    [Senate Hearing 116-628]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 116-628

                       U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
                      SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
                   PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 8, 2020

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    52-855 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                      ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                           John Keast, Staff Director
                      Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                          Steven Wall, General Counsel
                     Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
                  Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                          Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                                     ------

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
    TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 8, 2020.................................     1
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Markey......................................    15
    Statement of Senator Scott.......................................    17
    Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    19
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    21
    Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    25
    Statement of Senator Lee.........................................    27

                                   Witnesses

    Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard........     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee, USAF (Retired), Executive
      Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center, University of Alaska;
      Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission..................    30
        Prepared statement...........................................    32
    Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director, At-Sea Processors
      Association....................................................    41
        Prepared statement...........................................    42
    Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist, Woodwell Climate Research
      Center.........................................................    45
        Prepared statement...........................................    47

                       U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES FOR
                        SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL INTERESTS
                        AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY
                                 IN THE ARCTIC

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2020

                                   U.S. Senate,
                              Subcommittee on Security,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Wicker, Cruz, Lee,
    Young, Scott, Markey, Cantwell, and Blumenthal.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. This hearing will now come to order. I am
    pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses today as our
    subcommittee focuses on the capabilities of the United States
    Coast Guard for safeguarding our national interests in the
    Arctic region. We will be having two panels today. First, we
    are pleased to have the Vice Commandant of the United States
    Coast Guard, Admiral Charles Ray. He has been doing an
    outstanding job in his position.
        And then our second panel will be of experts. Major General
    Randy Kee who will be remote, as well as Stephanie Madsen,
    Executive Director, At-Sea Processors Association from Juneau,
    Alaska. And Dr. Jennifer Francis, also coming via remote means,
    is a Senior Scientist at the Woodwell Climate Research Center
    in Falmouth, Massachusetts. Last year, this subcommittee held a
    hearing that focused on the Arctic strategy released by the
    Coast Guard in April 2019. That strategy prioritizes three
    lines of effort, one of them being the need to enhance our
    capabilities for operating in the Arctic through persistent
    investments in infrastructure, assets, and personnel needed to
    close gaps in presence, particularly given our rivals in the
    Arctic--China and Russia--communications and domain awareness
    in this region of growing global focus.
        Today's hearing will focus on those needed investments in
    our Arctic capabilities, progress that has been made in
    obtaining them, and the vital work that still needs to be done.
    The Arctic has shifted from an area of cooperation to the next
    region of great power competition with our near, peer
    competitors, China and Russia, outpacing the United States in
    the development of ice capable vessels and investments into
    Arctic infrastructure. The U.S. only has two polar icebreakers
    and a fire aboard the HEALY this summer has put half of
    America's polar ice breaking fleet temporarily out of
    commission.
        As a result, the POLAR STAR is now America's only
    operational icebreaker, while Russia has approximately 54. This
    gap in capability creates space for Russia and China, which now
    has more icebreakers than we do, to exert maritime influence in
    the Arctic, which they are trying to do, and amplifies our
    existing vulnerabilities for vessel traffic, safety and
    security, maritime law enforcement, fisheries, resources
    management, search and rescue, and environmental response.
        We have seen Russia push all-in on controlling the Arctic.
    Russia has opened 16 deep water ports, 14 airfields, built
    Arctic military bases, and even formed a new Northern Arctic
    Command. In fact, Vladimir Putin has referred to the Northern
    Sea route as the new Suez Canal, which he says Russia intends
    to fully control. He has made major military investments to
    secure this route for Russia, and his Government has even
    threatened to sink foreign vessels that do not have a Russian
    pilot on board or a Russian escort vessel.
        In recent months, Russian provocation has only increased.
    The Russian navy conducted its largest war game exercise since
    the Cold War near Alaska. This exercise extended into the U.S.
    exclusive economic zone. Our commercial fishing fleet
    encountered a frightening situation in close proximity to a
    number of fishing vessels and directed them to immediately
    depart their legal fishing grounds. These were Russian
    warships, pictured here, and this graphic provided by the Coast
    Guard shows the locations clearly within the U.S. exclusive
    economic zone where our fleet was legally fishing when the
    Russian warships and aircraft, including submarines, pictured
    here above, ordered our fleet to leave the area.
        Without persistence--persistent U.S. presence in the
    Arctic, we risk leaving an opening for these types of
    aggressive actions to continue. Recognizing the importance of
    these critical gaps, Congress has already made steady progress
    toward authorizing needed investments. Currently, the closest
    U.S. deep water port to the Arctic is Dutch Harbor on Unalaska
    Island, which is 1,000 miles from the Arctic Circle, not very
    close. In May, the Senate committee on the Environment and
    Public Works, on which I sit, passed the America's Water and
    Infrastructure Act, advancing the long needed Arctic deep draft
    port at Nome, Nome, Alaska as the first in what we believe
    needs to be a series of strategic Arctic ports. That is a major
    step forward for our Nation and protecting America's interests
    in the Arctic. The port Nome will not only be a critical
    component for Arctic maritime transportation, it will serve as
    a staging area for search and rescue, pollution response, and
    security operations with the Coast Guard and the Navy.
        In June, the President weighed in on the importance of
    acquiring a polar security ice breaking fleet that can project
    persistent presence in the Arctic with the release of the
    President's memorandum on safeguarding U.S. national interests
    in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This Presidential memo
    adds weight to the efforts in Congress to authorize and fund
    new polar security cutters. Two years ago, I was able to
    authorize--get authorization in the NDAA for the construction
    of six polar class security cutters to start building our
    icebreaking fleet. We have followed up with the funds to build
    the first, and we are working on appropriations to secure the
    second, appropriation funding for the second polar class
    icebreaker.
        I am disappointed, however, in what I believe is the Coast
    Guard's lack of strategic vision for where to homeport these
    new icebreakers. While making sure there are budget imperatives
    and plans for grouping similar assets together in fewer
    locations for cost savings, I believe this is not something
    that should override the operational imperative to base Coast
    Guard resources and cutters close to where their mission is.
    That is what the President's memorandum asked for, particularly
    as the Arctic has emerged as a critical area for great power
    competition, and the ice breaking vessels we are building and
    will likely be--we will be leasing, need to be able to operate
    and be stationed near the Arctic or in the Arctic where the
    action is.
        I have just spoken to the National Security Adviser,
    Ambassador O'Brien, and I believe he shares similar views on
    these issues. These investments in our Arctic capabilities will
    help ensure that the United States does not cede any more
    ground in this strategic location. Without further investment
    in our polar capabilities, our adversaries influence will grow.
    And if that happens, we risk our ability to protect U.S.
    vessels, conducting commerce, to enforce international law, and
    to defeat threats to our National Security. With that, I want
    to thank our witnesses for participating in our hearing today
    to discuss this very important topic. I now want to recognize
    the Chairman of the Committee, to see if he has any opening
    statements, and then I will turn to Ranking Member Senator
    Markey. Chairman Wicker.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

        The Chairman. Well, thank you, Chairman Sullivan. And I
    think it is noteworthy that we are having a hearing on the
    Arctic, and it is about 62 degrees in this hearing room. I
    don't know how our capable leadership managed that, but I think
    it is very appropriate and maybe we need to have a hearing
    about the tropics next time, but in all seriousness, great to
    have Admiral Ray back with us and the other distinguished
    panel.
        And thank you, Chairman Sullivan, for your leadership on
    this important issue. Access to the Arctic's vast energy,
    mineral, fisheries, and other commercial resources is expanding
    and international competition for these assets is intensifying,
    as the Chair has just so ably stated. America's two nearest
    peer competitors, Russia and China, have both declared the
    region a national priority and have made corresponding
    investments. By contrast, U.S. investment in the Arctic
    infrastructure and capabilities has not kept up with our
    economic and National Security interests, and I want to be a
    teammate of our subcommittee Chair in rectifying that
    discrepancy.
        The U.S. Coast Guard is on the front lines of strategic
    security competition in the Arctic. The Coast Guard has
    operated the Arctic since 1867 when, through the foresight of
    Secretary of State William Seward, America purchased Alaska
    from Russia. The Coast Guard's diverse set of Arctic missions
    includes search and rescue, enforcing laws and treaties,
    environmental protection, facilitating commercial trade, and
    protecting National Security. The Coast Guard's icebreaker
    fleet acts as the Nation's principal tool to conduct many of
    these critical missions. And I have to stretch to call it a
    fleet. The current icebreaker fleet is well past its service
    life and in dire need of replacement.
        Long standing concerns with the icebreaking fleet size and
    age were underscored on August 18, 2020, when the Coast Guard
    cutter HEALY, a medium polar icebreaker, suffered an engine
    fire forcing the ship to return to her home port in Seattle.
    That fire has left the Coast Guard operating with a single
    icebreaker, the POLAR STAR, until the HEALY can be repaired.
    During a visit to Alaska hosted by the distinguished
    Subcommittee Chairman in August of last year, just before the
    fire, Admiral Ray and I flew out and landed on the HEALY in the
    Arctic. So I have witnessed firsthand the critical capabilities
    of this vessel and of its dedicated crew.
        The HEALY fire, combined with recent aggressive Russian
    naval exercises in the Arctic, demonstrates the need for more
    U.S. icebreakers. The Coast Guard will now have to stretch the
    service life of the POLAR STAR, the Nation's only heavy
    icebreaker until 2023, extending its lifetime to nearly 50
    years, well beyond the intended 30 years. In stark contrast to
    the American fleet, Russia currently has 4 heavy nuclear
    powered icebreakers and 11 medium icebreakers, with 3 more
    under construction and 11 additional icebreakers planned in the
    next decade. The Coast Guard has stated repeatedly that it
    requires at least three heavy and three medium polar
    icebreakers to fulfill its ice breaking mission.
        The Coast Guard has awarded a contract for the first three
    heavy polar security cutters, and we hope there will be more to
    come. And if I have anything to do with it, I want to be a
    teammate with our distinguished subcommittee Chairman in that
    regard. But in addition to new vessels, we need shoreside
    facilities, piers, and support personnel to sustain a fleet of
    polar security cutters. So we have our work cut out for us. I
    hope our witnesses will underscore the need to prioritize and
    accelerate the polar security cutter acquisition program.
    Icebreaking capacity and supporting infrastructure are just two
    of the many challenges facing the Coast Guard in the Arctic.
        On that visit to Alaska with Senator Sullivan, I spoke to
    the Coast Guard service members at Air Station Kodiak and
    aboard the Coast Guard cutter DOUGLAS MONROE about their role
    in protecting our ocean environment and marine life. The
    Commerce Committee is working to help the Coast Guard promote
    fisheries development and force our fisheries laws in respond
    to fisheries disasters. Alaska and my State of Mississippi may
    be thousands of miles apart, but we share a major interest in
    fisheries and the Coast Guard is protecting them every day.
        We hope to address these and other challenges in the Coast
    Guard Authorization Act, legislation co-sponsored again by our
    distinguished Subcommittee Chair Senator Sullivan, which we are
    optimistic will pass in the next few days. I look forward to
    this discussion. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
    believe Senator Markey is having a bit of an issue getting on
    the video here. So we are going to----
        The Chairman. I think the equipment is frozen up.
        Senator Sullivan. We are going to go directly--we are going
    to go directly to Admiral Ray for his opening statement. And I
    do want to mention, Mr. Chairman, with you and the Admiral's
    help, right now, it is looking like the NDAA is going to have
    the Coast Guard Authorization Act. This has been a goal of mine
    since I got here to pair those up. I think it is a good
    precedent that hopefully won't be a one-time occurrence this
    year, but something that we can look at doing every year. And I
    know the Coast Guard has been supportive of that as well. So
    that is good news. Admiral Ray, you have been doing a fantastic
    job in your role, and I look forward to your testimony in 5
    minutes, oral testimony, and if you have a longer written
    statement, we would be glad to put that in for the record.
    Floor is yours, sir.

                 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY,
                   VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Ray. Good afternoon, Chairman Sullivan, Chairman
    Wicker. Thank you for having me here. And before I get started,
    Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Commandant and on behalf of all
    the men and women of the United States Coast Guard, we pass our
    sincere condolences as you mourn the passing of your dad.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I want to thank you all for your
    unwavering support to our service and for this opportunity to
    update you on the Coast Guard's efforts to protect American
    sovereignty, promote economic prosperity, and expand American
    leadership across the Arctic. The rapidly changing physical,
    operational, and geostrategic Arctic environment is driving
    increased activity in the region and with it increased risk
    across the maritime sector.
        While our mission in the high latitudes have evolved since
    1867, our commitment to the region has not. We are leaning
    forward to address the safety and security of our Arctic
    residents and the Mariners who make their living there, home
    porting--by home porting new offshore patrol cutters, fast
    response cutters, investing in Alaska real estate
    infrastructure, and prioritizing our operations in the region.
    The Coast Guard is also deeply concerned about the rising
    strategic risk to our Nation as China and Russia compete for
    diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage in the Arctic.
    Both nations have publicly declared the Arctic a strategic
    priority and they continue to make significant investments to
    advance her own interests. Russia continues to invest heavily
    in icebreakers and Arctic infrastructure, better positioning
    themselves to shape the security and geopolitical environment
    in the region. They are focusing on developing the national
    resources, expanding their icebreaker fleet, and imposing
    strict governance on the Northern sea route.
        I am especially troubled by Russia's recent military
    exercises in the Bering Sea that the Senator referred to. In
    late August, they conducted a live fire exercise in an area
    that extended into the United States' exclusive economic zone,
    as is shown on the chart. Their irresponsible execution of this
    phase of their exercise created confusion and potentially
    unsafe interactions with American vessels legally fishing in
    our EEZ. Our long standing operational relationship with the
    Russians enabled us to, kind of through a red phone type
    scenario, cut through the red tape, and let them know of our
    concerns and what was going on that day.
        As you know, Senator, we sailed ALEX HALEY up there to
    investigate and provide awareness. However, I am disappointed
    that Russia chose to push the boundaries of responsible
    behavior in the Arctic and in doing so, put Americans at risk.
    China also aspires to assert influence across the Arctic,
    leveraging economic investments, and natural resources, and
    infrastructure, and expanding their icebreaking fleet. This
    summer, they launched the Xue Long 2, which operated in the
    high Arctic. China has announced plans for two additional
    icebreakers, threatening to outpace our icebreaker building
    program.
        The casualty, as Senator Wicker mentioned, a Coast Guard
    cutter HEALY this summer demonstrates our Nation's lack of
    capacity for icebreaking and emphasizes the critical importance
    of the Coast Guard's posed security cutter fleet. As was
    stated, we will begin construction of the post's security
    cutter in 2021 and it would be the first time we have done this
    in over 40 years. We have contracted with Halter Marine in
    Mississippi to design and buildup to three polar security
    cutters, and we appreciate the continued support from Congress
    and this committee, in particular, to build the next generation
    of assets.
        Our Coast Guard's Operation Arctic Shield continues to be
    the primary operational means of protecting and executing our
    sovereign rights and responsibilities in the U.S. Arctic. Our
    flexible expeditionary approach has never been more important.
    As Alaska cruises were canceled this summer due to the
    pandemic, we redirected resources to conduct additional patrols
    to monitor foreign research vessels, and to enhance policing of
    our maritime border with Russia. For the first time since 1984,
    as you know, the Coast Guard will conduct operations North of
    the Arctic Circle during this winter. When the National Science
    Foundation, as a result of a caution for the pandemic, decided
    they did not want to send POLAR STAR to McMurdo in Antarctica,
    we immediately came up with a different sale plan for her, and
    she is underway as we speak today, straight to Juan de Fuca,
    heading North toward Dutch Harbor and then further up into the
    Arctic.
        I think this demonstrates the Coast Guard's agility and the
    importance of the polar security cutters, the need for a larger
    icebreaker fleet to persistently safeguard our Nation's
    economic and national security interests in the high latitudes.
    While we are focused on protecting sovereignty in our U.S.
    Arctic, the Coast Guard is also working to build partnerships
    across the Arctic. This summer, we deployed--this past summer,
    we deployed two medium endurance cutters to participate in
    search and rescue and military exercises off of Greenland,
    operating with our allies Denmark, France, and Canada.
        We worked to establish the things that you do when you
    exercise together. Never has Coast Guard leadership been more
    important in the Arctic than it is right now, as we shape the
    region as a safe, cooperative, and prospective domain for all.
    You have my commitment, the commitment of our Commandant, and
    that the Coast Guard will continue to exert all efforts to meet
    this challenge.
        Thank you again, Senator, for this opportunity. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant,
                                U.S. Coast Guard
    Introduction
        Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here today to
    discuss the Coast Guard's role and activities to advance national
    security priorities across the Arctic Region. This effort includes
    safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and executing our national
    responsibilities while effecting safe, secure, and environmentally
    responsible maritime activity.
        The U.S. Arctic remains particularly dynamic, evolving
    environmentally, operationally, and strategically. Environmental
    changes, combined with the tyranny of distance and limited
    infrastructure, exacerbate the harshness of the operating environment.
    The types and levels of commercial activity are also transforming, from
    a surge in oil and gas exploration a few years ago to increases in
    vessel transits and expansion of environmental tourism. These
    alterations in types and location of activity, along with the changes
    in the physical environment, coincide with the reemergence of great
    power competition across the globe which are exemplified in the Arctic.
    The importance of, and demand signal for, Coast Guard's services and
    leadership have never been greater as these dynamic challenges magnify
    U.S. national security interests across the Arctic.
    National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
        The actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic nation states
    continue to shape the security environment and stability of the region.
    The geopolitical environment is evolving as state and non-state actors
    seek to advance their own interests in the Arctic. Allies, partners,
    and competitors increasingly contend for diplomatic, economic, and
    strategic advantage and influence. Russia and China exemplify that
    competition. Both have declared the Arctic a strategic priority; both
    have made significant investments in new or refurbished capabilities;
    and both are exerting direct or indirect influence across the region.
        Russia's expansive Arctic has the potential to support naval fleets
    readily deployable between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This region
    also represents significant economic opportunities, such as oil and gas
    extraction and development and attempted control of the Northern Sea
    Route for trans-Arctic shipping. As such, Russia continues to plan and
    expand its capabilities and capacity to influence and surge throughout
    the Arctic. This year, Russia launched the first in a new class of
    nuclear-powered icebreakers, which they sailed to the North Pole. In
    addition to continuing the expansion of its extensive icebreaker fleet,
    its renewed capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems,
    domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue stations. Furthermore,
    Russia recently established an inter-agency commission of the Russian
    Security Council focused on ensuring Russian national security
    interests in the Arctic. Finally, Russia recently completed Exercise
    Ocean Shield 2020, a multi-theater exercise involving participation by
    both its Pacific and Northern Fleets and including maneuvers in the
    Northern Bering Sea and Arctic approaches. Through this exercise,
    Russia extended its operations into the U.S. exclusive economic zone
    and interferred with the safety and sovereignty of the U.S. fishing
    fleet, indicating a willingness to push the boundaries of acceptable,
    responsible behavior and governance.
        China continues to aspire to assert influence across the Arctic
    including pursuit of economic investments in key strategic areas such
    as rare-earth elements, oil and gas development, air and sea ports,
    railways, and infrastructure to further its strategic objectives. Last
    year, China launched its first domestically-built icebreaking vessel,
    the Motor Vessel XUE LONG 2, which operated in the Arctic this year,
    including taking a sediment core sample while operating on the waters
    over the United States' extended continental shelf. China is also
    designing an even more powerful polar icebreaker expected to have twice
    the icebreaking capability of XUE LONG 2. With three icebreakers, China
    could outpace U.S. icebreaker capacity and polar access by 2024. The
    primary concern with Chinese activities in the Arctic is the potential
    to disrupt the cooperation, stability, and governance in the region for
    both Arctic and non-Arctic states.
    Coast Guard Leadership in the Arctic
        The Coast Guard has shaped and influenced national security in the
    Arctic for over 150 years. This effort includes asserting the Nation's
    sovereign rights, upholding our sovereign responsibilities from the
    strategic to the tactical level, and countering malign influence that
    is contrary to U.S. values and international rules and norms. The
    Service's missions have evolved along with the evolution of the
    physical, operational, and strategic environments.
        As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law enforcement
    authorities, combined with membership in the Intelligence Community,
    the Coast Guard seamlessly shifts between mission sets utilizing multi-
    mission personnel and assets. Specifically, the Coast Guard's
    constabulary functions and broad authorities serve as a critical bridge
    between the hard-power lethality of the Department of Defense (DoD) and
    soft-power diplomacy of the State Department. These characteristics
    enable the Service to cultivate strong international relationships and
    build coalitions among Arctic partners based on mutual interests and
    values that strengthen national security and regional stability while
    enhancing safety, maritime governance, and prosperity across the
    region.
        Where strategic goals align, the Coast Guard works closely with the
    DoD to ensure efficient operations. The Coast Guard is a member of the
    Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a EUCOM-sponsored multi-national
    group concerned with Arctic security issues, including maritime domain
    awareness. We work closely with NORTHCOM through the Arctic
    Capabilities Assessment Working Group, which was created to identify
    potential collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities in
    communications, maritime domain awareness, and presence. The Service's
    role as a member of the Intelligence Community offers a natural nexus
    for broad intelligence and information sharing, as appropriate, to
    counter nefarious actions in the Arctic and throughout the world. These
    efforts are only a few examples of partnerships between the Coast Guard
    and DoD.
        This year, Arctic operations and engagements have faced unique
    challenges and interruptions, mostly due to the global pandemic of
    COVID-19. However, because of these challenges and the growing
    strategic imperatives across the Arctic, the Service has adapted
    operations to meet the Nation's mission demands. The following
    highlights some of these initiatives that have particular impacts on
    the Nation's readiness as well as national and international security.
    Advancing Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic
        Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
    and operations effort that incorporates an expeditionary approach for
    deploying resources and conducting integrated operations to meet
    statutory mission demands, buys-down maritime risk, and advances
    national security objectives through maritime operations in the United
    States Arctic. ARCTIC SHIELD 2020 objectives included advancing
    national and Coast Guard strategic goals; enhancing capabilities to
    operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic; strengthening the rules-based
    order; and innovating and adapting to promote safety, resilience, and
    prosperity. An emergent priority was to protect Arctic residents by not
    transmitting or contracting COVID-19 while conducting missions. The
    pandemic imposed challenges on engagements and presence, both in
    communities and across the maritime domain, but has also presented
    other opportunities to broaden Arctic experience, training, and
    operational readiness to safeguard the U.S. Arctic.
        The Coast Guard conducted additional, unscheduled patrols in Arctic
    waters this season with CGC HEALY, CGC ALEX HALEY, and CGC MUNRO. With
    these patrols, the Service monitored foreign maritime activity,
    including the Arctic deployment of the XUE LONG 2; enhanced monitoring
    and enforcement of maritime activities including commercial fishing in
    the United States exclusive economic zone and along the maritime
    boundary line with Russia; supported other U.S. marine scientific
    research; and protected U.S. sovereign interests. This activity
    included a joint patrol with a Russian Border Guard vessel along the
    U.S./Russian maritime border that highlighted the Coast Guard's
    continued focus on regional cooperation to combat trans-Arctic threats
    such as illegal fisheries. Additionally, aircrews trained with CGC
    HEALY and CGC MUNRO as they patrolled in the Chukchi Sea and Bering
    Strait region, recertifying aircrews in shipboard landings in order to
    extend the operational reach of the Coast Guard into the higher
    latitudes.
        As in the past few seasons, the Coast Guard deployed two MH-60
    helicopters to Kotzebue, Alaska for four months to enhance response
    capabilities and provide direct support to communities in the U.S.
    Arctic region.
        These helicopters have flown over 390 flight hours, and executed
    eight long range search and rescue missions. Additionally, they
    provided critical support to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Office of Naval
    Research, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and the University of
    Washington in multiple missions to include assisting scientific
    research studying marine mammals plus Arctic ice and environmental
    conditions. Coast Guard HC-130 and MH-60 aircrews also conducted
    regular Maritime Domain Awareness flights, establishing a U.S.
    Government presence over U.S. Arctic waters, protecting U.S. sovereign
    interests, and executing U.S. responsibilities.
        Because of pandemic concerns in Antarctica, the National Science
    Foundation informed the Service that it will not use CGC POLAR STAR to
    support the McMurdo Station resupply mission this year. This change
    affords the Coast Guard the unique opportunity to conduct maritime
    operations in the U.S. Arctic during the winter. From December 2020 to
    February 2021, POLAR STAR will project power throughout the Arctic and
    defend American sovereignty along the U.S. and Russia maritime boundary
    line. This opportunity enhances Coast Guard readiness by increasing
    Arctic ice navigation proficiency and informs operations of the future
    Polar Security Cutters.
    Building Arctic Capacity
        The ability for the U.S. to lead in the Arctic, both strategically
    and operationally, hinges on physical presence to protect U.S. national
    sovereignty and safeguard our homeland security interests. The
    foundation of the Coast Guard's operational presence and influence is
    U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose is to provide assured, year-round
    access to the polar regions for executing not only Coast Guard missions
    but also national missions in the high latitudes.
        I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its
    continued support of the Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter program,
    which awarded a contract for the detail design and construction of the
    first ship in 2019. This program is efficiently managed through the
    joint Navy-Coast Guard Integrated Program Office, which was established
    to accelerate the project and leverage best practices from each
    Services' shipbuilding programs. Because of Congress's support and this
    partnership, the Nation is as close as we have been in over 40 years to
    recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to
    meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic
    polar regions.
        Until the delivery of Polar Security Cutters, the Coast Guard must
    maintain cutters POLAR STAR and HEALY, the Nation's only operational
    icebreakers. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension on
    POLAR STAR are already underway, and initial work for this project will
    begin in 2021, with phased industrial work occurring annually through
    2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel's
    service life until delivery of at least the second new Polar Security
    Cutter. The recent casualty to CGC HEALY, our only medium icebreaker,
    underscores the importance of this effort. It also highlights the
    Nation's limited bench strength for this particular mission set, and
    the importance of devoting sufficient resources for maintenance and
    repair activities to aging assets.
        On June 9th of this year, the Administration released a
    Presidential Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the
    Arctic and Antarctic Regions that directed a review of requirements for
    a polar security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that supports
    our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This
    memorandum highlights the Administration's priority for securing
    national interests in the Arctic and for recapitalizing the Nation's
    icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard will continue to work within the
    Department of Homeland Security, with the Department of Defense, and
    with other Departments in responding to the Nation's need in the
    Arctic.
        The Coast Guard must continue to evaluate options to advance U.S.
    interests in the region, which extend beyond the provision of
    icebreakers. As outlined in the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic
    Outlook, in order to respond to crises in the Arctic, our Nation must
    also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in
    the region. To meet the challenges of the Arctic as a strategically
    competitive space, the Coast Guard must also expand its means to shape
    the security environment and respond to, intercept, and collect
    information on activities and intentions of those operating in the
    Arctic region.
    Advancing Strategic Leadership and National Security Across the Arctic
        As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to
    expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard
    continues to be a leader across the region, expanding collaboration,
    cooperation, and interoperability.
        The Service exercises leadership through engagement in Arctic
    Council activities including representation on a variety of working
    groups. As Chair of the Marine Environmental Response Experts Group,
    the Coast Guard engaged with Russia during the response to the June
    2020 Arctic oil spill in Siberia, the worst ever in the region, and
    continues to work with partners to identify and apply lessons-learned
    from the spill to reduce risks in the United States. As a member of the
    Shipping Experts Group, the Coast Guard supports projects such as
    mitigation of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel
    oil by vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also chairs the Council's
    Search and Rescue Experts Group, served on the Council's Task Force on
    Arctic Marine Cooperation, and has been active in other task forces
    that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the 2013
    Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and the 2015 Framework for
    Oil Pollution Prevention.
        Additionally, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) continues to be a
    bridge between diplomacy and operations. Formally established in
    October 2015, the ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of the
    Service's Arctic strategy, as well as the objectives of the Arctic
    Council. It is a unique, action-oriented maritime governance forum
    where the Coast Guard and peer agencies from the other seven Arctic
    nations \1\ strengthen relationships, identify lessons learned, share
    best practices, carry out exercises, conduct combined operations, and
    coordinate emergency response missions. In April 2019, the ACGF
    conducted its second live exercise \2\, POLARIS, which incorporated six
    ships and five aircraft from ACGF member nations to respond to a
    simulated cruise ship in distress near Finland.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden
        \2\ The first live exercise, Arctic Guardina, was held in September
    2017
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined operations,
    and highlights the criticality of coordination preparedness for
    maritime environmental response and search and rescue. In April 2021,
    the ACGF will hold its third live exercise off the coast of Iceland.
        When Russia assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the ACGF
    in Summer 2021, the Coast Guard will continue to encourage advancement
    of shared ACGF objectives, including more collaboration with
    operational Arctic entities and increasing joint response capability
    for both search and rescue and marine environmental response cases.
        The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other
    international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization
    (IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and
    adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
    (Polar Code), which is mandatory under both the International
    Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International
    Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships (MARPOL).
        The Polar Code covers the full range of design, construction,
    equipment, operational, training, search and rescue, and environmental
    protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable
    waters surrounding the two polar regions. Additionally, in November
    2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with the Russian Federation to
    jointly develop and submit a proposal to the IMO to establish a system
    of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, with the
    objective of advancing the maritime transportation system in the
    region; promoting the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-
    conflicting commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence
    activities.
        The Coast Guard continues to work to expand the Service's influence
    across the Arctic. From July through September of this year, the Coast
    Guard deployed CGC CAMPBELL and CGC TAHOMA in the North Atlantic region
    to participate in joint military and Search and Rescue exercises. This
    included engagements with the Danish Joint Arctic Command, Canada, and
    France. These operations demonstrate the Service's strong relationships
    with international partners across the globe.
    Improving Critical Communications in the U.S. Arctic
        Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is simply
    communicating. Out of necessity, the Coast Guard uses a variety of
    solutions to communicate in the Arctic, which minimally satisfies
    current operational requirements. The Service is undertaking multiple
    connectivity and communications efforts to support and improve
    operations in the Region and will partner with the Department of
    Defense and other partners when possible. These efforts include
    recapitalizing our military satellite communications terminals,
    upgrading high-speed data ``Cutter Connectivity'' solutions with
    emerging polar satellite services, replacing all Coast Guard cutter
    High Frequency (HF) radios, and reegineering the terrestrial HF
    network. These efforts will dramatically improve the Service's Arctic
    communications and operations in the Arctic.
        Additionally, the Coast Guard is working with the Department of
    Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to execute a
    comprehensive review of mariner communications and connectivity needs
    with the broader Federal, State, local, and industry communities of
    interest in the Arctic. We have also engaged the DHS S&T Arctic Domain
    Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC) at the University of Alaska,
    Anchorage, to conduct relevant research. The intent is to identify
    areas of possible collaboration in a whole of government approach and
    potential public-private partnerships to address shared communication
    and connectivity gaps and needs.
    Conclusion
        The Coast Guard's value proposition in the Arctic includes
    upholding freedom of navigation and the rules-based order by setting
    and enforcing standards of behavior in the maritime domain. The Coast
    Guard's role in our whole-of-government approach to securing our
    national interests in the polar regions is using our experience,
    leadership, and ability to both influence and compete below the level
    of armed conflict. Leveraging the Service to set the example for
    maritime governance in the Arctic positions the United States to be the
    preferred partner of other Arctic allies and stakeholders to positively
    shape the security environment across the region. The Coast Guard, and
    the Nation, must remain committed and agile in the rapidly evolving
    geopolitical and operational Arctic environments.
        The Administration's and Congress' continued support for a
    modernized and capable polar fleet and Arctic infrastructure will
    posture not only the Coast Guard, but the Nation, to lead across the
    national and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
    minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as a continued area
    of low tension and great cooperation while preserving our national
    interests and rights. We understand the significant investment required
    to secure the Arctic, and we appreciate the trust the Nation has placed
    in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I
    look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Admiral, and I think we
    are going to just start right in, as we--when Senator Markey is
    available, we will make sure he has an opportunity to provide
    his opening statement. I want to begin by commanding the Coast
    Guard on its decision of the POLAR STAR do the Arctic patrol
    this winter.
        And can you provide an update on the status of the HEALY,
    and how extensive was the damage, and when do you think the
    HEALY will be operational again? I had the opportunity to meet
    with the captain and the ship's leadership crew, boy, just a
    couple of months ago when they were in Seward, Alaska, and it
    is a great crew, so I am glad everybody is safe, but an update
    would be appreciated.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I am proud to report to you, she is
    in the yard in the Mare Island, the upper reaches of San
    Francisco Bay, and they have done work on her before, so they
    are no strangers to her. We--the motor that we had to replace
    was 115 tons of motor. We had one spare. Somebody had the
    foresight years ago. When we commissioned HEALY, we had a
    spare. We actually built a building around it in Curtis
    Shipyard. So we had to ship it. It was too big to ship by rail
    or truck. We had to put on a barge and ship it through the
    Panama Canal. And so there is--we got her. The motor is
    replaced inside HEALY. We expect her to finish her dry dock
    availability toward the end of this month. For that, she will
    enter a dockside availability at home port and she will be
    ready to sail next summer so it would go back up North.
        Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you, Admiral. I am sure you
    are familiar with the memorandum from the President on June 9th
    of this year regarding the Arctic and ice breakers and where to
    look at home porting them. Are you familiar with that? And one
    of the things that I have been pressing, literally everybody
    listed on that memo: the Secretary of Defense, Homeland
    Security Secretary, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of State,
    OMB Director, National Security Adviser, is the importance of
    when we look at icebreakers, and I think everybody recognizes
    the need to build a fleet because we really don't even have a
    fleet, but to make sure they are home ported in an area in
    which they are in the region.
        Can you talk about that because right now, when I talk to
    the Senior Officials listed on that memorandum from the
    President on America's National Security interests in the
    Arctic, to a person they recognize that home porting
    icebreakers in Alaska makes long-term strategic sense and is in
    the long-term strategic interest of the United States of
    America. And as I mentioned in my opening statement, you know,
    I love the Coast Guard, but sometimes I get a sense of, kind
    of, a strategic thinking deficit on these kind of issues where
    too much of the home porting decisions seem to be based solely
    on where the current crew is, not where the action and the
    presence is needed. So can you talk to me about that?
        Admiral Ray. Yes. Senator Sullivan, so with regards to the
    President's memo, as you know, that was a joint effort between
    the Coast Guard and Department of Defense, NOAA, Department of
    State. And so we got together and created a document in
    response and turned it in on time to DHS and that was submitted
    to the NSA. So when they would choose to release that, I am not
    certain to say at this point.
        As you asked, during the course of this time, we did in our
    response say that, you know, Alaska home port should be
    considered in the analysis. And as I think you are aware, right
    now, we are--we have an ongoing homeport analysis for border
    security cutters that is ongoing. We expect that to complete in
    August and then a report out by the end of this Fiscal Year. So
    and that will definitely include analysis of home porting
    options in Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. And so your timeline for completion of
    that is August?
        Admiral Ray. The they report--the homework will be done in
    August, and I will double check this but this is what I recall
    from the memo. The homework will be done in August, and then we
    will have the analysis of it and, you know, running it, working
    it through our review process by the end of the calendar year.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask with regard to leasing. I just
    talked to the National Security Adviser. I know that there are
    icebreakers that are being looked at in Finland. Last week, I
    chaired the readiness subcommittee hearing on the Armed
    Services Committee with the Secretary of the Navy, CNO,
    Commandant of the Marine Corps. He had talked about this issue.
    There is another icebreaker that is in Florida, I guess. Not
    sure what it is really doing in Florida.
        But the look in terms of the potential to lease those soon,
    these are medium icebreakers that would essentially bridge the
    gap that we all recognize we have, my understanding is the
    White House, National Security Adviser, possibly the Navy, with
    regard to some of their funding, are looking at moving forward
    on leases soon. Like hopefully as early as the end of this
    month. Do you have any comment on that? And do you support it?
        Admiral Ray. Well, sir, Senator, with regards to leasing,
    we--that was obviously a part of the Presidential Directive to
    investigate that, and we went about that with the joint Navy
    and Coast Guard team. We have gone about investigating the
    feasibility of using those vessels for our purposes along the
    way, as we have said consistently, and it was accepted by those
    that, you know, at the NSA and others, was that any leasing
    arrangement would not be in lieu of building our own
    icebreakers, this would be in addition to.
        Senator Sullivan. As--I fully agree with that. In addition
    to, as a bridge.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I couldn't agree more.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I think it is--there is a
    potential that one of those vessels could be of benefit as a
    bridge, as you say.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. OK. Admiral, sorry, I am just
    trying to get a sense of--sometimes these remote hearings, you
    have got to get a sense of who is on the line and who isn't.
    And so for now, we don't have anyone on the line. So I am going
    to continue my line of questioning. With regard to the leased
    icebreakers that we are looking at--again, just speaking to the
    National Security Adviser about an hour ago, and I would fully
    support it as Chairman of this committee.
        There is also an interest in possibly if we do lease medium
    term icebreakers in the near future to at least have, again,
    those home ported or have one or two of those home ported in
    America's Arctic, which is Alaska. Give me a sense of what goes
    into the cost benefit analysis, because to me, and again, to so
    many that I have spoken to, it seems to be a strategic no
    brainer that if the entire point of having an icebreaker is
    particularly to protect the interest in the Arctic, to have it
    in the Arctic. Right now, the home porting in Seattle is a
    couple thousands of miles away, as you know, from the Bering
    Strait, where a lot of the action is and, of course, the Arctic
    Circle. So give me your thoughts on, again, what we could do
    with medium icebreakers right now?
        Again, I think the White House is looking at something that
    could be home ported hopefully soon in the America's Arctic,
    which is in Alaska. But what are the different things that the
    Coast Guard is looking at? Because as I mentioned my opening
    statement, sometimes it just seems very frustrating that--
    pretty obvious choice, long term strategic thinking would be
    you would want these home ported, at least some of the fleet,
    in America's Arctic.
        Admiral Ray. Senator, with regards to the potentially
    leased icebreakers short term bridging strategy, we have, you
    know, there is--we have not invested significant effort in
    analyzing where we would sail those from. I think, you know,
    obviously the closeness, the geography of the mission set that
    they would be engaged in. Your point is well made. For a longer
    term basing of our icebreakers, as you and I have talked and
    the Commandant have talked, there are multiple factors that we
    consider when we talk about the ability to maintain, not--we
    realize that through your work on the Committee that, you know,
    you will provide the resources we need.
        Senator Sullivan. We will.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. We appreciate and understand that.
    What we look at as the mission effectiveness, our ability to
    bring those to bear in a reasonable amount of time so that we
    can have a high probability success when we do sell that
    cutter. That is part of the calculus. There are other parts of
    the calculus with regards to the ability for the Coastees
    assigned to the cutters, for their families to, you know, to
    live and prosper in that vicinity. So as we talk about longer
    term home porting of cutters, as you and I have discussed said,
    those things are still--those are elements that we consider
    alongside the geographic considerations for getting to the OP
    area as soon as you would described.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another related questions. I
    know that, as you mentioned, there are feasibility studies with
    regard to home porting of the polar security cutters in Alaska,
    possibly Australia for the Antarctica mission. And also the
    FRCs, the feasibility study with regard to the ability to
    protect America's interests as it relates to China. So I know
    that there was look at Guam and maybe even American Samoa. How
    are those feasibility studies going? Now I am talking Alaska,
    Australia, and then for the FRCs, Guam and American Samoa.
        Admiral Ray. Well, as I--Senator, as I said earlier, the
    feasibility study for the home ports, the polar security
    cutters, that is ongoing right now. So we---I don't have any
    specific response with regards to some of the home ports that
    were mentioned in the President's memo.
        Senator Sullivan. OK, and just to be clear, sorry to
    interrupt, but those are for the six authorize polar security
    cutters that were authorized in the NDAA. So the longer term
    ones that we are building, not necessarily the short term
    bridging ones that have the potential to be leased in a much
    shorter amount of time, correct?
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. OK.
        Admiral Ray. So no, I mean, we are still working on the
    analysis of the home ports of those, as we have discussed. With
    regards to the fast response cutters, I want to thank you, in
    particular, for your support for our ability to homeport those
    where they need to be in Alaska. So, as you know, we are
    building--thanks to the support of this committee, we have
    funds already designated in Kodiak to start building out the
    piers there. We have funds on the unfunded priority list for
    Sitka. And then--so we are tracking with regards basing those
    in Alaska where they need to be.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we appreciate that.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. With regards to fast response
    cutters in the South Pacific, those--the discussion about
    potentially home porting one in American Samoa, we have already
    got two in Guam right now that are there, but the one in
    American Samoa, that has been a discussion. And we are
    analyzing that, but we don't have--that cutter is not on budget
    yet. So we will continue to analyze that and see what we come
    up with.
        Senator Sullivan. OK, good. I believe Senator Markey is on
    the line, so I am going to recognize him next. And then I will
    turn to Senator Scott. Senator Markey.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    great work in putting together this very important hearing.
    First, I want to thank our distinguished witnesses as well,
    including Dr. Jennifer Francis, who is a senior scientist at
    the world's leading Woodwell Climate Research Center, in
    Falmouth, Massachusetts. What is often thought of as the frozen
    Arctic is actually not so frozen anymore, making it a complex
    and fast changing environment that has caused a host of new and
    evolving national and economic security issues for us to
    confront. And we know that many of these changes are driven by
    the human-caused climate crisis. If we don't talk about the
    effects of climate change on the Arctic, we can't fully
    understand the truth that threats to our security. A novel
    Arctic climate is emerging in its new state, according to
    recent research, ``extremes become routine.''
        Rising temperatures are causing the region's climate to
    shift from sea ice to open water and from snow to rain. These
    changes in the North are sadly mirrored in the Antarctic, where
    the Pine Islands and Dewitts Glaciers are breaking free. The
    collapse of these ice sheets will have immense implications for
    rising seas, with Massachusetts and other coastal states facing
    up to 10 feet of sea level rise. Together, these climactic
    changes in polar regions are of incredible concern to our
    country. And as I mentioned before, the Arctic in particular is
    warming twice as fast as the global average. Between 1992 and
    2019, Arctic sea ice shrank by nearly a million square miles,
    an area larger than the State of Alaska.
        Current Arctic sea ice extent is the second lowest on
    record, with new trade routes opening and towns being flooded,
    the changes are drastic and unfolding at an unprecedented rate.
    The effects of fire field from the Arctic as well, with impacts
    in lower latitudes on weather patterns, extreme events and, of
    course, sea level. But we have also seen wildfires in places
    that few would have expected decades ago. In 2019, areas within
    the Arctic Circle experienced a massive fire season. That was
    supposed to be a freak occurrence. These fires weren't
    projected by scientists to start until mid-century. As the
    climate crisis continued to worsen, but now researchers say
    that the 2020 Arctic wildfire season, a previously unthinkable
    concept, is likely even worse than the one before. When I
    consider the changes in the Arctic, it is with great sadness
    and appreciation that I remember a climate scientist and
    climate change pioneer, Dr. Conrad Steffen. He was a leading
    researcher on the consequences of climate change in the Arctic
    and died in a tragic accident in Greenland this past summer.
        I met with Dr. Steffen in 2007 in Greenland and heard about
    his research, which found that climate change is causing the
    ice sheet in Greenland to melt at unprecedented speed. And
    sadly, because of our failure to heed the canary in the coal
    mine and take the drastic action on climate change, the ice
    sheet is now melting twice as fast as it was during that visit
    13 years ago. As the Chairman knows so well, the Arctic region
    is not some far off remote expanse. It provides livelihoods. To
    many, it is a global fishing center. It is a cultural and
    sacred place for Arctic indigenous peoples. It is the home of
    rare and endangered species. It is security. It is now at
    immediate risk as a result of the human caused climate crisis.
    The Arctic is a keystone of our climate system, which means
    that Arctic security is a National Security issue affecting all
    Americans. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
    I want to thank you all for the work you do. And would like to
    ask you, Admiral Ray, last year we spoke about the Coast
    Guard's oil spill preparedness.
        The Coast Guard had previously acknowledged shortfalls in
    its abilities to respond to any oil spills that might take
    place in the Arctic. In July 2020, a Russian power plant
    experienced a massive failure that dumped tens of thousands of
    tons of diesel into the Polar Arctic, showing how immediate
    this threat is to the fragile Arctic ecosystem. Admiral Ray,
    since we spoke last December, what specifically has the Coast
    Guard done to improve its oil spill response capabilities?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Several things
    to kind of, if you will, work to the left of an incident. We
    have worked on--this summer during Operation Arctic Shield, we
    made a concerted effort to get out and we visited. At the end
    of this summer, when you put it with the work we did last
    summer, we had visited 92 percent of the facilities that store
    petroleum products in the Alaskan Arctic. And as a result of
    that, we were able to inspect and we were able to work with the
    operators, owner operators, of these facilities, and work to
    ensure that those don't become, because as you know, the
    Russians spill that you referred to was caused by thawing
    permafrost and then the failure of containment tank that they
    had that has let several thousand gallons loose. So we have
    worked to address that. And we have actually inspected and
    visited 92 percent of those. We continue to work with Federal,
    state, and local stakeholders to perform exercises this summer
    with regards to our preparation for spills. And we also worked
    with----
        Senator Markey [continuing]. Are there additional resources
    which you would like Congress to provide to you to better
    protect the Arctic from any spills, either foreign or domestic?
        Admiral Ray. Well, the work that we are doing with the
    Department of Defense, we are leveraging some of their
    resources. And Senator, there are no specific, other than the
    capability to move this equipment which you are providing, the
    C-130Js and with additional H60 helicopters, those would be
    helpful in responding to any sort of incident or spill in the
    Arctic. So we can provide--we have--I am sorry, sir, go ahead.
        Senator Markey. You mentioned the permafrost is melting.
    Half of the world's permafrost is expected to vanish by the end
    of this century. But I noticed in your written testimony,
    Admiral, that it does not include the words climate change. Do
    you believe the Coast Guard should be planning for human caused
    climate change?
        Admiral Ray. Mr. Ranking Member, the Coast Guard has been
    consistent in that we are really agnostic as to the cause, but
    we are planning and paying attention to science all over our
    country. Up North in particular with regards to, as you would
    already discussed, that there is water where there used to be
    ice, the multi-year ice has receded. If you look at the planet
    from the North Pole aspect, you can clearly see greater
    expanses of water that remain over the course of time. We have
    seen it this year in our hurricane season. Down the Gulf Coast,
    we have had more named storms than we would ever had since we
    have been naming storms. So we pay very close attention to the
    forecast and the scientific analysis. But as I said, that is
    what we look at and what we build to what as we are planning
    our operations.
        Senator Markey. Now, I know what you are saying, but you
    can't be an agnostic when it comes to climate change. That is
    what's causing the hurricanes. That is what is causing the
    melting of the permafrost. It is what is driving all of these
    changes that we are seeing. And if I may Admiral Ray, do you
    think the Coast Guard needs to integrate climate resiliency
    into the construction of any new facilities in the Arctic?
        Admiral Ray. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Markey. And so, I just want to make sure, though, I
    make it clear that I thank you for your service, Admiral. I
    think you are really doing an excellent job, and I look forward
    to working with you.
        Senator Sullivan. Senator Scott.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Scott. First, I want to thank Chairman Sullivan for
    his commitment to the Coast Guard, his commitment to security
    in the Arctic, and all the things he has taught me about
    icebreakers in the last 2 years. I want to thank Admiral Ray
    for being here. I had no idea the importance of icebreakers
    until I got this job 2 years ago.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, being the Senator from Florida, we
    are OK with that.
        Senator Scott. But I have a great help with Chelsea, who is
    a great--I think she will be a great Coast Guard Admiral. So
    while the United States icebreaking capabilities have remained
    stagnant for decades, as we all know, Russia and communist
    China continue to advance policies and dedicate more resources
    to capitalizing on the issues of the Arctic. China's growing
    influence around the world presents a clear and present danger
    to the stability of world markets, the security of the United
    States and our allies in the quest for freedom and democracy
    around the globe. As we all know, we must do everything we can
    to make sure our men and women in uniform have every resource
    available to defend against the growing threat and keep our
    family safe. I want to thank again Chairman Sullivan.
        When I came up here and we were shut down, he was a big
    advocate of making sure the Coast Guard got--started getting
    paid. So, Admiral Ray, the Coast Guard plays a crucial role in
    defending our Nation and protecting our security in domestic
    and international waterways. Can you talk about the resources
    you think you need to remain competitive or the U.S. to remain
    competitive in commercial and defense activities in the Arctic?
    And how we can improve the coordination between the Coast Guard
    and the Department of Defense as we work to combat what Russia
    and China is trying to do in the Arctic?
        Admiral Ray. Thank you, Senator Scott, for the question.
    With regards to the resources we need to improve our readiness,
    the Arctic is, as you know, we use the same resources. There
    are a lot of the same ones. And so the readiness piece that the
    Coast Guard, that our Commandant has repeatedly talked about
    under testimony and in various other fora, it is pretty
    straightforward. We have had really good success with getting
    the funds to purchase new assets. Where we have fallen behind
    is in the asset, the funds to maintain those assets and operate
    them. And so where is the Department of Defense when they went
    to address their readiness kind of deficit a couple of years
    ago under this Administration, they realized about a 12 percent
    increase in their ONS funding and we are about flat lined. And
    so that is a challenge. That is one thing that we need. As I
    have said before, some of the assets that we are using up
    there, the polar security cutter is going to be really
    important as we continue to build our Arctic capability.
        We are also, Senator Sullivan, the Chairman asked me last
    time I testified about our communications capability. We made
    progress there, but it is going to require investments in
    satellite capability to communicate and operate up North. I
    could go through a list of assets, and sir, I would be glad to
    provide a more fulsome briefing for that. But it is primarily,
    I would say, our readiness has to do with operations and
    maintenance funding for our current assets. With regard to
    answer your part of the question about our engagement with DOD,
    I think we are about as tight now as we have been, on Arctic
    issues in particular, with DOD that we would been in my
    lifetime.
        As you know, we would got an integrated program office with
    the Navy to help construct the polar security cutters. And we
    have got equal roles of leadership with them on that committee.
    And it has been a tremendous help. I am convinced that our
    ability to award that contract in April of 2019 was really
    aided by our cooperation with the Navy and their experience
    with that.
        Senator Scott. Is the budget issue thing just tied to the
    fact that your budget is separate and--your budget comes up
    through Commerce, right? And so you are not part of the DOD
    budget. Do you think that is the reason why it is happening?
        Admiral Ray. Well, sir, we are part of Department of
    Homeland Security, and so we fall under that regime of budget
    distribution, if you will. And I am--we think the Coast Guard
    is well positioned in the Department of Homeland Security. We
    have got many missions that work for that. As you know, we are
    a military force, armed service at all times. But we also have
    Title 14 authority, which gives us law enforcement authority.
    We are a member of the intelligence community. So the
    Department of Homeland Security is a great place for the Coast
    Guard and we think we prosper there. But when it comes to the
    readiness funds that are that are provided to the Coast Guard
    via the Department, that is where I think we could use some
    support of.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Scott. And just, I
    want to ask this very quickly and get to Senator Blumenthal,
    but in my opening remarks I did mention that this is the first
    time, it looks like successfully, sometimes I talk to Senator
    Blumenthal a lot about it as well, that we are pairing up the
    Coast Guard Reauthorization Act with the NDAA. That brings a
    lot of synergies to the DOD and--or I shouldn't say DOD, I
    should say Coast Guard and other services operations. I am
    assuming, Admiral, you support that?
        Admiral Ray. Absolutely, sir, and we appreciate your
    tireless efforts to make that happen.
        Senator Scott. Well, we are going to--we are making it, I
    think we are making it a precedent this year and hopefully in a
    bipartisan way, we can make that happen every year. I think it
    helps the Coast Guard and the other services. Senator
    Blumenthal.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Sullivan. And I would
    just second with a great big exclamation point the fact that
    this pairing is not only profoundly significant and historic,
    but it is also bipartisan and I hope we continue the work
    together that we have started because the Coast Guard deserves
    that reliable and well merited treatment in terms of
    authorization and appropriation. We are very proud in
    Connecticut to be the home of the Coast Guard Academy. The
    Coast Guard has a long and storied history in Connecticut. We
    regard it as kind of one of our own, and very, very grateful
    for the role that the Coast Guard is playing in advancing our
    economic interests in the Arctic. I thank the Chairman for
    making that topic the focal point of today's hearing.
        I want to raise an issue probably somewhat painful to both
    of us, and I know that it is not within the direct purview of
    this hearing. So if you want to respond in writing as well as
    orally now, I certainly would welcome it, but as recently as
    this morning, I have been contacted my office by whistleblowers
    from the Academy complaining about some of the racial tension,
    potential slurs, other kinds of abuses that are deeply
    troubling. These instances have been disturbing to us. In
    Connecticut for a long time, in fact, to our delegation,
    Representative Joe Courtney and I have heard them for a while,
    and I know you are familiar with them. The June report from the
    Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General on
    racism at the Academy found that the Coast Guard has failed to
    thoroughly investigate racial harassment.
        Allegations including the use of racial slurs and failed to
    discipline cadets who were found guilty of that behavior. The
    specific incidents included in the report, I think you will
    agree, have no place in society, much less in the military or
    the training institutions like the great Coast Guard Academy
    that we are proud to host in Connecticut. Hate speech and race-
    based harassment by cadets at the Academy have gone largely
    underreported because of the stigma and shame attached to
    providing information, and sometimes they have been ignored.
        These experiences don't stay in New London, they affect the
    entire Coast Guard, as you well know, a little bit like a
    virus. Racial hatred and tension spreads. It is a contagion
    that I know the Coast Guard leadership is committed to stop.
    And so I just want to ask you, what you can tell me to update
    us as to what the Coast Guard is doing about this very
    important topic, what you are doing to monitor, counter it?
        I raise this topic certainly not cheerfully, but I think
    necessarily because I know, Ray, you are certainly committed to
    stop this kind of racial slurs or any other kind of abuse and
    just want to give you the opportunity to respond.
        Admiral Ray. Thanks for the question, Senator. And we do
    absolutely take this to heart, the report of the Inspector
    General from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as
    the righting the ship report that were from 2019 or excuse me,
    from 2019. We leaned into those and in the course of the last
    year we addressed every single recommendation, direction that
    was provided in those two reports and we have addressed them
    and reconciled them in policy and procedure. More importantly,
    I think what we would done with those is go from not just
    fixing our manuals and our policy, we have created tools to put
    in the hands of our commanders.
        And I am not just talking about the Coast Guard Academy. I
    am talking about Commanders writ large across the service so
    that they know how to conduct an investigation. They know what
    they have to report up. They know we are able to track
    harassment so that it--because many times these things start
    with harassment and they turn into something bigger.
        And so we put tools in our hands, to our Commanders, that
    we will use those and spread across the service so they can
    actually take action against these incidents. Taking it very
    seriously, sir, and thank you for bringing it up.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you heard recent reports of these
    kinds of racial incidents or slurs continuing?
        Admiral Ray. I have not heard of recent reports from the
    Coast Guard Academy. No, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Since the June report, have you heard
    any and what steps have you taken?
        Admiral Ray. Negative, sir. I have not heard any from--
    since the June report of the Coast Guard Academy. And I will
    double check with my team, but we--if there is something that
    happens of this nature, I get a report from our Civil Rights
    Directorate every month on things that happen of this nature.
    And so I am pretty sure I would have heard if it happened--
    maybe, you know, have not been informed. But I will double
    check and get back with you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. If you could double check, I would
    appreciate it. And I would also be interested to know, because
    my time has expired, maybe you can respond in writing, what
    kind of comprehensive steps have been taken to change the
    culture and to instill in the cadets the idea that there is
    zero tolerance for this kind of abuse?
        Admiral Ray. We will respond in writing to your question,
    sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Admiral Ray. Thanks to
    Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Cantwell.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    and to my colleague as well. These--so appreciative of you
    being here today. And, I have a historic day in the sense that
    the House is taking up the NDAA and passing legislation,
    including the Coast Guard with authorization for six
    icebreakers, so we definitely believe in that mission. It is a
    very bipartisan effort, a very bipartisan effort to also fund
    those icebreakers, as we have in the past. And so I want to ask
    you specifically about the mission moving forward. Admiral Ray,
    will the Coast Guard continue to build icebreakers beyond the
    three and recapitalize on these purposes of both the climate
    science aspect of the Arctic mission?
        Admiral Ray. So with regards your first question, ma'am,
    Senator, is I know you are aware, we have talked about three
    heavies and three medium icebreakers, and so--and we are in the
    precursor stages for the requirements for the medium
    icebreakers at this point. So by the plans we have now, that
    would be the next evolution of building out our icebreaker
    fleet. However, we are always reevaluating the fleet mix that
    we need with regards to icebreakers. So given the support of
    the Congress, I mean, we will continue to look at that and
    evaluate that.
        And so our real focus at this point--in fact, I was just
    down in Mississippi early last month at the Halter Shipyard
    with our Mission Support Commander and with our Deputy
    Commandant for Operations, meeting face to face with the
    leadership of the shipyard that is constructing the first polar
    security cutter, just to let them know how important it was to
    us and to our Nation. And they get it and they are going--they
    are moving out on that. Regards to the second part of your
    question, Senator, I am not sure I caught that----
        Senator Cantwell. Well, we want to make sure that--I mean,
    obviously, it is an evolving mission. And there is the work
    that the HEALY does, you know, science capabilities that we
    don't want to get lost in all of this. We want to continue
    those science capabilities. I want to make sure we are also
    getting a work force. Currently you are short 400 prevention
    personnel, and we certainly think that the Arctic is an
    important prevention mission. And so we want to make sure that
    we are discussing here what kind of resources that you need and
    what we need to do to keep the science mission and to have a
    work force.
        Admiral Ray. Senator, thank you for recognizing that
    prevention workforce. That is a part of regulatory role of the
    Coast Guard which often goes unheralded by it is so important.
    As we were talking with the Senator, the Chairman earlier, our
    folks and Secretary in Anchorage travelled all over the State
    of Alaska this summer to finish out, and they ended up
    completing about 92 percent of the inspection of the petroleum
    storage facilities in Alaska. That is the kind of work those
    folks do so bad things don't happen. So, thank you for your
    support of that workforce, Senator.
        Senator Cantwell. So, what do we need to do to train and
    skill more people?
        Admiral Ray. We are--we are completing, Senator, a study
    right now on--because the way we were turning our prevention
    officers was kind of--it is something we have been doing the
    same ways for years and we need to do something with greater
    effect where we have Centers of Excellence where we take people
    and just in time train them to do the missions we need. And it
    is much more complex now, whether it is deep water offshore
    drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, or whether is up in the Arctic
    oceans.
        And so the support for us--and once again this comes to the
    readiness funding that we have been talking about because if
    this is human capital--so to develop that human capital, it is
    operations and support funding where that is how we train
    people, that is how we send them to these industry Centers of
    Excellence, so that our people are on the right footing to do
    the regulatory role they need to protect our natural resources.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, whatever we can do to be helpful on
    that front. We want a Center of Excellence. People trained and
    skilled in the Arctic--there is no difference here between
    Senator Sullivan and I, and many of our colleagues on these
    issues. So thank you, and I am just taking by, you do agree
    that the science mission of the icebreaker fleet should
    continue?
        Admiral Ray. Absolutely ma'am. It is an important part of
    our mission. It has been for many years.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Admiral, I
    am going to ask a few follow-up questions and then I am going
    to see if Senator Markey has any, and I believe there might be
    one or two additional Senators who are wanting to participate
    and coming down to the hearing room. So, let me ask you, I
    highlighted it briefly in my opening statement, but the August
    26th incident that we had with this massive Russian military
    exercise that went into the United States' EEZ. I know that
    you, the Coast Guard, District 17 in Juno, the headquarters are
    often made aware of these kind of exercises to coordinate with
    Northern command, coordinate with the U.S. Navy.
        I have raised this with the Secretary of the Navy, with the
    North Comm Commander, what do you think happened that we can
    improve on to make sure that something like that doesn't happen
    again? First of all, our fishermen, in my view, should never be
    essentially forced out of the American EEZ, when they are
    legally fishing. And yet, that did happen because the Russians
    were being quite forceful. Second, there seemed to be somewhat
    of a lack of information flow and I am sure--and I know because
    I have requested if, an after-action to make sure that we
    improve upon that, particularly as it relates to our fishermen,
    whether they are based in Seattle or based in Alaska.
        You know, this is a huge part of the U.S. economy--a huge
    part of my state's economy. These are great, hardworking,
    patriotic Americans. And can you just comment on that and how
    we avoid that from happening again, and what steps we need to
    take? And if you are looking at, I know you are, but
    coordinating with North Comm and U.S. Navy on this?
        Admiral Ray. Senator, it is a multi-part question so I will
    try to answer it in the same way. The--first of all, as I
    described the activity of the Russians in planning and
    executing that section exercise, I think there was a degree of
    irresponsibility there that needs to be addressed and talked
    to, and we have done that. We have sent a written
    correspondence. We have got a Coast Guard attache in Russia who
    does the leg work with the Russians. And we have a relationship
    with the Russians' border guard that serves as a really kind of
    a red phone type of relationship, so we are working that.
        With that said, this was not our best day with regards to
    doing our role to look after American fishermen, the U.S. Coast
    Guard, so we--I will just be quite frank, we own some of this
    in that there is--although there is about 4,000, over 4,000 of
    those hydro packs that come out, the hydro pack is the form of
    a message that would describe the area that is on your chart
    there. About 4,000 of them a year. When the ones that are in
    our exclusive economic zone, we have a duty to pay attention to
    that. And we have looked at the ways that we can communicate
    that with the fishing fleet. And we did not do that that day.
    You know, there are ways they could receive it, on satellite
    phones and satellite receivers and other types. However, there
    are also ways we can transmit it to make a pointed effort.
        What we are doing to hopefully prevent this from ever
    happening again, we are having biweekly meetings with the
    industry groups, in particular the At-Sea Fish Processing group
    that will be represented in your next panel, to understand how
    we can communicate that to the fleet so that the fleet knows in
    advance when these things that could cause a challenge to their
    fisheries operations. And we are dedicated to doing a better
    job with that. This is not a once and done thing. This is going
    to be a persistent effort on the part of the U.S. Coast Guard
    to keep that fleet informed.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Let me turn next to--we were
    talking about the different things the Coast Guard needs in
    terms of its presence, its ability to do its job in the Arctic,
    one of which is infrastructure. As I mentioned, at the Port of
    Anchorage, Dutch Harbor, these are about a good 1,000 miles,
    1,200 miles away from the Arctic Circle. So Alaska, as you
    know, is a big state. Just because you are up in Alaska doesn't
    mean you are near at all to the action.
        As I like to say, that would be, you know, the functional
    equivalent of having a Coast Guard base in Florida protecting
    the interests of Boston or Rhode Island or Maine. So
    infrastructure is critical. We have made significant progress
    here on the deep water draft port for the Port of Nome, which
    is much more, in terms of a geographic sense, able to protect
    the interest of the Arctic. Last time you testified before this
    committee, you emphatically stated the need for those kind of
    ports and infrastructure. Can you just comment on that again?
        As I mentioned, in the Environment and Public Works
    Committee, the Ports and Harbor Bill has a very significant
    authorization for deep water draft port that can handle
    icebreakers, can handle fast response cutters, National
    Security cutters, even destroyers from the U.S. Navy. What is
    your sense of that? I believe we need a vision for a series of
    strategic Arctic ports the way Russia does. Can you comment on
    that a little bit and how important that is to the Coast Guard?
        Admiral Ray. Senator, I will. First, I want to thank you
    for the infrastructure that you have provided us already. As
    you know, about 10 percent of the Coast Guard's infrastructure
    is in Alaska----
        Senator Sullivan. We will continue to provide that as you
    need it.
        Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And I really--specifically with
    regards to Kodiak, because that is our stepping off point at
    present with regards to all of our operations in the Gulf of
    Alaska or heading further out West, the Aleutians are up North
    in the Bering and further North. As we have repeatedly said,
    sir, if there was a deep water port North of Dutch, as you
    would discussed, we would certainly take advantage of it. It
    would be a benefit to the Coast Guard.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, OK. Let me ask one final, actually,
    I am going to just make one more point again on the leasing and
    if we were to do kind of a leasing with regard to medium
    icebreakers, again, I think as a bridge for some of the polar
    class icebreakers, I think home porting those in Alaska would
    make immediate sense. We look at, I know the Coast Guard has
    already talked about Seattle for some of the polar class ones
    which are building on what is already there, makes sense. But
    as you know, there is going to be a lot more than just two or
    three from what we are working on.
        So I want to just make that statement from the Chairman's
    position here on the importance of that. What else do you need,
    the Coast Guard needs from this committee? As I mentioned, we
    are already working on that alignment between the NDAA and the
    Reauthorization Act. My goal would be to do the Reauthorization
    Act every year, just like we do the NDAA. It makes total sense.
        We should pair them, but the Coast Guard needs a
    Reauthorization Act every year just the way the rest of the
    military does. Is there anything else you need from this
    committee, whether it is Arctic related or any other broad
    based Coast Guard issues that are at the top of your list right
    now?
        Admiral Ray. Senator, I thank you for your support. I think
    as we have discussed two or three times here, that realization
    that the Coast Guard needs, in addition to the capital assets
    that Congress has been so good at providing us, we need those
    operations to maintenance funds moving forward, because that is
    what makes us go and will make us be the Coast Guard we need to
    be.
        And then I would be remiss and I would be--my Coastees
    would be disappointed in me. You know, our Coastees, when I
    travel around the Coast Guard, they still remember that
    shutdown, that partial shutdown of 2019 and how that affected
    them, viscerally affected them and their families. And so I
    would just ask for your continued support, direct finance so
    that the Coastees never have to--you know, if any military
    member is getting paid, they need to be getting paid.
        Senator Sullivan. I agree 100 percent with that last
    comment, and as you know, some of us worked day and night to
    make sure that wouldn't happen, didn't happen, got cured
    quickly when it did happen. And it is my goal as Chairman of
    this committee to make sure something like that never, ever,
    ever happens again. It was an outrage. The Coast Guard members,
    the family members and trust me, I did a few town halls in
    Alaska with them, they were appropriately really pissed and
    they should have been. And we need to make sure that doesn't
    happen again. I see we have one additional Senator who joined
    us. Senator Cruz, the floor is yours.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        Senator Cruz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
    thank you also for convening this hearing and for your
    leadership on this issue. Chairman Sullivan is the leading
    champion for the Coast Guard in the U.S. Senate and also the
    leading champion for America leading in the Arctic. And I am
    grateful for your leadership in both regards.
        Senator Sullivan. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Senator Cruz. I will also note, Admiral, and the question
    you raised about the shutdown. That shutdown in 2019 was
    unfortunate. And Senator Sullivan and I together teamed up on
    legislation to pay the men and women of the Coast Guard and
    took to the Senate floor trying to get the Senate to adopt it.
    Unfortunately, a Democratic Senator raised an objection and
    held the men and women of the Coast Guard hostage to that. And
    so I am hopeful we don't see a reprise of that in the days and
    weeks to come.
        The Arctic Circle has strategic, economic, and military
    significance for the United States, and I want to thank the
    Coast Guard for your continued presence in the region, your
    leadership working to protect America's interests. I've said
    for a long time that China is an adversary who would benefit
    from an American retreat all across the globe. President Xi and
    the Chinese Communist Party are investing heavily in the
    military, as is Russia. In your assessment today, who is the
    dominant power in the Arctic Circle?
        Admiral Ray. Senator, thanks for the question. From the
    analysis that we have done, I mean, obviously, if you look at
    the planet from the North down, down, looking down at the North
    Pole, you can see the extensive shoreline that Russia has. You
    know that they are--they are a force to be reckoned with there
    just because of geography. They have got the geography and they
    have got the natural resources there. So in the near term, I
    think Russia is certainly the Nation that we should really be
    paying close attention to. But we cannot ever take our eyes off
    the ball on China.
        I think that the behavior they are displaying in the polar
    regions, not just the Arctic, but the Antarctic and not just
    the Alaska Arctic, but over by Greenland as well, they are they
    are displaying similar activity, following, in my opinion and
    the analysis I've done, this is all unclassed, with regards to,
    you know, they are following the same playbook they followed in
    the South China Sea and following the places they do everywhere
    else. They will get a toehold, start working in the name of
    science, in the name of other things, and the next thing you
    know, they are moving forward with their agenda there. Does
    that answers your question, Senator?
        Senator Cruz. In your assessment, what would be the effect
    to the United States if we were to cede control of the Arctic
    to the Russians and the Chinese?
        Admiral Ray. Well, it would be no different than ceding the
    Gulf of Mexico to somebody else. It is a shore of the United
    States. It is the approach United States, although it is not as
    accessible as the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Coast or name
    your coast, but it is the same sovereignty rules and the same--
    we have the duty, we in the Coast Guard, and this is what we--
    we have the duty to protect it now. 30 years ago, when I was a
    young officer in the service, nobody talked about it because
    the multi-year ice had not receded. But now there is access out
    there that didn't exist. Traffic through the Bering Strait,
    increased, you know, 200 percent in the last four or 5 years.
        It is not going to replace the Suez Canal anytime soon, but
    it is growing and the access is up there. So I would say we
    should be planning to be able to exert our sovereignty, protect
    our resources, provide support for those who need access, and
    these are eco-tourists, these are Americans, a lot of them, or
    also the folks who are Alaska Natives who live and make their
    living up there. We need to be the same Coast Guard, I am
    speaking from a Coast Guard perspective, for them as I am for
    any other state in our country.
        Senator Cruz. You said in your opening statement that State
    actors, as well as non-State actors, are seeking to advance
    their own interests in the Arctic. What did you mean by non-
    State actors?
        Admiral Ray. Well, the potential for IUU fishing will exist
    up there. That is coming. I mean, when the Senator, now here in
    Nome, summer before last, we had a NOAA----
        Senator Cruz. And pretend hypothetically there were a
    Senator in the room that didn't know that particular acronym.
        Admiral Ray. OK, I am sorry, that is illegal, unregulated
    and unreported fishing. That is a scourge--it literally is one
    of the scourges of the planet. I would say, from a maritime
    perspective, IUU fishing, whether it is happening in the South
    Pacific, whether it is happening in the Bahamas or pick a
    place, off the coast of Africa, off the coast of Somalia, that
    is one of the most widespread degradation of resources that the
    planet knows. And it has effects.
        And so what the Senator and I saw last year when we were in
    Nome, there was a NOAA scientist there, really bright
    scientist, and she explained, she drew out a map for us in the
    gravel of the parking lot of the harbor at Nome, and she
    explained to us because Pollock is the most substantive
    American fishery. We could probably get arguments on that from
    other parts of the country, but it is the greatest in capacity
    what happens. And that is caught in the Bering Sea, and those
    Pollocks are moving North, up toward the Arctic.
        Now, there is a 16 year moratorium on fishing in the Arctic
    that pretty much everyone agrees who has the capability to fish
    up there. But they will be up there. They will be up there and
    they would deplete those resources just like they will anywhere
    else if we let them.
        Senator Cruz. And what resources does a Coast Guard need to
    combat both State and non-State actors in the Arctic?
        Admiral Ray. The capital assets that we are being provided
    right now, whether it is polar security cutters and continue to
    be able to build out that fleet, because what happens is--and
    that is why we call it polar security cutters and not
    icebreakers per say moving forward, because breaking ice is
    just a means to an end. The end is to get Coast Guard cutters
    with Coast Guardsmen on scene to a place where either people
    need a rescue or they need arresting. And we do both of those.
    And so that is the resources we need. And then the aircraft,
    the communications capability to go with them. But in the short
    term, as I was telling the Committee earlier, I think the
    operations and sustainment funds are really the long pole in
    the tent for our service right now.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Admiral. And as a closing
    observation, I will say I was up this summer in Alaska with
    Senator Sullivan. And my advice to you is for the Coast Guard
    to stay utterly agnostic on the malicious lie that Senator
    Sullivan persists in repeating, which is that Alaska is larger
    than Texas. And I can tell you, we Texans don't believe the
    lying maps that are put out. And my advice is for you to stay
    out of that particular squabble.
        Senator Sullivan. Just for your information, not only is it
    larger, but if you split Alaska in half, Texas would be the
    third largest state in the country. So we are--and I don't
    think the map makers are lying. But I am glad you were up
    there. And, Admiral, you are very popular. There is another
    Senator who was actually recently in Alaska as well, Senator
    Lee, who is joining us. And I am sure he has some questions as
    well.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
                         U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

        Senator Lee. Utah is bigger than most states, but I feel
    quite intimidated, not going to get into this dispute. I never
    realized it was up for debate, whether Texas was bigger than
    Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. It is not up for debate, just for the
    record.
        Senator Lee. Admiral, thanks so much for being here. Thanks
    for all you do. The mission of the Coast Guard is absolutely
    essential to who we are and our ability to live our lives as we
    do. In your testimony, you note that the ability of the United
    States to lead in the Arctic hinges on physical presence in the
    region so that we can defend our homeland and safeguard our own
    security interests. You note that this is really important for
    us and we ought to stick to that. This means that we need
    assured year round access to the polar regions. The Coast Guard
    has also noted that it needs six polar security cutters, these
    PSCs, for their missions.
        Now, my understanding is that the Coast Guard and Navy's
    first contract award for a PSC anticipates construction
    beginning sometime next year, sometime in 2021. Is that right?
    And then delivery of a vessel by 2024, meaning that we may not
    have vessels to fully replace our aging icebreakers for 5
    years, give or take, possibly a little bit more. Is that right?
        Admiral Ray. That is accurate, Senator.
        Senator Lee. Now, how does this timeline harm the Coast
    Guard's readiness and its ability to carry out its core
    missions?
        Admiral Ray. Well, this timeline is--it is, really at this
    point, it is unavoidable. We've got cutters that are over 40
    years old, where the oldest one, POLAR STAR, the one that we
    talk about the most, and it is an interesting--and so urgency,
    a sense of urgency has been on the Coast Guard for several
    years now. And I am just thankful that the result of the
    leadership here in this subcommittee and the support of the
    Administration. We are moving forward with recapitalizing.
    There is no time. The longest journey starts with the first
    step and we are on the step.
        Senator Lee. You know, Federal law generally prohibits the
    use of foreign contractors, foreign shipyards, for the
    construction of Coast Guard vessels or major components of
    Coast Guard vessels. It is no secret that Finland has boasted,
    apparently with some ability to back it up, that they could
    build an icebreaker within 2 years and they could do it for
    less than $300 million. Undoubtedly, we need, for the reasons
    that you have stated quite persuasively, we need to be able to
    compete with China and with Russia in this region in
    particular.
        In order to accelerate our acquisition, based on our needs
    for the acquisition, do you think Congress ought to consider,
    in a limited manner, sort of revisiting the general prohibition
    on foreign shipbuilding? In other words, would or could
    granting some limited flexibility to our NATO partners and
    friendly Arctic nations, is that something that could help the
    Coast Guard acquire the flexibility that it needs to get these
    vessels up and running so that we can establish this presence
    that we need in the Arctic?
        Admiral Ray. Senator, first of all, as I am sure it is no
    surprise, we are huge fans and supporters of the American
    industrial base in the shipyards along the Gulf Coast in that
    and I know you are, too. With that said, I think the bridging
    strategy that makes the most sense to the Coast Guard at this
    point is this potential to lease one of these icebreakers.
    Because it would need to be, and you know, it would have to be
    U.S.-flagged to be able to have the authority that we use it
    for. So that--from the perspective we have done is trying to
    bridge the closest gap that we found ourselves in. That makes
    more sense to me.
        Senator Lee. OK, it makes more sense. But just to be clear,
    it would be no security threats associated with, security
    issues, that would attend if we were to lift this restriction
    such that we could acquire a vessel in a different way than
    current law allows. Are there any security issues that would
    preclude us from contracting with someone operating within a
    NATO power or within another friendly nation, friendly Arctic
    Nation perhaps, to help us meet our shipbuilding needs? Would
    that present any security threat?
        Admiral Ray. Certainly, it depends on which one you are
    talking about. Not all are created equal, but of the Arctic
    nations that I am familiar with, that I have dealt with,
    security of the ones that are our allies would not be the first
    concern I would have.
        Senator Lee. They would not be the first concern that you
    would have. And would they be a concern at all? Is that a
    concern to have purchased that from Finland, for example?
        Admiral Ray. Is security a concern for--not to my
    knowledge, sir.
        Senator Lee. OK. Thank you very much. I see my time has
    expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And just one
    final question relates to what Senator Lee was asking about. He
    raises a really good point about this huge gap in capability
    for coverage of protecting American sovereignty. Isn't that one
    of the reasons the President put the memo out on the issue of
    if you are not going to build, which creates some legal
    challenges, at least right now in the current law to lease? And
    that is what we are looking at doing right now. Leasing
    potential medium icebreakers from Finland is one option, is
    that correct?
        Admiral Ray. There have been several different vessels
    alluded to, some of them are of Finnish origin, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. But to lease, to close that gap and
    protect that, to at least bridge that gap until we can build
    our own.
        Admiral Ray. That is the general strategy that we have been
    exploring and as a result of the President's memo.
        Senator Sullivan. And do you think that makes sense?
        Admiral Ray. I think you would agree it does. One thing I
    do want to state, these vessels, I have been around them and
    various commercial icebreakers, if you will. And they are not--
    they are not to military design with regards to communications,
    with regards to damage control, with regards to
    compartmentalization. So if we get, you know, in some sort of--
    we have some sort of accident because the nature of the work
    that we do, so there is a different gap.
        We would have to do some work to them. It is not just take
    one off the shelf. If it was, we would have probably done that
    a long time ago. So there will be some work required to make
    these for the Coast Guard. But with that said, it is the
    Commandant's position and our position that we will certainly
    consider this and work to see what makes sense to bridge this
    gap.
        Senator Sullivan. Right. Thank you. Sure, yes, Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. I just have to ask the question, so if I
    understand the point that is being made, and I think Senator
    Sullivan raises an excellent point, if in order to bridge the
    gap, perhaps we could lease something. If we could lease, for
    example, a vessel that has been built in Finland, that would
    suggest that our security needs are met by that vessel or
    certainly not compromised by that.
        And if the only reason why we are not securing that vessel
    from Finland is because U.S. law prevents it, even though we
    could potentially do it for a fraction of the cost and get it
    in less than half of the time. I would suggest that is a
    question for us to consider as a Congress, why is it that for
    the sake of hewing to the status quo of what current U.S. law
    requires, if there is no security implication from doing so,
    why would we need to limit ourselves to leasing rather than
    buying with regard to a Finnish-built icebreaker? That is a
    question I have for you.
        Admiral Ray. Sir, I think it is in the national interest to
    preserve our industrial base, shipbuilding base. And I think I
    mean, history has proven that. That is what won us World War II
    largely. And so I think to outsource the building of new ships
    for the use of our military, that would be something we would
    have to consider long and hard. And so my starting position is
    that when you protect this industrial base, which is declining,
    shipbuilding base is declining along the Gulf Coast in other
    places, and so that is--and that's where I stand on that.
        Senator Lee. And I completely agree that is a legitimate
    interest to maintain our industrial base so that we can have
    access to those things. When our own industrial base can't do
    things in the same way that others could do, especially with an
    ally, a friendly Arctic nation, I think that is a good reason
    for us to ask ourselves the question of whether we ought to
    revisit some aspects of existing law. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Lee. And Admiral, I
    want to thank you again, not just for this hearing, but the
    outstanding work that you would been doing for the Coast Guard.
    So many issues beyond just the Arctic. I appreciate very much
    your testimony for this panel. The record will remain open for
    2 weeks. And if there is additional questions from Senators,
    for the record, we respectfully ask you and your team to try to
    get back to those as soon as you can.
        But for now, sir, we are going to move on to our next
    panel. And I want to thank you again for your outstanding
    testimony today and your exceptional service to our Nation. And
    please pass on to the men and women of the Coast Guard that we
    got their back, and we are working to try and make sure we take
    care of them and give them the assets and training that they
    need to protect our nation, and do it in a way that makes all
    of us proud.
        Admiral Ray. Thank you very much for the opportunity, Mr.
    Chairman. And we really do appreciate your support.
        Senator Sullivan. Absolutely. We are now going to turn to
    our next panel. We have three witnesses that I mentioned
    earlier. They are all testifying remotely, so hopefully this is
    going to work easily. We have Major General Randy Kee, and
    Stephanie Madsen, and Dr. Jennifer Francis. General Kee, we
    will begin with you, sir.

          STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RANDY A. ``CHURCH'' KEE,

           USAF (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARCTIC DOMAIN

                AWARENESS CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA,

             COMMISSIONER, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION

        General Kee. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    and distinguished members of the Subcommittee in Washington,
    D.C.. It is an honor to discuss U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
    capabilities for safeguarding national interests and promoting
    economic security. I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's
    interest and support o the Coast Guard's Arctic endeavors. I
    have the privilege to serve as the Director of the Arctic
    Domain Awareness Center at the DHS Center of Excellence in
    Maritime Research hosted by the University of Alaska. I am also
    a U.S. Arctic Research Commissioner. The following reflections
    are mine alone and do not necessarily represent the views of
    the organizations to which I am assigned or affiliated.
        Among my experiences in the Arctic, please note I spent
    time listening and learning from Alaska's indigenous
    communities, getting insights from people who have been a part
    of the Arctic since time began. The Arctic is exceptional.
    Arctic exceptionalism in size, breadth, and depth of ongoing
    collaboration of our science and economic endeavors, indigenous
    peoples concerns, military cooperation and governance related
    activities are really the envy of many across the globe.
    Continuing Arctic exceptionalism is by no means assured, and
    U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives in science, economics,
    and measures to ensure American security and sovereignty should
    really top U.S. priorities.
        The opportunities of an opening Arctic are incentive for
    Arctic and Antarctic nations alike to pursue easier access to
    extract minerals, harvest marine life, conduct maritime
    transport, advance tourism and project sovereign influence.
    Diminishing Arctic environment is enabling rising competition
    between national powers. The Russian Federation has refurbished
    Soviet--former Soviet Arctic bases, built additional, and is
    capable of projecting power to and through the Arctic. With a
    dominant number of icebreakers, Russia can project surface
    forces in multiple directions simultaneously.
        Russian national decisionmaking and defense planning are
    opaque at best, and Russia's Arctic military advantage should
    be met with resolve and strength as America cannot afford to be
    perceived as weak in our Arctic commitment to the Kremlin. From
    my vantage, the Russian Navy's actions against Alaskan
    fishermen in the Bering Sea in late August are frankly
    unacceptable. Harassing Alaska vessels within the U.S. EEZ
    should not go unanswered and should not happen again. It is
    important to note Russia is an Arctic Nation who shares a
    critical Arctic waterway with the United States. It is in both
    Nation's interest to prevent conflict in the Bering and Chukchi
    Seas.
        Conversely, the People's Republic of China advances
    influence through the use of its economic power to gain access
    across the Arctic. China is normalizing an Arctic presence via
    national and icebreakers, gaining port access and advancing
    mining interests. It is not inconceivable China may conduct
    extractive measures closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than
    any we would likely prefer, particularly based on China's track
    record of environmental stewardship elsewhere. It is in our
    interests to find a way to decouple joint approaches between
    Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic region. This is possible
    through a diplomatic reproachment that does not condone or
    reward malign Russian actions, but guided by realizing there
    are a number of common Arctic interests between Moscow and
    Washington, D.C. I do believe that great power competition need
    not become great power confrontation.
        Against the backdrop of the most difficult operational and
    geostrategically challenging theaters in the planet, the
    selfless service of the U.S. Coast Guard makes the challenging
    look easy and conducting search and rescue, disaster response,
    law enforcement, and support to civil authorities. As a career
    military pilot with 30 years of service that includes operating
    the Arctic, please let me assure you, what America's Coast
    Guard does in the Arctic is demanding, requires daunting
    courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty. U.S.
    Coast Guard needs to project persistent power in the United
    States regions of the Arctic as well as other international
    Arctic waters. The authorization of six and appropriation of
    one polar security cutter was a critical gain. Hopefully new
    funding for more icebreaking cutters will be coming soon as
    capacity is well below what is needed. New icebreaking cutters
    need the ability to defend, communicate, and ascertain the
    operating domain.
        This summer's recent mishap aboard the Coast Guard's cutter
    HEALY highlights the challenge of the long lines of
    communications from home port in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic
    region. There should be consideration either developing or
    enhancing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an expeditionary
    function, providing a logistical and affordable levels of
    repair. Locating one or more such facilities in places such as
    Seward, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor or Nome can possibly provide ice
    going vessels an important third option between repair at sea
    or return to home port in Seattle.
        Coast Guard homeporting should be located at a robust
    multimodal transportation node, co-located with heavy marine
    industry, housing, schools, communications and logistics. I
    truly wish such facilities already existed in Alaska's Arctic,
    and advocate for smart and long term commitment to establish
    joint civil Government development of Alaskan ports. As a
    former military programmer, I am guided by the principle of
    efforts to create capabilities via ramps through multi-year
    incremental increments. One point to emphasize is the focus on
    increasing capabilities at or near the Bering Strait as this
    maritime choke point becomes--could become as strategically
    important as the Straits of Malacca or the Panama Canal to
    global maritime commerce.
        The State of Alaska's official motto, North to the Future,
    is as relevant as ever. I believe the importance of the Arctic
    will certainly continue to rise. Thank you for the opportunity
    to provide these reflections and please know how appreciative I
    am of your service to our Nation providing political leadership
    in these difficult times. I respectfully look forward to
    addressing your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Kee follows:]

          Prepared Statement of Major General Randy A. ``Church'' Kee,
      USAF (Retired), Executive Director, Arctic Domain Awareness Center,
      University of Alaska, Commissioner, U.S. Arctic Research Commission
    Introduction and overview of the specific needs.
        Good afternoon to you Mr. Chairman, ranking member and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee in Washington D.C. It is a
    genuine privilege and a pleasure to discuss U.S. Coast Guard
    Capabilities for Safeguarding National Interests and Promoting Economic
    Security in the Arctic.
        I have the honor to serve as the Director of the Arctic Domain
    Awareness Center, (ADAC) a Department of Homeland Security Center of
    Excellence in Maritime Research in support of the United States Coast
    Guard's Arctic mission, hosted by the University of Alaska at the
    University of Alaska Anchorage. Please know that ADAC and the Center's
    associated research and education network are truly committed to being
    the best possible support to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as we can
    individually and collectively muster. Accordingly, we in ADAC seek to
    be supportive of the U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook,
    (ArcSO) as well as the U.S. Coast Guard's 2018 Maritime Commerce
    Strategic Outlook (MCSO). I respectfully commend the Subcommittee's
    interest and support of the implementation of the U.S. Coast's Arctic
    Strategic Outlook and the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in an
    Arctic context, as important and believe is greatly appreciated by many
    who are concerned about these topics in Alaska, across our Nation and
    with America's closest Arctic partners and allies, in particular, our
    allies in Canada.
        In addition to serving and supporting the U.S. Coast Guard in
    leading ADAC, I respectfully relay that I was recently appointed as a
    Commissioner to the U.S. Arctic Research Commission by the President of
    the United States. In the coming months and years, I look forward to
    supporting and serving with the Commission in meeting statutory
    requirements as directed in the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984. As
    is the case with many in the research community, I have the privilege
    to serve in other committees and volunteer endeavors, and list the
    following as the more significant of these collateral activities: U.S.
    Delegation lead for Situational Awareness, International Cooperative
    Engagement for Polar Research, U.S. Office of Naval Research, Global
    Fellow, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center for International
    Scholars, Co-Chair, Alaska Civil Armed Services Team (ACAST), State of
    Alaska.
        I respectfully submit the reflections contained in this document
    are mine alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.
    Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, the State of Alaska,
    the University of Alaska, the Office of Naval Research, the Wilson
    Center or the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. These reflections do
    represent however, many years of Arctic focused endeavors ranging from
    military operations to military and national strategy development,
    multinational military engagement focused on Defense Support to Civil
    Authorities, policy and planning for defense and security formulation,
    and directing a multidiscipline center of Arctic maritime research.
        While many of these experiences are oriented at the Federal or
    multinational level, they also include time spent listening, learning
    and working with Alaska's indigenous communities of leaders, gaining
    understanding and insights of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea
    areas from these leaders in local and place-based knowledge. No
    meaningful work can happen in this region without the insight,
    involvement and collaboration with these communities.
        Due to the close collaboration we have at ADAC with DHS and the
    multiple echelons of Arctic-oriented service within the USCG, we
    identify our Center as an extended member of the DHS and Coast Guard
    family and celebrate their successes, while trying to lessen the burden
    of their operational challenges. The Center achieves this effort in a
    cost-effective manner by harnessing the power of the University of
    Alaska and our network of partners and collaborators, which contain
    research nodes across the United States, extensive research
    collaboration across Canada and some additional collaborations with
    America's Nordic Allies and partners as well. Strategically, ADAC's
    research, educational programs and convening activities continue to
    seek solutions that support the USCG's statutory missions associated
    with Coast Guard's Title 10 and Title 14 Authorities.
        At the outset, I very much hope the committee recognizes my
    reflections are oriented to be supportive of the challenges our
    Nation's Coast Guard faces in securing and protecting the U.S. Arctic
    maritime region. Against the backdrop of one of the most difficult
    operational theaters on the planet, the selfless service of the U.S.
    Coast Guard makes the challenging look easy in conducting search and
    rescue, disaster response, law enforcement and support to civil
    authorities. As a career military pilot with three decades of service
    that includes operating in the Arctic and across many other operational
    demanding areas, please let me assure you . . . what America's Coast
    Guard does every day in the Arctic is supremely demanding, requiring
    daunting courage, expert skills and a matchless fidelity to duty.
        The USCG has long made the case of needing to revitalize their
    ability to project persistent sovereign power into the ice-laden
    regions of the U.S. Arctic as well as the international waters of the
    Central Arctic. This persistent power is best advanced via Polar
    Security Cutters. The authorization of six and the appropriation of one
    Polar Security Cutter (PSC) was critically needed and hopefully
    additional appropriations for more Polar Security Cutters will be
    coming sooner than later, as the current capability of the U.S. Coast
    Guard in this capacity is greatly diminished and well below what is
    needed for the mission.
        While the platforms matter, as persistent presence is not achieved
    without them, it is useful to consider a comprehensive systems approach
    to projecting such persistence. USCG PSC's without connectivity or
    communications may be unable to respond when and where most needed in a
    timely manner for crisis response. PSC's that have lagging or
    incomplete operational domain awareness may not be able to ascertain
    risk or have sufficient tactical knowledge and understanding to conduct
    an assigned mission. For safety and mission assurance PSCs must be
    manned by crews and leadership that have been trained and educated to
    fully comprehend a complex operating environment. PSC's that do not
    have minimal logistics and support located within the theater they
    operate, may have to forfeit their operational tasking and retrograde
    thousands of miles back to home port to effect repairs when mechanical
    issues arise that are beyond the ability to repair at sea.
        As such, creating a systems approach in support of projecting
    persistence, that include PSCs, and complementary capabilities in
    communications & connectivity, domain awareness, institutionalized
    training and in-theater logistics support can result in PSCs providing
    a presence that signals to friend and foe alike. . .the U.S. Coast
    Guard is on the watch and vigilantly ready to protect and secure the
    U.S. maritime Arctic.
        Further, ensuring the U.S. Coast Guard is supported with the best
    understanding science and technology can deliver in characterizing the
    ever-changing Arctic at fine scale for U.S. Coast Guard operational and
    tactical decision makers, is a persistent and enduring need.
        The following paragraphs are presented to describe the challenge,
    present the key drivers of concern, offering solutions to consider and
    reflecting on opportunities to advance an improved chance of success
    for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Homeland Security Enterprise in better
    securing our Arctic maritime national interests.
    A discussion on the geostrategic challenges facing the Coast Guard and
            our national interests in the Arctic.
        Alaska and Alaska's maritime region make the U.S. an Arctic nation.
    While it may not be evident to many, and likely, most Americans, the
    Arctic region is vital to U.S. national interests and Alaska's maritime
    regions of the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are the Arctic
    approaches to U.S. sovereign territory. It is a region that is
    experiencing great change due to rising temperatures, now rising at
    more than twice the rate as lower latitudes and as forecasts indicate,
    this trend is posed to continue, and bring unique challenges that will
    strain all the inhabitants' ability to resiliently adapt . . . flora,
    fauna and people alike.
        When the United States became an Arctic nation in 1867, the Nation
    became responsible for facilitating domestic security and defending
    national sovereignty across a significant frontier, known to the
    generations of Alaska Native residents and a handful of explorers,
    miners, trappers and settlers from the continental U.S., Canada, Russia
    or other places. In the more than a century and half since the Alaska
    purchase, the national security challenges within America's Arctic have
    fundamentally changed. As seasonal Arctic ocean sea ice levels
    continues to diminish, the barriers of access are opening the Arctic
    region to natural resource development, maritime trade, and tourism,
    all of which is substantially transforming the security landscape of
    the high latitude north. New international actors now look to the
    Arctic for opportunity, while existing Arctic nations are now advancing
    efforts to better realize the region's economic potential.
        As the changing Arctic presents new economic and geopolitical
    opportunities, environmental change poses a significant threat to
    current economic systems and traditional lifestyles in the Arctic.
    Thawing (and sometimes melting) permafrost is compromising the land
    that serves as the foundation for coastal Arctic communities and the
    small number of connecting roads and ports. With less sea ice cover,
    weather systems are becoming more volatile, allowing for stronger storm
    systems that further exacerbate coastal erosion through storm surges,
    high winds and coastal flooding. Environmental changes in the Bering
    Sea is now having an impact to traditional commercial and subsistence
    fisheries as fish stocks are starting to move north, risking and in
    some instances, already dislocating traditional food sources for marine
    mammals and Alaskan Arctic residents alike. Collectively, these
    environmentally focused changes pose a significant threat to existing
    coastal communities, local economies and associated infrastructure
    within the region.
        The opportunities of an opening Arctic are an incentive for Arctic
    and non-Arctic nations alike to pursue easier to access and extract
    mineral and petrochemical resources, pursue fish proteins (at present,
    outside of the Central Arctic Ocean), conduct maritime transport,
    advance tourism and project sovereign influence through national
    flagged vessels.
        Reductions in sea ice have reduced the access barrier to maritime
    operations and as a result, increasing activity is gaining in the
    Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea regions. as well of course the overall
    pan-Arctic, which includes the Northern Sea Route along Russia's
    northern shore and the Northwest Passage across Northern Canada. The
    Arctic's diminishing sea ice environment is increasing accessibility to
    the vast hydrocarbon deposits within the region, which allows for
    Arctic nation-states like the Russian Federation to expand resource
    extraction efforts. The diminishing ice Arctic is enabling sea lanes of
    the Arctic to open sooner and stay open longer through the summer
    months and increasingly into the fall. This past May as an example, saw
    the earliest recorded transit of the Northern Sea Route, a record that
    will likely be routinely broken repeatedly in the seasons to come. The
    emerging economic potential of the Northern Sea Route, and the
    possibility of a viable Transpolar route within this century have
    incentivized nations and industry to consider leveraging these new and
    shorter routes for transporting maritime commerce as an economic
    advantage.
        The diminishing Arctic ice environment that is enabling rising
    competition is manifesting itself in a multifaceted manner. It is well
    understood the Russian Federation has restored and refurbished former
    Soviet bases along Russia's Arctic region, while creating new
    facilities and establishing forces at those stations capable of
    projecting power in and through the Arctic region, well beyond national
    borders. If this was simply establishing a safe and secure Russian
    Arctic in creating sound defense by having a more than capable offense,
    then such activities may be reasonable and possibly even acceptable.
    However, Russian national decisions and associated defense planning,
    are opaque at best, and the asymmetric Arctic military advantage
    created in the Russian Federation should be met with resolve and
    strength by the U.S. and America's Allies . . . as resolve and strength
    has historically been successful to stabilize relations between Moscow
    and Washington D.C.
        Russia's approach to managing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) bears
    monitoring. Their practices obliquely, if not directly, potentially
    restrict freedom of navigation and counter the aspect the NSR is an
    international waterway.
        Russia is no doubt, a considerable Arctic maritime power. With a
    dominant number of ice breakers, that range from vessels suitable for
    riverine operations to nuclear-powered ocean-going vessels, the Russian
    military can project sovereign influence throughout the pan Arctic in
    multiple directions simultaneously.
        Russian abilities to muster and project military forces into the
    Arctic are remarkable. The range and complexity of these activities
    have continued to grow substantially following their restart of Long-
    Range Aviation back in January 2007.
        Russian military exercises in the Bering Sea in late August are a
    deeply worrying example where lack of understanding, communication and
    a willingness for provocation, places not only military forces and
    response measures at risk, but these actions also place U.S. citizens
    at risk, such as the U.S. fishing fleet that were interrupted and
    alarmed in their commercial activities by poorly understood and
    reportedly aggressive Russian military maneuvers.
        Since the routine establishment of Extended Economic Zones (EEZ),
    normally 200 nautical miles from shore, as codified in the United
    Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
    1982, foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage,
    permitting transit and freedom of navigation as long as these vessels
    are not conducting items exclusively prohibited such as weapons
    testing, polluting, fishing or conducting scientific research.
    According to UNCLOS, it was allowable for the Russian navy to exercise
    in the U.S. EEZ, as long as the vessels stayed outside of U.S.
    territorial waters (12 nautical miles from shore).
        However, the Russian navy aggressive actions against U.S. flagged
    Alaskan fishermen in late August this year, are unacceptable. The
    Alaskan fishermen where rightly operating in a region well known and
    well established as a profitable fishing ground. For U.S. vessels to be
    harassed and ultimately forced to depart the area and losing the
    associated economic opportunity should not be permitted, particularly,
    as these fishermen where operating within the U.S. EEZ and adhering to
    the usual and customary practices of UNCLOS and of course U.S. fishing
    regulations.
        In past experiences while serving in uniform, I have been
    confronted by military members of the Russian Federation. While my
    reflections are anecdotal and not a full analysis, these experiences
    have created a personal reflection that Russian military rewards those
    who act aggressively, and restraint can often be seen as a sign of
    weakness.
        As the Russian Federation is an Arctic nation who shares a critical
    waterways management challenge with the United States, it is in both
    nations' interests to resolve conflicts, effectively communicate and
    find solutions to prevent escalation of tension and a rise in military
    actions along our shared and the economically increasingly important
    waterways in the Chukchi and Bering Seas.
        From personal experience, it is my belief that Russia respects
    strength and resolve, and towards that end the U.S. National Security
    Strategy provides the antidote and guiding perspective . . . peace
    through strength, sustained in a competent, professional manner earns
    the respect of the Kremlin and Russian forces. This requires
    investment, training, proficiency and most importantly . . . persistent
    presence, oriented on a timetable and tempo of our choosing.
        In sum, the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as weak in our
    Arctic resolve to the Kremlin. Certainly, America should avoid over-
    reacting in a manner that may be seen as unrestrained escalation, but
    should reserve the right to escalate if needed to retain the initiative
    and in every case, ensure Russia understands, the United States of
    America will defend our citizens, our territory, our treaty Allies and
    our National Interests.
        The Peoples Republic of China's efforts in the Arctic is
    manifesting itself differently than Russian actions. China continues to
    maximize it influence through use of its economic power to create
    potential for access to policy governance in forums such as the Arctic
    Council, and uses its economic strength to potentially position China
    to gain access to Arctic regional mineral wealth, fish proteins and
    more. China's economic partnership with Russia for Arctic region
    liquified natural gas (LNG) is one example of China's advancement on
    their declared Belt and Road initiative. China continues to project
    sovereign presence into and across the Arctic via Xue Long I and Xue
    Long II icebreaker cruises, with a third Xue Long to join future
    efforts. There are media reports that China is seeking to replicate
    Russian examples of developing nuclear powered ice breakers. In
    addition to investments in LNG on Russia's Arctic Yamal Peninsula,
    China's influence in gaining Iceland commercial port access and efforts
    to advance commercial mining interests in Greenland, signal China's
    strategic aims contain a comprehensive pan-Arctic approach. Based on
    their actions in other regions, it is a reasonable conclusion to state
    Chinese national need for raw resources such as mineral and fish
    proteins will continue to drive their aspirations and activities across
    the Arctic.s
        The People's Republic of China see the Arctic as integral to its
    global ambitions. It is fairly clear that China will continue efforts
    to gain access to resources and deliver products to market for economic
    benefit, while also establishing influence among the Arctic community
    who may be tempted by promises of infrastructure investment and
    economic development through Chinese investment. Chinese icebreakers
    continue to project presence in the Arctic region, to include
    operations in the Arctic basin outside of the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the
    Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. It is not inconceivable that such a presence
    could lead to mineral and other extractive measures in the future--
    closer to the U.S. Arctic maritime EEZ than we would likely prefer,
    particularly when considering the insufficient measures Chinese
    industry has made towards environmental stewardship in other regions
    across the globe.
        China's willingness to support infrastructure in developing
    regions, provides many reasons for caution and close examination of any
    promise or offer made by the Chinese government or government supported
    industry. Regrettably, there are a number of instances elsewhere on the
    planet where such promises have yet to substantially deliver, where
    more is the case where profound disappointment in these arrangements
    has been the result. One needs to simply review the many instances in
    Africa, South and Southeast Asia to get a full picture of the
    corresponding risks that await in the Arctic. China is not an Arctic
    nation, yet is acting as it has sovereign interests in the Arctic, and
    had its advocates continue to make remarks that China seeks and should
    be granted a role in Arctic Governance at a number of multinational
    forums such as the 2019 U.S. Arctic Research Commission and Woodrow
    Wilson Center hosted conference on the Impacts of a Diminishing Ice
    Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations. In sum, China's effective use
    in leveraging its national economic strength as a means to gain
    political influence across the Arctic is competing and conflicting with
    corresponding U.S. National Interests.
        To be sure, the Arctic is but one area in the growing array of geo-
    strategic challenges between the United States and China, but the pace
    of Chinese advancement in and across the pan Arctic region, to include
    their presence near U.S. Arctic waters is outpacing American countering
    efforts to deter and dissuade Chinese actions in the Arctic, which are
    counter to American national interest.
        A similar intent may be implied about Russia. However, while
    Russian military strength and considerable reach of their forces across
    the Arctic, arrayed against Europe and deployed in the Middle East, are
    dispatched by a nation that has an insufficient economic engine to
    long-term sustain such force. Russian investments in military
    capability are to be taken seriously, however, Russian economic
    shortfalls compromise Russian military strength, particularly when
    compared to the economic muscle of China as the world's second largest
    economy. Accordingly, finding ways to manage tensions with the Russian
    Federation in the Arctic as fellow Arctic nations, should be sought,
    particularly from a position of U.S. strength. Such measures should
    seek to first, find a way to decouple joint approaches between Moscow
    and Beijing. This is possible through diplomatic rapprochement that
    does not condone or reward past and current malign Russian actions, but
    guided by realizing there are a number of common interests in the
    Arctic between Moscow and Washington D.C. This approach may be well
    aligned to American interests and serve to better manage escalation of
    military tensions in the Arctic.
        The above discussions are a representative sample of the
    geostrategic challenges that face U.S. national interests in the
    Arctic. What is important to emphasize, Great Power Competition need
    not become Great Power Confrontation, and measures to manage and as
    useful, deescalate are important, if not critical. To be sure,
    escalation management requires the means and capabilities to back words
    with commensurate force. This is not only a Department of Defense
    matter. . .this includes ensuring needed capability within the national
    security enterprise, including the Department of Homeland Security and
    the United States Coast Guard.
        Against this backdrop, it is important for the Nation to continue
    to invest in real capabilities and invest in efforts that continue to
    innovate DHS and U.S. Coast Guard presence and ability to project and
    sustain activities in the Arctic region, particularly, U.S. Arctic
    maritime regions. Real capabilities such as PSCs, but also the means to
    make these platforms more versatile, more connected and more
    interoperable with the rest of the U.S. joint force and with our Allies
    and partners.
    A discussion on civil safety and security challenges facing the U.S.
            Coast Guard in the Arctic.
        While rising competition among the Great Powers is a pacing
    interest on Arctic matters, the spectrum of challenges that impact the
    U.S. maritime Arctic are considerable, and yet often times overshadowed
    by the higher profile provided to Great Power Competition.
        In order to prepare for these existing and increasingly complex
    security challenges, the U.S. Coast Guard released the USCG Arctic
    Strategic Outlook in 2019, significantly updating the prior 2013
    Strategy to focus three ``complementary lines of effort'' to the USCG
    will endeavor in order protect national interests: 1. Enhance
    Capability to Operate Effectively in the Dynamic Arctic. 2. Strengthen
    Rules-Based Order. 3. Innovate and Adapt to Promote Resilience and
    Prosperity. In order to prepare for the challenges facing the USCG in
    supporting the changes of American Maritime Commerce the USCG released
    the Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook in 2019. Along the Aleutians
    (the U.S. Congressional Southern Boundary of the Arctic), through the
    Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas provides the USCG an opportunity to
    view both the ArcSO and the MCSO in an integrated manner, providing
    opportunities to advance safety, security, waterways management and
    protection to maritime commerce for the benefit of the nation, industry
    and communities in the region.
        The Arctic region continues to experience unprecedented change in
    terms of environment, weather patterns, and human activity. Over the
    past year, rapidly warming trends have contributed to decreasing extant
    of Arctic Ocean sea ice and spurred seasonal increases in storm
    severity, via significantly stronger winds and coastal storm surges
    buffeting shores across the North American Arctic. As the Arctic
    continues to warm, the foundations of coastal regions securely frozen
    for centuries are now thawing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to
    intensifying severe weather patterns. Across the U.S. Arctic, this
    thawing terrain has an unusually high susceptibility to erosion, which
    is of great concern to associated infrastructure and communities.
    Characterizing these changes at fine scale, remains a research
    challenge that has yet to be fully addressed.
        Enabled by a changing environment, human activity across the Arctic
    is rising and includes increased commercial marine traffic, bolstered
    adventure tourism, (albeit temporarily dampened due to the Coronavirus
    pandemic) and expanded efforts to develop and conduct resource
    exploration and extraction methodologies. Newly opened pathways from
    the diminishing ice environment is a draw for nefarious influences in
    the region and can possibly contribute to unconventional marine safety
    and security threats including increased illicit trafficking and
    criminal activity. While modest global crude oil prices continue to
    dampen off-shore Arctic oil exploration activities in the Chukchi and
    Beaufort Seas, current favorable U.S. government exploration policies
    and historically fluctuating crude oil prices are likely to ensure that
    long-range oil and gas exploration activities will likely increase
    across the North American Arctic in the coming years.
        Transportation networks across the North American Arctic are
    principally limited to air and seasonal marine conveyance. Economic
    development remains limited due to remoteness, lack of infrastructure,
    high cost, and difficulty establishing new roads, ports, and
    facilities. In context of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the
    USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook, there is a need to consider how DHS and
    USCG will safeguard and secure new economic developments within the
    U.S. Arctic coastal and maritime regions in order to meet broad
    strategic goals for regional security.
        An increasingly dynamic Arctic continues to affect populations
    whose ancestors have inhabited the region for generations. Subsistence
    lifestyles continue but are increasingly threatened by retreating ice
    and increased regional industrial activity (such as marine shipping and
    resource extraction), which affect marine mammal activities and
    populations. Sincere consideration and active participation of local
    populations' lifestyles, practices, and customs should guide new U.S.
    Federal initiatives and inform DHS and USCG regional activities.
        As trends indicate, human activity across the Arctic continues to
    increase in scope and magnitude. As new Arctic expansion and operations
    bring a more diverse and less experienced population and the rapidly
    changing Arctic environment confounds traditional understanding, the
    percentage of those truly prepared for the Arctic environment is in
    decline. This leads to risk-prone behaviors that stress resources and
    challenge the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to conduct search and rescue,
    humanitarian assistance missions, protect fisheries and marine life and
    lead disaster response operations. Additionally, as more outsiders
    enter the Arctic, the reasons for their arrival become more diverse
    resulting in increased need for vigilance in enforcing national laws
    and regulations.
        The preceding paragraphs outline a series of concerns and a series
    of needs to consider in realizing a future U.S. maritime Arctic region
    better matched to national interests and the U.S. citizens who call the
    region home. Addressing these challenges are not only limited to the
    U.S. Arctic maritime region but should be conducted in a manner that
    better allows the U.S. Arctic maritime region to serve as the point of
    departure for increased efforts in the National Interest across the
    Arctic basin. To be sure, the investment costs to realize a substantial
    gain of economic prosperity for the region is sizeable, but so too is
    the potential opportunity.
        The Arctic is an exceptional region. Arctic ``exceptionalism'' in
    the size, breadth and depth of ongoing collaboration in facets such as
    Arctic science, economic endeavors, recognition of indigenous peoples
    and governance-related activities such as the mechanisms associated
    with the Arctic Council are the envy of many other regions across the
    globe. However, continuation of these aspects of Arctic exceptionalism
    is by no means assured and U.S. investment of Arctic initiatives of
    science, economics, and measures to ensure U.S. security and
    sovereignty, are well within U.S. national interests.
    A discussion on solutions and supporting concepts.
        Responding to the drivers of concern . . . it is important, if not
    critical to provide sustained support to the U.S. Coast Guard with
    improvements and capability to smartly project presence and enforcement
    to preserve and protect U.S. interests within our sovereign spaces,
    which ranges in providing the clenched fist of resolve to security
    missions to the hand of help to respond to civil crisis and to advance
    science and research in a pan-Arctic context to support the public
    good.
        What this means, is the real and critical value to field the Polar
    Security platforms validated to support the U.S. Coast Guard polar
    requirements. This also means providing these platforms the ability to
    serve as fully capable instruments of national sovereignty, capable to
    deter, dissuade and defend in like manner to USCG National Security
    Cutters. Advancing U.S. Coast Guard Arctic and Antarctic capabilities
    requires working with science and technology research and providers to
    gain smart abilities to receive and conduct command and control and to
    establish situational awareness and overall domain understanding,
    across remote and austere regions that have well understood limitations
    in communications and logistics infrastructure.
        This summer's recent mishap aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
    Healy, highlights the challenges of the long lines of communications
    from the Healy's homeport in Seattle to the U.S. Arctic region.
    Establishing a home port closer to the Arctic with full depot level
    repair capability is a considerable, and in fact, a quite massive
    investment in heavy infrastructure, base development, family quarters
    and more, particularly since no corresponding commercial infrastructure
    fully exists in Alaska.
        Homeporting of capital U.S. Coast Guard assets should be located at
    a robust multimodal transportation (air, road/rail, and seaport) node,
    with co-located heavy marine industry, piers, housing, schools,
    communications and logistics capability already exists. While I truly
    wish such facilities did exist in Alaska, and in particular, in the
    Arctic, and I would heartily advocate for smart and long-term
    commitment to establish joint civil-government development of Alaskan
    ports. As a former Headquarters U.S. Air Force programmer, I am guided
    by the principal of programmatic road maps that create capability via
    ``ramps'' . . . guided by a joint vision and sustained incremental
    advances that over a multi-year period to realize the vision. In sum--
    until a comprehensive Alaskan Arctic/near Arctic commercial port
    facility is realized, it may be wise to consider maintaining PSC home
    ports in Seattle, leveraging the existing commercial investments, that
    reduce the cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
        However, there should be consideration and deliberation in either
    developing or enhancing existing infrastructure in Alaska to serve an
    expeditionary/intermediary function providing logistical and affordable
    level of repair function for PSC Arctic operations. Locating one or
    more Polar Security Cutter expeditionary support/logistics facilities
    at locations near existing USCG facilities at Seward, Kodiak or a
    refurbished location at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians or alongside
    future developments at a deep-water port in Nome, can possibly provide
    the USCG PSC's (and other USCG plus U.S. Navy vessels) an important
    third option between repair at sea or return to home port in Seattle.
    The idea advanced by others in a port complex between the Port of Nome
    and the natural deep water port region known as Port Clarence is likely
    a highly useful future port construct.
        Quite frankly, advancing expeditionary support/logistics activities
    in or near the Alaskan Arctic region could prove the most helpful start
    in creating the programmatic ramp that could result in a multiyear
    approach to smart civil/military solutions to enable PSC homeporting,
    particularly, as industry sees opportunity to also invest in Arctic
    maritime transportation, tourism and extraction activities. From a
    geostrategic vantage, I do respectfully recommend that planners and
    programmers focus on increasing capabilities at/near the Bering Strait,
    as this maritime chokepoint could become as important as the Straits of
    Malacca or the Panama Canal to global maritime commerce.
        While USCG Search and Rescue in Alaska and the U.S. Arctic is well
    known and highly regarded, providing pollution and other environmental
    response across Alaska's coastal and maritime region is a thankless and
    exacting mission for the USCG. Spill response is costly, and proactive
    prevention is difficult and logistically straining. Scientific research
    and oil spill response communities provide important support to the
    efforts, but to be sure, advancing science of spill response and
    improving inspections using science and autonomous systems to better
    monitor across storage facilities across vast and remote regions will
    grow more important as facilities age and are more compromised by
    thawing permafrost and other environmental changes underway across the
    Arctic.
        Advancing the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic and overall polar
    capabilities also means advancing trusted relationships, with other
    Arctic Coast Guards as conducted via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, but
    importantly with Russian counterparts (for Bering & Chukchi Sea
    waterways management), Canadian Allies and with the Kingdom of Denmark
    as well as representative government on Greenland. Sustaining trusted
    relationships are a domestic matter as well. U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
    relations across Federal Departments and Agencies, State of Alaska,
    Alaska Native Communities and Academic partners take time to develop
    and once established, should be nurtured and sustained. In particular,
    it remains critical to consult and understand the challenges faced by
    the U.S. citizens of the Arctic who see first-hand, the changing Arctic
    maritime and can provide uniquely important insights beneficial to
    safety and security responders. The adage that you can't surge trust or
    a trusted relationship . . . applies in full measure to the Arctic.
        While the Arctic region is increasingly impacted by the changing
    physical terrain and a rise in a variety of human activities, the
    Arctic also provides some of the best examples of international
    cooperation on the planet. Highlights include the Arctic Council, led
    by 8 nations and 6 internationally recognized Arctic Indigenous groups,
    and supported by outstanding scientific research and focused working
    groups; the International Maritime Organization (and the IMO's
    supporting Polar Code); the International Arctic Science Committee; the
    University of the Arctic; the Arctic Coast Guard Forum; and the Arctic
    Security Forces Roundtable.
        While I am certain the Committee is familiar with the United
    Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a former military operator
    and someone familiar with international maritime operations, in an
    Arctic context, the United States could realize a stronger advantage by
    ratifying the treaty. In understanding there are both pros and cons
    towards ratification, failure to ratify reduces the influence in
    advancing U.S. interests in rules-based order across the international
    maritime region. The United States is fortunate to have Canada as our
    closest Arctic defense and security partner and ally. This includes a
    shared defense commitment through the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization, shared protection via protecting respective aerospace
    domains and the maritime approaches to Canadian and American sovereign
    territory via the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and
    a complementary defense arrangement through United States Northern
    Command and Canada's Joint Operations Command. This bi-national defense
    cooperation is supported by the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of
    Defense (PJBD), established in 1940 by joint declaration between the
    U.S. President and the Canadian Prime Minister. PJBD today has 4 CANUS
    departments represented: DoD, DHS and Canada's Department of National
    Defense and Department of Public Safety. As useful as the forum is
    towards advancing bi-national defense and security cooperation, it
    remains perhaps, a bit underleveraged in both Washington and Ottawa.
        While fortunate to have Canada as a close and enduring ally in
    securing and defending the North American Arctic, there are key drivers
    of concern that warrant increased support to our national security
    efforts in the Arctic region, and in particular, support to the USCG.
        While the Department of Defense has rightly benefitted in gaining
    increased readiness and capability through national reinvestments, the
    USCG has lagged in gaining the needed appropriations to renew and
    improve operational capability and supporting infrastructure to support
    this sea service to conduct its statutory assigned missions in both
    defense and security in the U.S. Arctic EEZ in the Bering, Chukchi and
    Beaufort regions and providing the ability to project sovereign U.S.
    maritime surface presence into the international ice laden waters east
    of North America. For a nation with Global interests and an implied
    intent to operate across the global commons of the Polar regions, the
    Nation's Coast Guard does not have the numbers of PSCs or the
    supporting capabilities to operate, command and control and sustain
    presence to match interests.
        What may not be clear to the Committee, is the role the Arctic
    Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) at the University of Alaska provides to
    supporting the U.S. Coast Guard or other Department of Homeland
    Security Arctic missions. ADAC is a Center of Excellence in Maritime
    Research that is part of the DHS Science and Technology Office of
    University Programs (DHS S&T OUP). ADAC was founded in the Summer of
    2014, received its first funding in January 2015 and is now in its
    seventh year of providing science and technology research, professional
    workforce research assistance-ships (at both the undergraduate and
    graduate levels) and planning an array of conferences and workshops,
    convening Arctic minded professionals in security, defense and
    supporting disciplines, virtually all inclusive of Canadian
    participation, with many also including Nordic Allies and partners. It
    is important to note, that ADAC works comprehensively to characterizing
    the dynamics of change (as previously discussed), in platforms, models,
    decision support and knowledge products to assess the associated impact
    to crisis response at granular levels, to enable smarter decisions and
    smarter decision making.
        ADAC and its associated research network have developed an
    important new capability in oil spill response via autonomous
    underwater vehicles and communications systems suited to the Arctic
    region. ADAC has created and greatly advanced a construct called the
    ``Arctic Incidents of National Significance'' method which creates new
    research by convening operators, scientists and industry to address
    specific concerns oriented to ``what keeps the commander up at night''
    to create solutions for gaps and shortfalls in Arctic capabilities.
    This approach has generated new awareness tools, decision support
    science and advances in Arctic search and rescue and marine pollution
    response.
        ADAC has recently commenced a new research project using unmanned
    aerial systems from the University of Alaska Fairbanks to train and
    equip local operators Unalakleet for monitoring of fuel storage
    facilities to support U.S. Coast Guard marine inspection requirements.
    ADAC is just about ready to commence a new comprehensive Arctic and
    Alaskan communications and connectivity assessment, oriented to a whole
    of mariner community approach.
        In sum, this center of maritime research led by the University of
    Alaska is creating domain awareness across a region that is woefully
    lacking in such knowledge.
        If/as desired, I would be pleased and honored to provide more
    information about the Center as meets the desires of the Committee. If/
    as desired, the following website provides a substantial insight to the
    Center's people, programs and activities: https://
    arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org/ In sum, ADAC has built trusted
    relationships across DHS and USCG, across the U.S. Federal and State of
    Alaska governments, Alaska Arctic communities, Arctic science
    professionals across the United States and with Canadian counterparts
    in each corresponding facet. To be sure, our team serves everyday
    focused to advance science and technology and other programs to benefit
    the DHS and USCG in their Arctic mission.
    Conclusion.
        I respectfully submit, it is not my place to recommend to the Coast
    Guard or the Department of Homeland Security in how to present the
    requirements for Congressional funding or which of the myriad of
    competing demands for funding in the department or the service should
    receive the highest priority. In equal measure, it is not my place to
    recommend to this Committee, what funding priority that is presented to
    the Committee should receive highest consideration. I would recommend
    however, the U.S. Coast Guard is the nations' vanguard to secure the
    U.S. Arctic maritime region, protecting fisheries and other marine
    life, rescuing people, responding and recovering from marine pollution
    events, supporting the science community to the benefit of many and
    projecting American sovereign power across the ice laden waters of the
    Arctic. Supporting USCG Arctic and Polar capability, is in the national
    interest. Providing this selflessly serving community of USCG mariners
    the capability to meet the full spectrum of statutory missions to
    respond at strength in and across the Arctic, will preserve our
    resources, advance national power to meet the rising challenge from
    other competing nations, support civil safety and security and will
    provide America's Arctic allies and partners, needed assurance of U.S.
    commitment towards the peaceful opening of the Arctic.
        The State of Alaska's official motto ``North to the Future'' is a
    relevant now as ever. Accordingly, I believe the importance of the
    Arctic will continue to rise. As the community of science projects
    Arctic warming will continue, associated environmental changes will
    continue accelerate, and accordingly, measures to address, adapt and
    increase resilience will need critical continued investment.
        The economic opportunity of the Arctic and in particular, the U.S.
    Arctic seem quite profound, but should be viewed at more than just
    another opportunity access natural wealth. Economically developing the
    Arctic in a sustained and responsible manner is a critical national
    interest and a flourishing economy that integrates existing culture,
    respectful to Alaskan Natives and other long-standing Arctic residents
    holds needed promise to lift a region to the benefits of these regions,
    the State of Alaska and the Nation.
        Waterways in the Bering and Chukchi could one day prove as one of
    the globe's most important to maritime commerce. Managing the
    incredibly important fisheries and marine life in the U.S. Arctic
    maritime, providing safety at sea, securing U.S. EEZs and being
    vigilant and prepared to respond to crisis and disaster in one of the
    most pristine areas on the planet provides a remarkable task list for
    the U.S. Coast Guard. I do believe that prioritizing the needs of the
    Coast Guard to address this task list is critical for the Committee to
    consider and to address in a substantial way.
        Thank you for the opportunity to provide these reflections, and
    please know how appreciative I am of your service to our Nation in
    providing political leadership in these difficult times. I genuinely
    appreciate your support and enabling efforts to ensure the U.S. Coast
    Guard can safely and properly meet the challenges and secure the
    opportunities of the developing Arctic region. I respectfully look
    forward to addressing your questions.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. Ms. Madsen.

       STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE MADSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AT-SEA
                         PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION

        Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Sullivan,
    Ranking Member Markey, members of the Subcommittee, thank you
    for the opportunity to testify. My name is Stephanie Madsen. I
    am the Executive Director of the At-Sea Processors Association.
    I have spent my entire career living and working in the Bering
    Sea, Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic includes
    some of the most productive fishing grounds on Earth. It is a
    truly remarkable place with its rich native culture, stunningly
    productive marine ecosystem, and vital geopolitical positioning
    adjacent to the Russian maritime boundary.
        For decades, the U.S. fishing industry has been able to
    operate in the eastern Bering Sea safely and with legal
    certainty. That sense of security was shattered during the last
    week of August, when Russian military warships and warplanes
    initiated a series of outrageous confrontations with U.S.
    fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ. These
    confrontations, unprecedented in my almost 40 years working
    with this industry, gave rise to genuine fears for the physical
    safety of fishing captains and their crews, and cost the
    affected companies millions of dollars in lost fishing
    opportunities.
        In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger was
    harassed by members of the Russian military over the course of
    5 hours, a Russian war plane flew overhead for 2 hours, issuing
    warnings and threats via radio through broken English. Those
    threats later escalated via transmissions from a nearby Russian
    warship. Until they reached such a fever pitch, the Northern
    Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas felt he had no choice but to protect
    the safety of this crew by complying with Russian military
    orders that he sailed 5 hours south and not return until
    September 4. In the second such incident, Russian warplanes
    repeatedly buzzed two vessels, Blue North and Bristol Leader,
    warning via radio that they were on live missile fire zone and
    in imminent danger.
        They ultimately felt compelled to follow Russian military
    orders to chart a specific course at maximum speed with Blue
    North Captain David Anderson cutting his fishing gear loose in
    order to evacuate the area quickly. In the third such incident,
    three Russian warships rapidly approached a cluster of fishing
    vessels, ordering that they changed course immediately. When
    one of those vessels, the Vesteraalen, replied that it had
    fishing gear in the water so it had limited ability to change
    course, a Russian warship came directly toward it, maneuvering
    as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came within a half
    nautical mile of Vesteraalen before changing its course. As a
    representative of the U.S. fishing industry and indeed a proud
    American citizen, I am outraged that the U.S. vessels would--
    could ever be subjected to this kind of treatment by a foreign
    military power.
        Today, I want to share two main messages with the
    Committee. First, in any future incident such as this, U.S.
    authorities must be far more active in safeguarding our
    sovereign fishing rights. We would later learn that these
    confrontations were related to a major Russian military
    exercise of which the Government received notice, yet nothing
    about the exercise was commuted to our industry. Furthermore,
    when captains contacted the Coast Guard to convey what was
    occurring, frontline Coast Guard personnel seemed unaware and
    were largely unable to provide our captains with guidance. In
    the event of any future exercise, news of what is planned must
    be shared widely in advance with our fleets, as well as smaller
    vessels operating out of the Northern Bering Sea communities.
        The Coast Guard must be on alert and Coast Guard assets
    must be deployed to the area to provide any assistance
    necessary to U.S. vessels. Alarmingly, none of those things
    happened here. Second, this kind of harassment simply cannot be
    allowed to become a new normal. In the rapidly changing Arctic,
    we fear being caught in the crossfire of Russia's effort to
    establish a more assertive military and economic presence, our
    sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be
    protected. From our vantage point, a remote U.S. military
    presence to protect U.S. interests in the region is simply non-
    negotiable.
        I would defer to my fellow witnesses with such impressive
    military credentials and expertise to opine on precisely what
    form that should take. But I thank the members of the
    Subcommittee for their focus on this region and for considering
    the enormous economic and national security stakes that are at
    play. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Madsen follows:]

          Prepared Statement of Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director,
                         At-sea Processors Association
        Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is
    Stephanie Madsen, and for the last 12 years I have served as Executive
    Director of the At-sea Processors Association--a trade association
    representing six member companies that operate catcher-processor
    vessels in North Pacific and U.S. West Coast fisheries. The most
    important fishery in which we participate is the Bering Sea/Aleutian
    Islands Wild Alaska Pollock fishery--the largest seafood fishery in the
    world. My members are proud to have been at the forefront of management
    innovations that have made our regions' fisheries a global model for
    sustainability. We are also a very proud contributor to Alaska's
    seafood economy, which supports 101,000 U.S. jobs and earns an
    estimated $5.6 billion in annual labor income.
        I have spent my entire career working in and around the Bering Sea/
    Aleutian Islands region. This part of the Arctic is truly remarkable,
    with its rich Native culture, stunningly productive marine ecosystem,
    and vital geopolitical positioning. Pollock fishing transcends the
    maritime boundary with Russia; our vessels operating in the U.S.
    Exclusive Economic Zone are sometimes within literal shouting distance
    of Russian vessels fishing for pollock in their waters. Yet in spite of
    this close proximity to a geopolitical adversary, our industry has for
    decades been able to operate safely and with legal certainty, relying
    on the USA/USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement concluded between James
    Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze on June 1, 1990.
        That feeling of certainty and safety has been shattered by recent
    confrontations initiated by Russian military warships and warplanes
    with U.S.-flagged fishing vessels operating lawfully within the U.S.
    EEZ. These incidents were alarming in and of themselves; they gave rise
    to genuine fear for the physical safety of fishing captains and their
    crews, and they disrupted the business operations of fishing companies
    at a critical point in a very important fishing season. They also give
    rise to an urgent question: do we risk these kinds of confrontations
    becoming something of a ``new normal'' in the changing Arctic? And if
    so, what are U.S. policymakers and military planners doing to safeguard
    U.S. economic and security interests in this vital region?
    Military Confrontations
        The last week of August started as a typical one in the summer
    fishing season. U.S.-flagged fishing vessels were operating throughout
    the Eastern Bering Sea. As always, different segments of the fleet were
    targeting a variety of species using traditional fishing methods. APA
    catcher-processor vessels work in parallel with smaller catcher vessels
    that deliver pollock and other groundfish to motherships for
    processing. Another fleet of catcher-processor vessels targets non-
    pollock groundfish such as Atka mackerel and flatfish, while freezer-
    longline vessels target Pacific cod. These Bering Sea fishing grounds
    are among the most productive anywhere in the world--although this year
    fishing conditions have been particularly challenging due to shifts in
    the stock dynamics and distribution.
        Tuesday, August 25 provided the first indication that it would not
    be a typical week for our fleets. The Island Enterprise, a catcher-
    processor vessel operated by Trident Seafoods, was fishing in the
    vicinity of Pervenets Canyon when suddenly, without warning, a large
    submarine--what we learned later to be an Oscar-class Russian nuclear
    submarine--surfaced in the vicinity. Shortly thereafter a warship
    appeared, traveling at 17.5 knots on direct course towards the
    submarine. The warship made no contact with the Island Enterprise, but
    came within 2.5 nautical miles. Other vessels also observed the
    submarine and warship that day. These were our first clues that a major
    Russian military operation was underway smack-dab in the middle of our
    fishing grounds.
        The close and unexplained proximity of a foreign warship and
    submarine were, as you can imagine, immediately troubling. However, it
    is the events that unfolded the following day, August 26, that have
    given rise to deep concern throughout our industry. On that day the
    Russian military initiated a series of confrontations with U.S.-flagged
    fishing vessels that were, from our perspective, dangerous and
    completely unacceptable. These confrontations gave rise to genuine
    fears for the safety of captains and their crews, and in some cases led
    to operational decisions that collectively cost companies millions of
    dollars in lost fishing opportunities.

       In the first such incident, the Northern Jaeger--a catcher-
            processor vessel operated by American Seafoods--was harassed by
            members of the Russian military over the course of
            approximately five hours. Northern Jaeger Captain Tim Thomas
            was positioned 21 nautical miles inside the U.S. EEZ when what
            he recognized to be a Russian military warplane started flying
            over his vessel. The warplane initiated radio contact, and
            through broken English started to deliver an alarming drumbeat
            of messages warning of ``danger'' and insisting that he
            ``leave'' as it continued to fly over the vessel at an
            increasingly low altitude. Despite his best efforts--which
            included enlisting the assistance of a Russian-speaking member
            of his crew--he was unable to ascertain from the warplane a
            clear sense of what was happening or to learn of any specific
            course of action that was being requested of him. During this
            period Captain Thomas repeatedly stated that he was operating
            lawfully within the U.S. EEZ and couldn't be ordered to
            ``leave''. He also initiated multiple conversations with United
            States Coast Guard personnel, none of whom appeared to be aware
            that a major Russian military exercise was underway in the U.S.
            EEZ. After approximately two hours the warplane departed, and
            radio contact was initiated by a Russian warship that was
            positioned approximately 40 nautical miles away. Communications
            from the warship became increasingly urgent, warning of
            imminent danger and demanding that the Northern Jaeger leave,
            without providing specific coordinates. Captain Thomas sought
            to chart a new course on several occasions, but each time
            communications came back from the Russian warship making clear
            that they were not satisfied. Eventually, the Russian warship
            ordered that Captain Thomas sail due South ``for five hours''
            and not return to the area until September 4. Ultimately, with
            the level of intensity of the Russian military communications
            continuing to increase--and no satisfactory explanation or
            support provided by the U.S. Coast Guard--Captain Thomas
            complied. He estimates that approximately five days of
            productive fishing time were lost by the encounter and his
            resulting relocation, an economic harm estimated to total
            approximately $1.5M.

       Positioned some distance to the north of Northern Jaeger
            were the Blue North and the Bristol Leader. These two freezer
            longliners were harassed by a Russian military warplane, which
            warned that they were in a live missile fire zone and in
            imminent danger. Bristol Leader Captain Brad Hall and Blue
            North Captain David Anderson recount similar experiences, with
            repeated fly-overs at low altitude--in some instances as low as
            an estimated 200 feet. After initiating radio contact, the
            warplane issued orders that they leave the area on a specific
            course at maximum speed. Both captains sought advice from the
            U.S. Coast Guard but were unable to learn any additional
            details about what was occurring. Coast Guard personnel told
            Captain Anderson to comply with the orders he was being given
            by the Russian military. Ultimately, both captains felt that
            they had no choice but to abandon their fishing activities and
            exit the area. The Blue North cut its fishing gear and left it
            behind in order to be able evacuate the area quickly. It was
            only when the vessels fully complied with the Russian
            warplane's orders that the harassment ceased. The economic
            losses relating to disabling fishing gear and relocating from
            productive fishing grounds were significant.

       In another area, more than 50 nautical miles inside the U.S.
            EEZ, six U.S. catcher boats and two motherships were operating
            along the shelf break. Three Russian warships and two support
            vessels appeared, and initiated radio communication with two of
            the catcher boats--the Vesteraalen and the Mark 1. As the
            warships rapidly approached the catcher boats, they issued
            orders that they change course immediately, warning of imminent
            danger. The Vesteraalen responded that it had fishing gear in
            the water so had limited ability to change course. In response
            a Russian warship came directly towards the Vesteraalen,
            maneuvering as if to signal hostile intent. The warship came
            within half a nautical mile of the Vesteraalen before finally
            changing course.

        As a representative of the U.S. fishing industry--and indeed as a
    proud American citizen--I find it completely unacceptable that U.S.-
    flagged vessels operating lawfully within the U.S. EEZ could ever be
    subjected to this kind of treatment. The fact that U.S. fishing
    companies, captains and crew had not been directly advised that a major
    Russian military exercise was planned in their sphere of regular
    operation is deeply concerning. The idea that U.S. vessels could be
    subjected to this kind of harassment by a foreign military power is
    alarming. And the notion that U.S. captains should be complying with
    orders issued by members of the Russian military is offensive. We need
    to ensure that the events of August 26 never happen again.
    Specific Observations
        In the immediate term, we believe there are steps the U.S.
    government must take to ensure that any future Russian military
    exercise potentially impacting U.S.-flagged vessels is handled
    differently and that U.S. fishermen maintain their sovereign right to
    legally operate in the U.S. EEZ.
        First, it is imperative that our industry be notified immediately
    and directly by our own government of any such planned exercise. Our
    understanding is that Russia provided notice of their intent to conduct
    these exercises, including specific coordinates, via HYDROPAC. This is
    a communication system that is not regularly monitored by our industry,
    and I want to be clear that it does not constitute sufficient notice to
    mariners. Furthermore, as noted above, some U.S. vessels were harassed
    outside the coordinates provided via HYDROPAC. We understand that the
    HYDROPAC notice was received by at least one agency of the U.S.
    government. If any part of the U.S. government is notified of such a
    foreign military exercise in the future, there must be a clear and
    widely-understood mechanism by which that news is communicated to
    potentially impacted fishing fleets so we are aware of the exercises
    and can respond accordingly should there be a threat to the safety of
    our vessels and crew. This mechanism needs to account for the diversity
    of fishing vessels active near the U.S.-Russian maritime boundary, from
    large catcher-processors to small skiffs operated out of Northern
    Bering Sea communities. Communications issued on the exercises fell
    short of alternatives that were available to U.S. authorities, such as
    issuance of a Marine Information Bulletin.
        Second, other parts of the U.S. government--most importantly the
    United States Coast Guard--must be alerted and have an opportunity to
    plan for the safety of U.S. mariners, including U.S.-flagged fishing
    vessels while they lawfully operate within the U.S. EEZ. It is
    unacceptable that Coast Guard officers on the front lines were unable
    to provide our captains with even the most basic information or, in
    most cases, guidance when contacted.
        Third, in the event of future foreign military operations in or
    near the U.S. EEZ in the Bering Sea, plans should be in place for the
    U.S. Coast Guard to have an at-sea presence in the area to deter
    engagements by the foreign military with U.S.-flagged vessels lawfully
    operating in the U.S. EEZ and to better intervene in the event there is
    engagement or other immediate danger to our vessels. Communication to
    our vessels of potential threats to our safety should be coming from
    the U.S. Coast Guard, not the Russian military. Recognizing the need
    for a presence after the August 26 events, the Coast Guard ultimately
    deployed the CGC ALEX HALEY to the area for the remainder of the
    planned exercises. This was appreciated, but future plans should
    include the deployment of at least one cutter to an area for the
    entirety of an operation to help prevent a recurrence of what occurred
    to our fleets.
    A New Normal?
        Beyond requesting the Subcommittee's help in securing these Federal
    process improvements, I welcome your focus on the broader geopolitical
    challenges in the Arctic region of which these confrontations appear to
    be merely one symptom. If indeed these exercises are part of Russia's
    effort to establish a more assertive presence in the Arctic--especially
    in a world where receding sea ice extent provides a set of new economic
    and military opportunities for regional powers--that is a cause of
    genuine alarm for our industry.
        Our sovereign right to legally fish within the U.S. EEZ must be
    protected. Our concerns are heightened by recent proclamations by
    members of the Russian Duma calling into question the legitimacy of the
    U.S./Russia boundary line--a cornerstone of the framework for our
    Federal fisheries. Russian naval exercises cannot be allowed to serve
    as a deterrent to the fully legitimate operations of a U.S. fishing
    fleet that competes directly with the Russian seafood industry in
    global markets for pollock, Pacific cod, and other groundfish.
        Anxiety throughout the industry was also further heightened when a
    Russian warplane harassed our vessels in a separate incident the
    following month. On September 14, approximately 70 miles west of St.
    George, a Russian warplane made two direct passes over a U.S.-flagged
    catcher-processor vessel, the Starbound--the first starboard to port,
    the second stern to bow--and then performed a fly-over of a second one
    of our vessels, the Alaska Ocean. The captains estimate that the
    aircraft was at approximately 500 feet. No radio contact was made. This
    incident does not appear in any way related to an officially-noticed
    military exercise. Although it didn't come with the level of economic
    cost or genuine fears regarding crew safety that accompanied the August
    26 incidents, it is extremely worrying if it is indicative of a broader
    trend.
        From our vantage point--on the front lines of a changing Arctic--a
    robust U.S. military presence to protect U.S. interests in the region
    is simply non-negotiable. I will defer to my fellow witnesses, with
    such impressive military credentials and expertise, to opine on
    precisely what form that should take; but I thank Members of the
    Subcommittee for their focus on this region, and for considering the
    enormous economic and national security stakes that are at play.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Madsen. And I agree with
    your comments wholeheartedly and we will have a good discussion
    on some of the details of those. Hopefully you saw Admiral
    Ray's testimony in the Coast Guard's view on that as well. Dr.
    Francis, you have 5 minutes for your oral statement and if you
    would like a longer written statement, we can provide that for
    the record.

       STATEMENT OF JENNIFER FRANCIS, SENIOR SCIENTIST, WOODWELL
                        CLIMATE RESEARCH CENTER

        Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Alright, everyone, I just
    have a few slides I want to share while I am speaking. Alright.
    Good afternoon--thank you to Chairman Sullivan and the
    Committee, and in particular to Senator--for inviting me to
    testify--today is because of the staggering decline in Arctic
    sea ice.--percent in this animation. Think of this ice as the
    Earth's mirror. It reflects most of the sun's energy that hits
    it right back to space without entering the climate system. And
    losing so much of this mirror is literally a threat multiplier
    to our National Security in several direct and indirect ways
    that are distinct from those you have already heard about
    today. The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of
    global warming.
        The extra heat now being absorbed in the Arctic Ocean has
    intensified global warming by 25 to 40 percent. The
    implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we have all
    watched in horror as a record number of billion dollar
    disasters, including wildfires, heat waves, floods and rapidly
    intensifying hurricanes, devastated parts of the United States
    and elsewhere, threatening communities, straining agriculture
    and food security, and stretching relief resources. This,
    Senators, is the face of climate change. The ice loss is also
    causing the Arctic to warm two to three times faster than the
    Earth as a whole.
        This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers and the Greenland
    ice sheet, which is accelerating sea level rise and threatening
    coastal cities and infrastructure worldwide. The rapid warming
    is in the--permafrost--grows in Arctic soils. Which could
    release--affects the frequency of extreme weather events as the
    North to South difference in air temperature is a major factor
    controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my
    own, suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference
    will make weather systems more persistent, which can lead to
    prolonged droughts, heat waves, storminess and even cold
    spells. Disrupted weather patterns pose new challenges to
    farmers and food security, electric utilities, drinking water
    managers and even human survival.
        The peoples of the North are also being directly affected
    by their transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their
    primary source of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting
    platform has thrown their way of life into chaos. The species
    that usually hunt have shifted migration patterns or
    disappeared altogether, and subarctic animals have appeared
    well North of their typical ranges. The ice serves as a means
    of transportation as well, but now it is often too thin to be
    trusted.
        Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the
    sea by large storm waves as winds now blow over ocean, open
    ocean rather than over stable sea ice. Their roads and
    airstrips are buckling as the ground beneath them thaws and
    collapses. These impacts are undermining the security of Arctic
    communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere. The news is
    not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice free Arctic waters
    enable normal cargo vessels to shortcut passages between major
    commercial ports in Eurasia and North America.
        Natural resources that have been inaccessible under the ice
    to now be more easily and economically exploited. But this
    easier access also comes with heightened risks to those
    venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in the way of our
    infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation
    resources, or even ports of call. Change has come quickly, and
    the region is woefully unprepared for these new activities.
    What can we do about these threats to National Security posed
    by Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I have discussed
    are symptoms of the underlying disease.
        To treat the disease, we need to pull out all the stops to
    reduce emissions of heat trapping gases and to remove carbon
    from the atmosphere by both natural and technological means.
    The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building
    resiliency, which depends on research that characterizes the
    physical threats, identifies the specific risks, and develop
    strategies to protect those in harm's way. This will not be
    easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more
    expensive and threatening to National Security. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Francis follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Dr. Jennifer Francis, Senior Scientist,
                        Woodwell Climate Research Center
        Thank you to the committee and in particular to Senator Markey for
    inviting me to provide testimony for this hearing.
        The Woodwell Climate Research Center is a Massachusetts-based non-
    profit organization of researchers who work with a worldwide network of
    partners to understand and combat climate change.\1\ Our scientists
    helped to launch the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
    Change in 1992, and shared the Nobel Prize with the Intergovernmental
    Panel on Climate Change in 2007. Woodwell brings together cutting edge
    science, and 35 years of policy impact to find societal-scale solutions
    that can be put into immediate action. Our scientific expertise is on
    climate change impacts, natural climate solutions, and climate risk.
    This includes work with extensive research on the local, regional, and
    global impacts of the rapidly warming Arctic.
        I am a senior scientist and a member of the Arctic Program at
    Woodwell. I received my PhD in Atmospheric Sciences from the University
    of Washington in 1994. After 24 years as a research professor in the
    Department of Marine and Coastal Sciences at Rutgers University, I
    joined Woodwell in 2018. My research focuses on connections between
    climate change and the rising frequency of extreme weather events,
    particularly the role of rapid warming and melting in the Arctic.
        Fossil fuel combustion and deforestation release heat-trapping
    greenhouse gases, which in turn, have caused global average temperature
    to rise at unprecedented rates. From 1901-2019, the globe has already
    warmed by 1+C (1.8+F), with nine of the top ten warmest occurring since
    2005.\2\ The rate of warming is not attributable to natural causes; in
    fact, the globe would be in a cooling phase now if it were not for the
    effects of human activities. The responses of Earth's natural systems
    to the warming are already adversely affecting our quality of life, and
    these impacts will worsen for generations to come if emissions of heat-
    trapping gases are not curtailed severely and rapidly. Mitigating,
    understanding, and preparing for these impacts is critical, hence the
    vital importance of hearings like this one.

        The effects of rapid Arctic change on the frequency and severity of
    physical hazards will affect society in all regions of the world, but
    none more so than in the Arctic.
        The pace of change in the Arctic system has been nothing short of
    staggering; the Arctic is experiencing the greater increase in average
    surface temperature globally (Fig 1). In just the past 40 years, half
    of the ice floating on the Arctic Ocean has vanished during summer.\3\
    Ice volume has declined by a whopping 75 percent (Fig. 2). Indeed, the
    dramatic loss of Arctic sea ice is the primary reason for the recent
    intense focus on the Arctic region. You can think of this ice as the
    Earth's mirror: it reflects most of the sun's energy that hits it right
    back to space without entering the climate system. Losing so much of
    this mirror is literally a threat multiplier to our national security
    in several direct and indirect ways that are distinct from those
    related to military concerns.

        The most direct impact of ice loss is the escalation of global
    warming. The extra heat now being absorbed by the planet where ice used
    to exist has intensified global warming by 25-40 percent.\5\ The
    implications of this are sobering. This year alone, we've all watched
    in horror as a record number of $1 billion disasters \6\--including
    wildfires, heatwaves, floods, and rapidly intensifying hurricanes--
    devastated parts of the U.S. and elsewhere, threatening the security of
    affected communities, straining agriculture and food security, and
    stretching relief resources. This, Senators, is the face of global
    warming.
        The ice loss is also causing the Arctic to warm three times faster
    than the Earth as a whole. This is exacerbating the melt of glaciers
    and the Greenland ice sheet, which contributes directly to the recent
    acceleration of sea-level rise, threatening coastal cities and
    infrastructure world-wide.\7\ The rapid warming is also hastening the
    pace of permafrost thaw--frozen Arctic soils--which could release vast
    stores of additional fossil carbon into the atmosphere.\8\ Arctic
    warming also affects the frequency and intensity of extreme weather
    events, as the north-to-south difference in air temperature is a major
    factor controlling weather patterns. Recent research, including my own,
    suggests that a reduction in that temperature difference will make
    weather systems more persistent, which can lead to prolonged droughts,
    heatwaves, storminess, and even cold spells\9\. As we all have
    witnessed, these tendencies have emerged in spades. Disrupted weather
    patterns pose new challenges to farmers and food security, electric
    utilities, drinking water managers, and even human survival.
        The Peoples of the North are also being directly affected by their
    transformed surroundings. Traditional hunting is their primary source
    of food, and the loss of ice as a hunting platform has thrown their way
    of life into chaos. The species they usually hunt have shifted
    migration patterns or disappeared altogether, and sub-Arctic animals
    have appeared well north of their typical ranges. Sea ice serves as a
    major transportation resource, as well, but now it is often too thin to
    be trusted. Moreover, their coastal villages are being washed into the
    sea by large storm waves, as winds now blow over open ocean rather than
    over stable sea ice. Their roads and airstrips are buckling as the
    ground beneath them thaws and collapses. These impacts are undermining
    the security of Arctic communities in Alaska and around the hemisphere.
        The news is not all bad, however. Expanded areas of ice-free Arctic
    waters enable normal cargo vessels to short-cut passages between major
    commercial ports in Eurasia and North America. Natural resources that
    have been inaccessible under the ice can now be more easily and
    economically exploited. But with this easier access also come
    heightened risks to those venturing into an Arctic Ocean with little in
    the way of infrastructure, emergency facilities, accident mitigation
    resources, or even ports of call. In collaboration with Tufts
    University, Woodwell scientists have charted more than 122 million
    messages from satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) data,
    mapping Arctic ship traffic from 2009 to 2016 (Fig 3). The mean center
    of ship traffic has moved 300 km to the north and east, taking
    advantage of newly ice-free ocean. Change has come quickly, and the
    region is woefully unprepared for these new activities.

        What can we do about these threats to national security posed by
    Arctic ice loss and warming? The impacts I've discussed are symptoms of
    the underlying disease. To treat the disease, we need to pull out all
    the stops to reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases and to remove
    carbon from the atmosphere via natural (such as reforestation) and
    technological (carbon capture) means.
        The symptoms must be addressed by proactively building resiliency,
    which depends on research that characterizes the physical threats,
    identifies the specific risks, and develops strategies to protect those
    in harm's way. My colleagues at Woodwell are engaged in an assessment
    of risk owing to Arctic change, a collaboration with partners at The
    Center for Climate and Security (CSS). The CSS is a Washington DC-based
    non-partisan institute housed in the Council on Strategic Risks. That
    project is employing cutting-edge climate-risk modeling to understand
    how climate change impacts will play out in the region, and how those
    will affect the existing balance of security. The project will
    demonstrate the potential value of granular modeling of climate change
    impacts to anticipate and prepare for societal instability and security
    challenges.
        Mitigating and adapting to climate change in the Arctic will not be
    easy or cheap, but the reactive approach will be much more expensive
    and threatening to national security\10\,\11\.
    References:
        1. https://www.woodwellclimate.org/
        2. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's)
    National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI): https://
    www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/projected-ranks#::text=The
    %20warmest%20years%20globally%20have,Courtesy%20of%20NOAA%20NCEI.
        3. National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC): http://nsidc.org/
    arcticseaicenews/
        4. http://psc.apl.uw.edu/research/projects/arctic-sea-ice-volume-
    anomaly/
        5. Duan, L., Cao, L., & Caldeira, K. (2019). Estimating
    contributions of sea ice and land snow to climate feedback. J. of
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        7. Francis, J.A. (2018). Meltdown, Scientific American, April 2018,
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        8. Natali S.M., J.D. Watts, B.M. Rogers et al., (2019). Large loss
    of CO2 in winter observed across the northern permafrost
    region. Nature Climate Change, 9, 852-857, doi:10.1038/s41558-019-0592-
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        9. Francis, J.A. (2019). Rough weather ahead, Scientific American,
    June 2019, Vol. 320, No. 6.
        10. Daniel, W. (2020) The National Security Implication of Climate
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        11. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/a-
    security-threat-assessment-of-climate-change.pdf

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Dr. Francis, and I am going to
    ask some witnesses some of the similar questions that I asked
    Admiral Ray. General Kee and Ms. Madsen, I would like you to
    comment on the issue of Arctic--both Arctic infrastructure in
    the home porting of icebreakers in the Arctic region. As I
    mentioned, we have six that have been authorized in the
    National Defense Authorization Act years ago. One is being
    built now.
        But as you know and you mentioned it General, the capacity
    of the United States relative to the great power competition
    rivals like China and Russia is significantly less,
    dramatically less. As we are building up the fleet and as we
    are looking at the issue of even short term bridge leasing, how
    much do you think it makes sense to make sure these assets are
    actually in the Arctic so they can respond to Arctic related
    National Security, economic security, environmental security,
    issues of ice being--somewhere else? General, we will start
    with you.
        General Kee. Senator Sullivan, thank you very much for the
    question, sir, and I will offer a couple of brief reflections.
    Number one, I do respectfully believe that the ability to
    create home ports is a multi-year endeavor. It does require the
    ability to leverage a port that has multimodal transportation
    capabilities, whether it is road, rail, air, but some
    multimodal aspects of logistics that connect it--to connect
    that port to essentially transportation network.
        And it does also, of course, really need housing, schools,
    and all, essentially the logistic support aspects of being able
    to handle the crews, the maintenance, logistics, support teams,
    etc., that the Coast Guard has that crews, essentially, this
    weapon system platform. So the idea to me and that is what I
    would respectfully offer to this conversation is, if you take
    the long-term approach that over time you build to a home port
    capacity, you take, maybe consider some ideas of building
    intermediate capacities, such as an expeditionary facility or
    expeditionary facilities that build essentially ports that the
    vessels can operate from essentially during a rotation of duty.
        In between times they need, before--in between time they
    would need to go to conduct upper level repairs that would
    really require a kind of home port or a large scale facility.
    So to me, I look at the idea that ultimately having home ports
    in the Arctic would make sense long term, is the idea that
    building this in concert with really from a civil, military or
    civil Government sort of joint venture makes perhaps much more
    sense based on the amount of actual cost it takes to building
    at heavy capacities of essentially depot repairs and the
    transportation networks.
        So the idea is the answer is yes, it is just a matter of
    time. And then looking at solutions that are expeditionary or
    intermediate as you work through the stair steps to create an
    actual home port that has all that heavy capabilities that they
    are in. The idea of leasing as an interim measure to me, again,
    as an interim measure makes lots of good sense. It is going to
    be a while before we can field organic capability, but in
    addition to leasing platforms, we also need to think about is
    the whole logistics package, crews, main support, the logistics
    tail that goes with this to make sure that it is essentially a
    complete math equation that really encompasses all the cost
    variables in that leasing equation so that there is really no
    surprise to the Coast Guard or really, or to the Congress that
    would be authorizing and appropriating such expenditures.
        So thinking through the full math equation of getting a
    comprehensive package of what it costs to do the leasing, I
    think is important. I do believe it is a good interim measure
    and it is a short term measure to buy time and reduce risk to
    allow the Coast Guard to get caught up with organic
    capabilities, to be able to have a more robust capability of
    projecting U.S. persistent presence into the Arctic region, I
    would say both the U.S. Arctic region and international Arctic
    waters spaces. I respectfully give the floor back to you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. So I am going to step out for one minute
    here. There have been a couple of votes that have been called.
    Senator Markey, I am going to yield the remainder of my
    questioning time to you and then I am going to try and get back
    here as quickly as possible. And so you can go vote if you
    haven't already voted. And then I will continue to follow up on
    the questions. If that sounds good to my Ranking Member, I am
    going to--I am going to head down and vote right now. I will be
    back. Thank you.
        Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Climate
    change is an intersectional issue, it affects our health, our
    economy, our environment and security. We are talking about the
    need for robust security planning in the Arctic region. But
    changes in the Arctic means less security for the rest of the
    country as well. Dr. Francis, is it true that changes in the
    Arctic climate affect sea levels and weather patterns
    throughout the United States from Feldman to Florida?
        Ms. Francis. It is absolutely true, Senator Markey. Thank
    you for that question, yes.
        Senator Markey. Yes, and it has repercussions that go far
    beyond any one region. Within the Arctic, warming temperatures
    and disrupting weather patterns are washing coastal villages
    into the sea, changing animal migration patterns, and
    collapsing roads and airstrips. Outside of the Arctic, the
    broader climate crisis is endangering public health through
    droughts, extreme weather, heat stress and other developing
    disasters. Dr. Francis, do you think we are doing enough to
    consider Arctic security in a holistic way, including taking
    into account its effects on permafrost, weather patterns,
    indigenous peoples and global sea level rise?
        Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Thank you very much for the
    question. I think we are doing way--at this point to, as I
    mentioned, to treat the disease, the underlying disease that is
    causing the ice to melt, that is causing--and in turn is
    causing sea levels, sea level rise to it--seeing this happening
    before our very eyes. So the changes that are happening in the
    Arctic are already affecting not only the people who live in
    the Arctic, but also down to the islands through sea level rise
    and through changes in weather patterns.
        My own research is acutely on this connection between the
    rapidly warming Arctic and the changes in weather--the main
    underlying effect is to cause weather patterns to become more
    persistent. And when they become more persistent, that leads to
    things like longer droughts, and longer, more prolonged heat
    waves, and even longer stormy periods. You might remember--
    years ago when we had six Northeasters--almost in a row. These
    types of weather regimes that are becoming more persistent to a
    whole variety of extreme weather events.
        Senator Markey. So how can the U.S. Government, including
    the Coast Guard, better invest in understanding and guarding
    against the effects of climate change in order to better
    increase our National Security and our economic security?
        Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, I think one of the
    main avenues that we should be going down right now is
    increasing the amount of information about the physical world
    up in the Arctic region, both the atmosphere, the ocean, the
    ice and the biology. So the atmosphere, this would help with
    forecasting weather--lack of data and information.
        And in terms of ocean effect, we know relatively little
    about the way that ocean currents move from up there and those
    things that affect how we could respond to or how the Coast
    Guard would respond to any kind of event that might happen up
    there. So, say, an oil spill, which has been mentioned. What's
    oil once it goes into the water, which way is the wind going to
    blow it, which way are the currents going to push it?
        If there were an accident and people were lost overboard,
    which direction with the drift? We are severely lacking some of
    that basic information about the Arctic system itself, which
    would play into not only research, but also any kind of
    environmental crisis and many of the operations that the Coast
    Guard undertakes on a regular basis.
        Senator Markey. And again, I apologize. I am going to have
    to go make this roll call as well. Just one final question, Dr.
    Francis, what areas of research do you think are most critical
    to invest in in order to better protect the Arctic and Arctic
    based resources?
        Ms. Francis. [Technical Issue.] Well, it really goes back
    to what I was just saying--understanding of how this ice and
    the ocean--works, but it is a real moving target. The Arctic
    that we have now is very, very different from the one that was
    there only 20 or 30 years ago. Any of--research that needs to
    occur and information that needs to be provided that can help
    us update--these--system-wide----
        Senator Markey. Dr. Francis, I apologize to you. You are
    having a little bit of an audio problem right now. I just--I
    want to thank you so much, again. And I apologize because I
    have to make the same roll call that Chairman Sullivan is
    making. And I thank you so much for all your great work. And
    Randy, thank you for yours as well. But I am just going to put
    the hearing into recess until Senator Sullivan returns. But
    thank you, Dr. Francis, so much.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Sullivan. The Subcommittee hearing will now
    reconvene. And again, I appreciate the witnesses' cooperation
    and flexibility here as we are voting in the Senate. Ms.
    Madsen, I wanted to get back to you with regard to not only
    your testimony, but with regard to what Admiral Ray had said
    with regard to the incident that you mentioned, that really was
    an outrage with regard to not just the Russian actions, but as
    Admiral Ray mentioned, there were some miscommunications,
    certainly by the Coast Guard.
        I have been asking for an after-action both from Northern
    Command, Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy. But what would you--as
    we are looking at this, what do you think we, and I am talking
    about the Coast Guard, the Navy, others involved, to prevent
    future incidences from happening again as you mentioned, this
    can't be the new normal, but what specifically would you and
    your members want to make sure happens with regard to Coast
    Guard actions and other actions that we as the U.S. Government
    can be taking?
        Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that in our
    written testimony, we lay out three actions. The first one is
    definitely we need to hear from our Government, not from the
    Russian military, about any activities. And so I think that
    what we discovered is that I don't really know how to describe
    it other than there was some kind of a gap in communication
    between the U.S. Government who knew about the exercises and
    the Coast Guard that we depend on and communicate with quite
    frequently. So I think that is one. Our U.S. Government needs
    to communicate amongst itself. The other more important one is,
    if we know that these exercises are legal and going to
    continue, then I think we need Coast Guard assets on the ground
    so that there is someone not 200 miles away at least, that can
    provide some kind of protection or guidance to the fishing
    fleet.
        Senator Sullivan, you might know that as you go further
    North, the border gets very constrained between the US. So it
    is not just a large fishing vessels that were impacted. Well,
    we were the ones that got impacted this year. But I am also
    concerned about some of those smaller vessels operating out of
    the Northern Bering Sea communities that in the future could
    also be impacted. So I think we really have to look at a
    variety of communication systems. And then when they know what
    is going on, we need to have Coast Guard assets there.
        Senator Sullivan. I think that is a great recommendation,
    and so not just being made aware, which, of course, that should
    have already been happening, but with regard to an exercise of
    that size and nature, to have our own assets in the region to
    protect with regard to what we are doing in our own fishing
    fleet. So I agree with that. And I think that that is something
    we will strongly encourage with regard to the Coast Guard's
    activities. Let me ask again, General and Ms. Madsen, the issue
    of infrastructure.
        We do have a large fishing fleet. It is an issue that as
    sea stocks move North, that the need for more infrastructure in
    Alaska is not just a National Security requirement, but an
    economic and a safety requirement. As I mentioned in my opening
    testimony, we are making substantial progress for a deep water
    port in Nome, Alaska, but where else and what else would you
    like to comment on with regard to infrastructure as it relates
    to protecting America's economic, National Security, fishing
    opportunities and other issues with regard to Arctic
    infrastructure? I would like for both of you to be able to
    comment on that.
        Ms. Madsen. Senator Sullivan, if I might start, Stephanie
    Madsen. As you know, Senator, I lived out in Unalaska, Dutch
    Harbor for 19 years. So I guess I am a little bit passionate
    about the international port of Dutch Harbor as one of the main
    deep water ports that is already in existence. Certainly Nome
    is very viable and very important as the Arctic becomes more
    open and security becomes more of an issue. So I think those
    two have definitely been identified.
        You know, the Coast Guard--we depend on the Coast Guard.
    Thank goodness for the Coast Guard, not only to help us enforce
    fishing regulations, but to provide safety and rescue. And it
    is difficult even now to have them based in Kodiak and would
    have to respond, you know, where we were fishing this summer.
    So I think that that would also encourage and enable the
    fishing fleet as the distribution of the fish changes to help
    us feel secure and have Coast Guard responsive, including the
    polar ice breakers.
        Senator Sullivan. General.
        General Kee. Chairman, thank you. And also, before we go
    further, Senator, I would like to offer condolences as well. I
    did not get a chance to say in the opening reflects, but please
    accept my condolences to you and your family for your loss.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        General Kee. I would like to offer a couple of thoughts.
    First, that is a great question and I appreciate the
    opportunity to reflect. I look at this strategically that the
    Arctic interests are continuing to rise. Our Arctic economic
    security interests are continuing to rise. When you look at the
    idea of creating ports and deep water ports are enablers, not
    only, of course, the National Security interests that are
    places where Coast Guard vessels and really Navy vessels can
    operate from, but also an opportunity to provide the economic
    engine that is so needed in Western Alaska in particular, and
    to advance, essentially providing economic opportunity to
    advance the livelihood of those people who live there to give
    them options to be able to stay in this region and have a
    viable future and viable careers, as opposed to where there
    really is not the economic engine there yet.
        And so strategically, the idea of building ports and
    increasing joint ventures with the commerce industry, the idea
    of an Arctic and really a bearing in Chukchi, Beaufort to Blue
    economy where mariculture and aquaculture activities could be
    pursued and a way to help begin the process of economically
    developing Western Alaska. And it is in our national interest.
    We are also looking at, of course, that communications are
    critical.
        The communications shortfalls, certainly what happened in
    August, are certainly a very evident. We as a Center that I
    have the privilege of shepherding are focused on commencing
    hopefully very, very soon a new study, it is called the Alaskan
    Antarctic Maritime Communications Connectivity Analysis, to
    really take a look across the mariner community of Alaska,
    breaking in five sectors to Southeast, Southcentral, the
    Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort, to really kind of break down what
    are the communications shortfalls that the mariners are facing,
    including, of course, the fishing fleet are facing in these
    regions, to be able to have that communication and connectivity
    ability so they can be notified in a timely manner and have the
    means to communicate when things such as what happened in
    August manifest.
        The idea, of course, when you think about ports is an idea
    of looking at Dutch Harbor, of course, is well known and well
    suited for not only the bearing, but also projecting power into
    the North Pacific. When you look at Port of Nome, it is a
    shallow port at this point, getting into deep water capacity.
    But you also have the idea that, and I know several have talked
    about and I mentioned this in my relatively lengthy written
    statement, the idea of a port complex. I know I have ventured
    that idea forward, where you look at the port complex between
    the existing port structure in Nome and what is being built out
    there to include, of course, looking at port Clarins as a
    natural deep water area and the idea of a port complex that is
    conducted in places like this and the Gulf Coast.
        The idea of building this over time and identifying
    opportunity there to not only, of course, serve commercial
    industry, for example, the graphite mine up there near Teller
    as a port, a place to--port Clarins, for example, could help
    service that. And ultimately the idea of building port
    infrastructure that connects with transportation nodes, idea
    looking toward the long term future of creating transportation
    nets and networks that include potentially road rail that
    connects Fairbanks, for example, out to Nome.
        Again long term ideas, but the end of the day, if we are
    going to really realize our Arctic interests, in particular the
    Bering region, Bering, and Chukchi, we do need to think about
    how partnerships in the commercial sector could be of interest
    and viability to reduce the taxpayer burden, of course, but
    also to create the idea of joint ventures that can really
    provide prosperity to both the commercial sector, the residents
    who live there, and a place to operate safely for National
    Security assets. So those are some thoughts. I would
    respectfully reflect to you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Alright. Thank you. Those are great. Ms.
    Madsen, I want to go back to Admiral Ray's comment at the end
    of his testimony on the issue of the Coast Guard's focus on IUU
    issues. And he talked about it from the perspective of the
    Coast Guard and the sustainability of our oceans and our
    fisheries throughout the world. I would like your perspective
    from that of the fishing fleet, can you share how critical it
    is to combating IUU fishing?
        I was proud as your Senator, one of the first bills that I
    was able to get through this committee was actually the
    implementation of the IUU fishing, treating the domestic
    legislation that did this. But how important is that, how
    equipped do you believe the Coast Guard is to combat IUU
    fishing issues, particularly as Admiral Ray talked about the
    fisheries migrating North, and what would you like, the Coast
    Guard or NOAA or other Federal agencies, to do more in this
    regard?
        Ms. Madsen. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As you
    well know, you know, our fisheries compete on the global
    market. And so if IUU fishing is not enforced, and that means
    that our markets are being impacted as well globally. And we
    are already--as you are well aware, because you are one of our
    heroes, that is a big impact to all of our fisheries,
    especially up in the North Pacific. So I believe that support
    of the Coast Guard, certainly funding, but I think it is a
    little bit bigger than just a Coast Guard.
        I think internationally we are going to have to pool our
    resources together. But it is critical. It is important. You
    know, one of our direct competitors for pollock is Russia right
    now. So, you know, you have hit on it. You have been our
    champion. And I think it is just going to come down to
    persistence, continued funding, and some very strong actions
    that indicate to the globe that we are not going to stand for
    it.
        Senator Sullivan. But so many of these issues, whether it
    is IUU fishing, whether it is protecting our economic
    interests, Dr. Francis, our environmental issue interests, they
    all in many ways converge on this issue of presence,
    infrastructure, Coast Guard vessels, icebreaking capabilities
    so the United States can actually be in the region, protect the
    region, and as Admiral Ray said, focus on what the Coast Guard
    does throughout the rest of the nation, which is protect the
    coasts and the sovereign interests of the country. Shouldn't be
    any different in the Arctic off the coast of Alaska than it is
    in the Gulf of Mexico. And I was glad to hear the Admiral say
    that.
        General, let me ask a more specific question. Prior to this
    hearing, I was on the phone with the National Security Adviser,
    Ambassador O'Brien. He is the lead on the Presidential memo
    that came out in June. I thought it was very positive. It was
    something we had been pressing the Trump Administration toon
    exactly how to protect our economic and security interests in
    the region. And there is an interest in quite soon looking at
    bridging the gap with regard to icebreaker coverage that we
    currently have, which has been exacerbated by the HEALY fire
    for two medium-sized icebreakers to be leased.
        There is a strong interest, I can tell you, at the White
    House to do this and to have these homeported in America's
    Arctic, in Alaska. If you had a recommendation for the National
    Security Adviser on this issue, where would you look to
    homeport? And it would have to be relatively soon, like within
    this year, two additional medium class icebreakers that could
    start to protect America's interests. It would be leased,
    obviously, from other sources and just being built. What do you
    think the best place is, given what you talked about earlier in
    your testimony, would be to homeport these two vessels in
    Alaska? Where would you recommend that?
        General Kee. Well, first of all, thank you for that
    question, Senator. And let me offer a reflection before I
    address the question, because I think at this point it is
    really important to know the details of the lease package. So,
    for example, would there be an intent to have depot level
    repairs provided on scene where the vessel was, ``home
    ported''? Because if you brought--you need to have that kind of
    capabilities. What would the leasing enterprise provide?
        For example, would they provide vending logistics to
    conduct not only the medium level, if you will, through flight
    or through--oh, my goodness to talk like I start a pilot for a
    moment, but the through vessel missions that when they come and
    go and then back to station at home port, those essentially--
    that means is conducted between depot level repair. If that is
    going to be conducted by the vendor providing the vessel that
    we are leasing from, then its ability--it is really on to their
    ability to bring that capability forward. And so that, therein
    lies the challenge. If you had the company that we are leasing
    from, and would be anticipating this to be a finished effort,
    and as a NATO partner, not a NATO ally, certainly they have
    interoperability aspects in the commercial sector that will be
    well familiar to people. They are not military vessels, that is
    what Admiral Ray described, but they are certainly capable. And
    certainly helps bridging the gap.
        So I would look to the fact of, you know, if they had a
    robust capability to bring forward, to do the kind of
    maintenance work needed, then I would get as far forward with
    that as I could, simply because they would be incumbent upon
    the vendor to provide that capability. If they are limited on
    this, for example, in the port of Nome, could be the place to
    operate from as an example, and especially if the draft was
    deep enough, interior space was available, and using air
    logistics to the airport there for time, sense delivery of
    materials and logistics would be, of course, a critical aspect
    to this. So the idea is, again, go as far forward----
        Senator Sullivan. Let me--let me, sorry to interrupt you,
    but let me, if you had to--if this was a leasing decision soon,
    a home porting decision soon. I get the, and it is important as
    you highlight the details of the leasing package, but from what
    exists currently in Alaska in terms of Coast Guard
    capabilities, Coast Guard stations, pier space, what would be
    one or two locations that you would think would be top on the
    list?
        General Kee. Well, then again--very close, Senator. I would
    look to obviously where the existing Coast Guard capabilities,
    for example, Kodiak and refurbishing aspects of Dutch Harbor.
    Both of those are known ports with existing pier space.
    Refurbishment costs are relatively minor at this point.
        There is some housing there in Dutch Harbor. There is
    perhaps more housing available in Kodiak. So near term would
    probably be Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and then looking further
    North to Nome as soon as you could get there, even if you
    operated from Nome part of the time and then retrograded back
    to either Dutch or Kodiak. Respectfully submitted.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, I am going to close a hearing
    with one final question for all three of the witnesses. You
    know, we have covered a lot of ground here. We know that the
    Arctic is challenged by remoteness, extreme environmental
    issues, severe weather issues, receding sea ice, but it is also
    a strategic area of major shipping locations, increase of great
    power competition, resources.
        What we haven't talked too much about is emerging
    technology to cope, to overcome some of these challenges or
    play a greater role. I will just throw this out for the final
    question. Is there any technological approach to some of the
    challenges that we are not thinking about, that we might be
    able to take advantage of in the future, and that relates to
    domain awareness, that relates to observer capabilities, any of
    those issues that given the expertise of the three witnesses on
    this panel, you would like to just highlight for the Committee
    as a final topic before we close?
        General Kee. Senator Sullivan, I would like to take a run
    to that question if it is OK with you.
        Senator Sullivan. Sure.
        General Kee. Strategically advancing science, technology
    and domain awareness really is about platforms, autonomous
    platforms, whether underwater, surface, or aerial, to be able
    to conduct the kinds of remote monitoring. This includes some
    of the infrastructure challenges the Coast Guard highlighted in
    really monitoring at-risk petroleum tanks and tank farms where
    environmental change and really degrading permafrost is causing
    many of these older structures to bear very close monitoring.
    Using unmanned aerial systems to monitor these is an important
    aspect.
        Being able to not only have platforms that can respond to
    oil spill response or characterize the Arctic from a
    bathymetric standpoint are things that technology has, again,
    solutions that can be of support. This is an area that is rich
    for onward discussions. But communications, satellite based and
    terrestrial based built to have communication and connectivity
    to mariners, Coast Guard mission sets, and of course, that
    interoperable Defense community, I think is critically
    important.
        And again, I would love to dive on this one deeper, but I
    know the time is short. So let me just offer those as a brief
    set of reflections. Last, for me, though, characterizing the
    Arctic at fine scale is important. I really appreciate the
    previous discussions with witnesses regarding the
    characterizing the Arctic at grand scale.
        To me, what matters for the Coast Guard vantage point and
    those of mariner operators is the weather outside in the
    windscreen. And so to me, how we can better characterize ocean
    currents, moving in ridging at fine scale, I think is going to
    matter tremendously as we look to advancing more mariner
    commercial activities and really projecting sovereign
    influences into the coming years and beyond. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Dr. Francis, do you have a
    view on this?
        Ms. Francis. Yes, thank you very much for this question,
    and it goes back to what I said earlier hopefully my Internet
    connection is a little better now and I won't be broken up
    quite so badly. But I agree with what was just said. And I
    would just reiterate that so many of the Coast Guards
    operating, you know, their mission is it really depends on
    having good information about the weather, about ocean
    currents, about what the ice is doing. And all of those really
    depend on getting good information from the environment so that
    our forecast models, which also need further development, can
    provide them with the best information about not just what is
    going on in their neighborhood at the moment, but also the
    forecast for the next day or week or longer.
        And they can then deploy their resources more effectively
    to take advantage of that, because if they were, as I
    mentioned, on an oil spill or man overboard or some kind of
    search and rescue, we know that cruise ships are now heading up
    there, it is still very likely, even though the ice is
    diminishing, it is still very possible that a cruise ship could
    be going along in the open water. The wind shifts, the pack ice
    moves down on that cruise ship and pins it in a location, runs
    it aground into rocks or whatever. And I think the Coast Guard
    would be very hard pressed to be able to respond to that kind
    of an emergency.
        So I really think we need to do a better job getting the
    information so that we can do a better job at the forecasting
    of both weather and also the ocean behavior and the sea ice.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. And Ms. Madsen, I will
    leave it up to you to close with that question.
        Ms. Madsen. Well, thank you very much, Senator. As you
    know, we are pretty proud up in Alaska about the science that
    we have. We have a pretty extensive climate model. We are you
    know, I am focused on fish, but the climate model extends far
    beyond that with its projections. The Alaska Fisheries Science
    Center has some of the lead scientist in this regard. We have
    had Marines that have been taking different measures of
    different things for many, many, many years.
        So we need to continue those time series. Because I am
    focused on fishing, I think we need to use and work a little
    bit better on cooperative research using the platforms that we
    have out in the Bering Sea. I know, Senator, that this year we
    were unable, as you know, to get our fishery surveys done. But
    with the help of the Science Center, many of the vessels took
    data loggers to collect temperature so that we could try to
    identify the cold pull and inform as much as we could without
    the surveys. So I think there is opportunities here. I guess
    maybe not technology based, but we do have the models up in the
    North Pacific.
        We need the surveys to continue to inform those models,
    which means money. But it is kind of a dual focus, a dual
    purpose. You not only get the data that would inform those
    models, but you would also get the data to inform the changes
    and the total allowable catches up in the North Pacific. So we
    have great science up here. I think we just need to double up
    on it and make sure the funding is there to encourage the
    continuation of some of these long time series.
        And Senator, we do appreciate all the work that you have
    done for the North Pacific and the fisheries for sure. So I
    can't let the hearing close without thanking you once again.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, let me thank you as well,
    Stephanie. You have done a great job and a real leader in our
    state on so many of these issues. And General, you too as well.
    And Dr. Francis, I know that Senator Markey holds you in very
    high regard as well. So I want to thank the three witnesses for
    a really, really productive hearing. We saw a lot of good
    bipartisan participation in this hearing, which I thought was
    great and important.
        The record for the hearing will remain open for an
    additional 2 weeks. If Senators have additional questions, they
    will please submit them for the record and for our witnesses.
    If you can respectfully try to get those answers back as soon
    as you can, we would greatly appreciate that.
        With that, I want to thank the witnesses again, both
    Admiral Ray and the current panelists, and a lot of good
    information and a lot of important issues that we need to work
    together on. And I think we have a lot of important information
    to digest and move forward on as we continue to look at the
    challenges and opportunities in America's Arctic. With that,
    this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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