[Senate Hearing 116-613]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-613
IMPROVING SECURITY AT AMERICA'S AIRPORTS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 17, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-762 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas, AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 17, 2019................................. 1
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Gardner..................................... 4
Statement of Senator Lee......................................... 33
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 40
Witnesses
Tori Emerson Barnes, Executive Vice President, Public Affairs and
Policy, U.S. Travel Association................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operations Officer, Denver International
Airport........................................................ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Lauren Beyer, Vice President of Security and Facilitation,
Airlines for America........................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Ken Cornick, Co-Founder and President, CLEAR..................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Sara Nelson, International President, Association of Flight
Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO........................................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Appendix
Letter dated October 16, 2019 to Hon. Dan Sullivan and Hon.
Edward J. Markey from Marc Rotenberg, EPIC President; Caitriona
Fitzgerald, EPIC Policy Director; and Jeramie Scott, EPIC
Senior Counsel................................................. 45
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, prepared
statement...................................................... 47
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Todd Young to:
Tori Emerson Barnes.......................................... 49
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to:
Ken Cornick.................................................. 50
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to:
Chris McLaughlin............................................. 50
Lauren Beyer................................................. 51
IMPROVING SECURITY AT AMERICA'S AIRPORTS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Sullivan, Blunt, Lee, Markey, Cantwell,
Blumenthal, Sinema, and Rosen.
Also present: Senator Gardner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing on the
Security Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee will now come
to order.
I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses today. And I apologize for the late start. A couple
of us were in hearings on other committees on some topics of
the day that kept us a little bit long. But I want to thank
them to bring their unique perspectives--our witnesses on
airport security.
While the Transportation Security Administration is the
principal Federal agency tasked with keeping our transportation
system secure, we know that security is a team effort among the
private sector and among different Federal agencies.
This hearing will focus on the perspectives of many
stakeholders, airports, airlines, employees, technology
providers, and the travel industry, on the state of aviation
security and where this committee should focus its attention to
address the most demanding needs and vulnerabilities in this
arena.
The importance of aviation security obviously cannot be
overstated. The terror attacks of September 11th showed us how
our transportation systems can be used as weapons against our
own citizens if not properly guarded.
Following these attacks, we rose to the challenge to secure
our airports against future acts of terrorism, but of course,
we need to remain vigilant.
One of the most notable actions toward this goal was the
creation by the Congress of the Transportation Security
Administration. Since its inception at the end of 2001, the TSA
has grown and adapted to meet the ever-changing threats across
our transportation systems. Like a lot of Senators, I spend a
lot of time traveling and in airports almost every weekend, and
I always thank our TSA employees, especially in Alaska for the
important work that they are doing up in my State.
Nowhere is the adaptability of aviation and the threats
more important than in aviation security. U.S. airports
accommodate over 950 million domestic and international
aviation passengers each year. That means each day the security
systems at our airports must be able to screen nearly 3 million
passengers, 1.5 million checked bags, and million carry-on bags
every day. And this demand on the system continues to grow.
Last month, Acting Deputy Administrator Patricia Cogswell
testified before our Full Committee that, quote, the last 12
months represents the highest volume of air travelers in TSA's
history with the busiest summer travel season ever and
estimates of anticipated annual growth of 4.5 percent per
passenger travel over the next 20 years.
Congress has taken action to be ready for this growth most
recently by passing the TSA Modernization Act as part of the
FAA reauthorization last year. Notably, this legislation marks
the first time since its creation that TSA has been
reauthorized. In the TSA Modernization Act, we directed the TSA
to make significant changes to propel innovation, expand field
operations and testing of advanced screening technologies,
increase use of canine resources, and enhance public area
security.
Now that a full year has passed since this Act was signed
into law, we need to ensure that these measures are being
implemented in a timely fashion so that we can stay ahead of
evolving threats instead of being forced to respond to them.
That is the overall purpose of this oversight hearing today.
The application of new security methods and technologies
must take into account their effect on commerce. Commercial
aviation is a $446 billion industry that supports over 10
million jobs. We must be able to look for and strike the right
balance to implement security that is strong and protects our
citizens and critical infrastructure while also being fluid
enough to enable the uninhibited flow of legitimate passenger,
baggage, and air cargo in commerce. Balancing this risk-based
approach is not easy, but it is critical to sustaining a secure
environment that enables our industry and the security of our
citizens to continue.
The aviation industry needs to continue collaborative
efforts and information sharing to address security threats to
their businesses and customers. And that is why it is so
important for us to hear from many of them on today's panel.
The unique perspectives of our witnesses in this hearing are
invaluable in terms of identifying how well the TSA is working
with their stakeholders to share security-related information,
plan the development of new security technology, and respond to
the varying needs of individual airports, airlines, and trusted
partners across the industry, all with the goal of making sure
our citizens are safe.
With that, I want to thank our witnesses for being here
today.
And I now recognize Ranking Member Markey for any opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and
thank you for having this important hearing on aviation
security.
Thanks to all the witnesses for being here today. This
panel offers us a range of perspectives on what more we need to
do to secure our skies.
Twenty years ago, aviation security was handled by private
companies employed by the airlines themselves. This system
created dangerous vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities that were
exposed and exploited on September 11, 2001. Determined to
prevent future attacks, Congress created the TSA to Federalize
aviation security and ensure that one agency was in charge.
In the years since, Congress has continued to improve TSA
policies while debating how to best balance security with civil
liberties and enhance the passenger experience. When it comes
to security, I believe that we have to continue to heed the
call of the 9/11 Commission which described, quote, failures of
imagination as a primary reason why those attacks were not
thwarted. We must do more than simply prepare our defenses for
the kinds of attacks we experienced 18 years ago. We must
anticipate the loopholes that terrorists could exploit today
and into the future.
That is why when Congress passed a law implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, I secured a provision
that required 100 percent screening of air cargo for passenger
aircraft. Nearly 40 percent of all cargo that is carried in
America is actually on passenger planes, and it is not owned by
the passengers on that plane. This air cargo sits directly
under the feet of passengers, and it was not subject to any
screening prior to my law.
And when we passed the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, I
authored language that directed the TSA to carry out a pilot
program testing more advanced screening technologies for carry-
on luggage. I will keep fighting to make sure our technology
keeps pace with the threats we face.
And I am proud of other progress that we have made too,
including common sense reforms that I fought for like banning
knives on airplanes, which I worked with Ms. Nelson to put on
the books as a law, and ensuring that small airports are just
as secure as our larger ones.
At the same time, I have long believed that we need to make
sure that our safety does not come at the expense of our civil
liberties. When the TSA's Quiet Skies program was exposed, I
demanded answers about why air marshals were collecting
information about American travelers who were not suspected of
any crimes and were not on any terrorist watch list. I am
pleased that the TSA has since heeded my call to rein in this
privacy-violating surveillance program.
And also, as facial recognition technology has become
increasingly integrated into the American travel experience, I
have raised significant concerns about the absence of rules of
the road for how this biometric technology is used. Travelers
deserve the right to say no to sharing their biometric
information. TSA must be required to secure that biometric data
it and its partners collect, and TSA should be required to
prevent any racial bias in its use of this technology. These
safeguards cannot be optional. The flying public deserves
enforceable rules that are specific to the unique threats that
facial recognition technology poses to American privacy.
And moving forward, there are plenty of other issues that
we have to look at in order to secure our airports. One major
issue is the ongoing diversion of revenue from the 9/11
security fee that is collected. Congress mandated this fee on
airline tickets in order to help finance the cost of protecting
our nation's aviation system. In 2013, however, Congress began
diverting one-third of the revenue generated by the 9/11
security fee to deficit reduction. That diversion of revenue is
unacceptable. TSA needs that revenue to secure our airports and
our skies. We should end this harmful policy immediately, and I
have introduced legislation with Senator Blumenthal in order to
ensure that we accomplish that goal.
And finally, another top area of concern is the danger of
insider threats. It is critical that we remain vigilant and
ensure that terrorists do not gain access to the internal
workings of our aviation system. Protecting programs designed
to mitigate this risk must be a top priority. And I hope that
we can talk today about the Known Crew Member program which
counters inside threats by allowing the TSA to verify the
identities of airline employees.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. A very important hearing
especially as we are looking at stories of upwards of 11,000
ISIS fighters who could be back out in business again and
creating an area that could be used to begin, once again, to
plan attacks against the United States. This is a perfect
hearing to begin to talk about the protections we need to have
in place.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Markey.
And I do want to welcome all of our witnesses here today:
Ms. Tori Barnes, who is the Executive Vice President of Public
Affairs and Policy for the U.S. Travel Association; Ms. Lauren
Beyer, the Vice President of Security and Facilitation,
Airlines for America; Mr. Ken Cornick, who is the Co-founder
and President of CLEAR; Ms. Sara Nelson, who is the
International President, Association of Flight Attendants; and
Mr. Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operating Officer of the Denver
International Airport.
And here to introduce Chris in a little more detail is his
outstanding U.S. Senator, Cory Gardner.
Senator Gardner.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
allowing me to join the Subcommittee. I am not a Member of the
Subcommittee, so it is a privilege to be here to introduce Mr.
McLaughlin. Thank you to all the members of the Committee for
allowing this opportunity.
I am pleased to be here this morning obviously to welcome
Chris McLaughlin, who currently serves as the Chief Operating
Officer for Denver International Airport, a role in which he
oversees the airport's largest business component.
One of the busiest airports in the nation, Denver
International Airport has been forward thinking in its efforts
to bolster security while maintaining an excellent experience
for traveling Coloradans and millions of visitors. I have been
proud to work with the airport to support their efforts at the
Federal level.
Mr. McLaughlin has an impressive range of experience that I
think will provide a very unique perspective for today's
discussion surrounding airport security. He served several
years at the Transportation Security Administration, as well as
worked at Air Wisconsin Airlines, Frontier Airlines, our
hometown airline, and CLEAR.
Welcome, Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you very much for being here
today. Thank you for representing Denver International Airport
and the organization. I look forward to hearing your testimony
today.
Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
Each of our witnesses will have 5 minutes to deliver an
oral argument, and a longer written statement will be included
in the record if you so desire. So why don't we begin with Ms.
Barnes?
STATEMENT OF TORI EMERSON BARNES,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AND POLICY, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Ms. Barnes. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey,
members of the Subcommittee, good morning.
I am Tori Barnes, Executive Vice President of Public
Affairs and Policy for the U.S. Travel Association.
First, I would like to thank the Committee for passing the
Brand USA Extension Act, a bill that will reauthorize the
United States' only travel promotion program, which is
absolutely vital to growing the U.S. economy and reducing the
trade deficit.
And thank you for inviting the broader travel industry to
participate in this very important hearing today.
U.S. Travel is the only association that represents all
sectors of the travel industry: hotels, airports, state and
local tourism offices, car rental companies, theme parks and
attractions, and many others. U.S. Travel's mission to increase
travel to and within the United States is always conditioned on
maintaining the strongest and highest standards of security.
In 2018, domestic travelers spent $933 billion in the
United States, which directly supported 7.7 million American
jobs. Travel is vital to the American economy and workforce,
and some of the best programs we have to facilitate travel are
also ones that strengthen security the most.
And that is why I am here today, to discuss ways that we
can improve security and efficiency ahead of the October 1,
2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
The REAL ID Act was passed in 2005, and its full
implementation has been put off by a series of extensions
intended to give states time to bring their IDs into
compliance. Now the Department of Homeland Security has said
that the era of REAL ID delays is over, and every American will
need a REAL ID license or acceptable alternative such as a U.S.
passport to fly next October. But Americans are simply not REAL
ID ready.
A U.S. Travel study found that an estimated 182 million
Americans are unlikely to have a REAL ID, and 50 percent of
Americans are unaware of the October 1, 2020 deadline
altogether. In fact, if REAL ID standards were enforced today,
99 million Americans would not have an acceptable alternative
ID, and almost 80,000 travelers could be denied boarding on the
first day. If that trend were to continue, over half of a
million travelers could be turned away in the first week,
costing nearly $300 million in lost spending.
U.S. Travel has been working with our industry partners to
share a consistent message to educate and encourage Americans
to get a REAL ID. But we cannot solve this by simply pushing
people to the DMV, especially when two states are not yet
issuing REAL IDs and are not expected to until next summer.
REAL ID represented the most secure form of identification
when it was conceived in 2005, but technology has advanced
greatly in the past 14 years. And we have a real opportunity to
bring security into the future rather than just working to meet
the requirements of the past.
U.S. Travel has outlined four policy proposals to modernize
security and avoid chaos at our airports next October.
First, turning travelers away at the checkpoint is just not
an option. Congress should immediately direct TSA to work with
the private sector to develop procedures for clearing travelers
that do not have a REAL ID or acceptable form of
identification.
Second, Congress should direct DHS to utilize the existing
security and identification features of trusted traveler
programs by designating CLEAR and TSA PreCheck enrollment
applicants as alternatives to REAL ID. This process should be
put in place as soon as possible but no later than October 1,
2020.
Third, Congress should act immediately to modernize the
REAL ID Act to allow for mobile devices and web-based REAL ID
applications and to permit TSA to accept mobile or digital REAL
ID-compliant driver's licenses.
Fourth, DHS should accelerate the implementation of
biometric identity verification technology at TSA checkpoints.
This is simply a way to provide faster, more secure screening,
using information that trusted travelers and passport holders
have already provided to DHS. Importantly, we are in support of
strong, clear standards for accuracy, privacy, and performance
mandated by DHS and Congress that drive biometric technology
forward.
Let me be clear. We are advocating for the limited use of
biometric security screening only for those who have opted in
to provide this information to DHS.
If we do not use this as an opportunity to modernize REAL
ID requirements, expand trusted traveler programs, and improve
biometrics, we will all spend the next year simply trying to
meet the policies of the last decade rather than preparing for
the next generation of secure and efficient travel.
There is a major opportunity to modernize the systems DHS
sought to strengthen with REAL ID 14 years ago.
I would like to thank the Committee for its leadership to
ensuring secure, efficient travel for all Americans. U.S.
Travel and our industry look forward to working with you on
this issue.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Barnes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tori Emerson Barnes, Executive Vice President,
Public Affairs and Policy, U.S. Travel Association
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, members of the
Subcommittee . . . good morning.
I'm Tori Barnes, Executive Vice President of Public Affairs and
Policy for the U.S. Travel Association. Thank you for inviting our
association, the voice of the broader travel industry, to participate
in this important hearing.
U.S. Travel is the only association that represents all sectors of
the travel industry--hotels, airports, state and local tourism offices,
car rental companies, theme parks and attractions, and many others.
With such a diverse membership, our association has a focused mission:
to increase travel to and within the United States, while maintaining
the highest standards of security.
In 2018, domestic travelers spent $933 billion in the United
States, representing 86 percent of total travel expenditures. Domestic
travel spending directly supported 7.7 million American jobs.\1\ Travel
is vital to the American economy and workforce, and some of the best
programs we have to facilitate travel are also ones that strengthen
security the most.
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\1\ https://www.ustravel.org/system/files/media_root/document/
Research_Fact-Sheet_Domestic
-Travel.pdf
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And that's what I would like to speak with you about today--to
discuss ways we can improve security and efficiency ahead of the
October 1, 2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
The REAL ID Act was passed in 2005, and its full implementation has
been put off by a series of extensions intended to give states time to
bring their IDs into compliance.\2\ Now, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has said the days of REAL ID delays is over, and every
American will need a REAL ID license or an acceptable alternative--such
as a U.S. passport, a U.S. military ID, an enhanced driver's license or
a DHS trusted traveler card--to fly next October.\3\
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\2\ https://www.dhs.gov/state-extensions
\3\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_Infographic
.pdf
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But Americans simply are not REAL ID ready.
U.S. Travel commissioned Longwoods International, a market research
consultancy, to conduct two surveys measuring both the public's
understanding of REAL ID Act requirements and awareness of the October
1, 2020 enforcement deadline. The studies, which were fielded in July
and September 2019, found that an estimated 182 million Americans (72
percent) say they do not have a REAL ID license or are unsure if they
do, and 57 percent of Americans are unaware of the October 1, 2020
deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
In fact, according to our survey, an estimated 99 million Americans
(39 percent) say they do not currently have any acceptable form of
identification (such as a REAL ID license, U.S. passport, a U.S.
military ID, an enhanced driver's license or a DHS trusted traveler
card) that can be used to fly starting October 1, 2020. This finding is
especially concerning, since, according to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and DHS, travelers that arrive at the airport
without a REAL ID or an acceptable alternative will be turned away from
the checkpoint and not be allowed through security to board their
flights.
U.S. Travel Association economists estimate that if the REAL ID
deadline were implemented today, approximately 78,500 American
travelers would be denied boarding on the first day. This would cost
the U.S. economy over $40.3 million in lost travel-related spending.
If that trend were to continue for a week, 549,500 million
travelers would be turned away, costing nearly $282 million in lost
spending.\4\ This is simply unacceptable.
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\4\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_SurveyFind
ings.pdf
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To help solve this problem, the U.S. Travel Association launched an
industry-wide public education campaign to increase awareness of the
October 1, 2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement and to encourage
Americans to get a compliant driver's license or acceptable alternative
before next October.
But we can't solve this by simply pushing people to the DMV.
Especially when two states, Oregon and Oklahoma, are not yet issuing
REAL IDs and aren't expected to begin until next summer.\5\
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\5\ https://www.dhs.gov/real-id
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REAL ID represented the most secure form of identification when it
was conceived in 2005, but technology has advanced greatly in the past
14 years. There is an opportunity to bring security into the future,
rather than just working to meet the requirements of the past. In order
to take advantage of this opportunity, Congress and the administration
must act.
U.S. Travel has outlined four policy proposals to modernize
security and avoid chaos at our airports come October 1, 2020.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_Factsheet_
UST.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First: Turning travelers away at the checkpoint is not an option.
Congress should immediately direct the TSA to work with the private
sector to develop procedures for clearing travelers that do not have a
REAL ID or acceptable alternative on October 1, 2020. In particular,
rural airports with limited resources and infrequent air travelers need
to have procedures in place to securely screen travelers who are not
REAL ID ready. DHS and TSA should leverage existing airport
infrastructure, services and identification methods to provide a
solution for passengers who are unable or unaware of the need to obtain
a REAL ID driver's license or accepted alternative.
Second: Congress must immediately direct DHS to utilize the
existing security and identification features of trusted traveler
programs by designating TSA Precheck and CLEAR enrollment as acceptable
alternatives to REAL ID licenses. This process should be in place no
later than October 1, 2020. Enrollees in TSA Precheck, for example,
must be vetted against several law enforcement databases, ensuring
greater security than a REAL ID alone.
Third: Congress must immediately act to modernize the REAL ID Act
to allow for mobile devices and web-based REAL ID applications, and to
permit TSA to accept mobile or digital REAL ID-compliant driver's
licenses.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. Sec. 30301 Note) and Federal
regulations governing state implementation (6 CFR Part 37) require
first-time applicants to apply in person at a DMV and present physical,
rather than electronic, documents for verification. The in-person
application requirements stem from statutory language directing the
``presentation and verification'' of source documents that DHS
interprets to mean in-person transactions using physical documents. The
REAL ID Act directive for states to complete a ``mandatory facial
capture'' is also interpreted by DHS to mean an in-person transaction
at a physical DMV location.
Modernizing the law and regulations will reduce DMV backlogs and
increase security checkpoint efficiency. In 2005 there was no TSA
Precheck and no mobile boarding passes--advances in technology have
allowed for greater security than America had when the law was enacted.
Fourth: DHS should accelerate the implementation of biometric
identity verification technology at TSA checkpoints. This is simply a
way to provide faster, more secure screening, using information that
trusted travelers and passport holders have already provided to DHS.
This is what TSOs are already doing--verifying an ID matches the person
in front of them. Biometric identity verification does the exact same
thing, but more accurately, securely and quickly. CBP is already using
this technology in the Entry/Exit process. DHS should align with
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and move this technology to the TSA
screening line to verify the identities of travelers who opt in.
Let me be clear: When it comes to biometrics, we are advocating for
uses that are:
Opt-in, where Americans have already decided to provide
their information to DHS, the U.S. Department of State or a
trusted traveler program;
Governed by clear and reasonable guidelines for accuracy,
privacy and performance; and
Already being pursued by DHS at the direction of Congress,
such as biometric exit, registered traveler, and the PreCheck
biometric pilot program.
We are asking Congress to prioritize the opt-in programs that
already have millions of participants; direct DHS to issue clear rules
for accuracy, privacy, and performance as soon as possible; and align
TSA's implementation of biometrics for passport holders and Precheck
enrollees with DHS goals for implementing biometric exit.
If we don't use this as an opportunity to modernize REAL ID
requirements, expand trusted traveler programs and enhance and improve
biometrics, states, Congress, DHS and the traveling public will spend
the next year simply trying to meet the policies of the last decade,
rather than preparing for the next generation of secure and efficient
travel.
There is a major opportunity to modernize the systems DHS sought to
strengthen with REAL ID 14 years ago. I'd like to thank the Committee
for its leadership in ensuring secure, efficient travel for all
Americans. U.S. Travel and our industry looks forward to working with
you on this issue.
Thank you.
______
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Barnes.
Mr. McLaughlin.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS McLAUGHLIN, CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER, DENVER
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. McLaughlin. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey,
members of the Subcommittee, Senator Gardner, thank you for
your continued leadership on aviation security and for inviting
me to this important hearing. I look forward to sharing an
airport perspective on the importance of enhancing aviation
security.
I am particularly grateful to testify at today's hearing
because aviation and airport security has been a career-long
passion. Over the past 20 years, I have worked in nearly every
sector of our industry, including for airlines where I ran
ground operations, for the TSA as the Federal Security Director
for Colorado, and in D.C. where I led the initial deployment of
TSA's PreCheck program as the Assistant Administrator for
Security Operations. And most recently I worked for two
disruptive technology companies helping them to gain traction
in commercial aviation security.
This morning, I would like to focus on the importance of
continued innovation in aviation security, with specific regard
to security modernization, continued focus on TSA PreCheck, and
the implementation of REAL ID.
Innovation in aviation security is critical for three main
reasons. First and foremost, we must stay ahead of an adaptive
and committed adversary. Second, we must keep up with ever-
increasing passenger volumes. And third, airports must maintain
the autonomy to flex to our unique customer needs and
preferences.
As threats to aviation have evolved, DEN has been
proactive. Notably, we have begun to overhaul our main terminal
in a way that strengthens the public area without compromising
its iconic nature. In response to attacks in pre-security
airport locations, we are repositioning our checkpoints to more
quickly disperse and insulate our passengers.
We have worked with the TSA to explore innovations to bring
this vision to life. Soon we will roll out TSA's CT program.
Earlier we were among the first airports in the Nation to
install automated screening lanes. And last fall, we became the
first to permanently install a new generation body scanner that
is more natural, less invasive, and faster than traditional
systems.
While keeping security top of mind, we also remain keenly
aware of our passenger volumes. Currently the fifth busiest
airport in the country, DEN is experiencing exceptional growth.
We will hit nearly 70 million passengers this year.
New technologies get us closer to meeting our passenger
demand, but technology alone is not enough. TSA PreCheck, for
example, has succeeded at improving the screening process for
its members. However, low enrollment has delayed the ultimate
goal of improving security and processing time for all
passengers. TSA must advance PreCheck, and the best way to do
this is through initiatives specified in the TSA Modernization
Act.
Recognizing that robust identify verification fortifies
risk-based security, DEN supports the implementation of REAL
ID, and we are committed to doing our part to ensure the
traveling public is well informed before they get to the
checkpoint. We also believe that the voluntary use of
biometrics can complement REAL ID.
Clearly, our need to stay ahead of the next threat, coupled
with our passenger growth, has impacted our identity as an
airport. It is with this in mind that we sought to expand, to
re-imagine, and to modernize our checkpoints. We are doing our
part, and TSA has made some progress, especially in formally
developing their gifting policy.
That said, the process should be easier and, frankly, it
should be less expensive. We are making substantial investments
in order to deliver our future checkpoint. DEN is buying the
equipment. We are paying for the installation. We are paying to
remove and store the existing equipment, and we are funding a
4-year maintenance plan. We are not doing this because we agree
that local jurisdictions should finance the Federal security
system. We are doing it because our customers cannot afford to
wait.
Two years ago, our CEO, Kim Day, offered this Committee two
actions that Congress could take to address the funding needed
to modernize security.
First, Congress should discontinue diverting the 9/11
security fee. Last fiscal year, $1.4 billion of security fees
were diverted away. In fact, billions of dollars that could
have gone to testing and deploying innovative technology have
instead gone to pay down unrelated government activities since
the law was changed in 2013.
The second is the passenger facility charge, or the PFC.
Even a modest increase in the PFC would give airports the
flexibility to prioritize security efforts to match passenger
growth.
Both these ideas remain valid today.
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify in front of
the Subcommittee, and I am confident that with your leadership
we can capitalize on real opportunities to make travel safer
and more efficient. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operating Officer,
Denver International Airport
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your continued leadership on aviation
security and for inviting me to this important hearing. My name is
Chris McLaughlin, and I am the Chief Operating Officer of Denver
International Airport (DEN). Security is a critical focus for airport
operators, and I look forward to sharing an airport perspective on the
continued importance of enhancing aviation security.
I would also like to thank Senator Gardner, who serves on the full
committee, for continuing to be a great champion for Colorado and
Denver's airport. His leadership in fostering innovation and driving
forward-looking security solutions at our Nation's airports has
resulted in increased efficiency and security for the traveling public.
I am particularly grateful to testify in today's hearing because
aviation and airport security has been a career-long passion of mine.
Over the past twenty years, I have worked in nearly every sector of our
industry. I worked for two airlines where I ran ground operations at
both the hub and system level; for the TSA, where I served as the
Federal Security Director for Colorado, and here in D.C. as the
assistant administrator for security operations. In that role, I
oversaw all 450 U.S. airports. I also played a leadership role in the
development and deployment of TSA's PreCheck program. Prior to joining
the airport, I served in executive roles for two disruptive technology
companies, helping them to gain traction during the early phases of
their growth in commercial aviation security.
This morning, I would like to focus my remarks on the importance of
continued innovation in aviation security, with specific regard to a
few key areas: the need to modernize our security infrastructure and
the acquisition challenges associated with doing so, continued focus on
important programs like TSA PreCheck, the implementation of REAL ID,
and advancements in biometric technology. I know these issues are
important to the Subcommittee, and I would like to convey how important
they are to airports as well.
Innovation in aviation security is critical for three main reasons.
First and foremost, we must stay ahead of an adaptive and committed
adversary. Second, we must keep up with ever increasing passenger
volumes--from infrastructure to operations. And third, airports must
maintain the autonomy to differentiate ourselves according to our
unique customer needs and preferences.
As threats to aviation have evolved, Denver has proactively
responded to the changing landscape, making a point to partner with
Department of Homeland Security agencies and airlines on innovations
that enhance security. Perhaps most publicly, we have embarked on a
project to overhaul our main terminal in a manner that strengthens our
public area security posture without compromising its iconic nature.
Largely in response to attacks in pre-security areas like Brussels and
Istanbul, and domestic incidents like those at Fort Lauderdale and LAX,
Denver is repositioning our checkpoints in a manner that more quickly
disperses and insulates our passengers.
From the beginning of our planning process, we have worked
diligently with TSA to explore potential innovations that allow TSA
officers to focus on security at the checkpoint--rather than crowd
control.
We partnered with TSA in 2017 to pilot a palm-print
biometric authentication technology.
We were among the first airports in the Nation to install
Automated Screening Lanes, and because of the positive results
we have seen, we are planning our next phase of installations
now.
We are among the first group of airports selected for TSA's
CT program and will soon be installing six lanes at DEN.
Last but not least--having served as the Federal Security
Director for TSA when AIT was first deployed a decade ago--I am
grateful that last fall DEN became the first airport in the
Nation to install a new generation of body scanning technology
that is more natural, less invasive, and faster than
traditional systems.
While our primary objective in this project has been to improve
security, we have remained keenly aware of our growth in passenger
traffic as well. Currently the 5th busiest airport in the country and
20th in the world, Denver is experiencing exponential growth. We
eclipsed 60 million passengers served in 2017, and just two years
later, we will serve nearly 70 million travelers this year.
Each of the technologies that I mentioned gets us closer to meeting
our passenger demand. In addition to these, it is critical that TSA
continue to advance its risk-based security initiatives. TSA PreCheck
has succeeded in its goal of enhancing security and improving the
screening process for individuals enrolled in the program. However, the
low overall enrollment rate has prevented TSA from achieving its
ultimate goal of improving security and processing time for all
passengers. TSA must continue to advance the PreCheck program and it is
my belief that the best way to do this is through the third-party
initiatives specified in the TSA Modernization Act.
Recognizing that robust identity authentication and verification is
a critical component of risked-based security, DEN supports the
upcoming implementation of REAL ID and we are committed to doing our
part to ensure the traveling public is well informed and prepared
before they get to the checkpoint. Similarly, we believe that the
voluntary use of biometrics improves the passenger experience for some
while strengthening security for all. We support guardrails to protect
the privacy of the traveling public. Still, based on existing aviation
programs and consumer trends in other areas, it is likely that a
growing number of passengers will voluntarily submit their biometrics
in order to expedite their security screening process. By verifying
these passengers' identity faster, officers have more time to verify
remaining passengers using traditional means.
While it may not be clear that ``individualism'' is something that
should be considered at a hearing on security, our identity is
something that we take very seriously at DEN. We are proud to have been
recognized as the top U.S. airport by Skytrax and The Wall Street
Journal this past year. Yet, at least for The Journal, we achieved this
ranking despite finishing 17th out of the top 20 airports for our
overall security experience. This score is not a reflection on the hard
work or customer focus of our TSA partners. Rather it reflects
checkpoints that need to be expanded, re-imagined, and modernized. As I
said earlier, we are doing our part, and TSA is working with us.
We appreciate TSA's effort in developing its gifting policy and for
issuing an approved list of automated screening lane vendors this year.
And we applaud the deliberate work the agency has undertaken to test
new technology and ensure our security remains the highest priority.
That said, it feels like the process should be easier, and frankly,
less expensive for airports.
We are making substantial financial investments in order to deliver
a checkpoint with modern technology. DEN is buying the equipment,
paying for its installation, paying to remove and store existing
equipment, and--under the new gifting program--funding a four-year
maintenance plan. After which, we will be ``allowed'' to give the
equipment to TSA. We are not alone in this. Other local jurisdictions
as well as airlines are making similar investments. We're not doing
this because we believe we should. We're doing it because our customers
can't afford for us to wait.
There is growing concern across the industry that the aviation
community's willingness to lend a hand after long TSA lines created a
perceived crisis in the summer 2016, is drifting into an expectation
that local jurisdictions will finance the Federal security system.
Two years ago, our CEO Kim Day came before this Committee and
offered two ideas Congress could authorize to address the funding
needed to modernize security and keep pace with the exceptional growth
in air travel:
First, Congress could discontinue the practice of diverting the 9/
11 security fee revenues to non-security purposes. In Fiscal Year 2019
alone, $1.4 billion of the fees air travelers paid for security were
diverted away. In fact, billions of dollars that could have gone to
testing innovative technology and recapitalizing checkpoints have
instead gone to pay down unrelated government activities since the
Balanced Budget Agreement of 2013 was signed. And, billions of future
resources will similarly be diverted unless Congress addresses this
situation.
The second is the Passenger Facility Charge, or PFC. Even a modest
increase in the PFC on originating and destination passengers would
give airports the flexibility to prioritize security efforts to match
the growth we are seeing.
Both ideas remain valid today.
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify in front of the
Subcommittee today. I am confident that with your leadership--and the
work of our stakeholders represented here at this witness table--that
we can capitalize on real opportunities to make travel safer and more
efficient.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin.
And the next witness, Ms. Beyer.
STATEMENT OF LAUREN BEYER, VICE PRESIDENT, SECURITY AND
FACILITATION, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA
Ms. Beyer. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member
Markey, and members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Lauren Beyer, and I am the Vice President for
Security and Facilitation at Airlines for America. Thank you
for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security.
As an industry, the safety and security of our passengers
and employees is our single highest priority. We recognize the
sometimes challenging security environment when operating all
over the world, and these challenges have grown in recent years
to include cybersecurity and unmanned aircraft systems. We are
dedicated to working cooperatively and collaboratively with TSA
and other partners to confront these challenges.
U.S. airlines strongly advocate for the development of
pragmatic, risk-based, and outcome-focused security measures.
Such an approach provides a framework that is more agile and
more responsive to threats and allows TSA and industry to focus
resources on the highest risks.
We must continue to build a partnership with TSA that is
collaborative and proactive. We have made good progress in this
regard under Administrator Pekoske's leadership, and we
appreciate the administrator's steadfast commitment to making
consistent coordination with industry part of the agency's
culture and standard way of doing business. Coordination is key
to security.
I would also like to thank this Committee for the
monumental achievement of enacting the TSA Modernization Act
last year. Many of the provisions in that bill were critical
security initiatives for airlines. We continue to urge TSA to
expeditiously and fully implement those provisions that are
outstanding, and we respectfully request this subcommittee
continue oversight of timely implementation. A few provisions
to note.
We are pleased that TSA has established an air cargo
security office in accordance with the Act. Consolidation of
air cargo expertise and decisionmaking within TSA will be
hugely beneficial to provide focus, momentum, and clear
guidance on cargo security initiatives. We have already seen
progress through TSA's successful rollout of the Third-Party
Canine Program, and we continue to work with TSA on efforts to
advance additional technological resources for the screening of
air cargo.
We are also in strong support of the innovation provisions
in the Act, and we encourage TSA to focus on expediting the
resourcing and permanent rollout of successful innovation
pilots so that these efforts are seen through from idea to
completion.
Insider threat continues to be of great concern to the
aviation industry. U.S. airlines are committed to working
proactively with TSA, the FAA, and other industry partners to
mitigate this continuing challenge. In fact, A4A, along with
our stakeholder partners, hosted an event earlier this year to
solicit insider threat best practices.
We are also an avid supporter of and participant in the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee's Insider Threat
subcommittee.
While not part of the TSA Modernization Act, I would also
like to emphasize and voice some concern regarding the October
1, 2020 REAL ID enforcement deadline for boarding commercial
aircraft. U.S. airlines have been working closely with DHS and
TSA to amplify their messaging. Since DHS and TSA have not
indicated any willingness to extend the deadline, we are
committed to keeping up the momentum to educate travelers.
However, much needs to be done within the next year for a
smooth transition. We appreciate Chairman Wicker's leadership
in raising awareness of REAL ID requirements and look forward
to working with the Committee on this issue.
Finally, two points on funding.
First, this Committee knows well that a portion of the
aviation security fees are diverted to our general deficit
reduction every year. We continue to request Congress redirect
TSA passenger security fee revenue back to aviation security.
And we appreciate Ranking Member Markey and Senator
Blumenthal's leadership on this issue and their legislation
eliminating the diversion.
Second, I would be remiss not to mention and emphasis the
importance of operational stability and predictability for the
TSA during any lapse in funding. The airline industry is
reliant upon the TSA providing critical security services. We
implore all involved to make sure budgetary contingency plans
are in place to allow TSA to operate normally if a shutdown
caused by a lack of funding occurs.
Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to testify and look
forward to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Beyer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lauren Beyer, Vice President, Security and
Facilitation, Airlines for America
Good morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members
of the Subcommittee. My name is Lauren Beyer, and I am the Vice
President for Security and Facilitation at Airlines for America (A4A).
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security.
Overview. The safety and security of our passengers and employees
is our single highest priority. We recognize the sometimes-challenging
security environment when operating in more than 800 airports in nearly
80 countries, and these challenges have grown in recent years to also
include cybersecurity and unmanned aircraft systems. We are dedicated
to working cooperatively and collaboratively with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and other partners around the world every
day to keep our skies safe and secure.
Securing the aviation system protects people first and foremost,
but it also helps preserve the American economy. The U.S. airline
industry helps drive $1.5 trillion annually in U.S. economic activity
and supports more than 10 million U.S. jobs. When talking about the
daily challenges of aviation security it is important to understand the
depth and magnitude of what takes place and what is transported by air:
U.S. airlines carry 2.4 million passengers and more than 58,000 tons of
cargo every single day. The National Strategy for Aviation Security
(NSAS) published in December of last year underscores this dual
objective:
``The NSAS aims to enhance the safety and security of the
Aviation Ecosystem, preserving the freedom of operations for
legitimate pursuits and facilitating American prosperity.'' \1\
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\1\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NSAS-
Signed.pdf
Given the vast geography and sheer volume of air travel it is
exceedingly important that we approach security in a smart, effective,
and efficient manner that best utilizes the finite resources available
to both improve security and facilitate commerce. This becomes even
more imperative given the expectation that both passenger and cargo
traffic are expected to grow in the coming years.
Indeed, the 2019 summer travel season was the busiest ever with TSA
screening 262 million passengers and crew between May 22-September 3.
This equates to an almost 3.4 percent increase over last year. Overall,
TSA performed well during this critical season, and I would like to
thank TSA for addressing the growing volume of passengers and cargo
with increased staffing and overtime allocation.
Risk-Based Security. As an industry, we believe aviation benefits
most from the principles of risk-based security--which is the lynchpin
and bedrock of our security system today. A risk-based approach
recognizes that ``one size fits all'' security is not the optimum
response to threats. The implementation of risk-based, outcome-focused
measures has been a widely accepted approach to aviation security by
governments and industry alike for some time. We know the effectiveness
of risk-based security and we therefore strongly support it.
One of our Nation's greatest challenges is to strike the right
balance when managing risk. Enhanced aviation security and the
efficient facilitation of passengers and cargo are not mutually
exclusive goals; government and industry must continue to work together
to find pragmatic approaches that appropriately balance these goals.
By utilizing and following risk-based principles we provide a
security framework that is more agile and more responsive to current
and emerging threats and allows TSA and industry to focus resources on
the highest risks. This framework also takes the operational complexity
of the U.S. aviation system into account.
Key to our effort to develop and effectively implement risk-based
security measures is coordination between TSA and industry. We must
continue to build partnerships between TSA and industry that focus on
pursuing security improvements in a collaborative and proactive manner.
Congress emphasized the importance of this partnership throughout the
TSA Modernization Act of 2018.
Published last year, the TSA Administrator's Intent which sets out
how TSA intends to execute its strategy through the end of 2020
specifically directs the agency through its guiding principles to
``actively seek stakeholder input'' and to ``collaborate to drive value
. . . through action, transparency and accountability.'' Further, the
first strategic priority is to improve security, including through
``consistent communications and coordination with regulated and non-
regulated partners.'' \2\ We have made good progress in this regard
under Administrator Pekoske's leadership, and U.S. airlines appreciate
the Administrator's steadfast commitment to making consistent
coordination and collaboration with industry part of the agency's
culture and standard way of doing business.
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\2\ https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/tsaadminintent_2018.pdf
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TSA Modernization Act. I would like to thank this Subcommittee and
the Congress for the monumental achievement of enacting the TSA
Modernization Act, the first reauthorization of TSA in its 18-year
existence. Many of the provisions in this bill were important to our
membership to move critical security initiatives forward. One such
provision was the establishment of a 5-year term for the TSA
Administrator. The continuity and stability that a 5-year term will
bring to a still young agency that has experienced tremendous
leadership turnover is much needed.
A4A and airlines have met with TSA periodically since the bill's
passage to review implementation status. While we recognize the volume
of requirements placed on TSA by the bill and in some cases the short
deadline required, we continue to urge TSA to expeditiously and fully
implement those provisions that are outstanding. We respectfully ask
this Subcommittee to do the same.
A4A has also partnered with TSA directly or through our
participation on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) to
provide input on TSA's execution of several provisions. One example of
this partnership is the provision that requires an airport worker
access controls cost and feasibility study. For TSA to assess the
impact of employee screening including a comparison of estimated costs
and effectiveness to TSA, airports, and airlines, it necessarily
requires close coordination with industry to ensure the full scale of
potential impact is considered.
Several cargo-related provisions of the TSA Modernization Act
deserve mention. We are pleased that TSA has established an air cargo
security office within TSA Policy, Plans and Engagement. Consolidation
of air cargo expertise and decision-making within TSA will be hugely
beneficial to provide focus, momentum and clear guidance on critical
cargo security initiatives, including those based on recommendations
from the ASAC Air Cargo Subcommittee. We have already seen progress
through TSA's successful rollout of the Third-Party Canine Program. We
continue to work with TSA on efforts to advance additional
technological resources for the screening of air cargo and hope to see
additional progress in the coming year.
Innovation in aviation security is key to ensure we continue to
stay ahead of adversaries, and innovation frequently has the added
benefit of improving the customer experience. This is a primary reason
we support TSA's Innovation Task Force (ITF). We encourage TSA to now
shift their focus to expediting the resourcing and permanent rollout of
successful ITF pilots so that these efforts are seen through from idea
to completion.
Additionally, A4A supports TSA's evaluation of biometrics for
identity verification at the security checkpoint as well as the
consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The primary
benefit of the biometric program is the enhanced ability to protect
against identity fraud, but we also believe it enhances customer
experience.
A4A members have worked closely with TSA and CBP during this
process. While we believe the privacy protections currently in place
are effective, we will continue to work with TSA and our passengers to
ensure the highest levels of privacy. Airlines already collect and
transmit biographic data to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to comply with Federal security requirements, so we have experience in
the area. Airlines, like DHS, also have committed to strict privacy
principles as it relates to the use of biometric information. For
facial recognition technology, these principles include opt-out options
and non-retention of photos for business purposes. We all agree that
privacy is of the utmost importance.
REAL ID. Effective October 1, 2020, travelers will be required to
have a REAL ID compliant driver's license or alternate approved
identification to pass through TSA checkpoints at airports, the final
enforcement deadline of the REAL ID Act of 2005.
We appreciate Chairman Wicker's leadership in raising awareness of
REAL ID in recent hearings and the media about the potential disruption
to air travel next year for those passengers who are not prepared with
a compliant driver's license or other form of identification.
U.S. airlines have been working closely with DHS and TSA to amplify
their messaging and to direct travelers to the appropriate websites to
ensure they're educated about how to obtain a REAL ID compliant
identification card. To that end, A4A participated in the TSA's press
conference on October 1, along with other coalition partners, to
highlight our public awareness campaigns.
Over the last year, we have undertaken a variety of activities to
highlight this issue. For example, our coalition wrote the states'
governors asking them to join us in making the public more aware of the
upcoming deadline. Since consumers in many states still have the choice
between a non-compliant ID, the states need to play a key role in
ensuring that consumers understand that even some new IDs may not be
compliant. We also asked the governors to consider revising
communications to their residents to make clear the difference between
REAL ID compliant and non-compliant IDs.
U.S. airlines also are employing a variety of methods to
prominently share information such as posting notices of the upcoming
change on their websites and social media, deploying videos on their
in-flight entertainment systems in addition to putting the message in
in-flight magazines.
Since DHS and TSA have not given any indication of a willingness to
extend the deadline, we are committed to keeping up the momentum in
educating the public in order to ensure that the 2.4 million people who
travel every day will be able to flow through the system as seamlessly
as possible.
Insider Threats. Insider threat continues to be of great concern to
the aviation industry, and incidents in recent years are a reminder of
the constant vigilance required to keep our skies safe. U.S. airlines
are committed to working proactively with TSA, the Federal Aviation
Administration and other industry partners to mitigate this continuing
challenge. In fact, A4A along with many of our stakeholder partners
hosted an event earlier this year that brought together subject matter
experts from across the industry and government to solicit airport and
aircraft security best practices. These practices were shared across
U.S. aviation industry stakeholders. We are currently working with TSA
and our other stakeholder partners to determine the best mechanism to
continue such voluntary sharing of best practices, whether that be an
insider threat information-sharing platform or an ongoing industry-wide
working group.
A4A is also an avid supporter of and participant in the ASAC,
including its Subcommittee on Insider Threat. We strongly believe the
ASAC is the best venue in which to examine and produce recommendations
on insider threats and other security matters. The ASAC includes
representatives from across the aviation industry and is the
traditional mechanism through which TSA and industry collaborate to
develop the most effective aviation security measures. The ASAC is a
tried, tested and proven mechanism to provide the TSA Administrator
diverse stakeholder input and sound security recommendations that
achieve the objective of enhanced security while maintaining respect
for and flexibility that accommodates the complexity of the U.S.
aviation system. This fact is recognized both by Congress through the
numerous provisions of the TSA Modernization Act that require
consultation with or recommendations from the ASAC as well as the TSA
through their strong history of acceptance of ASAC recommendations and
the recent establishment of a similar committee for surface
transportation stakeholders.
Stop the annual practice of diverting passenger security fee
revenue. U.S. aviation and its customers are subject to 17 Federal
aviation taxes and `fees'. Included within those numbers are revenues
that are intended to support activities at the TSA, including the
September 11th TSA Passenger Security Fee. As this Subcommittee knows
well, that `fee' is $5.60 imposed per one-way trip on passengers
enplaning at U.S. airports with a limit of $11.20 per round trip; the
fee also applies to inbound international passengers making a U.S.
connection.
However, starting in Fiscal Year 2014, Congress started diverting a
portion of that fee toward general deficit reduction and is scheduled
to continue diverting these critical resources through Fiscal Year
2027. From our perspective, this policy is simply unacceptable.
Airlines and their customers now pay $1.8 billion more in TSA security
fees--$4.1 billion (2018) vs. $2.3 billion (2013)--for the exact same
service. The concept of a `fee' specifically charged to pay for a
specific service has long been lost in our industry and they have all
simply become taxes by another name. We would respectfully request this
Committee do everything in its power to redirect TSA passenger security
fee revenue back where it belongs: paying for aviation security. These
diverted funds could go a long way to increase TSA capacity and
capability to mitigate risk.
We appreciate Ranking Member Markey and Senator Blumenthal's
leadership on this issue through introduction of legislation to
eliminate the diversion of security fees.
TSA Funding. I would be remiss not to mention and emphasize the
importance of operational stability and predictability for the TSA
during times of government shutdown caused by a lack of appropriation.
The airline industry is reliant upon the TSA providing critical
security services; simply, they are essential to our operations. Even
minor variations in staffing levels can have dramatic impacts on wait
times. Shutdowns come in various forms and circumstance. However, they
all have one common thread in that they quickly expose the critical
role our government professionals play in many aspects of our lives
that we simply take for granted as standard operating procedure. We
implore all involved to make sure budgetary contingency plans are in
place to allow TSA to operate normally if a shutdown caused by lack of
funding occurs. We welcome the Committee's support in the development
and implementation of practical and agreeable solutions that would
mitigate or alleviate any future shutdown scenarios. We believe the
traveling and shipping public deserve continuity.
Thank you, we appreciate the opportunity to testify and look
forward to any questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Beyer.
Mr. Cornick.
STATEMENT OF KEN CORNICK, CO-FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, CLEAR
Mr. Cornick. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
Member Markey, and members of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee
on Security.
My name is Ken Cornick. I am the Co-founder and President
of CLEAR, a registered traveler company, and I am honored to be
here today.
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act of 2001. This legislation led
to the creation of the Registered Traveler, or RT, program.
Congress' goal was to both enhance security and improve the
traveler experience. In 2006, under the Federal registry
notice, multiple RT providers began operations. Unfortunately,
RT providers fell victim to the great recession and in 2008
ceased operations.
Together with my co-founder, Caryn Seidman Becker, we
purchased CLEAR's assets in 2010 and relaunched the company as
a secure identify platform initially in Orland and Denver
airports. We are proud to be an American-owned company with a
mission to strengthen homeland security and delight consumers
with frictionless experiences.
CLEAR has grown significantly as travelers have recognized
the efficiency of our biometric process, and airports have
recognized the security, customer service, and economic
benefits of adopting CLEAR. By year end, CLEAR will have around
5 million members in 35 of our nation's largest airports. CLEAR
processes almost 5 percent of the nation's originating air
passengers using biometrics and upwards of 10 percent in the
airports in which we operate.
Our secure enrollment platform establishes an impermeable
link between one's identity and their biometrics. Our process
entails digitally authenticating a traveler's government-issued
ID, establishing that the person enrolling is definitively the
person on such document through the use of challenge questions
driven by commercially available data, and last by capturing
biometric data, including fingerprints, iris, and face. The
enrollment process takes approximately 5 minutes. Once
completed, the traveler can use CLEAR immediately.
We have had a significant and positive economic impact in
the communities in which we operate, as we have created over
2,000 jobs and shared tens of millions of dollars with our
airport partners and municipalities through revenue share
agreements. Our success is driven by a strong public-private
partnership with TSA. This partnership is a win-win for all
stakeholders, driving innovation, enhancing security, and
efficiency for travelers. CLEAR is a force multiplier for TSA
bringing significant additional resources to the checkpoint at
no cost to taxpayers.
We fully support TSA's efforts to drive checkpoint
efficiency through the introduction of new technology such as
biometrics. Further, CLEAR is eager and has offered to invest
its own capital, technology, and labor at the checkpoint to
support TSA in its mission.
We can and want to do more with TSA. We see many areas for
collaboration. We have vast experience in biometrics,
credential authentication, biometrics deployment, identity
management, and more.
Given today's environment, I think it is really important
to address data security, which is core to our business. We
have invested significantly in cybersecurity to ensure our
systems are best in class. CLEAR is subject to regular TSA
audits, and as a result of those investments and TSA's
oversight, we have been designated FISMA-High by TSA. That is
the highest government cyber compliance rating available.
CLEAR is also SAFETY Act certified by the Department of
Homeland Security as a qualified anti-terrorism technology.
In addition to securing our operations and our customers'
data, we take the privacy of our members extremely seriously.
CLEAR is a 100 percent opt-in service, and we do not sell
customer data.
From an operational perspective, our 2,000-plus passionate
team members, also known as Ambassadors, are all SIDA-badged
and trained on security.
In the past few years, we have forged partnerships with
premier travel companies, including Delta Airlines, United
Airlines, Hertz, and American Express. With these partnerships,
we are delivering seamless and secure traveler experiences from
curb to gate. Examples include biometric bag check, lounge
entry, boarding, and car rental exit lane.
Beyond the airport, we have a partnership with major league
baseball and sports teams to provide biometric ticketing and
secure access to over 24 stadiums across the country.
I want to thank the Committee for its ongoing support of
the Registered Traveler program and its efforts to ensure it
remains an important defense layer in aviation security.
In closing, I ask Congress to support a modernization of
the RT program and the resulting public-private partnership
that is driving the use of biometrics in aviation security. We
have come a long way, but we have more to do. By working with
all stakeholders, we know we can continue to support TSA's
mission and the goals of improving security while delighting
travelers.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cornick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ken Cornick, Co-Founder and President, CLEAR
Good Morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey and Members
of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security.
My name is Ken Cornick, I am a co-founder of CLEAR and the
company's President. I am honored to be in front of you today.
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001. This legislation led to the
creation of the Registered Traveler or RT program. Congress' goal was
to both enhance security and improve the traveler experience. In 2006,
under the Federal registry notice, multiple RT providers began
operations. Unfortunately, RT providers fell victim to the Great
Recession and in 2008, ceased operations.
My partner and CLEAR's CEO Caryn Seidman Becker and I purchased
CLEAR's assets in 2010. Soon after, we received approval from TSA to
relaunch CLEAR and opened our first two airports in Orlando and Denver.
CLEAR has grown significantly since then, as travelers have
recognized the efficiency of our biometric process and airports have
recognized the security, customer service and economic benefits of
adopting CLEAR. By year-end, CLEAR will have 5 million members in 35
of our Nation's largest airports. CLEAR processes almost 5 percent of
the Nation's originating air passengers daily using biometrics, and
upward of 10 percent in the airports we operate in.
We have had a significant and positive economic impact in the
communities in which we operate, as we have created over two thousand
jobs and shared tens of millions of dollars with our airport partners.
CLEAR is a secure identity platform. As an American-owned company,
our mission is to innovate to strengthen our Homeland's security and
delight consumers with frictionless experiences.
Our secure enrollment platform establishes an impermeable link
between one's identity and biometrics. Our process entails:
1. Digitally authenticating a traveler's government-issued
identification.
2. Establishing that the person enrolling is the person on such
document through the use of challenge questions driven by
commercially available data.
3. Capturing biometric data including fingerprints, iris image and
face.
The enrollment process takes approximately five minutes and can be
completed at any CLEAR location. Once completed, the traveler can use
CLEAR immediately anywhere in our network for identity verification.
Our success is driven by a strong public-private partnership with
TSA. This partnership is a win-win for all stakeholders--driving
innovation, enhancing security, and efficiency for travelers at zero
cost to taxpayers. CLEAR is a force multiplier for TSA--bringing
significant additional resources to the checkpoint.
We support TSA's efforts to drive checkpoint efficiency through the
introduction of new technology at the checkpoint and have numerous
ideas that would enable CLEAR to further collaborate with TSA in the
areas of biometrics and identity. Further, CLEAR is eager (and has
offered) to invest its own capital, technology, and labor at the
checkpoint to support TSA in its mission.
We can and want to do more with TSA--we see many areas for
collaboration, particularly as TSA pushes toward the use of biometrics
at the checkpoint and beyond. We have vast experience and expertise in
biometrics, credential authentication, biometrics deployment, identity
management, and more.
As CLEAR has grown, we have always maintained the underlying
Congressional intent of the Registered Traveler program--improving
overall security and enhancing the customer experience. We have done
this while driving innovation to the checkpoint.
Given the world we live in I think it is important to address data
security, which is core to our business. We have invested significantly
in cybersecurity to ensure our systems are best in class. CLEAR is
subject to regular TSA audits and as a result of our investments and
TSA's oversight, we have been designated FISMA-High by TSA--the highest
government cyber compliance rating available.
CLEAR's platform is also SAFETY Act Certified by the Department of
Homeland Security as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology.
In addition to securing our operations and our customers' data, we
take the privacy of our members very seriously. CLEAR is a 100 percent
opt-in service and we do not sell customer data.
Customer service is another key element of CLEAR's culture. Our
2,200+ passionate team members, also known as Ambassadors, are all SIDA
badged, trained on security as well as customer service. Our employees
are widely recognized as Ambassadors for the entire airport.
They are always available to help any traveler, answer questions,
be the extra eyes and ears or just be a friendly face at the screening
area. We have also begun training our Ambassadors on human trafficking
prevention.
As a result of our relentless focus on security and customer
service, we have become an instrumental partner for several premiere
travel companies including Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, Hertz, and
American Express.
CLEAR's partnership with Delta Air Lines started in 2016 and
continues today. Our partnership offers a discounted CLEAR membership
for Delta frequent fliers and helped launch CLEAR into several new
airports, including Atlanta, JFK, and other Delta hubs. Since then we
have expanded our relationship with Delta to offer biometric lounge
access and biometric boarding passes and are currently working with
Delta on new and exciting innovations to improve the customer
experience.
Our second airline partnership, with United Airlines, was announced
this past July. This partnership is already off to a great start;
already tens of thousands of new United customers have joined CLEAR and
we will soon bring CLEAR to United terminals in Chicago, Houston and
Newark. We are also working with United on new innovations that will
improve the travel experience for their customers.
Overall, we are delivering on seamless and secure travel
experiences from the curb to the gate. Specifically, we are working
with our partners to permit quick entry into lounges, board an
international departure with nothing more than your face and check your
bag with your fingers.
As we open CLEAR lanes throughout the United States, our
partnerships bring great benefits to travelers and the communities we
serve. For example, when Delta partnered with CLEAR, we entered
Atlanta, Detroit, Minneapolis and Salt Lake City, bringing dozens of
new jobs to each of those communities. When CLEAR enters O'Hare, Newark
and the United terminal at Houston Intercontinental, we will create 200
new jobs across those three cities. On average, our Ambassadors are
paid more than $20 per hour and receive amazing benefits to include
generous parental leave, full healthcare benefits and opportunities for
our Ambassadors to advance.
This year, we will share approximately $40 million with our airport
partners and their communities as part of our airport operating
contracts.
Beyond the airport, we think about the travel ribbon and making
travelers' journeys seamless and frictionless from the time they leave
their home in the morning until they are in their hotel room that night
in another city. We are committed to constantly innovating and
improving the travel experience.
One example of this commitment is our partnership with Hertz.
Today, we have 14 Hertz Fast Lanes Powered by CLEAR, where Hertz
President Club members can drive off the lot with their face. This
program started in late-2018 and will grow to encompass top Hertz
locations throughout the United States.
CLEAR also has a partnership with Major League Baseball. Today, we
have 24 sports partners including the Minnesota Twins, Texas Rangers,
Miami Heat and Seattle Seahawks, and we recently launched our first
collegiate partner--the University of Texas at Austin.
We are not stopping at just airport security or travel/
entertainment. We have use cases that focus on improving the customer
experience and reducing fraud in health care, biometric payment, age
validation, and access. We have exciting announcements planned in those
areas in the coming weeks.
I want to thank the Committee for its support of the Registered
Traveler program and its efforts to strengthen the program to ensure
that it remains an important part of our Nation's aviation security
layered defense.
I will close by asking Congress to support a modernization of the
RT program and the use of biometrics in aviation security. We have come
a long way since 9/11, but we have much work to do. By working with
Congress, TSA, our airport and airline partners, and other
stakeholders. We know we can continue to support TSA's mission and the
congressional goals of improving security and delighting travelers.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Cornick.
Ms. Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SARA NELSON, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION
OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO
Ms. Nelson. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and
members of the Committee, my name is Sara Nelson. I am the
International President of the Association of Flight
Attendants-CWA representing 50,000 flight attendants at 20
airlines. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today as a
key stakeholder and partner in airport security.
Before continuing, I would like to pause to recognize with
profound sadness the passing of the Honorable Elijah Cummings.
His was a voice of great moral clarity. We will miss the wisdom
and strength with which he fought for working people, for his
beloved Marylanders, and for our Nation.
On September 11, 2001, I was a Boston-based flight
attendant, and before 9/11 I worked United flight 175
frequently. It could have been me on that fateful day, but
instead it was people I knew and worked with and loved,
including my good friends: Amy King, Michael Tarrou, Amy
Jarret, Kathryn Laborie, Robert Fangman, Al Marchand, Alicia
Titus, Marianne MacFarlane, and Jesus Sanchez. Security is
personal for me and my flying partners. It is also fundamental
to our ability to do our job.
I remember airport security prior to September 11. I
remember the faces of the screeners who allowed the terrorists
entrance to terminal C at Logan and the ability to board flight
175. I remember the screeners' faces because they were there
all the time, 7 days a week, all hours of the day. I remember
the sounds of their voices, their tired smiles, and their
efforts to work long hours for the lowest bidding security
company just so they could provide for their own families. I
lost my friends, my profession was changed forever, but I also
often wonder about those security agents and how they have
coped with their part in failing to stop the most fatal attack
on U.S. soil. Do they understand they were set up to fail?
On a fairly regular basis, there has been an attempt to
return to the old system where security checkpoints were
contracted out to the lowest bidder. Any system that puts
security second to profits borders on reckless and is
unjustified regression from TSA's successful mission, quote, to
protect the nation's transportation systems, to ensure freedom
of movement for people and commerce.
We strongly support maintaining a professional Federal
Transportation Security Administration workforce. Federalizing
airport screening has been a success. Improving the security of
air travel and providing a rigorous review of our aviation
security with oversight by legislators and input from aviation
stakeholders and the traveling public. Crew and passengers are
safer today because of it.
We commend the efforts of TSA Administrator David Pekoske
and the entire agency for extraordinary efforts during the 35-
day government shutdown. Transportation security officers who
were required to report for work faced stress of unpaid bills
and uncertainty about when they would resume getting a
paycheck. This is an enormous distraction for the people
charged with handling security on the front lines. The shutdown
stretched people and resources and it put our security at risk.
It should never be repeated, and resources allocated to airport
security should never be diverted. We urge lawmakers to ensure
funding is adequate and stable to maintain the successful
mission with TSA.
Safety and security does not just happen. It happens
because we all work together to make it happen. Every day when
flight attendants report to work at America's airport before we
step onto the plane and assume our role as aviation's first
responders, we rely upon well trained transportation security
officers to ensure our safety and security and that of the
flying public.
Yet, this workforce of 44,000 Americans do not have the
guarantees and benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act or the
general schedule pay scale and they do not have the
representation rights accorded by Congress to most of the
Federal workforce under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
TSOs cannot appeal adverse personnel decisions even though TSA
managers, cargo inspectors, and TSA administrative personnel
have those rights. These are rights I work to protect for
flight attendants, and what we should expect for the
transportation security workforce. Congress should act to
accord TSOs these rights and ensure safer skies by passing
Senate bill 944, the Strengthening American Transportation
Security Act of 2019.
On Saturday afternoon, August 24, 2019, TSA announced
changes to the Known Crew Member program, or KCM, without
consulting unions representing airline crew members. This
resulted in confusion and misunderstanding among crew members,
as well as TSA personnel, as to what procedures were going to
be implemented and when. It also raised concerns about purpose
of the sudden change, causing distractions across aviation. In
the future, anytime TSA considers changes to KCM or the
standard security program for airlines or airports that affect
crew members and flight security, the agency should interface
with flight attendant and pilot unions to ensure the most
successful implementation of programs and maintain confidence
in our overall security.
I would like to again thank the Chairman, Ranking Member,
and members of the Committee for this opportunity to testify.
We are proud of our work as aviation's first responders and the
last line of defense in aviation security. We appreciate your
attention and diligent efforts to ensure we have the proper
tools to perform our work and to keep U.S. aviation safe and
secure.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sara Nelson, International President,
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and Members of the
Committee:
My name is Sara Nelson, International President of the Association
of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO (AFA), representing 50,000 Flight
Attendants at 20 airlines. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on improving airport security. This subject is critically
important to aviation's first responders. We also serve as the last
line of defense in aviation security.
TSA Workforce
Flight Attendants strongly support maintaining a professional,
Federal Transportation Security Administration workforce as part of the
overall solution to safety and security in commercial aviation.
On September 11, 2001, I was based in Boston as a United Airlines
flight attendant. Before 9/11, I had worked United flight 175
frequently. It could have been me on that fateful day, but instead it
was people I knew and worked with, including my good friends Amy King,
Michael Tarrou, Amy Jarret, Kathryn Laborie, Robert Fangman, Al
Marchand, Alicia Titus, Marianne MacFarlane, and Jesus Sanchez.
Security is very personal for me and my flying partners. It is also
fundamental to our ability to do our jobs.
I remember airport security prior to September 11th. I remember the
faces of the screeners who allowed terrorists entrance to terminal C at
Logan and the ability to board flight 175. I remember the screener's
faces because they were there all the time, 7 days a week, all hours of
the day. I remember the sounds of their voices, their tired smiles, and
their efforts to work the long hours for the lowest bidding security
company just so they could provide for their own families. I lost my
friends, my profession was redefined and our world changed forever, but
I also often wonder how those security agents have coped with their
part in failing to stop the most fatal attack on U.S. soil. Do they
understand they were set up to fail?
When airport security was federalized, security improved
immediately. When TSOs took over airport security, my personal security
improved dramatically. When TSOs won the right to be represented by the
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), our security
improved again because TSOs finally had a voice in their workplace.
Efforts by TSA to standardize training at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center has also created a more cohesive program and unified
commitment to TSA's mission.
AFA further supports full collective bargaining rights for
Transportation Security Officers to negotiate for better working
conditions, putting TSA officers on the General Schedule pay scale, and
providing officers with much needed statutory worker protections such
as the Rehabilitation Act against unfair labor practices. We believe
these worker rights are integral to maintaining a strong, engaged
workforce for aviation security.
Safety and security doesn't just happen; it happens because we all
work together to make it happen. My colleagues and I depend on TSA
workers to keep our jobs safe. Federalizing airport screening has been
a success, improving the security of air travel and providing a
rigorous review of our aviation security with oversight by legislators
and input from aviation stakeholders and the traveling public. Crew and
passengers are safer today because of it. We continue to depend upon a
regulated security system that meets the requirements of The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act), Pub. L. 110-53.
Adequate Long-Term Funding
Effective passenger and baggage screening is a vital part of our
layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It is also a difficult
job with massive responsibility.
On a fairly regular basis there has been an attempt to return to
the old system where security checkpoints were contracted out to the
lowest bidder. To return to a bottom-line driven system that puts
security second to profits borders on reckless and is an unjustified
regression from TSA's successful mission 'to protect the Nation's
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and
commerce.'
The Flight Attendants of this country act as first responders every
day of the year and our lives depend on the integrity of each layer of
security in the airport and on the aircraft. TSA must have the
consistent, long-term funding to give screeners the staffing, support
and training they need to do their jobs to help keep our skies safe and
secure.
Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation security.
Transportation security officers who are required to report for work
for without getting paid during a shutdown face added stress over
unpaid bills and uncertainty about when their paychecks will resume.
This is an enormous distraction for the people charged with handling
security on the frontlines.
We commend the efforts of TSA Administrator David Pekoske and the
entire agency for extraordinary efforts during the 35-day government
shutdown. Under extraordinarily difficult situations, the Administrator
and the entire Federal workforce worked around the clock to maintain
airport security and the ability for aviation to continue service. The
shutdown stretched people and resources. It put our security at risk.
It should never be repeated.
Before the deadline in September of this year, Congress passed a
stopgap spending measure to fund the government through November 21,
2019. While this averted another Government Shutdown in September, we
are once again setting up a cycle of short-term funding measures for
aviation safety and security. This will further slow work on the
implementation of the Act. The Senate Homeland Security Committee
estimates that the 35-day Government Shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years
in worker productivity \1\. Further, the dedicated work of Federal
employees deserves our respect and support with long-term funding
measures.
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\1\ Shutdown cost DOT, DHS thousands of years in lost productivity,
POLITICO Pro, https://t.co/O3478qNmFc?amp=1, September 17, 2019
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We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to other
security initiatives, such as border security. Reduced staffing at
checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience-when TSA is stretched thin, it
increases the risk of a serious security breach.
Flight Attendants often bear the brunt of travelers frustrated by
any inefficiencies in security screening, making our workspace more
volatile. Long lines also threaten air travel ticket sales and on-time
operations. Diverting resources, cuts to funding, or failure to lock in
long term funding can delay purchase of advanced screening equipment
and other mission-critical investments designed to keep travelers safe
and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security, as well as
undermine programs to support TSA workers and keep them on the job.
We urge lawmakers to ensure funding is adequate and stable to
maintain the successful mission of TSA.
Known Crewmember Program
Known Crew Member is a risk-based screening program that recognizes
airline crew are subject to extensive background and criminal records
checks to ensure security and safety of flight. In light of the trusted
status of airline crew with FAA Certification, the Known Crew Member
program provides alternate, expedited screening procedures. This helps
to properly allocate more TSA resources to lesser known persons
accessing the sterile areas of airports.
On Saturday afternoon, August 24, 2019, TSA announced changes to
the KCM program without consulting unions representing airline crew
members. This resulted in confusion and misunderstanding among crew
members as well as TSA personnel as to what procedures were going to be
implemented and when. It also raised concerns about purpose of the
sudden change, causing distractions across aviation.
While we believe there are many lessons to be learned from the
initial program change announcement from TSA, we also want to recognize
the immediate response and problem-solving efforts of Administrator
Pekoske and Deputy Administrator Cogswell. TSA worked closely with our
union and the Air Line Pilots Association to receive our concerns and
proposed solutions to maintain the integrity of the program with the
most efficient procedure changes for crew and TSOs alike.
In the future, any time TSA considers changes to KCM or the
standard security program for airlines or airports, that affect crew
members and flight security, the agency should provide notice in
advance to union security representatives in order to obtain union
input and perspective on how to best achieve the goals that TSA has
identified. Past experience has shown that such input is valuable and
benefits aviation security operations. Crewmember unions and airlines
are necessary industry stakeholders that should be regularly informed
and engaged for the most successful security programs and operational
implementation.
Current Legislation
AFA supports two pieces of legislation before this committee. The
Faster Act (S. 472) which would ensure aviation security service fees
pay for the costs of security screening and the Cyber AIR Act (S. 2181)
which would help protect from and require discloser of any attempt or
successful cyber-attacks.
Conclusion
I would like to again thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member and
the Members of this Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We
are proud of our work as aviation's first responders and the last line
of defense in aviation security. We appreciate your attention and
diligent efforts to ensure we have the proper tools to perform our work
and keep U.S. aviation safe and secure.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Nelson, for that
compelling testimony, and all the witnesses for very
informative opening statements.
I am just going to throw this out to literally everybody
here at the witness table kind of on the big issue that we are
focused on here in terms of an oversight hearing.
So as I mentioned and Senator Markey mentioned, last year
we passed the TSA Modernization Act. It contained the most
comprehensive overhaul of TSA since the creation of the agency
after 9/11. And some of the notable requirements that expand
PreCheck enrollment options, create new checkpoint lane
configurations, establish new vetting standards for airport
security badges--we were trying to address proactively some of
the security issues.
But what I would like to get from all of the witnesses here
is, have these provisions from last year's bill affected
airports and airlines negatively, positively? Is the TSA moving
quickly enough to implement these new provisions, and is there
coordination happening with the different stakeholders, which
are all represented here in this hearing, to implement some of
these areas? And what did we leave out? We thought that was a
pretty good bill. I think a number of you did, but obviously we
did not cover the whole area.
So if we can just start with that, and maybe, Mr.
McLaughlin, if you can kick it off as an airport manager, and
then I literally want to hear from all the witnesses on that
overarching question and really the purpose of this hearing.
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you.
I would say that in essentially a year, there has
definitely been steps in the right direction. I think some of
those steps have not been materialized. So, for example, I will
talk about CT for a quick second.
We have been selected as one of TSA's airports for the CT
program. We will receive six units, two in each of our
checkpoints. We are just now in the process where we have a
site survey coming up where we will begin the planning to
deploy those units across the airport.
Frankly speaking, that is not a lot of time in my opinion
to get something new and complex like this rolled out. So I am
not displeased with the timing. I share that just as an example
to say many of the things that you all have put in motion have
not been realized yet, but we are starting to see the beginning
phases of that.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Ms. Barnes, other witnesses? Do you want to address that
overarching question?
Ms. Barnes. Sure. So we are very supportive of the work
that you all have done and are grateful for the advancement of
the legislation. From our review, many of the deadlines have
not yet been met, and we would like to see faster
implementation in particular on some of the biometric
opportunities.
Senator Sullivan. And have you addressed that with TSA?
Ms. Barnes. We have an upcoming meeting next week.
Senator Sullivan. OK, good. Well, we would like to hear
what their response is.
Ms. Barnes. Absolutely. I would be happy to report back.
Senator Sullivan. Others? Ms. Beyer?
Ms. Beyer. So again, as I said in my testimony, many of the
provisions in the TSA Modernization Act were critical
initiatives for the airlines. So to your question about has it
impacted our work with TSA positively, the answer would be
absolutely, sir.
We have had multiple discussions from the airlines' side
with TSA on their progress toward implementing a number of the
provisions. As I noted in my testimony--and I would agree with
Mr. McLaughlin--there are many things included in that bill. So
we understand the workload that that puts on the agency.
However, we very much would like to see the remainder of those
provisions that are outstanding fully implemented as quickly as
possible.
But, again, some of our key focus areas are carrying a lot
of the air cargo security work to fruition, particularly on
identifying additional technological resources for the
screening of air cargo and innovation as well.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cornick?
Mr. Cornick. Thank you.
I think from an innovation perspective, we would like to do
more with TSA. So pushing biometrics further on an opt-in basis
into the checkpoint is a focus of ours.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think they are doing that at a
rate that is acceptable, or is it taking too long in that area?
Mr. Cornick. I do not have an opinion on if it is going
fast enough. All I know is that we are reaching about 5 percent
of the nation's volume using biometrics, and I think to get
real ubiquity with biometrics is going to be a team effort. A
public-private partnership is important because you have got a
passport database with face. You have got fingerprints in the
PreCheck enrollment data base. But I think ultimately if you
really want to penetrate the domestic market and get ubiquity
with biometrics, it needs to be a public-private partnership.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Nelson?
Ms. Nelson. What we have experienced just like with the FAA
is the interruption of resources and the strain on the workload
as Ms. Beyer referenced with the government shutdown, with the
short-term funding that does not provide for the ability to
plan long-term, and also with the diversion of the resources.
It is taxing and does not provide the resources to do what has
been mandated by Congress.
So we also just want to note that that has also been very
taxing on the TSA interfacing with stakeholders, and I am going
to allocate some of those decisions that have taken place on
their part to that. We can do a better job with interfacing
with stakeholders, and the GAO report from this last week
identified that as well.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to come back to this question of the diversion of
the security fee. For this Fiscal Year, it will be $1.3
billion, which is being raised ostensibly to protect the
security of the flying public, but yet that money is just going
to go into deficit reduction for the Federal Government.
So I would just like to come down and ask each of you, do
you believe that we should ensure that all of that funding goes
actually toward what its goal is as we are putting a fee on
passengers in our country? So, Ms. Barnes, do you think that
money should not be diverted and just going to security?
Ms. Barnes. Yes, Senator, we agree with you that we should
not divert the fees. They should be entirely used for security
and are supportive of your bill to do so.
Senator Markey. Mr. McLaughlin?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, sir. If you had told me 10 years ago
that airports would be paying for security technology, I would
have said that is crazy. And yet here we are today forced into
that situation.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Just expand on that. I mean,
there is funding.
Mr. McLaughlin. Right. I should not have said forced into
that situation. We are making a choice to buy the latest and
greatest technology because of our growth, because of our
passengers' need. But a decade ago, that would not have been
the way it would have been thought of.
Senator Markey. Because?
Mr. McLaughlin. TSA would have----
Senator Markey. Because TSA would have paid for it with the
$1.3 billion that is just going to be diverted this year and
the $20 billion since 2013 that has been diverted. So it
actually is an additional cost that has to be borne.
Ms. Beyer?
Ms. Beyer. Yes, Senator. As I said before, we are fully
supportive of your bill to end the diversion of the TSA
passenger security fee. Our passengers continue to pay this fee
and not receive the benefit for which it was intended. We think
there is no better way to enhance aviation security in this
country than to rededicate those resources where they belong.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Cornick?
Mr. Cornick. We agree entirely with you, and we think that
the more resources that are dedicated to the airport security,
the better off everybody is.
Senator Markey. Ms. Nelson?
Ms. Nelson. The FASTER Act should be passed right away. It
is a disservice and dishonest to the American public to
continue to allow a diversion of these fees.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
And, again, Mr. McLaughlin, you put your finger right on
it. You wind up having to find other ways of funding that. And
how do you fund it?
Mr. McLaughlin. So for us, we are in a position where we
are funding it internally.
Senator Markey. Who pays for it? Where do your revenues----
Mr. McLaughlin. Ultimately our stakeholders and our
passengers.
Senator Markey. So in other words, the passengers pay a fee
that then goes to the Federal Government that then gets
diverted to deficit reduction, and then you impose a fee on the
very same people in order to raise the money in order to buy
the technology that they had already paid for by the fee that
had originally been imposed upon them in order to fly out of
the Denver airport. Is that correct?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. We cover our fees through rates and
charges which ultimately are passed to passengers.
Senator Markey. So it winds up as double taxation----
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
Senator Markey.--in order to get the level of safety which
modern threats require you to implement.
So let me move over then to the Known Crew Member program.
That is particularly valuable. The program allows TSA to verify
the identity of trusted airline employees such as pilots and
flight attendants and expedite their airport security
screening, which both reduces the number of people in passenger
screening lines and protects us from insider threats.
Ms. Nelson already made reference to this. The TSA made
abrupt and disruptive changes to the Known Crew Member program
without consulting or providing advance notice to the relevant
stakeholders, including airline pilots and the flight
attendants themselves who are the subject of the rule.
And that is why I sent a letter to the TSA this week urging
the agency to work more closely with our crew members moving
forward. Crew members are our eyes in the sky. As Ms. Nelson
said, they are the last line of defense trying to detect
something that might go wrong that would jeopardize the
security of the passengers on those planes.
So, Ms. Nelson, has the TSA historically consulted your
union and other stakeholders before making changes to Known
Crew Member or similar programs, and do you believe that the
TSA has sufficiently committed to working with you moving
forward?
Ms. Nelson. In the past when there have been changes to the
Known Crew Member program or implementation of new procedures,
there has been quite a bit of consultation with our union and
with other crew member unions. That has worked very well
because we have been able to all be on the same page, airlines,
TSA, and the crew unions, to be able to communicate these
changes and have everyone understand what is going on.
Administrator Pekoske and Deputy Administrator Cogswell did
absolutely respond to our concerns, and I want to commend them
for----
Senator Markey. After the fact.
Ms. Nelson. After the fact. And I want to commend them for
working very closely with us on our concerns and trying to
resolve those issues. They continue to do that, but I do think
it is important to continue to lift up the importance of
working with stakeholders so that we can have a program that
works for our security, that unburdens the TSA to be able to
focus on the real threats in the airport, that allows the crews
to have full confidence in our security because there is not
confusion out there on the line.
Senator Markey. And I believe that going forward robust
collaboration with the flight attendants and other stakeholders
is absolutely essential to ensuring that any rules that we have
in place actually are the most effective that they can be, and
it should be informed by those who are on the front lines.
Ms. Nelson. They will be the most effective, and we will be
the most efficient with our security.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I have a few more questions, and I
am hoping that some of our colleagues are likely going to
return because this is a very important topic.
But let me ask Ms. Beyer and Mr. McLaughlin. Air cargo is
extremely important for our country. It is extremely important
for my state. The Ted Stevens-Anchorage International Airport
is the second largest U.S. airport for landed weight of cargo,
aircraft, and fifth largest in the world for air cargo
throughput.
The TSA Modernization Act, as you know, created a new
office at TSA dedicated to air cargo. How has the creation of
this air cargo office improved the security and efficiency of
air cargo moving through U.S. airports, and what more should
TSA be doing in collaboration with industry and others to
implement this?
Ms. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
As you noted, the air cargo office within TSA has recently
been established. So it is early days still, sir. They have
made good progress but, for example, full staffing under the
organization is still pending. So we are working with TSA as
they get to full capacity for that office.
As I noted, there are a number of very important air cargo
initiatives that we would like to see move forward. Key among
them is flexibility in screening options. Unlike passenger
screening checkpoints or checked baggage, air cargo screening
is performed by the industry. But we need TSA's support to
evaluate and perform research and development and certify
programs and technologies so that very diverse, complex air
cargo environments can be addressed and we have options to
perform that screening.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. McLaughlin, do you have a view on the
air cargo issue?
Mr. McLaughlin. So as proud as we are of our airport,
admittedly we are not the cargo super power that you all are.
Senator Sullivan. I am glad you acknowledged that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McLaughlin. But I will say I think the cargo is growing
in Denver as well, and we see tremendous potential in the
future. So what we are really looking for today--I will tell
you that we are getting everything that we need.
But there is a future that is right on our horizon, and
Senator Markey really pointed out well the fact for us to get
the whole equation right. And that means the screening of that
cargo has to be effective, but it also has to be very
efficient. The model is changing in air cargo, and the
screening model has to be able to keep pace with the transition
of cargo through hubs like Denver.
Senator Sullivan. OK. Thank you.
Let me ask Mr. Cornick on the issue which I think is a very
interesting one in terms of efficiency, but also security is on
the use of biometrics that your company is very focused on,
updated computer tomography machines and other screening
technologies. A lot of that is in, as you talked about, the
Registered Travel program.
How is TSA collaborating with external partners like your
company to help both not only expand this, but also make sure
that the security of our airline system continues as this
expansion occurs?
Mr. Cornick. Thank you for the question.
So there are a couple elements to that question.
First I would start with on the cyber side. TSA has been
collaborating with us from a cyber perspective.
Senator Sullivan. What does that mean? What do you mean
when you are talking about this?
Mr. Cornick. Well, data security. At the end of the day,
biometrics are really zeroes and ones. It is data and you have
to encrypt that data. And TSA has put forth standards that we
have met, and they have audited us to those standards. So we
are designated a FISMA-High company from a cyber perspective,
which is the highest Federal level of data security. So from
that perspective, we have been collaborating on the data
security to make sure our system is best in class.
TSA is rolling out something called credential
authentication technology, which validates that a driver's
license or a passport is actually real. The traveler would
present data at the time of travel. CLEAR has been doing
credential authentication technology since 2010. That is our
core process. We enroll someone. We validate it is a REAL ID
and we bind that identity to their biometrics. And that is
closing the identity loop. That is really, really important. So
we take CAT, credential authentication, one step further, and
we are combining it with biometrics, so we call it BAT. And so
that is a really important program.
The next step is to link it to Secure Flight. That is TSA's
back end that houses all of the security data, whether you are
a PreCheck flyer, standard, or you are a selectee. And that
connectivity into CAT is something that as a FISMA-High company
we think would be a great addition to the RT program to have
that direct connectivity into Secure Flight. So if you are a
registered traveler coming through the CLEAR lane, for example,
we know who you are using biometrics and we can get real time
data on your level of security. Are you PreCheck? Are you
standard? That is the similar connectivity as other private
entities like airlines, airports, and private companies that do
screening on behalf of TSA.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Lee.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Lee. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for being here to answer questions on
these important issues.
Mr. McLaughlin, I would like to start with you, if we
could.
On May 7 of this year, the FAA released a document on UAS
detection systems, talking about their use at airports. The
FAA's statement noted as follows, ``the FAA does not support
the use of counter-UAS systems by any entities other than
Federal departments with explicit statutory authority to use
this technology, including requirements for extensive
coordination with the FAA to ensure safety risks are
mitigated.''
In light of recent events, including those that occurred at
Gatwick, I believe airport authorities are rightly concerned
about safety and security threats that can be posed either by
people who are behaving with malicious intent or,
alternatively, those who are simply behaving recklessly.
Currently how vulnerable do you believe airports are to the
threats posed by either the malicious or the reckless use of
drones?
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you for the question.
I think to start the answer it really is important to
note--and this is often said in this industry--that if you have
seen one airport, you have seen one airport. Each airport has
its own sort of vulnerabilities and its own natural
fortifications, if you will. So the answer may be different for
all of us.
Speaking specifically for Denver, I would say that we have
support systems in place that keep us relatively safe. Other
airports, based on their configurations, may be in a different
state. What we have seen in the last several months is real
coordination between Federal, State, and local officials,
including by the way us. So we participate in regional working
groups on drones and how to deal with them and how to identify
them, what to do once they are identified.
And it is important to note that not all drones are
nefarious. As you pointed out, in some cases people may be
using them recreationally in the wrong places. But I would also
argue that I think there is a future where we can use drones
productively in our environment as well.
So we want to make sure that FAA has a balanced approach,
one, ensuring that we have opportunities to detect--and you
have talked about some of the work that is going on there--two,
that there are coordinated efforts to be able to handle an
actual drone event, again using a coordinated approach, and
then finally, a process in place that makes it relatively easy,
simple but obviously still protected for us to use drones in a
way that makes sense in the airport environment, whether that
is perimeter security or other things.
Senator Lee. Thank you. That is helpful and consistent with
what I have been thinking.
The FAA's guidance seems a little ambiguous, but it seems
also to imply to me that counter-UAS systems used by anyone
other than the Federal Government could be illegal. If this is
the case, what other recourse does an airport sponsor have to
deal with these kinds of threats? And do we need to clarify the
law? Is some additional authority necessary in order to empower
you to keep people safe?
Mr. McLaughlin. It is an incredibly difficult question. And
as I sit here, I think about spending most of my career charged
with protecting aviation. And so there is a tricky balance.
Right? So on the one hand, being dependent on a Federal agency
all the time to take that final drastic action seems limiting.
On the other hand, to not have really specific and strong
safeguards in place seems dangerous as well.
So what I think is really important right now--and let us
be honest. This is still a relatively new issue. There is an
ongoing dialogue that I think is really productive, and I think
that dialogue is going to produce really good results as long
as every voice is heard and every stakeholder is at the table.
So my hope would be that we continue to get to a place where
there is a balanced outcome with drones. One, how do we ensure
that the good ones are being used for the right reasons? Two,
how do we detect the bad ones? And three, what do we do with
them once those bad ones are in a place that they are
compromising our operation?
Senator Lee. By the way, were you able to consult with the
TSA as the TSA drafted its tactical response plan?
Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely.
Senator Lee. And are you currently implementing the
technical response plan?
Mr. McLaughlin. So yes. I am sorry. I did not mean to cut
you off.
Senator Lee. No. I was finished. At your airport.
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. So we are working very closely with
them. And I will say again in our case even before that
directive came out, a lot of really good work had been done.
And I will tell you that while the directive gives TSA rights
and authorities, they did not come in heavy-handed. Rather,
they came in as a partner to help work with us on what we would
do in the event that we needed to execute the plan.
Senator Lee. Well, I appreciate your comments, and I
especially appreciate your acknowledgement. I had never heard
it expressed that way. You have seen one airport. You have seen
on airport. And it would be folly for us to assume as a
government that what works in Denver necessarily works in San
Francisco, San Diego, Salt Lake City, Washington, D.C., or
anywhere else. And that is why I am hoping we can give you the
discretion and the authority that you need and clarify any
ambiguity to make sure that you can keep flyers safe. Thank
you.
Senator Sullivan. In Alaska, we call that one size does not
fit all from the Federal Government. And I think we see that
daily in this town.
Senator Lee. Although most of our states could fit inside
of Alaska easily.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Well, we are just getting these great
shout-outs to Alaska today. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually what we saw on 9/11 was that Mohamed Atta and the
others were coming through Portland, Maine and penetrating the
security there, and then when they reached Boston, there was
already an assumption that they had been cleared. So just
thinking about the interconnectivity of this entire defense
system that we try to put in place is absolutely critical.
And I agree with Ms. Nelson that the personnel in Boston
were traumatized because they could actually retrospectively
see those people walking around Logan because they had been
scoping out the airport for months before they did it, and they
could actually in their mind's eyes still see those people
sitting there, thinking that they had been cleared coming
through before.
Let me move on to another question if I may, and that is
the question of facial recognition because, as we work to keep
pace with emerging security threats, an aviation traveler's
civil liberties cannot be an afterthought. At airports across
the country, both TSA and Customs and Border Protection are
increasingly using facial recognition technology and collecting
sensitive biometric data about travelers. Yet, the public lacks
enforceable rights and rules to protect travelers' privacy and
addresses the unique threats that TSA's biometric data
collection poses to our civil liberties.
So, Mr. McLaughlin, do you agree that any collection of
Americans' biometric information at airports should always be
voluntary?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, I do.
Senator Markey. Do you agree that TSA should enact
enforceable rules and take all necessary steps to secure that
biometric data it collects is secure?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
Senator Markey. Do you agree that TSA should enact binding
safeguards to ensure that its use of biometric technology does
not disproportionately burden or misidentify people of color?
Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely, yes.
Senator Markey. I agree with you. I agree with all of your
answers. We are, however, quickly moving toward a point of no
return when it comes to the deployment of facial recognition
technology. TSA should stop using these invasive tools in the
absence of formal rules that reflect our values and protect our
privacies. All of this should be out there as the set of
security protections not just to make sure nothing bad happens
in terms of security for these airlines, but also nothing
happens to the security of the individuals who should also have
their rights protected and they are ensured that their privacy
is not being unnecessarily invaded.
So that is always the challenge for us in the government.
The technologies themselves are inanimate. They are only as
effective as the human values which we build into them. We have
to decide. And here, we still do not have a formal set of rules
that are on the books, especially to protect minorities and
others who could, in fact, have their identity be compromised.
So I thank you, Mr. McLaughlin. And once again, I call upon
the agency to formalize these rules. It is absolutely
essential. We should not be moving forward until we have
decided what those protections are going to be.
Let me move on next to something else that we know, and
that is those who mean to do us harm could try to exploit any
technological vulnerability in our aviation system. And that
means we need to discuss issues beyond TSA oversight that are
also critical to safety in our skies.
One top area of concern is the cybersecurity standards and
practices of airlines and aircraft manufacturers. Our airplanes
are increasingly computerized, and new software is being rolled
out every single day. Evolving technologies offer enormous
potential to improve safety and to entertain passengers. But it
will only take one hacker to access an aircraft's navigation or
flight control system to cause an unforgettable disaster.
Regrettably, after investigating the cybersecurity of our
aviation system, I discovered that although airlines may
frequently experience attempted cyber attacks, their protocols
and protections for cyber incidents need much improvement.
I also found that industry collaboration on cybersecurity
is inconsistent. And that is why I, again with Senator
Blumenthal, have reintroduced the Cyber Air Act. The Cyber Air
Act would require the airline industry to share information
about cybersecurity vulnerabilities and direct the FAA to
establish cybersecurity protections for aircraft.
Ms. Nelson, I am glad that you expressed support for our
legislation. Can you explain the importance of cybersecurity in
the skies from a crew member's perspective as we see this
enhancement of technology in the airlines of our country?
Ms. Nelson. Well, crew members literally put their lives on
the line when they go to work, and they expect that all
security measures are going to be adequately measured and in
place and any mitigation factors in place as well. We know this
issue very well because, as the FCC was considering adding
mobile broadband to our aircraft, we consulted with security
experts, tactical experts and discovered a range of scenarios
that created many vulnerabilities related to cybersecurity. We
shared those privately--that is not something I would share in
this open forum--but ultimately were successful in getting an
interagency working group to assess these issues.
This is another area where you talk about collaboration
within the industry and reporting this and sharing information
that is absolutely crucial to our security. And the Cyber Air
Act will ensure that we continue to maintain the mandates of
the 9/11 Commission report to continue to assess what the risks
are today and what mitigation factors need to be in place. And
we need full information and collaboration to be able to do
that.
Senator Markey. Do you agree with that, Mr. McLaughlin?
Mr. McLaughlin. I do. So obviously cybersecurity in the air
is really not my domain. On the ground we are committed to
cybersecurity. We have instituted a scalable framework based on
NIST that allows us to ensure that our systems are intact and
safe.
Senator Markey. One of the things that was very clear after
9/11 is that Mohamed Atta was a very highly educated individual
and many others who came to Boston. The 10 of them who came to
Boston on that day to hijack those two planes that ultimately
flew into the World Trade Center--they were sophisticated
people. But they were looking for the aperture. They were
looking for the way in that would be easiest for them. And it
turned out that they could do so just with box cutters. And
because of the lack of security, thinking about that as a
threat, the lack of imagination, we saw the catastrophe.
Here, we are faced with another situation where there are
highly sophisticated individuals who would exploit a
vulnerability, exploit a point, an aperture that might make it
possible for them to create a disaster. And if we do not have
in place the rules, the protections, the understanding, the
collaboration with those who are on the front lines, we could
just see a repetition although using a more modern way in order
to attack, but finding the vulnerability.
That is what was true with cargo. If we are going to screen
our bags as we are going through, make us take off our shoes,
and yet let cargo from people who are not even on the plane
then to go onto the same vessel, well, that is crazy. That is
crazy. So they will find and exploit these kind of
vulnerabilities.
So do any of the others of you want to speak about this
need to deal with the cybersecurity issues on these planes? Ms.
Beyer?
Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator.
So I agree with you that cybersecurity is an extremely
important issue, and airlines take it very seriously, sir. When
I talked earlier about safety and security of our passengers
and our crew members, that includes cybersecurity, and we are
very aware of those challenges.
Airlines are continuing to invest in our cybersecurity
infrastructure, as well as in ensuring robust information
exchange both at the government and other industry partners. We
do this in a number of ways. Two I would mention today. The
first is participation in the aviation ISAC is very critical
for that----
Senator Markey. ISAC stands for?
Ms. Beyer. Oh, that is a test. Sorry. It is a cyber-related
consortium of entities that is specifically set up to exchange
real-time information about cyber risks and cyber incidents.
And our airlines are active participants.
The second one that I wanted to mention, sir--and I can get
back to you on the exact acronym. Apologies.
The second one that I wanted to mention, sir, is that we
actively participate in regular stakeholder meetings with the
Aviation Cyber Initiative. That is a U.S. Government
interagency body, tri-chaired by the Department of Homeland
Security, the FAA, and the Department of Defense. And we are
actively engaged in those conversations with those agencies as
well.
Senator Sullivan. One follow-up. I want to make sure asking
Ms. Barnes a couple questions.
Senator Markey. If I may. Are you happy, Ms. Nelson, with
the level of cooperation you are receiving in terms of this
conversation about broadband or additional technologies being
introduced without a proper understanding of the potential
vulnerabilities?
Ms. Nelson. We believe the Cyber Air Act would close
loopholes.
Senator Markey. Good. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Senator Sullivan. So a couple more questions. I want to
make sure--Ms. Barnes had a couple questions directed at her
from a very important industry. We just actually had a big
tourism conference in Juneau, Alaska just last week, over 600
attendees. And so we certainly want to make sure we are
protecting the traveling public, but we are also making sure
that we can help increase this important industry in our
country in terms of tourism.
So I have three questions for you.
Have you found that the TSA's transportation security
officer staffing at security checkpoints is keeping pace with
the growth in passenger traffic, tourism traffic?
Are there other solutions you think that need to be
implemented or looked at by the Congress or TSA to handle the
increase in passenger volume?
And in your opening statement, you did talk about the REAL
ID requirements, and I think it is a concern. I know that two
states will not even start issuing compliant licenses until
June 2020. That is Oklahoma and Oregon. How well is TSA doing
in informing the traveling public about that?
I am throwing a lot at you there, but I wanted to make sure
you had the opportunity to go into some details on issues that
I know impact the tourism industry.
Ms. Barnes. Well, thank you, Chairman, and thank you for
your leadership on all travel-related issues and your work to
elevate the industry at large within the government because
that is a really important----
Senator Sullivan. We have a bill coming out soon that we
worked closely with you on, and hopefully it will get
bipartisan support in this committee.
Ms. Barnes. And we are very appreciative of that and thank
you for your leadership.
I will take the last question first. With regard to REAL
ID, we are working with TSA and DHS to help to make sure that
the traveling public is aware of this upcoming ID requirement.
But what we are really concerned by is that 57 percent of
Americans do not even know that the deadline is coming.
Senator Sullivan. How can we address that? We, the Federal
Government, writ large, State governments, others.
Ms. Barnes. Well, I think PSAs, talking to your
constituents, making sure that folks are aware. The airports
have been rolling out what the TSA has been providing.
But we have launched an education initiative within the
entirety of the industry, including our airports and airline
colleagues, with CLEAR and others because we think that--you
know, we have as many as 99 million Americans that are not REAL
ID-compliant. And so if 80,000 people show up perhaps on
October 1, 2020 and are turned away, that is just not
acceptable. And as you noted, Oregon and Oklahoma are not even
issuing REAL ID-compliant licenses until next summer.
But you also have 50 different applications of getting a
REAL ID, plus D.C., and the territories. You have got a state
like Washington State that has a different symbol. It does not
have a star. You have a state like Maryland who has been
issuing noncompliant REAL ID licenses. So they are requiring
folks to come back. You have a state like New Jersey that is
actually only implementing REAL IDs or issuing REAL IDs in two
locations in their state. So we have a really inconsistent
application of the requirements. And that is really why this
broader education effort is required.
But on top of that, we should be allowing enrollees in
CLEAR and TSA PreCheck who have already given a stronger
identification, their biometric, than is required to get a REAL
ID license. So we think automatically allowing them to be
considered REAL ID-compliant as soon as--that is one that
Congress would need to articulate or direct TSA to move forward
on. And we think that would be a huge help.
We also think moving to a mobile type of enrollment
allowing DMVs to do mobile enrollment and use mobile licenses
would help to accelerate the REAL ID process so that more folks
have those.
And then we are also, from an education standpoint,
recommending that for those that are not able to get a REAL ID
license in states like Oklahoma and Oregon that they move
forward and get a passport now or enroll in a CLEAR or TSA
PreCheck application.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
allowing me to come back. I was on the floor. I apologize for
missing some of the hearing.
And I am glad that all of you are in favor of returning the
security fee that passengers pay back to the TSA. Ms. Nelson
provided a really moving and eloquent account of how all of us
are affected, the people who work in the industry, as well as
the traveling public, by the threat to our security. And I
think that fee is tremendously important.
I want to focus on a different issue that was raised I
think or has been raised by Ms. Nelson. I think you recently
called for a ban on e-cigarettes from planes. Maybe you could
expand on your concerns about the threats that these devices
pose when they are carried on a plane.
Ms. Nelson. Thank you very much for that.
We have lithium ion batteries on the aircraft all the time.
They are in all kinds of devices that people carry, and some
people may be carrying as many as six on them at any time.
The number of times that we have had a runaway device or
runaway battery that has created smoke or flames, potentially
heading toward combustion on the plane has been much higher, a
much higher rate with the e-cigarettes. And so for that reason,
we believe it is very important that FAA look very closely at
these particular devices. There is a history here. When Samsung
had a device that was improperly flaming, there was a ban on
those devices. So there is a history here. We think they need
to look very closely at these e-cigarette devices which have
had a higher instance of failing on board the aircraft and
putting passengers and crew in danger.
Senator Blumenthal. And I am troubled by some of the
reports recently of weak enforcement of the checked baggage,
and I am quoting from the ``Washington Post'' of October 7,
just days ago. Quote: in March, Southwest Airlines employees
had to pull a smoking suitcase containing e-cigarette batteries
from a plane's cargo hold in San Diego. Adjacent bags were
damaged, as was the plane, which was temporarily taken out of
service.
So I am concerned that the DOT in May 2016, which banned
these devices from checked baggage, may have really been
insufficient to address--and I am quoting--the safety risks
posed by the battery-powered portable electronic smoking
devices. End quote. I welcome your view that consideration
ought to be given to going further.
Let me ask Ms. Beyer what your organization thinks about
this issue?
Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator. Thank you for the question.
Airlines care deeply about safety. And I am aware that FAA
already has regulations for transport of lithium ion batteries.
For us, anytime there is consideration of additional measures,
whether they be safety- or security-related, we believe that
that should be considered under the principles of risk-based
security.
I think in this particular instance, Senator, what would be
required is a very thoughtful process to determine whether
technology in the checked baggage environment is currently
capable or should be capable of screening for safety-related
concerns rather than just security-related concerns such as
explosives. So that is what we would advocate for, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you finally. After 9/11,
Congress mandated reinforced flight deck doors on commercial
aircraft to add a valuable level of protection for the
cockpits. But reinforced doors alone may not provide a complete
solution to the problem that they were intended to resolve.
There are times when operational necessity requires that the
flight door be open while the plane is in flight.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, as you know, included
an important security provision to address this issue. It
required the FAA to mandate secondary cockpit barriers on all
new passenger aircraft. Congress required the FAA to issue that
rule by October 5, 2019. That day has come. It is past. Instead
of meeting the statutory deadline, last month--or rather, on
October 5, the FAA announced that the selection of secondary
barriers--the working group intended to produce a
recommendation on the rule.
You are a member or your organization is a member on that
working group. Could you give us an update?
Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator.
So as you mentioned, A4A is a member on the working group
under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee that was set
up to look at and make recommendations to the FAA about
implementing that mandate. We look forward to participating in
that process and ensuring that all of the necessary information
is collected and reviewed so that the provision can be
implemented in such a way that it can actually be carried out
and executed, things like considerations of the variation in
aircraft fleet type, engineering considerations, training
considerations, et cetera. All of those things are what we hope
to bring to this working group for consideration.
Senator Blumenthal. I think your organization said that,
quote, secondary cockpit barriers were appropriate to certain
types of aircraft. For what types of aircraft would they be
inappropriate?
Ms. Beyer. So, sir, I am not aware of the exact quote that
you are referring to, but I would certainly say Congress has
weighed in on this particular issue on secondary barriers. And
we will continue to collaborate with the FAA on the best way to
implement that mandate.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, maybe in response to a written
question, you could be somewhat more specific.
My time has expired. I thank the Chairman for permitting me
to ask these questions. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Absolutely, Senator Blumenthal.
We are going to wrap this hearing up, but I do want to take
the opportunity very quickly, 30-45 seconds each of you, as the
last element of this hearing just give us just a very quick
summation of what you see in terms of the oversight issues are
the most important that we should, as the members of this
committee, remember and take away with us. So again, if you can
do it in less than a minute, each of you, I would appreciate
it.
Ms. Barnes, why do we not just start with you and go down
the line?
Ms. Barnes. Sure. So thank you for the opportunity to be
here today.
With regard to TSA, we think moving more quickly on the
implementation of their work and moving more quickly in
particular as they move the biometrics to the front of the TSA
checkpoint.
Furthermore, there is a lot of work we need to do to make
sure that America is REAL ID ready both via education and with
the agency as well because, quite frankly, we cannot have a
half a million flyers turned away at America's airports on
October 1, 2020. And so we thank you for your help in ensuring
that we are able to find policy solutions that can also help
mitigate the negative consequences of this deadline.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you and thank you for
keeping that close to one minute.
Mr. McLaughlin?
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you again very much for the time here
today.
For me it is a really simple message. Our industry is
growing both in passenger traffic and in cargo. Current
processes and current budgets will not keep up with that
growth. We need your help in ensuring that we have the budgets
to get where we need to go in the coming years. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Ms. Beyer?
Ms. Beyer. Certainly. Thank you.
I would agree with what Mr. McLaughlin said and also just
to highlight again and underscore the importance both of
stopping the diversion of the TSA passenger security fee. That
money is critical for us as a government and industry to move
this industry forward and ensure the security of our passengers
and crew.
And also to underscore, again as Ms. Barnes did, the
importance of educating the traveling public and avoiding a
problem at our airports on October 1 of next year when the REAL
ID enforcement deadline is set to be implemented.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Cornick?
Mr. Cornick. Thank you. Thank you for you continued support
of the RT program. We ask that Congress continues to modernize
the RT program and continue its support. We want to continue to
be a force multiplier for aviation security and grow our
public-private partnership.
Senator Sullivan. Excellent. Thank you.
And Ms. Nelson.
Ms. Nelson. Thank you very much.
Stable, secure funding with no diversion of that funding
and passing of the FAST Act, continued and committed
stakeholder involvement, including REAL ID. Flight attendants
are on the front line and can help educate the public on this.
And full representation rights for our TSOs.
And let me just also note that the Modernization Act was
phenomenal. Thank you so much for your work on that. The one
thing that we would say is missing from it is mandatory crew
member self-defense training. We were the first to die, the
last to be trained. And that goes right with our secondary
cockpit barriers.
So thank you very much.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. And I want to thank again all
the witnesses today.
The hearing will remain open for two weeks. During this
time, Senators may submit questions for the record. Upon
receipt, the witnesses are respectfully requested to submit
their written answers to the Committee as soon as possible but
by no later than Thursday, October 31.
And I want to thank the witnesses again.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Washington, DC, October 16, 2019
Hon. Dan Sullivan, Chairman,
Hon. Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Markey:
We write to you in advance of the hearing on ``Improving Security
at America's Airports: Stakeholder Perspectives.'' \1\ EPIC recently
filed a lawsuit against the Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'')
agency for a failure to establish necessary privacy safeguards for the
use of facial images at U.S. borders.\2\ Because the Transportation
Security Administration (``TSA'') has failed to establish necessary
privacy safeguards, including ensuring the travelers are able to
exercise their legal right to opt-out, we request you suspend the TSA's
use of facial image technology pending the completion of required
public rulemaking by CBP. A moratorium should also be established for
other DHS components that propose to deploy facial recognition and have
not conducted a public rulemaking. There is currently no legal
authority for DHS' or TSA's use of facial recognition technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Improving Security at America's Airports: Stakeholder
Perspectives, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Trans., Subcomm. on
Security, 116th Cong. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/
2019/10/improving-security-at-america-s-airports-stakeholder-
perspectives/6e8bba82-9b59-4f09-b0c4-e8511497f5c4.
\2\ EPIC v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, No. 19-cv-689
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 12, 2019); See https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/alt-
screening-procedures/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (``EPIC'') is a public
interest research center established in 1994 to focus public attention
on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.\3\ EPIC is focused on
protecting individual privacy rights, and we are particularly
interested in the privacy problems associated with surveillance.\4\ We
applaud Senator Markey and Senator Lee for calling for the suspension
of DHS's use of facial recognition in airports until a rulemaking to
establish privacy and security safeguards is complete.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See About EPIC, EPIC.org, https://epic.org/epic/about.html.
\4\ EPIC, EPIC Domestic Surveillance Project, https://epic.org/
privacy/surveillance/.
\5\ Press Release, Sens. Edward Markey and Mike Lee, Senators
Markey and Lee Call for Transparency on DHS Use of Facial Recognition
Technology (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/senators-markey-and-lee-call-for-transparency-on-dhs-use-of-
facial-recognition-technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, new privacy risks have arisen with the deployment of
facial recognition technology at U.S. airports following a 2017
Executive Order to ``expedite the completion and implementation of
biometric entry exit tracking system.'' \6\ Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP'') has now implemented the Biometric Entry-Exit
program for international travelers at 17 airports.\7\ TSA is quickly
moving to leverage CBP's Biometric Entry-Exit program to expand the use
of facial recognition at airports.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Exec. Order No. 13,780 Sec. 8.
\7\ Davey Alba, The U.S. Government Will Be Scanning Your Face At
20 Top Airports, Documents Show (Mar. 11, 2019), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/these-documents-reveal-the-
governments-detailed-plan-for.
\8\ TSA, TSA Biometrics Roadmap (Sept. 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/
sites/default/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA has conducted pilots at John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Los Angeles International Airport to test facial recognition
technology at security checkpoints servicing international
travelers.\9\ TSA also tested a fully biometric terminal at Hartsfield-
Jackson Atlanta International Airport that used facial recognition to
check your bag, go through security, and board a flight,\10\ and is
currently testing facial recognition at Las Vegas McCarran Airport.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ TSA, Facial Recognition Technology, https://www.tsa.gov/node/
20451.
\10\ TSA, TSA Releases Roadmap For Expanding Biometrics Technology
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2018/10/15/tsa-
releases-roadmap-expanding-biometrics-technology.
\11\ Protecting the Nation's Transportation Systems: Oversight of
the Transportation Security Administration, 114th Cong. (2019), S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans. (testimony of Patricia F. S.
Cogswell TSA Acting Deputy Administrator), available at https://
www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2019/09/11/protecting-nations-
transportation-systems-oversight-transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Las Vegas pilot is testing the ``operational effectiveness for
matching a traveler's image to the photos on the ID they present.''
\12\ This 1:1 matching is a much more privacy protective implementation
of facial recognition. 1:1 matching does not require a massive
biometric database, there is no need to retain the image, and the
machines conducting the 1:1 match do not need to be connected to the
cloud. Such an implementation virtually eliminates data breach risks
and the chance of mission creep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But whether TSA is seriously considering a 1:1 implementation is
not clear. The agency's Aviation Security Advisory Committee has failed
to fill the committee positions allotted for privacy advocates.\13\ And
TSA's on roadmap for facial recognition do not include the possibility
for implementing 1:1 matching.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ TSA, TSA Announces New Members of Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2019/09/
27/tsa-announces-new-members-aviation-security-advisory-committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2018, TSA released the ``TSA Biometrics Roadmap.''
\14\ The Roadmap makes clears TSA's intention to leverage CBP's facial
recognition capabilities implemented as part of the Biometric Entry-
Exit Program. But alternatives to CBP's cloud-based implementation are
not considered in the roadmap. And corresponding privacy safeguards
have not yet been established despite TSA moving forward with facial
recognition technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ TSA Biometrics Roadmap, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to an EPIC Freedom of Information Act request, CBP
recently released 346 pages of documents detailing the agency's
scramble to implement the flawed Biometric Entry-Exit system, a system
that employs facial recognition technology on travelers entering and
exiting the country. The documents obtained by EPIC describe the
administration's plan to extend the faulty pilot program to major U.S.
airports. The documents obtained by EPIC were covered in-depth by
Buzzfeed.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Alba, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the documents obtained, EPIC determined there are few
limits on how airlines can use the facial recognition data collected at
airports.\16\ Only recently has CBP changed course and indicated that
the agency will require airlines to delete the photos they take for the
Biometric Entry-Exit program.\17\ No such commitment has been made by
TSA. Indeed, TSA's Roadmap indicates that the agency wants to expand
the dissemination of biometric data as much as possible, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See CBP Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Biometric Pilot
Project, https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit/MOU-
Biometric-Pilot-Project.pdf.
\17\ Ashley Ortiz, CBP Program and Management Analyst, Presentation
before the Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, slide 23 (Dec.
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SLIDES-
DPIAC-Public%20Meeting%2012%2010-2018.pdf.
TSA will pursue a system architecture that promotes data
sharing to maximize biometric adoption throughout the passenger
base and across the aviation security touchpoints of the
passenger experience.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ TSA, TSA Biometrics Roadmap, 17 (Sept. 2018).
TSA seeks to broadly implement facial recognition through ``public-
private partnerships'' to create a ``biometrically-enabled curb-to-gate
passenger experience.'' \19\ TSA plans to implement an opt-in model of
facial recognition use for domestic travelers but there are no
guarantees that in the future TSA will not require passengers to
participate in facial recognition or make the alternative so cumbersome
as to essentially require passengers to opt-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preserving the ability of U.S. citizens to forgo facial recognition
for alternative processes is one of the core privacy issues with CBP's
Biometric Entry-Exit program.
EPIC recently sued CBP for all records related to the creation and
modification of alternative screening procedures for the Biometric
Entry-Exit program.\20\ The alternative screening procedure for U.S.
travelers that opt-out of facial recognition should be a manual check
of the traveler's identification documents. CBP, however, has provided
vague and inconsistent descriptions of alternative screening procedures
in both its ``Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)'' webpage
\21\ and the agency's privacy impact assessments.\22\ The creation and
modification of CBP's alternative screening procedures underscores
CBP's unchecked ability to modify alternative screening procedures
while travelers remain in the dark about how to protect their biometric
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ EPIC v. CBP, 19-cv-00689, Complaint, https://epic.org/foia/
cbp/alternative-screening-procedures/1-Complaint.pdf.
\21\ CBP, Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), https:/
/www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics/biometric-exit-faqs.
\22\ U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS/CBP/PIA-030(b), Privacy
Impact Assessment Update for the Traveler Verification Service (TVS):
Partner Process 8 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-may2017.pdf; see also U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., DHS/CBP/PIA-030(c), Privacy Impact Assessment Update for
the Traveler Verification Service (TVS): Partner Process 5-6 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-
cbp030-tvs-appendixb-july2018.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS/
CBP/PIA-056, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Traveler Verification
Service 2 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november2018_2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the close relationship between the TSA's implementation of
facial recognition and CBP's Biometric Entry-Exit program, the
Subcommittee should place a moratorium on TSA's implementation of
facial recognition until CBP implements proper privacy assessments,
policies and procedures, and oversight mechanisms.
Facial recognition poses threats to privacy and civil liberties.
Facial recognition techniques can be deployed covertly, remotely, and
on a mass scale. There is a lack of well-defined Federal regulations
controlling the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of
biometric identifiers. Ubiquitous identification by government agencies
eliminates the individual's ability to control the disclosure of their
identities, creates new opportunities for tracking and monitoring, and
poses a specific risk to the First Amendment rights of free association
and free expression.
Before there is any increased deployment of these programs, CBP
must conduct a public rulemaking and TSA must conduct a privacy impact
assessment. And deployment of surveillance technology should be
accompanied by new policies and procedures and independent oversight to
protect citizens' rights.
The use of facial recognition at the border has real consequences
for U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. All people entering the U.S.,
including U.S. passport holders, could be subject to this intrusive
screening technique. The privacy assessments, policies and procedures,
and oversight mechanisms must all be made public. Most critically, if
the TSA creates or expand a system of records that contains personal
information retrievable by name, it must comply with the requirements
of the Privacy Act so that the public can comment on a record system
established by a Federal agency.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 552a(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We ask that our statement be entered into the hearing record.
Sincerely,
/s/ Marc Rotenberg /s/ Caitriona Fitzgerald
Marc Rotenberg Caitriona Fitzgerald
EPIC President EPIC Policy Director
/s/ Jeramie Scott
Jeramie Scott
EPIC Senior Counsel
______
Prepared Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO
Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan and Ranking Members Cantwell and
Markey:
On behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, which represents more than 700,000 Federal and District of
Columbia employees who serve the American people in 70 different
agencies, including the 44,000 Transportation Security Officers who
protect the flying public, we appreciate the opportunity to submit this
letter for the record on ``Improving Security at America's Airports:
Stakeholder Perspectives.''
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are sworn to protect the
Nation's aviation security. They conduct themselves with the utmost
professionalism and respect for the importance of the work they do.
Every day, they identify and eradicate threats to aviation security.
TSOs take pride in making sure all systems are working and that
personnel are fully trained in operations and observing standard
operating procedures to ensure security.
Today, we commend the Committee for its examination of airport
security from the perspective of those whose work brings them to
America's airports. They are the flight attendants who ensure in-flight
safety, the air traffic controllers who secure every take-off and
landing. When they come to work, their lives and livelihoods depend on
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) getting security
right.
As the Committee considers the implementation of the TSA
Modernization Act of 2018, we point out one provision of that Act,
Section 1907, which required the TSA Administrator to convene a working
group consisting of representatives of the TSA and representatives of
AFGE to recommend reforms to TSA's personnel management system.
Security screening requires a substantial investment in technology, but
it is essentially a human function and thereby requires a commensurate
investment in the personnel who carry out these crucial functions.
TSA's personnel management system is perhaps the worst in the
Federal Government. It is a system that gives agency management
tremendous discretion and very little accountability because it
deprives employees of full due process and collective bargaining rights
guaranteed to other Federal employees under Title 5. Under Title 5,
personnel management is governed by a set of checks and balances that
ensures merit system principles are upheld for the benefit of good
government. Title 5 processes provide mechanisms that prevent managers
from hiring, firing, demoting, or disciplining employees for bad
reasons such as politics, bias, bigotry, or to shift blame for
mismanagement. Because TSA's workforce has fewer and weaker protections
against the consequences of mismanagement, it is unsurprising that the
agency experiences massive turnover, low morale, and a low level of
trust in management's decisions.
The recent decision to change the terms of coverage under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) for TSA's large
``part-time'' workforce is a good example of the misuse of authority in
the area of personnel management. Without notice, bargaining, or
rationale; without any mention during any of the Section 1907 Work
Group meetings, TSA issued a ``management directive'' on September 20,
2019 that effected a reduction in the agency's contribution to FEHBP
premiums for its part-time workforce. TSA defined part-time as all
employees ``assigned to work schedules of 32 hours or less per week (64
hours or less per pay period). . .'' Prior to the issuance of this
directive, TSA paid the same portion of FEHBP premiums for its full-
time and part-time workforce. Now, for those hired after September 30,
2019, FEHBP premiums will be pro-rated for those assigned to part-time
schedules. Of course, the assignment of a part-time vs. a full-time
schedule is at the sole discretion of management. Likewise, regular
assignment of overtime for a ``part-time'' Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) at management's discretion will not affect his or her
status as a part-time employee with a lower employer subsidy for FEHBP.
When TSA was established and granted authority to have a large
portion of its workforce on permanent part-time status in order to
maximize its flexibility, it agreed to provide FEHBP coverage on the
same basis for its part-time and full-time workforce. This arrangement
was far from optimal, as the vast majority of those assigned to part-
time schedules wanted and needed a full-time paycheck. The full FEHBP
subsidy has served as an important offset to the undesirable and
inadequate part-time schedule and associated salary. Indeed, TSA has
acknowledged that low TSO salaries and involuntary part-time schedules
have been large factors in creating the agency's difficulties with
turnover and low morale, both of which undermine its ability to carry
out its mission. Indeed, apart from the base meanness of the action, it
is difficult to understand why TSA has decided to worsen its problems
by cutting health insurance benefits for such a large portion of its
workforce.
The decision to convene a Working Group under Section 1907 of the
TSA Modernization Act of 2018 was a second-best effort to address TSA's
deficient record on the use of its vast flexibilities and discretion in
the area of personnel management. AFGE has argued strenuously that
TSA's personnel management shortcomings will not be solved unless and
until its employees are provided the same rights under Title 5 as other
Federal employees, including Federal law enforcement officers elsewhere
in the Department of Homeland Security. The Working Group was not a
substitute for collective bargaining rights, which at TSA exist almost
entirely at the whim of each subsequent Administrator. Thus the extent
of these rights is highly politicized and varies with an
administration's level of support toward the right of employees who
elect union representation to engage in collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, AFGE participated fully and in good faith in the Section
1907 Working Group meetings. As the surprise FEHBP reduction for a
substantial portion of the TSO workforce shows, it is not at all clear
that TSA participated on the same terms.
The Section 1907 Working Group met over several months this year
and recently submitted its report to Congress. What was remarkable
about the Working Group was that all proposals were made by the Group's
AFGE members. Rather than a robust discussion of the needs of personnel
from both a management and labor perspective, the Agency's
participation was primarily delivered in the form of decisions to
recommend AFGE's proposals or decline them with little or no
discussion. Included were proposals to change pay scales to incorporate
regular and reasonable increases over time, essential decisions about
fitness for duty, fair representation of the workforce including
reasonable grievance procedures and neutral arbitration, and basic
rights at work. Without fair pay and representation for its TSOs, TSA
will continue to experience high turnover, requiring significant
investment in rehiring and retraining.
Because TSOs are so essential to the security of the flying public,
they should be under the same law that governs personnel management in
the rest of the Federal Government. It is just as important to TSA's
mission that its workforce have fair compensation, full due process and
union rights as it is to every other component of DHS. During the
historic 2018-2019 government shutdown, the Nation learned about the
dedication and mettle of TSOs at the same time they learned of their
meager pay and substandard rights on the job. Please remember that TSOs
showed up at work every day during that difficult period. Many faced
significant challenges to make ends meet as the shutdown dragged
through three pay periods, but they kept their promise to the American
public. TSOs are frequently required to perform mandatory overtime, are
faced with ever-changing shifts and insufficient rest time between
shifts, and management failure to execute the rotation of duties in
accordance with standard operating procedures. These represent
potential security risks, many of which we tried to address through the
Working Group. Congress must understand that while AFGE did its best,
TSA did not reciprocate and thus the Section 1907 of the TSA
Modernization Act was not fully utilized to improve personnel
management in a way that will enhance aviation security.
As the Committee continues to examine airport security, please know
the workforce stands ready and determined to ensure the security of the
flying public. TSOs take pride in their work protecting America's
airports and skies. AFGE thanks the Committee for holding this
important hearing and we look forward to working with you to address
the aforementioned issues.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to
Tori Emerson Barnes
Ms. Barnes, in your testimony you outline the four policy
recommendations offered by U.S. Travel. The fourth recommendation is
related to the implementation of biometric identity verification
technology at TSA checkpoints.
Question. Can you speak to the critical need for TSA to utilize
advanced technology to update their security strategy and elaborate on
how TSA and DHS can effectively accelerate the implementation of
biometric technology?
Answer. The development and deployment of various technologies have
the opportunity to modernize the travel security process by both
enhancing security and increasing traveler facilitation.
TSA released its Biometric Roadmap in October 2018. This report
outlines how TSA plans to pursue and deploy biometrics technology at
airports. The report has four stated goals: (1) Partner with CBP on
Biometrics for international travelers, (2) Operationalize Biometrics
for TSA PreCheck, (3) Expand Biometrics to additional domestic
travelers, and (4) Develop infrastructure to support biometric
solutions. We believe these are lofty, but necessary goals to move
transportation security to meet modern traveler expectations and set
the foundation for the future of secure travel.
In our view, the timetable for providing biometric identification
options at travel checkpoints could significantly shorten if (1) DHS
provided greater clarity on matters of public interest, (2) CBP and TSA
capitalized on interagency synergy, and (3) both agencies gained access
to more resources dedicated to this specific use-case.
First, public trust acceptance, and utilization will drive DHS
forward. In an increasingly digital age, travelers are rightly
concerned about data security and privacy. DHS should provide clarity
about the application, collection, deletion, and sharing of all data
within the travel security ecosystem. Specific standards will provide
confidence to the travelling public that the technology is safe and
secure. Similarly, DHS should provide data on the accuracy of the
technology across locations and demographics, and set minimum standards
for application. Providing the traveling public clarity on the security
and accuracy of the technology will supplement the added facilitation
benefits of operationalizing biometric technology. Integrating
biometrics for Trusted Traveler enrollees, who have opted-in and been
vetted, will provide significant facilitation benefits by expediting
the traveler identification process that precludes the physical
security system at airports.
Second, we believe significant gains could be made if TSA and CBP
capitalized on each other's development and implementation process,
taking advantage of any technology advancement, procurement
opportunity, or insight gained throughout the process. To sustain
momentum throughout the development cycle, both agencies should focus
on the ultimate goal of embracing new technology and new capabilities
to ensure long-term applicability, and not get bogged down on
compatibility challenges tied to antiquated forms of identification.
The ultimate goal should be to produce an identification system that is
wholly independent from, and un-reliant on, card-based identification.
Third, TSA, CBP, and DHS will need resources to standardize,
operationalize, and then expedite implementation. Investments in
infrastructure, training, testing, and accuracy will be required to
bring biometrics to the checkpoint, all of which will require
significant new resources. Both TSA and CBP have a portion of their
collected fees diverted to non-security related accounts and
activities. Returning these fees to the accounts for which they were
originally intended will have a significant benefit on the operations
of both CBP and TSA. Additionally, dedicated appropriations will be
needed to successfully expand the roll out of biometric identification
beyond the test phase.
The travel industry applauded TSA for releasing their biometrics
roadmap in 2018. We share the vision for utilizing technology for the
screening of passengers because it has the potential to provide both
faster and more secure travel. Now we must do the hard work of putting
that vision into action. Congress and the Administration should work
together to take the steps listed above and bring forward the day when
Americans can have a safer, faster, and more convenient way to travel.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Ken Cornick
Question 1. Mr. Cornick, how does TSA's current Credential
Authentication Technology deployment plan impact your operations as a
participant in the Registered Traveler Program?
Answer. TSA has publicly stated that when its Credential
Authentication Technology (CAT) is deployed, all passengers including
biometrically verified Registered Traveler (RT) participants will be
required to be processed by the TSA Travel Document Checker (TDC) to be
run through CAT. We believe this undermines the RT program and will
cause passengers to question why they are taking the extra step to
submit biometrics only to stop again at the TDC. Additionally, this
eliminates any checkpoint efficiency gains that the RT program provides
for TSA and the traveling public.
This challenge could be avoided with RT programs having
transactional access to real time vetting status databases maintained
by TSA. The technology to fulfill this request is available and could
be implemented at no direct cost to taxpayers.
RT programs are force multipliers at the checkpoint providing
additional resources with enhanced security, technology, innovation,
and staff all at no cost to TSA.
Question 2. As a member of the Registered Traveler Program, would
CLEAR agree to sign a Secure Flight access agreement with TSA that
commits your company to ensuring privacy protection, data security, and
any other necessary safeguards?
Answer. Yes. CLEAR has stated to TSA on any number of occasions its
willingness to abide by any reasonable standards and requirements TSA
may put in place as a precondition to gaining connectivity to
SecureFlight. As an example, CLEAR has already invested a significant
amount of time and resources for its technology platform to be
certified by TSA as ``FISMA High. '' This was done specifically in
anticipation of gaining the aforementioned access. CLEAR welcomes the
opportunity to collaborate with TSA on a SecureFlight access agreement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Chris McLaughlin
Earlier this month (in October 2019), I sent a letter to
Administrator Pekoske urging the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to increase the authorized staffing levels at Minneapolis-St.
Paul International Airport (MSP) to help reduce increasing passenger
wait times. While historically only 55 percent of passengers began or
ended their flight at MSP, now 64 percent of passengers do, creating a
significant increase in demand for screening services. In addition to
increasing staff levels, programs like TSA PreCheck can help speed up
the security screening process.
Question. How do programs like TSA PreCheck help improve passenger
wait times and the security screening process?
Answer. Senator Klobuchar, thank you for the important question and
for your continued leadership on aviation security. While at TSA, I
played a leadership role in the development and deployment of TSA's
PreCheck program.
It is critical that TSA continue to advance its risk-based security
initiatives. To date, TSA PreCheck has succeeded in its goal of
enhancing security and improving the screening process for individuals
enrolled in the program. However, the low overall enrollment rate has
prevented TSA from achieving its ultimate goal of improving security
and processing time for all passengers. As I stated in my testimony,
TSA must continue to advance the PreCheck program and the best way to
do this is through the third-party initiatives that Congress specified
in the TSA Modernization Act.
I would like to take a deeper dive into the program to further
answer your question.
At the macro level, TSA PreCheck improves both passenger wait times
as well as the security screening process.
In terms of wait times, it's simple math; by leaving jackets,
belts, and shoes on, and liquids and laptops in the bag, passengers
process through physical screening more quickly than those that are
subjected to traditional divestiture requirements. As a result, the
larger we can grow the population of TSA PreCheck customers relative to
``standard'' customers, the faster the overall screening ``system''
will perform. Given the same number of TSA lanes and staffing, all
passengers should wait less than they otherwise would have as the TSA
PreCheck population grows.
It is interesting to note that many incorrectly believe that their
individual line wait experience should be reduced with TSA PreCheck.
This wasn't the originally stated objective of the program, but
rather a by-product of a fledging program with an inadequate marketing
engine to support it. Early TSA PreCheck adopters enjoyed empty lines
and have since begun to expect them. The program developers had an
expectation from the outset that the queues would eventually fill.
More importantly than wait times, TSA PreCheck improves overall
security by utilizing an intelligence driven, risk-based approach.
Individuals who volunteer identifiable information about themselves,
and who therefore become more ``known,'' present less of a security
risk than individuals who are wholly unknown. Because TSA has limited
resources, it makes sense from a security perspective to focus on
individuals who are lesser known. Finding a non-criminal prohibited
item being carried by a person with an unknown history of intent is a
higher priority than finding the same item being carried by a person
with no history of intent. No system is perfect, and ``known''
individuals aren't free of risk. Nonetheless, as a former TSA
Administrator used to say, ``TSA is in the business of risk mitigation,
not total risk elimination''.
Thank you for the question and please do not hesitate to reach out
should you or staff want to discuss further.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Lauren Beyer
Aviation safety is a priority for me, and I have introduced
legislation with Senators Cantwell, Blumenthal, Markey, and Duckworth--
the Safe Skies Act--to ensure that America's cargo plane pilots have
the same rest requirements as passenger pilots.
Question. Can you speak to the importance of having strong rest
requirements for both passenger and cargo pilots?
Answer. Aviation safety is ingrained in the culture of the U.S.
aviation industry, and at the forefront of every aspect of all
commercial operations, regardless of whether it is a passenger or cargo
operation.
When addressing crew alertness and fatigue-related issues, it is
important to understand the significant differences between cargo and
passenger operations and ensure that the safety regulatory framework is
capable of addressing the unique issues inherent in these operations.
Congress did just that in 2010, in mandating that all air carriers,
including cargo air carriers, have an FAA-approved Fatigue Risk
Management Plan (FRMP). The FAA-approved FRMPs ensure that all air
carriers have fatigue reporting programs, systems for monitoring pilot
fatigue, processes for developing fatigue mitigation measures where
needed, and training for crewmembers on the risks associated with
fatigue and steps they can and should take to mitigate these risks. As
a result of this framework, carriers, including cargo carriers, have
developed fatigue monitoring tools, invested in extensive fatigue
mitigation measures, and continue to develop robust systems for
monitoring pilot fatigue in order to adjust operations as needed. One
set of prescriptive rules that applies to all will not serve to address
the unique safety issues of the various types of operations we see
today. The FAA and the industry stakeholders have acknowledged this and
remain committed to developing fatigue science and collecting the
necessary data to further advance fatigue risk management systems.
As a result of this framework, both passenger and cargo carriers
strictly adhere to their respective FAA regulations and work
proactively with their pilots to continually improve alertness and
fatigue-related safety policies through their respective FAA-approved
FRMPs that are reviewed regularly by the FAA.
We share your commitment to safety and would be more than happy to
brief you and/or your staff on the significant efforts that take place
every day to address alertness and fatigue-related issues for pilots.
U.S. passenger and cargo carriers have a shared commitment to safety
and have spent decades establishing the global standard for safety and
security. We will continue to lead.
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