes 
``requirements to locate and designate `one or more' U.S. strategic 
ports in the Arctic.'' The U.S. must recognize and invest in the 
potential for dual-use facilities and capabilities in Alaska, starting 
with a multi-use port.
    Of particular interest should be the development of a deep-water 
port along the Bering Strait. There have been numerous reports and 
recommendations made as to scale, scope, and location of such a port. 
Nome, Port Clarence, and other location options are all in need of 
review and final decision sooner rather than later. But in the spirit 
of leveraging and integrating U.S. national assets for the security of 
our nation, linking the development, construction, and complementary 
mission sets of future Arctic-related infrastructure seems the most 
prudent strategy.
    Therefore, the committee should continue to support a Bering 
Strait, dual-use port as well as an emerging interest in reconstituting 
and upgrading the former U.S. Naval base in Adak, in the Aleutian 
Islands. Here, an upgraded Naval installation would serve to secure and 
protect the Nation's maritime, homeland, national, and commercial 
security requirements, while providing a dual use port for the U.S. 
Coast Guard. The two port concepts are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
I argue it is in the Nation's best interest to enhance and develop 
both.
    Combining and leveraging military, national and homeland security, 
and other Federal and state government capabilities and assets will 
better prepare the U.S. for our new Arctic, while requiring a 
reconceptualization of how the United States views its Arctic and the 
critical role the region will play in the Nation's future. Developing 
such a component of a more cohesive U.S. Arctic strategy is not only 
beneficial, but necessary for U.S. leadership in the region. The 2017 
U.S. National Security Strategy mentions the Arctic once, and the 
country has yet to put forward a document of integrated Arctic 
strategies, or guidelines for integration between various agencies such 
as DoD, DHS, DOE, and DOS.. Although there are seams of cooperation, 
for the most part, each entity carries out its own strategy in the 
Arctic (if it has one) even though cooperation is a key component in 
the region.
    Recommendation: Advance the development of a port, or preferably a 
string of ports, along the North Slope of Alaska, Bering Strait, and 
Aleutian Islands that will provide dual use capabilities to meet the 
needs of the U.S. Coast Guard, national and homeland security entities, 
as well as other federal, state, local, and commercial interests. 
Advance the development and implementation of enhanced, integrated 
Internet and communications connectivity throughout the region and 
leverage public-private partnerships where feasible.
    5. Communities
    The people of Alaska, and more specifically the Indigenous peoples 
of Alaska are on the vanguard of a changing, dynamic, shifting, melting 
landscape. For many Alaskan communities the land is their life, their 
identity, their culture, and the source for most of their food. Nearly 
three dozen Alaskan communities have been identified by a 2009 Army 
Corps of Engineers report \23\ as being seriously threatened by 
environmental change and in need of relocation; this number is likely 
to grow. These communities are stressed on many levels yet they have 
adapted and thrived in this landscape for thousands of years. But the 
changes are happening too fast, too dramatically, and too unpredictably 
to navigate with any certainty.
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    \23\ https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/
AlaskaBaselineErosion
AssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf
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    Alaskan communities live at the forefront of environmental change, 
and the consequential risks that develop as a result of those changes. 
For them, an oil spill represents not just an environmental disaster 
but a threat to the stability of the ecosystems upon which their 
livelihoods, food security, and cultural identities depend. Continued 
engagement between the USCG and Alaskan communities should be applauded 
and expanded through the Marine Safety Task Force initiative. The MSTF 
conducted safety and environmental protection missions (surveying and 
checking, for instance, bulk fuel storage facilities--a life sustaining 
resource throughout remote Alaska) in over 100 Alaskan communities.
    The USCG is a leader in the Arctic, and their Coast Guard Cities 
and Communities program--five of which are in Alaska (though none in 
the Arctic region)--demonstrate their enduring commitment to 
cultivating relationships with communities with whom they collaborate. 
As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``the Coast Guard has been 
part of life in many Arctic communities for over 150 years as a 
neighbor, law enforcer, and life saver. Alaskan Natives have been 
partners and teachers, and we continue to benefit from their 
traditional wisdom and deep understanding of the Arctic domain.'' 
Traditional Knowledge will play a key role in the future viability of 
these communities and will be important components of the U.S. Coast 
Guard's formulation of strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
making.
    Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard should further utilize 
Traditional Knowledge and expertise to enhance their missions 
throughout Alaska. Traditional Knowledge will remain an important 
component of a larger strategy to understand better a changing 
landscape and inform both strategies and tactics to address these 
changes; including the importance of community-based physical 
monitoring and detection.
6. Cooperation
    Continued participation and leadership by the U.S. in the Arctic 
Council, the Arctic Economic Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
is in our Nation's interest. These entities shape and reinforce a 
rules-based governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and indeed, the 
eight Arctic nations. They help to identify and conduct research and 
policy measures that strive to understand, mitigate, and address the 
impacts of a warming Arctic. The Arctic region is the only place, aside 
from the International Space Station, where the U.S. and Russia have 
maintained long-term cooperation, even in times of high tension. 
Because the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable has been on hold since 
the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum plays a 
more important role in maintaining open lines of communication between 
the U.S. and Russia.
    It is important that on shared security concerns related to oil 
spill response, protecting marine living resources, shipping, and SAR, 
the U.S. continues to work collaboratively with Russia and the other 
Arctic nations. As previously noted, the U.S. and Russia have worked 
successfully together to create IMO-approved, designated shipping 
routes through the Bering Strait in order to reduce risk to mariners.
    There were two incidents of concern this past summer in the Russian 
Arctic which underscore the need for the U.S. to work proactively and 
collaboratively with allies and partners to minimize risk of nuclear 
contamination, identify knowledge gaps, and develop a greater capacity 
to minimize harm from any event involving radioactive material. Such 
incidents also make clear the need for open lines of communication.
    Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard must continue to shape and 
lead the efforts of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, play a key role in 
the future of the Arctic Economic Council as it encourages continued, 
sustained, and responsible development of the North, and engage where 
appropriate with the United States Senior Arctic Official and her 
Arctic Council team at this consensus driven, Arctic focus 
organization.
7. Competition
    The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes U.S. adversaries seek to weaken 
``the international order that underpins a free and open maritime 
domain.'' It also states that ``clear and universally held norms, 
coupled with transparency, can dissipate'' the ``cloud of ambiguity'' 
under which they are operating.
    When exploring the competition dynamic in the Arctic, specifically 
between the United States, China, and Russia, we should consider each 
country's broader approach and national mindset. In the Arctic, and 
elsewhere, China plays the game ``Go;'' characterized by a long-term, 
methodical strategy to exert influence and power in a calculated 
fashion. Meanwhile, Russia plays the game ``Survivor;'' attempting to 
sustain an economy crippled by western sanctions and a declining 
population with an overreliance on natural resource development for 
both domestic and international markets. Finally, the United States 
plays the game ``Twister;'' attempting to balance its global leadership 
roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere, against the challenges 
presented by a new, accessible Arctic Ocean.
    Military ties between Russia and China are growing stronger in the 
Arctic. This is evidenced by an increase in joint military exercises 
between the two countries including the Russia-based Tsentr-2019 
exercise. The exercise included approximately 128,000 military 
personnel and helped further develop China, India, and Pakistan's 
operational capabilities in the high North region. The exercise 
included 1,600 troops under PLA Western Theater Command.\24\ This 
reality should be considered in juxtaposition to the 2018 NATO Trident 
Juncture Exercise that included 50,000 NATO troops and partners; 20,000 
of which were American troops.
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    \24\ ``Chinese troops participate in Tsentr-2019 drills'' China 
Military. http://eng.chinamil
.com.cn/view/2019-09/25/content_9635742.htm
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    In October of this year, Russian Federation President Vladimir 
Putin announced Russia would assist China in developing a missile 
defense system to strengthen China's ability to counter attacks from 
cruise and ballistic missiles.\25\ In mid-November of this year, Russia 
used a MiG-31K interceptor jet to test the Kinzhal (Dagger) hypersonic 
missile for the first time in the Arctic; the Finnish Government along 
with other Scandinavian countries took particular note of the test.\26\ 
And as is well documented, Russia continues to revitalize Cold War 
bases while developing new assets along the NSR from Franz Joseph Land 
to Wrangell Island; the latter a virtual stone's throw from Alaska.
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    \25\ Guardian staff and agencies. ``Russia is helping China build a 
missile defence system, Putin says.'' The Guardian. October 3, 2019. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/russia-is-helping-china-
build-a-missile-defence-system-putin-says
    \26\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia tests hypersonic missile in Arctic--
TASS cites sources.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
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    The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes the lack of ``investments in 
ice-capable surface maritime security assets'' on the part of the U.S. 
that ``limits the ability of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to 
credibly uphold sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the Arctic. 
It also diminishes America's position as the partner of choice for 
allies and partner nations.'' As a reminder, China, the self-declared 
``Near-Arctic State'' currently has four icebreakers and is developing 
two new vessels, one of which is planned to be nuclear powered. Russia 
has 53 operational icebreakers, with six under construction and 12 more 
planned. One of these will be a weaponized icebreaker with an 
electronic warfare platform, an anti-aircraft missile system, cruise 
missiles, and a helicopter launch pad.\27\
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    \27\ Perisic, Kyle. ``Russia reveals weaponized icebreaker it plans 
to use to control the Arctic.'' American Military News. November 1, 
2019. https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/11/russia-reveals-
weaponized-icebreaker-it-plans-to-use-to-control-the-arctic/
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    Presence, both operational and strategic, is critical to U.S. power 
projection in the Arctic region. The USCG is the critical, visible 
leader in this area as they try to meet their mission to counter new 
regional competition from both Russia and China. Yet, the U.S. Coast 
Guard has only one medium icebreaker The Healy that services the Arctic 
region, and one heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, which is already well 
past its expected service life and serves our Nation's Antarctic 
mission sets.
    The Arctic Strategic Outlook highlights the need for six polar 
security cutters to more effectively carry out its array of current and 
future mission sets in Polar Regions. The recommendation from the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) 
report on acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers noted the 
``USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block buy 
contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other 
measures to ensure best value for investment of public funds.'' \28\
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    \28\ ``Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling 
the Nation's Needs'' https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW07/20170725/
106311/HHRG-115-PW07-20170725-SD004.pdf
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    A block buy would likely make the contracts more competitive and 
lucrative, while bringing into service quicker these national assets. 
As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard requires the 
most advanced information possible on the Arctic environment and plays 
a critical role in the Nation's scientific effort at both ends of the 
globe. Therefore, it is imperative that all Polar Security Cutter fleet 
designs include structural and functional capabilities to support both 
Arctic and Antarctic research efforts as informed by the scientific 
community.
    Recommendation: Fully fund and commission 6 Polar Security Cutters. 
In addition, and to further leverage national assets in the Arctic, 
support the creation and full funding of the proposed Ted Stevens 
Arctic Center for Security Studies, which would be the first DoD 
Regional Center in the Arctic. This Center would address specific 
matters relevant to Arctic security and our Nation's defense, as well 
as leverage and complement the outstanding work conducted by the 
existing DHS supported Arctic Domain Awareness Center; a DHS Center of 
Excellence, in Anchorage, Alaska. The two Arctic-focused entities would 
be visible, tangible, and valuable steps toward a more ``whole of 
government'' approach to the Arctic as well as critical tools to inform 
and guide a more comprehensive Arctic strategy with necessary policy, 
training, and presence.
    And as a final note on the changing Arctic and our national 
security, a convergence of the Arctic's 7 Cs currently unfolding in 
Greenland. Greenland is experiencing the dramatic effects of global 
warming (in fact, just this week, a recent study in Nature noted the 
Greenland ice sheet's total losses nearly doubled each decade to an 
average of 254 billion tons lost annually--an increase that puts 
another six million people globally at risk of flooding); the promise 
of significant stores of strategic minerals and fisheries; foreign 
interest in developing ports and complementary infrastructure; a desire 
to be connected to regional and global markets; communities trying to 
adapt to a rapidly changing landscape; an active and important voice, 
in partnership with the Kingdom of Denmark, in the Arctic's future; and 
is situated in one of the most geographically, geopolitically, and 
geostrategically important locations in the world. In short, Greenland 
is emblematic of the emerged Arctic.
Conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, I often hear the Arctic referred to as an emerging 
issue. Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. As I have explained, it is 
no longer an isolated or remote region; rather it is an integrated 
component of our global political, economic, social, physical, and 
security landscape. The region is experiencing rapid and dynamic change 
and these seven unique drivers, the Arctic's 7Cs, help frame for this 
committee, and perhaps others, these pressing global issues in a way 
that can help to better understand and address our future Arctic.
    This testimony was shaped and informed with the input and 
assistance of my Wilson Center colleagues Mr. Jack Durkee, Ms. Marisol 
Maddox, and Ms. Bethany Johnson.

    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Mr. Sfraga. And I want 
to thank all the witnesses for their outstanding and 
informative testimony.
    I am pleased to have the Chairman of the Full Committee, of 
the Commerce Committee, and I think he would just like to say a 
few words on the importance of this topic as well.
    Mr. Chairman.

                STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And also thank you 
to Senator Markey. You have both exercised great leadership in 
this area, and I look forward to working with you in the 
future.
    And I am glad to be here at today's hearing to evaluate the 
Coast Guard's strategic presence in the Arctic and its ability 
to meet current and future challenges in the region.
    Our next panel will include Admiral Ray, and I appreciate 
his leadership as Vice Commandant.
    The Coast Guard is continuously deployed around the world 
on all seven continents and in every ocean. The Coast Guard is 
also providing and operating the U.S. polar-capable fleet. 
Presently the Coast Guard operates one heavy icebreaker, the 
POLAR STAR, and one medium icebreaker, the Healy. During my 
visit to Alaska in August with Admiral Ray and Chairman 
Sullivan, I had the privilege of sailing aboard the HEALY while 
it was underway in the Arctic Ocean. However, the Coast Guard 
currently lacks the capability or capacity to assure access in 
the high latitudes.
    But help is on the way. We are finally building the first 
new U.S. polar icebreaker in over 2 decades, and I hope we are 
only getting started.
    My visit to Alaska also included a stop at Dutch Harbor, 
the closest U.S. deepwater port in the Arctic. Dutch Harbor is 
over 800 miles from the strategically important Bering Strait. 
I observed how a lack of critical port infrastructure in the 
Arctic significantly limits both the Coast Guard's response 
time and its operational capability in the region.
    Icebreaking capacity and infrastructure are just two of the 
many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic. We are 
hoping to address these and other challenges in the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act, legislation sponsored by Chairman Sullivan, 
which we are working on with our House delegates, and we hope 
we are seeing the finish line on that piece of legislation.
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it was great 
having you and Admiral Ray in Alaska this summer. It was really 
a wonderful trip, and I know we will be able to talk about that 
more on the second panel.
    I am going to start the questioning here. You know, Mr. 
Sfraga, you talked about I think you said a digital or Internet 
abyss. I want to talk about what I mentioned in my opening 
statement, what the Chairman mentioned in his opening 
statement, which is essentially an infrastructure abyss. Again, 
my opening statement highlighted this idea that we really do 
not have any capability with regard to a strategic port. This 
is not a call for a giant Navy base or Coast Guard base. It is 
simply right now the ability to actually just have an 
icebreaker or a national security cutter or a Navy destroyer 
pull up to a port in America's Arctic. Right now, with the 
exception of Dutch Harbor and Anchorage, we cannot do that.
    Is that acceptable to you and should part of the DOD and 
Coast Guard plan not be to at least have what I have been 
calling a series of strategic Arctic ports in the region, which 
in the Lower 48, every community would find that to be a no-
brainer? And yet, we still struggle with the Pentagon, with the 
Coast Guard on this issue of a strategic Arctic port that can 
just handle shipping. Can I get each of your views on that, how 
important it is, and whether or not you agree with what I just 
stated? We will start with you, Ms. Conley.
    Ms. Conley. Senator, we absolutely need a deepwater port in 
the American Arctic.
    Senator Sullivan. At least one. I think several.
    Ms. Conley. I will start with one.
    Senator Sullivan. We have several on the East Coast. Right? 
Why would we not have it in the Arctic?
    Ms. Conley. Indeed. You know, let us think about how long 
it took us to get the polar security cutter. It took over a 
decade of talking and studying. We cannot wait 10 years for 
this infrastructure.
    But I think we have to do it in a smart way. We have to 
think about public-private partnerships. We have to do this 
efficiently.
    Senator Sullivan. Do we not need to do it quickly?
    Ms. Conley. Absolutely. This is why there has to be a 
dedicated Arctic security initiative or infrastructure budget 
that gives impetus, that sends strong messages to our private 
sector partners that there is sustained funding. We have to do 
this. We have to stop writing studies and reports that are not 
tethered to resources and an implementation plan. We cannot 
wait any longer for this.
    Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a thought on 
this issue of infrastructure?
    Ms. Goodman. Mr. Chairman, yes, I agree we should have a 
strategic port in the Arctic, and we should use this 
opportunity because we need the infrastructure in the Arctic 
also to understand--and amending Heather's very brilliant 
concept of an Arctic security initiative, it should have an 
environmental security component as well. And we should use it 
as a way to understand what it takes to build a resilient port, 
resilient to changing conditions, changing more rapidly than we 
expect in the region.
    Senator Sullivan. A great point. Excellent.
    Mr. Sfraga, infrastructure, a series of ports like we have 
on the East Coast.
    Dr. Sfraga. I agree, a string of ports. I think we need a 
string of ports from the North Slope along the Bering Strait, 
use our Adak Naval Base----
    Senator Sullivan. I mean, what good is an icebreaker and 
national security cutter if you cannot actually pull up in a 
port in the Arctic, which you cannot right now?
    Dr. Sfraga. Agreed, especially when we see increased 
traffic along the Bering Strait by Russia, China, and other 
nations. So to me a string of ports makes total sense. I think 
you need sort of a Manhattan Project for the Bering Strait for 
this string of ports. Let us resource them. They are all 
different. The North Slope needs something. The Bering Strait 
needs something. The Aleutians need something. And if you had 
one concerted effort funded, strategized. As Heather said, we 
have studied this over and over again. We kind of know what we 
need. I think it needs to be resourced, but one effort, DOD, 
DHS, Commerce, and come together and build the string of ports 
finally.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just very quickly because I do 
want to be efficient on our timing here. Ms. Conley, you have 
studied the National Security Strategy, the National Defense 
Strategy, which I think has very strong bipartisan support in 
the Congress. But can you describe how important the Arctic is 
to U.S. national security and how increasingly we are falling 
behind with regard to what the new National Security Strategy 
talks about, great power competition?
    Ms. Conley. Thank you, Senator. Yes. In many ways we 
understood the strategic imperative of the Arctic in the Second 
World War and, of course, during the cold war. And at the end 
of the cold war, we forgot. We absolutely let it atrophy. Of 
course, Russia did as well. But around the 2007-2008 period, 
Russia made a strategic decision to reconstitute in part its 
military footprint and put its budget, its ambitions, and its 
forward-looking policies in place. And a decade later, we are 
seeing the manifestation of that in increased nuclear exercises 
in the Arctic and combined operations.
    China discovered the strategic importance of the Arctic 
around the 2010-2011 time-frame, and they are bearing the 
fruits of their strategic ambitions.
    We continue to believe that we can just hold this 
minimalist position, do the bare minimum, and it is going to be 
OK. And I want to challenge that notion. We talk about great 
power competition in the National Security Strategy and the 
National Defense Strategy, but those documents are basically 
silent on the Arctic. And now that we have placed this in 
context, we have to put our actions behind our rhetoric. So 
whereas Secretary Pompeo laid out a great power competition 
framework, and then opening up our consulate in Nuuk is the 
only response to that, the message is that we are rhetorically 
interested in great power competition in the Arctic, but we are 
not interested in putting our budget where our mouth is.
    Senator Sullivan. I am just going to ask you one final yes 
or no on this. Again, I am going to turn this over to Senator 
Markey here.
    The Armed Services Committee on a provision I wrote 
required the Secretary of Defense to put forward an Arctic 
strategy. It was a good attempt. It needs to be much more 
fulsome. But they talked about we are going to protect our 
sovereignty by doing freedom of navigation operations in the 
Arctic.
    Does the U.S. military have the capability to do a freedom 
of navigation operation in the Arctic? Yes or no.
    Ms. Conley. No. Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard could 
do a freedom of navigation operation in the Arctic today.
    Senator Sullivan. That is good to know.
    Dr. Sfraga. No, sir.
    Ms. Goodman. No, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, let me just put it out there again that between 1992 
and 2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly one million square 
miles, larger than the entire area of Alaska. One million 
square miles. And the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the 
global average. So this is only going to accelerate and create 
an even greater number of issues that we have to deal with. And 
we are far behind in dealing with it.
    And all of it just comes back to the Oxford English 
Dictionary naming climate emergency as the 2019 word of the 
year. And they could have used the Arctic as the definition of 
the climate emergency, receding ice, raging wildfires, melting 
permafrost, endangered Arctic communities, and the global 
climate system.
    Ms. Goodman, as you mentioned in your testimony, what 
happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Melting ice 
sheets are now the largest contributor to sea level rise, and 
the slowdown of the Gulf Stream due to warmer Arctic waters is 
raising sea levels in the northeast United States. Scientists 
have also linked warmer Arctic temperatures to more extreme 
winter weather in the eastern United States.
    Ms. Goodman, how does climate change in the Arctic affect 
the Coast Guard's operations, facilities, and readiness in 
States in more southern latitudes on the Atlantic, including 
Massachusetts?
    Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Senator Markey.
    The Coast Guard now has to respond more frequently to these 
extreme weather events, more search and rescue missions all 
around our coastline, as well as we see fish stocks moving. So 
there are more challenges in managing fisheries today. We see 
the Coast Guard deployed ever more frequently for many 
different missions. The Homeland Security mission essentially 
has become quite intense, and the Coast Guard has had to not 
only up its game in the Arctic, but it has to up its game along 
our eastern seaboard as well.
    And the challenge is, as you both know, it is often under-
resourced to do its job. As we often say in the Department of 
Defense, a strategy without budget is hallucination.
    Senator Markey. Exactly.
    And again, the strategy has to be to deal with climate 
change. That is what the Coast Guard is living every single 
day, and if their resources are not increased, then their 
capacity to deal with the consequences----
    Ms. Goodman. Right. And they are really on the front lines 
of dealing with the changing climate along our coast every day.
    Senator Markey. Absolutely.
    The Coast Guard must do all it can to defend its facilities 
against the effects of climate change. As I mentioned in my 
opening statement, I worked to include language in this year's 
Coast Guard reauthorization that asked the Coast Guard to 
assess which of its installations are the most vulnerable to 
climate change as the rest of the Department of Defense has 
done. The Department of Defense report found that climate 
change threatens more than two-thirds of our operational 
critical military installations.
    Ms. Goodman, what can we learn from the Department of 
Defense reports as we work to make sure the Coast Guard is 
climate-ready in the Arctic and at all of its facilities?
    Ms. Goodman. Well, Senator Markey, we need to climate-proof 
our bases and our installations, Coast Guard as well as 
military. The NDAA this year includes several requirements, one 
for military installation resilience planning, which I think is 
important and could also be potentially applied to the Coast 
Guard. It also updates the Uniform Facilities Code to enable 
defense facilities to be better prepared for extreme weather 
events, flooding, sea level rise, wildfires, and other climate 
conditions. And again, that provision may potentially also 
apply to the Coast Guard. Again, it will have to be resourced, 
but it will enable us to help provide resilient infrastructure 
for the future.
    Senator Markey. You organized a group of admirals and 
generals to speak out on this issue in 2007, and I actually had 
General Gordon Sullivan be the first witness before a hearing 
which I conducted in April 2007 on this issue warning of the 
danger of climate change to our national security.
    The numbers of admirals and generals in that group are now 
exponentially larger. Are they not?
    Ms. Goodman. Oh, many. We have over 60 members who have 
participated.
    Senator Markey. Admirals and generals.
    Ms. Goodman. Admirals and generals, including Coast Guard 
officers, and still very active today.
    Senator Markey. So the issue is not getting smaller. It is 
getting larger largely because it is unaddressed in terms of 
what the consequences will be.
    Ms. Goodman. Right. As we have said with respect to Coast 
Guard operations as well, this issue and climate change across 
our spectrum of operations and facilities still deserves more 
attention and more investment.
    Senator Markey. Does the Coast Guard need additional data 
or resources to update its facilities to make them more 
resilient to climate change?
    Ms. Goodman. Absolutely it needs more data, but there are 
things that it can do now with the data it has as it plans for 
future operations.
    Senator Markey. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I just want to 
ask Mr. Sfraga a quick question, which is that the BP oil spill 
was the worst environmental disaster in American history, 
resulting in the death of 11 crew members and injuring 17 
others. Oil spewed into the ocean for nearly 3 months despite 
the presence of helicopters and a variety of vessels able to 
respond. We also had reliable weather and ocean current data 
and a robust communications network. None of that is the case 
in the Arctic.
    Mr. Sfraga, can you describe what an oil spill would look 
like in the Arctic and our current capacity to respond?
    Dr. Sfraga. Senator Markey, I can describe it by saying not 
good. We simply do not have the assets and the resources for an 
oil spill or an LNG tanker disaster in the Arctic. Like you 
mentioned, the Gulf of Mexico, private corporations, public 
entities, personal vessels--this was an all-out onslaught to 
not only save lives but also to protect the environment.
    We have none of that in the Arctic. And that is why I think 
you need to combine the search and rescue, spill mitigation, 
and emergency clauses within a port or facilities along the 
Arctic. We do not know how oil, ice, and the Arctic Ocean 
interact. To have a devastating oil spill in the Arctic in the 
ice would be monumental not just to contain it, but what it 
would do for the environment. So we do not have, A, the basic 
research to really give us a good idea of what would happen in 
that domain. Two, we do not have the assets. As Senator 
Sullivan pointed out, you have got over 800 miles from Kodiak 
to the North Slope of Alaska just to get there to see what 
might happen.
    So I am quite concerned. That keeps me up at night, as well 
as a disaster with a potential cruise ship. So it would not be 
like we had in the Gulf of Mexico. It would be 180 degrees from 
that.
    Senator Markey. And it could wind up being days before an 
inadequate response could be put in place.
    Dr. Sfraga. That is correct, sir, and that is why I think 
having ports is far more than just hooking up ships. Having 
ports provides us capacity and capabilities needed to protect 
the environment for any development from the U.S. side, but 
also we must think about the increased traffic coming from the 
northern sea route down the Bering Strait that has nothing to 
do with our government at all.
    Senator Markey. And the damage to the Arctic ecosystem 
could be----
    Dr. Sfraga. Significant.
    Senator Markey. Catastrophic.
    Dr. Sfraga. Yes. And what is problematic there, one final 
note, is I would say it would be catastrophic. But in reality, 
the basic research--we still cannot give you a definitive 
answer on that, but I would say that it would not be good.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Sfraga. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. One final question. Admiral Ray is going 
to be testifying next, so we are going to bring him up.
    You know, I mentioned we are starting to build the first 
icebreaker. I think everybody recognizes this is important and 
the final progress that we are making. The NDAA actually has 
the authorization and schedule for six. The Coast Guard 
announced that the first couple of these would be home-ported 
in Seattle. I know Senator Cantwell is very pleased with that, 
which makes sense because that is where the current icebreakers 
are.
    I would just ask, as we talk about ports and 
infrastructure, you want, obviously, these capabilities near 
where the action is. Let us assume we build six on time in the 
next 5 to 6 years. Does it not make sense to home-port the next 
three in the part of America that is the Arctic? Would you 
agree with that, each panelist?
    Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, I think we have to remind 
ourselves that these are also for Antarctica. In fact, that 
heavy polar security cutter is likely going to spend most of 
its time in Antarctica.
    Senator Sullivan. No offense to my colleague from Florida, 
but you would not want to home-port these in Miami.
    Ms. Conley. No. But I am just saying I think sometimes we 
think these are only for the Arctic.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I actually think, to be perfectly 
honest, the Coast Guard is the Coast Guard. And their mission--
I know they have an Antarctica mission, but I think we need to 
take care of our home first, our coasts first. So, this is a 
discussion I have been having with the Coast Guard about 
prioritization. This is not, as you mentioned, when there is 
not a lot of activity in the Arctic. There is great power 
competition in the Arctic. There is a lot going on in the 
Arctic. The Coast Guard needs to recognize that. We are going 
to talk to Admiral Ray about that. So, the Antarctic in my view 
is an important mission, but it certainly does not rise to the 
importance of protecting America, which is their primary 
mission.
    Ms. Conley. I do not disagree. And this is why we have the 
need for six icebreakers. If we consider, as Sherri noted, that 
Russia is weaponizing icebreakers, that China is now proposing 
to build a nuclear-powered icebreaker which can maintain long-
term presence potentially in the Arctic, we need a more 
significant presence closer----
    Senator Sullivan. So just to answer my question, would it 
make sense to home-port the additional ones in the place in 
America where they are needed?
    Ms. Conley. They need to be closer to the Arctic and to the 
economic activity there, which means they have to be in the 
American Arctic.
    Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a view on that?
    Ms. Goodman. Senator, I do think we need to be able to 
home-port at least one or more of the new icebreakers in the 
American Arctic.
    I also want to stress that I think that continuing presence 
in Antarctica is important for America's global leadership.
    Senator Sullivan. No. I am not saying it is not important. 
I do not want to be misinterpreted there. I agree with you. I 
just think we need the capability to guard our own shores, and 
that is why we need at least six. And I think we need more than 
six, but six is good.
    Mr. Sfraga, do you have a view on that?
    Dr. Sfraga. Senator, yes, I think six is a good start. I do 
think at least a couple of these icebreakers need to be home-
ported in the State of Alaska or near to the Arctic. I do think 
it should be in the State of Alaska. How that pans out is up to 
the Coast Guard.
    Senator Sullivan. No. It is actually not just up to the 
Coast Guard. It is the point of hearing here. It is up to 
Congress working with the Coast Guard.
    Dr. Sfraga. Six is a good start. How they are allocated is 
up to Congress. But I do think at least two of those need to be 
in the Arctic.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
    Well, listen, you have been a great panel, and we are going 
to have additional questions for all of you I am sure. Thank 
you for your leadership. Thank you for your outstanding 
testimony. And all of you have really, really played a great 
role, and I think getting the Congress and the Executive Branch 
to finally wake up to our challenges you are seeing is very 
bipartisan. It is bipartisan not just on this committee, but on 
the Armed Services Committee. But your leadership and your 
expertise is going to be continued to be needed by the 
Congress, by the Coast Guard, by the military. And I really 
want to thank you for the outstanding service you have provided 
our Nation already and the testimony today. We anticipate 
having the three of you back in front of these committees on a 
very regular basis, as long as I am around this place. So thank 
you very much.
    Ms. Conley. We call ourselves the ``Arctic Musketeers.'' So 
you have got the three of us.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Sullivan. We will excuse you and now have the Vice 
Commandant of the Coast Guard for our next witness.
    [Pause.]
    Senator Sullivan. Admiral Ray, welcome, sir. The committee 
is very, very pleased to have you here. You have 5 minutes for 
your opening statement, and we, of course, will submit for the 
record a longer written statement, if you would like that, as 
well. The floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, VICE COMMANDANT, UNITED 
                       STATES COAST GUARD

    Admiral Ray. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate you having me here. Ranking Member Markey, good to 
see you as well, sir. Thank you for having me.
    And thanks for forming up the Coast Guard Caucus, sir. I 
look forward to working with you moving forward.
    Senator Sullivan. About time. Right? I mean, holy cow. But 
we are glad to have done it.
    Admiral Ray. Far be it for me to tell you how to form up 
caucuses, but I am proud you got one.
    Senator Sullivan. And it is very bipartisan. A lot of 
Senators already have joined.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today, 
and I ask that my written testimony be submitted for the 
record.
    Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    On behalf of Admiral Schultz and the entire service, I 
would like to thank this subcommittee for your unwavering 
support for our Coast Guard. Today I will discuss our strategy 
to uphold American sovereignty and advance national security 
interests and promote economic prosperity in the rapidly 
evolving Arctic.
    As you state in your opening statement, sir, for over 150 
years, the Coast Guard has been America's primary maritime 
presence in the Arctic, and we have seen the impact of 
increased accessibility, human activity, and geostrategic 
competition.
    This past August, Senator Wicker and I had the opportunity 
to witness the increased accessibility firsthand, as we flew 40 
miles north of Utqiagvick to land aboard Healy as she operated 
in an open Arctic Ocean. As a result of the opening of this new 
ocean, commercial opportunities abound from energy production, 
surging cruise industry, expanded environmental tourism, 
centuries old subsistence activities are being altered. 
Hundreds of fishermen must go further away from traditional 
fishing and hunting grounds. Illegal unreported and unregulated 
fishing is increasingly a threat with the obvious potential to 
negatively impact Alaska seafood industries and the U.S. 
economy.
    As we have seen many times in history, when there are new 
opportunities for resources, the potential for competition 
increases. Nations seek to shape the security environment, 
expand their influence, and advance their own interests. As has 
been stated several times, Russia has the world's largest 
icebreaker fleet, and more importantly, they use this, expand 
their infrastructure to bolster military activities, grow their 
economic investments along the northern sea route. From that 
position of strength, they have the ability to exert influence 
and compete pretty effectively below the level of armed 
conflict.
    As has been stated, China, a non-Arctic state, is also 
investing heavily in the region. This year they took delivery 
of their first domestically built icebreaker, and they are a 
shipbuilding country. And they are currently designing a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker. China is also pursuing economic 
investments, oil, gas, and rare earth minerals, as was 
mentioned by the earlier panel. And I think their encroachment 
on the Arctic is emblematic of what they have done all over the 
world. Left unchecked, their actions risk fracturing the 
Arctic's kind of rules-based governance.
    To address these expanding operational challenges and 
threats to national security, Coast Guard, as has been stated, 
released our Arctic Strategic Outlook last April. It builds on 
successes we had from our 2013 strategy and highlights the 
value that the Coast Guard delivers as part of a whole-of-
government solution to our Arctic challenges.
    Outlook reaffirms our commitment to American leadership in 
the Arctic, establishes three lines of effort, as the Senator 
said, will enhance our capability to operate effectively in the 
Arctic domain, strengthen rules-based order, innovate and adapt 
to promote resiliency and prosperity.
    As has been stated many times by the earlier panel, we must 
maintain a physical presence in the Arctic. It begins with 
icebreakers, and I thank this subcommittee, sir, for all your 
support for that. It has been a long haul, but we are a lot 
better off than we were just a couple of years ago.
    Our presence includes operations in communities, ports, and 
waters across the region. Through Arctic Shield, it is scalable 
year-round. And just as we have in many other missions in other 
parts of the world, we will use our extensive authorities and 
unique capabilities to continue to cultivate a global coalition 
of like-minded partners. We will work with Federal, State, and 
local communities to strengthen interoperability and secure 
U.S. sovereign rights.
    In the past year, the Coast Guard cooperated with the 
Department of Defense in the Arctic expeditionary capabilities 
exercise the Senator referred to in both Seward and Adak. We 
participated in a mass rescue exercise with the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum in Finland, and we hosted the North Atlantic Coast 
Guard Forum.
    In addition to physical presence on the seas to meet the 
needs of the nation, we must have reliable technical 
capabilities that include communications, maritime domain 
awareness, and navigation. After Senator Wicker and I left 
Healy in August, they sailed north of 75 degree north, and they 
were off the grid for 27 days, no comms, except for a sat 
phone. Addressing limited factors require a whole-of-
government.
    So I am confident with the support of this committee, we 
will rise to these challenges.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, 
                       United States Coast Guard
Introduction
    Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the 
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the U.S. Coast 
Guard's strategy and operations to safeguard national security 
interests and advance safe, secure, and environmentally responsible 
maritime activity in the Arctic Region.
    The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867, 
when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. Since that time, 
the state of affairs in the Arctic has evolved significantly. The 
environment is experiencing unprecedented levels of change. The ice is 
receding; storms are increasing in frequency and magnitude; the coast 
is eroding; and permafrost is thawing. Alaskan residents are striving 
to sustain their culture and way of life while residents and non-
residents alike are pursuing emerging opportunities. For the Coast 
Guard, the demand signal for our services is expanding along with the 
operational environment, exacerbating the tyranny of distance of the 
region. The types of commercial activity are morphing, from oil and gas 
exploration a few years ago to the recent surge in cruise ship activity 
and expanding environmental tourism. These rapid changes in types and 
location of activity, along with the changes in the physical 
environment, magnify the challenges in executing the Service's mission 
to advance safety, security, sovereign rights, and stewardship across 
the Arctic.
    Simultaneously, the geopolitical environment is rapidly changing as 
state and non-state actors seek to advance their own interests in the 
Arctic. Allies, partners, and competitors alike increasingly compete 
for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage. The National Defense 
Strategy describes a world no longer at either peace or war but rather 
one of enduring great power competition.
    Shaping and influencing this continuum requires a mixture of 
diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, 
and law enforcement efforts to achieve and sustain national strategic 
objectives. As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law 
enforcement authorities, combined with membership in the intelligence 
community, the Coast Guard moves seamlessly to bridge the layers in 
this competition continuum. Specifically, the Coast Guard's 
constabulary function and broad authorities serve as a beneficial 
bridge between the hard-power lethality of the Defense Department and 
soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. This strategic 
versatility is well suited for operating in ambiguous environments 
requiring a flexible blend of diplomatic, information, military, 
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of 
statecraft. This makes the Coast Guard a unique agency to cultivate 
strong international relationships and better build a coalition of 
Arctic partners based on mutual interests and values that strengthen 
regional stability and enhance prosperity across the region. In 
collaboration with our Federal partners, the ultimate goal is for the 
Coast Guard to be the preferred, transparent partner in the Arctic.
    Our recently published 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms the 
Service's commitment to American leadership in the region through 
partnership, unity of effort, and continuous innovation, and 
establishes three lines of effort to achieve long-term success. First, 
we will enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic 
domain; second, we will strengthen the rules-based order; and third, we 
will innovate and adapt to promote resilience and foster prosperity. 
Our strategy aligns with the Nation's needs and interests to secure the 
Arctic, which requires significant investment and a whole-of-government 
approach across multiple Departments, agencies, and Services. The Coast 
Guard's value in this whole of government approach is our experience, 
leadership, model behavior, and ability to compete below the level of 
armed conflict. Therefore, strengthening the Coast Guard empowers the 
Nation to secure the Arctic against threats and shape the region as a 
safe, cooperative, and prosperous domain.
National Security Interests in the Arctic Region
    The United States is an Arctic nation with extensive sovereign 
rights and responsibilities, and our national security interests in the 
Arctic are significant, in part due to the reemergence of great power 
competition in the region. As access to the region evolves, many Arctic 
and non-Arctic nations aspire to assert or expand their role in 
governing the region; the dynamic operational environment continues to 
present risks and opportunities for a broad spectrum of stakeholders. 
To safeguard our national interests, the United States must plan for a 
robust, year-round maritime presence commensurate with the expanding 
interest in the Arctic's strategic value, in its natural resources, and 
in its potential as a transportation corridor between Asia, Europe, and 
North America. If we are not vigilant and proactive, other non-Arctic 
nations will outpace us in assuring their strategic interests in the 
Arctic in ways that may adversely affect the United States' interests.
    Actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic states shape the 
security environment and geopolitical stability of the region. In 
particular, our two near-peer competitors, Russia and China, are 
demonstrably intent on exploiting the maritime domain to advance their 
interests. Twenty percent of Russia's landmass is north of the Arctic 
Circle, and both onshore and offshore resource (minerals, oil, and gas) 
development is crucial to the Russian economy. Russia is also advancing 
the growth of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for trans-Arctic shipping 
and other commercial opportunities.
    The NSR continues to set new shipping records, last year reaching 
19.7 million tons of goods transported along the route. Natural 
resource extraction is the main contributor to these increases, 
predominantly oil and gas shipments from their Yamal facilities. If 
their energy projections come to fruition, then transport volumes on 
the NSR could reach 100 million tons per year by 2030.
    From a military perspective, Russia's long Arctic coastline, once 
stripped of sea ice in the future, will be both vulnerable, and able to 
support naval fleets readily deployable between the Atlantic and 
Pacific. The Russian government is currently rebuilding and expanding 
military bases that had previously fallen into disuse. These renewed 
capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop 
deployments, domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue response. 
Additionally, Russia has the world's largest number of icebreakers. 
With over 50 icebreakers that include four operational, nuclear-powered 
heavy icebreakers, and plans to build an additional seven nuclear 
powered icebreakers, Russia maintains the capabilities, capacities, 
experienced crews, and infrastructure necessary to operate and surge 
into the Arctic year-round.
    China has recently taken an active role in Arctic development, 
pursuing economic investments with every Arctic nation in key strategic 
areas, such as oil and gas development, ports, railways, and 
infrastructure. It has purchased numerous resource deposits throughout 
the region, including uranium, energy, and rare-earth elements. With 
the release of their Arctic Policy paper in January 2018, China 
declared itself a nation intrinsically tied to the Arctic, and signaled 
their intention to play a security and governance role in the region. 
China has directed Chinese companies and government agencies to become 
more involved in Arctic affairs, and is rapidly developing its ability 
to operate in the region. This year, China launched its first home-
built icebreaker and has begun designing an even more powerful and 
potentially nuclear-powered Polar icebreaker expected to have twice the 
icebreaking capability of its newest vessel. With three icebreakers 
China will have greater access than the United States currently has to 
the Arctic, its ports, and its resources. The concern with Chinese 
activities in the Arctic is the potential to disrupt the cooperation 
and stability in the region. Around the globe, China uses coercion, 
influence operations, debt-trap diplomacy, and implied military threats 
to persuade other states to heed China's strategic agenda. China views 
the Arctic as a component of its One Belt, One Road initiative, 
recently dubbed the Polar Silk Road. China's ambitions and outreach are 
fraught with risk, often times diminishing the sovereignty of states 
and fracturing the rules-based governance currently employed in the 
region.
    National security interests extend to the local level as well. For 
example, economic, environmental, and human security and stewardship 
are also linked to the changes and expanding activity in the Arctic. 
Significant increases in natural resource extraction in the U.S. Arctic 
have not yet materialized, but industries continue to explore 
opportunities so that they are positioned to leverage economic 
prospects as they emerge. Current industry growth in the Arctic 
includes a significant increase in cruise tourism and transpolar 
flights, which could potentially increase search and rescue missions 
and risk to the pristine environment. Additionally, we have observed 
steady but measured growth of shipping through the Bering Strait over 
the past ten years, across all sectors of industry. As the Arctic 
continues to experience longer and larger periods of reduced or ice-
free conditions, commercial interest and exploitation will grow. A 
recent U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System report 
projects that by 2030, vessel traffic through the Bering Strait could 
increase to more than 370 transits, which is roughly three times the 
2008 traffic levels. This potential rise will increase the demand for 
the Coast Guard to monitor, protect, and regulate increased maritime 
activity, such as de-conflicting shipping corridors in U.S. waters with 
subsistence hunting and fishing communities.
    Food security is another significant issue for Arctic residents and 
our Nation as a whole. The Bering Sea provides more than half of the 
wild-caught fish and shellfish in the United States, and the wildlife 
for subsistence harvesting. Alaska is ranked seventh in the world in 
global fish exporters, and their seafood industry accounts for almost 
$6 billion a year in total economic activity. Additionally, 
approximately 70 percent of the U.S. Arctic population relies on 
subsistence hunting and fishing for survival, the vast majority of 
which comes from the sea. Thus, changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean 
are increasing the risk to food security for the globe, from shipping 
that disrupts migration patterns, to increased risk of pollution 
incidents, to growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as 
fish stocks migrate.
    As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic region, 
challenges associated with legal and illicit activity plus state and 
non-state actors are likely to increase. In the face of this 
competition continuum, the Coast Guard's value proposition is even more 
critical in the Arctic and around the globe. The Service upholds 
freedom of the seas and the rules-based order by setting and enforcing 
standards of behavior in the maritime domain.
Balancing National Security Interests Across the Globe
    The Coast Guard possesses a broad suite of authorities and 
capabilities unique from the other armed services and traditional 
instruments of national defense. As previously noted, the Coast Guard's 
authorities expand beyond traditional military and intelligence roles, 
to include law enforcement and regulatory roles. This combination, 
along with a multitude of steady-state international bilateral 
agreements, offers a distinct compliment to conventional defense forces 
in the ongoing struggle to compete below the level of armed conflict.
    Coast Guard international engagements complement more traditional 
U.S. military posturing. Regular and persistent Coast Guard presence 
and peaceful engagements support regional stability while positioning 
the United States as the global maritime security partner of choice. 
The Coast Guard operates around the world in accordance with over 60 
international bilateral agreements, to include 11 with Oceania nations.
    Furthermore, the Service is also party to and, in many cases, 
serves in a leading capacity within a variety of multilateral forums 
including the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, Arctic Coast Guard 
Forum, South East Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the 
Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. This combination of 
access, authorities, and international acceptance, offers an 
indispensable opportunity of regional support and stability in this new 
era of competing influence.
    As the world's preeminent coast guard, the U.S. Coast Guard is 
logically the most suited to build partner capacity in maritime law 
enforcement, search and rescue, marine safety, fisheries management and 
conservation--all of which are traditional Coast Guard missions. These 
missions, incidentally, are in growing demand across the globe. 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, in particular, is a 
priority issue impacting global stability, in the Atlantic, across the 
Pacific, and even in Antarctica, where many economies heavily depend on 
local fish stocks as a primary source of protein and personal income.
    The Service, through its internationally recognized maritime law 
enforcement expertise and a multitude of bilateral and related ship 
rider agreements, offers viable options to augment partner nation law 
enforcement capacity to patrol their respective exclusive economic 
zones. These efforts are essential to preserving, protecting, and 
defending critical regional and migratory fish stock sustainability and 
economic vitality while simultaneously countering the malign influence 
and predatory practices of globally-spread powers such as China.
The Coast Guard in Alaska and the Arctic Region
    The Coast Guard has been an active leader in the Arctic for over 
150 years. Our latest 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms our 
commitment to American leadership in the region and articulates the 
ends, ways, and means to promote and safeguard national security in the 
Arctic. This includes waging a campaign for safety, sovereign rights, 
and stewardship through cooperation, addressing competition below the 
level of conflict, and preparing for conflict should it arise. The 
following highlights some of the initiatives that have particular 
impacts on our national and international security, but these 
activities must be part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach 
to security in the Arctic.
Strategic Leadership
    As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to 
expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is 
working collaboratively through international bodies to address the 
emerging challenges and opportunities in the region. One example is our 
support to the Arctic Council, which is a high-level international 
forum focused primarily on environmental protection and sustainable 
development issues in the Arctic region. The Council is composed of the 
eight Arctic nations, six Arctic indigenous groups, observer nations 
(including China), and non-governmental organizations that have 
observer status. The Coast Guard plays a significant role in supporting 
our Nation's existing engagement in Arctic Council activities through 
representation on two standing working groups--Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness & Response (EPPR), and Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME).
    Under the EPPR working group, the Coast Guard leads the U.S. 
Government delegation and serves as Chair of the Marine Environmental 
Response Experts Group. Within PAME, the Coast Guard participates in 
the Shipping Experts Group where we support projects such as mitigation 
of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by 
vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also served on the Council's 
Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation and has been active in other 
task forces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue 
Agreement, the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and 
the 2015 Framework for Oil Pollution Prevention.
    The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other 
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and 
adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(Polar Code) to cover the design, construction, equipment, operational, 
training, and environmental protection matters relevant to ships 
operating in the Polar regions. In 2017, the Coast Guard completed a 
rulemaking process to issue Polar Ship Certificates to U.S. vessels. We 
also developed and promulgated guidance to industry and our Captains-
of-the-Port on how to ensure compliance with the Polar Code.
    Additionally, in November 2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with 
the Russian Federation to jointly develop and submit a proposal to the 
IMO to establish a system of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and 
Bering Sea. The Coast Guard also submitted an associated proposal to 
establish ``Areas to be Avoided'' in three environmentally sensitive 
areas. The objective was to advance the maritime transportation system 
in the region; promote the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
conflict the commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence 
activities. The IMO adopted these measures at the 99th session of its 
Maritime Safety Committee, and the provisions entered into force in 
December 2018. These are but two examples of the Coast Guard being 
proactive in addressing emerging international and domestic maritime 
concerns in the Arctic.
    Last, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) is a bridge between 
diplomacy and operations. Formally established in October 2015, the 
ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of our Arctic strategy as well 
as the objectives of the Arctic Council. It is a unique, action-
oriented maritime governance forum where the Coast Guard and our peer 
agencies from the other seven Arctic nations strengthen relationships, 
identify lessons learned, share best practices, carry out exercises, 
conduct combined operations, and coordinate emergency response 
missions. In April 2019, the ACGF conducted its second live exercise, 
POLARIS, which incorporated six ships and five aircraft from the ACGF 
member nations to respond to a simulated cruise ship in distress near 
Finland. The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined 
operations with the eight ACGF nations and highlights the criticality 
of coordination in maritime environmental response and the 
responsibility to ensure search and rescue resources are prepared to 
respond.
Coast Guard Operations in the American Arctic
    Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning 
and operational endeavor that provides a flexible, mobile, and scalable 
presence in the Arctic domain. In 2019, ARCTIC SHIELD (AS19) operations 
advanced national and Coast Guard strategic goals by aligning 
operations to mitigate real-world threats and leverage opportunities of 
strategic interest.
    To promote regional resilience and strengthen the maritime 
transportation system, the Coast Guard spearheaded a Marine Safety Task 
Force (MSTF) to conduct missions in the remote regions of their Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). Employing active and reserve surge personnel, the 
MSTF deployed to and engaged with 102 local communities to perform 
marine safety and marine environmental protection missions in villages 
not on the road system in the Arctic and Western Alaska. In addition to 
the summer surge support, a major contributor to the MSTF success has 
been its partnerships: the Civil Air Patrol transportation saved 
valuable resources and allowed personnel to transit more seamlessly 
between remote villages.
    The MSTF teams inspected over 60 percent of the region's 380 
regulated bulk oil facilities--a massive improvement over the prior 
annual average of 12 percent. Frequent inspections and proactive 
communications between the Coast Guard and facility operators will 
reduce the environmental risk to remote communities, help remote 
villages build capacity to respond, and set baselines for resilience 
and awareness as their environment rapidly changes.
    From July to October, MH-60 helicopters and crews deployed to 
Forward Operating Location Kotzebue and to Utqiagvik to conduct Coast 
Guard missions. This year, those helicopters completed 25 SAR cases, 
saved 13 lives, and assisted 28 others in an environment harsher than 
anywhere else the Coast Guard operates. Additionally these assets 
improved the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness in the Arctic and 
provided critical support to Federal and state personnel studying 
marine mammals. The Coast Guard partnered with DoD to leverage their 
strategic lift capabilities to deploy the assets to Kotzebue and the 
North Slope. Additionally, when the helicopters made the unplanned 
shift to Utqiagvik in September, the Coast Guard leveraged a 
longstanding positive partnership with the North Slope Borough to gain 
critical hanger space and logistical support on short notice. The Coast 
Guard would not have been able to complete its scheduled deployment to 
the Arctic and provide SAR coverage to North Slope mariners without the 
efforts and support from both. The Coast Guard departed Utqiagvik on 
October 31, 2019, but subsistence whale hunting is still ongoing today. 
This highlights the changing operational environment not only for the 
Coast Guard but also for Arctic residents. The lengthened ``shoulder'' 
seasons of open water are beyond the period in which the Coast Guard 
has the resources to be present. Without the Coast Guard's highly 
mobile expeditionary forces, risk to mariners and coastal residents 
will escalate as maritime activity and traffic expands throughout the 
vast Arctic.
    AS19 exercised the Coast Guard's expeditionary capability by 
deploying a team from our Deployable Specialized Forces in California 
to conduct shore based law enforcement operations for the Kotzebue 
salmon state fishery that consists of nearly 100 small open skiffs. The 
enforcement operation reinforced several years of extensive marine 
prevention outreach, education, and training with these fishers. 
Planning and executing this mission highlighted the logistical and 
administrative challenges involved in supporting mission execution in 
the Arctic. This deployed law enforcement team provided 3 weeks of on-
water presence and contacted 59 commercial fishing vessels and 
conducted 27 boardings with 5 voyage terminations. The operation 
bolstered community support from the mayor and local fishermen and 
rallied the community to improve their own safety and survivability at 
sea.
    In the absence of a consistent law enforcement presence in the 
region, the Coast Guard must develop and exercise expeditionary 
capability to project surface forces into the Arctic as the weather 
patterns are less predictable and maritime activity continues to 
evolve. This team's employment points to the urgent need to modernize 
assets, infrastructure, and platforms to effectively operate and 
provide presence in the Arctic.
    In 2020, operations will be supported with cutter, aircraft, and 
shoreside presence across Western and Northern Alaska. Specific 
activities include establishing a regional SAR response capability, 
conducting boardings to promote fishing vessel safety, facility and 
vessel inspections, gold dredge fleet inspections, maritime safety 
compliance enforcement, and ice rescue training.
    Planned activities also include testing and improving oil spill 
preparedness and response capabilities, conducting a commercial 
aircraft crash-related mass rescue exercise, and completing a joint 
maritime pollution contingency exercise with international partners. 
Year-round outreach efforts will continue to deliver education and 
awareness services to Arctic communities and outlying native villages.
    As presence equals influence, the Coast Guard must continue to 
evaluate options to advance our 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook as well 
as national interests in the region. The resurgence of nation-state 
competition over the past 5-10 years has coincided with the dramatic 
changes in the physical environment of the Arctic. This reality has 
elevated the Arctic's prominence as a strategically competitive space. 
The Coast Guard, and the Nation, have limited means to respond to, 
intercept, or collect information on vessels operating in the Arctic 
region.
Icebreaking Capacity and Acquisition Status
    The ability for the United States to lead in the Arctic, both 
strategically and operationally, hinges on having the capabilities and 
capacity (presence) to protect our national sovereignty and safeguard 
our homeland security interests. The foundation of the Coast Guard's 
operational presence and influence is U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose 
is to provide assured, year-round access to the polar regions for 
executing national security missions within existing Coast Guard 
authorities. Our heavy icebreakers must be fully interoperable with 
DoD, international allies, and partners to optimally carry out national 
maritime homeland defense and homeland security missions. Thus, they 
will include sufficient space, weight, and power to conduct the full 
complement of multi-mission activities that support our Nation's 
current and future national security interests in the Arctic.
    The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified 
the need for six new polar icebreakers (at least three of which must be 
heavy) under the assumption that, in the future, the Coast Guard would 
be required to perform nine of its eleven statutory missions year-round 
in the Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United 
States Antarctic Program.
    In 2017, the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy 
completed an addendum to the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a 
broad overview of changes in the polar regions over the last seven 
years and to provide specific information for use in determining 
potential impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum 
provides confidence in the original findings and encourages the 
sustained reliance on its initial recommendations on the Nation's need 
for six icebreakers, three of which must be heavy icebreakers.
    The current Coast Guard icebreaker capacity is one heavy polar 
icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR--commissioned in 1976, and one medium 
icebreaker, CGC HEALY--commissioned in 2000. The primary differences 
between heavy and medium icebreakers are endurance and power. The Coast 
Guard considers a heavy icebreaker to be one that can break at least 
six feet of ice at a continuous speed of three knots and operate year-
round in the Arctic, with the necessary systems and endurance to 
protect its crew in the event it has to ``winter-over'' in substantial 
ice conditions. Conversely, medium icebreakers are designed to operate 
seasonally in the Arctic.
    Due to the strong support of the Administration and Congress, the 
FY 2019 appropriation included full funding for the acquisition of our 
first Polar Security Cutter (PSC), and some long lead time materials 
for the second. This investment sends a strong message that the Nation 
is serious about our interests in the Arctic. In April of this year, 
the joint Coast Guard and Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) awarded 
VT Halter Marine Inc., of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price 
incentive (firm) contract for the detail design and construction of the 
lead PSC. We are as close as we have been in over 40 years to 
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet, and continued investment will 
ensure we meet our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and 
dynamic polar regions.
    The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing 
heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with 
recapitalization. Construction on the first PSC is planned to begin in 
2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract includes 
financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR 
will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are 
delivered. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension project 
on POLAR STAR are already underway and initial work for this project 
will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from 
2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the 
vessel's service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.
Shore Infrastructure
    In addition to having the necessary platforms to maintain our 
presence in the Arctic, the Coast Guard maintains a robust shore 
infrastructure laydown in Alaska. Shore facilities support all Coast 
Guard operations and personnel, as well as provide required 
infrastructure to support the needs of the Service's operational 
communities. Investments in shore infrastructure are critical to 
modernizing the Coast Guard and equipping our workforce with the 
facilities required to meet mission.
    With approximately 10 percent of the Coast Guard's real property 
inventory located in Alaska, the need for proper capital investments is 
all the more critical given the vast distances between shore facilities 
in that region. We are currently building waterfront facilities and 
shore infrastructure to support the delivery of six new Fast Response 
Cutters (FRC) and two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to Alaska, as well 
as the critical housing and family support facilities to accommodate 
the additional personnel and their families to operate and maintain 
these new assets. Additionally, over the last few years, we have built 
a new hangar to support forward deployed helicopters in Cold Bay, 20 
new housing units in Kodiak, as well as new facilities in Kodiak to 
enable our transition from C-130H to C-130J aircraft.
Conclusion
    These efforts reaffirm our commitment to the region and our need 
for capabilities, capacity, and infrastructure to protect our national 
security and economic security interests in the region. Arctic 
operations must be balanced with competing demands for Coast Guard 
focus both at home and abroad. However, the Coast Guard must remain 
flexible and scalable to adapt to the rapidly evolving geopolitical and 
operational Arctic environments.
    Regardless, the Coast Guard will continue to lead across the 
National and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as an area of low 
tension, high attention, and great cooperation while preserving our 
national interests and rights. This leadership and collaboration across 
the national and international spectrum will enable us to reinforce 
positive opportunities and mitigate negative consequences in the Arctic 
region. Failing to increase and focus our Nation's leadership in the 
Arctic will result in other powerful nations taking the lead in a 
region with critical geostrategic value.
    We understand the significant investment required to secure the 
Arctic, and we appreciate and embrace the trust the Nation has placed 
in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I 
look forward to answering your questions.

    Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral. And I want to 
thank you again for coming up to Alaska with Chairman Wicker. 
It was a great visit. You have a lot of fans in Alaska. I can 
tell you that.
    And I do want to mention, as the Chairman and Ranking 
Member not just of this subcommittee, which has oversight of 
the Coast Guard, but also as the new leaders of the Coast Guard 
Caucus, we made a commitment. I certainly have. I will let 
Senator Markey speak for himself here. But on this issue of pay 
for the members of the Coast Guard, if there is another 
government shutdown, we have a provision currently in the Coast 
Guard bill that we are drafting, working with the House, very 
bipartisan that is in there that would prevent that from 
happening. So you would be treated--the great men and women of 
the Coast Guard--just like the men and women of the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marines. We cannot allow that. If there is 
another government shutdown, we cannot allow that to happen.
    Now, I am hearing there is some resistance to this in parts 
of the Congress. I am not sure where, but we are committed to 
working with you and other members to make sure there is 
parity. Parity. Outrageous that last year members of the Coast 
Guard were doing operations all over the world shoulder to 
shoulder with marines and sailors, and the Coast Guard men and 
women were not getting paid. We need to fix that. We are 
committed to fixing that. It is in the bill right now, and I 
want to call out any colleagues of mine who are trying to block 
that because I think most Americans found that outrageous that 
your men and women were not getting paid.
    So I am assuming you support that provision.
    Admiral Ray. If I may, sir, since last January when the 
government started back up after the 35-day shutdown, I have 
traveled from Puerto Rico to Alaska, from Boston to Houston, 
and every place I meet with Coasties--every place, without 
fail--they say, Admiral, what are you doing because young 
Coasties think I can do anything? And I quickly let them know 
it requires a change in law. What are you doing to ensure that 
that does not happen again? And they understand it. They are 
smart and they get it when I explain to them how the process 
works.
    But the thing I care about over the long haul is in the 
short term, it is a readiness issue. When I got people worrying 
about that, they are not worrying about the dangerous work they 
are doing day in and day out. And then over the long haul, the 
young people that serve in the Coast Guard that raise their 
right hand--they are making decisions. They can serve in the 
Marine Corps, in the Army, the Air Force, and they are choosing 
to serve in our Coast Guard, and I do not want them to think 
that the Coast Guard is less of an armed service and we are 
going to do a less job of taking care of them and their 
families.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to work with you on 
that, but we might need you to work some of our colleagues over 
who are resisting that, which I think is not appropriate. And I 
do not know where the resistance is coming from but evidently 
it is out there.
    I want to follow up on a question that I mentioned. We are 
making progress on the icebreakers. I asked a series of 
questions of our last panel just with regard to the state of 
not just infrastructure but Coast Guard assets. We are 
committed--this committee is committed--to the very broad-based 
recapitalization effort that is ongoing with the Coast Guard, 
more ships, better ships, more technologically advanced ships 
and aircraft.
    But would you agree--and I know it is a longer-term 
decision that the Congress and the Coast Guard has to make, but 
assuming we are able to get on budget or even faster six polar 
security cutters and medium cutters like the Healy, that they 
should be home-ported near where the Arctic is. The Coast Guard 
has already announced the Seattle basing, which given that 
there is currently cutters or icebreakers there, you can see 
how that would make sense. But moving forward, thinking about 
our strategic interests, thinking about the time it takes for 
an icebreaker to get from Seattle to the Arctic, 8 days or 
more, I know you cannot commit, but do you not think as you are 
looking strategically, assuming you had the resources, that 
that would make sense?
    Admiral Ray. Sir, I want to thank you for your support for 
home ports in general, for assets as we have looked forward 
with our fast response cutters moving up across Alaska and 
striking that balance between being close to the mission and 
being in places where we can maintain the assets and take care 
of our families that come along with them.
    So to answer your question, yes, sir. This is part of a 
holistic analysis. If we look at mission effectiveness, the 
ability to sustain the assets, and the ability to sustain the 
families of the people that are sailing and working on them. So 
we look forward to working, as we move forward, with you.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just a more direct question. 
You saw the wonderful people in Dutch Harbor. In Alaska, that 
is the number one fishing port in the nation, 10 years running, 
given the amount of seafood that is harvested from Alaskan 
waters. And the Coast Guard personnel station there do 
tremendous work. When you and I were there with the Chairman, 
we saw what great work they do and how strongly they are 
supported by the community in that very busy port.
    As we discussed, the Coast Guard members are required to 
complete their tour unaccompanied. That community has great 
schools, an increasing medical clinic with good capability. I 
think they would be warmly welcomed if the Coast Guard took a 
look at being able to bring their families with them on 
assignment. I know you got a bit of a polite earful when you 
were with me and Chairman Wicker on that issue.
    Have you been able to take a look at that or do you want to 
get back to me on the record for that question, which I know 
you probably expected me to ask you?
    Admiral Ray. Sir, we are committed to looking at that in 
the upcoming assignment, not this assignment season, but as we 
shape up our billets for this coming year in 2020. So I love 
Dutch Harbor, and there is a lot of people that do.
    Senator Sullivan. Me too. By the way, the Coast Guard does 
too. All the members out there love it.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. But we are meeting mission right now 
with the way we are doing it, sir. And it is not just a--I 
mean, we are meeting mission, sending folks out there for 1 
year, and the guys and gals that go out there and do the work 
that they do--they are integrated into the community quickly 
and doing it. I can understand the community--their desire to 
have the Coasties become a more integral part of their 
community because of the kind of young folks that we send out 
there. We are going to look at this issue and see if there are 
ways we can get there from here.
    We have got other places, as you know, in our service where 
we send people, single, because there are challenges with 
regard to, as you mentioned already, medical or schools or 
other things. Some of those may not apply in Dutch, but we have 
to look at the big picture.
    So we are going to look at that. I do not have the answer 
yet. When I got it, I will get to you.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    I am just going to come back to oil spills, if I may, sir.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. They are extremely challenging to clean up 
in icy conditions because oil gets trapped under ice or can 
travel upwards through small holes in porous ice. Therefore, in 
addition to the immediate response to the oil spill, oil will 
need to be cleaned up once the ice melts or travels to the top 
of the ice flows.
    In the 2019 Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard acknowledges 
shortfalls in its ability to respond to oil spills in the 
Arctic, but is not specific about what those shortfalls are.
    Admiral Ray, can you give us some examples of those 
shortfalls and how the Coast Guard is working to overcome them?
    Admiral Ray. If I could go in reverse order, sir, I will 
talk about what we are doing to overcome it and then talk about 
the shortfalls, if that is acceptable, Senator.
    So the oil spill challenge we have in the Arctic--you got 
to address it from prevention to response. So on the 
prevention, on the very high-end strategic end, we have done 
several things recently specifically to address this.
    One, we are kind of the drivers of the polar code for 
vessels operating up in the Arctic region. We have led the 
nation's effort at the International Maritime Organization. So 
what that does is makes ships less likely to cause an oil 
spill. We have one of the few relationships with Russia on this 
with regard to the boundary in the Bering Strait between our 
countries where we would work together to ensure that. And in 
fact, we have done that creating a port access route study to 
keep ships separated going through the Bering Strait. So on the 
prevention side, we are working it.
    With regard to responding, we have a series of exercises 
every year that work at both the national level and all the way 
down to the village level where we will go with the local 
village people, open the container that has got the pre-
positioned boom, drag it out, make sure it is in good shape. So 
we are working at the tactical level. So from the top to the 
end.
    And every summer--there is not a secret weapon for oil in 
ice yet that we have found. And every summer for the last 
decade, we have done research and development either onboard 
Coast Guard Healy when she is up there or in some other 
independent fashion with various ways to get oil out of ice, 
underneath ice, on top of ice. We are working with the Alaska 
Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence up in the 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks to put a UAV under the ice 
this winter to study this problem. So we are working at it 
hard. We do not have any ironclad solutions.
    And then the problem, Senator, is the same thing that 
challenges most operations in Alaska. It is time, distance, 
weather. Unless you have got a vessel poised, stationed every 
so many miles, which is just not sustainable, that is the 
biggest challenge. It is the tyranny of distance and that.
    But there is also scientific challenges, as has been 
mentioned by our esteemed panel members, and we are working to 
get after that.
    Senator Markey. And I am, obviously, very concerned about 
this. Today is actually the fourth anniversary of the signing 
of the Paris Climate Agreement, just 4 years ago today. And a 
lot of it is in recognition of what is happening up in the 
Arctic because it has consequences for the entire planet, 
especially that ice cap on Greenland. That is the largest ice 
cube imaginable. If it goes into the water, it is going to be 
catastrophic, upwards of 10 to 20 feet of sea rise. And it is 
happening at a very rapid rate, and it is much worse today than 
it was 4 years ago, and it is much worse today than when we 
began actually discussing this issue years ago.
    So we can see the consequences as well. The Coast Guard's 
2019 Strategic Outlook notes that fish stocks are shifting 
northward in response to warmer ocean temperatures in the 
Arctic creating new fishery enforcement challenges and illegal 
fishing presents one of the most significant law enforcement 
missions in the Arctic region. In August, the U.S. agreed to a 
moratorium on fishing in the high Arctic seas along with 
Canada, the European Union, and Russia. There are currently no 
commercial fisheries in the Arctic high seas because most of 
the region is covered by ice year around, but that is rapidly 
changing.
    So, Admiral, how does the Coast Guard currently partner 
with existing organizations and communities to monitor shifting 
fish stocks, marine mammals, and other living marine resources 
in the Arctic?
    Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    We are very active at the national level with NOAA in 
understanding fish stocks and understanding the changes to what 
is happening both in the weather in that area and with regard 
to the migration of the species. We work with NOAA as an 
enforcement arm. They do not have the capability to get 
offshore and enforce fisheries laws. And we have been doing 
that for many years.
    In the Alaska region, we work with the State troopers 
extensively, provide transportation for them. We work with them 
inside close to shore. And then we do independent operations on 
the high seas in the Bering Sea and up in the Arctic. Right 
now, as you say, there is no authorized fishing north of 64-ish 
I think is the latitude that we do not fish north of.
    But the point is that we are latched up with our 
interagency team. We are following the science. When the 
Senator and I were in Alaska at Nome, we had a NMFS scientist 
there. In the dirt of the parking lot in the Nome harbor, it 
was the best description I have had of the changing water 
temperature, what is happening with the Pollack stocks. And she 
drew a line in the sand. She told us what was happening with 
the fish stocks. So they are moving north, and we have got to 
be able to get up there and do enforcement there. And we intend 
to be there.
    Senator Markey. Yes. The cod of Massachusetts--they are 
moving north. The lobster are moving north. They need cold 
water. And we are seeing it dramatically along our coastline.
    The moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic high 
seas will be reconsidered in 16 years. It can take more than 10 
years to procure Coast Guard vessels that can withstand Arctic 
ice conditions.
    Admiral Ray, would the Coast Guard be ready for enforcement 
activity should the moratorium be lifted?
    Admiral Ray. Sir, our plan for--when you hear us talk about 
6-3-1, when we talk about recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet, 
we are talking about we need six polar icebreakers altogether. 
And three of them at least have to be heavy. And the essence of 
that, the underlying assumption is that we want access to the 
Arctic year-round. Right now, we do not have the capacity or 
the capability to do that. But in the future, our intent is to 
have access year-round.
    One of the reasons we call them polar security cutters--
icebreakers are just a means to an end. We are not up there to 
break ice. We are up there to get through ice to get to where 
we need to do our mission. And so that is literally what we 
will do with those.
    So to answer your question, I think in 10 years, given the 
pace that we are on with regard to building out, if we keep the 
funding steady, we are supposed to launch the first polar 
security cutter in 2024, and with one coming each year after 
that. If we stay steady with our funding, sir, we have got a 
good chance of being ready for that.
    Senator Markey. And one final question. If there was an oil 
spill and it was Russia or China that was responsible, what is 
their capacity to respond to an oil spill?
    Admiral Ray. I will have to get back to you on their 
specific capacity. I know that we exercise with the Russians. 
They have actually been to Juneau in the last few months, and 
we have been over there. And so we do exercises, table-tops in 
a lot of cases, exercises with regard to oil spills at sea in 
that boundary area, that seam between our nations? waters. So I 
do not know the specifics of their spill response equipment, 
but my assumption, given that we are exercising with them, they 
got some.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey, thanks. It is an 
important point because all of these issues, infrastructure, 
assets, are related to everything that we have been talking 
about, including to be ready for any kind of environmental 
spill or ship collision, as the previous panel had talked 
about. And again, the capacity that we expect in the Lower 48 
and pretty much have just does not exist in the Arctic. 
Everybody recognizes that. The previous panel made it clear 
that the National Defense Strategy, the new Arctic DOD strategy 
says we should be doing freedom of navigation operations. That 
is the strategy. We do not have that capability to do that 
right now with the Navy or the Coast Guard.
    Senator Markey. May I just say just in conclusion, I agree 
with the Chairman on pay for the Coast Guard?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Just 100 percent in agreement. There is 
absolutely no justification for not including the Coast Guard. 
You are vital to our national security. You are vital to 
protecting our citizens. And it is only getting more dangerous 
out there because of climate change, because of these weather 
conditions that are absolutely getting more extreme on an 
ongoing basis, more exposure to risk to these young men and 
women. And they should be paid equally with the other branches.
    Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me go a little deeper, Admiral, on 
one of the capabilities that you highlighted in your testimony 
again that we lack in the Arctic and we just take for granted 
in the rest of the country, and that is on communications 
capabilities.
    What are the current command and control communications 
limitations for the Coast Guard operating in the high north, 
and what should we, the Congress, be doing about that? What is 
the Coast Guard doing about that? Again, I think most people 
recognize that, wait a minute, there is a part of America, 
Alaska, where you have essentially no comms. Our military, our 
Coast Guard--that is unacceptable. I agree that is 
unacceptable. How do we close that gap?
    Admiral Ray. Sir, in the last few months, we have been 
talking with industry. As you know, last year we had a research 
and development project where we launched two cube sats, so low 
earth orbit sats, and they were in a polar orbit ellipse. And 
they were specifically for us, and we were using them. Those 
particular cube sats were used to provide a capability to 
detect an emergency signal. So if somebody had an EPIRB north 
over the horizon where we would not hear it from the North 
Slope there--and unfortunately--it was not very high-end 
project anyway--they tumbled. Both the satellites did. We got 
data off of one of them, and it showed that this is viable.
    Since then, I have been engaged with industry and the 
people that are a lot more dialed in on this than I am in the 
service, and we believe there is an opportunity to get more of 
those low earth orbit satellites launched that have the right 
orbit to service the polar region. I think that is the way 
ahead, and multiple of those because they are not super 
expensive. They are becoming--I have been told by people in 
industry that that is becoming. So I think moving in that 
direction, getting some support for that--currently we do not 
have a project for that, but getting in that direction is the 
way to go.
    As to what we are doing right now, we are doing what we 
have been doing for many years. We are using HF radios that 
have a long range. If the atmospherics are right, you can talk 
quite a ways, but you are not going to get any sort of data or 
anything like that. This is voice communications. This is what 
we are doing right now.
    Senator Sullivan. So is there things that we should be 
doing working with the Coast Guard in this committee to close 
that gap? It seems like it is a need for all the reasons we 
have talked about, the safety in particular, whether it is for 
the ship or whether it is on rescues or whether it is to help 
with some kind of environmental response, fishermen at sea. Is 
there a plan that the Coast Guard has that this committee can 
help make sure gets either in the bill or in appropriations?
    Admiral Ray. We do not have one that is to the level of 
specificity with regard to being ready for appropriations now, 
sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, let us look at working on that 
together.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. I think it is important.
    Let me go even a little bit more specific. You know, the 
Alaska delegation recently sent a letter to the Commandant 
urging him to prioritize the repair of the radio towers that 
relate to I think it is the Rescue 21, distress comms signal. 
As you know, since this summer, there have been numerous radio 
towers across the Gulf of Alaska that have been non-
operational. Particularly for our fishermen who are on the 
water and rely on the Coast Guard, if they are in distress, 
that lack of complete coverage that is existing is again 
something that I think most of the rest of the country would 
not tolerate.
    What is the Coast Guard doing to cover this gap? This is 
obviously not as complicated as the issue on the high north. 
This is more getting the communication infrastructure back to 
an operational status, including these radio towers that have 
become non-operational across the Gulf of Alaska.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    As you know, I spent 5 years flying search and rescue in 
Alaska----
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
    Admiral Ray [continuing]. Especially in southeast which is 
where most of these sites are because they are hidden behind 
mountains and in Kodiak as well.
    So the fundamental challenge here is twofold. It is the 
microwave system that is required to relay the signals, and it 
is power generation. That is the fundamental issue. So we are 
getting after that. And I have been tracking this. Literally 
three times a week I personally pull up the status of these 
sites. And we are going to take some risk in other areas to 
apply more funds to get after this power generation problem 
because if you get good power generation at these sites, they 
are going to work.
    Senator Sullivan. But the reason some of them have not been 
operational is primarily the power generation?
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. That is 80 percent of the problem. 
They are in very remote locations in the mountains, and there 
is a short window to work on them. And if they go down starting 
now in December, it could be a while. But we are going to apply 
some more funds to this.
    And then second, we just changed contractors. We got rid of 
the contractor who was providing the day-to-day maintenance for 
them. This just happened last week or 2 days ago. And so I am 
convinced that the new provider--and there is one in the State 
of Alaska, and they cover the entire region. And as you know, 
there are 33 sites. So this requires just like all things in 
Alaska--it is a logistics challenge. I am not making excuses. 
So I am confident these folks are going to get after it on the 
short term, and then we are going to apply some resources to 
get up the power generation and in the long run pull that left. 
Our response to you was longer, and we want to pull it to the 
left.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, listen, if there are resources that 
you need, I think that is the kind of issue that I am confident 
that all members of this committee would recognize the 
importance of this and fund the resources. It would not be an 
ask of a dramatic increase in resources. But as you know, this 
is vital to keep our fishermen safe who often are in seas that 
can be very dangerous. And having the Coast Guard there and the 
robust communications systems is critical. Again, you know that 
from firsthand experience flying in some of that difficult 
weather. So thank you for that. I appreciate the fact that you 
are focused on that very, very regularly. We just need to take 
action to make sure those non-operational sites are getting up 
so the fishermen in my State are safe. And I think that we all 
recognize that that is important.
    Let me ask another issue with regard to the broader Coast 
Guard Arctic strategy. And I do want to commend the Coast Guard 
with regard to its focus on this. I have publicly stated that 
one of my frustrations has been that the other military 
services have seemed to be slow to the awakening of our 
national security challenges, economic challenges, 
environmental challenges in the Arctic. And I do not levy that 
criticism at the Coast Guard. I believe that you recognize it. 
The Commandant certainly does. You have been operating in that 
part of the world for decades, if not centuries.
    But when you put out the strategy, what is the kind of gap 
between what you think we would need--we, not just the Coast 
Guard but the United States--to have a much more robust 
presence in the Arctic to safeguard our national security 
interests, our economic interests, our environmental interests, 
as I always like to remind people, the human interests? We have 
American citizens there. They happen to be my constituents. 
What we need in the shortfall between that and the resources to 
do that. Are there things that are not in the strategy because 
you do not think they would be resourced, or are there things 
in the strategy that we need as a Congress to address in terms 
of funding shortfalls?
    Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    We have gotten after a part of it. And I do not put all of 
my eggs in the icebreaker basket because that is one tool of 
several.
    Senator Sullivan. It is important.
    Admiral Ray. It is super important.
    Senator Sullivan. And it is important that we are making 
progress.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Finally.
    Admiral Ray. You are doggone right. 43 years since we built 
the last one. It is time to get going. So thank you for that.
    Senator Sullivan. I could not agree more.
    Admiral Ray. And that is huge because that allows us to be 
mobile. Today's challenges are not going to be where tomorrow's 
challenges are. So that is what that asset gives us. And when 
you compare that with a shipboard helicopter, unmanned aerial 
system, you have got real capability that you can move around 
and have effect on whatever mission you are working. You can do 
that.
    As I have said before, I think reliable communications 
through the region--you know, it is not just communications for 
emergencies. This is day in, day out. You and I have seen this. 
It is just running the business of having a presence on the 
North Slope. That is significant I think.
    The maritime domain awareness is enabled. So we talked 
about communicating and using satellite technology to enable 
that. That also enables us to know who is out there, and we 
want to know who is out there. And it needs to be more than the 
radar on a ship because you can only cover so much ground with 
that. So I think that capability, that kind of sensor and that 
ISR capability in the skies there.
    You know, other than that, I think just the continued 
support for our operations money for our service--you know, we 
have been kind of flat-lined on this. And we surge Coast Guard 
assets from all over the country to come up there during Arctic 
Shield. We will have a mechanic working on H-60's whose family 
is in Clearwater, Florida, but she is up there working on a 
helicopter on the North Slope. And that is OK. We do that, but 
that is not a long-term strategy. We know we are going to be up 
there every year. We need to have the assets to grow--the 
operations and maintenance money to grow those people. So end 
strength--I think that is also helpful.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and I 
appreciate your outstanding testimony.
    In the NDAA right now and the conference report--I believe 
the House is going to be voting on this today, and then it will 
come over here starting today or next week--there was a 
provision. It was something that I and many other members were 
interested in, is this idea of a strategic Arctic port. And I 
highlighted this in my opening statement whereby there is not 
the port capability anywhere near the Bering Strait to bring in 
a large-scale national security cutter or an icebreaker, polar 
security cutter. And again, on the East Coast or the West Coast 
of the United States, this would be considered just 
unacceptable.
    So there is a provision that directs the Secretary of 
Defense and Homeland Security to look at this issue and say, 
hey, we need this infrastructure, particularly when you look at 
what the Russians are doing in their Arctic.
    What is your sense of the importance of having a port that 
can handle these larger scale Coast Guard and Navy vessels to 
protect our economic and national security interests in the 
region, not 1,200 nautical miles away from the region?
    Admiral Ray. Sir, there is no question that a deepwater 
port north of Dutch--and there are a few candidates that I am 
well aware of, but a deepwater north up there somewhere in the 
vicinity would benefit Coast Guard operations. No doubt about 
that.
    Senator Sullivan. So you think we need it.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Well, listen, Admiral, I think you and the previous panel--
I want to thank you for your outstanding service. Please tell 
the men and women of the Coast Guard that this committee, 
certainly this subcommittee, are very appreciative of their 
hard work and sacrifice. And we will continue these series of 
hearings on the needs and capabilities of the Coast Guard.
    As we look to finish up the hearing, I will ask the 
witnesses both you, sir, and the previous panel that if there 
are any other questions from Senators on the Committee, that 
they will be submitting them in the next two weeks. And we ask 
that the written answers to these questions be written back to 
the Committee as soon as possible.
    I want to thank you again, Admiral, for your service and 
the previous panel for their outstanding testimony as well.
    And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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