[Senate Hearing 116-613]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 116-613

   IMPROVING SECURITY AT AMERICA'S AIRPORTS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            OCTOBER 17, 2019
                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
                             
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                             


                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-762 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                
                


       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                                 ------                                

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on October 17, 2019.................................     1
Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................     1
Statement of Senator Markey......................................     3
Statement of Senator Gardner.....................................     4
Statement of Senator Lee.........................................    33
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    40

                               Witnesses

Tori Emerson Barnes, Executive Vice President, Public Affairs and 
  Policy, U.S. Travel Association................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operations Officer, Denver International 
  Airport........................................................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    13
Lauren Beyer, Vice President of Security and Facilitation, 
  Airlines for America...........................................    15
    Prepared statement...........................................    17
Ken Cornick, Co-Founder and President, CLEAR.....................    20
    Prepared statement...........................................    22
Sara Nelson, International President, Association of Flight 
  Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO........................................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    25

                                Appendix

Letter dated October 16, 2019 to Hon. Dan Sullivan and Hon. 
  Edward J. Markey from Marc Rotenberg, EPIC President; Caitriona 
  Fitzgerald, EPIC Policy Director; and Jeramie Scott, EPIC 
  Senior Counsel.................................................    45
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, prepared 
  statement......................................................    47
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Todd Young to:
    Tori Emerson Barnes..........................................    49
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to:
    Ken Cornick..................................................    50
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to:
    Chris McLaughlin.............................................    50
    Lauren Beyer.................................................    51

 
   IMPROVING SECURITY AT AMERICA'S AIRPORTS: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2019

                               U.S. Senate,
                          Subcommittee on Security,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in 
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Sullivan, Blunt, Lee, Markey, Cantwell, 
Blumenthal, Sinema, and Rosen.
    Also present: Senator Gardner.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. Good morning. This hearing on the 
Security Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee will now come 
to order.
    I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of 
witnesses today. And I apologize for the late start. A couple 
of us were in hearings on other committees on some topics of 
the day that kept us a little bit long. But I want to thank 
them to bring their unique perspectives--our witnesses on 
airport security.
    While the Transportation Security Administration is the 
principal Federal agency tasked with keeping our transportation 
system secure, we know that security is a team effort among the 
private sector and among different Federal agencies.
    This hearing will focus on the perspectives of many 
stakeholders, airports, airlines, employees, technology 
providers, and the travel industry, on the state of aviation 
security and where this committee should focus its attention to 
address the most demanding needs and vulnerabilities in this 
arena.
    The importance of aviation security obviously cannot be 
overstated. The terror attacks of September 11th showed us how 
our transportation systems can be used as weapons against our 
own citizens if not properly guarded.
    Following these attacks, we rose to the challenge to secure 
our airports against future acts of terrorism, but of course, 
we need to remain vigilant.
    One of the most notable actions toward this goal was the 
creation by the Congress of the Transportation Security 
Administration. Since its inception at the end of 2001, the TSA 
has grown and adapted to meet the ever-changing threats across 
our transportation systems. Like a lot of Senators, I spend a 
lot of time traveling and in airports almost every weekend, and 
I always thank our TSA employees, especially in Alaska for the 
important work that they are doing up in my State.
    Nowhere is the adaptability of aviation and the threats 
more important than in aviation security. U.S. airports 
accommodate over 950 million domestic and international 
aviation passengers each year. That means each day the security 
systems at our airports must be able to screen nearly 3 million 
passengers, 1.5 million checked bags, and million carry-on bags 
every day. And this demand on the system continues to grow.
    Last month, Acting Deputy Administrator Patricia Cogswell 
testified before our Full Committee that, quote, the last 12 
months represents the highest volume of air travelers in TSA's 
history with the busiest summer travel season ever and 
estimates of anticipated annual growth of 4.5 percent per 
passenger travel over the next 20 years.
    Congress has taken action to be ready for this growth most 
recently by passing the TSA Modernization Act as part of the 
FAA reauthorization last year. Notably, this legislation marks 
the first time since its creation that TSA has been 
reauthorized. In the TSA Modernization Act, we directed the TSA 
to make significant changes to propel innovation, expand field 
operations and testing of advanced screening technologies, 
increase use of canine resources, and enhance public area 
security.
    Now that a full year has passed since this Act was signed 
into law, we need to ensure that these measures are being 
implemented in a timely fashion so that we can stay ahead of 
evolving threats instead of being forced to respond to them. 
That is the overall purpose of this oversight hearing today.
    The application of new security methods and technologies 
must take into account their effect on commerce. Commercial 
aviation is a $446 billion industry that supports over 10 
million jobs. We must be able to look for and strike the right 
balance to implement security that is strong and protects our 
citizens and critical infrastructure while also being fluid 
enough to enable the uninhibited flow of legitimate passenger, 
baggage, and air cargo in commerce. Balancing this risk-based 
approach is not easy, but it is critical to sustaining a secure 
environment that enables our industry and the security of our 
citizens to continue.
    The aviation industry needs to continue collaborative 
efforts and information sharing to address security threats to 
their businesses and customers. And that is why it is so 
important for us to hear from many of them on today's panel. 
The unique perspectives of our witnesses in this hearing are 
invaluable in terms of identifying how well the TSA is working 
with their stakeholders to share security-related information, 
plan the development of new security technology, and respond to 
the varying needs of individual airports, airlines, and trusted 
partners across the industry, all with the goal of making sure 
our citizens are safe.
    With that, I want to thank our witnesses for being here 
today.
    And I now recognize Ranking Member Markey for any opening 
statement.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and 
thank you for having this important hearing on aviation 
security.
    Thanks to all the witnesses for being here today. This 
panel offers us a range of perspectives on what more we need to 
do to secure our skies.
    Twenty years ago, aviation security was handled by private 
companies employed by the airlines themselves. This system 
created dangerous vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities that were 
exposed and exploited on September 11, 2001. Determined to 
prevent future attacks, Congress created the TSA to Federalize 
aviation security and ensure that one agency was in charge.
    In the years since, Congress has continued to improve TSA 
policies while debating how to best balance security with civil 
liberties and enhance the passenger experience. When it comes 
to security, I believe that we have to continue to heed the 
call of the 9/11 Commission which described, quote, failures of 
imagination as a primary reason why those attacks were not 
thwarted. We must do more than simply prepare our defenses for 
the kinds of attacks we experienced 18 years ago. We must 
anticipate the loopholes that terrorists could exploit today 
and into the future.
    That is why when Congress passed a law implementing the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, I secured a provision 
that required 100 percent screening of air cargo for passenger 
aircraft. Nearly 40 percent of all cargo that is carried in 
America is actually on passenger planes, and it is not owned by 
the passengers on that plane. This air cargo sits directly 
under the feet of passengers, and it was not subject to any 
screening prior to my law.
    And when we passed the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, I 
authored language that directed the TSA to carry out a pilot 
program testing more advanced screening technologies for carry-
on luggage. I will keep fighting to make sure our technology 
keeps pace with the threats we face.
    And I am proud of other progress that we have made too, 
including common sense reforms that I fought for like banning 
knives on airplanes, which I worked with Ms. Nelson to put on 
the books as a law, and ensuring that small airports are just 
as secure as our larger ones.
    At the same time, I have long believed that we need to make 
sure that our safety does not come at the expense of our civil 
liberties. When the TSA's Quiet Skies program was exposed, I 
demanded answers about why air marshals were collecting 
information about American travelers who were not suspected of 
any crimes and were not on any terrorist watch list. I am 
pleased that the TSA has since heeded my call to rein in this 
privacy-violating surveillance program.
    And also, as facial recognition technology has become 
increasingly integrated into the American travel experience, I 
have raised significant concerns about the absence of rules of 
the road for how this biometric technology is used. Travelers 
deserve the right to say no to sharing their biometric 
information. TSA must be required to secure that biometric data 
it and its partners collect, and TSA should be required to 
prevent any racial bias in its use of this technology. These 
safeguards cannot be optional. The flying public deserves 
enforceable rules that are specific to the unique threats that 
facial recognition technology poses to American privacy.
    And moving forward, there are plenty of other issues that 
we have to look at in order to secure our airports. One major 
issue is the ongoing diversion of revenue from the 9/11 
security fee that is collected. Congress mandated this fee on 
airline tickets in order to help finance the cost of protecting 
our nation's aviation system. In 2013, however, Congress began 
diverting one-third of the revenue generated by the 9/11 
security fee to deficit reduction. That diversion of revenue is 
unacceptable. TSA needs that revenue to secure our airports and 
our skies. We should end this harmful policy immediately, and I 
have introduced legislation with Senator Blumenthal in order to 
ensure that we accomplish that goal.
    And finally, another top area of concern is the danger of 
insider threats. It is critical that we remain vigilant and 
ensure that terrorists do not gain access to the internal 
workings of our aviation system. Protecting programs designed 
to mitigate this risk must be a top priority. And I hope that 
we can talk today about the Known Crew Member program which 
counters inside threats by allowing the TSA to verify the 
identities of airline employees.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman. A very important hearing 
especially as we are looking at stories of upwards of 11,000 
ISIS fighters who could be back out in business again and 
creating an area that could be used to begin, once again, to 
plan attacks against the United States. This is a perfect 
hearing to begin to talk about the protections we need to have 
in place.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    And I do want to welcome all of our witnesses here today: 
Ms. Tori Barnes, who is the Executive Vice President of Public 
Affairs and Policy for the U.S. Travel Association; Ms. Lauren 
Beyer, the Vice President of Security and Facilitation, 
Airlines for America; Mr. Ken Cornick, who is the Co-founder 
and President of CLEAR; Ms. Sara Nelson, who is the 
International President, Association of Flight Attendants; and 
Mr. Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operating Officer of the Denver 
International Airport.
    And here to introduce Chris in a little more detail is his 
outstanding U.S. Senator, Cory Gardner.
    Senator Gardner.

                STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

    Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 
allowing me to join the Subcommittee. I am not a Member of the 
Subcommittee, so it is a privilege to be here to introduce Mr. 
McLaughlin. Thank you to all the members of the Committee for 
allowing this opportunity.
    I am pleased to be here this morning obviously to welcome 
Chris McLaughlin, who currently serves as the Chief Operating 
Officer for Denver International Airport, a role in which he 
oversees the airport's largest business component.
    One of the busiest airports in the nation, Denver 
International Airport has been forward thinking in its efforts 
to bolster security while maintaining an excellent experience 
for traveling Coloradans and millions of visitors. I have been 
proud to work with the airport to support their efforts at the 
Federal level.
    Mr. McLaughlin has an impressive range of experience that I 
think will provide a very unique perspective for today's 
discussion surrounding airport security. He served several 
years at the Transportation Security Administration, as well as 
worked at Air Wisconsin Airlines, Frontier Airlines, our 
hometown airline, and CLEAR.
    Welcome, Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you very much for being here 
today. Thank you for representing Denver International Airport 
and the organization. I look forward to hearing your testimony 
today.
    Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
    Each of our witnesses will have 5 minutes to deliver an 
oral argument, and a longer written statement will be included 
in the record if you so desire. So why don't we begin with Ms. 
Barnes?

               STATEMENT OF TORI EMERSON BARNES,

            EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

              AND POLICY, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION

    Ms. Barnes. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, 
members of the Subcommittee, good morning.
    I am Tori Barnes, Executive Vice President of Public 
Affairs and Policy for the U.S. Travel Association.
    First, I would like to thank the Committee for passing the 
Brand USA Extension Act, a bill that will reauthorize the 
United States' only travel promotion program, which is 
absolutely vital to growing the U.S. economy and reducing the 
trade deficit.
    And thank you for inviting the broader travel industry to 
participate in this very important hearing today.
    U.S. Travel is the only association that represents all 
sectors of the travel industry: hotels, airports, state and 
local tourism offices, car rental companies, theme parks and 
attractions, and many others. U.S. Travel's mission to increase 
travel to and within the United States is always conditioned on 
maintaining the strongest and highest standards of security.
    In 2018, domestic travelers spent $933 billion in the 
United States, which directly supported 7.7 million American 
jobs. Travel is vital to the American economy and workforce, 
and some of the best programs we have to facilitate travel are 
also ones that strengthen security the most.
    And that is why I am here today, to discuss ways that we 
can improve security and efficiency ahead of the October 1, 
2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
    The REAL ID Act was passed in 2005, and its full 
implementation has been put off by a series of extensions 
intended to give states time to bring their IDs into 
compliance. Now the Department of Homeland Security has said 
that the era of REAL ID delays is over, and every American will 
need a REAL ID license or acceptable alternative such as a U.S. 
passport to fly next October. But Americans are simply not REAL 
ID ready.
    A U.S. Travel study found that an estimated 182 million 
Americans are unlikely to have a REAL ID, and 50 percent of 
Americans are unaware of the October 1, 2020 deadline 
altogether. In fact, if REAL ID standards were enforced today, 
99 million Americans would not have an acceptable alternative 
ID, and almost 80,000 travelers could be denied boarding on the 
first day. If that trend were to continue, over half of a 
million travelers could be turned away in the first week, 
costing nearly $300 million in lost spending.
    U.S. Travel has been working with our industry partners to 
share a consistent message to educate and encourage Americans 
to get a REAL ID. But we cannot solve this by simply pushing 
people to the DMV, especially when two states are not yet 
issuing REAL IDs and are not expected to until next summer.
    REAL ID represented the most secure form of identification 
when it was conceived in 2005, but technology has advanced 
greatly in the past 14 years. And we have a real opportunity to 
bring security into the future rather than just working to meet 
the requirements of the past.
    U.S. Travel has outlined four policy proposals to modernize 
security and avoid chaos at our airports next October.
    First, turning travelers away at the checkpoint is just not 
an option. Congress should immediately direct TSA to work with 
the private sector to develop procedures for clearing travelers 
that do not have a REAL ID or acceptable form of 
identification.
    Second, Congress should direct DHS to utilize the existing 
security and identification features of trusted traveler 
programs by designating CLEAR and TSA PreCheck enrollment 
applicants as alternatives to REAL ID. This process should be 
put in place as soon as possible but no later than October 1, 
2020.
    Third, Congress should act immediately to modernize the 
REAL ID Act to allow for mobile devices and web-based REAL ID 
applications and to permit TSA to accept mobile or digital REAL 
ID-compliant driver's licenses.
    Fourth, DHS should accelerate the implementation of 
biometric identity verification technology at TSA checkpoints. 
This is simply a way to provide faster, more secure screening, 
using information that trusted travelers and passport holders 
have already provided to DHS. Importantly, we are in support of 
strong, clear standards for accuracy, privacy, and performance 
mandated by DHS and Congress that drive biometric technology 
forward.
    Let me be clear. We are advocating for the limited use of 
biometric security screening only for those who have opted in 
to provide this information to DHS.
    If we do not use this as an opportunity to modernize REAL 
ID requirements, expand trusted traveler programs, and improve 
biometrics, we will all spend the next year simply trying to 
meet the policies of the last decade rather than preparing for 
the next generation of secure and efficient travel.
    There is a major opportunity to modernize the systems DHS 
sought to strengthen with REAL ID 14 years ago.
    I would like to thank the Committee for its leadership to 
ensuring secure, efficient travel for all Americans. U.S. 
Travel and our industry look forward to working with you on 
this issue.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Barnes follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Tori Emerson Barnes, Executive Vice President, 
           Public Affairs and Policy, U.S. Travel Association
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, members of the 
Subcommittee . . . good morning.
    I'm Tori Barnes, Executive Vice President of Public Affairs and 
Policy for the U.S. Travel Association. Thank you for inviting our 
association, the voice of the broader travel industry, to participate 
in this important hearing.
    U.S. Travel is the only association that represents all sectors of 
the travel industry--hotels, airports, state and local tourism offices, 
car rental companies, theme parks and attractions, and many others. 
With such a diverse membership, our association has a focused mission: 
to increase travel to and within the United States, while maintaining 
the highest standards of security.
    In 2018, domestic travelers spent $933 billion in the United 
States, representing 86 percent of total travel expenditures. Domestic 
travel spending directly supported 7.7 million American jobs.\1\ Travel 
is vital to the American economy and workforce, and some of the best 
programs we have to facilitate travel are also ones that strengthen 
security the most.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.ustravel.org/system/files/media_root/document/
Research_Fact-Sheet_Domestic
-Travel.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And that's what I would like to speak with you about today--to 
discuss ways we can improve security and efficiency ahead of the 
October 1, 2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
    The REAL ID Act was passed in 2005, and its full implementation has 
been put off by a series of extensions intended to give states time to 
bring their IDs into compliance.\2\ Now, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has said the days of REAL ID delays is over, and every 
American will need a REAL ID license or an acceptable alternative--such 
as a U.S. passport, a U.S. military ID, an enhanced driver's license or 
a DHS trusted traveler card--to fly next October.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://www.dhs.gov/state-extensions
    \3\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_Infographic
.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But Americans simply are not REAL ID ready.
    U.S. Travel commissioned Longwoods International, a market research 
consultancy, to conduct two surveys measuring both the public's 
understanding of REAL ID Act requirements and awareness of the October 
1, 2020 enforcement deadline. The studies, which were fielded in July 
and September 2019, found that an estimated 182 million Americans (72 
percent) say they do not have a REAL ID license or are unsure if they 
do, and 57 percent of Americans are unaware of the October 1, 2020 
deadline for REAL ID enforcement.
    In fact, according to our survey, an estimated 99 million Americans 
(39 percent) say they do not currently have any acceptable form of 
identification (such as a REAL ID license, U.S. passport, a U.S. 
military ID, an enhanced driver's license or a DHS trusted traveler 
card) that can be used to fly starting October 1, 2020. This finding is 
especially concerning, since, according to the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and DHS, travelers that arrive at the airport 
without a REAL ID or an acceptable alternative will be turned away from 
the checkpoint and not be allowed through security to board their 
flights.
    U.S. Travel Association economists estimate that if the REAL ID 
deadline were implemented today, approximately 78,500 American 
travelers would be denied boarding on the first day. This would cost 
the U.S. economy over $40.3 million in lost travel-related spending.
    If that trend were to continue for a week, 549,500 million 
travelers would be turned away, costing nearly $282 million in lost 
spending.\4\ This is simply unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_SurveyFind
ings.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To help solve this problem, the U.S. Travel Association launched an 
industry-wide public education campaign to increase awareness of the 
October 1, 2020 deadline for REAL ID enforcement and to encourage 
Americans to get a compliant driver's license or acceptable alternative 
before next October.
    But we can't solve this by simply pushing people to the DMV. 
Especially when two states, Oregon and Oklahoma, are not yet issuing 
REAL IDs and aren't expected to begin until next summer.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://www.dhs.gov/real-id
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    REAL ID represented the most secure form of identification when it 
was conceived in 2005, but technology has advanced greatly in the past 
14 years. There is an opportunity to bring security into the future, 
rather than just working to meet the requirements of the past. In order 
to take advantage of this opportunity, Congress and the administration 
must act.
    U.S. Travel has outlined four policy proposals to modernize 
security and avoid chaos at our airports come October 1, 2020.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/
document/REALID_Factsheet_
UST.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First: Turning travelers away at the checkpoint is not an option. 
Congress should immediately direct the TSA to work with the private 
sector to develop procedures for clearing travelers that do not have a 
REAL ID or acceptable alternative on October 1, 2020. In particular, 
rural airports with limited resources and infrequent air travelers need 
to have procedures in place to securely screen travelers who are not 
REAL ID ready. DHS and TSA should leverage existing airport 
infrastructure, services and identification methods to provide a 
solution for passengers who are unable or unaware of the need to obtain 
a REAL ID driver's license or accepted alternative.
    Second: Congress must immediately direct DHS to utilize the 
existing security and identification features of trusted traveler 
programs by designating TSA Precheck and CLEAR enrollment as acceptable 
alternatives to REAL ID licenses. This process should be in place no 
later than October 1, 2020. Enrollees in TSA Precheck, for example, 
must be vetted against several law enforcement databases, ensuring 
greater security than a REAL ID alone.
    Third: Congress must immediately act to modernize the REAL ID Act 
to allow for mobile devices and web-based REAL ID applications, and to 
permit TSA to accept mobile or digital REAL ID-compliant driver's 
licenses.
    The REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. Sec. 30301 Note) and Federal 
regulations governing state implementation (6 CFR Part 37) require 
first-time applicants to apply in person at a DMV and present physical, 
rather than electronic, documents for verification. The in-person 
application requirements stem from statutory language directing the 
``presentation and verification'' of source documents that DHS 
interprets to mean in-person transactions using physical documents. The 
REAL ID Act directive for states to complete a ``mandatory facial 
capture'' is also interpreted by DHS to mean an in-person transaction 
at a physical DMV location.
    Modernizing the law and regulations will reduce DMV backlogs and 
increase security checkpoint efficiency. In 2005 there was no TSA 
Precheck and no mobile boarding passes--advances in technology have 
allowed for greater security than America had when the law was enacted.
    Fourth: DHS should accelerate the implementation of biometric 
identity verification technology at TSA checkpoints. This is simply a 
way to provide faster, more secure screening, using information that 
trusted travelers and passport holders have already provided to DHS. 
This is what TSOs are already doing--verifying an ID matches the person 
in front of them. Biometric identity verification does the exact same 
thing, but more accurately, securely and quickly. CBP is already using 
this technology in the Entry/Exit process. DHS should align with 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and move this technology to the TSA 
screening line to verify the identities of travelers who opt in.
    Let me be clear: When it comes to biometrics, we are advocating for 
uses that are:

   Opt-in, where Americans have already decided to provide 
        their information to DHS, the U.S. Department of State or a 
        trusted traveler program;

   Governed by clear and reasonable guidelines for accuracy, 
        privacy and performance; and

   Already being pursued by DHS at the direction of Congress, 
        such as biometric exit, registered traveler, and the PreCheck 
        biometric pilot program.

    We are asking Congress to prioritize the opt-in programs that 
already have millions of participants; direct DHS to issue clear rules 
for accuracy, privacy, and performance as soon as possible; and align 
TSA's implementation of biometrics for passport holders and Precheck 
enrollees with DHS goals for implementing biometric exit.
    If we don't use this as an opportunity to modernize REAL ID 
requirements, expand trusted traveler programs and enhance and improve 
biometrics, states, Congress, DHS and the traveling public will spend 
the next year simply trying to meet the policies of the last decade, 
rather than preparing for the next generation of secure and efficient 
travel.
    There is a major opportunity to modernize the systems DHS sought to 
strengthen with REAL ID 14 years ago. I'd like to thank the Committee 
for its leadership in ensuring secure, efficient travel for all 
Americans. U.S. Travel and our industry looks forward to working with 
you on this issue.
    Thank you.
                                 ______
                                 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                 

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Barnes.
    Mr. McLaughlin.

STATEMENT OF CHRIS McLAUGHLIN, CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER, DENVER 
                     INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

    Mr. McLaughlin. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, 
members of the Subcommittee, Senator Gardner, thank you for 
your continued leadership on aviation security and for inviting 
me to this important hearing. I look forward to sharing an 
airport perspective on the importance of enhancing aviation 
security.
    I am particularly grateful to testify at today's hearing 
because aviation and airport security has been a career-long 
passion. Over the past 20 years, I have worked in nearly every 
sector of our industry, including for airlines where I ran 
ground operations, for the TSA as the Federal Security Director 
for Colorado, and in D.C. where I led the initial deployment of 
TSA's PreCheck program as the Assistant Administrator for 
Security Operations. And most recently I worked for two 
disruptive technology companies helping them to gain traction 
in commercial aviation security.
    This morning, I would like to focus on the importance of 
continued innovation in aviation security, with specific regard 
to security modernization, continued focus on TSA PreCheck, and 
the implementation of REAL ID.
    Innovation in aviation security is critical for three main 
reasons. First and foremost, we must stay ahead of an adaptive 
and committed adversary. Second, we must keep up with ever-
increasing passenger volumes. And third, airports must maintain 
the autonomy to flex to our unique customer needs and 
preferences.
    As threats to aviation have evolved, DEN has been 
proactive. Notably, we have begun to overhaul our main terminal 
in a way that strengthens the public area without compromising 
its iconic nature. In response to attacks in pre-security 
airport locations, we are repositioning our checkpoints to more 
quickly disperse and insulate our passengers.
    We have worked with the TSA to explore innovations to bring 
this vision to life. Soon we will roll out TSA's CT program. 
Earlier we were among the first airports in the Nation to 
install automated screening lanes. And last fall, we became the 
first to permanently install a new generation body scanner that 
is more natural, less invasive, and faster than traditional 
systems.
    While keeping security top of mind, we also remain keenly 
aware of our passenger volumes. Currently the fifth busiest 
airport in the country, DEN is experiencing exceptional growth. 
We will hit nearly 70 million passengers this year.
    New technologies get us closer to meeting our passenger 
demand, but technology alone is not enough. TSA PreCheck, for 
example, has succeeded at improving the screening process for 
its members. However, low enrollment has delayed the ultimate 
goal of improving security and processing time for all 
passengers. TSA must advance PreCheck, and the best way to do 
this is through initiatives specified in the TSA Modernization 
Act.
    Recognizing that robust identify verification fortifies 
risk-based security, DEN supports the implementation of REAL 
ID, and we are committed to doing our part to ensure the 
traveling public is well informed before they get to the 
checkpoint. We also believe that the voluntary use of 
biometrics can complement REAL ID.
    Clearly, our need to stay ahead of the next threat, coupled 
with our passenger growth, has impacted our identity as an 
airport. It is with this in mind that we sought to expand, to 
re-imagine, and to modernize our checkpoints. We are doing our 
part, and TSA has made some progress, especially in formally 
developing their gifting policy.
    That said, the process should be easier and, frankly, it 
should be less expensive. We are making substantial investments 
in order to deliver our future checkpoint. DEN is buying the 
equipment. We are paying for the installation. We are paying to 
remove and store the existing equipment, and we are funding a 
4-year maintenance plan. We are not doing this because we agree 
that local jurisdictions should finance the Federal security 
system. We are doing it because our customers cannot afford to 
wait.
    Two years ago, our CEO, Kim Day, offered this Committee two 
actions that Congress could take to address the funding needed 
to modernize security.
    First, Congress should discontinue diverting the 9/11 
security fee. Last fiscal year, $1.4 billion of security fees 
were diverted away. In fact, billions of dollars that could 
have gone to testing and deploying innovative technology have 
instead gone to pay down unrelated government activities since 
the law was changed in 2013.
    The second is the passenger facility charge, or the PFC. 
Even a modest increase in the PFC would give airports the 
flexibility to prioritize security efforts to match passenger 
growth.
    Both these ideas remain valid today.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to testify in front of 
the Subcommittee, and I am confident that with your leadership 
we can capitalize on real opportunities to make travel safer 
and more efficient. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Chris McLaughlin, Chief Operating Officer, 
                      Denver International Airport
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for your continued leadership on aviation 
security and for inviting me to this important hearing. My name is 
Chris McLaughlin, and I am the Chief Operating Officer of Denver 
International Airport (DEN). Security is a critical focus for airport 
operators, and I look forward to sharing an airport perspective on the 
continued importance of enhancing aviation security.
    I would also like to thank Senator Gardner, who serves on the full 
committee, for continuing to be a great champion for Colorado and 
Denver's airport. His leadership in fostering innovation and driving 
forward-looking security solutions at our Nation's airports has 
resulted in increased efficiency and security for the traveling public.
    I am particularly grateful to testify in today's hearing because 
aviation and airport security has been a career-long passion of mine. 
Over the past twenty years, I have worked in nearly every sector of our 
industry. I worked for two airlines where I ran ground operations at 
both the hub and system level; for the TSA, where I served as the 
Federal Security Director for Colorado, and here in D.C. as the 
assistant administrator for security operations. In that role, I 
oversaw all 450 U.S. airports. I also played a leadership role in the 
development and deployment of TSA's PreCheck program. Prior to joining 
the airport, I served in executive roles for two disruptive technology 
companies, helping them to gain traction during the early phases of 
their growth in commercial aviation security.
    This morning, I would like to focus my remarks on the importance of 
continued innovation in aviation security, with specific regard to a 
few key areas: the need to modernize our security infrastructure and 
the acquisition challenges associated with doing so, continued focus on 
important programs like TSA PreCheck, the implementation of REAL ID, 
and advancements in biometric technology. I know these issues are 
important to the Subcommittee, and I would like to convey how important 
they are to airports as well.
    Innovation in aviation security is critical for three main reasons. 
First and foremost, we must stay ahead of an adaptive and committed 
adversary. Second, we must keep up with ever increasing passenger 
volumes--from infrastructure to operations. And third, airports must 
maintain the autonomy to differentiate ourselves according to our 
unique customer needs and preferences.
    As threats to aviation have evolved, Denver has proactively 
responded to the changing landscape, making a point to partner with 
Department of Homeland Security agencies and airlines on innovations 
that enhance security. Perhaps most publicly, we have embarked on a 
project to overhaul our main terminal in a manner that strengthens our 
public area security posture without compromising its iconic nature. 
Largely in response to attacks in pre-security areas like Brussels and 
Istanbul, and domestic incidents like those at Fort Lauderdale and LAX, 
Denver is repositioning our checkpoints in a manner that more quickly 
disperses and insulates our passengers.
    From the beginning of our planning process, we have worked 
diligently with TSA to explore potential innovations that allow TSA 
officers to focus on security at the checkpoint--rather than crowd 
control.

   We partnered with TSA in 2017 to pilot a palm-print 
        biometric authentication technology.

   We were among the first airports in the Nation to install 
        Automated Screening Lanes, and because of the positive results 
        we have seen, we are planning our next phase of installations 
        now.

   We are among the first group of airports selected for TSA's 
        CT program and will soon be installing six lanes at DEN.

   Last but not least--having served as the Federal Security 
        Director for TSA when AIT was first deployed a decade ago--I am 
        grateful that last fall DEN became the first airport in the 
        Nation to install a new generation of body scanning technology 
        that is more natural, less invasive, and faster than 
        traditional systems.

    While our primary objective in this project has been to improve 
security, we have remained keenly aware of our growth in passenger 
traffic as well. Currently the 5th busiest airport in the country and 
20th in the world, Denver is experiencing exponential growth. We 
eclipsed 60 million passengers served in 2017, and just two years 
later, we will serve nearly 70 million travelers this year.
    Each of the technologies that I mentioned gets us closer to meeting 
our passenger demand. In addition to these, it is critical that TSA 
continue to advance its risk-based security initiatives. TSA PreCheck 
has succeeded in its goal of enhancing security and improving the 
screening process for individuals enrolled in the program. However, the 
low overall enrollment rate has prevented TSA from achieving its 
ultimate goal of improving security and processing time for all 
passengers. TSA must continue to advance the PreCheck program and it is 
my belief that the best way to do this is through the third-party 
initiatives specified in the TSA Modernization Act.
    Recognizing that robust identity authentication and verification is 
a critical component of risked-based security, DEN supports the 
upcoming implementation of REAL ID and we are committed to doing our 
part to ensure the traveling public is well informed and prepared 
before they get to the checkpoint. Similarly, we believe that the 
voluntary use of biometrics improves the passenger experience for some 
while strengthening security for all. We support guardrails to protect 
the privacy of the traveling public. Still, based on existing aviation 
programs and consumer trends in other areas, it is likely that a 
growing number of passengers will voluntarily submit their biometrics 
in order to expedite their security screening process. By verifying 
these passengers' identity faster, officers have more time to verify 
remaining passengers using traditional means.
    While it may not be clear that ``individualism'' is something that 
should be considered at a hearing on security, our identity is 
something that we take very seriously at DEN. We are proud to have been 
recognized as the top U.S. airport by Skytrax and The Wall Street 
Journal this past year. Yet, at least for The Journal, we achieved this 
ranking despite finishing 17th out of the top 20 airports for our 
overall security experience. This score is not a reflection on the hard 
work or customer focus of our TSA partners. Rather it reflects 
checkpoints that need to be expanded, re-imagined, and modernized. As I 
said earlier, we are doing our part, and TSA is working with us.
    We appreciate TSA's effort in developing its gifting policy and for 
issuing an approved list of automated screening lane vendors this year. 
And we applaud the deliberate work the agency has undertaken to test 
new technology and ensure our security remains the highest priority. 
That said, it feels like the process should be easier, and frankly, 
less expensive for airports.
    We are making substantial financial investments in order to deliver 
a checkpoint with modern technology. DEN is buying the equipment, 
paying for its installation, paying to remove and store existing 
equipment, and--under the new gifting program--funding a four-year 
maintenance plan. After which, we will be ``allowed'' to give the 
equipment to TSA. We are not alone in this. Other local jurisdictions 
as well as airlines are making similar investments. We're not doing 
this because we believe we should. We're doing it because our customers 
can't afford for us to wait.
    There is growing concern across the industry that the aviation 
community's willingness to lend a hand after long TSA lines created a 
perceived crisis in the summer 2016, is drifting into an expectation 
that local jurisdictions will finance the Federal security system.
    Two years ago, our CEO Kim Day came before this Committee and 
offered two ideas Congress could authorize to address the funding 
needed to modernize security and keep pace with the exceptional growth 
in air travel:
    First, Congress could discontinue the practice of diverting the 9/
11 security fee revenues to non-security purposes. In Fiscal Year 2019 
alone, $1.4 billion of the fees air travelers paid for security were 
diverted away. In fact, billions of dollars that could have gone to 
testing innovative technology and recapitalizing checkpoints have 
instead gone to pay down unrelated government activities since the 
Balanced Budget Agreement of 2013 was signed. And, billions of future 
resources will similarly be diverted unless Congress addresses this 
situation.
    The second is the Passenger Facility Charge, or PFC. Even a modest 
increase in the PFC on originating and destination passengers would 
give airports the flexibility to prioritize security efforts to match 
the growth we are seeing.
    Both ideas remain valid today.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to testify in front of the 
Subcommittee today. I am confident that with your leadership--and the 
work of our stakeholders represented here at this witness table--that 
we can capitalize on real opportunities to make travel safer and more 
efficient.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin.
    And the next witness, Ms. Beyer.

    STATEMENT OF LAUREN BEYER, VICE PRESIDENT, SECURITY AND 
               FACILITATION, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA

    Ms. Beyer. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member 
Markey, and members of the Subcommittee.
    My name is Lauren Beyer, and I am the Vice President for 
Security and Facilitation at Airlines for America. Thank you 
for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security.
    As an industry, the safety and security of our passengers 
and employees is our single highest priority. We recognize the 
sometimes challenging security environment when operating all 
over the world, and these challenges have grown in recent years 
to include cybersecurity and unmanned aircraft systems. We are 
dedicated to working cooperatively and collaboratively with TSA 
and other partners to confront these challenges.
    U.S. airlines strongly advocate for the development of 
pragmatic, risk-based, and outcome-focused security measures. 
Such an approach provides a framework that is more agile and 
more responsive to threats and allows TSA and industry to focus 
resources on the highest risks.
    We must continue to build a partnership with TSA that is 
collaborative and proactive. We have made good progress in this 
regard under Administrator Pekoske's leadership, and we 
appreciate the administrator's steadfast commitment to making 
consistent coordination with industry part of the agency's 
culture and standard way of doing business. Coordination is key 
to security.
    I would also like to thank this Committee for the 
monumental achievement of enacting the TSA Modernization Act 
last year. Many of the provisions in that bill were critical 
security initiatives for airlines. We continue to urge TSA to 
expeditiously and fully implement those provisions that are 
outstanding, and we respectfully request this subcommittee 
continue oversight of timely implementation. A few provisions 
to note.
    We are pleased that TSA has established an air cargo 
security office in accordance with the Act. Consolidation of 
air cargo expertise and decisionmaking within TSA will be 
hugely beneficial to provide focus, momentum, and clear 
guidance on cargo security initiatives. We have already seen 
progress through TSA's successful rollout of the Third-Party 
Canine Program, and we continue to work with TSA on efforts to 
advance additional technological resources for the screening of 
air cargo.
    We are also in strong support of the innovation provisions 
in the Act, and we encourage TSA to focus on expediting the 
resourcing and permanent rollout of successful innovation 
pilots so that these efforts are seen through from idea to 
completion.
    Insider threat continues to be of great concern to the 
aviation industry. U.S. airlines are committed to working 
proactively with TSA, the FAA, and other industry partners to 
mitigate this continuing challenge. In fact, A4A, along with 
our stakeholder partners, hosted an event earlier this year to 
solicit insider threat best practices.
    We are also an avid supporter of and participant in the 
Aviation Security Advisory Committee's Insider Threat 
subcommittee.
    While not part of the TSA Modernization Act, I would also 
like to emphasize and voice some concern regarding the October 
1, 2020 REAL ID enforcement deadline for boarding commercial 
aircraft. U.S. airlines have been working closely with DHS and 
TSA to amplify their messaging. Since DHS and TSA have not 
indicated any willingness to extend the deadline, we are 
committed to keeping up the momentum to educate travelers. 
However, much needs to be done within the next year for a 
smooth transition. We appreciate Chairman Wicker's leadership 
in raising awareness of REAL ID requirements and look forward 
to working with the Committee on this issue.
    Finally, two points on funding.
    First, this Committee knows well that a portion of the 
aviation security fees are diverted to our general deficit 
reduction every year. We continue to request Congress redirect 
TSA passenger security fee revenue back to aviation security. 
And we appreciate Ranking Member Markey and Senator 
Blumenthal's leadership on this issue and their legislation 
eliminating the diversion.
    Second, I would be remiss not to mention and emphasis the 
importance of operational stability and predictability for the 
TSA during any lapse in funding. The airline industry is 
reliant upon the TSA providing critical security services. We 
implore all involved to make sure budgetary contingency plans 
are in place to allow TSA to operate normally if a shutdown 
caused by a lack of funding occurs.
    Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to testify and look 
forward to any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Beyer follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Lauren Beyer, Vice President, Security and 
                   Facilitation, Airlines for America
    Good morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members 
of the Subcommittee. My name is Lauren Beyer, and I am the Vice 
President for Security and Facilitation at Airlines for America (A4A). 
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security.
    Overview. The safety and security of our passengers and employees 
is our single highest priority. We recognize the sometimes-challenging 
security environment when operating in more than 800 airports in nearly 
80 countries, and these challenges have grown in recent years to also 
include cybersecurity and unmanned aircraft systems. We are dedicated 
to working cooperatively and collaboratively with the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and other partners around the world every 
day to keep our skies safe and secure.
    Securing the aviation system protects people first and foremost, 
but it also helps preserve the American economy. The U.S. airline 
industry helps drive $1.5 trillion annually in U.S. economic activity 
and supports more than 10 million U.S. jobs. When talking about the 
daily challenges of aviation security it is important to understand the 
depth and magnitude of what takes place and what is transported by air: 
U.S. airlines carry 2.4 million passengers and more than 58,000 tons of 
cargo every single day. The National Strategy for Aviation Security 
(NSAS) published in December of last year underscores this dual 
objective:

        ``The NSAS aims to enhance the safety and security of the 
        Aviation Ecosystem, preserving the freedom of operations for 
        legitimate pursuits and facilitating American prosperity.'' \1\
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    \1\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NSAS-
Signed.pdf

    Given the vast geography and sheer volume of air travel it is 
exceedingly important that we approach security in a smart, effective, 
and efficient manner that best utilizes the finite resources available 
to both improve security and facilitate commerce. This becomes even 
more imperative given the expectation that both passenger and cargo 
traffic are expected to grow in the coming years.
    Indeed, the 2019 summer travel season was the busiest ever with TSA 
screening 262 million passengers and crew between May 22-September 3. 
This equates to an almost 3.4 percent increase over last year. Overall, 
TSA performed well during this critical season, and I would like to 
thank TSA for addressing the growing volume of passengers and cargo 
with increased staffing and overtime allocation.
    Risk-Based Security. As an industry, we believe aviation benefits 
most from the principles of risk-based security--which is the lynchpin 
and bedrock of our security system today. A risk-based approach 
recognizes that ``one size fits all'' security is not the optimum 
response to threats. The implementation of risk-based, outcome-focused 
measures has been a widely accepted approach to aviation security by 
governments and industry alike for some time. We know the effectiveness 
of risk-based security and we therefore strongly support it.
    One of our Nation's greatest challenges is to strike the right 
balance when managing risk. Enhanced aviation security and the 
efficient facilitation of passengers and cargo are not mutually 
exclusive goals; government and industry must continue to work together 
to find pragmatic approaches that appropriately balance these goals.
    By utilizing and following risk-based principles we provide a 
security framework that is more agile and more responsive to current 
and emerging threats and allows TSA and industry to focus resources on 
the highest risks. This framework also takes the operational complexity 
of the U.S. aviation system into account.
    Key to our effort to develop and effectively implement risk-based 
security measures is coordination between TSA and industry. We must 
continue to build partnerships between TSA and industry that focus on 
pursuing security improvements in a collaborative and proactive manner. 
Congress emphasized the importance of this partnership throughout the 
TSA Modernization Act of 2018.
    Published last year, the TSA Administrator's Intent which sets out 
how TSA intends to execute its strategy through the end of 2020 
specifically directs the agency through its guiding principles to 
``actively seek stakeholder input'' and to ``collaborate to drive value 
. . . through action, transparency and accountability.'' Further, the 
first strategic priority is to improve security, including through 
``consistent communications and coordination with regulated and non-
regulated partners.'' \2\ We have made good progress in this regard 
under Administrator Pekoske's leadership, and U.S. airlines appreciate 
the Administrator's steadfast commitment to making consistent 
coordination and collaboration with industry part of the agency's 
culture and standard way of doing business.
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    \2\ https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/tsaadminintent_2018.pdf
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    TSA Modernization Act. I would like to thank this Subcommittee and 
the Congress for the monumental achievement of enacting the TSA 
Modernization Act, the first reauthorization of TSA in its 18-year 
existence. Many of the provisions in this bill were important to our 
membership to move critical security initiatives forward. One such 
provision was the establishment of a 5-year term for the TSA 
Administrator. The continuity and stability that a 5-year term will 
bring to a still young agency that has experienced tremendous 
leadership turnover is much needed.
    A4A and airlines have met with TSA periodically since the bill's 
passage to review implementation status. While we recognize the volume 
of requirements placed on TSA by the bill and in some cases the short 
deadline required, we continue to urge TSA to expeditiously and fully 
implement those provisions that are outstanding. We respectfully ask 
this Subcommittee to do the same.
    A4A has also partnered with TSA directly or through our 
participation on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) to 
provide input on TSA's execution of several provisions. One example of 
this partnership is the provision that requires an airport worker 
access controls cost and feasibility study. For TSA to assess the 
impact of employee screening including a comparison of estimated costs 
and effectiveness to TSA, airports, and airlines, it necessarily 
requires close coordination with industry to ensure the full scale of 
potential impact is considered.
    Several cargo-related provisions of the TSA Modernization Act 
deserve mention. We are pleased that TSA has established an air cargo 
security office within TSA Policy, Plans and Engagement. Consolidation 
of air cargo expertise and decision-making within TSA will be hugely 
beneficial to provide focus, momentum and clear guidance on critical 
cargo security initiatives, including those based on recommendations 
from the ASAC Air Cargo Subcommittee. We have already seen progress 
through TSA's successful rollout of the Third-Party Canine Program. We 
continue to work with TSA on efforts to advance additional 
technological resources for the screening of air cargo and hope to see 
additional progress in the coming year.
    Innovation in aviation security is key to ensure we continue to 
stay ahead of adversaries, and innovation frequently has the added 
benefit of improving the customer experience. This is a primary reason 
we support TSA's Innovation Task Force (ITF). We encourage TSA to now 
shift their focus to expediting the resourcing and permanent rollout of 
successful ITF pilots so that these efforts are seen through from idea 
to completion.
    Additionally, A4A supports TSA's evaluation of biometrics for 
identity verification at the security checkpoint as well as the 
consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The primary 
benefit of the biometric program is the enhanced ability to protect 
against identity fraud, but we also believe it enhances customer 
experience.
    A4A members have worked closely with TSA and CBP during this 
process. While we believe the privacy protections currently in place 
are effective, we will continue to work with TSA and our passengers to 
ensure the highest levels of privacy. Airlines already collect and 
transmit biographic data to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
to comply with Federal security requirements, so we have experience in 
the area. Airlines, like DHS, also have committed to strict privacy 
principles as it relates to the use of biometric information. For 
facial recognition technology, these principles include opt-out options 
and non-retention of photos for business purposes. We all agree that 
privacy is of the utmost importance.
    REAL ID. Effective October 1, 2020, travelers will be required to 
have a REAL ID compliant driver's license or alternate approved 
identification to pass through TSA checkpoints at airports, the final 
enforcement deadline of the REAL ID Act of 2005.
    We appreciate Chairman Wicker's leadership in raising awareness of 
REAL ID in recent hearings and the media about the potential disruption 
to air travel next year for those passengers who are not prepared with 
a compliant driver's license or other form of identification.
    U.S. airlines have been working closely with DHS and TSA to amplify 
their messaging and to direct travelers to the appropriate websites to 
ensure they're educated about how to obtain a REAL ID compliant 
identification card. To that end, A4A participated in the TSA's press 
conference on October 1, along with other coalition partners, to 
highlight our public awareness campaigns.
    Over the last year, we have undertaken a variety of activities to 
highlight this issue. For example, our coalition wrote the states' 
governors asking them to join us in making the public more aware of the 
upcoming deadline. Since consumers in many states still have the choice 
between a non-compliant ID, the states need to play a key role in 
ensuring that consumers understand that even some new IDs may not be 
compliant. We also asked the governors to consider revising 
communications to their residents to make clear the difference between 
REAL ID compliant and non-compliant IDs.
    U.S. airlines also are employing a variety of methods to 
prominently share information such as posting notices of the upcoming 
change on their websites and social media, deploying videos on their 
in-flight entertainment systems in addition to putting the message in 
in-flight magazines.
    Since DHS and TSA have not given any indication of a willingness to 
extend the deadline, we are committed to keeping up the momentum in 
educating the public in order to ensure that the 2.4 million people who 
travel every day will be able to flow through the system as seamlessly 
as possible.
    Insider Threats. Insider threat continues to be of great concern to 
the aviation industry, and incidents in recent years are a reminder of 
the constant vigilance required to keep our skies safe. U.S. airlines 
are committed to working proactively with TSA, the Federal Aviation 
Administration and other industry partners to mitigate this continuing 
challenge. In fact, A4A along with many of our stakeholder partners 
hosted an event earlier this year that brought together subject matter 
experts from across the industry and government to solicit airport and 
aircraft security best practices. These practices were shared across 
U.S. aviation industry stakeholders. We are currently working with TSA 
and our other stakeholder partners to determine the best mechanism to 
continue such voluntary sharing of best practices, whether that be an 
insider threat information-sharing platform or an ongoing industry-wide 
working group.
    A4A is also an avid supporter of and participant in the ASAC, 
including its Subcommittee on Insider Threat. We strongly believe the 
ASAC is the best venue in which to examine and produce recommendations 
on insider threats and other security matters. The ASAC includes 
representatives from across the aviation industry and is the 
traditional mechanism through which TSA and industry collaborate to 
develop the most effective aviation security measures. The ASAC is a 
tried, tested and proven mechanism to provide the TSA Administrator 
diverse stakeholder input and sound security recommendations that 
achieve the objective of enhanced security while maintaining respect 
for and flexibility that accommodates the complexity of the U.S. 
aviation system. This fact is recognized both by Congress through the 
numerous provisions of the TSA Modernization Act that require 
consultation with or recommendations from the ASAC as well as the TSA 
through their strong history of acceptance of ASAC recommendations and 
the recent establishment of a similar committee for surface 
transportation stakeholders.
    Stop the annual practice of diverting passenger security fee 
revenue. U.S. aviation and its customers are subject to 17 Federal 
aviation taxes and `fees'. Included within those numbers are revenues 
that are intended to support activities at the TSA, including the 
September 11th TSA Passenger Security Fee. As this Subcommittee knows 
well, that `fee' is $5.60 imposed per one-way trip on passengers 
enplaning at U.S. airports with a limit of $11.20 per round trip; the 
fee also applies to inbound international passengers making a U.S. 
connection.
    However, starting in Fiscal Year 2014, Congress started diverting a 
portion of that fee toward general deficit reduction and is scheduled 
to continue diverting these critical resources through Fiscal Year 
2027. From our perspective, this policy is simply unacceptable. 
Airlines and their customers now pay $1.8 billion more in TSA security 
fees--$4.1 billion (2018) vs. $2.3 billion (2013)--for the exact same 
service. The concept of a `fee' specifically charged to pay for a 
specific service has long been lost in our industry and they have all 
simply become taxes by another name. We would respectfully request this 
Committee do everything in its power to redirect TSA passenger security 
fee revenue back where it belongs: paying for aviation security. These 
diverted funds could go a long way to increase TSA capacity and 
capability to mitigate risk.
    We appreciate Ranking Member Markey and Senator Blumenthal's 
leadership on this issue through introduction of legislation to 
eliminate the diversion of security fees.
    TSA Funding. I would be remiss not to mention and emphasize the 
importance of operational stability and predictability for the TSA 
during times of government shutdown caused by a lack of appropriation. 
The airline industry is reliant upon the TSA providing critical 
security services; simply, they are essential to our operations. Even 
minor variations in staffing levels can have dramatic impacts on wait 
times. Shutdowns come in various forms and circumstance. However, they 
all have one common thread in that they quickly expose the critical 
role our government professionals play in many aspects of our lives 
that we simply take for granted as standard operating procedure. We 
implore all involved to make sure budgetary contingency plans are in 
place to allow TSA to operate normally if a shutdown caused by lack of 
funding occurs. We welcome the Committee's support in the development 
and implementation of practical and agreeable solutions that would 
mitigate or alleviate any future shutdown scenarios. We believe the 
traveling and shipping public deserve continuity.
    Thank you, we appreciate the opportunity to testify and look 
forward to any questions.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Beyer.
    Mr. Cornick.

   STATEMENT OF KEN CORNICK, CO-FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, CLEAR

    Mr. Cornick. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking 
Member Markey, and members of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee 
on Security.
    My name is Ken Cornick. I am the Co-founder and President 
of CLEAR, a registered traveler company, and I am honored to be 
here today.
    Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act of 2001. This legislation led 
to the creation of the Registered Traveler, or RT, program. 
Congress' goal was to both enhance security and improve the 
traveler experience. In 2006, under the Federal registry 
notice, multiple RT providers began operations. Unfortunately, 
RT providers fell victim to the great recession and in 2008 
ceased operations.
    Together with my co-founder, Caryn Seidman Becker, we 
purchased CLEAR's assets in 2010 and relaunched the company as 
a secure identify platform initially in Orland and Denver 
airports. We are proud to be an American-owned company with a 
mission to strengthen homeland security and delight consumers 
with frictionless experiences.
    CLEAR has grown significantly as travelers have recognized 
the efficiency of our biometric process, and airports have 
recognized the security, customer service, and economic 
benefits of adopting CLEAR. By year end, CLEAR will have around 
5 million members in 35 of our nation's largest airports. CLEAR 
processes almost 5 percent of the nation's originating air 
passengers using biometrics and upwards of 10 percent in the 
airports in which we operate.
    Our secure enrollment platform establishes an impermeable 
link between one's identity and their biometrics. Our process 
entails digitally authenticating a traveler's government-issued 
ID, establishing that the person enrolling is definitively the 
person on such document through the use of challenge questions 
driven by commercially available data, and last by capturing 
biometric data, including fingerprints, iris, and face. The 
enrollment process takes approximately 5 minutes. Once 
completed, the traveler can use CLEAR immediately.
    We have had a significant and positive economic impact in 
the communities in which we operate, as we have created over 
2,000 jobs and shared tens of millions of dollars with our 
airport partners and municipalities through revenue share 
agreements. Our success is driven by a strong public-private 
partnership with TSA. This partnership is a win-win for all 
stakeholders, driving innovation, enhancing security, and 
efficiency for travelers. CLEAR is a force multiplier for TSA 
bringing significant additional resources to the checkpoint at 
no cost to taxpayers.
    We fully support TSA's efforts to drive checkpoint 
efficiency through the introduction of new technology such as 
biometrics. Further, CLEAR is eager and has offered to invest 
its own capital, technology, and labor at the checkpoint to 
support TSA in its mission.
    We can and want to do more with TSA. We see many areas for 
collaboration. We have vast experience in biometrics, 
credential authentication, biometrics deployment, identity 
management, and more.
    Given today's environment, I think it is really important 
to address data security, which is core to our business. We 
have invested significantly in cybersecurity to ensure our 
systems are best in class. CLEAR is subject to regular TSA 
audits, and as a result of those investments and TSA's 
oversight, we have been designated FISMA-High by TSA. That is 
the highest government cyber compliance rating available.
    CLEAR is also SAFETY Act certified by the Department of 
Homeland Security as a qualified anti-terrorism technology.
    In addition to securing our operations and our customers' 
data, we take the privacy of our members extremely seriously. 
CLEAR is a 100 percent opt-in service, and we do not sell 
customer data.
    From an operational perspective, our 2,000-plus passionate 
team members, also known as Ambassadors, are all SIDA-badged 
and trained on security.
    In the past few years, we have forged partnerships with 
premier travel companies, including Delta Airlines, United 
Airlines, Hertz, and American Express. With these partnerships, 
we are delivering seamless and secure traveler experiences from 
curb to gate. Examples include biometric bag check, lounge 
entry, boarding, and car rental exit lane.
    Beyond the airport, we have a partnership with major league 
baseball and sports teams to provide biometric ticketing and 
secure access to over 24 stadiums across the country.
    I want to thank the Committee for its ongoing support of 
the Registered Traveler program and its efforts to ensure it 
remains an important defense layer in aviation security.
    In closing, I ask Congress to support a modernization of 
the RT program and the resulting public-private partnership 
that is driving the use of biometrics in aviation security. We 
have come a long way, but we have more to do. By working with 
all stakeholders, we know we can continue to support TSA's 
mission and the goals of improving security while delighting 
travelers.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cornick follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Ken Cornick, Co-Founder and President, CLEAR
    Good Morning Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey and Members 
of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security.
    My name is Ken Cornick, I am a co-founder of CLEAR and the 
company's President. I am honored to be in front of you today.
    Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act of 2001. This legislation led to the 
creation of the Registered Traveler or RT program. Congress' goal was 
to both enhance security and improve the traveler experience. In 2006, 
under the Federal registry notice, multiple RT providers began 
operations. Unfortunately, RT providers fell victim to the Great 
Recession and in 2008, ceased operations.
    My partner and CLEAR's CEO Caryn Seidman Becker and I purchased 
CLEAR's assets in 2010. Soon after, we received approval from TSA to 
relaunch CLEAR and opened our first two airports in Orlando and Denver.
    CLEAR has grown significantly since then, as travelers have 
recognized the efficiency of our biometric process and airports have 
recognized the security, customer service and economic benefits of 
adopting CLEAR. By year-end, CLEAR will have 5 million members in 35 
of our Nation's largest airports. CLEAR processes almost 5 percent of 
the Nation's originating air passengers daily using biometrics, and 
upward of 10 percent in the airports we operate in.
    We have had a significant and positive economic impact in the 
communities in which we operate, as we have created over two thousand 
jobs and shared tens of millions of dollars with our airport partners.
    CLEAR is a secure identity platform. As an American-owned company, 
our mission is to innovate to strengthen our Homeland's security and 
delight consumers with frictionless experiences.
    Our secure enrollment platform establishes an impermeable link 
between one's identity and biometrics. Our process entails:

  1.  Digitally authenticating a traveler's government-issued 
        identification.

  2.  Establishing that the person enrolling is the person on such 
        document through the use of challenge questions driven by 
        commercially available data.

  3.  Capturing biometric data including fingerprints, iris image and 
        face.

    The enrollment process takes approximately five minutes and can be 
completed at any CLEAR location. Once completed, the traveler can use 
CLEAR immediately anywhere in our network for identity verification.
    Our success is driven by a strong public-private partnership with 
TSA. This partnership is a win-win for all stakeholders--driving 
innovation, enhancing security, and efficiency for travelers at zero 
cost to taxpayers. CLEAR is a force multiplier for TSA--bringing 
significant additional resources to the checkpoint.
    We support TSA's efforts to drive checkpoint efficiency through the 
introduction of new technology at the checkpoint and have numerous 
ideas that would enable CLEAR to further collaborate with TSA in the 
areas of biometrics and identity. Further, CLEAR is eager (and has 
offered) to invest its own capital, technology, and labor at the 
checkpoint to support TSA in its mission.
    We can and want to do more with TSA--we see many areas for 
collaboration, particularly as TSA pushes toward the use of biometrics 
at the checkpoint and beyond. We have vast experience and expertise in 
biometrics, credential authentication, biometrics deployment, identity 
management, and more.
    As CLEAR has grown, we have always maintained the underlying 
Congressional intent of the Registered Traveler program--improving 
overall security and enhancing the customer experience. We have done 
this while driving innovation to the checkpoint.
    Given the world we live in I think it is important to address data 
security, which is core to our business. We have invested significantly 
in cybersecurity to ensure our systems are best in class. CLEAR is 
subject to regular TSA audits and as a result of our investments and 
TSA's oversight, we have been designated FISMA-High by TSA--the highest 
government cyber compliance rating available.
    CLEAR's platform is also SAFETY Act Certified by the Department of 
Homeland Security as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology.
    In addition to securing our operations and our customers' data, we 
take the privacy of our members very seriously. CLEAR is a 100 percent 
opt-in service and we do not sell customer data.
    Customer service is another key element of CLEAR's culture. Our 
2,200+ passionate team members, also known as Ambassadors, are all SIDA 
badged, trained on security as well as customer service. Our employees 
are widely recognized as Ambassadors for the entire airport.
    They are always available to help any traveler, answer questions, 
be the extra eyes and ears or just be a friendly face at the screening 
area. We have also begun training our Ambassadors on human trafficking 
prevention.
    As a result of our relentless focus on security and customer 
service, we have become an instrumental partner for several premiere 
travel companies including Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, Hertz, and 
American Express.
    CLEAR's partnership with Delta Air Lines started in 2016 and 
continues today. Our partnership offers a discounted CLEAR membership 
for Delta frequent fliers and helped launch CLEAR into several new 
airports, including Atlanta, JFK, and other Delta hubs. Since then we 
have expanded our relationship with Delta to offer biometric lounge 
access and biometric boarding passes and are currently working with 
Delta on new and exciting innovations to improve the customer 
experience.
    Our second airline partnership, with United Airlines, was announced 
this past July. This partnership is already off to a great start; 
already tens of thousands of new United customers have joined CLEAR and 
we will soon bring CLEAR to United terminals in Chicago, Houston and 
Newark. We are also working with United on new innovations that will 
improve the travel experience for their customers.
    Overall, we are delivering on seamless and secure travel 
experiences from the curb to the gate. Specifically, we are working 
with our partners to permit quick entry into lounges, board an 
international departure with nothing more than your face and check your 
bag with your fingers.
    As we open CLEAR lanes throughout the United States, our 
partnerships bring great benefits to travelers and the communities we 
serve. For example, when Delta partnered with CLEAR, we entered 
Atlanta, Detroit, Minneapolis and Salt Lake City, bringing dozens of 
new jobs to each of those communities. When CLEAR enters O'Hare, Newark 
and the United terminal at Houston Intercontinental, we will create 200 
new jobs across those three cities. On average, our Ambassadors are 
paid more than $20 per hour and receive amazing benefits to include 
generous parental leave, full healthcare benefits and opportunities for 
our Ambassadors to advance.
    This year, we will share approximately $40 million with our airport 
partners and their communities as part of our airport operating 
contracts.
    Beyond the airport, we think about the travel ribbon and making 
travelers' journeys seamless and frictionless from the time they leave 
their home in the morning until they are in their hotel room that night 
in another city. We are committed to constantly innovating and 
improving the travel experience.
    One example of this commitment is our partnership with Hertz. 
Today, we have 14 Hertz Fast Lanes Powered by CLEAR, where Hertz 
President Club members can drive off the lot with their face. This 
program started in late-2018 and will grow to encompass top Hertz 
locations throughout the United States.
    CLEAR also has a partnership with Major League Baseball. Today, we 
have 24 sports partners including the Minnesota Twins, Texas Rangers, 
Miami Heat and Seattle Seahawks, and we recently launched our first 
collegiate partner--the University of Texas at Austin.
    We are not stopping at just airport security or travel/
entertainment. We have use cases that focus on improving the customer 
experience and reducing fraud in health care, biometric payment, age 
validation, and access. We have exciting announcements planned in those 
areas in the coming weeks.
    I want to thank the Committee for its support of the Registered 
Traveler program and its efforts to strengthen the program to ensure 
that it remains an important part of our Nation's aviation security 
layered defense.
    I will close by asking Congress to support a modernization of the 
RT program and the use of biometrics in aviation security. We have come 
a long way since 9/11, but we have much work to do. By working with 
Congress, TSA, our airport and airline partners, and other 
stakeholders. We know we can continue to support TSA's mission and the 
congressional goals of improving security and delighting travelers.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Cornick.
    Ms. Nelson.

STATEMENT OF SARA NELSON, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION 
               OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO

    Ms. Nelson. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and 
members of the Committee, my name is Sara Nelson. I am the 
International President of the Association of Flight 
Attendants-CWA representing 50,000 flight attendants at 20 
airlines. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today as a 
key stakeholder and partner in airport security.
    Before continuing, I would like to pause to recognize with 
profound sadness the passing of the Honorable Elijah Cummings. 
His was a voice of great moral clarity. We will miss the wisdom 
and strength with which he fought for working people, for his 
beloved Marylanders, and for our Nation.
    On September 11, 2001, I was a Boston-based flight 
attendant, and before 9/11 I worked United flight 175 
frequently. It could have been me on that fateful day, but 
instead it was people I knew and worked with and loved, 
including my good friends: Amy King, Michael Tarrou, Amy 
Jarret, Kathryn Laborie, Robert Fangman, Al Marchand, Alicia 
Titus, Marianne MacFarlane, and Jesus Sanchez. Security is 
personal for me and my flying partners. It is also fundamental 
to our ability to do our job.
    I remember airport security prior to September 11. I 
remember the faces of the screeners who allowed the terrorists 
entrance to terminal C at Logan and the ability to board flight 
175. I remember the screeners' faces because they were there 
all the time, 7 days a week, all hours of the day. I remember 
the sounds of their voices, their tired smiles, and their 
efforts to work long hours for the lowest bidding security 
company just so they could provide for their own families. I 
lost my friends, my profession was changed forever, but I also 
often wonder about those security agents and how they have 
coped with their part in failing to stop the most fatal attack 
on U.S. soil. Do they understand they were set up to fail?
    On a fairly regular basis, there has been an attempt to 
return to the old system where security checkpoints were 
contracted out to the lowest bidder. Any system that puts 
security second to profits borders on reckless and is 
unjustified regression from TSA's successful mission, quote, to 
protect the nation's transportation systems, to ensure freedom 
of movement for people and commerce.
    We strongly support maintaining a professional Federal 
Transportation Security Administration workforce. Federalizing 
airport screening has been a success. Improving the security of 
air travel and providing a rigorous review of our aviation 
security with oversight by legislators and input from aviation 
stakeholders and the traveling public. Crew and passengers are 
safer today because of it.
    We commend the efforts of TSA Administrator David Pekoske 
and the entire agency for extraordinary efforts during the 35-
day government shutdown. Transportation security officers who 
were required to report for work faced stress of unpaid bills 
and uncertainty about when they would resume getting a 
paycheck. This is an enormous distraction for the people 
charged with handling security on the front lines. The shutdown 
stretched people and resources and it put our security at risk. 
It should never be repeated, and resources allocated to airport 
security should never be diverted. We urge lawmakers to ensure 
funding is adequate and stable to maintain the successful 
mission with TSA.
    Safety and security does not just happen. It happens 
because we all work together to make it happen. Every day when 
flight attendants report to work at America's airport before we 
step onto the plane and assume our role as aviation's first 
responders, we rely upon well trained transportation security 
officers to ensure our safety and security and that of the 
flying public.
    Yet, this workforce of 44,000 Americans do not have the 
guarantees and benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act or the 
general schedule pay scale and they do not have the 
representation rights accorded by Congress to most of the 
Federal workforce under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
TSOs cannot appeal adverse personnel decisions even though TSA 
managers, cargo inspectors, and TSA administrative personnel 
have those rights. These are rights I work to protect for 
flight attendants, and what we should expect for the 
transportation security workforce. Congress should act to 
accord TSOs these rights and ensure safer skies by passing 
Senate bill 944, the Strengthening American Transportation 
Security Act of 2019.
    On Saturday afternoon, August 24, 2019, TSA announced 
changes to the Known Crew Member program, or KCM, without 
consulting unions representing airline crew members. This 
resulted in confusion and misunderstanding among crew members, 
as well as TSA personnel, as to what procedures were going to 
be implemented and when. It also raised concerns about purpose 
of the sudden change, causing distractions across aviation. In 
the future, anytime TSA considers changes to KCM or the 
standard security program for airlines or airports that affect 
crew members and flight security, the agency should interface 
with flight attendant and pilot unions to ensure the most 
successful implementation of programs and maintain confidence 
in our overall security.
    I would like to again thank the Chairman, Ranking Member, 
and members of the Committee for this opportunity to testify. 
We are proud of our work as aviation's first responders and the 
last line of defense in aviation security. We appreciate your 
attention and diligent efforts to ensure we have the proper 
tools to perform our work and to keep U.S. aviation safe and 
secure.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Nelson follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Sara Nelson, International President, 
             Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and Members of the 
Committee:

    My name is Sara Nelson, International President of the Association 
of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO (AFA), representing 50,000 Flight 
Attendants at 20 airlines. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today on improving airport security. This subject is critically 
important to aviation's first responders. We also serve as the last 
line of defense in aviation security.
TSA Workforce
    Flight Attendants strongly support maintaining a professional, 
Federal Transportation Security Administration workforce as part of the 
overall solution to safety and security in commercial aviation.
    On September 11, 2001, I was based in Boston as a United Airlines 
flight attendant. Before 9/11, I had worked United flight 175 
frequently. It could have been me on that fateful day, but instead it 
was people I knew and worked with, including my good friends Amy King, 
Michael Tarrou, Amy Jarret, Kathryn Laborie, Robert Fangman, Al 
Marchand, Alicia Titus, Marianne MacFarlane, and Jesus Sanchez. 
Security is very personal for me and my flying partners. It is also 
fundamental to our ability to do our jobs.
    I remember airport security prior to September 11th. I remember the 
faces of the screeners who allowed terrorists entrance to terminal C at 
Logan and the ability to board flight 175. I remember the screener's 
faces because they were there all the time, 7 days a week, all hours of 
the day. I remember the sounds of their voices, their tired smiles, and 
their efforts to work the long hours for the lowest bidding security 
company just so they could provide for their own families. I lost my 
friends, my profession was redefined and our world changed forever, but 
I also often wonder how those security agents have coped with their 
part in failing to stop the most fatal attack on U.S. soil. Do they 
understand they were set up to fail?
    When airport security was federalized, security improved 
immediately. When TSOs took over airport security, my personal security 
improved dramatically. When TSOs won the right to be represented by the 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), our security 
improved again because TSOs finally had a voice in their workplace. 
Efforts by TSA to standardize training at the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center has also created a more cohesive program and unified 
commitment to TSA's mission.
    AFA further supports full collective bargaining rights for 
Transportation Security Officers to negotiate for better working 
conditions, putting TSA officers on the General Schedule pay scale, and 
providing officers with much needed statutory worker protections such 
as the Rehabilitation Act against unfair labor practices. We believe 
these worker rights are integral to maintaining a strong, engaged 
workforce for aviation security.
    Safety and security doesn't just happen; it happens because we all 
work together to make it happen. My colleagues and I depend on TSA 
workers to keep our jobs safe. Federalizing airport screening has been 
a success, improving the security of air travel and providing a 
rigorous review of our aviation security with oversight by legislators 
and input from aviation stakeholders and the traveling public. Crew and 
passengers are safer today because of it. We continue to depend upon a 
regulated security system that meets the requirements of The 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 
Commission Act), Pub. L. 110-53.
Adequate Long-Term Funding
    Effective passenger and baggage screening is a vital part of our 
layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It is also a difficult 
job with massive responsibility.
    On a fairly regular basis there has been an attempt to return to 
the old system where security checkpoints were contracted out to the 
lowest bidder. To return to a bottom-line driven system that puts 
security second to profits borders on reckless and is an unjustified 
regression from TSA's successful mission 'to protect the Nation's 
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.'
    The Flight Attendants of this country act as first responders every 
day of the year and our lives depend on the integrity of each layer of 
security in the airport and on the aircraft. TSA must have the 
consistent, long-term funding to give screeners the staffing, support 
and training they need to do their jobs to help keep our skies safe and 
secure.
    Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation security. 
Transportation security officers who are required to report for work 
for without getting paid during a shutdown face added stress over 
unpaid bills and uncertainty about when their paychecks will resume. 
This is an enormous distraction for the people charged with handling 
security on the frontlines.
    We commend the efforts of TSA Administrator David Pekoske and the 
entire agency for extraordinary efforts during the 35-day government 
shutdown. Under extraordinarily difficult situations, the Administrator 
and the entire Federal workforce worked around the clock to maintain 
airport security and the ability for aviation to continue service. The 
shutdown stretched people and resources. It put our security at risk. 
It should never be repeated.
    Before the deadline in September of this year, Congress passed a 
stopgap spending measure to fund the government through November 21, 
2019. While this averted another Government Shutdown in September, we 
are once again setting up a cycle of short-term funding measures for 
aviation safety and security. This will further slow work on the 
implementation of the Act. The Senate Homeland Security Committee 
estimates that the 35-day Government Shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years 
in worker productivity \1\. Further, the dedicated work of Federal 
employees deserves our respect and support with long-term funding 
measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Shutdown cost DOT, DHS thousands of years in lost productivity, 
POLITICO Pro, https://t.co/O3478qNmFc?amp=1, September 17, 2019
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    We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to other 
security initiatives, such as border security. Reduced staffing at 
checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience-when TSA is stretched thin, it 
increases the risk of a serious security breach.
    Flight Attendants often bear the brunt of travelers frustrated by 
any inefficiencies in security screening, making our workspace more 
volatile. Long lines also threaten air travel ticket sales and on-time 
operations. Diverting resources, cuts to funding, or failure to lock in 
long term funding can delay purchase of advanced screening equipment 
and other mission-critical investments designed to keep travelers safe 
and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security, as well as 
undermine programs to support TSA workers and keep them on the job.
    We urge lawmakers to ensure funding is adequate and stable to 
maintain the successful mission of TSA.
Known Crewmember Program
    Known Crew Member is a risk-based screening program that recognizes 
airline crew are subject to extensive background and criminal records 
checks to ensure security and safety of flight. In light of the trusted 
status of airline crew with FAA Certification, the Known Crew Member 
program provides alternate, expedited screening procedures. This helps 
to properly allocate more TSA resources to lesser known persons 
accessing the sterile areas of airports.
    On Saturday afternoon, August 24, 2019, TSA announced changes to 
the KCM program without consulting unions representing airline crew 
members. This resulted in confusion and misunderstanding among crew 
members as well as TSA personnel as to what procedures were going to be 
implemented and when. It also raised concerns about purpose of the 
sudden change, causing distractions across aviation.
    While we believe there are many lessons to be learned from the 
initial program change announcement from TSA, we also want to recognize 
the immediate response and problem-solving efforts of Administrator 
Pekoske and Deputy Administrator Cogswell. TSA worked closely with our 
union and the Air Line Pilots Association to receive our concerns and 
proposed solutions to maintain the integrity of the program with the 
most efficient procedure changes for crew and TSOs alike.
    In the future, any time TSA considers changes to KCM or the 
standard security program for airlines or airports, that affect crew 
members and flight security, the agency should provide notice in 
advance to union security representatives in order to obtain union 
input and perspective on how to best achieve the goals that TSA has 
identified. Past experience has shown that such input is valuable and 
benefits aviation security operations. Crewmember unions and airlines 
are necessary industry stakeholders that should be regularly informed 
and engaged for the most successful security programs and operational 
implementation.
Current Legislation
    AFA supports two pieces of legislation before this committee. The 
Faster Act (S. 472) which would ensure aviation security service fees 
pay for the costs of security screening and the Cyber AIR Act (S. 2181) 
which would help protect from and require discloser of any attempt or 
successful cyber-attacks.
Conclusion
    I would like to again thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member and 
the Members of this Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We 
are proud of our work as aviation's first responders and the last line 
of defense in aviation security. We appreciate your attention and 
diligent efforts to ensure we have the proper tools to perform our work 
and keep U.S. aviation safe and secure.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Nelson, for that 
compelling testimony, and all the witnesses for very 
informative opening statements.
    I am just going to throw this out to literally everybody 
here at the witness table kind of on the big issue that we are 
focused on here in terms of an oversight hearing.
    So as I mentioned and Senator Markey mentioned, last year 
we passed the TSA Modernization Act. It contained the most 
comprehensive overhaul of TSA since the creation of the agency 
after 9/11. And some of the notable requirements that expand 
PreCheck enrollment options, create new checkpoint lane 
configurations, establish new vetting standards for airport 
security badges--we were trying to address proactively some of 
the security issues.
    But what I would like to get from all of the witnesses here 
is, have these provisions from last year's bill affected 
airports and airlines negatively, positively? Is the TSA moving 
quickly enough to implement these new provisions, and is there 
coordination happening with the different stakeholders, which 
are all represented here in this hearing, to implement some of 
these areas? And what did we leave out? We thought that was a 
pretty good bill. I think a number of you did, but obviously we 
did not cover the whole area.
    So if we can just start with that, and maybe, Mr. 
McLaughlin, if you can kick it off as an airport manager, and 
then I literally want to hear from all the witnesses on that 
overarching question and really the purpose of this hearing.
    Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you.
    I would say that in essentially a year, there has 
definitely been steps in the right direction. I think some of 
those steps have not been materialized. So, for example, I will 
talk about CT for a quick second.
    We have been selected as one of TSA's airports for the CT 
program. We will receive six units, two in each of our 
checkpoints. We are just now in the process where we have a 
site survey coming up where we will begin the planning to 
deploy those units across the airport.
    Frankly speaking, that is not a lot of time in my opinion 
to get something new and complex like this rolled out. So I am 
not displeased with the timing. I share that just as an example 
to say many of the things that you all have put in motion have 
not been realized yet, but we are starting to see the beginning 
phases of that.
    Senator Sullivan. Great.
    Ms. Barnes, other witnesses? Do you want to address that 
overarching question?
    Ms. Barnes. Sure. So we are very supportive of the work 
that you all have done and are grateful for the advancement of 
the legislation. From our review, many of the deadlines have 
not yet been met, and we would like to see faster 
implementation in particular on some of the biometric 
opportunities.
    Senator Sullivan. And have you addressed that with TSA?
    Ms. Barnes. We have an upcoming meeting next week.
    Senator Sullivan. OK, good. Well, we would like to hear 
what their response is.
    Ms. Barnes. Absolutely. I would be happy to report back.
    Senator Sullivan. Others? Ms. Beyer?
    Ms. Beyer. So again, as I said in my testimony, many of the 
provisions in the TSA Modernization Act were critical 
initiatives for the airlines. So to your question about has it 
impacted our work with TSA positively, the answer would be 
absolutely, sir.
    We have had multiple discussions from the airlines' side 
with TSA on their progress toward implementing a number of the 
provisions. As I noted in my testimony--and I would agree with 
Mr. McLaughlin--there are many things included in that bill. So 
we understand the workload that that puts on the agency. 
However, we very much would like to see the remainder of those 
provisions that are outstanding fully implemented as quickly as 
possible.
    But, again, some of our key focus areas are carrying a lot 
of the air cargo security work to fruition, particularly on 
identifying additional technological resources for the 
screening of air cargo and innovation as well.
    Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cornick?
    Mr. Cornick. Thank you.
    I think from an innovation perspective, we would like to do 
more with TSA. So pushing biometrics further on an opt-in basis 
into the checkpoint is a focus of ours.
    Senator Sullivan. Do you think they are doing that at a 
rate that is acceptable, or is it taking too long in that area?
    Mr. Cornick. I do not have an opinion on if it is going 
fast enough. All I know is that we are reaching about 5 percent 
of the nation's volume using biometrics, and I think to get 
real ubiquity with biometrics is going to be a team effort. A 
public-private partnership is important because you have got a 
passport database with face. You have got fingerprints in the 
PreCheck enrollment data base. But I think ultimately if you 
really want to penetrate the domestic market and get ubiquity 
with biometrics, it needs to be a public-private partnership.
    Senator Sullivan. Ms. Nelson?
    Ms. Nelson. What we have experienced just like with the FAA 
is the interruption of resources and the strain on the workload 
as Ms. Beyer referenced with the government shutdown, with the 
short-term funding that does not provide for the ability to 
plan long-term, and also with the diversion of the resources. 
It is taxing and does not provide the resources to do what has 
been mandated by Congress.
    So we also just want to note that that has also been very 
taxing on the TSA interfacing with stakeholders, and I am going 
to allocate some of those decisions that have taken place on 
their part to that. We can do a better job with interfacing 
with stakeholders, and the GAO report from this last week 
identified that as well.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to come back to this question of the diversion of 
the security fee. For this Fiscal Year, it will be $1.3 
billion, which is being raised ostensibly to protect the 
security of the flying public, but yet that money is just going 
to go into deficit reduction for the Federal Government.
    So I would just like to come down and ask each of you, do 
you believe that we should ensure that all of that funding goes 
actually toward what its goal is as we are putting a fee on 
passengers in our country? So, Ms. Barnes, do you think that 
money should not be diverted and just going to security?
    Ms. Barnes. Yes, Senator, we agree with you that we should 
not divert the fees. They should be entirely used for security 
and are supportive of your bill to do so.
    Senator Markey. Mr. McLaughlin?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, sir. If you had told me 10 years ago 
that airports would be paying for security technology, I would 
have said that is crazy. And yet here we are today forced into 
that situation.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Just expand on that. I mean, 
there is funding.
    Mr. McLaughlin. Right. I should not have said forced into 
that situation. We are making a choice to buy the latest and 
greatest technology because of our growth, because of our 
passengers' need. But a decade ago, that would not have been 
the way it would have been thought of.
    Senator Markey. Because?
    Mr. McLaughlin. TSA would have----
    Senator Markey. Because TSA would have paid for it with the 
$1.3 billion that is just going to be diverted this year and 
the $20 billion since 2013 that has been diverted. So it 
actually is an additional cost that has to be borne.
    Ms. Beyer?
    Ms. Beyer. Yes, Senator. As I said before, we are fully 
supportive of your bill to end the diversion of the TSA 
passenger security fee. Our passengers continue to pay this fee 
and not receive the benefit for which it was intended. We think 
there is no better way to enhance aviation security in this 
country than to rededicate those resources where they belong.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Mr. Cornick?
    Mr. Cornick. We agree entirely with you, and we think that 
the more resources that are dedicated to the airport security, 
the better off everybody is.
    Senator Markey. Ms. Nelson?
    Ms. Nelson. The FASTER Act should be passed right away. It 
is a disservice and dishonest to the American public to 
continue to allow a diversion of these fees.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    And, again, Mr. McLaughlin, you put your finger right on 
it. You wind up having to find other ways of funding that. And 
how do you fund it?
    Mr. McLaughlin. So for us, we are in a position where we 
are funding it internally.
    Senator Markey. Who pays for it? Where do your revenues----
    Mr. McLaughlin. Ultimately our stakeholders and our 
passengers.
    Senator Markey. So in other words, the passengers pay a fee 
that then goes to the Federal Government that then gets 
diverted to deficit reduction, and then you impose a fee on the 
very same people in order to raise the money in order to buy 
the technology that they had already paid for by the fee that 
had originally been imposed upon them in order to fly out of 
the Denver airport. Is that correct?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. We cover our fees through rates and 
charges which ultimately are passed to passengers.
    Senator Markey. So it winds up as double taxation----
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
    Senator Markey.--in order to get the level of safety which 
modern threats require you to implement.
    So let me move over then to the Known Crew Member program. 
That is particularly valuable. The program allows TSA to verify 
the identity of trusted airline employees such as pilots and 
flight attendants and expedite their airport security 
screening, which both reduces the number of people in passenger 
screening lines and protects us from insider threats.
    Ms. Nelson already made reference to this. The TSA made 
abrupt and disruptive changes to the Known Crew Member program 
without consulting or providing advance notice to the relevant 
stakeholders, including airline pilots and the flight 
attendants themselves who are the subject of the rule.
    And that is why I sent a letter to the TSA this week urging 
the agency to work more closely with our crew members moving 
forward. Crew members are our eyes in the sky. As Ms. Nelson 
said, they are the last line of defense trying to detect 
something that might go wrong that would jeopardize the 
security of the passengers on those planes.
    So, Ms. Nelson, has the TSA historically consulted your 
union and other stakeholders before making changes to Known 
Crew Member or similar programs, and do you believe that the 
TSA has sufficiently committed to working with you moving 
forward?
    Ms. Nelson. In the past when there have been changes to the 
Known Crew Member program or implementation of new procedures, 
there has been quite a bit of consultation with our union and 
with other crew member unions. That has worked very well 
because we have been able to all be on the same page, airlines, 
TSA, and the crew unions, to be able to communicate these 
changes and have everyone understand what is going on.
    Administrator Pekoske and Deputy Administrator Cogswell did 
absolutely respond to our concerns, and I want to commend them 
for----
    Senator Markey. After the fact.
    Ms. Nelson. After the fact. And I want to commend them for 
working very closely with us on our concerns and trying to 
resolve those issues. They continue to do that, but I do think 
it is important to continue to lift up the importance of 
working with stakeholders so that we can have a program that 
works for our security, that unburdens the TSA to be able to 
focus on the real threats in the airport, that allows the crews 
to have full confidence in our security because there is not 
confusion out there on the line.
    Senator Markey. And I believe that going forward robust 
collaboration with the flight attendants and other stakeholders 
is absolutely essential to ensuring that any rules that we have 
in place actually are the most effective that they can be, and 
it should be informed by those who are on the front lines.
    Ms. Nelson. They will be the most effective, and we will be 
the most efficient with our security.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I have a few more questions, and I 
am hoping that some of our colleagues are likely going to 
return because this is a very important topic.
    But let me ask Ms. Beyer and Mr. McLaughlin. Air cargo is 
extremely important for our country. It is extremely important 
for my state. The Ted Stevens-Anchorage International Airport 
is the second largest U.S. airport for landed weight of cargo, 
aircraft, and fifth largest in the world for air cargo 
throughput.
    The TSA Modernization Act, as you know, created a new 
office at TSA dedicated to air cargo. How has the creation of 
this air cargo office improved the security and efficiency of 
air cargo moving through U.S. airports, and what more should 
TSA be doing in collaboration with industry and others to 
implement this?
    Ms. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
    As you noted, the air cargo office within TSA has recently 
been established. So it is early days still, sir. They have 
made good progress but, for example, full staffing under the 
organization is still pending. So we are working with TSA as 
they get to full capacity for that office.
    As I noted, there are a number of very important air cargo 
initiatives that we would like to see move forward. Key among 
them is flexibility in screening options. Unlike passenger 
screening checkpoints or checked baggage, air cargo screening 
is performed by the industry. But we need TSA's support to 
evaluate and perform research and development and certify 
programs and technologies so that very diverse, complex air 
cargo environments can be addressed and we have options to 
perform that screening.
    Senator Sullivan. Mr. McLaughlin, do you have a view on the 
air cargo issue?
    Mr. McLaughlin. So as proud as we are of our airport, 
admittedly we are not the cargo super power that you all are.
    Senator Sullivan. I am glad you acknowledged that.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. McLaughlin. But I will say I think the cargo is growing 
in Denver as well, and we see tremendous potential in the 
future. So what we are really looking for today--I will tell 
you that we are getting everything that we need.
    But there is a future that is right on our horizon, and 
Senator Markey really pointed out well the fact for us to get 
the whole equation right. And that means the screening of that 
cargo has to be effective, but it also has to be very 
efficient. The model is changing in air cargo, and the 
screening model has to be able to keep pace with the transition 
of cargo through hubs like Denver.
    Senator Sullivan. OK. Thank you.
    Let me ask Mr. Cornick on the issue which I think is a very 
interesting one in terms of efficiency, but also security is on 
the use of biometrics that your company is very focused on, 
updated computer tomography machines and other screening 
technologies. A lot of that is in, as you talked about, the 
Registered Travel program.
    How is TSA collaborating with external partners like your 
company to help both not only expand this, but also make sure 
that the security of our airline system continues as this 
expansion occurs?
    Mr. Cornick. Thank you for the question.
    So there are a couple elements to that question.
    First I would start with on the cyber side. TSA has been 
collaborating with us from a cyber perspective.
    Senator Sullivan. What does that mean? What do you mean 
when you are talking about this?
    Mr. Cornick. Well, data security. At the end of the day, 
biometrics are really zeroes and ones. It is data and you have 
to encrypt that data. And TSA has put forth standards that we 
have met, and they have audited us to those standards. So we 
are designated a FISMA-High company from a cyber perspective, 
which is the highest Federal level of data security. So from 
that perspective, we have been collaborating on the data 
security to make sure our system is best in class.
    TSA is rolling out something called credential 
authentication technology, which validates that a driver's 
license or a passport is actually real. The traveler would 
present data at the time of travel. CLEAR has been doing 
credential authentication technology since 2010. That is our 
core process. We enroll someone. We validate it is a REAL ID 
and we bind that identity to their biometrics. And that is 
closing the identity loop. That is really, really important. So 
we take CAT, credential authentication, one step further, and 
we are combining it with biometrics, so we call it BAT. And so 
that is a really important program.
    The next step is to link it to Secure Flight. That is TSA's 
back end that houses all of the security data, whether you are 
a PreCheck flyer, standard, or you are a selectee. And that 
connectivity into CAT is something that as a FISMA-High company 
we think would be a great addition to the RT program to have 
that direct connectivity into Secure Flight. So if you are a 
registered traveler coming through the CLEAR lane, for example, 
we know who you are using biometrics and we can get real time 
data on your level of security. Are you PreCheck? Are you 
standard? That is the similar connectivity as other private 
entities like airlines, airports, and private companies that do 
screening on behalf of TSA.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Lee.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Lee. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks to all of you for being here to answer questions on 
these important issues.
    Mr. McLaughlin, I would like to start with you, if we 
could.
    On May 7 of this year, the FAA released a document on UAS 
detection systems, talking about their use at airports. The 
FAA's statement noted as follows, ``the FAA does not support 
the use of counter-UAS systems by any entities other than 
Federal departments with explicit statutory authority to use 
this technology, including requirements for extensive 
coordination with the FAA to ensure safety risks are 
mitigated.''
    In light of recent events, including those that occurred at 
Gatwick, I believe airport authorities are rightly concerned 
about safety and security threats that can be posed either by 
people who are behaving with malicious intent or, 
alternatively, those who are simply behaving recklessly.
    Currently how vulnerable do you believe airports are to the 
threats posed by either the malicious or the reckless use of 
drones?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you for the question.
    I think to start the answer it really is important to 
note--and this is often said in this industry--that if you have 
seen one airport, you have seen one airport. Each airport has 
its own sort of vulnerabilities and its own natural 
fortifications, if you will. So the answer may be different for 
all of us.
    Speaking specifically for Denver, I would say that we have 
support systems in place that keep us relatively safe. Other 
airports, based on their configurations, may be in a different 
state. What we have seen in the last several months is real 
coordination between Federal, State, and local officials, 
including by the way us. So we participate in regional working 
groups on drones and how to deal with them and how to identify 
them, what to do once they are identified.
    And it is important to note that not all drones are 
nefarious. As you pointed out, in some cases people may be 
using them recreationally in the wrong places. But I would also 
argue that I think there is a future where we can use drones 
productively in our environment as well.
    So we want to make sure that FAA has a balanced approach, 
one, ensuring that we have opportunities to detect--and you 
have talked about some of the work that is going on there--two, 
that there are coordinated efforts to be able to handle an 
actual drone event, again using a coordinated approach, and 
then finally, a process in place that makes it relatively easy, 
simple but obviously still protected for us to use drones in a 
way that makes sense in the airport environment, whether that 
is perimeter security or other things.
    Senator Lee. Thank you. That is helpful and consistent with 
what I have been thinking.
    The FAA's guidance seems a little ambiguous, but it seems 
also to imply to me that counter-UAS systems used by anyone 
other than the Federal Government could be illegal. If this is 
the case, what other recourse does an airport sponsor have to 
deal with these kinds of threats? And do we need to clarify the 
law? Is some additional authority necessary in order to empower 
you to keep people safe?
    Mr. McLaughlin. It is an incredibly difficult question. And 
as I sit here, I think about spending most of my career charged 
with protecting aviation. And so there is a tricky balance. 
Right? So on the one hand, being dependent on a Federal agency 
all the time to take that final drastic action seems limiting. 
On the other hand, to not have really specific and strong 
safeguards in place seems dangerous as well.
    So what I think is really important right now--and let us 
be honest. This is still a relatively new issue. There is an 
ongoing dialogue that I think is really productive, and I think 
that dialogue is going to produce really good results as long 
as every voice is heard and every stakeholder is at the table. 
So my hope would be that we continue to get to a place where 
there is a balanced outcome with drones. One, how do we ensure 
that the good ones are being used for the right reasons? Two, 
how do we detect the bad ones? And three, what do we do with 
them once those bad ones are in a place that they are 
compromising our operation?
    Senator Lee. By the way, were you able to consult with the 
TSA as the TSA drafted its tactical response plan?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely.
    Senator Lee. And are you currently implementing the 
technical response plan?
    Mr. McLaughlin. So yes. I am sorry. I did not mean to cut 
you off.
    Senator Lee. No. I was finished. At your airport.
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. So we are working very closely with 
them. And I will say again in our case even before that 
directive came out, a lot of really good work had been done. 
And I will tell you that while the directive gives TSA rights 
and authorities, they did not come in heavy-handed. Rather, 
they came in as a partner to help work with us on what we would 
do in the event that we needed to execute the plan.
    Senator Lee. Well, I appreciate your comments, and I 
especially appreciate your acknowledgement. I had never heard 
it expressed that way. You have seen one airport. You have seen 
on airport. And it would be folly for us to assume as a 
government that what works in Denver necessarily works in San 
Francisco, San Diego, Salt Lake City, Washington, D.C., or 
anywhere else. And that is why I am hoping we can give you the 
discretion and the authority that you need and clarify any 
ambiguity to make sure that you can keep flyers safe. Thank 
you.
    Senator Sullivan. In Alaska, we call that one size does not 
fit all from the Federal Government. And I think we see that 
daily in this town.
    Senator Lee. Although most of our states could fit inside 
of Alaska easily.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Sullivan. Well, we are just getting these great 
shout-outs to Alaska today. Thank you, Senator Lee.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Actually what we saw on 9/11 was that Mohamed Atta and the 
others were coming through Portland, Maine and penetrating the 
security there, and then when they reached Boston, there was 
already an assumption that they had been cleared. So just 
thinking about the interconnectivity of this entire defense 
system that we try to put in place is absolutely critical.
    And I agree with Ms. Nelson that the personnel in Boston 
were traumatized because they could actually retrospectively 
see those people walking around Logan because they had been 
scoping out the airport for months before they did it, and they 
could actually in their mind's eyes still see those people 
sitting there, thinking that they had been cleared coming 
through before.
    Let me move on to another question if I may, and that is 
the question of facial recognition because, as we work to keep 
pace with emerging security threats, an aviation traveler's 
civil liberties cannot be an afterthought. At airports across 
the country, both TSA and Customs and Border Protection are 
increasingly using facial recognition technology and collecting 
sensitive biometric data about travelers. Yet, the public lacks 
enforceable rights and rules to protect travelers' privacy and 
addresses the unique threats that TSA's biometric data 
collection poses to our civil liberties.
    So, Mr. McLaughlin, do you agree that any collection of 
Americans' biometric information at airports should always be 
voluntary?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, I do.
    Senator Markey. Do you agree that TSA should enact 
enforceable rules and take all necessary steps to secure that 
biometric data it collects is secure?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
    Senator Markey. Do you agree that TSA should enact binding 
safeguards to ensure that its use of biometric technology does 
not disproportionately burden or misidentify people of color?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely, yes.
    Senator Markey. I agree with you. I agree with all of your 
answers. We are, however, quickly moving toward a point of no 
return when it comes to the deployment of facial recognition 
technology. TSA should stop using these invasive tools in the 
absence of formal rules that reflect our values and protect our 
privacies. All of this should be out there as the set of 
security protections not just to make sure nothing bad happens 
in terms of security for these airlines, but also nothing 
happens to the security of the individuals who should also have 
their rights protected and they are ensured that their privacy 
is not being unnecessarily invaded.
    So that is always the challenge for us in the government. 
The technologies themselves are inanimate. They are only as 
effective as the human values which we build into them. We have 
to decide. And here, we still do not have a formal set of rules 
that are on the books, especially to protect minorities and 
others who could, in fact, have their identity be compromised.
    So I thank you, Mr. McLaughlin. And once again, I call upon 
the agency to formalize these rules. It is absolutely 
essential. We should not be moving forward until we have 
decided what those protections are going to be.
    Let me move on next to something else that we know, and 
that is those who mean to do us harm could try to exploit any 
technological vulnerability in our aviation system. And that 
means we need to discuss issues beyond TSA oversight that are 
also critical to safety in our skies.
    One top area of concern is the cybersecurity standards and 
practices of airlines and aircraft manufacturers. Our airplanes 
are increasingly computerized, and new software is being rolled 
out every single day. Evolving technologies offer enormous 
potential to improve safety and to entertain passengers. But it 
will only take one hacker to access an aircraft's navigation or 
flight control system to cause an unforgettable disaster.
    Regrettably, after investigating the cybersecurity of our 
aviation system, I discovered that although airlines may 
frequently experience attempted cyber attacks, their protocols 
and protections for cyber incidents need much improvement.
    I also found that industry collaboration on cybersecurity 
is inconsistent. And that is why I, again with Senator 
Blumenthal, have reintroduced the Cyber Air Act. The Cyber Air 
Act would require the airline industry to share information 
about cybersecurity vulnerabilities and direct the FAA to 
establish cybersecurity protections for aircraft.
    Ms. Nelson, I am glad that you expressed support for our 
legislation. Can you explain the importance of cybersecurity in 
the skies from a crew member's perspective as we see this 
enhancement of technology in the airlines of our country?
    Ms. Nelson. Well, crew members literally put their lives on 
the line when they go to work, and they expect that all 
security measures are going to be adequately measured and in 
place and any mitigation factors in place as well. We know this 
issue very well because, as the FCC was considering adding 
mobile broadband to our aircraft, we consulted with security 
experts, tactical experts and discovered a range of scenarios 
that created many vulnerabilities related to cybersecurity. We 
shared those privately--that is not something I would share in 
this open forum--but ultimately were successful in getting an 
interagency working group to assess these issues.
    This is another area where you talk about collaboration 
within the industry and reporting this and sharing information 
that is absolutely crucial to our security. And the Cyber Air 
Act will ensure that we continue to maintain the mandates of 
the 9/11 Commission report to continue to assess what the risks 
are today and what mitigation factors need to be in place. And 
we need full information and collaboration to be able to do 
that.
    Senator Markey. Do you agree with that, Mr. McLaughlin?
    Mr. McLaughlin. I do. So obviously cybersecurity in the air 
is really not my domain. On the ground we are committed to 
cybersecurity. We have instituted a scalable framework based on 
NIST that allows us to ensure that our systems are intact and 
safe.
    Senator Markey. One of the things that was very clear after 
9/11 is that Mohamed Atta was a very highly educated individual 
and many others who came to Boston. The 10 of them who came to 
Boston on that day to hijack those two planes that ultimately 
flew into the World Trade Center--they were sophisticated 
people. But they were looking for the aperture. They were 
looking for the way in that would be easiest for them. And it 
turned out that they could do so just with box cutters. And 
because of the lack of security, thinking about that as a 
threat, the lack of imagination, we saw the catastrophe.
    Here, we are faced with another situation where there are 
highly sophisticated individuals who would exploit a 
vulnerability, exploit a point, an aperture that might make it 
possible for them to create a disaster. And if we do not have 
in place the rules, the protections, the understanding, the 
collaboration with those who are on the front lines, we could 
just see a repetition although using a more modern way in order 
to attack, but finding the vulnerability.
    That is what was true with cargo. If we are going to screen 
our bags as we are going through, make us take off our shoes, 
and yet let cargo from people who are not even on the plane 
then to go onto the same vessel, well, that is crazy. That is 
crazy. So they will find and exploit these kind of 
vulnerabilities.
    So do any of the others of you want to speak about this 
need to deal with the cybersecurity issues on these planes? Ms. 
Beyer?
    Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator.
    So I agree with you that cybersecurity is an extremely 
important issue, and airlines take it very seriously, sir. When 
I talked earlier about safety and security of our passengers 
and our crew members, that includes cybersecurity, and we are 
very aware of those challenges.
    Airlines are continuing to invest in our cybersecurity 
infrastructure, as well as in ensuring robust information 
exchange both at the government and other industry partners. We 
do this in a number of ways. Two I would mention today. The 
first is participation in the aviation ISAC is very critical 
for that----
    Senator Markey. ISAC stands for?
    Ms. Beyer. Oh, that is a test. Sorry. It is a cyber-related 
consortium of entities that is specifically set up to exchange 
real-time information about cyber risks and cyber incidents. 
And our airlines are active participants.
    The second one that I wanted to mention, sir--and I can get 
back to you on the exact acronym. Apologies.
    The second one that I wanted to mention, sir, is that we 
actively participate in regular stakeholder meetings with the 
Aviation Cyber Initiative. That is a U.S. Government 
interagency body, tri-chaired by the Department of Homeland 
Security, the FAA, and the Department of Defense. And we are 
actively engaged in those conversations with those agencies as 
well.
    Senator Sullivan. One follow-up. I want to make sure asking 
Ms. Barnes a couple questions.
    Senator Markey. If I may. Are you happy, Ms. Nelson, with 
the level of cooperation you are receiving in terms of this 
conversation about broadband or additional technologies being 
introduced without a proper understanding of the potential 
vulnerabilities?
    Ms. Nelson. We believe the Cyber Air Act would close 
loopholes.
    Senator Markey. Good. Thank you. Appreciate it.
    Senator Sullivan. So a couple more questions. I want to 
make sure--Ms. Barnes had a couple questions directed at her 
from a very important industry. We just actually had a big 
tourism conference in Juneau, Alaska just last week, over 600 
attendees. And so we certainly want to make sure we are 
protecting the traveling public, but we are also making sure 
that we can help increase this important industry in our 
country in terms of tourism.
    So I have three questions for you.
    Have you found that the TSA's transportation security 
officer staffing at security checkpoints is keeping pace with 
the growth in passenger traffic, tourism traffic?
    Are there other solutions you think that need to be 
implemented or looked at by the Congress or TSA to handle the 
increase in passenger volume?
    And in your opening statement, you did talk about the REAL 
ID requirements, and I think it is a concern. I know that two 
states will not even start issuing compliant licenses until 
June 2020. That is Oklahoma and Oregon. How well is TSA doing 
in informing the traveling public about that?
    I am throwing a lot at you there, but I wanted to make sure 
you had the opportunity to go into some details on issues that 
I know impact the tourism industry.
    Ms. Barnes. Well, thank you, Chairman, and thank you for 
your leadership on all travel-related issues and your work to 
elevate the industry at large within the government because 
that is a really important----
    Senator Sullivan. We have a bill coming out soon that we 
worked closely with you on, and hopefully it will get 
bipartisan support in this committee.
    Ms. Barnes. And we are very appreciative of that and thank 
you for your leadership.
    I will take the last question first. With regard to REAL 
ID, we are working with TSA and DHS to help to make sure that 
the traveling public is aware of this upcoming ID requirement. 
But what we are really concerned by is that 57 percent of 
Americans do not even know that the deadline is coming.
    Senator Sullivan. How can we address that? We, the Federal 
Government, writ large, State governments, others.
    Ms. Barnes. Well, I think PSAs, talking to your 
constituents, making sure that folks are aware. The airports 
have been rolling out what the TSA has been providing.
    But we have launched an education initiative within the 
entirety of the industry, including our airports and airline 
colleagues, with CLEAR and others because we think that--you 
know, we have as many as 99 million Americans that are not REAL 
ID-compliant. And so if 80,000 people show up perhaps on 
October 1, 2020 and are turned away, that is just not 
acceptable. And as you noted, Oregon and Oklahoma are not even 
issuing REAL ID-compliant licenses until next summer.
    But you also have 50 different applications of getting a 
REAL ID, plus D.C., and the territories. You have got a state 
like Washington State that has a different symbol. It does not 
have a star. You have a state like Maryland who has been 
issuing noncompliant REAL ID licenses. So they are requiring 
folks to come back. You have a state like New Jersey that is 
actually only implementing REAL IDs or issuing REAL IDs in two 
locations in their state. So we have a really inconsistent 
application of the requirements. And that is really why this 
broader education effort is required.
    But on top of that, we should be allowing enrollees in 
CLEAR and TSA PreCheck who have already given a stronger 
identification, their biometric, than is required to get a REAL 
ID license. So we think automatically allowing them to be 
considered REAL ID-compliant as soon as--that is one that 
Congress would need to articulate or direct TSA to move forward 
on. And we think that would be a huge help.
    We also think moving to a mobile type of enrollment 
allowing DMVs to do mobile enrollment and use mobile licenses 
would help to accelerate the REAL ID process so that more folks 
have those.
    And then we are also, from an education standpoint, 
recommending that for those that are not able to get a REAL ID 
license in states like Oklahoma and Oregon that they move 
forward and get a passport now or enroll in a CLEAR or TSA 
PreCheck application.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Senator Blumenthal.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
allowing me to come back. I was on the floor. I apologize for 
missing some of the hearing.
    And I am glad that all of you are in favor of returning the 
security fee that passengers pay back to the TSA. Ms. Nelson 
provided a really moving and eloquent account of how all of us 
are affected, the people who work in the industry, as well as 
the traveling public, by the threat to our security. And I 
think that fee is tremendously important.
    I want to focus on a different issue that was raised I 
think or has been raised by Ms. Nelson. I think you recently 
called for a ban on e-cigarettes from planes. Maybe you could 
expand on your concerns about the threats that these devices 
pose when they are carried on a plane.
    Ms. Nelson. Thank you very much for that.
    We have lithium ion batteries on the aircraft all the time. 
They are in all kinds of devices that people carry, and some 
people may be carrying as many as six on them at any time.
    The number of times that we have had a runaway device or 
runaway battery that has created smoke or flames, potentially 
heading toward combustion on the plane has been much higher, a 
much higher rate with the e-cigarettes. And so for that reason, 
we believe it is very important that FAA look very closely at 
these particular devices. There is a history here. When Samsung 
had a device that was improperly flaming, there was a ban on 
those devices. So there is a history here. We think they need 
to look very closely at these e-cigarette devices which have 
had a higher instance of failing on board the aircraft and 
putting passengers and crew in danger.
    Senator Blumenthal. And I am troubled by some of the 
reports recently of weak enforcement of the checked baggage, 
and I am quoting from the ``Washington Post'' of October 7, 
just days ago. Quote: in March, Southwest Airlines employees 
had to pull a smoking suitcase containing e-cigarette batteries 
from a plane's cargo hold in San Diego. Adjacent bags were 
damaged, as was the plane, which was temporarily taken out of 
service.
    So I am concerned that the DOT in May 2016, which banned 
these devices from checked baggage, may have really been 
insufficient to address--and I am quoting--the safety risks 
posed by the battery-powered portable electronic smoking 
devices. End quote. I welcome your view that consideration 
ought to be given to going further.
    Let me ask Ms. Beyer what your organization thinks about 
this issue?
    Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator. Thank you for the question.
    Airlines care deeply about safety. And I am aware that FAA 
already has regulations for transport of lithium ion batteries. 
For us, anytime there is consideration of additional measures, 
whether they be safety- or security-related, we believe that 
that should be considered under the principles of risk-based 
security.
    I think in this particular instance, Senator, what would be 
required is a very thoughtful process to determine whether 
technology in the checked baggage environment is currently 
capable or should be capable of screening for safety-related 
concerns rather than just security-related concerns such as 
explosives. So that is what we would advocate for, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you finally. After 9/11, 
Congress mandated reinforced flight deck doors on commercial 
aircraft to add a valuable level of protection for the 
cockpits. But reinforced doors alone may not provide a complete 
solution to the problem that they were intended to resolve. 
There are times when operational necessity requires that the 
flight door be open while the plane is in flight.
    The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, as you know, included 
an important security provision to address this issue. It 
required the FAA to mandate secondary cockpit barriers on all 
new passenger aircraft. Congress required the FAA to issue that 
rule by October 5, 2019. That day has come. It is past. Instead 
of meeting the statutory deadline, last month--or rather, on 
October 5, the FAA announced that the selection of secondary 
barriers--the working group intended to produce a 
recommendation on the rule.
    You are a member or your organization is a member on that 
working group. Could you give us an update?
    Ms. Beyer. Certainly, Senator.
    So as you mentioned, A4A is a member on the working group 
under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee that was set 
up to look at and make recommendations to the FAA about 
implementing that mandate. We look forward to participating in 
that process and ensuring that all of the necessary information 
is collected and reviewed so that the provision can be 
implemented in such a way that it can actually be carried out 
and executed, things like considerations of the variation in 
aircraft fleet type, engineering considerations, training 
considerations, et cetera. All of those things are what we hope 
to bring to this working group for consideration.
    Senator Blumenthal. I think your organization said that, 
quote, secondary cockpit barriers were appropriate to certain 
types of aircraft. For what types of aircraft would they be 
inappropriate?
    Ms. Beyer. So, sir, I am not aware of the exact quote that 
you are referring to, but I would certainly say Congress has 
weighed in on this particular issue on secondary barriers. And 
we will continue to collaborate with the FAA on the best way to 
implement that mandate.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, maybe in response to a written 
question, you could be somewhat more specific.
    My time has expired. I thank the Chairman for permitting me 
to ask these questions. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Absolutely, Senator Blumenthal.
    We are going to wrap this hearing up, but I do want to take 
the opportunity very quickly, 30-45 seconds each of you, as the 
last element of this hearing just give us just a very quick 
summation of what you see in terms of the oversight issues are 
the most important that we should, as the members of this 
committee, remember and take away with us. So again, if you can 
do it in less than a minute, each of you, I would appreciate 
it.
    Ms. Barnes, why do we not just start with you and go down 
the line?
    Ms. Barnes. Sure. So thank you for the opportunity to be 
here today.
    With regard to TSA, we think moving more quickly on the 
implementation of their work and moving more quickly in 
particular as they move the biometrics to the front of the TSA 
checkpoint.
    Furthermore, there is a lot of work we need to do to make 
sure that America is REAL ID ready both via education and with 
the agency as well because, quite frankly, we cannot have a 
half a million flyers turned away at America's airports on 
October 1, 2020. And so we thank you for your help in ensuring 
that we are able to find policy solutions that can also help 
mitigate the negative consequences of this deadline.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you and thank you for 
keeping that close to one minute.
    Mr. McLaughlin?
    Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you again very much for the time here 
today.
    For me it is a really simple message. Our industry is 
growing both in passenger traffic and in cargo. Current 
processes and current budgets will not keep up with that 
growth. We need your help in ensuring that we have the budgets 
to get where we need to go in the coming years. Thank you.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Ms. Beyer?
    Ms. Beyer. Certainly. Thank you.
    I would agree with what Mr. McLaughlin said and also just 
to highlight again and underscore the importance both of 
stopping the diversion of the TSA passenger security fee. That 
money is critical for us as a government and industry to move 
this industry forward and ensure the security of our passengers 
and crew.
    And also to underscore, again as Ms. Barnes did, the 
importance of educating the traveling public and avoiding a 
problem at our airports on October 1 of next year when the REAL 
ID enforcement deadline is set to be implemented.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Mr. Cornick?
    Mr. Cornick. Thank you. Thank you for you continued support 
of the RT program. We ask that Congress continues to modernize 
the RT program and continue its support. We want to continue to 
be a force multiplier for aviation security and grow our 
public-private partnership.
    Senator Sullivan. Excellent. Thank you.
    And Ms. Nelson.
    Ms. Nelson. Thank you very much.
    Stable, secure funding with no diversion of that funding 
and passing of the FAST Act, continued and committed 
stakeholder involvement, including REAL ID. Flight attendants 
are on the front line and can help educate the public on this. 
And full representation rights for our TSOs.
    And let me just also note that the Modernization Act was 
phenomenal. Thank you so much for your work on that. The one 
thing that we would say is missing from it is mandatory crew 
member self-defense training. We were the first to die, the 
last to be trained. And that goes right with our secondary 
cockpit barriers.
    So thank you very much.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. And I want to thank again all 
the witnesses today.
    The hearing will remain open for two weeks. During this 
time, Senators may submit questions for the record. Upon 
receipt, the witnesses are respectfully requested to submit 
their written answers to the Committee as soon as possible but 
by no later than Thursday, October 31.
    And I want to thank the witnesses again.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                      Electronic Privacy Information Center
                                   Washington, DC, October 16, 2019

Hon. Dan Sullivan, Chairman,
Hon. Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Security,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Markey:

    We write to you in advance of the hearing on ``Improving Security 
at America's Airports: Stakeholder Perspectives.'' \1\ EPIC recently 
filed a lawsuit against the Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') 
agency for a failure to establish necessary privacy safeguards for the 
use of facial images at U.S. borders.\2\ Because the Transportation 
Security Administration (``TSA'') has failed to establish necessary 
privacy safeguards, including ensuring the travelers are able to 
exercise their legal right to opt-out, we request you suspend the TSA's 
use of facial image technology pending the completion of required 
public rulemaking by CBP. A moratorium should also be established for 
other DHS components that propose to deploy facial recognition and have 
not conducted a public rulemaking. There is currently no legal 
authority for DHS' or TSA's use of facial recognition technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Improving Security at America's Airports: Stakeholder 
Perspectives, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Trans., Subcomm. on 
Security, 116th Cong. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/
2019/10/improving-security-at-america-s-airports-stakeholder-
perspectives/6e8bba82-9b59-4f09-b0c4-e8511497f5c4.
    \2\ EPIC v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, No. 19-cv-689 
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 12, 2019); See https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/alt-
screening-procedures/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Electronic Privacy Information Center (``EPIC'') is a public 
interest research center established in 1994 to focus public attention 
on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.\3\ EPIC is focused on 
protecting individual privacy rights, and we are particularly 
interested in the privacy problems associated with surveillance.\4\ We 
applaud Senator Markey and Senator Lee for calling for the suspension 
of DHS's use of facial recognition in airports until a rulemaking to 
establish privacy and security safeguards is complete.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See About EPIC, EPIC.org, https://epic.org/epic/about.html.
    \4\ EPIC, EPIC Domestic Surveillance Project, https://epic.org/
privacy/surveillance/.
    \5\ Press Release, Sens. Edward Markey and Mike Lee, Senators 
Markey and Lee Call for Transparency on DHS Use of Facial Recognition 
Technology (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/senators-markey-and-lee-call-for-transparency-on-dhs-use-of-
facial-recognition-technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recently, new privacy risks have arisen with the deployment of 
facial recognition technology at U.S. airports following a 2017 
Executive Order to ``expedite the completion and implementation of 
biometric entry exit tracking system.'' \6\ Customs and Border 
Protection (``CBP'') has now implemented the Biometric Entry-Exit 
program for international travelers at 17 airports.\7\ TSA is quickly 
moving to leverage CBP's Biometric Entry-Exit program to expand the use 
of facial recognition at airports.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Exec. Order No. 13,780 Sec. 8.
    \7\ Davey Alba, The U.S. Government Will Be Scanning Your Face At 
20 Top Airports, Documents Show (Mar. 11, 2019), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/these-documents-reveal-the-
governments-detailed-plan-for.
    \8\ TSA, TSA Biometrics Roadmap (Sept. 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/
sites/default/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TSA has conducted pilots at John F. Kennedy International Airport 
and Los Angeles International Airport to test facial recognition 
technology at security checkpoints servicing international 
travelers.\9\ TSA also tested a fully biometric terminal at Hartsfield-
Jackson Atlanta International Airport that used facial recognition to 
check your bag, go through security, and board a flight,\10\ and is 
currently testing facial recognition at Las Vegas McCarran Airport.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ TSA, Facial Recognition Technology, https://www.tsa.gov/node/
20451.
    \10\ TSA, TSA Releases Roadmap For Expanding Biometrics Technology 
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2018/10/15/tsa-
releases-roadmap-expanding-biometrics-technology.
    \11\ Protecting the Nation's Transportation Systems: Oversight of 
the Transportation Security Administration, 114th Cong. (2019), S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans. (testimony of Patricia F. S. 
Cogswell TSA Acting Deputy Administrator), available at https://
www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2019/09/11/protecting-nations-
transportation-systems-oversight-transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Las Vegas pilot is testing the ``operational effectiveness for 
matching a traveler's image to the photos on the ID they present.'' 
\12\ This 1:1 matching is a much more privacy protective implementation 
of facial recognition. 1:1 matching does not require a massive 
biometric database, there is no need to retain the image, and the 
machines conducting the 1:1 match do not need to be connected to the 
cloud. Such an implementation virtually eliminates data breach risks 
and the chance of mission creep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But whether TSA is seriously considering a 1:1 implementation is 
not clear. The agency's Aviation Security Advisory Committee has failed 
to fill the committee positions allotted for privacy advocates.\13\ And 
TSA's on roadmap for facial recognition do not include the possibility 
for implementing 1:1 matching.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ TSA, TSA Announces New Members of Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee, (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2019/09/
27/tsa-announces-new-members-aviation-security-advisory-committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In September 2018, TSA released the ``TSA Biometrics Roadmap.'' 
\14\ The Roadmap makes clears TSA's intention to leverage CBP's facial 
recognition capabilities implemented as part of the Biometric Entry-
Exit Program. But alternatives to CBP's cloud-based implementation are 
not considered in the roadmap. And corresponding privacy safeguards 
have not yet been established despite TSA moving forward with facial 
recognition technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ TSA Biometrics Roadmap, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to an EPIC Freedom of Information Act request, CBP 
recently released 346 pages of documents detailing the agency's 
scramble to implement the flawed Biometric Entry-Exit system, a system 
that employs facial recognition technology on travelers entering and 
exiting the country. The documents obtained by EPIC describe the 
administration's plan to extend the faulty pilot program to major U.S. 
airports. The documents obtained by EPIC were covered in-depth by 
Buzzfeed.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Alba, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on the documents obtained, EPIC determined there are few 
limits on how airlines can use the facial recognition data collected at 
airports.\16\ Only recently has CBP changed course and indicated that 
the agency will require airlines to delete the photos they take for the 
Biometric Entry-Exit program.\17\ No such commitment has been made by 
TSA. Indeed, TSA's Roadmap indicates that the agency wants to expand 
the dissemination of biometric data as much as possible, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ See CBP Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Biometric Pilot 
Project, https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit/MOU-
Biometric-Pilot-Project.pdf.
    \17\ Ashley Ortiz, CBP Program and Management Analyst, Presentation 
before the Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee, slide 23 (Dec. 
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SLIDES-
DPIAC-Public%20Meeting%2012%2010-2018.pdf.

        TSA will pursue a system architecture that promotes data 
        sharing to maximize biometric adoption throughout the passenger 
        base and across the aviation security touchpoints of the 
        passenger experience.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ TSA, TSA Biometrics Roadmap, 17 (Sept. 2018).

    TSA seeks to broadly implement facial recognition through ``public-
private partnerships'' to create a ``biometrically-enabled curb-to-gate 
passenger experience.'' \19\ TSA plans to implement an opt-in model of 
facial recognition use for domestic travelers but there are no 
guarantees that in the future TSA will not require passengers to 
participate in facial recognition or make the alternative so cumbersome 
as to essentially require passengers to opt-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Preserving the ability of U.S. citizens to forgo facial recognition 
for alternative processes is one of the core privacy issues with CBP's 
Biometric Entry-Exit program.
    EPIC recently sued CBP for all records related to the creation and 
modification of alternative screening procedures for the Biometric 
Entry-Exit program.\20\ The alternative screening procedure for U.S. 
travelers that opt-out of facial recognition should be a manual check 
of the traveler's identification documents. CBP, however, has provided 
vague and inconsistent descriptions of alternative screening procedures 
in both its ``Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)'' webpage 
\21\ and the agency's privacy impact assessments.\22\ The creation and 
modification of CBP's alternative screening procedures underscores 
CBP's unchecked ability to modify alternative screening procedures 
while travelers remain in the dark about how to protect their biometric 
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ EPIC v. CBP, 19-cv-00689, Complaint, https://epic.org/foia/
cbp/alternative-screening-procedures/1-Complaint.pdf.
    \21\ CBP, Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), https:/
/www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics/biometric-exit-faqs.
    \22\ U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS/CBP/PIA-030(b), Privacy 
Impact Assessment Update for the Traveler Verification Service (TVS): 
Partner Process 8 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-may2017.pdf; see also U.S. Dep't of 
Homeland Sec., DHS/CBP/PIA-030(c), Privacy Impact Assessment Update for 
the Traveler Verification Service (TVS): Partner Process 5-6 (2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-
cbp030-tvs-appendixb-july2018.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS/
CBP/PIA-056, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Traveler Verification 
Service 2 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november2018_2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the close relationship between the TSA's implementation of 
facial recognition and CBP's Biometric Entry-Exit program, the 
Subcommittee should place a moratorium on TSA's implementation of 
facial recognition until CBP implements proper privacy assessments, 
policies and procedures, and oversight mechanisms.
    Facial recognition poses threats to privacy and civil liberties. 
Facial recognition techniques can be deployed covertly, remotely, and 
on a mass scale. There is a lack of well-defined Federal regulations 
controlling the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of 
biometric identifiers. Ubiquitous identification by government agencies 
eliminates the individual's ability to control the disclosure of their 
identities, creates new opportunities for tracking and monitoring, and 
poses a specific risk to the First Amendment rights of free association 
and free expression.
    Before there is any increased deployment of these programs, CBP 
must conduct a public rulemaking and TSA must conduct a privacy impact 
assessment. And deployment of surveillance technology should be 
accompanied by new policies and procedures and independent oversight to 
protect citizens' rights.
    The use of facial recognition at the border has real consequences 
for U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. All people entering the U.S., 
including U.S. passport holders, could be subject to this intrusive 
screening technique. The privacy assessments, policies and procedures, 
and oversight mechanisms must all be made public. Most critically, if 
the TSA creates or expand a system of records that contains personal 
information retrievable by name, it must comply with the requirements 
of the Privacy Act so that the public can comment on a record system 
established by a Federal agency.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 552a(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We ask that our statement be entered into the hearing record.
            Sincerely,

      /s/ Marc Rotenberg             /s/ Caitriona Fitzgerald
      Marc Rotenberg                 Caitriona Fitzgerald
      EPIC President                 EPIC Policy Director
 
      /s/ Jeramie Scott
      Jeramie Scott
      EPIC Senior Counsel
 

                                 ______
                                 
Prepared Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
                                  CIO
    Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan and Ranking Members Cantwell and 
Markey:

    On behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, which represents more than 700,000 Federal and District of 
Columbia employees who serve the American people in 70 different 
agencies, including the 44,000 Transportation Security Officers who 
protect the flying public, we appreciate the opportunity to submit this 
letter for the record on ``Improving Security at America's Airports: 
Stakeholder Perspectives.''
    Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are sworn to protect the 
Nation's aviation security. They conduct themselves with the utmost 
professionalism and respect for the importance of the work they do. 
Every day, they identify and eradicate threats to aviation security. 
TSOs take pride in making sure all systems are working and that 
personnel are fully trained in operations and observing standard 
operating procedures to ensure security.
    Today, we commend the Committee for its examination of airport 
security from the perspective of those whose work brings them to 
America's airports. They are the flight attendants who ensure in-flight 
safety, the air traffic controllers who secure every take-off and 
landing. When they come to work, their lives and livelihoods depend on 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) getting security 
right.
    As the Committee considers the implementation of the TSA 
Modernization Act of 2018, we point out one provision of that Act, 
Section 1907, which required the TSA Administrator to convene a working 
group consisting of representatives of the TSA and representatives of 
AFGE to recommend reforms to TSA's personnel management system. 
Security screening requires a substantial investment in technology, but 
it is essentially a human function and thereby requires a commensurate 
investment in the personnel who carry out these crucial functions.
    TSA's personnel management system is perhaps the worst in the 
Federal Government. It is a system that gives agency management 
tremendous discretion and very little accountability because it 
deprives employees of full due process and collective bargaining rights 
guaranteed to other Federal employees under Title 5. Under Title 5, 
personnel management is governed by a set of checks and balances that 
ensures merit system principles are upheld for the benefit of good 
government. Title 5 processes provide mechanisms that prevent managers 
from hiring, firing, demoting, or disciplining employees for bad 
reasons such as politics, bias, bigotry, or to shift blame for 
mismanagement. Because TSA's workforce has fewer and weaker protections 
against the consequences of mismanagement, it is unsurprising that the 
agency experiences massive turnover, low morale, and a low level of 
trust in management's decisions.
    The recent decision to change the terms of coverage under the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) for TSA's large 
``part-time'' workforce is a good example of the misuse of authority in 
the area of personnel management. Without notice, bargaining, or 
rationale; without any mention during any of the Section 1907 Work 
Group meetings, TSA issued a ``management directive'' on September 20, 
2019 that effected a reduction in the agency's contribution to FEHBP 
premiums for its part-time workforce. TSA defined part-time as all 
employees ``assigned to work schedules of 32 hours or less per week (64 
hours or less per pay period). . .'' Prior to the issuance of this 
directive, TSA paid the same portion of FEHBP premiums for its full-
time and part-time workforce. Now, for those hired after September 30, 
2019, FEHBP premiums will be pro-rated for those assigned to part-time 
schedules. Of course, the assignment of a part-time vs. a full-time 
schedule is at the sole discretion of management. Likewise, regular 
assignment of overtime for a ``part-time'' Transportation Security 
Officer (TSO) at management's discretion will not affect his or her 
status as a part-time employee with a lower employer subsidy for FEHBP.
    When TSA was established and granted authority to have a large 
portion of its workforce on permanent part-time status in order to 
maximize its flexibility, it agreed to provide FEHBP coverage on the 
same basis for its part-time and full-time workforce. This arrangement 
was far from optimal, as the vast majority of those assigned to part-
time schedules wanted and needed a full-time paycheck. The full FEHBP 
subsidy has served as an important offset to the undesirable and 
inadequate part-time schedule and associated salary. Indeed, TSA has 
acknowledged that low TSO salaries and involuntary part-time schedules 
have been large factors in creating the agency's difficulties with 
turnover and low morale, both of which undermine its ability to carry 
out its mission. Indeed, apart from the base meanness of the action, it 
is difficult to understand why TSA has decided to worsen its problems 
by cutting health insurance benefits for such a large portion of its 
workforce.
    The decision to convene a Working Group under Section 1907 of the 
TSA Modernization Act of 2018 was a second-best effort to address TSA's 
deficient record on the use of its vast flexibilities and discretion in 
the area of personnel management. AFGE has argued strenuously that 
TSA's personnel management shortcomings will not be solved unless and 
until its employees are provided the same rights under Title 5 as other 
Federal employees, including Federal law enforcement officers elsewhere 
in the Department of Homeland Security. The Working Group was not a 
substitute for collective bargaining rights, which at TSA exist almost 
entirely at the whim of each subsequent Administrator. Thus the extent 
of these rights is highly politicized and varies with an 
administration's level of support toward the right of employees who 
elect union representation to engage in collective bargaining. 
Nevertheless, AFGE participated fully and in good faith in the Section 
1907 Working Group meetings. As the surprise FEHBP reduction for a 
substantial portion of the TSO workforce shows, it is not at all clear 
that TSA participated on the same terms.
    The Section 1907 Working Group met over several months this year 
and recently submitted its report to Congress. What was remarkable 
about the Working Group was that all proposals were made by the Group's 
AFGE members. Rather than a robust discussion of the needs of personnel 
from both a management and labor perspective, the Agency's 
participation was primarily delivered in the form of decisions to 
recommend AFGE's proposals or decline them with little or no 
discussion. Included were proposals to change pay scales to incorporate 
regular and reasonable increases over time, essential decisions about 
fitness for duty, fair representation of the workforce including 
reasonable grievance procedures and neutral arbitration, and basic 
rights at work. Without fair pay and representation for its TSOs, TSA 
will continue to experience high turnover, requiring significant 
investment in rehiring and retraining.
    Because TSOs are so essential to the security of the flying public, 
they should be under the same law that governs personnel management in 
the rest of the Federal Government. It is just as important to TSA's 
mission that its workforce have fair compensation, full due process and 
union rights as it is to every other component of DHS. During the 
historic 2018-2019 government shutdown, the Nation learned about the 
dedication and mettle of TSOs at the same time they learned of their 
meager pay and substandard rights on the job. Please remember that TSOs 
showed up at work every day during that difficult period. Many faced 
significant challenges to make ends meet as the shutdown dragged 
through three pay periods, but they kept their promise to the American 
public. TSOs are frequently required to perform mandatory overtime, are 
faced with ever-changing shifts and insufficient rest time between 
shifts, and management failure to execute the rotation of duties in 
accordance with standard operating procedures. These represent 
potential security risks, many of which we tried to address through the 
Working Group. Congress must understand that while AFGE did its best, 
TSA did not reciprocate and thus the Section 1907 of the TSA 
Modernization Act was not fully utilized to improve personnel 
management in a way that will enhance aviation security.
    As the Committee continues to examine airport security, please know 
the workforce stands ready and determined to ensure the security of the 
flying public. TSOs take pride in their work protecting America's 
airports and skies. AFGE thanks the Committee for holding this 
important hearing and we look forward to working with you to address 
the aforementioned issues.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to 
                          Tori Emerson Barnes
    Ms. Barnes, in your testimony you outline the four policy 
recommendations offered by U.S. Travel. The fourth recommendation is 
related to the implementation of biometric identity verification 
technology at TSA checkpoints.
    Question. Can you speak to the critical need for TSA to utilize 
advanced technology to update their security strategy and elaborate on 
how TSA and DHS can effectively accelerate the implementation of 
biometric technology?
    Answer. The development and deployment of various technologies have 
the opportunity to modernize the travel security process by both 
enhancing security and increasing traveler facilitation.
    TSA released its Biometric Roadmap in October 2018. This report 
outlines how TSA plans to pursue and deploy biometrics technology at 
airports. The report has four stated goals: (1) Partner with CBP on 
Biometrics for international travelers, (2) Operationalize Biometrics 
for TSA PreCheck, (3) Expand Biometrics to additional domestic 
travelers, and (4) Develop infrastructure to support biometric 
solutions. We believe these are lofty, but necessary goals to move 
transportation security to meet modern traveler expectations and set 
the foundation for the future of secure travel.
    In our view, the timetable for providing biometric identification 
options at travel checkpoints could significantly shorten if (1) DHS 
provided greater clarity on matters of public interest, (2) CBP and TSA 
capitalized on interagency synergy, and (3) both agencies gained access 
to more resources dedicated to this specific use-case.
    First, public trust acceptance, and utilization will drive DHS 
forward. In an increasingly digital age, travelers are rightly 
concerned about data security and privacy. DHS should provide clarity 
about the application, collection, deletion, and sharing of all data 
within the travel security ecosystem. Specific standards will provide 
confidence to the travelling public that the technology is safe and 
secure. Similarly, DHS should provide data on the accuracy of the 
technology across locations and demographics, and set minimum standards 
for application. Providing the traveling public clarity on the security 
and accuracy of the technology will supplement the added facilitation 
benefits of operationalizing biometric technology. Integrating 
biometrics for Trusted Traveler enrollees, who have opted-in and been 
vetted, will provide significant facilitation benefits by expediting 
the traveler identification process that precludes the physical 
security system at airports.
    Second, we believe significant gains could be made if TSA and CBP 
capitalized on each other's development and implementation process, 
taking advantage of any technology advancement, procurement 
opportunity, or insight gained throughout the process. To sustain 
momentum throughout the development cycle, both agencies should focus 
on the ultimate goal of embracing new technology and new capabilities 
to ensure long-term applicability, and not get bogged down on 
compatibility challenges tied to antiquated forms of identification. 
The ultimate goal should be to produce an identification system that is 
wholly independent from, and un-reliant on, card-based identification.
    Third, TSA, CBP, and DHS will need resources to standardize, 
operationalize, and then expedite implementation. Investments in 
infrastructure, training, testing, and accuracy will be required to 
bring biometrics to the checkpoint, all of which will require 
significant new resources. Both TSA and CBP have a portion of their 
collected fees diverted to non-security related accounts and 
activities. Returning these fees to the accounts for which they were 
originally intended will have a significant benefit on the operations 
of both CBP and TSA. Additionally, dedicated appropriations will be 
needed to successfully expand the roll out of biometric identification 
beyond the test phase.
    The travel industry applauded TSA for releasing their biometrics 
roadmap in 2018. We share the vision for utilizing technology for the 
screening of passengers because it has the potential to provide both 
faster and more secure travel. Now we must do the hard work of putting 
that vision into action. Congress and the Administration should work 
together to take the steps listed above and bring forward the day when 
Americans can have a safer, faster, and more convenient way to travel.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to 
                              Ken Cornick
    Question 1. Mr. Cornick, how does TSA's current Credential 
Authentication Technology deployment plan impact your operations as a 
participant in the Registered Traveler Program?
    Answer. TSA has publicly stated that when its Credential 
Authentication Technology (CAT) is deployed, all passengers including 
biometrically verified Registered Traveler (RT) participants will be 
required to be processed by the TSA Travel Document Checker (TDC) to be 
run through CAT. We believe this undermines the RT program and will 
cause passengers to question why they are taking the extra step to 
submit biometrics only to stop again at the TDC. Additionally, this 
eliminates any checkpoint efficiency gains that the RT program provides 
for TSA and the traveling public.
    This challenge could be avoided with RT programs having 
transactional access to real time vetting status databases maintained 
by TSA. The technology to fulfill this request is available and could 
be implemented at no direct cost to taxpayers.
    RT programs are force multipliers at the checkpoint providing 
additional resources with enhanced security, technology, innovation, 
and staff all at no cost to TSA.

    Question 2. As a member of the Registered Traveler Program, would 
CLEAR agree to sign a Secure Flight access agreement with TSA that 
commits your company to ensuring privacy protection, data security, and 
any other necessary safeguards?
    Answer. Yes. CLEAR has stated to TSA on any number of occasions its 
willingness to abide by any reasonable standards and requirements TSA 
may put in place as a precondition to gaining connectivity to 
SecureFlight. As an example, CLEAR has already invested a significant 
amount of time and resources for its technology platform to be 
certified by TSA as ``FISMA High. '' This was done specifically in 
anticipation of gaining the aforementioned access. CLEAR welcomes the 
opportunity to collaborate with TSA on a SecureFlight access agreement.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                            Chris McLaughlin
    Earlier this month (in October 2019), I sent a letter to 
Administrator Pekoske urging the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) to increase the authorized staffing levels at Minneapolis-St. 
Paul International Airport (MSP) to help reduce increasing passenger 
wait times. While historically only 55 percent of passengers began or 
ended their flight at MSP, now 64 percent of passengers do, creating a 
significant increase in demand for screening services. In addition to 
increasing staff levels, programs like TSA PreCheck can help speed up 
the security screening process.
    Question. How do programs like TSA PreCheck help improve passenger 
wait times and the security screening process?
    Answer. Senator Klobuchar, thank you for the important question and 
for your continued leadership on aviation security. While at TSA, I 
played a leadership role in the development and deployment of TSA's 
PreCheck program.
    It is critical that TSA continue to advance its risk-based security 
initiatives. To date, TSA PreCheck has succeeded in its goal of 
enhancing security and improving the screening process for individuals 
enrolled in the program. However, the low overall enrollment rate has 
prevented TSA from achieving its ultimate goal of improving security 
and processing time for all passengers. As I stated in my testimony, 
TSA must continue to advance the PreCheck program and the best way to 
do this is through the third-party initiatives that Congress specified 
in the TSA Modernization Act.
    I would like to take a deeper dive into the program to further 
answer your question.
    At the macro level, TSA PreCheck improves both passenger wait times 
as well as the security screening process.
    In terms of wait times, it's simple math; by leaving jackets, 
belts, and shoes on, and liquids and laptops in the bag, passengers 
process through physical screening more quickly than those that are 
subjected to traditional divestiture requirements. As a result, the 
larger we can grow the population of TSA PreCheck customers relative to 
``standard'' customers, the faster the overall screening ``system'' 
will perform. Given the same number of TSA lanes and staffing, all 
passengers should wait less than they otherwise would have as the TSA 
PreCheck population grows.
    It is interesting to note that many incorrectly believe that their 
individual line wait experience should be reduced with TSA PreCheck.
    This wasn't the originally stated objective of the program, but 
rather a by-product of a fledging program with an inadequate marketing 
engine to support it. Early TSA PreCheck adopters enjoyed empty lines 
and have since begun to expect them. The program developers had an 
expectation from the outset that the queues would eventually fill.
    More importantly than wait times, TSA PreCheck improves overall 
security by utilizing an intelligence driven, risk-based approach. 
Individuals who volunteer identifiable information about themselves, 
and who therefore become more ``known,'' present less of a security 
risk than individuals who are wholly unknown. Because TSA has limited 
resources, it makes sense from a security perspective to focus on 
individuals who are lesser known. Finding a non-criminal prohibited 
item being carried by a person with an unknown history of intent is a 
higher priority than finding the same item being carried by a person 
with no history of intent. No system is perfect, and ``known'' 
individuals aren't free of risk. Nonetheless, as a former TSA 
Administrator used to say, ``TSA is in the business of risk mitigation, 
not total risk elimination''.
    Thank you for the question and please do not hesitate to reach out 
should you or staff want to discuss further.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                              Lauren Beyer
    Aviation safety is a priority for me, and I have introduced 
legislation with Senators Cantwell, Blumenthal, Markey, and Duckworth--
the Safe Skies Act--to ensure that America's cargo plane pilots have 
the same rest requirements as passenger pilots.
    Question. Can you speak to the importance of having strong rest 
requirements for both passenger and cargo pilots?
    Answer. Aviation safety is ingrained in the culture of the U.S. 
aviation industry, and at the forefront of every aspect of all 
commercial operations, regardless of whether it is a passenger or cargo 
operation.
    When addressing crew alertness and fatigue-related issues, it is 
important to understand the significant differences between cargo and 
passenger operations and ensure that the safety regulatory framework is 
capable of addressing the unique issues inherent in these operations. 
Congress did just that in 2010, in mandating that all air carriers, 
including cargo air carriers, have an FAA-approved Fatigue Risk 
Management Plan (FRMP). The FAA-approved FRMPs ensure that all air 
carriers have fatigue reporting programs, systems for monitoring pilot 
fatigue, processes for developing fatigue mitigation measures where 
needed, and training for crewmembers on the risks associated with 
fatigue and steps they can and should take to mitigate these risks. As 
a result of this framework, carriers, including cargo carriers, have 
developed fatigue monitoring tools, invested in extensive fatigue 
mitigation measures, and continue to develop robust systems for 
monitoring pilot fatigue in order to adjust operations as needed. One 
set of prescriptive rules that applies to all will not serve to address 
the unique safety issues of the various types of operations we see 
today. The FAA and the industry stakeholders have acknowledged this and 
remain committed to developing fatigue science and collecting the 
necessary data to further advance fatigue risk management systems.
    As a result of this framework, both passenger and cargo carriers 
strictly adhere to their respective FAA regulations and work 
proactively with their pilots to continually improve alertness and 
fatigue-related safety policies through their respective FAA-approved 
FRMPs that are reviewed regularly by the FAA.
    We share your commitment to safety and would be more than happy to 
brief you and/or your staff on the significant efforts that take place 
every day to address alertness and fatigue-related issues for pilots. 
U.S. passenger and cargo carriers have a shared commitment to safety 
and have spent decades establishing the global standard for safety and 
security. We will continue to lead.

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