    [Senate Hearing 116-636]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 116-636

                    EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND
                     THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS ON THE
                   U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 12, 2019

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                       [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    52-942 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                      ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                           John Keast, Staff Director
                      Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                          Steven Wall, General Counsel
                     Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
                  Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                          Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                                     ------

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
    TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 12, 2019................................     1
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Markey......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Wicker......................................    69

                                   Witnesses

    Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia and the
      Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and
      International Studies (CSIS)...................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    44
    Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute and Environmental
      Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson International
      Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center for
      Climate & Security.............................................    49
        Prepared statement...........................................    50
    Dr. Michael Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience
      Program; Director of the Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson
      International Center for Scholars..............................    58
        Prepared statement...........................................    60
    Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, United States Coast
      Guard..........................................................    76
        Prepared statement...........................................    78

    EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND THREATS IN THE ARCTIC: A FOCUS
                ON THE U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2019

                                   U.S. Senate,
                              Subcommittee on Security,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
    room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Fischer,
    Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, Blumenthal, and Sinema.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing will now come
    tos order.
        I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
    witnesses today to share with the Subcommittee their
    perspectives on the expanding opportunities, challenges, and
    national security threats in the Arctic and how the Coast Guard
    can shape its Arctic strategy to best protect U.S. interests in
    the region.
        The changes occurring in the Arctic are monumental. For the
    first time in living history, receding sea ice is opening up an
    entire ocean to the world. This provides access to previously
    unreachable natural resources. Estimates are that 30 percent of
    the world's undiscovered natural gas, 13 percent of its
    undiscovered oil, and an abundance of rare earth and other
    minerals exist in the Arctic region.
        It opens up formerly impassable maritime traffic routes
    that are thousands of nautical miles shorter when compared to
    using the Suez or Panama Canals potentially saving shippers
    weeks in travel expenses.
        There is a whole realm of economic opportunity that did not
    exist 10 or 20 years ago, and other nations have already taken
    major steps to capitalize on this prospect.
        We can see Arctic nations like Russia who have built ports,
    icebreakers, maritime traffic infrastructure, and ice-hardened
    shipping vessels to expand their commercial activity in the
    Arctic.
        Even non-Arctic nations like China are making major
    investments in Arctic development. They are building
    icebreakers and vessels capable of operating in the high
    latitudes even though they have no sovereign territory near any
    Arctic waters.
        The U.S., one of eight actual Arctic nations, has lagged
    behind in developing the infrastructure needed to meet the
    challenges and opportunities brought on by this expanding
    economic opportunity. We only have one operational heavy and
    one medium polar icebreaker. Compare this to the growing fleet
    of over 50 Russian icebreakers, and they are building many
    more. And even China's icebreaking capacity will surpass ours
    by 2025 or earlier.
        The nearest Department of Defense strategic seaport is
    1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic. That is like putting our
    Coast Guard resources in Miami and asking them to respond to
    distress calls in Boston.
        The level of infrastructure development, domain awareness,
    hydrographic mapping, and reliable communications are far from
    sufficient to support the current and projected maritime
    traffic through the region.
        Overcoming these hurdles will take a whole-of-government
    effort, working with industry, NGO partners, Arctic
    communities, and strong international cooperation to enable the
    safe flow of commerce and protection of the natural Arctic
    environment.
        A key component of the U.S. Government strategy for
    managing the changing landscape in the Arctic is the U.S. Coast
    Guard. The Coast Guard has long been at the forefront of Arctic
    operations. They have been leading heroic rescue missions there
    for more than 150 years, including the overland relief
    expedition in 1897 that saved the lives of 265 whalers iced in
    at Point Barrow.
        Recognizing the vital service the Coast Guard provides for
    our nation, I am pleased to announce today that my Ranking
    Member, Senator Markey, and I have formed the Senate Coast
    Guard Caucus, along with a number of other Senators who will
    come together in a bipartisan manner to bolster and strengthen
    this important branch of the armed services. I am very glad
    about this, and to be honest, I am quite surprised that there
    was no Senate caucus prior to today. So that is good news.
        I am continually impressed with the valiant actions of the
    men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard and look forward to the
    great work this newly formed caucus will do to support their
    service.
        We are making progress slowly but surely on many of these
    Arctic issues. The Coast Guard, for example, in April of this
    year released an updated Arctic strategic outlook that laid out
    their lines of effort for meeting the challenges of increased
    maritime activity in the region. Those lines of effort will
    include: enhancing their capability to operate in the Arctic,
    cooperating with partners and allies to uphold rules-based
    order in the region, and innovating new solutions to provide
    crisis response, law enforcement, and maritime transportation
    management. The Coast Guard also awarded a contract for the
    construction of up to three heavy icebreakers, the first new
    heavy icebreakers to be built by the United States in over 40
    years. These are part of the six new icebreakers authorized by
    Congress in last year's NDAA, a bipartisan provision in that
    bill that I was proud to have authored. Getting these
    icebreakers is an important step in the right direction for
    building our capacity to operate in the Arctic, but we need to
    do more.
        Just yesterday, the Full Committee of the Commerce
    Committee passed the Arctic Shipping Federal Advisory Committee
    Act, which is another important step with regard to our Arctic
    strategic interests.
        I will also soon be introducing legislation to further
    advance the collaboration between the Navy and the Coast Guard
    to increase their effectiveness for carrying out sustained
    operations in the Arctic. This bill will direct the strategic
    focus, infrastructure investment, and capability development
    needed to rapidly respond to crises in the Arctic, to secure
    our sovereignty through persistent presence in this region of
    increasing great power competition. And part of the reason for
    this hearing is to help inform that bill as we are putting the
    final touches on it.
        With that, I want to thank our witnesses today. We have two
    panels. So we will be efficient in our questioning. Here to
    discuss this very important topic are some of the nation's
    foremost experts as well as the Vice Commandant of the Coast
    Guard, Admiral Ray, who I am pleased is here.
        I now want to recognize Senator Markey for any opening
    statement he may have.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    having this very important hearing.
        And to our distinguished witnesses, thank you for joining
    us this morning.
        The frozen Arctic is a hotbed of challenges for security in
    maritime transportation, international relations, and on-the-
    ground community needs. I believe the primary underlying cause
    of these challenges is climate change. We cannot ignore the
    effects of the climate emergency in the Arctic. It is happening
    right before our eyes. NOAA's 2019 Arctic report card published
    on Tuesday recounts record warming and ice melt in the Arctic.
    Unprecedented wildfires raged across Greenland and Siberia this
    summer. And Arctic communities are under threat from the
    rapidly thawing ice and permafrost. The Arctic is warming at
    least twice as fast as the global average, and between 1992 and
    2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly 1 million square miles,
    an area larger than the State of Alaska. This melt is opening
    new trade routes, flooding towns, and unlocking marine
    resources faster than we can keep up.
        These changes have consequences far beyond the Arctic
    Circle. The Arctic is our planet's air conditioner. It sustains
    the ocean circulation that regulates weather on the U.S. east
    coast. And melting Arctic ice sheets raise sea levels across
    the world.
        I had the opportunity to visit Greenland in 2007 and
    learned firsthand how climate change affects Arctic ice.
    Greenland's ice sheet is thousands of feet thick and the height
    of five and a half Empire State Buildings, enough to raise
    global sea levels by more than 20 feet. The ice sheet is now
    melting twice as fast as when I visited 12 years ago. It is
    pouring almost 300 billion tons of melt water into the ocean
    every year, contributing to sea levels on the U.S. east coast
    rising three to four times higher than the global average.
        President Trump may have been unsuccessful in his bid to
    purchase Greenland, but we already have more Greenland than we
    know what to do with piling up on the shores of Massachusetts.
        As you will hear from our witnesses, climate change in the
    Arctic poses a security threat both in the Arctic and beyond.
    China and Russia are putting a new spin on the term ``cold
    war'' as they build their strategic presence in the frozen
    Arctic. Increased commercial use of a changing Arctic presents
    risk for maritime safety as ships navigate volatile new routes.
    Thawing ice and permafrost threaten Arctic communities' food
    security and their very way of life. Oil spills and other
    hazards threaten the fragile Arctic ecosystem. All of these
    threats put additional strain on our Coast Guard as they
    fulfill their many important missions in the Arctic.
        The Coast Guard must also address the vulnerability of
    their own facilities and operations to extreme storms,
    flooding, changing ice conditions, and other climate impacts.
        In this year's Coast Guard's reauthorization, I worked to
    secure language encouraging the Coast Guard to report on its
    most climate vulnerable installations as the rest of the
    Department of Defense has done. But reporting is not enough. We
    must rethink our approach to infrastructure planning from our
    southernmost to northernmost installations, and climate change
    must be at the center of our calculus.
        The 2019 NOAA Arctic report card makes the climate science
    clear. The Arctic is experiencing unprecedented warming and
    loss of snow and ice. The Coast Guard's Arctic Strategic
    Outlook makes the security risk of a warming Arctic clear. We
    are not adequately prepared to respond to the Arctic climate
    emergency. The Coast Guard must better incorporate climate
    considerations in its missions and planning, and Congress must
    support our Coast Guard to ensure they have the resources and
    facilities to do so. We must maintain leadership in our
    scientific missions to ensure we can understand rapidly
    changing conditions in the Arctic, as well as support our
    diplomatic goals. Most importantly, we need bold and
    transformative climate action now.
        And I agree with the Chairman of the Committee that it is
    important for us to, on a bipartisan basis, have a Coast Guard
    Caucus. This is going to become a very critical part of the
    long-term strategic thinking of the United States, and it is
    important that, on a bipartisan basis, we partner to create
    this caucus now.
        So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Markey.
        Well, I want to welcome our very distinguished witnesses
    today. On our first panel, we have Heather Conley, Senior Vice
    President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and the Director
    of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies; Ms. Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar
    Institute and Environmental Change and Security Program, the
    Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and Michael
    Sfraga, Director of Global Risk and Resilience Program, and
    Director of the Polar Institute also at the Woodrow Wilson
    International Center for Scholars.
        Each of you will have five minutes for your opening
    statement. A longer statement can be included in the record, if
    you would like. We will start with you, Ms. Conley.

              STATEMENT OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE

              PRESIDENT, EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC;

                AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR

               STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

        Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, thank you and Senator Markey
    so much for holding this very important hearing. And I
    congratulate you on the bipartisan Coast Guard caucus, as well
    as continued work in bringing the Navy and the Coast Guard
    together in this joint mission.
        What a timely moment to have this hearing. It is a great
    time to take stock of what we have accomplished in 2019, but,
    more importantly, think about what must be done in 2020. And I
    think exactly the NOAA Arctic report card from two days ago, in
    highlighting so many profound changes in the Arctic, one of its
    most important points was the lack of sea ice formation in the
    Bering Sea, again very important to America's territorial
    waters and its coastline.
        So let us take a look at 2019. Absolutely the exciting news
    that we now have in process: the construction of one heavy
    polar security cutter.
        And I think the other two elements of 2019 certainly was
    Secretary Mike Pompeo's speech in Finland in May of this year,
    which was the first time a senior official placed the Arctic in
    a public speech within a great power competition framework. But
    that was very surprising and shocking to our allies. And I
    think that reminds us that we have to work more closely with
    our allies as we look at the Arctic increasingly through this
    lens.
        And of course, as you rightly note, Greenland became much
    more a topic of conversation and its strategic importance. But
    again, this is all part of the strategic awakening that we are
    having regarding the Arctic.
        But I have to say perhaps the year closed out with the most
    troubling news to me, which was 4 days ago the announcement by
    the Russian military that they are placing S-400s in each of
    their Russian military units across the Russian Arctic, calling
    it a de facto anti-missile dome. So today we are already
    potentially losing access to the Arctic because of Russia's
    growing military footprint.
        You have asked us here to assess the Coast Guard's updated
    Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. And of all of us that have
    worked so closely with the Coast Guard over the last decade as
    it is thinking about the Arctic, the Coast Guard has faithfully
    tried to protect America's sovereignty in the Arctic. They have
    warned us that they need more resources. They have detailed
    what they have required, and they have done the best with what
    they have. This is no longer sufficient. The Coast Guard simply
    needs a dedicated budget to build the Arctic infrastructure
    that it needs, and it needs strong and sustained civilian
    leadership to make sure that that infrastructure is in place.
        The challenges in the Arctic are great regarding security.
    In fact, the United States has two Arctics. We have the north
    Pacific/North American Arctic--and of course our requirements
    to support Alaska only continue to grow as we see increased
    commercial traffic--principally Chinese LNG carriers that are
    going to the Yamal Peninsula. But we also have the north
    Atlantic/European Arctic, which is vital to protecting the
    north Atlantic sea lines of communication, and we are seeing a
    dramatic up-tick in Russian submarine activity in the north
    Atlantic. So, we not only have one challenge in the Arctic, we
    have two.
        The Coast Guard frequently refers to ``presence equals
    influence.'' I could not agree more with that equation. And the
    two states that are building presence in the Arctic are, of
    course, Russia and China. Russia is, in my view, our most
    significant near-term security challenge in the Arctic.
    Although I know the U.S. Government continues to be very
    focused on China, and we do have a very important long-term
    strategic challenge there, Russia presents the near-term
    challenge. And CSIS has been in partnership with the National
    Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to detail Russia's military
    footprint using satellite imagery. And if it meets the
    Committee's approval, I would like to put for the record some
    of these satellite imageries and the analysis that we have
    included.
        Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Conley. Thank you.
        The challenge, however, is what we do not know is how
    Russia and China are going to interact together in the Arctic.
    And again, 2019 showed us increased economic activity, science
    activity, as well as military activity.
        So in my testimony, I am calling for a dedicated Arctic
    Security Initiative, a budget very similar to the European
    Deterrence Initiative, which gives us a dedicated multiyear
    budget to actually enhance our infrastructure needs, but also
    to enhance our diplomatic, our economic, our scientific
    presence because, as China and Russia's influence grows in the
    Arctic through science, economics, and security, the U.S. must
    be equally present.
        And again, I thank this Committee. The U.S. Coast Guard has
    the leadership. They know what they need. They need the budget
    to do so.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President, Europe,
       Eurasia and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for
                   Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
        Thank you, Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Markey, for the
    opportunity to come before you this morning to discuss America's
    security strategy for the Arctic and the readiness of our frontline
    defenders, the United States Coast Guard. My testimony today could be
    as relevant for the Senate Armed Services Committee as it is for the
    Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, such is the nature
    of Arctic security today.
        It is a particularly fitting and timely moment to take stock of
    what we have accomplished this year regarding U.S. security policy
    toward the Arctic and, most importantly, what we must do to secure and
    increase America's security in the Arctic in 2020 and beyond.
        It goes without saying that we are having this discussion today
    because of the profound transformation of the Arctic region due to
    climate change. From rapid permafrost thaw and extensive coastal
    erosion, which is breaking apart and collapsing terrestrial
    infrastructure to the extraordinary diminishment of the Greenland Ice
    Sheet and thinning and disappearance of polar ice caps, these changes
    have propelled the U.S. and all Arctic coastal states to protect and
    secure their territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
    coastlines. This is particularly true for the United States which lacks
    infrastructure and capabilities to protect and defend its fourth
    coast.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``The Arctic of the Future: Strategic Pursuit or Great Power
    Miscalculation?: Keynote Address,'' Center for Strategic and
    International Studies, remarks by Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, May 10,
    2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-future-strategic-pursuit-or-
    great-power-miscalculation-keynote-address.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        After nearly a decade of study, 2019 will be remembered as the year
    that the United States formally launched the construction of a heavy
    polar security cutter, something this Nation has not done for 42 years.
    2019 however was marked, as in many previous years, by the release of a
    plethora of U.S. government Arctic strategies: the U.S. Navy quietly
    released its Arctic strategy in January, the Coast Guard released its
    updated strategy in April, and the Defense Department released its
    mandated study of U.S. defense operations in June. We had anticipated
    the release of an Air Force Arctic strategy but that has yet to be
    released. But 2019 will perhaps be most remembered as the year of
    significant U.S. rhetorical change as Washington now views the Arctic
    through the lens of great power competition, highlighting the increased
    military and economic presence of Russia and China in the Arctic. This
    policy shift was encapsulated in Secretary of State Pompeo's speech in
    Rovaniemi, Finland in May of this year. And of course, 2019 will be
    forever known as the year that Washington rediscovered the strategic
    importance of Greenland which prompted the U.S. to announce that is
    reestablishing a U.S. consulate in Greenland's capital of Nuuk.
        In 2019, there was good news: The U.S. national security community
    is now talking more about the strategic importance of the Arctic more
    than ever before. But there is also bad news: The U.S. government isn't
    advancing its policies. Said a different way, the U.S. is acting as if
    it is still 2013 while the Arctic security environment worsens.
    The Updated Coast Guard Strategy
        It is with this in mind that we must view the Coast Guard's updated
    Arctic Strategic Outlook. Its updated outlook is perhaps the best of
    the many U.S. government strategies that describe the new geopolitical
    realities in the Arctic. Without hyperbole or hype, the strategy
    clearly states Russia's and China's long-term strategic ambitions for
    the Arctic which pose challenges to U.S. interests and the United
    States' ability to maintain unfettered access in the region.
        While the Coast Guard accurately describes these new challenges,
    its strategy, as well as the U.S. government's posture, remains largely
    the same as it was in 2013. There are no other significant U.S.
    infrastructure initiatives on the horizon other than the construction
    of a new polar security cutter which will primarily be used in
    Antarctica;\2\ there is no dedicated budget or prioritization of
    infrastructure improvements. There is no deep-water port in the
    American Arctic and there are no ice-strengthened surface vessels in
    the U.S. Navy's inventory. There hasn't been a substantial investment
    in increased U.S. forward operating locations in the Arctic,
    communication and navigation assets or greater domain awareness. The
    U.S. could not conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the Russian
    Arctic today if it wanted to, and without agreement from the Canadian
    government, it could not traverse the Northwest Passage.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, ``The Implications of
    U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region,'' Center for Strategic
    and International Studies, May 3, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
    implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite our rhetoric, the current minimalist U.S. presence and
    posture in the Arctic signals that we consider the region a low
    priority. But Russia and China both have a long-term strategy and a
    dedicated budget to achieve their ambitions. Without a significant
    policy response from the U.S. and its allies, Russia and China will
    largely shape the region's future.
        What makes this perennial U.S. minimalist posture in the Arctic so
    troubling is that the United States has not one but two security tasks
    in the Arctic: while the U.S. must always prioritize the protection of
    its waters and territory in the North Pacific, the narrow Bering
    Strait, and the U.S. EEZ in the Chukchi Sea, the U.S. also has Arctic
    security responsibilities in the North Atlantic, North and Barents
    Seas. Both the North Atlantic/European Arctic and North Pacific/North
    American Arctic present ``avenues of approach'' to the homeland that
    directly impact the security of the United States.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ C. Todd Lopez, ``Northcom Commander Cites Arctic as Area of
    Concern,'' U.S. Department of Defense, July 23, 2019. https://
    www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1913989/northcom-commander-cites-
    arctic-as-area-of-concern/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prioritizing the Great Powers in the Arctic
        Russia. Russia poses the most immediate challenge to U.S. national
    security interests in both the North Pacific and the North Atlantic and
    must be the near-term priority. Russia has allocated trillions of
    rubles over the past decade to Arctic economic and military
    development, with the government declaring that it will spend
    approximately $63 billion by 2020 and $235 billion until 2035 with
    significant tax incentives. President Putin has announced that cargo
    shipments will increase to 80 million tons along the Northern Sea Route
    (NSR) by 2025 and the Russian icebreaker fleet will expand to 13 heavy
    icebreakers by 2035--9 of which will be nuclear powered and some will
    be fitted with cruise missiles -as well as investments in the expansion
    and upgrading of ports, infrastructure, and search and rescue
    activities along the NSR.\4\ In the past year, Russia has made several
    important changes related to the use of the NSR, to include giving the
    Russian nuclear agency, Rosatom, bureaucratic control over the maritime
    route, and limiting foreign warships traffic without a 45-day
    notification and permission by the Russian government.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Vladimir Isachenkov and Irina Titova, ``Putin outlines
    ambitious Arctic expansion program,'' Associated Press, April 9, 2019.
    https://www.apnews.com/d0c2eb39a3b44b40ac8ddb1749ebe143.
        \5\ ``Russia Tightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,'' The
    Maritime Executive, March 8, 2019. https://www.maritime-executive.com/
    article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Like the United States, Russia also has ``two Arctics.'' In
    Russia's eastern Arctic, Russia has refurbished airfields, search and
    rescue, and radar stations to improve awareness in the air and maritime
    domains, which includes Sopka-2 radar systems on Wrangel Island (300
    miles from Alaska) and Cape Schmidt. These systems create a
    ``protective dome'' across Russia's vast Arctic coastline and improve
    its overall operational picture to detect and track vessels and
    aircraft. For example, Sopka-2 radars also control civilian air traffic
    and provide meteorological data to better inform mariners traversing
    the route. But Russia's military footprint transforms as one moves
    toward the European Arctic. The Russian military recently announced
    that it will increase the number of S-400 missile defense units
    deployed across the Russian Arctic which tracks with its recent
    deployment of more sophisticated equipment to defend its air and
    maritime domains. Kotelny Island and Novaya Zemlya for example are
    equipped with missile defense systems like the Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1
    systems which create a complex layered coastal defense arrangement that
    secures territory deeper into the central Arctic. Such capabilities
    strengthen Russia's power projection capabilities in the Barents Sea
    and increase its ability to deny aerial, maritime, or land access to
    NATO or U.S. forces. Perhaps most worryingly is what Russia is
    practicing (and signaling) in the Arctic through its recent Grom or
    Thunder 2019 exercise, which engaged Russia's strategic nuclear forces
    and involved all four of Russia's naval fleets, 12,000 troops, and
    included the launch of two nuclear warheads in the Barents Sea as well
    as several other ballistic missiles.\6\ This military posture exceeds
    the Coast Guard's remit, and while the Coast Guard enjoys a pragmatic
    relationship with the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) in joint
    monitoring of the Bering Straits and in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,
    this challenge is of a different magnitude.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Cruise missiles played key role in Putin's
    strategic war games,'' The Barents Observer, October 18, 2019. https://
    thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/10/cruise-missiles-played-key-
    role-putins-strategic-war-games.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China. The longer-term challenge to U.S. security interests is
    China's growing economic presence in the Arctic which could prelude an
    eventual military presence. China's movement into the Arctic was both
    strategic and opportunistic, taking advantage of Russia's financial
    shortcomings after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014 as well
    as the precipitous drop in global energy and commodity prices. Beijing
    has also developed a broader Arctic engagement strategy which includes
    increased activities with international organizations and robust
    economic diplomacy with individual Arctic Council states, primarily
    related to access to Arctic protein sources, maritime access,
    infrastructure development, and enhanced information and
    telecommunications access.
        By 2015, China had described the Arctic as a new strategic frontier
    (alongside space and the sea bed) where there was ``undetermined
    sovereignty.'' China's efforts in the Arctic are designed to preserve
    its unfettered access to the international waters of the Central Arctic
    Ocean (CAO) and to construct a case for preservations of its sovereign
    rights to the region by means of discovery and by continual presence
    and influence. Over a relatively short period (approximately 5 years)
    of time, China has transformed from a low-key player in the Arctic to a
    major actor.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Anne-Marie Brady, ``China's Expanding Antarctic Interests:
    Implications for New Zealand,'' Small States and the New Security
    Environment, Policy brief no.2, June 3, 2017, http://
    www.canterbury.ac.nz/media/documents/research/China%27s-expanding-
    Antarctic-interests.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China continues to enhance it scientific and industrial footprint
    across the Arctic. It maintains two research stations, one on Svalbard
    and one in Northern Iceland. Plans to develop a third in Russia are
    underway. The Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on
    Chinese military and security developments presciently warned that
    Beijing could use the cover of science to gain a military foothold in
    the region through the utilization of dual-use technologies including
    satellites.\8\ In January 2018, China unveiled plans to expand its Belt
    and Road Initiative to the Arctic, establishing a Polar Silk Road
    across the region.\9\ Shortly after, in September, it launched its
    first domestically built and second non-nuclear polar class icebreaker,
    the Xue Long 2. This now gives China two polar icebreakers, matching
    the United States in terms of operational capabilities. Beijing has
    also announced plans to construct a nuclear-powered icebreaker which
    would enable China to retain a near permanent presence in the Arctic
    and could be a precursor to the development of a nuclear-powered
    aircraft carrier.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Blake Hounshell, ``Pompeo aims to counter China's ambitions in
    the Arctic,'' Politico, May 6, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/
    2019/05/06/pompeo-arctic-china-russia-1302649.
        \9\ Philip Wen, ``China unveils vision for `Polar Silk Road' across
    Arctic,'' Reuters, January 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
    us-china-arctic/china-unveils-vision-for-polar-silk-road-across-arctic-
    idUSKBN1FF0J8.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. can develop a specific security policy vis-a-vis Russia's
    military posture, and it can develop specific policies for China's
    dual-use economic and scientific posture in the Arctic. But what U.S.
    policymakers are not equipped to address is the convergence of China
    and Russia's economic and military interests in the Arctic. Over the
    past 24 months, we have witnessed an acceleration of Russian and
    Chinese cooperation, which has enhanced cooperation related to the
    Yamal LNG-1 and 2 Projects, in which the Chinese National Petroleum
    Corporation (CNPC) has invested heavily and in which Chinese firms own
    29.9 percent of the projects.\10\ The economic relationship continues
    to expand, and President Putin has suggested that the NSR, as part of
    China's Maritime Silk Road, would create a ``global and competitive
    route that connects Northeastern, Eastern, and Southeastern Asia with
    Europe.'' \11\ The two are also engaging in military affairs, as 3,200
    Chinese troops and 900 weapons units participated in Russia's large-
    scale Vostok-18 exercise.\12\ While Chinese and Russian navies and land
    forces have exercised together annually since 2015, in July 2019, the
    first Sino-Russian joint air patrols occurred over the Korean
    Peninsula. If such joint actions were to occur in the Arctic, it would
    be very concerning to U.S. security interests.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Elena Mazneva, ``From Russia With Love: A Super-Chilled Prize
    for China,'' Bloomberg, October 26, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/
    news/articles/2017-10-26/china-to-get-first-yamal-lng-cargo-as-russia-
    says-thank-you.
        \11\ Atle Staleesen, ``Putin steps up talks with Beijing over
    Arctic shipping,'' The Barents Observer, April 30, 2019, https://
    thebarentsobserver.com/en/2019/04/putin-steps-talks-beijing-over-
    arctic-shipping.
        \12\ Danila Galperovich, ``Analysts: Russia's Vostok '18 Troop
    Numbers, `China Alliance' Claims Questionable,'' VOA September 11,
    2018. https://www.voanews.com/europe/analysts-russias-vostok-18-troop-
    numbers-china-alliance-claims-questionable.
        \13\ Andrew Osborn and Joyce Lee, ``First Russian-Chinese air
    patrol in Asia-Pacific draws shots from South Korea,'' Reuters, July
    22, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-
    aircraft/first-russian-chinese-air-patrol-in-asia-pacific-draws-shots-
    from-south-korea-idUSKCN1UI072.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What Needs to be Done in 2020
        The Coast Guard frequently uses the following equation for the
    Arctic: presence = influence. This is absolutely correct: the U.S. must
    increase its physical presence in 2020 diplomatically, militarily,
    scientifically, and economically, primarily through public-private
    partnerships. Such a holistic approach must include the reorganization
    of the U.S. government related to Arctic issues; an increase in U.S.
    Arctic diplomatic presence and activity, strengthening science,
    research, and economic opportunities; and the development and
    positioning of increased U.S. security assets across the circumpolar
    Arctic.
        While it is encouraging that the U.S. is restoring its consulate in
    Greenland, the U.S. must enhance its Arctic diplomacy with all of our
    closest allies in the Arctic and regionally, to include Canada,
    Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. The
    U.S. should initiate annual meetings of the foreign and defense
    ministers of Arctic allies to cooperatively discuss and address
    emerging challenges in the region. Similarly, the U.S. should push for
    more frequent meetings of the five Arctic coastal states to discuss
    pertinent issues like the future management of the high seas in the
    Central Arctic Ocean.
        From a security and defense perspective, the U.S. must budget the
    necessary resources to enhance its presence in the North American and
    European Arctic. Just as the U.S. has responded to Russia's military
    posture in Eastern Europe through a series of bilateral defense
    enhancements funded in part by the European Deterrence Initiative
    (EDI), the U.S. should create an Arctic Security Initiative or ASI. The
    ASI would fund greater exercises and training in the Arctic to include
    search and rescue, pollution response, and maritime domain awareness
    activities, as well as the work of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Funds
    could also be used for the development of a layered homeland defense
    design; the increased deployment of strategic forces with short-
    duration rotational deployment of bombers; an investment in upgraded
    sensors for indicators & warnings; and unmanned undersea vehicles and
    anti-submarine warfare equipment; Arctic infrastructure, such as
    reinforcing existing reception facilities along Greenland's west coast,
    limited reception facilities and/or sensor capabilities along
    Greenland's east coast to enhance ASW capabilities in the GIUK gap; and
    enhancements to Thule AFB such as upgrades to the early warning missile
    defense radar in Greenland as well as the eventual modernization of
    NORAD's air, radar, and satellite systems could also be viewed as an
    element of enhanced Arctic air and maritime awareness or preparedness.
        The U.S. must also leverage its strength in Arctic science. This
    includes our robust and world-renowned scientific network of
    institutions and scholars. The budget for U.S. Arctic science and
    research should increase, particularly as it relates to observational
    research infrastructure and expanded research campaigns in the Alaskan
    Arctic. Crucial to these efforts is the inclusion of indigenous voices
    whose knowledge and experience in the region are invaluable.
    Internationally, the U.S. should use the recent Agreement on Enhancing
    International Arctic Scientific Cooperation to establish other norms,
    code of conduct, and regulations. Doing so promotes transparency
    related to scientific collection, data monitoring, and analysis. The
    U.S. should consider the creation of an Arctic Science Infrastructure
    Fund (ASIF). Such a program would increase the number of U.S. research
    stations in the Arctic. Currently, the U.S. has only three: two in
    Alaska and one in Greenland.
        As science drives our understanding of future developments in the
    region, sustainable economic activity should follow. The U.S. must
    actively facilitate public-private partnerships with other industries
    to identify and fund new infrastructure including a deep-water port,
    search-and-rescue stations, refurbished hangars for air assets, and
    improved telecommunications systems which could be incentivized through
    the Arctic Security Initiative. Doing so would improve observational
    coverage and domain awareness while promoting safer economic activity.
    Internationally, the U.S. should promote greater trade and investment
    between the North Atlantic/European Arctic region (which includes New
    England, Canada's maritime provinces, Iceland, Denmark and the UK) and
    the North Pacific/North American region (which includes Alaska and
    Canada's northwest territories).
        And finally, organizationally, it is time for the U.S. government
    to demonstrate--clearly and on a daily basis--that the Arctic is
    strategically important to the U.S. The establishment of several senior
    positions in the national security community is required. New positions
    should include a Senior Director for the Arctic at the National
    Security Council, the re-naming of the Assistant Secretary of State for
    European, Eurasian and Arctic affairs, the establishment of a Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Northern European and Arctic Affairs
    in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the creation of a senior
    civilian leader position in the Department of Homeland Security that is
    tasked with focusing on America's fourth coast.
        Any nation can write an Arctic strategy, but a strategically minded
    and purpose-driven great maritime power will budget for and implement
    the strategy while also successfully engaging its allies. The United
    States has proven repeatedly it can write many strategies, but it has
    not proven it can shape and influence the Arctic in the future. Russia
    and China are implementing their strategies and shaping the region,
    unfortunately to their preferred interests and outcomes.
        If we hold this hearing again at the end of 2020, what will the
    U.S. have accomplished to enhance its security in the Arctic?

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Conley.
        Ms. Goodman.

    STATEMENT OF SHERRI GOODMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, POLAR INSTITUTE AND
       ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON
     INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS; AND SENIOR STRATEGIST, THE
                     CENTER FOR CLIMATE & SECURITY

        Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Markey,
    Senator Cantwell. It is a pleasure to be here with you today.
    And I want to also endorse your creating a Senate Coast Guard
    Caucus. I think it is very timely.
        I have over 30 years of experience as a security
    professional serving as the first Deputy Under Secretary of
    Defense for Environmental Security. I am also the founder and
    former executive director of the CNA Military Advisory Board
    comprised of senior retired generals and admirals, including
    Coast Guard, that since 2007 has continually assessed the
    security implications of climate change, which we characterize
    as a threat multiplier.
        My bottom line for you today, my BLUF (Bottom Line Up
    Front), four points.
        First, climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the
    strategic operating environment for the Coast Guard in the
    Arctic, and around the world. As we convene in Washington at
    the end of 2019 with the global climate summit currently taking
    place in Madrid, what is happening in the Arctic is the
    clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting sea ice,
    and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape
    in which the Coast Guard and our military forces now operate.
    The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes,
    and most dramatically in the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean
    is increasingly accessible and navigable, though still
    treacherous and unpredictable, exposing a new maritime border
    for the U.S.
        Just yesterday, as was mentioned, NOAA released its annual
    Arctic report card confirming near record high air and ocean
    temperatures and melting of the Greenland ice sheet, low sea
    ice extents, and shifts in the distribution of commercially
    valuable marine species. And what happens in the Arctic does
    not stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice storage keeps our
    coastal cities like Miami and Houston above water. Changing
    weather patterns in the Lower 48 from the polar vortex creating
    extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc in
    prime agricultural regions have all Americans feeling the
    effects of Arctic climate change.
        Second, in the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening
    our competitors and adversaries, primarily Russia and China,
    creating new risks and complicating navigating conditions for
    the Coast Guard and our military.
        The changing climate is enabling great power competition in
    the Arctic today. While it has historically been a region
    characterized by cooperation and diplomacy, we have recently
    seen a zone of increased tensions over valuable energy and
    mineral resources and access to shipping routes.
        China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to gain
    access to European shipping opportunities. China has declared
    itself to be a near-Arctic state and intends to build a Polar
    Silk Road that will stretch from Shanghai to Hamburg. China is
    upgrading its icebreaking and related capabilities and
    strategically deploying scientists across the region.
        Meanwhile, Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route
    as a new access maritime road from Asia to Europe. Militarily,
    Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern Sea
    Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our
    high north allies. And just last month, Russia tested a
    hypersonic missile for the first time in the Arctic and plans
    to launch their first weaponized icebreaker by 2023.
        The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in
    the Arctic near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among
    the new risks in a rapidly changing Arctic and one that keeps
    me up at night is a potential nuclear shipping incident in
    Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear safety record is deeply
    concerning, from Chernobyl to the Kursk submarine to recent
    incidents this year.
        To help prepare for future such incidents, we need to
    conduct more exercises like the scenario demonstration we
    recently held with Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and
    others demonstrating how a table-top exercise can be used for
    emergency response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as
    a triggering event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place
    in the year 2050 in which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides
    with its Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker in a winter storm,
    not an unrealistic future planning scenario.
        Third, we have a responsibility to prepare for changing
    Arctic conditions and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its
    operating capabilities in the Arctic from additional
    icebreaking capability, improved domain awareness,
    communications, and research.
        The U.S., unfortunately, has fallen behind in equipping our
    forces to operate safely and securely in the changing Arctic.
    The three components we need are speeding the deployment of
    icebreaking capability in the form of the polar security
    cutter, aviation assets and autonomous systems; improving
    Arctic domain awareness and communications capabilities,
    including mapping and charting, and ensuring the U.S. maintains
    its competitive edge in Arctic research and development.
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, leadership in Arctic security is
    essential--and I thank you very much for your leadership--to
    America's overall security and strategic interests and must be
    a whole-of-government and partnership effort, including our
    allies, communities, private sector, and others that serve to
    strengthen the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience
    for the future.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute
         and Environmental Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson
     International Center for Scholars; and Senior Strategist, The Center
                             for Climate & Security
        Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee:

        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name
    is Sherri Goodman. I am a Senior Fellow at the Polar Institute and the
    Environmental Change & Security Program of the Woodrow Wilson
    International Center and a Senior Strategist at the Center for Climate
    & Security. I have over 30 years of experience as a security
    professional. I served as the first Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
    (Environmental Security). I am also the Founder and former Executive
    Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board, comprised of senior
    retired generals and admirals--including Coast Guard--that since 2007
    have continuously assessed the security implications of climate change,
    which we characterize as a ``threat multiplier.''
        As we convene in Washington at the end of 2019, with a global
    climate summit currently taking place in Madrid, what is happening in
    the Arctic is the clearest evidence of how rising temperatures, melting
    sea ice, and collapsing permafrost are reshaping the security landscape
    in which the U.S. Coast Guard, and our military forces, now operate.
    The opening of a new ocean is occurring within our lifetimes, and most
    dramatically within the last 2 decades. The Arctic Ocean is now an
    increasingly accessible, navigable, maritime border for the US. The
    Arctic region is warming at 2-3 times the global average, according to
    the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. And
    what happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic. Greenland's ice
    storage keeps our coastal cities, like Miami and Houston, above water.
    Changing weather patterns in the lower 48 states, from the polar vortex
    creating extreme weather events to disruptive storms that wreak havoc
    in prime agricultural regions, have all Americans feeling the effects
    of Arctic climate change.
        My Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) today is:

      1.  Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic
            operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and
            around the world.

      2.  In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors
            and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and
            complicating navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our
            military.

      3.  We have a ``Responsibility to Prepare'' \1\ for changing Arctic
            conditions, and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating
            capabilities in the Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to
            improved domain awareness (mapping and charting),
            communications and research capabilities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Werrell, Caitlin and Francesco Femia. ``The Responsibility to
    Prepare and Prevent.'' The Center for Climate and Security. October
    2019. https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/01/31/interview-with-sherri-
    goodman-a-responsibility-to-prepare/

      4.  Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall
            security and strategic interests, and must be a whole of U.S.
            government and partnership effort including allies,
            communities, private sector, and others, that serves to
            undergird the rules-based order and support Arctic resilience.
                                     ______

      #1: Climate change is a threat multiplier, reshaping the strategic
    operating environment for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, and around the
                                     world.
        The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a
    Changing Climate found that climate change is evident in the furthest
    reaches of the globe from the highest mountain peaks to the deepest
    oceans.\2\ Greenland is now melting from the top down. Here are the key
    findings that shape the strategic operating environment for the Coast
    Guard and others operating in the Arctic region:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Maddox, Marisol. ``Two Divergent Paths for Our Planet Revealed
    in New IPCC Report on Oceans and Cryosphere.'' New Security Beat.
    November 18, 2019. https://www.newsecu
    ritybeat.org/2019/11/divergent-paths-planet-revealed-ipcc-report-
    oceans-cryosphere/

       ``Arctic sea ice extent in September (when sea ice extent is
            at its minimum) has declined about 13 percent per decade
            (during the satellite era from 1979 to 2018), changes likely
            unprecedented in at least 1,000 years. The Arctic's older,
            thicker sea ice, which acts as a bastion against melting of
            other sea ice, has almost completely disappeared. Only about 10
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            percent of sea ice is at least five years old.

       Ice sheets and glaciers are losing ice around the world.
            Between 2006 and 2015, Greenland's Ice Sheet lost 278 gigatons
            (Gt) of mass per year. Antarctica's Ice Sheet lost 155 Gt per
            year, and glaciers around the world (beyond Greenland and
            Antarctica) lost 220 Gt a year. Combined, the ice loss between
            Greenland, Antarctica and other glaciers not part of ice sheets
            was 653 Gt per year. For context, a single gigaton of water
            would fill about 400,000 Olympic pools.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Walbolt, Kristen. ``10 things: All about ice.'' NASA's Jet
    Propulsion Lab. March 28, 2018. https://sealevel.nasa.gov/news/114/10-
    things-all-about-ice

       The Arctic has warmed more than double the global average in
            the last two decades. During the winters of 2016 and 2018,
            surface temperatures in the central Arctic were 6 degrees C
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            (10.8 degrees F) above the 1981-2010 average.

       From 2007 to 2016, permafrost temperatures increased by
            about 0.3 degrees C (0.5 degrees F), a record level of warming
            for permafrost. Warming of permafrost can be a ticking time
            bomb. Arctic and boreal permafrost contains 1440-1600 Gt of
            carbon. When it melts, that carbon is emitted into the
            atmosphere, fueling more warming.'' \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Levin, Kelly and Ezra Northrop. ``4 Things to Know About the
    IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere.'' World Resources
    Institute. September 25, 2019. https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/09/4-
    things-know-about-ipcc-special-report-ocean-and-cryosphere

        Arctic communities have already experienced disruptions to their
    freshwater supply, infrastructure, transportation, tourism and cultural
    traditions, due to a melting cryosphere. Many species dependent on cold
    temperatures, ice, and snow are at risk, with some facing extinction.
    These changes will worsen as warming continues.
        Indeed, the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook identifies that ``the
    warming of the Arctic has led to longer and larger windows of reduced
    ice conditions,'' and that ``from 2006 to 2018, satellite imagery
    observed the 12 lowest Arctic ice extents on record.''
                                     ______

     #2: In the Arctic, a changing climate is emboldening our competitors
    and adversaries (Russia and China), creating new risks and complicating
          navigating conditions for the Coast Guard and our military.
        The Arctic has emerged as a region of geostrategic competition,
    primarily because rising temperatures, melting sea ice, and collapsing
    permafrost now grant access to this region previously locked in ice
    most of year. Indeed, climate change is enabling great power
    competition in the Arctic today. While the Arctic has, since the end of
    the Cold War, been a region characterized by cooperation and diplomacy,
    it has more recently become a zone of increased tensions over valuable
    energy and mineral resources, and access to shipping routes. The
    retreating and thinning of Arctic ice have given rise to exponential
    growth in economic and military activities, including shipping,
    resource extraction, and other commerce. The Coast Guard Strategic
    Outlook stresses that ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to
    open and increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard
    services. Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating
    environment that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to
    unpredictable levels of risk.'' Rapid Arctic change is feeding into
    China's and Russia's strategic ambitions, both regionally and globally.
        As I stated in an article in Foreign Policy last year, ``China has
    large ambitions throughout the Arctic.'' \5\ This includes the
    advancement of both commercial and military objectives. For instance,
    China is aiming to use Russia's Northern Sea Route to ship goods and
    other materials to and from ports in Europe. This will shorten travel
    times compared to traditional routes through the Straits of Malacca and
    Suez Canal, offering China a new strategic advantage in terms of global
    trade and freedom of navigation. In January 2018, this ambition was
    formalized in China's first public Arctic policy, wherein China
    declared itself to be a ``near Arctic State,'' and articulated its
    intention to build a ``Polar Silk Road'' that will stretch from
    Shanghai to Hamburg, first across the Northern Sea Route, and
    potentially later, across the central Arctic Ocean.\6\ In the long
    term, China foresees using the even shorter Transpolar Sea Route across
    the very top of the Arctic, when that opens in a few decades due to
    melting sea ice. This route, which might be available for several
    months each year, would save China from having to depend on Russian-
    controlled waters. As Li Zhenfu, director of Dalian Maritime
    University's research Center for Polar Maritime studies, noted,
    ``[w]hoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new
    passage of world economics and international strategies.'' \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Goodman, Sherri, and Elisabeth Freese. ``China's Ready to Cash
    In on a Melting Arctic.'' Foreign Policy. May 1, 2018. https://
    foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/01/chinas-ready-to-cash-in-on-a-melting-
    arctic/
        \6\ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of
    China. ``Full Text: China's Arctic Policy.'' The State Council of the
    People's Republic of China. January 26, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/
    archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
        \7\ Jakobson, Linda. ``China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.''
    Insights on Peace and Security. March 2010. https://www.sipri.org/
    sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China also is deepening its Arctic presence through foreign direct
    investment in several Northern European Arctic States.\8\ China is
    exploiting climate change and the very real need for Arctic-based
    infrastructure investment to assert itself as a key partner in economic
    development and scientific exploration. This presence enhances their
    own domain awareness, and investments could plausibly be leveraged to
    influence policy to be more desirable for China's long-term strategic
    interests.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Rosen, Mark E and Cara B. Thuringer, ``Unconstrained Foreign
    Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security.'' CNA.
    November 2017.
        \9\ Goodman, Sherri and Marisol Maddox. ``China's Growing Arctic
    Presence.'' China-US Focus. November 19, 2018. https://
    www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-growing-arctic-presence
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In a recent article, Coast Guard Commander, William Woityra, points
    out that mistrust of China's actions and intentions in the Arctic is
    firmly rooted in a pattern of behavior that they have displayed, which
    shows that ``When it is convenient, and when there are economic
    incentives to cheat, China has a history of turning a blind eye to the
    illegal activity of its industries, or tacitly supporting them.'' \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Woityra, William. ``China Can't Be Trusted in the Arctic.
    Proceedings. December 2019. Vol. 145/12/1,402.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia has been increasing its military presence and assertiveness
    in the Arctic--and a significant amount of it is proportionate to their
    vast Arctic territory--but their ambitions have political, military and
    commercial dimensions. On the political side, Russia has the longest
    Arctic coastline of any Arctic coastal state, and Russian identity has
    historically been tied to the Arctic. Expanding Arctic development, as
    ice and permafrost melt, is therefore likely to enjoy broad public
    support from a nation that identifies with its Arctic heritage.
    Commercially, approximately 20 percent of Russia's GDP is derived from
    Arctic activities, primarily energy, industrials and mining.\11\
    Russian President Vladimir Putin has set ambitious cargo shipping
    goals, which would quadruple the volume to be shipped through the
    Northern Sea Route from 20 million tons to 80 million tons by 2024.\12\
    Though this cargo increase still represents a small portion of total
    global shipping, it is still a lofty goal for an environmentally
    sensitive region which does not yet have fully developed emergency
    response capabilities. Russia seeks to monetize the Northern Sea Route
    as a new access route from China to Europe which, as the ice melts,
    will presumably be available for several months each year. This could
    cut up to 15 days off the current route via the Suez Canal and the
    Strait of Malacca. It is noteworthy that President Putin has stated
    that he sees the Northern Sea Route as a future ``global, competitive
    transport artery'' that is ``the key to the development of the Russian
    Arctic and the regions of the Far East.'' \13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Devyatkin, Pavel. ``Russia's Arctic Strategy: Aimed at
    Conflict or Cooperation? (Part I).'' The Arctic Institute. February 6,
    2018. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-aimed-
    conflict-cooperation-part-one/
        \12\ Staalesen, Atle. ``It's an order from the Kremlin: shipping on
    Northern Sea Route to reach 80 million tons by 2024.'' The Barents
    Observer. May 15, 2018. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/
    05/its-order-kremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-increase-80-million-
    tons-2024
        \13\ Staalesen, Atle. ``Russia's Putin to turn Northern Sea Route
    into global shipping artery.'' Eye on the Arctic. May 15, 2018. https:/
    /www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/05/15/arctic-shipping-russia-
    policy-international-kremlin/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Militarily, Russia has been upgrading its bases along the Northern
    Sea Route and exerting increasingly aggressive behavior against our
    High North allies and partners. Russia has violated Swedish \14\
    airspace, simulated attacking northern Norway \15\ and tested
    electronic warfare capabilities, including the jamming of GPS systems
    during the NATO exercise Trident Juncture, and in days since, as
    well.\16\ Russia claims its military buildup is primarily for economic
    reasons, presenting the Northern Sea Route as a maritime toll road
    through the Arctic, and seeking to monetize the route by requiring
    transit vessels to pay a ``toll'' for military escort through the
    shallow waters close to the Russian coastline. However, it is clear
    that Russia would be able to use these forces and capabilities for
    other purposes as well. Just last month Russia tested a hypersonic
    missile for the first time in the Arctic,\17\ and they plan to launch
    their first weaponized icebreaker, Ivan Papanin, by 2023.\18\ In short,
    China and Russia are opportunistically expanding their power and
    influence in direct response to a melting Arctic, and this will have
    significant consequences for U.S. interests.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Sweden: Russian Military Planes Briefly Violated Airspace.''
    Associated Press. January 24, 2019. https://apnews.com/
    097a3fd978f14f4e9a7f4e5cb4d1d600
        \15\ Nilsen, Thomas. ``11 Russian Fighter Jets Made Mock Attack on
    Norwegian Arctic Radar.'' The Barents Observer. February 12, 2019.
    https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/11-russian-fighter-
    jets-made-mock-attack-norwegian-arctic-radar
        \16\ Staalesen, Atle. ``GPS Jamming on Agenda as Russian Defence
    Delegation Sat down for Talks in Oslo.'' The Independent Barents
    Observer. March 18, 2019. https://thebarentsob
    server.com/en/security/2019/03/gpsjamming-agenda-russian-defence-
    delegation-sits-down-talks-oslo
        \17\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia Tests Hypersonic Missile in Arctic,
    TASS cites Source.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
    www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
    sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
        \18\ ``Russian Shipyard Launches Missile-Carrying Icebreaker.'' The
    Maritime Executive. October 28, 2019. https://www.maritime-
    executive.com/article/russian-shipyard-launches-missile-carrying-
    icebreaker
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in Arctic
    waters near the U.S. presents other risks as well. Among the new risks
    in a rapidly changing Arctic, one that ``keeps me up at night,'' is a
    potential nuclear shipping incident in Arctic waters. Russia's nuclear
    safety record is deeply concerning, from Chernobyl, to the Kursk
    submarine sinking in 2000, to the 2019 failed recovery of the Skyfall
    missile and the nuclear submarine which caught on fire. These incidents
    reveal a Russian tendency to not only withhold critical incident
    information about the extent and severity of radioactive contamination
    but to actually cover the incidents up in an attempt to evade
    accountability. This irresponsible practice has implications for Coast
    Guard and partner agency mission planning in responding to a crisis in
    the Arctic.
        To help prepare for future such incidents, a scenario demonstration
    was conducted earlier this year by the Council on Strategic Risks,
    Sandia National Labs and the Wilson Center's Polar Institute at the
    Arctic Futures 2050 conference. With Coast Guard and Alaskan Native
    community participation, we demonstrated ``how a table-top exercise can
    be used to bring science, indigenous and policy communities together to
    develop information, ideas and proposed actions to drive future
    research directions, policy initiatives and planning for emergency
    response in the Arctic of 2050. This exercise used as a triggering
    event an Arctic maritime incident that takes place in the year 2050 in
    which a Chinese-owned LNG tanker collides with its Russian nuclear-
    powered icebreaker escort in a winter storm.''
        Key takeaways from the exercise include:\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Jim Townsend, Marisol Maddox.
    ``Inclusive Planning for Changing Arctic Futures: Demonstrating a
    Scenario-Based Discussion.'' Council on Strategic Risks. September 5,
    2019 https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2019/09/19/planning-for-a-
    changing-arctic-a-scenario-based-discussion-paper/

       ``The initial operational response to any major Arctic
            shipping incident will follow well established search and
            rescue protocols and will be led by the United States Coast
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Guard.''

       ``If a nuclear incident of this type occurs, it is likely to
            become an incident of national significance and an incident
            command structure will be established. A nuclear accident in
            shallow water has the potential to become a very serious
            incident.''

       ``Important predictive capabilities for situational
            awareness and informing response decisions does not currently
            exist for winter Arctic conditions.''

       ``The U.S. Arctic currently lacks multiple facets of both
            operational and research infrastructure needed to provide key
            elements of both short and long-term response to a major
            winter-time incident.''

       ``There must be a strong indigenous voice and participation
            in the response effort. Arctic indigenous communities have
            important knowledge to inform response decisions and must be
            part of response decisions.''

       ``This incident has the potential to rapidly become a major
            international incident. Communication lines with Russian (and
            other countries') institutions will be important. Confidence
            Building Measures (CBM) could help to prepare both the U.S. and
            Russia for a future contingency.''
                                     ______

    #3: We have a Responsibility to Prepare for changing Arctic conditions
    and the Coast Guard needs to enhance its operating capabilities in the
      Arctic, from additional ice breaking, to improved domain awareness
       (mapping and charting), communications and research capabilities.
        As former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated in 2018, ``We need to
    up our game in the Arctic.'' While the Coast Guard has a long and
    storied tradition of Arctic operations, for which I have deep respect,
    in the climate era we also need to enable the Coast Guard to ``up its
    game in the Arctic,'' to meet its essential missions. As the Coast
    Guard Strategic Outlook states: ``The United States is an Arctic
    Nation, and the United States Coast Guard has served as the lead
    Federal agency for homeland security, safety and environmental
    stewardship in the Arctic region for over 150 years.''
        Among the U.S.'s emerging needs in a changing Arctic is a strategic
    deep-water port. Currently, the closest deep-water port to the U.S.
    Arctic is 800 miles away in Kodiak, Alaska. That is inadequate in the
    climate era with increased navigation, tourism, and other sea-based
    traffic and the accompanying risks for search and rescue. An Arctic
    deep-water port is a strategic initiative that the U.S. government,
    engaging the private sector in a financially meaningful way, needs to
    plan for future maritime safety and other operations.
        I am pleased that the Committee has included in the Coast Guard
    Authorization Act a provision to prepare a report on the Arctic
    capabilities of the Armed Forces, including identifying gaps in
    Department of Navy capabilities to protect Coast Guard assets during
    Freedom of Navigations operations. This capability is becoming more
    important in a changing Arctic.
        The U.S. has fallen behind in equipping our forces to operate
    safety and securely in a changing Arctic. There are 3 key components to
    Coast Guard's operational capability in the Arctic. Each one requires
    additional support:

      1.  Speed the deployment of additional ice breaking capability in the
            form of the ``polar security cutter, aviation assets and
            autonomous systems. Today, Coast Guard has limited ice breaking
            capability that must fulfill missions at both poles, including
            Antarctica. As the Strategic Outlook diplomatically states:
            ``This national fleet does not currently have the capability or
            capacity necessary to assure access in the high latitudes.''
            The Administration and Congress have authorized one new polar
            security cutter; however, the Coast Guard needs at least 6, of
            which 3 are ``medium'' and 3 are ``heavy,'' according to its
            own requirements. And, from an acquisition standpoint, it is
            financially preferable to conduct a multiple buy, as a single
            vessel will have very high unit costs. At least one vessel in
            the Polar Security Cutter fleet should be science-ready so they
            are able to continue serving as a platform for scientific
            research that is critical to domain awareness and detection of
            changes over time.\20\ Additionally, the Coast Guard needs
            modern aviation capability for search and rescue, as well as
            the autonomous systems that are able to substantially enhance a
            variety of Coast Guard mission sets, from illegal fishing
            detection to mapping and charting.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Congressional Research Service. ``Coast Guard Polar Security
    Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for
    Congress.'' Congressional Research Service. October 4, 2019. https://
    fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf

      2.  Improve Arctic Domain Awareness and Communications capabilities.
            Given the rapidly changing Arctic environmental and operating
            conditions, it is essential that we improve U.S. Arctic,
            including maritime, domain awareness capabilities. MDA is a
            diverse set of capabilities, some of which are within the Coast
            Guard's budget, but many of which are supported by other
            agencies, and which also need to be harnessed from local
            communities with direct observations of the changing Arctic
            conditions. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states, Arctic
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            domain awareness requirements include:

          a.  Information about national defense and security;

          b.  Information on vessel crew, passenger and cargo carried;

          c.  Pollution detection and tracking capabilities;

          d.  Weather and environmental observations, including ice
                reconnaissance;

          e.  Assessment of living marine resources; and,

          f.  Assessment of human activity and infrastructure.

         Consider again the possible nuclear shipping incident with a
            Russian nuclear -powered icebreaker and a Chinese LNG vessel in
            the Bering Strait. Information on all of the above will be
            essential in responding to such a crisis should it occur. That
            is why we need to act today to increase our MDA and
            communications capabilities in the Arctic which includes
            improving national communications infrastructure for broadband
            and satellite coverage to support security as well as
            commercial, recreational, and subsistence-based activities.

         In that regard, I am pleased that the White House has recently
            announced an intent to develop a national strategy on mapping,
            exploring and characterizing the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
            (EEZ) and the shoreline and near-shoreline areas of Alaska.
            Some of our current Arctic charts date back to the 1800s and
            are wholly inadequate for today's needs. Only around 4 percent
            of Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska have been charted to
            modern standards.\21\ As the recent White House Memorandum
            stated, ``Data and information about the ocean help to advance
            maritime commerce, domestic seafood production, healthy and
            sustainable fisheries, coastal resilience, energy production,
            tourism and recreation, environmental protection, national and
            homeland security, and other interests. Such activities
            contribute more than $300 billion per year of economic
            activity, 3 million jobs, and $129 billion in wages.'' \22\
            Equally important, improved mapping and charting will help us
            prepare to operate in a changing Arctic, and to improve our
            predictive capabilities for better decision making.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Cole, Dermot. ``Outdated navigational charts are an Arctic
    maritime disaster in the making.'' Arctic Today. September 10, 2018.
    https://www.arctictoday.com/outdated-navigational-charts-arctic-
    maritime-disaster-making/
        \22\ ``Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive
    Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska.'' The White
    House. November 19, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
    actions/memorandum-ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-
    shoreline-nearshore-alaska/

      3.  Ensure the U.S. maintains its competitive edge in Arctic research
            and development. For decades, the U.S. has supported extensive
            research on the Arctic, from marine to terrestrial systems,
            from space to ecosystems. This research, conducted by leading
            universities across the Nation as well as Federal agency
            laboratories, is a core component of America's competitive edge
            in the Arctic. The Coast Guard's icebreakers are host to the
            science missions conducted aboard to gather direct observations
            and data about Arctic conditions. America's scientific
            enterprise, and research and development capabilities, have
            long supported both our overall security posture and our global
            engagement strategies, as well as enabling us to better
            understand the natural world. Nowhere is this more important
            than in Arctic research. Today, China, Russia, and others are
            increasing their research capabilities both within and about
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            the Arctic.

         Research helps us better understand the pace of Arctic climate
            change and prepare for this changed future. For example, as
            global fish stocks migrate as waters warm toward the poles, we
            need to better understand how to manage emerging and potential
            fisheries, and growing potential for illegal and unregulated
            fishing. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
            Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean signed in 2018 by
            multiple nations, including the US, Russia, China, and others
            is a good example of acting with the precautionary principle in
            situations in which we do not yet have sufficient knowledge to
            make decisions about sustainable management of a fishery in
            this long ice-covered area.\23\ Over the next decade, however,
            many nations will be seeking to develop this knowledge, and we
            need to ensure there is sufficient scientific knowledge to
            support sustainable management and prevent some of the worst
            outcomes of climate change.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ ``Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the
    Central Arctic Ocean.'' https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/
    000449233.pdf

         The proposed High Arctic Research Center (HARC) facility at
            Oliktok Point is a great example of a physical location that
            would greatly complement the development of homeland security
            and defense missions in the Arctic and support a re-established
            leadership position in the region for the United States. The
            proposed Center, ``could serve as a physical launch pad for
            scientists, giving them year-round, multi-domain access for
            research, development, Arctic technology testing, and domain
            awareness. . . . Research and extensive real-time observations
            in the Arctic could help researchers collect data that would
            fill critical gaps in monitoring, providing real-time
            information, enhancing forecasting, and creating better
            simulations for planning purposes to serve security and
            commercial enterprises.'' \24\ The High Arctic Research Center
            would enable testing and demonstration of technologies for
            multiple Coast Guard missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Goodman, Sherri, Peter Davies, Marisol Maddox, Clara Summers.
    ``Research in a Changing Arctic Must be Prioritized.'' New Security
    Beat. October 8, 2019. https://www.newsecurity
    beat.org/2019/10/research-changing-arctic-prioritized/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     ______

      #4: Leadership on Arctic security is essential to America's overall
    security and must be a whole of U.S. government and partnership effort,
     including allies, communities, private sector, and others, that serve
           to undergird the rules-based order and support resilience.
        The Coast Guard is not alone in the Arctic. The keys to American
    leadership on Arctic Security are partnerships and unity of effort.
    This term refers to an inclusive approach that marshals all elements of
    capability, including the joint and interagency community, state and
    local government, industry, non-profit and academic organizations. Key
    partnerships for the US, in particular the Coast Guard, in the Arctic
    include:

       Native Alaskan Communities: Those who live in the region are
            often best able to ``ground truth'' observations and will know
            what's happening long before many in Washington do. They
            observe trends and recognize patterns that may not be
            distinguishable to others. That is why it is essential to ``co-
            produce'' knowledge with those closest to the Arctic domain. I
            am pleased that both the Coast Guard and other interagency
            partners have been including the Native Alaskan community in
            developing both research approaches and improving domain
            awareness. As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook states:
            ``Alaska Natives are a critical layer of security in the
            Arctic.'' The Native Alaskan communities are also on the
            frontlines of climate disruption, from coastal erosion
            occurring at many villages, to permafrost thaw disrupting
            traditional livelihoods, to harmful algal blooms (HABs) harming
            fish stocks and megafauna, to extreme weather storms disrupting
            the critical supply chain of fuel and food delivery. These
            changing conditions increase demands for Coast Guard support
            and response and stretch scarce resources even further.

       Arctic Coast Guard Forum: Another important security layer
            in the Arctic is the partnership the Coast Guard has with the
            Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Appropriately characterized as a
            bridge between ``diplomacy and operations,'' the Arctic Coast
            Guard Forum enables the Coast Guards of the 8 Arctic nations
            both to strengthen working relationships, conduct exercises and
            combined operations, and coordinate emergency response, which
            becomes more necessary as climate challenges mount.

       Innovation and Technology: The U.S. has always been a
            technology and innovation leader. As the Arctic changes, we
            need to harness that capability to advance low-carbon and
            sustainable systems for Arctic operations, observations and
            planning. For example, wind and solar-powered ocean drones are
            now helping to map the Arctic. Other types of autonomous
            systems and advanced technologies will help keep America' at
            the forefront of Arctic, low carbon and resilience innovation
            in the Arctic.

       International agreements and institutions that are the
            backbone of the rules-based order: America's security in the
            Arctic depends on key international organizations and
            agreements. They are even more important in an era of great
            power competition.

         Arctic Council: The Arctic Council provides an
                important intergovernmental forum for the 8 Arctic nations,
                Indigenous People's organizations, observer states and non-
                governmental organizations to engage on a wide range of
                Arctic issues (other than military security). It has also
                developed important agreements on Search and Rescue, Oil
                Spill Preparedness and Response, and Scientific
                Cooperation, that serve to strengthen cooperation in
                uncertain times.

         Law of the Sea Convention: The Law of the Sea
                Convention (UNCLOS) continues to be an important legal
                framework for the Coast Guard, the U.S. military and others
                operating in the region, despite the fact that the United
                States has not yet ratified it.

         International Maritime Organization (IMO): The IMO's
                Polar Code, adopted in 2014, establishes important
                standards for design, construction, equipment, operation,
                training and environment protection and safety for ships
                operating in polar regions.
    Recommendations
        To summarize my recommendations above, here are the key areas where
    Congressional support and action is needed:

      1.  Advancing the acquisition of polar security cutters, and
            structurally equip them to carry out scientific research.

      2.  Increasing MDA capabilities in conjunction with other agencies.

      3.  Supporting continued Arctic research and development,
            demonstration, test and evaluation across multiple agencies.

      4.  Mapping and charting Alaskan waters and near shoreline for
            maritime safety.

      5.  Reducing further climate risk through sustainable and low-carbon
            approaches across all domains using a Responsibility to Prepare
            and Prevent approach.
                                     ______

               Conclusion: Arctic Leadership for the 21st Century
        As the Coast Guard Strategic Outlook appropriately states:

            ``Arctic Security requires leadership and cooperation across
            multiple national security areas of interest, including border
            security, economic security, environmental security, food
            security, freedom of navigation, geopolitical stability, human
            safety, national defense, natural resource protection and
            assertion and protection of U.S. sovereign rights.''

    America's leadership on climate security is the other essential element
    to advancing America's Arctic interests in the 21st century.

        The globally-devastating Second World War precipitated the creation
    of an international system led by the United States, designed to
    protect the sovereignty of states against external aggression and
    decrease the likelihood of conflict between nations. This is the world
    order we are trying to preserve today. However, the rapid rate of
    climatic change, combined with other global threats, and the increasing
    stress on security that follows means that this system must adapt--and
    adapt quickly. The U.S. should lead that effort, just as it led the
    effort to ensure global stability after the Second World War.
        Fortunately, the difference between today and major global
    disruptions of the past is that we can spot impending disasters earlier
    and more easily. Though the risks are unprecedented, our foresight is
    unprecedented as well. Technological developments have given us
    predictive tools that enhance our ability to anticipate and mitigate
    threats. In short, we have the ability to make our communities,
    institutions and individuals more resilient to a broad range of
    threats. This foresight underscores a responsibility to advance
    resilient solutions that are commensurate to the threat. That is our
    ``Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent,'' which is most evident in
    what our Coast Guard needs to do to continue operating safely and
    securely in the changing Arctic. If we don't, we will either have to
    watch our adversaries take the lead, or failing that, bear witness to
    an increasingly unstable world.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Goodman.
        Mr. Sfraga.

     STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL SFRAGA, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL RISK AND
     RESILIENCE PROGRAM; DIRECTOR OF THE POLAR INSTITUTE, WOODROW
                WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

        Dr. Sfraga. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator
    Markey, thank you. Senator Cantwell, thank you for your
    interests.
        I am here today to provide a bit of context for the Arctic,
    providing key issues that face the United States in the Arctic.
        As noted, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean, and
    it is a region the U.S. Coast Guard has operated in for over
    150 years. And the importance of these operations will increase
    in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible
    U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the nation?s
    interests. Presence is important. Presence is mandatory.
    Presence is influence.
        The United States Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic
    Outlook is a perfect filter through which my testimony should
    be viewed. They specifically outlined three areas of effort: to
    enhance their capability to operate effectively in a dynamic
    Arctic domain; to strengthen the rules-based order; and to
    innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity in the
    Arctic.
        The Arctic, as you noted, is experiencing rapid change.
    There are risks. There are realities. There are opportunities.
    So I tried to design a framework called Navigating the Arctic's
    7Cs, to give us seven buckets through which we can think about
    our future Arctic. These Cs are: climate, commodities,
    commerce, connectivity, communities, cooperation, and
    competition. I think the Coast Guard's Strategic Outlook does a
    very good job of providing us a road map through these Cs.
        Senators, you have already covered, as have my colleagues
    here, the issue of climate, so I will not review what you have
    already noted. I simply will say that Congress should support
    the Coast Guard's request for additional Arctic research so
    that they better understand the domain in which they are to
    operate.
        Commodities is the second C. With a coastline of 34,000
    miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic, there is significant
    potential for economic development in the United States and to
    enhance our nation's Arctic security. But we worry about the
    growing interests not only for our challenges but also
    opportunities. We worry about them in terms of Arctic tourism.
    We think about moving fish stocks north. We think about the
    real threat of an oil and gas spill, and we about the many
    challenges our Coast Guard faces to address these many issues.
        We think the Congress should support the U.S. Coast Guard's
    search and rescue requirements, as noted in their Strategic
    Outlook.
        The third C is commerce. Increased access to a variety of
    resources is an opportunity and a risk, as my colleagues have
    outlined. There has been a fivefold increase in commercial
    activity along the northern sea route, primarily driven by
    resource development. If the State of Alaska or the Federal
    Government decides to develop Alaska's LNG prospects, the Coast
    Guard will need the assets to enable the Nation to not only be
    protected from oil spills, but to manage this facility or
    facilities on Alaska's North Slope.
        The Coast Guard needs significant domain awareness. The
    Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive
    Economic Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska is an
    encouraging step. Without robust maritime domain awareness,
    however, conducting safe and secure shipping is daunting
    challenge.
        So Congress should support a comprehensive and
    appropriately funded Arctic domain awareness and ocean mapping
    strategy.
        Four, connectivity. We do not have a digital divide, a data
    divide, or an infrastructure divide in America's Arctic. We
    have a digital, data, and infrastructure abyss. Closing this
    abyss will require innovative solutions with persistent public/
    private investment with all Federal agencies participating.
    When you think about infrastructure in the Arctic, in America's
    Arctic, think about this in contrast. China has pursued
    investments in various Arctic nations' infrastructure,
    including an approximate 40 percent stake in the first Yamal
    LNG facility, as well as their recently opened Power of Siberia
    pipeline which connects China and Russia's energy network.
        Meanwhile, the United States does not have one single
    Arctic port.
        Congress should invest in a dual-use facility and
    capabilities in Alaska starting with a multi-use port and
    advancing development of enhanced integrated Internet
    communications and connectivity throughout the region.
        Five, communities. The indigenous communities of Alaska are
    no the forefront of a collapsing landscape. Dozens of Alaskan
    villages are threatened. Their landscape is their rhythm of
    life. The Coast Guard has supported these communities
    throughout the last decade.
        So the U.S. Coast Guard should continue to support Alaska's
    indigenous communities through initiatives like the Coast
    Guard's Cities and Communities Program.
        Six, cooperation. Continued participation and leadership by
    the United States in the Arctic Council, the Arctic Economic
    Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum is in our nation's
    interest. These entities shape and reinforce the rules-based
    governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and all Arctic
    nations.
        My recommendation is that the Coast Guard continue to lead
    in this effort.
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, seven, competition. The great
    competition between the United States, China, and Russia should
    be considered in each country's broader approach and national
    mindset. In the Arctic and elsewhere, China plays the game
    ``Go,'' characterized by a long-term methodological strategy to
    exert influence and power in a calculated fashion. Russia plays
    the game ``Survivor,'' attempting to sustain an economy
    crippled by Western sanctions and a declining population with
    an over-reliance on natural resource development for both
    domestic and international markets. And finally, the United
    States plays the game ``Twister,'' trying to balance global
    leadership roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South
    China Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere
    against the challenges presented by a new and accessible ocean.
        Congress should move with urgency to see our polar security
    cutter fleet funded and in service sooner rather than later.
        And in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. It
    is no longer an isolated or remote region. It is part of the
    geopolitical, economic, social, physical, and security
    landscape globally. So I hope these Arctic 7Cs, this framework,
    helps us think through the future Arctic for the United States.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sfraga follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Dr. Mike Sfraga, Director, Polar Institute, and
          Director, Global Risk & Resilience Program, Woodrow Wilson
                       International Center for Scholars
    Introduction
        Good morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and
    distinguished members of the Subcommittee, my name is Mike Sfraga. I am
    the Director of the Polar Institute and the Director of the Global Risk
    and Resilience Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Nation's think
    tank. I am honored to testify on the subject ``Expanding Opportunities,
    Challenges, and Threats in the Arctic: A Focus on the USCG Strategic
    Outlook.'' My role today is to provide a contextual overview of the key
    Arctic issues facing the US, and other Arctic and non-Arctic nations.
        Mr. Chairman, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean: a
    fourth accessible, maritime border for the United States. The Arctic
    Ocean joins the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean
    as a critical geographic component of our country's maritime ring of
    security and opportunity. Spanning nearly five and one half million
    square miles, the Arctic Ocean covers an area roughly 1.5 times the
    size of the United States and nearly half the size of the Continent of
    Africa. It is a region that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has operated in
    for over 150 years, and the importance of these operations will only
    increase in the coming months, years, and decades. Viable and visible
    U.S. presence in the Arctic is critical to the Nation's interests:
    presence is important; presence is mandatory, and presence is
    influence.
        As the primary surface presence of the United States in the Arctic,
    and the first responder to any incident that falls under their 11
    statutory missions, the USCG must be empowered to fulfill the needs of
    this country. As the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook
    states, ``The Arctic maritime domain will continue to open and
    increased activity will create more demand for Coast Guard services.
    Near-term variability will result in a dynamic operating environment
    that exposes mariners and Arctic communities to unpredictable levels of
    risk.''
        The United States Coast Guard 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook is a
    perfect filter through which my testimony should be considered, as is
    the Department of Homeland Security's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
    2020-2024. The DHS Strategic Plan champions ``'Relentless Resilience'
    for all threats and hazards,'' which requires a whole of government
    approach. The USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook targets three lines of
    effort to further the Department's goals: (1) enhancing their
    capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain, (2)
    strengthen the rules-based order, and (3) innovate and adapt to promote
    resilience and prosperity in the Arctic.
        The Arctic, including Alaska, the state by which the United States
    is an Arctic nation, is experiencing rapidly evolving threats--and
    opportunities--that we must recognize and address. To re-conceptualize
    the realities, risks, and opportunities in the Arctic, I designed a
    framework called Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs.
        The 7Cs are: (1) Climate, (2) Commodities, (3) Commerce, (4)
    Connectivity, (5) Communities, (6) Cooperation, and (7) Competition. To
    effectively protect the homeland by addressing the challenges and
    opportunities of a transformed Arctic, the USCG must thoroughly
    consider how it Navigates the Arctic's 7Cs; their 2019 Arctic Strategic
    Outlook provides a good roadmap to do so.
    1. Climate
        Global Warming is real, rapid, and palpable. According to NASA,
    September Arctic Ocean ice extent has decreased from about 3 million
    square miles in 1980 to less than 2 million square miles as of
    September of this year. Arctic sea ice extent in September (when it is
    at its lowest) has declined almost 13 percent per decade since 1979.\1\
    The Arctic is warming more than twice as fast as the global average.
    The UN's World Meteorological Organization recently noted a surge in
    carbon emissions and stated the gap between global targets and true
    emissions is ``glaring and growing,'' and must be halved by 2030 to
    have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C. ``In order
    to have a 66 percent probability of avoiding global warming beyond 1.5
    degrees C, the IPCC says we can release no more than 113 billion
    additional tons of carbon. That's only about ten years of emissions at
    the current rate.'' \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Arctic Sea Ice Minimum.'' NASA: Global Climate Change.
    https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/
        \2\ ``Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5'' IPCC. https://
    www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The recent IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a
    Changing Climate documented the melting of high mountain glaciers and
    polar ice sheets significantly jeopardize the planet's freshwater
    supply. Another recent study declares 9 major climate tipping points
    have been triggered, 5 of which are directly related to Arctic change:
    1. the destabilization of the Greenland ice shelf, 2. reduction in
    Arctic sea ice, 3. thawing of permafrost, 4. slowdown of Atlantic
    circulation, 5. fire and pest outbreaks in boreal forests.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ ``Climate tipping points--too risky to bet against.'' Nature.
    https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Associated sea ice decline has many implications for the United
    States, including: a more accessible border along Alaska's coastline;
    increased risk to mariners; stronger and more frequent storms; threats
    to coastal communities due to coastline and permafrost degradation,
    and; shifting subsistence patterns. For the first time in history,
    warming water temperatures have led to such a precipitous decline in
    Pacific cod stock that the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council
    announced they will close the Gulf of Alaska cod fishery for the 2020
    season.\4\ Sea ice decline also opens new and expanded opportunities: a
    more accessible resource base; increased shipping and commerce; and
    increases in tourism and recreational activities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ George, Kavitha. ``Extremely low cod numbers lead feds to close
    the Gulf of Alaska fishery for the first time.'' Alaska Public Media.
    December 6, 2019. https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/12/06/extremely-
    low-cod-numbers-linked-to-the-marine-heatwave-lead-feds-to-close-the-
    gulf
    -of-alaska-fishery-for-the-first-time/?fbclid=IwAR0NP-
    Z6BydPZ3Uo2LgO1lciKixtZp5duLJGf4_
    tvGtMqKYojFRnQgbcDZw
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Global warming is the preeminent driver of change in the Arctic and
    requires a rapid yet responsible evolution of the USCG's posture,
    strategy, and operations. It also requires the U.S. government to
    provide necessary resources to the USCG so they can execute their
    mission, and for applicable Federal agencies to shoulder a share of the
    responsibility. Indeed, a ``whole of government'' strategy and approach
    is required. But in order to more effectively meet their mission in the
    Arctic, the USCG must have accurate, reliable, and sustained
    information about the Arctic environment in which they are to operate.
    The need for additional, sustained, and appropriately funded research
    and observation systems cannot be over emphasized.
        Recommendation: Support the Arctic Strategic Outlook's call for
    additional Arctic research and associated funding. A perfect starting
    place is adoption and resourcing of the United States Arctic Research
    Commission's Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research
    2019-2020. Nine recommendations that enhance the Nation's ability to
    ``Observe, Understand, and Forecast Arctic Environmental Change'' are
    identified in the document.
    2. Commodities
        The rapidly changing climate is opening resource development
    opportunities throughout the Arctic, including Alaska. With a coastline
    of nearly 34,000 miles, 2,500 of which are in the Arctic,\5\ Alaska has
    significant potential for economic development at the community, state,
    and Federal levels. The subsequent 1,000,000 square miles of the U.S.
    Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone \6\, currently extending 200 nautical
    miles out from the Alaskan coastline, provides a vast landscape full of
    opportunities to satisfy global commodity markets, ensure our Nation's
    energy security, while simultaneously presenting a significant
    challenge to the Coast Guard's mandate to uphold American sovereignty.
    The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for managing and regulating the
    Nation's maritime borders and all actions within them--including those
    actions that promote economic prosperity and threaten U.S. sovereignty
    and its economic independence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf
        \6\ 2019 USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As an Alaskan, I am well aware of the importance of the Alaskan
    seafood industry to the state; averaging $3 billion a year in critical
    revenue. As the Arctic continues to warm, fish stocks may move farther
    north, which may enhance the industry's profits while presenting
    challenges as well. The possible migration north of fish stocks will
    further stretch fisheries enforcement assets. The Coast Guard conducts
    patrols in the Bering Sea to counter illegal, unregulated, and
    unreported (IUU) fishing; however, the northern migration of these
    living resources may require the Coast Guard to patrol more extensive
    swathes of territory and increase the frequencies of such patrols.
    Protecting these resources and preventing international IUU fishing in
    the region will become more important in the coming years and decades.
        Arctic tourism will further complicate the Coast Guard's mission in
    the North. From mobile ``hotel'' tents positioned at the North Pole, to
    a boom in Arctic cruise adventures, thousands of people traveling a
    once inaccessible landscape pose myriad challenges for all Arctic
    nations. In 2016, the Crystal Serenity carried 1,700 people through the
    Northwest Passage, making it the first large scale cruise ship to do
    so.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ https://thinkprogress.org/arctic-biggest-cruise-ship-ever-
    ea7b71e9844f/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Considering the USCG's Search and Rescue (SAR) mission and
    operations, an austere scenario should be considered. If a cruise ship
    accident occurred along the North Slope of Alaska, the first city with
    any capacity to assist in the disaster would be Utqiagvik, formerly
    known as Barrow. The city has a population less than 4,500, and its one
    hospital, the Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital, is a state-of-the-art
    institution with a 20-bed general medical facility \8\. This number of
    beds could not handle a large-scale disaster in the Arctic and would
    require the Coast Guard to transfer victims to Fairbanks or Anchorage--
    a distance of 502 and 720 miles, respectively. However, the Coast Guard
    has neither the air nor sea assets to address a disaster on this scale;
    the tyranny of distance is amplified in the Arctic.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ https://www.ihs.gov/sites/alaska/themes/responsive2017/
    display_objects/documents/hf/Barrow.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to Cruise Industry News' 2019 Expedition Market Report,
    ``expedition' cruising is the fastest growing market in the entire
    shipping industry.\9\ A cruise crisis, which becomes more of a concern
    grows with the predicted growth of special, Arctic designed expedition
    ships [the number currently in operation is predicted to increase from
    80 to 108 vessels by 2022 \10\] requires an increase in all phases of
    search and rescue operations. As noted by the USCG 2019 Arctic
    Strategic Outlook: ``as cruise ship and transpolar aviation traffic
    grows, so does the potential need for mass rescue operations in remote
    and icy waters. The current state of response capabilities makes this
    one of the most challenging of all possible scenarios.'' Proper
    prevention and management measures could mitigate the risk of these
    accidents and their environmental and economic impacts.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ https://www.cruiseindustrynews.com/flip/expedition19/mobile/
    index.html#p=2
        \10\ https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/travel/2018/05/arctic-
    cruise-ship-boom
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Response capabilities regarding non-living resource emergencies
    must also be expanded and enhanced. The Arctic is estimated to hold 13
    percent of the world's undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's
    undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural
    gas liquids. The increased availability of these resources caused by
    continued and rapid Arctic Ocean sea ice decline has reenergized the
    global commodity market's interest in the Arctic. This interest is
    predicted to endure--particularly as geopolitical tensions continue to
    multiply in resource heavy areas around the world.
        Recommendation: Support and address the U.S. Coast Guard's SAR
    requirements as noted in USCG 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, with
    particular attention given to robust asset allocation along the Bering
    Strait and North Slope of Alaska.
    3. Commerce
        Increased access to a wide array of natural resource commodities
    has led directly to an increase in shipping and related activities in
    the Arctic, most notably in the Russian Arctic. There has been a five-
    fold increase in commercial activity along Russia's Northern Sea Route
    (NSR) since 2014, primarily driven by its regional resource extraction
    and subsequent transport systems to domestic and international markets.
    According to Business Index North, 22,022 voyages with 20.1 million
    tons of freight transited the NSR in 2018--twice the tonnage of 2017.
    The number jumped again to 30 million tons in 2019 \11\. In the month
    of September this year, there were 50 voyages that originated from, or
    traveled to, international destinations using the Northern Sea
    Route.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ https://www.arctictoday.com/rosatom-looks-to-make-7-billion-
    investment-in-arctic-shipping-service/
        \12\ https://arctic-lio.com/nsr-shipping-traffic-activities-in-
    september-2019/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia derives an estimated 20 percent of its GDP and 30 percent of
    its exports from the Arctic--and aims to quadruple the cargo to 80
    million tons per year by 2024 by enhancing and expanding their Arctic
    infrastructure. Russia's Yamal Peninsula, an epicenter of this
    commerce, is now emblematic of globally integrated Arctic. China owns
    an approximate 40 percent stake in the Yamal 1 LNG project. Arctic-
    specific LNG tankers built in the shipyards of South Korea transport
    LNG along the NSR, down the Bering Strait to Asian--Chinese markets.
    This is the new Arctic; an expanding global economic system that stands
    in stark contrast to the lack of activity in America's Arctic.
        The success of the Yamal 1 project has spurred the construction of
    a second Russian LNG facility. Novatek is Russia's largest LNG
    producer--and majority owner of the Yamal 1 complex. They recently
    reached a final investment decision (FID) of $21.3 billion for their
    Arctic LNG Yamal 2 facility.\13\ Novatek is partnering with French,
    Chinese, and Japanese companies on this project, with continued
    interest from Saudi Aramco. The facility is expected to be complete
    within the next five years.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ https://www.lngworldnews.com/arctic-lng-2-partners-make-fid/
        \14\ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-05/russia-s-
    novatek-gives-green-light-to-arctic-lng-2-project
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        An integrated commercial system linking the Yamal facilities and
    other oil and gas developments along Russia's Arctic Coast will enhance
    Russia's position as a source for much needed energy resources. The
    recently proposed Sakhalin Energy Transfer Facility, located on
    Sakhalin Island, could make delivery of Russian LNG to Asian markets
    more viable and cost effective. Russia's Power of Siberia pipeline, the
    first pipeline to send Russian gas directly to China, launched
    operations on December 2nd of this year, ushering in greater
    connections between the two countries' markets.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ https://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The United States should take note of this growing Russian Arctic
    infrastructure network and its ever-growing relationship with Asian
    markets. Renewed interest in America's Arctic as a source of energy
    security has spurred conversation about the need for, and feasibility
    of, a year-round or seasonal energy and transit complex along Alaska's
    North Slope. Although much work would need to be done, a Public Private
    Partnership may be of interest as the U.S. looks to secure its own
    energy sources and take advantage of vast LNG assets along Alaska's
    coast and the ever-increasing LNG markets throughout Asia. Yet, for LNG
    development and shipping to occur in and around Alaska, it must be
    economically reasible, safe, reliable, regulated, and have a
    significant U.S. Coast Guard presence.
        The United States has a well-functioning Marine Transportation
    System (MTS), and it is at the core of the Nation's economic
    prosperity. The U.S. Coast Guard maintains the safety, security, and
    efficiency of the MTS, providing stable regulations that enables $5.4
    trillion in economic activity per year. While challenging, an extension
    and variation of the MTS could be established in America's Arctic. The
    USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook describes such an expansion that would
    require an adaptation of MTS management tools, as well as innovative
    policies and technologies that are Arctic-appropriate. This can only be
    accomplished with the support and partnership of public and private
    sector entities and would be a tangible, actionable step the U.S. can
    take to prepare for future opportunities.
        In preparation for greater U.S. commercial presence in the Arctic,
    the U.S. Coast Guard has taken steps toward improving navigational
    safety and environmental protection. A rare partnership with Russia has
    led to an agreement, entered into force one year ago, that establishes
    two-way shipping routes, promotes safe commerce, and takes into account
    subsistence patterns in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea. Additionally,
    the Memorandum on Ocean Mapping of the United States Exclusive Economic
    Zone and the Shoreline and Nearshore of Alaska \16\, issued on November
    19 of this year, provides encouraging steps towards expediting
    shoreline and nearshore mapping capabilities for Alaska and its Arctic
    region. This is a critical component of any future, integrated, U.S.
    Arctic strategy that considers our homeland security, national
    security, economic security, as well as social and political security
    in a dynamically changing landscape.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-
    ocean-mapping-united-states-exclusive-economic-zone-shoreline-
    nearshore-alaska/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The timing of the memorandum highlights how modern aids to
    navigation will be crucial in integrating the Arctic into the broader
    U.S. MTS and enhancing economic development. Less than 5 percent of the
    U.S. maritime Arctic is charted to modern international standards; we
    lack the basic information crucial to understanding our Arctic domain.
    Without robust maritime domain awareness (MDA), conducting safe and
    secure shipping for economic development remains a daunting challenge.
    As noted by the USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``MDA favorable to
    supporting economic growth and resource management requires information
    on vessels, crews, passengers and cargo carried (if applicable);
    pollution detection and tracking capabilities; weather and
    environmental observations, including ice reconnaissance; an assessment
    of living marine resources activity; and an assessment of human
    activity and infrastructure''.
        As noted, the U.S. Coast Guard's capabilities for MDA are stretched
    thin in the Arctic because there does not exist sufficient access to
    reliable, redundant, robust Internet connectivity. The result of which
    inhibits data gathering, information sharing between local, state, and
    Federal agencies and all facets of observational capabilities. This
    reality stifles commerce, SAR, national and homeland defense
    requirements, and limits Alaska communities to engage in state,
    national and international opportunities. Moreover, without reliable
    data gathering and dissemination, expansive and reliable infrastructure
    development and maintenance would be nearly impossible to realize.
        Recommendation: A comprehensive and appropriately funded ocean
    mapping strategy should be developed and executed to advance all facets
    of U.S. interests and include the development of an Arctic MTS.
    4. Connectivity
        There are many ways to describe connectivity in the Arctic context.
    We tend to think of connectivity as just an Internet connection, but we
    should focus on a broader application of connectivity--addressing both
    digital and physical infrastructure.
        As noted in my past testimonies, we do not have a digital or
    information divide in America's Arctic--we have a digital and
    information abyss. This abyss is not just a U.S. Coast Guard issue, but
    a real problem that jeopardizes our national and homeland security and
    one that must be met by the collective and integrated family of Federal
    agencies. To be clear, telecommunications and information
    infrastructure in the Arctic requires a coordinated and leveraged
    approach involving governance and operations expertise from local,
    state, and Federal entities.
        Closing this abyss in the Arctic, and specifically for the U.S.
    Coast Guard will require innovative solutions that maintain levels of
    flexibility and scalability, coupled with persistent public-private
    investment. Joint efforts with local communities, state agencies, and
    other Federal institutions--including scientific and research
    organizations--would result in more reliable communication solutions.
        These solutions should incorporate investments in, and funding for,
    ``ice-breaking ships, such as the Polar Security Cutter, aviation
    assets, unmanned or autonomous systems, and trained personnel'' capable
    of operating in the harsh and remote arctic environment, as stated in
    the 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook. If these investments are not made,
    the United States will continually fall behind other arctic nations. To
    date, the U.S. is the only Arctic State that has not made a comparable
    investment to these resources--it is also quickly being surpassed in
    this field by non-arctic states
        China's proclaimed ``Polar Silk Road'' is designed to ``facilitate
    connectivity and sustainable economic and social development of the
    Arctic''--by constructing and investing in infrastructure for arctic
    resource development, transportation hubs, and shipping routes.\17\
    Already, China has pursued investments in various Arctic nations'
    infrastructure. The ``near-arctic state'' owns approximately 40 percent
    stake in the Yamal 1 facility and is considering financing port
    facilities in Arkhangelsk (Russia)\18\ and Kirkenes (Norway).\19\ The
    China Communications Construction Company [CCCC] bid on a contract for
    the construction of three Greenland commercial airports, located in
    Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq, at a cost upwards of $550 million.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/
    content_281476026660336
    .htm
        \18\ https://www.globaltrademag.com/china-russia-collaborating-
    arctic-port/
        \19\ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029125.htm
        \20\ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/07/how-a-
    potential-chinese-built-airport-in-greenland-could-be-risky-for-a-
    vital-us-air-force-base/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The country's dynamic investment interests also range from
    financing research centers like the Northern Lights Research Facility
    in Iceland, to pursuing investments in undersea fiber-optic cables such
    as the Arctic Connect cable system.\21\ A CNA report estimates that
    China's proposed investments amounted to ``over $1.4 trillion in the
    economies of the Arctic nations (including Finland and Sweden)''
    between 2005 and 2017.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ https://www.capacitymedia.com/articles/3824070/cinia-moves-
    full-speed-ahead-with-arctic-connect
        \22\ https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia is also bolstering its dual-use Arctic assets. Their
    extensive lattice of ports, air bases, commercial hubs, a floating
    nuclear power plant off the Arctic coast City of Pevek, and SAR
    resources have been a component of civilian-government, as well as
    military activities, including recent tests of new weapons systems and
    increased troop deployments.
        Meanwhile, the U.S. does not have a major deep-water port along
    1,500 nautical miles of its Arctic coastline: from Dutch Harbor to
    Alaska's North Slope. As the Arctic Strategic Outlook states, ``the
    closest Coast Guard Air Station to the Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK.
    This is approximately 820 nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK--a
    distance comparable of that from Boston, MA to Miami, FL.''
        Without a viable deep-water port or string of ports--in the U.S.
    Arctic--commerce, SAR, and national security interests will not be met.
    The June 2019 National Defense Authorization Act includes
    ``requirements to locate and designate `one or more' U.S. strategic
    ports in the Arctic.'' The U.S. must recognize and invest in the
    potential for dual-use facilities and capabilities in Alaska, starting
    with a multi-use port.
        Of particular interest should be the development of a deep-water
    port along the Bering Strait. There have been numerous reports and
    recommendations made as to scale, scope, and location of such a port.
    Nome, Port Clarence, and other location options are all in need of
    review and final decision sooner rather than later. But in the spirit
    of leveraging and integrating U.S. national assets for the security of
    our nation, linking the development, construction, and complementary
    mission sets of future Arctic-related infrastructure seems the most
    prudent strategy.
        Therefore, the committee should continue to support a Bering
    Strait, dual-use port as well as an emerging interest in reconstituting
    and upgrading the former U.S. Naval base in Adak, in the Aleutian
    Islands. Here, an upgraded Naval installation would serve to secure and
    protect the Nation's maritime, homeland, national, and commercial
    security requirements, while providing a dual use port for the U.S.
    Coast Guard. The two port concepts are not mutually exclusive. Rather,
    I argue it is in the Nation's best interest to enhance and develop
    both.
        Combining and leveraging military, national and homeland security,
    and other Federal and state government capabilities and assets will
    better prepare the U.S. for our new Arctic, while requiring a
    reconceptualization of how the United States views its Arctic and the
    critical role the region will play in the Nation's future. Developing
    such a component of a more cohesive U.S. Arctic strategy is not only
    beneficial, but necessary for U.S. leadership in the region. The 2017
    U.S. National Security Strategy mentions the Arctic once, and the
    country has yet to put forward a document of integrated Arctic
    strategies, or guidelines for integration between various agencies such
    as DoD, DHS, DOE, and DOS.. Although there are seams of cooperation,
    for the most part, each entity carries out its own strategy in the
    Arctic (if it has one) even though cooperation is a key component in
    the region.
        Recommendation: Advance the development of a port, or preferably a
    string of ports, along the North Slope of Alaska, Bering Strait, and
    Aleutian Islands that will provide dual use capabilities to meet the
    needs of the U.S. Coast Guard, national and homeland security entities,
    as well as other federal, state, local, and commercial interests.
    Advance the development and implementation of enhanced, integrated
    Internet and communications connectivity throughout the region and
    leverage public-private partnerships where feasible.
        5. Communities
        The people of Alaska, and more specifically the Indigenous peoples
    of Alaska are on the vanguard of a changing, dynamic, shifting, melting
    landscape. For many Alaskan communities the land is their life, their
    identity, their culture, and the source for most of their food. Nearly
    three dozen Alaskan communities have been identified by a 2009 Army
    Corps of Engineers report \23\ as being seriously threatened by
    environmental change and in need of relocation; this number is likely
    to grow. These communities are stressed on many levels yet they have
    adapted and thrived in this landscape for thousands of years. But the
    changes are happening too fast, too dramatically, and too unpredictably
    to navigate with any certainty.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/
    AlaskaBaselineErosion
    AssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Alaskan communities live at the forefront of environmental change,
    and the consequential risks that develop as a result of those changes.
    For them, an oil spill represents not just an environmental disaster
    but a threat to the stability of the ecosystems upon which their
    livelihoods, food security, and cultural identities depend. Continued
    engagement between the USCG and Alaskan communities should be applauded
    and expanded through the Marine Safety Task Force initiative. The MSTF
    conducted safety and environmental protection missions (surveying and
    checking, for instance, bulk fuel storage facilities--a life sustaining
    resource throughout remote Alaska) in over 100 Alaskan communities.
        The USCG is a leader in the Arctic, and their Coast Guard Cities
    and Communities program--five of which are in Alaska (though none in
    the Arctic region)--demonstrate their enduring commitment to
    cultivating relationships with communities with whom they collaborate.
    As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, ``the Coast Guard has been
    part of life in many Arctic communities for over 150 years as a
    neighbor, law enforcer, and life saver. Alaskan Natives have been
    partners and teachers, and we continue to benefit from their
    traditional wisdom and deep understanding of the Arctic domain.''
    Traditional Knowledge will play a key role in the future viability of
    these communities and will be important components of the U.S. Coast
    Guard's formulation of strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
    making.
        Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard should further utilize
    Traditional Knowledge and expertise to enhance their missions
    throughout Alaska. Traditional Knowledge will remain an important
    component of a larger strategy to understand better a changing
    landscape and inform both strategies and tactics to address these
    changes; including the importance of community-based physical
    monitoring and detection.
    6. Cooperation
        Continued participation and leadership by the U.S. in the Arctic
    Council, the Arctic Economic Council, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum
    is in our Nation's interest. These entities shape and reinforce a
    rules-based governance structure for the Arctic Ocean and indeed, the
    eight Arctic nations. They help to identify and conduct research and
    policy measures that strive to understand, mitigate, and address the
    impacts of a warming Arctic. The Arctic region is the only place, aside
    from the International Space Station, where the U.S. and Russia have
    maintained long-term cooperation, even in times of high tension.
    Because the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable has been on hold since
    the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum plays a
    more important role in maintaining open lines of communication between
    the U.S. and Russia.
        It is important that on shared security concerns related to oil
    spill response, protecting marine living resources, shipping, and SAR,
    the U.S. continues to work collaboratively with Russia and the other
    Arctic nations. As previously noted, the U.S. and Russia have worked
    successfully together to create IMO-approved, designated shipping
    routes through the Bering Strait in order to reduce risk to mariners.
        There were two incidents of concern this past summer in the Russian
    Arctic which underscore the need for the U.S. to work proactively and
    collaboratively with allies and partners to minimize risk of nuclear
    contamination, identify knowledge gaps, and develop a greater capacity
    to minimize harm from any event involving radioactive material. Such
    incidents also make clear the need for open lines of communication.
        Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard must continue to shape and
    lead the efforts of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, play a key role in
    the future of the Arctic Economic Council as it encourages continued,
    sustained, and responsible development of the North, and engage where
    appropriate with the United States Senior Arctic Official and her
    Arctic Council team at this consensus driven, Arctic focus
    organization.
    7. Competition
        The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes U.S. adversaries seek to weaken
    ``the international order that underpins a free and open maritime
    domain.'' It also states that ``clear and universally held norms,
    coupled with transparency, can dissipate'' the ``cloud of ambiguity''
    under which they are operating.
        When exploring the competition dynamic in the Arctic, specifically
    between the United States, China, and Russia, we should consider each
    country's broader approach and national mindset. In the Arctic, and
    elsewhere, China plays the game ``Go;'' characterized by a long-term,
    methodical strategy to exert influence and power in a calculated
    fashion. Meanwhile, Russia plays the game ``Survivor;'' attempting to
    sustain an economy crippled by western sanctions and a declining
    population with an overreliance on natural resource development for
    both domestic and international markets. Finally, the United States
    plays the game ``Twister;'' attempting to balance its global leadership
    roles in the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea,
    Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere, against the challenges
    presented by a new, accessible Arctic Ocean.
        Military ties between Russia and China are growing stronger in the
    Arctic. This is evidenced by an increase in joint military exercises
    between the two countries including the Russia-based Tsentr-2019
    exercise. The exercise included approximately 128,000 military
    personnel and helped further develop China, India, and Pakistan's
    operational capabilities in the high North region. The exercise
    included 1,600 troops under PLA Western Theater Command.\24\ This
    reality should be considered in juxtaposition to the 2018 NATO Trident
    Juncture Exercise that included 50,000 NATO troops and partners; 20,000
    of which were American troops.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ ``Chinese troops participate in Tsentr-2019 drills'' China
    Military. http://eng.chinamil
    .com.cn/view/2019-09/25/content_9635742.htm
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In October of this year, Russian Federation President Vladimir
    Putin announced Russia would assist China in developing a missile
    defense system to strengthen China's ability to counter attacks from
    cruise and ballistic missiles.\25\ In mid-November of this year, Russia
    used a MiG-31K interceptor jet to test the Kinzhal (Dagger) hypersonic
    missile for the first time in the Arctic; the Finnish Government along
    with other Scandinavian countries took particular note of the test.\26\
    And as is well documented, Russia continues to revitalize Cold War
    bases while developing new assets along the NSR from Franz Joseph Land
    to Wrangell Island; the latter a virtual stone's throw from Alaska.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ Guardian staff and agencies. ``Russia is helping China build a
    missile defence system, Putin says.'' The Guardian. October 3, 2019.
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/04/russia-is-helping-china-
    build-a-missile-defence-system-putin-says
        \26\ Devitt, Polina. ``Russia tests hypersonic missile in Arctic--
    TASS cites sources.'' Reuters. November 30, 2019. https://
    www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-missiles/russia-tests-hyper
    sonic-missile-in-arctic-tass-cites-sources-idUSKBN1Y40BB
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Arctic Strategic Outlook notes the lack of ``investments in
    ice-capable surface maritime security assets'' on the part of the U.S.
    that ``limits the ability of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to
    credibly uphold sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the Arctic.
    It also diminishes America's position as the partner of choice for
    allies and partner nations.'' As a reminder, China, the self-declared
    ``Near-Arctic State'' currently has four icebreakers and is developing
    two new vessels, one of which is planned to be nuclear powered. Russia
    has 53 operational icebreakers, with six under construction and 12 more
    planned. One of these will be a weaponized icebreaker with an
    electronic warfare platform, an anti-aircraft missile system, cruise
    missiles, and a helicopter launch pad.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ Perisic, Kyle. ``Russia reveals weaponized icebreaker it plans
    to use to control the Arctic.'' American Military News. November 1,
    2019. https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/11/russia-reveals-
    weaponized-icebreaker-it-plans-to-use-to-control-the-arctic/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Presence, both operational and strategic, is critical to U.S. power
    projection in the Arctic region. The USCG is the critical, visible
    leader in this area as they try to meet their mission to counter new
    regional competition from both Russia and China. Yet, the U.S. Coast
    Guard has only one medium icebreaker The Healy that services the Arctic
    region, and one heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, which is already well
    past its expected service life and serves our Nation's Antarctic
    mission sets.
        The Arctic Strategic Outlook highlights the need for six polar
    security cutters to more effectively carry out its array of current and
    future mission sets in Polar Regions. The recommendation from the
    National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)
    report on acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers noted the
    ``USCG should follow an acquisition strategy that includes block buy
    contracting with a fixed price incentive fee contract and take other
    measures to ensure best value for investment of public funds.'' \28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ ``Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling
    the Nation's Needs'' https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW07/20170725/
    106311/HHRG-115-PW07-20170725-SD004.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A block buy would likely make the contracts more competitive and
    lucrative, while bringing into service quicker these national assets.
    As noted in the Arctic Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard requires the
    most advanced information possible on the Arctic environment and plays
    a critical role in the Nation's scientific effort at both ends of the
    globe. Therefore, it is imperative that all Polar Security Cutter fleet
    designs include structural and functional capabilities to support both
    Arctic and Antarctic research efforts as informed by the scientific
    community.
        Recommendation: Fully fund and commission 6 Polar Security Cutters.
    In addition, and to further leverage national assets in the Arctic,
    support the creation and full funding of the proposed Ted Stevens
    Arctic Center for Security Studies, which would be the first DoD
    Regional Center in the Arctic. This Center would address specific
    matters relevant to Arctic security and our Nation's defense, as well
    as leverage and complement the outstanding work conducted by the
    existing DHS supported Arctic Domain Awareness Center; a DHS Center of
    Excellence, in Anchorage, Alaska. The two Arctic-focused entities would
    be visible, tangible, and valuable steps toward a more ``whole of
    government'' approach to the Arctic as well as critical tools to inform
    and guide a more comprehensive Arctic strategy with necessary policy,
    training, and presence.
        And as a final note on the changing Arctic and our national
    security, a convergence of the Arctic's 7 Cs currently unfolding in
    Greenland. Greenland is experiencing the dramatic effects of global
    warming (in fact, just this week, a recent study in Nature noted the
    Greenland ice sheet's total losses nearly doubled each decade to an
    average of 254 billion tons lost annually--an increase that puts
    another six million people globally at risk of flooding); the promise
    of significant stores of strategic minerals and fisheries; foreign
    interest in developing ports and complementary infrastructure; a desire
    to be connected to regional and global markets; communities trying to
    adapt to a rapidly changing landscape; an active and important voice,
    in partnership with the Kingdom of Denmark, in the Arctic's future; and
    is situated in one of the most geographically, geopolitically, and
    geostrategically important locations in the world. In short, Greenland
    is emblematic of the emerged Arctic.
    Conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, I often hear the Arctic referred to as an emerging
    issue. Mr. Chairman, the Arctic has emerged. As I have explained, it is
    no longer an isolated or remote region; rather it is an integrated
    component of our global political, economic, social, physical, and
    security landscape. The region is experiencing rapid and dynamic change
    and these seven unique drivers, the Arctic's 7Cs, help frame for this
    committee, and perhaps others, these pressing global issues in a way
    that can help to better understand and address our future Arctic.
        This testimony was shaped and informed with the input and
    assistance of my Wilson Center colleagues Mr. Jack Durkee, Ms. Marisol
    Maddox, and Ms. Bethany Johnson.

        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Mr. Sfraga. And I want
    to thank all the witnesses for their outstanding and
    informative testimony.
        I am pleased to have the Chairman of the Full Committee, of
    the Commerce Committee, and I think he would just like to say a
    few words on the importance of this topic as well.
        Mr. Chairman.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And also thank you
    to Senator Markey. You have both exercised great leadership in
    this area, and I look forward to working with you in the
    future.
        And I am glad to be here at today's hearing to evaluate the
    Coast Guard's strategic presence in the Arctic and its ability
    to meet current and future challenges in the region.
        Our next panel will include Admiral Ray, and I appreciate
    his leadership as Vice Commandant.
        The Coast Guard is continuously deployed around the world
    on all seven continents and in every ocean. The Coast Guard is
    also providing and operating the U.S. polar-capable fleet.
    Presently the Coast Guard operates one heavy icebreaker, the
    POLAR STAR, and one medium icebreaker, the Healy. During my
    visit to Alaska in August with Admiral Ray and Chairman
    Sullivan, I had the privilege of sailing aboard the HEALY while
    it was underway in the Arctic Ocean. However, the Coast Guard
    currently lacks the capability or capacity to assure access in
    the high latitudes.
        But help is on the way. We are finally building the first
    new U.S. polar icebreaker in over 2 decades, and I hope we are
    only getting started.
        My visit to Alaska also included a stop at Dutch Harbor,
    the closest U.S. deepwater port in the Arctic. Dutch Harbor is
    over 800 miles from the strategically important Bering Strait.
    I observed how a lack of critical port infrastructure in the
    Arctic significantly limits both the Coast Guard's response
    time and its operational capability in the region.
        Icebreaking capacity and infrastructure are just two of the
    many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic. We are
    hoping to address these and other challenges in the Coast Guard
    Authorization Act, legislation sponsored by Chairman Sullivan,
    which we are working on with our House delegates, and we hope
    we are seeing the finish line on that piece of legislation.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it was great
    having you and Admiral Ray in Alaska this summer. It was really
    a wonderful trip, and I know we will be able to talk about that
    more on the second panel.
        I am going to start the questioning here. You know, Mr.
    Sfraga, you talked about I think you said a digital or Internet
    abyss. I want to talk about what I mentioned in my opening
    statement, what the Chairman mentioned in his opening
    statement, which is essentially an infrastructure abyss. Again,
    my opening statement highlighted this idea that we really do
    not have any capability with regard to a strategic port. This
    is not a call for a giant Navy base or Coast Guard base. It is
    simply right now the ability to actually just have an
    icebreaker or a national security cutter or a Navy destroyer
    pull up to a port in America's Arctic. Right now, with the
    exception of Dutch Harbor and Anchorage, we cannot do that.
        Is that acceptable to you and should part of the DOD and
    Coast Guard plan not be to at least have what I have been
    calling a series of strategic Arctic ports in the region, which
    in the Lower 48, every community would find that to be a no-
    brainer? And yet, we still struggle with the Pentagon, with the
    Coast Guard on this issue of a strategic Arctic port that can
    just handle shipping. Can I get each of your views on that, how
    important it is, and whether or not you agree with what I just
    stated? We will start with you, Ms. Conley.
        Ms. Conley. Senator, we absolutely need a deepwater port in
    the American Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. At least one. I think several.
        Ms. Conley. I will start with one.
        Senator Sullivan. We have several on the East Coast. Right?
    Why would we not have it in the Arctic?
        Ms. Conley. Indeed. You know, let us think about how long
    it took us to get the polar security cutter. It took over a
    decade of talking and studying. We cannot wait 10 years for
    this infrastructure.
        But I think we have to do it in a smart way. We have to
    think about public-private partnerships. We have to do this
    efficiently.
        Senator Sullivan. Do we not need to do it quickly?
        Ms. Conley. Absolutely. This is why there has to be a
    dedicated Arctic security initiative or infrastructure budget
    that gives impetus, that sends strong messages to our private
    sector partners that there is sustained funding. We have to do
    this. We have to stop writing studies and reports that are not
    tethered to resources and an implementation plan. We cannot
    wait any longer for this.
        Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a thought on
    this issue of infrastructure?
        Ms. Goodman. Mr. Chairman, yes, I agree we should have a
    strategic port in the Arctic, and we should use this
    opportunity because we need the infrastructure in the Arctic
    also to understand--and amending Heather's very brilliant
    concept of an Arctic security initiative, it should have an
    environmental security component as well. And we should use it
    as a way to understand what it takes to build a resilient port,
    resilient to changing conditions, changing more rapidly than we
    expect in the region.
        Senator Sullivan. A great point. Excellent.
        Mr. Sfraga, infrastructure, a series of ports like we have
    on the East Coast.
        Dr. Sfraga. I agree, a string of ports. I think we need a
    string of ports from the North Slope along the Bering Strait,
    use our Adak Naval Base----
        Senator Sullivan. I mean, what good is an icebreaker and
    national security cutter if you cannot actually pull up in a
    port in the Arctic, which you cannot right now?
        Dr. Sfraga. Agreed, especially when we see increased
    traffic along the Bering Strait by Russia, China, and other
    nations. So to me a string of ports makes total sense. I think
    you need sort of a Manhattan Project for the Bering Strait for
    this string of ports. Let us resource them. They are all
    different. The North Slope needs something. The Bering Strait
    needs something. The Aleutians need something. And if you had
    one concerted effort funded, strategized. As Heather said, we
    have studied this over and over again. We kind of know what we
    need. I think it needs to be resourced, but one effort, DOD,
    DHS, Commerce, and come together and build the string of ports
    finally.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just very quickly because I do
    want to be efficient on our timing here. Ms. Conley, you have
    studied the National Security Strategy, the National Defense
    Strategy, which I think has very strong bipartisan support in
    the Congress. But can you describe how important the Arctic is
    to U.S. national security and how increasingly we are falling
    behind with regard to what the new National Security Strategy
    talks about, great power competition?
        Ms. Conley. Thank you, Senator. Yes. In many ways we
    understood the strategic imperative of the Arctic in the Second
    World War and, of course, during the cold war. And at the end
    of the cold war, we forgot. We absolutely let it atrophy. Of
    course, Russia did as well. But around the 2007-2008 period,
    Russia made a strategic decision to reconstitute in part its
    military footprint and put its budget, its ambitions, and its
    forward-looking policies in place. And a decade later, we are
    seeing the manifestation of that in increased nuclear exercises
    in the Arctic and combined operations.
        China discovered the strategic importance of the Arctic
    around the 2010-2011 time-frame, and they are bearing the
    fruits of their strategic ambitions.
        We continue to believe that we can just hold this
    minimalist position, do the bare minimum, and it is going to be
    OK. And I want to challenge that notion. We talk about great
    power competition in the National Security Strategy and the
    National Defense Strategy, but those documents are basically
    silent on the Arctic. And now that we have placed this in
    context, we have to put our actions behind our rhetoric. So
    whereas Secretary Pompeo laid out a great power competition
    framework, and then opening up our consulate in Nuuk is the
    only response to that, the message is that we are rhetorically
    interested in great power competition in the Arctic, but we are
    not interested in putting our budget where our mouth is.
        Senator Sullivan. I am just going to ask you one final yes
    or no on this. Again, I am going to turn this over to Senator
    Markey here.
        The Armed Services Committee on a provision I wrote
    required the Secretary of Defense to put forward an Arctic
    strategy. It was a good attempt. It needs to be much more
    fulsome. But they talked about we are going to protect our
    sovereignty by doing freedom of navigation operations in the
    Arctic.
        Does the U.S. military have the capability to do a freedom
    of navigation operation in the Arctic? Yes or no.
        Ms. Conley. No. Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard could
    do a freedom of navigation operation in the Arctic today.
        Senator Sullivan. That is good to know.
        Dr. Sfraga. No, sir.
        Ms. Goodman. No, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey.
        Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, let me just put it out there again that between 1992
    and 2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly one million square
    miles, larger than the entire area of Alaska. One million
    square miles. And the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the
    global average. So this is only going to accelerate and create
    an even greater number of issues that we have to deal with. And
    we are far behind in dealing with it.
        And all of it just comes back to the Oxford English
    Dictionary naming climate emergency as the 2019 word of the
    year. And they could have used the Arctic as the definition of
    the climate emergency, receding ice, raging wildfires, melting
    permafrost, endangered Arctic communities, and the global
    climate system.
        Ms. Goodman, as you mentioned in your testimony, what
    happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Melting ice
    sheets are now the largest contributor to sea level rise, and
    the slowdown of the Gulf Stream due to warmer Arctic waters is
    raising sea levels in the northeast United States. Scientists
    have also linked warmer Arctic temperatures to more extreme
    winter weather in the eastern United States.
        Ms. Goodman, how does climate change in the Arctic affect
    the Coast Guard's operations, facilities, and readiness in
    States in more southern latitudes on the Atlantic, including
    Massachusetts?
        Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Senator Markey.
        The Coast Guard now has to respond more frequently to these
    extreme weather events, more search and rescue missions all
    around our coastline, as well as we see fish stocks moving. So
    there are more challenges in managing fisheries today. We see
    the Coast Guard deployed ever more frequently for many
    different missions. The Homeland Security mission essentially
    has become quite intense, and the Coast Guard has had to not
    only up its game in the Arctic, but it has to up its game along
    our eastern seaboard as well.
        And the challenge is, as you both know, it is often under-
    resourced to do its job. As we often say in the Department of
    Defense, a strategy without budget is hallucination.
        Senator Markey. Exactly.
        And again, the strategy has to be to deal with climate
    change. That is what the Coast Guard is living every single
    day, and if their resources are not increased, then their
    capacity to deal with the consequences----
        Ms. Goodman. Right. And they are really on the front lines
    of dealing with the changing climate along our coast every day.
        Senator Markey. Absolutely.
        The Coast Guard must do all it can to defend its facilities
    against the effects of climate change. As I mentioned in my
    opening statement, I worked to include language in this year's
    Coast Guard reauthorization that asked the Coast Guard to
    assess which of its installations are the most vulnerable to
    climate change as the rest of the Department of Defense has
    done. The Department of Defense report found that climate
    change threatens more than two-thirds of our operational
    critical military installations.
        Ms. Goodman, what can we learn from the Department of
    Defense reports as we work to make sure the Coast Guard is
    climate-ready in the Arctic and at all of its facilities?
        Ms. Goodman. Well, Senator Markey, we need to climate-proof
    our bases and our installations, Coast Guard as well as
    military. The NDAA this year includes several requirements, one
    for military installation resilience planning, which I think is
    important and could also be potentially applied to the Coast
    Guard. It also updates the Uniform Facilities Code to enable
    defense facilities to be better prepared for extreme weather
    events, flooding, sea level rise, wildfires, and other climate
    conditions. And again, that provision may potentially also
    apply to the Coast Guard. Again, it will have to be resourced,
    but it will enable us to help provide resilient infrastructure
    for the future.
        Senator Markey. You organized a group of admirals and
    generals to speak out on this issue in 2007, and I actually had
    General Gordon Sullivan be the first witness before a hearing
    which I conducted in April 2007 on this issue warning of the
    danger of climate change to our national security.
        The numbers of admirals and generals in that group are now
    exponentially larger. Are they not?
        Ms. Goodman. Oh, many. We have over 60 members who have
    participated.
        Senator Markey. Admirals and generals.
        Ms. Goodman. Admirals and generals, including Coast Guard
    officers, and still very active today.
        Senator Markey. So the issue is not getting smaller. It is
    getting larger largely because it is unaddressed in terms of
    what the consequences will be.
        Ms. Goodman. Right. As we have said with respect to Coast
    Guard operations as well, this issue and climate change across
    our spectrum of operations and facilities still deserves more
    attention and more investment.
        Senator Markey. Does the Coast Guard need additional data
    or resources to update its facilities to make them more
    resilient to climate change?
        Ms. Goodman. Absolutely it needs more data, but there are
    things that it can do now with the data it has as it plans for
    future operations.
        Senator Markey. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I just want to
    ask Mr. Sfraga a quick question, which is that the BP oil spill
    was the worst environmental disaster in American history,
    resulting in the death of 11 crew members and injuring 17
    others. Oil spewed into the ocean for nearly 3 months despite
    the presence of helicopters and a variety of vessels able to
    respond. We also had reliable weather and ocean current data
    and a robust communications network. None of that is the case
    in the Arctic.
        Mr. Sfraga, can you describe what an oil spill would look
    like in the Arctic and our current capacity to respond?
        Dr. Sfraga. Senator Markey, I can describe it by saying not
    good. We simply do not have the assets and the resources for an
    oil spill or an LNG tanker disaster in the Arctic. Like you
    mentioned, the Gulf of Mexico, private corporations, public
    entities, personal vessels--this was an all-out onslaught to
    not only save lives but also to protect the environment.
        We have none of that in the Arctic. And that is why I think
    you need to combine the search and rescue, spill mitigation,
    and emergency clauses within a port or facilities along the
    Arctic. We do not know how oil, ice, and the Arctic Ocean
    interact. To have a devastating oil spill in the Arctic in the
    ice would be monumental not just to contain it, but what it
    would do for the environment. So we do not have, A, the basic
    research to really give us a good idea of what would happen in
    that domain. Two, we do not have the assets. As Senator
    Sullivan pointed out, you have got over 800 miles from Kodiak
    to the North Slope of Alaska just to get there to see what
    might happen.
        So I am quite concerned. That keeps me up at night, as well
    as a disaster with a potential cruise ship. So it would not be
    like we had in the Gulf of Mexico. It would be 180 degrees from
    that.
        Senator Markey. And it could wind up being days before an
    inadequate response could be put in place.
        Dr. Sfraga. That is correct, sir, and that is why I think
    having ports is far more than just hooking up ships. Having
    ports provides us capacity and capabilities needed to protect
    the environment for any development from the U.S. side, but
    also we must think about the increased traffic coming from the
    northern sea route down the Bering Strait that has nothing to
    do with our government at all.
        Senator Markey. And the damage to the Arctic ecosystem
    could be----
        Dr. Sfraga. Significant.
        Senator Markey. Catastrophic.
        Dr. Sfraga. Yes. And what is problematic there, one final
    note, is I would say it would be catastrophic. But in reality,
    the basic research--we still cannot give you a definitive
    answer on that, but I would say that it would not be good.
        Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
        Dr. Sfraga. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. One final question. Admiral Ray is going
    to be testifying next, so we are going to bring him up.
        You know, I mentioned we are starting to build the first
    icebreaker. I think everybody recognizes this is important and
    the final progress that we are making. The NDAA actually has
    the authorization and schedule for six. The Coast Guard
    announced that the first couple of these would be home-ported
    in Seattle. I know Senator Cantwell is very pleased with that,
    which makes sense because that is where the current icebreakers
    are.
        I would just ask, as we talk about ports and
    infrastructure, you want, obviously, these capabilities near
    where the action is. Let us assume we build six on time in the
    next 5 to 6 years. Does it not make sense to home-port the next
    three in the part of America that is the Arctic? Would you
    agree with that, each panelist?
        Ms. Conley. Senator Sullivan, I think we have to remind
    ourselves that these are also for Antarctica. In fact, that
    heavy polar security cutter is likely going to spend most of
    its time in Antarctica.
        Senator Sullivan. No offense to my colleague from Florida,
    but you would not want to home-port these in Miami.
        Ms. Conley. No. But I am just saying I think sometimes we
    think these are only for the Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I actually think, to be perfectly
    honest, the Coast Guard is the Coast Guard. And their mission--
    I know they have an Antarctica mission, but I think we need to
    take care of our home first, our coasts first. So, this is a
    discussion I have been having with the Coast Guard about
    prioritization. This is not, as you mentioned, when there is
    not a lot of activity in the Arctic. There is great power
    competition in the Arctic. There is a lot going on in the
    Arctic. The Coast Guard needs to recognize that. We are going
    to talk to Admiral Ray about that. So, the Antarctic in my view
    is an important mission, but it certainly does not rise to the
    importance of protecting America, which is their primary
    mission.
        Ms. Conley. I do not disagree. And this is why we have the
    need for six icebreakers. If we consider, as Sherri noted, that
    Russia is weaponizing icebreakers, that China is now proposing
    to build a nuclear-powered icebreaker which can maintain long-
    term presence potentially in the Arctic, we need a more
    significant presence closer----
        Senator Sullivan. So just to answer my question, would it
    make sense to home-port the additional ones in the place in
    America where they are needed?
        Ms. Conley. They need to be closer to the Arctic and to the
    economic activity there, which means they have to be in the
    American Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Ms. Goodman, do you have a view on that?
        Ms. Goodman. Senator, I do think we need to be able to
    home-port at least one or more of the new icebreakers in the
    American Arctic.
        I also want to stress that I think that continuing presence
    in Antarctica is important for America's global leadership.
        Senator Sullivan. No. I am not saying it is not important.
    I do not want to be misinterpreted there. I agree with you. I
    just think we need the capability to guard our own shores, and
    that is why we need at least six. And I think we need more than
    six, but six is good.
        Mr. Sfraga, do you have a view on that?
        Dr. Sfraga. Senator, yes, I think six is a good start. I do
    think at least a couple of these icebreakers need to be home-
    ported in the State of Alaska or near to the Arctic. I do think
    it should be in the State of Alaska. How that pans out is up to
    the Coast Guard.
        Senator Sullivan. No. It is actually not just up to the
    Coast Guard. It is the point of hearing here. It is up to
    Congress working with the Coast Guard.
        Dr. Sfraga. Six is a good start. How they are allocated is
    up to Congress. But I do think at least two of those need to be
    in the Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Well, listen, you have been a great panel, and we are going
    to have additional questions for all of you I am sure. Thank
    you for your leadership. Thank you for your outstanding
    testimony. And all of you have really, really played a great
    role, and I think getting the Congress and the Executive Branch
    to finally wake up to our challenges you are seeing is very
    bipartisan. It is bipartisan not just on this committee, but on
    the Armed Services Committee. But your leadership and your
    expertise is going to be continued to be needed by the
    Congress, by the Coast Guard, by the military. And I really
    want to thank you for the outstanding service you have provided
    our Nation already and the testimony today. We anticipate
    having the three of you back in front of these committees on a
    very regular basis, as long as I am around this place. So thank
    you very much.
        Ms. Conley. We call ourselves the ``Arctic Musketeers.'' So
    you have got the three of us.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. We will excuse you and now have the Vice
    Commandant of the Coast Guard for our next witness.
        [Pause.]
        Senator Sullivan. Admiral Ray, welcome, sir. The committee
    is very, very pleased to have you here. You have 5 minutes for
    your opening statement, and we, of course, will submit for the
    record a longer written statement, if you would like that, as
    well. The floor is yours.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, VICE COMMANDANT, UNITED
                           STATES COAST GUARD

        Admiral Ray. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman. I
    appreciate you having me here. Ranking Member Markey, good to
    see you as well, sir. Thank you for having me.
        And thanks for forming up the Coast Guard Caucus, sir. I
    look forward to working with you moving forward.
        Senator Sullivan. About time. Right? I mean, holy cow. But
    we are glad to have done it.
        Admiral Ray. Far be it for me to tell you how to form up
    caucuses, but I am proud you got one.
        Senator Sullivan. And it is very bipartisan. A lot of
    Senators already have joined.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today,
    and I ask that my written testimony be submitted for the
    record.
        Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        On behalf of Admiral Schultz and the entire service, I
    would like to thank this subcommittee for your unwavering
    support for our Coast Guard. Today I will discuss our strategy
    to uphold American sovereignty and advance national security
    interests and promote economic prosperity in the rapidly
    evolving Arctic.
        As you state in your opening statement, sir, for over 150
    years, the Coast Guard has been America's primary maritime
    presence in the Arctic, and we have seen the impact of
    increased accessibility, human activity, and geostrategic
    competition.
        This past August, Senator Wicker and I had the opportunity
    to witness the increased accessibility firsthand, as we flew 40
    miles north of Utqiagvick to land aboard Healy as she operated
    in an open Arctic Ocean. As a result of the opening of this new
    ocean, commercial opportunities abound from energy production,
    surging cruise industry, expanded environmental tourism,
    centuries old subsistence activities are being altered.
    Hundreds of fishermen must go further away from traditional
    fishing and hunting grounds. Illegal unreported and unregulated
    fishing is increasingly a threat with the obvious potential to
    negatively impact Alaska seafood industries and the U.S.
    economy.
        As we have seen many times in history, when there are new
    opportunities for resources, the potential for competition
    increases. Nations seek to shape the security environment,
    expand their influence, and advance their own interests. As has
    been stated several times, Russia has the world's largest
    icebreaker fleet, and more importantly, they use this, expand
    their infrastructure to bolster military activities, grow their
    economic investments along the northern sea route. From that
    position of strength, they have the ability to exert influence
    and compete pretty effectively below the level of armed
    conflict.
        As has been stated, China, a non-Arctic state, is also
    investing heavily in the region. This year they took delivery
    of their first domestically built icebreaker, and they are a
    shipbuilding country. And they are currently designing a
    nuclear-powered icebreaker. China is also pursuing economic
    investments, oil, gas, and rare earth minerals, as was
    mentioned by the earlier panel. And I think their encroachment
    on the Arctic is emblematic of what they have done all over the
    world. Left unchecked, their actions risk fracturing the
    Arctic's kind of rules-based governance.
        To address these expanding operational challenges and
    threats to national security, Coast Guard, as has been stated,
    released our Arctic Strategic Outlook last April. It builds on
    successes we had from our 2013 strategy and highlights the
    value that the Coast Guard delivers as part of a whole-of-
    government solution to our Arctic challenges.
        Outlook reaffirms our commitment to American leadership in
    the Arctic, establishes three lines of effort, as the Senator
    said, will enhance our capability to operate effectively in the
    Arctic domain, strengthen rules-based order, innovate and adapt
    to promote resiliency and prosperity.
        As has been stated many times by the earlier panel, we must
    maintain a physical presence in the Arctic. It begins with
    icebreakers, and I thank this subcommittee, sir, for all your
    support for that. It has been a long haul, but we are a lot
    better off than we were just a couple of years ago.
        Our presence includes operations in communities, ports, and
    waters across the region. Through Arctic Shield, it is scalable
    year-round. And just as we have in many other missions in other
    parts of the world, we will use our extensive authorities and
    unique capabilities to continue to cultivate a global coalition
    of like-minded partners. We will work with Federal, State, and
    local communities to strengthen interoperability and secure
    U.S. sovereign rights.
        In the past year, the Coast Guard cooperated with the
    Department of Defense in the Arctic expeditionary capabilities
    exercise the Senator referred to in both Seward and Adak. We
    participated in a mass rescue exercise with the Arctic Coast
    Guard Forum in Finland, and we hosted the North Atlantic Coast
    Guard Forum.
        In addition to physical presence on the seas to meet the
    needs of the nation, we must have reliable technical
    capabilities that include communications, maritime domain
    awareness, and navigation. After Senator Wicker and I left
    Healy in August, they sailed north of 75 degree north, and they
    were off the grid for 27 days, no comms, except for a sat
    phone. Addressing limited factors require a whole-of-
    government.
        So I am confident with the support of this committee, we
    will rise to these challenges.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant,
                           United States Coast Guard
    Introduction
        Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the U.S. Coast
    Guard's strategy and operations to safeguard national security
    interests and advance safe, secure, and environmentally responsible
    maritime activity in the Arctic Region.
        The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867,
    when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. Since that time,
    the state of affairs in the Arctic has evolved significantly. The
    environment is experiencing unprecedented levels of change. The ice is
    receding; storms are increasing in frequency and magnitude; the coast
    is eroding; and permafrost is thawing. Alaskan residents are striving
    to sustain their culture and way of life while residents and non-
    residents alike are pursuing emerging opportunities. For the Coast
    Guard, the demand signal for our services is expanding along with the
    operational environment, exacerbating the tyranny of distance of the
    region. The types of commercial activity are morphing, from oil and gas
    exploration a few years ago to the recent surge in cruise ship activity
    and expanding environmental tourism. These rapid changes in types and
    location of activity, along with the changes in the physical
    environment, magnify the challenges in executing the Service's mission
    to advance safety, security, sovereign rights, and stewardship across
    the Arctic.
        Simultaneously, the geopolitical environment is rapidly changing as
    state and non-state actors seek to advance their own interests in the
    Arctic. Allies, partners, and competitors alike increasingly compete
    for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage. The National Defense
    Strategy describes a world no longer at either peace or war but rather
    one of enduring great power competition.
        Shaping and influencing this continuum requires a mixture of
    diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence,
    and law enforcement efforts to achieve and sustain national strategic
    objectives. As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law
    enforcement authorities, combined with membership in the intelligence
    community, the Coast Guard moves seamlessly to bridge the layers in
    this competition continuum. Specifically, the Coast Guard's
    constabulary function and broad authorities serve as a beneficial
    bridge between the hard-power lethality of the Defense Department and
    soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. This strategic
    versatility is well suited for operating in ambiguous environments
    requiring a flexible blend of diplomatic, information, military,
    economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of
    statecraft. This makes the Coast Guard a unique agency to cultivate
    strong international relationships and better build a coalition of
    Arctic partners based on mutual interests and values that strengthen
    regional stability and enhance prosperity across the region. In
    collaboration with our Federal partners, the ultimate goal is for the
    Coast Guard to be the preferred, transparent partner in the Arctic.
        Our recently published 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms the
    Service's commitment to American leadership in the region through
    partnership, unity of effort, and continuous innovation, and
    establishes three lines of effort to achieve long-term success. First,
    we will enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic
    domain; second, we will strengthen the rules-based order; and third, we
    will innovate and adapt to promote resilience and foster prosperity.
    Our strategy aligns with the Nation's needs and interests to secure the
    Arctic, which requires significant investment and a whole-of-government
    approach across multiple Departments, agencies, and Services. The Coast
    Guard's value in this whole of government approach is our experience,
    leadership, model behavior, and ability to compete below the level of
    armed conflict. Therefore, strengthening the Coast Guard empowers the
    Nation to secure the Arctic against threats and shape the region as a
    safe, cooperative, and prosperous domain.
    National Security Interests in the Arctic Region
        The United States is an Arctic nation with extensive sovereign
    rights and responsibilities, and our national security interests in the
    Arctic are significant, in part due to the reemergence of great power
    competition in the region. As access to the region evolves, many Arctic
    and non-Arctic nations aspire to assert or expand their role in
    governing the region; the dynamic operational environment continues to
    present risks and opportunities for a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
    To safeguard our national interests, the United States must plan for a
    robust, year-round maritime presence commensurate with the expanding
    interest in the Arctic's strategic value, in its natural resources, and
    in its potential as a transportation corridor between Asia, Europe, and
    North America. If we are not vigilant and proactive, other non-Arctic
    nations will outpace us in assuring their strategic interests in the
    Arctic in ways that may adversely affect the United States' interests.
        Actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic states shape the
    security environment and geopolitical stability of the region. In
    particular, our two near-peer competitors, Russia and China, are
    demonstrably intent on exploiting the maritime domain to advance their
    interests. Twenty percent of Russia's landmass is north of the Arctic
    Circle, and both onshore and offshore resource (minerals, oil, and gas)
    development is crucial to the Russian economy. Russia is also advancing
    the growth of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for trans-Arctic shipping
    and other commercial opportunities.
        The NSR continues to set new shipping records, last year reaching
    19.7 million tons of goods transported along the route. Natural
    resource extraction is the main contributor to these increases,
    predominantly oil and gas shipments from their Yamal facilities. If
    their energy projections come to fruition, then transport volumes on
    the NSR could reach 100 million tons per year by 2030.
        From a military perspective, Russia's long Arctic coastline, once
    stripped of sea ice in the future, will be both vulnerable, and able to
    support naval fleets readily deployable between the Atlantic and
    Pacific. The Russian government is currently rebuilding and expanding
    military bases that had previously fallen into disuse. These renewed
    capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop
    deployments, domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue response.
    Additionally, Russia has the world's largest number of icebreakers.
    With over 50 icebreakers that include four operational, nuclear-powered
    heavy icebreakers, and plans to build an additional seven nuclear
    powered icebreakers, Russia maintains the capabilities, capacities,
    experienced crews, and infrastructure necessary to operate and surge
    into the Arctic year-round.
        China has recently taken an active role in Arctic development,
    pursuing economic investments with every Arctic nation in key strategic
    areas, such as oil and gas development, ports, railways, and
    infrastructure. It has purchased numerous resource deposits throughout
    the region, including uranium, energy, and rare-earth elements. With
    the release of their Arctic Policy paper in January 2018, China
    declared itself a nation intrinsically tied to the Arctic, and signaled
    their intention to play a security and governance role in the region.
    China has directed Chinese companies and government agencies to become
    more involved in Arctic affairs, and is rapidly developing its ability
    to operate in the region. This year, China launched its first home-
    built icebreaker and has begun designing an even more powerful and
    potentially nuclear-powered Polar icebreaker expected to have twice the
    icebreaking capability of its newest vessel. With three icebreakers
    China will have greater access than the United States currently has to
    the Arctic, its ports, and its resources. The concern with Chinese
    activities in the Arctic is the potential to disrupt the cooperation
    and stability in the region. Around the globe, China uses coercion,
    influence operations, debt-trap diplomacy, and implied military threats
    to persuade other states to heed China's strategic agenda. China views
    the Arctic as a component of its One Belt, One Road initiative,
    recently dubbed the Polar Silk Road. China's ambitions and outreach are
    fraught with risk, often times diminishing the sovereignty of states
    and fracturing the rules-based governance currently employed in the
    region.
        National security interests extend to the local level as well. For
    example, economic, environmental, and human security and stewardship
    are also linked to the changes and expanding activity in the Arctic.
    Significant increases in natural resource extraction in the U.S. Arctic
    have not yet materialized, but industries continue to explore
    opportunities so that they are positioned to leverage economic
    prospects as they emerge. Current industry growth in the Arctic
    includes a significant increase in cruise tourism and transpolar
    flights, which could potentially increase search and rescue missions
    and risk to the pristine environment. Additionally, we have observed
    steady but measured growth of shipping through the Bering Strait over
    the past ten years, across all sectors of industry. As the Arctic
    continues to experience longer and larger periods of reduced or ice-
    free conditions, commercial interest and exploitation will grow. A
    recent U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System report
    projects that by 2030, vessel traffic through the Bering Strait could
    increase to more than 370 transits, which is roughly three times the
    2008 traffic levels. This potential rise will increase the demand for
    the Coast Guard to monitor, protect, and regulate increased maritime
    activity, such as de-conflicting shipping corridors in U.S. waters with
    subsistence hunting and fishing communities.
        Food security is another significant issue for Arctic residents and
    our Nation as a whole. The Bering Sea provides more than half of the
    wild-caught fish and shellfish in the United States, and the wildlife
    for subsistence harvesting. Alaska is ranked seventh in the world in
    global fish exporters, and their seafood industry accounts for almost
    $6 billion a year in total economic activity. Additionally,
    approximately 70 percent of the U.S. Arctic population relies on
    subsistence hunting and fishing for survival, the vast majority of
    which comes from the sea. Thus, changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean
    are increasing the risk to food security for the globe, from shipping
    that disrupts migration patterns, to increased risk of pollution
    incidents, to growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as
    fish stocks migrate.
        As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic region,
    challenges associated with legal and illicit activity plus state and
    non-state actors are likely to increase. In the face of this
    competition continuum, the Coast Guard's value proposition is even more
    critical in the Arctic and around the globe. The Service upholds
    freedom of the seas and the rules-based order by setting and enforcing
    standards of behavior in the maritime domain.
    Balancing National Security Interests Across the Globe
        The Coast Guard possesses a broad suite of authorities and
    capabilities unique from the other armed services and traditional
    instruments of national defense. As previously noted, the Coast Guard's
    authorities expand beyond traditional military and intelligence roles,
    to include law enforcement and regulatory roles. This combination,
    along with a multitude of steady-state international bilateral
    agreements, offers a distinct compliment to conventional defense forces
    in the ongoing struggle to compete below the level of armed conflict.
        Coast Guard international engagements complement more traditional
    U.S. military posturing. Regular and persistent Coast Guard presence
    and peaceful engagements support regional stability while positioning
    the United States as the global maritime security partner of choice.
    The Coast Guard operates around the world in accordance with over 60
    international bilateral agreements, to include 11 with Oceania nations.
        Furthermore, the Service is also party to and, in many cases,
    serves in a leading capacity within a variety of multilateral forums
    including the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, Arctic Coast Guard
    Forum, South East Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the
    Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. This combination of
    access, authorities, and international acceptance, offers an
    indispensable opportunity of regional support and stability in this new
    era of competing influence.
        As the world's preeminent coast guard, the U.S. Coast Guard is
    logically the most suited to build partner capacity in maritime law
    enforcement, search and rescue, marine safety, fisheries management and
    conservation--all of which are traditional Coast Guard missions. These
    missions, incidentally, are in growing demand across the globe.
    Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, in particular, is a
    priority issue impacting global stability, in the Atlantic, across the
    Pacific, and even in Antarctica, where many economies heavily depend on
    local fish stocks as a primary source of protein and personal income.
        The Service, through its internationally recognized maritime law
    enforcement expertise and a multitude of bilateral and related ship
    rider agreements, offers viable options to augment partner nation law
    enforcement capacity to patrol their respective exclusive economic
    zones. These efforts are essential to preserving, protecting, and
    defending critical regional and migratory fish stock sustainability and
    economic vitality while simultaneously countering the malign influence
    and predatory practices of globally-spread powers such as China.
    The Coast Guard in Alaska and the Arctic Region
        The Coast Guard has been an active leader in the Arctic for over
    150 years. Our latest 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms our
    commitment to American leadership in the region and articulates the
    ends, ways, and means to promote and safeguard national security in the
    Arctic. This includes waging a campaign for safety, sovereign rights,
    and stewardship through cooperation, addressing competition below the
    level of conflict, and preparing for conflict should it arise. The
    following highlights some of the initiatives that have particular
    impacts on our national and international security, but these
    activities must be part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach
    to security in the Arctic.
    Strategic Leadership
        As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to
    expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is
    working collaboratively through international bodies to address the
    emerging challenges and opportunities in the region. One example is our
    support to the Arctic Council, which is a high-level international
    forum focused primarily on environmental protection and sustainable
    development issues in the Arctic region. The Council is composed of the
    eight Arctic nations, six Arctic indigenous groups, observer nations
    (including China), and non-governmental organizations that have
    observer status. The Coast Guard plays a significant role in supporting
    our Nation's existing engagement in Arctic Council activities through
    representation on two standing working groups--Emergency Prevention,
    Preparedness & Response (EPPR), and Protection of the Arctic Marine
    Environment (PAME).
        Under the EPPR working group, the Coast Guard leads the U.S.
    Government delegation and serves as Chair of the Marine Environmental
    Response Experts Group. Within PAME, the Coast Guard participates in
    the Shipping Experts Group where we support projects such as mitigation
    of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by
    vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also served on the Council's
    Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation and has been active in other
    task forces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue
    Agreement, the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and
    the 2015 Framework for Oil Pollution Prevention.
        The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other
    international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization
    (IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and
    adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
    (Polar Code) to cover the design, construction, equipment, operational,
    training, and environmental protection matters relevant to ships
    operating in the Polar regions. In 2017, the Coast Guard completed a
    rulemaking process to issue Polar Ship Certificates to U.S. vessels. We
    also developed and promulgated guidance to industry and our Captains-
    of-the-Port on how to ensure compliance with the Polar Code.
        Additionally, in November 2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with
    the Russian Federation to jointly develop and submit a proposal to the
    IMO to establish a system of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and
    Bering Sea. The Coast Guard also submitted an associated proposal to
    establish ``Areas to be Avoided'' in three environmentally sensitive
    areas. The objective was to advance the maritime transportation system
    in the region; promote the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
    conflict the commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence
    activities. The IMO adopted these measures at the 99th session of its
    Maritime Safety Committee, and the provisions entered into force in
    December 2018. These are but two examples of the Coast Guard being
    proactive in addressing emerging international and domestic maritime
    concerns in the Arctic.
        Last, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) is a bridge between
    diplomacy and operations. Formally established in October 2015, the
    ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of our Arctic strategy as well
    as the objectives of the Arctic Council. It is a unique, action-
    oriented maritime governance forum where the Coast Guard and our peer
    agencies from the other seven Arctic nations strengthen relationships,
    identify lessons learned, share best practices, carry out exercises,
    conduct combined operations, and coordinate emergency response
    missions. In April 2019, the ACGF conducted its second live exercise,
    POLARIS, which incorporated six ships and five aircraft from the ACGF
    member nations to respond to a simulated cruise ship in distress near
    Finland. The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined
    operations with the eight ACGF nations and highlights the criticality
    of coordination in maritime environmental response and the
    responsibility to ensure search and rescue resources are prepared to
    respond.
    Coast Guard Operations in the American Arctic
        Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
    and operational endeavor that provides a flexible, mobile, and scalable
    presence in the Arctic domain. In 2019, ARCTIC SHIELD (AS19) operations
    advanced national and Coast Guard strategic goals by aligning
    operations to mitigate real-world threats and leverage opportunities of
    strategic interest.
        To promote regional resilience and strengthen the maritime
    transportation system, the Coast Guard spearheaded a Marine Safety Task
    Force (MSTF) to conduct missions in the remote regions of their Area of
    Responsibility (AOR). Employing active and reserve surge personnel, the
    MSTF deployed to and engaged with 102 local communities to perform
    marine safety and marine environmental protection missions in villages
    not on the road system in the Arctic and Western Alaska. In addition to
    the summer surge support, a major contributor to the MSTF success has
    been its partnerships: the Civil Air Patrol transportation saved
    valuable resources and allowed personnel to transit more seamlessly
    between remote villages.
        The MSTF teams inspected over 60 percent of the region's 380
    regulated bulk oil facilities--a massive improvement over the prior
    annual average of 12 percent. Frequent inspections and proactive
    communications between the Coast Guard and facility operators will
    reduce the environmental risk to remote communities, help remote
    villages build capacity to respond, and set baselines for resilience
    and awareness as their environment rapidly changes.
        From July to October, MH-60 helicopters and crews deployed to
    Forward Operating Location Kotzebue and to Utqiagvik to conduct Coast
    Guard missions. This year, those helicopters completed 25 SAR cases,
    saved 13 lives, and assisted 28 others in an environment harsher than
    anywhere else the Coast Guard operates. Additionally these assets
    improved the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness in the Arctic and
    provided critical support to Federal and state personnel studying
    marine mammals. The Coast Guard partnered with DoD to leverage their
    strategic lift capabilities to deploy the assets to Kotzebue and the
    North Slope. Additionally, when the helicopters made the unplanned
    shift to Utqiagvik in September, the Coast Guard leveraged a
    longstanding positive partnership with the North Slope Borough to gain
    critical hanger space and logistical support on short notice. The Coast
    Guard would not have been able to complete its scheduled deployment to
    the Arctic and provide SAR coverage to North Slope mariners without the
    efforts and support from both. The Coast Guard departed Utqiagvik on
    October 31, 2019, but subsistence whale hunting is still ongoing today.
    This highlights the changing operational environment not only for the
    Coast Guard but also for Arctic residents. The lengthened ``shoulder''
    seasons of open water are beyond the period in which the Coast Guard
    has the resources to be present. Without the Coast Guard's highly
    mobile expeditionary forces, risk to mariners and coastal residents
    will escalate as maritime activity and traffic expands throughout the
    vast Arctic.
        AS19 exercised the Coast Guard's expeditionary capability by
    deploying a team from our Deployable Specialized Forces in California
    to conduct shore based law enforcement operations for the Kotzebue
    salmon state fishery that consists of nearly 100 small open skiffs. The
    enforcement operation reinforced several years of extensive marine
    prevention outreach, education, and training with these fishers.
    Planning and executing this mission highlighted the logistical and
    administrative challenges involved in supporting mission execution in
    the Arctic. This deployed law enforcement team provided 3 weeks of on-
    water presence and contacted 59 commercial fishing vessels and
    conducted 27 boardings with 5 voyage terminations. The operation
    bolstered community support from the mayor and local fishermen and
    rallied the community to improve their own safety and survivability at
    sea.
        In the absence of a consistent law enforcement presence in the
    region, the Coast Guard must develop and exercise expeditionary
    capability to project surface forces into the Arctic as the weather
    patterns are less predictable and maritime activity continues to
    evolve. This team's employment points to the urgent need to modernize
    assets, infrastructure, and platforms to effectively operate and
    provide presence in the Arctic.
        In 2020, operations will be supported with cutter, aircraft, and
    shoreside presence across Western and Northern Alaska. Specific
    activities include establishing a regional SAR response capability,
    conducting boardings to promote fishing vessel safety, facility and
    vessel inspections, gold dredge fleet inspections, maritime safety
    compliance enforcement, and ice rescue training.
        Planned activities also include testing and improving oil spill
    preparedness and response capabilities, conducting a commercial
    aircraft crash-related mass rescue exercise, and completing a joint
    maritime pollution contingency exercise with international partners.
    Year-round outreach efforts will continue to deliver education and
    awareness services to Arctic communities and outlying native villages.
        As presence equals influence, the Coast Guard must continue to
    evaluate options to advance our 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook as well
    as national interests in the region. The resurgence of nation-state
    competition over the past 5-10 years has coincided with the dramatic
    changes in the physical environment of the Arctic. This reality has
    elevated the Arctic's prominence as a strategically competitive space.
    The Coast Guard, and the Nation, have limited means to respond to,
    intercept, or collect information on vessels operating in the Arctic
    region.
    Icebreaking Capacity and Acquisition Status
        The ability for the United States to lead in the Arctic, both
    strategically and operationally, hinges on having the capabilities and
    capacity (presence) to protect our national sovereignty and safeguard
    our homeland security interests. The foundation of the Coast Guard's
    operational presence and influence is U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose
    is to provide assured, year-round access to the polar regions for
    executing national security missions within existing Coast Guard
    authorities. Our heavy icebreakers must be fully interoperable with
    DoD, international allies, and partners to optimally carry out national
    maritime homeland defense and homeland security missions. Thus, they
    will include sufficient space, weight, and power to conduct the full
    complement of multi-mission activities that support our Nation's
    current and future national security interests in the Arctic.
        The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified
    the need for six new polar icebreakers (at least three of which must be
    heavy) under the assumption that, in the future, the Coast Guard would
    be required to perform nine of its eleven statutory missions year-round
    in the Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United
    States Antarctic Program.
        In 2017, the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy
    completed an addendum to the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a
    broad overview of changes in the polar regions over the last seven
    years and to provide specific information for use in determining
    potential impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum
    provides confidence in the original findings and encourages the
    sustained reliance on its initial recommendations on the Nation's need
    for six icebreakers, three of which must be heavy icebreakers.
        The current Coast Guard icebreaker capacity is one heavy polar
    icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR--commissioned in 1976, and one medium
    icebreaker, CGC HEALY--commissioned in 2000. The primary differences
    between heavy and medium icebreakers are endurance and power. The Coast
    Guard considers a heavy icebreaker to be one that can break at least
    six feet of ice at a continuous speed of three knots and operate year-
    round in the Arctic, with the necessary systems and endurance to
    protect its crew in the event it has to ``winter-over'' in substantial
    ice conditions. Conversely, medium icebreakers are designed to operate
    seasonally in the Arctic.
        Due to the strong support of the Administration and Congress, the
    FY 2019 appropriation included full funding for the acquisition of our
    first Polar Security Cutter (PSC), and some long lead time materials
    for the second. This investment sends a strong message that the Nation
    is serious about our interests in the Arctic. In April of this year,
    the joint Coast Guard and Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) awarded
    VT Halter Marine Inc., of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price
    incentive (firm) contract for the detail design and construction of the
    lead PSC. We are as close as we have been in over 40 years to
    recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet, and continued investment will
    ensure we meet our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and
    dynamic polar regions.
        The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing
    heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with
    recapitalization. Construction on the first PSC is planned to begin in
    2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract includes
    financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR
    will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are
    delivered. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension project
    on POLAR STAR are already underway and initial work for this project
    will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from
    2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the
    vessel's service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.
    Shore Infrastructure
        In addition to having the necessary platforms to maintain our
    presence in the Arctic, the Coast Guard maintains a robust shore
    infrastructure laydown in Alaska. Shore facilities support all Coast
    Guard operations and personnel, as well as provide required
    infrastructure to support the needs of the Service's operational
    communities. Investments in shore infrastructure are critical to
    modernizing the Coast Guard and equipping our workforce with the
    facilities required to meet mission.
        With approximately 10 percent of the Coast Guard's real property
    inventory located in Alaska, the need for proper capital investments is
    all the more critical given the vast distances between shore facilities
    in that region. We are currently building waterfront facilities and
    shore infrastructure to support the delivery of six new Fast Response
    Cutters (FRC) and two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to Alaska, as well
    as the critical housing and family support facilities to accommodate
    the additional personnel and their families to operate and maintain
    these new assets. Additionally, over the last few years, we have built
    a new hangar to support forward deployed helicopters in Cold Bay, 20
    new housing units in Kodiak, as well as new facilities in Kodiak to
    enable our transition from C-130H to C-130J aircraft.
    Conclusion
        These efforts reaffirm our commitment to the region and our need
    for capabilities, capacity, and infrastructure to protect our national
    security and economic security interests in the region. Arctic
    operations must be balanced with competing demands for Coast Guard
    focus both at home and abroad. However, the Coast Guard must remain
    flexible and scalable to adapt to the rapidly evolving geopolitical and
    operational Arctic environments.
        Regardless, the Coast Guard will continue to lead across the
    National and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
    minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as an area of low
    tension, high attention, and great cooperation while preserving our
    national interests and rights. This leadership and collaboration across
    the national and international spectrum will enable us to reinforce
    positive opportunities and mitigate negative consequences in the Arctic
    region. Failing to increase and focus our Nation's leadership in the
    Arctic will result in other powerful nations taking the lead in a
    region with critical geostrategic value.
        We understand the significant investment required to secure the
    Arctic, and we appreciate and embrace the trust the Nation has placed
    in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I
    look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral. And I want to
    thank you again for coming up to Alaska with Chairman Wicker.
    It was a great visit. You have a lot of fans in Alaska. I can
    tell you that.
        And I do want to mention, as the Chairman and Ranking
    Member not just of this subcommittee, which has oversight of
    the Coast Guard, but also as the new leaders of the Coast Guard
    Caucus, we made a commitment. I certainly have. I will let
    Senator Markey speak for himself here. But on this issue of pay
    for the members of the Coast Guard, if there is another
    government shutdown, we have a provision currently in the Coast
    Guard bill that we are drafting, working with the House, very
    bipartisan that is in there that would prevent that from
    happening. So you would be treated--the great men and women of
    the Coast Guard--just like the men and women of the Army, Navy,
    Air Force, and Marines. We cannot allow that. If there is
    another government shutdown, we cannot allow that to happen.
        Now, I am hearing there is some resistance to this in parts
    of the Congress. I am not sure where, but we are committed to
    working with you and other members to make sure there is
    parity. Parity. Outrageous that last year members of the Coast
    Guard were doing operations all over the world shoulder to
    shoulder with marines and sailors, and the Coast Guard men and
    women were not getting paid. We need to fix that. We are
    committed to fixing that. It is in the bill right now, and I
    want to call out any colleagues of mine who are trying to block
    that because I think most Americans found that outrageous that
    your men and women were not getting paid.
        So I am assuming you support that provision.
        Admiral Ray. If I may, sir, since last January when the
    government started back up after the 35-day shutdown, I have
    traveled from Puerto Rico to Alaska, from Boston to Houston,
    and every place I meet with Coasties--every place, without
    fail--they say, Admiral, what are you doing because young
    Coasties think I can do anything? And I quickly let them know
    it requires a change in law. What are you doing to ensure that
    that does not happen again? And they understand it. They are
    smart and they get it when I explain to them how the process
    works.
        But the thing I care about over the long haul is in the
    short term, it is a readiness issue. When I got people worrying
    about that, they are not worrying about the dangerous work they
    are doing day in and day out. And then over the long haul, the
    young people that serve in the Coast Guard that raise their
    right hand--they are making decisions. They can serve in the
    Marine Corps, in the Army, the Air Force, and they are choosing
    to serve in our Coast Guard, and I do not want them to think
    that the Coast Guard is less of an armed service and we are
    going to do a less job of taking care of them and their
    families.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to work with you on
    that, but we might need you to work some of our colleagues over
    who are resisting that, which I think is not appropriate. And I
    do not know where the resistance is coming from but evidently
    it is out there.
        I want to follow up on a question that I mentioned. We are
    making progress on the icebreakers. I asked a series of
    questions of our last panel just with regard to the state of
    not just infrastructure but Coast Guard assets. We are
    committed--this committee is committed--to the very broad-based
    recapitalization effort that is ongoing with the Coast Guard,
    more ships, better ships, more technologically advanced ships
    and aircraft.
        But would you agree--and I know it is a longer-term
    decision that the Congress and the Coast Guard has to make, but
    assuming we are able to get on budget or even faster six polar
    security cutters and medium cutters like the Healy, that they
    should be home-ported near where the Arctic is. The Coast Guard
    has already announced the Seattle basing, which given that
    there is currently cutters or icebreakers there, you can see
    how that would make sense. But moving forward, thinking about
    our strategic interests, thinking about the time it takes for
    an icebreaker to get from Seattle to the Arctic, 8 days or
    more, I know you cannot commit, but do you not think as you are
    looking strategically, assuming you had the resources, that
    that would make sense?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, I want to thank you for your support for
    home ports in general, for assets as we have looked forward
    with our fast response cutters moving up across Alaska and
    striking that balance between being close to the mission and
    being in places where we can maintain the assets and take care
    of our families that come along with them.
        So to answer your question, yes, sir. This is part of a
    holistic analysis. If we look at mission effectiveness, the
    ability to sustain the assets, and the ability to sustain the
    families of the people that are sailing and working on them. So
    we look forward to working, as we move forward, with you.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just a more direct question.
    You saw the wonderful people in Dutch Harbor. In Alaska, that
    is the number one fishing port in the nation, 10 years running,
    given the amount of seafood that is harvested from Alaskan
    waters. And the Coast Guard personnel station there do
    tremendous work. When you and I were there with the Chairman,
    we saw what great work they do and how strongly they are
    supported by the community in that very busy port.
        As we discussed, the Coast Guard members are required to
    complete their tour unaccompanied. That community has great
    schools, an increasing medical clinic with good capability. I
    think they would be warmly welcomed if the Coast Guard took a
    look at being able to bring their families with them on
    assignment. I know you got a bit of a polite earful when you
    were with me and Chairman Wicker on that issue.
        Have you been able to take a look at that or do you want to
    get back to me on the record for that question, which I know
    you probably expected me to ask you?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, we are committed to looking at that in
    the upcoming assignment, not this assignment season, but as we
    shape up our billets for this coming year in 2020. So I love
    Dutch Harbor, and there is a lot of people that do.
        Senator Sullivan. Me too. By the way, the Coast Guard does
    too. All the members out there love it.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. But we are meeting mission right now
    with the way we are doing it, sir. And it is not just a--I
    mean, we are meeting mission, sending folks out there for 1
    year, and the guys and gals that go out there and do the work
    that they do--they are integrated into the community quickly
    and doing it. I can understand the community--their desire to
    have the Coasties become a more integral part of their
    community because of the kind of young folks that we send out
    there. We are going to look at this issue and see if there are
    ways we can get there from here.
        We have got other places, as you know, in our service where
    we send people, single, because there are challenges with
    regard to, as you mentioned already, medical or schools or
    other things. Some of those may not apply in Dutch, but we have
    to look at the big picture.
        So we are going to look at that. I do not have the answer
    yet. When I got it, I will get to you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Markey.
        Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
        I am just going to come back to oil spills, if I may, sir.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Markey. They are extremely challenging to clean up
    in icy conditions because oil gets trapped under ice or can
    travel upwards through small holes in porous ice. Therefore, in
    addition to the immediate response to the oil spill, oil will
    need to be cleaned up once the ice melts or travels to the top
    of the ice flows.
        In the 2019 Strategic Outlook, the Coast Guard acknowledges
    shortfalls in its ability to respond to oil spills in the
    Arctic, but is not specific about what those shortfalls are.
        Admiral Ray, can you give us some examples of those
    shortfalls and how the Coast Guard is working to overcome them?
        Admiral Ray. If I could go in reverse order, sir, I will
    talk about what we are doing to overcome it and then talk about
    the shortfalls, if that is acceptable, Senator.
        So the oil spill challenge we have in the Arctic--you got
    to address it from prevention to response. So on the
    prevention, on the very high-end strategic end, we have done
    several things recently specifically to address this.
        One, we are kind of the drivers of the polar code for
    vessels operating up in the Arctic region. We have led the
    nation's effort at the International Maritime Organization. So
    what that does is makes ships less likely to cause an oil
    spill. We have one of the few relationships with Russia on this
    with regard to the boundary in the Bering Strait between our
    countries where we would work together to ensure that. And in
    fact, we have done that creating a port access route study to
    keep ships separated going through the Bering Strait. So on the
    prevention side, we are working it.
        With regard to responding, we have a series of exercises
    every year that work at both the national level and all the way
    down to the village level where we will go with the local
    village people, open the container that has got the pre-
    positioned boom, drag it out, make sure it is in good shape. So
    we are working at the tactical level. So from the top to the
    end.
        And every summer--there is not a secret weapon for oil in
    ice yet that we have found. And every summer for the last
    decade, we have done research and development either onboard
    Coast Guard Healy when she is up there or in some other
    independent fashion with various ways to get oil out of ice,
    underneath ice, on top of ice. We are working with the Alaska
    Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence up in the
    University of Alaska at Fairbanks to put a UAV under the ice
    this winter to study this problem. So we are working at it
    hard. We do not have any ironclad solutions.
        And then the problem, Senator, is the same thing that
    challenges most operations in Alaska. It is time, distance,
    weather. Unless you have got a vessel poised, stationed every
    so many miles, which is just not sustainable, that is the
    biggest challenge. It is the tyranny of distance and that.
        But there is also scientific challenges, as has been
    mentioned by our esteemed panel members, and we are working to
    get after that.
        Senator Markey. And I am, obviously, very concerned about
    this. Today is actually the fourth anniversary of the signing
    of the Paris Climate Agreement, just 4 years ago today. And a
    lot of it is in recognition of what is happening up in the
    Arctic because it has consequences for the entire planet,
    especially that ice cap on Greenland. That is the largest ice
    cube imaginable. If it goes into the water, it is going to be
    catastrophic, upwards of 10 to 20 feet of sea rise. And it is
    happening at a very rapid rate, and it is much worse today than
    it was 4 years ago, and it is much worse today than when we
    began actually discussing this issue years ago.
        So we can see the consequences as well. The Coast Guard's
    2019 Strategic Outlook notes that fish stocks are shifting
    northward in response to warmer ocean temperatures in the
    Arctic creating new fishery enforcement challenges and illegal
    fishing presents one of the most significant law enforcement
    missions in the Arctic region. In August, the U.S. agreed to a
    moratorium on fishing in the high Arctic seas along with
    Canada, the European Union, and Russia. There are currently no
    commercial fisheries in the Arctic high seas because most of
    the region is covered by ice year around, but that is rapidly
    changing.
        So, Admiral, how does the Coast Guard currently partner
    with existing organizations and communities to monitor shifting
    fish stocks, marine mammals, and other living marine resources
    in the Arctic?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
        We are very active at the national level with NOAA in
    understanding fish stocks and understanding the changes to what
    is happening both in the weather in that area and with regard
    to the migration of the species. We work with NOAA as an
    enforcement arm. They do not have the capability to get
    offshore and enforce fisheries laws. And we have been doing
    that for many years.
        In the Alaska region, we work with the State troopers
    extensively, provide transportation for them. We work with them
    inside close to shore. And then we do independent operations on
    the high seas in the Bering Sea and up in the Arctic. Right
    now, as you say, there is no authorized fishing north of 64-ish
    I think is the latitude that we do not fish north of.
        But the point is that we are latched up with our
    interagency team. We are following the science. When the
    Senator and I were in Alaska at Nome, we had a NMFS scientist
    there. In the dirt of the parking lot in the Nome harbor, it
    was the best description I have had of the changing water
    temperature, what is happening with the Pollack stocks. And she
    drew a line in the sand. She told us what was happening with
    the fish stocks. So they are moving north, and we have got to
    be able to get up there and do enforcement there. And we intend
    to be there.
        Senator Markey. Yes. The cod of Massachusetts--they are
    moving north. The lobster are moving north. They need cold
    water. And we are seeing it dramatically along our coastline.
        The moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic high
    seas will be reconsidered in 16 years. It can take more than 10
    years to procure Coast Guard vessels that can withstand Arctic
    ice conditions.
        Admiral Ray, would the Coast Guard be ready for enforcement
    activity should the moratorium be lifted?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, our plan for--when you hear us talk about
    6-3-1, when we talk about recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet,
    we are talking about we need six polar icebreakers altogether.
    And three of them at least have to be heavy. And the essence of
    that, the underlying assumption is that we want access to the
    Arctic year-round. Right now, we do not have the capacity or
    the capability to do that. But in the future, our intent is to
    have access year-round.
        One of the reasons we call them polar security cutters--
    icebreakers are just a means to an end. We are not up there to
    break ice. We are up there to get through ice to get to where
    we need to do our mission. And so that is literally what we
    will do with those.
        So to answer your question, I think in 10 years, given the
    pace that we are on with regard to building out, if we keep the
    funding steady, we are supposed to launch the first polar
    security cutter in 2024, and with one coming each year after
    that. If we stay steady with our funding, sir, we have got a
    good chance of being ready for that.
        Senator Markey. And one final question. If there was an oil
    spill and it was Russia or China that was responsible, what is
    their capacity to respond to an oil spill?
        Admiral Ray. I will have to get back to you on their
    specific capacity. I know that we exercise with the Russians.
    They have actually been to Juneau in the last few months, and
    we have been over there. And so we do exercises, table-tops in
    a lot of cases, exercises with regard to oil spills at sea in
    that boundary area, that seam between our nations? waters. So I
    do not know the specifics of their spill response equipment,
    but my assumption, given that we are exercising with them, they
    got some.
        Senator Markey. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Senator Markey, thanks. It is an
    important point because all of these issues, infrastructure,
    assets, are related to everything that we have been talking
    about, including to be ready for any kind of environmental
    spill or ship collision, as the previous panel had talked
    about. And again, the capacity that we expect in the Lower 48
    and pretty much have just does not exist in the Arctic.
    Everybody recognizes that. The previous panel made it clear
    that the National Defense Strategy, the new Arctic DOD strategy
    says we should be doing freedom of navigation operations. That
    is the strategy. We do not have that capability to do that
    right now with the Navy or the Coast Guard.
        Senator Markey. May I just say just in conclusion, I agree
    with the Chairman on pay for the Coast Guard?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Markey. Just 100 percent in agreement. There is
    absolutely no justification for not including the Coast Guard.
    You are vital to our national security. You are vital to
    protecting our citizens. And it is only getting more dangerous
    out there because of climate change, because of these weather
    conditions that are absolutely getting more extreme on an
    ongoing basis, more exposure to risk to these young men and
    women. And they should be paid equally with the other branches.
        Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me go a little deeper, Admiral, on
    one of the capabilities that you highlighted in your testimony
    again that we lack in the Arctic and we just take for granted
    in the rest of the country, and that is on communications
    capabilities.
        What are the current command and control communications
    limitations for the Coast Guard operating in the high north,
    and what should we, the Congress, be doing about that? What is
    the Coast Guard doing about that? Again, I think most people
    recognize that, wait a minute, there is a part of America,
    Alaska, where you have essentially no comms. Our military, our
    Coast Guard--that is unacceptable. I agree that is
    unacceptable. How do we close that gap?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, in the last few months, we have been
    talking with industry. As you know, last year we had a research
    and development project where we launched two cube sats, so low
    earth orbit sats, and they were in a polar orbit ellipse. And
    they were specifically for us, and we were using them. Those
    particular cube sats were used to provide a capability to
    detect an emergency signal. So if somebody had an EPIRB north
    over the horizon where we would not hear it from the North
    Slope there--and unfortunately--it was not very high-end
    project anyway--they tumbled. Both the satellites did. We got
    data off of one of them, and it showed that this is viable.
        Since then, I have been engaged with industry and the
    people that are a lot more dialed in on this than I am in the
    service, and we believe there is an opportunity to get more of
    those low earth orbit satellites launched that have the right
    orbit to service the polar region. I think that is the way
    ahead, and multiple of those because they are not super
    expensive. They are becoming--I have been told by people in
    industry that that is becoming. So I think moving in that
    direction, getting some support for that--currently we do not
    have a project for that, but getting in that direction is the
    way to go.
        As to what we are doing right now, we are doing what we
    have been doing for many years. We are using HF radios that
    have a long range. If the atmospherics are right, you can talk
    quite a ways, but you are not going to get any sort of data or
    anything like that. This is voice communications. This is what
    we are doing right now.
        Senator Sullivan. So is there things that we should be
    doing working with the Coast Guard in this committee to close
    that gap? It seems like it is a need for all the reasons we
    have talked about, the safety in particular, whether it is for
    the ship or whether it is on rescues or whether it is to help
    with some kind of environmental response, fishermen at sea. Is
    there a plan that the Coast Guard has that this committee can
    help make sure gets either in the bill or in appropriations?
        Admiral Ray. We do not have one that is to the level of
    specificity with regard to being ready for appropriations now,
    sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, let us look at working on that
    together.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I think it is important.
        Let me go even a little bit more specific. You know, the
    Alaska delegation recently sent a letter to the Commandant
    urging him to prioritize the repair of the radio towers that
    relate to I think it is the Rescue 21, distress comms signal.
    As you know, since this summer, there have been numerous radio
    towers across the Gulf of Alaska that have been non-
    operational. Particularly for our fishermen who are on the
    water and rely on the Coast Guard, if they are in distress,
    that lack of complete coverage that is existing is again
    something that I think most of the rest of the country would
    not tolerate.
        What is the Coast Guard doing to cover this gap? This is
    obviously not as complicated as the issue on the high north.
    This is more getting the communication infrastructure back to
    an operational status, including these radio towers that have
    become non-operational across the Gulf of Alaska.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, Senator.
        As you know, I spent 5 years flying search and rescue in
    Alaska----
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
        Admiral Ray [continuing]. Especially in southeast which is
    where most of these sites are because they are hidden behind
    mountains and in Kodiak as well.
        So the fundamental challenge here is twofold. It is the
    microwave system that is required to relay the signals, and it
    is power generation. That is the fundamental issue. So we are
    getting after that. And I have been tracking this. Literally
    three times a week I personally pull up the status of these
    sites. And we are going to take some risk in other areas to
    apply more funds to get after this power generation problem
    because if you get good power generation at these sites, they
    are going to work.
        Senator Sullivan. But the reason some of them have not been
    operational is primarily the power generation?
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. That is 80 percent of the problem.
    They are in very remote locations in the mountains, and there
    is a short window to work on them. And if they go down starting
    now in December, it could be a while. But we are going to apply
    some more funds to this.
        And then second, we just changed contractors. We got rid of
    the contractor who was providing the day-to-day maintenance for
    them. This just happened last week or 2 days ago. And so I am
    convinced that the new provider--and there is one in the State
    of Alaska, and they cover the entire region. And as you know,
    there are 33 sites. So this requires just like all things in
    Alaska--it is a logistics challenge. I am not making excuses.
    So I am confident these folks are going to get after it on the
    short term, and then we are going to apply some resources to
    get up the power generation and in the long run pull that left.
    Our response to you was longer, and we want to pull it to the
    left.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, listen, if there are resources that
    you need, I think that is the kind of issue that I am confident
    that all members of this committee would recognize the
    importance of this and fund the resources. It would not be an
    ask of a dramatic increase in resources. But as you know, this
    is vital to keep our fishermen safe who often are in seas that
    can be very dangerous. And having the Coast Guard there and the
    robust communications systems is critical. Again, you know that
    from firsthand experience flying in some of that difficult
    weather. So thank you for that. I appreciate the fact that you
    are focused on that very, very regularly. We just need to take
    action to make sure those non-operational sites are getting up
    so the fishermen in my State are safe. And I think that we all
    recognize that that is important.
        Let me ask another issue with regard to the broader Coast
    Guard Arctic strategy. And I do want to commend the Coast Guard
    with regard to its focus on this. I have publicly stated that
    one of my frustrations has been that the other military
    services have seemed to be slow to the awakening of our
    national security challenges, economic challenges,
    environmental challenges in the Arctic. And I do not levy that
    criticism at the Coast Guard. I believe that you recognize it.
    The Commandant certainly does. You have been operating in that
    part of the world for decades, if not centuries.
        But when you put out the strategy, what is the kind of gap
    between what you think we would need--we, not just the Coast
    Guard but the United States--to have a much more robust
    presence in the Arctic to safeguard our national security
    interests, our economic interests, our environmental interests,
    as I always like to remind people, the human interests? We have
    American citizens there. They happen to be my constituents.
    What we need in the shortfall between that and the resources to
    do that. Are there things that are not in the strategy because
    you do not think they would be resourced, or are there things
    in the strategy that we need as a Congress to address in terms
    of funding shortfalls?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you for the question, Senator.
        We have gotten after a part of it. And I do not put all of
    my eggs in the icebreaker basket because that is one tool of
    several.
        Senator Sullivan. It is important.
        Admiral Ray. It is super important.
        Senator Sullivan. And it is important that we are making
    progress.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Finally.
        Admiral Ray. You are doggone right. 43 years since we built
    the last one. It is time to get going. So thank you for that.
        Senator Sullivan. I could not agree more.
        Admiral Ray. And that is huge because that allows us to be
    mobile. Today's challenges are not going to be where tomorrow's
    challenges are. So that is what that asset gives us. And when
    you compare that with a shipboard helicopter, unmanned aerial
    system, you have got real capability that you can move around
    and have effect on whatever mission you are working. You can do
    that.
        As I have said before, I think reliable communications
    through the region--you know, it is not just communications for
    emergencies. This is day in, day out. You and I have seen this.
    It is just running the business of having a presence on the
    North Slope. That is significant I think.
        The maritime domain awareness is enabled. So we talked
    about communicating and using satellite technology to enable
    that. That also enables us to know who is out there, and we
    want to know who is out there. And it needs to be more than the
    radar on a ship because you can only cover so much ground with
    that. So I think that capability, that kind of sensor and that
    ISR capability in the skies there.
        You know, other than that, I think just the continued
    support for our operations money for our service--you know, we
    have been kind of flat-lined on this. And we surge Coast Guard
    assets from all over the country to come up there during Arctic
    Shield. We will have a mechanic working on H-60's whose family
    is in Clearwater, Florida, but she is up there working on a
    helicopter on the North Slope. And that is OK. We do that, but
    that is not a long-term strategy. We know we are going to be up
    there every year. We need to have the assets to grow--the
    operations and maintenance money to grow those people. So end
    strength--I think that is also helpful.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and I
    appreciate your outstanding testimony.
        In the NDAA right now and the conference report--I believe
    the House is going to be voting on this today, and then it will
    come over here starting today or next week--there was a
    provision. It was something that I and many other members were
    interested in, is this idea of a strategic Arctic port. And I
    highlighted this in my opening statement whereby there is not
    the port capability anywhere near the Bering Strait to bring in
    a large-scale national security cutter or an icebreaker, polar
    security cutter. And again, on the East Coast or the West Coast
    of the United States, this would be considered just
    unacceptable.
        So there is a provision that directs the Secretary of
    Defense and Homeland Security to look at this issue and say,
    hey, we need this infrastructure, particularly when you look at
    what the Russians are doing in their Arctic.
        What is your sense of the importance of having a port that
    can handle these larger scale Coast Guard and Navy vessels to
    protect our economic and national security interests in the
    region, not 1,200 nautical miles away from the region?
        Admiral Ray. Sir, there is no question that a deepwater
    port north of Dutch--and there are a few candidates that I am
    well aware of, but a deepwater north up there somewhere in the
    vicinity would benefit Coast Guard operations. No doubt about
    that.
        Senator Sullivan. So you think we need it.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Well, listen, Admiral, I think you and the previous panel--
    I want to thank you for your outstanding service. Please tell
    the men and women of the Coast Guard that this committee,
    certainly this subcommittee, are very appreciative of their
    hard work and sacrifice. And we will continue these series of
    hearings on the needs and capabilities of the Coast Guard.
        As we look to finish up the hearing, I will ask the
    witnesses both you, sir, and the previous panel that if there
    are any other questions from Senators on the Committee, that
    they will be submitting them in the next two weeks. And we ask
    that the written answers to these questions be written back to
    the Committee as soon as possible.
        I want to thank you again, Admiral, for your service and
    the previous panel for their outstanding testimony as well.
        And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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