[Senate Hearing 116-636]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-636
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND
THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS ON THE
U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 12, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-942 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas, AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 12, 2019................................ 1
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 69
Witnesses
Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia and the
Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute and Environmental
Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center for
Climate & Security............................................. 49
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Dr. Michael Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience
Program; Director of the Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.............................. 58
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, United States Coast
Guard.......................................................... 76
Prepared statement........................................... 78
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS
ON THE U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Fischer,
Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, Blumenthal, and Sinema.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing will now come
tos order.
I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses today to share with the Subcommittee their
perspectives on the expanding opportunities, challenges, and
national security threats in the Arctic and how the Coast Guard
can shape its Arctic strategy to best protect U.S. interests in
the region.
The changes occurring in the Arctic are monumental. For the
first time in living history, receding sea ice is opening up an
entire ocean to the world. This provides access to previously
unreachable natural resources. Estimates are that 30 percent of
the world's undiscovered natural gas, 13 percent of its
undiscovered oil, and an abundance of rare earth and other
minerals exist in the Arctic region.
It opens up formerly impassable maritime traffic routes
that are thousands of nautical miles shorter when compared to
using the Suez or Panama Canals potentially saving shippers
weeks in travel expenses.
There is a whole realm of economic opportunity that did not
exist 10 or 20 years ago, and other nations have already taken
major steps to capitalize on this prospect.
We can see Arctic nations like Russia who have built ports,
icebreakers, maritime traffic infrastructure, and ice-hardened
shipping vessels to expand their commercial activity in the
Arctic.
Even non-Arctic nations like China are making major
investments in Arctic development. They are building
icebreakers and vessels capable of operating in the high
latitudes even though they have no sovereign territory near any
Arctic waters.
The U.S., one of eight actual Arctic nations, has lagged
behind in developing the infrastructure needed to meet the
challenges and opportunities brought on by this expanding
economic opportunity. We only have one operational heavy and
one medium polar icebreaker. Compare this to the growing fleet
of over 50 Russian icebreakers, and they are building many
more. And even China's icebreaking capacity will surpass ours
by 2025 or earlier.
The nearest Department of Defense strategic seaport is
1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic. That is like putting our
Coast Guard resources in Miami and asking them to respond to
distress calls in Boston.
The level of infrastructure development, domain awareness,
hydrographic mapping, and reliable communications are far from
sufficient to support the current and projected maritime
traffic through the region.
Overcoming these hurdles will take a whole-of-government
effort, working with industry, NGO partners, Arctic
communities, and strong international cooperation to enable the
safe flow of commerce and protection of the natural Arctic
environment.
A key component of the U.S. Government strategy for
managing the changing landscape in the Arctic is the U.S. Coast
Guard. The Coast Guard has long been at the forefront of Arctic
operations. They have been leading heroic rescue missions there
for more than 150 years, including the overland relief
expedition in 1897 that saved the lives of 265 whalers iced in
at Point Barrow.
Recognizing the vital service the Coast Guard provides for
our nation, I am pleased to announce today that my Ranking
Member, Senator Markey, and I have formed the Senate Coast
Guard Caucus, along with a number of other Senators who will
come together in a bipartisan manner to bolster and strengthen
this important branch of the armed services. I am very glad
about this, and to be honest, I am quite surprised that there
was no Senate caucus prior to today. So that is good news.
I am continually impressed with the valiant actions of the
men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard and look forward to the
great work this newly formed caucus will do to support their
service.
We are making progress slowly but surely on many of these
Arctic issues. The Coast Guard, for example, in April of this
year released an updated Arctic strategic outlook that laid out
their lines of effort for meeting the challenges of increased
maritime activity in the region. Those lines of effort will
include: enhancing their capability to operate in the Arctic,
cooperating with partners and allies to uphold rules-based
order in the region, and innovating new solutions to provide
crisis response, law enforcement, and maritime transportation
management. The Coast Guard also awarded a contract for the
construction of up to three heavy icebreakers, the first new
heavy icebreakers to be built by the United States in over 40
years. These are part of the six new icebreakers authorized by
Congress in last year's NDAA, a bipartisan provision in that
bill that I was proud to have authored. Getting these
icebreakers is an important step in the right direction for
building our capacity to operate in the Arctic, but we need to
do more.
Just yesterday, the Full Committee of the Commerce
Committee passed the Arctic Shipping Federal Advisory Committee
Act, which is another important step with regard to our Arctic
strategic interests.
I will also soon be introducing legislation to further
advance the collaboration between the Navy and the Coast Guard
to increase their effectiveness for carrying out sustained
operations in the Arctic. This bill will direct the strategic
focus, infrastructure investment, and capability development
needed to rapidly respond to crises in the Arctic, to secure
our sovereignty through persistent presence in this region of
increasing great power competition. And part of the reason for
this hearing is to help inform that bill as we are putting the
final touches on it.
With that, I want to thank our witnesses today. We have two
panels. So we will be efficient in our questioning. Here to
discuss this very important topic are some of the nation's
foremost experts as well as the Vice Commandant of the Coast
Guard, Admiral Ray, who I am pleased is here.
I now want to recognize Senator Markey for any opening
statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
having this very important hearing.
And to our distinguished witnesses, thank you for joining
us this morning.
The frozen Arctic is a hotbed of challenges for security in
maritime transportation, international relations, and on-the-
ground community needs. I believe the primary underlying cause
of these challenges is climate change. We cannot ignore the
effects of the climate emergency in the Arctic. It is happening
right before our eyes. NOAA's 2019 Arctic report card published
on Tuesday recounts record warming and ice melt in the Arctic.
Unprecedented wildfires raged across Greenland and Siberia this
summer. And Arctic communities are under threat from the
rapidly thawing ice and permafrost. The Arctic is warming at
least twice as fast as the global average, and between 1992 and
2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly 1 million square miles,
an area larger than the State of Alaska. This melt is opening
new trade routes, flooding towns, and unlocking marine
resources faster than we can keep up.
These changes have consequences far beyond the Arctic
Circle. The Arctic is our planet's air conditioner. It sustains
the ocean circulation that regulates weather on the U.S. east
coast. And melting Arctic ice sheets raise sea levels across
the world.
I had the opportunity to visit Greenland in 2007 and
learned firsthand how climate change affects Arctic ice.
Greenland's ice sheet is thousands of feet thick and the height
of five and a half Empire State Buildings, enough to raise
global sea levels by more than 20 feet. The ice sheet is now
melting twice as fast as when I visited 12 years ago. It is
pouring almost 300 billion tons of melt water into the ocean
every year, contributing to sea levels on the U.S. east coast
rising three to four times higher than the global average.
President Trump may have been unsuccessful in his bid to
purchase Greenland, but we already have more Greenland than we
know what to do with piling up on the shores of Massachusetts.
As you will hear from our witnesses, climate change in the
Arctic poses a security threat both in the Arctic and beyond.
China and Russia are putting a new spin on the term ``cold
war'' as they build their strategic presence in the frozen
Arctic. Increased commercial use of a changing Arctic presents
risk for maritime safety as ships navigate volatile new routes.
Thawing ice and permafrost threaten Arctic communities' food
security and their very way of life. Oil spills and other
hazards threaten the fragile Arctic ecosystem. All of these
threats put additional strain on our Coast Guard as they
fulfill their many important missions in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard must also address the vulnerability of
their own facilities and operations to extreme storms,
flooding, changing ice conditions, and other climate impacts.
In this year's Coast Guard's reauthorization, I worked to
secure language encouraging the Coast Guard to report on its
most climate vulnerable installations as the rest of the
Department of Defense has done. But reporting is not enough. We
must rethink our approach to infrastructure planning from our
southernmost to northernmost installations, and climate change
must be at the center of our calculus.
The 2019 NOAA Arctic report card makes the climate science
clear. The Arctic is experiencing unprecedented warming and
loss of snow and ice. The Coast Guard's Arctic Strategic
Outlook makes the security risk of a warming Arctic clear. We
are not adequately prepared to respond to the Arctic climate
emergency. The Coast Guard must better incorporate climate
considerations in its missions and planning, and Congress must
support our Coast Guard to ensure they have the resources and
facilities to do so. We must maintain leadership in our
scientific missions to ensure we can understand rapidly
changing conditions in the Arctic, as well as support our
diplomatic goals. Most importantly, we need bold and
transformative climate action now.
And I agree with the Chairman of the Committee that it is
important for us to, on a bipartisan basis, have a Coast Guard
Caucus. This is going to become a very critical part of the
long-term strategic thinking of the United States, and it is
important that, on a bipartisan basis, we partner to create
this caucus now.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Well, I want to welcome our very distinguished witnesses
today. On our first panel, we have Heather Conley, Senior Vice
President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and the Director
of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Ms. Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar
Institute and Environmental Change and Security Program, the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and Michael
Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience Program, and
Director of the Polar Institute also at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.
Each of you will have five minutes for your opening
statement. A longer statement can be included in the record, if
you would like. We will start with you, Ms. Conley.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT, EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC;
AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)
Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, thank you and Senator Markey
so much for holding this very important hearing. And I
congratulate you on the bipartisan Coast Guard caucus, as well
as continued work in bringing the Navy and the Coast Guard
together in this joint mission.
What a timely moment to have this hearing. It is a great
time to take stock of what we have accomplished in 2019, but,
more importantly, think about what must be done in 2020. And I
think exactly the NOAA Arctic report card from two days ago, in
highlighting so many profound changes in the Arctic, one of its
most important points was the lack of sea ice formation in the
Bering Sea, again very important to America's territorial
waters and its coastline.
So let us take a look at 2019. Absolutely the exciting news
that we now have in process: the construction of one heavy
polar security cutter.
And I think the other two elements of 2019 certainly was
Secretary Mike Pompeo's speech in Finland in May of this year,
which was the first time a senior official placed the Arctic in
a public speech within a great power competition framework. But
that was very surprising and shocking to our allies. And I
think that reminds us that we have to work more closely with
our allies as we look at the Arctic increasingly through this
lens.
And of course, as you rightly note, Greenland became much
more a topic of conversation and its strategic importance. But
again, this is all part of the strategic awakening that we are
having regarding the Arctic.
But I have to say perhaps the year closed out with the most
troubling news to me, which was 4 days ago the announcement by
the Russian military that they are placing S-400s in each of
their Russian military units across the Russian Arctic, calling
it a de facto anti-missile dome. So today we are already
potentially losing access to the Arctic because of Russia's
growing military footprint.
You have asked us here to assess the Coast Guard's updated
Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. And of all of us that have
worked so closely with the Coast Guard over the last decade as
it is thinking about the Arctic, the Coast Guard has faithfully
tried to protect America's sovereignty in the Arctic. They have
warned us that they need more resources. They have detailed
what they have required, and they have done the best with what
they have. This is no longer sufficient. The Coast Guard simply
needs a dedicated budget to build the Arctic infrastructure
that it needs, and it needs strong and sustained civilian
leadership to make sure that that infrastructure is in place.
The challenges in the Arctic are great regarding security.
In fact, the United States has two Arctics. We have the north
Pacific/North American Arctic--and of course our requirements
to support Alaska only continue to grow as we see increased
commercial traffic--principally Chinese LNG carriers that are
going to the Yamal Peninsula. But we also have the north
Atlantic/European Arctic, which is vital to protecting the
north Atlantic sea lines of communication, and we are seeing a
dramatic up-tick in Russian submarine activity in the north
Atlantic. So, we not only have one challenge in the Arctic, we
have two.
The Coast Guard frequently refers to ``presence equals
influence.'' I could not agree more with that equation. And the
two states that are building presence in the Arctic are, of
course, Russia and China. Russia is, in my view, our most
significant near-term security challenge in the Arctic.
Although I know the U.S. Government continues to be very
focused on China, and we do have a very important long-term
strategic challenge there, Russia presents the near-term
challenge. And CSIS has been in partnership with the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to detail Russia's military
footprint using satellite imagery. And if it meets the
Committee's approval, I would like to put for the record some
of these satellite imageries and the analysis that we have
included.
Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Conley. Thank you.
The challenge, however, is what we do not know is how
Russia and China are going to interact together in the Arctic.
And again, 2019 showed us increased economic activity, science
activity, as well as military activity.
So in my testimony, I am calling for a dedicated Arctic
Security Initiative, a budget very similar to the European
Deterrence Initiative, which gives us a dedicated multiyear
budget to actually enhance our infrastructure needs, but also
to enhance our diplomatic, our economic, our scientific
presence because, as China and Russia's influence grows in the
Arctic through science, economics, and security, the U.S. must
be equally present.
And again, I thank this Committee. The U.S. Coast Guard has
the leadership. They know what they need. They need the budget
to do so.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe,
Eurasia and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Thank you, Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Markey, for the
opportunity to come before you this morning to discuss America's
security strategy for the Arctic and the readiness of our frontline
defenders, the United States Coast Guard. My testimony today could be
as relevant for the Senate Armed Services Committee as it is for the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, such is the nature
of Arctic security today.
It is a particularly fitting and timely moment to take stock of
what we have accomplished this year regarding U.S. security policy
toward the Arctic and, most importantly, what we must do to secure and
increase America's security in the Arctic in 2020 and beyond.
It goes without saying that we are having this discussion today
because of the profound transformation of the Arctic region due to
climate change. From rapid permafrost thaw and extensive coastal
erosion, which is breaking apart and collapsing terrestrial
infrastructure to the extraordinary diminishment of the Greenland Ice
Sheet and thinning and disappearance of polar ice caps, these changes
have propelled the U.S. and all Arctic coastal states to protect and
secure their territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
coastlines. This is particularly true for the United States which lacks
infrastructure and capabilities to protect and defend its fourth
coast.\1\
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\1\ ``The Arctic of the Future: Strategic Pursuit or Great Power
Miscalculation?: Keynote Address,'' Center for Strategic and
International Studies, remarks by Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, May 10,
2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-future-strategic-pursuit-or-
great-power-miscalculation-keynote-address.
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After nearly a decade of study, 2019 will be remembered as the year
that the United States formally launched the construction of a heavy
polar security cutter, something this Nation has not done for 42 years.
2019 however was marked, as in many previous years, by the release of a
plethora of U.S. government Arctic strategies: the U.S. Navy quietly
released its Arctic strategy in January, the Coast Guard released its
updated strategy in April, and the Defense Department released its
mandated study of U.S. defense operations in June. We had anticipated
the release of an Air Force Arctic strategy but that has yet to be
released. But 2019 will perhaps be most remembered as the year of
significant U.S. rhetorical change as Washington now views the Arctic
through the lens of great power competition, highlighting the increased
military and economic presence of Russia and China in the Arctic. This
policy shift was encapsulated in Secretary of State Pompeo's speech in
Rovaniemi, Finland in May of this year. And of course, 2019 will be
forever known as the year that Washington rediscovered the strategic
importance of Greenland which prompted the U.S. to announce that is
reestablishing a U.S. consulate in Greenland's capital of Nuuk.
In 2019, there was good news: The U.S. national security community
is now talking more about the strategic importance of the Arctic more
than ever before. But there is also bad news: The U.S. government isn't
advancing its policies. Said a different way, the U.S. is acting as if
it is still 2013 while the Arctic security environment worsens.
The Updated Coast Guard Strategy
It is with this in mind that we must view the Coast Guard's updated
Arctic Strategic Outlook. Its updated outlook is perhaps the best of
the many U.S. government strategies that describe the new geopolitical
realities in the Arctic. Without hyperbole or hype, the strategy
clearly states Russia's and China's long-term strategic ambitions for
the Arctic which pose challenges to U.S. interests and the United
States' ability to maintain unfettered access in the region.
While the Coast Guard accurately describes these new challenges,
its strategy, as well as the U.S. government's posture, remains largely
the same as it was in 2013. There are no other significant U.S.
infrastructure initiatives on the horizon other than the construction
of a new polar security cutter which will primarily be used in
Antarctica;\2\ there is no dedicated budget or prioritization of
infrastructure improvements. There is no deep-water port in the
American Arctic and there are no ice-strengthened surface vessels in
the U.S. Navy's inventory. There hasn't been a substantial investment
in increased U.S. forward operating locations in the Arctic,
communication and navigation assets or greater domain awareness. The
U.S. could not conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the Russian
Arctic today if it wanted to, and without agreement from the Canadian
government, it could not traverse the Northwest Passage.
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\2\ Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, ``The Implications of
U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region,'' Center for Strategic
and International Studies, May 3, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region.
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Despite our rhetoric, the current minimalist U.S. presence and
posture in the Arctic signals that we consider the region a low
priority. But Russia and China both have a long-term strategy and a
dedicated budget to achieve their ambitions. Without a significant
policy response from the U.S. and its allies, Russia and China will
largely shape the region's future.
What makes this perennial U.S. minimalist posture in the Arctic so
troubling is that the United States has not one but two security tasks
in the Arctic: while the U.S. must always prioritize the protection of
its waters and territory in the North Pacific, the narrow Bering
Strait, and the U.S. EEZ in the Chukchi Sea, the U.S. also has Arctic
security responsibilities in the North Atlantic, North and Barents
Seas. Both the North Atlantic/European Arctic and North Pacific/North
American Arctic present ``avenues of approach'' to the homeland that
directly impact the security of the United States.\3\
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\3\ C. Todd Lopez, ``Northcom Commander Cites Arctic as Area of
Concern,'' U.S. Department of Defense, July 23, 2019. https://
www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1913989/northcom-commander-cites-
arctic-as-area-of-concern/.
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Prioritizing the Great Powers in the Arctic
Russia. Russia poses the most immediate challenge to U.S. national
security interests in both the North Pacific and the North Atlantic and
must be the near-term priority. Russia has allocated trillions of
rubles over the past decade to Arctic economic and military
development, with the government declaring that it will spend
approximately $63 billion by 2020 and $235 billion until 2035 with
significant tax incentives. President Putin has announced that cargo
shipments will increase to 80 million tons along the Northern Sea Route
(NSR) by 2025 and the Russian icebreaker fleet will expand to 13 heavy
icebreakers by 2035--9 of which will be nuclear powered and some will
be fitted with cruise missiles -as well as investments in the expansion
and upgrading of ports, infrastructure, and search and rescue
activities along the NSR.\4\ In the past year, Russia has made several
important changes related to the use of the NSR, to include giving the
Russian nuclear agency, Rosatom, bureaucratic control over the maritime
route, and limiting foreign warships traffic without a 45-day
notification and permission by the Russian government.\5\
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\4\ Vladimir Isachenkov and Irina Titova, ``Putin outlines
ambitious Arctic expansion program,'' Associated Press, April 9, 2019.
https://www.apnews.com/d0c2eb39a3b44b40ac8ddb1749ebe143.
\5\ ``Russia Tightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,'' The
Maritime Executive, March 8, 2019. https://www.maritime-executive.com/
article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route
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Like the United States, Russia also has ``two Arctics.'' In
Russia's eastern Arctic, Russia has refurbished airfields, search and
rescue, and radar stations to improve awareness in the air and maritime
domains, which includes Sopka-2 radar systems on Wrangel Island (300
miles from Alaska) and Cape Schmidt. These systems create a
``protective dome'' across Russia's vast Arctic coastline and improve
its overall operational picture to detect and track vessels and
aircraft. For example, Sopka-2 radars also control civilian air traffic
and provide meteorological data to better inform mariners traversing
the route. But Russia's military footprint transforms as one moves
toward the European Arctic. The Russian military recently announced
that it will increase the number of S-400 missile defense units
deployed across the Russian Arctic which tracks with its recent
deployment of more sophisticated equipment to defend its air and
maritime domains. Kotelny Island and Novaya Zemlya for example are
equipped with missile defense systems like the Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1
systems which create a complex layered coastal defense arrangement that
secures territory deeper into the central Arctic. Such capabilities
strengthen Russia's power projection capabilities in the Barents Sea
and increase its ability to deny aerial, maritime, or land access to
NATO or U.S. forces. Perhaps most worryingly is what Russia is
practicing (and signaling) in the Arctic through its recent Grom or
Thunder 2019 exercise, which engaged Russia's strategic nuclear forces
and involved all four of Russia's naval fleets, 12,000 troops, and
included the launch of two nuclear warheads in the Barents Sea as well
as several other ballistic missiles.\6\ This military posture exceeds
the Coast Guard's remit, and while the Coast Guard enjoys a pragmatic
relationship with the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) in joint
monitoring of the Bering Straits and in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,
this challenge is of a different magnitude.
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\6\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Cruise missiles played key role in Putin's
strategic war games,'' The Barents Observer, October 18, 2019. https://
thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/10/cruise-missiles-played-key-
role-putins-strategic-war-games.
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China. The longer-term challenge to U.S. security interests is
China's growing economic presence in the Arctic which could prelude an
eventual military presence. China's movement into the Arctic was both
strategic and opportunistic, taking advantage of Russia's financial
shortcomings after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014 as well
as the precipitous drop in global energy and commodity prices. Beijing
has also developed a broader Arctic engagement strategy which includes
increased activities with international organizations and robust
economic diplomacy with individual Arctic Council states, primarily
related to access to Arctic protein sources, maritime access,
infrastructure development, and enhanced information and
telecommunications access.
By 2015, China had described the Arctic as a new strategic frontier
(alongside space and the sea bed) where there was ``undetermined
sovereignty.'' China's efforts in the Arctic are designed to preserve
its unfettered access to the international waters of the Central Arctic
Ocean (CAO) and to construct a case for preservations of its sovereign
rights to the region by means of discovery and by continual presence
and influence. Over a relatively short period (approximately 5 years)
of time, China has transformed from a low-key player in the Arctic to a
major actor.\7\
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\7\ Anne-Marie Brady, ``China's Expanding Antarctic Interests:
Implications for New Zealand,'' Small States and the New Security
Environment, Policy brief no.2, June 3, 2017, http://
www.canterbury.ac.nz/media/documents/research/China%27s-expanding-
Antarctic-interests.pdf.
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China continues to enhance it scientific and industrial footprint
across the Arctic. It maintains two research stations, one on Svalbard
and one in Northern Iceland. Plans to develop a third in Russia are
underway. The Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on
Chinese military and security developments presciently warned that
Beijing could use the cover of science to gain a military foothold in
the region through the utilization of dual-use technologies including
satellites.\8\ In January 2018, China unveiled plans to expand its Belt
and Road Initiative to the Arctic, establishing a Polar Silk Road
across the region.\9\ Shortly after, in September, it launched its
first domestically built and second non-nuclear polar class icebreaker,
the Xue Long 2. This now gives China two polar icebreakers, matching
the United States in terms of operational capabilities. Beijing has
also announced plans to construct a nuclear-powered icebreaker which
would enable China to retain a near permanent presence in the Arctic
and could be a precursor to the development of a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Blake Hounshell, ``Pompeo aims to counter China's ambitions in
the Arctic,'' Politico, May 6, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/05/06/pompeo-arctic-china-russia-1302649.
\9\ Philip Wen, ``China unveils vision for `Polar Silk Road' across
Arctic,'' Reuters, January 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-china-arctic/china-unveils-vision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-
idUSKBN1FF0J8.
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The U.S. can develop a specific security policy vis-a-vis Russia's
military posture, and it can develop specific policies for China's
dual-use economic and scientific posture in the Arctic. But what U.S.
policymakers are not equipped to address is the convergence of China
and Russia's economic and military interests in the Arctic. Over the
past 24 months, we have witnessed an acceleration of Russian and
Chinese cooperation, which has enhanced cooperation related to the
Yamal LNG-1 and 2 Projects, in which the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) has invested heavily and in which Chinese firms own
29.9 percent of the projects.\10\ The economic relationship continues
to expand, and President Putin has suggested that the NSR, as part of
China's Maritime Silk Road, would create a ``global and competitive
route that connects Northeastern, Eastern, and Southeastern Asia with
Europe.'' \11\ The two are also engaging in military affairs, as 3,200
Chinese troops and 900 weapons units participated in Russia's large-
scale Vostok-18 exercise.\12\ While Chinese and Russian navies and land
forces have exercised together annually since 2015, in July 2019, the
first Sino-Russian joint air patrols occurred over the Korean
Peninsula. If such joint actions were to occur in the Arctic, it would
be very concerning to U.S. security interests.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Elena Mazneva, ``From Russia With Love: A Super-Chilled Prize
for China,'' Bloomberg, October 26, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-10-26/china-to-get-first-yamal-lng-cargo-as-russia-
says-thank-you.
\11\ Atle Staleesen, ``Putin steps up talks with Beijing over
Arctic shipping,'' The Barents Observer, April 30, 2019, https://
thebarentsobserver.com/en/2019/04/putin-steps-talks-beijing-over-
arctic-shipping.
\12\ Danila Galperovich, ``Analysts: Russia's Vostok '18 Troop
Numbers, `China Alliance' Claims Questionable,'' VOA September 11,
2018. https://www.voanews.com/europe/analysts-russias-vostok-18-troop-
numbers-china-alliance-claims-questionable.
\13\ Andrew Osborn and Joyce Lee, ``First Russian-Chinese air
patrol in Asia-Pacific draws shots from South Korea,'' Reuters, July
22, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-
aircraft/first-russian-chinese-air-patrol-in-asia-pacific-draws-shots-
from-south-korea-idUSKCN1UI072.
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What Needs to be Done in 2020
The Coast Guard frequently uses the following equation for the
Arctic: presence = influence. This is absolutely correct: the U.S. must
increase its physical presence in 2020 diplomatically, militarily,
scientifically, and economically, primarily through public-private
partnerships. Such a holistic approach must include the reorganization
of the U.S. government related to Arctic issues; an increase in U.S.
Arctic diplomatic presence and activity, strengthening science,
research, and economic opportunities; and the development and
positioning of increased U.S. security assets across the circumpolar
Arctic.
While it is encouraging that the U.S. is restoring its consulate in
Greenland, the U.S. must enhance its Arctic diplomacy with all of our
closest allies in the Arctic and regionally, to include Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. The
U.S. should initiate annual meetings of the foreign and defense
ministers of Arctic allies to cooperatively discuss and address
emerging challenges in the region. Similarly, the U.S. should push for
more frequent meetings of the five Arctic coastal states to discuss
pertinent issues like the future management of the high seas in the
Central Arctic Ocean.
From a security and defense perspective, the U.S. must budget the
necessary resources to enhance its presence in the North American and
European Arctic. Just as the U.S. has responded to Russia's military
posture in Eastern Europe through a series of bilateral defense
enhancements funded in part by the European Deterrence Initiative
(EDI), the U.S. should create an Arctic Security Initiative or ASI. The
ASI would fund greater exercises and training in the Arctic to include
search and rescue, pollution response, and maritime domain awareness
activities, as well as the work of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Funds
could also be used for the development of a layered homeland defense
design; the increased deployment of strategic forces with short-
duration rotational deployment of bombers; an investment in upgraded
sensors for indicators & warnings; and unmanned undersea vehicles and
anti-submarine warfare equipment; Arctic infrastructure, such as
reinforcing existing reception facilities along Greenland's west coast,
limited reception facilities and/or sensor capabilities along
Greenland's east coast to enhance ASW capabilities in the GIUK gap; and
enhancements to Thule AFB such as upgrades to the early warning missile
defense radar in Greenland as well as the eventual modernization of
NORAD's air, radar, and satellite systems could also be viewed as an
element of enhanced Arctic air and maritime awareness or preparedness.
The U.S. must also leverage its strength in Arctic science. This
includes our robust and world-renowned scientific network of
institutions and scholars. The budget for U.S. Arctic science and
research should increase, particularly as it relates to observational
research infrastructure and expanded research campaigns in the Alaskan
Arctic. Crucial to these efforts is the inclusion of indigenous voices
whose knowledge and experience in the region are invaluable.
Internationally, the U.S. should use the recent Agreement on Enhancing
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation to establish other norms,
code of conduct, and regulations. Doing so promotes transparency
related to scientific collection, data monitoring, and analysis. The
U.S. should consider the creation of an Arctic Science Infrastructure
Fund (ASIF). Such a program would increase the number of U.S. research
stations in the Arctic. Currently, the U.S. has only three: two in
Alaska and one in Greenland.
As science drives our understanding of future developments in the
region, sustainable economic activity should follow. The U.S. must
actively facilitate public-private partnerships with other industries
to identify and fund new infrastructure including a deep-water port,
search-and-rescue stations, refurbished hangars for air assets, and
improved telecommunications systems which could be incentivized through
the Arctic Security Initiative. Doing so would improve observational
coverage and domain awareness while promoting safer economic activity.
Internationally, the U.S. should promote greater trade and investment
between the North Atlantic/European Arctic region (which includes New
England, Canada's maritime provinces, Iceland, Denmark and the UK) and
the North Pacific/North American region (which includes Alaska and
Canada's northwest territories).
And finally, organizationally, it is time for the U.S. government
to demonstrate--clearly and on a daily basis--that the Arctic is
strategically important to the U.S. The establishment of several senior
positions in the national security community is required. New positions
should include a Senior Director for the Arctic at the National
Security Council, the re-naming of the Assistant Secretary of State for
European, Eurasian and Arctic affairs, the establishment of a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Northern European and Arctic Affairs
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the creation of a senior
civilian leader position in the Department of Homeland Security that is
tasked with focusing on America's fourth coast.
Any nation can write an Arctic strategy, but a strategically minded
and purpose-driven great maritime power will budget for and implement
the strategy while also successfully engaging its allies. The United
States has proven repeatedly it can write many strategies, but it has
not proven it can shape and influence the Arctic in the future. Russia
and China are implementing their strategies and shaping the region,
unfortunately to their preferred interests and outcomes.
If we hold this hearing again at the end of 2020, what will the
U.S. have accomplished to enhance its security in the Arctic?
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Conley.
Ms. Goodman.
STATEMENT OF SHERRI GOODMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, POLAR INSTITUTE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS; AND SENIOR STRATEGIST, THE
CENTER FOR CLIMATE & SECURITY
Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Markey,
Senator Cantwell. It is a pleasure to be here with you today.
And I want to also endorse your creating a Senate Coast Guard
Caucus. I think it is very timely.
I have over 30 years of experience as a security
professional serving as the first Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Environmental Security. I am also the founder and
former executive director of the CNA Military Advisory Board
comprised of senior retired generals and admirals, including
Coast Guard, that since 2007 has continually assessed the
security implications of climate change, which we characterize
as a threat multiplier.
My bottom line for you today, my BLUF (Bottom Line Up
Front), four points.
First, climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the
strategic operating environment for the Coast Guard in the
Arctic, and around the world. As we convene in Washington at
the end of 2019 with the global climate summit currently taking
place in Madrid, what is happening in the Arctic is the
clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting sea ice,
and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape
in which the Coast Guard and our military forces now operate.
The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes,
and most dramatically in the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean
is increasingly accessible and navigable, though still
treacherous and unpredictable, exposing a new maritime border
for the U.S.
Just yesterday, as was mentioned, NOAA released its annual
Arctic report card confirming near record high air and ocean
temperatures and melting of the Greenland ice sheet, low sea
ice extents, and shifts in the distribution of commercially
valuable marine species. And what happens in the Arctic does
not stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice storage keeps our
coastal cities like Miami and Houston above water. Changing
weather patterns in the Lower 48 from the polar vortex creating
extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc in
prime agricultural regions have all Americans feeling the
effects of Arctic climate change.
Second, in the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening
our competitors and adversaries, primarily Russia and China,
creating new risks and complicating navigating conditions for
the Coast Guard and our military.
The changing climate is enabling great power competition in
the Arctic today. While it has historically been a region
characterized by cooperation and diplomacy, we have recently
seen a zone of increased tensions over valuable energy and
mineral resources and access to shipping routes.
China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to gain
access to European shipping opportunities. China has declared
itself to be a near-Arctic state and intends to build a Polar
Silk Road that will stretch from Shanghai to Hamburg. China is
upgrading its icebreaking and related capabilities and
strategically deploying scientists across the region.
Meanwhile, Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route
as a new access maritime road from Asia to Europe. Militarily,
Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern Sea
Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our
high north allies. And just last month, Russia tested a
hypersonic missile for the first time in the Arctic and plans
to launch their first weaponized icebreaker by 2023.
The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in
the Arctic near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among
the new risks in a rapidly changing Arctic and one that keeps
me up at night is a potential nuclear shipping incident in
Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear safety record is deeply
concerning, from Chernobyl to the Kursk submarine to recent
incidents this year.
To help prepare for future such incidents, we need to
conduct more exercises like the scenario demonstration we
recently held with Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and
others demonstrating how a table-top exercise can be used for
emergency response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as
a triggering event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place
in the year 2050 in which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides
with its Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker in a winter storm,
not an unrealistic future planning scenario.
Third, we have a responsibility to prepare for changing
Arctic conditions and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its
operating capabilities in the Arctic from additional
icebreaking capability, improved domain awareness,
communications, and research.
The U.S., unfortunately, has fallen behind in equipping our
forces to operate safely and securely in the changing Arctic.
The three components we need are speeding the deployment of
icebreaking capability in the form of the polar security
cutter, aviation assets and autonomous systems; improving
Arctic domain awareness and communications capabilities,
including mapping and charting, and ensuring the U.S. maintains
its competitive edge in Arctic research and development.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, leadership in Arctic security is
essential--and I thank you very much for your leadership--to
America's overall security and strategic interests and must be
a whole-of-government and partnership effort, including our
allies, communities, private sector, and others that serve to
strengthen the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience
for the future.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute
and Environmental Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center
for Climate & Security
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name
is Sherri Goodman. I am a Senior Fellow at the Polar Institute and the
Environmental Change & Security Program of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center and a Senior Strategist at the Center for Climate
& Security. I have over 30 years of experience as a security
professional. I served as the first Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
(Environmental Security). I am also the Founder and former Executive
Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board, comprised of senior
retired generals and admirals--including Coast Guard--that since 2007
have continuously assessed the security implications of climate change,
which we characterize as a ``threat multiplier.''
As we convene in Washington at the end of 2019, with a global
climate summit currently taking place in Madrid, what is happening in
the Arctic is the clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting
sea ice, and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape
in which the U.S. Coast Guard, and our military forces, now operate.
The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes, and most
dramatically within the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean is now an
increasingly accessible, navigable, maritime border for the US. The
Arctic region is warming at 2-3 times the global average, according to
the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. And
what happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice
storage keeps our coastal cities, like Miami and Houston, above water.
Changing weather patterns in the lower 48 states, from the polar vortex
creating extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc
in prime agricultural regions, have all Americans feeling the effects
of Arctic climate change.
My Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) today is:
1. Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic
operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and
around the world.
2. In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors
and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and
complicating navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our
military.
3. We have a ``Responsibility to Prepare'' \1\ for changing Arctic
conditions, and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating
capabilities in the Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to
improved domain awareness (mapping and charting),
communications and research capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Werrell, Caitlin and Francesco Femia. ``The Responsibility to
Prepare and Prevent.'' The Center for Climate and Security. October
2019. https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/01/31/interview-with-sherri-
goodman-a-responsibility-to-prepare/
4. Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall
security and strategic interests, and must be a whole of U.S.
government and partnership effort including allies,
communities, private sector, and others, that serves to
undergird the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience.
______
#1: Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic
operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and around the
world.
The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a
Changing Climate found that climate change is evident in the furthest
reaches of the globe from the highest mountain peaks to the deepest
oceans.\2\ Greenland is now melting from the top down. Here are the key
findings that shape the strategic operating environment for the Coast
Guard and others operating in the Arctic region:
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\2\ Maddox, Marisol. ``Two Divergent Paths for Our Planet Revealed
in New IPCC Report on Oceans and Cryosphere.'' New Security Beat.
November 18, 2019. https://www.newsecu
ritybeat.org/2019/11/divergent-paths-planet-revealed-ipcc-report-
oceans-cryosphere/
``Arctic sea ice extent in September (when sea ice extent is
at its minimum) has declined about 13 percent per decade
(during the satellite era from 1979 to 2018), changes likely
unprecedented in at least 1,000 years. The Arctic's older,
thicker sea ice, which acts as a bastion against melting of
other sea ice, has almost completely disappeared. Only about 10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
percent of sea ice is at least five years old.
Ice sheets and glaciers are losing ice around the world.
Between 2006 and 2015, Greenland's Ice Sheet lost 278 gigatons
(Gt) of mass per year. Antarctica's Ice Sheet lost 155 Gt per
year, and glaciers around the world (beyond Greenland and
Antarctica) lost 220 Gt a year. Combined, the ice loss between
Greenland, Antarctica and other glaciers not part of ice sheets
was 653 Gt per year. For context, a single gigaton of water
would fill about 400,000 Olympic pools.\3\
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\3\ Walbolt, Kristen. ``10 things: All about ice.'' NASA's Jet
Propulsion Lab. March 28, 2018. https://sealevel.nasa.gov/news/114/10-
things-all-about-ice
The Arctic has warmed more than double the global average in
the last two decades. During the winters of 2016 and 2018,
surface temperatures in the central Arctic were 6 degrees C
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(10.8 degrees F) above the 1981-2010 average.
From 2007 to 2016, permafrost temperatures increased by
about 0.3 degrees C (0.5 degrees F), a record level of warming
for permafrost. Warming of permafrost can be a ticking time
bomb. Arctic and boreal permafrost contains 1440-1600 Gt of
carbon. When it melts, that carbon is emitted into the
atmosphere, fueling more warming.'' \4\
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\4\ Levin, Kelly and Ezra Northrop. ``4 Things to Know About the
IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere.'' World Resources
Institute. September 25, 2019. https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/09/4-
things-know-about-ipcc-special-report-ocean-and-cryosphere
Arctic communities have already experienced disruptions to their
freshwater supply, infrastructure, transportation, tourism and cultural
traditions, due to a melting cryosphere. Many species dependent on cold
temperatures, ice, and snow are at risk, with some facing extinction.
These changes will worsen as warming continues.
Indeed, the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook identifies that ``the
warming of the Arctic has led to longer and larger windows of reduced
ice conditions,'' and that ``from 2006 to 2018, satellite imagery
observed the 12 lowest Arctic ice extents on record.''
______
#2: In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors
and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and complicating
navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our military.
The Arctic has emerged as a region of geostrategic competition,
primarily because rising temperatures, melting sea ice, and collapsing
permafrost now grant access to this region previously locked in ice
most of year. Indeed, climate change is enabling great power
competition in the Arctic today. While the Arctic has, since the end of
the Cold War, been a region characterized by cooperation and diplomacy,
it has more recently become a zone of increased tensions over valuable
energy and mineral resources, and access to shipping routes. The
retreating and thinning of Arctic ice have given rise to exponential
growth in economic and military activities, including shipping,
resource extraction, and other commerce. The Coast Guard Strategic
Outlook stresses that ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to
open and increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard
services. Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating
environment that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to
unpredictable levels of risk.'' Rapid Arctic change is feeding into
China's and Russia's strategic ambitions, both regionally and globally.
As I stated in an article in Foreign Policy last year, ``China has
large ambitions throughout the Arctic.'' \5\ This includes the
advancement of both commercial and military objectives. For instance,
China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to ship goods and
other materials to and from ports in Europe. This will shorten travel
times compared to traditional routes through the Straits of Malacca and
Suez Canal, offering China a new strategic advantage in terms of global
trade and freedom of navigation. In January 2018, this ambition was
formalized in China's first public Arctic policy, wherein China
declared itself to be a ``near Arctic State,'' and articulated its
intention to build a ``Polar Silk Road'' that will stretch from
Shanghai to Hamburg, first across the Northern Sea Route, and
potentially later, across the central Arctic Ocean.\6\ In the long
term, China foresees using the even shorter Transpolar Sea Route across
the very top of the Arctic, when that opens in a few decades due to
melting sea ice. This route, which might be available for several
months each year, would save China from having to depend on Russian-
controlled waters. As Li Zhenfu, director of Dalian Maritime
University's research Center for Polar Maritime studies, noted,
``[w]hoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new
passage of world economics and international strategies.'' \7\
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\5\ Goodman, Sherri, and Elisabeth Freese. ``China's Ready to Cash
In on a Melting Arctic.'' Foreign Policy. May 1, 2018. https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/01/chinas-ready-to-cash-in-on-a-melting-
arctic/
\6\ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of
China. ``Full Text: China's Arctic Policy.'' The State Council of the
People's Republic of China. January 26, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/
archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
\7\ Jakobson, Linda. ``China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.''
Insights on Peace and Security. March 2010. https://www.sipri.org/
sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China also is deepening its Arctic presence through foreign direct
investment in several Northern European Arctic States.\8\ China is
exploiting climate change and the very real need for Arctic-based
infrastructure investment to assert itself as a key partner in economic
development and scientific exploration. This presence enhances their
own domain awareness, and investments could plausibly be leveraged to
influence policy to be more desirable for China's long-term strategic
interests.\9\
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\8\ Rosen, Mark E and Cara B. Thuringer, ``Unconstrained Foreign
Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security.'' CNA.
November 2017.
\9\ Goodman, Sherri and Marisol Maddox. ``China's Growing Arctic
Presence.'' China-US Focus. November 19, 2018. https://
www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-growing-arctic-presence
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a recent article, Coast Guard Commander, William Woityra, points
out that mistrust of China's actions and intentions in the Arctic is
firmly rooted in a pattern of behavior that they have displayed, which
shows that ``When it is convenient, and when there are economic
incentives to cheat, China has a history of turning a blind eye to the
illegal activity of its industries, or tacitly supporting them.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Woityra, William. ``China Can't Be Trusted in the Arctic.
Proceedings. December 2019. Vol. 145/12/1,402.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia has been increasing its military presence and assertiveness
in the Arctic--and a significant amount of it is proportionate to their
vast Arctic territory--but their ambitions have political, military and
commercial dimensions. On the political side, Russia has the longest
Arctic coastline of any Arctic coastal state, and Russian identity has
historically been tied to the Arctic. Expanding Arctic development, as
ice and permafrost melt, is therefore likely to enjoy broad public
support from a nation that identifies with its Arctic heritage.
Commercially, approximately 20 percent of Russia's GDP is derived from
Arctic activities, primarily energy, industrials and mining.\11\
Russian President Vladimir Putin has set ambitious cargo shipping
goals, which would quadruple the volume to be shipped through the
Northern Sea Route from 20 million tons to 80 million tons by 2024.\12\
Though this cargo increase still represents a small portion of total
global shipping, it is still a lofty goal for an environmentally
sensitive region which does not yet have fully developed emergency
response capabilities. Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route
as a new access route from China to Europe which, as the ice melts,
will presumably be available for several months each year. This could
cut up to 15 days off the current route via the Suez Canal and the
Strait of Malacca. It is noteworthy that President Putin has stated
that he sees the Northern Sea Route as a future ``global, competitive
transport artery'' that is ``the key to the development of the Russian
Arctic and the regions of the Far East.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Devyatkin, Pavel. ``Russia's Arctic Strategy: Aimed at
Conflict or Cooperation? (Part I).'' The Arctic Institute. February 6,
2018. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-aimed-
conflict-cooperation-part-one/
\12\ Staalesen, Atle. ``It's an order from the Kremlin: shipping on
Northern Sea Route to reach 80 million tons by 2024.'' The Barents
Observer. May 15, 2018. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/
05/its-order-kremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-increase-80-million-
tons-2024
\13\ Staalesen, Atle. ``Russia's Putin to turn Northern Sea Route
into global shipping artery.'' Eye on the Arctic. May 15, 2018. https:/
/www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/05/15/arctic-shipping-russia-
policy-international-kremlin/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Militarily, Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern
Sea Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our
High North allies and partners. Russia has violated Swedish \14\
airspace, simulated attacking northern Norway \15\ and tested
electronic warfare capabilities, including the jamming of GPS systems
during the NATO exercise Trident Juncture, and in days since, as
well.\16\ Russia claims its military buildup is primarily for economic
reasons, presenting the Northern Sea Route as a maritime toll road
through the Arctic, and seeking to monetize the route by requiring
transit vessels to pay a ``toll'' for military escort through the
shallow waters close to the Russian coastline. However, it is clear
that Russia would be able to use these forces and capabilities for
other purposes as well. Just last month Russia tested a hypersonic
missile for the first time in the Arctic,\17\ and they plan to launch
their first weaponized icebreaker, Ivan Papanin, by 2023.\18\ In short,
China and Russia are opportunistically expanding their power and
influence in direct response to a melting Arctic, and this will have
significant consequences for U.S. interests.
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\14\ Sweden: Russian Military Planes Briefly Violated Airspace.''
Associated Press. January 24, 2019. https://apnews.com/
097a3fd978f14f4e9a7f4e5cb4d1d600
\15\ Nilsen, Thomas. ``11 Russian Fighter Jets Made Mock Attack on
Norwegian Arctic Radar.'' The Barents Observer. February 12, 2019.
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/11-russian-fighter-
jets-made-mock-attack-norwegian-arctic-radar
\16\ Staalesen, Atle. ``GPS Jamming on Agenda as Russian Defence
Delegation Sat down for Talks in Oslo.'' The Independent Barents
Observer. March 18, 2019. https://thebarentsob
server.com/en/security/2019/03/gpsjamming-agenda-russian-defence-
delegation-sits-down-talks-oslo
\17\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia Tests Hypersonic Missile in Arctic,
TASS cites Source.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
\18\ ``Russian Shipyard Launches Missile-Carrying Icebreaker.'' The
Maritime Executive. October 28, 2019. https://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/russian-shipyard-launches-missile-carrying-
icebreaker
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in Arctic
waters near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among the new risks
in a rapidly changing Arctic, one that ``keeps me up at night,'' is a
potential nuclear shipping incident in Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear
safety record is deeply concerning, from Chernobyl, to the Kursk
submarine sinking in 2000, to the 2019 failed recovery of the Skyfall
missile and the nuclear submarine which caught on fire. These incidents
reveal a Russian tendency to not only withhold critical incident
information about the extent and severity of radioactive contamination
but to actually cover the incidents up in an attempt to evade
accountability. This irresponsible practice has implications for Coast
Guard and partner agency mission planning in responding to a crisis in
the Arctic.
To help prepare for future such incidents, a scenario demonstration
was conducted earlier this year by the Council on Strategic Risks,
Sandia National Labs and the Wilson Center's Polar Institute at the
Arctic Futures 2050 conference. With Coast Guard and Alaskan Native
community participation, we demonstrated ``how a table-top exercise can
be used to bring science, indigenous and policy communities together to
develop information, ideas and proposed actions to drive future
research directions, policy initiatives and planning for emergency
response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as a triggering
event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place in the year 2050 in
which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides with its Russian nuclear-
powered icebreaker escort in a winter storm.''
Key takeaways from the exercise include:\19\
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\19\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Jim Townsend, Marisol Maddox.
``Inclusive Planning for Changing Arctic Futures: Demonstrating a
Scenario-Based Discussion.'' Council on Strategic Risks. September 5,
2019 https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2019/09/19/planning-for-a-
changing-arctic-a-scenario-based-discussion-paper/
``The initial operational response to any major Arctic
shipping incident will follow well established search and
rescue protocols and will be led by the United States Coast
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Guard.''
``If a nuclear incident of this type occurs, it is likely to
become an incident of national significance and an incident
command structure will be established. A nuclear accident in
shallow water has the potential to become a very serious
incident.''
``Important predictive capabilities for situational
awareness and informing response decisions does not currently
exist for winter Arctic conditions.''
``The U.S. Arctic currently lacks multiple facets of both
operational and research infrastructure needed to provide key
elements of both short and long-term response to a major
winter-time incident.''
``There must be a strong indigenous voice and participation
in the response effort. Arctic indigenous communities have
important knowledge to inform response decisions and must be
part of response decisions.''
``This incident has the potential to rapidly become a major
international incident. Communication lines with Russian (and
other countries') institutions will be important. Confidence
Building Measures (CBM) could help to prepare both the U.S. and
Russia for a future contingency.''
______
#3: We have a Responsibility to Prepare for changing Arctic conditions
and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating capabilities in the
Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to improved domain awareness
(mapping and charting), communications and research capabilities.
As former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated in 2018, ``We need to
up our game in the Arctic.'' While the Coast Guard has a long and
storied tradition of Arctic operations, for which I have deep respect,
in the climate era we also need to enable the Coast Guard to ``up its
game in the Arctic,'' to meet its essential missions. As the Coast
Guard Strategic Outlook states: ``The United States is an Arctic
Nation, and the United States Coast Guard has served as the lead
Federal agency for homeland security, safety and environmental
stewardship in the Arctic region for over 150 years.''
Among the U.S.'s emerging needs in a changing Arctic is a strategic
deep-water port. Currently, the closest deep-water port to the U.S.
Arctic is 800 miles away in Kodiak, Alaska. That is inadequate in the
climate era with increased navigation, tourism, and other sea-based
traffic and the accompanying risks for search and rescue. An Arctic
deep-water port is a strategic initiative that the U.S. government,
engaging the private sector in a financially meaningful way, needs to
plan for future maritime safety and other operations.
I am pleased that the Committee has included in the Coast Guard
Authorization Act a provision to prepare a report on the Arctic
capabilities of the Armed Forces, including identifying gaps in
Department of Navy capabilities to protect Coast Guard assets during
Freedom of Navigations operations. This capability is becoming more
important in a changing Arctic.
The U.S. has fallen behind in equipping our forces to operate
safety and securely in a changing Arctic. There are 3 key components to
Coast Guard's operational capability in the Arctic. Each one requires
additional support:
1. Speed the deployment of additional ice breaking capability in the
form of the ``polar security cutter, aviation assets and
autonomous systems. Today, Coast Guard has limited ice breaking
capability that must fulfill missions at both poles, including
Antarctica. As the Strategic Outlook diplomatically states:
``This national fleet does not currently have the capability or
capacity necessary to assure access in the high latitudes.''
The Administration and Congress have authorized one new polar
security cutter; however, the Coast Guard needs at least 6, of
which 3 are ``medium'' and 3 are ``heavy,'' according to its
own requirements. And, from an acquisition standpoint, it is
financially preferable to conduct a multiple buy, as a single
vessel will have very high unit costs. At least one vessel in
the Polar Security Cutter fleet should be science-ready so they
are able to continue serving as a platform for scientific
research that is critical to domain awareness and detection of
changes over time.\20\ Additionally, the Coast Guard needs
modern aviation capability for search and rescue, as well as
the autonomous systems that are able to substantially enhance a
variety of Coast Guard mission sets, from illegal fishing
detection to mapping and charting.
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\20\ Congressional Research Service. ``Coast Guard Polar Security
Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress.'' Congressional Research Service. October 4, 2019. https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
2. Improve Arctic Domain Awareness and Communications capabilities.
Given the rapidly changing Arctic environmental and operating
conditions, it is essential that we improve U.S. Arctic,
including maritime, domain awareness capabilities. MDA is a
diverse set of capabilities, some of which are within the Coast
Guard's budget, but many of which are supported by other
agencies, and which also need to be harnessed from local
communities with direct observations of the changing Arctic
conditions. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states, Arctic
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domain awareness requirements include:
a. Information about national defense and security;
b. Information on vessel crew, passenger and cargo carried;
c. Pollution detection and tracking capabilities;
d. Weather and environmental observations, including ice
reconnaissance;
e. Assessment of living marine resources; and,
f. Assessment of human activity and infrastructure.
Consider again the possible nuclear shipping incident with a
Russian nuclear -powered icebreaker and a Chinese LNG vessel in
the Bering Strait. Information on all of the above will be
essential in responding to such a crisis should it occur. That
is why we need to act today to increase our MDA and
communications capabilities in the Arctic which includes
improving national communications infrastructure for broadband
and satellite coverage to support security as well as
commercial, recreational, and subsistence-based activities.
In that regard, I am pleased that the White House has recently
announced an intent to develop a national strategy on mapping,
exploring and characterizing the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and the shoreline and near-shoreline areas of Alaska.
Some of our current Arctic charts date back to the 1800s and
are wholly inadequate for today's needs. Only around 4 percent
of Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska have been charted to
modern standards.\21\ As the recent White House Memorandum
stated, ``Data and information about the ocean help to advance
maritime commerce, domestic seafood production, healthy and
sustainable fisheries, coastal resilience, energy production,
tourism and recreation, environmental protection, national and
homeland security, and other interests. Such activities
contribute more than $300 billion per year of economic
activity, 3 million jobs, and $129 billion in wages.'' \22\
Equally important, improved mapping and charting will help us
prepare to operate in a changing Arctic, and to improve our
predictive capabilities for better decision making.
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\21\ Cole, Dermot. ``Outdated navigational charts are an Arctic
maritime disaster in the making.'' Arctic Today. September 10, 2018.
https://www.arctictoday.com/outdated-navigational-charts-arctic-
maritime-disaster-making/
\22\ ``Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska.'' The White
House. November 19, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/memorandum-ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-
shoreline-nearshore-alaska/
3. Ensure the U.S. maintains its competitive edge in Arctic research
and development. For decades, the U.S. has supported extensive
research on the Arctic, from marine to terrestrial systems,
from space to ecosystems. This research, conducted by leading
universities across the Nation as well as Federal agency
laboratories, is a core component of America's competitive edge
in the Arctic. The Coast Guard's icebreakers are host to the
science missions conducted aboard to gather direct observations
and data about Arctic conditions. America's scientific
enterprise, and research and development capabilities, have
long supported both our overall security posture and our global
engagement strategies, as well as enabling us to better
understand the natural world. Nowhere is this more important
than in Arctic research. Today, China, Russia, and others are
increasing their research capabilities both within and about
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the Arctic.
Research helps us better understand the pace of Arctic climate
change and prepare for this changed future. For example, as
global fish stocks migrate as waters warm toward the poles, we
need to better understand how to manage emerging and potential
fisheries, and growing potential for illegal and unregulated
fishing. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean signed in 2018 by
multiple nations, including the US, Russia, China, and others
is a good example of acting with the precautionary principle in
situations in which we do not yet have sufficient knowledge to
make decisions about sustainable management of a fishery in
this long ice-covered area.\23\ Over the next decade, however,
many nations will be seeking to develop this knowledge, and we
need to ensure there is sufficient scientific knowledge to
support sustainable management and prevent some of the worst
outcomes of climate change.
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\23\ ``Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the
Central Arctic Ocean.'' https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/
000449233.pdf
The proposed High Arctic Research Center (HARC) facility at
Oliktok Point is a great example of a physical location that
would greatly complement the development of homeland security
and defense missions in the Arctic and support a re-established
leadership position in the region for the United States. The
proposed Center, ``could serve as a physical launch pad for
scientists, giving them year-round, multi-domain access for
research, development, Arctic technology testing, and domain
awareness. . . . Research and extensive real-time observations
in the Arctic could help researchers collect data that would
fill critical gaps in monitoring, providing real-time
information, enhancing forecasting, and creating better
simulations for planning purposes to serve security and
commercial enterprises.'' \24\ The High Arctic Research Center
would enable testing and demonstration of technologies for
multiple Coast Guard missions.
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\24\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Marisol Maddox, Clara Summers.
``Research in a Changing Arctic Must be Prioritized.'' New Security
Beat. October 8, 2019. https://www.newsecurity
beat.org/2019/10/research-changing-arctic-prioritized/
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______
#4: Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall
security and must be a whole of U.S. government and partnership effort,
including allies, communities, private sector, and others, that serve
to undergird the rules-based order and support resilience.
The Coast Guard is not alone in the Arctic. The keys to American
leadership on Arctic Security are partnerships and unity of effort.
This term refers to an inclusive approach that marshals all elements of
capability, including the joint and interagency community, state and
local government, industry, non-profit and academic organizations. Key
partnerships for the US, in particular the Coast Guard, in the Arctic
include:
Native Alaskan Communities: Those who live in the region are
often best able to ``ground truth'' observations and will know
what's happening long before many in Washington do. They
observe trends and recognize patterns that may not be
distinguishable to others. That is why it is essential to ``co-
produce'' knowledge with those closest to the Arctic domain. I
am pleased that both the Coast Guard and other interagency
partners have been including the Native Alaskan community in
developing both research approaches and improving domain
awareness. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states:
``Alaska Natives are a critical layer of security in the
Arctic.'' The Native Alaskan communities are also on the
frontlines of climate disruption, from coastal erosion
occurring at many villages, to permafrost thaw disrupting
traditional livelihoods, to harmful algal blooms (HABs) harming
fish stocks and megafauna, to extreme weather storms disrupting
the critical supply chain of fuel and food delivery. These
changing conditions increase demands for Coast Guard support
and response and stretch scarce resources even further.
Arctic Coast Guard Forum: Another important security layer
in the Arctic is the partnership the Coast Guard has with the
Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Appropriately characterized as a
bridge between ``diplomacy and operations,'' the Arctic Coast
Guard Forum enables the Coast Guards of the 8 Arctic nations
both to strengthen working relationships, conduct exercises and
combined operations, and coordinate emergency response, which
becomes more necessary as climate challenges mount.
Innovation and Technology: The U.S. has always been a
technology and innovation leader. As the Arctic changes, we
need to harness that capability to advance low-carbon and
sustainable systems for Arctic operations, observations and
planning. For example, wind and solar-powered ocean drones are
now helping to map the Arctic. Other types of autonomous
systems and advanced technologies will help keep America' at
the forefront of Arctic, low carbon and resilience innovation
in the Arctic.
International agreements and institutions that are the
backbone of the rules-based order: America's security in the
Arctic depends on key international organizations and
agreements. They are even more important in an era of great
power competition.
Arctic Council: The Arctic Council provides an
important intergovernmental forum for the 8 Arctic nations,
Indigenous People's organizations, observer states and non-
governmental organizations to engage on a wide range of
Arctic issues (other than military security). It has also
developed important agreements on Search and Rescue, Oil
Spill Preparedness and Response, and Scientific
Cooperation, that serve to strengthen cooperation in
uncertain times.
Law of the Sea Convention: The Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS) continues to be an important legal
framework for the Coast Guard, the U.S. military and others
operating in the region, despite the fact that the United
States has not yet ratified it.
International Maritime Organization (IMO): The IMO's
Polar Code, adopted in 2014, establishes important
standards for design, construction, equipment, operation,
training and environment protection and safety for ships
operating in polar regions.
Recommendations
To summarize my recommendations above, here are the key areas where
Congressional support and action is needed:
1. Advancing the acquisition of polar security cutters, and
structurally equip them to carry out scientific research.
2. Increasing MDA capabilities in conjunction with other agencies.
3. Supporting continued Arctic research and development,
demonstration, test and evaluation across multiple agencies.
4. Mapping and charting Alaskan waters and near shoreline for
maritime safety.
5. Reducing further climate risk through sustainable and low-carbon
approaches across all domains using a Responsibility to Prepare
and Prevent approach.
______
Conclusion: Arctic Leadership for the 21st Century
As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook appropriately states:
``Arctic Security requires leadership and cooperation across
multiple national security areas of interest, including border
security, economic security, environmental security, food
security, freedom of navigation, geopolitical stability, human
safety, national defense, natural resource protection and
assertion and protection of U.S. sovereign rights.''
America's leadership on climate security is the other essential element
to advancing America's Arctic interests in the 21st century.
The globally-devastating Second World War precipitated the creation
of an international system led by the United States, designed to
protect the sovereignty of states against external aggression and
decrease the likelihood of conflict between nations. This is the world
order we are trying to preserve today. However, the rapid rate of
climatic change, combined with other global threats, and the increasing
stress on security that follows means that this system must adapt--and
adapt quickly. The U.S. should lead that effort, just as it led the
effort to ensure global stability after the Second World War.
Fortunately, the difference between today and major global
disruptions of the past is that we can spot impending disasters earlier
and more easily. Though the risks are unprecedented, our foresight is
unprecedented as well. Technological developments have given us
predictive tools that enhance our ability to anticipate and mitigate
threats. In short, we have the ability to make our communities,
institutions and individuals more resilient to a broad range of
threats. This foresight underscores a responsibility to advance
resilient solutions that are commensurate to the threat. That is our
``Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent,'' which is most evident in
what our Coast Guard needs to do to continue operating safely and
securely in the changing Arctic. If we don't, we will either have to
watch our adversaries take the lead, or failing that, bear witness to
an increasingly unstable world.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Goodman.
Mr. Sfraga.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL SFRAGA, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL RISK AND
RESILIENCE PROGRAM; DIRECTOR OF THE POLAR INSTITUTE, WOODROW
WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Dr. Sfraga. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator
Markey, thank you. Senator Cantwell, thank you for your
interests.
I am here today to provide a bit of context for the Arctic,
providing key issues that face the United States in the Arctic.
As noted, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean, and
it is a region the U.S. Coast Guard has operated in for over
150 years. And the importance of these operations will increase
in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible
U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the nation?s
interests. Presence is important. Presence is mandatory.
Presence is influence.
The United States Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic
Outlook is a perfect filter through which my testimony should
be viewed. They specifically outlined three areas of effort: to
enhance their capability to operate effectively in a dynamic
Arctic domain; to strengthen the rules-based order; and to
innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity in the
Arctic.
The Arctic, as you noted, is experiencing rapid change.
There are risks. There are realities. There are opportunities.
So I tried to design a framework called Navigating the Arctic's
7Cs, to give us seven buckets through which we can think about
our future Arctic. These Cs are: climate, commodities,
commerce, connectivity, communities, cooperation, and
competition. I think the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook does a
very good job of providing us a road map through these Cs.
Senators, you have already covered, as have my colleagues
here, the issue of climate, so I will not review what you have
already noted. I simply will say that Congress should support
the Coast Guard's request for additional Arctic research so
that they better understand the domain in which they are to
operate.
Commodities is the second C. With a coastline of 34,000
miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic, there is significant
potential for economic development in the United States and to
enhance our nation's Arctic security. But we worry about the
growing interests not only for our challenges but also
opportunities. We worry about them in terms of Arctic tourism.
We think about moving fish stocks north. We think about the
real threat of an oil and gas spill, and we about the many
challenges our Coast Guard faces to address these many issues.
We think the Congress should support the U.S. Coast Guard's
search and rescue requirements, as noted in their Strategic
Outlook.
The third C is commerce. Increased access to a variety of
resources is an opportunity and a risk, as my colleagues have
outlined. There has been a fivefold increase in commercial
activity along the northern sea route, primarily driven by
resource development. If the State of Alaska or the Federal
Government decides to develop Alaska's LNG prospects, the Coast
Guard will need the assets to enable the Nation to not only be
protected from oil spills, but to manage this facility or
facilities on Alaska's North Slope.
The Coast Guard needs significant domain awareness. The
Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska is an
encouraging step. Without robust maritime domain awareness,
however, conducting safe and secure shipping is daunting
challenge.
So Congress should support a comprehensive and
appropriately funded Arctic domain awareness and ocean mapping
strategy.
Four, connectivity. We do not have a digital divide, a data
divide, or an infrastructure divide in America's Arctic. We
have a digital, data, and infrastructure abyss. Closing this
abyss will require innovative solutions with persistent public/
private investment with all Federal agencies participating.
When you think about infrastructure in the Arctic, in America's
Arctic, think about this in contrast. China has pursued
investments in various Arctic nations' infrastructure,
including an approximate 40 percent stake in the first Yamal
LNG facility, as well as their recently opened Power of Siberia
pipeline which connects China and Russia's energy network.
Meanwhile, the United States does not have one single
Arctic port.
Congress should invest in a dual-use facility and
capabilities in Alaska starting with a multi-use port and
advancing development of enhanced integrated Internet
communications and connectivity throughout the region.
Five, communities. The indigenous communities of Alaska are
no the forefront of a collapsing landscape. Dozens of Alaskan
villages are threatened. Their landscape is their rhythm of
life. The Coast Guard has supported these communities
throughout the last decade.
So the U.S. Coast Guard should continue to support Alaska's
indigenous communities through initiatives like the Coast
Guard's Cities and Communities Program.
Six, cooperation. Continued participation and leadership by
the United States in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Economic
Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum is in our nation's
interest. These entities shape and reinforce the rules-based
governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and all Arctic
nations.
My recommendation is that the Coast Guard continue to lead
in this effort.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, seven, competition. The great
competition between the United States, China, and Russia should
be considered in each country's broader approach and national
mindset. In the Arctic and elsewhere, China plays the game
``Go,'' characterized by a long-term methodological strategy to
exert influence and power in a calculated fashion. Russia plays
the game ``Survivor,'' attempting to sustain an economy
crippled by Western sanctions and a declining population with
an over-reliance on natural resource development for both
domestic and international markets. And finally, the United
States plays the game ``Twister,'' trying to balance global
leadership roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South
China Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere
against the challenges presented by a new and accessible ocean.
Congress should move with urgency to see our polar security
cutter fleet funded and in service sooner rather than later.
And in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. It
is no longer an isolated or remote region. It is part of the
geopolitical, economic, social, physical, and security
landscape globally. So I hope these Arctic 7Cs, this framework,
helps us think through the future Arctic for the United States.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sfraga follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Mike Sfraga, Director, Polar Institute, and
Director, Global Risk & Resilience Program, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, my name is Mike Sfraga. I am
the Director of the Polar Institute and the Director of the Global Risk
and Resilience Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Nation's think
tank. I am honored to testify on the subject ``Expanding Opportunities,
Challenges, and Threats in the Arctic: A Focus on the USCG Strategic
Outlook.'' My role today is to provide a contextual overview of the key
Arctic issues facing the US, and other Arctic and non-Arctic nations.
Mr. Chairman, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean: a
fourth accessible, maritime border for the United States. The Arctic
Ocean joins the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean
as a critical geographic component of our country's maritime ring of
security and opportunity. Spanning nearly five and one half million
square miles, the Arctic Ocean covers an area roughly 1.5 times the
size of the United States and nearly half the size of the Continent of
Africa. It is a region that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has operated in
for over 150 years, and the importance of these operations will only
increase in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible
U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the Nation's interests:
presence is important; presence is mandatory, and presence is
influence.
As the primary surface presence of the United States in the Arctic,
and the first responder to any incident that falls under their 11
statutory missions, the USCG must be empowered to fulfill the needs of
this country. As the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook
states, ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to open and
increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard services.
Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating environment
that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to unpredictable levels of
risk.''
The United States Coast Guard 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook is a
perfect filter through which my testimony should be considered, as is
the Department of Homeland Security's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2020-2024. The DHS Strategic Plan champions ``'Relentless Resilience'
for all threats and hazards,'' which requires a whole of government
approach. The USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook targets three lines of
effort to further the Department's goals: (1) enhancing their
capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain, (2)
strengthen the rules-based order, and (3) innovate and adapt to promote
resilience and prosperity in the Arctic.
The Arctic, including Alaska, the state by which the United States
is an Arctic nation, is experiencing rapidly evolving threats--and
opportunities--that we must recognize and address. To re-conceptualize
the realities, risks, and opportunities in the Arctic, I designed a
framework called Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs.
The 7Cs are: (1) Climate, (2) Commodities, (3) Commerce, (4)
Connectivity, (5) Communities, (6) Cooperation, and (7) Competition. To
effectively protect the homeland by addressing the challenges and
opportunities of a transformed Arctic, the USCG must thoroughly
consider how it Navigates the Arctic's 7Cs; their 2019 Arctic Strategic
Outlook provides a good roadmap to do so.
1. Climate
Global Warming is real, rapid, and palpable. According to NASA,
September Arctic Ocean ice extent has decreased from about 3 million
square miles in 1980 to less than 2 million square miles as of
September of this year. Arctic sea ice extent in September (when it is
at its lowest) has declined almost 13 percent per decade since 1979.\1\
The Arctic is warming more than twice as fast as the global average.
The UN's World Meteorological Organization recently noted a surge in
carbon emissions and stated the gap between global targets and true
emissions is ``glaring and growing,'' and must be halved by 2030 to
have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C. ``In order
to have a 66 percent probability of avoiding global warming beyond 1.5
degrees C, the IPCC says we can release no more than 113 billion
additional tons of carbon. That's only about ten years of emissions at
the current rate.'' \2\
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\1\ ``Arctic Sea Ice Minimum.'' NASA: Global Climate Change.
https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/
\2\ ``Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5'' IPCC. https://
www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
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The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a
Changing Climate documented the melting of high mountain glaciers and
polar ice sheets significantly jeopardize the planet's freshwater
supply. Another recent study declares 9 major climate tipping points
have been triggered, 5 of which are directly related to Arctic change:
1. the destabilization of the Greenland ice shelf, 2. reduction in
Arctic sea ice, 3. thawing of permafrost, 4. slowdown of Atlantic
circulation, 5. fire and pest outbreaks in boreal forests.\3\
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\3\ ``Climate tipping points--too risky to bet against.'' Nature.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0
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Associated sea ice decline has many implications for the United
States, including: a more accessible border along Alaska's coastline;
increased risk to mariners; stronger and more frequent storms; threats
to coastal communities due to coastline and permafrost degradation,
and; shifting subsistence patterns. For the first time in history,
warming water temperatures have led to such a precipitous decline in
Pacific cod stock that the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council
announced they will close the Gulf of Alaska cod fishery for the 2020
season.\4\ Sea ice decline also opens new and expanded opportunities: a
more accessible resource base; increased shipping and commerce; and
increases in tourism and recreational activities.
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\4\ George, Kavitha. ``Extremely low cod numbers lead feds to close
the Gulf of Alaska fishery for the first time.'' Alaska Public Media.
December 6, 2019. https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/12/06/extremely-
low-cod-numbers-linked-to-the-marine-heatwave-lead-feds-to-close-the-
gulf
-of-alaska-fishery-for-the-first-time/?fbclid=IwAR0NP-
Z6BydPZ3Uo2LgO1lciKixtZp5duLJGf4_
tvGtMqKYojFRnQgbcDZw
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Global warming is the preeminent driver of change in the Arctic and
requires a rapid yet responsible evolution of the USCG's posture,
strategy, and operations. It also requires the U.S. government to
provide necessary resources to the USCG so they can execute their
mission, and for applicable Federal agencies to shoulder a share of the
responsibility. Indeed, a ``whole of government'' strategy and approach
is required. But in order to more effectively meet their mission in the
Arctic, the USCG must have accurate, reliable, and sustained
information about the Arctic environment in which they are to operate.
The need for additional, sustained, and appropriately funded research
and observation systems cannot be over emphasized.
Recommendation: Support the Arctic Strategic Outlook's call for
additional Arctic research and associated funding. A perfect starting
place is adoption and resourcing of the United States Arctic Research
Commission's Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research
2019-2020. Nine recommendations that enhance the Nation's ability to
``Observe, Understand, and Forecast Arctic Environmental Change'' are
identified in the document.
2. Commodities
The rapidly changing climate is opening resource development
opportunities throughout the Arctic, including Alaska. With a coastline
of nearly 34,000 miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic,\5\ Alaska has
significant potential for economic development at the community, state,
and Federal levels. The subsequent 1,000,000 square miles of the U.S.
Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone \6\, currently extending 200 nautical
miles out from the Alaskan coastline, provides a vast landscape full of
opportunities to satisfy global commodity markets, ensure our Nation's
energy security, while simultaneously presenting a significant
challenge to the Coast Guard's mandate to uphold American sovereignty.
The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for managing and regulating the
Nation's maritime borders and all actions within them--including those
actions that promote economic prosperity and threaten U.S. sovereignty
and its economic independence.
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\5\ https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf
\6\ 2019 USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook
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As an Alaskan, I am well aware of the importance of the Alaskan
seafood industry to the state; averaging $3 billion a year in critical
revenue. As the Arctic continues to warm, fish stocks may move farther
north, which may enhance the industry's profits while presenting
challenges as well. The possible migration north of fish stocks will
further stretch fisheries enforcement assets. The Coast Guard conducts
patrols in the Bering Sea to counter illegal, unregulated, and
unreported (IUU) fishing; however, the northern migration of these
living resources may require the Coast Guard to patrol more extensive
swathes of territory and increase the frequencies of such patrols.
Protecting these resources and preventing international IUU fishing in
the region will become more important in the coming years and decades.
Arctic tourism will further complicate the Coast Guard's mission in
the North. From mobile ``hotel'' tents positioned at the North Pole, to
a boom in Arctic cruise adventures, thousands of people traveling a
once inaccessible landscape pose myriad challenges for all Arctic
nations. In 2016, the Crystal Serenity carried 1,700 people through the
Northwest Passage, making it the first large scale cruise ship to do
so.\7\
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\7\ https://thinkprogress.org/arctic-biggest-cruise-ship-ever-
ea7b71e9844f/
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Considering the USCG's Search and Rescue (SAR) mission and
operations, an austere scenario should be considered. If a cruise ship
accident occurred along the North Slope of Alaska, the first city with
any capacity to assist in the disaster would be Utqiagvik, formerly
known as Barrow. The city has a population less than 4,500, and its one
hospital, the Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital, is a state-of-the-art
institution with a 20-bed general medical facility \8\. This number of
beds could not handle a large-scale disaster in the Arctic and would
require the Coast Guard to transfer victims to Fairbanks or Anchorage--
a distance of 502 and 720 miles, respectively. However, the Coast Guard
has neither the air nor sea assets to address a disaster on this scale;
the tyranny of distance is amplified in the Arctic.
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\8\ https://www.ihs.gov/sites/alaska/themes/responsive2017/
display_objects/documents/hf/Barrow.pdf
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According to Cruise Industry News' 2019 Expedition Market Report,
``expedition' cruising is the fastest growing market in the entire
shipping industry.\9\ A cruise crisis, which becomes more of a concern
grows with the predicted growth of special, Arctic designed expedition
ships [the number currently in operation is predicted to increase from
80 to 108 vessels by 2022 \10\] requires an increase in all phases of
search and rescue operations. As noted by the USCG 2019 Arctic
Strategic Outlook: ``as cruise ship and transpolar aviation traffic
grows, so does the potential need for mass rescue operations in remote
and icy waters. The current state of response capabilities makes this
one of the most challenging of all possible scenarios.'' Proper
prevention and management measures could mitigate the risk of these
accidents and their environmental and economic impacts.
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\9\ https://www.cruiseindustrynews.com/flip/expedition19/mobile/
index.html#p=2
\10\ https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/travel/2018/05/arctic-
cruise-ship-boom
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Response capabilities regarding non-living resource emergencies
must also be expanded and enhanced. The Arctic is estimated to hold 13
percent of the world's undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural
gas liquids. The increased availability of these resources caused by
continued and rapid Arctic Ocean sea ice decline has reenergized the
global commodity market's interest in the Arctic. This interest is
predicted to endure--particularly as geopolitical tensions continue to
multiply in resource heavy areas around the world.
Recommendation: Support and address the U.S. Coast Guard's SAR
requirements as noted in USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, with
particular attention given to robust asset allocation along the Bering
Strait and North Slope of Alaska.
3. Commerce
Increased access to a wide array of natural resource commodities
has led directly to an increase in shipping and related activities in
the Arctic, most notably in the Russian Arctic. There has been a five-
fold increase in commercial activity along Russia's Northern Sea Route
(NSR) since 2014, primarily driven by its regional resource extraction
and subsequent transport systems to domestic and international markets.
According to Business Index North, 22,022 voyages with 20.1 million
tons of freight transited the NSR in 2018--twice the tonnage of 2017.
The number jumped again to 30 million tons in 2019 \11\. In the month
of September this year, there were 50 voyages that originated from, or
traveled to, international destinations using the Northern Sea
Route.\12\
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\11\ https://www.arctictoday.com/rosatom-looks-to-make-7-billion-
investment-in-arctic-shipping-service/
\12\ https://arctic-lio.com/nsr-shipping-traffic-activities-in-
september-2019/
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Russia derives an estimated 20 percent of its GDP and 30 percent of
its exports from the Arctic--and aims to quadruple the cargo to 80
million tons per year by 2024 by enhancing and expanding their Arctic
infrastructure. Russia's Yamal Peninsula, an epicenter of this
commerce, is now emblematic of globally integrated Arctic. China owns
an approximate 40 percent stake in the Yamal 1 LNG project. Arctic-
specific LNG tankers built in the shipyards of South Korea transport
LNG along the NSR, down the Bering Strait to Asian--Chinese markets.
This is the new Arctic; an expanding global economic system that stands
in stark contrast to the lack of activity in America's Arctic.
The success of the Yamal 1 project has spurred the construction of
a second Russian LNG facility. Novatek is Russia's largest LNG
producer--and majority owner of the Yamal 1 complex. They recently
reached a final investment decision (FID) of $21.3 billion for their
Arctic LNG Yamal 2 facility.\13\ Novatek is partnering with French,
Chinese, and Japanese companies on this project, with continued
interest from Saudi Aramco. The facility is expected to be complete
within the next five years.\14\
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\13\ https://www.lngworldnews.com/arctic-lng-2-partners-make-fid/
\14\ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-05/russia-s-
novatek-gives-green-light-to-arctic-lng-2-project
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An integrated commercial system linking the Yamal facilities and
other oil and gas developments along Russia's Arctic Coast will enhance
Russia's position as a source for much needed energy resources. The
recently proposed Sakhalin Energy Transfer Facility, located on
Sakhalin Island, could make delivery of Russian LNG to Asian markets
more viable and cost effective. Russia's Power of Siberia pipeline, the
first pipeline to send Russian gas directly to China, launched
operations on December 2nd of this year, ushering in greater
connections between the two countries' markets.\15\
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\15\ https://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/
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The United States should take note of this growing Russian Arctic
infrastructure network and its ever-growing relationship with Asian
markets. Renewed interest in America's Arctic as a source of energy
security has spurred conversation about the need for, and feasibility
of, a year-round or seasonal energy and transit complex along Alaska's
North Slope. Although much work would need to be done, a Public Private
Partnership may be of interest as the U.S. looks to secure its own
energy sources and take advantage of vast LNG assets along Alaska's
coast and the ever-increasing LNG markets throughout Asia. Yet, for LNG
development and shipping to occur in and around Alaska, it must be
economically reasible, safe, reliable, regulated, and have a
significant U.S. Coast Guard presence.
The United States has a well-functioning Marine Transportation
System (MTS), and it is at the core of the Nation's economic
prosperity. The U.S. Coast Guard maintains the safety, security, and
efficiency of the MTS, providing stable regulations that enables $5.4
trillion in economic activity per year. While challenging, an extension
and variation of the MTS could be established in America's Arctic. The
USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook describes such an expansion that would
require an adaptation of MTS management tools, as well as innovative
policies and technologies that are Arctic-appropriate. This can only be
accomplished with the support and partnership of public and private
sector entities and would be a tangible, actionable step the U.S. can
take to prepare for future opportunities.
In preparation for greater U.S. commercial presence in the Arctic,
the U.S. Coast Guard has taken steps toward improving navigational
safety and environmental protection. A rare partnership with Russia has
led to an agreement, entered into force one year ago, that establishes
two-way shipping routes, promotes safe commerce, and takes into account
subsistence patterns in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea. Additionally,
the Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska \16\, issued on November
19 of this year, provides encouraging steps towards expediting
shoreline and nearshore mapping capabilities for Alaska and its Arctic
region. This is a critical component of any future, integrated, U.S.
Arctic strategy that considers our homeland security, national
security, economic security, as well as social and political security
in a dynamically changing landscape.
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\16\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-
ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-shoreline-
nearshore-alaska/
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The timing of the memorandum highlights how modern aids to
navigation will be crucial in integrating the Arctic into the broader
U.S. MTS and enhancing economic development. Less than 5 percent of the
U.S. maritime Arctic is charted to modern international standards; we
lack the basic information crucial to understanding our Arctic domain.
Without robust maritime domain awareness (MDA), conducting safe and
secure shipping for economic development remains a daunting challenge.
As noted by the USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``MDA favorable to
supporting economic growth and resource management requires information
on vessels, crews, passengers and cargo carried (if applicable);
pollution detection and tracking capabilities; weather and
environmental observations, including ice reconnaissance; an assessment
of living marine resources activity; and an assessment of human
activity and infrastructure''.
As noted, the U.S. Coast Guard's capabilities for MDA are stretched
thin in the Arctic because there does not exist sufficient access to
reliable, redundant, robust Internet connectivity. The result of which
inhibits data gathering, information sharing between local, state, and
Federal agencies and all facets of observational capabilities. This
reality stifles commerce, SAR, national and homeland defense
requirements, and limits Alaska communities to engage in state,
national and international opportunities. Moreover, without reliable
data gathering and dissemination, expansive and reliable infrastructure
development and maintenance would be nearly impossible to realize.
Recommendation: A comprehensive and appropriately funded ocean
mapping strategy should be developed and executed to advance all facets
of U.S. interests and include the development of an Arctic MTS.
4. Connectivity
There are many ways to describe connectivity in the Arctic context.
We tend to think of connectivity as just an Internet connection, but we
should focus on a broader application of connectivity--addressing both
digital and physical infrastructure.
As noted in my past testimonies, we do not have a digital or
information divide in America's Arctic--we have a digital and
information abyss. This abyss is not just a U.S. Coast Guard issue, but
a real problem that jeopardizes our national and homeland security and
one that must be met by the collective and integrated family of Federal
agencies. To be clear, telecommunications and information
infrastructure in the Arctic requires a coordinated and leveraged
approach involving governance and operations expertise from local,
state, and Federal entities.
Closing this abyss in the Arctic, and specifically for the U.S.
Coast Guard will require innovative solutions that maintain levels of
flexibility and scalability, coupled with persistent public-private
investment. Joint efforts with local communities, state agencies, and
other Federal institutions--including scientific and research
organizations--would result in more reliable communication solutions.
These solutions should incorporate investments in, and funding for,
``ice-breaking ships, such as the Polar Security Cutter, aviation
assets, unmanned or autonomous systems, and trained personnel'' capable
of operating in the harsh and remote arctic environment, as stated in
the 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook. If these investments are not made,
the United States will continually fall behind other arctic nations. To
date, the U.S. is the only Arctic State that has not made a comparable
investment to these resources--it is also quickly being surpassed in
this field by non-arctic states
China's proclaimed ``Polar Silk Road'' is designed to ``facilitate
connectivity and sustainable economic and social development of the
Arctic''--by constructing and investing in infrastructure for arctic
resource development, transportation hubs, and shipping routes.\17\
Already, China has pursued investments in various Arctic nations'
infrastructure. The ``near-arctic state'' owns approximately 40 percent
stake in the Yamal 1 facility and is considering financing port
facilities in Arkhangelsk (Russia)\18\ and Kirkenes (Norway).\19\ The
China Communications Construction Company [CCCC] bid on a contract for
the construction of three Greenland commercial airports, located in
Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq, at a cost upwards of $550 million.\20\
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\17\ http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/
content_281476026660336
.htm
\18\ https://www.globaltrademag.com/china-russia-collaborating-
arctic-port/
\19\ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029125.htm
\20\ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/07/how-a-
potential-chinese-built-airport-in-greenland-could-be-risky-for-a-
vital-us-air-force-base/
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The country's dynamic investment interests also range from
financing research centers like the Northern Lights Research Facility
in Iceland, to pursuing investments in undersea fiber-optic cables such
as the Arctic Connect cable system.\21\ A CNA report estimates that
China's proposed investments amounted to ``over $1.4 trillion in the
economies of the Arctic nations (including Finland and Sweden)''
between 2005 and 2017.\22\
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\21\ https://www.capacitymedia.com/articles/3824070/cinia-moves-
full-speed-ahead-with-arctic-connect
\22\ https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf
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Russia is also bolstering its dual-use Arctic assets. Their
extensive lattice of ports, air bases, commercial hubs, a floating
nuclear power plant off the Arctic coast City of Pevek, and SAR
resources have been a component of civilian-government, as well as
military activities, including recent tests of new weapons systems and
increased troop deployments.
Meanwhile, the U.S. does not have a major deep-water port along
1,500 nautical miles of its Arctic coastline: from Dutch Harbor to
Alaska's North Slope. As the Arctic Strategic Outlook states, ``the
closest Coast Guard Air Station to the Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK.
This is approximately 820 nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK--a
distance comparable of that from Boston, MA to Miami, FL.''
Without a viable deep-water port or string of ports--in the U.S.
Arctic--commerce, SAR, and national security interests will not be met.
The June 2019 National Defense Authorization Act includes
``requirements to locate and designate `one or more' U.S. strategic
ports in the Arctic.'' The U.S. must recognize and invest in the
potential for dual-use facilities and capabilities in Alaska, starting
with a multi-use port.
Of particular interest should be the development of a deep-water
port along the Bering Strait. There have been numerous reports and
recommendations made as to scale, scope, and location of such a port.
Nome, Port Clarence, and other location options are all in need of
review and final decision sooner rather than later. But in the spirit
of leveraging and integrating U.S. national assets for the security of
our nation, linking the development, construction, and complementary
mission sets of future Arctic-related infrastructure seems the most
prudent strategy.
Therefore, the committee should continue to support a Bering
Strait, dual-use port as well as an emerging interest in reconstituting
and upgrading the former U.S. Naval base in Adak, in the Aleutian
Islands. Here, an upgraded Naval installation would serve to secure and
protect the Nation's maritime, homeland, national, and commercial
security requirements, while providing a dual use port for the U.S.
Coast Guard. The two port concepts are not mutually exclusive. Rather,
I argue it is in the Nation's best interest to enhance and develop
both.
Combining and leveraging military, national and homeland security,
and other Federal and state government capabilities and assets will
better prepare the U.S. for our new Arctic, while requiring a
reconceptualization of how the United States views its Arctic and the
critical role the region will play in the Nation's future. Developing
such a component of a more cohesive U.S. Arctic strategy is not only
beneficial, but necessary for U.S. leadership in the region. The 2017
U.S. National Security Strategy mentions the Arctic once, and the
country has yet to put forward a document of integrated Arctic
strategies, or guidelines for integration between various agencies such
as DoD, DHS, DOE, and DOS.. Although there are seams of cooperation,
for the most part, each entity carries out its own strategy in the
Arctic (if it has one) even though cooperation is a key component in
the region.
Recommendation: Advance the development of a port, or preferably a
string of ports, along the North Slope of Alaska, Bering Strait, and
Aleutian Islands that will provide dual use capabilities to meet the
needs of the U.S. Coast Guard, national and homeland security entities,
as well as other federal, state, local, and commercial interests.
Advance the development and implementation of enhanced, integrated
Internet and communications connectivity throughout the region and
leverage public-private partnerships where feasible.
5. Communities
The people of Alaska, and more specifically the Indigenous peoples
of Alaska are on the vanguard of a changing, dynamic, shifting, melting
landscape. For many Alaskan communities the land is their life, their
identity, their culture, and the source for most of their food. Nearly
three dozen Alaskan communities have been identified by a 2009 Army
Corps of Engineers report \23\ as being seriously threatened by
environmental change and in need of relocation; this number is likely
to grow. These communities are stressed on many levels yet they have
adapted and thrived in this landscape for thousands of years. But the
changes are happening too fast, too dramatically, and too unpredictably
to navigate with any certainty.
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\23\ https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/
AlaskaBaselineErosion
AssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf
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Alaskan communities live at the forefront of environmental change,
and the consequential risks that develop as a result of those changes.
For them, an oil spill represents not just an environmental disaster
but a threat to the stability of the ecosystems upon which their
livelihoods, food security, and cultural identities depend. Continued
engagement between the USCG and Alaskan communities should be applauded
and expanded through the Marine Safety Task Force initiative. The MSTF
conducted safety and environmental protection missions (surveying and
checking, for instance, bulk fuel storage facilities--a life sustaining
resource throughout remote Alaska) in over 100 Alaskan communities.
The USCG is a leader in the Arctic, and their Coast Guard Cities
and Communities program--five of which are in Alaska (though none in
the Arctic region)--demonstrate their enduring commitment to
cultivating relationships with communities with whom they collaborate.
As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``the Coast Guard has been
part of life in many Arctic communities for over 150 years as a
neighbor, law enforcer, and life saver. Alaskan Natives have been
partners and teachers, and we continue to benefit from their
traditional wisdom and deep understanding of the Arctic domain.''
Traditional Knowledge will play a key role in the future viability of
these communities and will be important components of the U.S. Coast
Guard's formulation of strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
making.
Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard should further utilize
Traditional Knowledge and expertise to enhance their missions
throughout Alaska. Traditional Knowledge will remain an important
component of a larger strategy to understand better a changing
landscape and inform both strategies and tactics to address these
changes; including the importance of community-based physical
monitoring and detection.
6. Cooperation
Continued participation and leadership by the U.S. in the Arctic
Council, the Arctic Economic Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum
is in our Nation's interest. These entities shape and reinforce a
rules-based governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and indeed, the
eight Arctic nations. They help to identify and conduct research and
policy measures that strive to understand, mitigate, and address the
impacts of a warming Arctic. The Arctic region is the only place, aside
from the International Space Station, where the U.S. and Russia have
maintained long-term cooperation, even in times of high tension.
Because the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable has been on hold since
the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum plays a
more important role in maintaining open lines of communication between
the U.S. and Russia.
It is important that on shared security concerns related to oil
spill response, protecting marine living resources, shipping, and SAR,
the U.S. continues to work collaboratively with Russia and the other
Arctic nations. As previously noted, the U.S. and Russia have worked
successfully together to create IMO-approved, designated shipping
routes through the Bering Strait in order to reduce risk to mariners.
There were two incidents of concern this past summer in the Russian
Arctic which underscore the need for the U.S. to work proactively and
collaboratively with allies and partners to minimize risk of nuclear
contamination, identify knowledge gaps, and develop a greater capacity
to minimize harm from any event involving radioactive material. Such
incidents also make clear the need for open lines of communication.
Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard must continue to shape and
lead the efforts of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, play a key role in
the future of the Arctic Economic Council as it encourages continued,
sustained, and responsible development of the North, and engage where
appropriate with the United States Senior Arctic Official and her
Arctic Council team at this consensus driven, Arctic focus
organization.
7. Competition
The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes U.S. adversaries seek to weaken
``the international order that underpins a free and open maritime
domain.'' It also states that ``clear and universally held norms,
coupled with transparency, can dissipate'' the ``cloud of ambiguity''
under which they are operating.
When exploring the competition dynamic in the Arctic, specifically
between the United States, China, and Russia, we should consider each
country's broader approach and national mindset. In the Arctic, and
elsewhere, China plays the game ``Go;'' characterized by a long-term,
methodical strategy to exert influence and power in a calculated
fashion. Meanwhile, Russia plays the game ``Survivor;'' attempting to
sustain an economy crippled by western sanctions and a declining
population with an overreliance on natural resource development for
both domestic and international markets. Finally, the United States
plays the game ``Twister;'' attempting to balance its global leadership
roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea,
Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere, against the challenges
presented by a new, accessible Arctic Ocean.
Military ties between Russia and China are growing stronger in the
Arctic. This is evidenced by an increase in joint military exercises
between the two countries including the Russia-based Tsentr-2019
exercise. The exercise included approximately 128,000 military
personnel and helped further develop China, India, and Pakistan's
operational capabilities in the high North region. The exercise
included 1,600 troops under PLA Western Theater Command.\24\ This
reality should be considered in juxtaposition to the 2018 NATO Trident
Juncture Exercise that included 50,000 NATO troops and partners; 20,000
of which were American troops.
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\24\ ``Chinese troops participate in Tsentr-2019 drills'' China
Military. http://eng.chinamil
.com.cn/view/2019-09/25/content_9635742.htm
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In October of this year, Russian Federation President Vladimir
Putin announced Russia would assist China in developing a missile
defense system to strengthen China's ability to counter attacks from
cruise and ballistic missiles.\25\ In mid-November of this year, Russia
used a MiG-31K interceptor jet to test the Kinzhal (Dagger) hypersonic
missile for the first time in the Arctic; the Finnish Government along
with other Scandinavian countries took particular note of the test.\26\
And as is well documented, Russia continues to revitalize Cold War
bases while developing new assets along the NSR from Franz Joseph Land
to Wrangell Island; the latter a virtual stone's throw from Alaska.
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\25\ Guardian staff and agencies. ``Russia is helping China build a
missile defence system, Putin says.'' The Guardian. October 3, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/russia-is-helping-china-
build-a-missile-defence-system-putin-says
\26\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia tests hypersonic missile in Arctic--
TASS cites sources.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
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The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes the lack of ``investments in
ice-capable surface maritime security assets'' on the part of the U.S.
that ``limits the ability of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to
credibly uphold sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the Arctic.
It also diminishes America's position as the partner of choice for
allies and partner nations.'' As a reminder, China, the self-declared
``Near-Arctic State'' currently has four icebreakers and is developing
two new vessels, one of which is planned to be nuclear powered. Russia
has 53 operational icebreakers, with six under construction and 12 more
planned. One of these will be a weaponized icebreaker with an
electronic warfare platform, an anti-aircraft missile system, cruise
missiles, and a helicopter launch pad.\27\
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\27\ Perisic, Kyle. ``Russia reveals weaponized icebreaker it plans
to use to control the Arctic.'' American Military News. November 1,
2019. https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/11/russia-reveals-
weaponized-icebreaker-it-plans-to-use-to-control-the-arctic/
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Presence, both operational and strategic, is critical to U.S. power
projection in the Arctic region. The USCG is the critical, visible
leader in this area as they try to meet their mission to counter new
regional competition from both Russia and China. Yet, the U.S. Coast
Guard has only one medium icebreaker The Healy that services the Arctic
region, and one heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, which is already well
past its expected service life and serves our Nation's Antarctic
mission sets.
The Arctic Strategic Outlook highlights the need for six polar
security cutters to more effectively carry out its array of current and
future mission sets in Polar Regions. The recommendation from the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)
report on acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers noted the
``USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block buy
contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other
measures to ensure best value for investment of public funds.'' \28\
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\28\ ``Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling
the Nation's Needs'' https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW07/20170725/
106311/HHRG-115-PW07-20170725-SD004.pdf
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A block buy would likely make the contracts more competitive and
lucrative, while bringing into service quicker these national assets.
As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard requires the
most advanced information possible on the Arctic environment and plays
a critical role in the Nation's scientific effort at both ends of the
globe. Therefore, it is imperative that all Polar Security Cutter fleet
designs include structural and functional capabilities to support both
Arctic and Antarctic research efforts as informed by the scientific
community.
Recommendation: Fully fund and commission 6 Polar Security Cutters.
In addition, and to further leverage national assets in the Arctic,
support the creation and full funding of the proposed Ted Stevens
Arctic Center for Security Studies, which would be the first DoD
Regional Center in the Arctic. This Center would address specific
matters relevant to Arctic security and our Nation's defense, as well
as leverage and complement the outstanding work conducted by the
existing DHS supported Arctic Domain Awareness Center; a DHS Center of
Excellence, in Anchorage, Alaska. The two Arctic-focused entities would
be visible, tangible, and valuable steps toward a more ``whole of
government'' approach to the Arctic as well as critical tools to inform
and guide a more comprehensive Arctic strategy with necessary policy,
training, and presence.
And as a final note on the changing Arctic and our national
security, a convergence of the Arctic's 7 Cs currently unfolding in
Greenland. Greenland is experiencing the dramatic effects of global
warming (in fact, just this week, a recent study in Nature noted the
Greenland ice sheet's total losses nearly doubled each decade to an
average of 254 billion tons lost annually--an increase that puts
another six million people globally at risk of flooding); the promise
of significant stores of strategic minerals and fisheries; foreign
interest in developing ports and complementary infrastructure; a desire
to be connected to regional and global markets; communities trying to
adapt to a rapidly changing landscape; an active and important voice,
in partnership with the Kingdom of Denmark, in the Arctic's future; and
is situated in one of the most geographically, geopolitically, and
geostrategically important locations in the world. In short, Greenland
is emblematic of the emerged Arctic.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I often hear the Arctic referred to as an emerging
issue. Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. As I have explained, it is
no longer an isolated or remote region; rather it is an integrated
component of our global political, economic, social, physical, and
security landscape. The region is experiencing rapid and dynamic change
and these seven unique drivers, the Arctic's 7Cs, help frame for this
committee, and perhaps others, these pressing global issues in a way
that can help to better understand and address our future Arctic.
This testimony was shaped and informed with the input and
assistance of my Wilson Center colleagues Mr. Jack Durkee, Ms. Marisol
Maddox, and Ms. Bethany Johnson.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Mr. Sfraga. And I want
to thank all the witnesses for their outstanding and
informative testimony.
I am pleased to have the Chairman of the Full Committee, of
the Commerce Committee, and I think he would just like to say a
few words on the importance of this topic as well.
Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And also thank you
to Senator Markey. You have both exercised great leadership in
this area, and I look forward to working with you in the
future.
And I am glad to be here at today's hearing to evaluate the
Coast Guard's strategic presence in the Arctic and its ability
to meet current and future challenges in the region.
Our next panel will include Admiral Ray, and I appreciate
his leadership as Vice Commandant.
The Coast Guard is continuously deployed around the world
on all seven continents and in every ocean. The Coast Guard is
also providing and operating the U.S. polar-capable fleet.
Presently the Coast Guard operates one heavy icebreaker, the
POLAR STAR, and one medium icebreaker, the Healy. During my
visit to Alaska in August with Admiral Ray and Chairman
Sullivan, I had the privilege of sailing aboard the HEALY while
it was underway in the Arctic Ocean. However, the Coast Guard
currently lacks the capability or capacity to assure access in
the high latitudes.
But help is on the way. We are finally building the first
new U.S. polar icebreaker in over 2 decades, and I hope we are
only getting started.
My visit to Alaska also included a stop at Dutch Harbor,
the closest U.S. deepwater port in the Arctic. Dutch Harbor is
over 800 miles from the strategically important Bering Strait.
I observed how a lack of critical port infrastructure in the
Arctic significantly limits both the Coast Guard's response
time and its operational capability in the region.
Icebreaking capacity and infrastructure are just two of the
many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic. We are
hoping to address these and other challenges in the Coast Guard
Authorization Act, legislation sponsored by Chairman Sullivan,
which we are working on with our House delegates, and we hope
we are seeing the finish line on that piece of legislation.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it was great
having you and Admiral Ray in Alaska this summer. It was really
a wonderful trip, and I know we will be able to talk about that
more on the second panel.
I am going to start the questioning here. You know, Mr.
Sfraga, you talked about I think you said a digital or Internet
abyss. I want to talk about what I mentioned in my opening
statement, what the Chairman mentioned in his opening
statement, which is essentially an infrastructure abyss. Again,
my opening statement highlighted this idea that we really do
not have any capability with regard to a strategic port. This
is not a call for a giant Navy base or Coast Guard base. It is
simply right now the ability to actually just have an
icebreaker or a national security cutter or a Navy destroyer
pull up to a port in America's Arctic. Right now, with the
exception of Dutch Harbor and Anchorage, we cannot do that.
Is that acceptable to you and should part of the DOD and
Coast Guard plan not be to at least have what I have been
calling a series of strategic Arctic ports in the region, which
in the Lower 48, every community would find that to be a no-
brainer? And yet, we still struggle with the Pentagon, with the
Coast Guard on this issue of a strategic Arctic port that can
just handle shipping. Can I get each of your views on that, how
important it is, and whether or not you agree with what I just
stated? We will start with you, Ms. Conley.
Ms. Conley. Senator, we absolutely need a deepwater port in
the American Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. At least one. I think several.
Ms. Conley. I will start with one.
Senator Sullivan. We have several on the East Coast. Right?
Why would we not have it in the Arctic?
Ms. Conley. Indeed. You know, let us think about how long
it took us to get the polar security cutter. It took over a
decade of talking and studying. We cannot wait 10 years for
this infrastructure.
But I think we have to do it in a smart way. We have to
think about public-private partnerships. We have to do this
efficiently.
Senator Sullivan. Do we not need to do it quickly?
Ms. Conley. Absolutely. This is why there has to be a
dedicated Arctic security initiative or infrastructure budget
that gives impetus, that sends strong messages to our private
sector partners that there is sustained funding. We have to do
this. We have to stop writing studies and reports that are not
tethered to resources and an implementation plan. We cannot
wait any longer for this.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a thought on
this issue of infrastructure?
Ms. Goodman. Mr. Chairman, yes, I agree we should have a
strategic port in the Arctic, and we should use this
opportunity because we need the infrastructure in the Arctic
also to understand--and amending Heather's very brilliant
concept of an Arctic security initiative, it should have an
environmental security component as well. And we should use it
as a way to understand what it takes to build a resilient port,
resilient to changing conditions, changing more rapidly than we
expect in the region.
Senator Sullivan. A great point. Excellent.
Mr. Sfraga, infrastructure, a series of ports like we have
on the East Coast.
Dr. Sfraga. I agree, a string of ports. I think we need a
string of ports from the North Slope along the Bering Strait,
use our Adak Naval Base----
Senator Sullivan. I mean, what good is an icebreaker and
national security cutter if you cannot actually pull up in a
port in the Arctic, which you cannot right now?
Dr. Sfraga. Agreed, especially when we see increased
traffic along the Bering Strait by Russia, China, and other
nations. So to me a string of ports makes total sense. I think
you need sort of a Manhattan Project for the Bering Strait for
this string of ports. Let us resource them. They are all
different. The North Slope needs something. The Bering Strait
needs something. The Aleutians need something. And if you had
one concerted effort funded, strategized. As Heather said, we
have studied this over and over again. We kind of know what we
need. I think it needs to be resourced, but one effort, DOD,
DHS, Commerce, and come together and build the string of ports
finally.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just very quickly because I do
want to be efficient on our timing here. Ms. Conley, you have
studied the National Security Strategy, the National Defense
Strategy, which I think has very strong bipartisan support in
the Congress. But can you describe how important the Arctic is
to U.S. national security and how increasingly we are falling
behind with regard to what the new National Security Strategy
talks about, great power competition?
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Senator. Yes. In many ways we
understood the strategic imperative of the Arctic in the Second
World War and, of course, during the cold war. And at the end
of the cold war, we forgot. We absolutely let it atrophy. Of
course, Russia did as well. But around the 2007-2008 period,
Russia made a strategic decision to reconstitute in part its
military footprint and put its budget, its ambitions, and its
forward-looking policies in place. And a decade later, we are
seeing the manifestation of that in increased nuclear exercises
in the Arctic and combined operations.
China discovered the strategic importance of the Arctic
around the 2010-2011 time-frame, and they are bearing the
fruits of their strategic ambitions.
We continue to believe that we can just hold this
minimalist position, do the bare minimum, and it is going to be
OK. And I want to challenge that notion. We talk about great
power competition in the National Security Strategy and the
National Defense Strategy, but those documents are basically
silent on the Arctic. And now that we have placed this in
context, we have to put our actions behind our rhetoric. So
whereas Secretary Pompeo laid out a great power competition
framework, and then opening up our consulate in Nuuk is the
only response to that, the message is that we are rhetorically
interested in great power competition in the Arctic, but we are
not interested in putting our budget where our mouth is.
Senator Sullivan. I am just going to ask you one final yes
or no on this. Again, I am going to turn this over to Senator
Markey here.
The Armed Services Committee on a provision I wrote
required the Secretary of Defense to put forward an Arctic
strategy. It was a good attempt. It needs to be much more
fulsome. But they talked about we are going to protect our
sovereignty by doing freedom of navigation operations in the
Arctic.
Does the U.S. military have the capability to do a freedom
of navigation operation in the Arctic? Yes or no.
Ms. Conley. No. Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard could
do a freedom of navigation operation in the Arctic today.
Senator Sullivan. That is good to know.
Dr. Sfraga. No, sir.
Ms. Goodman. No, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, let me just put it out there again that between 1992
and 2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly one million square
miles, larger than the entire area of Alaska. One million
square miles. And the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the
global average. So this is only going to accelerate and create
an even greater number of issues that we have to deal with. And
we are far behind in dealing with it.
And all of it just comes back to the Oxford English
Dictionary naming climate emergency as the 2019 word of the
year. And they could have used the Arctic as the definition of
the climate emergency, receding ice, raging wildfires, melting
permafrost, endangered Arctic communities, and the global
climate system.
Ms. Goodman, as you mentioned in your testimony, what
happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Melting ice
sheets are now the largest contributor to sea level rise, and
the slowdown of the Gulf Stream due to warmer Arctic waters is
raising sea levels in the northeast United States. Scientists
have also linked warmer Arctic temperatures to more extreme
winter weather in the eastern United States.
Ms. Goodman, how does climate change in the Arctic affect
the Coast Guard's operations, facilities, and readiness in
States in more southern latitudes on the Atlantic, including
Massachusetts?
Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Senator Markey.
The Coast Guard now has to respond more frequently to these
extreme weather events, more search and rescue missions all
around our coastline, as well as we see fish stocks moving. So
there are more challenges in managing fisheries today. We see
the Coast Guard deployed ever more frequently for many
different missions. The Homeland Security mission essentially
has become quite intense, and the Coast Guard has had to not
only up its game in the Arctic, but it has to up its game along
our eastern seaboard as well.
And the challenge is, as you both know, it is often under-
resourced to do its job. As we often say in the Department of
Defense, a strategy without budget is hallucination.
Senator Markey. Exactly.
And again, the strategy has to be to deal with climate
change. That is what the Coast Guard is living every single
day, and if their resources are not increased, then their
capacity to deal with the consequences----
Ms. Goodman. Right. And they are really on the front lines
of dealing with the changing climate along our coast every day.
Senator Markey. Absolutely.
The Coast Guard must do all it can to defend its facilities
against the effects of climate change. As I mentioned in my
opening statement, I worked to include language in this year's
Coast Guard reauthorization that asked the Coast Guard to
assess which of its installations are the most vulnerable to
climate change as the rest of the Department of Defense has
done. The Department of Defense report found that climate
change threatens more than two-thirds of our operational
critical military installations.
Ms. Goodman, what can we learn from the Department of
Defense reports as we work to make sure the Coast Guard is
climate-ready in the Arctic and at all of its facilities?
Ms. Goodman. Well, Senator Markey, we need to climate-proof
our bases and our installations, Coast Guard as well as
military. The NDAA this year includes several requirements, one
for military installation resilience planning, which I think is
important and could also be potentially applied to the Coast
Guard. It also updates the Uniform Facilities Code to enable
defense facilities to be better prepared for extreme weather
events, flooding, sea level rise, wildfires, and other climate
conditions. And again, that provision may potentially also
apply to the Coast Guard. Again, it will have to be resourced,
but it will enable us to help provide resilient infrastructure
for the future.
Senator Markey. You organized a group of admirals and
generals to speak out on this issue in 2007, and I actually had
General Gordon Sullivan be the first witness before a hearing
which I conducted in April 2007 on this issue warning of the
danger of climate change to our national security.
The numbers of admirals and generals in that group are now
exponentially larger. Are they not?
Ms. Goodman. Oh, many. We have over 60 members who have
participated.
Senator Markey. Admirals and generals.
Ms. Goodman. Admirals and generals, including Coast Guard
officers, and still very active today.
Senator Markey. So the issue is not getting smaller. It is
getting larger largely because it is unaddressed in terms of
what the consequences will be.
Ms. Goodman. Right. As we have said with respect to Coast
Guard operations as well, this issue and climate change across
our spectrum of operations and facilities still deserves more
attention and more investment.
Senator Markey. Does the Coast Guard need additional data
or resources to update its facilities to make them more
resilient to climate change?
Ms. Goodman. Absolutely it needs more data, but there are
things that it can do now with the data it has as it plans for
future operations.
Senator Markey. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I just want to
ask Mr. Sfraga a quick question, which is that the BP oil spill
was the worst environmental disaster in American history,
resulting in the death of 11 crew members and injuring 17
others. Oil spewed into the ocean for nearly 3 months despite
the presence of helicopters and a variety of vessels able to
respond. We also had reliable weather and ocean current data
and a robust communications network. None of that is the case
in the Arctic.
Mr. Sfraga, can you describe what an oil spill would look
like in the Arctic and our current capacity to respond?
Dr. Sfraga. Senator Markey, I can describe it by saying not
good. We simply do not have the assets and the resources for an
oil spill or an LNG tanker disaster in the Arctic. Like you
mentioned, the Gulf of Mexico, private corporations, public
entities, personal vessels--this was an all-out onslaught to
not only save lives but also to protect the environment.
We have none of that in the Arctic. And that is why I think
you need to combine the search and rescue, spill mitigation,
and emergency clauses within a port or facilities along the
Arctic. We do not know how oil, ice, and the Arctic Ocean
interact. To have a devastating oil spill in the Arctic in the
ice would be monumental not just to contain it, but what it
would do for the environment. So we do not have, A, the basic
research to really give us a good idea of what would happen in
that domain. Two, we do not have the assets. As Senator
Sullivan pointed out, you have got over 800 miles from Kodiak
to the North Slope of Alaska just to get there to see what
might happen.
So I am quite concerned. That keeps me up at night, as well
as a disaster with a potential cruise ship. So it would not be
like we had in the Gulf of Mexico. It would be 180 degrees from
that.
Senator Markey. And it could wind up being days before an
inadequate response could be put in place.
Dr. Sfraga. That is correct, sir, and that is why I think
having ports is far more than just hooking up ships. Having
ports provides us capacity and capabilities needed to protect
the environment for any development from the U.S. side, but
also we must think about the increased traffic coming from the
northern sea route down the Bering Strait that has nothing to
do with our government at all.
Senator Markey. And the damage to the Arctic ecosystem
could be----
Dr. Sfraga. Significant.
Senator Markey. Catastrophic.
Dr. Sfraga. Yes. And what is problematic there, one final
note, is I would say it would be catastrophic. But in reality,
the basic research--we still cannot give you a definitive
answer on that, but I would say that it would not be good.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Sfraga. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. One final question. Admiral Ray is going
to be testifying next, so we are going to bring him up.
You know, I mentioned we are starting to build the first
icebreaker. I think everybody recognizes this is important and
the final progress that we are making. The NDAA actually has
the authorization and schedule for six. The Coast Guard
announced that the first couple of these would be home-ported
in Seattle. I know Senator Cantwell is very pleased with that,
which makes sense because that is where the current icebreakers
are.
I would just ask, as we talk about ports and
infrastructure, you want, obviously, these capabilities near
where the action is. Let us assume we build six on time in the
next 5 to 6 years. Does it not make sense to home-port the next
three in the part of America that is the Arctic? Would you
agree with that, each panelist?
Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, I think we have to remind
ourselves that these are also for Antarctica. In fact, that
heavy polar security cutter is likely going to spend most of
its time in Antarctica.
Senator Sullivan. No offense to my colleague from Florida,
but you would not want to home-port these in Miami.
Ms. Conley. No. But I am just saying I think sometimes we
think these are only for the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I actually think, to be perfectly
honest, the Coast Guard is the Coast Guard. And their mission--
I know they have an Antarctica mission, but I think we need to
take care of our home first, our coasts first. So, this is a
discussion I have been having with the Coast Guard about
prioritization. This is not, as you mentioned, when there is
not a lot of activity in the Arctic. There is great power
competition in the Arctic. There is a lot going on in the
Arctic. The Coast Guard needs to recognize that. We are going
to talk to Admiral Ray about that. So, the Antarctic in my view
is an important mission, but it certainly does not rise to the
importance of protecting America, which is their primary
mission.
Ms. Conley. I do not disagree. And this is why we have the
need for six icebreakers. If we consider, as Sherri noted, that
Russia is weaponizing icebreakers, that China is now proposing
to build a nuclear-powered icebreaker which can maintain long-
term presence potentially in the Arctic, we need a more
significant presence closer----
Senator Sullivan. So just to answer my question, would it
make sense to home-port the additional ones in the place in
America where they are needed?
Ms. Conley. They need to be closer to the Arctic and to the
economic activity there, which means they have to be in the
American Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a view on that?
Ms. Goodman. Senator, I do think we need to be able to
home-port at least one or more of the new icebreakers in the
American Arctic.
I also want to stress that I think that continuing presence
in Antarctica is important for America's global leadership.
Senator Sullivan. No. I am not saying it is not important.
I do not want to be misinterpreted there. I agree with you. I
just think we need the capability to guard our own shores, and
that is why we need at least six. And I think we need more than
six, but six is good.
Mr. Sfraga, do you have a view on that?
Dr. Sfraga. Senator, yes, I think six is a good start. I do
think at least a couple of these icebreakers need to be home-
ported in the State of Alaska or near to the Arctic. I do think
it should be in the State of Alaska. How that pans out is up to
the Coast Guard.
Senator Sullivan. No. It is actually not just up to the
Coast Guard. It is the point of hearing here. It is up to
Congress working with the Coast Guard.
Dr. Sfraga. Six is a good start. How they are allocated is
up to Congress. But I do think at least two of those need to be
in the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Well, listen, you have been a great panel, and we are going
to have additional questions for all of you I am sure. Thank
you for your leadership. Thank you for your outstanding
testimony. And all of you have really, really played a great
role, and I think getting the Congress and the Executive Branch
to finally wake up to our challenges you are seeing is very
bipartisan. It is bipartisan not just on this committee, but on
the Armed Services Committee. But your leadership and your
expertise is going to be continued to be needed by the
Congress, by the Coast Guard, by the military. And I really
want to thank you for the outstanding service you have provided
our Nation already and the testimony today. We anticipate
having the three of you back in front of these committees on a
very regular basis, as long as I am around this place. So thank
you very much.
Ms. Conley. We call ourselves the ``Arctic Musketeers.'' So
you have got the three of us.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. We will excuse you and now have the Vice
Commandant of the Coast Guard for our next witness.
[Pause.]
Senator Sullivan. Admiral Ray, welcome, sir. The committee
is very, very pleased to have you here. You have 5 minutes for
your opening statement, and we, of course, will submit for the
record a longer written statement, if you would like that, as
well. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, VICE COMMANDANT, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Ray. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you having me here. Ranking Member Markey, good to
see you as well, sir. Thank you for having me.
And thanks for forming up the Coast Guard Caucus, sir. I
look forward to working with you moving forward.
Senator Sullivan. About time. Right? I mean, holy cow. But
we are glad to have done it.
Admiral Ray. Far be it for me to tell you how to form up
caucuses, but I am proud you got one.
Senator Sullivan. And it is very bipartisan. A lot of
Senators already have joined.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today,
and I ask that my written testimony be submitted for the
record.
Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
On behalf of Admiral Schultz and the entire service, I
would like to thank this subcommittee for your unwavering
support for our Coast Guard. Today I will discuss our strategy
to uphold American sovereignty and advance national security
interests and promote economic prosperity in the rapidly
evolving Arctic.
As you state in your opening statement, sir, for over 150
years, the Coast Guard has been America's primary maritime
presence in the Arctic, and we have seen the impact of
increased accessibility, human activity, and geostrategic
competition.
This past August, Senator Wicker and I had the opportunity
to witness the increased accessibility firsthand, as we flew 40
miles north of Utqiagvick to land aboard Healy as she operated
in an open Arctic Ocean. As a result of the opening of this new
ocean, commercial opportunities abound from energy production,
surging cruise industry, expanded environmental tourism,
centuries old subsistence activities are being altered.
Hundreds of fishermen must go further away from traditional
fishing and hunting grounds. Illegal unreported and unregulated
fishing is increasingly a threat with the obvious potential to
negatively impact Alaska seafood industries and the U.S.
economy.
As we have seen many times in history, when there are new
opportunities for resources, the potential for competition
increases. Nations seek to shape the security environment,
expand their influence, and advance their own interests. As has
been stated several times, Russia has the world's largest
icebreaker fleet, and more importantly, they use this, expand
their infrastructure to bolster military activities, grow their
economic investments along the northern sea route. From that
position of strength, they have the ability to exert influence
and compete pretty effectively below the level of armed
conflict.
As has been stated, China, a non-Arctic state, is also
investing heavily in the region. This year they took delivery
of their first domestically built icebreaker, and they are a
shipbuilding country. And they are currently designing a
nuclear-powered icebreaker. China is also pursuing economic
investments, oil, gas, and rare earth minerals, as was
mentioned by the earlier panel. And I think their encroachment
on the Arctic is emblematic of what they have done all over the
world. Left unchecked, their actions risk fracturing the
Arctic's kind of rules-based governance.
To address these expanding operational challenges and
threats to national security, Coast Guard, as has been stated,
released our Arctic Strategic Outlook last April. It builds on
successes we had from our 2013 strategy and highlights the
value that the Coast Guard delivers as part of a whole-of-
government solution to our Arctic challenges.
Outlook reaffirms our commitment to American leadership in
the Arctic, establishes three lines of effort, as the Senator
said, will enhance our capability to operate effectively in the
Arctic domain, strengthen rules-based order, innovate and adapt
to promote resiliency and prosperity.
As has been stated many times by the earlier panel, we must
maintain a physical presence in the Arctic. It begins with
icebreakers, and I thank this subcommittee, sir, for all your
support for that. It has been a long haul, but we are a lot
better off than we were just a couple of years ago.
Our presence includes operations in communities, ports, and
waters across the region. Through Arctic Shield, it is scalable
year-round. And just as we have in many other missions in other
parts of the world, we will use our extensive authorities and
unique capabilities to continue to cultivate a global coalition
of like-minded partners. We will work with Federal, State, and
local communities to strengthen interoperability and secure
U.S. sovereign rights.
In the past year, the Coast Guard cooperated with the
Department of Defense in the Arctic expeditionary capabilities
exercise the Senator referred to in both Seward and Adak. We
participated in a mass rescue exercise with the Arctic Coast
Guard Forum in Finland, and we hosted the North Atlantic Coast
Guard Forum.
In addition to physical presence on the seas to meet the
needs of the nation, we must have reliable technical
capabilities that include communications, maritime domain
awareness, and navigation. After Senator Wicker and I left
Healy in August, they sailed north of 75 degree north, and they
were off the grid for 27 days, no comms, except for a sat
phone. Addressing limited factors require a whole-of-
government.
So I am confident with the support of this committee, we
will rise to these challenges.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant,
United States Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the U.S. Coast
Guard's strategy and operations to safeguard national security
interests and advance safe, secure, and environmentally responsible
maritime activity in the Arctic Region.
The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867,
when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. Since that time,
the state of affairs in the Arctic has evolved significantly. The
environment is experiencing unprecedented levels of change. The ice is
receding; storms are increasing in frequency and magnitude; the coast
is eroding; and permafrost is thawing. Alaskan residents are striving
to sustain their culture and way of life while residents and non-
residents alike are pursuing emerging opportunities. For the Coast
Guard, the demand signal for our services is expanding along with the
operational environment, exacerbating the tyranny of distance of the
region. The types of commercial activity are morphing, from oil and gas
exploration a few years ago to the recent surge in cruise ship activity
and expanding environmental tourism. These rapid changes in types and
location of activity, along with the changes in the physical
environment, magnify the challenges in executing the Service's mission
to advance safety, security, sovereign rights, and stewardship across
the Arctic.
Simultaneously, the geopolitical environment is rapidly changing as
state and non-state actors seek to advance their own interests in the
Arctic. Allies, partners, and competitors alike increasingly compete
for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage. The National Defense
Strategy describes a world no longer at either peace or war but rather
one of enduring great power competition.
Shaping and influencing this continuum requires a mixture of
diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence,
and law enforcement efforts to achieve and sustain national strategic
objectives. As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law
enforcement authorities, combined with membership in the intelligence
community, the Coast Guard moves seamlessly to bridge the layers in
this competition continuum. Specifically, the Coast Guard's
constabulary function and broad authorities serve as a beneficial
bridge between the hard-power lethality of the Defense Department and
soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. This strategic
versatility is well suited for operating in ambiguous environments
requiring a flexible blend of diplomatic, information, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of
statecraft. This makes the Coast Guard a unique agency to cultivate
strong international relationships and better build a coalition of
Arctic partners based on mutual interests and values that strengthen
regional stability and enhance prosperity across the region. In
collaboration with our Federal partners, the ultimate goal is for the
Coast Guard to be the preferred, transparent partner in the Arctic.
Our recently published 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms the
Service's commitment to American leadership in the region through
partnership, unity of effort, and continuous innovation, and
establishes three lines of effort to achieve long-term success. First,
we will enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic
domain; second, we will strengthen the rules-based order; and third, we
will innovate and adapt to promote resilience and foster prosperity.
Our strategy aligns with the Nation's needs and interests to secure the
Arctic, which requires significant investment and a whole-of-government
approach across multiple Departments, agencies, and Services. The Coast
Guard's value in this whole of government approach is our experience,
leadership, model behavior, and ability to compete below the level of
armed conflict. Therefore, strengthening the Coast Guard empowers the
Nation to secure the Arctic against threats and shape the region as a
safe, cooperative, and prosperous domain.
National Security Interests in the Arctic Region
The United States is an Arctic nation with extensive sovereign
rights and responsibilities, and our national security interests in the
Arctic are significant, in part due to the reemergence of great power
competition in the region. As access to the region evolves, many Arctic
and non-Arctic nations aspire to assert or expand their role in
governing the region; the dynamic operational environment continues to
present risks and opportunities for a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
To safeguard our national interests, the United States must plan for a
robust, year-round maritime presence commensurate with the expanding
interest in the Arctic's strategic value, in its natural resources, and
in its potential as a transportation corridor between Asia, Europe, and
North America. If we are not vigilant and proactive, other non-Arctic
nations will outpace us in assuring their strategic interests in the
Arctic in ways that may adversely affect the United States' interests.
Actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic states shape the
security environment and geopolitical stability of the region. In
particular, our two near-peer competitors, Russia and China, are
demonstrably intent on exploiting the maritime domain to advance their
interests. Twenty percent of Russia's landmass is north of the Arctic
Circle, and both onshore and offshore resource (minerals, oil, and gas)
development is crucial to the Russian economy. Russia is also advancing
the growth of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for trans-Arctic shipping
and other commercial opportunities.
The NSR continues to set new shipping records, last year reaching
19.7 million tons of goods transported along the route. Natural
resource extraction is the main contributor to these increases,
predominantly oil and gas shipments from their Yamal facilities. If
their energy projections come to fruition, then transport volumes on
the NSR could reach 100 million tons per year by 2030.
From a military perspective, Russia's long Arctic coastline, once
stripped of sea ice in the future, will be both vulnerable, and able to
support naval fleets readily deployable between the Atlantic and
Pacific. The Russian government is currently rebuilding and expanding
military bases that had previously fallen into disuse. These renewed
capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop
deployments, domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue response.
Additionally, Russia has the world's largest number of icebreakers.
With over 50 icebreakers that include four operational, nuclear-powered
heavy icebreakers, and plans to build an additional seven nuclear
powered icebreakers, Russia maintains the capabilities, capacities,
experienced crews, and infrastructure necessary to operate and surge
into the Arctic year-round.
China has recently taken an active role in Arctic development,
pursuing economic investments with every Arctic nation in key strategic
areas, such as oil and gas development, ports, railways, and
infrastructure. It has purchased numerous resource deposits throughout
the region, including uranium, energy, and rare-earth elements. With
the release of their Arctic Policy paper in January 2018, China
declared itself a nation intrinsically tied to the Arctic, and signaled
their intention to play a security and governance role in the region.
China has directed Chinese companies and government agencies to become
more involved in Arctic affairs, and is rapidly developing its ability
to operate in the region. This year, China launched its first home-
built icebreaker and has begun designing an even more powerful and
potentially nuclear-powered Polar icebreaker expected to have twice the
icebreaking capability of its newest vessel. With three icebreakers
China will have greater access than the United States currently has to
the Arctic, its ports, and its resources. The concern with Chinese
activities in the Arctic is the potential to disrupt the cooperation
and stability in the region. Around the globe, China uses coercion,
influence operations, debt-trap diplomacy, and implied military threats
to persuade other states to heed China's strategic agenda. China views
the Arctic as a component of its One Belt, One Road initiative,
recently dubbed the Polar Silk Road. China's ambitions and outreach are
fraught with risk, often times diminishing the sovereignty of states
and fracturing the rules-based governance currently employed in the
region.
National security interests extend to the local level as well. For
example, economic, environmental, and human security and stewardship
are also linked to the changes and expanding activity in the Arctic.
Significant increases in natural resource extraction in the U.S. Arctic
have not yet materialized, but industries continue to explore
opportunities so that they are positioned to leverage economic
prospects as they emerge. Current industry growth in the Arctic
includes a significant increase in cruise tourism and transpolar
flights, which could potentially increase search and rescue missions
and risk to the pristine environment. Additionally, we have observed
steady but measured growth of shipping through the Bering Strait over
the past ten years, across all sectors of industry. As the Arctic
continues to experience longer and larger periods of reduced or ice-
free conditions, commercial interest and exploitation will grow. A
recent U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System report
projects that by 2030, vessel traffic through the Bering Strait could
increase to more than 370 transits, which is roughly three times the
2008 traffic levels. This potential rise will increase the demand for
the Coast Guard to monitor, protect, and regulate increased maritime
activity, such as de-conflicting shipping corridors in U.S. waters with
subsistence hunting and fishing communities.
Food security is another significant issue for Arctic residents and
our Nation as a whole. The Bering Sea provides more than half of the
wild-caught fish and shellfish in the United States, and the wildlife
for subsistence harvesting. Alaska is ranked seventh in the world in
global fish exporters, and their seafood industry accounts for almost
$6 billion a year in total economic activity. Additionally,
approximately 70 percent of the U.S. Arctic population relies on
subsistence hunting and fishing for survival, the vast majority of
which comes from the sea. Thus, changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean
are increasing the risk to food security for the globe, from shipping
that disrupts migration patterns, to increased risk of pollution
incidents, to growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as
fish stocks migrate.
As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic region,
challenges associated with legal and illicit activity plus state and
non-state actors are likely to increase. In the face of this
competition continuum, the Coast Guard's value proposition is even more
critical in the Arctic and around the globe. The Service upholds
freedom of the seas and the rules-based order by setting and enforcing
standards of behavior in the maritime domain.
Balancing National Security Interests Across the Globe
The Coast Guard possesses a broad suite of authorities and
capabilities unique from the other armed services and traditional
instruments of national defense. As previously noted, the Coast Guard's
authorities expand beyond traditional military and intelligence roles,
to include law enforcement and regulatory roles. This combination,
along with a multitude of steady-state international bilateral
agreements, offers a distinct compliment to conventional defense forces
in the ongoing struggle to compete below the level of armed conflict.
Coast Guard international engagements complement more traditional
U.S. military posturing. Regular and persistent Coast Guard presence
and peaceful engagements support regional stability while positioning
the United States as the global maritime security partner of choice.
The Coast Guard operates around the world in accordance with over 60
international bilateral agreements, to include 11 with Oceania nations.
Furthermore, the Service is also party to and, in many cases,
serves in a leading capacity within a variety of multilateral forums
including the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, Arctic Coast Guard
Forum, South East Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the
Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. This combination of
access, authorities, and international acceptance, offers an
indispensable opportunity of regional support and stability in this new
era of competing influence.
As the world's preeminent coast guard, the U.S. Coast Guard is
logically the most suited to build partner capacity in maritime law
enforcement, search and rescue, marine safety, fisheries management and
conservation--all of which are traditional Coast Guard missions. These
missions, incidentally, are in growing demand across the globe.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, in particular, is a
priority issue impacting global stability, in the Atlantic, across the
Pacific, and even in Antarctica, where many economies heavily depend on
local fish stocks as a primary source of protein and personal income.
The Service, through its internationally recognized maritime law
enforcement expertise and a multitude of bilateral and related ship
rider agreements, offers viable options to augment partner nation law
enforcement capacity to patrol their respective exclusive economic
zones. These efforts are essential to preserving, protecting, and
defending critical regional and migratory fish stock sustainability and
economic vitality while simultaneously countering the malign influence
and predatory practices of globally-spread powers such as China.
The Coast Guard in Alaska and the Arctic Region
The Coast Guard has been an active leader in the Arctic for over
150 years. Our latest 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms our
commitment to American leadership in the region and articulates the
ends, ways, and means to promote and safeguard national security in the
Arctic. This includes waging a campaign for safety, sovereign rights,
and stewardship through cooperation, addressing competition below the
level of conflict, and preparing for conflict should it arise. The
following highlights some of the initiatives that have particular
impacts on our national and international security, but these
activities must be part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach
to security in the Arctic.
Strategic Leadership
As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to
expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is
working collaboratively through international bodies to address the
emerging challenges and opportunities in the region. One example is our
support to the Arctic Council, which is a high-level international
forum focused primarily on environmental protection and sustainable
development issues in the Arctic region. The Council is composed of the
eight Arctic nations, six Arctic indigenous groups, observer nations
(including China), and non-governmental organizations that have
observer status. The Coast Guard plays a significant role in supporting
our Nation's existing engagement in Arctic Council activities through
representation on two standing working groups--Emergency Prevention,
Preparedness & Response (EPPR), and Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME).
Under the EPPR working group, the Coast Guard leads the U.S.
Government delegation and serves as Chair of the Marine Environmental
Response Experts Group. Within PAME, the Coast Guard participates in
the Shipping Experts Group where we support projects such as mitigation
of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by
vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also served on the Council's
Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation and has been active in other
task forces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue
Agreement, the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and
the 2015 Framework for Oil Pollution Prevention.
The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and
adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
(Polar Code) to cover the design, construction, equipment, operational,
training, and environmental protection matters relevant to ships
operating in the Polar regions. In 2017, the Coast Guard completed a
rulemaking process to issue Polar Ship Certificates to U.S. vessels. We
also developed and promulgated guidance to industry and our Captains-
of-the-Port on how to ensure compliance with the Polar Code.
Additionally, in November 2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with
the Russian Federation to jointly develop and submit a proposal to the
IMO to establish a system of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and
Bering Sea. The Coast Guard also submitted an associated proposal to
establish ``Areas to be Avoided'' in three environmentally sensitive
areas. The objective was to advance the maritime transportation system
in the region; promote the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
conflict the commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence
activities. The IMO adopted these measures at the 99th session of its
Maritime Safety Committee, and the provisions entered into force in
December 2018. These are but two examples of the Coast Guard being
proactive in addressing emerging international and domestic maritime
concerns in the Arctic.
Last, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) is a bridge between
diplomacy and operations. Formally established in October 2015, the
ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of our Arctic strategy as well
as the objectives of the Arctic Council. It is a unique, action-
oriented maritime governance forum where the Coast Guard and our peer
agencies from the other seven Arctic nations strengthen relationships,
identify lessons learned, share best practices, carry out exercises,
conduct combined operations, and coordinate emergency response
missions. In April 2019, the ACGF conducted its second live exercise,
POLARIS, which incorporated six ships and five aircraft from the ACGF
member nations to respond to a simulated cruise ship in distress near
Finland. The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined
operations with the eight ACGF nations and highlights the criticality
of coordination in maritime environmental response and the
responsibility to ensure search and rescue resources are prepared to
respond.
Coast Guard Operations in the American Arctic
Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
and operational endeavor that provides a flexible, mobile, and scalable
presence in the Arctic domain. In 2019, ARCTIC SHIELD (AS19) operations
advanced national and Coast Guard strategic goals by aligning
operations to mitigate real-world threats and leverage opportunities of
strategic interest.
To promote regional resilience and strengthen the maritime
transportation system, the Coast Guard spearheaded a Marine Safety Task
Force (MSTF) to conduct missions in the remote regions of their Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Employing active and reserve surge personnel, the
MSTF deployed to and engaged with 102 local communities to perform
marine safety and marine environmental protection missions in villages
not on the road system in the Arctic and Western Alaska. In addition to
the summer surge support, a major contributor to the MSTF success has
been its partnerships: the Civil Air Patrol transportation saved
valuable resources and allowed personnel to transit more seamlessly
between remote villages.
The MSTF teams inspected over 60 percent of the region's 380
regulated bulk oil facilities--a massive improvement over the prior
annual average of 12 percent. Frequent inspections and proactive
communications between the Coast Guard and facility operators will
reduce the environmental risk to remote communities, help remote
villages build capacity to respond, and set baselines for resilience
and awareness as their environment rapidly changes.
From July to October, MH-60 helicopters and crews deployed to
Forward Operating Location Kotzebue and to Utqiagvik to conduct Coast
Guard missions. This year, those helicopters completed 25 SAR cases,
saved 13 lives, and assisted 28 others in an environment harsher than
anywhere else the Coast Guard operates. Additionally these assets
improved the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness in the Arctic and
provided critical support to Federal and state personnel studying
marine mammals. The Coast Guard partnered with DoD to leverage their
strategic lift capabilities to deploy the assets to Kotzebue and the
North Slope. Additionally, when the helicopters made the unplanned
shift to Utqiagvik in September, the Coast Guard leveraged a
longstanding positive partnership with the North Slope Borough to gain
critical hanger space and logistical support on short notice. The Coast
Guard would not have been able to complete its scheduled deployment to
the Arctic and provide SAR coverage to North Slope mariners without the
efforts and support from both. The Coast Guard departed Utqiagvik on
October 31, 2019, but subsistence whale hunting is still ongoing today.
This highlights the changing operational environment not only for the
Coast Guard but also for Arctic residents. The lengthened ``shoulder''
seasons of open water are beyond the period in which the Coast Guard
has the resources to be present. Without the Coast Guard's highly
mobile expeditionary forces, risk to mariners and coastal residents
will escalate as maritime activity and traffic expands throughout the
vast Arctic.
AS19 exercised the Coast Guard's expeditionary capability by
deploying a team from our Deployable Specialized Forces in California
to conduct shore based law enforcement operations for the Kotzebue
salmon state fishery that consists of nearly 100 small open skiffs. The
enforcement operation reinforced several years of extensive marine
prevention outreach, education, and training with these fishers.
Planning and executing this mission highlighted the logistical and
administrative challenges involved in supporting mission execution in
the Arctic. This deployed law enforcement team provided 3 weeks of on-
water presence and contacted 59 commercial fishing vessels and
conducted 27 boardings with 5 voyage terminations. The operation
bolstered community support from the mayor and local fishermen and
rallied the community to improve their own safety and survivability at
sea.
In the absence of a consistent law enforcement presence in the
region, the Coast Guard must develop and exercise expeditionary
capability to project surface forces into the Arctic as the weather
patterns are less predictable and maritime activity continues to
evolve. This team's employment points to the urgent need to modernize
assets, infrastructure, and platforms to effectively operate and
provide presence in the Arctic.
In 2020, operations will be supported with cutter, aircraft, and
shoreside presence across Western and Northern Alaska. Specific
activities include establishing a regional SAR response capability,
conducting boardings to promote fishing vessel safety, facility and
vessel inspections, gold dredge fleet inspections, maritime safety
compliance enforcement, and ice rescue training.
Planned activities also include testing and improving oil spill
preparedness and response capabilities, conducting a commercial
aircraft crash-related mass rescue exercise, and completing a joint
maritime pollution contingency exercise with international partners.
Year-round outreach efforts will continue to deliver education and
awareness services to Arctic communities and outlying native villages.
As presence equals influence, the Coast Guard must continue to
evaluate options to advance our 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook as well
as national interests in the region. The resurgence of nation-state
competition over the past 5-10 years has coincided with the dramatic
changes in the physical environment of the Arctic. This reality has
elevated the Arctic's prominence as a strategically competitive space.
The Coast Guard, and the Nation, have limited means to respond to,
intercept, or collect information on vessels operating in the Arctic
region.
Icebreaking Capacity and Acquisition Status
The ability for the United States to lead in the Arctic, both
strategically and operationally, hinges on having the capabilities and
capacity (presence) to protect our national sovereignty and safeguard
our homeland security interests. The foundation of the Coast Guard's
operational presence and influence is U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose
is to provide assured, year-round access to the polar regions for
executing national security missions within existing Coast Guard
authorities. Our heavy icebreakers must be fully interoperable with
DoD, international allies, and partners to optimally carry out national
maritime homeland defense and homeland security missions. Thus, they
will include sufficient space, weight, and power to conduct the full
complement of multi-mission activities that support our Nation's
current and future national security interests in the Arctic.
The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified
the need for six new polar icebreakers (at least three of which must be
heavy) under the assumption that, in the future, the Coast Guard would
be required to perform nine of its eleven statutory missions year-round
in the Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United
States Antarctic Program.
In 2017, the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy
completed an addendum to the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a
broad overview of changes in the polar regions over the last seven
years and to provide specific information for use in determining
potential impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum
provides confidence in the original findings and encourages the
sustained reliance on its initial recommendations on the Nation's need
for six icebreakers, three of which must be heavy icebreakers.
The current Coast Guard icebreaker capacity is one heavy polar
icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR--commissioned in 1976, and one medium
icebreaker, CGC HEALY--commissioned in 2000. The primary differences
between heavy and medium icebreakers are endurance and power. The Coast
Guard considers a heavy icebreaker to be one that can break at least
six feet of ice at a continuous speed of three knots and operate year-
round in the Arctic, with the necessary systems and endurance to
protect its crew in the event it has to ``winter-over'' in substantial
ice conditions. Conversely, medium icebreakers are designed to operate
seasonally in the Arctic.
Due to the strong support of the Administration and Congress, the
FY 2019 appropriation included full funding for the acquisition of our
first Polar Security Cutter (PSC), and some long lead time materials
for the second. This investment sends a strong message that the Nation
is serious about our interests in the Arctic. In April of this year,
the joint Coast Guard and Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) awarded
VT Halter Marine Inc., of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price
incentive (firm) contract for the detail design and construction of the
lead PSC. We are as close as we have been in over 40 years to
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet, and continued investment will
ensure we meet our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and
dynamic polar regions.
The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing
heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with
recapitalization. Construction on the first PSC is planned to begin in
2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract includes
financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR
will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are
delivered. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension project
on POLAR STAR are already underway and initial work for this project
will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from
2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the
vessel's service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.
Shore Infrastructure
In addition to having the necessary platforms to maintain our
presence in the Arctic, the Coast Guard maintains a robust shore
infrastructure laydown in Alaska. Shore facilities support all Coast
Guard operations and personnel, as well as provide required
infrastructure to support the needs of the Service's operational
communities. Investments in shore infrastructure are critical to
modernizing the Coast Guard and equipping our workforce with the
facilities required to meet mission.
With approximately 10 percent of the Coast Guard's real property
inventory located in Alaska, the need for proper capital investments is
all the more critical given the vast distances between shore facilities
in that region. We are currently building waterfront facilities and
shore infrastructure to support the delivery of six new Fast Response
Cutters (FRC) and two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to Alaska, as well
as the critical housing and family support facilities to accommodate
the additional personnel and their families to operate and maintain
these new assets. Additionally, over the last few years, we have built
a new hangar to support forward deployed helicopters in Cold Bay, 20
new housing units in Kodiak, as well as new facilities in Kodiak to
enable our transition from C-130H to C-130J aircraft.
Conclusion
These efforts reaffirm our commitment to the region and our need
for capabilities, capacity, and infrastructure to protect our national
security and economic security interests in the region. Arctic
operations must be balanced with competing demands for Coast Guard
focus both at home and abroad. However, the Coast Guard must remain
flexible and scalable to adapt to the rapidly evolving geopolitical and
operational Arctic environments.
Regardless, the Coast Guard will continue to lead across the
National and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as an area of low
tension, high attention, and great cooperation while preserving our
national interests and rights. This leadership and collaboration across
the national and international spectrum will enable us to reinforce
positive opportunities and mitigate negative consequences in the Arctic
region. Failing to increase and focus our Nation's leadership in the
Arctic will result in other powerful nations taking the lead in a
region with critical geostrategic value.
We understand the significant investment required to secure the
Arctic, and we appreciate and embrace the trust the Nation has placed
in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral. And I want to
thank you again for coming up to Alaska with Chairman Wicker.
It was a great visit. You have a lot of fans in Alaska. I can
tell you that.
And I do want to mention, as the Chairman and Ranking
Member not just of this subcommittee, which has oversight of
the Coast Guard, but also as the new leaders of the Coast Guard
Caucus, we made a commitment. I certainly have. I will let
Senator Markey speak for himself here. But on this issue of pay
for the members of the Coast Guard, if there is another
government shutdown, we have a provision currently in the Coast
Guard bill that we are drafting, working with the House, very
bipartisan that is in there that would prevent that from
happening. So you would be treated--the great men and women of
the Coast Guard--just like the men and women of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marines. We cannot allow that. If there is
another government shutdown, we cannot allow that to happen.
Now, I am hearing there is some resistance to this in parts
of the Congress. I am not sure where, but we are committed to
working with you and other members to make sure there is
parity. Parity. Outrageous that last year members of the Coast
Guard were doing operations all over the world shoulder to
shoulder with marines and sailors, and the Coast Guard men and
women were not getting paid. We need to fix that. We are
committed to fixing that. It is in the bill right now, and I
want to call out any colleagues of mine who are trying to block
that because I think most Americans found that outrageous that
your men and women were not getting paid.
So I am assuming you support that provision.
Admiral Ray. If I may, sir, since last January when the
government started back up after the 35-day shutdown, I have
traveled from Puerto Rico to Alaska, from Boston to Houston,
and every place I meet with Coasties--every place, without
fail--they say, Admiral, what are you doing because young
Coasties think I can do anything? And I quickly let them know
it requires a change in law. What are you doing to ensure that
that does not happen again? And they understand it. They are
smart and they get it when I explain to them how the process
works.
But the thing I care about over the long haul is in the
short term, it is a readiness issue. When I got people worrying
about that, they are not worrying about the dangerous work they
are doing day in and day out. And then over the long haul, the
young people that serve in the Coast Guard that raise their
right hand--they are making decisions. They can serve in the
Marine Corps, in the Army, the Air Force, and they are choosing
to serve in our Coast Guard, and I do not want them to think
that the Coast Guard is less of an armed service and we are
going to do a less job of taking care of them and their
families.
Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to work with you on
that, but we might need you to work some of our colleagues over
who are resisting that, which I think is not appropriate. And I
do not know where the resistance is coming from but evidently
it is out there.
I want to follow up on a question that I mentioned. We are
making progress on the icebreakers. I asked a series of
questions of our last panel just with regard to the state of
not just infrastructure but Coast Guard assets. We are
committed--this committee is committed--to the very broad-based
recapitalization effort that is ongoing with the Coast Guard,
more ships, better ships, more technologically advanced ships
and aircraft.
But would you agree--and I know it is a longer-term
decision that the Congress and the Coast Guard has to make, but
assuming we are able to get on budget or even faster six polar
security cutters and medium cutters like the Healy, that they
should be home-ported near where the Arctic is. The Coast Guard
has already announced the Seattle basing, which given that
there is currently cutters or icebreakers there, you can see
how that would make sense. But moving forward, thinking about
our strategic interests, thinking about the time it takes for
an icebreaker to get from Seattle to the Arctic, 8 days or
more, I know you cannot commit, but do you not think as you are
looking strategically, assuming you had the resources, that
that would make sense?
Admiral Ray. Sir, I want to thank you for your support for
home ports in general, for assets as we have looked forward
with our fast response cutters moving up across Alaska and
striking that balance between being close to the mission and
being in places where we can maintain the assets and take care
of our families that come along with them.
So to answer your question, yes, sir. This is part of a
holistic analysis. If we look at mission effectiveness, the
ability to sustain the assets, and the ability to sustain the
families of the people that are sailing and working on them. So
we look forward to working, as we move forward, with you.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just a more direct question.
You saw the wonderful people in Dutch Harbor. In Alaska, that
is the number one fishing port in the nation, 10 years running,
given the amount of seafood that is harvested from Alaskan
waters. And the Coast Guard personnel station there do
tremendous work. When you and I were there with the Chairman,
we saw what great work they do and how strongly they are
supported by the community in that very busy port.
As we discussed, the Coast Guard members are required to
complete their tour unaccompanied. That community has great
schools, an increasing medical clinic with good capability. I
think they would be warmly welcomed if the Coast Guard took a
look at being able to bring their families with them on
assignment. I know you got a bit of a polite earful when you
were with me and Chairman Wicker on that issue.
Have you been able to take a look at that or do you want to
get back to me on the record for that question, which I know
you probably expected me to ask you?
Admiral Ray. Sir, we are committed to looking at that in
the upcoming assignment, not this assignment season, but as we
shape up our billets for this coming year in 2020. So I love
Dutch Harbor, and there is a lot of people that do.
Senator Sullivan. Me too. By the way, the Coast Guard does
too. All the members out there love it.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. But we are meeting mission right now
with the way we are doing it, sir. And it is not just a--I
mean, we are meeting mission, sending folks out there for 1
year, and the guys and gals that go out there and do the work
that they do--they are integrated into the community quickly
and doing it. I can understand the community--their desire to
have the Coasties become a more integral part of their
community because of the kind of young folks that we send out
there. We are going to look at this issue and see if there are
ways we can get there from here.
We have got other places, as you know, in our service where
we send people, single, because there are challenges with
regard to, as you mentioned already, medical or schools or
other things. Some of those may not apply in Dutch, but we have
to look at the big picture.
So we are going to look at that. I do not have the answer
yet. When I got it, I will get to you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I am just going to come back to oil spills, if I may, sir.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. They are extremely challenging to clean up
in icy conditions because oil gets trapped under ice or can
travel upwards through small holes in porous ice. Therefore, in
addition to the immediate response to the oil spill, oil will
need to be cleaned up once the ice melts or travels to the top
of the ice flows.
In the 2019 Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard acknowledges
shortfalls in its ability to respond to oil spills in the
Arctic, but is not specific about what those shortfalls are.
Admiral Ray, can you give us some examples of those
shortfalls and how the Coast Guard is working to overcome them?
Admiral Ray. If I could go in reverse order, sir, I will
talk about what we are doing to overcome it and then talk about
the shortfalls, if that is acceptable, Senator.
So the oil spill challenge we have in the Arctic--you got
to address it from prevention to response. So on the
prevention, on the very high-end strategic end, we have done
several things recently specifically to address this.
One, we are kind of the drivers of the polar code for
vessels operating up in the Arctic region. We have led the
nation's effort at the International Maritime Organization. So
what that does is makes ships less likely to cause an oil
spill. We have one of the few relationships with Russia on this
with regard to the boundary in the Bering Strait between our
countries where we would work together to ensure that. And in
fact, we have done that creating a port access route study to
keep ships separated going through the Bering Strait. So on the
prevention side, we are working it.
With regard to responding, we have a series of exercises
every year that work at both the national level and all the way
down to the village level where we will go with the local
village people, open the container that has got the pre-
positioned boom, drag it out, make sure it is in good shape. So
we are working at the tactical level. So from the top to the
end.
And every summer--there is not a secret weapon for oil in
ice yet that we have found. And every summer for the last
decade, we have done research and development either onboard
Coast Guard Healy when she is up there or in some other
independent fashion with various ways to get oil out of ice,
underneath ice, on top of ice. We are working with the Alaska
Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence up in the
University of Alaska at Fairbanks to put a UAV under the ice
this winter to study this problem. So we are working at it
hard. We do not have any ironclad solutions.
And then the problem, Senator, is the same thing that
challenges most operations in Alaska. It is time, distance,
weather. Unless you have got a vessel poised, stationed every
so many miles, which is just not sustainable, that is the
biggest challenge. It is the tyranny of distance and that.
But there is also scientific challenges, as has been
mentioned by our esteemed panel members, and we are working to
get after that.
Senator Markey. And I am, obviously, very concerned about
this. Today is actually the fourth anniversary of the signing
of the Paris Climate Agreement, just 4 years ago today. And a
lot of it is in recognition of what is happening up in the
Arctic because it has consequences for the entire planet,
especially that ice cap on Greenland. That is the largest ice
cube imaginable. If it goes into the water, it is going to be
catastrophic, upwards of 10 to 20 feet of sea rise. And it is
happening at a very rapid rate, and it is much worse today than
it was 4 years ago, and it is much worse today than when we
began actually discussing this issue years ago.
So we can see the consequences as well. The Coast Guard's
2019 Strategic Outlook notes that fish stocks are shifting
northward in response to warmer ocean temperatures in the
Arctic creating new fishery enforcement challenges and illegal
fishing presents one of the most significant law enforcement
missions in the Arctic region. In August, the U.S. agreed to a
moratorium on fishing in the high Arctic seas along with
Canada, the European Union, and Russia. There are currently no
commercial fisheries in the Arctic high seas because most of
the region is covered by ice year around, but that is rapidly
changing.
So, Admiral, how does the Coast Guard currently partner
with existing organizations and communities to monitor shifting
fish stocks, marine mammals, and other living marine resources
in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
We are very active at the national level with NOAA in
understanding fish stocks and understanding the changes to what
is happening both in the weather in that area and with regard
to the migration of the species. We work with NOAA as an
enforcement arm. They do not have the capability to get
offshore and enforce fisheries laws. And we have been doing
that for many years.
In the Alaska region, we work with the State troopers
extensively, provide transportation for them. We work with them
inside close to shore. And then we do independent operations on
the high seas in the Bering Sea and up in the Arctic. Right
now, as you say, there is no authorized fishing north of 64-ish
I think is the latitude that we do not fish north of.
But the point is that we are latched up with our
interagency team. We are following the science. When the
Senator and I were in Alaska at Nome, we had a NMFS scientist
there. In the dirt of the parking lot in the Nome harbor, it
was the best description I have had of the changing water
temperature, what is happening with the Pollack stocks. And she
drew a line in the sand. She told us what was happening with
the fish stocks. So they are moving north, and we have got to
be able to get up there and do enforcement there. And we intend
to be there.
Senator Markey. Yes. The cod of Massachusetts--they are
moving north. The lobster are moving north. They need cold
water. And we are seeing it dramatically along our coastline.
The moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic high
seas will be reconsidered in 16 years. It can take more than 10
years to procure Coast Guard vessels that can withstand Arctic
ice conditions.
Admiral Ray, would the Coast Guard be ready for enforcement
activity should the moratorium be lifted?
Admiral Ray. Sir, our plan for--when you hear us talk about
6-3-1, when we talk about recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet,
we are talking about we need six polar icebreakers altogether.
And three of them at least have to be heavy. And the essence of
that, the underlying assumption is that we want access to the
Arctic year-round. Right now, we do not have the capacity or
the capability to do that. But in the future, our intent is to
have access year-round.
One of the reasons we call them polar security cutters--
icebreakers are just a means to an end. We are not up there to
break ice. We are up there to get through ice to get to where
we need to do our mission. And so that is literally what we
will do with those.
So to answer your question, I think in 10 years, given the
pace that we are on with regard to building out, if we keep the
funding steady, we are supposed to launch the first polar
security cutter in 2024, and with one coming each year after
that. If we stay steady with our funding, sir, we have got a
good chance of being ready for that.
Senator Markey. And one final question. If there was an oil
spill and it was Russia or China that was responsible, what is
their capacity to respond to an oil spill?
Admiral Ray. I will have to get back to you on their
specific capacity. I know that we exercise with the Russians.
They have actually been to Juneau in the last few months, and
we have been over there. And so we do exercises, table-tops in
a lot of cases, exercises with regard to oil spills at sea in
that boundary area, that seam between our nations? waters. So I
do not know the specifics of their spill response equipment,
but my assumption, given that we are exercising with them, they
got some.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey, thanks. It is an
important point because all of these issues, infrastructure,
assets, are related to everything that we have been talking
about, including to be ready for any kind of environmental
spill or ship collision, as the previous panel had talked
about. And again, the capacity that we expect in the Lower 48
and pretty much have just does not exist in the Arctic.
Everybody recognizes that. The previous panel made it clear
that the National Defense Strategy, the new Arctic DOD strategy
says we should be doing freedom of navigation operations. That
is the strategy. We do not have that capability to do that
right now with the Navy or the Coast Guard.
Senator Markey. May I just say just in conclusion, I agree
with the Chairman on pay for the Coast Guard?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Markey. Just 100 percent in agreement. There is
absolutely no justification for not including the Coast Guard.
You are vital to our national security. You are vital to
protecting our citizens. And it is only getting more dangerous
out there because of climate change, because of these weather
conditions that are absolutely getting more extreme on an
ongoing basis, more exposure to risk to these young men and
women. And they should be paid equally with the other branches.
Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Let me go a little deeper, Admiral, on
one of the capabilities that you highlighted in your testimony
again that we lack in the Arctic and we just take for granted
in the rest of the country, and that is on communications
capabilities.
What are the current command and control communications
limitations for the Coast Guard operating in the high north,
and what should we, the Congress, be doing about that? What is
the Coast Guard doing about that? Again, I think most people
recognize that, wait a minute, there is a part of America,
Alaska, where you have essentially no comms. Our military, our
Coast Guard--that is unacceptable. I agree that is
unacceptable. How do we close that gap?
Admiral Ray. Sir, in the last few months, we have been
talking with industry. As you know, last year we had a research
and development project where we launched two cube sats, so low
earth orbit sats, and they were in a polar orbit ellipse. And
they were specifically for us, and we were using them. Those
particular cube sats were used to provide a capability to
detect an emergency signal. So if somebody had an EPIRB north
over the horizon where we would not hear it from the North
Slope there--and unfortunately--it was not very high-end
project anyway--they tumbled. Both the satellites did. We got
data off of one of them, and it showed that this is viable.
Since then, I have been engaged with industry and the
people that are a lot more dialed in on this than I am in the
service, and we believe there is an opportunity to get more of
those low earth orbit satellites launched that have the right
orbit to service the polar region. I think that is the way
ahead, and multiple of those because they are not super
expensive. They are becoming--I have been told by people in
industry that that is becoming. So I think moving in that
direction, getting some support for that--currently we do not
have a project for that, but getting in that direction is the
way to go.
As to what we are doing right now, we are doing what we
have been doing for many years. We are using HF radios that
have a long range. If the atmospherics are right, you can talk
quite a ways, but you are not going to get any sort of data or
anything like that. This is voice communications. This is what
we are doing right now.
Senator Sullivan. So is there things that we should be
doing working with the Coast Guard in this committee to close
that gap? It seems like it is a need for all the reasons we
have talked about, the safety in particular, whether it is for
the ship or whether it is on rescues or whether it is to help
with some kind of environmental response, fishermen at sea. Is
there a plan that the Coast Guard has that this committee can
help make sure gets either in the bill or in appropriations?
Admiral Ray. We do not have one that is to the level of
specificity with regard to being ready for appropriations now,
sir.
Senator Sullivan. Well, let us look at working on that
together.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. I think it is important.
Let me go even a little bit more specific. You know, the
Alaska delegation recently sent a letter to the Commandant
urging him to prioritize the repair of the radio towers that
relate to I think it is the Rescue 21, distress comms signal.
As you know, since this summer, there have been numerous radio
towers across the Gulf of Alaska that have been non-
operational. Particularly for our fishermen who are on the
water and rely on the Coast Guard, if they are in distress,
that lack of complete coverage that is existing is again
something that I think most of the rest of the country would
not tolerate.
What is the Coast Guard doing to cover this gap? This is
obviously not as complicated as the issue on the high north.
This is more getting the communication infrastructure back to
an operational status, including these radio towers that have
become non-operational across the Gulf of Alaska.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, Senator.
As you know, I spent 5 years flying search and rescue in
Alaska----
Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
Admiral Ray [continuing]. Especially in southeast which is
where most of these sites are because they are hidden behind
mountains and in Kodiak as well.
So the fundamental challenge here is twofold. It is the
microwave system that is required to relay the signals, and it
is power generation. That is the fundamental issue. So we are
getting after that. And I have been tracking this. Literally
three times a week I personally pull up the status of these
sites. And we are going to take some risk in other areas to
apply more funds to get after this power generation problem
because if you get good power generation at these sites, they
are going to work.
Senator Sullivan. But the reason some of them have not been
operational is primarily the power generation?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. That is 80 percent of the problem.
They are in very remote locations in the mountains, and there
is a short window to work on them. And if they go down starting
now in December, it could be a while. But we are going to apply
some more funds to this.
And then second, we just changed contractors. We got rid of
the contractor who was providing the day-to-day maintenance for
them. This just happened last week or 2 days ago. And so I am
convinced that the new provider--and there is one in the State
of Alaska, and they cover the entire region. And as you know,
there are 33 sites. So this requires just like all things in
Alaska--it is a logistics challenge. I am not making excuses.
So I am confident these folks are going to get after it on the
short term, and then we are going to apply some resources to
get up the power generation and in the long run pull that left.
Our response to you was longer, and we want to pull it to the
left.
Senator Sullivan. Well, listen, if there are resources that
you need, I think that is the kind of issue that I am confident
that all members of this committee would recognize the
importance of this and fund the resources. It would not be an
ask of a dramatic increase in resources. But as you know, this
is vital to keep our fishermen safe who often are in seas that
can be very dangerous. And having the Coast Guard there and the
robust communications systems is critical. Again, you know that
from firsthand experience flying in some of that difficult
weather. So thank you for that. I appreciate the fact that you
are focused on that very, very regularly. We just need to take
action to make sure those non-operational sites are getting up
so the fishermen in my State are safe. And I think that we all
recognize that that is important.
Let me ask another issue with regard to the broader Coast
Guard Arctic strategy. And I do want to commend the Coast Guard
with regard to its focus on this. I have publicly stated that
one of my frustrations has been that the other military
services have seemed to be slow to the awakening of our
national security challenges, economic challenges,
environmental challenges in the Arctic. And I do not levy that
criticism at the Coast Guard. I believe that you recognize it.
The Commandant certainly does. You have been operating in that
part of the world for decades, if not centuries.
But when you put out the strategy, what is the kind of gap
between what you think we would need--we, not just the Coast
Guard but the United States--to have a much more robust
presence in the Arctic to safeguard our national security
interests, our economic interests, our environmental interests,
as I always like to remind people, the human interests? We have
American citizens there. They happen to be my constituents.
What we need in the shortfall between that and the resources to
do that. Are there things that are not in the strategy because
you do not think they would be resourced, or are there things
in the strategy that we need as a Congress to address in terms
of funding shortfalls?
Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
We have gotten after a part of it. And I do not put all of
my eggs in the icebreaker basket because that is one tool of
several.
Senator Sullivan. It is important.
Admiral Ray. It is super important.
Senator Sullivan. And it is important that we are making
progress.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Finally.
Admiral Ray. You are doggone right. 43 years since we built
the last one. It is time to get going. So thank you for that.
Senator Sullivan. I could not agree more.
Admiral Ray. And that is huge because that allows us to be
mobile. Today's challenges are not going to be where tomorrow's
challenges are. So that is what that asset gives us. And when
you compare that with a shipboard helicopter, unmanned aerial
system, you have got real capability that you can move around
and have effect on whatever mission you are working. You can do
that.
As I have said before, I think reliable communications
through the region--you know, it is not just communications for
emergencies. This is day in, day out. You and I have seen this.
It is just running the business of having a presence on the
North Slope. That is significant I think.
The maritime domain awareness is enabled. So we talked
about communicating and using satellite technology to enable
that. That also enables us to know who is out there, and we
want to know who is out there. And it needs to be more than the
radar on a ship because you can only cover so much ground with
that. So I think that capability, that kind of sensor and that
ISR capability in the skies there.
You know, other than that, I think just the continued
support for our operations money for our service--you know, we
have been kind of flat-lined on this. And we surge Coast Guard
assets from all over the country to come up there during Arctic
Shield. We will have a mechanic working on H-60's whose family
is in Clearwater, Florida, but she is up there working on a
helicopter on the North Slope. And that is OK. We do that, but
that is not a long-term strategy. We know we are going to be up
there every year. We need to have the assets to grow--the
operations and maintenance money to grow those people. So end
strength--I think that is also helpful.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and I
appreciate your outstanding testimony.
In the NDAA right now and the conference report--I believe
the House is going to be voting on this today, and then it will
come over here starting today or next week--there was a
provision. It was something that I and many other members were
interested in, is this idea of a strategic Arctic port. And I
highlighted this in my opening statement whereby there is not
the port capability anywhere near the Bering Strait to bring in
a large-scale national security cutter or an icebreaker, polar
security cutter. And again, on the East Coast or the West Coast
of the United States, this would be considered just
unacceptable.
So there is a provision that directs the Secretary of
Defense and Homeland Security to look at this issue and say,
hey, we need this infrastructure, particularly when you look at
what the Russians are doing in their Arctic.
What is your sense of the importance of having a port that
can handle these larger scale Coast Guard and Navy vessels to
protect our economic and national security interests in the
region, not 1,200 nautical miles away from the region?
Admiral Ray. Sir, there is no question that a deepwater
port north of Dutch--and there are a few candidates that I am
well aware of, but a deepwater north up there somewhere in the
vicinity would benefit Coast Guard operations. No doubt about
that.
Senator Sullivan. So you think we need it.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Well, listen, Admiral, I think you and the previous panel--
I want to thank you for your outstanding service. Please tell
the men and women of the Coast Guard that this committee,
certainly this subcommittee, are very appreciative of their
hard work and sacrifice. And we will continue these series of
hearings on the needs and capabilities of the Coast Guard.
As we look to finish up the hearing, I will ask the
witnesses both you, sir, and the previous panel that if there
are any other questions from Senators on the Committee, that
they will be submitting them in the next two weeks. And we ask
that the written answers to these questions be written back to
the Committee as soon as possible.
I want to thank you again, Admiral, for your service and
the previous panel for their outstanding testimony as well.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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