[Senate Hearing 116-628]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 116-628

                   U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
                  SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
               PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 8, 2020

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
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                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                                 ------                                

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on December 8, 2020.................................     1
Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................     1
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     3
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    15
Statement of Senator Scott.......................................    17
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    19
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    21
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    25
Statement of Senator Lee.........................................    27

                               Witnesses

Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard........     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee, USAF (Retired), Executive 
  Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center, University of Alaska; 
  Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission..................    30
    Prepared statement...........................................    32
Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director, At-Sea Processors 
  Association....................................................    41
    Prepared statement...........................................    42
Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist, Woodwell Climate Research 
  Center.........................................................    45
    Prepared statement...........................................    47

 
                   U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
                    SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS
                    AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY
                             IN THE ARCTIC

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2020

                               U.S. Senate,
                          Subcommittee on Security,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Cruz, Lee, 
Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, and Blumenthal.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. This hearing will now come to order. I am 
pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses today as our 
subcommittee focuses on the capabilities of the United States 
Coast Guard for safeguarding our national interests in the 
Arctic region. We will be having two panels today. First, we 
are pleased to have the Vice Commandant of the United States 
Coast Guard, Admiral Charles Ray. He has been doing an 
outstanding job in his position.
    And then our second panel will be of experts. Major General 
Randy Kee who will be remote, as well as Stephanie Madsen, 
Executive Director, At-Sea Processors Association from Juneau, 
Alaska. And Dr. Jennifer Francis, also coming via remote means, 
is a Senior Scientist at the Woodwell Climate Research Center 
in Falmouth, Massachusetts. Last year, this subcommittee held a 
hearing that focused on the Arctic strategy released by the 
Coast Guard in April 2019. That strategy prioritizes three 
lines of effort, one of them being the need to enhance our 
capabilities for operating in the Arctic through persistent 
investments in infrastructure, assets, and personnel needed to 
close gaps in presence, particularly given our rivals in the 
Arctic--China and Russia--communications and domain awareness 
in this region of growing global focus.
    Today's hearing will focus on those needed investments in 
our Arctic capabilities, progress that has been made in 
obtaining them, and the vital work that still needs to be done. 
The Arctic has shifted from an area of cooperation to the next 
region of great power competition with our near, peer 
competitors, China and Russia, outpacing the United States in 
the development of ice capable vessels and investments into 
Arctic infrastructure. The U.S. only has two polar icebreakers 
and a fire aboard the HEALY this summer has put half of 
America's polar ice breaking fleet temporarily out of 
commission.
    As a result, the POLAR STAR is now America's only 
operational icebreaker, while Russia has approximately 54. This 
gap in capability creates space for Russia and China, which now 
has more icebreakers than we do, to exert maritime influence in 
the Arctic, which they are trying to do, and amplifies our 
existing vulnerabilities for vessel traffic, safety and 
security, maritime law enforcement, fisheries, resources 
management, search and rescue, and environmental response.
    We have seen Russia push all-in on controlling the Arctic. 
Russia has opened 16 deep water ports, 14 airfields, built 
Arctic military bases, and even formed a new Northern Arctic 
Command. In fact, Vladimir Putin has referred to the Northern 
Sea route as the new Suez Canal, which he says Russia intends 
to fully control. He has made major military investments to 
secure this route for Russia, and his Government has even 
threatened to sink foreign vessels that do not have a Russian 
pilot on board or a Russian escort vessel.
    In recent months, Russian provocation has only increased. 
The Russian navy conducted its largest war game exercise since 
the Cold War near Alaska. This exercise extended into the U.S. 
exclusive economic zone. Our commercial fishing fleet 
encountered a frightening situation in close proximity to a 
number of fishing vessels and directed them to immediately 
depart their legal fishing grounds. These were Russian 
warships, pictured here, and this graphic provided by the Coast 
Guard shows the locations clearly within the U.S. exclusive 
economic zone where our fleet was legally fishing when the 
Russian warships and aircraft, including submarines, pictured 
here above, ordered our fleet to leave the area.
    Without persistence--persistent U.S. presence in the 
Arctic, we risk leaving an opening for these types of 
aggressive actions to continue. Recognizing the importance of 
these critical gaps, Congress has already made steady progress 
toward authorizing needed investments. Currently, the closest 
U.S. deep water port to the Arctic is Dutch Harbor on Unalaska 
Island, which is 1,000 miles from the Arctic Circle, not very 
close. In May, the Senate committee on the Environment and 
Public Works, on which I sit, passed the America's Water and 
Infrastructure Act, advancing the long needed Arctic deep draft 
port at Nome, Nome, Alaska as the first in what we believe 
needs to be a series of strategic Arctic ports. That is a major 
step forward for our Nation and protecting America's interests 
in the Arctic. The port Nome will not only be a critical 
component for Arctic maritime transportation, it will serve as 
a staging area for search and rescue, pollution response, and 
security operations with the Coast Guard and the Navy.
    In June, the President weighed in on the importance of 
acquiring a polar security ice breaking fleet that can project 
persistent presence in the Arctic with the release of the 
President's memorandum on safeguarding U.S. national interests 
in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This Presidential memo 
adds weight to the efforts in Congress to authorize and fund 
new polar security cutters. Two years ago, I was able to 
authorize--get authorization in the NDAA for the construction 
of six polar class security cutters to start building our 
icebreaking fleet. We have followed up with the funds to build 
the first, and we are working on appropriations to secure the 
second, appropriation funding for the second polar class 
icebreaker.
    I am disappointed, however, in what I believe is the Coast 
Guard's lack of strategic vision for where to homeport these 
new icebreakers. While making sure there are budget imperatives 
and plans for grouping similar assets together in fewer 
locations for cost savings, I believe this is not something 
that should override the operational imperative to base Coast 
Guard resources and cutters close to where their mission is. 
That is what the President's memorandum asked for, particularly 
as the Arctic has emerged as a critical area for great power 
competition, and the ice breaking vessels we are building and 
will likely be--we will be leasing, need to be able to operate 
and be stationed near the Arctic or in the Arctic where the 
action is.
    I have just spoken to the National Security Adviser, 
Ambassador O'Brien, and I believe he shares similar views on 
these issues. These investments in our Arctic capabilities will 
help ensure that the United States does not cede any more 
ground in this strategic location. Without further investment 
in our polar capabilities, our adversaries influence will grow. 
And if that happens, we risk our ability to protect U.S. 
vessels, conducting commerce, to enforce international law, and 
to defeat threats to our National Security. With that, I want 
to thank our witnesses for participating in our hearing today 
to discuss this very important topic. I now want to recognize 
the Chairman of the Committee, to see if he has any opening 
statements, and then I will turn to Ranking Member Senator 
Markey. Chairman Wicker.

                STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    The Chairman. Well, thank you, Chairman Sullivan. And I 
think it is noteworthy that we are having a hearing on the 
Arctic, and it is about 62 degrees in this hearing room. I 
don't know how our capable leadership managed that, but I think 
it is very appropriate and maybe we need to have a hearing 
about the tropics next time, but in all seriousness, great to 
have Admiral Ray back with us and the other distinguished 
panel.
    And thank you, Chairman Sullivan, for your leadership on 
this important issue. Access to the Arctic's vast energy, 
mineral, fisheries, and other commercial resources is expanding 
and international competition for these assets is intensifying, 
as the Chair has just so ably stated. America's two nearest 
peer competitors, Russia and China, have both declared the 
region a national priority and have made corresponding 
investments. By contrast, U.S. investment in the Arctic 
infrastructure and capabilities has not kept up with our 
economic and National Security interests, and I want to be a 
teammate of our subcommittee Chair in rectifying that 
discrepancy.
    The U.S. Coast Guard is on the front lines of strategic 
security competition in the Arctic. The Coast Guard has 
operated the Arctic since 1867 when, through the foresight of 
Secretary of State William Seward, America purchased Alaska 
from Russia. The Coast Guard's diverse set of Arctic missions 
includes search and rescue, enforcing laws and treaties, 
environmental protection, facilitating commercial trade, and 
protecting National Security. The Coast Guard's icebreaker 
fleet acts as the Nation's principal tool to conduct many of 
these critical missions. And I have to stretch to call it a 
fleet. The current icebreaker fleet is well past its service 
life and in dire need of replacement.
    Long standing concerns with the icebreaking fleet size and 
age were underscored on August 18, 2020, when the Coast Guard 
cutter HEALY, a medium polar icebreaker, suffered an engine 
fire forcing the ship to return to her home port in Seattle. 
That fire has left the Coast Guard operating with a single 
icebreaker, the POLAR STAR, until the HEALY can be repaired. 
During a visit to Alaska hosted by the distinguished 
Subcommittee Chairman in August of last year, just before the 
fire, Admiral Ray and I flew out and landed on the HEALY in the 
Arctic. So I have witnessed firsthand the critical capabilities 
of this vessel and of its dedicated crew.
    The HEALY fire, combined with recent aggressive Russian 
naval exercises in the Arctic, demonstrates the need for more 
U.S. icebreakers. The Coast Guard will now have to stretch the 
service life of the POLAR STAR, the Nation's only heavy 
icebreaker until 2023, extending its lifetime to nearly 50 
years, well beyond the intended 30 years. In stark contrast to 
the American fleet, Russia currently has 4 heavy nuclear 
powered icebreakers and 11 medium icebreakers, with 3 more 
under construction and 11 additional icebreakers planned in the 
next decade. The Coast Guard has stated repeatedly that it 
requires at least three heavy and three medium polar 
icebreakers to fulfill its ice breaking mission.
    The Coast Guard has awarded a contract for the first three 
heavy polar security cutters, and we hope there will be more to 
come. And if I have anything to do with it, I want to be a 
teammate with our distinguished subcommittee Chairman in that 
regard. But in addition to new vessels, we need shoreside 
facilities, piers, and support personnel to sustain a fleet of 
polar security cutters. So we have our work cut out for us. I 
hope our witnesses will underscore the need to prioritize and 
accelerate the polar security cutter acquisition program. 
Icebreaking capacity and supporting infrastructure are just two 
of the many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic.
    On that visit to Alaska with Senator Sullivan, I spoke to 
the Coast Guard service members at Air Station Kodiak and 
aboard the Coast Guard cutter DOUGLAS MONROE about their role 
in protecting our ocean environment and marine life. The 
Commerce Committee is working to help the Coast Guard promote 
fisheries development and force our fisheries laws in respond 
to fisheries disasters. Alaska and my State of Mississippi may 
be thousands of miles apart, but we share a major interest in 
fisheries and the Coast Guard is protecting them every day.
    We hope to address these and other challenges in the Coast 
Guard Authorization Act, legislation co-sponsored again by our 
distinguished Subcommittee Chair Senator Sullivan, which we are 
optimistic will pass in the next few days. I look forward to 
this discussion. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I 
believe Senator Markey is having a bit of an issue getting on 
the video here. So we are going to----
    The Chairman. I think the equipment is frozen up.
    Senator Sullivan. We are going to go directly--we are going 
to go directly to Admiral Ray for his opening statement. And I 
do want to mention, Mr. Chairman, with you and the Admiral's 
help, right now, it is looking like the NDAA is going to have 
the Coast Guard Authorization Act. This has been a goal of mine 
since I got here to pair those up. I think it is a good 
precedent that hopefully won't be a one-time occurrence this 
year, but something that we can look at doing every year. And I 
know the Coast Guard has been supportive of that as well. So 
that is good news. Admiral Ray, you have been doing a fantastic 
job in your role, and I look forward to your testimony in 5 
minutes, oral testimony, and if you have a longer written 
statement, we would be glad to put that in for the record. 
Floor is yours, sir.

             STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, 
               VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Ray. Good afternoon, Chairman Sullivan, Chairman 
Wicker. Thank you for having me here. And before I get started, 
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Commandant and on behalf of all 
the men and women of the United States Coast Guard, we pass our 
sincere condolences as you mourn the passing of your dad.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you very much.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I want to thank you all for your 
unwavering support to our service and for this opportunity to 
update you on the Coast Guard's efforts to protect American 
sovereignty, promote economic prosperity, and expand American 
leadership across the Arctic. The rapidly changing physical, 
operational, and geostrategic Arctic environment is driving 
increased activity in the region and with it increased risk 
across the maritime sector.
    While our mission in the high latitudes have evolved since 
1867, our commitment to the region has not. We are leaning 
forward to address the safety and security of our Arctic 
residents and the Mariners who make their living there, home 
porting--by home porting new offshore patrol cutters, fast 
response cutters, investing in Alaska real estate 
infrastructure, and prioritizing our operations in the region. 
The Coast Guard is also deeply concerned about the rising 
strategic risk to our Nation as China and Russia compete for 
diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage in the Arctic. 
Both nations have publicly declared the Arctic a strategic 
priority and they continue to make significant investments to 
advance her own interests. Russia continues to invest heavily 
in icebreakers and Arctic infrastructure, better positioning 
themselves to shape the security and geopolitical environment 
in the region. They are focusing on developing the national 
resources, expanding their icebreaker fleet, and imposing 
strict governance on the Northern sea route.
    I am especially troubled by Russia's recent military 
exercises in the Bering Sea that the Senator referred to. In 
late August, they conducted a live fire exercise in an area 
that extended into the United States' exclusive economic zone, 
as is shown on the chart. Their irresponsible execution of this 
phase of their exercise created confusion and potentially 
unsafe interactions with American vessels legally fishing in 
our EEZ. Our long standing operational relationship with the 
Russians enabled us to, kind of through a red phone type 
scenario, cut through the red tape, and let them know of our 
concerns and what was going on that day.
    As you know, Senator, we sailed ALEX HALEY up there to 
investigate and provide awareness. However, I am disappointed 
that Russia chose to push the boundaries of responsible 
behavior in the Arctic and in doing so, put Americans at risk. 
China also aspires to assert influence across the Arctic, 
leveraging economic investments, and natural resources, and 
infrastructure, and expanding their icebreaking fleet. This 
summer, they launched the Xue Long 2, which operated in the 
high Arctic. China has announced plans for two additional 
icebreakers, threatening to outpace our icebreaker building 
program.
    The casualty, as Senator Wicker mentioned, a Coast Guard 
cutter HEALY this summer demonstrates our Nation's lack of 
capacity for icebreaking and emphasizes the critical importance 
of the Coast Guard's posed security cutter fleet. As was 
stated, we will begin construction of the post's security 
cutter in 2021 and it would be the first time we have done this 
in over 40 years. We have contracted with Halter Marine in 
Mississippi to design and buildup to three polar security 
cutters, and we appreciate the continued support from Congress 
and this committee, in particular, to build the next generation 
of assets.
    Our Coast Guard's Operation Arctic Shield continues to be 
the primary operational means of protecting and executing our 
sovereign rights and responsibilities in the U.S. Arctic. Our 
flexible expeditionary approach has never been more important. 
As Alaska cruises were canceled this summer due to the 
pandemic, we redirected resources to conduct additional patrols 
to monitor foreign research vessels, and to enhance policing of 
our maritime border with Russia. For the first time since 1984, 
as you know, the Coast Guard will conduct operations North of 
the Arctic Circle during this winter. When the National Science 
Foundation, as a result of a caution for the pandemic, decided 
they did not want to send POLAR STAR to McMurdo in Antarctica, 
we immediately came up with a different sale plan for her, and 
she is underway as we speak today, straight to Juan de Fuca, 
heading North toward Dutch Harbor and then further up into the 
Arctic.
    I think this demonstrates the Coast Guard's agility and the 
importance of the polar security cutters, the need for a larger 
icebreaker fleet to persistently safeguard our Nation's 
economic and national security interests in the high latitudes. 
While we are focused on protecting sovereignty in our U.S. 
Arctic, the Coast Guard is also working to build partnerships 
across the Arctic. This summer, we deployed--this past summer, 
we deployed two medium endurance cutters to participate in 
search and rescue and military exercises off of Greenland, 
operating with our allies Denmark, France, and Canada.
    We worked to establish the things that you do when you 
exercise together. Never has Coast Guard leadership been more 
important in the Arctic than it is right now, as we shape the 
region as a safe, cooperative, and prospective domain for all. 
You have my commitment, the commitment of our Commandant, and 
that the Coast Guard will continue to exert all efforts to meet 
this challenge.
    Thank you again, Senator, for this opportunity. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, 
                            U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
    Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here today to 
discuss the Coast Guard's role and activities to advance national 
security priorities across the Arctic Region. This effort includes 
safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and executing our national 
responsibilities while effecting safe, secure, and environmentally 
responsible maritime activity.
    The U.S. Arctic remains particularly dynamic, evolving 
environmentally, operationally, and strategically. Environmental 
changes, combined with the tyranny of distance and limited 
infrastructure, exacerbate the harshness of the operating environment. 
The types and levels of commercial activity are also transforming, from 
a surge in oil and gas exploration a few years ago to increases in 
vessel transits and expansion of environmental tourism. These 
alterations in types and location of activity, along with the changes 
in the physical environment, coincide with the reemergence of great 
power competition across the globe which are exemplified in the Arctic. 
The importance of, and demand signal for, Coast Guard's services and 
leadership have never been greater as these dynamic challenges magnify 
U.S. national security interests across the Arctic.
National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
    The actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic nation states 
continue to shape the security environment and stability of the region. 
The geopolitical environment is evolving as state and non-state actors 
seek to advance their own interests in the Arctic. Allies, partners, 
and competitors increasingly contend for diplomatic, economic, and 
strategic advantage and influence. Russia and China exemplify that 
competition. Both have declared the Arctic a strategic priority; both 
have made significant investments in new or refurbished capabilities; 
and both are exerting direct or indirect influence across the region.
    Russia's expansive Arctic has the potential to support naval fleets 
readily deployable between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This region 
also represents significant economic opportunities, such as oil and gas 
extraction and development and attempted control of the Northern Sea 
Route for trans-Arctic shipping. As such, Russia continues to plan and 
expand its capabilities and capacity to influence and surge throughout 
the Arctic. This year, Russia launched the first in a new class of 
nuclear-powered icebreakers, which they sailed to the North Pole. In 
addition to continuing the expansion of its extensive icebreaker fleet, 
its renewed capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, 
domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue stations. Furthermore, 
Russia recently established an inter-agency commission of the Russian 
Security Council focused on ensuring Russian national security 
interests in the Arctic. Finally, Russia recently completed Exercise 
Ocean Shield 2020, a multi-theater exercise involving participation by 
both its Pacific and Northern Fleets and including maneuvers in the 
Northern Bering Sea and Arctic approaches. Through this exercise, 
Russia extended its operations into the U.S. exclusive economic zone 
and interferred with the safety and sovereignty of the U.S. fishing 
fleet, indicating a willingness to push the boundaries of acceptable, 
responsible behavior and governance.
    China continues to aspire to assert influence across the Arctic 
including pursuit of economic investments in key strategic areas such 
as rare-earth elements, oil and gas development, air and sea ports, 
railways, and infrastructure to further its strategic objectives. Last 
year, China launched its first domestically-built icebreaking vessel, 
the Motor Vessel XUE LONG 2, which operated in the Arctic this year, 
including taking a sediment core sample while operating on the waters 
over the United States' extended continental shelf. China is also 
designing an even more powerful polar icebreaker expected to have twice 
the icebreaking capability of XUE LONG 2. With three icebreakers, China 
could outpace U.S. icebreaker capacity and polar access by 2024. The 
primary concern with Chinese activities in the Arctic is the potential 
to disrupt the cooperation, stability, and governance in the region for 
both Arctic and non-Arctic states.
Coast Guard Leadership in the Arctic
    The Coast Guard has shaped and influenced national security in the 
Arctic for over 150 years. This effort includes asserting the Nation's 
sovereign rights, upholding our sovereign responsibilities from the 
strategic to the tactical level, and countering malign influence that 
is contrary to U.S. values and international rules and norms. The 
Service's missions have evolved along with the evolution of the 
physical, operational, and strategic environments.
    As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law enforcement 
authorities, combined with membership in the Intelligence Community, 
the Coast Guard seamlessly shifts between mission sets utilizing multi-
mission personnel and assets. Specifically, the Coast Guard's 
constabulary functions and broad authorities serve as a critical bridge 
between the hard-power lethality of the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. These characteristics 
enable the Service to cultivate strong international relationships and 
build coalitions among Arctic partners based on mutual interests and 
values that strengthen national security and regional stability while 
enhancing safety, maritime governance, and prosperity across the 
region.
    Where strategic goals align, the Coast Guard works closely with the 
DoD to ensure efficient operations. The Coast Guard is a member of the 
Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a EUCOM-sponsored multi-national 
group concerned with Arctic security issues, including maritime domain 
awareness. We work closely with NORTHCOM through the Arctic 
Capabilities Assessment Working Group, which was created to identify 
potential collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities in 
communications, maritime domain awareness, and presence. The Service's 
role as a member of the Intelligence Community offers a natural nexus 
for broad intelligence and information sharing, as appropriate, to 
counter nefarious actions in the Arctic and throughout the world. These 
efforts are only a few examples of partnerships between the Coast Guard 
and DoD.
    This year, Arctic operations and engagements have faced unique 
challenges and interruptions, mostly due to the global pandemic of 
COVID-19. However, because of these challenges and the growing 
strategic imperatives across the Arctic, the Service has adapted 
operations to meet the Nation's mission demands. The following 
highlights some of these initiatives that have particular impacts on 
the Nation's readiness as well as national and international security.
Advancing Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic
    Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning 
and operations effort that incorporates an expeditionary approach for 
deploying resources and conducting integrated operations to meet 
statutory mission demands, buys-down maritime risk, and advances 
national security objectives through maritime operations in the United 
States Arctic. ARCTIC SHIELD 2020 objectives included advancing 
national and Coast Guard strategic goals; enhancing capabilities to 
operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic; strengthening the rules-based 
order; and innovating and adapting to promote safety, resilience, and 
prosperity. An emergent priority was to protect Arctic residents by not 
transmitting or contracting COVID-19 while conducting missions. The 
pandemic imposed challenges on engagements and presence, both in 
communities and across the maritime domain, but has also presented 
other opportunities to broaden Arctic experience, training, and 
operational readiness to safeguard the U.S. Arctic.
    The Coast Guard conducted additional, unscheduled patrols in Arctic 
waters this season with CGC HEALY, CGC ALEX HALEY, and CGC MUNRO. With 
these patrols, the Service monitored foreign maritime activity, 
including the Arctic deployment of the XUE LONG 2; enhanced monitoring 
and enforcement of maritime activities including commercial fishing in 
the United States exclusive economic zone and along the maritime 
boundary line with Russia; supported other U.S. marine scientific 
research; and protected U.S. sovereign interests. This activity 
included a joint patrol with a Russian Border Guard vessel along the 
U.S./Russian maritime border that highlighted the Coast Guard's 
continued focus on regional cooperation to combat trans-Arctic threats 
such as illegal fisheries. Additionally, aircrews trained with CGC 
HEALY and CGC MUNRO as they patrolled in the Chukchi Sea and Bering 
Strait region, recertifying aircrews in shipboard landings in order to 
extend the operational reach of the Coast Guard into the higher 
latitudes.
    As in the past few seasons, the Coast Guard deployed two MH-60 
helicopters to Kotzebue, Alaska for four months to enhance response 
capabilities and provide direct support to communities in the U.S. 
Arctic region.
    These helicopters have flown over 390 flight hours, and executed 
eight long range search and rescue missions. Additionally, they 
provided critical support to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Office of Naval 
Research, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and the University of 
Washington in multiple missions to include assisting scientific 
research studying marine mammals plus Arctic ice and environmental 
conditions. Coast Guard HC-130 and MH-60 aircrews also conducted 
regular Maritime Domain Awareness flights, establishing a U.S. 
Government presence over U.S. Arctic waters, protecting U.S. sovereign 
interests, and executing U.S. responsibilities.
    Because of pandemic concerns in Antarctica, the National Science 
Foundation informed the Service that it will not use CGC POLAR STAR to 
support the McMurdo Station resupply mission this year. This change 
affords the Coast Guard the unique opportunity to conduct maritime 
operations in the U.S. Arctic during the winter. From December 2020 to 
February 2021, POLAR STAR will project power throughout the Arctic and 
defend American sovereignty along the U.S. and Russia maritime boundary 
line. This opportunity enhances Coast Guard readiness by increasing 
Arctic ice navigation proficiency and informs operations of the future 
Polar Security Cutters.
Building Arctic Capacity
    The ability for the U.S. to lead in the Arctic, both strategically 
and operationally, hinges on physical presence to protect U.S. national 
sovereignty and safeguard our homeland security interests. The 
foundation of the Coast Guard's operational presence and influence is 
U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose is to provide assured, year-round 
access to the polar regions for executing not only Coast Guard missions 
but also national missions in the high latitudes.
    I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its 
continued support of the Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter program, 
which awarded a contract for the detail design and construction of the 
first ship in 2019. This program is efficiently managed through the 
joint Navy-Coast Guard Integrated Program Office, which was established 
to accelerate the project and leverage best practices from each 
Services' shipbuilding programs. Because of Congress's support and this 
partnership, the Nation is as close as we have been in over 40 years to 
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to 
meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic 
polar regions.
    Until the delivery of Polar Security Cutters, the Coast Guard must 
maintain cutters POLAR STAR and HEALY, the Nation's only operational 
icebreakers. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension on 
POLAR STAR are already underway, and initial work for this project will 
begin in 2021, with phased industrial work occurring annually through 
2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel's 
service life until delivery of at least the second new Polar Security 
Cutter. The recent casualty to CGC HEALY, our only medium icebreaker, 
underscores the importance of this effort. It also highlights the 
Nation's limited bench strength for this particular mission set, and 
the importance of devoting sufficient resources for maintenance and 
repair activities to aging assets.
    On June 9th of this year, the Administration released a 
Presidential Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the 
Arctic and Antarctic Regions that directed a review of requirements for 
a polar security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that supports 
our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This 
memorandum highlights the Administration's priority for securing 
national interests in the Arctic and for recapitalizing the Nation's 
icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard will continue to work within the 
Department of Homeland Security, with the Department of Defense, and 
with other Departments in responding to the Nation's need in the 
Arctic.
    The Coast Guard must continue to evaluate options to advance U.S. 
interests in the region, which extend beyond the provision of 
icebreakers. As outlined in the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic 
Outlook, in order to respond to crises in the Arctic, our Nation must 
also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in 
the region. To meet the challenges of the Arctic as a strategically 
competitive space, the Coast Guard must also expand its means to shape 
the security environment and respond to, intercept, and collect 
information on activities and intentions of those operating in the 
Arctic region.
Advancing Strategic Leadership and National Security Across the Arctic
    As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to 
expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard 
continues to be a leader across the region, expanding collaboration, 
cooperation, and interoperability.
    The Service exercises leadership through engagement in Arctic 
Council activities including representation on a variety of working 
groups. As Chair of the Marine Environmental Response Experts Group, 
the Coast Guard engaged with Russia during the response to the June 
2020 Arctic oil spill in Siberia, the worst ever in the region, and 
continues to work with partners to identify and apply lessons-learned 
from the spill to reduce risks in the United States. As a member of the 
Shipping Experts Group, the Coast Guard supports projects such as 
mitigation of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel 
oil by vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also chairs the Council's 
Search and Rescue Experts Group, served on the Council's Task Force on 
Arctic Marine Cooperation, and has been active in other task forces 
that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the 2013 
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and the 2015 Framework for 
Oil Pollution Prevention.
    Additionally, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) continues to be a 
bridge between diplomacy and operations. Formally established in 
October 2015, the ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of the 
Service's Arctic strategy, as well as the objectives of the Arctic 
Council. It is a unique, action-oriented maritime governance forum 
where the Coast Guard and peer agencies from the other seven Arctic 
nations \1\ strengthen relationships, identify lessons learned, share 
best practices, carry out exercises, conduct combined operations, and 
coordinate emergency response missions. In April 2019, the ACGF 
conducted its second live exercise \2\, POLARIS, which incorporated six 
ships and five aircraft from ACGF member nations to respond to a 
simulated cruise ship in distress near Finland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden
    \2\ The first live exercise, Arctic Guardina, was held in September 
2017
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined operations, 
and highlights the criticality of coordination preparedness for 
maritime environmental response and search and rescue. In April 2021, 
the ACGF will hold its third live exercise off the coast of Iceland.
    When Russia assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the ACGF 
in Summer 2021, the Coast Guard will continue to encourage advancement 
of shared ACGF objectives, including more collaboration with 
operational Arctic entities and increasing joint response capability 
for both search and rescue and marine environmental response cases.
    The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other 
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and 
adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(Polar Code), which is mandatory under both the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships (MARPOL).
    The Polar Code covers the full range of design, construction, 
equipment, operational, training, search and rescue, and environmental 
protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable 
waters surrounding the two polar regions. Additionally, in November 
2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with the Russian Federation to 
jointly develop and submit a proposal to the IMO to establish a system 
of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, with the 
objective of advancing the maritime transportation system in the 
region; promoting the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
conflicting commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence 
activities.
    The Coast Guard continues to work to expand the Service's influence 
across the Arctic. From July through September of this year, the Coast 
Guard deployed CGC CAMPBELL and CGC TAHOMA in the North Atlantic region 
to participate in joint military and Search and Rescue exercises. This 
included engagements with the Danish Joint Arctic Command, Canada, and 
France. These operations demonstrate the Service's strong relationships 
with international partners across the globe.
Improving Critical Communications in the U.S. Arctic
    Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is simply 
communicating. Out of necessity, the Coast Guard uses a variety of 
solutions to communicate in the Arctic, which minimally satisfies 
current operational requirements. The Service is undertaking multiple 
connectivity and communications efforts to support and improve 
operations in the Region and will partner with the Department of 
Defense and other partners when possible. These efforts include 
recapitalizing our military satellite communications terminals, 
upgrading high-speed data ``Cutter Connectivity'' solutions with 
emerging polar satellite services, replacing all Coast Guard cutter 
High Frequency (HF) radios, and reegineering the terrestrial HF 
network. These efforts will dramatically improve the Service's Arctic 
communications and operations in the Arctic.
    Additionally, the Coast Guard is working with the Department of 
Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to execute a 
comprehensive review of mariner communications and connectivity needs 
with the broader Federal, State, local, and industry communities of 
interest in the Arctic. We have also engaged the DHS S&T Arctic Domain 
Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC) at the University of Alaska, 
Anchorage, to conduct relevant research. The intent is to identify 
areas of possible collaboration in a whole of government approach and 
potential public-private partnerships to address shared communication 
and connectivity gaps and needs.
Conclusion
    The Coast Guard's value proposition in the Arctic includes 
upholding freedom of navigation and the rules-based order by setting 
and enforcing standards of behavior in the maritime domain. The Coast 
Guard's role in our whole-of-government approach to securing our 
national interests in the polar regions is using our experience, 
leadership, and ability to both influence and compete below the level 
of armed conflict. Leveraging the Service to set the example for 
maritime governance in the Arctic positions the United States to be the 
preferred partner of other Arctic allies and stakeholders to positively 
shape the security environment across the region. The Coast Guard, and 
the Nation, must remain committed and agile in the rapidly evolving 
geopolitical and operational Arctic environments.
    The Administration's and Congress' continued support for a 
modernized and capable polar fleet and Arctic infrastructure will 
posture not only the Coast Guard, but the Nation, to lead across the 
national and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as a continued area 
of low tension and great cooperation while preserving our national 
interests and rights. We understand the significant investment required 
to secure the Arctic, and we appreciate the trust the Nation has placed 
in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I 
look forward to answering your questions.

    Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral, and I think we 
are going to just start right in, as we--when Senator Markey is 
available, we will make sure he has an opportunity to provide 
his opening statement. I want to begin by commanding the Coast 
Guard on its decision of the POLAR STAR do the Arctic patrol 
this winter.
    And can you provide an update on the status of the HEALY, 
and how extensive was the damage, and when do you think the 
HEALY will be operational again? I had the opportunity to meet 
with the captain and the ship's leadership crew, boy, just a 
couple of months ago when they were in Seward, Alaska, and it 
is a great crew, so I am glad everybody is safe, but an update 
would be appreciated.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I am proud to report to you, she is 
in the yard in the Mare Island, the upper reaches of San 
Francisco Bay, and they have done work on her before, so they 
are no strangers to her. We--the motor that we had to replace 
was 115 tons of motor. We had one spare. Somebody had the 
foresight years ago. When we commissioned HEALY, we had a 
spare. We actually built a building around it in Curtis 
Shipyard. So we had to ship it. It was too big to ship by rail 
or truck. We had to put on a barge and ship it through the 
Panama Canal. And so there is--we got her. The motor is 
replaced inside HEALY. We expect her to finish her dry dock 
availability toward the end of this month. For that, she will 
enter a dockside availability at home port and she will be 
ready to sail next summer so it would go back up North.
    Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you, Admiral. I am sure you 
are familiar with the memorandum from the President on June 9th 
of this year regarding the Arctic and ice breakers and where to 
look at home porting them. Are you familiar with that? And one 
of the things that I have been pressing, literally everybody 
listed on that memo: the Secretary of Defense, Homeland 
Security Secretary, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of State, 
OMB Director, National Security Adviser, is the importance of 
when we look at icebreakers, and I think everybody recognizes 
the need to build a fleet because we really don't even have a 
fleet, but to make sure they are home ported in an area in 
which they are in the region.
    Can you talk about that because right now, when I talk to 
the Senior Officials listed on that memorandum from the 
President on America's National Security interests in the 
Arctic, to a person they recognize that home porting 
icebreakers in Alaska makes long-term strategic sense and is in 
the long-term strategic interest of the United States of 
America. And as I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, 
I love the Coast Guard, but sometimes I get a sense of, kind 
of, a strategic thinking deficit on these kind of issues where 
too much of the home porting decisions seem to be based solely 
on where the current crew is, not where the action and the 
presence is needed. So can you talk to me about that?
    Admiral Ray. Yes. Senator Sullivan, so with regards to the 
President's memo, as you know, that was a joint effort between 
the Coast Guard and Department of Defense, NOAA, Department of 
State. And so we got together and created a document in 
response and turned it in on time to DHS and that was submitted 
to the NSA. So when they would choose to release that, I am not 
certain to say at this point.
    As you asked, during the course of this time, we did in our 
response say that, you know, Alaska home port should be 
considered in the analysis. And as I think you are aware, right 
now, we are--we have an ongoing homeport analysis for border 
security cutters that is ongoing. We expect that to complete in 
August and then a report out by the end of this Fiscal Year. So 
and that will definitely include analysis of home porting 
options in Alaska.
    Senator Sullivan. And so your timeline for completion of 
that is August?
    Admiral Ray. The they report--the homework will be done in 
August, and I will double check this but this is what I recall 
from the memo. The homework will be done in August, and then we 
will have the analysis of it and, you know, running it, working 
it through our review process by the end of the calendar year.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask with regard to leasing. I just 
talked to the National Security Adviser. I know that there are 
icebreakers that are being looked at in Finland. Last week, I 
chaired the readiness subcommittee hearing on the Armed 
Services Committee with the Secretary of the Navy, CNO, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. He had talked about this issue. 
There is another icebreaker that is in Florida, I guess. Not 
sure what it is really doing in Florida.
    But the look in terms of the potential to lease those soon, 
these are medium icebreakers that would essentially bridge the 
gap that we all recognize we have, my understanding is the 
White House, National Security Adviser, possibly the Navy, with 
regard to some of their funding, are looking at moving forward 
on leases soon. Like hopefully as early as the end of this 
month. Do you have any comment on that? And do you support it?
    Admiral Ray. Well, sir, Senator, with regards to leasing, 
we--that was obviously a part of the Presidential Directive to 
investigate that, and we went about that with the joint Navy 
and Coast Guard team. We have gone about investigating the 
feasibility of using those vessels for our purposes along the 
way, as we have said consistently, and it was accepted by those 
that, you know, at the NSA and others, was that any leasing 
arrangement would not be in lieu of building our own 
icebreakers, this would be in addition to.
    Senator Sullivan. As--I fully agree with that. In addition 
to, as a bridge.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. I couldn't agree more.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I think it is--there is a 
potential that one of those vessels could be of benefit as a 
bridge, as you say.
    Senator Sullivan. Good. OK. Admiral, sorry, I am just 
trying to get a sense of--sometimes these remote hearings, you 
have got to get a sense of who is on the line and who isn't. 
And so for now, we don't have anyone on the line. So I am going 
to continue my line of questioning. With regard to the leased 
icebreakers that we are looking at--again, just speaking to the 
National Security Adviser about an hour ago, and I would fully 
support it as Chairman of this committee.
    There is also an interest in possibly if we do lease medium 
term icebreakers in the near future to at least have, again, 
those home ported or have one or two of those home ported in 
America's Arctic, which is Alaska. Give me a sense of what goes 
into the cost benefit analysis, because to me, and again, to so 
many that I have spoken to, it seems to be a strategic no 
brainer that if the entire point of having an icebreaker is 
particularly to protect the interest in the Arctic, to have it 
in the Arctic. Right now, the home porting in Seattle is a 
couple thousands of miles away, as you know, from the Bering 
Strait, where a lot of the action is and, of course, the Arctic 
Circle. So give me your thoughts on, again, what we could do 
with medium icebreakers right now?
    Again, I think the White House is looking at something that 
could be home ported hopefully soon in the America's Arctic, 
which is in Alaska. But what are the different things that the 
Coast Guard is looking at? Because as I mentioned my opening 
statement, sometimes it just seems very frustrating that--
pretty obvious choice, long term strategic thinking would be 
you would want these home ported, at least some of the fleet, 
in America's Arctic.
    Admiral Ray. Senator, with regards to the potentially 
leased icebreakers short term bridging strategy, we have, you 
know, there is--we have not invested significant effort in 
analyzing where we would sail those from. I think, you know, 
obviously the closeness, the geography of the mission set that 
they would be engaged in. Your point is well made. For a longer 
term basing of our icebreakers, as you and I have talked and 
the Commandant have talked, there are multiple factors that we 
consider when we talk about the ability to maintain, not--we 
realize that through your work on the Committee that, you know, 
you will provide the resources we need.
    Senator Sullivan. We will.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. We appreciate and understand that. 
What we look at as the mission effectiveness, our ability to 
bring those to bear in a reasonable amount of time so that we 
can have a high probability success when we do sell that 
cutter. That is part of the calculus. There are other parts of 
the calculus with regards to the ability for the Coastees 
assigned to the cutters, for their families to, you know, to 
live and prosper in that vicinity. So as we talk about longer 
term home porting of cutters, as you and I have discussed said, 
those things are still--those are elements that we consider 
alongside the geographic considerations for getting to the OP 
area as soon as you would described.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another related questions. I 
know that, as you mentioned, there are feasibility studies with 
regard to home porting of the polar security cutters in Alaska, 
possibly Australia for the Antarctica mission. And also the 
FRCs, the feasibility study with regard to the ability to 
protect America's interests as it relates to China. So I know 
that there was look at Guam and maybe even American Samoa. How 
are those feasibility studies going? Now I am talking Alaska, 
Australia, and then for the FRCs, Guam and American Samoa.
    Admiral Ray. Well, as I--Senator, as I said earlier, the 
feasibility study for the home ports, the polar security 
cutters, that is ongoing right now. So we---I don't have any 
specific response with regards to some of the home ports that 
were mentioned in the President's memo.
    Senator Sullivan. OK, and just to be clear, sorry to 
interrupt, but those are for the six authorize polar security 
cutters that were authorized in the NDAA. So the longer term 
ones that we are building, not necessarily the short term 
bridging ones that have the potential to be leased in a much 
shorter amount of time, correct?
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. OK.
    Admiral Ray. So no, I mean, we are still working on the 
analysis of the home ports of those, as we have discussed. With 
regards to the fast response cutters, I want to thank you, in 
particular, for your support for our ability to homeport those 
where they need to be in Alaska. So, as you know, we are 
building--thanks to the support of this committee, we have 
funds already designated in Kodiak to start building out the 
piers there. We have funds on the unfunded priority list for 
Sitka. And then--so we are tracking with regards basing those 
in Alaska where they need to be.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, we appreciate that.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. With regards to fast response 
cutters in the South Pacific, those--the discussion about 
potentially home porting one in American Samoa, we have already 
got two in Guam right now that are there, but the one in 
American Samoa, that has been a discussion. And we are 
analyzing that, but we don't have--that cutter is not on budget 
yet. So we will continue to analyze that and see what we come 
up with.
    Senator Sullivan. OK, good. I believe Senator Markey is on 
the line, so I am going to recognize him next. And then I will 
turn to Senator Scott. Senator Markey.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 
great work in putting together this very important hearing. 
First, I want to thank our distinguished witnesses as well, 
including Dr. Jennifer Francis, who is a senior scientist at 
the world's leading Woodwell Climate Research Center, in 
Falmouth, Massachusetts. What is often thought of as the frozen 
Arctic is actually not so frozen anymore, making it a complex 
and fast changing environment that has caused a host of new and 
evolving national and economic security issues for us to 
confront. And we know that many of these changes are driven by 
the human-caused climate crisis. If we don't talk about the 
effects of climate change on the Arctic, we can't fully 
understand the truth that threats to our security. A novel 
Arctic climate is emerging in its new state, according to 
recent research, ``extremes become routine.''
    Rising temperatures are causing the region's climate to 
shift from sea ice to open water and from snow to rain. These 
changes in the North are sadly mirrored in the Antarctic, where 
the Pine Islands and Dewitts Glaciers are breaking free. The 
collapse of these ice sheets will have immense implications for 
rising seas, with Massachusetts and other coastal states facing 
up to 10 feet of sea level rise. Together, these climactic 
changes in polar regions are of incredible concern to our 
country. And as I mentioned before, the Arctic in particular is 
warming twice as fast as the global average. Between 1992 and 
2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly a million square miles, 
an area larger than the State of Alaska.
    Current Arctic sea ice extent is the second lowest on 
record, with new trade routes opening and towns being flooded, 
the changes are drastic and unfolding at an unprecedented rate. 
The effects of fire field from the Arctic as well, with impacts 
in lower latitudes on weather patterns, extreme events and, of 
course, sea level. But we have also seen wildfires in places 
that few would have expected decades ago. In 2019, areas within 
the Arctic Circle experienced a massive fire season. That was 
supposed to be a freak occurrence. These fires weren't 
projected by scientists to start until mid-century. As the 
climate crisis continued to worsen, but now researchers say 
that the 2020 Arctic wildfire season, a previously unthinkable 
concept, is likely even worse than the one before. When I 
consider the changes in the Arctic, it is with great sadness 
and appreciation that I remember a climate scientist and 
climate change pioneer, Dr. Conrad Steffen. He was a leading 
researcher on the consequences of climate change in the Arctic 
and died in a tragic accident in Greenland this past summer.
    I met with Dr. Steffen in 2007 in Greenland and heard about 
his research, which found that climate change is causing the 
ice sheet in Greenland to melt at unprecedented speed. And 
sadly, because of our failure to heed the canary in the coal 
mine and take the drastic action on climate change, the ice 
sheet is now melting twice as fast as it was during that visit 
13 years ago. As the Chairman knows so well, the Arctic region 
is not some far off remote expanse. It provides livelihoods. To 
many, it is a global fishing center. It is a cultural and 
sacred place for Arctic indigenous peoples. It is the home of 
rare and endangered species. It is security. It is now at 
immediate risk as a result of the human caused climate crisis. 
The Arctic is a keystone of our climate system, which means 
that Arctic security is a National Security issue affecting all 
Americans. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 
I want to thank you all for the work you do. And would like to 
ask you, Admiral Ray, last year we spoke about the Coast 
Guard's oil spill preparedness.
    The Coast Guard had previously acknowledged shortfalls in 
its abilities to respond to any oil spills that might take 
place in the Arctic. In July 2020, a Russian power plant 
experienced a massive failure that dumped tens of thousands of 
tons of diesel into the Polar Arctic, showing how immediate 
this threat is to the fragile Arctic ecosystem. Admiral Ray, 
since we spoke last December, what specifically has the Coast 
Guard done to improve its oil spill response capabilities?
    Admiral Ray. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Several things 
to kind of, if you will, work to the left of an incident. We 
have worked on--this summer during Operation Arctic Shield, we 
made a concerted effort to get out and we visited. At the end 
of this summer, when you put it with the work we did last 
summer, we had visited 92 percent of the facilities that store 
petroleum products in the Alaskan Arctic. And as a result of 
that, we were able to inspect and we were able to work with the 
operators, owner operators, of these facilities, and work to 
ensure that those don't become, because as you know, the 
Russians spill that you referred to was caused by thawing 
permafrost and then the failure of containment tank that they 
had that has let several thousand gallons loose. So we have 
worked to address that. And we have actually inspected and 
visited 92 percent of those. We continue to work with Federal, 
state, and local stakeholders to perform exercises this summer 
with regards to our preparation for spills. And we also worked 
with----
    Senator Markey [continuing]. Are there additional resources 
which you would like Congress to provide to you to better 
protect the Arctic from any spills, either foreign or domestic?
    Admiral Ray. Well, the work that we are doing with the 
Department of Defense, we are leveraging some of their 
resources. And Senator, there are no specific, other than the 
capability to move this equipment which you are providing, the 
C-130Js and with additional H60 helicopters, those would be 
helpful in responding to any sort of incident or spill in the 
Arctic. So we can provide--we have--I am sorry, sir, go ahead.
    Senator Markey. You mentioned the permafrost is melting. 
Half of the world's permafrost is expected to vanish by the end 
of this century. But I noticed in your written testimony, 
Admiral, that it does not include the words climate change. Do 
you believe the Coast Guard should be planning for human caused 
climate change?
    Admiral Ray. Mr. Ranking Member, the Coast Guard has been 
consistent in that we are really agnostic as to the cause, but 
we are planning and paying attention to science all over our 
country. Up North in particular with regards to, as you would 
already discussed, that there is water where there used to be 
ice, the multi-year ice has receded. If you look at the planet 
from the North Pole aspect, you can clearly see greater 
expanses of water that remain over the course of time. We have 
seen it this year in our hurricane season. Down the Gulf Coast, 
we have had more named storms than we would ever had since we 
have been naming storms. So we pay very close attention to the 
forecast and the scientific analysis. But as I said, that is 
what we look at and what we build to what as we are planning 
our operations.
    Senator Markey. Now, I know what you are saying, but you 
can't be an agnostic when it comes to climate change. That is 
what's causing the hurricanes. That is what is causing the 
melting of the permafrost. It is what is driving all of these 
changes that we are seeing. And if I may Admiral Ray, do you 
think the Coast Guard needs to integrate climate resiliency 
into the construction of any new facilities in the Arctic?
    Admiral Ray. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Markey. And so, I just want to make sure, though, I 
make it clear that I thank you for your service, Admiral. I 
think you are really doing an excellent job, and I look forward 
to working with you.
    Senator Sullivan. Senator Scott.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Scott. First, I want to thank Chairman Sullivan for 
his commitment to the Coast Guard, his commitment to security 
in the Arctic, and all the things he has taught me about 
icebreakers in the last 2 years. I want to thank Admiral Ray 
for being here. I had no idea the importance of icebreakers 
until I got this job 2 years ago.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, being the Senator from Florida, we 
are OK with that.
    Senator Scott. But I have a great help with Chelsea, who is 
a great--I think she will be a great Coast Guard Admiral. So 
while the United States icebreaking capabilities have remained 
stagnant for decades, as we all know, Russia and communist 
China continue to advance policies and dedicate more resources 
to capitalizing on the issues of the Arctic. China's growing 
influence around the world presents a clear and present danger 
to the stability of world markets, the security of the United 
States and our allies in the quest for freedom and democracy 
around the globe. As we all know, we must do everything we can 
to make sure our men and women in uniform have every resource 
available to defend against the growing threat and keep our 
family safe. I want to thank again Chairman Sullivan.
    When I came up here and we were shut down, he was a big 
advocate of making sure the Coast Guard got--started getting 
paid. So, Admiral Ray, the Coast Guard plays a crucial role in 
defending our Nation and protecting our security in domestic 
and international waterways. Can you talk about the resources 
you think you need to remain competitive or the U.S. to remain 
competitive in commercial and defense activities in the Arctic? 
And how we can improve the coordination between the Coast Guard 
and the Department of Defense as we work to combat what Russia 
and China is trying to do in the Arctic?
    Admiral Ray. Thank you, Senator Scott, for the question. 
With regards to the resources we need to improve our readiness, 
the Arctic is, as you know, we use the same resources. There 
are a lot of the same ones. And so the readiness piece that the 
Coast Guard, that our Commandant has repeatedly talked about 
under testimony and in various other fora, it is pretty 
straightforward. We have had really good success with getting 
the funds to purchase new assets. Where we have fallen behind 
is in the asset, the funds to maintain those assets and operate 
them. And so where is the Department of Defense when they went 
to address their readiness kind of deficit a couple of years 
ago under this Administration, they realized about a 12 percent 
increase in their ONS funding and we are about flat lined. And 
so that is a challenge. That is one thing that we need. As I 
have said before, some of the assets that we are using up 
there, the polar security cutter is going to be really 
important as we continue to build our Arctic capability.
    We are also, Senator Sullivan, the Chairman asked me last 
time I testified about our communications capability. We made 
progress there, but it is going to require investments in 
satellite capability to communicate and operate up North. I 
could go through a list of assets, and sir, I would be glad to 
provide a more fulsome briefing for that. But it is primarily, 
I would say, our readiness has to do with operations and 
maintenance funding for our current assets. With regard to 
answer your part of the question about our engagement with DOD, 
I think we are about as tight now as we have been, on Arctic 
issues in particular, with DOD that we would been in my 
lifetime.
    As you know, we would got an integrated program office with 
the Navy to help construct the polar security cutters. And we 
have got equal roles of leadership with them on that committee. 
And it has been a tremendous help. I am convinced that our 
ability to award that contract in April of 2019 was really 
aided by our cooperation with the Navy and their experience 
with that.
    Senator Scott. Is the budget issue thing just tied to the 
fact that your budget is separate and--your budget comes up 
through Commerce, right? And so you are not part of the DOD 
budget. Do you think that is the reason why it is happening?
    Admiral Ray. Well, sir, we are part of Department of 
Homeland Security, and so we fall under that regime of budget 
distribution, if you will. And I am--we think the Coast Guard 
is well positioned in the Department of Homeland Security. We 
have got many missions that work for that. As you know, we are 
a military force, armed service at all times. But we also have 
Title 14 authority, which gives us law enforcement authority. 
We are a member of the intelligence community. So the 
Department of Homeland Security is a great place for the Coast 
Guard and we think we prosper there. But when it comes to the 
readiness funds that are that are provided to the Coast Guard 
via the Department, that is where I think we could use some 
support of.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Scott. And just, I 
want to ask this very quickly and get to Senator Blumenthal, 
but in my opening remarks I did mention that this is the first 
time, it looks like successfully, sometimes I talk to Senator 
Blumenthal a lot about it as well, that we are pairing up the 
Coast Guard Reauthorization Act with the NDAA. That brings a 
lot of synergies to the DOD and--or I shouldn't say DOD, I 
should say Coast Guard and other services operations. I am 
assuming, Admiral, you support that?
    Admiral Ray. Absolutely, sir, and we appreciate your 
tireless efforts to make that happen.
    Senator Scott. Well, we are going to--we are making it, I 
think we are making it a precedent this year and hopefully in a 
bipartisan way, we can make that happen every year. I think it 
helps the Coast Guard and the other services. Senator 
Blumenthal.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Sullivan. And I would 
just second with a great big exclamation point the fact that 
this pairing is not only profoundly significant and historic, 
but it is also bipartisan and I hope we continue the work 
together that we have started because the Coast Guard deserves 
that reliable and well merited treatment in terms of 
authorization and appropriation. We are very proud in 
Connecticut to be the home of the Coast Guard Academy. The 
Coast Guard has a long and storied history in Connecticut. We 
regard it as kind of one of our own, and very, very grateful 
for the role that the Coast Guard is playing in advancing our 
economic interests in the Arctic. I thank the Chairman for 
making that topic the focal point of today's hearing.
    I want to raise an issue probably somewhat painful to both 
of us, and I know that it is not within the direct purview of 
this hearing. So if you want to respond in writing as well as 
orally now, I certainly would welcome it, but as recently as 
this morning, I have been contacted my office by whistleblowers 
from the Academy complaining about some of the racial tension, 
potential slurs, other kinds of abuses that are deeply 
troubling. These instances have been disturbing to us. In 
Connecticut for a long time, in fact, to our delegation, 
Representative Joe Courtney and I have heard them for a while, 
and I know you are familiar with them. The June report from the 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General on 
racism at the Academy found that the Coast Guard has failed to 
thoroughly investigate racial harassment.
    Allegations including the use of racial slurs and failed to 
discipline cadets who were found guilty of that behavior. The 
specific incidents included in the report, I think you will 
agree, have no place in society, much less in the military or 
the training institutions like the great Coast Guard Academy 
that we are proud to host in Connecticut. Hate speech and race-
based harassment by cadets at the Academy have gone largely 
underreported because of the stigma and shame attached to 
providing information, and sometimes they have been ignored.
    These experiences don't stay in New London, they affect the 
entire Coast Guard, as you well know, a little bit like a 
virus. Racial hatred and tension spreads. It is a contagion 
that I know the Coast Guard leadership is committed to stop. 
And so I just want to ask you, what you can tell me to update 
us as to what the Coast Guard is doing about this very 
important topic, what you are doing to monitor, counter it?
    I raise this topic certainly not cheerfully, but I think 
necessarily because I know, Ray, you are certainly committed to 
stop this kind of racial slurs or any other kind of abuse and 
just want to give you the opportunity to respond.
    Admiral Ray. Thanks for the question, Senator. And we do 
absolutely take this to heart, the report of the Inspector 
General from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as 
the righting the ship report that were from 2019 or excuse me, 
from 2019. We leaned into those and in the course of the last 
year we addressed every single recommendation, direction that 
was provided in those two reports and we have addressed them 
and reconciled them in policy and procedure. More importantly, 
I think what we would done with those is go from not just 
fixing our manuals and our policy, we have created tools to put 
in the hands of our commanders.
    And I am not just talking about the Coast Guard Academy. I 
am talking about Commanders writ large across the service so 
that they know how to conduct an investigation. They know what 
they have to report up. They know we are able to track 
harassment so that it--because many times these things start 
with harassment and they turn into something bigger.
    And so we put tools in our hands, to our Commanders, that 
we will use those and spread across the service so they can 
actually take action against these incidents. Taking it very 
seriously, sir, and thank you for bringing it up.
    Senator Blumenthal. Have you heard recent reports of these 
kinds of racial incidents or slurs continuing?
    Admiral Ray. I have not heard of recent reports from the 
Coast Guard Academy. No, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Since the June report, have you heard 
any and what steps have you taken?
    Admiral Ray. Negative, sir. I have not heard any from--
since the June report of the Coast Guard Academy. And I will 
double check with my team, but we--if there is something that 
happens of this nature, I get a report from our Civil Rights 
Directorate every month on things that happen of this nature. 
And so I am pretty sure I would have heard if it happened--
maybe, you know, have not been informed. But I will double 
check and get back with you, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. If you could double check, I would 
appreciate it. And I would also be interested to know, because 
my time has expired, maybe you can respond in writing, what 
kind of comprehensive steps have been taken to change the 
culture and to instill in the cadets the idea that there is 
zero tolerance for this kind of abuse?
    Admiral Ray. We will respond in writing to your question, 
sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Admiral Ray. Thanks to 
Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator 
Cantwell.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
and to my colleague as well. These--so appreciative of you 
being here today. And, I have a historic day in the sense that 
the House is taking up the NDAA and passing legislation, 
including the Coast Guard with authorization for six 
icebreakers, so we definitely believe in that mission. It is a 
very bipartisan effort, a very bipartisan effort to also fund 
those icebreakers, as we have in the past. And so I want to ask 
you specifically about the mission moving forward. Admiral Ray, 
will the Coast Guard continue to build icebreakers beyond the 
three and recapitalize on these purposes of both the climate 
science aspect of the Arctic mission?
    Admiral Ray. So with regards your first question, ma'am, 
Senator, is I know you are aware, we have talked about three 
heavies and three medium icebreakers, and so--and we are in the 
precursor stages for the requirements for the medium 
icebreakers at this point. So by the plans we have now, that 
would be the next evolution of building out our icebreaker 
fleet. However, we are always reevaluating the fleet mix that 
we need with regards to icebreakers. So given the support of 
the Congress, I mean, we will continue to look at that and 
evaluate that.
    And so our real focus at this point--in fact, I was just 
down in Mississippi early last month at the Halter Shipyard 
with our Mission Support Commander and with our Deputy 
Commandant for Operations, meeting face to face with the 
leadership of the shipyard that is constructing the first polar 
security cutter, just to let them know how important it was to 
us and to our Nation. And they get it and they are going--they 
are moving out on that. Regards to the second part of your 
question, Senator, I am not sure I caught that----
    Senator Cantwell. Well, we want to make sure that--I mean, 
obviously, it is an evolving mission. And there is the work 
that the HEALY does, you know, science capabilities that we 
don't want to get lost in all of this. We want to continue 
those science capabilities. I want to make sure we are also 
getting a work force. Currently you are short 400 prevention 
personnel, and we certainly think that the Arctic is an 
important prevention mission. And so we want to make sure that 
we are discussing here what kind of resources that you need and 
what we need to do to keep the science mission and to have a 
work force.
    Admiral Ray. Senator, thank you for recognizing that 
prevention workforce. That is a part of regulatory role of the 
Coast Guard which often goes unheralded by it is so important. 
As we were talking with the Senator, the Chairman earlier, our 
folks and Secretary in Anchorage travelled all over the State 
of Alaska this summer to finish out, and they ended up 
completing about 92 percent of the inspection of the petroleum 
storage facilities in Alaska. That is the kind of work those 
folks do so bad things don't happen. So, thank you for your 
support of that workforce, Senator.
    Senator Cantwell. So, what do we need to do to train and 
skill more people?
    Admiral Ray. We are--we are completing, Senator, a study 
right now on--because the way we were turning our prevention 
officers was kind of--it is something we have been doing the 
same ways for years and we need to do something with greater 
effect where we have Centers of Excellence where we take people 
and just in time train them to do the missions we need. And it 
is much more complex now, whether it is deep water offshore 
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, or whether is up in the Arctic 
oceans.
    And so the support for us--and once again this comes to the 
readiness funding that we have been talking about because if 
this is human capital--so to develop that human capital, it is 
operations and support funding where that is how we train 
people, that is how we send them to these industry Centers of 
Excellence, so that our people are on the right footing to do 
the regulatory role they need to protect our natural resources.
    Senator Cantwell. Well, whatever we can do to be helpful on 
that front. We want a Center of Excellence. People trained and 
skilled in the Arctic--there is no difference here between 
Senator Sullivan and I, and many of our colleagues on these 
issues. So thank you, and I am just taking by, you do agree 
that the science mission of the icebreaker fleet should 
continue?
    Admiral Ray. Absolutely ma'am. It is an important part of 
our mission. It has been for many years.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Admiral, I 
am going to ask a few follow-up questions and then I am going 
to see if Senator Markey has any, and I believe there might be 
one or two additional Senators who are wanting to participate 
and coming down to the hearing room. So, let me ask you, I 
highlighted it briefly in my opening statement, but the August 
26th incident that we had with this massive Russian military 
exercise that went into the United States' EEZ. I know that 
you, the Coast Guard, District 17 in Juno, the headquarters are 
often made aware of these kind of exercises to coordinate with 
Northern command, coordinate with the U.S. Navy.
    I have raised this with the Secretary of the Navy, with the 
North Comm Commander, what do you think happened that we can 
improve on to make sure that something like that doesn't happen 
again? First of all, our fishermen, in my view, should never be 
essentially forced out of the American EEZ, when they are 
legally fishing. And yet, that did happen because the Russians 
were being quite forceful. Second, there seemed to be somewhat 
of a lack of information flow and I am sure--and I know because 
I have requested if, an after-action to make sure that we 
improve upon that, particularly as it relates to our fishermen, 
whether they are based in Seattle or based in Alaska.
    You know, this is a huge part of the U.S. economy--a huge 
part of my state's economy. These are great, hardworking, 
patriotic Americans. And can you just comment on that and how 
we avoid that from happening again, and what steps we need to 
take? And if you are looking at, I know you are, but 
coordinating with North Comm and U.S. Navy on this?
    Admiral Ray. Senator, it is a multi-part question so I will 
try to answer it in the same way. The--first of all, as I 
described the activity of the Russians in planning and 
executing that section exercise, I think there was a degree of 
irresponsibility there that needs to be addressed and talked 
to, and we have done that. We have sent a written 
correspondence. We have got a Coast Guard attache in Russia who 
does the leg work with the Russians. And we have a relationship 
with the Russians' border guard that serves as a really kind of 
a red phone type of relationship, so we are working that.
    With that said, this was not our best day with regards to 
doing our role to look after American fishermen, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, so we--I will just be quite frank, we own some of this 
in that there is--although there is about 4,000, over 4,000 of 
those hydro packs that come out, the hydro pack is the form of 
a message that would describe the area that is on your chart 
there. About 4,000 of them a year. When the ones that are in 
our exclusive economic zone, we have a duty to pay attention to 
that. And we have looked at the ways that we can communicate 
that with the fishing fleet. And we did not do that that day. 
You know, there are ways they could receive it, on satellite 
phones and satellite receivers and other types. However, there 
are also ways we can transmit it to make a pointed effort.
    What we are doing to hopefully prevent this from ever 
happening again, we are having biweekly meetings with the 
industry groups, in particular the At-Sea Fish Processing group 
that will be represented in your next panel, to understand how 
we can communicate that to the fleet so that the fleet knows in 
advance when these things that could cause a challenge to their 
fisheries operations. And we are dedicated to doing a better 
job with that. This is not a once and done thing. This is going 
to be a persistent effort on the part of the U.S. Coast Guard 
to keep that fleet informed.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Let me turn next to--we were 
talking about the different things the Coast Guard needs in 
terms of its presence, its ability to do its job in the Arctic, 
one of which is infrastructure. As I mentioned, at the Port of 
Anchorage, Dutch Harbor, these are about a good 1,000 miles, 
1,200 miles away from the Arctic Circle. So Alaska, as you 
know, is a big state. Just because you are up in Alaska doesn't 
mean you are near at all to the action.
    As I like to say, that would be, you know, the functional 
equivalent of having a Coast Guard base in Florida protecting 
the interests of Boston or Rhode Island or Maine. So 
infrastructure is critical. We have made significant progress 
here on the deep water draft port for the Port of Nome, which 
is much more, in terms of a geographic sense, able to protect 
the interest of the Arctic. Last time you testified before this 
committee, you emphatically stated the need for those kind of 
ports and infrastructure. Can you just comment on that again?
    As I mentioned, in the Environment and Public Works 
Committee, the Ports and Harbor Bill has a very significant 
authorization for deep water draft port that can handle 
icebreakers, can handle fast response cutters, National 
Security cutters, even destroyers from the U.S. Navy. What is 
your sense of that? I believe we need a vision for a series of 
strategic Arctic ports the way Russia does. Can you comment on 
that a little bit and how important that is to the Coast Guard?
    Admiral Ray. Senator, I will. First, I want to thank you 
for the infrastructure that you have provided us already. As 
you know, about 10 percent of the Coast Guard's infrastructure 
is in Alaska----
    Senator Sullivan. We will continue to provide that as you 
need it.
    Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I really--specifically with 
regards to Kodiak, because that is our stepping off point at 
present with regards to all of our operations in the Gulf of 
Alaska or heading further out West, the Aleutians are up North 
in the Bering and further North. As we have repeatedly said, 
sir, if there was a deep water port North of Dutch, as you 
would discussed, we would certainly take advantage of it. It 
would be a benefit to the Coast Guard.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes, OK. Let me ask one final, actually, 
I am going to just make one more point again on the leasing and 
if we were to do kind of a leasing with regard to medium 
icebreakers, again, I think as a bridge for some of the polar 
class icebreakers, I think home porting those in Alaska would 
make immediate sense. We look at, I know the Coast Guard has 
already talked about Seattle for some of the polar class ones 
which are building on what is already there, makes sense. But 
as you know, there is going to be a lot more than just two or 
three from what we are working on.
    So I want to just make that statement from the Chairman's 
position here on the importance of that. What else do you need, 
the Coast Guard needs from this committee? As I mentioned, we 
are already working on that alignment between the NDAA and the 
Reauthorization Act. My goal would be to do the Reauthorization 
Act every year, just like we do the NDAA. It makes total sense.
    We should pair them, but the Coast Guard needs a 
Reauthorization Act every year just the way the rest of the 
military does. Is there anything else you need from this 
committee, whether it is Arctic related or any other broad 
based Coast Guard issues that are at the top of your list right 
now?
    Admiral Ray. Senator, I thank you for your support. I think 
as we have discussed two or three times here, that realization 
that the Coast Guard needs, in addition to the capital assets 
that Congress has been so good at providing us, we need those 
operations to maintenance funds moving forward, because that is 
what makes us go and will make us be the Coast Guard we need to 
be.
    And then I would be remiss and I would be--my Coastees 
would be disappointed in me. You know, our Coastees, when I 
travel around the Coast Guard, they still remember that 
shutdown, that partial shutdown of 2019 and how that affected 
them, viscerally affected them and their families. And so I 
would just ask for your continued support, direct finance so 
that the Coastees never have to--you know, if any military 
member is getting paid, they need to be getting paid.
    Senator Sullivan. I agree 100 percent with that last 
comment, and as you know, some of us worked day and night to 
make sure that wouldn't happen, didn't happen, got cured 
quickly when it did happen. And it is my goal as Chairman of 
this committee to make sure something like that never, ever, 
ever happens again. It was an outrage. The Coast Guard members, 
the family members and trust me, I did a few town halls in 
Alaska with them, they were appropriately really pissed and 
they should have been. And we need to make sure that doesn't 
happen again. I see we have one additional Senator who joined 
us. Senator Cruz, the floor is yours.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

    Senator Cruz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me 
thank you also for convening this hearing and for your 
leadership on this issue. Chairman Sullivan is the leading 
champion for the Coast Guard in the U.S. Senate and also the 
leading champion for America leading in the Arctic. And I am 
grateful for your leadership in both regards.
    Senator Sullivan. I appreciate that. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. I will also note, Admiral, and the question 
you raised about the shutdown. That shutdown in 2019 was 
unfortunate. And Senator Sullivan and I together teamed up on 
legislation to pay the men and women of the Coast Guard and 
took to the Senate floor trying to get the Senate to adopt it. 
Unfortunately, a Democratic Senator raised an objection and 
held the men and women of the Coast Guard hostage to that. And 
so I am hopeful we don't see a reprise of that in the days and 
weeks to come.
    The Arctic Circle has strategic, economic, and military 
significance for the United States, and I want to thank the 
Coast Guard for your continued presence in the region, your 
leadership working to protect America's interests. I've said 
for a long time that China is an adversary who would benefit 
from an American retreat all across the globe. President Xi and 
the Chinese Communist Party are investing heavily in the 
military, as is Russia. In your assessment today, who is the 
dominant power in the Arctic Circle?
    Admiral Ray. Senator, thanks for the question. From the 
analysis that we have done, I mean, obviously, if you look at 
the planet from the North down, down, looking down at the North 
Pole, you can see the extensive shoreline that Russia has. You 
know that they are--they are a force to be reckoned with there 
just because of geography. They have got the geography and they 
have got the natural resources there. So in the near term, I 
think Russia is certainly the Nation that we should really be 
paying close attention to. But we cannot ever take our eyes off 
the ball on China.
    I think that the behavior they are displaying in the polar 
regions, not just the Arctic, but the Antarctic and not just 
the Alaska Arctic, but over by Greenland as well, they are they 
are displaying similar activity, following, in my opinion and 
the analysis I've done, this is all unclassed, with regards to, 
you know, they are following the same playbook they followed in 
the South China Sea and following the places they do everywhere 
else. They will get a toehold, start working in the name of 
science, in the name of other things, and the next thing you 
know, they are moving forward with their agenda there. Does 
that answers your question, Senator?
    Senator Cruz. In your assessment, what would be the effect 
to the United States if we were to cede control of the Arctic 
to the Russians and the Chinese?
    Admiral Ray. Well, it would be no different than ceding the 
Gulf of Mexico to somebody else. It is a shore of the United 
States. It is the approach United States, although it is not as 
accessible as the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Coast or name 
your coast, but it is the same sovereignty rules and the same--
we have the duty, we in the Coast Guard, and this is what we--
we have the duty to protect it now. 30 years ago, when I was a 
young officer in the service, nobody talked about it because 
the multi-year ice had not receded. But now there is access out 
there that didn't exist. Traffic through the Bering Strait, 
increased, you know, 200 percent in the last four or 5 years.
    It is not going to replace the Suez Canal anytime soon, but 
it is growing and the access is up there. So I would say we 
should be planning to be able to exert our sovereignty, protect 
our resources, provide support for those who need access, and 
these are eco-tourists, these are Americans, a lot of them, or 
also the folks who are Alaska Natives who live and make their 
living up there. We need to be the same Coast Guard, I am 
speaking from a Coast Guard perspective, for them as I am for 
any other state in our country.
    Senator Cruz. You said in your opening statement that State 
actors, as well as non-State actors, are seeking to advance 
their own interests in the Arctic. What did you mean by non-
State actors?
    Admiral Ray. Well, the potential for IUU fishing will exist 
up there. That is coming. I mean, when the Senator, now here in 
Nome, summer before last, we had a NOAA----
    Senator Cruz. And pretend hypothetically there were a 
Senator in the room that didn't know that particular acronym.
    Admiral Ray. OK, I am sorry, that is illegal, unregulated 
and unreported fishing. That is a scourge--it literally is one 
of the scourges of the planet. I would say, from a maritime 
perspective, IUU fishing, whether it is happening in the South 
Pacific, whether it is happening in the Bahamas or pick a 
place, off the coast of Africa, off the coast of Somalia, that 
is one of the most widespread degradation of resources that the 
planet knows. And it has effects.
    And so what the Senator and I saw last year when we were in 
Nome, there was a NOAA scientist there, really bright 
scientist, and she explained, she drew out a map for us in the 
gravel of the parking lot of the harbor at Nome, and she 
explained to us because Pollock is the most substantive 
American fishery. We could probably get arguments on that from 
other parts of the country, but it is the greatest in capacity 
what happens. And that is caught in the Bering Sea, and those 
Pollocks are moving North, up toward the Arctic.
    Now, there is a 16 year moratorium on fishing in the Arctic 
that pretty much everyone agrees who has the capability to fish 
up there. But they will be up there. They will be up there and 
they would deplete those resources just like they will anywhere 
else if we let them.
    Senator Cruz. And what resources does a Coast Guard need to 
combat both State and non-State actors in the Arctic?
    Admiral Ray. The capital assets that we are being provided 
right now, whether it is polar security cutters and continue to 
be able to build out that fleet, because what happens is--and 
that is why we call it polar security cutters and not 
icebreakers per say moving forward, because breaking ice is 
just a means to an end. The end is to get Coast Guard cutters 
with Coast Guardsmen on scene to a place where either people 
need a rescue or they need arresting. And we do both of those. 
And so that is the resources we need. And then the aircraft, 
the communications capability to go with them. But in the short 
term, as I was telling the Committee earlier, I think the 
operations and sustainment funds are really the long pole in 
the tent for our service right now.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Admiral. And as a closing 
observation, I will say I was up this summer in Alaska with 
Senator Sullivan. And my advice to you is for the Coast Guard 
to stay utterly agnostic on the malicious lie that Senator 
Sullivan persists in repeating, which is that Alaska is larger 
than Texas. And I can tell you, we Texans don't believe the 
lying maps that are put out. And my advice is for you to stay 
out of that particular squabble.
    Senator Sullivan. Just for your information, not only is it 
larger, but if you split Alaska in half, Texas would be the 
third largest state in the country. So we are--and I don't 
think the map makers are lying. But I am glad you were up 
there. And, Admiral, you are very popular. There is another 
Senator who was actually recently in Alaska as well, Senator 
Lee, who is joining us. And I am sure he has some questions as 
well.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Lee. Utah is bigger than most states, but I feel 
quite intimidated, not going to get into this dispute. I never 
realized it was up for debate, whether Texas was bigger than 
Alaska.
    Senator Sullivan. It is not up for debate, just for the 
record.
    Senator Lee. Admiral, thanks so much for being here. Thanks 
for all you do. The mission of the Coast Guard is absolutely 
essential to who we are and our ability to live our lives as we 
do. In your testimony, you note that the ability of the United 
States to lead in the Arctic hinges on physical presence in the 
region so that we can defend our homeland and safeguard our own 
security interests. You note that this is really important for 
us and we ought to stick to that. This means that we need 
assured year round access to the polar regions. The Coast Guard 
has also noted that it needs six polar security cutters, these 
PSCs, for their missions.
    Now, my understanding is that the Coast Guard and Navy's 
first contract award for a PSC anticipates construction 
beginning sometime next year, sometime in 2021. Is that right? 
And then delivery of a vessel by 2024, meaning that we may not 
have vessels to fully replace our aging icebreakers for 5 
years, give or take, possibly a little bit more. Is that right?
    Admiral Ray. That is accurate, Senator.
    Senator Lee. Now, how does this timeline harm the Coast 
Guard's readiness and its ability to carry out its core 
missions?
    Admiral Ray. Well, this timeline is--it is, really at this 
point, it is unavoidable. We've got cutters that are over 40 
years old, where the oldest one, POLAR STAR, the one that we 
talk about the most, and it is an interesting--and so urgency, 
a sense of urgency has been on the Coast Guard for several 
years now. And I am just thankful that the result of the 
leadership here in this subcommittee and the support of the 
Administration. We are moving forward with recapitalizing. 
There is no time. The longest journey starts with the first 
step and we are on the step.
    Senator Lee. You know, Federal law generally prohibits the 
use of foreign contractors, foreign shipyards, for the 
construction of Coast Guard vessels or major components of 
Coast Guard vessels. It is no secret that Finland has boasted, 
apparently with some ability to back it up, that they could 
build an icebreaker within 2 years and they could do it for 
less than $300 million. Undoubtedly, we need, for the reasons 
that you have stated quite persuasively, we need to be able to 
compete with China and with Russia in this region in 
particular.
    In order to accelerate our acquisition, based on our needs 
for the acquisition, do you think Congress ought to consider, 
in a limited manner, sort of revisiting the general prohibition 
on foreign shipbuilding? In other words, would or could 
granting some limited flexibility to our NATO partners and 
friendly Arctic nations, is that something that could help the 
Coast Guard acquire the flexibility that it needs to get these 
vessels up and running so that we can establish this presence 
that we need in the Arctic?
    Admiral Ray. Senator, first of all, as I am sure it is no 
surprise, we are huge fans and supporters of the American 
industrial base in the shipyards along the Gulf Coast in that 
and I know you are, too. With that said, I think the bridging 
strategy that makes the most sense to the Coast Guard at this 
point is this potential to lease one of these icebreakers. 
Because it would need to be, and you know, it would have to be 
U.S.-flagged to be able to have the authority that we use it 
for. So that--from the perspective we have done is trying to 
bridge the closest gap that we found ourselves in. That makes 
more sense to me.
    Senator Lee. OK, it makes more sense. But just to be clear, 
it would be no security threats associated with, security 
issues, that would attend if we were to lift this restriction 
such that we could acquire a vessel in a different way than 
current law allows. Are there any security issues that would 
preclude us from contracting with someone operating within a 
NATO power or within another friendly nation, friendly Arctic 
Nation perhaps, to help us meet our shipbuilding needs? Would 
that present any security threat?
    Admiral Ray. Certainly, it depends on which one you are 
talking about. Not all are created equal, but of the Arctic 
nations that I am familiar with, that I have dealt with, 
security of the ones that are our allies would not be the first 
concern I would have.
    Senator Lee. They would not be the first concern that you 
would have. And would they be a concern at all? Is that a 
concern to have purchased that from Finland, for example?
    Admiral Ray. Is security a concern for--not to my 
knowledge, sir.
    Senator Lee. OK. Thank you very much. I see my time has 
expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And just one 
final question relates to what Senator Lee was asking about. He 
raises a really good point about this huge gap in capability 
for coverage of protecting American sovereignty. Isn't that one 
of the reasons the President put the memo out on the issue of 
if you are not going to build, which creates some legal 
challenges, at least right now in the current law to lease? And 
that is what we are looking at doing right now. Leasing 
potential medium icebreakers from Finland is one option, is 
that correct?
    Admiral Ray. There have been several different vessels 
alluded to, some of them are of Finnish origin, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. But to lease, to close that gap and 
protect that, to at least bridge that gap until we can build 
our own.
    Admiral Ray. That is the general strategy that we have been 
exploring and as a result of the President's memo.
    Senator Sullivan. And do you think that makes sense?
    Admiral Ray. I think you would agree it does. One thing I 
do want to state, these vessels, I have been around them and 
various commercial icebreakers, if you will. And they are not--
they are not to military design with regards to communications, 
with regards to damage control, with regards to 
compartmentalization. So if we get, you know, in some sort of--
we have some sort of accident because the nature of the work 
that we do, so there is a different gap.
    We would have to do some work to them. It is not just take 
one off the shelf. If it was, we would have probably done that 
a long time ago. So there will be some work required to make 
these for the Coast Guard. But with that said, it is the 
Commandant's position and our position that we will certainly 
consider this and work to see what makes sense to bridge this 
gap.
    Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you. Sure, yes, Senator Lee.
    Senator Lee. I just have to ask the question, so if I 
understand the point that is being made, and I think Senator 
Sullivan raises an excellent point, if in order to bridge the 
gap, perhaps we could lease something. If we could lease, for 
example, a vessel that has been built in Finland, that would 
suggest that our security needs are met by that vessel or 
certainly not compromised by that.
    And if the only reason why we are not securing that vessel 
from Finland is because U.S. law prevents it, even though we 
could potentially do it for a fraction of the cost and get it 
in less than half of the time. I would suggest that is a 
question for us to consider as a Congress, why is it that for 
the sake of hewing to the status quo of what current U.S. law 
requires, if there is no security implication from doing so, 
why would we need to limit ourselves to leasing rather than 
buying with regard to a Finnish-built icebreaker? That is a 
question I have for you.
    Admiral Ray. Sir, I think it is in the national interest to 
preserve our industrial base, shipbuilding base. And I think I 
mean, history has proven that. That is what won us World War II 
largely. And so I think to outsource the building of new ships 
for the use of our military, that would be something we would 
have to consider long and hard. And so my starting position is 
that when you protect this industrial base, which is declining, 
shipbuilding base is declining along the Gulf Coast in other 
places, and so that is--and that's where I stand on that.
    Senator Lee. And I completely agree that is a legitimate 
interest to maintain our industrial base so that we can have 
access to those things. When our own industrial base can't do 
things in the same way that others could do, especially with an 
ally, a friendly Arctic nation, I think that is a good reason 
for us to ask ourselves the question of whether we ought to 
revisit some aspects of existing law. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And Admiral, I 
want to thank you again, not just for this hearing, but the 
outstanding work that you would been doing for the Coast Guard. 
So many issues beyond just the Arctic. I appreciate very much 
your testimony for this panel. The record will remain open for 
2 weeks. And if there is additional questions from Senators, 
for the record, we respectfully ask you and your team to try to 
get back to those as soon as you can.
    But for now, sir, we are going to move on to our next 
panel. And I want to thank you again for your outstanding 
testimony today and your exceptional service to our Nation. And 
please pass on to the men and women of the Coast Guard that we 
got their back, and we are working to try and make sure we take 
care of them and give them the assets and training that they 
need to protect our nation, and do it in a way that makes all 
of us proud.
    Admiral Ray. Thank you very much for the opportunity, Mr. 
Chairman. And we really do appreciate your support.
    Senator Sullivan. Absolutely. We are now going to turn to 
our next panel. We have three witnesses that I mentioned 
earlier. They are all testifying remotely, so hopefully this is 
going to work easily. We have Major General Randy Kee, and 
Stephanie Madsen, and Dr. Jennifer Francis. General Kee, we 
will begin with you, sir.

      STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RANDY A. ``CHURCH'' KEE,

       USAF (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARCTIC DOMAIN

            AWARENESS CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA,

         COMMISSIONER, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION

    General Kee. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee in Washington, 
D.C.. It is an honor to discuss U.S. Coast Guard Arctic 
capabilities for safeguarding national interests and promoting 
economic security. I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's 
interest and support o the Coast Guard's Arctic endeavors. I 
have the privilege to serve as the Director of the Arctic 
Domain Awareness Center at the DHS Center of Excellence in 
Maritime Research hosted by the University of Alaska. I am also 
a U.S. Arctic Research Commissioner. The following reflections 
are mine alone and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the organizations to which I am assigned or affiliated.
    Among my experiences in the Arctic, please note I spent 
time listening and learning from Alaska's indigenous 
communities, getting insights from people who have been a part 
of the Arctic since time began. The Arctic is exceptional. 
Arctic exceptionalism in size, breadth, and depth of ongoing 
collaboration of our science and economic endeavors, indigenous 
peoples concerns, military cooperation and governance related 
activities are really the envy of many across the globe. 
Continuing Arctic exceptionalism is by no means assured, and 
U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives in science, economics, 
and measures to ensure American security and sovereignty should 
really top U.S. priorities.
    The opportunities of an opening Arctic are incentive for 
Arctic and Antarctic nations alike to pursue easier access to 
extract minerals, harvest marine life, conduct maritime 
transport, advance tourism and project sovereign influence. 
Diminishing Arctic environment is enabling rising competition 
between national powers. The Russian Federation has refurbished 
Soviet--former Soviet Arctic bases, built additional, and is 
capable of projecting power to and through the Arctic. With a 
dominant number of icebreakers, Russia can project surface 
forces in multiple directions simultaneously.
    Russian national decisionmaking and defense planning are 
opaque at best, and Russia's Arctic military advantage should 
be met with resolve and strength as America cannot afford to be 
perceived as weak in our Arctic commitment to the Kremlin. From 
my vantage, the Russian Navy's actions against Alaskan 
fishermen in the Bering Sea in late August are frankly 
unacceptable. Harassing Alaska vessels within the U.S. EEZ 
should not go unanswered and should not happen again. It is 
important to note Russia is an Arctic Nation who shares a 
critical Arctic waterway with the United States. It is in both 
Nation's interest to prevent conflict in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas.
    Conversely, the People's Republic of China advances 
influence through the use of its economic power to gain access 
across the Arctic. China is normalizing an Arctic presence via 
national and icebreakers, gaining port access and advancing 
mining interests. It is not inconceivable China may conduct 
extractive measures closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than 
any we would likely prefer, particularly based on China's track 
record of environmental stewardship elsewhere. It is in our 
interests to find a way to decouple joint approaches between 
Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic region. This is possible 
through a diplomatic reproachment that does not condone or 
reward malign Russian actions, but guided by realizing there 
are a number of common Arctic interests between Moscow and 
Washington, D.C. I do believe that great power competition need 
not become great power confrontation.
    Against the backdrop of the most difficult operational and 
geostrategically challenging theaters in the planet, the 
selfless service of the U.S. Coast Guard makes the challenging 
look easy and conducting search and rescue, disaster response, 
law enforcement, and support to civil authorities. As a career 
military pilot with 30 years of service that includes operating 
the Arctic, please let me assure you, what America's Coast 
Guard does in the Arctic is demanding, requires daunting 
courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty. U.S. 
Coast Guard needs to project persistent power in the United 
States regions of the Arctic as well as other international 
Arctic waters. The authorization of six and appropriation of 
one polar security cutter was a critical gain. Hopefully new 
funding for more icebreaking cutters will be coming soon as 
capacity is well below what is needed. New icebreaking cutters 
need the ability to defend, communicate, and ascertain the 
operating domain.
    This summer's recent mishap aboard the Coast Guard's cutter 
HEALY highlights the challenge of the long lines of 
communications from home port in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic 
region. There should be consideration either developing or 
enhancing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an expeditionary 
function, providing a logistical and affordable levels of 
repair. Locating one or more such facilities in places such as 
Seward, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor or Nome can possibly provide ice 
going vessels an important third option between repair at sea 
or return to home port in Seattle.
    Coast Guard homeporting should be located at a robust 
multimodal transportation node, co-located with heavy marine 
industry, housing, schools, communications and logistics. I 
truly wish such facilities already existed in Alaska's Arctic, 
and advocate for smart and long term commitment to establish 
joint civil Government development of Alaskan ports. As a 
former military programmer, I am guided by the principle of 
efforts to create capabilities via ramps through multi-year 
incremental increments. One point to emphasize is the focus on 
increasing capabilities at or near the Bering Strait as this 
maritime choke point becomes--could become as strategically 
important as the Straits of Malacca or the Panama Canal to 
global maritime commerce.
    The State of Alaska's official motto, North to the Future, 
is as relevant as ever. I believe the importance of the Arctic 
will certainly continue to rise. Thank you for the opportunity 
to provide these reflections and please know how appreciative I 
am of your service to our Nation providing political leadership 
in these difficult times. I respectfully look forward to 
addressing your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Kee follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee,
  USAF (Retired), Executive Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center, 
  University of Alaska, Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission
Introduction and overview of the specific needs.
    Good afternoon to you Mr. Chairman, ranking member and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee in Washington D.C. It is a 
genuine privilege and a pleasure to discuss U.S. Coast Guard 
Capabilities for Safeguarding National Interests and Promoting Economic 
Security in the Arctic.
    I have the honor to serve as the Director of the Arctic Domain 
Awareness Center, (ADAC) a Department of Homeland Security Center of 
Excellence in Maritime Research in support of the United States Coast 
Guard's Arctic mission, hosted by the University of Alaska at the 
University of Alaska Anchorage. Please know that ADAC and the Center's 
associated research and education network are truly committed to being 
the best possible support to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as we can 
individually and collectively muster. Accordingly, we in ADAC seek to 
be supportive of the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, 
(ArcSO) as well as the U.S. Coast Guard's 2018 Maritime Commerce 
Strategic Outlook (MCSO). I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's 
interest and support of the implementation of the U.S. Coast's Arctic 
Strategic Outlook and the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in an 
Arctic context, as important and believe is greatly appreciated by many 
who are concerned about these topics in Alaska, across our Nation and 
with America's closest Arctic partners and allies, in particular, our 
allies in Canada.
    In addition to serving and supporting the U.S. Coast Guard in 
leading ADAC, I respectfully relay that I was recently appointed as a 
Commissioner to the U.S. Arctic Research Commission by the President of 
the United States. In the coming months and years, I look forward to 
supporting and serving with the Commission in meeting statutory 
requirements as directed in the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984. As 
is the case with many in the research community, I have the privilege 
to serve in other committees and volunteer endeavors, and list the 
following as the more significant of these collateral activities: U.S. 
Delegation lead for Situational Awareness, International Cooperative 
Engagement for Polar Research, U.S. Office of Naval Research, Global 
Fellow, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center for International 
Scholars, Co-Chair, Alaska Civil Armed Services Team (ACAST), State of 
Alaska.
    I respectfully submit the reflections contained in this document 
are mine alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. 
Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, the State of Alaska, 
the University of Alaska, the Office of Naval Research, the Wilson 
Center or the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. These reflections do 
represent however, many years of Arctic focused endeavors ranging from 
military operations to military and national strategy development, 
multinational military engagement focused on Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities, policy and planning for defense and security formulation, 
and directing a multidiscipline center of Arctic maritime research.
    While many of these experiences are oriented at the Federal or 
multinational level, they also include time spent listening, learning 
and working with Alaska's indigenous communities of leaders, gaining 
understanding and insights of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea 
areas from these leaders in local and place-based knowledge. No 
meaningful work can happen in this region without the insight, 
involvement and collaboration with these communities.
    Due to the close collaboration we have at ADAC with DHS and the 
multiple echelons of Arctic-oriented service within the USCG, we 
identify our Center as an extended member of the DHS and Coast Guard 
family and celebrate their successes, while trying to lessen the burden 
of their operational challenges. The Center achieves this effort in a 
cost-effective manner by harnessing the power of the University of 
Alaska and our network of partners and collaborators, which contain 
research nodes across the United States, extensive research 
collaboration across Canada and some additional collaborations with 
America's Nordic Allies and partners as well. Strategically, ADAC's 
research, educational programs and convening activities continue to 
seek solutions that support the USCG's statutory missions associated 
with Coast Guard's Title 10 and Title 14 Authorities.
    At the outset, I very much hope the committee recognizes my 
reflections are oriented to be supportive of the challenges our 
Nation's Coast Guard faces in securing and protecting the U.S. Arctic 
maritime region. Against the backdrop of one of the most difficult 
operational theaters on the planet, the selfless service of the U.S. 
Coast Guard makes the challenging look easy in conducting search and 
rescue, disaster response, law enforcement and support to civil 
authorities. As a career military pilot with three decades of service 
that includes operating in the Arctic and across many other operational 
demanding areas, please let me assure you . . . what America's Coast 
Guard does every day in the Arctic is supremely demanding, requiring 
daunting courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty.
    The USCG has long made the case of needing to revitalize their 
ability to project persistent sovereign power into the ice-laden 
regions of the U.S. Arctic as well as the international waters of the 
Central Arctic. This persistent power is best advanced via Polar 
Security Cutters. The authorization of six and the appropriation of one 
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) was critically needed and hopefully 
additional appropriations for more Polar Security Cutters will be 
coming sooner than later, as the current capability of the U.S. Coast 
Guard in this capacity is greatly diminished and well below what is 
needed for the mission.
    While the platforms matter, as persistent presence is not achieved 
without them, it is useful to consider a comprehensive systems approach 
to projecting such persistence. USCG PSC's without connectivity or 
communications may be unable to respond when and where most needed in a 
timely manner for crisis response. PSC's that have lagging or 
incomplete operational domain awareness may not be able to ascertain 
risk or have sufficient tactical knowledge and understanding to conduct 
an assigned mission. For safety and mission assurance PSCs must be 
manned by crews and leadership that have been trained and educated to 
fully comprehend a complex operating environment. PSC's that do not 
have minimal logistics and support located within the theater they 
operate, may have to forfeit their operational tasking and retrograde 
thousands of miles back to home port to effect repairs when mechanical 
issues arise that are beyond the ability to repair at sea.
    As such, creating a systems approach in support of projecting 
persistence, that include PSCs, and complementary capabilities in 
communications & connectivity, domain awareness, institutionalized 
training and in-theater logistics support can result in PSCs providing 
a presence that signals to friend and foe alike. . .the U.S. Coast 
Guard is on the watch and vigilantly ready to protect and secure the 
U.S. maritime Arctic.
    Further, ensuring the U.S. Coast Guard is supported with the best 
understanding science and technology can deliver in characterizing the 
ever-changing Arctic at fine scale for U.S. Coast Guard operational and 
tactical decision makers, is a persistent and enduring need.
    The following paragraphs are presented to describe the challenge, 
present the key drivers of concern, offering solutions to consider and 
reflecting on opportunities to advance an improved chance of success 
for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Homeland Security Enterprise in better 
securing our Arctic maritime national interests.
A discussion on the geostrategic challenges facing the Coast Guard and 
        our national interests in the Arctic.
    Alaska and Alaska's maritime region make the U.S. an Arctic nation. 
While it may not be evident to many, and likely, most Americans, the 
Arctic region is vital to U.S. national interests and Alaska's maritime 
regions of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are the Arctic 
approaches to U.S. sovereign territory. It is a region that is 
experiencing great change due to rising temperatures, now rising at 
more than twice the rate as lower latitudes and as forecasts indicate, 
this trend is posed to continue, and bring unique challenges that will 
strain all the inhabitants' ability to resiliently adapt . . . flora, 
fauna and people alike.
    When the United States became an Arctic nation in 1867, the Nation 
became responsible for facilitating domestic security and defending 
national sovereignty across a significant frontier, known to the 
generations of Alaska Native residents and a handful of explorers, 
miners, trappers and settlers from the continental U.S., Canada, Russia 
or other places. In the more than a century and half since the Alaska 
purchase, the national security challenges within America's Arctic have 
fundamentally changed. As seasonal Arctic ocean sea ice levels 
continues to diminish, the barriers of access are opening the Arctic 
region to natural resource development, maritime trade, and tourism, 
all of which is substantially transforming the security landscape of 
the high latitude north. New international actors now look to the 
Arctic for opportunity, while existing Arctic nations are now advancing 
efforts to better realize the region's economic potential.
    As the changing Arctic presents new economic and geopolitical 
opportunities, environmental change poses a significant threat to 
current economic systems and traditional lifestyles in the Arctic. 
Thawing (and sometimes melting) permafrost is compromising the land 
that serves as the foundation for coastal Arctic communities and the 
small number of connecting roads and ports. With less sea ice cover, 
weather systems are becoming more volatile, allowing for stronger storm 
systems that further exacerbate coastal erosion through storm surges, 
high winds and coastal flooding. Environmental changes in the Bering 
Sea is now having an impact to traditional commercial and subsistence 
fisheries as fish stocks are starting to move north, risking and in 
some instances, already dislocating traditional food sources for marine 
mammals and Alaskan Arctic residents alike. Collectively, these 
environmentally focused changes pose a significant threat to existing 
coastal communities, local economies and associated infrastructure 
within the region.
    The opportunities of an opening Arctic are an incentive for Arctic 
and non-Arctic nations alike to pursue easier to access and extract 
mineral and petrochemical resources, pursue fish proteins (at present, 
outside of the Central Arctic Ocean), conduct maritime transport, 
advance tourism and project sovereign influence through national 
flagged vessels.
    Reductions in sea ice have reduced the access barrier to maritime 
operations and as a result, increasing activity is gaining in the 
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea regions. as well of course the overall 
pan-Arctic, which includes the Northern Sea Route along Russia's 
northern shore and the Northwest Passage across Northern Canada. The 
Arctic's diminishing sea ice environment is increasing accessibility to 
the vast hydrocarbon deposits within the region, which allows for 
Arctic nation-states like the Russian Federation to expand resource 
extraction efforts. The diminishing ice Arctic is enabling sea lanes of 
the Arctic to open sooner and stay open longer through the summer 
months and increasingly into the fall. This past May as an example, saw 
the earliest recorded transit of the Northern Sea Route, a record that 
will likely be routinely broken repeatedly in the seasons to come. The 
emerging economic potential of the Northern Sea Route, and the 
possibility of a viable Transpolar route within this century have 
incentivized nations and industry to consider leveraging these new and 
shorter routes for transporting maritime commerce as an economic 
advantage.
    The diminishing Arctic ice environment that is enabling rising 
competition is manifesting itself in a multifaceted manner. It is well 
understood the Russian Federation has restored and refurbished former 
Soviet bases along Russia's Arctic region, while creating new 
facilities and establishing forces at those stations capable of 
projecting power in and through the Arctic region, well beyond national 
borders. If this was simply establishing a safe and secure Russian 
Arctic in creating sound defense by having a more than capable offense, 
then such activities may be reasonable and possibly even acceptable. 
However, Russian national decisions and associated defense planning, 
are opaque at best, and the asymmetric Arctic military advantage 
created in the Russian Federation should be met with resolve and 
strength by the U.S. and America's Allies . . . as resolve and strength 
has historically been successful to stabilize relations between Moscow 
and Washington D.C.
    Russia's approach to managing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) bears 
monitoring. Their practices obliquely, if not directly, potentially 
restrict freedom of navigation and counter the aspect the NSR is an 
international waterway.
    Russia is no doubt, a considerable Arctic maritime power. With a 
dominant number of ice breakers, that range from vessels suitable for 
riverine operations to nuclear-powered ocean-going vessels, the Russian 
military can project sovereign influence throughout the pan Arctic in 
multiple directions simultaneously.
    Russian abilities to muster and project military forces into the 
Arctic are remarkable. The range and complexity of these activities 
have continued to grow substantially following their restart of Long-
Range Aviation back in January 2007.
    Russian military exercises in the Bering Sea in late August are a 
deeply worrying example where lack of understanding, communication and 
a willingness for provocation, places not only military forces and 
response measures at risk, but these actions also place U.S. citizens 
at risk, such as the U.S. fishing fleet that were interrupted and 
alarmed in their commercial activities by poorly understood and 
reportedly aggressive Russian military maneuvers.
    Since the routine establishment of Extended Economic Zones (EEZ), 
normally 200 nautical miles from shore, as codified in the United 
Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
1982, foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage, 
permitting transit and freedom of navigation as long as these vessels 
are not conducting items exclusively prohibited such as weapons 
testing, polluting, fishing or conducting scientific research. 
According to UNCLOS, it was allowable for the Russian navy to exercise 
in the U.S. EEZ, as long as the vessels stayed outside of U.S. 
territorial waters (12 nautical miles from shore).
    However, the Russian navy aggressive actions against U.S. flagged 
Alaskan fishermen in late August this year, are unacceptable. The 
Alaskan fishermen where rightly operating in a region well known and 
well established as a profitable fishing ground. For U.S. vessels to be 
harassed and ultimately forced to depart the area and losing the 
associated economic opportunity should not be permitted, particularly, 
as these fishermen where operating within the U.S. EEZ and adhering to 
the usual and customary practices of UNCLOS and of course U.S. fishing 
regulations.
    In past experiences while serving in uniform, I have been 
confronted by military members of the Russian Federation. While my 
reflections are anecdotal and not a full analysis, these experiences 
have created a personal reflection that Russian military rewards those 
who act aggressively, and restraint can often be seen as a sign of 
weakness.
    As the Russian Federation is an Arctic nation who shares a critical 
waterways management challenge with the United States, it is in both 
nations' interests to resolve conflicts, effectively communicate and 
find solutions to prevent escalation of tension and a rise in military 
actions along our shared and the economically increasingly important 
waterways in the Chukchi and Bering Seas.
    From personal experience, it is my belief that Russia respects 
strength and resolve, and towards that end the U.S. National Security 
Strategy provides the antidote and guiding perspective . . . peace 
through strength, sustained in a competent, professional manner earns 
the respect of the Kremlin and Russian forces. This requires 
investment, training, proficiency and most importantly . . . persistent 
presence, oriented on a timetable and tempo of our choosing.
    In sum, the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as weak in our 
Arctic resolve to the Kremlin. Certainly, America should avoid over-
reacting in a manner that may be seen as unrestrained escalation, but 
should reserve the right to escalate if needed to retain the initiative 
and in every case, ensure Russia understands, the United States of 
America will defend our citizens, our territory, our treaty Allies and 
our National Interests.
    The Peoples Republic of China's efforts in the Arctic is 
manifesting itself differently than Russian actions. China continues to 
maximize it influence through use of its economic power to create 
potential for access to policy governance in forums such as the Arctic 
Council, and uses its economic strength to potentially position China 
to gain access to Arctic regional mineral wealth, fish proteins and 
more. China's economic partnership with Russia for Arctic region 
liquified natural gas (LNG) is one example of China's advancement on 
their declared Belt and Road initiative. China continues to project 
sovereign presence into and across the Arctic via Xue Long I and Xue 
Long II icebreaker cruises, with a third Xue Long to join future 
efforts. There are media reports that China is seeking to replicate 
Russian examples of developing nuclear powered ice breakers. In 
addition to investments in LNG on Russia's Arctic Yamal Peninsula, 
China's influence in gaining Iceland commercial port access and efforts 
to advance commercial mining interests in Greenland, signal China's 
strategic aims contain a comprehensive pan-Arctic approach. Based on 
their actions in other regions, it is a reasonable conclusion to state 
Chinese national need for raw resources such as mineral and fish 
proteins will continue to drive their aspirations and activities across 
the Arctic.s
    The People's Republic of China see the Arctic as integral to its 
global ambitions. It is fairly clear that China will continue efforts 
to gain access to resources and deliver products to market for economic 
benefit, while also establishing influence among the Arctic community 
who may be tempted by promises of infrastructure investment and 
economic development through Chinese investment. Chinese icebreakers 
continue to project presence in the Arctic region, to include 
operations in the Arctic basin outside of the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the 
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. It is not inconceivable that such a presence 
could lead to mineral and other extractive measures in the future--
closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than we would likely prefer, 
particularly when considering the insufficient measures Chinese 
industry has made towards environmental stewardship in other regions 
across the globe.
    China's willingness to support infrastructure in developing 
regions, provides many reasons for caution and close examination of any 
promise or offer made by the Chinese government or government supported 
industry. Regrettably, there are a number of instances elsewhere on the 
planet where such promises have yet to substantially deliver, where 
more is the case where profound disappointment in these arrangements 
has been the result. One needs to simply review the many instances in 
Africa, South and Southeast Asia to get a full picture of the 
corresponding risks that await in the Arctic. China is not an Arctic 
nation, yet is acting as it has sovereign interests in the Arctic, and 
had its advocates continue to make remarks that China seeks and should 
be granted a role in Arctic Governance at a number of multinational 
forums such as the 2019 U.S. Arctic Research Commission and Woodrow 
Wilson Center hosted conference on the Impacts of a Diminishing Ice 
Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations. In sum, China's effective use 
in leveraging its national economic strength as a means to gain 
political influence across the Arctic is competing and conflicting with 
corresponding U.S. National Interests.
    To be sure, the Arctic is but one area in the growing array of geo-
strategic challenges between the United States and China, but the pace 
of Chinese advancement in and across the pan Arctic region, to include 
their presence near U.S. Arctic waters is outpacing American countering 
efforts to deter and dissuade Chinese actions in the Arctic, which are 
counter to American national interest.
    A similar intent may be implied about Russia. However, while 
Russian military strength and considerable reach of their forces across 
the Arctic, arrayed against Europe and deployed in the Middle East, are 
dispatched by a nation that has an insufficient economic engine to 
long-term sustain such force. Russian investments in military 
capability are to be taken seriously, however, Russian economic 
shortfalls compromise Russian military strength, particularly when 
compared to the economic muscle of China as the world's second largest 
economy. Accordingly, finding ways to manage tensions with the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic as fellow Arctic nations, should be sought, 
particularly from a position of U.S. strength. Such measures should 
seek to first, find a way to decouple joint approaches between Moscow 
and Beijing. This is possible through diplomatic rapprochement that 
does not condone or reward past and current malign Russian actions, but 
guided by realizing there are a number of common interests in the 
Arctic between Moscow and Washington D.C. This approach may be well 
aligned to American interests and serve to better manage escalation of 
military tensions in the Arctic.
    The above discussions are a representative sample of the 
geostrategic challenges that face U.S. national interests in the 
Arctic. What is important to emphasize, Great Power Competition need 
not become Great Power Confrontation, and measures to manage and as 
useful, deescalate are important, if not critical. To be sure, 
escalation management requires the means and capabilities to back words 
with commensurate force. This is not only a Department of Defense 
matter. . .this includes ensuring needed capability within the national 
security enterprise, including the Department of Homeland Security and 
the United States Coast Guard.
    Against this backdrop, it is important for the Nation to continue 
to invest in real capabilities and invest in efforts that continue to 
innovate DHS and U.S. Coast Guard presence and ability to project and 
sustain activities in the Arctic region, particularly, U.S. Arctic 
maritime regions. Real capabilities such as PSCs, but also the means to 
make these platforms more versatile, more connected and more 
interoperable with the rest of the U.S. joint force and with our Allies 
and partners.
A discussion on civil safety and security challenges facing the U.S. 
        Coast Guard in the Arctic.
    While rising competition among the Great Powers is a pacing 
interest on Arctic matters, the spectrum of challenges that impact the 
U.S. maritime Arctic are considerable, and yet often times overshadowed 
by the higher profile provided to Great Power Competition.
    In order to prepare for these existing and increasingly complex 
security challenges, the U.S. Coast Guard released the USCG Arctic 
Strategic Outlook in 2019, significantly updating the prior 2013 
Strategy to focus three ``complementary lines of effort'' to the USCG 
will endeavor in order protect national interests: 1. Enhance 
Capability to Operate Effectively in the Dynamic Arctic. 2. Strengthen 
Rules-Based Order. 3. Innovate and Adapt to Promote Resilience and 
Prosperity. In order to prepare for the challenges facing the USCG in 
supporting the changes of American Maritime Commerce the USCG released 
the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in 2019. Along the Aleutians 
(the U.S. Congressional Southern Boundary of the Arctic), through the 
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas provides the USCG an opportunity to 
view both the ArcSO and the MCSO in an integrated manner, providing 
opportunities to advance safety, security, waterways management and 
protection to maritime commerce for the benefit of the nation, industry 
and communities in the region.
    The Arctic region continues to experience unprecedented change in 
terms of environment, weather patterns, and human activity. Over the 
past year, rapidly warming trends have contributed to decreasing extant 
of Arctic Ocean sea ice and spurred seasonal increases in storm 
severity, via significantly stronger winds and coastal storm surges 
buffeting shores across the North American Arctic. As the Arctic 
continues to warm, the foundations of coastal regions securely frozen 
for centuries are now thawing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
intensifying severe weather patterns. Across the U.S. Arctic, this 
thawing terrain has an unusually high susceptibility to erosion, which 
is of great concern to associated infrastructure and communities. 
Characterizing these changes at fine scale, remains a research 
challenge that has yet to be fully addressed.
    Enabled by a changing environment, human activity across the Arctic 
is rising and includes increased commercial marine traffic, bolstered 
adventure tourism, (albeit temporarily dampened due to the Coronavirus 
pandemic) and expanded efforts to develop and conduct resource 
exploration and extraction methodologies. Newly opened pathways from 
the diminishing ice environment is a draw for nefarious influences in 
the region and can possibly contribute to unconventional marine safety 
and security threats including increased illicit trafficking and 
criminal activity. While modest global crude oil prices continue to 
dampen off-shore Arctic oil exploration activities in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas, current favorable U.S. government exploration policies 
and historically fluctuating crude oil prices are likely to ensure that 
long-range oil and gas exploration activities will likely increase 
across the North American Arctic in the coming years.
    Transportation networks across the North American Arctic are 
principally limited to air and seasonal marine conveyance. Economic 
development remains limited due to remoteness, lack of infrastructure, 
high cost, and difficulty establishing new roads, ports, and 
facilities. In context of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the 
USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, there is a need to consider how DHS and 
USCG will safeguard and secure new economic developments within the 
U.S. Arctic coastal and maritime regions in order to meet broad 
strategic goals for regional security.
    An increasingly dynamic Arctic continues to affect populations 
whose ancestors have inhabited the region for generations. Subsistence 
lifestyles continue but are increasingly threatened by retreating ice 
and increased regional industrial activity (such as marine shipping and 
resource extraction), which affect marine mammal activities and 
populations. Sincere consideration and active participation of local 
populations' lifestyles, practices, and customs should guide new U.S. 
Federal initiatives and inform DHS and USCG regional activities.
    As trends indicate, human activity across the Arctic continues to 
increase in scope and magnitude. As new Arctic expansion and operations 
bring a more diverse and less experienced population and the rapidly 
changing Arctic environment confounds traditional understanding, the 
percentage of those truly prepared for the Arctic environment is in 
decline. This leads to risk-prone behaviors that stress resources and 
challenge the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to conduct search and rescue, 
humanitarian assistance missions, protect fisheries and marine life and 
lead disaster response operations. Additionally, as more outsiders 
enter the Arctic, the reasons for their arrival become more diverse 
resulting in increased need for vigilance in enforcing national laws 
and regulations.
    The preceding paragraphs outline a series of concerns and a series 
of needs to consider in realizing a future U.S. maritime Arctic region 
better matched to national interests and the U.S. citizens who call the 
region home. Addressing these challenges are not only limited to the 
U.S. Arctic maritime region but should be conducted in a manner that 
better allows the U.S. Arctic maritime region to serve as the point of 
departure for increased efforts in the National Interest across the 
Arctic basin. To be sure, the investment costs to realize a substantial 
gain of economic prosperity for the region is sizeable, but so too is 
the potential opportunity.
    The Arctic is an exceptional region. Arctic ``exceptionalism'' in 
the size, breadth and depth of ongoing collaboration in facets such as 
Arctic science, economic endeavors, recognition of indigenous peoples 
and governance-related activities such as the mechanisms associated 
with the Arctic Council are the envy of many other regions across the 
globe. However, continuation of these aspects of Arctic exceptionalism 
is by no means assured and U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives of 
science, economics, and measures to ensure U.S. security and 
sovereignty, are well within U.S. national interests.
A discussion on solutions and supporting concepts.
    Responding to the drivers of concern . . . it is important, if not 
critical to provide sustained support to the U.S. Coast Guard with 
improvements and capability to smartly project presence and enforcement 
to preserve and protect U.S. interests within our sovereign spaces, 
which ranges in providing the clenched fist of resolve to security 
missions to the hand of help to respond to civil crisis and to advance 
science and research in a pan-Arctic context to support the public 
good.
    What this means, is the real and critical value to field the Polar 
Security platforms validated to support the U.S. Coast Guard polar 
requirements. This also means providing these platforms the ability to 
serve as fully capable instruments of national sovereignty, capable to 
deter, dissuade and defend in like manner to USCG National Security 
Cutters. Advancing U.S. Coast Guard Arctic and Antarctic capabilities 
requires working with science and technology research and providers to 
gain smart abilities to receive and conduct command and control and to 
establish situational awareness and overall domain understanding, 
across remote and austere regions that have well understood limitations 
in communications and logistics infrastructure.
    This summer's recent mishap aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter 
Healy, highlights the challenges of the long lines of communications 
from the Healy's homeport in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic region. 
Establishing a home port closer to the Arctic with full depot level 
repair capability is a considerable, and in fact, a quite massive 
investment in heavy infrastructure, base development, family quarters 
and more, particularly since no corresponding commercial infrastructure 
fully exists in Alaska.
    Homeporting of capital U.S. Coast Guard assets should be located at 
a robust multimodal transportation (air, road/rail, and seaport) node, 
with co-located heavy marine industry, piers, housing, schools, 
communications and logistics capability already exists. While I truly 
wish such facilities did exist in Alaska, and in particular, in the 
Arctic, and I would heartily advocate for smart and long-term 
commitment to establish joint civil-government development of Alaskan 
ports. As a former Headquarters U.S. Air Force programmer, I am guided 
by the principal of programmatic road maps that create capability via 
``ramps'' . . . guided by a joint vision and sustained incremental 
advances that over a multi-year period to realize the vision. In sum--
until a comprehensive Alaskan Arctic/near Arctic commercial port 
facility is realized, it may be wise to consider maintaining PSC home 
ports in Seattle, leveraging the existing commercial investments, that 
reduce the cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
    However, there should be consideration and deliberation in either 
developing or enhancing existing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an 
expeditionary/intermediary function providing logistical and affordable 
level of repair function for PSC Arctic operations. Locating one or 
more Polar Security Cutter expeditionary support/logistics facilities 
at locations near existing USCG facilities at Seward, Kodiak or a 
refurbished location at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians or alongside 
future developments at a deep-water port in Nome, can possibly provide 
the USCG PSC's (and other USCG plus U.S. Navy vessels) an important 
third option between repair at sea or return to home port in Seattle. 
The idea advanced by others in a port complex between the Port of Nome 
and the natural deep water port region known as Port Clarence is likely 
a highly useful future port construct.
    Quite frankly, advancing expeditionary support/logistics activities 
in or near the Alaskan Arctic region could prove the most helpful start 
in creating the programmatic ramp that could result in a multiyear 
approach to smart civil/military solutions to enable PSC homeporting, 
particularly, as industry sees opportunity to also invest in Arctic 
maritime transportation, tourism and extraction activities. From a 
geostrategic vantage, I do respectfully recommend that planners and 
programmers focus on increasing capabilities at/near the Bering Strait, 
as this maritime chokepoint could become as important as the Straits of 
Malacca or the Panama Canal to global maritime commerce.
    While USCG Search and Rescue in Alaska and the U.S. Arctic is well 
known and highly regarded, providing pollution and other environmental 
response across Alaska's coastal and maritime region is a thankless and 
exacting mission for the USCG. Spill response is costly, and proactive 
prevention is difficult and logistically straining. Scientific research 
and oil spill response communities provide important support to the 
efforts, but to be sure, advancing science of spill response and 
improving inspections using science and autonomous systems to better 
monitor across storage facilities across vast and remote regions will 
grow more important as facilities age and are more compromised by 
thawing permafrost and other environmental changes underway across the 
Arctic.
    Advancing the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic and overall polar 
capabilities also means advancing trusted relationships, with other 
Arctic Coast Guards as conducted via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, but 
importantly with Russian counterparts (for Bering & Chukchi Sea 
waterways management), Canadian Allies and with the Kingdom of Denmark 
as well as representative government on Greenland. Sustaining trusted 
relationships are a domestic matter as well. U.S. Coast Guard Arctic 
relations across Federal Departments and Agencies, State of Alaska, 
Alaska Native Communities and Academic partners take time to develop 
and once established, should be nurtured and sustained. In particular, 
it remains critical to consult and understand the challenges faced by 
the U.S. citizens of the Arctic who see first-hand, the changing Arctic 
maritime and can provide uniquely important insights beneficial to 
safety and security responders. The adage that you can't surge trust or 
a trusted relationship . . . applies in full measure to the Arctic.
    While the Arctic region is increasingly impacted by the changing 
physical terrain and a rise in a variety of human activities, the 
Arctic also provides some of the best examples of international 
cooperation on the planet. Highlights include the Arctic Council, led 
by 8 nations and 6 internationally recognized Arctic Indigenous groups, 
and supported by outstanding scientific research and focused working 
groups; the International Maritime Organization (and the IMO's 
supporting Polar Code); the International Arctic Science Committee; the 
University of the Arctic; the Arctic Coast Guard Forum; and the Arctic 
Security Forces Roundtable.
    While I am certain the Committee is familiar with the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a former military operator 
and someone familiar with international maritime operations, in an 
Arctic context, the United States could realize a stronger advantage by 
ratifying the treaty. In understanding there are both pros and cons 
towards ratification, failure to ratify reduces the influence in 
advancing U.S. interests in rules-based order across the international 
maritime region. The United States is fortunate to have Canada as our 
closest Arctic defense and security partner and ally. This includes a 
shared defense commitment through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, shared protection via protecting respective aerospace 
domains and the maritime approaches to Canadian and American sovereign 
territory via the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and 
a complementary defense arrangement through United States Northern 
Command and Canada's Joint Operations Command. This bi-national defense 
cooperation is supported by the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of 
Defense (PJBD), established in 1940 by joint declaration between the 
U.S. President and the Canadian Prime Minister. PJBD today has 4 CANUS 
departments represented: DoD, DHS and Canada's Department of National 
Defense and Department of Public Safety. As useful as the forum is 
towards advancing bi-national defense and security cooperation, it 
remains perhaps, a bit underleveraged in both Washington and Ottawa.
    While fortunate to have Canada as a close and enduring ally in 
securing and defending the North American Arctic, there are key drivers 
of concern that warrant increased support to our national security 
efforts in the Arctic region, and in particular, support to the USCG.
    While the Department of Defense has rightly benefitted in gaining 
increased readiness and capability through national reinvestments, the 
USCG has lagged in gaining the needed appropriations to renew and 
improve operational capability and supporting infrastructure to support 
this sea service to conduct its statutory assigned missions in both 
defense and security in the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the Bering, Chukchi and 
Beaufort regions and providing the ability to project sovereign U.S. 
maritime surface presence into the international ice laden waters east 
of North America. For a nation with Global interests and an implied 
intent to operate across the global commons of the Polar regions, the 
Nation's Coast Guard does not have the numbers of PSCs or the 
supporting capabilities to operate, command and control and sustain 
presence to match interests.
    What may not be clear to the Committee, is the role the Arctic 
Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) at the University of Alaska provides to 
supporting the U.S. Coast Guard or other Department of Homeland 
Security Arctic missions. ADAC is a Center of Excellence in Maritime 
Research that is part of the DHS Science and Technology Office of 
University Programs (DHS S&T OUP). ADAC was founded in the Summer of 
2014, received its first funding in January 2015 and is now in its 
seventh year of providing science and technology research, professional 
workforce research assistance-ships (at both the undergraduate and 
graduate levels) and planning an array of conferences and workshops, 
convening Arctic minded professionals in security, defense and 
supporting disciplines, virtually all inclusive of Canadian 
participation, with many also including Nordic Allies and partners. It 
is important to note, that ADAC works comprehensively to characterizing 
the dynamics of change (as previously discussed), in platforms, models, 
decision support and knowledge products to assess the associated impact 
to crisis response at granular levels, to enable smarter decisions and 
smarter decision making.
    ADAC and its associated research network have developed an 
important new capability in oil spill response via autonomous 
underwater vehicles and communications systems suited to the Arctic 
region. ADAC has created and greatly advanced a construct called the 
``Arctic Incidents of National Significance'' method which creates new 
research by convening operators, scientists and industry to address 
specific concerns oriented to ``what keeps the commander up at night'' 
to create solutions for gaps and shortfalls in Arctic capabilities. 
This approach has generated new awareness tools, decision support 
science and advances in Arctic search and rescue and marine pollution 
response.
    ADAC has recently commenced a new research project using unmanned 
aerial systems from the University of Alaska Fairbanks to train and 
equip local operators Unalakleet for monitoring of fuel storage 
facilities to support U.S. Coast Guard marine inspection requirements. 
ADAC is just about ready to commence a new comprehensive Arctic and 
Alaskan communications and connectivity assessment, oriented to a whole 
of mariner community approach.
    In sum, this center of maritime research led by the University of 
Alaska is creating domain awareness across a region that is woefully 
lacking in such knowledge.
    If/as desired, I would be pleased and honored to provide more 
information about the Center as meets the desires of the Committee. If/
as desired, the following website provides a substantial insight to the 
Center's people, programs and activities: https://
arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/ In sum, ADAC has built trusted 
relationships across DHS and USCG, across the U.S. Federal and State of 
Alaska governments, Alaska Arctic communities, Arctic science 
professionals across the United States and with Canadian counterparts 
in each corresponding facet. To be sure, our team serves everyday 
focused to advance science and technology and other programs to benefit 
the DHS and USCG in their Arctic mission.
Conclusion.
    I respectfully submit, it is not my place to recommend to the Coast 
Guard or the Department of Homeland Security in how to present the 
requirements for Congressional funding or which of the myriad of 
competing demands for funding in the department or the service should 
receive the highest priority. In equal measure, it is not my place to 
recommend to this Committee, what funding priority that is presented to 
the Committee should receive highest consideration. I would recommend 
however, the U.S. Coast Guard is the nations' vanguard to secure the 
U.S. Arctic maritime region, protecting fisheries and other marine 
life, rescuing people, responding and recovering from marine pollution 
events, supporting the science community to the benefit of many and 
projecting American sovereign power across the ice laden waters of the 
Arctic. Supporting USCG Arctic and Polar capability, is in the national 
interest. Providing this selflessly serving community of USCG mariners 
the capability to meet the full spectrum of statutory missions to 
respond at strength in and across the Arctic, will preserve our 
resources, advance national power to meet the rising challenge from 
other competing nations, support civil safety and security and will 
provide America's Arctic allies and partners, needed assurance of U.S. 
commitment towards the peaceful opening of the Arctic.
    The State of Alaska's official motto ``North to the Future'' is a 
relevant now as ever. Accordingly, I believe the importance of the 
Arctic will continue to rise. As the community of science projects 
Arctic warming will continue, associated environmental changes will 
continue accelerate, and accordingly, measures to address, adapt and 
increase resilience will need critical continued investment.
    The economic opportunity of the Arctic and in particular, the U.S. 
Arctic seem quite profound, but should be viewed at more than just 
another opportunity access natural wealth. Economically developing the 
Arctic in a sustained and responsible manner is a critical national 
interest and a flourishing economy that integrates existing culture, 
respectful to Alaskan Natives and other long-standing Arctic residents 
holds needed promise to lift a region to the benefits of these regions, 
the State of Alaska and the Nation.
    Waterways in the Bering and Chukchi could one day prove as one of 
the globe's most important to maritime commerce. Managing the 
incredibly important fisheries and marine life in the U.S. Arctic 
maritime, providing safety at sea, securing U.S. EEZs and being 
vigilant and prepared to respond to crisis and disaster in one of the 
most pristine areas on the planet provides a remarkable task list for 
the U.S. Coast Guard. I do believe that prioritizing the needs of the 
Coast Guard to address this task list is critical for the Committee to 
consider and to address in a substantial way.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide these reflections, and 
please know how appreciative I am of your service to our Nation in 
providing political leadership in these difficult times. I genuinely 
appreciate your support and enabling efforts to ensure the U.S. Coast 
Guard can safely and properly meet the challenges and secure the 
opportunities of the developing Arctic region. I respectfully look 
forward to addressing your questions.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. Ms. Madsen.

   STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE MADSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AT-SEA 
                     PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION

    Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Sullivan, 
Ranking Member Markey, members of the Subcommittee, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify. My name is Stephanie Madsen. I 
am the Executive Director of the At-Sea Processors Association. 
I have spent my entire career living and working in the Bering 
Sea, Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic includes 
some of the most productive fishing grounds on Earth. It is a 
truly remarkable place with its rich native culture, stunningly 
productive marine ecosystem, and vital geopolitical positioning 
adjacent to the Russian maritime boundary.
    For decades, the U.S. fishing industry has been able to 
operate in the eastern Bering Sea safely and with legal 
certainty. That sense of security was shattered during the last 
week of August, when Russian military warships and warplanes 
initiated a series of outrageous confrontations with U.S. 
fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ. These 
confrontations, unprecedented in my almost 40 years working 
with this industry, gave rise to genuine fears for the physical 
safety of fishing captains and their crews, and cost the 
affected companies millions of dollars in lost fishing 
opportunities.
    In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger was 
harassed by members of the Russian military over the course of 
5 hours, a Russian war plane flew overhead for 2 hours, issuing 
warnings and threats via radio through broken English. Those 
threats later escalated via transmissions from a nearby Russian 
warship. Until they reached such a fever pitch, the Northern 
Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas felt he had no choice but to protect 
the safety of this crew by complying with Russian military 
orders that he sailed 5 hours south and not return until 
September 4. In the second such incident, Russian warplanes 
repeatedly buzzed two vessels, Blue North and Bristol Leader, 
warning via radio that they were on live missile fire zone and 
in imminent danger.
    They ultimately felt compelled to follow Russian military 
orders to chart a specific course at maximum speed with Blue 
North Captain David Anderson cutting his fishing gear loose in 
order to evacuate the area quickly. In the third such incident, 
three Russian warships rapidly approached a cluster of fishing 
vessels, ordering that they changed course immediately. When 
one of those vessels, the Vesteraalen, replied that it had 
fishing gear in the water so it had limited ability to change 
course, a Russian warship came directly toward it, maneuvering 
as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came within a half 
nautical mile of Vesteraalen before changing its course. As a 
representative of the U.S. fishing industry and indeed a proud 
American citizen, I am outraged that the U.S. vessels would--
could ever be subjected to this kind of treatment by a foreign 
military power.
    Today, I want to share two main messages with the 
Committee. First, in any future incident such as this, U.S. 
authorities must be far more active in safeguarding our 
sovereign fishing rights. We would later learn that these 
confrontations were related to a major Russian military 
exercise of which the Government received notice, yet nothing 
about the exercise was commuted to our industry. Furthermore, 
when captains contacted the Coast Guard to convey what was 
occurring, frontline Coast Guard personnel seemed unaware and 
were largely unable to provide our captains with guidance. In 
the event of any future exercise, news of what is planned must 
be shared widely in advance with our fleets, as well as smaller 
vessels operating out of the Northern Bering Sea communities.
    The Coast Guard must be on alert and Coast Guard assets 
must be deployed to the area to provide any assistance 
necessary to U.S. vessels. Alarmingly, none of those things 
happened here. Second, this kind of harassment simply cannot be 
allowed to become a new normal. In the rapidly changing Arctic, 
we fear being caught in the crossfire of Russia's effort to 
establish a more assertive military and economic presence, our 
sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be 
protected. From our vantage point, a remote U.S. military 
presence to protect U.S. interests in the region is simply non-
negotiable.
    I would defer to my fellow witnesses with such impressive 
military credentials and expertise to opine on precisely what 
form that should take. But I thank the members of the 
Subcommittee for their focus on this region and for considering 
the enormous economic and national security stakes that are at 
play. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Madsen follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director, 
                     At-sea Processors Association
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is 
Stephanie Madsen, and for the last 12 years I have served as Executive 
Director of the At-sea Processors Association--a trade association 
representing six member companies that operate catcher-processor 
vessels in North Pacific and U.S. West Coast fisheries. The most 
important fishery in which we participate is the Bering Sea/Aleutian 
Islands Wild Alaska Pollock fishery--the largest seafood fishery in the 
world. My members are proud to have been at the forefront of management 
innovations that have made our regions' fisheries a global model for 
sustainability. We are also a very proud contributor to Alaska's 
seafood economy, which supports 101,000 U.S. jobs and earns an 
estimated $5.6 billion in annual labor income.
    I have spent my entire career working in and around the Bering Sea/
Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic is truly remarkable, 
with its rich Native culture, stunningly productive marine ecosystem, 
and vital geopolitical positioning. Pollock fishing transcends the 
maritime boundary with Russia; our vessels operating in the U.S. 
Exclusive Economic Zone are sometimes within literal shouting distance 
of Russian vessels fishing for pollock in their waters. Yet in spite of 
this close proximity to a geopolitical adversary, our industry has for 
decades been able to operate safely and with legal certainty, relying 
on the USA/USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement concluded between James 
Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze on June 1, 1990.
    That feeling of certainty and safety has been shattered by recent 
confrontations initiated by Russian military warships and warplanes 
with U.S.-flagged fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. 
EEZ. These incidents were alarming in and of themselves; they gave rise 
to genuine fear for the physical safety of fishing captains and their 
crews, and they disrupted the business operations of fishing companies 
at a critical point in a very important fishing season. They also give 
rise to an urgent question: do we risk these kinds of confrontations 
becoming something of a ``new normal'' in the changing Arctic? And if 
so, what are U.S. policymakers and military planners doing to safeguard 
U.S. economic and security interests in this vital region?
Military Confrontations
    The last week of August started as a typical one in the summer 
fishing season. U.S.-flagged fishing vessels were operating throughout 
the Eastern Bering Sea. As always, different segments of the fleet were 
targeting a variety of species using traditional fishing methods. APA 
catcher-processor vessels work in parallel with smaller catcher vessels 
that deliver pollock and other groundfish to motherships for 
processing. Another fleet of catcher-processor vessels targets non-
pollock groundfish such as Atka mackerel and flatfish, while freezer-
longline vessels target Pacific cod. These Bering Sea fishing grounds 
are among the most productive anywhere in the world--although this year 
fishing conditions have been particularly challenging due to shifts in 
the stock dynamics and distribution.
    Tuesday, August 25 provided the first indication that it would not 
be a typical week for our fleets. The Island Enterprise, a catcher-
processor vessel operated by Trident Seafoods, was fishing in the 
vicinity of Pervenets Canyon when suddenly, without warning, a large 
submarine--what we learned later to be an Oscar-class Russian nuclear 
submarine--surfaced in the vicinity. Shortly thereafter a warship 
appeared, traveling at 17.5 knots on direct course towards the 
submarine. The warship made no contact with the Island Enterprise, but 
came within 2.5 nautical miles. Other vessels also observed the 
submarine and warship that day. These were our first clues that a major 
Russian military operation was underway smack-dab in the middle of our 
fishing grounds.
    The close and unexplained proximity of a foreign warship and 
submarine were, as you can imagine, immediately troubling. However, it 
is the events that unfolded the following day, August 26, that have 
given rise to deep concern throughout our industry. On that day the 
Russian military initiated a series of confrontations with U.S.-flagged 
fishing vessels that were, from our perspective, dangerous and 
completely unacceptable. These confrontations gave rise to genuine 
fears for the safety of captains and their crews, and in some cases led 
to operational decisions that collectively cost companies millions of 
dollars in lost fishing opportunities.

   In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger--a catcher-
        processor vessel operated by American Seafoods--was harassed by 
        members of the Russian military over the course of 
        approximately five hours. Northern Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas 
        was positioned 21 nautical miles inside the U.S. EEZ when what 
        he recognized to be a Russian military warplane started flying 
        over his vessel. The warplane initiated radio contact, and 
        through broken English started to deliver an alarming drumbeat 
        of messages warning of ``danger'' and insisting that he 
        ``leave'' as it continued to fly over the vessel at an 
        increasingly low altitude. Despite his best efforts--which 
        included enlisting the assistance of a Russian-speaking member 
        of his crew--he was unable to ascertain from the warplane a 
        clear sense of what was happening or to learn of any specific 
        course of action that was being requested of him. During this 
        period Captain Thomas repeatedly stated that he was operating 
        lawfully within the U.S. EEZ and couldn't be ordered to 
        ``leave''. He also initiated multiple conversations with United 
        States Coast Guard personnel, none of whom appeared to be aware 
        that a major Russian military exercise was underway in the U.S. 
        EEZ. After approximately two hours the warplane departed, and 
        radio contact was initiated by a Russian warship that was 
        positioned approximately 40 nautical miles away. Communications 
        from the warship became increasingly urgent, warning of 
        imminent danger and demanding that the Northern Jaeger leave, 
        without providing specific coordinates. Captain Thomas sought 
        to chart a new course on several occasions, but each time 
        communications came back from the Russian warship making clear 
        that they were not satisfied. Eventually, the Russian warship 
        ordered that Captain Thomas sail due South ``for five hours'' 
        and not return to the area until September 4. Ultimately, with 
        the level of intensity of the Russian military communications 
        continuing to increase--and no satisfactory explanation or 
        support provided by the U.S. Coast Guard--Captain Thomas 
        complied. He estimates that approximately five days of 
        productive fishing time were lost by the encounter and his 
        resulting relocation, an economic harm estimated to total 
        approximately $1.5M.

   Positioned some distance to the north of Northern Jaeger 
        were the Blue North and the Bristol Leader. These two freezer 
        longliners were harassed by a Russian military warplane, which 
        warned that they were in a live missile fire zone and in 
        imminent danger. Bristol Leader Captain Brad Hall and Blue 
        North Captain David Anderson recount similar experiences, with 
        repeated fly-overs at low altitude--in some instances as low as 
        an estimated 200 feet. After initiating radio contact, the 
        warplane issued orders that they leave the area on a specific 
        course at maximum speed. Both captains sought advice from the 
        U.S. Coast Guard but were unable to learn any additional 
        details about what was occurring. Coast Guard personnel told 
        Captain Anderson to comply with the orders he was being given 
        by the Russian military. Ultimately, both captains felt that 
        they had no choice but to abandon their fishing activities and 
        exit the area. The Blue North cut its fishing gear and left it 
        behind in order to be able evacuate the area quickly. It was 
        only when the vessels fully complied with the Russian 
        warplane's orders that the harassment ceased. The economic 
        losses relating to disabling fishing gear and relocating from 
        productive fishing grounds were significant.

   In another area, more than 50 nautical miles inside the U.S. 
        EEZ, six U.S. catcher boats and two motherships were operating 
        along the shelf break. Three Russian warships and two support 
        vessels appeared, and initiated radio communication with two of 
        the catcher boats--the Vesteraalen and the Mark 1. As the 
        warships rapidly approached the catcher boats, they issued 
        orders that they change course immediately, warning of imminent 
        danger. The Vesteraalen responded that it had fishing gear in 
        the water so had limited ability to change course. In response 
        a Russian warship came directly towards the Vesteraalen, 
        maneuvering as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came 
        within half a nautical mile of the Vesteraalen before finally 
        changing course.

    As a representative of the U.S. fishing industry--and indeed as a 
proud American citizen--I find it completely unacceptable that U.S.-
flagged vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ could ever be 
subjected to this kind of treatment. The fact that U.S. fishing 
companies, captains and crew had not been directly advised that a major 
Russian military exercise was planned in their sphere of regular 
operation is deeply concerning. The idea that U.S. vessels could be 
subjected to this kind of harassment by a foreign military power is 
alarming. And the notion that U.S. captains should be complying with 
orders issued by members of the Russian military is offensive. We need 
to ensure that the events of August 26 never happen again.
Specific Observations
    In the immediate term, we believe there are steps the U.S. 
government must take to ensure that any future Russian military 
exercise potentially impacting U.S.-flagged vessels is handled 
differently and that U.S. fishermen maintain their sovereign right to 
legally operate in the U.S. EEZ.
    First, it is imperative that our industry be notified immediately 
and directly by our own government of any such planned exercise. Our 
understanding is that Russia provided notice of their intent to conduct 
these exercises, including specific coordinates, via HYDROPAC. This is 
a communication system that is not regularly monitored by our industry, 
and I want to be clear that it does not constitute sufficient notice to 
mariners. Furthermore, as noted above, some U.S. vessels were harassed 
outside the coordinates provided via HYDROPAC. We understand that the 
HYDROPAC notice was received by at least one agency of the U.S. 
government. If any part of the U.S. government is notified of such a 
foreign military exercise in the future, there must be a clear and 
widely-understood mechanism by which that news is communicated to 
potentially impacted fishing fleets so we are aware of the exercises 
and can respond accordingly should there be a threat to the safety of 
our vessels and crew. This mechanism needs to account for the diversity 
of fishing vessels active near the U.S.-Russian maritime boundary, from 
large catcher-processors to small skiffs operated out of Northern 
Bering Sea communities. Communications issued on the exercises fell 
short of alternatives that were available to U.S. authorities, such as 
issuance of a Marine Information Bulletin.
    Second, other parts of the U.S. government--most importantly the 
United States Coast Guard--must be alerted and have an opportunity to 
plan for the safety of U.S. mariners, including U.S.-flagged fishing 
vessels while they lawfully operate within the U.S. EEZ. It is 
unacceptable that Coast Guard officers on the front lines were unable 
to provide our captains with even the most basic information or, in 
most cases, guidance when contacted.
    Third, in the event of future foreign military operations in or 
near the U.S. EEZ in the Bering Sea, plans should be in place for the 
U.S. Coast Guard to have an at-sea presence in the area to deter 
engagements by the foreign military with U.S.-flagged vessels lawfully 
operating in the U.S. EEZ and to better intervene in the event there is 
engagement or other immediate danger to our vessels. Communication to 
our vessels of potential threats to our safety should be coming from 
the U.S. Coast Guard, not the Russian military. Recognizing the need 
for a presence after the August 26 events, the Coast Guard ultimately 
deployed the CGC ALEX HALEY to the area for the remainder of the 
planned exercises. This was appreciated, but future plans should 
include the deployment of at least one cutter to an area for the 
entirety of an operation to help prevent a recurrence of what occurred 
to our fleets.
A New Normal?
    Beyond requesting the Subcommittee's help in securing these Federal 
process improvements, I welcome your focus on the broader geopolitical 
challenges in the Arctic region of which these confrontations appear to 
be merely one symptom. If indeed these exercises are part of Russia's 
effort to establish a more assertive presence in the Arctic--especially 
in a world where receding sea ice extent provides a set of new economic 
and military opportunities for regional powers--that is a cause of 
genuine alarm for our industry.
    Our sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be 
protected. Our concerns are heightened by recent proclamations by 
members of the Russian Duma calling into question the legitimacy of the 
U.S./Russia boundary line--a cornerstone of the framework for our 
Federal fisheries. Russian naval exercises cannot be allowed to serve 
as a deterrent to the fully legitimate operations of a U.S. fishing 
fleet that competes directly with the Russian seafood industry in 
global markets for pollock, Pacific cod, and other groundfish.
    Anxiety throughout the industry was also further heightened when a 
Russian warplane harassed our vessels in a separate incident the 
following month. On September 14, approximately 70 miles west of St. 
George, a Russian warplane made two direct passes over a U.S.-flagged 
catcher-processor vessel, the Starbound--the first starboard to port, 
the second stern to bow--and then performed a fly-over of a second one 
of our vessels, the Alaska Ocean. The captains estimate that the 
aircraft was at approximately 500 feet. No radio contact was made. This 
incident does not appear in any way related to an officially-noticed 
military exercise. Although it didn't come with the level of economic 
cost or genuine fears regarding crew safety that accompanied the August 
26 incidents, it is extremely worrying if it is indicative of a broader 
trend.
    From our vantage point--on the front lines of a changing Arctic--a 
robust U.S. military presence to protect U.S. interests in the region 
is simply non-negotiable. I will defer to my fellow witnesses, with 
such impressive military credentials and expertise, to opine on 
precisely what form that should take; but I thank Members of the 
Subcommittee for their focus on this region, and for considering the 
enormous economic and national security stakes that are at play.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Madsen. And I agree with 
your comments wholeheartedly and we will have a good discussion 
on some of the details of those. Hopefully you saw Admiral 
Ray's testimony in the Coast Guard's view on that as well. Dr. 
Francis, you have 5 minutes for your oral statement and if you 
would like a longer written statement, we can provide that for 
the record.

   STATEMENT OF JENNIFER FRANCIS, SENIOR SCIENTIST, WOODWELL 
                    CLIMATE RESEARCH CENTER

    Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Alright, everyone, I just 
have a few slides I want to share while I am speaking. Alright. 
Good afternoon--thank you to Chairman Sullivan and the 
Committee, and in particular to Senator--for inviting me to 
testify--today is because of the staggering decline in Arctic 
sea ice.--percent in this animation. Think of this ice as the 
Earth's mirror. It reflects most of the sun's energy that hits 
it right back to space without entering the climate system. And 
losing so much of this mirror is literally a threat multiplier 
to our National Security in several direct and indirect ways 
that are distinct from those you have already heard about 
today. The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of 
global warming.
    The extra heat now being absorbed in the Arctic Ocean has 
intensified global warming by 25 to 40 percent. The 
implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we have all 
watched in horror as a record number of billion dollar 
disasters, including wildfires, heat waves, floods and rapidly 
intensifying hurricanes, devastated parts of the United States 
and elsewhere, threatening communities, straining agriculture 
and food security, and stretching relief resources. This, 
Senators, is the face of climate change. The ice loss is also 
causing the Arctic to warm two to three times faster than the 
Earth as a whole.
    This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers and the Greenland 
ice sheet, which is accelerating sea level rise and threatening 
coastal cities and infrastructure worldwide. The rapid warming 
is in the--permafrost--grows in Arctic soils. Which could 
release--affects the frequency of extreme weather events as the 
North to South difference in air temperature is a major factor 
controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my 
own, suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference 
will make weather systems more persistent, which can lead to 
prolonged droughts, heat waves, storminess and even cold 
spells. Disrupted weather patterns pose new challenges to 
farmers and food security, electric utilities, drinking water 
managers and even human survival.
    The peoples of the North are also being directly affected 
by their transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their 
primary source of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting 
platform has thrown their way of life into chaos. The species 
that usually hunt have shifted migration patterns or 
disappeared altogether, and subarctic animals have appeared 
well North of their typical ranges. The ice serves as a means 
of transportation as well, but now it is often too thin to be 
trusted.
    Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the 
sea by large storm waves as winds now blow over ocean, open 
ocean rather than over stable sea ice. Their roads and 
airstrips are buckling as the ground beneath them thaws and 
collapses. These impacts are undermining the security of Arctic 
communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere. The news is 
not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice free Arctic waters 
enable normal cargo vessels to shortcut passages between major 
commercial ports in Eurasia and North America.
    Natural resources that have been inaccessible under the ice 
to now be more easily and economically exploited. But this 
easier access also comes with heightened risks to those 
venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in the way of our 
infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation 
resources, or even ports of call. Change has come quickly, and 
the region is woefully unprepared for these new activities. 
What can we do about these threats to National Security posed 
by Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I have discussed 
are symptoms of the underlying disease.
    To treat the disease, we need to pull out all the stops to 
reduce emissions of heat trapping gases and to remove carbon 
from the atmosphere by both natural and technological means. 
The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building 
resiliency, which depends on research that characterizes the 
physical threats, identifies the specific risks, and develop 
strategies to protect those in harm's way. This will not be 
easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more 
expensive and threatening to National Security. Thank you very 
much.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Francis follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Dr. Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist, 
                    Woodwell Climate Research Center
    Thank you to the committee and in particular to Senator Markey for 
inviting me to provide testimony for this hearing.
    The Woodwell Climate Research Center is a Massachusetts-based non-
profit organization of researchers who work with a worldwide network of 
partners to understand and combat climate change.\1\ Our scientists 
helped to launch the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 1992, and shared the Nobel Prize with the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change in 2007. Woodwell brings together cutting edge 
science, and 35 years of policy impact to find societal-scale solutions 
that can be put into immediate action. Our scientific expertise is on 
climate change impacts, natural climate solutions, and climate risk. 
This includes work with extensive research on the local, regional, and 
global impacts of the rapidly warming Arctic.
    I am a senior scientist and a member of the Arctic Program at 
Woodwell. I received my PhD in Atmospheric Sciences from the University 
of Washington in 1994. After 24 years as a research professor in the 
Department of Marine and Coastal Sciences at Rutgers University, I 
joined Woodwell in 2018. My research focuses on connections between 
climate change and the rising frequency of extreme weather events, 
particularly the role of rapid warming and melting in the Arctic.
    Fossil fuel combustion and deforestation release heat-trapping 
greenhouse gases, which in turn, have caused global average temperature 
to rise at unprecedented rates. From 1901-2019, the globe has already 
warmed by 1+C (1.8+F), with nine of the top ten warmest occurring since 
2005.\2\ The rate of warming is not attributable to natural causes; in 
fact, the globe would be in a cooling phase now if it were not for the 
effects of human activities. The responses of Earth's natural systems 
to the warming are already adversely affecting our quality of life, and 
these impacts will worsen for generations to come if emissions of heat-
trapping gases are not curtailed severely and rapidly. Mitigating, 
understanding, and preparing for these impacts is critical, hence the 
vital importance of hearings like this one.


    The effects of rapid Arctic change on the frequency and severity of 
physical hazards will affect society in all regions of the world, but 
none more so than in the Arctic.
    The pace of change in the Arctic system has been nothing short of 
staggering; the Arctic is experiencing the greater increase in average 
surface temperature globally (Fig 1). In just the past 40 years, half 
of the ice floating on the Arctic Ocean has vanished during summer.\3\ 
Ice volume has declined by a whopping 75 percent (Fig. 2). Indeed, the 
dramatic loss of Arctic sea ice is the primary reason for the recent 
intense focus on the Arctic region. You can think of this ice as the 
Earth's mirror: it reflects most of the sun's energy that hits it right 
back to space without entering the climate system. Losing so much of 
this mirror is literally a threat multiplier to our national security 
in several direct and indirect ways that are distinct from those 
related to military concerns.


    The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of global 
warming. The extra heat now being absorbed by the planet where ice used 
to exist has intensified global warming by 25-40 percent.\5\ The 
implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we've all watched 
in horror as a record number of $1 billion disasters \6\--including 
wildfires, heatwaves, floods, and rapidly intensifying hurricanes--
devastated parts of the U.S. and elsewhere, threatening the security of 
affected communities, straining agriculture and food security, and 
stretching relief resources. This, Senators, is the face of global 
warming.
    The ice loss is also causing the Arctic to warm three times faster 
than the Earth as a whole. This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers 
and the Greenland ice sheet, which contributes directly to the recent 
acceleration of sea-level rise, threatening coastal cities and 
infrastructure world-wide.\7\ The rapid warming is also hastening the 
pace of permafrost thaw--frozen Arctic soils--which could release vast 
stores of additional fossil carbon into the atmosphere.\8\ Arctic 
warming also affects the frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
events, as the north-to-south difference in air temperature is a major 
factor controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my own, 
suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference will make 
weather systems more persistent, which can lead to prolonged droughts, 
heatwaves, storminess, and even cold spells\9\. As we all have 
witnessed, these tendencies have emerged in spades. Disrupted weather 
patterns pose new challenges to farmers and food security, electric 
utilities, drinking water managers, and even human survival.
    The Peoples of the North are also being directly affected by their 
transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their primary source 
of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting platform has thrown their way 
of life into chaos. The species they usually hunt have shifted 
migration patterns or disappeared altogether, and sub-Arctic animals 
have appeared well north of their typical ranges. Sea ice serves as a 
major transportation resource, as well, but now it is often too thin to 
be trusted. Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the 
sea by large storm waves, as winds now blow over open ocean rather than 
over stable sea ice. Their roads and airstrips are buckling as the 
ground beneath them thaws and collapses. These impacts are undermining 
the security of Arctic communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere.
    The news is not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice-free Arctic 
waters enable normal cargo vessels to short-cut passages between major 
commercial ports in Eurasia and North America. Natural resources that 
have been inaccessible under the ice can now be more easily and 
economically exploited. But with this easier access also come 
heightened risks to those venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in 
the way of infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation 
resources, or even ports of call. In collaboration with Tufts 
University, Woodwell scientists have charted more than 122 million 
messages from satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, 
mapping Arctic ship traffic from 2009 to 2016 (Fig 3). The mean center 
of ship traffic has moved 300 km to the north and east, taking 
advantage of newly ice-free ocean. Change has come quickly, and the 
region is woefully unprepared for these new activities.


    What can we do about these threats to national security posed by 
Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I've discussed are symptoms of 
the underlying disease. To treat the disease, we need to pull out all 
the stops to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases and to remove 
carbon from the atmosphere via natural (such as reforestation) and 
technological (carbon capture) means.
    The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building resiliency, 
which depends on research that characterizes the physical threats, 
identifies the specific risks, and develops strategies to protect those 
in harm's way. My colleagues at Woodwell are engaged in an assessment 
of risk owing to Arctic change, a collaboration with partners at The 
Center for Climate and Security (CSS). The CSS is a Washington DC-based 
non-partisan institute housed in the Council on Strategic Risks. That 
project is employing cutting-edge climate-risk modeling to understand 
how climate change impacts will play out in the region, and how those 
will affect the existing balance of security. The project will 
demonstrate the potential value of granular modeling of climate change 
impacts to anticipate and prepare for societal instability and security 
challenges.
    Mitigating and adapting to climate change in the Arctic will not be 
easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more expensive 
and threatening to national security\10\,\11\.
References:
    1. https://www.woodwellclimate.org/
    2. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) 
National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI): https://
www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/projected-ranks#::text=The
%20warmest%20years%20globally%20have,Courtesy%20of%20NOAA%20NCEI.
    3. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC): http://nsidc.org/
arcticseaicenews/
    4. http://psc.apl.uw.edu/research/projects/arctic-sea-ice-volume-
anomaly/
    5. Duan, L., Cao, L., & Caldeira, K. (2019). Estimating 
contributions of sea ice and land snow to climate feedback. J. of 
Geophys. Res.: Atmos., 124, 199-208, doi:10.1029/2018JD029093.
    6. https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/national/2020-breaks-
billion-dollar-natural-disas
ters-record-in-us
    7. Francis, J.A. (2018). Meltdown, Scientific American, April 2018, 
Vol. 318.
    8. Natali S.M., J.D. Watts, B.M. Rogers et al., (2019). Large loss 
of CO2 in winter observed across the northern permafrost 
region. Nature Climate Change, 9, 852-857, doi:10.1038/s41558-019-0592-
8.
    9. Francis, J.A. (2019). Rough weather ahead, Scientific American, 
June 2019, Vol. 320, No. 6.
    10. Daniel, W. (2020) The National Security Implication of Climate 
Change: Redefining Threats, Bolstering Budgets, and Mobilizing the 
Arctic, Journal of International Affairs, https://
jia.sipa.columbia.edu/national-security-implications-climate-change-
redefining-threats-bolstering-budgets-and-mobilizing
    11. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/a-
security-threat-assessment-of-climate-change.pdf

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Dr. Francis, and I am going to 
ask some witnesses some of the similar questions that I asked 
Admiral Ray. General Kee and Ms. Madsen, I would like you to 
comment on the issue of Arctic--both Arctic infrastructure in 
the home porting of icebreakers in the Arctic region. As I 
mentioned, we have six that have been authorized in the 
National Defense Authorization Act years ago. One is being 
built now.
    But as you know and you mentioned it General, the capacity 
of the United States relative to the great power competition 
rivals like China and Russia is significantly less, 
dramatically less. As we are building up the fleet and as we 
are looking at the issue of even short term bridge leasing, how 
much do you think it makes sense to make sure these assets are 
actually in the Arctic so they can respond to Arctic related 
National Security, economic security, environmental security, 
issues of ice being--somewhere else? General, we will start 
with you.
    General Kee. Senator Sullivan, thank you very much for the 
question, sir, and I will offer a couple of brief reflections. 
Number one, I do respectfully believe that the ability to 
create home ports is a multi-year endeavor. It does require the 
ability to leverage a port that has multimodal transportation 
capabilities, whether it is road, rail, air, but some 
multimodal aspects of logistics that connect it--to connect 
that port to essentially transportation network.
    And it does also, of course, really need housing, schools, 
and all, essentially the logistic support aspects of being able 
to handle the crews, the maintenance, logistics, support teams, 
etc., that the Coast Guard has that crews, essentially, this 
weapon system platform. So the idea to me and that is what I 
would respectfully offer to this conversation is, if you take 
the long-term approach that over time you build to a home port 
capacity, you take, maybe consider some ideas of building 
intermediate capacities, such as an expeditionary facility or 
expeditionary facilities that build essentially ports that the 
vessels can operate from essentially during a rotation of duty.
    In between times they need, before--in between time they 
would need to go to conduct upper level repairs that would 
really require a kind of home port or a large scale facility. 
So to me, I look at the idea that ultimately having home ports 
in the Arctic would make sense long term, is the idea that 
building this in concert with really from a civil, military or 
civil Government sort of joint venture makes perhaps much more 
sense based on the amount of actual cost it takes to building 
at heavy capacities of essentially depot repairs and the 
transportation networks.
    So the idea is the answer is yes, it is just a matter of 
time. And then looking at solutions that are expeditionary or 
intermediate as you work through the stair steps to create an 
actual home port that has all that heavy capabilities that they 
are in. The idea of leasing as an interim measure to me, again, 
as an interim measure makes lots of good sense. It is going to 
be a while before we can field organic capability, but in 
addition to leasing platforms, we also need to think about is 
the whole logistics package, crews, main support, the logistics 
tail that goes with this to make sure that it is essentially a 
complete math equation that really encompasses all the cost 
variables in that leasing equation so that there is really no 
surprise to the Coast Guard or really, or to the Congress that 
would be authorizing and appropriating such expenditures.
    So thinking through the full math equation of getting a 
comprehensive package of what it costs to do the leasing, I 
think is important. I do believe it is a good interim measure 
and it is a short term measure to buy time and reduce risk to 
allow the Coast Guard to get caught up with organic 
capabilities, to be able to have a more robust capability of 
projecting U.S. persistent presence into the Arctic region, I 
would say both the U.S. Arctic region and international Arctic 
waters spaces. I respectfully give the floor back to you, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. So I am going to step out for one minute 
here. There have been a couple of votes that have been called. 
Senator Markey, I am going to yield the remainder of my 
questioning time to you and then I am going to try and get back 
here as quickly as possible. And so you can go vote if you 
haven't already voted. And then I will continue to follow up on 
the questions. If that sounds good to my Ranking Member, I am 
going to--I am going to head down and vote right now. I will be 
back. Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Climate 
change is an intersectional issue, it affects our health, our 
economy, our environment and security. We are talking about the 
need for robust security planning in the Arctic region. But 
changes in the Arctic means less security for the rest of the 
country as well. Dr. Francis, is it true that changes in the 
Arctic climate affect sea levels and weather patterns 
throughout the United States from Feldman to Florida?
    Ms. Francis. It is absolutely true, Senator Markey. Thank 
you for that question, yes.
    Senator Markey. Yes, and it has repercussions that go far 
beyond any one region. Within the Arctic, warming temperatures 
and disrupting weather patterns are washing coastal villages 
into the sea, changing animal migration patterns, and 
collapsing roads and airstrips. Outside of the Arctic, the 
broader climate crisis is endangering public health through 
droughts, extreme weather, heat stress and other developing 
disasters. Dr. Francis, do you think we are doing enough to 
consider Arctic security in a holistic way, including taking 
into account its effects on permafrost, weather patterns, 
indigenous peoples and global sea level rise?
    Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Thank you very much for the 
question. I think we are doing way--at this point to, as I 
mentioned, to treat the disease, the underlying disease that is 
causing the ice to melt, that is causing--and in turn is 
causing sea levels, sea level rise to it--seeing this happening 
before our very eyes. So the changes that are happening in the 
Arctic are already affecting not only the people who live in 
the Arctic, but also down to the islands through sea level rise 
and through changes in weather patterns.
    My own research is acutely on this connection between the 
rapidly warming Arctic and the changes in weather--the main 
underlying effect is to cause weather patterns to become more 
persistent. And when they become more persistent, that leads to 
things like longer droughts, and longer, more prolonged heat 
waves, and even longer stormy periods. You might remember--
years ago when we had six Northeasters--almost in a row. These 
types of weather regimes that are becoming more persistent to a 
whole variety of extreme weather events.
    Senator Markey. So how can the U.S. Government, including 
the Coast Guard, better invest in understanding and guarding 
against the effects of climate change in order to better 
increase our National Security and our economic security?
    Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, I think one of the 
main avenues that we should be going down right now is 
increasing the amount of information about the physical world 
up in the Arctic region, both the atmosphere, the ocean, the 
ice and the biology. So the atmosphere, this would help with 
forecasting weather--lack of data and information.
    And in terms of ocean effect, we know relatively little 
about the way that ocean currents move from up there and those 
things that affect how we could respond to or how the Coast 
Guard would respond to any kind of event that might happen up 
there. So, say, an oil spill, which has been mentioned. What's 
oil once it goes into the water, which way is the wind going to 
blow it, which way are the currents going to push it?
    If there were an accident and people were lost overboard, 
which direction with the drift? We are severely lacking some of 
that basic information about the Arctic system itself, which 
would play into not only research, but also any kind of 
environmental crisis and many of the operations that the Coast 
Guard undertakes on a regular basis.
    Senator Markey. And again, I apologize. I am going to have 
to go make this roll call as well. Just one final question, Dr. 
Francis, what areas of research do you think are most critical 
to invest in in order to better protect the Arctic and Arctic 
based resources?
    Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, it really goes back 
to what I was just saying--understanding of how this ice and 
the ocean--works, but it is a real moving target. The Arctic 
that we have now is very, very different from the one that was 
there only 20 or 30 years ago. Any of--research that needs to 
occur and information that needs to be provided that can help 
us update--these--system-wide----
    Senator Markey. Dr. Francis, I apologize to you. You are 
having a little bit of an audio problem right now. I just--I 
want to thank you so much, again. And I apologize because I 
have to make the same roll call that Chairman Sullivan is 
making. And I thank you so much for all your great work. And 
Randy, thank you for yours as well. But I am just going to put 
the hearing into recess until Senator Sullivan returns. But 
thank you, Dr. Francis, so much.
    [Recess.]
    Senator Sullivan. The Subcommittee hearing will now 
reconvene. And again, I appreciate the witnesses' cooperation 
and flexibility here as we are voting in the Senate. Ms. 
Madsen, I wanted to get back to you with regard to not only 
your testimony, but with regard to what Admiral Ray had said 
with regard to the incident that you mentioned, that really was 
an outrage with regard to not just the Russian actions, but as 
Admiral Ray mentioned, there were some miscommunications, 
certainly by the Coast Guard.
    I have been asking for an after-action both from Northern 
Command, Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. But what would you--as 
we are looking at this, what do you think we, and I am talking 
about the Coast Guard, the Navy, others involved, to prevent 
future incidences from happening again as you mentioned, this 
can't be the new normal, but what specifically would you and 
your members want to make sure happens with regard to Coast 
Guard actions and other actions that we as the U.S. Government 
can be taking?
    Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that in our 
written testimony, we lay out three actions. The first one is 
definitely we need to hear from our Government, not from the 
Russian military, about any activities. And so I think that 
what we discovered is that I don't really know how to describe 
it other than there was some kind of a gap in communication 
between the U.S. Government who knew about the exercises and 
the Coast Guard that we depend on and communicate with quite 
frequently. So I think that is one. Our U.S. Government needs 
to communicate amongst itself. The other more important one is, 
if we know that these exercises are legal and going to 
continue, then I think we need Coast Guard assets on the ground 
so that there is someone not 200 miles away at least, that can 
provide some kind of protection or guidance to the fishing 
fleet.
    Senator Sullivan, you might know that as you go further 
North, the border gets very constrained between the US. So it 
is not just a large fishing vessels that were impacted. Well, 
we were the ones that got impacted this year. But I am also 
concerned about some of those smaller vessels operating out of 
the Northern Bering Sea communities that in the future could 
also be impacted. So I think we really have to look at a 
variety of communication systems. And then when they know what 
is going on, we need to have Coast Guard assets there.
    Senator Sullivan. I think that is a great recommendation, 
and so not just being made aware, which, of course, that should 
have already been happening, but with regard to an exercise of 
that size and nature, to have our own assets in the region to 
protect with regard to what we are doing in our own fishing 
fleet. So I agree with that. And I think that that is something 
we will strongly encourage with regard to the Coast Guard's 
activities. Let me ask again, General and Ms. Madsen, the issue 
of infrastructure.
    We do have a large fishing fleet. It is an issue that as 
sea stocks move North, that the need for more infrastructure in 
Alaska is not just a National Security requirement, but an 
economic and a safety requirement. As I mentioned in my opening 
testimony, we are making substantial progress for a deep water 
port in Nome, Alaska, but where else and what else would you 
like to comment on with regard to infrastructure as it relates 
to protecting America's economic, National Security, fishing 
opportunities and other issues with regard to Arctic 
infrastructure? I would like for both of you to be able to 
comment on that.
    Ms. Madsen. Senator Sullivan, if I might start, Stephanie 
Madsen. As you know, Senator, I lived out in Unalaska, Dutch 
Harbor for 19 years. So I guess I am a little bit passionate 
about the international port of Dutch Harbor as one of the main 
deep water ports that is already in existence. Certainly Nome 
is very viable and very important as the Arctic becomes more 
open and security becomes more of an issue. So I think those 
two have definitely been identified.
    You know, the Coast Guard--we depend on the Coast Guard. 
Thank goodness for the Coast Guard, not only to help us enforce 
fishing regulations, but to provide safety and rescue. And it 
is difficult even now to have them based in Kodiak and would 
have to respond, you know, where we were fishing this summer. 
So I think that that would also encourage and enable the 
fishing fleet as the distribution of the fish changes to help 
us feel secure and have Coast Guard responsive, including the 
polar ice breakers.
    Senator Sullivan. General.
    General Kee. Chairman, thank you. And also, before we go 
further, Senator, I would like to offer condolences as well. I 
did not get a chance to say in the opening reflects, but please 
accept my condolences to you and your family for your loss.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    General Kee. I would like to offer a couple of thoughts. 
First, that is a great question and I appreciate the 
opportunity to reflect. I look at this strategically that the 
Arctic interests are continuing to rise. Our Arctic economic 
security interests are continuing to rise. When you look at the 
idea of creating ports and deep water ports are enablers, not 
only, of course, the National Security interests that are 
places where Coast Guard vessels and really Navy vessels can 
operate from, but also an opportunity to provide the economic 
engine that is so needed in Western Alaska in particular, and 
to advance, essentially providing economic opportunity to 
advance the livelihood of those people who live there to give 
them options to be able to stay in this region and have a 
viable future and viable careers, as opposed to where there 
really is not the economic engine there yet.
    And so strategically, the idea of building ports and 
increasing joint ventures with the commerce industry, the idea 
of an Arctic and really a bearing in Chukchi, Beaufort to Blue 
economy where mariculture and aquaculture activities could be 
pursued and a way to help begin the process of economically 
developing Western Alaska. And it is in our national interest. 
We are also looking at, of course, that communications are 
critical.
    The communications shortfalls, certainly what happened in 
August, are certainly a very evident. We as a Center that I 
have the privilege of shepherding are focused on commencing 
hopefully very, very soon a new study, it is called the Alaskan 
Antarctic Maritime Communications Connectivity Analysis, to 
really take a look across the mariner community of Alaska, 
breaking in five sectors to Southeast, Southcentral, the 
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort, to really kind of break down what 
are the communications shortfalls that the mariners are facing, 
including, of course, the fishing fleet are facing in these 
regions, to be able to have that communication and connectivity 
ability so they can be notified in a timely manner and have the 
means to communicate when things such as what happened in 
August manifest.
    The idea, of course, when you think about ports is an idea 
of looking at Dutch Harbor, of course, is well known and well 
suited for not only the bearing, but also projecting power into 
the North Pacific. When you look at Port of Nome, it is a 
shallow port at this point, getting into deep water capacity. 
But you also have the idea that, and I know several have talked 
about and I mentioned this in my relatively lengthy written 
statement, the idea of a port complex. I know I have ventured 
that idea forward, where you look at the port complex between 
the existing port structure in Nome and what is being built out 
there to include, of course, looking at port Clarins as a 
natural deep water area and the idea of a port complex that is 
conducted in places like this and the Gulf Coast.
    The idea of building this over time and identifying 
opportunity there to not only, of course, serve commercial 
industry, for example, the graphite mine up there near Teller 
as a port, a place to--port Clarins, for example, could help 
service that. And ultimately the idea of building port 
infrastructure that connects with transportation nodes, idea 
looking toward the long term future of creating transportation 
nets and networks that include potentially road rail that 
connects Fairbanks, for example, out to Nome.
    Again long term ideas, but the end of the day, if we are 
going to really realize our Arctic interests, in particular the 
Bering region, Bering, and Chukchi, we do need to think about 
how partnerships in the commercial sector could be of interest 
and viability to reduce the taxpayer burden, of course, but 
also to create the idea of joint ventures that can really 
provide prosperity to both the commercial sector, the residents 
who live there, and a place to operate safely for National 
Security assets. So those are some thoughts. I would 
respectfully reflect to you, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Alright. Thank you. Those are great. Ms. 
Madsen, I want to go back to Admiral Ray's comment at the end 
of his testimony on the issue of the Coast Guard's focus on IUU 
issues. And he talked about it from the perspective of the 
Coast Guard and the sustainability of our oceans and our 
fisheries throughout the world. I would like your perspective 
from that of the fishing fleet, can you share how critical it 
is to combating IUU fishing?
    I was proud as your Senator, one of the first bills that I 
was able to get through this committee was actually the 
implementation of the IUU fishing, treating the domestic 
legislation that did this. But how important is that, how 
equipped do you believe the Coast Guard is to combat IUU 
fishing issues, particularly as Admiral Ray talked about the 
fisheries migrating North, and what would you like, the Coast 
Guard or NOAA or other Federal agencies, to do more in this 
regard?
    Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As you 
well know, you know, our fisheries compete on the global 
market. And so if IUU fishing is not enforced, and that means 
that our markets are being impacted as well globally. And we 
are already--as you are well aware, because you are one of our 
heroes, that is a big impact to all of our fisheries, 
especially up in the North Pacific. So I believe that support 
of the Coast Guard, certainly funding, but I think it is a 
little bit bigger than just a Coast Guard.
    I think internationally we are going to have to pool our 
resources together. But it is critical. It is important. You 
know, one of our direct competitors for pollock is Russia right 
now. So, you know, you have hit on it. You have been our 
champion. And I think it is just going to come down to 
persistence, continued funding, and some very strong actions 
that indicate to the globe that we are not going to stand for 
it.
    Senator Sullivan. But so many of these issues, whether it 
is IUU fishing, whether it is protecting our economic 
interests, Dr. Francis, our environmental issue interests, they 
all in many ways converge on this issue of presence, 
infrastructure, Coast Guard vessels, icebreaking capabilities 
so the United States can actually be in the region, protect the 
region, and as Admiral Ray said, focus on what the Coast Guard 
does throughout the rest of the nation, which is protect the 
coasts and the sovereign interests of the country. Shouldn't be 
any different in the Arctic off the coast of Alaska than it is 
in the Gulf of Mexico. And I was glad to hear the Admiral say 
that.
    General, let me ask a more specific question. Prior to this 
hearing, I was on the phone with the National Security Adviser, 
Ambassador O'Brien. He is the lead on the Presidential memo 
that came out in June. I thought it was very positive. It was 
something we had been pressing the Trump Administration toon 
exactly how to protect our economic and security interests in 
the region. And there is an interest in quite soon looking at 
bridging the gap with regard to icebreaker coverage that we 
currently have, which has been exacerbated by the HEALY fire 
for two medium-sized icebreakers to be leased.
    There is a strong interest, I can tell you, at the White 
House to do this and to have these homeported in America's 
Arctic, in Alaska. If you had a recommendation for the National 
Security Adviser on this issue, where would you look to 
homeport? And it would have to be relatively soon, like within 
this year, two additional medium class icebreakers that could 
start to protect America's interests. It would be leased, 
obviously, from other sources and just being built. What do you 
think the best place is, given what you talked about earlier in 
your testimony, would be to homeport these two vessels in 
Alaska? Where would you recommend that?
    General Kee. Well, first of all, thank you for that 
question, Senator. And let me offer a reflection before I 
address the question, because I think at this point it is 
really important to know the details of the lease package. So, 
for example, would there be an intent to have depot level 
repairs provided on scene where the vessel was, ``home 
ported''? Because if you brought--you need to have that kind of 
capabilities. What would the leasing enterprise provide?
    For example, would they provide vending logistics to 
conduct not only the medium level, if you will, through flight 
or through--oh, my goodness to talk like I start a pilot for a 
moment, but the through vessel missions that when they come and 
go and then back to station at home port, those essentially--
that means is conducted between depot level repair. If that is 
going to be conducted by the vendor providing the vessel that 
we are leasing from, then its ability--it is really on to their 
ability to bring that capability forward. And so that, therein 
lies the challenge. If you had the company that we are leasing 
from, and would be anticipating this to be a finished effort, 
and as a NATO partner, not a NATO ally, certainly they have 
interoperability aspects in the commercial sector that will be 
well familiar to people. They are not military vessels, that is 
what Admiral Ray described, but they are certainly capable. And 
certainly helps bridging the gap.
    So I would look to the fact of, you know, if they had a 
robust capability to bring forward, to do the kind of 
maintenance work needed, then I would get as far forward with 
that as I could, simply because they would be incumbent upon 
the vendor to provide that capability. If they are limited on 
this, for example, in the port of Nome, could be the place to 
operate from as an example, and especially if the draft was 
deep enough, interior space was available, and using air 
logistics to the airport there for time, sense delivery of 
materials and logistics would be, of course, a critical aspect 
to this. So the idea is, again, go as far forward----
    Senator Sullivan. Let me--let me, sorry to interrupt you, 
but let me, if you had to--if this was a leasing decision soon, 
a home porting decision soon. I get the, and it is important as 
you highlight the details of the leasing package, but from what 
exists currently in Alaska in terms of Coast Guard 
capabilities, Coast Guard stations, pier space, what would be 
one or two locations that you would think would be top on the 
list?
    General Kee. Well, then again--very close, Senator. I would 
look to obviously where the existing Coast Guard capabilities, 
for example, Kodiak and refurbishing aspects of Dutch Harbor. 
Both of those are known ports with existing pier space. 
Refurbishment costs are relatively minor at this point.
    There is some housing there in Dutch Harbor. There is 
perhaps more housing available in Kodiak. So near term would 
probably be Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and then looking further 
North to Nome as soon as you could get there, even if you 
operated from Nome part of the time and then retrograded back 
to either Dutch or Kodiak. Respectfully submitted.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, I am going to close a hearing 
with one final question for all three of the witnesses. You 
know, we have covered a lot of ground here. We know that the 
Arctic is challenged by remoteness, extreme environmental 
issues, severe weather issues, receding sea ice, but it is also 
a strategic area of major shipping locations, increase of great 
power competition, resources.
    What we haven't talked too much about is emerging 
technology to cope, to overcome some of these challenges or 
play a greater role. I will just throw this out for the final 
question. Is there any technological approach to some of the 
challenges that we are not thinking about, that we might be 
able to take advantage of in the future, and that relates to 
domain awareness, that relates to observer capabilities, any of 
those issues that given the expertise of the three witnesses on 
this panel, you would like to just highlight for the Committee 
as a final topic before we close?
    General Kee. Senator Sullivan, I would like to take a run 
to that question if it is OK with you.
    Senator Sullivan. Sure.
    General Kee. Strategically advancing science, technology 
and domain awareness really is about platforms, autonomous 
platforms, whether underwater, surface, or aerial, to be able 
to conduct the kinds of remote monitoring. This includes some 
of the infrastructure challenges the Coast Guard highlighted in 
really monitoring at-risk petroleum tanks and tank farms where 
environmental change and really degrading permafrost is causing 
many of these older structures to bear very close monitoring. 
Using unmanned aerial systems to monitor these is an important 
aspect.
    Being able to not only have platforms that can respond to 
oil spill response or characterize the Arctic from a 
bathymetric standpoint are things that technology has, again, 
solutions that can be of support. This is an area that is rich 
for onward discussions. But communications, satellite based and 
terrestrial based built to have communication and connectivity 
to mariners, Coast Guard mission sets, and of course, that 
interoperable Defense community, I think is critically 
important.
    And again, I would love to dive on this one deeper, but I 
know the time is short. So let me just offer those as a brief 
set of reflections. Last, for me, though, characterizing the 
Arctic at fine scale is important. I really appreciate the 
previous discussions with witnesses regarding the 
characterizing the Arctic at grand scale.
    To me, what matters for the Coast Guard vantage point and 
those of mariner operators is the weather outside in the 
windscreen. And so to me, how we can better characterize ocean 
currents, moving in ridging at fine scale, I think is going to 
matter tremendously as we look to advancing more mariner 
commercial activities and really projecting sovereign 
influences into the coming years and beyond. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Dr. Francis, do you have a 
view on this?
    Ms. Francis. Yes, thank you very much for this question, 
and it goes back to what I said earlier hopefully my Internet 
connection is a little better now and I won't be broken up 
quite so badly. But I agree with what was just said. And I 
would just reiterate that so many of the Coast Guards 
operating, you know, their mission is it really depends on 
having good information about the weather, about ocean 
currents, about what the ice is doing. And all of those really 
depend on getting good information from the environment so that 
our forecast models, which also need further development, can 
provide them with the best information about not just what is 
going on in their neighborhood at the moment, but also the 
forecast for the next day or week or longer.
    And they can then deploy their resources more effectively 
to take advantage of that, because if they were, as I 
mentioned, on an oil spill or man overboard or some kind of 
search and rescue, we know that cruise ships are now heading up 
there, it is still very likely, even though the ice is 
diminishing, it is still very possible that a cruise ship could 
be going along in the open water. The wind shifts, the pack ice 
moves down on that cruise ship and pins it in a location, runs 
it aground into rocks or whatever. And I think the Coast Guard 
would be very hard pressed to be able to respond to that kind 
of an emergency.
    So I really think we need to do a better job getting the 
information so that we can do a better job at the forecasting 
of both weather and also the ocean behavior and the sea ice.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. And Ms. Madsen, I will 
leave it up to you to close with that question.
    Ms. Madsen. Well, thank you very much, Senator. As you 
know, we are pretty proud up in Alaska about the science that 
we have. We have a pretty extensive climate model. We are you 
know, I am focused on fish, but the climate model extends far 
beyond that with its projections. The Alaska Fisheries Science 
Center has some of the lead scientist in this regard. We have 
had Marines that have been taking different measures of 
different things for many, many, many years.
    So we need to continue those time series. Because I am 
focused on fishing, I think we need to use and work a little 
bit better on cooperative research using the platforms that we 
have out in the Bering Sea. I know, Senator, that this year we 
were unable, as you know, to get our fishery surveys done. But 
with the help of the Science Center, many of the vessels took 
data loggers to collect temperature so that we could try to 
identify the cold pull and inform as much as we could without 
the surveys. So I think there is opportunities here. I guess 
maybe not technology based, but we do have the models up in the 
North Pacific.
    We need the surveys to continue to inform those models, 
which means money. But it is kind of a dual focus, a dual 
purpose. You not only get the data that would inform those 
models, but you would also get the data to inform the changes 
and the total allowable catches up in the North Pacific. So we 
have great science up here. I think we just need to double up 
on it and make sure the funding is there to encourage the 
continuation of some of these long time series.
    And Senator, we do appreciate all the work that you have 
done for the North Pacific and the fisheries for sure. So I 
can't let the hearing close without thanking you once again.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, let me thank you as well, 
Stephanie. You have done a great job and a real leader in our 
state on so many of these issues. And General, you too as well. 
And Dr. Francis, I know that Senator Markey holds you in very 
high regard as well. So I want to thank the three witnesses for 
a really, really productive hearing. We saw a lot of good 
bipartisan participation in this hearing, which I thought was 
great and important.
    The record for the hearing will remain open for an 
additional 2 weeks. If Senators have additional questions, they 
will please submit them for the record and for our witnesses. 
If you can respectfully try to get those answers back as soon 
as you can, we would greatly appreciate that.
    With that, I want to thank the witnesses again, both 
Admiral Ray and the current panelists, and a lot of good 
information and a lot of important issues that we need to work 
together on. And I think we have a lot of important information 
to digest and move forward on as we continue to look at the 
challenges and opportunities in America's Arctic. With that, 
this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    
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