[Senate Hearing 116-628]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-628
U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-855 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas, AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 8, 2020................................. 1
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 15
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 17
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 19
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 21
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 25
Statement of Senator Lee......................................... 27
Witnesses
Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard........ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee, USAF (Retired), Executive
Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center, University of Alaska;
Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission.................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director, At-Sea Processors
Association.................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist, Woodwell Climate Research
Center......................................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY
IN THE ARCTIC
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Cruz, Lee,
Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, and Blumenthal.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. This hearing will now come to order. I am
pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses today as our
subcommittee focuses on the capabilities of the United States
Coast Guard for safeguarding our national interests in the
Arctic region. We will be having two panels today. First, we
are pleased to have the Vice Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard, Admiral Charles Ray. He has been doing an
outstanding job in his position.
And then our second panel will be of experts. Major General
Randy Kee who will be remote, as well as Stephanie Madsen,
Executive Director, At-Sea Processors Association from Juneau,
Alaska. And Dr. Jennifer Francis, also coming via remote means,
is a Senior Scientist at the Woodwell Climate Research Center
in Falmouth, Massachusetts. Last year, this subcommittee held a
hearing that focused on the Arctic strategy released by the
Coast Guard in April 2019. That strategy prioritizes three
lines of effort, one of them being the need to enhance our
capabilities for operating in the Arctic through persistent
investments in infrastructure, assets, and personnel needed to
close gaps in presence, particularly given our rivals in the
Arctic--China and Russia--communications and domain awareness
in this region of growing global focus.
Today's hearing will focus on those needed investments in
our Arctic capabilities, progress that has been made in
obtaining them, and the vital work that still needs to be done.
The Arctic has shifted from an area of cooperation to the next
region of great power competition with our near, peer
competitors, China and Russia, outpacing the United States in
the development of ice capable vessels and investments into
Arctic infrastructure. The U.S. only has two polar icebreakers
and a fire aboard the HEALY this summer has put half of
America's polar ice breaking fleet temporarily out of
commission.
As a result, the POLAR STAR is now America's only
operational icebreaker, while Russia has approximately 54. This
gap in capability creates space for Russia and China, which now
has more icebreakers than we do, to exert maritime influence in
the Arctic, which they are trying to do, and amplifies our
existing vulnerabilities for vessel traffic, safety and
security, maritime law enforcement, fisheries, resources
management, search and rescue, and environmental response.
We have seen Russia push all-in on controlling the Arctic.
Russia has opened 16 deep water ports, 14 airfields, built
Arctic military bases, and even formed a new Northern Arctic
Command. In fact, Vladimir Putin has referred to the Northern
Sea route as the new Suez Canal, which he says Russia intends
to fully control. He has made major military investments to
secure this route for Russia, and his Government has even
threatened to sink foreign vessels that do not have a Russian
pilot on board or a Russian escort vessel.
In recent months, Russian provocation has only increased.
The Russian navy conducted its largest war game exercise since
the Cold War near Alaska. This exercise extended into the U.S.
exclusive economic zone. Our commercial fishing fleet
encountered a frightening situation in close proximity to a
number of fishing vessels and directed them to immediately
depart their legal fishing grounds. These were Russian
warships, pictured here, and this graphic provided by the Coast
Guard shows the locations clearly within the U.S. exclusive
economic zone where our fleet was legally fishing when the
Russian warships and aircraft, including submarines, pictured
here above, ordered our fleet to leave the area.
Without persistence--persistent U.S. presence in the
Arctic, we risk leaving an opening for these types of
aggressive actions to continue. Recognizing the importance of
these critical gaps, Congress has already made steady progress
toward authorizing needed investments. Currently, the closest
U.S. deep water port to the Arctic is Dutch Harbor on Unalaska
Island, which is 1,000 miles from the Arctic Circle, not very
close. In May, the Senate committee on the Environment and
Public Works, on which I sit, passed the America's Water and
Infrastructure Act, advancing the long needed Arctic deep draft
port at Nome, Nome, Alaska as the first in what we believe
needs to be a series of strategic Arctic ports. That is a major
step forward for our Nation and protecting America's interests
in the Arctic. The port Nome will not only be a critical
component for Arctic maritime transportation, it will serve as
a staging area for search and rescue, pollution response, and
security operations with the Coast Guard and the Navy.
In June, the President weighed in on the importance of
acquiring a polar security ice breaking fleet that can project
persistent presence in the Arctic with the release of the
President's memorandum on safeguarding U.S. national interests
in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This Presidential memo
adds weight to the efforts in Congress to authorize and fund
new polar security cutters. Two years ago, I was able to
authorize--get authorization in the NDAA for the construction
of six polar class security cutters to start building our
icebreaking fleet. We have followed up with the funds to build
the first, and we are working on appropriations to secure the
second, appropriation funding for the second polar class
icebreaker.
I am disappointed, however, in what I believe is the Coast
Guard's lack of strategic vision for where to homeport these
new icebreakers. While making sure there are budget imperatives
and plans for grouping similar assets together in fewer
locations for cost savings, I believe this is not something
that should override the operational imperative to base Coast
Guard resources and cutters close to where their mission is.
That is what the President's memorandum asked for, particularly
as the Arctic has emerged as a critical area for great power
competition, and the ice breaking vessels we are building and
will likely be--we will be leasing, need to be able to operate
and be stationed near the Arctic or in the Arctic where the
action is.
I have just spoken to the National Security Adviser,
Ambassador O'Brien, and I believe he shares similar views on
these issues. These investments in our Arctic capabilities will
help ensure that the United States does not cede any more
ground in this strategic location. Without further investment
in our polar capabilities, our adversaries influence will grow.
And if that happens, we risk our ability to protect U.S.
vessels, conducting commerce, to enforce international law, and
to defeat threats to our National Security. With that, I want
to thank our witnesses for participating in our hearing today
to discuss this very important topic. I now want to recognize
the Chairman of the Committee, to see if he has any opening
statements, and then I will turn to Ranking Member Senator
Markey. Chairman Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Chairman Sullivan. And I
think it is noteworthy that we are having a hearing on the
Arctic, and it is about 62 degrees in this hearing room. I
don't know how our capable leadership managed that, but I think
it is very appropriate and maybe we need to have a hearing
about the tropics next time, but in all seriousness, great to
have Admiral Ray back with us and the other distinguished
panel.
And thank you, Chairman Sullivan, for your leadership on
this important issue. Access to the Arctic's vast energy,
mineral, fisheries, and other commercial resources is expanding
and international competition for these assets is intensifying,
as the Chair has just so ably stated. America's two nearest
peer competitors, Russia and China, have both declared the
region a national priority and have made corresponding
investments. By contrast, U.S. investment in the Arctic
infrastructure and capabilities has not kept up with our
economic and National Security interests, and I want to be a
teammate of our subcommittee Chair in rectifying that
discrepancy.
The U.S. Coast Guard is on the front lines of strategic
security competition in the Arctic. The Coast Guard has
operated the Arctic since 1867 when, through the foresight of
Secretary of State William Seward, America purchased Alaska
from Russia. The Coast Guard's diverse set of Arctic missions
includes search and rescue, enforcing laws and treaties,
environmental protection, facilitating commercial trade, and
protecting National Security. The Coast Guard's icebreaker
fleet acts as the Nation's principal tool to conduct many of
these critical missions. And I have to stretch to call it a
fleet. The current icebreaker fleet is well past its service
life and in dire need of replacement.
Long standing concerns with the icebreaking fleet size and
age were underscored on August 18, 2020, when the Coast Guard
cutter HEALY, a medium polar icebreaker, suffered an engine
fire forcing the ship to return to her home port in Seattle.
That fire has left the Coast Guard operating with a single
icebreaker, the POLAR STAR, until the HEALY can be repaired.
During a visit to Alaska hosted by the distinguished
Subcommittee Chairman in August of last year, just before the
fire, Admiral Ray and I flew out and landed on the HEALY in the
Arctic. So I have witnessed firsthand the critical capabilities
of this vessel and of its dedicated crew.
The HEALY fire, combined with recent aggressive Russian
naval exercises in the Arctic, demonstrates the need for more
U.S. icebreakers. The Coast Guard will now have to stretch the
service life of the POLAR STAR, the Nation's only heavy
icebreaker until 2023, extending its lifetime to nearly 50
years, well beyond the intended 30 years. In stark contrast to
the American fleet, Russia currently has 4 heavy nuclear
powered icebreakers and 11 medium icebreakers, with 3 more
under construction and 11 additional icebreakers planned in the
next decade. The Coast Guard has stated repeatedly that it
requires at least three heavy and three medium polar
icebreakers to fulfill its ice breaking mission.
The Coast Guard has awarded a contract for the first three
heavy polar security cutters, and we hope there will be more to
come. And if I have anything to do with it, I want to be a
teammate with our distinguished subcommittee Chairman in that
regard. But in addition to new vessels, we need shoreside
facilities, piers, and support personnel to sustain a fleet of
polar security cutters. So we have our work cut out for us. I
hope our witnesses will underscore the need to prioritize and
accelerate the polar security cutter acquisition program.
Icebreaking capacity and supporting infrastructure are just two
of the many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic.
On that visit to Alaska with Senator Sullivan, I spoke to
the Coast Guard service members at Air Station Kodiak and
aboard the Coast Guard cutter DOUGLAS MONROE about their role
in protecting our ocean environment and marine life. The
Commerce Committee is working to help the Coast Guard promote
fisheries development and force our fisheries laws in respond
to fisheries disasters. Alaska and my State of Mississippi may
be thousands of miles apart, but we share a major interest in
fisheries and the Coast Guard is protecting them every day.
We hope to address these and other challenges in the Coast
Guard Authorization Act, legislation co-sponsored again by our
distinguished Subcommittee Chair Senator Sullivan, which we are
optimistic will pass in the next few days. I look forward to
this discussion. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
believe Senator Markey is having a bit of an issue getting on
the video here. So we are going to----
The Chairman. I think the equipment is frozen up.
Senator Sullivan. We are going to go directly--we are going
to go directly to Admiral Ray for his opening statement. And I
do want to mention, Mr. Chairman, with you and the Admiral's
help, right now, it is looking like the NDAA is going to have
the Coast Guard Authorization Act. This has been a goal of mine
since I got here to pair those up. I think it is a good
precedent that hopefully won't be a one-time occurrence this
year, but something that we can look at doing every year. And I
know the Coast Guard has been supportive of that as well. So
that is good news. Admiral Ray, you have been doing a fantastic
job in your role, and I look forward to your testimony in 5
minutes, oral testimony, and if you have a longer written
statement, we would be glad to put that in for the record.
Floor is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY,
VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Ray. Good afternoon, Chairman Sullivan, Chairman
Wicker. Thank you for having me here. And before I get started,
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Commandant and on behalf of all
the men and women of the United States Coast Guard, we pass our
sincere condolences as you mourn the passing of your dad.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you very much.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I want to thank you all for your
unwavering support to our service and for this opportunity to
update you on the Coast Guard's efforts to protect American
sovereignty, promote economic prosperity, and expand American
leadership across the Arctic. The rapidly changing physical,
operational, and geostrategic Arctic environment is driving
increased activity in the region and with it increased risk
across the maritime sector.
While our mission in the high latitudes have evolved since
1867, our commitment to the region has not. We are leaning
forward to address the safety and security of our Arctic
residents and the Mariners who make their living there, home
porting--by home porting new offshore patrol cutters, fast
response cutters, investing in Alaska real estate
infrastructure, and prioritizing our operations in the region.
The Coast Guard is also deeply concerned about the rising
strategic risk to our Nation as China and Russia compete for
diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage in the Arctic.
Both nations have publicly declared the Arctic a strategic
priority and they continue to make significant investments to
advance her own interests. Russia continues to invest heavily
in icebreakers and Arctic infrastructure, better positioning
themselves to shape the security and geopolitical environment
in the region. They are focusing on developing the national
resources, expanding their icebreaker fleet, and imposing
strict governance on the Northern sea route.
I am especially troubled by Russia's recent military
exercises in the Bering Sea that the Senator referred to. In
late August, they conducted a live fire exercise in an area
that extended into the United States' exclusive economic zone,
as is shown on the chart. Their irresponsible execution of this
phase of their exercise created confusion and potentially
unsafe interactions with American vessels legally fishing in
our EEZ. Our long standing operational relationship with the
Russians enabled us to, kind of through a red phone type
scenario, cut through the red tape, and let them know of our
concerns and what was going on that day.
As you know, Senator, we sailed ALEX HALEY up there to
investigate and provide awareness. However, I am disappointed
that Russia chose to push the boundaries of responsible
behavior in the Arctic and in doing so, put Americans at risk.
China also aspires to assert influence across the Arctic,
leveraging economic investments, and natural resources, and
infrastructure, and expanding their icebreaking fleet. This
summer, they launched the Xue Long 2, which operated in the
high Arctic. China has announced plans for two additional
icebreakers, threatening to outpace our icebreaker building
program.
The casualty, as Senator Wicker mentioned, a Coast Guard
cutter HEALY this summer demonstrates our Nation's lack of
capacity for icebreaking and emphasizes the critical importance
of the Coast Guard's posed security cutter fleet. As was
stated, we will begin construction of the post's security
cutter in 2021 and it would be the first time we have done this
in over 40 years. We have contracted with Halter Marine in
Mississippi to design and buildup to three polar security
cutters, and we appreciate the continued support from Congress
and this committee, in particular, to build the next generation
of assets.
Our Coast Guard's Operation Arctic Shield continues to be
the primary operational means of protecting and executing our
sovereign rights and responsibilities in the U.S. Arctic. Our
flexible expeditionary approach has never been more important.
As Alaska cruises were canceled this summer due to the
pandemic, we redirected resources to conduct additional patrols
to monitor foreign research vessels, and to enhance policing of
our maritime border with Russia. For the first time since 1984,
as you know, the Coast Guard will conduct operations North of
the Arctic Circle during this winter. When the National Science
Foundation, as a result of a caution for the pandemic, decided
they did not want to send POLAR STAR to McMurdo in Antarctica,
we immediately came up with a different sale plan for her, and
she is underway as we speak today, straight to Juan de Fuca,
heading North toward Dutch Harbor and then further up into the
Arctic.
I think this demonstrates the Coast Guard's agility and the
importance of the polar security cutters, the need for a larger
icebreaker fleet to persistently safeguard our Nation's
economic and national security interests in the high latitudes.
While we are focused on protecting sovereignty in our U.S.
Arctic, the Coast Guard is also working to build partnerships
across the Arctic. This summer, we deployed--this past summer,
we deployed two medium endurance cutters to participate in
search and rescue and military exercises off of Greenland,
operating with our allies Denmark, France, and Canada.
We worked to establish the things that you do when you
exercise together. Never has Coast Guard leadership been more
important in the Arctic than it is right now, as we shape the
region as a safe, cooperative, and prospective domain for all.
You have my commitment, the commitment of our Commandant, and
that the Coast Guard will continue to exert all efforts to meet
this challenge.
Thank you again, Senator, for this opportunity. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here today to
discuss the Coast Guard's role and activities to advance national
security priorities across the Arctic Region. This effort includes
safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and executing our national
responsibilities while effecting safe, secure, and environmentally
responsible maritime activity.
The U.S. Arctic remains particularly dynamic, evolving
environmentally, operationally, and strategically. Environmental
changes, combined with the tyranny of distance and limited
infrastructure, exacerbate the harshness of the operating environment.
The types and levels of commercial activity are also transforming, from
a surge in oil and gas exploration a few years ago to increases in
vessel transits and expansion of environmental tourism. These
alterations in types and location of activity, along with the changes
in the physical environment, coincide with the reemergence of great
power competition across the globe which are exemplified in the Arctic.
The importance of, and demand signal for, Coast Guard's services and
leadership have never been greater as these dynamic challenges magnify
U.S. national security interests across the Arctic.
National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
The actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic nation states
continue to shape the security environment and stability of the region.
The geopolitical environment is evolving as state and non-state actors
seek to advance their own interests in the Arctic. Allies, partners,
and competitors increasingly contend for diplomatic, economic, and
strategic advantage and influence. Russia and China exemplify that
competition. Both have declared the Arctic a strategic priority; both
have made significant investments in new or refurbished capabilities;
and both are exerting direct or indirect influence across the region.
Russia's expansive Arctic has the potential to support naval fleets
readily deployable between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This region
also represents significant economic opportunities, such as oil and gas
extraction and development and attempted control of the Northern Sea
Route for trans-Arctic shipping. As such, Russia continues to plan and
expand its capabilities and capacity to influence and surge throughout
the Arctic. This year, Russia launched the first in a new class of
nuclear-powered icebreakers, which they sailed to the North Pole. In
addition to continuing the expansion of its extensive icebreaker fleet,
its renewed capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems,
domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue stations. Furthermore,
Russia recently established an inter-agency commission of the Russian
Security Council focused on ensuring Russian national security
interests in the Arctic. Finally, Russia recently completed Exercise
Ocean Shield 2020, a multi-theater exercise involving participation by
both its Pacific and Northern Fleets and including maneuvers in the
Northern Bering Sea and Arctic approaches. Through this exercise,
Russia extended its operations into the U.S. exclusive economic zone
and interferred with the safety and sovereignty of the U.S. fishing
fleet, indicating a willingness to push the boundaries of acceptable,
responsible behavior and governance.
China continues to aspire to assert influence across the Arctic
including pursuit of economic investments in key strategic areas such
as rare-earth elements, oil and gas development, air and sea ports,
railways, and infrastructure to further its strategic objectives. Last
year, China launched its first domestically-built icebreaking vessel,
the Motor Vessel XUE LONG 2, which operated in the Arctic this year,
including taking a sediment core sample while operating on the waters
over the United States' extended continental shelf. China is also
designing an even more powerful polar icebreaker expected to have twice
the icebreaking capability of XUE LONG 2. With three icebreakers, China
could outpace U.S. icebreaker capacity and polar access by 2024. The
primary concern with Chinese activities in the Arctic is the potential
to disrupt the cooperation, stability, and governance in the region for
both Arctic and non-Arctic states.
Coast Guard Leadership in the Arctic
The Coast Guard has shaped and influenced national security in the
Arctic for over 150 years. This effort includes asserting the Nation's
sovereign rights, upholding our sovereign responsibilities from the
strategic to the tactical level, and countering malign influence that
is contrary to U.S. values and international rules and norms. The
Service's missions have evolved along with the evolution of the
physical, operational, and strategic environments.
As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law enforcement
authorities, combined with membership in the Intelligence Community,
the Coast Guard seamlessly shifts between mission sets utilizing multi-
mission personnel and assets. Specifically, the Coast Guard's
constabulary functions and broad authorities serve as a critical bridge
between the hard-power lethality of the Department of Defense (DoD) and
soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. These characteristics
enable the Service to cultivate strong international relationships and
build coalitions among Arctic partners based on mutual interests and
values that strengthen national security and regional stability while
enhancing safety, maritime governance, and prosperity across the
region.
Where strategic goals align, the Coast Guard works closely with the
DoD to ensure efficient operations. The Coast Guard is a member of the
Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a EUCOM-sponsored multi-national
group concerned with Arctic security issues, including maritime domain
awareness. We work closely with NORTHCOM through the Arctic
Capabilities Assessment Working Group, which was created to identify
potential collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities in
communications, maritime domain awareness, and presence. The Service's
role as a member of the Intelligence Community offers a natural nexus
for broad intelligence and information sharing, as appropriate, to
counter nefarious actions in the Arctic and throughout the world. These
efforts are only a few examples of partnerships between the Coast Guard
and DoD.
This year, Arctic operations and engagements have faced unique
challenges and interruptions, mostly due to the global pandemic of
COVID-19. However, because of these challenges and the growing
strategic imperatives across the Arctic, the Service has adapted
operations to meet the Nation's mission demands. The following
highlights some of these initiatives that have particular impacts on
the Nation's readiness as well as national and international security.
Advancing Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic
Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
and operations effort that incorporates an expeditionary approach for
deploying resources and conducting integrated operations to meet
statutory mission demands, buys-down maritime risk, and advances
national security objectives through maritime operations in the United
States Arctic. ARCTIC SHIELD 2020 objectives included advancing
national and Coast Guard strategic goals; enhancing capabilities to
operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic; strengthening the rules-based
order; and innovating and adapting to promote safety, resilience, and
prosperity. An emergent priority was to protect Arctic residents by not
transmitting or contracting COVID-19 while conducting missions. The
pandemic imposed challenges on engagements and presence, both in
communities and across the maritime domain, but has also presented
other opportunities to broaden Arctic experience, training, and
operational readiness to safeguard the U.S. Arctic.
The Coast Guard conducted additional, unscheduled patrols in Arctic
waters this season with CGC HEALY, CGC ALEX HALEY, and CGC MUNRO. With
these patrols, the Service monitored foreign maritime activity,
including the Arctic deployment of the XUE LONG 2; enhanced monitoring
and enforcement of maritime activities including commercial fishing in
the United States exclusive economic zone and along the maritime
boundary line with Russia; supported other U.S. marine scientific
research; and protected U.S. sovereign interests. This activity
included a joint patrol with a Russian Border Guard vessel along the
U.S./Russian maritime border that highlighted the Coast Guard's
continued focus on regional cooperation to combat trans-Arctic threats
such as illegal fisheries. Additionally, aircrews trained with CGC
HEALY and CGC MUNRO as they patrolled in the Chukchi Sea and Bering
Strait region, recertifying aircrews in shipboard landings in order to
extend the operational reach of the Coast Guard into the higher
latitudes.
As in the past few seasons, the Coast Guard deployed two MH-60
helicopters to Kotzebue, Alaska for four months to enhance response
capabilities and provide direct support to communities in the U.S.
Arctic region.
These helicopters have flown over 390 flight hours, and executed
eight long range search and rescue missions. Additionally, they
provided critical support to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Office of Naval
Research, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and the University of
Washington in multiple missions to include assisting scientific
research studying marine mammals plus Arctic ice and environmental
conditions. Coast Guard HC-130 and MH-60 aircrews also conducted
regular Maritime Domain Awareness flights, establishing a U.S.
Government presence over U.S. Arctic waters, protecting U.S. sovereign
interests, and executing U.S. responsibilities.
Because of pandemic concerns in Antarctica, the National Science
Foundation informed the Service that it will not use CGC POLAR STAR to
support the McMurdo Station resupply mission this year. This change
affords the Coast Guard the unique opportunity to conduct maritime
operations in the U.S. Arctic during the winter. From December 2020 to
February 2021, POLAR STAR will project power throughout the Arctic and
defend American sovereignty along the U.S. and Russia maritime boundary
line. This opportunity enhances Coast Guard readiness by increasing
Arctic ice navigation proficiency and informs operations of the future
Polar Security Cutters.
Building Arctic Capacity
The ability for the U.S. to lead in the Arctic, both strategically
and operationally, hinges on physical presence to protect U.S. national
sovereignty and safeguard our homeland security interests. The
foundation of the Coast Guard's operational presence and influence is
U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose is to provide assured, year-round
access to the polar regions for executing not only Coast Guard missions
but also national missions in the high latitudes.
I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its
continued support of the Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter program,
which awarded a contract for the detail design and construction of the
first ship in 2019. This program is efficiently managed through the
joint Navy-Coast Guard Integrated Program Office, which was established
to accelerate the project and leverage best practices from each
Services' shipbuilding programs. Because of Congress's support and this
partnership, the Nation is as close as we have been in over 40 years to
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to
meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic
polar regions.
Until the delivery of Polar Security Cutters, the Coast Guard must
maintain cutters POLAR STAR and HEALY, the Nation's only operational
icebreakers. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension on
POLAR STAR are already underway, and initial work for this project will
begin in 2021, with phased industrial work occurring annually through
2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel's
service life until delivery of at least the second new Polar Security
Cutter. The recent casualty to CGC HEALY, our only medium icebreaker,
underscores the importance of this effort. It also highlights the
Nation's limited bench strength for this particular mission set, and
the importance of devoting sufficient resources for maintenance and
repair activities to aging assets.
On June 9th of this year, the Administration released a
Presidential Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the
Arctic and Antarctic Regions that directed a review of requirements for
a polar security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that supports
our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This
memorandum highlights the Administration's priority for securing
national interests in the Arctic and for recapitalizing the Nation's
icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard will continue to work within the
Department of Homeland Security, with the Department of Defense, and
with other Departments in responding to the Nation's need in the
Arctic.
The Coast Guard must continue to evaluate options to advance U.S.
interests in the region, which extend beyond the provision of
icebreakers. As outlined in the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic
Outlook, in order to respond to crises in the Arctic, our Nation must
also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in
the region. To meet the challenges of the Arctic as a strategically
competitive space, the Coast Guard must also expand its means to shape
the security environment and respond to, intercept, and collect
information on activities and intentions of those operating in the
Arctic region.
Advancing Strategic Leadership and National Security Across the Arctic
As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to
expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard
continues to be a leader across the region, expanding collaboration,
cooperation, and interoperability.
The Service exercises leadership through engagement in Arctic
Council activities including representation on a variety of working
groups. As Chair of the Marine Environmental Response Experts Group,
the Coast Guard engaged with Russia during the response to the June
2020 Arctic oil spill in Siberia, the worst ever in the region, and
continues to work with partners to identify and apply lessons-learned
from the spill to reduce risks in the United States. As a member of the
Shipping Experts Group, the Coast Guard supports projects such as
mitigation of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel
oil by vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also chairs the Council's
Search and Rescue Experts Group, served on the Council's Task Force on
Arctic Marine Cooperation, and has been active in other task forces
that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the 2013
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and the 2015 Framework for
Oil Pollution Prevention.
Additionally, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) continues to be a
bridge between diplomacy and operations. Formally established in
October 2015, the ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of the
Service's Arctic strategy, as well as the objectives of the Arctic
Council. It is a unique, action-oriented maritime governance forum
where the Coast Guard and peer agencies from the other seven Arctic
nations \1\ strengthen relationships, identify lessons learned, share
best practices, carry out exercises, conduct combined operations, and
coordinate emergency response missions. In April 2019, the ACGF
conducted its second live exercise \2\, POLARIS, which incorporated six
ships and five aircraft from ACGF member nations to respond to a
simulated cruise ship in distress near Finland.
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\1\ Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden
\2\ The first live exercise, Arctic Guardina, was held in September
2017
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The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined operations,
and highlights the criticality of coordination preparedness for
maritime environmental response and search and rescue. In April 2021,
the ACGF will hold its third live exercise off the coast of Iceland.
When Russia assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the ACGF
in Summer 2021, the Coast Guard will continue to encourage advancement
of shared ACGF objectives, including more collaboration with
operational Arctic entities and increasing joint response capability
for both search and rescue and marine environmental response cases.
The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and
adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
(Polar Code), which is mandatory under both the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships (MARPOL).
The Polar Code covers the full range of design, construction,
equipment, operational, training, search and rescue, and environmental
protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable
waters surrounding the two polar regions. Additionally, in November
2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with the Russian Federation to
jointly develop and submit a proposal to the IMO to establish a system
of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, with the
objective of advancing the maritime transportation system in the
region; promoting the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
conflicting commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence
activities.
The Coast Guard continues to work to expand the Service's influence
across the Arctic. From July through September of this year, the Coast
Guard deployed CGC CAMPBELL and CGC TAHOMA in the North Atlantic region
to participate in joint military and Search and Rescue exercises. This
included engagements with the Danish Joint Arctic Command, Canada, and
France. These operations demonstrate the Service's strong relationships
with international partners across the globe.
Improving Critical Communications in the U.S. Arctic
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is simply
communicating. Out of necessity, the Coast Guard uses a variety of
solutions to communicate in the Arctic, which minimally satisfies
current operational requirements. The Service is undertaking multiple
connectivity and communications efforts to support and improve
operations in the Region and will partner with the Department of
Defense and other partners when possible. These efforts include
recapitalizing our military satellite communications terminals,
upgrading high-speed data ``Cutter Connectivity'' solutions with
emerging polar satellite services, replacing all Coast Guard cutter
High Frequency (HF) radios, and reegineering the terrestrial HF
network. These efforts will dramatically improve the Service's Arctic
communications and operations in the Arctic.
Additionally, the Coast Guard is working with the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to execute a
comprehensive review of mariner communications and connectivity needs
with the broader Federal, State, local, and industry communities of
interest in the Arctic. We have also engaged the DHS S&T Arctic Domain
Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC) at the University of Alaska,
Anchorage, to conduct relevant research. The intent is to identify
areas of possible collaboration in a whole of government approach and
potential public-private partnerships to address shared communication
and connectivity gaps and needs.
Conclusion
The Coast Guard's value proposition in the Arctic includes
upholding freedom of navigation and the rules-based order by setting
and enforcing standards of behavior in the maritime domain. The Coast
Guard's role in our whole-of-government approach to securing our
national interests in the polar regions is using our experience,
leadership, and ability to both influence and compete below the level
of armed conflict. Leveraging the Service to set the example for
maritime governance in the Arctic positions the United States to be the
preferred partner of other Arctic allies and stakeholders to positively
shape the security environment across the region. The Coast Guard, and
the Nation, must remain committed and agile in the rapidly evolving
geopolitical and operational Arctic environments.
The Administration's and Congress' continued support for a
modernized and capable polar fleet and Arctic infrastructure will
posture not only the Coast Guard, but the Nation, to lead across the
national and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as a continued area
of low tension and great cooperation while preserving our national
interests and rights. We understand the significant investment required
to secure the Arctic, and we appreciate the trust the Nation has placed
in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral, and I think we
are going to just start right in, as we--when Senator Markey is
available, we will make sure he has an opportunity to provide
his opening statement. I want to begin by commanding the Coast
Guard on its decision of the POLAR STAR do the Arctic patrol
this winter.
And can you provide an update on the status of the HEALY,
and how extensive was the damage, and when do you think the
HEALY will be operational again? I had the opportunity to meet
with the captain and the ship's leadership crew, boy, just a
couple of months ago when they were in Seward, Alaska, and it
is a great crew, so I am glad everybody is safe, but an update
would be appreciated.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I am proud to report to you, she is
in the yard in the Mare Island, the upper reaches of San
Francisco Bay, and they have done work on her before, so they
are no strangers to her. We--the motor that we had to replace
was 115 tons of motor. We had one spare. Somebody had the
foresight years ago. When we commissioned HEALY, we had a
spare. We actually built a building around it in Curtis
Shipyard. So we had to ship it. It was too big to ship by rail
or truck. We had to put on a barge and ship it through the
Panama Canal. And so there is--we got her. The motor is
replaced inside HEALY. We expect her to finish her dry dock
availability toward the end of this month. For that, she will
enter a dockside availability at home port and she will be
ready to sail next summer so it would go back up North.
Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you, Admiral. I am sure you
are familiar with the memorandum from the President on June 9th
of this year regarding the Arctic and ice breakers and where to
look at home porting them. Are you familiar with that? And one
of the things that I have been pressing, literally everybody
listed on that memo: the Secretary of Defense, Homeland
Security Secretary, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of State,
OMB Director, National Security Adviser, is the importance of
when we look at icebreakers, and I think everybody recognizes
the need to build a fleet because we really don't even have a
fleet, but to make sure they are home ported in an area in
which they are in the region.
Can you talk about that because right now, when I talk to
the Senior Officials listed on that memorandum from the
President on America's National Security interests in the
Arctic, to a person they recognize that home porting
icebreakers in Alaska makes long-term strategic sense and is in
the long-term strategic interest of the United States of
America. And as I mentioned in my opening statement, you know,
I love the Coast Guard, but sometimes I get a sense of, kind
of, a strategic thinking deficit on these kind of issues where
too much of the home porting decisions seem to be based solely
on where the current crew is, not where the action and the
presence is needed. So can you talk to me about that?
Admiral Ray. Yes. Senator Sullivan, so with regards to the
President's memo, as you know, that was a joint effort between
the Coast Guard and Department of Defense, NOAA, Department of
State. And so we got together and created a document in
response and turned it in on time to DHS and that was submitted
to the NSA. So when they would choose to release that, I am not
certain to say at this point.
As you asked, during the course of this time, we did in our
response say that, you know, Alaska home port should be
considered in the analysis. And as I think you are aware, right
now, we are--we have an ongoing homeport analysis for border
security cutters that is ongoing. We expect that to complete in
August and then a report out by the end of this Fiscal Year. So
and that will definitely include analysis of home porting
options in Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. And so your timeline for completion of
that is August?
Admiral Ray. The they report--the homework will be done in
August, and I will double check this but this is what I recall
from the memo. The homework will be done in August, and then we
will have the analysis of it and, you know, running it, working
it through our review process by the end of the calendar year.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask with regard to leasing. I just
talked to the National Security Adviser. I know that there are
icebreakers that are being looked at in Finland. Last week, I
chaired the readiness subcommittee hearing on the Armed
Services Committee with the Secretary of the Navy, CNO,
Commandant of the Marine Corps. He had talked about this issue.
There is another icebreaker that is in Florida, I guess. Not
sure what it is really doing in Florida.
But the look in terms of the potential to lease those soon,
these are medium icebreakers that would essentially bridge the
gap that we all recognize we have, my understanding is the
White House, National Security Adviser, possibly the Navy, with
regard to some of their funding, are looking at moving forward
on leases soon. Like hopefully as early as the end of this
month. Do you have any comment on that? And do you support it?
Admiral Ray. Well, sir, Senator, with regards to leasing,
we--that was obviously a part of the Presidential Directive to
investigate that, and we went about that with the joint Navy
and Coast Guard team. We have gone about investigating the
feasibility of using those vessels for our purposes along the
way, as we have said consistently, and it was accepted by those
that, you know, at the NSA and others, was that any leasing
arrangement would not be in lieu of building our own
icebreakers, this would be in addition to.
Senator Sullivan. As--I fully agree with that. In addition
to, as a bridge.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. I couldn't agree more.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I think it is--there is a
potential that one of those vessels could be of benefit as a
bridge, as you say.
Senator Sullivan. Good. OK. Admiral, sorry, I am just
trying to get a sense of--sometimes these remote hearings, you
have got to get a sense of who is on the line and who isn't.
And so for now, we don't have anyone on the line. So I am going
to continue my line of questioning. With regard to the leased
icebreakers that we are looking at--again, just speaking to the
National Security Adviser about an hour ago, and I would fully
support it as Chairman of this committee.
There is also an interest in possibly if we do lease medium
term icebreakers in the near future to at least have, again,
those home ported or have one or two of those home ported in
America's Arctic, which is Alaska. Give me a sense of what goes
into the cost benefit analysis, because to me, and again, to so
many that I have spoken to, it seems to be a strategic no
brainer that if the entire point of having an icebreaker is
particularly to protect the interest in the Arctic, to have it
in the Arctic. Right now, the home porting in Seattle is a
couple thousands of miles away, as you know, from the Bering
Strait, where a lot of the action is and, of course, the Arctic
Circle. So give me your thoughts on, again, what we could do
with medium icebreakers right now?
Again, I think the White House is looking at something that
could be home ported hopefully soon in the America's Arctic,
which is in Alaska. But what are the different things that the
Coast Guard is looking at? Because as I mentioned my opening
statement, sometimes it just seems very frustrating that--
pretty obvious choice, long term strategic thinking would be
you would want these home ported, at least some of the fleet,
in America's Arctic.
Admiral Ray. Senator, with regards to the potentially
leased icebreakers short term bridging strategy, we have, you
know, there is--we have not invested significant effort in
analyzing where we would sail those from. I think, you know,
obviously the closeness, the geography of the mission set that
they would be engaged in. Your point is well made. For a longer
term basing of our icebreakers, as you and I have talked and
the Commandant have talked, there are multiple factors that we
consider when we talk about the ability to maintain, not--we
realize that through your work on the Committee that, you know,
you will provide the resources we need.
Senator Sullivan. We will.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. We appreciate and understand that.
What we look at as the mission effectiveness, our ability to
bring those to bear in a reasonable amount of time so that we
can have a high probability success when we do sell that
cutter. That is part of the calculus. There are other parts of
the calculus with regards to the ability for the Coastees
assigned to the cutters, for their families to, you know, to
live and prosper in that vicinity. So as we talk about longer
term home porting of cutters, as you and I have discussed said,
those things are still--those are elements that we consider
alongside the geographic considerations for getting to the OP
area as soon as you would described.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another related questions. I
know that, as you mentioned, there are feasibility studies with
regard to home porting of the polar security cutters in Alaska,
possibly Australia for the Antarctica mission. And also the
FRCs, the feasibility study with regard to the ability to
protect America's interests as it relates to China. So I know
that there was look at Guam and maybe even American Samoa. How
are those feasibility studies going? Now I am talking Alaska,
Australia, and then for the FRCs, Guam and American Samoa.
Admiral Ray. Well, as I--Senator, as I said earlier, the
feasibility study for the home ports, the polar security
cutters, that is ongoing right now. So we---I don't have any
specific response with regards to some of the home ports that
were mentioned in the President's memo.
Senator Sullivan. OK, and just to be clear, sorry to
interrupt, but those are for the six authorize polar security
cutters that were authorized in the NDAA. So the longer term
ones that we are building, not necessarily the short term
bridging ones that have the potential to be leased in a much
shorter amount of time, correct?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. OK.
Admiral Ray. So no, I mean, we are still working on the
analysis of the home ports of those, as we have discussed. With
regards to the fast response cutters, I want to thank you, in
particular, for your support for our ability to homeport those
where they need to be in Alaska. So, as you know, we are
building--thanks to the support of this committee, we have
funds already designated in Kodiak to start building out the
piers there. We have funds on the unfunded priority list for
Sitka. And then--so we are tracking with regards basing those
in Alaska where they need to be.
Senator Sullivan. Well, we appreciate that.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. With regards to fast response
cutters in the South Pacific, those--the discussion about
potentially home porting one in American Samoa, we have already
got two in Guam right now that are there, but the one in
American Samoa, that has been a discussion. And we are
analyzing that, but we don't have--that cutter is not on budget
yet. So we will continue to analyze that and see what we come
up with.
Senator Sullivan. OK, good. I believe Senator Markey is on
the line, so I am going to recognize him next. And then I will
turn to Senator Scott. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
great work in putting together this very important hearing.
First, I want to thank our distinguished witnesses as well,
including Dr. Jennifer Francis, who is a senior scientist at
the world's leading Woodwell Climate Research Center, in
Falmouth, Massachusetts. What is often thought of as the frozen
Arctic is actually not so frozen anymore, making it a complex
and fast changing environment that has caused a host of new and
evolving national and economic security issues for us to
confront. And we know that many of these changes are driven by
the human-caused climate crisis. If we don't talk about the
effects of climate change on the Arctic, we can't fully
understand the truth that threats to our security. A novel
Arctic climate is emerging in its new state, according to
recent research, ``extremes become routine.''
Rising temperatures are causing the region's climate to
shift from sea ice to open water and from snow to rain. These
changes in the North are sadly mirrored in the Antarctic, where
the Pine Islands and Dewitts Glaciers are breaking free. The
collapse of these ice sheets will have immense implications for
rising seas, with Massachusetts and other coastal states facing
up to 10 feet of sea level rise. Together, these climactic
changes in polar regions are of incredible concern to our
country. And as I mentioned before, the Arctic in particular is
warming twice as fast as the global average. Between 1992 and
2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly a million square miles,
an area larger than the State of Alaska.
Current Arctic sea ice extent is the second lowest on
record, with new trade routes opening and towns being flooded,
the changes are drastic and unfolding at an unprecedented rate.
The effects of fire field from the Arctic as well, with impacts
in lower latitudes on weather patterns, extreme events and, of
course, sea level. But we have also seen wildfires in places
that few would have expected decades ago. In 2019, areas within
the Arctic Circle experienced a massive fire season. That was
supposed to be a freak occurrence. These fires weren't
projected by scientists to start until mid-century. As the
climate crisis continued to worsen, but now researchers say
that the 2020 Arctic wildfire season, a previously unthinkable
concept, is likely even worse than the one before. When I
consider the changes in the Arctic, it is with great sadness
and appreciation that I remember a climate scientist and
climate change pioneer, Dr. Conrad Steffen. He was a leading
researcher on the consequences of climate change in the Arctic
and died in a tragic accident in Greenland this past summer.
I met with Dr. Steffen in 2007 in Greenland and heard about
his research, which found that climate change is causing the
ice sheet in Greenland to melt at unprecedented speed. And
sadly, because of our failure to heed the canary in the coal
mine and take the drastic action on climate change, the ice
sheet is now melting twice as fast as it was during that visit
13 years ago. As the Chairman knows so well, the Arctic region
is not some far off remote expanse. It provides livelihoods. To
many, it is a global fishing center. It is a cultural and
sacred place for Arctic indigenous peoples. It is the home of
rare and endangered species. It is security. It is now at
immediate risk as a result of the human caused climate crisis.
The Arctic is a keystone of our climate system, which means
that Arctic security is a National Security issue affecting all
Americans. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
I want to thank you all for the work you do. And would like to
ask you, Admiral Ray, last year we spoke about the Coast
Guard's oil spill preparedness.
The Coast Guard had previously acknowledged shortfalls in
its abilities to respond to any oil spills that might take
place in the Arctic. In July 2020, a Russian power plant
experienced a massive failure that dumped tens of thousands of
tons of diesel into the Polar Arctic, showing how immediate
this threat is to the fragile Arctic ecosystem. Admiral Ray,
since we spoke last December, what specifically has the Coast
Guard done to improve its oil spill response capabilities?
Admiral Ray. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Several things
to kind of, if you will, work to the left of an incident. We
have worked on--this summer during Operation Arctic Shield, we
made a concerted effort to get out and we visited. At the end
of this summer, when you put it with the work we did last
summer, we had visited 92 percent of the facilities that store
petroleum products in the Alaskan Arctic. And as a result of
that, we were able to inspect and we were able to work with the
operators, owner operators, of these facilities, and work to
ensure that those don't become, because as you know, the
Russians spill that you referred to was caused by thawing
permafrost and then the failure of containment tank that they
had that has let several thousand gallons loose. So we have
worked to address that. And we have actually inspected and
visited 92 percent of those. We continue to work with Federal,
state, and local stakeholders to perform exercises this summer
with regards to our preparation for spills. And we also worked
with----
Senator Markey [continuing]. Are there additional resources
which you would like Congress to provide to you to better
protect the Arctic from any spills, either foreign or domestic?
Admiral Ray. Well, the work that we are doing with the
Department of Defense, we are leveraging some of their
resources. And Senator, there are no specific, other than the
capability to move this equipment which you are providing, the
C-130Js and with additional H60 helicopters, those would be
helpful in responding to any sort of incident or spill in the
Arctic. So we can provide--we have--I am sorry, sir, go ahead.
Senator Markey. You mentioned the permafrost is melting.
Half of the world's permafrost is expected to vanish by the end
of this century. But I noticed in your written testimony,
Admiral, that it does not include the words climate change. Do
you believe the Coast Guard should be planning for human caused
climate change?
Admiral Ray. Mr. Ranking Member, the Coast Guard has been
consistent in that we are really agnostic as to the cause, but
we are planning and paying attention to science all over our
country. Up North in particular with regards to, as you would
already discussed, that there is water where there used to be
ice, the multi-year ice has receded. If you look at the planet
from the North Pole aspect, you can clearly see greater
expanses of water that remain over the course of time. We have
seen it this year in our hurricane season. Down the Gulf Coast,
we have had more named storms than we would ever had since we
have been naming storms. So we pay very close attention to the
forecast and the scientific analysis. But as I said, that is
what we look at and what we build to what as we are planning
our operations.
Senator Markey. Now, I know what you are saying, but you
can't be an agnostic when it comes to climate change. That is
what's causing the hurricanes. That is what is causing the
melting of the permafrost. It is what is driving all of these
changes that we are seeing. And if I may Admiral Ray, do you
think the Coast Guard needs to integrate climate resiliency
into the construction of any new facilities in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Markey. And so, I just want to make sure, though, I
make it clear that I thank you for your service, Admiral. I
think you are really doing an excellent job, and I look forward
to working with you.
Senator Sullivan. Senator Scott.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Scott. First, I want to thank Chairman Sullivan for
his commitment to the Coast Guard, his commitment to security
in the Arctic, and all the things he has taught me about
icebreakers in the last 2 years. I want to thank Admiral Ray
for being here. I had no idea the importance of icebreakers
until I got this job 2 years ago.
Senator Sullivan. Well, being the Senator from Florida, we
are OK with that.
Senator Scott. But I have a great help with Chelsea, who is
a great--I think she will be a great Coast Guard Admiral. So
while the United States icebreaking capabilities have remained
stagnant for decades, as we all know, Russia and communist
China continue to advance policies and dedicate more resources
to capitalizing on the issues of the Arctic. China's growing
influence around the world presents a clear and present danger
to the stability of world markets, the security of the United
States and our allies in the quest for freedom and democracy
around the globe. As we all know, we must do everything we can
to make sure our men and women in uniform have every resource
available to defend against the growing threat and keep our
family safe. I want to thank again Chairman Sullivan.
When I came up here and we were shut down, he was a big
advocate of making sure the Coast Guard got--started getting
paid. So, Admiral Ray, the Coast Guard plays a crucial role in
defending our Nation and protecting our security in domestic
and international waterways. Can you talk about the resources
you think you need to remain competitive or the U.S. to remain
competitive in commercial and defense activities in the Arctic?
And how we can improve the coordination between the Coast Guard
and the Department of Defense as we work to combat what Russia
and China is trying to do in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. Thank you, Senator Scott, for the question.
With regards to the resources we need to improve our readiness,
the Arctic is, as you know, we use the same resources. There
are a lot of the same ones. And so the readiness piece that the
Coast Guard, that our Commandant has repeatedly talked about
under testimony and in various other fora, it is pretty
straightforward. We have had really good success with getting
the funds to purchase new assets. Where we have fallen behind
is in the asset, the funds to maintain those assets and operate
them. And so where is the Department of Defense when they went
to address their readiness kind of deficit a couple of years
ago under this Administration, they realized about a 12 percent
increase in their ONS funding and we are about flat lined. And
so that is a challenge. That is one thing that we need. As I
have said before, some of the assets that we are using up
there, the polar security cutter is going to be really
important as we continue to build our Arctic capability.
We are also, Senator Sullivan, the Chairman asked me last
time I testified about our communications capability. We made
progress there, but it is going to require investments in
satellite capability to communicate and operate up North. I
could go through a list of assets, and sir, I would be glad to
provide a more fulsome briefing for that. But it is primarily,
I would say, our readiness has to do with operations and
maintenance funding for our current assets. With regard to
answer your part of the question about our engagement with DOD,
I think we are about as tight now as we have been, on Arctic
issues in particular, with DOD that we would been in my
lifetime.
As you know, we would got an integrated program office with
the Navy to help construct the polar security cutters. And we
have got equal roles of leadership with them on that committee.
And it has been a tremendous help. I am convinced that our
ability to award that contract in April of 2019 was really
aided by our cooperation with the Navy and their experience
with that.
Senator Scott. Is the budget issue thing just tied to the
fact that your budget is separate and--your budget comes up
through Commerce, right? And so you are not part of the DOD
budget. Do you think that is the reason why it is happening?
Admiral Ray. Well, sir, we are part of Department of
Homeland Security, and so we fall under that regime of budget
distribution, if you will. And I am--we think the Coast Guard
is well positioned in the Department of Homeland Security. We
have got many missions that work for that. As you know, we are
a military force, armed service at all times. But we also have
Title 14 authority, which gives us law enforcement authority.
We are a member of the intelligence community. So the
Department of Homeland Security is a great place for the Coast
Guard and we think we prosper there. But when it comes to the
readiness funds that are that are provided to the Coast Guard
via the Department, that is where I think we could use some
support of.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Scott. And just, I
want to ask this very quickly and get to Senator Blumenthal,
but in my opening remarks I did mention that this is the first
time, it looks like successfully, sometimes I talk to Senator
Blumenthal a lot about it as well, that we are pairing up the
Coast Guard Reauthorization Act with the NDAA. That brings a
lot of synergies to the DOD and--or I shouldn't say DOD, I
should say Coast Guard and other services operations. I am
assuming, Admiral, you support that?
Admiral Ray. Absolutely, sir, and we appreciate your
tireless efforts to make that happen.
Senator Scott. Well, we are going to--we are making it, I
think we are making it a precedent this year and hopefully in a
bipartisan way, we can make that happen every year. I think it
helps the Coast Guard and the other services. Senator
Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Sullivan. And I would
just second with a great big exclamation point the fact that
this pairing is not only profoundly significant and historic,
but it is also bipartisan and I hope we continue the work
together that we have started because the Coast Guard deserves
that reliable and well merited treatment in terms of
authorization and appropriation. We are very proud in
Connecticut to be the home of the Coast Guard Academy. The
Coast Guard has a long and storied history in Connecticut. We
regard it as kind of one of our own, and very, very grateful
for the role that the Coast Guard is playing in advancing our
economic interests in the Arctic. I thank the Chairman for
making that topic the focal point of today's hearing.
I want to raise an issue probably somewhat painful to both
of us, and I know that it is not within the direct purview of
this hearing. So if you want to respond in writing as well as
orally now, I certainly would welcome it, but as recently as
this morning, I have been contacted my office by whistleblowers
from the Academy complaining about some of the racial tension,
potential slurs, other kinds of abuses that are deeply
troubling. These instances have been disturbing to us. In
Connecticut for a long time, in fact, to our delegation,
Representative Joe Courtney and I have heard them for a while,
and I know you are familiar with them. The June report from the
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General on
racism at the Academy found that the Coast Guard has failed to
thoroughly investigate racial harassment.
Allegations including the use of racial slurs and failed to
discipline cadets who were found guilty of that behavior. The
specific incidents included in the report, I think you will
agree, have no place in society, much less in the military or
the training institutions like the great Coast Guard Academy
that we are proud to host in Connecticut. Hate speech and race-
based harassment by cadets at the Academy have gone largely
underreported because of the stigma and shame attached to
providing information, and sometimes they have been ignored.
These experiences don't stay in New London, they affect the
entire Coast Guard, as you well know, a little bit like a
virus. Racial hatred and tension spreads. It is a contagion
that I know the Coast Guard leadership is committed to stop.
And so I just want to ask you, what you can tell me to update
us as to what the Coast Guard is doing about this very
important topic, what you are doing to monitor, counter it?
I raise this topic certainly not cheerfully, but I think
necessarily because I know, Ray, you are certainly committed to
stop this kind of racial slurs or any other kind of abuse and
just want to give you the opportunity to respond.
Admiral Ray. Thanks for the question, Senator. And we do
absolutely take this to heart, the report of the Inspector
General from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as
the righting the ship report that were from 2019 or excuse me,
from 2019. We leaned into those and in the course of the last
year we addressed every single recommendation, direction that
was provided in those two reports and we have addressed them
and reconciled them in policy and procedure. More importantly,
I think what we would done with those is go from not just
fixing our manuals and our policy, we have created tools to put
in the hands of our commanders.
And I am not just talking about the Coast Guard Academy. I
am talking about Commanders writ large across the service so
that they know how to conduct an investigation. They know what
they have to report up. They know we are able to track
harassment so that it--because many times these things start
with harassment and they turn into something bigger.
And so we put tools in our hands, to our Commanders, that
we will use those and spread across the service so they can
actually take action against these incidents. Taking it very
seriously, sir, and thank you for bringing it up.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you heard recent reports of these
kinds of racial incidents or slurs continuing?
Admiral Ray. I have not heard of recent reports from the
Coast Guard Academy. No, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Since the June report, have you heard
any and what steps have you taken?
Admiral Ray. Negative, sir. I have not heard any from--
since the June report of the Coast Guard Academy. And I will
double check with my team, but we--if there is something that
happens of this nature, I get a report from our Civil Rights
Directorate every month on things that happen of this nature.
And so I am pretty sure I would have heard if it happened--
maybe, you know, have not been informed. But I will double
check and get back with you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. If you could double check, I would
appreciate it. And I would also be interested to know, because
my time has expired, maybe you can respond in writing, what
kind of comprehensive steps have been taken to change the
culture and to instill in the cadets the idea that there is
zero tolerance for this kind of abuse?
Admiral Ray. We will respond in writing to your question,
sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Admiral Ray. Thanks to
Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
and to my colleague as well. These--so appreciative of you
being here today. And, I have a historic day in the sense that
the House is taking up the NDAA and passing legislation,
including the Coast Guard with authorization for six
icebreakers, so we definitely believe in that mission. It is a
very bipartisan effort, a very bipartisan effort to also fund
those icebreakers, as we have in the past. And so I want to ask
you specifically about the mission moving forward. Admiral Ray,
will the Coast Guard continue to build icebreakers beyond the
three and recapitalize on these purposes of both the climate
science aspect of the Arctic mission?
Admiral Ray. So with regards your first question, ma'am,
Senator, is I know you are aware, we have talked about three
heavies and three medium icebreakers, and so--and we are in the
precursor stages for the requirements for the medium
icebreakers at this point. So by the plans we have now, that
would be the next evolution of building out our icebreaker
fleet. However, we are always reevaluating the fleet mix that
we need with regards to icebreakers. So given the support of
the Congress, I mean, we will continue to look at that and
evaluate that.
And so our real focus at this point--in fact, I was just
down in Mississippi early last month at the Halter Shipyard
with our Mission Support Commander and with our Deputy
Commandant for Operations, meeting face to face with the
leadership of the shipyard that is constructing the first polar
security cutter, just to let them know how important it was to
us and to our Nation. And they get it and they are going--they
are moving out on that. Regards to the second part of your
question, Senator, I am not sure I caught that----
Senator Cantwell. Well, we want to make sure that--I mean,
obviously, it is an evolving mission. And there is the work
that the HEALY does, you know, science capabilities that we
don't want to get lost in all of this. We want to continue
those science capabilities. I want to make sure we are also
getting a work force. Currently you are short 400 prevention
personnel, and we certainly think that the Arctic is an
important prevention mission. And so we want to make sure that
we are discussing here what kind of resources that you need and
what we need to do to keep the science mission and to have a
work force.
Admiral Ray. Senator, thank you for recognizing that
prevention workforce. That is a part of regulatory role of the
Coast Guard which often goes unheralded by it is so important.
As we were talking with the Senator, the Chairman earlier, our
folks and Secretary in Anchorage travelled all over the State
of Alaska this summer to finish out, and they ended up
completing about 92 percent of the inspection of the petroleum
storage facilities in Alaska. That is the kind of work those
folks do so bad things don't happen. So, thank you for your
support of that workforce, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. So, what do we need to do to train and
skill more people?
Admiral Ray. We are--we are completing, Senator, a study
right now on--because the way we were turning our prevention
officers was kind of--it is something we have been doing the
same ways for years and we need to do something with greater
effect where we have Centers of Excellence where we take people
and just in time train them to do the missions we need. And it
is much more complex now, whether it is deep water offshore
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, or whether is up in the Arctic
oceans.
And so the support for us--and once again this comes to the
readiness funding that we have been talking about because if
this is human capital--so to develop that human capital, it is
operations and support funding where that is how we train
people, that is how we send them to these industry Centers of
Excellence, so that our people are on the right footing to do
the regulatory role they need to protect our natural resources.
Senator Cantwell. Well, whatever we can do to be helpful on
that front. We want a Center of Excellence. People trained and
skilled in the Arctic--there is no difference here between
Senator Sullivan and I, and many of our colleagues on these
issues. So thank you, and I am just taking by, you do agree
that the science mission of the icebreaker fleet should
continue?
Admiral Ray. Absolutely ma'am. It is an important part of
our mission. It has been for many years.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Admiral, I
am going to ask a few follow-up questions and then I am going
to see if Senator Markey has any, and I believe there might be
one or two additional Senators who are wanting to participate
and coming down to the hearing room. So, let me ask you, I
highlighted it briefly in my opening statement, but the August
26th incident that we had with this massive Russian military
exercise that went into the United States' EEZ. I know that
you, the Coast Guard, District 17 in Juno, the headquarters are
often made aware of these kind of exercises to coordinate with
Northern command, coordinate with the U.S. Navy.
I have raised this with the Secretary of the Navy, with the
North Comm Commander, what do you think happened that we can
improve on to make sure that something like that doesn't happen
again? First of all, our fishermen, in my view, should never be
essentially forced out of the American EEZ, when they are
legally fishing. And yet, that did happen because the Russians
were being quite forceful. Second, there seemed to be somewhat
of a lack of information flow and I am sure--and I know because
I have requested if, an after-action to make sure that we
improve upon that, particularly as it relates to our fishermen,
whether they are based in Seattle or based in Alaska.
You know, this is a huge part of the U.S. economy--a huge
part of my state's economy. These are great, hardworking,
patriotic Americans. And can you just comment on that and how
we avoid that from happening again, and what steps we need to
take? And if you are looking at, I know you are, but
coordinating with North Comm and U.S. Navy on this?
Admiral Ray. Senator, it is a multi-part question so I will
try to answer it in the same way. The--first of all, as I
described the activity of the Russians in planning and
executing that section exercise, I think there was a degree of
irresponsibility there that needs to be addressed and talked
to, and we have done that. We have sent a written
correspondence. We have got a Coast Guard attache in Russia who
does the leg work with the Russians. And we have a relationship
with the Russians' border guard that serves as a really kind of
a red phone type of relationship, so we are working that.
With that said, this was not our best day with regards to
doing our role to look after American fishermen, the U.S. Coast
Guard, so we--I will just be quite frank, we own some of this
in that there is--although there is about 4,000, over 4,000 of
those hydro packs that come out, the hydro pack is the form of
a message that would describe the area that is on your chart
there. About 4,000 of them a year. When the ones that are in
our exclusive economic zone, we have a duty to pay attention to
that. And we have looked at the ways that we can communicate
that with the fishing fleet. And we did not do that that day.
You know, there are ways they could receive it, on satellite
phones and satellite receivers and other types. However, there
are also ways we can transmit it to make a pointed effort.
What we are doing to hopefully prevent this from ever
happening again, we are having biweekly meetings with the
industry groups, in particular the At-Sea Fish Processing group
that will be represented in your next panel, to understand how
we can communicate that to the fleet so that the fleet knows in
advance when these things that could cause a challenge to their
fisheries operations. And we are dedicated to doing a better
job with that. This is not a once and done thing. This is going
to be a persistent effort on the part of the U.S. Coast Guard
to keep that fleet informed.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Let me turn next to--we were
talking about the different things the Coast Guard needs in
terms of its presence, its ability to do its job in the Arctic,
one of which is infrastructure. As I mentioned, at the Port of
Anchorage, Dutch Harbor, these are about a good 1,000 miles,
1,200 miles away from the Arctic Circle. So Alaska, as you
know, is a big state. Just because you are up in Alaska doesn't
mean you are near at all to the action.
As I like to say, that would be, you know, the functional
equivalent of having a Coast Guard base in Florida protecting
the interests of Boston or Rhode Island or Maine. So
infrastructure is critical. We have made significant progress
here on the deep water draft port for the Port of Nome, which
is much more, in terms of a geographic sense, able to protect
the interest of the Arctic. Last time you testified before this
committee, you emphatically stated the need for those kind of
ports and infrastructure. Can you just comment on that again?
As I mentioned, in the Environment and Public Works
Committee, the Ports and Harbor Bill has a very significant
authorization for deep water draft port that can handle
icebreakers, can handle fast response cutters, National
Security cutters, even destroyers from the U.S. Navy. What is
your sense of that? I believe we need a vision for a series of
strategic Arctic ports the way Russia does. Can you comment on
that a little bit and how important that is to the Coast Guard?
Admiral Ray. Senator, I will. First, I want to thank you
for the infrastructure that you have provided us already. As
you know, about 10 percent of the Coast Guard's infrastructure
is in Alaska----
Senator Sullivan. We will continue to provide that as you
need it.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I really--specifically with
regards to Kodiak, because that is our stepping off point at
present with regards to all of our operations in the Gulf of
Alaska or heading further out West, the Aleutians are up North
in the Bering and further North. As we have repeatedly said,
sir, if there was a deep water port North of Dutch, as you
would discussed, we would certainly take advantage of it. It
would be a benefit to the Coast Guard.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, OK. Let me ask one final, actually,
I am going to just make one more point again on the leasing and
if we were to do kind of a leasing with regard to medium
icebreakers, again, I think as a bridge for some of the polar
class icebreakers, I think home porting those in Alaska would
make immediate sense. We look at, I know the Coast Guard has
already talked about Seattle for some of the polar class ones
which are building on what is already there, makes sense. But
as you know, there is going to be a lot more than just two or
three from what we are working on.
So I want to just make that statement from the Chairman's
position here on the importance of that. What else do you need,
the Coast Guard needs from this committee? As I mentioned, we
are already working on that alignment between the NDAA and the
Reauthorization Act. My goal would be to do the Reauthorization
Act every year, just like we do the NDAA. It makes total sense.
We should pair them, but the Coast Guard needs a
Reauthorization Act every year just the way the rest of the
military does. Is there anything else you need from this
committee, whether it is Arctic related or any other broad
based Coast Guard issues that are at the top of your list right
now?
Admiral Ray. Senator, I thank you for your support. I think
as we have discussed two or three times here, that realization
that the Coast Guard needs, in addition to the capital assets
that Congress has been so good at providing us, we need those
operations to maintenance funds moving forward, because that is
what makes us go and will make us be the Coast Guard we need to
be.
And then I would be remiss and I would be--my Coastees
would be disappointed in me. You know, our Coastees, when I
travel around the Coast Guard, they still remember that
shutdown, that partial shutdown of 2019 and how that affected
them, viscerally affected them and their families. And so I
would just ask for your continued support, direct finance so
that the Coastees never have to--you know, if any military
member is getting paid, they need to be getting paid.
Senator Sullivan. I agree 100 percent with that last
comment, and as you know, some of us worked day and night to
make sure that wouldn't happen, didn't happen, got cured
quickly when it did happen. And it is my goal as Chairman of
this committee to make sure something like that never, ever,
ever happens again. It was an outrage. The Coast Guard members,
the family members and trust me, I did a few town halls in
Alaska with them, they were appropriately really pissed and
they should have been. And we need to make sure that doesn't
happen again. I see we have one additional Senator who joined
us. Senator Cruz, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
thank you also for convening this hearing and for your
leadership on this issue. Chairman Sullivan is the leading
champion for the Coast Guard in the U.S. Senate and also the
leading champion for America leading in the Arctic. And I am
grateful for your leadership in both regards.
Senator Sullivan. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. I will also note, Admiral, and the question
you raised about the shutdown. That shutdown in 2019 was
unfortunate. And Senator Sullivan and I together teamed up on
legislation to pay the men and women of the Coast Guard and
took to the Senate floor trying to get the Senate to adopt it.
Unfortunately, a Democratic Senator raised an objection and
held the men and women of the Coast Guard hostage to that. And
so I am hopeful we don't see a reprise of that in the days and
weeks to come.
The Arctic Circle has strategic, economic, and military
significance for the United States, and I want to thank the
Coast Guard for your continued presence in the region, your
leadership working to protect America's interests. I've said
for a long time that China is an adversary who would benefit
from an American retreat all across the globe. President Xi and
the Chinese Communist Party are investing heavily in the
military, as is Russia. In your assessment today, who is the
dominant power in the Arctic Circle?
Admiral Ray. Senator, thanks for the question. From the
analysis that we have done, I mean, obviously, if you look at
the planet from the North down, down, looking down at the North
Pole, you can see the extensive shoreline that Russia has. You
know that they are--they are a force to be reckoned with there
just because of geography. They have got the geography and they
have got the natural resources there. So in the near term, I
think Russia is certainly the Nation that we should really be
paying close attention to. But we cannot ever take our eyes off
the ball on China.
I think that the behavior they are displaying in the polar
regions, not just the Arctic, but the Antarctic and not just
the Alaska Arctic, but over by Greenland as well, they are they
are displaying similar activity, following, in my opinion and
the analysis I've done, this is all unclassed, with regards to,
you know, they are following the same playbook they followed in
the South China Sea and following the places they do everywhere
else. They will get a toehold, start working in the name of
science, in the name of other things, and the next thing you
know, they are moving forward with their agenda there. Does
that answers your question, Senator?
Senator Cruz. In your assessment, what would be the effect
to the United States if we were to cede control of the Arctic
to the Russians and the Chinese?
Admiral Ray. Well, it would be no different than ceding the
Gulf of Mexico to somebody else. It is a shore of the United
States. It is the approach United States, although it is not as
accessible as the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Coast or name
your coast, but it is the same sovereignty rules and the same--
we have the duty, we in the Coast Guard, and this is what we--
we have the duty to protect it now. 30 years ago, when I was a
young officer in the service, nobody talked about it because
the multi-year ice had not receded. But now there is access out
there that didn't exist. Traffic through the Bering Strait,
increased, you know, 200 percent in the last four or 5 years.
It is not going to replace the Suez Canal anytime soon, but
it is growing and the access is up there. So I would say we
should be planning to be able to exert our sovereignty, protect
our resources, provide support for those who need access, and
these are eco-tourists, these are Americans, a lot of them, or
also the folks who are Alaska Natives who live and make their
living up there. We need to be the same Coast Guard, I am
speaking from a Coast Guard perspective, for them as I am for
any other state in our country.
Senator Cruz. You said in your opening statement that State
actors, as well as non-State actors, are seeking to advance
their own interests in the Arctic. What did you mean by non-
State actors?
Admiral Ray. Well, the potential for IUU fishing will exist
up there. That is coming. I mean, when the Senator, now here in
Nome, summer before last, we had a NOAA----
Senator Cruz. And pretend hypothetically there were a
Senator in the room that didn't know that particular acronym.
Admiral Ray. OK, I am sorry, that is illegal, unregulated
and unreported fishing. That is a scourge--it literally is one
of the scourges of the planet. I would say, from a maritime
perspective, IUU fishing, whether it is happening in the South
Pacific, whether it is happening in the Bahamas or pick a
place, off the coast of Africa, off the coast of Somalia, that
is one of the most widespread degradation of resources that the
planet knows. And it has effects.
And so what the Senator and I saw last year when we were in
Nome, there was a NOAA scientist there, really bright
scientist, and she explained, she drew out a map for us in the
gravel of the parking lot of the harbor at Nome, and she
explained to us because Pollock is the most substantive
American fishery. We could probably get arguments on that from
other parts of the country, but it is the greatest in capacity
what happens. And that is caught in the Bering Sea, and those
Pollocks are moving North, up toward the Arctic.
Now, there is a 16 year moratorium on fishing in the Arctic
that pretty much everyone agrees who has the capability to fish
up there. But they will be up there. They will be up there and
they would deplete those resources just like they will anywhere
else if we let them.
Senator Cruz. And what resources does a Coast Guard need to
combat both State and non-State actors in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. The capital assets that we are being provided
right now, whether it is polar security cutters and continue to
be able to build out that fleet, because what happens is--and
that is why we call it polar security cutters and not
icebreakers per say moving forward, because breaking ice is
just a means to an end. The end is to get Coast Guard cutters
with Coast Guardsmen on scene to a place where either people
need a rescue or they need arresting. And we do both of those.
And so that is the resources we need. And then the aircraft,
the communications capability to go with them. But in the short
term, as I was telling the Committee earlier, I think the
operations and sustainment funds are really the long pole in
the tent for our service right now.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Admiral. And as a closing
observation, I will say I was up this summer in Alaska with
Senator Sullivan. And my advice to you is for the Coast Guard
to stay utterly agnostic on the malicious lie that Senator
Sullivan persists in repeating, which is that Alaska is larger
than Texas. And I can tell you, we Texans don't believe the
lying maps that are put out. And my advice is for you to stay
out of that particular squabble.
Senator Sullivan. Just for your information, not only is it
larger, but if you split Alaska in half, Texas would be the
third largest state in the country. So we are--and I don't
think the map makers are lying. But I am glad you were up
there. And, Admiral, you are very popular. There is another
Senator who was actually recently in Alaska as well, Senator
Lee, who is joining us. And I am sure he has some questions as
well.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Lee. Utah is bigger than most states, but I feel
quite intimidated, not going to get into this dispute. I never
realized it was up for debate, whether Texas was bigger than
Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. It is not up for debate, just for the
record.
Senator Lee. Admiral, thanks so much for being here. Thanks
for all you do. The mission of the Coast Guard is absolutely
essential to who we are and our ability to live our lives as we
do. In your testimony, you note that the ability of the United
States to lead in the Arctic hinges on physical presence in the
region so that we can defend our homeland and safeguard our own
security interests. You note that this is really important for
us and we ought to stick to that. This means that we need
assured year round access to the polar regions. The Coast Guard
has also noted that it needs six polar security cutters, these
PSCs, for their missions.
Now, my understanding is that the Coast Guard and Navy's
first contract award for a PSC anticipates construction
beginning sometime next year, sometime in 2021. Is that right?
And then delivery of a vessel by 2024, meaning that we may not
have vessels to fully replace our aging icebreakers for 5
years, give or take, possibly a little bit more. Is that right?
Admiral Ray. That is accurate, Senator.
Senator Lee. Now, how does this timeline harm the Coast
Guard's readiness and its ability to carry out its core
missions?
Admiral Ray. Well, this timeline is--it is, really at this
point, it is unavoidable. We've got cutters that are over 40
years old, where the oldest one, POLAR STAR, the one that we
talk about the most, and it is an interesting--and so urgency,
a sense of urgency has been on the Coast Guard for several
years now. And I am just thankful that the result of the
leadership here in this subcommittee and the support of the
Administration. We are moving forward with recapitalizing.
There is no time. The longest journey starts with the first
step and we are on the step.
Senator Lee. You know, Federal law generally prohibits the
use of foreign contractors, foreign shipyards, for the
construction of Coast Guard vessels or major components of
Coast Guard vessels. It is no secret that Finland has boasted,
apparently with some ability to back it up, that they could
build an icebreaker within 2 years and they could do it for
less than $300 million. Undoubtedly, we need, for the reasons
that you have stated quite persuasively, we need to be able to
compete with China and with Russia in this region in
particular.
In order to accelerate our acquisition, based on our needs
for the acquisition, do you think Congress ought to consider,
in a limited manner, sort of revisiting the general prohibition
on foreign shipbuilding? In other words, would or could
granting some limited flexibility to our NATO partners and
friendly Arctic nations, is that something that could help the
Coast Guard acquire the flexibility that it needs to get these
vessels up and running so that we can establish this presence
that we need in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. Senator, first of all, as I am sure it is no
surprise, we are huge fans and supporters of the American
industrial base in the shipyards along the Gulf Coast in that
and I know you are, too. With that said, I think the bridging
strategy that makes the most sense to the Coast Guard at this
point is this potential to lease one of these icebreakers.
Because it would need to be, and you know, it would have to be
U.S.-flagged to be able to have the authority that we use it
for. So that--from the perspective we have done is trying to
bridge the closest gap that we found ourselves in. That makes
more sense to me.
Senator Lee. OK, it makes more sense. But just to be clear,
it would be no security threats associated with, security
issues, that would attend if we were to lift this restriction
such that we could acquire a vessel in a different way than
current law allows. Are there any security issues that would
preclude us from contracting with someone operating within a
NATO power or within another friendly nation, friendly Arctic
Nation perhaps, to help us meet our shipbuilding needs? Would
that present any security threat?
Admiral Ray. Certainly, it depends on which one you are
talking about. Not all are created equal, but of the Arctic
nations that I am familiar with, that I have dealt with,
security of the ones that are our allies would not be the first
concern I would have.
Senator Lee. They would not be the first concern that you
would have. And would they be a concern at all? Is that a
concern to have purchased that from Finland, for example?
Admiral Ray. Is security a concern for--not to my
knowledge, sir.
Senator Lee. OK. Thank you very much. I see my time has
expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And just one
final question relates to what Senator Lee was asking about. He
raises a really good point about this huge gap in capability
for coverage of protecting American sovereignty. Isn't that one
of the reasons the President put the memo out on the issue of
if you are not going to build, which creates some legal
challenges, at least right now in the current law to lease? And
that is what we are looking at doing right now. Leasing
potential medium icebreakers from Finland is one option, is
that correct?
Admiral Ray. There have been several different vessels
alluded to, some of them are of Finnish origin, sir.
Senator Sullivan. But to lease, to close that gap and
protect that, to at least bridge that gap until we can build
our own.
Admiral Ray. That is the general strategy that we have been
exploring and as a result of the President's memo.
Senator Sullivan. And do you think that makes sense?
Admiral Ray. I think you would agree it does. One thing I
do want to state, these vessels, I have been around them and
various commercial icebreakers, if you will. And they are not--
they are not to military design with regards to communications,
with regards to damage control, with regards to
compartmentalization. So if we get, you know, in some sort of--
we have some sort of accident because the nature of the work
that we do, so there is a different gap.
We would have to do some work to them. It is not just take
one off the shelf. If it was, we would have probably done that
a long time ago. So there will be some work required to make
these for the Coast Guard. But with that said, it is the
Commandant's position and our position that we will certainly
consider this and work to see what makes sense to bridge this
gap.
Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you. Sure, yes, Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. I just have to ask the question, so if I
understand the point that is being made, and I think Senator
Sullivan raises an excellent point, if in order to bridge the
gap, perhaps we could lease something. If we could lease, for
example, a vessel that has been built in Finland, that would
suggest that our security needs are met by that vessel or
certainly not compromised by that.
And if the only reason why we are not securing that vessel
from Finland is because U.S. law prevents it, even though we
could potentially do it for a fraction of the cost and get it
in less than half of the time. I would suggest that is a
question for us to consider as a Congress, why is it that for
the sake of hewing to the status quo of what current U.S. law
requires, if there is no security implication from doing so,
why would we need to limit ourselves to leasing rather than
buying with regard to a Finnish-built icebreaker? That is a
question I have for you.
Admiral Ray. Sir, I think it is in the national interest to
preserve our industrial base, shipbuilding base. And I think I
mean, history has proven that. That is what won us World War II
largely. And so I think to outsource the building of new ships
for the use of our military, that would be something we would
have to consider long and hard. And so my starting position is
that when you protect this industrial base, which is declining,
shipbuilding base is declining along the Gulf Coast in other
places, and so that is--and that's where I stand on that.
Senator Lee. And I completely agree that is a legitimate
interest to maintain our industrial base so that we can have
access to those things. When our own industrial base can't do
things in the same way that others could do, especially with an
ally, a friendly Arctic nation, I think that is a good reason
for us to ask ourselves the question of whether we ought to
revisit some aspects of existing law. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And Admiral, I
want to thank you again, not just for this hearing, but the
outstanding work that you would been doing for the Coast Guard.
So many issues beyond just the Arctic. I appreciate very much
your testimony for this panel. The record will remain open for
2 weeks. And if there is additional questions from Senators,
for the record, we respectfully ask you and your team to try to
get back to those as soon as you can.
But for now, sir, we are going to move on to our next
panel. And I want to thank you again for your outstanding
testimony today and your exceptional service to our Nation. And
please pass on to the men and women of the Coast Guard that we
got their back, and we are working to try and make sure we take
care of them and give them the assets and training that they
need to protect our nation, and do it in a way that makes all
of us proud.
Admiral Ray. Thank you very much for the opportunity, Mr.
Chairman. And we really do appreciate your support.
Senator Sullivan. Absolutely. We are now going to turn to
our next panel. We have three witnesses that I mentioned
earlier. They are all testifying remotely, so hopefully this is
going to work easily. We have Major General Randy Kee, and
Stephanie Madsen, and Dr. Jennifer Francis. General Kee, we
will begin with you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RANDY A. ``CHURCH'' KEE,
USAF (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARCTIC DOMAIN
AWARENESS CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA,
COMMISSIONER, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION
General Kee. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee in Washington,
D.C.. It is an honor to discuss U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
capabilities for safeguarding national interests and promoting
economic security. I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's
interest and support o the Coast Guard's Arctic endeavors. I
have the privilege to serve as the Director of the Arctic
Domain Awareness Center at the DHS Center of Excellence in
Maritime Research hosted by the University of Alaska. I am also
a U.S. Arctic Research Commissioner. The following reflections
are mine alone and do not necessarily represent the views of
the organizations to which I am assigned or affiliated.
Among my experiences in the Arctic, please note I spent
time listening and learning from Alaska's indigenous
communities, getting insights from people who have been a part
of the Arctic since time began. The Arctic is exceptional.
Arctic exceptionalism in size, breadth, and depth of ongoing
collaboration of our science and economic endeavors, indigenous
peoples concerns, military cooperation and governance related
activities are really the envy of many across the globe.
Continuing Arctic exceptionalism is by no means assured, and
U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives in science, economics,
and measures to ensure American security and sovereignty should
really top U.S. priorities.
The opportunities of an opening Arctic are incentive for
Arctic and Antarctic nations alike to pursue easier access to
extract minerals, harvest marine life, conduct maritime
transport, advance tourism and project sovereign influence.
Diminishing Arctic environment is enabling rising competition
between national powers. The Russian Federation has refurbished
Soviet--former Soviet Arctic bases, built additional, and is
capable of projecting power to and through the Arctic. With a
dominant number of icebreakers, Russia can project surface
forces in multiple directions simultaneously.
Russian national decisionmaking and defense planning are
opaque at best, and Russia's Arctic military advantage should
be met with resolve and strength as America cannot afford to be
perceived as weak in our Arctic commitment to the Kremlin. From
my vantage, the Russian Navy's actions against Alaskan
fishermen in the Bering Sea in late August are frankly
unacceptable. Harassing Alaska vessels within the U.S. EEZ
should not go unanswered and should not happen again. It is
important to note Russia is an Arctic Nation who shares a
critical Arctic waterway with the United States. It is in both
Nation's interest to prevent conflict in the Bering and Chukchi
Seas.
Conversely, the People's Republic of China advances
influence through the use of its economic power to gain access
across the Arctic. China is normalizing an Arctic presence via
national and icebreakers, gaining port access and advancing
mining interests. It is not inconceivable China may conduct
extractive measures closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than
any we would likely prefer, particularly based on China's track
record of environmental stewardship elsewhere. It is in our
interests to find a way to decouple joint approaches between
Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic region. This is possible
through a diplomatic reproachment that does not condone or
reward malign Russian actions, but guided by realizing there
are a number of common Arctic interests between Moscow and
Washington, D.C. I do believe that great power competition need
not become great power confrontation.
Against the backdrop of the most difficult operational and
geostrategically challenging theaters in the planet, the
selfless service of the U.S. Coast Guard makes the challenging
look easy and conducting search and rescue, disaster response,
law enforcement, and support to civil authorities. As a career
military pilot with 30 years of service that includes operating
the Arctic, please let me assure you, what America's Coast
Guard does in the Arctic is demanding, requires daunting
courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty. U.S.
Coast Guard needs to project persistent power in the United
States regions of the Arctic as well as other international
Arctic waters. The authorization of six and appropriation of
one polar security cutter was a critical gain. Hopefully new
funding for more icebreaking cutters will be coming soon as
capacity is well below what is needed. New icebreaking cutters
need the ability to defend, communicate, and ascertain the
operating domain.
This summer's recent mishap aboard the Coast Guard's cutter
HEALY highlights the challenge of the long lines of
communications from home port in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic
region. There should be consideration either developing or
enhancing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an expeditionary
function, providing a logistical and affordable levels of
repair. Locating one or more such facilities in places such as
Seward, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor or Nome can possibly provide ice
going vessels an important third option between repair at sea
or return to home port in Seattle.
Coast Guard homeporting should be located at a robust
multimodal transportation node, co-located with heavy marine
industry, housing, schools, communications and logistics. I
truly wish such facilities already existed in Alaska's Arctic,
and advocate for smart and long term commitment to establish
joint civil Government development of Alaskan ports. As a
former military programmer, I am guided by the principle of
efforts to create capabilities via ramps through multi-year
incremental increments. One point to emphasize is the focus on
increasing capabilities at or near the Bering Strait as this
maritime choke point becomes--could become as strategically
important as the Straits of Malacca or the Panama Canal to
global maritime commerce.
The State of Alaska's official motto, North to the Future,
is as relevant as ever. I believe the importance of the Arctic
will certainly continue to rise. Thank you for the opportunity
to provide these reflections and please know how appreciative I
am of your service to our Nation providing political leadership
in these difficult times. I respectfully look forward to
addressing your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee,
USAF (Retired), Executive Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center,
University of Alaska, Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission
Introduction and overview of the specific needs.
Good afternoon to you Mr. Chairman, ranking member and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee in Washington D.C. It is a
genuine privilege and a pleasure to discuss U.S. Coast Guard
Capabilities for Safeguarding National Interests and Promoting Economic
Security in the Arctic.
I have the honor to serve as the Director of the Arctic Domain
Awareness Center, (ADAC) a Department of Homeland Security Center of
Excellence in Maritime Research in support of the United States Coast
Guard's Arctic mission, hosted by the University of Alaska at the
University of Alaska Anchorage. Please know that ADAC and the Center's
associated research and education network are truly committed to being
the best possible support to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as we can
individually and collectively muster. Accordingly, we in ADAC seek to
be supportive of the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook,
(ArcSO) as well as the U.S. Coast Guard's 2018 Maritime Commerce
Strategic Outlook (MCSO). I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's
interest and support of the implementation of the U.S. Coast's Arctic
Strategic Outlook and the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in an
Arctic context, as important and believe is greatly appreciated by many
who are concerned about these topics in Alaska, across our Nation and
with America's closest Arctic partners and allies, in particular, our
allies in Canada.
In addition to serving and supporting the U.S. Coast Guard in
leading ADAC, I respectfully relay that I was recently appointed as a
Commissioner to the U.S. Arctic Research Commission by the President of
the United States. In the coming months and years, I look forward to
supporting and serving with the Commission in meeting statutory
requirements as directed in the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984. As
is the case with many in the research community, I have the privilege
to serve in other committees and volunteer endeavors, and list the
following as the more significant of these collateral activities: U.S.
Delegation lead for Situational Awareness, International Cooperative
Engagement for Polar Research, U.S. Office of Naval Research, Global
Fellow, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars, Co-Chair, Alaska Civil Armed Services Team (ACAST), State of
Alaska.
I respectfully submit the reflections contained in this document
are mine alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.
Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, the State of Alaska,
the University of Alaska, the Office of Naval Research, the Wilson
Center or the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. These reflections do
represent however, many years of Arctic focused endeavors ranging from
military operations to military and national strategy development,
multinational military engagement focused on Defense Support to Civil
Authorities, policy and planning for defense and security formulation,
and directing a multidiscipline center of Arctic maritime research.
While many of these experiences are oriented at the Federal or
multinational level, they also include time spent listening, learning
and working with Alaska's indigenous communities of leaders, gaining
understanding and insights of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea
areas from these leaders in local and place-based knowledge. No
meaningful work can happen in this region without the insight,
involvement and collaboration with these communities.
Due to the close collaboration we have at ADAC with DHS and the
multiple echelons of Arctic-oriented service within the USCG, we
identify our Center as an extended member of the DHS and Coast Guard
family and celebrate their successes, while trying to lessen the burden
of their operational challenges. The Center achieves this effort in a
cost-effective manner by harnessing the power of the University of
Alaska and our network of partners and collaborators, which contain
research nodes across the United States, extensive research
collaboration across Canada and some additional collaborations with
America's Nordic Allies and partners as well. Strategically, ADAC's
research, educational programs and convening activities continue to
seek solutions that support the USCG's statutory missions associated
with Coast Guard's Title 10 and Title 14 Authorities.
At the outset, I very much hope the committee recognizes my
reflections are oriented to be supportive of the challenges our
Nation's Coast Guard faces in securing and protecting the U.S. Arctic
maritime region. Against the backdrop of one of the most difficult
operational theaters on the planet, the selfless service of the U.S.
Coast Guard makes the challenging look easy in conducting search and
rescue, disaster response, law enforcement and support to civil
authorities. As a career military pilot with three decades of service
that includes operating in the Arctic and across many other operational
demanding areas, please let me assure you . . . what America's Coast
Guard does every day in the Arctic is supremely demanding, requiring
daunting courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty.
The USCG has long made the case of needing to revitalize their
ability to project persistent sovereign power into the ice-laden
regions of the U.S. Arctic as well as the international waters of the
Central Arctic. This persistent power is best advanced via Polar
Security Cutters. The authorization of six and the appropriation of one
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) was critically needed and hopefully
additional appropriations for more Polar Security Cutters will be
coming sooner than later, as the current capability of the U.S. Coast
Guard in this capacity is greatly diminished and well below what is
needed for the mission.
While the platforms matter, as persistent presence is not achieved
without them, it is useful to consider a comprehensive systems approach
to projecting such persistence. USCG PSC's without connectivity or
communications may be unable to respond when and where most needed in a
timely manner for crisis response. PSC's that have lagging or
incomplete operational domain awareness may not be able to ascertain
risk or have sufficient tactical knowledge and understanding to conduct
an assigned mission. For safety and mission assurance PSCs must be
manned by crews and leadership that have been trained and educated to
fully comprehend a complex operating environment. PSC's that do not
have minimal logistics and support located within the theater they
operate, may have to forfeit their operational tasking and retrograde
thousands of miles back to home port to effect repairs when mechanical
issues arise that are beyond the ability to repair at sea.
As such, creating a systems approach in support of projecting
persistence, that include PSCs, and complementary capabilities in
communications & connectivity, domain awareness, institutionalized
training and in-theater logistics support can result in PSCs providing
a presence that signals to friend and foe alike. . .the U.S. Coast
Guard is on the watch and vigilantly ready to protect and secure the
U.S. maritime Arctic.
Further, ensuring the U.S. Coast Guard is supported with the best
understanding science and technology can deliver in characterizing the
ever-changing Arctic at fine scale for U.S. Coast Guard operational and
tactical decision makers, is a persistent and enduring need.
The following paragraphs are presented to describe the challenge,
present the key drivers of concern, offering solutions to consider and
reflecting on opportunities to advance an improved chance of success
for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Homeland Security Enterprise in better
securing our Arctic maritime national interests.
A discussion on the geostrategic challenges facing the Coast Guard and
our national interests in the Arctic.
Alaska and Alaska's maritime region make the U.S. an Arctic nation.
While it may not be evident to many, and likely, most Americans, the
Arctic region is vital to U.S. national interests and Alaska's maritime
regions of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are the Arctic
approaches to U.S. sovereign territory. It is a region that is
experiencing great change due to rising temperatures, now rising at
more than twice the rate as lower latitudes and as forecasts indicate,
this trend is posed to continue, and bring unique challenges that will
strain all the inhabitants' ability to resiliently adapt . . . flora,
fauna and people alike.
When the United States became an Arctic nation in 1867, the Nation
became responsible for facilitating domestic security and defending
national sovereignty across a significant frontier, known to the
generations of Alaska Native residents and a handful of explorers,
miners, trappers and settlers from the continental U.S., Canada, Russia
or other places. In the more than a century and half since the Alaska
purchase, the national security challenges within America's Arctic have
fundamentally changed. As seasonal Arctic ocean sea ice levels
continues to diminish, the barriers of access are opening the Arctic
region to natural resource development, maritime trade, and tourism,
all of which is substantially transforming the security landscape of
the high latitude north. New international actors now look to the
Arctic for opportunity, while existing Arctic nations are now advancing
efforts to better realize the region's economic potential.
As the changing Arctic presents new economic and geopolitical
opportunities, environmental change poses a significant threat to
current economic systems and traditional lifestyles in the Arctic.
Thawing (and sometimes melting) permafrost is compromising the land
that serves as the foundation for coastal Arctic communities and the
small number of connecting roads and ports. With less sea ice cover,
weather systems are becoming more volatile, allowing for stronger storm
systems that further exacerbate coastal erosion through storm surges,
high winds and coastal flooding. Environmental changes in the Bering
Sea is now having an impact to traditional commercial and subsistence
fisheries as fish stocks are starting to move north, risking and in
some instances, already dislocating traditional food sources for marine
mammals and Alaskan Arctic residents alike. Collectively, these
environmentally focused changes pose a significant threat to existing
coastal communities, local economies and associated infrastructure
within the region.
The opportunities of an opening Arctic are an incentive for Arctic
and non-Arctic nations alike to pursue easier to access and extract
mineral and petrochemical resources, pursue fish proteins (at present,
outside of the Central Arctic Ocean), conduct maritime transport,
advance tourism and project sovereign influence through national
flagged vessels.
Reductions in sea ice have reduced the access barrier to maritime
operations and as a result, increasing activity is gaining in the
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea regions. as well of course the overall
pan-Arctic, which includes the Northern Sea Route along Russia's
northern shore and the Northwest Passage across Northern Canada. The
Arctic's diminishing sea ice environment is increasing accessibility to
the vast hydrocarbon deposits within the region, which allows for
Arctic nation-states like the Russian Federation to expand resource
extraction efforts. The diminishing ice Arctic is enabling sea lanes of
the Arctic to open sooner and stay open longer through the summer
months and increasingly into the fall. This past May as an example, saw
the earliest recorded transit of the Northern Sea Route, a record that
will likely be routinely broken repeatedly in the seasons to come. The
emerging economic potential of the Northern Sea Route, and the
possibility of a viable Transpolar route within this century have
incentivized nations and industry to consider leveraging these new and
shorter routes for transporting maritime commerce as an economic
advantage.
The diminishing Arctic ice environment that is enabling rising
competition is manifesting itself in a multifaceted manner. It is well
understood the Russian Federation has restored and refurbished former
Soviet bases along Russia's Arctic region, while creating new
facilities and establishing forces at those stations capable of
projecting power in and through the Arctic region, well beyond national
borders. If this was simply establishing a safe and secure Russian
Arctic in creating sound defense by having a more than capable offense,
then such activities may be reasonable and possibly even acceptable.
However, Russian national decisions and associated defense planning,
are opaque at best, and the asymmetric Arctic military advantage
created in the Russian Federation should be met with resolve and
strength by the U.S. and America's Allies . . . as resolve and strength
has historically been successful to stabilize relations between Moscow
and Washington D.C.
Russia's approach to managing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) bears
monitoring. Their practices obliquely, if not directly, potentially
restrict freedom of navigation and counter the aspect the NSR is an
international waterway.
Russia is no doubt, a considerable Arctic maritime power. With a
dominant number of ice breakers, that range from vessels suitable for
riverine operations to nuclear-powered ocean-going vessels, the Russian
military can project sovereign influence throughout the pan Arctic in
multiple directions simultaneously.
Russian abilities to muster and project military forces into the
Arctic are remarkable. The range and complexity of these activities
have continued to grow substantially following their restart of Long-
Range Aviation back in January 2007.
Russian military exercises in the Bering Sea in late August are a
deeply worrying example where lack of understanding, communication and
a willingness for provocation, places not only military forces and
response measures at risk, but these actions also place U.S. citizens
at risk, such as the U.S. fishing fleet that were interrupted and
alarmed in their commercial activities by poorly understood and
reportedly aggressive Russian military maneuvers.
Since the routine establishment of Extended Economic Zones (EEZ),
normally 200 nautical miles from shore, as codified in the United
Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
1982, foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage,
permitting transit and freedom of navigation as long as these vessels
are not conducting items exclusively prohibited such as weapons
testing, polluting, fishing or conducting scientific research.
According to UNCLOS, it was allowable for the Russian navy to exercise
in the U.S. EEZ, as long as the vessels stayed outside of U.S.
territorial waters (12 nautical miles from shore).
However, the Russian navy aggressive actions against U.S. flagged
Alaskan fishermen in late August this year, are unacceptable. The
Alaskan fishermen where rightly operating in a region well known and
well established as a profitable fishing ground. For U.S. vessels to be
harassed and ultimately forced to depart the area and losing the
associated economic opportunity should not be permitted, particularly,
as these fishermen where operating within the U.S. EEZ and adhering to
the usual and customary practices of UNCLOS and of course U.S. fishing
regulations.
In past experiences while serving in uniform, I have been
confronted by military members of the Russian Federation. While my
reflections are anecdotal and not a full analysis, these experiences
have created a personal reflection that Russian military rewards those
who act aggressively, and restraint can often be seen as a sign of
weakness.
As the Russian Federation is an Arctic nation who shares a critical
waterways management challenge with the United States, it is in both
nations' interests to resolve conflicts, effectively communicate and
find solutions to prevent escalation of tension and a rise in military
actions along our shared and the economically increasingly important
waterways in the Chukchi and Bering Seas.
From personal experience, it is my belief that Russia respects
strength and resolve, and towards that end the U.S. National Security
Strategy provides the antidote and guiding perspective . . . peace
through strength, sustained in a competent, professional manner earns
the respect of the Kremlin and Russian forces. This requires
investment, training, proficiency and most importantly . . . persistent
presence, oriented on a timetable and tempo of our choosing.
In sum, the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as weak in our
Arctic resolve to the Kremlin. Certainly, America should avoid over-
reacting in a manner that may be seen as unrestrained escalation, but
should reserve the right to escalate if needed to retain the initiative
and in every case, ensure Russia understands, the United States of
America will defend our citizens, our territory, our treaty Allies and
our National Interests.
The Peoples Republic of China's efforts in the Arctic is
manifesting itself differently than Russian actions. China continues to
maximize it influence through use of its economic power to create
potential for access to policy governance in forums such as the Arctic
Council, and uses its economic strength to potentially position China
to gain access to Arctic regional mineral wealth, fish proteins and
more. China's economic partnership with Russia for Arctic region
liquified natural gas (LNG) is one example of China's advancement on
their declared Belt and Road initiative. China continues to project
sovereign presence into and across the Arctic via Xue Long I and Xue
Long II icebreaker cruises, with a third Xue Long to join future
efforts. There are media reports that China is seeking to replicate
Russian examples of developing nuclear powered ice breakers. In
addition to investments in LNG on Russia's Arctic Yamal Peninsula,
China's influence in gaining Iceland commercial port access and efforts
to advance commercial mining interests in Greenland, signal China's
strategic aims contain a comprehensive pan-Arctic approach. Based on
their actions in other regions, it is a reasonable conclusion to state
Chinese national need for raw resources such as mineral and fish
proteins will continue to drive their aspirations and activities across
the Arctic.s
The People's Republic of China see the Arctic as integral to its
global ambitions. It is fairly clear that China will continue efforts
to gain access to resources and deliver products to market for economic
benefit, while also establishing influence among the Arctic community
who may be tempted by promises of infrastructure investment and
economic development through Chinese investment. Chinese icebreakers
continue to project presence in the Arctic region, to include
operations in the Arctic basin outside of the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. It is not inconceivable that such a presence
could lead to mineral and other extractive measures in the future--
closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than we would likely prefer,
particularly when considering the insufficient measures Chinese
industry has made towards environmental stewardship in other regions
across the globe.
China's willingness to support infrastructure in developing
regions, provides many reasons for caution and close examination of any
promise or offer made by the Chinese government or government supported
industry. Regrettably, there are a number of instances elsewhere on the
planet where such promises have yet to substantially deliver, where
more is the case where profound disappointment in these arrangements
has been the result. One needs to simply review the many instances in
Africa, South and Southeast Asia to get a full picture of the
corresponding risks that await in the Arctic. China is not an Arctic
nation, yet is acting as it has sovereign interests in the Arctic, and
had its advocates continue to make remarks that China seeks and should
be granted a role in Arctic Governance at a number of multinational
forums such as the 2019 U.S. Arctic Research Commission and Woodrow
Wilson Center hosted conference on the Impacts of a Diminishing Ice
Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations. In sum, China's effective use
in leveraging its national economic strength as a means to gain
political influence across the Arctic is competing and conflicting with
corresponding U.S. National Interests.
To be sure, the Arctic is but one area in the growing array of geo-
strategic challenges between the United States and China, but the pace
of Chinese advancement in and across the pan Arctic region, to include
their presence near U.S. Arctic waters is outpacing American countering
efforts to deter and dissuade Chinese actions in the Arctic, which are
counter to American national interest.
A similar intent may be implied about Russia. However, while
Russian military strength and considerable reach of their forces across
the Arctic, arrayed against Europe and deployed in the Middle East, are
dispatched by a nation that has an insufficient economic engine to
long-term sustain such force. Russian investments in military
capability are to be taken seriously, however, Russian economic
shortfalls compromise Russian military strength, particularly when
compared to the economic muscle of China as the world's second largest
economy. Accordingly, finding ways to manage tensions with the Russian
Federation in the Arctic as fellow Arctic nations, should be sought,
particularly from a position of U.S. strength. Such measures should
seek to first, find a way to decouple joint approaches between Moscow
and Beijing. This is possible through diplomatic rapprochement that
does not condone or reward past and current malign Russian actions, but
guided by realizing there are a number of common interests in the
Arctic between Moscow and Washington D.C. This approach may be well
aligned to American interests and serve to better manage escalation of
military tensions in the Arctic.
The above discussions are a representative sample of the
geostrategic challenges that face U.S. national interests in the
Arctic. What is important to emphasize, Great Power Competition need
not become Great Power Confrontation, and measures to manage and as
useful, deescalate are important, if not critical. To be sure,
escalation management requires the means and capabilities to back words
with commensurate force. This is not only a Department of Defense
matter. . .this includes ensuring needed capability within the national
security enterprise, including the Department of Homeland Security and
the United States Coast Guard.
Against this backdrop, it is important for the Nation to continue
to invest in real capabilities and invest in efforts that continue to
innovate DHS and U.S. Coast Guard presence and ability to project and
sustain activities in the Arctic region, particularly, U.S. Arctic
maritime regions. Real capabilities such as PSCs, but also the means to
make these platforms more versatile, more connected and more
interoperable with the rest of the U.S. joint force and with our Allies
and partners.
A discussion on civil safety and security challenges facing the U.S.
Coast Guard in the Arctic.
While rising competition among the Great Powers is a pacing
interest on Arctic matters, the spectrum of challenges that impact the
U.S. maritime Arctic are considerable, and yet often times overshadowed
by the higher profile provided to Great Power Competition.
In order to prepare for these existing and increasingly complex
security challenges, the U.S. Coast Guard released the USCG Arctic
Strategic Outlook in 2019, significantly updating the prior 2013
Strategy to focus three ``complementary lines of effort'' to the USCG
will endeavor in order protect national interests: 1. Enhance
Capability to Operate Effectively in the Dynamic Arctic. 2. Strengthen
Rules-Based Order. 3. Innovate and Adapt to Promote Resilience and
Prosperity. In order to prepare for the challenges facing the USCG in
supporting the changes of American Maritime Commerce the USCG released
the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in 2019. Along the Aleutians
(the U.S. Congressional Southern Boundary of the Arctic), through the
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas provides the USCG an opportunity to
view both the ArcSO and the MCSO in an integrated manner, providing
opportunities to advance safety, security, waterways management and
protection to maritime commerce for the benefit of the nation, industry
and communities in the region.
The Arctic region continues to experience unprecedented change in
terms of environment, weather patterns, and human activity. Over the
past year, rapidly warming trends have contributed to decreasing extant
of Arctic Ocean sea ice and spurred seasonal increases in storm
severity, via significantly stronger winds and coastal storm surges
buffeting shores across the North American Arctic. As the Arctic
continues to warm, the foundations of coastal regions securely frozen
for centuries are now thawing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to
intensifying severe weather patterns. Across the U.S. Arctic, this
thawing terrain has an unusually high susceptibility to erosion, which
is of great concern to associated infrastructure and communities.
Characterizing these changes at fine scale, remains a research
challenge that has yet to be fully addressed.
Enabled by a changing environment, human activity across the Arctic
is rising and includes increased commercial marine traffic, bolstered
adventure tourism, (albeit temporarily dampened due to the Coronavirus
pandemic) and expanded efforts to develop and conduct resource
exploration and extraction methodologies. Newly opened pathways from
the diminishing ice environment is a draw for nefarious influences in
the region and can possibly contribute to unconventional marine safety
and security threats including increased illicit trafficking and
criminal activity. While modest global crude oil prices continue to
dampen off-shore Arctic oil exploration activities in the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas, current favorable U.S. government exploration policies
and historically fluctuating crude oil prices are likely to ensure that
long-range oil and gas exploration activities will likely increase
across the North American Arctic in the coming years.
Transportation networks across the North American Arctic are
principally limited to air and seasonal marine conveyance. Economic
development remains limited due to remoteness, lack of infrastructure,
high cost, and difficulty establishing new roads, ports, and
facilities. In context of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the
USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, there is a need to consider how DHS and
USCG will safeguard and secure new economic developments within the
U.S. Arctic coastal and maritime regions in order to meet broad
strategic goals for regional security.
An increasingly dynamic Arctic continues to affect populations
whose ancestors have inhabited the region for generations. Subsistence
lifestyles continue but are increasingly threatened by retreating ice
and increased regional industrial activity (such as marine shipping and
resource extraction), which affect marine mammal activities and
populations. Sincere consideration and active participation of local
populations' lifestyles, practices, and customs should guide new U.S.
Federal initiatives and inform DHS and USCG regional activities.
As trends indicate, human activity across the Arctic continues to
increase in scope and magnitude. As new Arctic expansion and operations
bring a more diverse and less experienced population and the rapidly
changing Arctic environment confounds traditional understanding, the
percentage of those truly prepared for the Arctic environment is in
decline. This leads to risk-prone behaviors that stress resources and
challenge the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to conduct search and rescue,
humanitarian assistance missions, protect fisheries and marine life and
lead disaster response operations. Additionally, as more outsiders
enter the Arctic, the reasons for their arrival become more diverse
resulting in increased need for vigilance in enforcing national laws
and regulations.
The preceding paragraphs outline a series of concerns and a series
of needs to consider in realizing a future U.S. maritime Arctic region
better matched to national interests and the U.S. citizens who call the
region home. Addressing these challenges are not only limited to the
U.S. Arctic maritime region but should be conducted in a manner that
better allows the U.S. Arctic maritime region to serve as the point of
departure for increased efforts in the National Interest across the
Arctic basin. To be sure, the investment costs to realize a substantial
gain of economic prosperity for the region is sizeable, but so too is
the potential opportunity.
The Arctic is an exceptional region. Arctic ``exceptionalism'' in
the size, breadth and depth of ongoing collaboration in facets such as
Arctic science, economic endeavors, recognition of indigenous peoples
and governance-related activities such as the mechanisms associated
with the Arctic Council are the envy of many other regions across the
globe. However, continuation of these aspects of Arctic exceptionalism
is by no means assured and U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives of
science, economics, and measures to ensure U.S. security and
sovereignty, are well within U.S. national interests.
A discussion on solutions and supporting concepts.
Responding to the drivers of concern . . . it is important, if not
critical to provide sustained support to the U.S. Coast Guard with
improvements and capability to smartly project presence and enforcement
to preserve and protect U.S. interests within our sovereign spaces,
which ranges in providing the clenched fist of resolve to security
missions to the hand of help to respond to civil crisis and to advance
science and research in a pan-Arctic context to support the public
good.
What this means, is the real and critical value to field the Polar
Security platforms validated to support the U.S. Coast Guard polar
requirements. This also means providing these platforms the ability to
serve as fully capable instruments of national sovereignty, capable to
deter, dissuade and defend in like manner to USCG National Security
Cutters. Advancing U.S. Coast Guard Arctic and Antarctic capabilities
requires working with science and technology research and providers to
gain smart abilities to receive and conduct command and control and to
establish situational awareness and overall domain understanding,
across remote and austere regions that have well understood limitations
in communications and logistics infrastructure.
This summer's recent mishap aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
Healy, highlights the challenges of the long lines of communications
from the Healy's homeport in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic region.
Establishing a home port closer to the Arctic with full depot level
repair capability is a considerable, and in fact, a quite massive
investment in heavy infrastructure, base development, family quarters
and more, particularly since no corresponding commercial infrastructure
fully exists in Alaska.
Homeporting of capital U.S. Coast Guard assets should be located at
a robust multimodal transportation (air, road/rail, and seaport) node,
with co-located heavy marine industry, piers, housing, schools,
communications and logistics capability already exists. While I truly
wish such facilities did exist in Alaska, and in particular, in the
Arctic, and I would heartily advocate for smart and long-term
commitment to establish joint civil-government development of Alaskan
ports. As a former Headquarters U.S. Air Force programmer, I am guided
by the principal of programmatic road maps that create capability via
``ramps'' . . . guided by a joint vision and sustained incremental
advances that over a multi-year period to realize the vision. In sum--
until a comprehensive Alaskan Arctic/near Arctic commercial port
facility is realized, it may be wise to consider maintaining PSC home
ports in Seattle, leveraging the existing commercial investments, that
reduce the cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
However, there should be consideration and deliberation in either
developing or enhancing existing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an
expeditionary/intermediary function providing logistical and affordable
level of repair function for PSC Arctic operations. Locating one or
more Polar Security Cutter expeditionary support/logistics facilities
at locations near existing USCG facilities at Seward, Kodiak or a
refurbished location at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians or alongside
future developments at a deep-water port in Nome, can possibly provide
the USCG PSC's (and other USCG plus U.S. Navy vessels) an important
third option between repair at sea or return to home port in Seattle.
The idea advanced by others in a port complex between the Port of Nome
and the natural deep water port region known as Port Clarence is likely
a highly useful future port construct.
Quite frankly, advancing expeditionary support/logistics activities
in or near the Alaskan Arctic region could prove the most helpful start
in creating the programmatic ramp that could result in a multiyear
approach to smart civil/military solutions to enable PSC homeporting,
particularly, as industry sees opportunity to also invest in Arctic
maritime transportation, tourism and extraction activities. From a
geostrategic vantage, I do respectfully recommend that planners and
programmers focus on increasing capabilities at/near the Bering Strait,
as this maritime chokepoint could become as important as the Straits of
Malacca or the Panama Canal to global maritime commerce.
While USCG Search and Rescue in Alaska and the U.S. Arctic is well
known and highly regarded, providing pollution and other environmental
response across Alaska's coastal and maritime region is a thankless and
exacting mission for the USCG. Spill response is costly, and proactive
prevention is difficult and logistically straining. Scientific research
and oil spill response communities provide important support to the
efforts, but to be sure, advancing science of spill response and
improving inspections using science and autonomous systems to better
monitor across storage facilities across vast and remote regions will
grow more important as facilities age and are more compromised by
thawing permafrost and other environmental changes underway across the
Arctic.
Advancing the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic and overall polar
capabilities also means advancing trusted relationships, with other
Arctic Coast Guards as conducted via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, but
importantly with Russian counterparts (for Bering & Chukchi Sea
waterways management), Canadian Allies and with the Kingdom of Denmark
as well as representative government on Greenland. Sustaining trusted
relationships are a domestic matter as well. U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
relations across Federal Departments and Agencies, State of Alaska,
Alaska Native Communities and Academic partners take time to develop
and once established, should be nurtured and sustained. In particular,
it remains critical to consult and understand the challenges faced by
the U.S. citizens of the Arctic who see first-hand, the changing Arctic
maritime and can provide uniquely important insights beneficial to
safety and security responders. The adage that you can't surge trust or
a trusted relationship . . . applies in full measure to the Arctic.
While the Arctic region is increasingly impacted by the changing
physical terrain and a rise in a variety of human activities, the
Arctic also provides some of the best examples of international
cooperation on the planet. Highlights include the Arctic Council, led
by 8 nations and 6 internationally recognized Arctic Indigenous groups,
and supported by outstanding scientific research and focused working
groups; the International Maritime Organization (and the IMO's
supporting Polar Code); the International Arctic Science Committee; the
University of the Arctic; the Arctic Coast Guard Forum; and the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable.
While I am certain the Committee is familiar with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a former military operator
and someone familiar with international maritime operations, in an
Arctic context, the United States could realize a stronger advantage by
ratifying the treaty. In understanding there are both pros and cons
towards ratification, failure to ratify reduces the influence in
advancing U.S. interests in rules-based order across the international
maritime region. The United States is fortunate to have Canada as our
closest Arctic defense and security partner and ally. This includes a
shared defense commitment through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, shared protection via protecting respective aerospace
domains and the maritime approaches to Canadian and American sovereign
territory via the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and
a complementary defense arrangement through United States Northern
Command and Canada's Joint Operations Command. This bi-national defense
cooperation is supported by the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of
Defense (PJBD), established in 1940 by joint declaration between the
U.S. President and the Canadian Prime Minister. PJBD today has 4 CANUS
departments represented: DoD, DHS and Canada's Department of National
Defense and Department of Public Safety. As useful as the forum is
towards advancing bi-national defense and security cooperation, it
remains perhaps, a bit underleveraged in both Washington and Ottawa.
While fortunate to have Canada as a close and enduring ally in
securing and defending the North American Arctic, there are key drivers
of concern that warrant increased support to our national security
efforts in the Arctic region, and in particular, support to the USCG.
While the Department of Defense has rightly benefitted in gaining
increased readiness and capability through national reinvestments, the
USCG has lagged in gaining the needed appropriations to renew and
improve operational capability and supporting infrastructure to support
this sea service to conduct its statutory assigned missions in both
defense and security in the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the Bering, Chukchi and
Beaufort regions and providing the ability to project sovereign U.S.
maritime surface presence into the international ice laden waters east
of North America. For a nation with Global interests and an implied
intent to operate across the global commons of the Polar regions, the
Nation's Coast Guard does not have the numbers of PSCs or the
supporting capabilities to operate, command and control and sustain
presence to match interests.
What may not be clear to the Committee, is the role the Arctic
Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) at the University of Alaska provides to
supporting the U.S. Coast Guard or other Department of Homeland
Security Arctic missions. ADAC is a Center of Excellence in Maritime
Research that is part of the DHS Science and Technology Office of
University Programs (DHS S&T OUP). ADAC was founded in the Summer of
2014, received its first funding in January 2015 and is now in its
seventh year of providing science and technology research, professional
workforce research assistance-ships (at both the undergraduate and
graduate levels) and planning an array of conferences and workshops,
convening Arctic minded professionals in security, defense and
supporting disciplines, virtually all inclusive of Canadian
participation, with many also including Nordic Allies and partners. It
is important to note, that ADAC works comprehensively to characterizing
the dynamics of change (as previously discussed), in platforms, models,
decision support and knowledge products to assess the associated impact
to crisis response at granular levels, to enable smarter decisions and
smarter decision making.
ADAC and its associated research network have developed an
important new capability in oil spill response via autonomous
underwater vehicles and communications systems suited to the Arctic
region. ADAC has created and greatly advanced a construct called the
``Arctic Incidents of National Significance'' method which creates new
research by convening operators, scientists and industry to address
specific concerns oriented to ``what keeps the commander up at night''
to create solutions for gaps and shortfalls in Arctic capabilities.
This approach has generated new awareness tools, decision support
science and advances in Arctic search and rescue and marine pollution
response.
ADAC has recently commenced a new research project using unmanned
aerial systems from the University of Alaska Fairbanks to train and
equip local operators Unalakleet for monitoring of fuel storage
facilities to support U.S. Coast Guard marine inspection requirements.
ADAC is just about ready to commence a new comprehensive Arctic and
Alaskan communications and connectivity assessment, oriented to a whole
of mariner community approach.
In sum, this center of maritime research led by the University of
Alaska is creating domain awareness across a region that is woefully
lacking in such knowledge.
If/as desired, I would be pleased and honored to provide more
information about the Center as meets the desires of the Committee. If/
as desired, the following website provides a substantial insight to the
Center's people, programs and activities: https://
arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/ In sum, ADAC has built trusted
relationships across DHS and USCG, across the U.S. Federal and State of
Alaska governments, Alaska Arctic communities, Arctic science
professionals across the United States and with Canadian counterparts
in each corresponding facet. To be sure, our team serves everyday
focused to advance science and technology and other programs to benefit
the DHS and USCG in their Arctic mission.
Conclusion.
I respectfully submit, it is not my place to recommend to the Coast
Guard or the Department of Homeland Security in how to present the
requirements for Congressional funding or which of the myriad of
competing demands for funding in the department or the service should
receive the highest priority. In equal measure, it is not my place to
recommend to this Committee, what funding priority that is presented to
the Committee should receive highest consideration. I would recommend
however, the U.S. Coast Guard is the nations' vanguard to secure the
U.S. Arctic maritime region, protecting fisheries and other marine
life, rescuing people, responding and recovering from marine pollution
events, supporting the science community to the benefit of many and
projecting American sovereign power across the ice laden waters of the
Arctic. Supporting USCG Arctic and Polar capability, is in the national
interest. Providing this selflessly serving community of USCG mariners
the capability to meet the full spectrum of statutory missions to
respond at strength in and across the Arctic, will preserve our
resources, advance national power to meet the rising challenge from
other competing nations, support civil safety and security and will
provide America's Arctic allies and partners, needed assurance of U.S.
commitment towards the peaceful opening of the Arctic.
The State of Alaska's official motto ``North to the Future'' is a
relevant now as ever. Accordingly, I believe the importance of the
Arctic will continue to rise. As the community of science projects
Arctic warming will continue, associated environmental changes will
continue accelerate, and accordingly, measures to address, adapt and
increase resilience will need critical continued investment.
The economic opportunity of the Arctic and in particular, the U.S.
Arctic seem quite profound, but should be viewed at more than just
another opportunity access natural wealth. Economically developing the
Arctic in a sustained and responsible manner is a critical national
interest and a flourishing economy that integrates existing culture,
respectful to Alaskan Natives and other long-standing Arctic residents
holds needed promise to lift a region to the benefits of these regions,
the State of Alaska and the Nation.
Waterways in the Bering and Chukchi could one day prove as one of
the globe's most important to maritime commerce. Managing the
incredibly important fisheries and marine life in the U.S. Arctic
maritime, providing safety at sea, securing U.S. EEZs and being
vigilant and prepared to respond to crisis and disaster in one of the
most pristine areas on the planet provides a remarkable task list for
the U.S. Coast Guard. I do believe that prioritizing the needs of the
Coast Guard to address this task list is critical for the Committee to
consider and to address in a substantial way.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide these reflections, and
please know how appreciative I am of your service to our Nation in
providing political leadership in these difficult times. I genuinely
appreciate your support and enabling efforts to ensure the U.S. Coast
Guard can safely and properly meet the challenges and secure the
opportunities of the developing Arctic region. I respectfully look
forward to addressing your questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. Ms. Madsen.
STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE MADSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AT-SEA
PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION
Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Sullivan,
Ranking Member Markey, members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify. My name is Stephanie Madsen. I
am the Executive Director of the At-Sea Processors Association.
I have spent my entire career living and working in the Bering
Sea, Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic includes
some of the most productive fishing grounds on Earth. It is a
truly remarkable place with its rich native culture, stunningly
productive marine ecosystem, and vital geopolitical positioning
adjacent to the Russian maritime boundary.
For decades, the U.S. fishing industry has been able to
operate in the eastern Bering Sea safely and with legal
certainty. That sense of security was shattered during the last
week of August, when Russian military warships and warplanes
initiated a series of outrageous confrontations with U.S.
fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ. These
confrontations, unprecedented in my almost 40 years working
with this industry, gave rise to genuine fears for the physical
safety of fishing captains and their crews, and cost the
affected companies millions of dollars in lost fishing
opportunities.
In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger was
harassed by members of the Russian military over the course of
5 hours, a Russian war plane flew overhead for 2 hours, issuing
warnings and threats via radio through broken English. Those
threats later escalated via transmissions from a nearby Russian
warship. Until they reached such a fever pitch, the Northern
Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas felt he had no choice but to protect
the safety of this crew by complying with Russian military
orders that he sailed 5 hours south and not return until
September 4. In the second such incident, Russian warplanes
repeatedly buzzed two vessels, Blue North and Bristol Leader,
warning via radio that they were on live missile fire zone and
in imminent danger.
They ultimately felt compelled to follow Russian military
orders to chart a specific course at maximum speed with Blue
North Captain David Anderson cutting his fishing gear loose in
order to evacuate the area quickly. In the third such incident,
three Russian warships rapidly approached a cluster of fishing
vessels, ordering that they changed course immediately. When
one of those vessels, the Vesteraalen, replied that it had
fishing gear in the water so it had limited ability to change
course, a Russian warship came directly toward it, maneuvering
as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came within a half
nautical mile of Vesteraalen before changing its course. As a
representative of the U.S. fishing industry and indeed a proud
American citizen, I am outraged that the U.S. vessels would--
could ever be subjected to this kind of treatment by a foreign
military power.
Today, I want to share two main messages with the
Committee. First, in any future incident such as this, U.S.
authorities must be far more active in safeguarding our
sovereign fishing rights. We would later learn that these
confrontations were related to a major Russian military
exercise of which the Government received notice, yet nothing
about the exercise was commuted to our industry. Furthermore,
when captains contacted the Coast Guard to convey what was
occurring, frontline Coast Guard personnel seemed unaware and
were largely unable to provide our captains with guidance. In
the event of any future exercise, news of what is planned must
be shared widely in advance with our fleets, as well as smaller
vessels operating out of the Northern Bering Sea communities.
The Coast Guard must be on alert and Coast Guard assets
must be deployed to the area to provide any assistance
necessary to U.S. vessels. Alarmingly, none of those things
happened here. Second, this kind of harassment simply cannot be
allowed to become a new normal. In the rapidly changing Arctic,
we fear being caught in the crossfire of Russia's effort to
establish a more assertive military and economic presence, our
sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be
protected. From our vantage point, a remote U.S. military
presence to protect U.S. interests in the region is simply non-
negotiable.
I would defer to my fellow witnesses with such impressive
military credentials and expertise to opine on precisely what
form that should take. But I thank the members of the
Subcommittee for their focus on this region and for considering
the enormous economic and national security stakes that are at
play. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Madsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director,
At-sea Processors Association
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is
Stephanie Madsen, and for the last 12 years I have served as Executive
Director of the At-sea Processors Association--a trade association
representing six member companies that operate catcher-processor
vessels in North Pacific and U.S. West Coast fisheries. The most
important fishery in which we participate is the Bering Sea/Aleutian
Islands Wild Alaska Pollock fishery--the largest seafood fishery in the
world. My members are proud to have been at the forefront of management
innovations that have made our regions' fisheries a global model for
sustainability. We are also a very proud contributor to Alaska's
seafood economy, which supports 101,000 U.S. jobs and earns an
estimated $5.6 billion in annual labor income.
I have spent my entire career working in and around the Bering Sea/
Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic is truly remarkable,
with its rich Native culture, stunningly productive marine ecosystem,
and vital geopolitical positioning. Pollock fishing transcends the
maritime boundary with Russia; our vessels operating in the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone are sometimes within literal shouting distance
of Russian vessels fishing for pollock in their waters. Yet in spite of
this close proximity to a geopolitical adversary, our industry has for
decades been able to operate safely and with legal certainty, relying
on the USA/USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement concluded between James
Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze on June 1, 1990.
That feeling of certainty and safety has been shattered by recent
confrontations initiated by Russian military warships and warplanes
with U.S.-flagged fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S.
EEZ. These incidents were alarming in and of themselves; they gave rise
to genuine fear for the physical safety of fishing captains and their
crews, and they disrupted the business operations of fishing companies
at a critical point in a very important fishing season. They also give
rise to an urgent question: do we risk these kinds of confrontations
becoming something of a ``new normal'' in the changing Arctic? And if
so, what are U.S. policymakers and military planners doing to safeguard
U.S. economic and security interests in this vital region?
Military Confrontations
The last week of August started as a typical one in the summer
fishing season. U.S.-flagged fishing vessels were operating throughout
the Eastern Bering Sea. As always, different segments of the fleet were
targeting a variety of species using traditional fishing methods. APA
catcher-processor vessels work in parallel with smaller catcher vessels
that deliver pollock and other groundfish to motherships for
processing. Another fleet of catcher-processor vessels targets non-
pollock groundfish such as Atka mackerel and flatfish, while freezer-
longline vessels target Pacific cod. These Bering Sea fishing grounds
are among the most productive anywhere in the world--although this year
fishing conditions have been particularly challenging due to shifts in
the stock dynamics and distribution.
Tuesday, August 25 provided the first indication that it would not
be a typical week for our fleets. The Island Enterprise, a catcher-
processor vessel operated by Trident Seafoods, was fishing in the
vicinity of Pervenets Canyon when suddenly, without warning, a large
submarine--what we learned later to be an Oscar-class Russian nuclear
submarine--surfaced in the vicinity. Shortly thereafter a warship
appeared, traveling at 17.5 knots on direct course towards the
submarine. The warship made no contact with the Island Enterprise, but
came within 2.5 nautical miles. Other vessels also observed the
submarine and warship that day. These were our first clues that a major
Russian military operation was underway smack-dab in the middle of our
fishing grounds.
The close and unexplained proximity of a foreign warship and
submarine were, as you can imagine, immediately troubling. However, it
is the events that unfolded the following day, August 26, that have
given rise to deep concern throughout our industry. On that day the
Russian military initiated a series of confrontations with U.S.-flagged
fishing vessels that were, from our perspective, dangerous and
completely unacceptable. These confrontations gave rise to genuine
fears for the safety of captains and their crews, and in some cases led
to operational decisions that collectively cost companies millions of
dollars in lost fishing opportunities.
In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger--a catcher-
processor vessel operated by American Seafoods--was harassed by
members of the Russian military over the course of
approximately five hours. Northern Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas
was positioned 21 nautical miles inside the U.S. EEZ when what
he recognized to be a Russian military warplane started flying
over his vessel. The warplane initiated radio contact, and
through broken English started to deliver an alarming drumbeat
of messages warning of ``danger'' and insisting that he
``leave'' as it continued to fly over the vessel at an
increasingly low altitude. Despite his best efforts--which
included enlisting the assistance of a Russian-speaking member
of his crew--he was unable to ascertain from the warplane a
clear sense of what was happening or to learn of any specific
course of action that was being requested of him. During this
period Captain Thomas repeatedly stated that he was operating
lawfully within the U.S. EEZ and couldn't be ordered to
``leave''. He also initiated multiple conversations with United
States Coast Guard personnel, none of whom appeared to be aware
that a major Russian military exercise was underway in the U.S.
EEZ. After approximately two hours the warplane departed, and
radio contact was initiated by a Russian warship that was
positioned approximately 40 nautical miles away. Communications
from the warship became increasingly urgent, warning of
imminent danger and demanding that the Northern Jaeger leave,
without providing specific coordinates. Captain Thomas sought
to chart a new course on several occasions, but each time
communications came back from the Russian warship making clear
that they were not satisfied. Eventually, the Russian warship
ordered that Captain Thomas sail due South ``for five hours''
and not return to the area until September 4. Ultimately, with
the level of intensity of the Russian military communications
continuing to increase--and no satisfactory explanation or
support provided by the U.S. Coast Guard--Captain Thomas
complied. He estimates that approximately five days of
productive fishing time were lost by the encounter and his
resulting relocation, an economic harm estimated to total
approximately $1.5M.
Positioned some distance to the north of Northern Jaeger
were the Blue North and the Bristol Leader. These two freezer
longliners were harassed by a Russian military warplane, which
warned that they were in a live missile fire zone and in
imminent danger. Bristol Leader Captain Brad Hall and Blue
North Captain David Anderson recount similar experiences, with
repeated fly-overs at low altitude--in some instances as low as
an estimated 200 feet. After initiating radio contact, the
warplane issued orders that they leave the area on a specific
course at maximum speed. Both captains sought advice from the
U.S. Coast Guard but were unable to learn any additional
details about what was occurring. Coast Guard personnel told
Captain Anderson to comply with the orders he was being given
by the Russian military. Ultimately, both captains felt that
they had no choice but to abandon their fishing activities and
exit the area. The Blue North cut its fishing gear and left it
behind in order to be able evacuate the area quickly. It was
only when the vessels fully complied with the Russian
warplane's orders that the harassment ceased. The economic
losses relating to disabling fishing gear and relocating from
productive fishing grounds were significant.
In another area, more than 50 nautical miles inside the U.S.
EEZ, six U.S. catcher boats and two motherships were operating
along the shelf break. Three Russian warships and two support
vessels appeared, and initiated radio communication with two of
the catcher boats--the Vesteraalen and the Mark 1. As the
warships rapidly approached the catcher boats, they issued
orders that they change course immediately, warning of imminent
danger. The Vesteraalen responded that it had fishing gear in
the water so had limited ability to change course. In response
a Russian warship came directly towards the Vesteraalen,
maneuvering as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came
within half a nautical mile of the Vesteraalen before finally
changing course.
As a representative of the U.S. fishing industry--and indeed as a
proud American citizen--I find it completely unacceptable that U.S.-
flagged vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ could ever be
subjected to this kind of treatment. The fact that U.S. fishing
companies, captains and crew had not been directly advised that a major
Russian military exercise was planned in their sphere of regular
operation is deeply concerning. The idea that U.S. vessels could be
subjected to this kind of harassment by a foreign military power is
alarming. And the notion that U.S. captains should be complying with
orders issued by members of the Russian military is offensive. We need
to ensure that the events of August 26 never happen again.
Specific Observations
In the immediate term, we believe there are steps the U.S.
government must take to ensure that any future Russian military
exercise potentially impacting U.S.-flagged vessels is handled
differently and that U.S. fishermen maintain their sovereign right to
legally operate in the U.S. EEZ.
First, it is imperative that our industry be notified immediately
and directly by our own government of any such planned exercise. Our
understanding is that Russia provided notice of their intent to conduct
these exercises, including specific coordinates, via HYDROPAC. This is
a communication system that is not regularly monitored by our industry,
and I want to be clear that it does not constitute sufficient notice to
mariners. Furthermore, as noted above, some U.S. vessels were harassed
outside the coordinates provided via HYDROPAC. We understand that the
HYDROPAC notice was received by at least one agency of the U.S.
government. If any part of the U.S. government is notified of such a
foreign military exercise in the future, there must be a clear and
widely-understood mechanism by which that news is communicated to
potentially impacted fishing fleets so we are aware of the exercises
and can respond accordingly should there be a threat to the safety of
our vessels and crew. This mechanism needs to account for the diversity
of fishing vessels active near the U.S.-Russian maritime boundary, from
large catcher-processors to small skiffs operated out of Northern
Bering Sea communities. Communications issued on the exercises fell
short of alternatives that were available to U.S. authorities, such as
issuance of a Marine Information Bulletin.
Second, other parts of the U.S. government--most importantly the
United States Coast Guard--must be alerted and have an opportunity to
plan for the safety of U.S. mariners, including U.S.-flagged fishing
vessels while they lawfully operate within the U.S. EEZ. It is
unacceptable that Coast Guard officers on the front lines were unable
to provide our captains with even the most basic information or, in
most cases, guidance when contacted.
Third, in the event of future foreign military operations in or
near the U.S. EEZ in the Bering Sea, plans should be in place for the
U.S. Coast Guard to have an at-sea presence in the area to deter
engagements by the foreign military with U.S.-flagged vessels lawfully
operating in the U.S. EEZ and to better intervene in the event there is
engagement or other immediate danger to our vessels. Communication to
our vessels of potential threats to our safety should be coming from
the U.S. Coast Guard, not the Russian military. Recognizing the need
for a presence after the August 26 events, the Coast Guard ultimately
deployed the CGC ALEX HALEY to the area for the remainder of the
planned exercises. This was appreciated, but future plans should
include the deployment of at least one cutter to an area for the
entirety of an operation to help prevent a recurrence of what occurred
to our fleets.
A New Normal?
Beyond requesting the Subcommittee's help in securing these Federal
process improvements, I welcome your focus on the broader geopolitical
challenges in the Arctic region of which these confrontations appear to
be merely one symptom. If indeed these exercises are part of Russia's
effort to establish a more assertive presence in the Arctic--especially
in a world where receding sea ice extent provides a set of new economic
and military opportunities for regional powers--that is a cause of
genuine alarm for our industry.
Our sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be
protected. Our concerns are heightened by recent proclamations by
members of the Russian Duma calling into question the legitimacy of the
U.S./Russia boundary line--a cornerstone of the framework for our
Federal fisheries. Russian naval exercises cannot be allowed to serve
as a deterrent to the fully legitimate operations of a U.S. fishing
fleet that competes directly with the Russian seafood industry in
global markets for pollock, Pacific cod, and other groundfish.
Anxiety throughout the industry was also further heightened when a
Russian warplane harassed our vessels in a separate incident the
following month. On September 14, approximately 70 miles west of St.
George, a Russian warplane made two direct passes over a U.S.-flagged
catcher-processor vessel, the Starbound--the first starboard to port,
the second stern to bow--and then performed a fly-over of a second one
of our vessels, the Alaska Ocean. The captains estimate that the
aircraft was at approximately 500 feet. No radio contact was made. This
incident does not appear in any way related to an officially-noticed
military exercise. Although it didn't come with the level of economic
cost or genuine fears regarding crew safety that accompanied the August
26 incidents, it is extremely worrying if it is indicative of a broader
trend.
From our vantage point--on the front lines of a changing Arctic--a
robust U.S. military presence to protect U.S. interests in the region
is simply non-negotiable. I will defer to my fellow witnesses, with
such impressive military credentials and expertise, to opine on
precisely what form that should take; but I thank Members of the
Subcommittee for their focus on this region, and for considering the
enormous economic and national security stakes that are at play.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Madsen. And I agree with
your comments wholeheartedly and we will have a good discussion
on some of the details of those. Hopefully you saw Admiral
Ray's testimony in the Coast Guard's view on that as well. Dr.
Francis, you have 5 minutes for your oral statement and if you
would like a longer written statement, we can provide that for
the record.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER FRANCIS, SENIOR SCIENTIST, WOODWELL
CLIMATE RESEARCH CENTER
Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Alright, everyone, I just
have a few slides I want to share while I am speaking. Alright.
Good afternoon--thank you to Chairman Sullivan and the
Committee, and in particular to Senator--for inviting me to
testify--today is because of the staggering decline in Arctic
sea ice.--percent in this animation. Think of this ice as the
Earth's mirror. It reflects most of the sun's energy that hits
it right back to space without entering the climate system. And
losing so much of this mirror is literally a threat multiplier
to our National Security in several direct and indirect ways
that are distinct from those you have already heard about
today. The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of
global warming.
The extra heat now being absorbed in the Arctic Ocean has
intensified global warming by 25 to 40 percent. The
implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we have all
watched in horror as a record number of billion dollar
disasters, including wildfires, heat waves, floods and rapidly
intensifying hurricanes, devastated parts of the United States
and elsewhere, threatening communities, straining agriculture
and food security, and stretching relief resources. This,
Senators, is the face of climate change. The ice loss is also
causing the Arctic to warm two to three times faster than the
Earth as a whole.
This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers and the Greenland
ice sheet, which is accelerating sea level rise and threatening
coastal cities and infrastructure worldwide. The rapid warming
is in the--permafrost--grows in Arctic soils. Which could
release--affects the frequency of extreme weather events as the
North to South difference in air temperature is a major factor
controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my
own, suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference
will make weather systems more persistent, which can lead to
prolonged droughts, heat waves, storminess and even cold
spells. Disrupted weather patterns pose new challenges to
farmers and food security, electric utilities, drinking water
managers and even human survival.
The peoples of the North are also being directly affected
by their transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their
primary source of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting
platform has thrown their way of life into chaos. The species
that usually hunt have shifted migration patterns or
disappeared altogether, and subarctic animals have appeared
well North of their typical ranges. The ice serves as a means
of transportation as well, but now it is often too thin to be
trusted.
Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the
sea by large storm waves as winds now blow over ocean, open
ocean rather than over stable sea ice. Their roads and
airstrips are buckling as the ground beneath them thaws and
collapses. These impacts are undermining the security of Arctic
communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere. The news is
not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice free Arctic waters
enable normal cargo vessels to shortcut passages between major
commercial ports in Eurasia and North America.
Natural resources that have been inaccessible under the ice
to now be more easily and economically exploited. But this
easier access also comes with heightened risks to those
venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in the way of our
infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation
resources, or even ports of call. Change has come quickly, and
the region is woefully unprepared for these new activities.
What can we do about these threats to National Security posed
by Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I have discussed
are symptoms of the underlying disease.
To treat the disease, we need to pull out all the stops to
reduce emissions of heat trapping gases and to remove carbon
from the atmosphere by both natural and technological means.
The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building
resiliency, which depends on research that characterizes the
physical threats, identifies the specific risks, and develop
strategies to protect those in harm's way. This will not be
easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more
expensive and threatening to National Security. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Francis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist,
Woodwell Climate Research Center
Thank you to the committee and in particular to Senator Markey for
inviting me to provide testimony for this hearing.
The Woodwell Climate Research Center is a Massachusetts-based non-
profit organization of researchers who work with a worldwide network of
partners to understand and combat climate change.\1\ Our scientists
helped to launch the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 1992, and shared the Nobel Prize with the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change in 2007. Woodwell brings together cutting edge
science, and 35 years of policy impact to find societal-scale solutions
that can be put into immediate action. Our scientific expertise is on
climate change impacts, natural climate solutions, and climate risk.
This includes work with extensive research on the local, regional, and
global impacts of the rapidly warming Arctic.
I am a senior scientist and a member of the Arctic Program at
Woodwell. I received my PhD in Atmospheric Sciences from the University
of Washington in 1994. After 24 years as a research professor in the
Department of Marine and Coastal Sciences at Rutgers University, I
joined Woodwell in 2018. My research focuses on connections between
climate change and the rising frequency of extreme weather events,
particularly the role of rapid warming and melting in the Arctic.
Fossil fuel combustion and deforestation release heat-trapping
greenhouse gases, which in turn, have caused global average temperature
to rise at unprecedented rates. From 1901-2019, the globe has already
warmed by 1+C (1.8+F), with nine of the top ten warmest occurring since
2005.\2\ The rate of warming is not attributable to natural causes; in
fact, the globe would be in a cooling phase now if it were not for the
effects of human activities. The responses of Earth's natural systems
to the warming are already adversely affecting our quality of life, and
these impacts will worsen for generations to come if emissions of heat-
trapping gases are not curtailed severely and rapidly. Mitigating,
understanding, and preparing for these impacts is critical, hence the
vital importance of hearings like this one.
The effects of rapid Arctic change on the frequency and severity of
physical hazards will affect society in all regions of the world, but
none more so than in the Arctic.
The pace of change in the Arctic system has been nothing short of
staggering; the Arctic is experiencing the greater increase in average
surface temperature globally (Fig 1). In just the past 40 years, half
of the ice floating on the Arctic Ocean has vanished during summer.\3\
Ice volume has declined by a whopping 75 percent (Fig. 2). Indeed, the
dramatic loss of Arctic sea ice is the primary reason for the recent
intense focus on the Arctic region. You can think of this ice as the
Earth's mirror: it reflects most of the sun's energy that hits it right
back to space without entering the climate system. Losing so much of
this mirror is literally a threat multiplier to our national security
in several direct and indirect ways that are distinct from those
related to military concerns.
The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of global
warming. The extra heat now being absorbed by the planet where ice used
to exist has intensified global warming by 25-40 percent.\5\ The
implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we've all watched
in horror as a record number of $1 billion disasters \6\--including
wildfires, heatwaves, floods, and rapidly intensifying hurricanes--
devastated parts of the U.S. and elsewhere, threatening the security of
affected communities, straining agriculture and food security, and
stretching relief resources. This, Senators, is the face of global
warming.
The ice loss is also causing the Arctic to warm three times faster
than the Earth as a whole. This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers
and the Greenland ice sheet, which contributes directly to the recent
acceleration of sea-level rise, threatening coastal cities and
infrastructure world-wide.\7\ The rapid warming is also hastening the
pace of permafrost thaw--frozen Arctic soils--which could release vast
stores of additional fossil carbon into the atmosphere.\8\ Arctic
warming also affects the frequency and intensity of extreme weather
events, as the north-to-south difference in air temperature is a major
factor controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my own,
suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference will make
weather systems more persistent, which can lead to prolonged droughts,
heatwaves, storminess, and even cold spells\9\. As we all have
witnessed, these tendencies have emerged in spades. Disrupted weather
patterns pose new challenges to farmers and food security, electric
utilities, drinking water managers, and even human survival.
The Peoples of the North are also being directly affected by their
transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their primary source
of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting platform has thrown their way
of life into chaos. The species they usually hunt have shifted
migration patterns or disappeared altogether, and sub-Arctic animals
have appeared well north of their typical ranges. Sea ice serves as a
major transportation resource, as well, but now it is often too thin to
be trusted. Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the
sea by large storm waves, as winds now blow over open ocean rather than
over stable sea ice. Their roads and airstrips are buckling as the
ground beneath them thaws and collapses. These impacts are undermining
the security of Arctic communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere.
The news is not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice-free Arctic
waters enable normal cargo vessels to short-cut passages between major
commercial ports in Eurasia and North America. Natural resources that
have been inaccessible under the ice can now be more easily and
economically exploited. But with this easier access also come
heightened risks to those venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in
the way of infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation
resources, or even ports of call. In collaboration with Tufts
University, Woodwell scientists have charted more than 122 million
messages from satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data,
mapping Arctic ship traffic from 2009 to 2016 (Fig 3). The mean center
of ship traffic has moved 300 km to the north and east, taking
advantage of newly ice-free ocean. Change has come quickly, and the
region is woefully unprepared for these new activities.
What can we do about these threats to national security posed by
Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I've discussed are symptoms of
the underlying disease. To treat the disease, we need to pull out all
the stops to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases and to remove
carbon from the atmosphere via natural (such as reforestation) and
technological (carbon capture) means.
The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building resiliency,
which depends on research that characterizes the physical threats,
identifies the specific risks, and develops strategies to protect those
in harm's way. My colleagues at Woodwell are engaged in an assessment
of risk owing to Arctic change, a collaboration with partners at The
Center for Climate and Security (CSS). The CSS is a Washington DC-based
non-partisan institute housed in the Council on Strategic Risks. That
project is employing cutting-edge climate-risk modeling to understand
how climate change impacts will play out in the region, and how those
will affect the existing balance of security. The project will
demonstrate the potential value of granular modeling of climate change
impacts to anticipate and prepare for societal instability and security
challenges.
Mitigating and adapting to climate change in the Arctic will not be
easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more expensive
and threatening to national security\10\,\11\.
References:
1. https://www.woodwellclimate.org/
2. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's)
National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI): https://
www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/projected-ranks#: :text=The
%20warmest%20years%20globally%20have,Courtesy%20of%20NOAA%20NCEI.
3. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC): http://nsidc.org/
arcticseaicenews/
4. http://psc.apl.uw.edu/research/projects/arctic-sea-ice-volume-
anomaly/
5. Duan, L., Cao, L., & Caldeira, K. (2019). Estimating
contributions of sea ice and land snow to climate feedback. J. of
Geophys. Res.: Atmos., 124, 199-208, doi:10.1029/2018JD029093.
6. https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/national/2020-breaks-
billion-dollar-natural-disas
ters-record-in-us
7. Francis, J.A. (2018). Meltdown, Scientific American, April 2018,
Vol. 318.
8. Natali S.M., J.D. Watts, B.M. Rogers et al., (2019). Large loss
of CO2 in winter observed across the northern permafrost
region. Nature Climate Change, 9, 852-857, doi:10.1038/s41558-019-0592-
8.
9. Francis, J.A. (2019). Rough weather ahead, Scientific American,
June 2019, Vol. 320, No. 6.
10. Daniel, W. (2020) The National Security Implication of Climate
Change: Redefining Threats, Bolstering Budgets, and Mobilizing the
Arctic, Journal of International Affairs, https://
jia.sipa.columbia.edu/national-security-implications-climate-change-
redefining-threats-bolstering-budgets-and-mobilizing
11. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/a-
security-threat-assessment-of-climate-change.pdf
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Dr. Francis, and I am going to
ask some witnesses some of the similar questions that I asked
Admiral Ray. General Kee and Ms. Madsen, I would like you to
comment on the issue of Arctic--both Arctic infrastructure in
the home porting of icebreakers in the Arctic region. As I
mentioned, we have six that have been authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act years ago. One is being
built now.
But as you know and you mentioned it General, the capacity
of the United States relative to the great power competition
rivals like China and Russia is significantly less,
dramatically less. As we are building up the fleet and as we
are looking at the issue of even short term bridge leasing, how
much do you think it makes sense to make sure these assets are
actually in the Arctic so they can respond to Arctic related
National Security, economic security, environmental security,
issues of ice being--somewhere else? General, we will start
with you.
General Kee. Senator Sullivan, thank you very much for the
question, sir, and I will offer a couple of brief reflections.
Number one, I do respectfully believe that the ability to
create home ports is a multi-year endeavor. It does require the
ability to leverage a port that has multimodal transportation
capabilities, whether it is road, rail, air, but some
multimodal aspects of logistics that connect it--to connect
that port to essentially transportation network.
And it does also, of course, really need housing, schools,
and all, essentially the logistic support aspects of being able
to handle the crews, the maintenance, logistics, support teams,
etc., that the Coast Guard has that crews, essentially, this
weapon system platform. So the idea to me and that is what I
would respectfully offer to this conversation is, if you take
the long-term approach that over time you build to a home port
capacity, you take, maybe consider some ideas of building
intermediate capacities, such as an expeditionary facility or
expeditionary facilities that build essentially ports that the
vessels can operate from essentially during a rotation of duty.
In between times they need, before--in between time they
would need to go to conduct upper level repairs that would
really require a kind of home port or a large scale facility.
So to me, I look at the idea that ultimately having home ports
in the Arctic would make sense long term, is the idea that
building this in concert with really from a civil, military or
civil Government sort of joint venture makes perhaps much more
sense based on the amount of actual cost it takes to building
at heavy capacities of essentially depot repairs and the
transportation networks.
So the idea is the answer is yes, it is just a matter of
time. And then looking at solutions that are expeditionary or
intermediate as you work through the stair steps to create an
actual home port that has all that heavy capabilities that they
are in. The idea of leasing as an interim measure to me, again,
as an interim measure makes lots of good sense. It is going to
be a while before we can field organic capability, but in
addition to leasing platforms, we also need to think about is
the whole logistics package, crews, main support, the logistics
tail that goes with this to make sure that it is essentially a
complete math equation that really encompasses all the cost
variables in that leasing equation so that there is really no
surprise to the Coast Guard or really, or to the Congress that
would be authorizing and appropriating such expenditures.
So thinking through the full math equation of getting a
comprehensive package of what it costs to do the leasing, I
think is important. I do believe it is a good interim measure
and it is a short term measure to buy time and reduce risk to
allow the Coast Guard to get caught up with organic
capabilities, to be able to have a more robust capability of
projecting U.S. persistent presence into the Arctic region, I
would say both the U.S. Arctic region and international Arctic
waters spaces. I respectfully give the floor back to you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So I am going to step out for one minute
here. There have been a couple of votes that have been called.
Senator Markey, I am going to yield the remainder of my
questioning time to you and then I am going to try and get back
here as quickly as possible. And so you can go vote if you
haven't already voted. And then I will continue to follow up on
the questions. If that sounds good to my Ranking Member, I am
going to--I am going to head down and vote right now. I will be
back. Thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Climate
change is an intersectional issue, it affects our health, our
economy, our environment and security. We are talking about the
need for robust security planning in the Arctic region. But
changes in the Arctic means less security for the rest of the
country as well. Dr. Francis, is it true that changes in the
Arctic climate affect sea levels and weather patterns
throughout the United States from Feldman to Florida?
Ms. Francis. It is absolutely true, Senator Markey. Thank
you for that question, yes.
Senator Markey. Yes, and it has repercussions that go far
beyond any one region. Within the Arctic, warming temperatures
and disrupting weather patterns are washing coastal villages
into the sea, changing animal migration patterns, and
collapsing roads and airstrips. Outside of the Arctic, the
broader climate crisis is endangering public health through
droughts, extreme weather, heat stress and other developing
disasters. Dr. Francis, do you think we are doing enough to
consider Arctic security in a holistic way, including taking
into account its effects on permafrost, weather patterns,
indigenous peoples and global sea level rise?
Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Thank you very much for the
question. I think we are doing way--at this point to, as I
mentioned, to treat the disease, the underlying disease that is
causing the ice to melt, that is causing--and in turn is
causing sea levels, sea level rise to it--seeing this happening
before our very eyes. So the changes that are happening in the
Arctic are already affecting not only the people who live in
the Arctic, but also down to the islands through sea level rise
and through changes in weather patterns.
My own research is acutely on this connection between the
rapidly warming Arctic and the changes in weather--the main
underlying effect is to cause weather patterns to become more
persistent. And when they become more persistent, that leads to
things like longer droughts, and longer, more prolonged heat
waves, and even longer stormy periods. You might remember--
years ago when we had six Northeasters--almost in a row. These
types of weather regimes that are becoming more persistent to a
whole variety of extreme weather events.
Senator Markey. So how can the U.S. Government, including
the Coast Guard, better invest in understanding and guarding
against the effects of climate change in order to better
increase our National Security and our economic security?
Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, I think one of the
main avenues that we should be going down right now is
increasing the amount of information about the physical world
up in the Arctic region, both the atmosphere, the ocean, the
ice and the biology. So the atmosphere, this would help with
forecasting weather--lack of data and information.
And in terms of ocean effect, we know relatively little
about the way that ocean currents move from up there and those
things that affect how we could respond to or how the Coast
Guard would respond to any kind of event that might happen up
there. So, say, an oil spill, which has been mentioned. What's
oil once it goes into the water, which way is the wind going to
blow it, which way are the currents going to push it?
If there were an accident and people were lost overboard,
which direction with the drift? We are severely lacking some of
that basic information about the Arctic system itself, which
would play into not only research, but also any kind of
environmental crisis and many of the operations that the Coast
Guard undertakes on a regular basis.
Senator Markey. And again, I apologize. I am going to have
to go make this roll call as well. Just one final question, Dr.
Francis, what areas of research do you think are most critical
to invest in in order to better protect the Arctic and Arctic
based resources?
Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, it really goes back
to what I was just saying--understanding of how this ice and
the ocean--works, but it is a real moving target. The Arctic
that we have now is very, very different from the one that was
there only 20 or 30 years ago. Any of--research that needs to
occur and information that needs to be provided that can help
us update--these--system-wide----
Senator Markey. Dr. Francis, I apologize to you. You are
having a little bit of an audio problem right now. I just--I
want to thank you so much, again. And I apologize because I
have to make the same roll call that Chairman Sullivan is
making. And I thank you so much for all your great work. And
Randy, thank you for yours as well. But I am just going to put
the hearing into recess until Senator Sullivan returns. But
thank you, Dr. Francis, so much.
[Recess.]
Senator Sullivan. The Subcommittee hearing will now
reconvene. And again, I appreciate the witnesses' cooperation
and flexibility here as we are voting in the Senate. Ms.
Madsen, I wanted to get back to you with regard to not only
your testimony, but with regard to what Admiral Ray had said
with regard to the incident that you mentioned, that really was
an outrage with regard to not just the Russian actions, but as
Admiral Ray mentioned, there were some miscommunications,
certainly by the Coast Guard.
I have been asking for an after-action both from Northern
Command, Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. But what would you--as
we are looking at this, what do you think we, and I am talking
about the Coast Guard, the Navy, others involved, to prevent
future incidences from happening again as you mentioned, this
can't be the new normal, but what specifically would you and
your members want to make sure happens with regard to Coast
Guard actions and other actions that we as the U.S. Government
can be taking?
Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that in our
written testimony, we lay out three actions. The first one is
definitely we need to hear from our Government, not from the
Russian military, about any activities. And so I think that
what we discovered is that I don't really know how to describe
it other than there was some kind of a gap in communication
between the U.S. Government who knew about the exercises and
the Coast Guard that we depend on and communicate with quite
frequently. So I think that is one. Our U.S. Government needs
to communicate amongst itself. The other more important one is,
if we know that these exercises are legal and going to
continue, then I think we need Coast Guard assets on the ground
so that there is someone not 200 miles away at least, that can
provide some kind of protection or guidance to the fishing
fleet.
Senator Sullivan, you might know that as you go further
North, the border gets very constrained between the US. So it
is not just a large fishing vessels that were impacted. Well,
we were the ones that got impacted this year. But I am also
concerned about some of those smaller vessels operating out of
the Northern Bering Sea communities that in the future could
also be impacted. So I think we really have to look at a
variety of communication systems. And then when they know what
is going on, we need to have Coast Guard assets there.
Senator Sullivan. I think that is a great recommendation,
and so not just being made aware, which, of course, that should
have already been happening, but with regard to an exercise of
that size and nature, to have our own assets in the region to
protect with regard to what we are doing in our own fishing
fleet. So I agree with that. And I think that that is something
we will strongly encourage with regard to the Coast Guard's
activities. Let me ask again, General and Ms. Madsen, the issue
of infrastructure.
We do have a large fishing fleet. It is an issue that as
sea stocks move North, that the need for more infrastructure in
Alaska is not just a National Security requirement, but an
economic and a safety requirement. As I mentioned in my opening
testimony, we are making substantial progress for a deep water
port in Nome, Alaska, but where else and what else would you
like to comment on with regard to infrastructure as it relates
to protecting America's economic, National Security, fishing
opportunities and other issues with regard to Arctic
infrastructure? I would like for both of you to be able to
comment on that.
Ms. Madsen. Senator Sullivan, if I might start, Stephanie
Madsen. As you know, Senator, I lived out in Unalaska, Dutch
Harbor for 19 years. So I guess I am a little bit passionate
about the international port of Dutch Harbor as one of the main
deep water ports that is already in existence. Certainly Nome
is very viable and very important as the Arctic becomes more
open and security becomes more of an issue. So I think those
two have definitely been identified.
You know, the Coast Guard--we depend on the Coast Guard.
Thank goodness for the Coast Guard, not only to help us enforce
fishing regulations, but to provide safety and rescue. And it
is difficult even now to have them based in Kodiak and would
have to respond, you know, where we were fishing this summer.
So I think that that would also encourage and enable the
fishing fleet as the distribution of the fish changes to help
us feel secure and have Coast Guard responsive, including the
polar ice breakers.
Senator Sullivan. General.
General Kee. Chairman, thank you. And also, before we go
further, Senator, I would like to offer condolences as well. I
did not get a chance to say in the opening reflects, but please
accept my condolences to you and your family for your loss.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
General Kee. I would like to offer a couple of thoughts.
First, that is a great question and I appreciate the
opportunity to reflect. I look at this strategically that the
Arctic interests are continuing to rise. Our Arctic economic
security interests are continuing to rise. When you look at the
idea of creating ports and deep water ports are enablers, not
only, of course, the National Security interests that are
places where Coast Guard vessels and really Navy vessels can
operate from, but also an opportunity to provide the economic
engine that is so needed in Western Alaska in particular, and
to advance, essentially providing economic opportunity to
advance the livelihood of those people who live there to give
them options to be able to stay in this region and have a
viable future and viable careers, as opposed to where there
really is not the economic engine there yet.
And so strategically, the idea of building ports and
increasing joint ventures with the commerce industry, the idea
of an Arctic and really a bearing in Chukchi, Beaufort to Blue
economy where mariculture and aquaculture activities could be
pursued and a way to help begin the process of economically
developing Western Alaska. And it is in our national interest.
We are also looking at, of course, that communications are
critical.
The communications shortfalls, certainly what happened in
August, are certainly a very evident. We as a Center that I
have the privilege of shepherding are focused on commencing
hopefully very, very soon a new study, it is called the Alaskan
Antarctic Maritime Communications Connectivity Analysis, to
really take a look across the mariner community of Alaska,
breaking in five sectors to Southeast, Southcentral, the
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort, to really kind of break down what
are the communications shortfalls that the mariners are facing,
including, of course, the fishing fleet are facing in these
regions, to be able to have that communication and connectivity
ability so they can be notified in a timely manner and have the
means to communicate when things such as what happened in
August manifest.
The idea, of course, when you think about ports is an idea
of looking at Dutch Harbor, of course, is well known and well
suited for not only the bearing, but also projecting power into
the North Pacific. When you look at Port of Nome, it is a
shallow port at this point, getting into deep water capacity.
But you also have the idea that, and I know several have talked
about and I mentioned this in my relatively lengthy written
statement, the idea of a port complex. I know I have ventured
that idea forward, where you look at the port complex between
the existing port structure in Nome and what is being built out
there to include, of course, looking at port Clarins as a
natural deep water area and the idea of a port complex that is
conducted in places like this and the Gulf Coast.
The idea of building this over time and identifying
opportunity there to not only, of course, serve commercial
industry, for example, the graphite mine up there near Teller
as a port, a place to--port Clarins, for example, could help
service that. And ultimately the idea of building port
infrastructure that connects with transportation nodes, idea
looking toward the long term future of creating transportation
nets and networks that include potentially road rail that
connects Fairbanks, for example, out to Nome.
Again long term ideas, but the end of the day, if we are
going to really realize our Arctic interests, in particular the
Bering region, Bering, and Chukchi, we do need to think about
how partnerships in the commercial sector could be of interest
and viability to reduce the taxpayer burden, of course, but
also to create the idea of joint ventures that can really
provide prosperity to both the commercial sector, the residents
who live there, and a place to operate safely for National
Security assets. So those are some thoughts. I would
respectfully reflect to you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Alright. Thank you. Those are great. Ms.
Madsen, I want to go back to Admiral Ray's comment at the end
of his testimony on the issue of the Coast Guard's focus on IUU
issues. And he talked about it from the perspective of the
Coast Guard and the sustainability of our oceans and our
fisheries throughout the world. I would like your perspective
from that of the fishing fleet, can you share how critical it
is to combating IUU fishing?
I was proud as your Senator, one of the first bills that I
was able to get through this committee was actually the
implementation of the IUU fishing, treating the domestic
legislation that did this. But how important is that, how
equipped do you believe the Coast Guard is to combat IUU
fishing issues, particularly as Admiral Ray talked about the
fisheries migrating North, and what would you like, the Coast
Guard or NOAA or other Federal agencies, to do more in this
regard?
Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As you
well know, you know, our fisheries compete on the global
market. And so if IUU fishing is not enforced, and that means
that our markets are being impacted as well globally. And we
are already--as you are well aware, because you are one of our
heroes, that is a big impact to all of our fisheries,
especially up in the North Pacific. So I believe that support
of the Coast Guard, certainly funding, but I think it is a
little bit bigger than just a Coast Guard.
I think internationally we are going to have to pool our
resources together. But it is critical. It is important. You
know, one of our direct competitors for pollock is Russia right
now. So, you know, you have hit on it. You have been our
champion. And I think it is just going to come down to
persistence, continued funding, and some very strong actions
that indicate to the globe that we are not going to stand for
it.
Senator Sullivan. But so many of these issues, whether it
is IUU fishing, whether it is protecting our economic
interests, Dr. Francis, our environmental issue interests, they
all in many ways converge on this issue of presence,
infrastructure, Coast Guard vessels, icebreaking capabilities
so the United States can actually be in the region, protect the
region, and as Admiral Ray said, focus on what the Coast Guard
does throughout the rest of the nation, which is protect the
coasts and the sovereign interests of the country. Shouldn't be
any different in the Arctic off the coast of Alaska than it is
in the Gulf of Mexico. And I was glad to hear the Admiral say
that.
General, let me ask a more specific question. Prior to this
hearing, I was on the phone with the National Security Adviser,
Ambassador O'Brien. He is the lead on the Presidential memo
that came out in June. I thought it was very positive. It was
something we had been pressing the Trump Administration toon
exactly how to protect our economic and security interests in
the region. And there is an interest in quite soon looking at
bridging the gap with regard to icebreaker coverage that we
currently have, which has been exacerbated by the HEALY fire
for two medium-sized icebreakers to be leased.
There is a strong interest, I can tell you, at the White
House to do this and to have these homeported in America's
Arctic, in Alaska. If you had a recommendation for the National
Security Adviser on this issue, where would you look to
homeport? And it would have to be relatively soon, like within
this year, two additional medium class icebreakers that could
start to protect America's interests. It would be leased,
obviously, from other sources and just being built. What do you
think the best place is, given what you talked about earlier in
your testimony, would be to homeport these two vessels in
Alaska? Where would you recommend that?
General Kee. Well, first of all, thank you for that
question, Senator. And let me offer a reflection before I
address the question, because I think at this point it is
really important to know the details of the lease package. So,
for example, would there be an intent to have depot level
repairs provided on scene where the vessel was, ``home
ported''? Because if you brought--you need to have that kind of
capabilities. What would the leasing enterprise provide?
For example, would they provide vending logistics to
conduct not only the medium level, if you will, through flight
or through--oh, my goodness to talk like I start a pilot for a
moment, but the through vessel missions that when they come and
go and then back to station at home port, those essentially--
that means is conducted between depot level repair. If that is
going to be conducted by the vendor providing the vessel that
we are leasing from, then its ability--it is really on to their
ability to bring that capability forward. And so that, therein
lies the challenge. If you had the company that we are leasing
from, and would be anticipating this to be a finished effort,
and as a NATO partner, not a NATO ally, certainly they have
interoperability aspects in the commercial sector that will be
well familiar to people. They are not military vessels, that is
what Admiral Ray described, but they are certainly capable. And
certainly helps bridging the gap.
So I would look to the fact of, you know, if they had a
robust capability to bring forward, to do the kind of
maintenance work needed, then I would get as far forward with
that as I could, simply because they would be incumbent upon
the vendor to provide that capability. If they are limited on
this, for example, in the port of Nome, could be the place to
operate from as an example, and especially if the draft was
deep enough, interior space was available, and using air
logistics to the airport there for time, sense delivery of
materials and logistics would be, of course, a critical aspect
to this. So the idea is, again, go as far forward----
Senator Sullivan. Let me--let me, sorry to interrupt you,
but let me, if you had to--if this was a leasing decision soon,
a home porting decision soon. I get the, and it is important as
you highlight the details of the leasing package, but from what
exists currently in Alaska in terms of Coast Guard
capabilities, Coast Guard stations, pier space, what would be
one or two locations that you would think would be top on the
list?
General Kee. Well, then again--very close, Senator. I would
look to obviously where the existing Coast Guard capabilities,
for example, Kodiak and refurbishing aspects of Dutch Harbor.
Both of those are known ports with existing pier space.
Refurbishment costs are relatively minor at this point.
There is some housing there in Dutch Harbor. There is
perhaps more housing available in Kodiak. So near term would
probably be Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and then looking further
North to Nome as soon as you could get there, even if you
operated from Nome part of the time and then retrograded back
to either Dutch or Kodiak. Respectfully submitted.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, I am going to close a hearing
with one final question for all three of the witnesses. You
know, we have covered a lot of ground here. We know that the
Arctic is challenged by remoteness, extreme environmental
issues, severe weather issues, receding sea ice, but it is also
a strategic area of major shipping locations, increase of great
power competition, resources.
What we haven't talked too much about is emerging
technology to cope, to overcome some of these challenges or
play a greater role. I will just throw this out for the final
question. Is there any technological approach to some of the
challenges that we are not thinking about, that we might be
able to take advantage of in the future, and that relates to
domain awareness, that relates to observer capabilities, any of
those issues that given the expertise of the three witnesses on
this panel, you would like to just highlight for the Committee
as a final topic before we close?
General Kee. Senator Sullivan, I would like to take a run
to that question if it is OK with you.
Senator Sullivan. Sure.
General Kee. Strategically advancing science, technology
and domain awareness really is about platforms, autonomous
platforms, whether underwater, surface, or aerial, to be able
to conduct the kinds of remote monitoring. This includes some
of the infrastructure challenges the Coast Guard highlighted in
really monitoring at-risk petroleum tanks and tank farms where
environmental change and really degrading permafrost is causing
many of these older structures to bear very close monitoring.
Using unmanned aerial systems to monitor these is an important
aspect.
Being able to not only have platforms that can respond to
oil spill response or characterize the Arctic from a
bathymetric standpoint are things that technology has, again,
solutions that can be of support. This is an area that is rich
for onward discussions. But communications, satellite based and
terrestrial based built to have communication and connectivity
to mariners, Coast Guard mission sets, and of course, that
interoperable Defense community, I think is critically
important.
And again, I would love to dive on this one deeper, but I
know the time is short. So let me just offer those as a brief
set of reflections. Last, for me, though, characterizing the
Arctic at fine scale is important. I really appreciate the
previous discussions with witnesses regarding the
characterizing the Arctic at grand scale.
To me, what matters for the Coast Guard vantage point and
those of mariner operators is the weather outside in the
windscreen. And so to me, how we can better characterize ocean
currents, moving in ridging at fine scale, I think is going to
matter tremendously as we look to advancing more mariner
commercial activities and really projecting sovereign
influences into the coming years and beyond. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Dr. Francis, do you have a
view on this?
Ms. Francis. Yes, thank you very much for this question,
and it goes back to what I said earlier hopefully my Internet
connection is a little better now and I won't be broken up
quite so badly. But I agree with what was just said. And I
would just reiterate that so many of the Coast Guards
operating, you know, their mission is it really depends on
having good information about the weather, about ocean
currents, about what the ice is doing. And all of those really
depend on getting good information from the environment so that
our forecast models, which also need further development, can
provide them with the best information about not just what is
going on in their neighborhood at the moment, but also the
forecast for the next day or week or longer.
And they can then deploy their resources more effectively
to take advantage of that, because if they were, as I
mentioned, on an oil spill or man overboard or some kind of
search and rescue, we know that cruise ships are now heading up
there, it is still very likely, even though the ice is
diminishing, it is still very possible that a cruise ship could
be going along in the open water. The wind shifts, the pack ice
moves down on that cruise ship and pins it in a location, runs
it aground into rocks or whatever. And I think the Coast Guard
would be very hard pressed to be able to respond to that kind
of an emergency.
So I really think we need to do a better job getting the
information so that we can do a better job at the forecasting
of both weather and also the ocean behavior and the sea ice.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. And Ms. Madsen, I will
leave it up to you to close with that question.
Ms. Madsen. Well, thank you very much, Senator. As you
know, we are pretty proud up in Alaska about the science that
we have. We have a pretty extensive climate model. We are you
know, I am focused on fish, but the climate model extends far
beyond that with its projections. The Alaska Fisheries Science
Center has some of the lead scientist in this regard. We have
had Marines that have been taking different measures of
different things for many, many, many years.
So we need to continue those time series. Because I am
focused on fishing, I think we need to use and work a little
bit better on cooperative research using the platforms that we
have out in the Bering Sea. I know, Senator, that this year we
were unable, as you know, to get our fishery surveys done. But
with the help of the Science Center, many of the vessels took
data loggers to collect temperature so that we could try to
identify the cold pull and inform as much as we could without
the surveys. So I think there is opportunities here. I guess
maybe not technology based, but we do have the models up in the
North Pacific.
We need the surveys to continue to inform those models,
which means money. But it is kind of a dual focus, a dual
purpose. You not only get the data that would inform those
models, but you would also get the data to inform the changes
and the total allowable catches up in the North Pacific. So we
have great science up here. I think we just need to double up
on it and make sure the funding is there to encourage the
continuation of some of these long time series.
And Senator, we do appreciate all the work that you have
done for the North Pacific and the fisheries for sure. So I
can't let the hearing close without thanking you once again.
Senator Sullivan. Well, let me thank you as well,
Stephanie. You have done a great job and a real leader in our
state on so many of these issues. And General, you too as well.
And Dr. Francis, I know that Senator Markey holds you in very
high regard as well. So I want to thank the three witnesses for
a really, really productive hearing. We saw a lot of good
bipartisan participation in this hearing, which I thought was
great and important.
The record for the hearing will remain open for an
additional 2 weeks. If Senators have additional questions, they
will please submit them for the record and for our witnesses.
If you can respectfully try to get those answers back as soon
as you can, we would greatly appreciate that.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses again, both
Admiral Ray and the current panelists, and a lot of good
information and a lot of important issues that we need to work
together on. And I think we have a lot of important information
to digest and move forward on as we continue to look at the
challenges and opportunities in America's Arctic. With that,
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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