[Senate Hearing 116-608]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-608
PROTECTING THE NATION'S TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS: OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 11, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-750 WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 11, 2019............................... 1
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 2
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 13
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 15
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 17
Statement of Senator Lee......................................... 19
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 21
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 22
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 25
Statement of Senator Tester...................................... 27
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 29
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 31
Witnesses
Patricia F. S. Cogswell, Acting Deputy Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Appendix
Letter dated September 11, 2019 to Hon. Roger Wicker and Hon.
Maria Cantwell from Alethea Predeoux, Director, Legislative
Department, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO............................................................ 35
Response to written questions submitted to Patricia F. S.
Cogswell by:
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 36
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 38
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 38
Hon. Shelly Moore Capito..................................... 43
Hon. Mike Lee................................................ 43
Hon. Todd Young.............................................. 47
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 47
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 49
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 50
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 52
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 57
PROTECTING THE NATION'S
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: OVERSIGHT
OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Thune, Blunt,
Fischer, Sullivan, Gardner, Blackburn, Capito, Lee, Young,
Cantwell, Blumenthal, Markey, Udall, Peters, Tester, and Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
The Chairman. Good morning and welcome to this hearing on
protecting the nation's transportation systems.
This morning we reflect on a somber day in American
history. It is exactly 18 years ago that terrorists turned
civilian aircraft into weapons killing nearly 3,000 Americans
and injuring thousands more. Today we honor the memories of
those who perished and those first responders who ran into
harm's way to help their fellow citizens.
The tragedy of 9/11 led to the creation of the
Transportation Security Administration, TSA, within the new
Department of Homeland Security. TSA is charged with protecting
our nation's transportation systems from attacks and ensuring
freedom of movement of people and commerce.
I am pleased that Acting Deputy Administrator Patricia
Cogswell is here to update the Committee on TSA's progress
toward achieving these goals.
America's air, land, and marine transportation systems are
designed for accessibility and efficiency. The enduring
challenge remains how to deter and respond to terrorist attacks
without unduly burdening travel, the economy, and civil
liberties.
TSA's workforce includes transportation security
inspectors, Federal air marshals, and visible intermodal
prevention and response teams, among other security
professionals.
Congress has worked to support this dedicated workforce by
passing the first-ever TSA reauthorization bill, the TSA
Modernization Act, in last year's FAA reauthorization
legislation. The Modernization Act includes provisions to
streamline acquisition, expand the PreCheck program, support
the Screening Partnership Program, mandate more rigorous
background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access
controls, and enhance security in public areas of airports.
Thus far, TSA has done an admirable job of responding to
the myriad of directives and reporting requirements of the
bill. However, I remain concerned about the pace of TSA's
deployment of new screening technology, the rate of the
PreCheck expansion, the seeming lack of urgency for
implementing Screening Partnership Program reforms, and the
absence of a comprehensive plan to integrate the Registered
Traveler program with credential authentication technology
systems. I hope our witness today will address the agency's
progress toward implementing the Modernization Act.
In addition to this Act implementation, the Committee will
also exercise oversight on reforms to existing security
programs, notably the Passenger Screening teams. In February,
Administrator Pekoske briefed the Committee on disturbing
testing results from the IG and promised to revamp canine
training. TSA has also committed to making the Federal Air
Marshals program more intelligence-based.
Improving today's frontline security programs is important,
but TSA must adapt to changing threats and technologies. The
committee is interested in emerging technology, including
biometrics. Perhaps we will hear about that today. We
understand that TSA has a biometrics road map, but we certainly
need to review this in light of concerns involving privacy,
data protection, and civil liberties.
So I look forward to a robust discussion today on the vital
role that TSA plays.
Madam Ranking Member, you are now recognized for opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me also
welcome Acting Deputy Administrator Cogswell for joining us
this morning and thank you for all the work that TSA does in
keeping us safe every day.
On this somber day, we remember the tragic and devastating
events of 18 years ago. An adversary motivated by nothing short
of an evil attack on our Nation and the horrifying grief and
loss of life was unimaginable. Establishing the Transportation
Security Administration was among several steps that Congress
took to help ensure the attack would never be repeated. In the
last Congress, this committee worked hard to complete the work
on the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, also including the
first comprehensive reauthorization of TSA since the agency was
created shortly after the September 11 attacks. Our focus today
is on the oversight of the agency as it continues its critical
mission and seeks to implement the mandates included in last
year's TSA authorization, formerly known as the TSA
Modernization Act.
As you know, last year's TSA Modernization Act focused on
improving transportation security by addressing such issues as
training and deployment of canines for screening of passengers
and cargo, reinforcing efforts to intercept insider threats,
and expediting testing and deployment of new screening
technologies in various organizations to ensure the effective
leadership at the agency. I also want to note here I appreciate
the good work of the Pacific Northwest Laboratories in
Richland, Washington, who, at airports with the TSA Millimeter
Wave Scan, have worked through security and developing--we call
it--the TSA salute, but nonetheless, this overhead has given
quite a security layer and yesterday had the chance to talk
with Acting Director Cogswell about the next generation of
technology which we will be deploying at airports. But both at
our airports with individual travelers and our cargo
containers, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory continues to stay
ahead on cutting-edge technology, and we appreciate the work of
our R&D labs in helping us maintain security.
I also appreciate your candor regarding a recent diversion
of TSA resources to the southern border. I spoke to you about a
letter that was sent by my colleague, Senator Wicker, and I
about the diversion of those resources. My guess is we will
have a chance to ask you in this morning's hearing about that.
Reports indicated at the time that there could be an additional
800 FAMs who would be deployed with the ultimate goal of
sending 175 to support the CBP operations. So I look forward to
asking you about those questions this morning.
So as my colleague said, we are here to review what we can
do to make sure that the TSA remains a strong and viable force.
I remain very interested in the canine units' success and the
further deployment of that as one of the fastest growing
airports, if not the fastest growing airport in the nation,
Sea-Tac. The challenges of moving people and making sure we are
all secure is a very, very important daily task. So thank you
for being here to address these issues.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Members and guests should know that Senators on the floor
will be observing a moment of silence at 11 this morning, and
in connection with that, this committee will also be observing
that moment of silence at the stroke of 11 just before votes
begin. So be mindful of that.
And, Ms. Cogswell, we are delighted to have you, and we are
interested in hearing your opening statement. Thank you for
being here.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA F. S. COGSWELL,
ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Cogswell. Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you
for inviting me to testify about the work the Transportation
Security Administration does to keep our nation's
transportation systems secure. We appreciate the continued
support of Congress and are grateful for the productive
relationship we have with this committee, as well as the
authorities provided in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, the
first reauthorization of us as an agency.
On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people died as a result
of the worst act of terrorism ever committed on American soil.
From this tragedy, we renewed our dedication to the ideals and
freedoms that define our Nation. 9/11 changed us all. With the
goal to never again face such an attack, Congress created the
TSA just 2 months afterwards.
Eighteen years have passed since the tragic events of
September 11, and while many Americans, including some of TSA's
current employees, are too young to have vivid recollections of
that day, aviation and other modes of transportation remain
highly sought-after targets by terrorists whose methods of
attack remain more decentralized and opportunistic than ever
before.
TSA must meet the challenge of pervasive and constantly
evolving threats in both physical and cyber realms. TSA's most
important asset in this fight is its people. I am extremely
proud of the 63,000 dedicated professionals who make up TSA's
workforce. Every day they demonstrate our core values of
integrity, respect, and commitment to the mission.
Earlier this year, a significant portion of our workforce,
including transportation security officers, Federal air
marshals, transportation security inspectors, canine handlers,
vetting and intelligence personnel and support staff worked
without pay for 35 days during the partial government shutdown.
Through this incredibly trying period, our employees dedicated
true professionalism and commitment to the mission despite
suffering significant financial and personal challenges. We are
grateful that Members of Congress continue to look for ways to
protect our workforce in the event of a future lapse in
appropriation and stand ready to work with you to advance this
effort.
TSA was a very important year for the direction of TSA. Not
only did Congress pass and the President sign the TSA
Modernization Act, but TSA also developed its strategy through
2026 in its Administrator Intent to guide the execution. During
2019, we have focused on implementation. TSA has completed more
than 46 percent of the 180 requirements mandated in the Act and
53 percent of those with specific deadlines. Completed
statutory requirements range from a global aviation security
review to creating an air cargo division and establishing a
surface transportation security advisory committee.
When Administrator Pekoske testified before this Committee
last September, he described the efforts TSA was taking to
rapidly advance TSA's acquisition of computed tomography
screening systems and credential authentication technology. CT
and CAT allowed TSA to more easily identify potential threats
in less invasive and more automated ways, enhancing both the
effectiveness of our screening processes and the passenger
experience. Thanks to the support of Congress, TSA awarded a
contract for 300 CT machines and 500 CAT machines and is
beginning deployment.
Additionally, consistent with the TSA Modernization Act
requirements for PreCheck, in 2019 we successfully conducted
pilots at two airports, demonstrating TSA can achieve
significantly higher throughput for pure PreCheck only lanes.
We are also encouraged by early results of a new option that we
are testing that enables passengers to enroll via a mobile
tablet at the airport near the checkpoint.
We know the importance of assessing risk as we carry out
our mission. Consistent with the Modernization Act requirement,
our Federal air marshals integrated risk-based, intelligence-
driven, rule information into their concept of operations
through a prioritized mission deployment strategy focused on
high-risk travelers and revised international risk assessment
models.
Similarly, TSA has taken a number of strategic actions to
address the risk associated with insider threat, including the
establishment of an ASAC subcommittee on insider threat and
assessing options to improve airport worker controls. TSA plans
to produce a road map to describe the way forward to mitigate
insider risk.
TSA also recognizes strategic success depends on our
workforce. We commissioned a blue ribbon panel comprised of
public and private sector leaders with extensive human capital
expertise to conduct a full review of human capital service
policy and delivery at TSA. We have used the results of that
effort, as well as input received through the early
establishment of a national advisory council and other fora, to
develop a number of workforce initiatives, including a two-tier
performance system, model officer recognition program, and the
TSO career progression program.
TSA's theme in recognition of the 18th anniversary of the
September 11th attack is ``Honoring the Memory, Protecting the
Nation.'' We are confident through vigilance, collaboration
with domestic and international partners, and the continued
support of Congress we will all reach our mutual goal of ``not
on our watch.''
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and the members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patricia F. S. Cogswell,
Acting Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify about the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
work we are doing to keep the Nation's transportation system secure. On
behalf of all TSA employees, we appreciate the continued support of
Congress and are grateful for the productive relationship we have with
this Committee as well as the authorities provided to the agency
through the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, the first reauthorization of
our critical security agency.
On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people died as a result of the
worst act of terrorism ever committed on American soil. From that
tragedy, we, as Americans, renewed our dedication to the ideals and
freedoms that define our great nation. The world changed that day, and
seemingly remote dangers proved their destructive power here in our
homeland. In the days immediately following the attacks, our Nation
rallied around accounts of the courage and heroism of first responders,
emergency personnel, and everyday citizens who risked everything to
save others. Not only was 9/11 an attack on our freedom, but it was
also an attempt to alter America's way of life. It did not succeed.
In the months and years since, helplessness and fear became hope
and resolve. 9/11 changed us all. It also defined what TSA does. With
the goal to never again face such an attack on our soil, Congress
created the TSA just two months after the attack. Since its creation,
TSA's ongoing commitment to ensuring safe travel has allowed Americans
to continue traveling securely and freely.
Eighteen years have passed since the horrific events of September
11, 2001, and many Americans, including some of TSA's current
employees, are of such an age that they do not have a vivid
recollection of that day. While memories for some do not exist or may
have faded, we must remember the reality that aviation and
transportation hubs remain highly-valued targets for terrorists, whose
methods of attack are more decentralized and opportunistic than ever
before. Rest assured, the passage of time since 9/11 has not weakened
our resolve to secure vital transportation modes, nor do we
underestimate the persistent nature of our adversaries.
The reality is that every day, TSA is challenged by a pervasive and
constantly evolving threat environment, both in the physical and cyber
realms, and one that now includes the potential use of unmanned
aircraft systems. We must never forget the lessons of 9/11, and must
ensure we continue in our resolve to protect the Nation. As such, the
importance of TSA's mantra, ``Not On Our Watch,'' rings as true today
as it did every previous anniversary of 9/11.
As we discuss TSA's work, it is particularly important to emphasize
that we all share the goal of protecting travelers, commerce, and the
transportation system itself, in order to protect our economy and the
American way of life. We also recognize that we can never be satisfied
with the status quo and must also always be looking for innovative ways
to improve our people, procedures and technology.
TSA's most important asset is its people. I am extremely proud of
the 63,000 dedicated professionals who make up TSA's workforce, share
our core values of integrity, respect, and commitment, and provide
security for millions of individuals using our transportation systems
each and every day. Exemplary of their dedication to the mission,
earlier this year Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Federal Air
Marshals, vetting and intelligence personnel, Transportation Security
Inspectors, canine handlers, and support staffs worked for 35 days
under extraordinarily challenging circumstances during the lapse in
appropriations. Many of those individuals, and in particular our TSOs,
who are in lower pay bands, continued to report to work despite
suffering financial hardships. While TSA leveraged the flexibility
provided by our authorities and appropriations to use prior year carry-
over funding to mitigate the adverse financial effect on our workforce,
the impact was real. We are hopeful that such circumstances can be
avoided in the future and look forward to working with Congress to
develop and implement such a solution.
Securing the Nation's transportation system, which is complex,
expansive, and interdependent, requires a collective effort; it is not
something that the government can accomplish alone. To that end, TSA
recognizes the critical importance of partnering with stakeholders in
developing transportation security solutions. In particular, we
appreciate the authority provided by the TSA Modernization Act to
establish a Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee, which
has since been created and held its first meeting in July. TSA also
receives invaluable insights from stakeholders through the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Committee's Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating
Council, and other forums. The discussions, feedback, and input
provided by those entities, as well as new congressionally-created
working groups focused on explosive detection canine capacity, are
facilitating better information sharing between all transportation
security stakeholders as well as the development of various types of
best practice guidance for countering determined adversaries.
The U.S. transportation system accommodates approximately 965
million domestic and international aviation passengers annually--this
equates to the screening of 2.8 million passengers, 1.4 million check
bags, and 5.1 million carry-on bags each day. In surface
transportation, there are more than 10.1 billion passenger trips on
mass transit per year, approximately 600 million passengers traveling
over-the-road buses each year; and more than 1 million hazardous
material shipments on trucks every day. Beyond those usage numbers
associated with a relatively open network of transportation modes, the
physical scope of the system encompasses approximately 138,000 miles of
railroad tracks; 4.2 million miles of highway; 616,000 highway bridges;
503 road tunnels; and nearly 2.7 million miles of pipeline.
While the scope of our transportation system is significant, it is
critically important from a planning and execution perspective to also
recognize that demands are increasing. For instance, the last twelve
months represent the highest volume of air travelers in the agency's
history and we just completed the busiest summer travel season ever,
screening more than 262 million aviation passengers and crew between
Memorial Day and Labor Day. These increased numbers will likely
continue as aviation industry estimates anticipate annual growth of 4.5
percent for passenger travel and 2.5 percent for cargo over the next 20
years. Thanks in part to the support of Congress, TSA has been able to
take measures to address the recent increases in volume, with current
staffing levels at 2,100 more full time employees than last year as
well as a 20 percent increase in the allocation of overtime to ensure
airports have the flexibility to schedule officers during peak times.
TSA's continued success is contingent upon our ability to rise to
the challenge of outmatching dynamic threats to our aviation and
surface transportation systems and doing so within the parameters of
fiscal reality. Traveler volume and expectations for a positive,
seamless experience are trending up. We must continue to work hard, but
also need to work smarter, more strategically, and in innovative ways
to stay ahead of the threat and remain a global leader in
transportation security. Further, we must also continue to build
resiliency in our organization so that we are prepared and able to
respond to significant national crises like those caused by a natural
disaster or currently being experienced on the southwest border.
Resiliency is reflected in TSA's people, structure, and doctrine.
Although Administrator Pekoske is currently dual-hatted, continuing to
serve as the Administrator while also serving as the Department of
Homeland Security's Acting Deputy Secretary, TSA, through its strong
leadership corps and sound organizational structure, continues to
implement the TSA Modernization Act and execute the 2018-2026 TSA
Strategy and the Administrator's Intent that were put in place prior to
him assuming that role. The TSA Strategy ensures our focus on
capability innovation and threat-informed, information-driven
operations. The Administrator's Intent explains how we will execute the
Strategy between now and 2020. The TSA Strategy and Administrator's
Intent detail the three main strategic priorities for the organization
and how we will accomplish them. Both documents are posted on our
website for public review and transparency. The first priority is to
improve security and safeguard the transportation system. Our second is
to accelerate action. And the final priority is to commit to our
people. These priorities reflect TSA's focus on preserving frontline
operations, quickly transitioning to new solutions and capabilities,
and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources.
Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System
TSA's operational environment requires robust partnerships and
effective security operations across all modes of transportation. We
strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and
professional workforce, more effective threat detection capabilities,
enhanced intelligence and vetting, and better communication and
coordination with stakeholders. Simultaneously, we also strive to
improve the passenger experience.
When Administrator Pekoske testified before this Committee last
September, he explained the extraordinary efforts TSA was taking to
test computed tomography (CT) screening systems and expand their use at
airport checkpoints. CT technology allows TSA officers to more easily
identify potential threats in a less invasive way and eventually may
eliminate the need for passengers to remove liquids, electronics and
food items from carry-on passenger bags. This technology both enhances
the effectiveness of TSA's security screening process and improves the
passenger experience. Thanks to the support of Congress, TSA recently
awarded a contract for 300 CT units. The deployment of this technology
along with Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which improves
and automates identity verification and validation, is transforming the
effectiveness and efficiency of our checkpoint screening process.
TSA has explored a number of other ways to improve performance,
manage risk and use resources more effectively. Consistent with the TSA
Modernization Act requirement to limit the use of TSA Pre3 lanes to
only individuals with Known Traveler Numbers, which represents
approximately 20 percent of domestic travelers, we successfully
conducted pilots at two airports; demonstrating that TSA can achieve
higher throughput for ``pure Pre3'' lanes. In addition, we also sought
to test our Future Lane Experience (FLEx) model, at two airports to
assess throughput when we provide alternate procedures for processing
passengers identified as lower risk; this screening is not as
streamlined as what a TSA Pre3 member would receive, but more
efficient than standard processing. TSA used CAT units for these
pilots.
Similarly, TSA has conducted joint pilots with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), using the facial recognition system and photo
galleries CBP built to meet its biometric entry-exit program mandate,
to assess how facial recognition technologies could be used to
potentially automate Travel Document Checker (TDC) functions at our
checkpoint. TSA is also currently carrying out a pilot at Las Vegas
McCarran Airport, adding an automated facial matching capability to
existing CAT systems, to assess operational effectiveness for matching
a traveler's image to the photos on the ID they present to the officer
at the TDC. In carrying out these efforts, which are designed to find
ways to both improve security effectiveness and enhance the passenger
experience, TSA is also committed to ensuring appropriate privacy and
data integrity protections are in place.
TSA is also using risk-based decision making with regard to
deployment of Federal Air Marshals as well as their seating on flights
to provide better tactical position based on the potential threat.
Finally, TSA has continued to expand participation in the TSA Pre3
program through marketing and partnership, with the current number of
airlines participating in TSA Pre3 standing at 73 domestic and
international carriers representing 95 percent of passengers traveling
to or within the U.S. All of these efforts are focused on examining how
TSA can more effectively use technology and its personnel to reduce
risk, provide better security faster, and enhance the traveler
experience.
Looking abroad, for the last two years, TSA has implemented
enhanced security requirements for all commercial flights to the United
States. Those measures include enhanced screening of passengers and
electronic devices, and heightened security standards for aircraft and
airports. These new security measures have been implemented at 283 last
points of departure airports in 106 countries. These airports service
approximately 338 U.S. and foreign airlines, transporting an average of
375,000 passengers on 2,100 flights daily. While those actions are
effective in the near term, TSA is focused on raising the global
baseline for aviation security through long term partnerships and
cooperation. To that end, earlier this year TSA conducted a Global
Aviation Security Review, as mandated by the TSA Modernization Act, and
identified a number of best practices related to enhancing
collaboration with foreign partners on aviation security capacity.
Additionally, TSA performed focused audit visits to determine
compliance with TSA Security Directives/Emergency Amendments. TSA is
using that review to advance the improvement of international aviation
security standards for passengers.
TSA also continues to improve air cargo security. Earlier this
year, per the TSA Modernization Act, TSA established an air cargo
division, reviewed the effectiveness of the certified cargo screening
program, and conducted a feasibility study of the potential use of CT
systems for screening air cargo. Consistent with the TSA Modernization
Act requirement as well as the results of that study, TSA is partnering
with an all-cargo entity to conduct a pilot program to test the
effectiveness of CT for screening in such a setting. As threats
continue to evolve, TSA, in cooperation with partners world-wide, will
work to improve intelligence sharing and standardize best practices,
while also pursuing technological security advancements.
In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, TSA
continues to oversee the security of the surface transportation system.
On a daily basis, TSA assists surface stakeholders through conducting
vulnerability assessments, analyzing security programs across the
surface sector--from pipelines, to mass transit, to freight rail, to
over-the-road bus entities--providing training and exercise support,
sharing intelligence information, and executing collaborative law
enforcement and security operations--such as those operations conducted
the Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response teams. Since December
2018, TSA, in partnership with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, has conducted four Validated Architecture Design
Reviews, which are in depth cybersecurity assessments, at select
pipeline companies and has four additional assessments scheduled. We
also conducted 18 ISTEP exercises this Fiscal Year in surface
transportation modes. In an effort to improve the support and services
we provide, over the last several months TSA has elevated the Surface
Operations leadership position, realigned resources to focus on surface
inspections, established the Surface Transportation Security Advisory
Committee, and distributed a survey to more than 3,000 surface
transportation stakeholders to better assess their needs.
Finally, TSA continues to work to address current and evolving
threats by looking at emerging technologies, including from outside the
transportation environment, to assess how they might be applied in the
surface transportation environment. Through the process of establishing
operational test beds, TSA works with surface transportation owners and
operators to develop and deploy technology solutions to advance
security for different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway
motor carrier, pipeline, and freight rail). TSA does not procure the
technology for surface transportation operators and owners. The test
bed approach assists with development of their technology requirements,
helps inform their acquisition decision making process, and enables TSA
to share the results of the testing in government technology forums.
Accelerate Action
In many ways, 2019 represents a year of implementation of a number
of initiatives that TSA accelerated last year--specifically, deployment
of both CT and CAT technology at the checkpoints. This year has also
included a renewed focus on developing the next generation of Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) devices. TSA is currently partnering with the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the Department of Energy, and
security stakeholders to assess next generation enhanced AIT systems.
Through providing automated target algorithms with more data, these
systems should increase detection performance and reduce potential
false alarms. TSA will also continue to conduct airport trials of
alternative AIT solutions designed to reduce processing times and
improve performance accuracy.
By embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile processes, and
facilitating collaboration, TSA is positioning itself to keep pace with
industry partners while advancing security across all modes of
transportation. To that end, TSA has formalized a strategic management
process that aligns strategy and policy to operations by leveraging
risk assessment capabilities to inform budgeting and investment
decisions. We used this approach in the development of the TSA Capital
Investment Plan that was submitted to Congress earlier this year
pursuant to the TSA Modernization Act requirement.
Commit to Our People
TSA recognizes that our strategic success depends upon our
workforce. Our priority to Commit to Our People focuses on our ability
to attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our workforce at
all levels of the organization. TSA commissioned a Blue Ribbon Panel
comprised of public and private sector leaders with extensive human
capital expertise to conduct a full review of the human capital service
policy and delivery at TSA, including TSO pay and compensation, to
identify ways we can improve as an organization. Among a number of
findings, the Panel reaffirmed that TSA's authorizing statute, the
Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), provides TSA with greater
authority and flexibility to manage our workforce than the General
Schedule. Working within that authority, TSA currently has a number of
initiatives underway that are designed to enhance our ability to
compete as an employer and attract and retain talent.
Two-Tier Performance System--Based upon input from our
workforce, we determined that the way we had implemented our
multi-tier performance system was placing significant paperwork
burdens on our employees and supervisors without providing
meaningful distinctions between employees or benefits for their
professional development. Beginning in October, TSA will shift
to a simpler two-tier system for the screening workforce (e.g.,
meets standards/does not meet standards) that will streamline
the process and significantly reduce subjectivity.
Model Officer Recognition--Also beginning in October, TSA is
implementing a new program that provides the agency with a
mechanism to better recognize its top officers for the work
they are doing throughout the year with monetary and non-
monetary awards for special acts as well as pay increases.
TSO Career Progression--This initiative provides a clearly
defined and transparent career path for uniformed officers with
pay increases tied to enhanced skills and training. The first
phase of TSO Career Progression was implemented in August 2018,
and TSA has updated and rolled out six new training classes
this past year. The development of future phases is underway,
and we look to expand this initiative to other segments of the
workforce.
Over the last few years, TSA has seen significant improvements in
the results of the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS).
While we are proud of these advancements and our FEVS improvements, we
realize that as an Agency we must continue to innovate and compete as
an employer to ensure our workplace attracts, keeps, and develops great
personnel. We are confident that the actions we have taken to improve
employee communications with senior leadership through reestablishing
the National Advisory Council and creating uniformed advisors to the
Administrator, as well as the initiatives noted previously will advance
our efforts towards that goal.
Conclusion
Despite the passage of eighteen years since the attacks on
September 11, 2001, TSA is focused on two things--``Honoring the
Memory, Protecting the Nation.'' Although the priorities of our
Strategy are ambitious, they are necessary to stay ahead of persistent,
determined adversaries while also preserving individual freedoms and
the benefits of an open, efficient transportation system. We are
resolute in our desire to ensure that a similar event never occurs in
the future and are confident that through vigilance, collaboration with
domestic and international partners, and the continued support of
Congress and all of our stakeholders, such an attack will not occur on
``Our Watch.''
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
am honored to serve in this capacity along with the dedicated men and
women of TSA. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for your testimony.
Let me start by asking about something I do not think we
saw in your printed testimony, and that is the Screening
Partnership Program. The Modernization Act included a number of
provisions to enhance the Screening Partnership Program, such
as allowing airport operators to participate in the evaluation
of SPP proposals.
When will TSA finish developing this process, and are you
currently briefing these assessments to every airport director?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question.
So as you know, there were a number of requirements related
to the Security Partnership Program, which enables individual
airports to choose to use contracted private entities to
perform screening services while still matching the quality and
type of screening provided similarly to TSA. We have already
brought on board the majority of those requirements,
specifically and probably the largest one being ensuring use of
the full cost recovery that the Federal Government uses to
evaluate the bids by the individual performance entities. At
this point, we have already awarded three new contracts this
year under the new requirements, with a fourth one expected
before the end of September, and we have several more scheduled
for completion in early 2020.
The Chairman. Are you briefing every airport director about
this?
Ms. Cogswell. Every airport director is very closely tied
into the process by which we solicit the requirements and then
proceed through the actual analysis and results.
The Chairman. OK.
Now, on Real ID, it is our understanding that TSA will
begin turning away travelers that do not have Real ID compliant
ID cards on October 1st of next year. How is that going, and do
you have some contingency plans for obviously the people who
are going to be caught by surprise?
Ms. Cogswell. As you correctly noted, October 1, 2020 is
the final implementation date for the Real ID Act as
implemented through regulation. It is critically important to
recall that the rationale and reason for that Act in the first
place was actually one of the recommendations coming from the
9/11 Commission, noting in fact that that was one of the
methods used by the perpetrators of the attack. At this stage,
we are in incredibly close coordination through DHS and with
TSA directly in every location around the country. We are
working to get signs out. We have recently started as every
individual travels, they will be notified if the document they
are presenting at the time they come to our travel document
checker whether or not their identity document will meet the
requirements post next year. We want to make sure everyone has
the maximum amount of time they can in order to obtain either a
Real ID compliant document or other acceptable form of
identification such as a passport or military identification.
The Chairman. I have got my Mississippi driver's license
here. Are all the states compliant now with the driver's
licenses that are being issued as of this date?
Ms. Cogswell. 50 of 56 issuing jurisdictions are currently
compliant. The six remaining are scheduled to be complete in
the next year.
The Chairman. Some of those are states?
Ms. Cogswell. Two are states.
The Chairman. Very good. It just seems to me that once
those 56 jurisdictions comply, that is going to take care of
almost everybody. I sure hope so.
Is TSA PreCheck helping to make the lines shorter for
everybody else?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that question.
In fact, we see a profound change in airports where a
significant population are PreCheck members in terms of the
overall throughput for any individual airport. As of right now,
we have about 20 million individuals who are in the program,
having a known traveler number. That includes 9 million who are
directly enrolled with PreCheck, another 9 million who are
members of CBP's Global Entry program, and additional other
populations such as yourself, sir, through the process we used
to bring in other additional populations who are screened
through very highly controlled processes.
At this point, we see nationwide about 20 percent of all
travelers each day are PreCheck----
The Chairman. 20 percent.
Ms. Cogswell.--which is a quite good number. We want to see
it continue to grow.
The Chairman. Does that help the other 80 percent?
Ms. Cogswell. It does.
The Chairman. Well, there is a requirement. Non-PreCheck
passengers must remove their liquids. If you are PreCheck, this
is relaxed. Tell us about that. And what is the status of TSA's
deployment of computed tomography screening machines? And what
is your anticipated timeline on allowing all passengers, not
just PreCheck, to keep liquids and laptops in their bags during
screening?
Ms. Cogswell. As you noted, one of the primary differences
between--the most visible differences between standard
screening and PreCheck screening is the ability to leave your
laptop within your bag. You can also leave your shoes on and
light jackets. You do not have to take off clothing in order to
go through the screening equipment.
The Chairman. That is great.
Ms. Cogswell. As you have noted, one of the pieces we see
that will help us get to the next stage is that computed
tomography, or CT machine. Those machines, because of their
much greater ability to gather additional sensor data, provide
us a significantly enhanced ability to see within that carry-on
baggage to look for items that might be threats, meaning we
have to have less divestiture, less passengers have to pull out
from their bag. Laptops are the easiest ones to proceed with
first. We are also working very carefully with the makers of
the equipment to look for what algorithms we can put in place
to enhance beyond that that will get us to liquid so that we
can----
The Chairman. Well, I am intruding on Senator Cantwell's
time. But what is your timeline there?
Ms. Cogswell. We are still working to develop the algorithm
to be able to truly tell what the content and type of liquid it
is.
The Chairman. AI. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, Administrator Cogswell, I mentioned Sea-Tac and
its rapid growth. I think we are at 135,000 people a day and
almost 50 million a year. I noticed that the site for Sea-Tac
says that it was built in 1949 to accommodate a million people.
So the fact that we are accommodating annually 50 million
people shows the stress and strain on the system. And as we
discussed yesterday, moving cargo is what we do in the
Northwest as well. So these security measures are of utmost
importance to us in continuing to do a good job at the security
layer, as well as moving in a cost effective fashion.
So I wanted to ask you about the new rules for developing
the canine units and for third party explosive detections. When
will we see those, and what other initiatives are we pursuing
to have fully trained teams available for deployment? And then
I also wanted to ask you about the diversion to the southern
border, how many TSA people were diverted, and what were the
impacts on lines at airports across the country?
Ms. Cogswell. So the program you are noting--we refer to it
as Third Party Canine. We published the regulations last
December and immediately began training teams. At this point in
time, we have more than 171 teams and 30 entities already
performing screening, those private screening requirements at
those private screening entities already operating today. We
expect to see continued growth in volume in that space. We have
had a lot of interest in it.
As to your question about the southwest border----
Senator Cantwell. On the canine point, so is TSA pursuing
other initiatives, or do you think you are going to be more
aggressive in just pursuing this Third Party stream?
Ms. Cogswell. In addition to the aspect around the Third
Party Canine, we are also looking at the next round, next
review, next enhancement of technology that could be available
for use in screening of cargo. Similar to the same types of
equipment that we use in checked bag today and are moving to
the checkpoint, we think there is much greater capability for
pallet-sized, much larger size in the cargo screening
environment.
Senator Cantwell. So it is safe to say that Sea-Tac will be
seeing aggressive use of canines and that TSA will be
continuing its own efforts, as well as whatever Sea-Tac does on
its own.
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely. This is an area that we think is
absolutely ripe for continued evolution, and we are very
pleased at all the partnerships we have that is dedicated to
that mission.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Now southern border.
Ms. Cogswell. On to the southern border. We have been
detailing personnel to support CBP since early in the summer.
The high water point of the total number of people that we had
down at the southern border at any given time was about 350.
Today we are down to around 180 post Congress' approval of the
supplemental, as well as the decrease we have seen in the
number of migrants appearing at the border.
The individuals we send are all volunteers. They chose to
support that mission. We are incredibly grateful for their
choice to perform and serve in that function.
Types of activities they perform include providing
transportation from detention facilities to hospitals, while
they are at the hospital, making sure that there is a security
layer, and then returning them to the detention facility. Other
areas include helping provide supplies, inventorying personal
belongings when someone arrives, other aspects in that front.
As we continue to go forward, we made very clear decisions
as we were going through the setup of that program that we
would not endanger transportation security or greatly
disadvantage any one location. So we specifically designed the
volumes of people and locations to have minimal impact.
Senator Cantwell. So you are saying minimal impact or no
impact? I know you mentioned to me that you exempted all the
high volume airports from being impacted. So you took
volunteers from places where you are saying they basically had
little or no impact. Is that what you are saying?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes. So if you are talking about people who
work at our checkpoints, we specifically designed it for those
locations where we could do so recognizing what the volumes
were at that location. Other places that we looked to, of
course, are our Federal air marshals. So we selected
individuals, recognizing that we would see in the near term
some decrease in the number of, for example, Viper missions
that were run at various surface locations or some decrease in
our lower priority flights. But we have been able to manage and
maintain that amount to minimize impact.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Deputy Administrator, as you noted in your testimony, I am
glad to see that the TSA has established the Surface
Transportation Security Advisory Committee, and I was proud to
work on the legislation that established it.
Now that it is established, what processes are in place to
ensure the TSA seriously considers and implements the
recommendations provided by those advisory committee members?
Ms. Cogswell. We are incredibly fortunate that we have had
a long and productive relationship with many members in the
surface transportation sphere. This legislation was a very
significant benefit to us because it let us formalize that
process and create a truer avenue that allows us to take formal
recommendations. Similar to how we have operated the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, we believe there is an enormous
value of having a venue such as this where we can ask specific
questions, ask for specific advice in areas, and receive it
formally through that mechanism. So thank you very much for
your support.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Also, the TSA Modernization Act requires that you conduct a
surface transportation security assessment and implement a
risk-based strategy based on that assessment. You then have to,
obviously, develop a budget, resource allocations that are
really going to look at that risk-based strategy that comes
about.
Earlier this year, the Administrator spoke at a House
committee meeting on that and said the assessment was going to
be completed probably by October of this year. Do you think you
are going to meet that deadline? And can you provide this
committee right now with any kind of insight on what maybe we
can expect to see in that assessment?
Ms. Cogswell. We are working very hard to complete that
requirement. We believe we will be in time to meet the
deadline.
Overall, I think the important piece of the assessment is
ensuring that we have correctly and adequately looked across
all of the threats, all of the vulnerabilities, and the
consequential risks associated coming out of any particular
vector at the security environment for surface transportation.
At this time, I think the most important part from our
perspective is the ability to call much greater attention to
surface transportation. This is an area where very good people
have worked for a long time to improve surface transportation
security. I cannot tell you the number of people I have met
just dedicated to this mission. The ability to call attention
to their great work, see how far they have come, see where they
need to go farther is a great place to be.
Senator Fischer. Do you anticipate that there may be a
classified section to this assessment that the Committee will
have access to?
Ms. Cogswell. At this time, I do not know that we are
planning a classified attachment. However, we are happy to
provide a classified briefing to you or your team, should you
want it, as well as the regular briefings that we do to further
go into depth against all of the different threats we see.
Senator Fischer. I think it would be very, very helpful and
also very important that this committee be able have those
classified briefings. But I also think it would be really
helpful if you would have a written attachment that we would be
able to review in a classified setting so that we have, I
think, a fuller understanding of the risks that are out there
and what is needed and what would be a responsibility of this
committee to try and meet those needs in the future.
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that. I will take it
back. But we will look forward to meeting your requirement.
Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much.
Also you know, in December 2018, the GAO issued a report on
the pipeline security program and made 10 recommendations, all
of which DHS has concurred with. Can you provide an update on
where TSA is at in implementing those GAO recommendations on
pipelines?
Ms. Cogswell. We are making strong progress against all of
the GAO recommendations. I think most important from our
perspective is looking at how we are reenergizing and
revitalizing the competencies and knowledge of our workforce in
this space. Through our recent changes--and again, thank you
for the TSA Modernization Act requirement--we now have a
dedicated section solely to surface transportation. In that, we
have combined the way we pull together our compliance staff,
our inspectors, and we are further developing a core cadre who
are specialized and have much greater expertise in both
pipeline, as well as we are pursuing additional expertise in
cyber. So at this stage, we have completed the first 24 going
through that additional training and are looking to expand from
there.
Senator Fischer. Are you seeing a good working relationship
with the other agencies involved?
Ms. Cogswell. We are. In particular, FMCSA and FERC have
both been very, very solid partners closely working with us.
Parts of Department of Energy, in particular, we do dedicated
briefings with to the various members of industry.
I also want to just say I cannot say enough about the great
relationships we have with the members of industry. They are
extremely laser focused on the security aspects and needs.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service.
What is the statutory authorization for diverting TSA
employees to the border?
Ms. Cogswell. I believe, sir, it is in the original
creation language for the Department of Homeland Security. But
there is a secondary provision within TSA's legislation
directly that allows us to authorize use of personnel in
support of overarching missions. As other examples of where we
do this today is in support of hurricane or other natural
disaster responses, as well as the July 4th activities here on
the Mall or----
Senator Blumenthal. Are currently TSA employees diverted to
the hurricane response effort?
Ms. Cogswell. We had 120 ready on standby to go based on
where incidents occurred in the United States. We were able to
absorb it locally and did not have to detail anyone.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, will you commit to
provide us with some kind of notice in the event that
additional TSA employees are diverted to the border beyond the
180 that are now there?
Ms. Cogswell. We will.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to ask you about the September
11 security fee. We have recalled at this hearing and will be
recalling on the floor very shortly that horrific tragedy that
spurred the creation of the TSA and led to vast improvements in
our nation's airport security. In paying for these
improvements, as you know, Congress established a user fee that
passengers pay on their tickets. It is known as the September
11 security fee. The fee was initially intended to go only to
improving the security of our nation's transportation system.
In 2013, Congress passed a measure to reduce the deficit,
and as part of a major budget compromise, the September 11
security fee was raised from $5 to $5.60, but Congress required
one-third of the revenue collected from those fees to go toward
reducing the deficit. In my view, this measure was nonsensical.
Senator Markey and I have introduced S. 472, the Funding
for Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration Act.
It is known as the FASTER Act. This legislation would eliminate
the diversion of funds to pay for totally unrelated government
spending and ensure that the passenger security fees go only to
transportation security and prevent Congress from, again,
raiding these funds in the future.
My question to you is, would you support giving TSA access
to these funds should Congress return the full amount of
revenue generated by the September 11 security fund to its
purpose of securing our nation's transportation system?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that question.
While there is no official administration position on the
legislation, I will say we very much share your interest in
ensuring a continual, consistent funding source for the agency
dedicated to improving both security in terms of technology and
paying for our personnel.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, there can be no consistent source
of funding if Congress is diverting those fees that are charged
to travelers for transportation security and, in effect, do a
bait and switch to divert them elsewhere. Correct?
Ms. Cogswell. It is more difficult, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. More difficult and eventually it will
detract from your efforts to secure our nation's airports and
other transportation facilities. Correct?
Ms. Cogswell. So far what it has meant is a potential
leveling off of our funding sources.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, then would you commit to provide
this Committee with a position on this legislation hopefully in
support of it?
Ms. Cogswell. We will seek to work very closely with the
process through the administration to obtain a formal
administration position.
Senator Blumenthal. On another topic, as you know, on July
17, 2019, a mechanic for American Airlines allegedly tampered
with a key aircraft computer system at Miami International
Airport. It indicated a vulnerability to insider threats. How
vulnerable is our nation's aviation system to insider threats?
Ms. Cogswell. Insider threats is one of the significant
threat streams that we regularly look at and something that we
are actively working with our international partners, as well
as our domestic partners, including both in government and in
industry. This is an area that we believe needs to have a
multi-factored, multi-faceted approach to counter. Not only do
we rely on background checks, access control, but we also look
to ensure a culture across the board where individuals, if they
see something that does not look right, that does not make
sense, they are immediately reporting it so that it can be
quickly attended to. While we want all of these pieces to work
together, it takes each and every one of us every day to have
that first most in mind.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
According to our Committee procedures, Senator Peters is
next. He will be followed by Senator Lee.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, as we remember the tragic events of September 11, 18
years ago, we know that out of that tragedy came the 9/11
Commission, and its report examined what happened and it made a
number of recommendations to remedy the failures that led up to
that tragic event.
One of the last 9/11 Commission recommendations that has
not been adopted--most all of them have been adopted--was the
necessity to streamline congressional oversight, which I know
continues to be a challenge for the department. The Department
of Homeland Security is beholden to over 90 congressional
committees in the House and Senate.
So my question to you is, how would you evaluate
congressional oversight of TSA and TSA's ability to be
responsive to over 90 congressional committees in the House and
Senate?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question.
As you highlighted, compared to some other agencies, we
have some additional requirements and a larger number of
committees to whom we respond. TSA is extremely fortunate that
I think we have pretty good relationships with almost every
oversight entity that we work with. We try very hard to look
for ways to do joint briefings, to consolidate interests in a
way that helps overall drive efficiency on our end and
responsiveness toward overall congressional oversight.
Senator Peters. Would consolidated oversight be helpful?
Ms. Cogswell. I think the administration position is very
much in line with what you are suggesting. There are some
interest areas. I think we are willing to work with Congress on
how to make sure that the resulting actions, whatever they may
be, best suit the needs for congressional oversight, as well as
helping streamline our requirements.
Senator Peters. I continue to hear from some of my
constituents in very diverse areas in Michigan about some very
lengthy, very interests of screenings that they get. Every
single time they travel, they are pulled aside. And certainly
maintaining a safe and secure aviation environment is
paramount. We have to keep us all safe, but you also have to
protect civil rights of law-abiding travelers. It is a very
delicate balance. The Department of Homeland Security always
has to balance the rights of individuals with also keeping us
safe.
But to that end, I think it is important for us to be
conscious of what is happening and to track what is happening.
And so I want to acknowledge first that I know it is difficult
to track information related to wait times prior to screenings,
the length of screenings, the demographics of passengers that
are being pulled aside, as well as secondary screening
complaint data.
But my question to you is, do you believe there is room for
expanding the collection of data and sharing it with
appropriate congressional committees and civil society groups
so we get a better handle as to what is exactly happening at
these inspection sites?
Ms. Cogswell. One of the requirements of the TSA
Modernization Act, as you I believe know, is in order for us to
be able to report wait times across all locations. So we are
actively working along with airports to reach that goal. In
many locations, we are already in positions where we are
demonstrating some of that process today.
As to some of your other questions, I would say we are
incredibly welcoming of input and feedback across communities.
We have a coalition that looks at multi-cultural issues,
disability issues, others who need assistance or may have
difficulty at our checkpoints. We regularly meet with them,
including we have a meeting later this month here in
Washington, as well as around the country. And, sir, we would
be happy to come, if you would like, to your district to meet
with any of your local constituents as well.
That community has provided us invaluable information.
Their individual stories, pieces of information they have been
able to pass has enabled us both to do some explanation behind
why we do certain things, but it has also enabled us to change
our processes, methodology, how we teach our officers to
conduct certain checks in recognition of what people have
experienced. That information is invaluable to us.
Senator Peters. So one of the processes that you have to
address people who are experiencing difficulties is the DHS
TRIP process, as you know. I hear from my constituents that
they are very dissatisfied with that process. So I would like
to have your assessment as to possible ways that we can expand
or strengthen TRIP to make it more user friendly and make it
one that actually works as intended.
Ms. Cogswell. We continue to look to change the language in
the letters that are responded to to be as informative as
possible. Quite often what we find is the number one issue
people write in about is a belief that they are on a watch
list. Quite often that is not the reason that they received
additional screening. So sometimes that explanation can be a
little convoluted, and I think we can continue to improve on
how we try to explain the different factors that can result in
someone having additional screening. This is something that is
not intuitive to a large portion of the traveling public, and
we recognize that.
An example of how we have tried to address that is we
actually have videos up on our web page to tell people this is
what you should expect when you come for screening. We have
also tried as many possible ways to find how we can interact
with individuals in addition to formal letters to get to the
root cause, what they might be seeing, what they are
perceiving. There are instances where we can link up that
person with a passenger screening specialist as they come to
the airport that will provide them additional assistance and
explanation to process through.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lee.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here today to answer our questions.
Since 2014, the Department of Homeland Security, in
particular the Office of Inspector General at the Department of
Homeland Security, has been covertly auditing and inspecting
security-related aspects of TSA, and it has done so, as far as
I am aware, about four times. The IG's findings have revealed
some very alarming rates of failure, failure due to both human
and technology-based failures.
Most recently in February of this year, the IG conducted
covert testing on procedures to safeguard the so-called secure
areas of airports, finding both human-based and technology-
based vulnerabilities at various points. And the IG made a
series of six recommendations in response to the perception of
those failures.
As of two months ago, each of the six recommendations made
by the IG were still open. What can you tell us about the
current status of the IG's recommendations, and when can we
expect that those will be closed?
Ms. Cogswell. We have concurred with all of the
recommendations and are actively working to address them. A
number of these recommendations are ones highlighting some
areas that we also believe play into the larger discussion we
are having around insider threat and the need to do more in
insider threat. So not only are we looking to rapidly respond
to those requirements, we are also looking at what this tells
us and how it informs our wider recognition. We would be happy
to provide you some additional discussion in perhaps a
different setting as to some of the details of the requirement.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
Overall, we have seen this several times in the last few
years. What do you feel about the overall trajectory of how it
is going?
Ms. Cogswell. Overall, we believe that it is critically
important that not only the Inspector General but we ourselves
do continual covert testing on our own programs and processes.
We look at not only how are we performing against the standards
we set ourselves originally, how we were set up to meet
threats, are we meeting the threats we were set up for, but
also as the threats changed, how are we positioned against
those new threats, the ones we were not designed originally to
meet.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I would encourage you to do that.
As you can imagine, there is a significant deprivation of a
person's privacy and liberty when a person is stopped along the
way. Most of the time, the way these things work, the
overwhelming majority of the people you are stopping,
inconveniencing, and people whose privacy is being violated are
the innocent people. So in order to do that, we need to make
sure that whatever we are doing is working and is done in the
most minimally invasive means possible.
TSA has recently been collaborating with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection over the testing of facial recognition
technology. Can you tell me a little bit about what the TSA's
timeline is for the widespread adoption of facial recognition
technology? And I would also like to know what the TSA does
when it collects this information? Does it collect it for any
purpose other than as a verification of the person's ID? Does
it now, or will it in the future, be keeping that data for any
longer than is necessary to perform the task at hand, or how
long do they keep it?
Ms. Cogswell. So we are conducting two types of pilots. The
first one, as you noted, is with Customs and Border Protection.
The way that process works is based on how many people who we
think is going to be flying any individual day based on who the
carriers tell us have bought tickets, CBP helps pre-position a
gallery of photos of individuals whose passports are already on
file, passport photos. As they approach a checkpoint, we are
able to do a match against that smaller number of parties. So
we are not widely screening against large sets of data. We are
looking for you to match you.
The second type of pilot we are doing just started recently
out at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. That one, using our
credential authentication technology, looks at matching you to
the facial image on your driver's license or other document.
Under both circumstances, we retain long enough to do the match
for initial auditing, and then we are not storing.
Senator Lee. In that sense, what happens in Vegas stays in
Vegas.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
Senator Lee. Until 2016, new TSOs often completed their
training requirements at or near their home airports. It is my
understanding that TSOs now receive training at a centralized
TSA academy located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in Georgia.
Since this has happened, has TSA had any budget savings as
a result of that?
Ms. Cogswell. So as you correctly note, we changed our
process, and we have changed it slightly again in this past
year. What we have done is as a new TSO comes on board, they
first are at their home airport for a period of time, about 6
months, and then they go off to the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco. This lets us go through an initial
process and procedure to bring them on board, continue to
ensure that they are a good fit for the position that we are
tracking them for prior to undergoing the two-week training
down in Glynco.
What we have seen coming out of the training in Glynco is
not as much a budgetary savings per se as a consistency of
training and camaraderie of spirit as people meet and retain
those relationships across multiple airports. It enables them
to know what another airport is doing against the same problem,
as well as what their home airport does.
Senator Lee. I see my time has expired. Thank you very
much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you very much for your testimony and your
service.
I was in Congress when we created the TSA after the 9/11
attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans. Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups continue to threaten our aviation system.
Eighteen years later, along with Senators Cantwell and
Blumenthal, I am concerned that TSA employees are being pulled
off the job for political purposes to address a manufactured
crisis on our southern border.
You mentioned in a response letter to Congress in June that
TSA planned to increase the number of full-time equivalents
allocated to the airports by more than 2,000 personnel and
authorized a 20 percent increase in overtime.
How much did this relocation of personnel to the southern
border cost TSA?
Ms. Cogswell. Senator, we have deployed at this moment in
time about 180 individuals across multiple job types, so
Federal air marshals, transportation security officers,
counsel, lawyers, and support staff to help at the southwest
border, help our sister agency, CBP. The highest mark that we
had throughout this period was about 350. So we are
significantly decreased and continuing to see a decrease post
the supplemental that was provided by Congress, as well as a
decrease in the overall migration trends.
Senator Udall. And could you give me an estimate on the
180, how much that would cost, and also the 350?
Ms. Cogswell. We absolutely will get back to you on this.
Senator Udall. You cannot do that right now.
Ms. Cogswell. I cannot do the math in my head at the
moment.
Senator Udall. OK. Thank you.
Two weeks ago, we learned that TSA funds were being
reprogrammed to Immigration and Customs Enforcement to pay for
migrant detention beds and transportation costs. These funds
are being diverted from the aviation security and operation and
support accounts, among others. Do you believe TSA operations
will be negatively impacted by this reprogramming, and what are
the immediate impacts to TSA operations from this
reprogramming?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we very carefully selected the areas of
reprogramming to ensure that it would not have any permanent
effects on the agency. It is delaying certain types of
activities that we might have otherwise done in the fourth
quarter, but even there we look to minimize.
Most of what we are looking at will automatically recur
next year. So funding will resume then.
Senator Udall. So since many of these funds go toward
training and supplies, are you preparing for long-term
disruption to these programs?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we very carefully monitored it to ensure
that we believe we will not undergo a continued impact into the
new fiscal year.
Senator Udall. Shifting to facial recognition, with very
few rules of the road for facial recognition right now, I am
concerned that the drive for efficiency will lead to expansive
collection of sensitive data by government agencies. How can we
be sure that the promise of slightly faster lines at the
security check is not at the expense of accurate security
screening or of our own citizens' privacy?
Ms. Cogswell. The way we have set up our programs today in
biometrics, we have not only attempted to complete all of the
requisite updates for privacy impact assessments, but also put
out significant material to try to describe to people what we
are collecting, how we are collecting it, how the information
will be used, and how long we will hold it. In particular, the
way we are conducting the pilots to date, we collect an image
for only as long as we need to to conduct a match either
against a photo already on file with CBP, such as a passport
photo, or in order to do a match against a credential you are
presenting at that moment in time. We are then not retaining
that image.
Senator Udall. You are serving in an acting capacity. Is
that correct?
Ms. Cogswell. That is.
Senator Udall. And then your boss above you is in an acting
capacity double acting. Is that correct?
Ms. Cogswell. That is correct.
Senator Udall. Do you believe that hurts congressional
accountability with this kind of pattern across the government?
Ms. Cogswell. I will say that we all recognize the
importance of having Senate-confirmed positions in all of the
important roles that they traditionally perform within DHS and
TSA.
I will say as a secondary note, however, if you have to be
in this situation, having the strong leaders we have in Acting
Secretary McAleenan and Acting Deputy Secretary Pekoske in
those roles, given their long history and career experience,
has been very valuable. There is no question in my mind if
something occurs, they know exactly how to immediately respond.
Senator Udall. My worry is that with these acting and
without Senate confirmation, we get ourselves in a situation
where in our democracy the rule being sent from the top is, you
know, you are there and you could be gone the next day, and
that is a very dangerous rule for democracy. So I would hope to
see you in a confirmed capacity some day. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Blackburn is next, and at the end of her
questioning, we will observe the moment of silence in memory of
the victims of 9/11. Senator Blackburn.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cogswell, thank you so much for being here.
I will tell you the inconsistency that is happening with
the vetting that takes place at the airport, but then we look
at the southern border and we have thousands of people on a
weekly basis who are not vetted, we do not know who they are,
we do not know what they are bringing into this country. Many
times it is drugs. Many times they are bringing in human
beings, trafficking women and children. We would never allow
that passing through an airport. But yet, it happens every day
at the southern border. So I think it is completely appropriate
that your DHS and TSA agents are there on that southern border
to help provide some control and some appropriate vetting.
Let me stay with the vetting process, and Senator Lee
touched on this. In recent years, as he mentioned, both the GAO
and the IG have identified some very serious security
vulnerabilities that exist with the screeners. And I use the
term ``screeners'' because that is their legislated and
statutorial name and their job and description.
You have had some true flaws in here and I think the red
team test that were failed with weapons getting past your
screeners 95 percent of the time by the red teams. That shows a
lack of attention to detail, a lack of focus on the job.
I also know when we started looking at this issue back in
2012 when TSA was having massive problems with screeners
violating passengers' personal privacy, with invasive patdowns,
sneaking drugs through airports, and a whole host of other
criminal behavior ranging from theft to bribery to child
pornography within the ranks of those TSA members, screeners--
not officers and agents, but screeners--and I understand that
you all have taken some steps to try to address these issues.
You have worked with the FBI to identify criminal behavior.
So I would like for you to talk a little bit more about
what you are doing at a granular level through your vetting
process to be certain you are not hiring individuals. And at
one point, you were advertising on pizza boxes for people to
come work with the TSA. Talk about how that has changed or if
you are still employing such activity, how many total hours of
training are you now giving to the screeners. At one point,
they were getting 40 hours of training and then were being put
into a uniform that would allow people to believe they were an
officer when they are not an officer. And then how many hours
of training are being given to the canines?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, ma'am. A large number of questions. I
will endeavor to recall all of them. I apologize if I miss one.
So probably I will start with the incredibly important role
of all the efforts we can take to mitigate insider threat. That
means insider from the perspective of a TSA employee, as well
as an airport worker or other worker in the aviation community.
We work in close proximity, as you noted, with the FBI and
other law enforcement to identify where we believe either
criminal activity is occurring, as you noted moving drugs or
other materials, but also where we believe someone might be at
risk of just not having the right level of security culture
preparedness inherent in what they approach and do. This is an
area that we both strongly participate on the investigatory
side but also in terms of our culture and training.
As you highlighted, this is an area we have extreme,
extensive focus. As we look at how we are recruiting, we want
to make sure that we are getting individuals not only that can
meet rigorous security requirements, but also who understand
what the job is, why it is important, and are actually
dedicated to the mission. Critical for us is to help them
understand what the job is and ensure they know what they are
signing up for. Someone who perhaps does not want to spend a
lot of time with people on a regular basis is not going to
enjoy working at our checkpoint when tens of thousands of
people come through every single day. So we want to ensure we
are getting individuals who have that strong character that we
need and also are best suited for that kind of interaction.
We also have changed up and created a TSO career
progression model. We have an initial training when they start
on board. They are wearing a different uniform at that point so
that they are distinguished from others. They then go to the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia for
a two-week intensive period.
Senator Blackburn. That constitutes how many hours of class
training?
Ms. Cogswell. Two full weeks. So that is 80 hours.
Senator Blackburn. Eighty hours, OK.
Senator Blackburn. They then continue to meet requirements
for training ongoing through the next several years as they
progress. This includes not only training and testing on their
current knowledge to ensure it does not get stale and they are
still able to readily identify that image of a weapon on an X-
ray as they were the day they left the academy, but also to
help them continue and grow their own skills, including
coaching and mentoring new employees as they come onto the
checkpoint.
To your last point about the ability to identify prohibited
items as they are coming to the checkpoint, this is job one for
us. This is the most important thing we do. We look at it as
twofold. One is the training of our staff, but the second is
ensuring that we have the best technology available to support
them and that they know how to use it effectively. This is one
of the reasons we are very focused on the new computed
tomography machines for passenger carry-on materials. When you
look at a densely cluttered bag and you are looking at a number
of them in short order, it is more difficult in our current
technology than it will be with the CT machines. The CT
machines will give us greater visibility, the ability to rotate
it, an ability to use automated target recognition algorithms
that look for not just a gun but pieces of a gun so that we can
identify it even if it does not look exactly right. Critically
important for us as we go forward.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Ladies and gentlemen, at this point in memory of the 3,000
souls that were lost on 9/11 and in honor and recognition of
the people who stepped forward, we are going to observe a
moment of silence. I am going to ask that members and staff
stand for this moment of silence and our guests are invited to
stand with us for this moment of silence.
[A moment of silence was observed.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. You may be seated.
Senator Thune is recognized. Some of us will be going to
vote and coming back, but we will continue to stagger our
questions and accommodate members and our distinguished
witness. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, thanks to the hard work of this committee,
Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which
included the TSA Modernization Act reauthorizing the agency for
the first time since 2001 when it was founded in response to
the tragic attacks that occurred 18 years ago on this day. The
bill included several provisions aimed at deploying more
advanced screening technologies, increased protections for
unsecured portions of the airport, and minimizing security line
wait times, all to benefit the experience of the traveling
public while keeping our airports and our skies safe from harm.
Building on improvements made by the FAA Extension Safety
and Security Act of 2016, the bill also required TSA to
increase the accessibility of the PreCheck program. This
included a provision requiring the agency to enter into an
agreement with private sector entities to expand PreCheck
enrollment options, such as start to finish secure online or
mobile enrollment capabilities. Increasing enrollment options
is important in rural states like South Dakota where enrollment
is currently limited to two physical locations.
Ms. Cogswell, could you speak to the agency's
implementation of this section, including when you expect such
an agreement to be finalized and operational?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much, sir, and I appreciate
very much the critical role you played in helping get the TSA
Modernization Act completed.
I would just like to note we are currently already testing
a mobile environment enrollment methodology. It is at the
checkpoint but where an individual who, as they go to the
airport for their regularly scheduled flight, at that time are
able to, through a tablet, complete an enrollment. Critical for
us is to try out this environment because it provides us true
flexibility to match that equipment to where the people are at
the time they are actually traveling, making it just an in-
journey step in process rather than something they have to do
in addition to a regular scheduled trip.
We are also working hard, as is required under the Act, to
bring on board a second vendor to help increase the number of
sites of enrollment.
Senator Thune. And how complicated is the mobile online app
in terms of filling that out?
Ms. Cogswell. So right now, the way the tablet works, you
actually have a person there helping people get through the
process so that if they are not understanding how to do the
image of their document, there is someone right there to help
them take their fingerprints, et cetera.
Senator Thune. Right there at the airport.
Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
Senator Thune. OK. But again, I would say there are a lot
of folks who are very far away from airports in places like
South Dakota.
Let me ask you this first because I think too that I want
to follow up on that previous question. But Senator Peters and
I introduced the Secure Traveler Act earlier this year, which
expedites PreCheck enrollment for law enforcement officers and
Federal employees holding an active security clearance who have
already undergone substantial background checks. That bill was
reported out of the Committee on July the 24th.
Have any previous actions been taken by TSA to expedite
PreCheck enrollment for populations that have already undergone
screening by another Federal agency?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir, they have. In fact, a significant
number of individuals who are part of our Known Traveler
Program who have received a Known Traveler number are
individuals whose clearances we are able to directly verify
because they are held, for example, with another Federal agency
who has entered an agreement with us.
Critical for us is that ability to manage the relationship
so that we know if an individual is terminated from a position
or leaves a position, that they are no longer eligible for that
program.
We can provide to you a list of all the different entities
we do this with today, as well as approximate numbers, should
you wish, in another setting.
Senator Thune. The TSA Modernization Act expanded the Law
Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program which helped smaller
airports comply with Federal requirements to keep local law
enforcement officers at the airport. This program has greatly
benefited airport security in South Dakota where the resources
of smaller airports are often strained.
Could you speak to how this program continues to improve
airport security across the country, particularly in smaller
airports?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir. We are extremely fortunate to have
really good relationships across the board with State and local
counterparts, as well as law enforcement specifically dedicated
to individual transportation areas.
What we find, especially in smaller communities, is those
areas are quite often limited in the number of law enforcement
officers that they might have to cover a very large geographic
area. And so this ability for us to reimburse them for their
time enables them to spend more dedicated time, perhaps even
hire additional people, to be able to focus on transportation
security.
Senator Thune. All right. Last question quickly. The
expansion also required TSA to review regulations and
compliance policies and, if necessary, revise them to reduce
administrative burden on airports. Has TSA made any revisions
to current regulations and policies as a result of this
requirement?
Ms. Cogswell. We have conducted a review and are in the
process of a number of what we consider de-regulatory
provisions to reduce burden.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Madam Chair.
Senator Capito [presiding]. Yes. I am the acting chair. You
can identify with that.
Senator Tester.
STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Tester. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that a
lot.
Well, I am going to go back to a previous question on Real
ID. Is Montana one of the states that is noncompliant?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, I will be happy to provide you a full
list after the session.
Senator Tester. OK. It would be great. You do not know or
you do not want to tell?
Ms. Cogswell. I cannot recall at this moment in time. I
apologize.
Senator Tester. OK. I would like to find out because I want
to make sure that what the state has done meets what we need to
do.
Are you fully staffed within TSA?
Ms. Cogswell. We have been able to hire especially for the
airports to a level that we need to and are expected to.
Senator Tester. One of the things that I would just say
that if you are able to transfer $230 million and you are able
to transfer people to go in different directions, then we are
overfunding you. I would just say that. And maybe we are
overfunding a lot of different agencies. So we need to be
cognizant of that in the legislative branch moving forward.
This was a previous question also. One of the IG reports
that were done pointed out that turnover at smaller airports
was a problem, turnover of personnel. You had said in a
previous question that you agreed with the IG although I think
the IG rejected your action plan--and correct me if I am
wrong--and that this is still an open recommendation. Is that
correct?
Ms. Cogswell. We have a recommendation--I believe the
current status is we have provided initial materials. They have
requested additional materials, so they have left it responded
to but still open.
Senator Tester. But the first solution was rejected by the
IG. Is that correct?
Ms. Cogswell. I believe they are requesting additional
material.
Senator Tester. OK. So they are still on the first
recommendation.
Have you been able to get them that additional material?
Ms. Cogswell. I cannot recall at this moment in time the
status of that specific provision.
Senator Tester. I would love to know that because I happen
to come from a state, as the previous questioner, that has a
lot of small airports. In fact, they are all small airports.
And I happen to use those airports twice a week. So I am
intimately familiar with--and your staff, by the way, does a
great job. They really do do an incredible job on the ground.
They are very accommodating and professional.
The problem is that in these smaller airports, I do not
know how you can hire anybody. I do not know what the wage is,
but it is around 15-16 bucks. In a lot of the airports, they
come in. They are there for 4 hours. They go home. They come
back. They are there for 4 hours. What is being done for the
pay? I mean, I have got to tell you we are paying about as much
for new teachers, and they are underpaid greatly. OK? So how
are we solving this problem? Maybe I should say I think it is a
pay issue, and why has pay not been bumped up to be able to
recruit more people?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, first I just want to say thank you so
much for your care and concern for our workforce. I share that
completely and appreciate how much you have done to call
attention to this.
Senator Tester. No problem, but we got a problem in mission
control and we need to fix it.
Ms. Cogswell. So under our current authorities, we have a
lot of ability to set pay. Right now in small airports, for
example, we pay a significant retention bonus differential to
increase their pay to the level of prevailing wage or to ensure
a level of consistency at the airport. Similarly to your point,
that split shift--we are able to actually pay additional beyond
what would be allowed under traditional----
Senator Tester. You are able to, but are you?
Ms. Cogswell. And we do. Those we both fund.
Senator Tester. So why is the IG issue even an issue?
Ms. Cogswell. So I think the larger question in
consideration is, as we go forward and look at what should be a
process and scale goes to your larger question. We want to be
in a position where we are recognizing the incredible knowledge
and skills these individuals have and want to ensure that as
they stay with us over a number of years, they continue to see
increases in pay. That is where we have had traditionally not
an authorities issue but a budget issue.
Senator Tester. OK. If it is a budget issue and you do not
have enough money, why are you not screaming from the rafters
about transferring 230 million bucks which, by the way, the
last time I checked is more money than I can imagine, from this
budget to the southern border? And I do not agree with the
previous questioner that said that the southern border
deserves--yes, we need a secure southern border, but it is a
different budget. So one of the problems I have got here is
that--you are a head of this agency--if in fact it is budget
problem, then you should be screaming. And I know your boss
says we have got to have this wall, which is a really bad idea,
by the way, and most of the people in this room know this but
are afraid to speak up about it. Why are you not screaming?
And I would say the same thing to the Department of
Defense. We are overfunding these folks. We are overfunding you
if you do not scream and they pull 230 million bucks.
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we recognize and appreciate the strong
support we are having for our workforce. What we are trying to
do right now is put together a series of options on what
additional pay would look like that we look to propose going
into next year.
Senator Tester. That is right.
And I would just say and I have got to quit because I am
way past time. But exit lanes are another issue. If we cannot
afford to put people in exit lanes and we are going to be put
it on these small airports, then we should not be letting the
President allocate $230 million for this Republican policy of a
wall on the southern border.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Capito. Thank you for being here today and thank
you for your great answer to questions and your depth of
knowledge. I appreciate that. Certainly I do not think it is
lost on any of us today that on 9/11 that we are talking about
something that was created because of 9/11. And so we are in
great admiration for what you and all of your organization does
for the safety and security of our transportation system.
Senator Tester and I are the--I am the Chairman of the
Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senator
Tester is the Ranking Member on that committee. So we are both
familiar with the budgetary issues.
I want to talk about the CTs because I understand that
there was a protest on the procurement of the CTs that were
awarded to Smith Detection and it was funded in Fiscal Year
2019. In your statement, you mentioned that 300 have been not
produced yet, manufactured, but you led the contract on them.
How much has this contest delayed the implementation, and what
timeline are we on for these 300 CT scanners?
Ms. Cogswell. We were extremely fortunate that in short
order the protest was resolved. So we only lost about 90 days
as a result. The award has been completed, and we have already
identified where the machines are scheduled for and we will
begin deployment in this fall.
Senator Capito. In this fall. And how are you making the
determinations of where they should be deployed?
Ms. Cogswell. We looked at airports through a wide variety
of lenses, both in terms of some of the risk calculations but
also to let us try it out in a lot of different environments.
So we have big airports covered. We have small airports covered
to ensure that we recognize how they operate across the board.
Senator Capito. Do you anticipate that the next tranche of
CTs will have an even more improved technology with even more
micro-detection capabilities? Is that what you are looking for?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we are looking to the
next algorithm as part of the next acquisition, as well as what
we call an integrated machine with the automated screening
lane, the roller process that brings in bags into the machine
and has an auto diverter on the back end when something is
identified as problematic. This will enable us to have
increased throughput, ability to have multiplexing so more than
one passenger can put their materials up at the same time, as
well as automated bag return--or bin return so that we do not
have to have officers moving bins back and forth.
Senator Capito. I was in an airport--I cannot remember
where it was. It might have been in Europe where they do have
the automatic bag return. It comes down under and then just
refills.
Let me ask you this. On the staffing issue, as the Chair of
the Appropriations Committee, in Fiscal Year 2019, we were able
to get funding for 1,144 new TSA personnel. In response to the
questions earlier, it sounds as though you were able to hire
that many within that fiscal year. Is that correct?
Ms. Cogswell. Correct.
Senator Capito. Through all of your different recruitment
mechanisms.
Ms. Cogswell. Yes. We go through a process, as you know,
throughout the year that assesses when we need to have a
certain number of positions out to match peak volume, peak
season at any given airport. We closely track the amount of
passengers projected, not only writ large, not only in an
airport but down to an individual terminal to ensure we are
hiring well enough in advance to have that staffed up.
Senator Capito. What kind of turnover do you have?
Ms. Cogswell. So across the board if you look at the
average, we are at about 17 percent, which is relatively
commensurate with what the Department of Labor says is
consistent for Federal agencies hiring at this level. We still
want to look to bring that down, and some of what we are doing
in this method is aimed at ensuring we are addressing some of
the areas that people find hardest about this job. Part of it
is looking at the pay system, but part of it also is looking at
training you toward a career so you see where you are going----
Senator Capito. Do you pay retention bonuses?
Ms. Cogswell. We have the ability to use retention bonuses.
The predominant place we use it is those places where we are
competitive in terms of entry level salary in particular. So a
place whose minimum wage has gone up, an area with an extremely
low unemployment rate, those are some of the places we look at
retention incentives.
Senator Capito. Do you pay a recruitment bonus?
Ms. Cogswell. We do not.
Senator Capito. Do you employ an agency to do your
recruiting?
Ms. Cogswell. We do.
Senator Capito. And just one?
Ms. Cogswell. We have a contract out that helps us with the
recruiting, as well as the processing of the various----
Senator Capito. Is that a Homeland Security contract, or is
that just TSA? Does it recruit border agents and others?
Ms. Cogswell. It does not recruit border agents. It only
recruits for TSA.
Senator Capito. OK, because that has been an issue over on
the Border Patrol is trying to get their recruitment.
Last question, just kind of a comment I will make--and we
have talked about consistencies. First of all, I saw the
numbers. Just the numbers that are coming through on the
holidays this year are just record numbers. And so I think just
observationally for me, you are moving a lot of people very
rapidly. And I think you have worked hard to kind of work out
some of the kinks on how to get them through.
But there is inconsistency because sometimes--I have one of
those larger iPads. Sometimes it can go through in my purse.
Sometimes it has to go into the little thing that goes through.
What is the inconsistency there?
Ms. Cogswell. So what we look at is how cluttered the bag
would be. What we ask is our officers to consider how best to
ensure throughput while maximizing their ability to detect any
prohibited item in a bag. So what that might mean is at a given
checkpoint, they are looking to ensure enough pieces come out
to get that good x-ray image.
Senator Capito. OK. That makes sense.
The last question I had--I am way over--was on batteries,
but I will follow up in writing. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Capito.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
And I just want to begin by emphasizing an issue that my
friend, Senator Blumenthal, raised that it is critical on the
18th anniversary of 9/11 that Congress pass our FASTER Act and
restore all of TSA's security funding. I think that is
absolutely imperative.
Customs and Border Protection is using facial recognition
technology at 22 airports. And just last month, TSA began using
facial recognition tools on travelers at a Las Vegas McCarran
International Airport security checkpoint. Yet, there are
currently no enforceable rules from TSA governing facial
recognition. Passengers today have no enforceable right to say
no to sharing their biometric information. TSA has no
obligation to secure the biometric data it collections. And
there is no rule requiring TSA to prevent any racial bias in
its use of this technology.
Deputy Administrator Cogswell, it is essential that TSA put
in place rules and safeguards on facial recognition before your
agency further deploys the technology. Will you commit to
pausing TSA's use of facial recognition technology and enacting
these rules for the traveling public before further expanding
the use of facial recognition?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, if I could go through your pieces for
just one moment. There are a series of requirements that govern
any U.S. Government program requiring us to very clearly
demonstrate and explain how information is being collected, how
it is being used, whether people have the provision to opt out,
and how they can look to correct their record, as well as how
long that information is retained. That is governed under the
Privacy Act. We comply with privacy impact assessments and
other materials.
Senator Markey. So do you have formal rules in place to
protect travelers' privacy?
Ms. Cogswell. We do.
Senator Markey. So I would appreciate if you could present
to the Committee all of those rules.
Ms. Cogswell, can you confirm that TSA has no plans to
compel American citizens to share their biometric information
and that Americans' participation in TSA's facial recognition
program will always take place strictly on a voluntary basis?
Ms. Cogswell. We do.
Senator Markey. Excellent.
Can you commit that TSA will take all necessary steps to
secure the biometric data that you collect?
Ms. Cogswell. We will.
Senator Markey. Will you commit that TSA's biometric
technology will not disproportionately burden and misidentify
people of color?
Ms. Cogswell. We will.
Senator Markey. Well, unfortunately, the report TSA
recently submitted to Congress as a result of Senator Lee and
my amendment to the FAA Reauthorization does little to reassure
us that you will use that technology in a responsible fashion.
I am concerned that we are in the wild west when it comes to
facial recognition. TSA in my opinion should stop deploying
these invasive tools until we are sure that everything is in
place in order to satisfy the need to protect information which
is, in fact, being gathered about American citizens.
Mr. Chairman, the roll call is on on the Senate floor, and
I wish I could stay and ask one more set of questions, but I
just think in the best interests of making sure that I make
that roll call on the Senate floor, I will yield back the
balance of my time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
It may be that Members will vote and come back, but I think
we have pretty much finished.
You and I had an exchange, Madam Director, about the Real
ID, and I was feeling pretty good about the fact that 48 states
are in compliance with their driver's licenses. And then I
remembered that sometimes you can renew your driver's license
for several years. For example, in Mississippi, you can renew
your driver's license for 8 years. So it occurs to me there are
going to be a lot more people with driver's licenses from
compliant states and jurisdictions who will have older driver's
licenses. And there still may be quite a disruption, Y2K type
disruption, on October 1, 2020. So what are we going to do
about that?
Ms. Cogswell. We very much share your concern that that is
not the place we want to be. We are doing everything we can to
get the word out. You are exactly right that both there is a
combination of people whose licenses are still valid, but also
individuals who are in states who issue both Real ID and non-
Real ID compliant licenses today. So they may be renewing their
license not fully understanding that they are getting a non-
Real ID compliant license----
The Chairman. Help me understand why a state would do that.
Ms. Cogswell. Certain states are looking to have some
flexibility in terms of what some of the requirements are. They
may believe their population in particular is looking to have
an option where they do not have to produce some of the same
level of documentation about birth in the United States or
citizenship, for example.
The Chairman. So I am still not feeling good about these
disruptions in October of next year.
Ms. Cogswell. We very much are working state by state,
locality by locality to do our best to get the word out. I will
also say that in addition to a driver's license, you have
options for other types of forms of ID, military identification
if you are a current member or former, as well as passports.
U.S. passports are also an option. So even if you are in a
state where you are concerned about your ability to get through
in time, you may still obtain one of these other forms of
documentation and you can use that to fly.
The Chairman. You know, I think we need to heighten
awareness about this. Most people do not have a passport, and
most people are not in the military or veterans. So it is going
to be that driver's license 9 times out of 10. I think we will
want to visit with you on the record about, if you do not mind,
giving us a very thorough answer about how we can comply with
this. It seems to me citizens are going to be caught by
surprise and outraged just about a year from now if suddenly
they cannot board a plane. They have bought the ticket and
gotten there, and suddenly that item that has been golden for
years and years no longer gets you on the plane. So let us work
on that.
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I think I have got to read some words to make this
official. The record will remain open for two weeks. During the
time, Senators are asked to submit questions for the record.
Upon receipt, our witness is requested to submit her written
answers to the Committee as soon as possible. I bet you can
comply with that.
So thank you very much, Ms. Cogswell. You are a great and
articulate witness, and you have done a great job today.
The hearing is now adjourned with the thanks of the
Committee.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
September 11, 2019
Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Cantwell:
On behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, which represents more than 700,000 Federal and District of
Columbia employees who serve the American people in 70 different
agencies, including the 44,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
who protect the flying public, we appreciate the Committee holding this
important hearing on ``Protecting the Nation's Transportation Security
Systems: Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration.''
TSOs are the first line of defense to protect the flying public, so the
Committee's oversight is essential to the work we do.
TSOs are sworn to protect the Nation's aviation security. They
conduct themselves with the utmost professionalism and respect for the
importance of the work they do. Every day, they identify and eradicate
threats to aviation security. Some TSOs in our bargaining unit serve on
the Field Evaluation Teams and take pride in making sure all systems
are working and that personnel are fully trained in operations and
observing standard operating procedures. The performance of the TSO
workforce is at a high level and their diligence continues to keep the
flying public safe.
We commend the Committee for its role in ensuring the proper
oversight of transportation security and we urge you to consider the
workforce factors that contribute to proper security and those that
could serve to challenge the safety of the flying public.
In March of this year, the Department of Homeland Security Office
of Inspector General issued a report, ``TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to
Hire, Retain and Train Its Transportation Security Officers,'' which
concluded that TSA's personnel policies make it harder to hire and
retain TSOs. Shortcomings in hiring and retention, fueled by low pay
and unequal personnel policies, present a threat to aviation security.
TSOs work under a separate personnel system that denies such basic
protections as the right to appeal adverse personnel actions to an
objective, outside body like the Merit Systems Protection Board. They
are often required to work mandatory overtime, receive disparate
discipline and repeatedly report the failure of managers to execute
rotation of duties in accordance with standard operating procedures.
Additionally, the 35-day government shutdown of 2018-2019 placed an
enormous burden on a workforce that receives among the lowest
compensation in the Federal government. Many TSOs are still paying off
loans they needed to help meet their financial obligations during the
shutdown. An overworked, underpaid workforce facing the stress of
making ends meet could result in an unnecessary and completely
avoidable security threat.
The TSA workforce is our greatest weapon against attacks on
aviation security. It needs to be treated like the valuable resource
that it is. The simplest and most equitable solution is to extend to
TSOs the rights under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, which would ensure TSOs
the same fair pay, union rights and respectful treatment as other
Federal workers. Reducing turnover will decrease the cost and burden of
recruitment and training and provide a consistent, ready workforce to
protect the flying public.
As the Committee conducts its oversight of TSA operations, please
know the workforce stands ready and determined as a reliable partner in
ensuring aviation security. TSOs take pride in our work protecting
America's airports and skies.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Alethea Predeoux,
Director, Legislative Department.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Question 1. The TSA Modernization Act also includes a provision
requiring TSA to make screening performance assessments available to
airport directors quarterly. Is TSA currently briefing these
assessments to every airport director? If so, how is TSA carrying out
this requirement?
Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
taken multiple steps to satisfy this provision of the TSA Modernization
Act, and placed heightened emphasis on field leadership for completion
of the requirement. To maintain consistency and accuracy of the
performance information that is being shared, TSA Headquarters provides
Federal Security Directors (FSDs) performance related data points. This
information is provided electronically for all FSDs and appropriate
staff. The Assistant Administrator for Domestic Aviation Operations
provides executive oversight for the completion of sharing performance
information with airport management.
Question 2. TSA Administrator Pekoske's response to my May 22
letter stated that TSA would reduce Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) operations by 20 percent. VIPR teams play a critical
security role, particularly for surface transportation and ports.
Congress has consistently supported the program. Please update the
committee on the VIPR program. When will operations return to normal
levels? Do you have plans to increase the number of teams?
Answer. The anticipated reduction in Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response (VIPR) operations was 19 percent, however, the actual
reduction was only seven percent. All VIPR program teams returned from
the Southwest Border the first week of July and VIPR operations are now
at normal operational levels.
The FY 2020 President's Budget request proposes to eliminate the
VIPR program.
Question 3. It has recently come the Committee's attention that TSA
is drafting guidelines for airports and airlines to donate or ``gift''
security equipment for TSA use at checkpoints and in checked baggage
areas. Specifically, TSA's guidelines may require all airports
interested in upgrading terminals or adding screening lanes to purchase
and then donate screening equipment and then pay for installation and
maintenance. If true, this is would particularly burden midsize and
small airports with limited resources and ``outsource'' a core TSA
responsibility. Passenger and baggage screening are core TSA missions
directly supported through security fees on travelers and annually
appropriated funds. It is my understanding that TSA might be
considering new guidelines for airports and airlines that would expand
the scope of donating or ``gifting'' security equipment. Although there
is a role for donations, TSA has the responsibility to provide all
airports--no matter their size--with a baseline of high-quality
screening equipment and pay for installation and maintenance. Most
airports cannot afford to buy and maintain screening equipment--and
they should not be expected to. Is TSA planning any significant changes
regarding equipment donations? Please clear this up for the committee.
In what situations will TSA expect industry to pay for screening
equipment, installation, and maintenance?
Answer. This process is an option for airport stakeholders who may
benefit from accelerating acquisition timelines, recapitalizing TSE, or
enhancing security and the passenger experience. The CAP is neither a
solicitation vehicle nor a circumvention of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and TSA acquisition or procurement processes.
TSA does not and will not require or expect stakeholders to donate
TSE. TSA will continue to obtain, test, procure, and deploy high-
quality screening capability for airport screening, including at
midsize and small airports. TSA will continue to work with airports and
airlines that are upgrading terminals or adding screening lanes by
providing available TSE or ensuring there is a plan to provide the
screening equipment in the future when it becomes available.
The ability of stakeholders to donate screening capability through
the CAP will supplement equipment that TSA procures and deploys through
its normal process, and will ultimately add to the overall capability
supply. This will enable TSA to deploy procured capability across the
aviation system, including to midsize and small airports that may be
unable or unwilling to donate equipment.
If a stakeholder determines that donating TSE is beneficial and the
right decision for the entity, TSA requires donors to be financially
responsible for efforts associated with the deployment and sustainment
of the donated capability for an agreed upon period of time, given that
these financial requirements have not been included in TSA's budget for
the relevant Fiscal Year.
Question 4. In December, the TSA released its Cybersecurity Roadmap
to guide cybersecurity efforts within TSA and across the transportation
systems sector. What steps has TSA taken to reduce cybersecurity risks
across the transportation systems sector?
Answer. TSA is in the process of building its cybersecurity
expertise and capacity to fulfill its role as a co-Sector Specific
Agency for the Transportation Systems Sector (TSS), and is leveraging
its existing personnel, combined with resources from within DHS, to
engage with its stakeholders within the TSS. TSA has worked to develop
a strong partnership with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) to leverage CISA's cybersecurity expertise to address the
ever evolving cybersecurity threats to the TSS. For example, TSA has
partnered with CISA and the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) to
conduct in-depth cybersecurity assessments at critical pipeline
companies. In 2019, six assessments have been conducted to date, with
two additional scheduled. NRMC will analyze data from the reviews to
assess industry posture regarding cybersecurity and future assessment
needs. TSA and CISA have further partnered to assess the cybersecurity
risks posed to the rail sector. Additionally, TSA and CISA have been
working to develop information sharing protocols for incident and
threat reporting information.
In partnership with CISA, TSA has conducted 16 regional surface
transportation-focused and one aviation transportation-focused
Cybersecurity Workshops. The Cybersecurity Workshop series is an
information sharing initiative designed for TSS stakeholders to learn
about DHS and other government cybersecurity risk management resources,
programs, and five non-technical actions they can consider to enhance
their cybersecurity posture. TSA's outreach efforts address the TSA
Cybersecurity Roadmap Implementation Plan objectives of monitoring and
adjusting TSA's guidance to stakeholders regarding cyber risks (2.2.2)
and expanding and improving the sharing of cybersecurity information
(2.2.3). TSA's product efforts address the DHS Cybersecurity
Implementation Plan objectives of maintaining strategic awareness of
trends in national and systemic cybersecurity risks (1.1), maturing
cybersecurity offerings and engagements to address significant national
risks to critical infrastructure (3.1), expanding and improving sharing
of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and other cybersecurity
information (3.2), and improving cybersecurity capabilities and
resources available to sector-specific agencies, regulators, and
policymakers (3.3).
TSA is an active participant in the Aviation Cyber Initiative
(ACI), which is a tri-chaired task force led by DHS and CISA, the
Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation. The ACI is
designed to identify and analyze aviation cyber vulnerabilities in
support of cyber risk-reduction and resiliency efforts within the
Aviation Ecosystem, which includes both civil and military aviation.
Additionally, TSA is currently developing and promoting cybersecurity-
related reporting guidelines for Mass Transit and Freight Rail that
align with Executive Orders 13636 and 13800 and the requirements for
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework
(Presidential Policy Determination-41), Presidential Policy
Determination-21, and rule making initiatives.
Question 5. A recent U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) study
``Critical Infrastructure Protection--Actions Needed to Address
Significant Weaknesses'' (GAO 19-48), found significant weaknesses
within TSA's pipeline security program management. Overall, what
progress has TSA made to address pipeline cybersecurity and are there
additional actions that can be taken to improve the program? If there
are any weaknesses, what can Congress do to help TSA address these as
quickly as possible? Does TSA have plans to add dedicated personnel or
resources to pipeline cybersecurity activities in the near future? To
what extent do the Corporate Security Reviews and the Critical Facility
Security Reviews provide TSA with an understanding of the pipeline
industry's cybersecurity readiness?
Answer. TSA has partnered with CISA to assess pipeline
cybersecurity at select pipeline companies. These Validated
Architecture Design Reviews (VADRs) are conducted on site over a two-
day period and assess all aspects of the security of a pipeline
operator's industrial control systems (ICS). ICS include control,
measurement and telemetry systems. CISA provides personnel with ICS
expertise to conduct these assessments. Results are analyzed by NRMC to
provide an assessment of the vulnerability gaps that exist and identify
best practices across the industry. As of October 1, 2019, TSA and CISA
have completed six of these assessments. Analysis of these assessments
is expected to be completed before December 31, 2019 and will establish
a baseline to determine the cybersecurity protection measures in place
in the industry.
TSA Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) provide an excellent
understanding of the pipeline industry's cybersecurity readiness. CSRs
were updated in 2018 to include an expanded focus on cybersecurity
plans and programs and to better align with the new cybersecurity
protection measures identified in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines.
The Critical Facility Security Reviews are focused on physical security
at critical facilities. However, they do include a limited number of
questions related to cyber hygiene practices employed at the
facilities. TSA plans to add cybersecurity specialists to assess and
develop appropriate programs to address surface transportation
cybersecurity needs identified through these efforts.
TSA looks forward to working with Congress to ensure appropriate
resources are available to meet TSA's surface transportation security
responsibilities.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Question. Section 1978 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 says
if an individual has undergone a security threat assessment and
received a Transportation Worker Identification Credential, than that
person does not have to pay for a separate security threat assessment
for a hazardous materials endorsement. Can you provide an update on
where TSA is in implementing this provision, and whether the agency has
issued any guidance to state motor vehicle departments to facilitate
this change?
Answer. TSA will publish an Exemption Memo authorizing states to
issue an Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) based on an existing
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) Security Threat
Assessment (STA). The memo exempts states from the required HME STA in
the current reg. The Exemption Memo will also include guidance to the
States on issuance of an HME to individuals who hold a valid TWIC. TSA
provided interim guidance to the trucking industry and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) in December 2018. TSA and
FMCSA continue to meet to discuss a coordinated communications plan for
stakeholders prior to final implementation of the plan.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Pipeline Cybersecurity
The TSA has authority over pipeline security, both physical and
cybersecurity. To properly perform necessary pipeline security
oversight, TSA must have the capability and resources to demonstrate
the security readiness of the pipeline industry to the constantly
evolving physical and cyber threats. To assist the Committee in the
interest in assessing the short and long-term plans for TSA's Pipeline
Security program management, I would appreciate your providing details
to the following.
Question 1. Please provide an organization chart showing the new
TSA Surface Operations division and how it fits into the overall TSA
structure as required in the Modernization Act.
Please provide an organization chart specifically for TSA Surface
Operations. In addition, provide the total number of personnel
reporting in the new Surface Operations; show all groups, sections,
and/or branches under TSA Surface Operations and the number of
personnel assigned to each; and clearly identify those personnel whose
primary responsibility is pipeline security. If zero, please explain.
Answer. Per the TSA Modernization Act, the Assistant Administrator
for Surface Operations reports to the Executive Assistant Administrator
of Security Operation, a direct report to the Administrator. There are
a total of 71 allocated personnel within the Surface Operations
organization. Four positions within Surface Operations HQ have primary
responsibility for pipeline security. This does not include the
establishment of the field-based Pipeline Security Assessment Team
(PSAT). The PSAT consists of 24 Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface (TSI-S) from across the country. While the TSIs participating
in the PSAT report to the Federal Security Directors whose airport they
are assigned to rather than to Surface Operations, they have been
specifically selected and trained to conduct Critical Facility Security
Reviews (CFSRs) and assist with other security activities with the
pipeline community.
Question 2. It is my understanding the TSA Surface Operations
reorganization includes the standing-up of Regional Security Directors.
Provide a map of the geographic areas for which the new Regional
Security Directors will be responsible. How many personnel will be
assigned to each of the Regional Security Directors, and clearly
identify those personnel whose primary role will be pipeline security.
Do these Regional Security Directors have cybersecurity experience for
pipeline operations? If no, please explain.
Answer. In the recent restructuring of TSA, a new Surface
Operations office was created. Surface Operations includes five regions
that cover the surface modes in their respective geographic areas. Each
region is staffed with a Regional Surface Director (RSD) and a staff of
supporting positions, with a primary role focused on general surface
security, not just pipeline security. Three of the RSDs have five
allocated positions, and the remaining two have six allocated
positions. Although RSDs do not have specific cybersecurity experience,
they bring vast executive leadership and transportation security
experience to Surface Operations, which is being applied to leverage
federal, state and local partnerships at the executive level across the
entire surface transportation landscape; this includes Freight Rail,
Highway Motor Carrier (HMC), Maritime, Mass Transit & Passenger Rail
(MTPR), Pipeline, and the critical infrastructure that supports these
networks.
Question 3. How are the 200+ TSA Transportation Surface inspectors
in the field assigned across the country? What are their
responsibilities? To what extent do their responsibilities include
pipeline security--physical and cyber?
Answer. There are currently 201 TSI-S located in 49 field offices
across five regions. TSI-Ss are allocated and assigned throughout the
country based on estimated inspection and outreach workloads with
consideration for the number of entities to be inspected/assessed, the
time required to complete and travel to the inspection/assessment
locations, as well as time to complete inspection/assessment reports
and follow-up actions.
TSI-Ss are responsible for regulatory and non-regulatory activities
within their Area of Responsibility. Regulatory activity is based on
rules published in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
part 1580. 49 CFR 1580--Rail Transportation Security requires both
passenger and freight rail operators to designate Rail Security
Coordinators and to report security-related incidents involving their
operations. Additional requirements for freight rail operators include
the tracking and transfer of Toxic Inhalation Hazards, highly toxic
substances that can cause massive casualties if released. The second
set of rules enforced by a TSI-S are found in 49 CFR 1570--
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. In partnership with
the United States Coast Guard, a TSI-S conducts TWIC compliance
inspections of TWICs as individuals access Maritime Transportation
Security Act-regulated facilities.
In addition to regulatory activity, a TSI-S also performs non-
regulatory activity such as various security assessments, tabletop
exercises, and security training, in all modes of surface
transportation. Such activities are designed to assist surface
transportation partners in enhancing their existing security programs
through a collaborative process.
In May of 2019, Surface Operations solicited existing TSI-Ss to
become part of a dedicated PSAT to conduct pipeline CFSRs throughout
the United States. These 24 inspectors were then trained by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration on pipeline
operations and conducted additional on-the-job pipeline security
training with DHS/TSA headquarters personnel. In FY20 these inspectors
will begin participating in CFSRs and serve as a security resource to
pipeline operators and facilities nationwide.
Question 4. What is the total FY19 budget for TSA Surface
Operations? What percentage of that budget is dedicated to pipeline
security, and what percentage is dedicated to pipeline cybersecurity?
Furthermore, what is the projected FY20 budget for the new Surface
Operations division and what percentage of that budget is dedicated to
pipeline security--physical and cyber?
Answer. The FY 2019 Budget for the Surface Programs PPA was
$130.141M. Included in this PPA, is the Surface Operations budget of
$8.6M. The FY 2020 Budget for Surface Programs PPA is $9.02M. The
Surface Operations budget is not presented by line item, or
transportation mode (mass transit, freight rail, pipelines, highway
motor carrier). However, in the case of pipeline security, which has
been the focus of much attention in the last two years, there has been
a significant commitment of resources to address security issues.
In July 2019, TSA identified 24 Transportation Security Inspectors
to form the Pipeline Security Assessment Team (PSAT). These 24
Inspectors were selected to augment the two subject matter experts TSA
had in the Pipeline Section to conduct security assessments of Critical
Pipeline Facilities. The 24 member PSAT team received Pipeline Training
at the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
Training Facility in Oklahoma; training in the process of conducting a
physical security assessment at a pipeline critical facility, including
the inbrief and outbrief; briefings and tours of operational pipeline
companies in the field; shadowing of the TSA pipeline experts during an
assessment and were shadowed by a TSA expert on an assessment to
prepare them to effectively and efficiently conduct a physical security
assessment on a critical pipeline facility. In FY 2019, TSA conducted
60 Critical Facility Security Reviews, and 22 Corporate Security
Reviews. In FY 2020, TSA, to date, has conducted 38 Critical Facility
Security Reviews, and 8 Corporate Security Reviews.
TSA partners with CISA to conduct cyber security assessments of
pipeline facilities. In FY 2019, TSA partnered with CISA to conduct 6
Validated Architecture Design Reviews (VADR) and TSA partnered with
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to conduct 2 Cyber
Architecture Design reviews for a total of 8 pipeline cyber security
reviews conducted in FY19. To date, one VADR has been conducted in FY
2020 and 10 VADRs are scheduled through August 2020.
The TSA budget impact (FY19) to support the pipeline cyber security
assessments supported by TSA was $1.56M.
The TSA budget impact (FY20) for personnel resources to support the
accomplishments to date and those scheduled for FY20 is $4.3M.
In the TSA FY 2020 budget, $8.4M has been funded to conduct
pipeline cyber security assessments. TSA is working through its
Contracting office to establish a contract with a company with
appropriate cyber security expertise to conduct cyber security
assessments on pipeline facilities.
Question 5. Considering the cyber threats facing surface
transportation presently, what specific TSA resources are dedicated to
addressing the cyber threats to pipelines, including threat assessment
and infrastructure assessment? Provide plans explaining how such
program would be sustained.
Answer. TSA Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) currently has two full-
time analysts that look at cyber threats to pipelines on a part-time
basis; if future requests are fulfilled TSA intends to have one cyber
analyst dedicated to cyber threats related to pipelines on a full-time
basis. As proposed in the TSA Cybersecurity Implementation Plan (CSIP)
and the DHS CSIP, TSA I&A intends to increase its total number of cyber
threat personnel to 12, including the aforementioned analyst dedicated
to cyber threats to pipelines full-time.
TSA has dedicated personnel to support both Corporate Security
Reviews and Validated Architecture Design Reviews for Fiscal Year (FY)
2020. For infrastructure assessments, TSA conducted 22 Corporate
Security Reviews in FY 2019, which included a cybersecurity assessment.
In addition, TSA partnered with the NRMC to conduct in depth
cybersecurity assessments (VADR). TSA and the NRMC partnered to conduct
six assessments in FY 2019.
TSA conducted CFSRs at pipeline facilities that focus on physical
security but also include a cyber-component. TSA conducted 60 CFSRs in
FY 2019.
Question 6. Does TSA have plans to add dedicated personnel to
pipeline cybersecurity activities? Please explain if the response is
``no''. Otherwise, address the following: describe the plan, how it
will be sustained, and when it will be implemented. In addition, how
and when will new pipeline security personnel be trained and when will
the new personnel start to work with pipeline industry operators?
Answer. Currently, the TSA I&A office has two full-time analysts
that review cyber threats to pipelines on a part-time basis. In support
of future efforts identified in the TSA CSIP and the DHS CSIP, TSA I&A
intends to increase its total number of cyber threat personnel to 12,
including one analyst dedicated to looking at cyber threats to
pipelines full-time.
TSA also plans to add cybersecurity specialists to support surface
transportation cybersecurity assessments and preparedness. TSA has
identified and trained 24 additional personnel to augment pipeline
security assessments. Those personnel will complete training by
December 31, 2019 and start assessments in 2020.
Question 7. Does TSA plan to issue pipeline security regulations or
mandates--physical and/or cyber? Please explain if the response is
``no''. If ``yes'', will the regulations or mandates be similar to the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation Standards (NERC-CIP)?
Answer. No, TSA does not have plans to issue pipeline security
regulations. TSA conducted over 80 independent, objective, physical and
cybersecurity assessments in FY 2018 and 2019 to measure compliance
with the measures outlined in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines.
Based on the results of our physical and cybersecurity assessments, TSA
is confident that our cooperative approach with industry is working to
ensure that appropriate security measures are in place to address
current threats. In addition, a regulatory approach alone is not
suitable in addressing evolving, dynamic threats. TSA finds tremendous
value in its ability to develop and issue security guidance, tools and
resources for surface transportation owners and operators, as well as
the ability to adjust industry standards to assess new and more
innovative threat tactics has proven to be effective and efficient. TSA
will continue to work collaboratively with the pipeline industry to
refine guidance to address emerging threats.
Question 8. Please explain the difference between TSA's Corporate
Security Reviews and the Critical Facility Security Reviews answer the
following questions (Questions 8-12): How many companies have been
assessed to-date in each and how many companies are confirmed for the
rest of FY19 and for FY20?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration conducts two
types of pipeline security reviews: CSR and CFSRs. CSRs are voluntary
reviews of a pipeline owner's corporate security plans, policies and
procedures at the corporate level. These reviews are conducted with
senior security and operations executives at corporate headquarters.
CFSRs are voluntary on-site reviews of critical pipeline facilities, as
well as other select pipeline facilities, throughout the Nation. The
CFSRs focuses on the physical security measures and implementation of
security policies and procedures at the critical facility.
Since 2003, TSA has assessed 207 companies. Twenty-two CSRs were
conducted during FY19 and 25 CSRs are scheduled for FY20.
Between 2012-2019, TSA conducted 368 CFSRs. Sixty CFSRs were
conducted in FY19. TSA plans to increase this number to between 75-125
CFSRs in FY20 by utilizing a dedicated field based team of Surface
Inspectors.
Question 9. How are the companies selected for review? Can pipeline
operators sign-up to be assessed? If so, how?
Answer. To select facilities for review, TSA uses the Pipeline
Relative Risk Ranking Tool (PRRRT) to create TSA's top 100 critical
pipeline systems. The risk assessment calculates threat, vulnerability,
and consequence based on variables such as the amount of throughput and
other factors including but not limited to: product deliverability to
military facilities, power plants, and airports; and factors such as
pipelines near high consequence Urban Area Security Initiative or High
Threat Urban Areas. Critical Facilities are identified by the operator
during the CSR process. Once identified, CFSRs are scheduled according
to risk identified by the PRRRT. Pipeline operators and facilities may
request to be assessed through direct communication to TSA.
Question 10. What is the fully-loaded cost per assessment?
Answer. The cost to the government for contract support associated
with each CSR is $15,341.74 and $4,951.36 for each CFSR. In addition to
this contract support, several TSA employees within Surface Operations
assigned to headquarters and the field also contribute to these
assessments as part of the duties and responsibilities of their
position. As discussed more fully below, any TSA estimates on the
additional cost of the full time employee contributions is speculative
since the frequency of these assessments vary and these employees
fulfill other duties and responsibilities for Surface Operations in
addition to assisting with the assessments.
Question 11. How often are assessments performed and how quickly
does TSA follow up on the security recommendations they provide
pipeline operators?
Answer. Frequency of CSRs and CFSRs conducted with industry is
based on availability of funding for contract support and agreement of
pipeline operators to participate in the voluntary assessments. Within
two to three weeks following a CSR or CFSR, TSA provides a summary of
the assessment and follow-up instructions to the stakeholder.
Question 12. How does TSA hold pipeline operators accountable to
the measures in the Pipeline Security Guidelines and recommendations
that result from the assessments?
Answer. TSA's pipeline security programs are voluntary and
collaborative in nature. The pipeline industry works closely with TSA
to increase their security posture using the results of completed CSRs
and CFSRs. Within two to three weeks following an assessment, TSA
provides a summary of the recommendations and follow-up instructions to
the stakeholder. TSA requests stakeholders to address Pipeline Security
Guideline recommendations within 12-18 months following an assessment.
These recommendations are addressed through direct follow up with the
stakeholder as well as during any future assessment.
Question 13. Outline TSA's plan to address pipeline cybersecurity.
In addition, to what extent do the Corporate Security Reviews and the
Critical Facility Security Reviews provide TSA with an understanding of
the pipeline industry's cybersecurity readiness?
Answer. TSA is addressing pipeline cybersecurity through two
primary initiatives with government and industry partners that begin
with intelligence and information sharing. In the past year, TSA has
partnered with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Energy and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to
provide six briefings to industry leaders. These briefings will
continue to ensure that industry and government are fully apprised of
potential threats.
Second, TSA will continue to assess cybersecurity in the industry
to more fully understand the risks and necessary measures to reduce
risks. TSA has partnered with CISA to assess pipeline cybersecurity at
select pipeline companies. These VADRs are conducted on site over a
two-day period and assess all aspects of the security of a pipeline
operator's ICS. CISA provides personnel with ICS expertise to conduct
these assessments. Results are analyzed by NRMC to provide an
assessment of the vulnerability gaps and best practices across the
industry. As of October 1, 2019, TSA and CISA have completed six of
these assessments. Analysis of these assessments is expected to be
completed before December 31, 2019 and will establish a baseline to
determine the cybersecurity protection measures in place in the
industry.
The output of TSA CSRs provides awareness of the pipeline
industry's cybersecurity readiness. CSRs were updated in 2018 to
include an expanded focus on cybersecurity plans and programs and to
better align with new cybersecurity protection measures outlined in the
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. CFSRs also look at both physical and
cyber protective measures for on-site cyber assets and increase TSA's
understanding of the industry's readiness.
TSA plans to add cybersecurity specialists to assess and develop
appropriate programs to address surface transportation cybersecurity
needs identified through these efforts.
Question 14. In just over a year, October 2020, the traveling
public will be required to have identification that is ``REAL ID''
compliant. However, a number of states are still not issuing these IDs
or are not issuing at rates needed. How does TSA plan to handle people
who do not have compliant identification?
Answer. Congress enacted the REAL ID Act in 2005 in response to the
9/11 Commission recommendations, to establish minimum security
standards for state-issued driver's licenses and state IDs pertaining
to security, authentication, and issuance standards that can be
accepted by Federal agencies for official purposes. These official
purposes include, but are not limited to: (1) accessing Federal
facilities; (2) boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft; and
(3) entering nuclear power plants.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) are partnering with industry and state
governments to alert travelers about the REAL ID deadline to ensure
they have time to prepare for full enforcement, beginning October 1,
2020.
Pursuant to the REAL ID regulations, starting October 1, 2020, TSA
will only accept state-issued driver's licenses and identification
cards as identification at the security screening checkpoint if those
documents are issued in accordance with the REAL ID standards by a REAL
ID-compliant state. If a traveler does not have a REAL ID-compliant ID,
they may provide another acceptable form of identification (such as, a
valid passport, state issued enhanced driver's license, or U.S.
military ID), for domestic air travel; however, passengers who are
unable to verify their identity will not be permitted through the
screening checkpoint. In August 2019, Transportation Security Officers
began providing reminders to passengers who presented non-compliant
licenses at checkpoints about the upcoming REAL ID enforcement date.
For a list of acceptable IDs, visit TSA's acceptable form of
identification page, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/
identification.
TSA and DHS have been working with stakeholders to ensure that the
public is aware of the upcoming October 1, 2020 REAL ID enforcement
deadline. For example, in the spring of 2018, DHS and TSA launched a
public awareness campaign around identification requirement changes,
and TSA hosted a national media event on October 1, 2019, with industry
partners and Department of Motor Vehicles leaders. In August 2019, TSA
and DHS offered states the opportunity to share state-specific driver's
license images for customized signage. So far, twenty-five states have
worked with TSA to develop customized state-specific REAL ID signage
for TSA screening checkpoints.
The Agency routinely includes REAL ID messaging in national media
engagements and on its social media platforms (approximately 1.3
million followers on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and
YouTube), and engages travelers by answering their questions via
AskTSA. TSA currently offers an online toolkit of products available to
support the communication needs of stakeholders, which is available on
the TSA website, tsa.gov/real-id..
Question 15. Many of our Alaskan communities don't have their own
DMVs and Alaskans have to fly to get to one. How are you working to
address the uniqueness of travel in the State of Alaska?
Answer. DHS recognizes that in some cases an individual's ability
to regularly access a state's motor vehicle office may be limited. As
such, TSA and DHS are partnering with industry and state governments to
alert travelers about the REAL ID deadline to ensure they have ample
time to prepare for full enforcement on October 1, 2020, and also
encouraging states to accommodate their citizens based on each state's
unique circumstances. In August 2019, TSA began verbally advising
travelers presenting non-compliant licenses of the upcoming REAL ID
enforcement date. TSA has also co-hosted REAL ID events with motor
vehicle administration officials in numerous locations around the
country throughout the spring and summer, with more to be scheduled. In
addition, TSA has launched a robust social media campaign to alert
travelers across the country. DHS and TSA are committed to engaging
with stakeholders, including officials in Alaska, and incorporating
their feedback, where appropriate, into TSA's efforts to prepare the
public for full enforcement of the REAL ID Act on October 1, 2020.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Shelly Moore Capito
to Patricia F. S. Cogswell
In February, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued
an Interim Final Rule (IFR) to prohibit the transportation of lithium
ion batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft. It is my understanding
that the TSA currently has regulations governing the size of lithium
batteries as well as where they are stored on passenger flights.
Question. What does the TSA take into account when regulating spare
lithium batteries on passenger aircraft? As lithium batteries start
being integrated into more products, like suitcases, does the TSA
anticipate having to issue further guidelines for securing lithium
batteries on passenger flights?
Answer. TSA conducts the screening of individuals, accessible
property, and checked baggage in order to detect, deter, and prevent
any explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other threat to security into the
sterile area and/or before entering the aircraft. Hazardous materials
(HAZMAT) allowed onboard an aircraft must be properly marked, labeled,
and packaged with proper notification. When a Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) discovers an item that is, or appears to be, HAZMAT, such
as a battery, they are directed to not remove the HAZMAT, to maintain
control of the accessible property or checked baggage, and to notify
the Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO). If the
discovery of HAZMAT occurs at the checkpoint, the STSO must notify the
individual that the item is not allowed and provide the individual with
proper disposal options. If the discovery occurs in checked baggage,
the STSO must notify the appropriate aircraft operator/carrier.
The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate the
transportation of HAZMAT from the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act. TSA has no regulations specific to this material, thus TSA
programs reference U.S. Department of Transportation HAZMAT
regulations.
TSA is not planning to issue further guidelines on lithium
batteries at this time. The issue surrounding lithium batteries is a
HAZMAT issue, and the Federal Aviation Administration and the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration addresses such matters.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mike Lee to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
A 2015 GAO report entitled ``Screening Partnership Program: TSA Can
Benefit from Improved Cost Estimates'' noted that during the Screening
Partnership Program transition process for four Montana airports, TSA
offered a $10,000 relocation payment to screeners who chose to transfer
their employment with TSA to a non-SPP airport. The report notes that
contractors were unaware, at the time, that TSA offered such relocation
payments. According to GAO, contractors also raised concerns that such
payments delayed and disrupted their ability to hire screeners.
Question 1. Is it still TSA's policy to offer relocation payments
to TSOs at airports undergoing an SPP transition? If so, what is the
current amount of the relocation payment? Does TSA have public guidance
that explains the circumstances for offering relocation payments? And
has TSA communicated this policy to SPP contractors?
Answer. Yes, TSA has the authority to offer a relocation payment in
accordance with TSA Management Directive 1000.12, Authorization and
Reimbursement for Relocations. TSA has traditionally offered a fixed
relocation payment of $10,000 for Continental United States relocations
and $14,999 for to/from Outside Continental United States locations, to
permanent TSA employees whose positions have been eliminated and would
be involuntarily separated if they do not transfer to a new position.
TSA does not have public guidance explaining the circumstances for
offering relocation payments. The TSO relocation policy is a policy
that contractors and airport authorities are aware of as it is part of
our involuntary workforce reduction policy. It only applies to airports
when they transition from Federal to private screening.
Question 2. TSA has recently collaborated with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) over the testing of facial recognition
technology. In the September 11th, 2019 Commerce Committee hearing, you
noted that in the biometric pilot programs currently underway TSA only
stores facial data captured at security checkpoints for the duration of
time it takes to match the identification (passport, drivers license,
etc.) provided by the traveler.
How long does it take to complete an identification match using the
biometric technology currently active in TSA's pilot programs?
Answer. The time it takes to complete an identification match is
dependent on multiple variables that include the quality of the
captured photograph, quality of the reference photograph, lighting
conditions, types of physical credentials that are being scanned, and
network bandwidth availability. There are two types of biometrics
technology solutions that TSA is testing for the checkpoint for
different target populations. For the Trusted Traveler populations (TSA
PreCheck and CBP Global Entry), TSA is working with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) in piloting a one to many, or 1:N facial
recognition solution in Terminal F in Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport that leverages the CBP Traveler Verification
Service (TVS). In the 1:N solution, facial images are captured at the
checkpoint and compared to a gallery of reference photographs that have
been pre-staged. The time to match for this solution has consistently
been under 2 seconds.
For the non-Trusted Traveler populations, TSA (without CBP) is
prototyping a one to one, or 1:1 facial matching solution that enhances
the Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) machine by adding a
local camera and facial matching capability. TSA has conducted pilots
to test 1:1 biometric matching in TSA Pre3 lanes, but is also
exploring this solution for the general traveling public. Under this
solution, the device (CAT + Camera) scans the physical ID tendered by
the passenger at the checkpoint (i.e., passports, driver's license) and
compares the passenger's facial image stored on his or her identity
documents with the passenger's live facial image captured by the CAT +
Camera. In this solution, there is no backend gallery of reference
photographs since the live face is locally matched against the
photograph on the tendered ID. The speed of this match is primarily
dependent on the quality of the live face capture and the quality of
the ID photograph. TSA does not currently have operational data to
quantify the average time to match. TSA conducted a pilot using CAT +
Camera over 30-days in Las Vegas McCarran Airport in September 2019 and
submitted the collected data to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) for a scientific
analysis that we expect will show the average processing time for this
solution.
Question 3. What are TSA's plans for the wider adoption of facial
recognition technology outside its current pilot programs?
Answer. In October 2018, Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) published the TSA Biometrics Roadmap for Aviation Security and
the Passenger Experience (Biometrics Roadmap), which will guide the
agency's biometric efforts in the coming years and articulates clear
pathways to improve security, safeguard the Nation's transportation
system, and accelerate the speed of action through smart investments
and collaborative partnerships. Integrating biometrics into the
checkpoint will enable TSA to further strengthen its security baseline,
more effectively deter and detect bad actors, and better measure
performance of security measures against adversaries trying to gain
access to the airport sterile environment. TSA's Biometrics Roadmap
centers on four goals, primarily aligned to the aviation passenger
profile:
Partner with CBP on biometrics for international travelers
Operationalize biometrics for TSA Pre3 travelers
Expand biometrics to additional domestic travelers
Develop supporting infrastructure for biometric solutions
TSA is exploring biometric technology solutions using 1:N
``tokenless'' facial recognition and 1:1 facial matching to provide
automated verification of identities at the Travel Document Checker
(TDC) position at the checkpoint. A 1:N solution provides a more
seamless passenger experience since he or she does not have to produce
a physical credential but requires a backend gallery of pre-staged
photos to be matched against the passenger as he or she comes through
the checkpoint. 1:1 does require the passenger to produce a physical
credential with which to assert his or her identity at the checkpoint;
the live face is captured and compared to the photograph on the
physical credential for a match. This solution does not require a
backend gallery of photographs, but does represent a less seamless
passenger experience.
For 1:N testing, TSA is leveraging CBP's TVS to verify the
identities of Trusted Travelers. In parallel, TSA is evaluating 1:1
technology solutions that use TSA's Credential Authentication
Technology (CAT).
In August 2019, TSA piloted a proof of concept that equipped a CAT
device with a camera (CAT-C) at the checkpoint at McCarran
International Airport in Las Vegas. The CAT-C device was used to
validate that the identity document a passenger presented was
authentic; collect the photo image and biographic information from the
passenger's document; and capture the passenger's live facial image.
The CAT-C device compared a live facial image to the image on the
passenger's identity document, and once a matching result was recorded,
TSA personnel directed the passenger to the standard manual TDC
process.
Over the course of FY20, TSA will continue to test and refine these
1:1 and 1:N solutions in coordination with interagency and industry
partners. FY20 systems development, pilots, data collection, and post-
pilot analyses will culminate in a set of validated and defensible
requirements for program investment decisions in FY21 and beyond. These
investment decisions in Q1 FY21 will inform TSA's acquisition path
forward on the facial recognition solution at TSA checkpoints and guide
TSA's plans for the long term adoption of biometric capabilities at the
checkpoint in the coming years. These solutions may include 1:1 and 1:N
matching that will build upon TSA's underlying technology platforms to
enhance security effectiveness, capture operational efficiencies, and
transform the passenger experience as articulated in the Biometrics
Roadmap published on TSA.gov in late 2018. TSA is also partnering with
the Office of Biometric Identity Management on a long-term strategy for
use of biometrics across all transit modes.
Question 4. What are TSA's plans for communication with the public
on TSA's use of the technology?
Answer. Recognizing the need to communicate the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) approach for developing and
implementing biometric solutions, TSA issued the TSA Biometrics Roadmap
for Aviation Security & the Passenger Experience in September 2018. The
Roadmap is available to the public at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
TSA also maintains a publicly available ``Biometrics Technology''
page at https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology, which provides
information on how TSA is using biometrics to improve aviation security
by modernizing aviation passenger identity verification, including
facial recognition technology.
Where TSA has piloted facial recognition technology, TSA has
provided English and Spanish signage at the airport in close proximity
to the dedicated test lanes to provide notice to passengers. TSA
personnel monitoring the testing also had English and Spanish hand-outs
providing additional information about TSA's screening technology and
data protection procedures. These signs and hand-outs also advised the
public that participation is voluntary.
TSA has relied upon a number of publicly available Privacy Impact
Assessments (PIAs), which can be found on the DHS Privacy Office's
public-facing website for review at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/
departure-information-systems-test. These PIAs will be updated and
strengthened as necessary as biometric identification develops further.
Should TSA fully operationalize facial recognition technology, it will
continue to provide robust notice and meaningful choice of
alternatives.
Additionally, as required by the TSA Modernization Act (Public Law
115-254, Oct. 5, 2018), TSA studied matching performance differences
across biometric systems and operational environments to identify the
risk of different error rates that correlate with user race, gender,
and age and other grounds. Earlier this year, TSA provided a report to
Congress that includes an assessment of these issues.
Question 5. Until 2016, new TSOs often completed their training
requirements at or near their home airports. TSOs now receive
centralized training at the TSA Academy located at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center in Georgia.
A 2018 GAO report noted that TSA has not identified performance
goals or measures to assess the benefits of the TSO Basic Program.
Since the publication of the report, has TSA taken any steps to
identify metrics to assess the effectiveness of the TSO Basic Program?
What are these metrics? Has TSA come to any conclusions on the
effectiveness of the centralized TSO training model?
Answer. In response to Government Accountability Office Audit
180552 ``AVIATION SECURITY: Basic Training Program for Transportation
Security Officers Would Benefit from Performance Goals and Measures,''
TSA instituted a series of benchmarks regarding the in-residence TSO
Basic Training Program (TSO-BPT) conducted at the TSA-Academy (TSA-A)
that newly hired Transportation Security Officers (TSO) attend.
The metric for the first time pass rate on the Image Interpretation
Test (IIT) was set at 90 percent for all TSO-BTP graduates. The IIT
first time pass rate for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 was 95 percent. TSO-BTP
graduates from the TSA-A continue to excel on this measure.
TSOs are administered a Job Knowledge Test (JKT) at the end of TSO-
BTP. TSA established a metric of a first time pass rate of 95 percent
for the JKT. For FY 2019, the overall first-time pass rate for the TSO-
BTP JKT was 99.8 percent. TSO-BTP graduates continue to demonstrate
mastery of the topics trained at TSA-A.
To provide an additional measure of performance of skills taught
during TSO-BTP, a Practical Observation Laboratory (POL) was developed.
The POL provides TSO-BTP students the opportunity to demonstrate their
mastery of the standard Pat-Down procedure taught in the program. In FY
2019, 99.3 percent of all TSO-BTP students at TSA-A completed the POL
and demonstrated their mastery of the Pat-down techniques.
In an effort to better measure the impact of TSO-BTP on employee
engagement, TSA added two questions to the Standard Level 1 Course
Evaluation:
(1) I recommend TSA as a good place to work.
(2) I am satisfied with my job.
These questions mirror questions asked on the Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). After completing all necessary internal
reviews and approvals, the new Level 1 survey with the two new
questions was released at the beginning of FY 2020. The timing of the
release will provide TSA with a full year of data for comparison to the
ongoing FEVS data collection.
Question 6. TSA has continued to develop and implement enhanced
screening techniques and technology at airports, including enhanced
pat-downs, full-body scanners, and in-depth examination of carry-on
baggage.
Has TSA increased its detection of potential threats as a result of
enhanced screenings conducted via pat-downs and full-body scanners? If
so, what statistics can you provide to support this conclusion?
Answer. Currently, TSA does not have any covert testing data to
indicate whether enhanced screenings conducted via pat-downs and full-
body scanners introduced in the past several years has increased
detection of potential threats in the checkpoint environment. TSA
initiated covert testing in August 2019 that is intended to understand
whether checkpoint security effectiveness is increasing or decreasing
over time, and if possible, associate changes in the screening system
to changes in effectiveness. While such testing will be unable to speak
to the impact of past improvements, our initial baseline statistics are
anticipated to be available in second quarter of FY 2020.
Question 7. With the launch of the TSA Pre-Check program,
passengers are permitted to keep their shoes on through all parts of
the screening process while general boarding passengers are not.
In light of the use of enhanced screening technology at airports,
including full-body scanners, what is the security value of requiring
general boarding passengers to remove their shoes? Does TSA have any
plans to revisit the policy in the future?
Answer. Currently, passengers who go through the standard screening
process are required to remove their shoes so they can be screened via
x-ray for non-metallic explosives. TSA routinely reviews its policies
and procedures for shoe screening to evaluate the risk versus passenger
experience. TSA will evaluate any new transportation security equipment
capable of shoe screening through technology demonstrations as they
become available.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Public-Private Partnerships
Question 1. Over the years, the TSA has utilized various public-
private partnerships to revolutionize airport security and decrease
wait times. As an example, the Indianapolis International Airport was
one of the first facilities to test and deploy TSA's new CT scanners,
leveraging a strong industrial partnership. As a result, Hoosier
confidence and satisfaction improved.
Can you speak to how the TSA can further improve its internal
processes from the private sector?
Answer. TSA's Innovation Task Force (ITF) demonstration processes
provide industry with increased access to operational data that allows
vendors to better integrate technology and develop or refine solutions
to better meet TSA's needs. The ITF process has created strong
relationships with security technology vendors, the airline industry,
and airport authorities by working closely on matters that were not
previously addressed by TSA.
The culmination of upgrades to current technology, future
capabilities, enhancements to processes and training delivery, long-
term investment strategy, and future requirements and acquisitions,
supports a system-of-systems approach that positions TSA to address
identified and emerging security capability gaps, and also improve
security and the customer experience. Since its inception in 2016, ITF
has demonstrated 23 solutions from 22 solution providers. These
demonstrations have informed eight TSA requirement documents--
Capability Analysis Reports, Operational Requirements Documents, and
Functional Requirements Documents--and four of TSA's acquisition and
procurement decisions.
Question 2. Can you speak to how the TSA can further improve its
internal processes from the private sector? With the agency having to
quickly adapt to identify threats, what are the agency's priorities
when assessing public-private partnerships?
Answer. TSA created a Capability Acceptance Process (CAP) within
Acquisition Program Management (APM) to evaluate offers of
transportation security equipment (TSE) and related services from the
private sector. Under this program, TSA considers multiple variables
when assessing partnership offers, such as its impact to airport
security screening, the full life-cycle cost of the donation, and its
effect to TSA operations, including staffing and training. TSA
addresses these considerations through a business case analysis with
various TSA stakeholders that identifies the overall value of the
proposed offer of TSE. Priorities are given to those offers that
advance airport security screening more efficiently, effectively, and
rapidly while minimizing overall costs for TSA. While the program
primarily focuses on already qualified TSE, emerging technologies are
also considered if they promote the fielding of improved capabilities
at U.S. airports. As of October 2019, APM is working with 13 private
entities on offers of 140 pieces of equipment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Biometrics. In August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security
released a report titled ``Transportation Security Administration and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Deployment of Biometric
Technologies'' that states that ``no bias based on demographics has
been statistically identified'' in current biometric systems used by
CBP or TSA. However, this seems to conflict with other studies showing
that biometric facial identification systems have significant rates of
error. For example, a 2012 study co-authored by the FBI showed
significant error rates in facial recognition with ethnic minority
groups, young people, and women.
Question 1. What specific information is DHS relying on to conclude
there are no demographic biases in the technology it is using?
Anseer. On October 3, 2018, Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, which was signed into law shortly thereafter. Section 1919
of the Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a
report to Congress, with assessments from the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Administrator and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Commissioner relating to biometric technologies. The
statement referenced is found in the Executive Summary of the report
and is in relation to CBP's analysis on its Traveler Verification
Service (TVS) system performance.
CBP measures and evaluates true match and non-match rates, as well
as false match and non-match rates to provide a comprehensive
understanding of system effectiveness in alignment with its mission.
CBP analyzes for demographic biases in its biometric exit systems.
Based on the Key Performance Parameters in section VI(A) of the TSA/CBP
report, no bias based on demographics was statistically identified in
its approach. However, biometric match performance shows greater
correlation to operational and environmental conditions, such as
lighting. The report also notes that CBP actively makes improvements
and engages in public dialogue on appropriate standards.
TSA is aware of a variety of concerns related to performance
issues, including inadequate demographic performance, and takes this
issue seriously. There have been significant improvements in the
accuracy rates of facial recognition algorithms. According to the most
recent Facial Recognition Vendor Test, administered by the NIST, there
have been significant advancements in facial recognition technology,
with many algorithms operating 20 times better in 2018 than the best
products did in 2013. The same report noted that additional gains are
expected as this technology continues to develop.
Question 2. How does TSA intend to notify the public about its
increased use of biometric information? Will it provide an easily
readable summary of its policy for use of biometrics?
Answer. TSA issued the TSA Biometrics Roadmap for Aviation Security
& the Passenger Experience in September 2018 to explain its approach
for developing and implementing biometric solutions. The Roadmap is
available to the public at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/
tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
TSA also maintains a publicly available ``Biometrics Technology''
page at https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology, which provides
information on how TSA is using biometrics to improve aviation security
by modernizing aviation passenger identity verification.
TSA's piloting of facial recognition technology exemplifies its
approach to passenger notification. Pursuant to Section 208 of the E-
Government Act of 2002 and Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, TSA also provides notice to the public of its biometric
technology pilots via publicly available Privacy Impact Assessments
(PIAs). These PIAs are available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/
dhscbppia-056-traveler-verification-service-0 and https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/dhstsapia-046-travel-document-checker-automation-using-
facial-recognition. TSA will continue to comply with DHS privacy policy
throughout each phase of TSA's biometric solution development--from
initial design to implementation.
As part of its facial recognition biometrics technology pilots with
CBP, TSA has made pilot information available via public signage at
pilot sites. Additionally, in its facial matching biometric technology
pilots, TSA has provided English and Spanish signage at the airport in
close proximity to the dedicated test lanes to provide immediate notice
to passengers. TSA personnel monitoring the testing had English and
Spanish hand-outs available that provided additional information about
TSA's screening technology and data protection procedures. These signs
and hand-outs also notified the public that participation is completely
voluntary.
Surface Transportation Security Strategy. TSA plays a critical role
in securing our surface transportation network. The TSA Modernization
Act required TSA to assess the vulnerabilities of all surface
transportation modes and develop a risk-based surface transportation
security strategy.
Question 3. What is the status of TSA's risk-based surface
transportation security strategy?
Answer. The ``TSA Surface Transportation Security Assessment'' that
satisfies the requirement in Section 1964(a) of the TSA Modernization
Act addressing vulnerabilities of and risks to, surface transportation
systems, was completed on October 18, 2019. TSA's development and
implementation of a cross-cutting, risk-based ``Surface Transportation
Security Strategy'' that will meet the requirement in Section 1964(b)
of the TSA Modernization Act is currently on schedule to be completed
prior to the April 15, 2020 due date.
TSA's FY 2020 budget requested just $72 million for Surface
Security Operations, a 45 percent decrease from FY 2019 appropriated
amounts.
Question 4. Does this decrease reflect a decrease in the risks
associated with surface transportation?
Answer. This decrease does not reflect a decrease in the risks
associated with surface transportation as there has not been a
significant change in the overall risk to surface transportation. The
reduction to the Surface Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 budget request is a
result of the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program
elimination. This past year, TSA pursued several key initiatives to
enhance our efforts to identify and reduce gaps in surface
transportation security. Notably, TSA established the Surface
Transportation Security Advisory Committee to advise, consult with,
report to, and make recommendations to the TSA Administrator on surface
transportation security matters, including the development, refinement,
and implementation of policies, programs, initiatives, rulemakings, and
security directives pertaining to surface transportation security. TSA
also elevated Surface Operations to the Assistant Administrator level
within Security Operations, increased partnership with the
Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group, updated the agency's
Surface Risk Assessment, and continues to build cybersecurity and
intelligence expertise in the surface space.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Patricia F.S. Cogswell
As we discussed earlier this month, passenger wait times have been
increasing at Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP) International Airport. Between
2012 and 2017, MSP passenger traffic increased 12 percent while TSA
reduced its number of screeners by 6 percent. Last month, I sent a
letter to Administrator Pekoske urging TSA to increase the authorized
staffing levels at MSP to help reduce wait times.
Question 1. Can you provide an update on what TSA has done to
address passenger wait times and improve coordination with MSP since
our discussion?
Answer. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP), like many
other airports, is experiencing significant passenger growth, which
affects passenger wait times. TSA monitors passenger volume during peak
times to minimize passenger wait times, while ensuring security
effectiveness. For FY 2019, TSA increased the Transportation Security
Officer frontline authorization at MSP by 3.5 percent over FY18 levels,
raising the authorized staffing level from 631 to 653 full-time
equivalents (FTE). We also provided additional FTE to MSP to assist
with passenger queueing during the new airport construction project
that is ongoing. Terminal 1 Departure Hall construction began in the
2nd quarter of 2018, with the most significant impact to security
checkpoint access from August 18, 2019 through October 8, 2019. While
MSP suspended impactful construction during the holidays, construction
will continue to impact the passenger experience at MSP well into 2021-
2022. TSA currently staffs all the security checkpoint lanes required
to meet passenger demand based on passenger estimates provided by air
carriers.
Staffing and scheduling subject matter experts completed a site
visit to MSP in late July 2019. This visit validated TSA's staffing
model for MSP and ensures that MSP staffing requirements are accurately
represented based on the airport's operating characteristics. TSA made
several updates to account for recent configuration changes and the
planned increase in passenger throughput. These changes will influence
the 2020 staffing budget for MSP. TSA conducted a follow-up visit and
discussion during the week of November 4, 2019.
In addition, it is important to note that the TSA Federal Security
Director at MSP meets regularly with MSP management to discuss
operations, especially with the ongoing construction project at the
airport.
Question 2. What is TSA doing to ensure that airports across the
country have the staffing they need to reduce wait times while also
improving security?
Answer. TSA is constantly finding ways to improve security and
reduce wait times at airports across the country. We ensure our success
in these two areas through the effective management of resources,
constant improvement in screening technology and operating procedures,
and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
ensure our budget requests accurately represent our staffing
requirements. TSA has a best practice staffing model, validated by the
Government Accountability Office that effectively determines staffing
resource requirements at each location based on airport specific
inputs, including space constraints at the airport. This same model
informs TSA's budget requests and ensures that as the number of
passengers increases and airport infrastructure changes, our budgets
support our updated staffing requirements.
TSA may also utilize the National Deployment Office to deploy
additional Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), to provide
supplemental screening resources at airports. This type of support is
typically reserved for seasonal peaks, at special events, during
crises, and periods of other personnel shortages. For example, this may
occur at airports unable to hire to their established staffing model,
airports where passenger volumes are expected to exceed forecasts, or
those that TSA leadership has determined need additional resources to
mitigate risk.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Question 1. Ms. Cogswell, what has been the overall cost to TSA for
the roughly 350 personnel reassigned to the southern border? What is
the cost for the roughly 180 personnel currently assigned to the
border, and what is the current timeline for their return to their
normal duties within TSA?
Answer. As of October 31, 2019 TSA had deployed a total of 368
general support volunteers. The overall cost to TSA for FY 2019 is
approximately $2,517,000. Currently, TSA has 85 employees deployed on
the Southwest Border. The cost for pay period 19 is approximately
$231,000. All TSA employees returned from the Southwest Border prior to
December 23, 2019.
Question 2. As to the reprogramming of funds to support immigration
enforcement, you mentioned in your answers that accounts were carefully
selected and activities were delayed as a result. I would like more
detail on where the funds were pulled from, how the loss of funds
affected those accounts and programs, and the expected timeline for
recovery of those accounts and programs.
Answer. TSA selected funding to support immigration enforcement
from programs based on their execution status and lower security risk.
$19.9 million of the $23.8 million transferred by TSA was from the FY
2019 operations and support account. From this account, TSA deferred a
Federal Air Marshal Service workers' compensation obligation for
payment to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) by one year. Worker's
compensation bills are payable 2 years in arrears, thus the funding
must be obligated and paid to DOL in FY 2020. The Surface funding
accrued as a result of unused payroll due to Surface Inspectors and
VIPR programs vacancies, as programs prioritize hiring in higher-risk
aviation sectors. The recently passed TSA Modernization Act prioritizes
surface security and requires a reorganization and reprioritization of
surface security activities, which is expected to improve execution and
hiring in this area. For the FY 2018 and no-year account funding TSA
opted to curtail some travel and small procurements; these are not
recurring reductions and the programs have normal funding levels in FY
2020.
The following detailed breakout shows funding sources:
Transportation Security Administration ($23.8M):
FY 2019 Operations and Support ($19.9M):
$13.9M transferred from Federal Air Marshals delaying the
Federal Air Marshals' workers' compensation bill payment to DOL
into FY 2020.
$6.0M transferred from Surface Programs resulting in limited
impact since funding accrued as a result of payroll underburn.
FY 2018 Operations and Support ($3.3M):
$0.54M transferred from Canines
$0.04M transferred from Federal Air Marshals
$2.1M transferred from Mission Support
$0.06M transferred from Secure Flight
$0.33M transferred from Surface Programs
$0.2M transferred from Vetting Programs
No-Year Accounts ($0.58M):
$0.51M transferred from miscellaneous Program Projects &
Activities in TSA's FY 2004 Aviation Security accounts (P.L.
108-90).
$0.07M transferred from miscellaneous Program Projects &
Activities in TSA's FY 2005 Aviation Security accounts (P.L.
108-334).
Question 3. The collection of biometrics demands a high level of
transparency to the general public. Does TSA plan to publish reports on
the real world effectiveness of the facial recognition programs that
have been tested in several airports? I would like to know how TSA is
evaluating these programs in terms of bias, incorrect matches, and
overall efficiency for screening and security.
Answer. We are aware of concerns related to performance issues,
including inadequate demographic performance, and take this issue
seriously. TSA is working closely with government partners such as CBP,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and DHS
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to develop, test, and refine
biometric technology.
TSA is engaged in a multi-phase prototyping and piloting effort
that will be designed to carefully assess security effectiveness and
operational efficiency as a part of its biometrics technology testing
and development in the field. Each phase is described in detail through
discrete Privacy Impact Assessments that are published on the DHS
Privacy Office's website. It is too early to affirmatively state that
the analysis of the various phases of the testing process will be
publicly available since we are still conducting pilots and assessing
the results. However, the effectiveness of these technologies in the
real world is of vital concern to TSA because the technologies will not
provide security value if they are not effective across the entire
population. As such, TSA has defined a disciplined acquisitions process
approved by TSA's Component Acquisitions Executive that specifies
comprehensive testing and transparent review processes to ensure that
any facial capabilities satisfactorily address the whole spectrum of
system performance concerns.
To note, there have been significant improvements in the accuracy
rates of facial recognition algorithms. According to the most recent
Facial Recognition Vendor Test, administered by the NIST, there have
been significant advancements in facial recognition technology, with
many algorithms operating 20 times better in 2018 than the best
products did in 2013. The same report noted that additional gains are
expected as this technology continues to develop.
Additionally, TSA is also performing specific testing and
evaluation to assess the impact of biometrics on screening and security
and will communicate results as they become available.
For the most recent pilot at LAS in September 2019, TSA is working
with S&T to conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis on the test.
The conclusions will evaluate performance metrics for demographic
performance, incorrect matches, and overall efficiency for screening
and security.
To investigate and address potential inadequate demographic
performance in facial recognition technology, S&T has been researching
the demographic effects in facial recognition and their dependence on
image acquisition. The results of this research will help provide
insight into how the magnitude of measured demographic effects depend
on image acquisition, and thus, biometric accuracy. Additionally, S&T
has been working to develop a framework for classifying biometric
performance differentials that separately consider the effect of false
positive and false negative outcomes. Concurrently, S&T has been
conducting face recognition algorithm performance research, and the
results demonstrate that false positive outcomes of face recognition
systems are not simply linked to a single demographic factor, and that
there needs to be careful consideration of interactions between
multiple factors to evaluate the equitability of facial recognition
systems.
Question 4. Along those same lines, what is the expected timeline
for rolling out facial recognition technology broadly? Does TSA have
any plans to expand their use of other facial recognition technology
beyond what has been deployed in its pilot programs? If facial
recognition technology is broadly deployed, does TSA have any plans to
share collected face biometrics with other agencies or private
companies? Or to create an internal database of face biometrics? Or to
check face biometrics against private or public databases outside of
the Federal government, e.g., state drivers' license databases? Are
there any plans to test or implement constant live facial recognition
in airports to passively identify travelers? And finally, if broadly
deployed, will TSA continue with opt-in screenings or will it switch to
an opt-out model?
Answer. Over the course of FY 2020, TSA will continue to test and
refine potential facial recognition and facial matching technology
solutions in coordination with interagency and industry partners. FY
2020 systems development, pilots, data collection, and post-pilot
analyses will culminate in a set of validated and defensible
requirements to inform program investment decisions in FY 2021 and
beyond. Those decisions will influence TSA's acquisition approach and
guide its plans for the long term adoption of biometric capabilities at
the checkpoint.
TSA is exploring alternate biometric technology solutions using 1:N
``tokenless'' facial recognition and 1:1 facial matching to provide
automated verification of identities at the TDC position at the
checkpoint. 1:N matching compares a live image capture against a number
(N) of records in the reference database, and 1:1 matching compares a
live image capture of the passenger against a single record (e.g., his/
her passport photo). For 1:N testing, TSA is leveraging CBP TVS to
verify the identities of Trusted Travelers. In parallel, TSA is
evaluating 1:1 technology solutions that leverage TSA's Credential
Authentication Technology.
TSA is evaluating these potential technology solutions as a means
to improve security at the TSA screening checkpoint by verifying the
identities of passengers more effectively and efficiently using
biometrics. Such technology may allow TSA to automate and improve upon
functions that are currently performed manually at the TDC position at
entry point to the TSA Checkpoint, which would both permit TSOs at the
checkpoint to provide increased attention to other security tasks, and
improve the passenger experience at the checkpoint.
TSA has no current plans to share collected face biometrics
with other agencies or private companies.
TSA has no plans to create an internal database of passenger
photographs, except for those in the voluntarily vetted
populations covered by specific programs such as PreCheck.
TSA has no plans to check facial biometrics against private
or public databases outside of the Federal Government,
including state Department of Motor Vehicle databases.
TSA has no plans to test or implement constant live facial
recognition in airports to passively identify travelers; it is
solely testing the potential use of facial recognition
technology for identity verification purposes of individuals
presenting themselves at the checkpoint based on the credential
presented.
Currently, participation in TSA's biometric technology pilots is
completely voluntary and passengers have the ability to opt-in into
various biometric pilots. TSA will continue to inform and engage with
Congress as it carries out the goals in TSA's Biometrics Roadmap,
published in September 2018.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Question 1. I want to thank all the Transportation Security
Officers (``TSOs'') who help protect our Nation every day. In June,
five TSOs were attacked at a checkpoint at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport.
Has TSA reviewed the events of the attack and determined what measures
it can undertake to protect officers from future attacks?
Answer. Following the June event at Phoenix Sky Harbor
International Airport (PHX), TSA took several steps to prepare and
protect officers against future attacks. First, we created a short
video briefing on the attack at PHX, which includes testimonials from
the TSOs involved and provides guidance for those who may be suddenly
confronted by an assailant in the future. The video briefing is
required viewing for everyone at TSA (with completion by the end of the
calendar year). Second, we will incorporate relevant scenarios into FY
2020 National Training Plan to include ``what-if'' sessions to serve as
refreshers of the steps to take should a similar event occur.
Individuals who attack TSOs may face local, state or Federal
criminal charges. TSA ensures that local police review all cases to
determine if criminal charges can be issued and will support the
prosecution of all suspected attackers. In addition, TSA initiates a
separate civil enforcement case against individuals who attack TSOs,
regardless of whether the TSO was physically injured in the attack, for
which the maximum fine is $13,333.
Question 2. Acting Deputy Administrator Cogswell, as you know,
Phoenix Sky Harbor was one of the first airports in the country to use
checkpoint-based Computed Tomography (``CT'') technology to improve
overall security in airports. Is this new CT technology providing
better screening and speeding up the screening lines at checkpoints?
When will travelers not have to remove their laptops and 3-1-1 liquids
from their carry-on bags?
Answer. Computed Tomography (CT) provides 3-D images to TSOs
allowing them to more easily identify objects which were difficult to
identify on older 2-D image systems. The 3-D image provides the Officer
better views of the contents of the carry-on baggage. This allows for a
more complete analysis as compared to the current X-ray systems. CT
capabilities include enhanced visual interpretation, image
manipulation, improved detection of homemade explosives, reduced false
alarm rates, and reduced threat mass detection compared to current AT
systems.
Regarding throughput, with the introduction of any new technology
there is a learning curve for both passengers and TSOs. TSA anticipated
that initially the new CT systems to be somewhat slower than existing
AT systems, however as TSOs and passengers become more familiar with
CT, lane throughput would improve. Additionally, as TSA continues with
the formal program of record to procure additional CT systems, the
ancillary equipment, like automatic diverters and automated screening
lanes, will bolster throughput.
Passengers in CT lanes will not have to remove their laptops from
their carry-on baggage. We have also recently begun demonstrating the
reduced threat mass algorithm to enable passengers to leave the 3-1-1
liquids, gels and aerosols (LGA) in their bags. At all other airports
not involved in the testing, the current liquids, gels and aerosols
requirements will remain unchanged, and passengers will still be
required to divest 3-1-1 LGA.
Question 3. Arizona's airports are on the cutting edge of new
technology to keep our transportation system secure. For example,
Phoenix Mesa-Gateway Airport is involved in the pilot program for
automated Exit Lane technology at small airports. What are the benefits
we expect to see from the automated exit lanes at smaller airports?
Answer. Automated exit lane technologies offer potential to reduce
personnel requirements and expense by replacing human exit lane
monitors with a more secure means of reducing unauthorized access. Such
technology can increase the safety of security personnel by more
clearly identifying persons of interest while affording opportunity for
better containment, improve law enforcement response time by providing
real-time visual or closed-circuit television coverage, and alert a
wide range of operational and response personnel of ongoing potential
hazardous or dangerous security incidents. Automated exit lane
technologies also significantly reduce the risk of requiring a complete
evacuation of a concourse or gate area and the rescreening all
occupants, which can cause delays, reduce public confidence, and result
in large expenses.
Question 4. When Phoenix Sky Harbor closes the outdated Terminal 2
and completes the modernization of Terminal 3, the TSA has told the
airport that TSA will not pay to move screening machines to the
expanded Terminal 3 checkpoint. Why doesn't TSA pay to move or install
its equipment when airports modernize or make improvements to screening
areas? Why are these costs the responsibility of the airport?
Answer. The City of Phoenix--Aviation Department is initiating and
sponsoring the move of terminal operations from Terminal 2 to Terminal
3. As outlined in TSA Checkpoint Requirements and Planning Guide, dated
December 17, 2018, the project sponsor (in this case The City of
Phoenix--Aviation Department) is responsible for all aspects of the
project, including basic engineering, hiring of a licensed
architectural and engineering firm, communications, master planning,
project management, and other appropriate design functions and funding.
Examples of sponsor-driven projects include new or renovated
checkpoint(s) driven by increased capacity, the addition of lanes, new
terminals, etc.
TSA assumes responsibility of paying for the move or installation
of screening equipment when a project is initiated and sponsored by
TSA, such as the upcoming installation of Checkpoint CT equipment at
selected airports across the Nation, including Phoenix Sky Harbor
International Airport.
Question 5. The Registered Traveler Program--a public-private
partnership to develop safe and efficient checkpoint processes--has
been a great success and encouraged innovative thinking about airport
security. How do you see the Credential Authentication Technology roll-
out intersecting with the Registered Traveler Program? Can you commit
that you will have a working solution that does not harm the Registered
Traveler Program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Registered Traveler (RT) program does not create any role for the
private sector at the checkpoint, which is manned exclusively by U.S.
Government employees or contractors performing security screening
functions. Separate from the security screening process, the RT program
is a business opportunity for private-sector firms to provide identity
verification under contract with airport operators and air carriers,
not with TSA. CLEAR is the only firm pursuing this opportunity to act
as a RT service provider, operating at about seven percent of federally
regulated airports. At those airports, a CLEAR employee verifies the
identity of CLEAR's paying customers before they reach the checkpoint.
The employee then escorts these customers to the head of line at the
TSA checkpoint, where the employee positively hands-off the passenger
to a TSA TSO at the TDC part of the checkpoint.
The deployment of Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which
is underway, will significantly enhance TSA's ability to perform the
critical TDC checkpoint security functions as well as support
innovations such as the Flexible Lane Experience, an adaptable
screening process that focuses on risk.
TSA has worked collaboratively for more than two years with CLEAR
to improve its performance of the RT service provider functions. For
instance, TSA invested significant time and resources to assist CLEAR
in bringing its information systems security controls up to NIST
standards to ensure the protection of RT customer data. Additionally,
TSA leadership has met with CLEAR's executives multiple times on
matters related to RT. With the ongoing deployment of CAT, TSA
technical experts continue to regularly engage with CLEAR to identify
ways CLEAR passengers could interact with CAT in an expedited fashion.
To that end, TSA is working with CLEAR to sign a Cooperative Research
and Development Agreement.
Question 6. We have heard concerns from stakeholders about high
levels of turnover in the TSO workforce. A March 2019 report from the
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General
entitled, TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train its
Transportation Security Officers, outlines a number of challenges and
recommendations regarding the TSO workforce. Stakeholders point to TSO
compensation schedule as a major challenge to employee retention.
What is TSA learning from its exit surveys regarding staff
retention challenges and how is it using this information to
improve retention?
What is TSA doing to improve recruitment and retention of
staff? What incentives are available and how are you tracking
the effectiveness of these incentives? What have the outcomes
of these efforts been so far?
What impact would moving TSO positions to the General
Schedule (``GS'') pay scale have on recruitment and retention
of TSOs?
Related to the impact of moving TSOs to the GS, what would
be the impact of creating a unified personnel system, similar
to that of other Federal employees, under Title Five of the
U.S. Code, and moving the TSO workforce to that system?
Answer. In August 2018, TSA implemented the TSO Career Progression
initiative, which established a clearly defined and transparent career
path with pay increases tied to enhanced skills and the completion of
advanced training courses such as Essentials of Leading Security
Operations (ELSO), Essentials of Supervising Security Operations
(ESSO), Essentials of Managing Security Operations (EMSO), and Advance
Resolution Conversation (ARC). This program helps improve TSO retention
by providing the workforce with transparent career pathways based on
training and enhancement of skills.
In addition, TSA transitioned to a two-tier performance management
system for TSOs beginning with FY 2020 to ease the administrative
burden on our Officers and their supervisors. Along with this, TSA is
implementing a Model Officer Recognition initiative in calendar year
2020 which will identify and reward our top officers for ongoing
contributions to the mission. Under this initiative, officers may
receive both Model Officer Monetary and Non-Monetary Awards and a Model
Officer Pay Increase.
TSA plans to continue to exercise its flexibility to make targeted
changes to TSO pay to improve recruitment and retention.
Question 7. How long, on average, does the hiring process for TSOs
take? What are the areas in the hiring process that take the longest?
How can (or is) TSA enhancing the hiring process to ensure it is
recruiting and hiring qualified candidates in a reasonable timeframe?
How can Congress support efforts to improve hiring efficiencies?
Answer. The TSO hiring time-frame is generally viewed from two
vantage points: 1) the operational perspective and 2) the applicant
perspective as the TSO position is filled from a Ready Pool of
applicants. Airports forecast their TSO hiring needs in advance in
order to allow time for candidates to move through the entire TSO
hiring process as it has several steps. These include the Computer-
Based Testing (CBT), which is comprised of an object recognition
aptitude test and an English proficiency test. Candidates who pass the
CBT are then eligible for the Airport Assessment during which
candidates must provide proof of identity and U.S. Citizenship to
confirm their eligibility for the TSO position. Candidates who meet
this requirement must then successfully pass a Structured Interview
that evaluates their competencies for the TSO position. Candidates who
pass the Structured Interview component of the Airport Assessment then
have their fingerprints collected in preparation for the pre-hire
background investigation and are invited to attend the TSO Medical/Drug
Evaluation, which determines if they meet the TSO Medical Guidelines.
Candidates who pass the Medical/Drug Evaluation must then complete the
Pre-hire background investigation to confirm their suitability for
employment in a national security agency. Once all of these steps have
been successfully completed, the candidates are then placed in the
Ready Pool where they are immediately available for a final job offer
when the airport has TSO hiring needs.
From an operational perspective, hiring needs are typically met
within 20 to 22 calendar days. From the applicant vantage point,
however, the time-to-hire can range from 60 to 170 calendar days. These
times can vary based on how frequently an airport conducts candidate
assessments and extends final job offers. Typically, larger airports
hire more frequently and, therefore, tend to process their candidates
more quickly.
Generally, the longest process steps are the time candidates wait
for the airport to conduct airport assessments, as well as, the time to
complete the pre-hire background check, and the time from the final job
offer to entry on duty. To reduce the applicant time-to-hire, TSA is
exploring several options. These include an enhanced CBT to help reduce
the number of questions required in the Structured Interview and,
therefore, reduce the duration of the Airport Assessment, which will
increase capacity for processing candidates. Additionally, TSA is
exploring technology that will enable the agency to remotely proctor
the CBT thereby reducing the need for candidates to schedule an
appointment and report to a brick and mortar facility in order to
complete their test. Recently, TSA recently deployed a new medical
self-scheduling tool to help shorten the time it takes for TSO
candidates to schedule their medical/drug evaluation following the
airport assessment. As well, the Agency has devoted resources to help
expedite the pre-hire background investigation adjudication process for
TSO candidates.
The TSO hiring process designed to ensure that all of the
candidates who are referred for selection fully meet all the
legislative requirements for the position that are delineated in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (PL 107-71). We
appreciate Congress' continued support as process changes are
implemented to continue improving TSO hiring efficiency.
Question 8. How does TSA support TSOs for career development and
advancement? What programs are in place to proactively develop and
train staff in a career trajectory?
Answer. The TSO Career Progression program provides a transparent
and predictable career path for the TSA frontline workforce. The
program establishes clear training requirements for each position,
rewarding TSOs for developing their professional skills and accepting
additional responsibility. Through the TSO Career Progression program,
TSA improves the current organizational system by establishing greater
clarity and predictability to a TSO's career as a professional security
officer.
The TSO Career Progression program consists of:
Phase I training for newly hired Officers focusing on
introductory security duties.
Phase II training conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, GA providing the technical knowledge
and skills needed for on-body and carry-on baggage threat
detection.
The ELSO, and the ARC courses provide advanced detection and
security operations management training for Lead Transportation
Security Officers
The ESSO course provides Supervisory Transportation Security
Officers with the administrative, leadership, and technical
skills needed to efficiently and effectively supervise large
security screening operations.
The EMSO course for Transportation Security Managers focuses
on advanced management skills, and providing for the security
and safety of the traveling public, aviation stakeholders and
TSA personnel.
Question 9. Overall, what changes has TSA implemented, or would
like to implement, to improve recruitment, retention and training of
TSOs? What assistance does TSA need from Congress in order to improve
TSO hiring and retention?
Answer. In August 2018, TSA implemented the TSO Career Progression
initiative, which established a clearly defined and transparent career
path with pay increases tied to enhanced skills and the completion of
advanced training courses such as Essentials of Leading Security
Operations (ELSO), Essentials of Supervising Security Operations
(ESSO), Essentials of Managing Security Operations (EMSO), and Advance
Resolution Conversation (ARC). This program helps improve TSO retention
by providing the workforce with transparent career pathways based on
training and enhancement of skills.
In addition, TSA transitioned to a two-tier performance management
system for TSOs beginning with FY 2020 to ease the administrative
burden on our Officers and their supervisors. Along with this, TSA is
implementing a Model Officer Recognition initiative in calendar year
2020 which will identify and reward our top officers for ongoing
contributions to the mission. Under this initiative, officers may
receive both Model Officer Monetary and Non-Monetary Awards and a Model
Officer Pay Increase.
TSA plans to continue to exercise its flexibility to make targeted
changes to TSO pay to improve recruitment and retention.
Question 10. TSA plays a critical role in securing pipelines and
other critical infrastructure. I am aware of the partnership between
TSA and CISA to improve TSA's cybersecurity strategy, to include the
Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative and participation in the Continuous
Diagnostics and Mitigation Program. Please provide an update on TSA's
cybersecurity strategy, including goals achieved since the publication
of the 2018 cybersecurity roadmap, priorities for CY 2020, and cyber
workforce needs to achieve near and long-term goals for these
initiatives.
Answer. TSA will continue to use the budgetary process to request
additional resources to meet the goals and objectives outlined in the
DHS Cybersecurity Strategy and the TSA Cybersecurity Roadmap. TSA is in
the process of building its cybersecurity expertise and capacity to
fulfill its role as a co-Sector Specific Agency for the Transportation
Systems Sector (TSS), and is leveraging its existing personnel,
combined with resources from within DHS, to engage with its
stakeholders within the TSS. For example, TSA has partnered with the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the
National Risk Management Center (NRMC) to conduct in-depth
cybersecurity assessments at critical pipeline companies. In 2019, six
assessments have been conducted to date, with two additional scheduled.
NRMC will analyze data from the reviews to assess industry posture
regarding cybersecurity and future assessment needs. TSA and CISA have
partnered to develop additional cybersecurity assessment tools for use
by pipeline stakeholders, as well as coordinated assessments with TSA
and CISA. Additionally, in partnership with CISA, TSA has conducted 16
regional surface transportation-focused and one aviation
transportation-focused Cybersecurity Workshops.
TSA is a member and active participant in the Aviation Cyber
Initiative (ACI), which is a tri-chaired task force led by DHS, the
U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The ACI is designed to identify and analyze aviation cyber
vulnerabilities in support of cyber risk-reduction and resiliency
efforts within the Aviation Ecosystem, which includes both civil and
military aviation. Additionally, TSA is currently developing and
promoting cybersecurity-related reporting guidelines for Mass Transit
and Freight Rail that align with Executive Orders 13636 and 13800 and
the requirements for the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Framework (Presidential Policy Determination-41), Presidential
Policy Determination-21, and rule making initiatives. TSA will work
with the Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee to identify
processes to improve cyber threat information sharing across all of the
modes of surface transportation.
Question 11. When CBP or ICE releases a migrant or migrant family
on its own recognizance with a Notice to Appear (``NTA'') in
immigration court at a future date, those migrants almost always enter
the U.S. transportation system to travel to the location of their U.S.
sponsor. Many migrants utilize our Nation's air travel system.
What documents do migrants who have been released from DHS
custody with an NTA need to pass through TSA security
checkpoints at airports?
Answer. Migrants can provide the following alternate documents at
the checkpoint:
1. ICE Form I-200--Warrant for Arrest of Alien
2. ICE Form I-205--Warrant of Removal/Deportation
3. ICE Form I-220A--Order of Release on Recognizance
4. ICE Form I-220B--Order of Supervision
5. DHS Form I-862--Notice to Appear
Upon TSA's validation of identifying information on these
documents, TSA will proceed with screening the migrant. The validation
occurs by communication between TSA personnel at the checkpoint, which
will provide TSA's Identity Verification Call Center (IVCC), with the
name and file number of the individual. The IVCC will in turn confirm
identifying information with CBP and/or U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement records. If TSA is unable to validate the passenger's
identity, he/she will be denied entry into the sterile area of the
airport.
What guidance has TSA issued to TSOs regarding how to
process migrants who present NTAs as part of their travel
documents when they pass through TSA security checkpoints?
Answer. Guidance has been provided through an Operations Directive,
a job aid, a Frequently Asked Questions supporting document, a National
Shift Brief to Officers, and examples of the acceptable alternate
forms.
Does TSA instruct TSOs to make any additional phone calls to
CBP or ICE regarding the status of migrants with NTAs and their
ability to travel within the U.S. air travel system?
Answer. No, Officers are instructed to validate the individual's
identity by calling the IVCC.
What steps has TSA taken to ensure that TSOs understand the
TSA guidance on how to handle migrants who present a NTA as
part of their travel documents?
Answer. A briefing and review of the directive and associated job
aid was required by all officers, and completion of the briefing and
review is being monitored by the local training departments.
Does TSA have any plans to change or enhance said training?
Answer. Currently there are no plans for changes. All TSA policies
are continuously under review and will be updated, as necessary.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Southern Border. Despite reports by the Department of Homeland
Security Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office
raising airport security concerns, this Administration has diverted
numerous TSA workers from airport security to jobs they are not trained
to do, namely enforcing immigration policies along the southern border.
This includes six TSA employees from the Las Vegas airport and two from
the airport in Reno. TSA provided this information to me in response to
Questions for the Record I submitted through the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee in May.
Question 1. How many, if any, TSA officers are still stationed at
the southern border or are currently taking part in immigration-related
activities? When will TSA officers who were previously deployed to the
border return to their duty stations at our airports?
Question 2. Are TSA agents continuing to be transferred to the
Southern Border as part of TDYs?
[If NO]: If, as the weather cools down later this year, the
number of individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry
increases, will TSA agents again be deployed to the border?
Answer. TSA officers are providing humanitarian relief efforts in
support of CBP, not conducting immigration-related duties. Their
contributions include language translation for medical professionals,
transporting medical and welfare items for detainees, processing high
volumes of personal property, preparing meals, and conducting welfare
checks. CBP provides the appropriate training needed to perform those
duties.
As of October 31, 2019, TSA had 57 officers deployed to the
southern border, none of which were from LAS or Reno-Tahoe
International Airport. Deployments are 45 days in duration, and
officers return to their airports at the conclusion of their
deployment. TSA currently does not have any deployments at the border.
Additionally, we understand that DHS is tapering off deployments to
the southern border but TSA will continue to support DHS's mission.
Question 3. Can you assure us that neither McCarran International
Airport nor Reno-Tahoe International Airport will be impacted in the
future by TSA agents being sent to conduct work outside of their
mission?
Answer. As a component of DHS, TSA continues to support DHS's
mission and calls for volunteers to assist with a variety of
situations--such as emergency response, high-profile events, and other
circumstances--taking into account impact to operations. Volunteering
is completely at an employee's discretion and is subject to the
approval of their airport's Federal Security Director. We will continue
to make every effort to minimize the impact to airport operations so
that security effectiveness can be maintained.
Question 4. What types of additional efforts are being taken to
ensure TSA will be adequately prepared throughout the upcoming high-
volume holiday season?
Answer. For the high-volume holiday season, TSA employed its
holiday plan, which included multiple strategies for mitigating wait
times and ensuring operations ran as smoothly as possible. Federal
Security Directors at airports exercised their authority to deploy
overtime resources, conduct shift swaps and schedule adjustments,
offered extended hours for part-time officers, deployed officers
between hubs and spokes, and used other TSA employees at non-certified
officer positions such as bin running support. We also ensured the
continued close partnership with airline and airport stakeholders to
assist in managing passenger movement and forecast travel loads as far
in advance as possible, ensuring we had the appropriate resources.
Further, the TSA Airport Operations Center (AOC), which hosts weekly
national teleconference calls with TSA and airport/air carrier
stakeholders, closely tracked and monitored equipment and issues that
could impact TSA operations. The AOC works closely with TSA's
contracting office to ensure expedited resolution of any equipment
issues.
Fusion Center. This past year, McCarran International Airport in
Las Vegas alone saw nearly 50 million passengers, the most ever. With
so many visitors every year, Las Vegas is not only a major tourist and
business destination, but also unfortunately a target for those who
wish us harm. For that reason, our community is part of a federal,
state, tribal, and local law enforcement collaboration through our
fusion center, the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center. This
dynamic partnership allows law enforcement to rapidly and accurately
respond to terrorist and other threats. TSA is on the front lines of
the battle against terrorist threats, both in our skies and in our
communities.
Question 5. Does TSA coordinate with local fusion centers to share
and receive threat information?
Answer. Yes. Our local Field Intelligence Officer, and as needed
the Regional Field Intelligence Manager, routinely collaborate and
coordinate with the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center. TSA also
has one FTE employee embedded at the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism
Center to facilitate collaboration between the fusion center and the
Federal government.
Question 6. In some ways, the threats posing Americans are
shifting, with more and more challenges coming from right here at home.
How is the increasing threat of domestic terrorism impacting TSA's work
and its collaboration with local law enforcement?
Answer. While the threat from domestic terrorism has shifted in
terms of ideology and intent, it is not a new phenomenon. The TSA
remains concerned about the threat from Homegrown Violent Extremists
(HVE) and lone offenders, some motivated by extremist ideology aligned
with foreign terrorist organizations, or who are aligned with racially
and ethnically motivated violent extremism, or even environmental
rights extremism.
The tactics used by each group for their individual purposes vary.
Foreign terrorist organizations continue to use social media to
encourage attacks on U.S. transportation systems and HVEs remain the
greatest threat to highway motor carrier, mass transit, and passenger
rail. Tactics include the use of rudimentary Improvised Explosive
Devices, small arms, edged weapons, and vehicle ramming. Environmental
Rights Extremists call for low-level disruptive activities against
pipeline and freight rail, such as sabotage.
TSA continues to engage the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and Department of Homeland Security Fusion Centers, as well as state
and local law enforcement to stay abreast of localized threats to
transportation in the Homeland, mainly through our Field Intelligence
Officers. We also partner with FBI at the headquarters level to
coordinate responses to domestic terrorism threats through multiple
venues, including embedded liaisons at the National Joint Terrorism
Task Force Civil Aviation Security Program and Domestic Terrorism
Operations Section.
McCarran International Airport TSA Pre-Check Pilot. I understand
that TSA is evaluating facial recognition tools to automate the
identity and boarding pass verification process in the United States.
Currently, McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas is participating
in a pilot program to test the automation of the identity verification
portion of the new Travel Document Checker. Travelers in the TSA Pre-
check lane who volunteer will have their photo taken at the checkpoint
and compared to an image taken from their ID.
Question 7. For those who participate:
What are the main differences passengers will experience
when going through this particular checkpoint as opposed to the
regular checkpoint?
Will this program improve passenger experience?
Question 8. Has the rollout helped or hurt current screening
capacity?
Question 9. Can you discuss why Las Vegas was selected for this
pilot program?
Answer. Prior to the Credential Authentication Technology with a
camera (CAT-C) Phase I Pilot, TSA conducted an evaluation of the system
against a checklist of government and industry standards to assess
potential passenger usability issues. During the CAT-C Phase I Pilot,
TSA administered and conducted passenger experience research to
document passenger needs and gather passenger feedback, to analyze and
understand the logistical and operational implications of facial
recognition technology. Generally, many passengers expressed
familiarity with biometric systems. Convenience and expedited
processing were major draws for voluntary participation.
Building on this passenger feedback, TSA conducted a short-term
proof of concept at LAS for automating the identity verification
portion of the TDC using biometric facial matching technology. The main
difference from the regular checkpoint experience is that a voluntarily
participating passenger had his or her photo taken by a camera
positioned at the checkpoint for identity verification when this would
usually be done manually by the TDC. The passenger then went through
the normal screening process. No security screening was done by the
CAT-C prototype device as a part of this pilot.
TSA assessed its ability to compare the passenger's live facial
image at the checkpoint against an image taken from the passenger's
identity document for passengers who opted to participate. The CAT-C
system was used to compare passenger identification documents with
their live picture taken at the checkpoint. TSA, in coordination with
DHS S&T, is performing analysis to understand the prototype device's
matching performance in an operational environment and to identify
human factors requirements needed to develop a user-friendly biometric
solution that will benefit both TSOs and passengers. The impact of the
use of this type of technology on current screening capacity is one of
the items being analyzed by DHS S&T. This is in line with TSA's
commitment to enhancing the passenger experience and adopting a user-
friendly system.
Las Vegas was selected for the test site to provide FTE Global
conference attendees from both government and industry an opportunity
to test the biometric technology. The conference was held in Las Vegas
on September 4-6, 2019.
Question 10. My understanding is that through this technology TSA
will collect the passenger's photo, along with ``certain biographic
information'' and temporarily retain it for technical analysis.
Can you please define:
a. What ``certain biographic information'' means?
b. How long ``temporarily retain'' lasts?
c. What ``technical analysis'' is and what exactly is being
analyzing?
What is the scope of use for this information, how long will
it be held, and how is it secured? What happens to this
information when the pilot program ends?
Is this information shared with other agencies within the
Federal government? Can you give this Committee assurances that
this information will not be sold, monetized, shared, or used
for anything other than research purposes?
Answer. Information on TSA's procedures with respect to personally
identifiable information (PII) as part of biometrics technology pilots
is available via PIAs posted on the DHS Privacy website: https://
www.dhs.gov/publication/dhstsapia-046-travel-document-checker-
automation-using-facial-recognition.
On August 23, 2019, TSA published a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
for Travel Document Checker Automation Using Facial Recognition (DHS/
TSA/PIA-046(a)) for a short-term proof of concept at the LAS. DHS
conducts Privacy Impact Assessments on both programs and information
technology systems, pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002 Section
208 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Section 222. The PIA for the
LAS pilot examined the privacy impact of the proof of concept, and
TSA's use of facial recognition technology for identity verification at
airport checkpoints. In reference to the facial recognition test at
LAS, TSA collected the following passenger data: real-time images of
the passenger's face (live photo from the checkpoint); passenger's
photograph from the identity document; identification document issuance
and expiration dates; date of travel; the type of identification
document; the organization that issued the identification document
(e.g., the state that issued the passenger's driver's license, or the
U.S. Department of State in the case of passports); year of passenger's
birth; and gender/Sex as listed in the identification document.
This information was necessary to test the viability of comparing
identification documents with live facial images with CAT with a CAT-C
device. TSA only collected opt-in passenger PII directly relevant and
necessary to assess critical operational and technological components.
Data collected during the proof of concept was transferred on a
weekly basis to S&T for analysis. S&T deleted the data no later than
180 days following receipt in accordance with an approved TSA record
retention schedule for security technology (N1-560-04-14, Item 2). S&T
safeguarded the hard drive and the data it removed from the hard drive.
S&T test data is maintained within secured DHS facilities, using DHS
firewalls, stand-alone computers, or secured computer networks. Access
to test data is limited to persons with an authorized need-to know,
proper security clearances, and who have also completed annual privacy,
information security, and physical security awareness courses
S&T is currently evaluating the performance of the camera system
(e.g., failure to acquire rate) and the system matching performance
(e.g., false match rate, false non-match rate). S&T is also analyzing
the variation in biometric performance based on reference image source
(e.g., document type and document issue date). The results of the CAT-C
evaluation will be used to help inform future TSA plans and biometrics
requirements development and to identify and mitigate any performance
issues and operational concerns.
S&T did not employ the data obtained from this pilot for
operational use, and no data sharing with other DHS components or
outside of DHS occurred. The principal purpose of using PII during the
proof of concept was to assess the operational and technological
components of the CAT-C, including the viability of using facial
recognition to automate the TDC process, and for no other purpose.
Additionally, in any future biometric technology pilots involving
the collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of PII, TSA will
continue to be transparent by notifying the public and explaining the
steps the agency is taking to safeguard individuals' information.
In its development of biometric technologies for additional
populations, TSA will comply with Section 208 of the E-Government Act
of 2002, Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and DHS'
privacy compliance process, including the Fair Information Practice
Principles. TSA will also comply with applicable TSA, DHS, and Office
of Management and Budget policies and authorities governing the
handling of PII.
As I understand it, the new optional TSA checkpoint deployed at
McCarran also features a new body scanner that is first-of-its-kind TSA
technology, allows all individuals to keep laptops in their bags, and
includes a body scanner with flat panels--similar to what you walk
through at a retail store--instead of an enclosed space like what is
currently used across the country.
Question 11. How successful have these technologies proven so far,
and that is the timeline for these to be used at other airports?
Answer. In collaboration with LAS, TSA's Innovation Checkpoint
allows innovative technology and processes to be assessed in a live
checkpoint environment. TSA will have the ability to drive decision
making with data that better defines requirements, further develops
innovative capabilities and improves processes. The Innovation
Checkpoint will also drive enhancements to the passenger experience by
utilizing data from human factor assessments and surveys. While not the
only location TSA demonstrates emerging technology, it is a new key
capability for TSA to drive innovative methods for effectiveness and
efficiency in passenger screening.
The Innovation Task Force (ITF) has recently completed the
operational demonstration of the Enhanced Advanced Imaging Technology
(eAIT) system (new body scanner), a dual flat-panel millimeter wave
imaging system that has proven to improve on-person screening
capabilities by providing simplified stance requirements, corrective
feedback on improper positioning, and multiple secondary screening
stations for alarm resolution. The ITF recently completed live
operational demonstration activities for the eAIT system at Denver
International Airport (DEN) and Los Angeles International Airport.
Results showed that the unique capabilities provided by the eAIT system
significantly increased throughput, reduced the false alarm rate (lower
touch rate), and improved the overall passenger experience relative to
currently deployed on-person screening systems. ITF intends to
facilitate follow-on demonstrations of the eAIT system within the
Innovation Checkpoint at LAS to assess alternative system
configurations and impact to the overall checkpoint security system. In
addition, the Requirements and Capabilities Analysis On-Person
Screening Capability Management Office will be coordinating the
continual operational assessment of various gifted eAIT systems at
LaGuardia Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport,
and DEN.