[Senate Hearing 116-608]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







                                                        S. Hrg. 116-608
 
                 PROTECTING THE NATION'S TRANSPORTATION
    SYSTEMS: OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
               
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                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
                                  ______

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 52-750                      WASHINGTON : 2023
              
                
                
       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                      
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on September 11, 2019...............................     1
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     1
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     2
Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    13
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    15
Statement of Senator Peters......................................    17
Statement of Senator Lee.........................................    19
Statement of Senator Udall.......................................    21
Statement of Senator Blackburn...................................    22
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................    25
Statement of Senator Tester......................................    27
Statement of Senator Capito......................................    29
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    31

                               Witnesses

Patricia F. S. Cogswell, Acting Deputy Administrator, 
  Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security..............................................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5

                                Appendix

Letter dated September 11, 2019 to Hon. Roger Wicker and Hon. 
  Maria Cantwell from Alethea Predeoux, Director, Legislative 
  Department, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
  CIO............................................................    35
Response to written questions submitted to Patricia F. S. 
  Cogswell by:
    Hon. Roger Wicker............................................    36
    Hon. Deb Fischer.............................................    38
    Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    38
    Hon. Shelly Moore Capito.....................................    43
    Hon. Mike Lee................................................    43
    Hon. Todd Young..............................................    47
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    47
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    49
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................    50
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    52
    Hon. Jacky Rosen.............................................    57


                        PROTECTING THE NATION'S



                   TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: OVERSIGHT



             OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

                              ----------                              


                     WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger Wicker, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Thune, Blunt, 
Fischer, Sullivan, Gardner, Blackburn, Capito, Lee, Young, 
Cantwell, Blumenthal, Markey, Udall, Peters, Tester, and Rosen.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    The Chairman. Good morning and welcome to this hearing on 
protecting the nation's transportation systems.
    This morning we reflect on a somber day in American 
history. It is exactly 18 years ago that terrorists turned 
civilian aircraft into weapons killing nearly 3,000 Americans 
and injuring thousands more. Today we honor the memories of 
those who perished and those first responders who ran into 
harm's way to help their fellow citizens.
    The tragedy of 9/11 led to the creation of the 
Transportation Security Administration, TSA, within the new 
Department of Homeland Security. TSA is charged with protecting 
our nation's transportation systems from attacks and ensuring 
freedom of movement of people and commerce.
    I am pleased that Acting Deputy Administrator Patricia 
Cogswell is here to update the Committee on TSA's progress 
toward achieving these goals.
    America's air, land, and marine transportation systems are 
designed for accessibility and efficiency. The enduring 
challenge remains how to deter and respond to terrorist attacks 
without unduly burdening travel, the economy, and civil 
liberties.
    TSA's workforce includes transportation security 
inspectors, Federal air marshals, and visible intermodal 
prevention and response teams, among other security 
professionals.
    Congress has worked to support this dedicated workforce by 
passing the first-ever TSA reauthorization bill, the TSA 
Modernization Act, in last year's FAA reauthorization 
legislation. The Modernization Act includes provisions to 
streamline acquisition, expand the PreCheck program, support 
the Screening Partnership Program, mandate more rigorous 
background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access 
controls, and enhance security in public areas of airports.
    Thus far, TSA has done an admirable job of responding to 
the myriad of directives and reporting requirements of the 
bill. However, I remain concerned about the pace of TSA's 
deployment of new screening technology, the rate of the 
PreCheck expansion, the seeming lack of urgency for 
implementing Screening Partnership Program reforms, and the 
absence of a comprehensive plan to integrate the Registered 
Traveler program with credential authentication technology 
systems. I hope our witness today will address the agency's 
progress toward implementing the Modernization Act.
    In addition to this Act implementation, the Committee will 
also exercise oversight on reforms to existing security 
programs, notably the Passenger Screening teams. In February, 
Administrator Pekoske briefed the Committee on disturbing 
testing results from the IG and promised to revamp canine 
training. TSA has also committed to making the Federal Air 
Marshals program more intelligence-based.
    Improving today's frontline security programs is important, 
but TSA must adapt to changing threats and technologies. The 
committee is interested in emerging technology, including 
biometrics. Perhaps we will hear about that today. We 
understand that TSA has a biometrics road map, but we certainly 
need to review this in light of concerns involving privacy, 
data protection, and civil liberties.
    So I look forward to a robust discussion today on the vital 
role that TSA plays.
    Madam Ranking Member, you are now recognized for opening 
remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me also 
welcome Acting Deputy Administrator Cogswell for joining us 
this morning and thank you for all the work that TSA does in 
keeping us safe every day.
    On this somber day, we remember the tragic and devastating 
events of 18 years ago. An adversary motivated by nothing short 
of an evil attack on our Nation and the horrifying grief and 
loss of life was unimaginable. Establishing the Transportation 
Security Administration was among several steps that Congress 
took to help ensure the attack would never be repeated. In the 
last Congress, this committee worked hard to complete the work 
on the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, also including the 
first comprehensive reauthorization of TSA since the agency was 
created shortly after the September 11 attacks. Our focus today 
is on the oversight of the agency as it continues its critical 
mission and seeks to implement the mandates included in last 
year's TSA authorization, formerly known as the TSA 
Modernization Act.
    As you know, last year's TSA Modernization Act focused on 
improving transportation security by addressing such issues as 
training and deployment of canines for screening of passengers 
and cargo, reinforcing efforts to intercept insider threats, 
and expediting testing and deployment of new screening 
technologies in various organizations to ensure the effective 
leadership at the agency. I also want to note here I appreciate 
the good work of the Pacific Northwest Laboratories in 
Richland, Washington, who, at airports with the TSA Millimeter 
Wave Scan, have worked through security and developing--we call 
it--the TSA salute, but nonetheless, this overhead has given 
quite a security layer and yesterday had the chance to talk 
with Acting Director Cogswell about the next generation of 
technology which we will be deploying at airports. But both at 
our airports with individual travelers and our cargo 
containers, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory continues to stay 
ahead on cutting-edge technology, and we appreciate the work of 
our R&D labs in helping us maintain security.
    I also appreciate your candor regarding a recent diversion 
of TSA resources to the southern border. I spoke to you about a 
letter that was sent by my colleague, Senator Wicker, and I 
about the diversion of those resources. My guess is we will 
have a chance to ask you in this morning's hearing about that. 
Reports indicated at the time that there could be an additional 
800 FAMs who would be deployed with the ultimate goal of 
sending 175 to support the CBP operations. So I look forward to 
asking you about those questions this morning.
    So as my colleague said, we are here to review what we can 
do to make sure that the TSA remains a strong and viable force. 
I remain very interested in the canine units' success and the 
further deployment of that as one of the fastest growing 
airports, if not the fastest growing airport in the nation, 
Sea-Tac. The challenges of moving people and making sure we are 
all secure is a very, very important daily task. So thank you 
for being here to address these issues.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
    Members and guests should know that Senators on the floor 
will be observing a moment of silence at 11 this morning, and 
in connection with that, this committee will also be observing 
that moment of silence at the stroke of 11 just before votes 
begin. So be mindful of that.
    And, Ms. Cogswell, we are delighted to have you, and we are 
interested in hearing your opening statement. Thank you for 
being here.

             STATEMENT OF PATRICIA F. S. COGSWELL,

                  ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

             TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Cogswell. Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member 
Cantwell, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you 
for inviting me to testify about the work the Transportation 
Security Administration does to keep our nation's 
transportation systems secure. We appreciate the continued 
support of Congress and are grateful for the productive 
relationship we have with this committee, as well as the 
authorities provided in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, the 
first reauthorization of us as an agency.
    On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people died as a result 
of the worst act of terrorism ever committed on American soil. 
From this tragedy, we renewed our dedication to the ideals and 
freedoms that define our Nation. 9/11 changed us all. With the 
goal to never again face such an attack, Congress created the 
TSA just 2 months afterwards.
    Eighteen years have passed since the tragic events of 
September 11, and while many Americans, including some of TSA's 
current employees, are too young to have vivid recollections of 
that day, aviation and other modes of transportation remain 
highly sought-after targets by terrorists whose methods of 
attack remain more decentralized and opportunistic than ever 
before.
    TSA must meet the challenge of pervasive and constantly 
evolving threats in both physical and cyber realms. TSA's most 
important asset in this fight is its people. I am extremely 
proud of the 63,000 dedicated professionals who make up TSA's 
workforce. Every day they demonstrate our core values of 
integrity, respect, and commitment to the mission.
    Earlier this year, a significant portion of our workforce, 
including transportation security officers, Federal air 
marshals, transportation security inspectors, canine handlers, 
vetting and intelligence personnel and support staff worked 
without pay for 35 days during the partial government shutdown. 
Through this incredibly trying period, our employees dedicated 
true professionalism and commitment to the mission despite 
suffering significant financial and personal challenges. We are 
grateful that Members of Congress continue to look for ways to 
protect our workforce in the event of a future lapse in 
appropriation and stand ready to work with you to advance this 
effort.
    TSA was a very important year for the direction of TSA. Not 
only did Congress pass and the President sign the TSA 
Modernization Act, but TSA also developed its strategy through 
2026 in its Administrator Intent to guide the execution. During 
2019, we have focused on implementation. TSA has completed more 
than 46 percent of the 180 requirements mandated in the Act and 
53 percent of those with specific deadlines. Completed 
statutory requirements range from a global aviation security 
review to creating an air cargo division and establishing a 
surface transportation security advisory committee.
    When Administrator Pekoske testified before this Committee 
last September, he described the efforts TSA was taking to 
rapidly advance TSA's acquisition of computed tomography 
screening systems and credential authentication technology. CT 
and CAT allowed TSA to more easily identify potential threats 
in less invasive and more automated ways, enhancing both the 
effectiveness of our screening processes and the passenger 
experience. Thanks to the support of Congress, TSA awarded a 
contract for 300 CT machines and 500 CAT machines and is 
beginning deployment.
    Additionally, consistent with the TSA Modernization Act 
requirements for PreCheck, in 2019 we successfully conducted 
pilots at two airports, demonstrating TSA can achieve 
significantly higher throughput for pure PreCheck only lanes. 
We are also encouraged by early results of a new option that we 
are testing that enables passengers to enroll via a mobile 
tablet at the airport near the checkpoint.
    We know the importance of assessing risk as we carry out 
our mission. Consistent with the Modernization Act requirement, 
our Federal air marshals integrated risk-based, intelligence-
driven, rule information into their concept of operations 
through a prioritized mission deployment strategy focused on 
high-risk travelers and revised international risk assessment 
models.
    Similarly, TSA has taken a number of strategic actions to 
address the risk associated with insider threat, including the 
establishment of an ASAC subcommittee on insider threat and 
assessing options to improve airport worker controls. TSA plans 
to produce a road map to describe the way forward to mitigate 
insider risk.
    TSA also recognizes strategic success depends on our 
workforce. We commissioned a blue ribbon panel comprised of 
public and private sector leaders with extensive human capital 
expertise to conduct a full review of human capital service 
policy and delivery at TSA. We have used the results of that 
effort, as well as input received through the early 
establishment of a national advisory council and other fora, to 
develop a number of workforce initiatives, including a two-tier 
performance system, model officer recognition program, and the 
TSO career progression program.
    TSA's theme in recognition of the 18th anniversary of the 
September 11th attack is ``Honoring the Memory, Protecting the 
Nation.'' We are confident through vigilance, collaboration 
with domestic and international partners, and the continued 
support of Congress we will all reach our mutual goal of ``not 
on our watch.''
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and the members 
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Patricia F. S. Cogswell,
  Acting Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration,
                  U.S. Department of Homeland Security
    Good morning Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to 
testify about the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 
work we are doing to keep the Nation's transportation system secure. On 
behalf of all TSA employees, we appreciate the continued support of 
Congress and are grateful for the productive relationship we have with 
this Committee as well as the authorities provided to the agency 
through the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, the first reauthorization of 
our critical security agency.
    On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people died as a result of the 
worst act of terrorism ever committed on American soil. From that 
tragedy, we, as Americans, renewed our dedication to the ideals and 
freedoms that define our great nation. The world changed that day, and 
seemingly remote dangers proved their destructive power here in our 
homeland. In the days immediately following the attacks, our Nation 
rallied around accounts of the courage and heroism of first responders, 
emergency personnel, and everyday citizens who risked everything to 
save others. Not only was 9/11 an attack on our freedom, but it was 
also an attempt to alter America's way of life. It did not succeed.
    In the months and years since, helplessness and fear became hope 
and resolve. 9/11 changed us all. It also defined what TSA does. With 
the goal to never again face such an attack on our soil, Congress 
created the TSA just two months after the attack. Since its creation, 
TSA's ongoing commitment to ensuring safe travel has allowed Americans 
to continue traveling securely and freely.
    Eighteen years have passed since the horrific events of September 
11, 2001, and many Americans, including some of TSA's current 
employees, are of such an age that they do not have a vivid 
recollection of that day. While memories for some do not exist or may 
have faded, we must remember the reality that aviation and 
transportation hubs remain highly-valued targets for terrorists, whose 
methods of attack are more decentralized and opportunistic than ever 
before. Rest assured, the passage of time since 9/11 has not weakened 
our resolve to secure vital transportation modes, nor do we 
underestimate the persistent nature of our adversaries.
    The reality is that every day, TSA is challenged by a pervasive and 
constantly evolving threat environment, both in the physical and cyber 
realms, and one that now includes the potential use of unmanned 
aircraft systems. We must never forget the lessons of 9/11, and must 
ensure we continue in our resolve to protect the Nation. As such, the 
importance of TSA's mantra, ``Not On Our Watch,'' rings as true today 
as it did every previous anniversary of 9/11.
    As we discuss TSA's work, it is particularly important to emphasize 
that we all share the goal of protecting travelers, commerce, and the 
transportation system itself, in order to protect our economy and the 
American way of life. We also recognize that we can never be satisfied 
with the status quo and must also always be looking for innovative ways 
to improve our people, procedures and technology.
    TSA's most important asset is its people. I am extremely proud of 
the 63,000 dedicated professionals who make up TSA's workforce, share 
our core values of integrity, respect, and commitment, and provide 
security for millions of individuals using our transportation systems 
each and every day. Exemplary of their dedication to the mission, 
earlier this year Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Federal Air 
Marshals, vetting and intelligence personnel, Transportation Security 
Inspectors, canine handlers, and support staffs worked for 35 days 
under extraordinarily challenging circumstances during the lapse in 
appropriations. Many of those individuals, and in particular our TSOs, 
who are in lower pay bands, continued to report to work despite 
suffering financial hardships. While TSA leveraged the flexibility 
provided by our authorities and appropriations to use prior year carry-
over funding to mitigate the adverse financial effect on our workforce, 
the impact was real. We are hopeful that such circumstances can be 
avoided in the future and look forward to working with Congress to 
develop and implement such a solution.
    Securing the Nation's transportation system, which is complex, 
expansive, and interdependent, requires a collective effort; it is not 
something that the government can accomplish alone. To that end, TSA 
recognizes the critical importance of partnering with stakeholders in 
developing transportation security solutions. In particular, we 
appreciate the authority provided by the TSA Modernization Act to 
establish a Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee, which 
has since been created and held its first meeting in July. TSA also 
receives invaluable insights from stakeholders through the Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee, DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Advisory Committee's Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating 
Council, and other forums. The discussions, feedback, and input 
provided by those entities, as well as new congressionally-created 
working groups focused on explosive detection canine capacity, are 
facilitating better information sharing between all transportation 
security stakeholders as well as the development of various types of 
best practice guidance for countering determined adversaries.
    The U.S. transportation system accommodates approximately 965 
million domestic and international aviation passengers annually--this 
equates to the screening of 2.8 million passengers, 1.4 million check 
bags, and 5.1 million carry-on bags each day. In surface 
transportation, there are more than 10.1 billion passenger trips on 
mass transit per year, approximately 600 million passengers traveling 
over-the-road buses each year; and more than 1 million hazardous 
material shipments on trucks every day. Beyond those usage numbers 
associated with a relatively open network of transportation modes, the 
physical scope of the system encompasses approximately 138,000 miles of 
railroad tracks; 4.2 million miles of highway; 616,000 highway bridges; 
503 road tunnels; and nearly 2.7 million miles of pipeline.
    While the scope of our transportation system is significant, it is 
critically important from a planning and execution perspective to also 
recognize that demands are increasing. For instance, the last twelve 
months represent the highest volume of air travelers in the agency's 
history and we just completed the busiest summer travel season ever, 
screening more than 262 million aviation passengers and crew between 
Memorial Day and Labor Day. These increased numbers will likely 
continue as aviation industry estimates anticipate annual growth of 4.5 
percent for passenger travel and 2.5 percent for cargo over the next 20 
years. Thanks in part to the support of Congress, TSA has been able to 
take measures to address the recent increases in volume, with current 
staffing levels at 2,100 more full time employees than last year as 
well as a 20 percent increase in the allocation of overtime to ensure 
airports have the flexibility to schedule officers during peak times.
    TSA's continued success is contingent upon our ability to rise to 
the challenge of outmatching dynamic threats to our aviation and 
surface transportation systems and doing so within the parameters of 
fiscal reality. Traveler volume and expectations for a positive, 
seamless experience are trending up. We must continue to work hard, but 
also need to work smarter, more strategically, and in innovative ways 
to stay ahead of the threat and remain a global leader in 
transportation security. Further, we must also continue to build 
resiliency in our organization so that we are prepared and able to 
respond to significant national crises like those caused by a natural 
disaster or currently being experienced on the southwest border. 
Resiliency is reflected in TSA's people, structure, and doctrine. 
Although Administrator Pekoske is currently dual-hatted, continuing to 
serve as the Administrator while also serving as the Department of 
Homeland Security's Acting Deputy Secretary, TSA, through its strong 
leadership corps and sound organizational structure, continues to 
implement the TSA Modernization Act and execute the 2018-2026 TSA 
Strategy and the Administrator's Intent that were put in place prior to 
him assuming that role. The TSA Strategy ensures our focus on 
capability innovation and threat-informed, information-driven 
operations. The Administrator's Intent explains how we will execute the 
Strategy between now and 2020. The TSA Strategy and Administrator's 
Intent detail the three main strategic priorities for the organization 
and how we will accomplish them. Both documents are posted on our 
website for public review and transparency. The first priority is to 
improve security and safeguard the transportation system. Our second is 
to accelerate action. And the final priority is to commit to our 
people. These priorities reflect TSA's focus on preserving frontline 
operations, quickly transitioning to new solutions and capabilities, 
and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources.
Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System
    TSA's operational environment requires robust partnerships and 
effective security operations across all modes of transportation. We 
strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and 
professional workforce, more effective threat detection capabilities, 
enhanced intelligence and vetting, and better communication and 
coordination with stakeholders. Simultaneously, we also strive to 
improve the passenger experience.
    When Administrator Pekoske testified before this Committee last 
September, he explained the extraordinary efforts TSA was taking to 
test computed tomography (CT) screening systems and expand their use at 
airport checkpoints. CT technology allows TSA officers to more easily 
identify potential threats in a less invasive way and eventually may 
eliminate the need for passengers to remove liquids, electronics and 
food items from carry-on passenger bags. This technology both enhances 
the effectiveness of TSA's security screening process and improves the 
passenger experience. Thanks to the support of Congress, TSA recently 
awarded a contract for 300 CT units. The deployment of this technology 
along with Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which improves 
and automates identity verification and validation, is transforming the 
effectiveness and efficiency of our checkpoint screening process.
    TSA has explored a number of other ways to improve performance, 
manage risk and use resources more effectively. Consistent with the TSA 
Modernization Act requirement to limit the use of TSA Pre3 lanes to 
only individuals with Known Traveler Numbers, which represents 
approximately 20 percent of domestic travelers, we successfully 
conducted pilots at two airports; demonstrating that TSA can achieve 
higher throughput for ``pure Pre3'' lanes. In addition, we also sought 
to test our Future Lane Experience (FLEx) model, at two airports to 
assess throughput when we provide alternate procedures for processing 
passengers identified as lower risk; this screening is not as 
streamlined as what a TSA Pre3 member would receive, but more 
efficient than standard processing. TSA used CAT units for these 
pilots.
    Similarly, TSA has conducted joint pilots with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), using the facial recognition system and photo 
galleries CBP built to meet its biometric entry-exit program mandate, 
to assess how facial recognition technologies could be used to 
potentially automate Travel Document Checker (TDC) functions at our 
checkpoint. TSA is also currently carrying out a pilot at Las Vegas 
McCarran Airport, adding an automated facial matching capability to 
existing CAT systems, to assess operational effectiveness for matching 
a traveler's image to the photos on the ID they present to the officer 
at the TDC. In carrying out these efforts, which are designed to find 
ways to both improve security effectiveness and enhance the passenger 
experience, TSA is also committed to ensuring appropriate privacy and 
data integrity protections are in place.
    TSA is also using risk-based decision making with regard to 
deployment of Federal Air Marshals as well as their seating on flights 
to provide better tactical position based on the potential threat. 
Finally, TSA has continued to expand participation in the TSA Pre3 
program through marketing and partnership, with the current number of 
airlines participating in TSA Pre3 standing at 73 domestic and 
international carriers representing 95 percent of passengers traveling 
to or within the U.S. All of these efforts are focused on examining how 
TSA can more effectively use technology and its personnel to reduce 
risk, provide better security faster, and enhance the traveler 
experience.
    Looking abroad, for the last two years, TSA has implemented 
enhanced security requirements for all commercial flights to the United 
States. Those measures include enhanced screening of passengers and 
electronic devices, and heightened security standards for aircraft and 
airports. These new security measures have been implemented at 283 last 
points of departure airports in 106 countries. These airports service 
approximately 338 U.S. and foreign airlines, transporting an average of 
375,000 passengers on 2,100 flights daily. While those actions are 
effective in the near term, TSA is focused on raising the global 
baseline for aviation security through long term partnerships and 
cooperation. To that end, earlier this year TSA conducted a Global 
Aviation Security Review, as mandated by the TSA Modernization Act, and 
identified a number of best practices related to enhancing 
collaboration with foreign partners on aviation security capacity. 
Additionally, TSA performed focused audit visits to determine 
compliance with TSA Security Directives/Emergency Amendments. TSA is 
using that review to advance the improvement of international aviation 
security standards for passengers.
    TSA also continues to improve air cargo security. Earlier this 
year, per the TSA Modernization Act, TSA established an air cargo 
division, reviewed the effectiveness of the certified cargo screening 
program, and conducted a feasibility study of the potential use of CT 
systems for screening air cargo. Consistent with the TSA Modernization 
Act requirement as well as the results of that study, TSA is partnering 
with an all-cargo entity to conduct a pilot program to test the 
effectiveness of CT for screening in such a setting. As threats 
continue to evolve, TSA, in cooperation with partners world-wide, will 
work to improve intelligence sharing and standardize best practices, 
while also pursuing technological security advancements.
    In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, TSA 
continues to oversee the security of the surface transportation system. 
On a daily basis, TSA assists surface stakeholders through conducting 
vulnerability assessments, analyzing security programs across the 
surface sector--from pipelines, to mass transit, to freight rail, to 
over-the-road bus entities--providing training and exercise support, 
sharing intelligence information, and executing collaborative law 
enforcement and security operations--such as those operations conducted 
the Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response teams. Since December 
2018, TSA, in partnership with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, has conducted four Validated Architecture Design 
Reviews, which are in depth cybersecurity assessments, at select 
pipeline companies and has four additional assessments scheduled. We 
also conducted 18 ISTEP exercises this Fiscal Year in surface 
transportation modes. In an effort to improve the support and services 
we provide, over the last several months TSA has elevated the Surface 
Operations leadership position, realigned resources to focus on surface 
inspections, established the Surface Transportation Security Advisory 
Committee, and distributed a survey to more than 3,000 surface 
transportation stakeholders to better assess their needs.
    Finally, TSA continues to work to address current and evolving 
threats by looking at emerging technologies, including from outside the 
transportation environment, to assess how they might be applied in the 
surface transportation environment. Through the process of establishing 
operational test beds, TSA works with surface transportation owners and 
operators to develop and deploy technology solutions to advance 
security for different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway 
motor carrier, pipeline, and freight rail). TSA does not procure the 
technology for surface transportation operators and owners. The test 
bed approach assists with development of their technology requirements, 
helps inform their acquisition decision making process, and enables TSA 
to share the results of the testing in government technology forums.
Accelerate Action
    In many ways, 2019 represents a year of implementation of a number 
of initiatives that TSA accelerated last year--specifically, deployment 
of both CT and CAT technology at the checkpoints. This year has also 
included a renewed focus on developing the next generation of Advanced 
Imaging Technology (AIT) devices. TSA is currently partnering with the 
DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the Department of Energy, and 
security stakeholders to assess next generation enhanced AIT systems. 
Through providing automated target algorithms with more data, these 
systems should increase detection performance and reduce potential 
false alarms. TSA will also continue to conduct airport trials of 
alternative AIT solutions designed to reduce processing times and 
improve performance accuracy.
    By embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile processes, and 
facilitating collaboration, TSA is positioning itself to keep pace with 
industry partners while advancing security across all modes of 
transportation. To that end, TSA has formalized a strategic management 
process that aligns strategy and policy to operations by leveraging 
risk assessment capabilities to inform budgeting and investment 
decisions. We used this approach in the development of the TSA Capital 
Investment Plan that was submitted to Congress earlier this year 
pursuant to the TSA Modernization Act requirement.
Commit to Our People
    TSA recognizes that our strategic success depends upon our 
workforce. Our priority to Commit to Our People focuses on our ability 
to attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our workforce at 
all levels of the organization. TSA commissioned a Blue Ribbon Panel 
comprised of public and private sector leaders with extensive human 
capital expertise to conduct a full review of the human capital service 
policy and delivery at TSA, including TSO pay and compensation, to 
identify ways we can improve as an organization. Among a number of 
findings, the Panel reaffirmed that TSA's authorizing statute, the 
Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), provides TSA with greater 
authority and flexibility to manage our workforce than the General 
Schedule. Working within that authority, TSA currently has a number of 
initiatives underway that are designed to enhance our ability to 
compete as an employer and attract and retain talent.

   Two-Tier Performance System--Based upon input from our 
        workforce, we determined that the way we had implemented our 
        multi-tier performance system was placing significant paperwork 
        burdens on our employees and supervisors without providing 
        meaningful distinctions between employees or benefits for their 
        professional development. Beginning in October, TSA will shift 
        to a simpler two-tier system for the screening workforce (e.g., 
        meets standards/does not meet standards) that will streamline 
        the process and significantly reduce subjectivity.

   Model Officer Recognition--Also beginning in October, TSA is 
        implementing a new program that provides the agency with a 
        mechanism to better recognize its top officers for the work 
        they are doing throughout the year with monetary and non-
        monetary awards for special acts as well as pay increases.

   TSO Career Progression--This initiative provides a clearly 
        defined and transparent career path for uniformed officers with 
        pay increases tied to enhanced skills and training. The first 
        phase of TSO Career Progression was implemented in August 2018, 
        and TSA has updated and rolled out six new training classes 
        this past year. The development of future phases is underway, 
        and we look to expand this initiative to other segments of the 
        workforce.

    Over the last few years, TSA has seen significant improvements in 
the results of the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). 
While we are proud of these advancements and our FEVS improvements, we 
realize that as an Agency we must continue to innovate and compete as 
an employer to ensure our workplace attracts, keeps, and develops great 
personnel. We are confident that the actions we have taken to improve 
employee communications with senior leadership through reestablishing 
the National Advisory Council and creating uniformed advisors to the 
Administrator, as well as the initiatives noted previously will advance 
our efforts towards that goal.
Conclusion
    Despite the passage of eighteen years since the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, TSA is focused on two things--``Honoring the 
Memory, Protecting the Nation.'' Although the priorities of our 
Strategy are ambitious, they are necessary to stay ahead of persistent, 
determined adversaries while also preserving individual freedoms and 
the benefits of an open, efficient transportation system. We are 
resolute in our desire to ensure that a similar event never occurs in 
the future and are confident that through vigilance, collaboration with 
domestic and international partners, and the continued support of 
Congress and all of our stakeholders, such an attack will not occur on 
``Our Watch.''
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I 
am honored to serve in this capacity along with the dedicated men and 
women of TSA. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for your testimony.
    Let me start by asking about something I do not think we 
saw in your printed testimony, and that is the Screening 
Partnership Program. The Modernization Act included a number of 
provisions to enhance the Screening Partnership Program, such 
as allowing airport operators to participate in the evaluation 
of SPP proposals.
    When will TSA finish developing this process, and are you 
currently briefing these assessments to every airport director?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question.
    So as you know, there were a number of requirements related 
to the Security Partnership Program, which enables individual 
airports to choose to use contracted private entities to 
perform screening services while still matching the quality and 
type of screening provided similarly to TSA. We have already 
brought on board the majority of those requirements, 
specifically and probably the largest one being ensuring use of 
the full cost recovery that the Federal Government uses to 
evaluate the bids by the individual performance entities. At 
this point, we have already awarded three new contracts this 
year under the new requirements, with a fourth one expected 
before the end of September, and we have several more scheduled 
for completion in early 2020.
    The Chairman. Are you briefing every airport director about 
this?
    Ms. Cogswell. Every airport director is very closely tied 
into the process by which we solicit the requirements and then 
proceed through the actual analysis and results.
    The Chairman. OK.
    Now, on Real ID, it is our understanding that TSA will 
begin turning away travelers that do not have Real ID compliant 
ID cards on October 1st of next year. How is that going, and do 
you have some contingency plans for obviously the people who 
are going to be caught by surprise?
    Ms. Cogswell. As you correctly noted, October 1, 2020 is 
the final implementation date for the Real ID Act as 
implemented through regulation. It is critically important to 
recall that the rationale and reason for that Act in the first 
place was actually one of the recommendations coming from the 
9/11 Commission, noting in fact that that was one of the 
methods used by the perpetrators of the attack. At this stage, 
we are in incredibly close coordination through DHS and with 
TSA directly in every location around the country. We are 
working to get signs out. We have recently started as every 
individual travels, they will be notified if the document they 
are presenting at the time they come to our travel document 
checker whether or not their identity document will meet the 
requirements post next year. We want to make sure everyone has 
the maximum amount of time they can in order to obtain either a 
Real ID compliant document or other acceptable form of 
identification such as a passport or military identification.
    The Chairman. I have got my Mississippi driver's license 
here. Are all the states compliant now with the driver's 
licenses that are being issued as of this date?
    Ms. Cogswell. 50 of 56 issuing jurisdictions are currently 
compliant. The six remaining are scheduled to be complete in 
the next year.
    The Chairman. Some of those are states?
    Ms. Cogswell. Two are states.
    The Chairman. Very good. It just seems to me that once 
those 56 jurisdictions comply, that is going to take care of 
almost everybody. I sure hope so.
    Is TSA PreCheck helping to make the lines shorter for 
everybody else?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that question.
    In fact, we see a profound change in airports where a 
significant population are PreCheck members in terms of the 
overall throughput for any individual airport. As of right now, 
we have about 20 million individuals who are in the program, 
having a known traveler number. That includes 9 million who are 
directly enrolled with PreCheck, another 9 million who are 
members of CBP's Global Entry program, and additional other 
populations such as yourself, sir, through the process we used 
to bring in other additional populations who are screened 
through very highly controlled processes.
    At this point, we see nationwide about 20 percent of all 
travelers each day are PreCheck----
    The Chairman. 20 percent.
    Ms. Cogswell.--which is a quite good number. We want to see 
it continue to grow.
    The Chairman. Does that help the other 80 percent?
    Ms. Cogswell. It does.
    The Chairman. Well, there is a requirement. Non-PreCheck 
passengers must remove their liquids. If you are PreCheck, this 
is relaxed. Tell us about that. And what is the status of TSA's 
deployment of computed tomography screening machines? And what 
is your anticipated timeline on allowing all passengers, not 
just PreCheck, to keep liquids and laptops in their bags during 
screening?
    Ms. Cogswell. As you noted, one of the primary differences 
between--the most visible differences between standard 
screening and PreCheck screening is the ability to leave your 
laptop within your bag. You can also leave your shoes on and 
light jackets. You do not have to take off clothing in order to 
go through the screening equipment.
    The Chairman. That is great.
    Ms. Cogswell. As you have noted, one of the pieces we see 
that will help us get to the next stage is that computed 
tomography, or CT machine. Those machines, because of their 
much greater ability to gather additional sensor data, provide 
us a significantly enhanced ability to see within that carry-on 
baggage to look for items that might be threats, meaning we 
have to have less divestiture, less passengers have to pull out 
from their bag. Laptops are the easiest ones to proceed with 
first. We are also working very carefully with the makers of 
the equipment to look for what algorithms we can put in place 
to enhance beyond that that will get us to liquid so that we 
can----
    The Chairman. Well, I am intruding on Senator Cantwell's 
time. But what is your timeline there?
    Ms. Cogswell. We are still working to develop the algorithm 
to be able to truly tell what the content and type of liquid it 
is.
    The Chairman. AI. Thank you.
    Senator Cantwell.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And again, Administrator Cogswell, I mentioned Sea-Tac and 
its rapid growth. I think we are at 135,000 people a day and 
almost 50 million a year. I noticed that the site for Sea-Tac 
says that it was built in 1949 to accommodate a million people. 
So the fact that we are accommodating annually 50 million 
people shows the stress and strain on the system. And as we 
discussed yesterday, moving cargo is what we do in the 
Northwest as well. So these security measures are of utmost 
importance to us in continuing to do a good job at the security 
layer, as well as moving in a cost effective fashion.
    So I wanted to ask you about the new rules for developing 
the canine units and for third party explosive detections. When 
will we see those, and what other initiatives are we pursuing 
to have fully trained teams available for deployment? And then 
I also wanted to ask you about the diversion to the southern 
border, how many TSA people were diverted, and what were the 
impacts on lines at airports across the country?
    Ms. Cogswell. So the program you are noting--we refer to it 
as Third Party Canine. We published the regulations last 
December and immediately began training teams. At this point in 
time, we have more than 171 teams and 30 entities already 
performing screening, those private screening requirements at 
those private screening entities already operating today. We 
expect to see continued growth in volume in that space. We have 
had a lot of interest in it.
    As to your question about the southwest border----
    Senator Cantwell. On the canine point, so is TSA pursuing 
other initiatives, or do you think you are going to be more 
aggressive in just pursuing this Third Party stream?
    Ms. Cogswell. In addition to the aspect around the Third 
Party Canine, we are also looking at the next round, next 
review, next enhancement of technology that could be available 
for use in screening of cargo. Similar to the same types of 
equipment that we use in checked bag today and are moving to 
the checkpoint, we think there is much greater capability for 
pallet-sized, much larger size in the cargo screening 
environment.
    Senator Cantwell. So it is safe to say that Sea-Tac will be 
seeing aggressive use of canines and that TSA will be 
continuing its own efforts, as well as whatever Sea-Tac does on 
its own.
    Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely. This is an area that we think is 
absolutely ripe for continued evolution, and we are very 
pleased at all the partnerships we have that is dedicated to 
that mission.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. Now southern border.
    Ms. Cogswell. On to the southern border. We have been 
detailing personnel to support CBP since early in the summer. 
The high water point of the total number of people that we had 
down at the southern border at any given time was about 350. 
Today we are down to around 180 post Congress' approval of the 
supplemental, as well as the decrease we have seen in the 
number of migrants appearing at the border.
    The individuals we send are all volunteers. They chose to 
support that mission. We are incredibly grateful for their 
choice to perform and serve in that function.
    Types of activities they perform include providing 
transportation from detention facilities to hospitals, while 
they are at the hospital, making sure that there is a security 
layer, and then returning them to the detention facility. Other 
areas include helping provide supplies, inventorying personal 
belongings when someone arrives, other aspects in that front.
    As we continue to go forward, we made very clear decisions 
as we were going through the setup of that program that we 
would not endanger transportation security or greatly 
disadvantage any one location. So we specifically designed the 
volumes of people and locations to have minimal impact.
    Senator Cantwell. So you are saying minimal impact or no 
impact? I know you mentioned to me that you exempted all the 
high volume airports from being impacted. So you took 
volunteers from places where you are saying they basically had 
little or no impact. Is that what you are saying?
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes. So if you are talking about people who 
work at our checkpoints, we specifically designed it for those 
locations where we could do so recognizing what the volumes 
were at that location. Other places that we looked to, of 
course, are our Federal air marshals. So we selected 
individuals, recognizing that we would see in the near term 
some decrease in the number of, for example, Viper missions 
that were run at various surface locations or some decrease in 
our lower priority flights. But we have been able to manage and 
maintain that amount to minimize impact.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Deputy Administrator, as you noted in your testimony, I am 
glad to see that the TSA has established the Surface 
Transportation Security Advisory Committee, and I was proud to 
work on the legislation that established it.
    Now that it is established, what processes are in place to 
ensure the TSA seriously considers and implements the 
recommendations provided by those advisory committee members?
    Ms. Cogswell. We are incredibly fortunate that we have had 
a long and productive relationship with many members in the 
surface transportation sphere. This legislation was a very 
significant benefit to us because it let us formalize that 
process and create a truer avenue that allows us to take formal 
recommendations. Similar to how we have operated the Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee, we believe there is an enormous 
value of having a venue such as this where we can ask specific 
questions, ask for specific advice in areas, and receive it 
formally through that mechanism. So thank you very much for 
your support.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Also, the TSA Modernization Act requires that you conduct a 
surface transportation security assessment and implement a 
risk-based strategy based on that assessment. You then have to, 
obviously, develop a budget, resource allocations that are 
really going to look at that risk-based strategy that comes 
about.
    Earlier this year, the Administrator spoke at a House 
committee meeting on that and said the assessment was going to 
be completed probably by October of this year. Do you think you 
are going to meet that deadline? And can you provide this 
committee right now with any kind of insight on what maybe we 
can expect to see in that assessment?
    Ms. Cogswell. We are working very hard to complete that 
requirement. We believe we will be in time to meet the 
deadline.
    Overall, I think the important piece of the assessment is 
ensuring that we have correctly and adequately looked across 
all of the threats, all of the vulnerabilities, and the 
consequential risks associated coming out of any particular 
vector at the security environment for surface transportation.
    At this time, I think the most important part from our 
perspective is the ability to call much greater attention to 
surface transportation. This is an area where very good people 
have worked for a long time to improve surface transportation 
security. I cannot tell you the number of people I have met 
just dedicated to this mission. The ability to call attention 
to their great work, see how far they have come, see where they 
need to go farther is a great place to be.
    Senator Fischer. Do you anticipate that there may be a 
classified section to this assessment that the Committee will 
have access to?
    Ms. Cogswell. At this time, I do not know that we are 
planning a classified attachment. However, we are happy to 
provide a classified briefing to you or your team, should you 
want it, as well as the regular briefings that we do to further 
go into depth against all of the different threats we see.
    Senator Fischer. I think it would be very, very helpful and 
also very important that this committee be able have those 
classified briefings. But I also think it would be really 
helpful if you would have a written attachment that we would be 
able to review in a classified setting so that we have, I 
think, a fuller understanding of the risks that are out there 
and what is needed and what would be a responsibility of this 
committee to try and meet those needs in the future.
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that. I will take it 
back. But we will look forward to meeting your requirement.
    Senator Fischer. OK. Thank you very much.
    Also you know, in December 2018, the GAO issued a report on 
the pipeline security program and made 10 recommendations, all 
of which DHS has concurred with. Can you provide an update on 
where TSA is at in implementing those GAO recommendations on 
pipelines?
    Ms. Cogswell. We are making strong progress against all of 
the GAO recommendations. I think most important from our 
perspective is looking at how we are reenergizing and 
revitalizing the competencies and knowledge of our workforce in 
this space. Through our recent changes--and again, thank you 
for the TSA Modernization Act requirement--we now have a 
dedicated section solely to surface transportation. In that, we 
have combined the way we pull together our compliance staff, 
our inspectors, and we are further developing a core cadre who 
are specialized and have much greater expertise in both 
pipeline, as well as we are pursuing additional expertise in 
cyber. So at this stage, we have completed the first 24 going 
through that additional training and are looking to expand from 
there.
    Senator Fischer. Are you seeing a good working relationship 
with the other agencies involved?
    Ms. Cogswell. We are. In particular, FMCSA and FERC have 
both been very, very solid partners closely working with us. 
Parts of Department of Energy, in particular, we do dedicated 
briefings with to the various members of industry.
    I also want to just say I cannot say enough about the great 
relationships we have with the members of industry. They are 
extremely laser focused on the security aspects and needs.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Blumenthal.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for your service.
    What is the statutory authorization for diverting TSA 
employees to the border?
    Ms. Cogswell. I believe, sir, it is in the original 
creation language for the Department of Homeland Security. But 
there is a secondary provision within TSA's legislation 
directly that allows us to authorize use of personnel in 
support of overarching missions. As other examples of where we 
do this today is in support of hurricane or other natural 
disaster responses, as well as the July 4th activities here on 
the Mall or----
    Senator Blumenthal. Are currently TSA employees diverted to 
the hurricane response effort?
    Ms. Cogswell. We had 120 ready on standby to go based on 
where incidents occurred in the United States. We were able to 
absorb it locally and did not have to detail anyone.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, will you commit to 
provide us with some kind of notice in the event that 
additional TSA employees are diverted to the border beyond the 
180 that are now there?
    Ms. Cogswell. We will.
    Senator Blumenthal. I want to ask you about the September 
11 security fee. We have recalled at this hearing and will be 
recalling on the floor very shortly that horrific tragedy that 
spurred the creation of the TSA and led to vast improvements in 
our nation's airport security. In paying for these 
improvements, as you know, Congress established a user fee that 
passengers pay on their tickets. It is known as the September 
11 security fee. The fee was initially intended to go only to 
improving the security of our nation's transportation system.
    In 2013, Congress passed a measure to reduce the deficit, 
and as part of a major budget compromise, the September 11 
security fee was raised from $5 to $5.60, but Congress required 
one-third of the revenue collected from those fees to go toward 
reducing the deficit. In my view, this measure was nonsensical.
    Senator Markey and I have introduced S. 472, the Funding 
for Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration Act. 
It is known as the FASTER Act. This legislation would eliminate 
the diversion of funds to pay for totally unrelated government 
spending and ensure that the passenger security fees go only to 
transportation security and prevent Congress from, again, 
raiding these funds in the future.
    My question to you is, would you support giving TSA access 
to these funds should Congress return the full amount of 
revenue generated by the September 11 security fund to its 
purpose of securing our nation's transportation system?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for that question.
    While there is no official administration position on the 
legislation, I will say we very much share your interest in 
ensuring a continual, consistent funding source for the agency 
dedicated to improving both security in terms of technology and 
paying for our personnel.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, there can be no consistent source 
of funding if Congress is diverting those fees that are charged 
to travelers for transportation security and, in effect, do a 
bait and switch to divert them elsewhere. Correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. It is more difficult, yes.
    Senator Blumenthal. More difficult and eventually it will 
detract from your efforts to secure our nation's airports and 
other transportation facilities. Correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. So far what it has meant is a potential 
leveling off of our funding sources.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, then would you commit to provide 
this Committee with a position on this legislation hopefully in 
support of it?
    Ms. Cogswell. We will seek to work very closely with the 
process through the administration to obtain a formal 
administration position.
    Senator Blumenthal. On another topic, as you know, on July 
17, 2019, a mechanic for American Airlines allegedly tampered 
with a key aircraft computer system at Miami International 
Airport. It indicated a vulnerability to insider threats. How 
vulnerable is our nation's aviation system to insider threats?
    Ms. Cogswell. Insider threats is one of the significant 
threat streams that we regularly look at and something that we 
are actively working with our international partners, as well 
as our domestic partners, including both in government and in 
industry. This is an area that we believe needs to have a 
multi-factored, multi-faceted approach to counter. Not only do 
we rely on background checks, access control, but we also look 
to ensure a culture across the board where individuals, if they 
see something that does not look right, that does not make 
sense, they are immediately reporting it so that it can be 
quickly attended to. While we want all of these pieces to work 
together, it takes each and every one of us every day to have 
that first most in mind.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    According to our Committee procedures, Senator Peters is 
next. He will be followed by Senator Lee.

                STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Today, as we remember the tragic events of September 11, 18 
years ago, we know that out of that tragedy came the 9/11 
Commission, and its report examined what happened and it made a 
number of recommendations to remedy the failures that led up to 
that tragic event.
    One of the last 9/11 Commission recommendations that has 
not been adopted--most all of them have been adopted--was the 
necessity to streamline congressional oversight, which I know 
continues to be a challenge for the department. The Department 
of Homeland Security is beholden to over 90 congressional 
committees in the House and Senate.
    So my question to you is, how would you evaluate 
congressional oversight of TSA and TSA's ability to be 
responsive to over 90 congressional committees in the House and 
Senate?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question.
    As you highlighted, compared to some other agencies, we 
have some additional requirements and a larger number of 
committees to whom we respond. TSA is extremely fortunate that 
I think we have pretty good relationships with almost every 
oversight entity that we work with. We try very hard to look 
for ways to do joint briefings, to consolidate interests in a 
way that helps overall drive efficiency on our end and 
responsiveness toward overall congressional oversight.
    Senator Peters. Would consolidated oversight be helpful?
    Ms. Cogswell. I think the administration position is very 
much in line with what you are suggesting. There are some 
interest areas. I think we are willing to work with Congress on 
how to make sure that the resulting actions, whatever they may 
be, best suit the needs for congressional oversight, as well as 
helping streamline our requirements.
    Senator Peters. I continue to hear from some of my 
constituents in very diverse areas in Michigan about some very 
lengthy, very interests of screenings that they get. Every 
single time they travel, they are pulled aside. And certainly 
maintaining a safe and secure aviation environment is 
paramount. We have to keep us all safe, but you also have to 
protect civil rights of law-abiding travelers. It is a very 
delicate balance. The Department of Homeland Security always 
has to balance the rights of individuals with also keeping us 
safe.
    But to that end, I think it is important for us to be 
conscious of what is happening and to track what is happening. 
And so I want to acknowledge first that I know it is difficult 
to track information related to wait times prior to screenings, 
the length of screenings, the demographics of passengers that 
are being pulled aside, as well as secondary screening 
complaint data.
    But my question to you is, do you believe there is room for 
expanding the collection of data and sharing it with 
appropriate congressional committees and civil society groups 
so we get a better handle as to what is exactly happening at 
these inspection sites?
    Ms. Cogswell. One of the requirements of the TSA 
Modernization Act, as you I believe know, is in order for us to 
be able to report wait times across all locations. So we are 
actively working along with airports to reach that goal. In 
many locations, we are already in positions where we are 
demonstrating some of that process today.
    As to some of your other questions, I would say we are 
incredibly welcoming of input and feedback across communities. 
We have a coalition that looks at multi-cultural issues, 
disability issues, others who need assistance or may have 
difficulty at our checkpoints. We regularly meet with them, 
including we have a meeting later this month here in 
Washington, as well as around the country. And, sir, we would 
be happy to come, if you would like, to your district to meet 
with any of your local constituents as well.
    That community has provided us invaluable information. 
Their individual stories, pieces of information they have been 
able to pass has enabled us both to do some explanation behind 
why we do certain things, but it has also enabled us to change 
our processes, methodology, how we teach our officers to 
conduct certain checks in recognition of what people have 
experienced. That information is invaluable to us.
    Senator Peters. So one of the processes that you have to 
address people who are experiencing difficulties is the DHS 
TRIP process, as you know. I hear from my constituents that 
they are very dissatisfied with that process. So I would like 
to have your assessment as to possible ways that we can expand 
or strengthen TRIP to make it more user friendly and make it 
one that actually works as intended.
    Ms. Cogswell. We continue to look to change the language in 
the letters that are responded to to be as informative as 
possible. Quite often what we find is the number one issue 
people write in about is a belief that they are on a watch 
list. Quite often that is not the reason that they received 
additional screening. So sometimes that explanation can be a 
little convoluted, and I think we can continue to improve on 
how we try to explain the different factors that can result in 
someone having additional screening. This is something that is 
not intuitive to a large portion of the traveling public, and 
we recognize that.
    An example of how we have tried to address that is we 
actually have videos up on our web page to tell people this is 
what you should expect when you come for screening. We have 
also tried as many possible ways to find how we can interact 
with individuals in addition to formal letters to get to the 
root cause, what they might be seeing, what they are 
perceiving. There are instances where we can link up that 
person with a passenger screening specialist as they come to 
the airport that will provide them additional assistance and 
explanation to process through.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Lee.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for being here today to answer our questions.
    Since 2014, the Department of Homeland Security, in 
particular the Office of Inspector General at the Department of 
Homeland Security, has been covertly auditing and inspecting 
security-related aspects of TSA, and it has done so, as far as 
I am aware, about four times. The IG's findings have revealed 
some very alarming rates of failure, failure due to both human 
and technology-based failures.
    Most recently in February of this year, the IG conducted 
covert testing on procedures to safeguard the so-called secure 
areas of airports, finding both human-based and technology-
based vulnerabilities at various points. And the IG made a 
series of six recommendations in response to the perception of 
those failures.
    As of two months ago, each of the six recommendations made 
by the IG were still open. What can you tell us about the 
current status of the IG's recommendations, and when can we 
expect that those will be closed?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have concurred with all of the 
recommendations and are actively working to address them. A 
number of these recommendations are ones highlighting some 
areas that we also believe play into the larger discussion we 
are having around insider threat and the need to do more in 
insider threat. So not only are we looking to rapidly respond 
to those requirements, we are also looking at what this tells 
us and how it informs our wider recognition. We would be happy 
to provide you some additional discussion in perhaps a 
different setting as to some of the details of the requirement.
    Senator Lee. Thank you.
    Overall, we have seen this several times in the last few 
years. What do you feel about the overall trajectory of how it 
is going?
    Ms. Cogswell. Overall, we believe that it is critically 
important that not only the Inspector General but we ourselves 
do continual covert testing on our own programs and processes. 
We look at not only how are we performing against the standards 
we set ourselves originally, how we were set up to meet 
threats, are we meeting the threats we were set up for, but 
also as the threats changed, how are we positioned against 
those new threats, the ones we were not designed originally to 
meet.
    Senator Lee. Thank you. I would encourage you to do that.
    As you can imagine, there is a significant deprivation of a 
person's privacy and liberty when a person is stopped along the 
way. Most of the time, the way these things work, the 
overwhelming majority of the people you are stopping, 
inconveniencing, and people whose privacy is being violated are 
the innocent people. So in order to do that, we need to make 
sure that whatever we are doing is working and is done in the 
most minimally invasive means possible.
    TSA has recently been collaborating with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection over the testing of facial recognition 
technology. Can you tell me a little bit about what the TSA's 
timeline is for the widespread adoption of facial recognition 
technology? And I would also like to know what the TSA does 
when it collects this information? Does it collect it for any 
purpose other than as a verification of the person's ID? Does 
it now, or will it in the future, be keeping that data for any 
longer than is necessary to perform the task at hand, or how 
long do they keep it?
    Ms. Cogswell. So we are conducting two types of pilots. The 
first one, as you noted, is with Customs and Border Protection. 
The way that process works is based on how many people who we 
think is going to be flying any individual day based on who the 
carriers tell us have bought tickets, CBP helps pre-position a 
gallery of photos of individuals whose passports are already on 
file, passport photos. As they approach a checkpoint, we are 
able to do a match against that smaller number of parties. So 
we are not widely screening against large sets of data. We are 
looking for you to match you.
    The second type of pilot we are doing just started recently 
out at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. That one, using our 
credential authentication technology, looks at matching you to 
the facial image on your driver's license or other document. 
Under both circumstances, we retain long enough to do the match 
for initial auditing, and then we are not storing.
    Senator Lee. In that sense, what happens in Vegas stays in 
Vegas.
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
    Senator Lee. Until 2016, new TSOs often completed their 
training requirements at or near their home airports. It is my 
understanding that TSOs now receive training at a centralized 
TSA academy located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center in Georgia.
    Since this has happened, has TSA had any budget savings as 
a result of that?
    Ms. Cogswell. So as you correctly note, we changed our 
process, and we have changed it slightly again in this past 
year. What we have done is as a new TSO comes on board, they 
first are at their home airport for a period of time, about 6 
months, and then they go off to the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center in Glynco. This lets us go through an initial 
process and procedure to bring them on board, continue to 
ensure that they are a good fit for the position that we are 
tracking them for prior to undergoing the two-week training 
down in Glynco.
    What we have seen coming out of the training in Glynco is 
not as much a budgetary savings per se as a consistency of 
training and camaraderie of spirit as people meet and retain 
those relationships across multiple airports. It enables them 
to know what another airport is doing against the same problem, 
as well as what their home airport does.
    Senator Lee. I see my time has expired. Thank you very 
much.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lee.
    Senator Udall.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you very much for your testimony and your 
service.
    I was in Congress when we created the TSA after the 9/11 
attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans. Al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups continue to threaten our aviation system. 
Eighteen years later, along with Senators Cantwell and 
Blumenthal, I am concerned that TSA employees are being pulled 
off the job for political purposes to address a manufactured 
crisis on our southern border.
    You mentioned in a response letter to Congress in June that 
TSA planned to increase the number of full-time equivalents 
allocated to the airports by more than 2,000 personnel and 
authorized a 20 percent increase in overtime.
    How much did this relocation of personnel to the southern 
border cost TSA?
    Ms. Cogswell. Senator, we have deployed at this moment in 
time about 180 individuals across multiple job types, so 
Federal air marshals, transportation security officers, 
counsel, lawyers, and support staff to help at the southwest 
border, help our sister agency, CBP. The highest mark that we 
had throughout this period was about 350. So we are 
significantly decreased and continuing to see a decrease post 
the supplemental that was provided by Congress, as well as a 
decrease in the overall migration trends.
    Senator Udall. And could you give me an estimate on the 
180, how much that would cost, and also the 350?
    Ms. Cogswell. We absolutely will get back to you on this.
    Senator Udall. You cannot do that right now.
    Ms. Cogswell. I cannot do the math in my head at the 
moment.
    Senator Udall. OK. Thank you.
    Two weeks ago, we learned that TSA funds were being 
reprogrammed to Immigration and Customs Enforcement to pay for 
migrant detention beds and transportation costs. These funds 
are being diverted from the aviation security and operation and 
support accounts, among others. Do you believe TSA operations 
will be negatively impacted by this reprogramming, and what are 
the immediate impacts to TSA operations from this 
reprogramming?
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we very carefully selected the areas of 
reprogramming to ensure that it would not have any permanent 
effects on the agency. It is delaying certain types of 
activities that we might have otherwise done in the fourth 
quarter, but even there we look to minimize.
    Most of what we are looking at will automatically recur 
next year. So funding will resume then.
    Senator Udall. So since many of these funds go toward 
training and supplies, are you preparing for long-term 
disruption to these programs?
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we very carefully monitored it to ensure 
that we believe we will not undergo a continued impact into the 
new fiscal year.
    Senator Udall. Shifting to facial recognition, with very 
few rules of the road for facial recognition right now, I am 
concerned that the drive for efficiency will lead to expansive 
collection of sensitive data by government agencies. How can we 
be sure that the promise of slightly faster lines at the 
security check is not at the expense of accurate security 
screening or of our own citizens' privacy?
    Ms. Cogswell. The way we have set up our programs today in 
biometrics, we have not only attempted to complete all of the 
requisite updates for privacy impact assessments, but also put 
out significant material to try to describe to people what we 
are collecting, how we are collecting it, how the information 
will be used, and how long we will hold it. In particular, the 
way we are conducting the pilots to date, we collect an image 
for only as long as we need to to conduct a match either 
against a photo already on file with CBP, such as a passport 
photo, or in order to do a match against a credential you are 
presenting at that moment in time. We are then not retaining 
that image.
    Senator Udall. You are serving in an acting capacity. Is 
that correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. That is.
    Senator Udall. And then your boss above you is in an acting 
capacity double acting. Is that correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. That is correct.
    Senator Udall. Do you believe that hurts congressional 
accountability with this kind of pattern across the government?
    Ms. Cogswell. I will say that we all recognize the 
importance of having Senate-confirmed positions in all of the 
important roles that they traditionally perform within DHS and 
TSA.
    I will say as a secondary note, however, if you have to be 
in this situation, having the strong leaders we have in Acting 
Secretary McAleenan and Acting Deputy Secretary Pekoske in 
those roles, given their long history and career experience, 
has been very valuable. There is no question in my mind if 
something occurs, they know exactly how to immediately respond.
    Senator Udall. My worry is that with these acting and 
without Senate confirmation, we get ourselves in a situation 
where in our democracy the rule being sent from the top is, you 
know, you are there and you could be gone the next day, and 
that is a very dangerous rule for democracy. So I would hope to 
see you in a confirmed capacity some day. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Blackburn is next, and at the end of her 
questioning, we will observe the moment of silence in memory of 
the victims of 9/11. Senator Blackburn.

              STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Cogswell, thank you so much for being here.
    I will tell you the inconsistency that is happening with 
the vetting that takes place at the airport, but then we look 
at the southern border and we have thousands of people on a 
weekly basis who are not vetted, we do not know who they are, 
we do not know what they are bringing into this country. Many 
times it is drugs. Many times they are bringing in human 
beings, trafficking women and children. We would never allow 
that passing through an airport. But yet, it happens every day 
at the southern border. So I think it is completely appropriate 
that your DHS and TSA agents are there on that southern border 
to help provide some control and some appropriate vetting.
    Let me stay with the vetting process, and Senator Lee 
touched on this. In recent years, as he mentioned, both the GAO 
and the IG have identified some very serious security 
vulnerabilities that exist with the screeners. And I use the 
term ``screeners'' because that is their legislated and 
statutorial name and their job and description.
    You have had some true flaws in here and I think the red 
team test that were failed with weapons getting past your 
screeners 95 percent of the time by the red teams. That shows a 
lack of attention to detail, a lack of focus on the job.
    I also know when we started looking at this issue back in 
2012 when TSA was having massive problems with screeners 
violating passengers' personal privacy, with invasive patdowns, 
sneaking drugs through airports, and a whole host of other 
criminal behavior ranging from theft to bribery to child 
pornography within the ranks of those TSA members, screeners--
not officers and agents, but screeners--and I understand that 
you all have taken some steps to try to address these issues. 
You have worked with the FBI to identify criminal behavior.
    So I would like for you to talk a little bit more about 
what you are doing at a granular level through your vetting 
process to be certain you are not hiring individuals. And at 
one point, you were advertising on pizza boxes for people to 
come work with the TSA. Talk about how that has changed or if 
you are still employing such activity, how many total hours of 
training are you now giving to the screeners. At one point, 
they were getting 40 hours of training and then were being put 
into a uniform that would allow people to believe they were an 
officer when they are not an officer. And then how many hours 
of training are being given to the canines?
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes, ma'am. A large number of questions. I 
will endeavor to recall all of them. I apologize if I miss one.
    So probably I will start with the incredibly important role 
of all the efforts we can take to mitigate insider threat. That 
means insider from the perspective of a TSA employee, as well 
as an airport worker or other worker in the aviation community. 
We work in close proximity, as you noted, with the FBI and 
other law enforcement to identify where we believe either 
criminal activity is occurring, as you noted moving drugs or 
other materials, but also where we believe someone might be at 
risk of just not having the right level of security culture 
preparedness inherent in what they approach and do. This is an 
area that we both strongly participate on the investigatory 
side but also in terms of our culture and training.
    As you highlighted, this is an area we have extreme, 
extensive focus. As we look at how we are recruiting, we want 
to make sure that we are getting individuals not only that can 
meet rigorous security requirements, but also who understand 
what the job is, why it is important, and are actually 
dedicated to the mission. Critical for us is to help them 
understand what the job is and ensure they know what they are 
signing up for. Someone who perhaps does not want to spend a 
lot of time with people on a regular basis is not going to 
enjoy working at our checkpoint when tens of thousands of 
people come through every single day. So we want to ensure we 
are getting individuals who have that strong character that we 
need and also are best suited for that kind of interaction.
    We also have changed up and created a TSO career 
progression model. We have an initial training when they start 
on board. They are wearing a different uniform at that point so 
that they are distinguished from others. They then go to the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia for 
a two-week intensive period.
    Senator Blackburn. That constitutes how many hours of class 
training?
    Ms. Cogswell. Two full weeks. So that is 80 hours.
    Senator Blackburn. Eighty hours, OK.
    Senator Blackburn. They then continue to meet requirements 
for training ongoing through the next several years as they 
progress. This includes not only training and testing on their 
current knowledge to ensure it does not get stale and they are 
still able to readily identify that image of a weapon on an X-
ray as they were the day they left the academy, but also to 
help them continue and grow their own skills, including 
coaching and mentoring new employees as they come onto the 
checkpoint.
    To your last point about the ability to identify prohibited 
items as they are coming to the checkpoint, this is job one for 
us. This is the most important thing we do. We look at it as 
twofold. One is the training of our staff, but the second is 
ensuring that we have the best technology available to support 
them and that they know how to use it effectively. This is one 
of the reasons we are very focused on the new computed 
tomography machines for passenger carry-on materials. When you 
look at a densely cluttered bag and you are looking at a number 
of them in short order, it is more difficult in our current 
technology than it will be with the CT machines. The CT 
machines will give us greater visibility, the ability to rotate 
it, an ability to use automated target recognition algorithms 
that look for not just a gun but pieces of a gun so that we can 
identify it even if it does not look exactly right. Critically 
important for us as we go forward.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Ladies and gentlemen, at this point in memory of the 3,000 
souls that were lost on 9/11 and in honor and recognition of 
the people who stepped forward, we are going to observe a 
moment of silence. I am going to ask that members and staff 
stand for this moment of silence and our guests are invited to 
stand with us for this moment of silence.
    [A moment of silence was observed.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. You may be seated.
    Senator Thune is recognized. Some of us will be going to 
vote and coming back, but we will continue to stagger our 
questions and accommodate members and our distinguished 
witness. Senator Thune.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Last year, thanks to the hard work of this committee, 
Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which 
included the TSA Modernization Act reauthorizing the agency for 
the first time since 2001 when it was founded in response to 
the tragic attacks that occurred 18 years ago on this day. The 
bill included several provisions aimed at deploying more 
advanced screening technologies, increased protections for 
unsecured portions of the airport, and minimizing security line 
wait times, all to benefit the experience of the traveling 
public while keeping our airports and our skies safe from harm.
    Building on improvements made by the FAA Extension Safety 
and Security Act of 2016, the bill also required TSA to 
increase the accessibility of the PreCheck program. This 
included a provision requiring the agency to enter into an 
agreement with private sector entities to expand PreCheck 
enrollment options, such as start to finish secure online or 
mobile enrollment capabilities. Increasing enrollment options 
is important in rural states like South Dakota where enrollment 
is currently limited to two physical locations.
    Ms. Cogswell, could you speak to the agency's 
implementation of this section, including when you expect such 
an agreement to be finalized and operational?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much, sir, and I appreciate 
very much the critical role you played in helping get the TSA 
Modernization Act completed.
    I would just like to note we are currently already testing 
a mobile environment enrollment methodology. It is at the 
checkpoint but where an individual who, as they go to the 
airport for their regularly scheduled flight, at that time are 
able to, through a tablet, complete an enrollment. Critical for 
us is to try out this environment because it provides us true 
flexibility to match that equipment to where the people are at 
the time they are actually traveling, making it just an in-
journey step in process rather than something they have to do 
in addition to a regular scheduled trip.
    We are also working hard, as is required under the Act, to 
bring on board a second vendor to help increase the number of 
sites of enrollment.
    Senator Thune. And how complicated is the mobile online app 
in terms of filling that out?
    Ms. Cogswell. So right now, the way the tablet works, you 
actually have a person there helping people get through the 
process so that if they are not understanding how to do the 
image of their document, there is someone right there to help 
them take their fingerprints, et cetera.
    Senator Thune. Right there at the airport.
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
    Senator Thune. OK. But again, I would say there are a lot 
of folks who are very far away from airports in places like 
South Dakota.
    Let me ask you this first because I think too that I want 
to follow up on that previous question. But Senator Peters and 
I introduced the Secure Traveler Act earlier this year, which 
expedites PreCheck enrollment for law enforcement officers and 
Federal employees holding an active security clearance who have 
already undergone substantial background checks. That bill was 
reported out of the Committee on July the 24th.
    Have any previous actions been taken by TSA to expedite 
PreCheck enrollment for populations that have already undergone 
screening by another Federal agency?
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir, they have. In fact, a significant 
number of individuals who are part of our Known Traveler 
Program who have received a Known Traveler number are 
individuals whose clearances we are able to directly verify 
because they are held, for example, with another Federal agency 
who has entered an agreement with us.
    Critical for us is that ability to manage the relationship 
so that we know if an individual is terminated from a position 
or leaves a position, that they are no longer eligible for that 
program.
    We can provide to you a list of all the different entities 
we do this with today, as well as approximate numbers, should 
you wish, in another setting.
    Senator Thune. The TSA Modernization Act expanded the Law 
Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program which helped smaller 
airports comply with Federal requirements to keep local law 
enforcement officers at the airport. This program has greatly 
benefited airport security in South Dakota where the resources 
of smaller airports are often strained.
    Could you speak to how this program continues to improve 
airport security across the country, particularly in smaller 
airports?
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir. We are extremely fortunate to have 
really good relationships across the board with State and local 
counterparts, as well as law enforcement specifically dedicated 
to individual transportation areas.
    What we find, especially in smaller communities, is those 
areas are quite often limited in the number of law enforcement 
officers that they might have to cover a very large geographic 
area. And so this ability for us to reimburse them for their 
time enables them to spend more dedicated time, perhaps even 
hire additional people, to be able to focus on transportation 
security.
    Senator Thune. All right. Last question quickly. The 
expansion also required TSA to review regulations and 
compliance policies and, if necessary, revise them to reduce 
administrative burden on airports. Has TSA made any revisions 
to current regulations and policies as a result of this 
requirement?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have conducted a review and are in the 
process of a number of what we consider de-regulatory 
provisions to reduce burden.
    Senator Thune. Thank you.
    Madam Chair.
    Senator Capito [presiding]. Yes. I am the acting chair. You 
can identify with that.
    Senator Tester.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

    Senator Tester. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that a 
lot.
    Well, I am going to go back to a previous question on Real 
ID. Is Montana one of the states that is noncompliant?
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, I will be happy to provide you a full 
list after the session.
    Senator Tester. OK. It would be great. You do not know or 
you do not want to tell?
    Ms. Cogswell. I cannot recall at this moment in time. I 
apologize.
    Senator Tester. OK. I would like to find out because I want 
to make sure that what the state has done meets what we need to 
do.
    Are you fully staffed within TSA?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have been able to hire especially for the 
airports to a level that we need to and are expected to.
    Senator Tester. One of the things that I would just say 
that if you are able to transfer $230 million and you are able 
to transfer people to go in different directions, then we are 
overfunding you. I would just say that. And maybe we are 
overfunding a lot of different agencies. So we need to be 
cognizant of that in the legislative branch moving forward.
    This was a previous question also. One of the IG reports 
that were done pointed out that turnover at smaller airports 
was a problem, turnover of personnel. You had said in a 
previous question that you agreed with the IG although I think 
the IG rejected your action plan--and correct me if I am 
wrong--and that this is still an open recommendation. Is that 
correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have a recommendation--I believe the 
current status is we have provided initial materials. They have 
requested additional materials, so they have left it responded 
to but still open.
    Senator Tester. But the first solution was rejected by the 
IG. Is that correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. I believe they are requesting additional 
material.
    Senator Tester. OK. So they are still on the first 
recommendation.
    Have you been able to get them that additional material?
    Ms. Cogswell. I cannot recall at this moment in time the 
status of that specific provision.
    Senator Tester. I would love to know that because I happen 
to come from a state, as the previous questioner, that has a 
lot of small airports. In fact, they are all small airports. 
And I happen to use those airports twice a week. So I am 
intimately familiar with--and your staff, by the way, does a 
great job. They really do do an incredible job on the ground. 
They are very accommodating and professional.
    The problem is that in these smaller airports, I do not 
know how you can hire anybody. I do not know what the wage is, 
but it is around 15-16 bucks. In a lot of the airports, they 
come in. They are there for 4 hours. They go home. They come 
back. They are there for 4 hours. What is being done for the 
pay? I mean, I have got to tell you we are paying about as much 
for new teachers, and they are underpaid greatly. OK? So how 
are we solving this problem? Maybe I should say I think it is a 
pay issue, and why has pay not been bumped up to be able to 
recruit more people?
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, first I just want to say thank you so 
much for your care and concern for our workforce. I share that 
completely and appreciate how much you have done to call 
attention to this.
    Senator Tester. No problem, but we got a problem in mission 
control and we need to fix it.
    Ms. Cogswell. So under our current authorities, we have a 
lot of ability to set pay. Right now in small airports, for 
example, we pay a significant retention bonus differential to 
increase their pay to the level of prevailing wage or to ensure 
a level of consistency at the airport. Similarly to your point, 
that split shift--we are able to actually pay additional beyond 
what would be allowed under traditional----
    Senator Tester. You are able to, but are you?
    Ms. Cogswell. And we do. Those we both fund.
    Senator Tester. So why is the IG issue even an issue?
    Ms. Cogswell. So I think the larger question in 
consideration is, as we go forward and look at what should be a 
process and scale goes to your larger question. We want to be 
in a position where we are recognizing the incredible knowledge 
and skills these individuals have and want to ensure that as 
they stay with us over a number of years, they continue to see 
increases in pay. That is where we have had traditionally not 
an authorities issue but a budget issue.
    Senator Tester. OK. If it is a budget issue and you do not 
have enough money, why are you not screaming from the rafters 
about transferring 230 million bucks which, by the way, the 
last time I checked is more money than I can imagine, from this 
budget to the southern border? And I do not agree with the 
previous questioner that said that the southern border 
deserves--yes, we need a secure southern border, but it is a 
different budget. So one of the problems I have got here is 
that--you are a head of this agency--if in fact it is budget 
problem, then you should be screaming. And I know your boss 
says we have got to have this wall, which is a really bad idea, 
by the way, and most of the people in this room know this but 
are afraid to speak up about it. Why are you not screaming?
    And I would say the same thing to the Department of 
Defense. We are overfunding these folks. We are overfunding you 
if you do not scream and they pull 230 million bucks.
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, we recognize and appreciate the strong 
support we are having for our workforce. What we are trying to 
do right now is put together a series of options on what 
additional pay would look like that we look to propose going 
into next year.
    Senator Tester. That is right.
    And I would just say and I have got to quit because I am 
way past time. But exit lanes are another issue. If we cannot 
afford to put people in exit lanes and we are going to be put 
it on these small airports, then we should not be letting the 
President allocate $230 million for this Republican policy of a 
wall on the southern border.

            STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

    Senator Capito. Thank you for being here today and thank 
you for your great answer to questions and your depth of 
knowledge. I appreciate that. Certainly I do not think it is 
lost on any of us today that on 9/11 that we are talking about 
something that was created because of 9/11. And so we are in 
great admiration for what you and all of your organization does 
for the safety and security of our transportation system.
    Senator Tester and I are the--I am the Chairman of the 
Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senator 
Tester is the Ranking Member on that committee. So we are both 
familiar with the budgetary issues.
    I want to talk about the CTs because I understand that 
there was a protest on the procurement of the CTs that were 
awarded to Smith Detection and it was funded in Fiscal Year 
2019. In your statement, you mentioned that 300 have been not 
produced yet, manufactured, but you led the contract on them. 
How much has this contest delayed the implementation, and what 
timeline are we on for these 300 CT scanners?
    Ms. Cogswell. We were extremely fortunate that in short 
order the protest was resolved. So we only lost about 90 days 
as a result. The award has been completed, and we have already 
identified where the machines are scheduled for and we will 
begin deployment in this fall.
    Senator Capito. In this fall. And how are you making the 
determinations of where they should be deployed?
    Ms. Cogswell. We looked at airports through a wide variety 
of lenses, both in terms of some of the risk calculations but 
also to let us try it out in a lot of different environments. 
So we have big airports covered. We have small airports covered 
to ensure that we recognize how they operate across the board.
    Senator Capito. Do you anticipate that the next tranche of 
CTs will have an even more improved technology with even more 
micro-detection capabilities? Is that what you are looking for?
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we are looking to the 
next algorithm as part of the next acquisition, as well as what 
we call an integrated machine with the automated screening 
lane, the roller process that brings in bags into the machine 
and has an auto diverter on the back end when something is 
identified as problematic. This will enable us to have 
increased throughput, ability to have multiplexing so more than 
one passenger can put their materials up at the same time, as 
well as automated bag return--or bin return so that we do not 
have to have officers moving bins back and forth.
    Senator Capito. I was in an airport--I cannot remember 
where it was. It might have been in Europe where they do have 
the automatic bag return. It comes down under and then just 
refills.
    Let me ask you this. On the staffing issue, as the Chair of 
the Appropriations Committee, in Fiscal Year 2019, we were able 
to get funding for 1,144 new TSA personnel. In response to the 
questions earlier, it sounds as though you were able to hire 
that many within that fiscal year. Is that correct?
    Ms. Cogswell. Correct.
    Senator Capito. Through all of your different recruitment 
mechanisms.
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes. We go through a process, as you know, 
throughout the year that assesses when we need to have a 
certain number of positions out to match peak volume, peak 
season at any given airport. We closely track the amount of 
passengers projected, not only writ large, not only in an 
airport but down to an individual terminal to ensure we are 
hiring well enough in advance to have that staffed up.
    Senator Capito. What kind of turnover do you have?
    Ms. Cogswell. So across the board if you look at the 
average, we are at about 17 percent, which is relatively 
commensurate with what the Department of Labor says is 
consistent for Federal agencies hiring at this level. We still 
want to look to bring that down, and some of what we are doing 
in this method is aimed at ensuring we are addressing some of 
the areas that people find hardest about this job. Part of it 
is looking at the pay system, but part of it also is looking at 
training you toward a career so you see where you are going----
    Senator Capito. Do you pay retention bonuses?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have the ability to use retention bonuses. 
The predominant place we use it is those places where we are 
competitive in terms of entry level salary in particular. So a 
place whose minimum wage has gone up, an area with an extremely 
low unemployment rate, those are some of the places we look at 
retention incentives.
    Senator Capito. Do you pay a recruitment bonus?
    Ms. Cogswell. We do not.
    Senator Capito. Do you employ an agency to do your 
recruiting?
    Ms. Cogswell. We do.
    Senator Capito. And just one?
    Ms. Cogswell. We have a contract out that helps us with the 
recruiting, as well as the processing of the various----
    Senator Capito. Is that a Homeland Security contract, or is 
that just TSA? Does it recruit border agents and others?
    Ms. Cogswell. It does not recruit border agents. It only 
recruits for TSA.
    Senator Capito. OK, because that has been an issue over on 
the Border Patrol is trying to get their recruitment.
    Last question, just kind of a comment I will make--and we 
have talked about consistencies. First of all, I saw the 
numbers. Just the numbers that are coming through on the 
holidays this year are just record numbers. And so I think just 
observationally for me, you are moving a lot of people very 
rapidly. And I think you have worked hard to kind of work out 
some of the kinks on how to get them through.
    But there is inconsistency because sometimes--I have one of 
those larger iPads. Sometimes it can go through in my purse. 
Sometimes it has to go into the little thing that goes through. 
What is the inconsistency there?
    Ms. Cogswell. So what we look at is how cluttered the bag 
would be. What we ask is our officers to consider how best to 
ensure throughput while maximizing their ability to detect any 
prohibited item in a bag. So what that might mean is at a given 
checkpoint, they are looking to ensure enough pieces come out 
to get that good x-ray image.
    Senator Capito. OK. That makes sense.
    The last question I had--I am way over--was on batteries, 
but I will follow up in writing. Thank you.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Capito.
    Senator Markey.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    And I just want to begin by emphasizing an issue that my 
friend, Senator Blumenthal, raised that it is critical on the 
18th anniversary of 9/11 that Congress pass our FASTER Act and 
restore all of TSA's security funding. I think that is 
absolutely imperative.
    Customs and Border Protection is using facial recognition 
technology at 22 airports. And just last month, TSA began using 
facial recognition tools on travelers at a Las Vegas McCarran 
International Airport security checkpoint. Yet, there are 
currently no enforceable rules from TSA governing facial 
recognition. Passengers today have no enforceable right to say 
no to sharing their biometric information. TSA has no 
obligation to secure the biometric data it collections. And 
there is no rule requiring TSA to prevent any racial bias in 
its use of this technology.
    Deputy Administrator Cogswell, it is essential that TSA put 
in place rules and safeguards on facial recognition before your 
agency further deploys the technology. Will you commit to 
pausing TSA's use of facial recognition technology and enacting 
these rules for the traveling public before further expanding 
the use of facial recognition?
    Ms. Cogswell. Sir, if I could go through your pieces for 
just one moment. There are a series of requirements that govern 
any U.S. Government program requiring us to very clearly 
demonstrate and explain how information is being collected, how 
it is being used, whether people have the provision to opt out, 
and how they can look to correct their record, as well as how 
long that information is retained. That is governed under the 
Privacy Act. We comply with privacy impact assessments and 
other materials.
    Senator Markey. So do you have formal rules in place to 
protect travelers' privacy?
    Ms. Cogswell. We do.
    Senator Markey. So I would appreciate if you could present 
to the Committee all of those rules.
    Ms. Cogswell, can you confirm that TSA has no plans to 
compel American citizens to share their biometric information 
and that Americans' participation in TSA's facial recognition 
program will always take place strictly on a voluntary basis?
    Ms. Cogswell. We do.
    Senator Markey. Excellent.
    Can you commit that TSA will take all necessary steps to 
secure the biometric data that you collect?
    Ms. Cogswell. We will.
    Senator Markey. Will you commit that TSA's biometric 
technology will not disproportionately burden and misidentify 
people of color?
    Ms. Cogswell. We will.
    Senator Markey. Well, unfortunately, the report TSA 
recently submitted to Congress as a result of Senator Lee and 
my amendment to the FAA Reauthorization does little to reassure 
us that you will use that technology in a responsible fashion. 
I am concerned that we are in the wild west when it comes to 
facial recognition. TSA in my opinion should stop deploying 
these invasive tools until we are sure that everything is in 
place in order to satisfy the need to protect information which 
is, in fact, being gathered about American citizens.
    Mr. Chairman, the roll call is on on the Senate floor, and 
I wish I could stay and ask one more set of questions, but I 
just think in the best interests of making sure that I make 
that roll call on the Senate floor, I will yield back the 
balance of my time. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    It may be that Members will vote and come back, but I think 
we have pretty much finished.
    You and I had an exchange, Madam Director, about the Real 
ID, and I was feeling pretty good about the fact that 48 states 
are in compliance with their driver's licenses. And then I 
remembered that sometimes you can renew your driver's license 
for several years. For example, in Mississippi, you can renew 
your driver's license for 8 years. So it occurs to me there are 
going to be a lot more people with driver's licenses from 
compliant states and jurisdictions who will have older driver's 
licenses. And there still may be quite a disruption, Y2K type 
disruption, on October 1, 2020. So what are we going to do 
about that?
    Ms. Cogswell. We very much share your concern that that is 
not the place we want to be. We are doing everything we can to 
get the word out. You are exactly right that both there is a 
combination of people whose licenses are still valid, but also 
individuals who are in states who issue both Real ID and non-
Real ID compliant licenses today. So they may be renewing their 
license not fully understanding that they are getting a non-
Real ID compliant license----
    The Chairman. Help me understand why a state would do that.
    Ms. Cogswell. Certain states are looking to have some 
flexibility in terms of what some of the requirements are. They 
may believe their population in particular is looking to have 
an option where they do not have to produce some of the same 
level of documentation about birth in the United States or 
citizenship, for example.
    The Chairman. So I am still not feeling good about these 
disruptions in October of next year.
    Ms. Cogswell. We very much are working state by state, 
locality by locality to do our best to get the word out. I will 
also say that in addition to a driver's license, you have 
options for other types of forms of ID, military identification 
if you are a current member or former, as well as passports. 
U.S. passports are also an option. So even if you are in a 
state where you are concerned about your ability to get through 
in time, you may still obtain one of these other forms of 
documentation and you can use that to fly.
    The Chairman. You know, I think we need to heighten 
awareness about this. Most people do not have a passport, and 
most people are not in the military or veterans. So it is going 
to be that driver's license 9 times out of 10. I think we will 
want to visit with you on the record about, if you do not mind, 
giving us a very thorough answer about how we can comply with 
this. It seems to me citizens are going to be caught by 
surprise and outraged just about a year from now if suddenly 
they cannot board a plane. They have bought the ticket and 
gotten there, and suddenly that item that has been golden for 
years and years no longer gets you on the plane. So let us work 
on that.
    Ms. Cogswell. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And I think I have got to read some words to make this 
official. The record will remain open for two weeks. During the 
time, Senators are asked to submit questions for the record. 
Upon receipt, our witness is requested to submit her written 
answers to the Committee as soon as possible. I bet you can 
comply with that.
    So thank you very much, Ms. Cogswell. You are a great and 
articulate witness, and you have done a great job today.
    The hearing is now adjourned with the thanks of the 
Committee.
    [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

       American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
                                                 September 11, 2019

Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Cantwell:

    On behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, which represents more than 700,000 Federal and District of 
Columbia employees who serve the American people in 70 different 
agencies, including the 44,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) 
who protect the flying public, we appreciate the Committee holding this 
important hearing on ``Protecting the Nation's Transportation Security 
Systems: Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration.'' 
TSOs are the first line of defense to protect the flying public, so the 
Committee's oversight is essential to the work we do.
    TSOs are sworn to protect the Nation's aviation security. They 
conduct themselves with the utmost professionalism and respect for the 
importance of the work they do. Every day, they identify and eradicate 
threats to aviation security. Some TSOs in our bargaining unit serve on 
the Field Evaluation Teams and take pride in making sure all systems 
are working and that personnel are fully trained in operations and 
observing standard operating procedures. The performance of the TSO 
workforce is at a high level and their diligence continues to keep the 
flying public safe.
    We commend the Committee for its role in ensuring the proper 
oversight of transportation security and we urge you to consider the 
workforce factors that contribute to proper security and those that 
could serve to challenge the safety of the flying public.
    In March of this year, the Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Inspector General issued a report, ``TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to 
Hire, Retain and Train Its Transportation Security Officers,'' which 
concluded that TSA's personnel policies make it harder to hire and 
retain TSOs. Shortcomings in hiring and retention, fueled by low pay 
and unequal personnel policies, present a threat to aviation security.
    TSOs work under a separate personnel system that denies such basic 
protections as the right to appeal adverse personnel actions to an 
objective, outside body like the Merit Systems Protection Board. They 
are often required to work mandatory overtime, receive disparate 
discipline and repeatedly report the failure of managers to execute 
rotation of duties in accordance with standard operating procedures. 
Additionally, the 35-day government shutdown of 2018-2019 placed an 
enormous burden on a workforce that receives among the lowest 
compensation in the Federal government. Many TSOs are still paying off 
loans they needed to help meet their financial obligations during the 
shutdown. An overworked, underpaid workforce facing the stress of 
making ends meet could result in an unnecessary and completely 
avoidable security threat.
    The TSA workforce is our greatest weapon against attacks on 
aviation security. It needs to be treated like the valuable resource 
that it is. The simplest and most equitable solution is to extend to 
TSOs the rights under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, which would ensure TSOs 
the same fair pay, union rights and respectful treatment as other 
Federal workers. Reducing turnover will decrease the cost and burden of 
recruitment and training and provide a consistent, ready workforce to 
protect the flying public.
    As the Committee conducts its oversight of TSA operations, please 
know the workforce stands ready and determined as a reliable partner in 
ensuring aviation security. TSOs take pride in our work protecting 
America's airports and skies.
    Thank you for your consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                          Alethea Predeoux,
                                  Director, Legislative Department.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Question 1. The TSA Modernization Act also includes a provision 
requiring TSA to make screening performance assessments available to 
airport directors quarterly. Is TSA currently briefing these 
assessments to every airport director? If so, how is TSA carrying out 
this requirement?
    Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
taken multiple steps to satisfy this provision of the TSA Modernization 
Act, and placed heightened emphasis on field leadership for completion 
of the requirement. To maintain consistency and accuracy of the 
performance information that is being shared, TSA Headquarters provides 
Federal Security Directors (FSDs) performance related data points. This 
information is provided electronically for all FSDs and appropriate 
staff. The Assistant Administrator for Domestic Aviation Operations 
provides executive oversight for the completion of sharing performance 
information with airport management.

    Question 2. TSA Administrator Pekoske's response to my May 22 
letter stated that TSA would reduce Visible Intermodal Prevention and 
Response (VIPR) operations by 20 percent. VIPR teams play a critical 
security role, particularly for surface transportation and ports. 
Congress has consistently supported the program. Please update the 
committee on the VIPR program. When will operations return to normal 
levels? Do you have plans to increase the number of teams?
    Answer. The anticipated reduction in Visible Intermodal Prevention 
and Response (VIPR) operations was 19 percent, however, the actual 
reduction was only seven percent. All VIPR program teams returned from 
the Southwest Border the first week of July and VIPR operations are now 
at normal operational levels.
    The FY 2020 President's Budget request proposes to eliminate the 
VIPR program.

    Question 3. It has recently come the Committee's attention that TSA 
is drafting guidelines for airports and airlines to donate or ``gift'' 
security equipment for TSA use at checkpoints and in checked baggage 
areas. Specifically, TSA's guidelines may require all airports 
interested in upgrading terminals or adding screening lanes to purchase 
and then donate screening equipment and then pay for installation and 
maintenance. If true, this is would particularly burden midsize and 
small airports with limited resources and ``outsource'' a core TSA 
responsibility. Passenger and baggage screening are core TSA missions 
directly supported through security fees on travelers and annually 
appropriated funds. It is my understanding that TSA might be 
considering new guidelines for airports and airlines that would expand 
the scope of donating or ``gifting'' security equipment. Although there 
is a role for donations, TSA has the responsibility to provide all 
airports--no matter their size--with a baseline of high-quality 
screening equipment and pay for installation and maintenance. Most 
airports cannot afford to buy and maintain screening equipment--and 
they should not be expected to. Is TSA planning any significant changes 
regarding equipment donations? Please clear this up for the committee. 
In what situations will TSA expect industry to pay for screening 
equipment, installation, and maintenance?
    Answer. This process is an option for airport stakeholders who may 
benefit from accelerating acquisition timelines, recapitalizing TSE, or 
enhancing security and the passenger experience. The CAP is neither a 
solicitation vehicle nor a circumvention of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and TSA acquisition or procurement processes.
    TSA does not and will not require or expect stakeholders to donate 
TSE. TSA will continue to obtain, test, procure, and deploy high-
quality screening capability for airport screening, including at 
midsize and small airports. TSA will continue to work with airports and 
airlines that are upgrading terminals or adding screening lanes by 
providing available TSE or ensuring there is a plan to provide the 
screening equipment in the future when it becomes available.
    The ability of stakeholders to donate screening capability through 
the CAP will supplement equipment that TSA procures and deploys through 
its normal process, and will ultimately add to the overall capability 
supply. This will enable TSA to deploy procured capability across the 
aviation system, including to midsize and small airports that may be 
unable or unwilling to donate equipment.
    If a stakeholder determines that donating TSE is beneficial and the 
right decision for the entity, TSA requires donors to be financially 
responsible for efforts associated with the deployment and sustainment 
of the donated capability for an agreed upon period of time, given that 
these financial requirements have not been included in TSA's budget for 
the relevant Fiscal Year.

    Question 4. In December, the TSA released its Cybersecurity Roadmap 
to guide cybersecurity efforts within TSA and across the transportation 
systems sector. What steps has TSA taken to reduce cybersecurity risks 
across the transportation systems sector?
    Answer. TSA is in the process of building its cybersecurity 
expertise and capacity to fulfill its role as a co-Sector Specific 
Agency for the Transportation Systems Sector (TSS), and is leveraging 
its existing personnel, combined with resources from within DHS, to 
engage with its stakeholders within the TSS. TSA has worked to develop 
a strong partnership with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) to leverage CISA's cybersecurity expertise to address the 
ever evolving cybersecurity threats to the TSS. For example, TSA has 
partnered with CISA and the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) to 
conduct in-depth cybersecurity assessments at critical pipeline 
companies. In 2019, six assessments have been conducted to date, with 
two additional scheduled. NRMC will analyze data from the reviews to 
assess industry posture regarding cybersecurity and future assessment 
needs. TSA and CISA have further partnered to assess the cybersecurity 
risks posed to the rail sector. Additionally, TSA and CISA have been 
working to develop information sharing protocols for incident and 
threat reporting information.
    In partnership with CISA, TSA has conducted 16 regional surface 
transportation-focused and one aviation transportation-focused 
Cybersecurity Workshops. The Cybersecurity Workshop series is an 
information sharing initiative designed for TSS stakeholders to learn 
about DHS and other government cybersecurity risk management resources, 
programs, and five non-technical actions they can consider to enhance 
their cybersecurity posture. TSA's outreach efforts address the TSA 
Cybersecurity Roadmap Implementation Plan objectives of monitoring and 
adjusting TSA's guidance to stakeholders regarding cyber risks (2.2.2) 
and expanding and improving the sharing of cybersecurity information 
(2.2.3). TSA's product efforts address the DHS Cybersecurity 
Implementation Plan objectives of maintaining strategic awareness of 
trends in national and systemic cybersecurity risks (1.1), maturing 
cybersecurity offerings and engagements to address significant national 
risks to critical infrastructure (3.1), expanding and improving sharing 
of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and other cybersecurity 
information (3.2), and improving cybersecurity capabilities and 
resources available to sector-specific agencies, regulators, and 
policymakers (3.3).
    TSA is an active participant in the Aviation Cyber Initiative 
(ACI), which is a tri-chaired task force led by DHS and CISA, the 
Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation. The ACI is 
designed to identify and analyze aviation cyber vulnerabilities in 
support of cyber risk-reduction and resiliency efforts within the 
Aviation Ecosystem, which includes both civil and military aviation. 
Additionally, TSA is currently developing and promoting cybersecurity-
related reporting guidelines for Mass Transit and Freight Rail that 
align with Executive Orders 13636 and 13800 and the requirements for 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework 
(Presidential Policy Determination-41), Presidential Policy 
Determination-21, and rule making initiatives.

    Question 5. A recent U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) study 
``Critical Infrastructure Protection--Actions Needed to Address 
Significant Weaknesses'' (GAO 19-48), found significant weaknesses 
within TSA's pipeline security program management. Overall, what 
progress has TSA made to address pipeline cybersecurity and are there 
additional actions that can be taken to improve the program? If there 
are any weaknesses, what can Congress do to help TSA address these as 
quickly as possible? Does TSA have plans to add dedicated personnel or 
resources to pipeline cybersecurity activities in the near future? To 
what extent do the Corporate Security Reviews and the Critical Facility 
Security Reviews provide TSA with an understanding of the pipeline 
industry's cybersecurity readiness?
    Answer. TSA has partnered with CISA to assess pipeline 
cybersecurity at select pipeline companies. These Validated 
Architecture Design Reviews (VADRs) are conducted on site over a two-
day period and assess all aspects of the security of a pipeline 
operator's industrial control systems (ICS). ICS include control, 
measurement and telemetry systems. CISA provides personnel with ICS 
expertise to conduct these assessments. Results are analyzed by NRMC to 
provide an assessment of the vulnerability gaps that exist and identify 
best practices across the industry. As of October 1, 2019, TSA and CISA 
have completed six of these assessments. Analysis of these assessments 
is expected to be completed before December 31, 2019 and will establish 
a baseline to determine the cybersecurity protection measures in place 
in the industry.
    TSA Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) provide an excellent 
understanding of the pipeline industry's cybersecurity readiness. CSRs 
were updated in 2018 to include an expanded focus on cybersecurity 
plans and programs and to better align with the new cybersecurity 
protection measures identified in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. 
The Critical Facility Security Reviews are focused on physical security 
at critical facilities. However, they do include a limited number of 
questions related to cyber hygiene practices employed at the 
facilities. TSA plans to add cybersecurity specialists to assess and 
develop appropriate programs to address surface transportation 
cybersecurity needs identified through these efforts.
    TSA looks forward to working with Congress to ensure appropriate 
resources are available to meet TSA's surface transportation security 
responsibilities.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Question. Section 1978 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 says 
if an individual has undergone a security threat assessment and 
received a Transportation Worker Identification Credential, than that 
person does not have to pay for a separate security threat assessment 
for a hazardous materials endorsement. Can you provide an update on 
where TSA is in implementing this provision, and whether the agency has 
issued any guidance to state motor vehicle departments to facilitate 
this change?
    Answer. TSA will publish an Exemption Memo authorizing states to 
issue an Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) based on an existing 
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) Security Threat 
Assessment (STA). The memo exempts states from the required HME STA in 
the current reg. The Exemption Memo will also include guidance to the 
States on issuance of an HME to individuals who hold a valid TWIC. TSA 
provided interim guidance to the trucking industry and the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) in December 2018. TSA and 
FMCSA continue to meet to discuss a coordinated communications plan for 
stakeholders prior to final implementation of the plan.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Pipeline Cybersecurity
    The TSA has authority over pipeline security, both physical and 
cybersecurity. To properly perform necessary pipeline security 
oversight, TSA must have the capability and resources to demonstrate 
the security readiness of the pipeline industry to the constantly 
evolving physical and cyber threats. To assist the Committee in the 
interest in assessing the short and long-term plans for TSA's Pipeline 
Security program management, I would appreciate your providing details 
to the following.

    Question 1. Please provide an organization chart showing the new 
TSA Surface Operations division and how it fits into the overall TSA 
structure as required in the Modernization Act.
    Please provide an organization chart specifically for TSA Surface 
Operations. In addition, provide the total number of personnel 
reporting in the new Surface Operations; show all groups, sections, 
and/or branches under TSA Surface Operations and the number of 
personnel assigned to each; and clearly identify those personnel whose 
primary responsibility is pipeline security. If zero, please explain.
    Answer. Per the TSA Modernization Act, the Assistant Administrator 
for Surface Operations reports to the Executive Assistant Administrator 
of Security Operation, a direct report to the Administrator. There are 
a total of 71 allocated personnel within the Surface Operations 
organization. Four positions within Surface Operations HQ have primary 
responsibility for pipeline security. This does not include the 
establishment of the field-based Pipeline Security Assessment Team 
(PSAT). The PSAT consists of 24 Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface (TSI-S) from across the country. While the TSIs participating 
in the PSAT report to the Federal Security Directors whose airport they 
are assigned to rather than to Surface Operations, they have been 
specifically selected and trained to conduct Critical Facility Security 
Reviews (CFSRs) and assist with other security activities with the 
pipeline community.

    Question 2. It is my understanding the TSA Surface Operations 
reorganization includes the standing-up of Regional Security Directors. 
Provide a map of the geographic areas for which the new Regional 
Security Directors will be responsible. How many personnel will be 
assigned to each of the Regional Security Directors, and clearly 
identify those personnel whose primary role will be pipeline security. 
Do these Regional Security Directors have cybersecurity experience for 
pipeline operations? If no, please explain.
    Answer. In the recent restructuring of TSA, a new Surface 
Operations office was created. Surface Operations includes five regions 
that cover the surface modes in their respective geographic areas. Each 
region is staffed with a Regional Surface Director (RSD) and a staff of 
supporting positions, with a primary role focused on general surface 
security, not just pipeline security. Three of the RSDs have five 
allocated positions, and the remaining two have six allocated 
positions. Although RSDs do not have specific cybersecurity experience, 
they bring vast executive leadership and transportation security 
experience to Surface Operations, which is being applied to leverage 
federal, state and local partnerships at the executive level across the 
entire surface transportation landscape; this includes Freight Rail, 
Highway Motor Carrier (HMC), Maritime, Mass Transit & Passenger Rail 
(MTPR), Pipeline, and the critical infrastructure that supports these 
networks.

    Question 3. How are the 200+ TSA Transportation Surface inspectors 
in the field assigned across the country? What are their 
responsibilities? To what extent do their responsibilities include 
pipeline security--physical and cyber?
    Answer. There are currently 201 TSI-S located in 49 field offices 
across five regions. TSI-Ss are allocated and assigned throughout the 
country based on estimated inspection and outreach workloads with 
consideration for the number of entities to be inspected/assessed, the 
time required to complete and travel to the inspection/assessment 
locations, as well as time to complete inspection/assessment reports 
and follow-up actions.
    TSI-Ss are responsible for regulatory and non-regulatory activities 
within their Area of Responsibility. Regulatory activity is based on 
rules published in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
part 1580. 49 CFR 1580--Rail Transportation Security requires both 
passenger and freight rail operators to designate Rail Security 
Coordinators and to report security-related incidents involving their 
operations. Additional requirements for freight rail operators include 
the tracking and transfer of Toxic Inhalation Hazards, highly toxic 
substances that can cause massive casualties if released. The second 
set of rules enforced by a TSI-S are found in 49 CFR 1570--
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. In partnership with 
the United States Coast Guard, a TSI-S conducts TWIC compliance 
inspections of TWICs as individuals access Maritime Transportation 
Security Act-regulated facilities.
    In addition to regulatory activity, a TSI-S also performs non-
regulatory activity such as various security assessments, tabletop 
exercises, and security training, in all modes of surface 
transportation. Such activities are designed to assist surface 
transportation partners in enhancing their existing security programs 
through a collaborative process.
    In May of 2019, Surface Operations solicited existing TSI-Ss to 
become part of a dedicated PSAT to conduct pipeline CFSRs throughout 
the United States. These 24 inspectors were then trained by the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration on pipeline 
operations and conducted additional on-the-job pipeline security 
training with DHS/TSA headquarters personnel. In FY20 these inspectors 
will begin participating in CFSRs and serve as a security resource to 
pipeline operators and facilities nationwide.

    Question 4. What is the total FY19 budget for TSA Surface 
Operations? What percentage of that budget is dedicated to pipeline 
security, and what percentage is dedicated to pipeline cybersecurity? 
Furthermore, what is the projected FY20 budget for the new Surface 
Operations division and what percentage of that budget is dedicated to 
pipeline security--physical and cyber?
    Answer. The FY 2019 Budget for the Surface Programs PPA was 
$130.141M. Included in this PPA, is the Surface Operations budget of 
$8.6M. The FY 2020 Budget for Surface Programs PPA is $9.02M. The 
Surface Operations budget is not presented by line item, or 
transportation mode (mass transit, freight rail, pipelines, highway 
motor carrier). However, in the case of pipeline security, which has 
been the focus of much attention in the last two years, there has been 
a significant commitment of resources to address security issues.
    In July 2019, TSA identified 24 Transportation Security Inspectors 
to form the Pipeline Security Assessment Team (PSAT). These 24 
Inspectors were selected to augment the two subject matter experts TSA 
had in the Pipeline Section to conduct security assessments of Critical 
Pipeline Facilities. The 24 member PSAT team received Pipeline Training 
at the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
Training Facility in Oklahoma; training in the process of conducting a 
physical security assessment at a pipeline critical facility, including 
the inbrief and outbrief; briefings and tours of operational pipeline 
companies in the field; shadowing of the TSA pipeline experts during an 
assessment and were shadowed by a TSA expert on an assessment to 
prepare them to effectively and efficiently conduct a physical security 
assessment on a critical pipeline facility. In FY 2019, TSA conducted 
60 Critical Facility Security Reviews, and 22 Corporate Security 
Reviews. In FY 2020, TSA, to date, has conducted 38 Critical Facility 
Security Reviews, and 8 Corporate Security Reviews.
    TSA partners with CISA to conduct cyber security assessments of 
pipeline facilities. In FY 2019, TSA partnered with CISA to conduct 6 
Validated Architecture Design Reviews (VADR) and TSA partnered with 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to conduct 2 Cyber 
Architecture Design reviews for a total of 8 pipeline cyber security 
reviews conducted in FY19. To date, one VADR has been conducted in FY 
2020 and 10 VADRs are scheduled through August 2020.
    The TSA budget impact (FY19) to support the pipeline cyber security 
assessments supported by TSA was $1.56M.
    The TSA budget impact (FY20) for personnel resources to support the 
accomplishments to date and those scheduled for FY20 is $4.3M.
    In the TSA FY 2020 budget, $8.4M has been funded to conduct 
pipeline cyber security assessments. TSA is working through its 
Contracting office to establish a contract with a company with 
appropriate cyber security expertise to conduct cyber security 
assessments on pipeline facilities.

    Question 5. Considering the cyber threats facing surface 
transportation presently, what specific TSA resources are dedicated to 
addressing the cyber threats to pipelines, including threat assessment 
and infrastructure assessment? Provide plans explaining how such 
program would be sustained.
    Answer. TSA Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) currently has two full-
time analysts that look at cyber threats to pipelines on a part-time 
basis; if future requests are fulfilled TSA intends to have one cyber 
analyst dedicated to cyber threats related to pipelines on a full-time 
basis. As proposed in the TSA Cybersecurity Implementation Plan (CSIP) 
and the DHS CSIP, TSA I&A intends to increase its total number of cyber 
threat personnel to 12, including the aforementioned analyst dedicated 
to cyber threats to pipelines full-time.
    TSA has dedicated personnel to support both Corporate Security 
Reviews and Validated Architecture Design Reviews for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2020. For infrastructure assessments, TSA conducted 22 Corporate 
Security Reviews in FY 2019, which included a cybersecurity assessment. 
In addition, TSA partnered with the NRMC to conduct in depth 
cybersecurity assessments (VADR). TSA and the NRMC partnered to conduct 
six assessments in FY 2019.
    TSA conducted CFSRs at pipeline facilities that focus on physical 
security but also include a cyber-component. TSA conducted 60 CFSRs in 
FY 2019.

    Question 6. Does TSA have plans to add dedicated personnel to 
pipeline cybersecurity activities? Please explain if the response is 
``no''. Otherwise, address the following: describe the plan, how it 
will be sustained, and when it will be implemented. In addition, how 
and when will new pipeline security personnel be trained and when will 
the new personnel start to work with pipeline industry operators?
    Answer. Currently, the TSA I&A office has two full-time analysts 
that review cyber threats to pipelines on a part-time basis. In support 
of future efforts identified in the TSA CSIP and the DHS CSIP, TSA I&A 
intends to increase its total number of cyber threat personnel to 12, 
including one analyst dedicated to looking at cyber threats to 
pipelines full-time.
    TSA also plans to add cybersecurity specialists to support surface 
transportation cybersecurity assessments and preparedness. TSA has 
identified and trained 24 additional personnel to augment pipeline 
security assessments. Those personnel will complete training by 
December 31, 2019 and start assessments in 2020.

    Question 7. Does TSA plan to issue pipeline security regulations or 
mandates--physical and/or cyber? Please explain if the response is 
``no''. If ``yes'', will the regulations or mandates be similar to the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation Standards (NERC-CIP)?
    Answer. No, TSA does not have plans to issue pipeline security 
regulations. TSA conducted over 80 independent, objective, physical and 
cybersecurity assessments in FY 2018 and 2019 to measure compliance 
with the measures outlined in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. 
Based on the results of our physical and cybersecurity assessments, TSA 
is confident that our cooperative approach with industry is working to 
ensure that appropriate security measures are in place to address 
current threats. In addition, a regulatory approach alone is not 
suitable in addressing evolving, dynamic threats. TSA finds tremendous 
value in its ability to develop and issue security guidance, tools and 
resources for surface transportation owners and operators, as well as 
the ability to adjust industry standards to assess new and more 
innovative threat tactics has proven to be effective and efficient. TSA 
will continue to work collaboratively with the pipeline industry to 
refine guidance to address emerging threats.

    Question 8. Please explain the difference between TSA's Corporate 
Security Reviews and the Critical Facility Security Reviews answer the 
following questions (Questions 8-12): How many companies have been 
assessed to-date in each and how many companies are confirmed for the 
rest of FY19 and for FY20?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration conducts two 
types of pipeline security reviews: CSR and CFSRs. CSRs are voluntary 
reviews of a pipeline owner's corporate security plans, policies and 
procedures at the corporate level. These reviews are conducted with 
senior security and operations executives at corporate headquarters. 
CFSRs are voluntary on-site reviews of critical pipeline facilities, as 
well as other select pipeline facilities, throughout the Nation. The 
CFSRs focuses on the physical security measures and implementation of 
security policies and procedures at the critical facility.
    Since 2003, TSA has assessed 207 companies. Twenty-two CSRs were 
conducted during FY19 and 25 CSRs are scheduled for FY20.
    Between 2012-2019, TSA conducted 368 CFSRs. Sixty CFSRs were 
conducted in FY19. TSA plans to increase this number to between 75-125 
CFSRs in FY20 by utilizing a dedicated field based team of Surface 
Inspectors.

    Question 9. How are the companies selected for review? Can pipeline 
operators sign-up to be assessed? If so, how?
    Answer. To select facilities for review, TSA uses the Pipeline 
Relative Risk Ranking Tool (PRRRT) to create TSA's top 100 critical 
pipeline systems. The risk assessment calculates threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence based on variables such as the amount of throughput and 
other factors including but not limited to: product deliverability to 
military facilities, power plants, and airports; and factors such as 
pipelines near high consequence Urban Area Security Initiative or High 
Threat Urban Areas. Critical Facilities are identified by the operator 
during the CSR process. Once identified, CFSRs are scheduled according 
to risk identified by the PRRRT. Pipeline operators and facilities may 
request to be assessed through direct communication to TSA.

    Question 10. What is the fully-loaded cost per assessment?
    Answer. The cost to the government for contract support associated 
with each CSR is $15,341.74 and $4,951.36 for each CFSR. In addition to 
this contract support, several TSA employees within Surface Operations 
assigned to headquarters and the field also contribute to these 
assessments as part of the duties and responsibilities of their 
position. As discussed more fully below, any TSA estimates on the 
additional cost of the full time employee contributions is speculative 
since the frequency of these assessments vary and these employees 
fulfill other duties and responsibilities for Surface Operations in 
addition to assisting with the assessments.

    Question 11. How often are assessments performed and how quickly 
does TSA follow up on the security recommendations they provide 
pipeline operators?
    Answer. Frequency of CSRs and CFSRs conducted with industry is 
based on availability of funding for contract support and agreement of 
pipeline operators to participate in the voluntary assessments. Within 
two to three weeks following a CSR or CFSR, TSA provides a summary of 
the assessment and follow-up instructions to the stakeholder.

    Question 12. How does TSA hold pipeline operators accountable to 
the measures in the Pipeline Security Guidelines and recommendations 
that result from the assessments?
    Answer. TSA's pipeline security programs are voluntary and 
collaborative in nature. The pipeline industry works closely with TSA 
to increase their security posture using the results of completed CSRs 
and CFSRs. Within two to three weeks following an assessment, TSA 
provides a summary of the recommendations and follow-up instructions to 
the stakeholder. TSA requests stakeholders to address Pipeline Security 
Guideline recommendations within 12-18 months following an assessment. 
These recommendations are addressed through direct follow up with the 
stakeholder as well as during any future assessment.

    Question 13. Outline TSA's plan to address pipeline cybersecurity. 
In addition, to what extent do the Corporate Security Reviews and the 
Critical Facility Security Reviews provide TSA with an understanding of 
the pipeline industry's cybersecurity readiness?
    Answer. TSA is addressing pipeline cybersecurity through two 
primary initiatives with government and industry partners that begin 
with intelligence and information sharing. In the past year, TSA has 
partnered with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Energy and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to 
provide six briefings to industry leaders. These briefings will 
continue to ensure that industry and government are fully apprised of 
potential threats.
    Second, TSA will continue to assess cybersecurity in the industry 
to more fully understand the risks and necessary measures to reduce 
risks. TSA has partnered with CISA to assess pipeline cybersecurity at 
select pipeline companies. These VADRs are conducted on site over a 
two-day period and assess all aspects of the security of a pipeline 
operator's ICS. CISA provides personnel with ICS expertise to conduct 
these assessments. Results are analyzed by NRMC to provide an 
assessment of the vulnerability gaps and best practices across the 
industry. As of October 1, 2019, TSA and CISA have completed six of 
these assessments. Analysis of these assessments is expected to be 
completed before December 31, 2019 and will establish a baseline to 
determine the cybersecurity protection measures in place in the 
industry.
    The output of TSA CSRs provides awareness of the pipeline 
industry's cybersecurity readiness. CSRs were updated in 2018 to 
include an expanded focus on cybersecurity plans and programs and to 
better align with new cybersecurity protection measures outlined in the 
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. CFSRs also look at both physical and 
cyber protective measures for on-site cyber assets and increase TSA's 
understanding of the industry's readiness.
    TSA plans to add cybersecurity specialists to assess and develop 
appropriate programs to address surface transportation cybersecurity 
needs identified through these efforts.

    Question 14. In just over a year, October 2020, the traveling 
public will be required to have identification that is ``REAL ID'' 
compliant. However, a number of states are still not issuing these IDs 
or are not issuing at rates needed. How does TSA plan to handle people 
who do not have compliant identification?
    Answer. Congress enacted the REAL ID Act in 2005 in response to the 
9/11 Commission recommendations, to establish minimum security 
standards for state-issued driver's licenses and state IDs pertaining 
to security, authentication, and issuance standards that can be 
accepted by Federal agencies for official purposes. These official 
purposes include, but are not limited to: (1) accessing Federal 
facilities; (2) boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft; and 
(3) entering nuclear power plants.
    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) are partnering with industry and state 
governments to alert travelers about the REAL ID deadline to ensure 
they have time to prepare for full enforcement, beginning October 1, 
2020.
    Pursuant to the REAL ID regulations, starting October 1, 2020, TSA 
will only accept state-issued driver's licenses and identification 
cards as identification at the security screening checkpoint if those 
documents are issued in accordance with the REAL ID standards by a REAL 
ID-compliant state. If a traveler does not have a REAL ID-compliant ID, 
they may provide another acceptable form of identification (such as, a 
valid passport, state issued enhanced driver's license, or U.S. 
military ID), for domestic air travel; however, passengers who are 
unable to verify their identity will not be permitted through the 
screening checkpoint. In August 2019, Transportation Security Officers 
began providing reminders to passengers who presented non-compliant 
licenses at checkpoints about the upcoming REAL ID enforcement date. 
For a list of acceptable IDs, visit TSA's acceptable form of 
identification page, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/
identification.
    TSA and DHS have been working with stakeholders to ensure that the 
public is aware of the upcoming October 1, 2020 REAL ID enforcement 
deadline. For example, in the spring of 2018, DHS and TSA launched a 
public awareness campaign around identification requirement changes, 
and TSA hosted a national media event on October 1, 2019, with industry 
partners and Department of Motor Vehicles leaders. In August 2019, TSA 
and DHS offered states the opportunity to share state-specific driver's 
license images for customized signage. So far, twenty-five states have 
worked with TSA to develop customized state-specific REAL ID signage 
for TSA screening checkpoints.
    The Agency routinely includes REAL ID messaging in national media 
engagements and on its social media platforms (approximately 1.3 
million followers on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
YouTube), and engages travelers by answering their questions via 
AskTSA. TSA currently offers an online toolkit of products available to 
support the communication needs of stakeholders, which is available on 
the TSA website, tsa.gov/real-id..

    Question 15. Many of our Alaskan communities don't have their own 
DMVs and Alaskans have to fly to get to one. How are you working to 
address the uniqueness of travel in the State of Alaska?
    Answer. DHS recognizes that in some cases an individual's ability 
to regularly access a state's motor vehicle office may be limited. As 
such, TSA and DHS are partnering with industry and state governments to 
alert travelers about the REAL ID deadline to ensure they have ample 
time to prepare for full enforcement on October 1, 2020, and also 
encouraging states to accommodate their citizens based on each state's 
unique circumstances. In August 2019, TSA began verbally advising 
travelers presenting non-compliant licenses of the upcoming REAL ID 
enforcement date. TSA has also co-hosted REAL ID events with motor 
vehicle administration officials in numerous locations around the 
country throughout the spring and summer, with more to be scheduled. In 
addition, TSA has launched a robust social media campaign to alert 
travelers across the country. DHS and TSA are committed to engaging 
with stakeholders, including officials in Alaska, and incorporating 
their feedback, where appropriate, into TSA's efforts to prepare the 
public for full enforcement of the REAL ID Act on October 1, 2020.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Shelly Moore Capito 
                       to Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    In February, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued 
an Interim Final Rule (IFR) to prohibit the transportation of lithium 
ion batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft. It is my understanding 
that the TSA currently has regulations governing the size of lithium 
batteries as well as where they are stored on passenger flights.

    Question. What does the TSA take into account when regulating spare 
lithium batteries on passenger aircraft? As lithium batteries start 
being integrated into more products, like suitcases, does the TSA 
anticipate having to issue further guidelines for securing lithium 
batteries on passenger flights?
    Answer. TSA conducts the screening of individuals, accessible 
property, and checked baggage in order to detect, deter, and prevent 
any explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other threat to security into the 
sterile area and/or before entering the aircraft. Hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) allowed onboard an aircraft must be properly marked, labeled, 
and packaged with proper notification. When a Transportation Security 
Officer (TSO) discovers an item that is, or appears to be, HAZMAT, such 
as a battery, they are directed to not remove the HAZMAT, to maintain 
control of the accessible property or checked baggage, and to notify 
the Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO). If the 
discovery of HAZMAT occurs at the checkpoint, the STSO must notify the 
individual that the item is not allowed and provide the individual with 
proper disposal options. If the discovery occurs in checked baggage, 
the STSO must notify the appropriate aircraft operator/carrier.
    The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate the 
transportation of HAZMAT from the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Act. TSA has no regulations specific to this material, thus TSA 
programs reference U.S. Department of Transportation HAZMAT 
regulations.
    TSA is not planning to issue further guidelines on lithium 
batteries at this time. The issue surrounding lithium batteries is a 
HAZMAT issue, and the Federal Aviation Administration and the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration addresses such matters.
                                 ______
                                 
      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mike Lee to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    A 2015 GAO report entitled ``Screening Partnership Program: TSA Can 
Benefit from Improved Cost Estimates'' noted that during the Screening 
Partnership Program transition process for four Montana airports, TSA 
offered a $10,000 relocation payment to screeners who chose to transfer 
their employment with TSA to a non-SPP airport. The report notes that 
contractors were unaware, at the time, that TSA offered such relocation 
payments. According to GAO, contractors also raised concerns that such 
payments delayed and disrupted their ability to hire screeners.
    Question 1. Is it still TSA's policy to offer relocation payments 
to TSOs at airports undergoing an SPP transition? If so, what is the 
current amount of the relocation payment? Does TSA have public guidance 
that explains the circumstances for offering relocation payments? And 
has TSA communicated this policy to SPP contractors?
    Answer. Yes, TSA has the authority to offer a relocation payment in 
accordance with TSA Management Directive 1000.12, Authorization and 
Reimbursement for Relocations. TSA has traditionally offered a fixed 
relocation payment of $10,000 for Continental United States relocations 
and $14,999 for to/from Outside Continental United States locations, to 
permanent TSA employees whose positions have been eliminated and would 
be involuntarily separated if they do not transfer to a new position.
    TSA does not have public guidance explaining the circumstances for 
offering relocation payments. The TSO relocation policy is a policy 
that contractors and airport authorities are aware of as it is part of 
our involuntary workforce reduction policy. It only applies to airports 
when they transition from Federal to private screening.

    Question 2. TSA has recently collaborated with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) over the testing of facial recognition 
technology. In the September 11th, 2019 Commerce Committee hearing, you 
noted that in the biometric pilot programs currently underway TSA only 
stores facial data captured at security checkpoints for the duration of 
time it takes to match the identification (passport, drivers license, 
etc.) provided by the traveler.
    How long does it take to complete an identification match using the 
biometric technology currently active in TSA's pilot programs?
    Answer. The time it takes to complete an identification match is 
dependent on multiple variables that include the quality of the 
captured photograph, quality of the reference photograph, lighting 
conditions, types of physical credentials that are being scanned, and 
network bandwidth availability. There are two types of biometrics 
technology solutions that TSA is testing for the checkpoint for 
different target populations. For the Trusted Traveler populations (TSA 
PreCheck and CBP Global Entry), TSA is working with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) in piloting a one to many, or 1:N facial 
recognition solution in Terminal F in Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport that leverages the CBP Traveler Verification 
Service (TVS). In the 1:N solution, facial images are captured at the 
checkpoint and compared to a gallery of reference photographs that have 
been pre-staged. The time to match for this solution has consistently 
been under 2 seconds.
    For the non-Trusted Traveler populations, TSA (without CBP) is 
prototyping a one to one, or 1:1 facial matching solution that enhances 
the Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) machine by adding a 
local camera and facial matching capability. TSA has conducted pilots 
to test 1:1 biometric matching in TSA Pre3 lanes, but is also 
exploring this solution for the general traveling public. Under this 
solution, the device (CAT + Camera) scans the physical ID tendered by 
the passenger at the checkpoint (i.e., passports, driver's license) and 
compares the passenger's facial image stored on his or her identity 
documents with the passenger's live facial image captured by the CAT + 
Camera. In this solution, there is no backend gallery of reference 
photographs since the live face is locally matched against the 
photograph on the tendered ID. The speed of this match is primarily 
dependent on the quality of the live face capture and the quality of 
the ID photograph. TSA does not currently have operational data to 
quantify the average time to match. TSA conducted a pilot using CAT + 
Camera over 30-days in Las Vegas McCarran Airport in September 2019 and 
submitted the collected data to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) for a scientific 
analysis that we expect will show the average processing time for this 
solution.

    Question 3. What are TSA's plans for the wider adoption of facial 
recognition technology outside its current pilot programs?
    Answer. In October 2018, Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) published the TSA Biometrics Roadmap for Aviation Security and 
the Passenger Experience (Biometrics Roadmap), which will guide the 
agency's biometric efforts in the coming years and articulates clear 
pathways to improve security, safeguard the Nation's transportation 
system, and accelerate the speed of action through smart investments 
and collaborative partnerships. Integrating biometrics into the 
checkpoint will enable TSA to further strengthen its security baseline, 
more effectively deter and detect bad actors, and better measure 
performance of security measures against adversaries trying to gain 
access to the airport sterile environment. TSA's Biometrics Roadmap 
centers on four goals, primarily aligned to the aviation passenger 
profile:

        Partner with CBP on biometrics for international travelers

        Operationalize biometrics for TSA Pre3 travelers

        Expand biometrics to additional domestic travelers

        Develop supporting infrastructure for biometric solutions

    TSA is exploring biometric technology solutions using 1:N 
``tokenless'' facial recognition and 1:1 facial matching to provide 
automated verification of identities at the Travel Document Checker 
(TDC) position at the checkpoint. A 1:N solution provides a more 
seamless passenger experience since he or she does not have to produce 
a physical credential but requires a backend gallery of pre-staged 
photos to be matched against the passenger as he or she comes through 
the checkpoint. 1:1 does require the passenger to produce a physical 
credential with which to assert his or her identity at the checkpoint; 
the live face is captured and compared to the photograph on the 
physical credential for a match. This solution does not require a 
backend gallery of photographs, but does represent a less seamless 
passenger experience.
    For 1:N testing, TSA is leveraging CBP's TVS to verify the 
identities of Trusted Travelers. In parallel, TSA is evaluating 1:1 
technology solutions that use TSA's Credential Authentication 
Technology (CAT).
    In August 2019, TSA piloted a proof of concept that equipped a CAT 
device with a camera (CAT-C) at the checkpoint at McCarran 
International Airport in Las Vegas. The CAT-C device was used to 
validate that the identity document a passenger presented was 
authentic; collect the photo image and biographic information from the 
passenger's document; and capture the passenger's live facial image. 
The CAT-C device compared a live facial image to the image on the 
passenger's identity document, and once a matching result was recorded, 
TSA personnel directed the passenger to the standard manual TDC 
process.
    Over the course of FY20, TSA will continue to test and refine these 
1:1 and 1:N solutions in coordination with interagency and industry 
partners. FY20 systems development, pilots, data collection, and post-
pilot analyses will culminate in a set of validated and defensible 
requirements for program investment decisions in FY21 and beyond. These 
investment decisions in Q1 FY21 will inform TSA's acquisition path 
forward on the facial recognition solution at TSA checkpoints and guide 
TSA's plans for the long term adoption of biometric capabilities at the 
checkpoint in the coming years. These solutions may include 1:1 and 1:N 
matching that will build upon TSA's underlying technology platforms to 
enhance security effectiveness, capture operational efficiencies, and 
transform the passenger experience as articulated in the Biometrics 
Roadmap published on TSA.gov in late 2018. TSA is also partnering with 
the Office of Biometric Identity Management on a long-term strategy for 
use of biometrics across all transit modes.

    Question 4. What are TSA's plans for communication with the public 
on TSA's use of the technology?
    Answer. Recognizing the need to communicate the Transportation 
Security Administration's (TSA) approach for developing and 
implementing biometric solutions, TSA issued the TSA Biometrics Roadmap 
for Aviation Security & the Passenger Experience in September 2018. The 
Roadmap is available to the public at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
    TSA also maintains a publicly available ``Biometrics Technology'' 
page at https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology, which provides 
information on how TSA is using biometrics to improve aviation security 
by modernizing aviation passenger identity verification, including 
facial recognition technology.
    Where TSA has piloted facial recognition technology, TSA has 
provided English and Spanish signage at the airport in close proximity 
to the dedicated test lanes to provide notice to passengers. TSA 
personnel monitoring the testing also had English and Spanish hand-outs 
providing additional information about TSA's screening technology and 
data protection procedures. These signs and hand-outs also advised the 
public that participation is voluntary.
    TSA has relied upon a number of publicly available Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIAs), which can be found on the DHS Privacy Office's 
public-facing website for review at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/
departure-information-systems-test. These PIAs will be updated and 
strengthened as necessary as biometric identification develops further. 
Should TSA fully operationalize facial recognition technology, it will 
continue to provide robust notice and meaningful choice of 
alternatives.
    Additionally, as required by the TSA Modernization Act (Public Law 
115-254, Oct. 5, 2018), TSA studied matching performance differences 
across biometric systems and operational environments to identify the 
risk of different error rates that correlate with user race, gender, 
and age and other grounds. Earlier this year, TSA provided a report to 
Congress that includes an assessment of these issues.

    Question 5. Until 2016, new TSOs often completed their training 
requirements at or near their home airports. TSOs now receive 
centralized training at the TSA Academy located at the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center in Georgia.
    A 2018 GAO report noted that TSA has not identified performance 
goals or measures to assess the benefits of the TSO Basic Program. 
Since the publication of the report, has TSA taken any steps to 
identify metrics to assess the effectiveness of the TSO Basic Program? 
What are these metrics? Has TSA come to any conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the centralized TSO training model?
    Answer. In response to Government Accountability Office Audit 
180552 ``AVIATION SECURITY: Basic Training Program for Transportation 
Security Officers Would Benefit from Performance Goals and Measures,'' 
TSA instituted a series of benchmarks regarding the in-residence TSO 
Basic Training Program (TSO-BPT) conducted at the TSA-Academy (TSA-A) 
that newly hired Transportation Security Officers (TSO) attend.
    The metric for the first time pass rate on the Image Interpretation 
Test (IIT) was set at 90 percent for all TSO-BTP graduates. The IIT 
first time pass rate for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 was 95 percent. TSO-BTP 
graduates from the TSA-A continue to excel on this measure.
    TSOs are administered a Job Knowledge Test (JKT) at the end of TSO-
BTP. TSA established a metric of a first time pass rate of 95 percent 
for the JKT. For FY 2019, the overall first-time pass rate for the TSO-
BTP JKT was 99.8 percent. TSO-BTP graduates continue to demonstrate 
mastery of the topics trained at TSA-A.
    To provide an additional measure of performance of skills taught 
during TSO-BTP, a Practical Observation Laboratory (POL) was developed. 
The POL provides TSO-BTP students the opportunity to demonstrate their 
mastery of the standard Pat-Down procedure taught in the program. In FY 
2019, 99.3 percent of all TSO-BTP students at TSA-A completed the POL 
and demonstrated their mastery of the Pat-down techniques.
    In an effort to better measure the impact of TSO-BTP on employee 
engagement, TSA added two questions to the Standard Level 1 Course 
Evaluation:

  (1)  I recommend TSA as a good place to work.

  (2)  I am satisfied with my job.

    These questions mirror questions asked on the Federal Employee 
Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). After completing all necessary internal 
reviews and approvals, the new Level 1 survey with the two new 
questions was released at the beginning of FY 2020. The timing of the 
release will provide TSA with a full year of data for comparison to the 
ongoing FEVS data collection.

    Question 6. TSA has continued to develop and implement enhanced 
screening techniques and technology at airports, including enhanced 
pat-downs, full-body scanners, and in-depth examination of carry-on 
baggage.
    Has TSA increased its detection of potential threats as a result of 
enhanced screenings conducted via pat-downs and full-body scanners? If 
so, what statistics can you provide to support this conclusion?
    Answer. Currently, TSA does not have any covert testing data to 
indicate whether enhanced screenings conducted via pat-downs and full-
body scanners introduced in the past several years has increased 
detection of potential threats in the checkpoint environment. TSA 
initiated covert testing in August 2019 that is intended to understand 
whether checkpoint security effectiveness is increasing or decreasing 
over time, and if possible, associate changes in the screening system 
to changes in effectiveness. While such testing will be unable to speak 
to the impact of past improvements, our initial baseline statistics are 
anticipated to be available in second quarter of FY 2020.

    Question 7. With the launch of the TSA Pre-Check program, 
passengers are permitted to keep their shoes on through all parts of 
the screening process while general boarding passengers are not.
    In light of the use of enhanced screening technology at airports, 
including full-body scanners, what is the security value of requiring 
general boarding passengers to remove their shoes? Does TSA have any 
plans to revisit the policy in the future?
    Answer. Currently, passengers who go through the standard screening 
process are required to remove their shoes so they can be screened via 
x-ray for non-metallic explosives. TSA routinely reviews its policies 
and procedures for shoe screening to evaluate the risk versus passenger 
experience. TSA will evaluate any new transportation security equipment 
capable of shoe screening through technology demonstrations as they 
become available.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
Public-Private Partnerships
    Question 1. Over the years, the TSA has utilized various public-
private partnerships to revolutionize airport security and decrease 
wait times. As an example, the Indianapolis International Airport was 
one of the first facilities to test and deploy TSA's new CT scanners, 
leveraging a strong industrial partnership. As a result, Hoosier 
confidence and satisfaction improved.
    Can you speak to how the TSA can further improve its internal 
processes from the private sector?
    Answer. TSA's Innovation Task Force (ITF) demonstration processes 
provide industry with increased access to operational data that allows 
vendors to better integrate technology and develop or refine solutions 
to better meet TSA's needs. The ITF process has created strong 
relationships with security technology vendors, the airline industry, 
and airport authorities by working closely on matters that were not 
previously addressed by TSA.
    The culmination of upgrades to current technology, future 
capabilities, enhancements to processes and training delivery, long-
term investment strategy, and future requirements and acquisitions, 
supports a system-of-systems approach that positions TSA to address 
identified and emerging security capability gaps, and also improve 
security and the customer experience. Since its inception in 2016, ITF 
has demonstrated 23 solutions from 22 solution providers. These 
demonstrations have informed eight TSA requirement documents--
Capability Analysis Reports, Operational Requirements Documents, and 
Functional Requirements Documents--and four of TSA's acquisition and 
procurement decisions.

    Question 2. Can you speak to how the TSA can further improve its 
internal processes from the private sector? With the agency having to 
quickly adapt to identify threats, what are the agency's priorities 
when assessing public-private partnerships?
    Answer. TSA created a Capability Acceptance Process (CAP) within 
Acquisition Program Management (APM) to evaluate offers of 
transportation security equipment (TSE) and related services from the 
private sector. Under this program, TSA considers multiple variables 
when assessing partnership offers, such as its impact to airport 
security screening, the full life-cycle cost of the donation, and its 
effect to TSA operations, including staffing and training. TSA 
addresses these considerations through a business case analysis with 
various TSA stakeholders that identifies the overall value of the 
proposed offer of TSE. Priorities are given to those offers that 
advance airport security screening more efficiently, effectively, and 
rapidly while minimizing overall costs for TSA. While the program 
primarily focuses on already qualified TSE, emerging technologies are 
also considered if they promote the fielding of improved capabilities 
at U.S. airports. As of October 2019, APM is working with 13 private 
entities on offers of 140 pieces of equipment.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Biometrics. In August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security 
released a report titled ``Transportation Security Administration and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Deployment of Biometric 
Technologies'' that states that ``no bias based on demographics has 
been statistically identified'' in current biometric systems used by 
CBP or TSA. However, this seems to conflict with other studies showing 
that biometric facial identification systems have significant rates of 
error. For example, a 2012 study co-authored by the FBI showed 
significant error rates in facial recognition with ethnic minority 
groups, young people, and women.
    Question 1. What specific information is DHS relying on to conclude 
there are no demographic biases in the technology it is using?
    Anseer. On October 3, 2018, Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization 
Act of 2018, which was signed into law shortly thereafter. Section 1919 
of the Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a 
report to Congress, with assessments from the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA) Administrator and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection's (CBP) Commissioner relating to biometric technologies. The 
statement referenced is found in the Executive Summary of the report 
and is in relation to CBP's analysis on its Traveler Verification 
Service (TVS) system performance.
    CBP measures and evaluates true match and non-match rates, as well 
as false match and non-match rates to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of system effectiveness in alignment with its mission. 
CBP analyzes for demographic biases in its biometric exit systems. 
Based on the Key Performance Parameters in section VI(A) of the TSA/CBP 
report, no bias based on demographics was statistically identified in 
its approach. However, biometric match performance shows greater 
correlation to operational and environmental conditions, such as 
lighting. The report also notes that CBP actively makes improvements 
and engages in public dialogue on appropriate standards.
    TSA is aware of a variety of concerns related to performance 
issues, including inadequate demographic performance, and takes this 
issue seriously. There have been significant improvements in the 
accuracy rates of facial recognition algorithms. According to the most 
recent Facial Recognition Vendor Test, administered by the NIST, there 
have been significant advancements in facial recognition technology, 
with many algorithms operating 20 times better in 2018 than the best 
products did in 2013. The same report noted that additional gains are 
expected as this technology continues to develop.

    Question 2. How does TSA intend to notify the public about its 
increased use of biometric information? Will it provide an easily 
readable summary of its policy for use of biometrics?
    Answer. TSA issued the TSA Biometrics Roadmap for Aviation Security 
& the Passenger Experience in September 2018 to explain its approach 
for developing and implementing biometric solutions. The Roadmap is 
available to the public at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/
tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf.
    TSA also maintains a publicly available ``Biometrics Technology'' 
page at https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology, which provides 
information on how TSA is using biometrics to improve aviation security 
by modernizing aviation passenger identity verification.
    TSA's piloting of facial recognition technology exemplifies its 
approach to passenger notification. Pursuant to Section 208 of the E-
Government Act of 2002 and Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, TSA also provides notice to the public of its biometric 
technology pilots via publicly available Privacy Impact Assessments 
(PIAs). These PIAs are available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/
dhscbppia-056-traveler-verification-service-0 and https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/dhstsapia-046-travel-document-checker-automation-using-
facial-recognition. TSA will continue to comply with DHS privacy policy 
throughout each phase of TSA's biometric solution development--from 
initial design to implementation.
    As part of its facial recognition biometrics technology pilots with 
CBP, TSA has made pilot information available via public signage at 
pilot sites. Additionally, in its facial matching biometric technology 
pilots, TSA has provided English and Spanish signage at the airport in 
close proximity to the dedicated test lanes to provide immediate notice 
to passengers. TSA personnel monitoring the testing had English and 
Spanish hand-outs available that provided additional information about 
TSA's screening technology and data protection procedures. These signs 
and hand-outs also notified the public that participation is completely 
voluntary.

    Surface Transportation Security Strategy. TSA plays a critical role 
in securing our surface transportation network. The TSA Modernization 
Act required TSA to assess the vulnerabilities of all surface 
transportation modes and develop a risk-based surface transportation 
security strategy.
    Question 3. What is the status of TSA's risk-based surface 
transportation security strategy?
    Answer. The ``TSA Surface Transportation Security Assessment'' that 
satisfies the requirement in Section 1964(a) of the TSA Modernization 
Act addressing vulnerabilities of and risks to, surface transportation 
systems, was completed on October 18, 2019. TSA's development and 
implementation of a cross-cutting, risk-based ``Surface Transportation 
Security Strategy'' that will meet the requirement in Section 1964(b) 
of the TSA Modernization Act is currently on schedule to be completed 
prior to the April 15, 2020 due date.
    TSA's FY 2020 budget requested just $72 million for Surface 
Security Operations, a 45 percent decrease from FY 2019 appropriated 
amounts.

    Question 4. Does this decrease reflect a decrease in the risks 
associated with surface transportation?
    Answer. This decrease does not reflect a decrease in the risks 
associated with surface transportation as there has not been a 
significant change in the overall risk to surface transportation. The 
reduction to the Surface Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 budget request is a 
result of the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program 
elimination. This past year, TSA pursued several key initiatives to 
enhance our efforts to identify and reduce gaps in surface 
transportation security. Notably, TSA established the Surface 
Transportation Security Advisory Committee to advise, consult with, 
report to, and make recommendations to the TSA Administrator on surface 
transportation security matters, including the development, refinement, 
and implementation of policies, programs, initiatives, rulemakings, and 
security directives pertaining to surface transportation security. TSA 
also elevated Surface Operations to the Assistant Administrator level 
within Security Operations, increased partnership with the 
Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group, updated the agency's 
Surface Risk Assessment, and continues to build cybersecurity and 
intelligence expertise in the surface space.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                         Patricia F.S. Cogswell
    As we discussed earlier this month, passenger wait times have been 
increasing at Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP) International Airport. Between 
2012 and 2017, MSP passenger traffic increased 12 percent while TSA 
reduced its number of screeners by 6 percent. Last month, I sent a 
letter to Administrator Pekoske urging TSA to increase the authorized 
staffing levels at MSP to help reduce wait times.
    Question 1. Can you provide an update on what TSA has done to 
address passenger wait times and improve coordination with MSP since 
our discussion?
    Answer. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP), like many 
other airports, is experiencing significant passenger growth, which 
affects passenger wait times. TSA monitors passenger volume during peak 
times to minimize passenger wait times, while ensuring security 
effectiveness. For FY 2019, TSA increased the Transportation Security 
Officer frontline authorization at MSP by 3.5 percent over FY18 levels, 
raising the authorized staffing level from 631 to 653 full-time 
equivalents (FTE). We also provided additional FTE to MSP to assist 
with passenger queueing during the new airport construction project 
that is ongoing. Terminal 1 Departure Hall construction began in the 
2nd quarter of 2018, with the most significant impact to security 
checkpoint access from August 18, 2019 through October 8, 2019. While 
MSP suspended impactful construction during the holidays, construction 
will continue to impact the passenger experience at MSP well into 2021-
2022. TSA currently staffs all the security checkpoint lanes required 
to meet passenger demand based on passenger estimates provided by air 
carriers.
    Staffing and scheduling subject matter experts completed a site 
visit to MSP in late July 2019. This visit validated TSA's staffing 
model for MSP and ensures that MSP staffing requirements are accurately 
represented based on the airport's operating characteristics. TSA made 
several updates to account for recent configuration changes and the 
planned increase in passenger throughput. These changes will influence 
the 2020 staffing budget for MSP. TSA conducted a follow-up visit and 
discussion during the week of November 4, 2019.
    In addition, it is important to note that the TSA Federal Security 
Director at MSP meets regularly with MSP management to discuss 
operations, especially with the ongoing construction project at the 
airport.

    Question 2. What is TSA doing to ensure that airports across the 
country have the staffing they need to reduce wait times while also 
improving security?
    Answer. TSA is constantly finding ways to improve security and 
reduce wait times at airports across the country. We ensure our success 
in these two areas through the effective management of resources, 
constant improvement in screening technology and operating procedures, 
and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
ensure our budget requests accurately represent our staffing 
requirements. TSA has a best practice staffing model, validated by the 
Government Accountability Office that effectively determines staffing 
resource requirements at each location based on airport specific 
inputs, including space constraints at the airport. This same model 
informs TSA's budget requests and ensures that as the number of 
passengers increases and airport infrastructure changes, our budgets 
support our updated staffing requirements.
    TSA may also utilize the National Deployment Office to deploy 
additional Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), to provide 
supplemental screening resources at airports. This type of support is 
typically reserved for seasonal peaks, at special events, during 
crises, and periods of other personnel shortages. For example, this may 
occur at airports unable to hire to their established staffing model, 
airports where passenger volumes are expected to exceed forecasts, or 
those that TSA leadership has determined need additional resources to 
mitigate risk.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Question 1. Ms. Cogswell, what has been the overall cost to TSA for 
the roughly 350 personnel reassigned to the southern border? What is 
the cost for the roughly 180 personnel currently assigned to the 
border, and what is the current timeline for their return to their 
normal duties within TSA?
    Answer. As of October 31, 2019 TSA had deployed a total of 368 
general support volunteers. The overall cost to TSA for FY 2019 is 
approximately $2,517,000. Currently, TSA has 85 employees deployed on 
the Southwest Border. The cost for pay period 19 is approximately 
$231,000. All TSA employees returned from the Southwest Border prior to 
December 23, 2019.

    Question 2. As to the reprogramming of funds to support immigration 
enforcement, you mentioned in your answers that accounts were carefully 
selected and activities were delayed as a result. I would like more 
detail on where the funds were pulled from, how the loss of funds 
affected those accounts and programs, and the expected timeline for 
recovery of those accounts and programs.
    Answer. TSA selected funding to support immigration enforcement 
from programs based on their execution status and lower security risk. 
$19.9 million of the $23.8 million transferred by TSA was from the FY 
2019 operations and support account. From this account, TSA deferred a 
Federal Air Marshal Service workers' compensation obligation for 
payment to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) by one year. Worker's 
compensation bills are payable 2 years in arrears, thus the funding 
must be obligated and paid to DOL in FY 2020. The Surface funding 
accrued as a result of unused payroll due to Surface Inspectors and 
VIPR programs vacancies, as programs prioritize hiring in higher-risk 
aviation sectors. The recently passed TSA Modernization Act prioritizes 
surface security and requires a reorganization and reprioritization of 
surface security activities, which is expected to improve execution and 
hiring in this area. For the FY 2018 and no-year account funding TSA 
opted to curtail some travel and small procurements; these are not 
recurring reductions and the programs have normal funding levels in FY 
2020.
    The following detailed breakout shows funding sources:

    Transportation Security Administration ($23.8M):

    FY 2019 Operations and Support ($19.9M):

   $13.9M transferred from Federal Air Marshals delaying the 
        Federal Air Marshals' workers' compensation bill payment to DOL 
        into FY 2020.

   $6.0M transferred from Surface Programs resulting in limited 
        impact since funding accrued as a result of payroll underburn.

    FY 2018 Operations and Support ($3.3M):

   $0.54M transferred from Canines

   $0.04M transferred from Federal Air Marshals

   $2.1M transferred from Mission Support

   $0.06M transferred from Secure Flight

   $0.33M transferred from Surface Programs

   $0.2M transferred from Vetting Programs

    No-Year Accounts ($0.58M):

   $0.51M transferred from miscellaneous Program Projects & 
        Activities in TSA's FY 2004 Aviation Security accounts (P.L. 
        108-90).

   $0.07M transferred from miscellaneous Program Projects & 
        Activities in TSA's FY 2005 Aviation Security accounts (P.L. 
        108-334).

    Question 3. The collection of biometrics demands a high level of 
transparency to the general public. Does TSA plan to publish reports on 
the real world effectiveness of the facial recognition programs that 
have been tested in several airports? I would like to know how TSA is 
evaluating these programs in terms of bias, incorrect matches, and 
overall efficiency for screening and security.
    Answer. We are aware of concerns related to performance issues, 
including inadequate demographic performance, and take this issue 
seriously. TSA is working closely with government partners such as CBP, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and DHS 
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to develop, test, and refine 
biometric technology.
    TSA is engaged in a multi-phase prototyping and piloting effort 
that will be designed to carefully assess security effectiveness and 
operational efficiency as a part of its biometrics technology testing 
and development in the field. Each phase is described in detail through 
discrete Privacy Impact Assessments that are published on the DHS 
Privacy Office's website. It is too early to affirmatively state that 
the analysis of the various phases of the testing process will be 
publicly available since we are still conducting pilots and assessing 
the results. However, the effectiveness of these technologies in the 
real world is of vital concern to TSA because the technologies will not 
provide security value if they are not effective across the entire 
population. As such, TSA has defined a disciplined acquisitions process 
approved by TSA's Component Acquisitions Executive that specifies 
comprehensive testing and transparent review processes to ensure that 
any facial capabilities satisfactorily address the whole spectrum of 
system performance concerns.
    To note, there have been significant improvements in the accuracy 
rates of facial recognition algorithms. According to the most recent 
Facial Recognition Vendor Test, administered by the NIST, there have 
been significant advancements in facial recognition technology, with 
many algorithms operating 20 times better in 2018 than the best 
products did in 2013. The same report noted that additional gains are 
expected as this technology continues to develop.
    Additionally, TSA is also performing specific testing and 
evaluation to assess the impact of biometrics on screening and security 
and will communicate results as they become available.
    For the most recent pilot at LAS in September 2019, TSA is working 
with S&T to conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis on the test. 
The conclusions will evaluate performance metrics for demographic 
performance, incorrect matches, and overall efficiency for screening 
and security.
    To investigate and address potential inadequate demographic 
performance in facial recognition technology, S&T has been researching 
the demographic effects in facial recognition and their dependence on 
image acquisition. The results of this research will help provide 
insight into how the magnitude of measured demographic effects depend 
on image acquisition, and thus, biometric accuracy. Additionally, S&T 
has been working to develop a framework for classifying biometric 
performance differentials that separately consider the effect of false 
positive and false negative outcomes. Concurrently, S&T has been 
conducting face recognition algorithm performance research, and the 
results demonstrate that false positive outcomes of face recognition 
systems are not simply linked to a single demographic factor, and that 
there needs to be careful consideration of interactions between 
multiple factors to evaluate the equitability of facial recognition 
systems.

    Question 4. Along those same lines, what is the expected timeline 
for rolling out facial recognition technology broadly? Does TSA have 
any plans to expand their use of other facial recognition technology 
beyond what has been deployed in its pilot programs? If facial 
recognition technology is broadly deployed, does TSA have any plans to 
share collected face biometrics with other agencies or private 
companies? Or to create an internal database of face biometrics? Or to 
check face biometrics against private or public databases outside of 
the Federal government, e.g., state drivers' license databases? Are 
there any plans to test or implement constant live facial recognition 
in airports to passively identify travelers? And finally, if broadly 
deployed, will TSA continue with opt-in screenings or will it switch to 
an opt-out model?
    Answer. Over the course of FY 2020, TSA will continue to test and 
refine potential facial recognition and facial matching technology 
solutions in coordination with interagency and industry partners. FY 
2020 systems development, pilots, data collection, and post-pilot 
analyses will culminate in a set of validated and defensible 
requirements to inform program investment decisions in FY 2021 and 
beyond. Those decisions will influence TSA's acquisition approach and 
guide its plans for the long term adoption of biometric capabilities at 
the checkpoint.
    TSA is exploring alternate biometric technology solutions using 1:N 
``tokenless'' facial recognition and 1:1 facial matching to provide 
automated verification of identities at the TDC position at the 
checkpoint. 1:N matching compares a live image capture against a number 
(N) of records in the reference database, and 1:1 matching compares a 
live image capture of the passenger against a single record (e.g., his/
her passport photo). For 1:N testing, TSA is leveraging CBP TVS to 
verify the identities of Trusted Travelers. In parallel, TSA is 
evaluating 1:1 technology solutions that leverage TSA's Credential 
Authentication Technology.
    TSA is evaluating these potential technology solutions as a means 
to improve security at the TSA screening checkpoint by verifying the 
identities of passengers more effectively and efficiently using 
biometrics. Such technology may allow TSA to automate and improve upon 
functions that are currently performed manually at the TDC position at 
entry point to the TSA Checkpoint, which would both permit TSOs at the 
checkpoint to provide increased attention to other security tasks, and 
improve the passenger experience at the checkpoint.

   TSA has no current plans to share collected face biometrics 
        with other agencies or private companies.

   TSA has no plans to create an internal database of passenger 
        photographs, except for those in the voluntarily vetted 
        populations covered by specific programs such as PreCheck.

   TSA has no plans to check facial biometrics against private 
        or public databases outside of the Federal Government, 
        including state Department of Motor Vehicle databases.

   TSA has no plans to test or implement constant live facial 
        recognition in airports to passively identify travelers; it is 
        solely testing the potential use of facial recognition 
        technology for identity verification purposes of individuals 
        presenting themselves at the checkpoint based on the credential 
        presented.

    Currently, participation in TSA's biometric technology pilots is 
completely voluntary and passengers have the ability to opt-in into 
various biometric pilots. TSA will continue to inform and engage with 
Congress as it carries out the goals in TSA's Biometrics Roadmap, 
published in September 2018.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Question 1. I want to thank all the Transportation Security 
Officers (``TSOs'') who help protect our Nation every day. In June, 
five TSOs were attacked at a checkpoint at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport. 
Has TSA reviewed the events of the attack and determined what measures 
it can undertake to protect officers from future attacks?
    Answer. Following the June event at Phoenix Sky Harbor 
International Airport (PHX), TSA took several steps to prepare and 
protect officers against future attacks. First, we created a short 
video briefing on the attack at PHX, which includes testimonials from 
the TSOs involved and provides guidance for those who may be suddenly 
confronted by an assailant in the future. The video briefing is 
required viewing for everyone at TSA (with completion by the end of the 
calendar year). Second, we will incorporate relevant scenarios into FY 
2020 National Training Plan to include ``what-if'' sessions to serve as 
refreshers of the steps to take should a similar event occur.
    Individuals who attack TSOs may face local, state or Federal 
criminal charges. TSA ensures that local police review all cases to 
determine if criminal charges can be issued and will support the 
prosecution of all suspected attackers. In addition, TSA initiates a 
separate civil enforcement case against individuals who attack TSOs, 
regardless of whether the TSO was physically injured in the attack, for 
which the maximum fine is $13,333.

    Question 2. Acting Deputy Administrator Cogswell, as you know, 
Phoenix Sky Harbor was one of the first airports in the country to use 
checkpoint-based Computed Tomography (``CT'') technology to improve 
overall security in airports. Is this new CT technology providing 
better screening and speeding up the screening lines at checkpoints? 
When will travelers not have to remove their laptops and 3-1-1 liquids 
from their carry-on bags?
    Answer. Computed Tomography (CT) provides 3-D images to TSOs 
allowing them to more easily identify objects which were difficult to 
identify on older 2-D image systems. The 3-D image provides the Officer 
better views of the contents of the carry-on baggage. This allows for a 
more complete analysis as compared to the current X-ray systems. CT 
capabilities include enhanced visual interpretation, image 
manipulation, improved detection of homemade explosives, reduced false 
alarm rates, and reduced threat mass detection compared to current AT 
systems.
    Regarding throughput, with the introduction of any new technology 
there is a learning curve for both passengers and TSOs. TSA anticipated 
that initially the new CT systems to be somewhat slower than existing 
AT systems, however as TSOs and passengers become more familiar with 
CT, lane throughput would improve. Additionally, as TSA continues with 
the formal program of record to procure additional CT systems, the 
ancillary equipment, like automatic diverters and automated screening 
lanes, will bolster throughput.
    Passengers in CT lanes will not have to remove their laptops from 
their carry-on baggage. We have also recently begun demonstrating the 
reduced threat mass algorithm to enable passengers to leave the 3-1-1 
liquids, gels and aerosols (LGA) in their bags. At all other airports 
not involved in the testing, the current liquids, gels and aerosols 
requirements will remain unchanged, and passengers will still be 
required to divest 3-1-1 LGA.

    Question 3. Arizona's airports are on the cutting edge of new 
technology to keep our transportation system secure. For example, 
Phoenix Mesa-Gateway Airport is involved in the pilot program for 
automated Exit Lane technology at small airports. What are the benefits 
we expect to see from the automated exit lanes at smaller airports?
    Answer. Automated exit lane technologies offer potential to reduce 
personnel requirements and expense by replacing human exit lane 
monitors with a more secure means of reducing unauthorized access. Such 
technology can increase the safety of security personnel by more 
clearly identifying persons of interest while affording opportunity for 
better containment, improve law enforcement response time by providing 
real-time visual or closed-circuit television coverage, and alert a 
wide range of operational and response personnel of ongoing potential 
hazardous or dangerous security incidents. Automated exit lane 
technologies also significantly reduce the risk of requiring a complete 
evacuation of a concourse or gate area and the rescreening all 
occupants, which can cause delays, reduce public confidence, and result 
in large expenses.

    Question 4. When Phoenix Sky Harbor closes the outdated Terminal 2 
and completes the modernization of Terminal 3, the TSA has told the 
airport that TSA will not pay to move screening machines to the 
expanded Terminal 3 checkpoint. Why doesn't TSA pay to move or install 
its equipment when airports modernize or make improvements to screening 
areas? Why are these costs the responsibility of the airport?
    Answer. The City of Phoenix--Aviation Department is initiating and 
sponsoring the move of terminal operations from Terminal 2 to Terminal 
3. As outlined in TSA Checkpoint Requirements and Planning Guide, dated 
December 17, 2018, the project sponsor (in this case The City of 
Phoenix--Aviation Department) is responsible for all aspects of the 
project, including basic engineering, hiring of a licensed 
architectural and engineering firm, communications, master planning, 
project management, and other appropriate design functions and funding. 
Examples of sponsor-driven projects include new or renovated 
checkpoint(s) driven by increased capacity, the addition of lanes, new 
terminals, etc.
    TSA assumes responsibility of paying for the move or installation 
of screening equipment when a project is initiated and sponsored by 
TSA, such as the upcoming installation of Checkpoint CT equipment at 
selected airports across the Nation, including Phoenix Sky Harbor 
International Airport.

    Question 5. The Registered Traveler Program--a public-private 
partnership to develop safe and efficient checkpoint processes--has 
been a great success and encouraged innovative thinking about airport 
security. How do you see the Credential Authentication Technology roll-
out intersecting with the Registered Traveler Program? Can you commit 
that you will have a working solution that does not harm the Registered 
Traveler Program?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) 
Registered Traveler (RT) program does not create any role for the 
private sector at the checkpoint, which is manned exclusively by U.S. 
Government employees or contractors performing security screening 
functions. Separate from the security screening process, the RT program 
is a business opportunity for private-sector firms to provide identity 
verification under contract with airport operators and air carriers, 
not with TSA. CLEAR is the only firm pursuing this opportunity to act 
as a RT service provider, operating at about seven percent of federally 
regulated airports. At those airports, a CLEAR employee verifies the 
identity of CLEAR's paying customers before they reach the checkpoint. 
The employee then escorts these customers to the head of line at the 
TSA checkpoint, where the employee positively hands-off the passenger 
to a TSA TSO at the TDC part of the checkpoint.
    The deployment of Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which 
is underway, will significantly enhance TSA's ability to perform the 
critical TDC checkpoint security functions as well as support 
innovations such as the Flexible Lane Experience, an adaptable 
screening process that focuses on risk.
    TSA has worked collaboratively for more than two years with CLEAR 
to improve its performance of the RT service provider functions. For 
instance, TSA invested significant time and resources to assist CLEAR 
in bringing its information systems security controls up to NIST 
standards to ensure the protection of RT customer data. Additionally, 
TSA leadership has met with CLEAR's executives multiple times on 
matters related to RT. With the ongoing deployment of CAT, TSA 
technical experts continue to regularly engage with CLEAR to identify 
ways CLEAR passengers could interact with CAT in an expedited fashion. 
To that end, TSA is working with CLEAR to sign a Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreement.

    Question 6. We have heard concerns from stakeholders about high 
levels of turnover in the TSO workforce. A March 2019 report from the 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General 
entitled, TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train its 
Transportation Security Officers, outlines a number of challenges and 
recommendations regarding the TSO workforce. Stakeholders point to TSO 
compensation schedule as a major challenge to employee retention.

   What is TSA learning from its exit surveys regarding staff 
        retention challenges and how is it using this information to 
        improve retention?

   What is TSA doing to improve recruitment and retention of 
        staff? What incentives are available and how are you tracking 
        the effectiveness of these incentives? What have the outcomes 
        of these efforts been so far?

   What impact would moving TSO positions to the General 
        Schedule (``GS'') pay scale have on recruitment and retention 
        of TSOs?

   Related to the impact of moving TSOs to the GS, what would 
        be the impact of creating a unified personnel system, similar 
        to that of other Federal employees, under Title Five of the 
        U.S. Code, and moving the TSO workforce to that system?

    Answer. In August 2018, TSA implemented the TSO Career Progression 
initiative, which established a clearly defined and transparent career 
path with pay increases tied to enhanced skills and the completion of 
advanced training courses such as Essentials of Leading Security 
Operations (ELSO), Essentials of Supervising Security Operations 
(ESSO), Essentials of Managing Security Operations (EMSO), and Advance 
Resolution Conversation (ARC). This program helps improve TSO retention 
by providing the workforce with transparent career pathways based on 
training and enhancement of skills.
    In addition, TSA transitioned to a two-tier performance management 
system for TSOs beginning with FY 2020 to ease the administrative 
burden on our Officers and their supervisors. Along with this, TSA is 
implementing a Model Officer Recognition initiative in calendar year 
2020 which will identify and reward our top officers for ongoing 
contributions to the mission. Under this initiative, officers may 
receive both Model Officer Monetary and Non-Monetary Awards and a Model 
Officer Pay Increase.
    TSA plans to continue to exercise its flexibility to make targeted 
changes to TSO pay to improve recruitment and retention.

    Question 7. How long, on average, does the hiring process for TSOs 
take? What are the areas in the hiring process that take the longest? 
How can (or is) TSA enhancing the hiring process to ensure it is 
recruiting and hiring qualified candidates in a reasonable timeframe? 
How can Congress support efforts to improve hiring efficiencies?
    Answer. The TSO hiring time-frame is generally viewed from two 
vantage points: 1) the operational perspective and 2) the applicant 
perspective as the TSO position is filled from a Ready Pool of 
applicants. Airports forecast their TSO hiring needs in advance in 
order to allow time for candidates to move through the entire TSO 
hiring process as it has several steps. These include the Computer-
Based Testing (CBT), which is comprised of an object recognition 
aptitude test and an English proficiency test. Candidates who pass the 
CBT are then eligible for the Airport Assessment during which 
candidates must provide proof of identity and U.S. Citizenship to 
confirm their eligibility for the TSO position. Candidates who meet 
this requirement must then successfully pass a Structured Interview 
that evaluates their competencies for the TSO position. Candidates who 
pass the Structured Interview component of the Airport Assessment then 
have their fingerprints collected in preparation for the pre-hire 
background investigation and are invited to attend the TSO Medical/Drug 
Evaluation, which determines if they meet the TSO Medical Guidelines. 
Candidates who pass the Medical/Drug Evaluation must then complete the 
Pre-hire background investigation to confirm their suitability for 
employment in a national security agency. Once all of these steps have 
been successfully completed, the candidates are then placed in the 
Ready Pool where they are immediately available for a final job offer 
when the airport has TSO hiring needs.
    From an operational perspective, hiring needs are typically met 
within 20 to 22 calendar days. From the applicant vantage point, 
however, the time-to-hire can range from 60 to 170 calendar days. These 
times can vary based on how frequently an airport conducts candidate 
assessments and extends final job offers. Typically, larger airports 
hire more frequently and, therefore, tend to process their candidates 
more quickly.
    Generally, the longest process steps are the time candidates wait 
for the airport to conduct airport assessments, as well as, the time to 
complete the pre-hire background check, and the time from the final job 
offer to entry on duty. To reduce the applicant time-to-hire, TSA is 
exploring several options. These include an enhanced CBT to help reduce 
the number of questions required in the Structured Interview and, 
therefore, reduce the duration of the Airport Assessment, which will 
increase capacity for processing candidates. Additionally, TSA is 
exploring technology that will enable the agency to remotely proctor 
the CBT thereby reducing the need for candidates to schedule an 
appointment and report to a brick and mortar facility in order to 
complete their test. Recently, TSA recently deployed a new medical 
self-scheduling tool to help shorten the time it takes for TSO 
candidates to schedule their medical/drug evaluation following the 
airport assessment. As well, the Agency has devoted resources to help 
expedite the pre-hire background investigation adjudication process for 
TSO candidates.
    The TSO hiring process designed to ensure that all of the 
candidates who are referred for selection fully meet all the 
legislative requirements for the position that are delineated in the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (PL 107-71). We 
appreciate Congress' continued support as process changes are 
implemented to continue improving TSO hiring efficiency.

    Question 8. How does TSA support TSOs for career development and 
advancement? What programs are in place to proactively develop and 
train staff in a career trajectory?
    Answer. The TSO Career Progression program provides a transparent 
and predictable career path for the TSA frontline workforce. The 
program establishes clear training requirements for each position, 
rewarding TSOs for developing their professional skills and accepting 
additional responsibility. Through the TSO Career Progression program, 
TSA improves the current organizational system by establishing greater 
clarity and predictability to a TSO's career as a professional security 
officer.
    The TSO Career Progression program consists of:

   Phase I training for newly hired Officers focusing on 
        introductory security duties.

   Phase II training conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement 
        Training Center in Glynco, GA providing the technical knowledge 
        and skills needed for on-body and carry-on baggage threat 
        detection.

   The ELSO, and the ARC courses provide advanced detection and 
        security operations management training for Lead Transportation 
        Security Officers

   The ESSO course provides Supervisory Transportation Security 
        Officers with the administrative, leadership, and technical 
        skills needed to efficiently and effectively supervise large 
        security screening operations.

   The EMSO course for Transportation Security Managers focuses 
        on advanced management skills, and providing for the security 
        and safety of the traveling public, aviation stakeholders and 
        TSA personnel.

    Question 9. Overall, what changes has TSA implemented, or would 
like to implement, to improve recruitment, retention and training of 
TSOs? What assistance does TSA need from Congress in order to improve 
TSO hiring and retention?
    Answer. In August 2018, TSA implemented the TSO Career Progression 
initiative, which established a clearly defined and transparent career 
path with pay increases tied to enhanced skills and the completion of 
advanced training courses such as Essentials of Leading Security 
Operations (ELSO), Essentials of Supervising Security Operations 
(ESSO), Essentials of Managing Security Operations (EMSO), and Advance 
Resolution Conversation (ARC). This program helps improve TSO retention 
by providing the workforce with transparent career pathways based on 
training and enhancement of skills.
    In addition, TSA transitioned to a two-tier performance management 
system for TSOs beginning with FY 2020 to ease the administrative 
burden on our Officers and their supervisors. Along with this, TSA is 
implementing a Model Officer Recognition initiative in calendar year 
2020 which will identify and reward our top officers for ongoing 
contributions to the mission. Under this initiative, officers may 
receive both Model Officer Monetary and Non-Monetary Awards and a Model 
Officer Pay Increase.
    TSA plans to continue to exercise its flexibility to make targeted 
changes to TSO pay to improve recruitment and retention.

    Question 10. TSA plays a critical role in securing pipelines and 
other critical infrastructure. I am aware of the partnership between 
TSA and CISA to improve TSA's cybersecurity strategy, to include the 
Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative and participation in the Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation Program. Please provide an update on TSA's 
cybersecurity strategy, including goals achieved since the publication 
of the 2018 cybersecurity roadmap, priorities for CY 2020, and cyber 
workforce needs to achieve near and long-term goals for these 
initiatives.
    Answer. TSA will continue to use the budgetary process to request 
additional resources to meet the goals and objectives outlined in the 
DHS Cybersecurity Strategy and the TSA Cybersecurity Roadmap. TSA is in 
the process of building its cybersecurity expertise and capacity to 
fulfill its role as a co-Sector Specific Agency for the Transportation 
Systems Sector (TSS), and is leveraging its existing personnel, 
combined with resources from within DHS, to engage with its 
stakeholders within the TSS. For example, TSA has partnered with the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the 
National Risk Management Center (NRMC) to conduct in-depth 
cybersecurity assessments at critical pipeline companies. In 2019, six 
assessments have been conducted to date, with two additional scheduled. 
NRMC will analyze data from the reviews to assess industry posture 
regarding cybersecurity and future assessment needs. TSA and CISA have 
partnered to develop additional cybersecurity assessment tools for use 
by pipeline stakeholders, as well as coordinated assessments with TSA 
and CISA. Additionally, in partnership with CISA, TSA has conducted 16 
regional surface transportation-focused and one aviation 
transportation-focused Cybersecurity Workshops.
    TSA is a member and active participant in the Aviation Cyber 
Initiative (ACI), which is a tri-chaired task force led by DHS, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
The ACI is designed to identify and analyze aviation cyber 
vulnerabilities in support of cyber risk-reduction and resiliency 
efforts within the Aviation Ecosystem, which includes both civil and 
military aviation. Additionally, TSA is currently developing and 
promoting cybersecurity-related reporting guidelines for Mass Transit 
and Freight Rail that align with Executive Orders 13636 and 13800 and 
the requirements for the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Framework (Presidential Policy Determination-41), Presidential 
Policy Determination-21, and rule making initiatives. TSA will work 
with the Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee to identify 
processes to improve cyber threat information sharing across all of the 
modes of surface transportation.

    Question 11. When CBP or ICE releases a migrant or migrant family 
on its own recognizance with a Notice to Appear (``NTA'') in 
immigration court at a future date, those migrants almost always enter 
the U.S. transportation system to travel to the location of their U.S. 
sponsor. Many migrants utilize our Nation's air travel system.

   What documents do migrants who have been released from DHS 
        custody with an NTA need to pass through TSA security 
        checkpoints at airports?
    Answer. Migrants can provide the following alternate documents at 
the checkpoint:

  1.  ICE Form I-200--Warrant for Arrest of Alien

  2.  ICE Form I-205--Warrant of Removal/Deportation

  3.  ICE Form I-220A--Order of Release on Recognizance

  4.  ICE Form I-220B--Order of Supervision

  5.  DHS Form I-862--Notice to Appear

    Upon TSA's validation of identifying information on these 
documents, TSA will proceed with screening the migrant. The validation 
occurs by communication between TSA personnel at the checkpoint, which 
will provide TSA's Identity Verification Call Center (IVCC), with the 
name and file number of the individual. The IVCC will in turn confirm 
identifying information with CBP and/or U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement records. If TSA is unable to validate the passenger's 
identity, he/she will be denied entry into the sterile area of the 
airport.

   What guidance has TSA issued to TSOs regarding how to 
        process migrants who present NTAs as part of their travel 
        documents when they pass through TSA security checkpoints?
    Answer. Guidance has been provided through an Operations Directive, 
a job aid, a Frequently Asked Questions supporting document, a National 
Shift Brief to Officers, and examples of the acceptable alternate 
forms.

   Does TSA instruct TSOs to make any additional phone calls to 
        CBP or ICE regarding the status of migrants with NTAs and their 
        ability to travel within the U.S. air travel system?
    Answer. No, Officers are instructed to validate the individual's 
identity by calling the IVCC.

   What steps has TSA taken to ensure that TSOs understand the 
        TSA guidance on how to handle migrants who present a NTA as 
        part of their travel documents?
    Answer. A briefing and review of the directive and associated job 
aid was required by all officers, and completion of the briefing and 
review is being monitored by the local training departments.

   Does TSA have any plans to change or enhance said training?
    Answer. Currently there are no plans for changes. All TSA policies 
are continuously under review and will be updated, as necessary.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to 
                        Patricia F. S. Cogswell
    Southern Border. Despite reports by the Department of Homeland 
Security Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office 
raising airport security concerns, this Administration has diverted 
numerous TSA workers from airport security to jobs they are not trained 
to do, namely enforcing immigration policies along the southern border. 
This includes six TSA employees from the Las Vegas airport and two from 
the airport in Reno. TSA provided this information to me in response to 
Questions for the Record I submitted through the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee in May.
    Question 1. How many, if any, TSA officers are still stationed at 
the southern border or are currently taking part in immigration-related 
activities? When will TSA officers who were previously deployed to the 
border return to their duty stations at our airports?

    Question 2. Are TSA agents continuing to be transferred to the 
Southern Border as part of TDYs?

   [If NO]: If, as the weather cools down later this year, the 
        number of individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry 
        increases, will TSA agents again be deployed to the border?
    Answer. TSA officers are providing humanitarian relief efforts in 
support of CBP, not conducting immigration-related duties. Their 
contributions include language translation for medical professionals, 
transporting medical and welfare items for detainees, processing high 
volumes of personal property, preparing meals, and conducting welfare 
checks. CBP provides the appropriate training needed to perform those 
duties.
    As of October 31, 2019, TSA had 57 officers deployed to the 
southern border, none of which were from LAS or Reno-Tahoe 
International Airport. Deployments are 45 days in duration, and 
officers return to their airports at the conclusion of their 
deployment. TSA currently does not have any deployments at the border.
    Additionally, we understand that DHS is tapering off deployments to 
the southern border but TSA will continue to support DHS's mission.

    Question 3. Can you assure us that neither McCarran International 
Airport nor Reno-Tahoe International Airport will be impacted in the 
future by TSA agents being sent to conduct work outside of their 
mission?
    Answer. As a component of DHS, TSA continues to support DHS's 
mission and calls for volunteers to assist with a variety of 
situations--such as emergency response, high-profile events, and other 
circumstances--taking into account impact to operations. Volunteering 
is completely at an employee's discretion and is subject to the 
approval of their airport's Federal Security Director. We will continue 
to make every effort to minimize the impact to airport operations so 
that security effectiveness can be maintained.

    Question 4. What types of additional efforts are being taken to 
ensure TSA will be adequately prepared throughout the upcoming high-
volume holiday season?
    Answer. For the high-volume holiday season, TSA employed its 
holiday plan, which included multiple strategies for mitigating wait 
times and ensuring operations ran as smoothly as possible. Federal 
Security Directors at airports exercised their authority to deploy 
overtime resources, conduct shift swaps and schedule adjustments, 
offered extended hours for part-time officers, deployed officers 
between hubs and spokes, and used other TSA employees at non-certified 
officer positions such as bin running support. We also ensured the 
continued close partnership with airline and airport stakeholders to 
assist in managing passenger movement and forecast travel loads as far 
in advance as possible, ensuring we had the appropriate resources. 
Further, the TSA Airport Operations Center (AOC), which hosts weekly 
national teleconference calls with TSA and airport/air carrier 
stakeholders, closely tracked and monitored equipment and issues that 
could impact TSA operations. The AOC works closely with TSA's 
contracting office to ensure expedited resolution of any equipment 
issues.

    Fusion Center. This past year, McCarran International Airport in 
Las Vegas alone saw nearly 50 million passengers, the most ever. With 
so many visitors every year, Las Vegas is not only a major tourist and 
business destination, but also unfortunately a target for those who 
wish us harm. For that reason, our community is part of a federal, 
state, tribal, and local law enforcement collaboration through our 
fusion center, the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center. This 
dynamic partnership allows law enforcement to rapidly and accurately 
respond to terrorist and other threats. TSA is on the front lines of 
the battle against terrorist threats, both in our skies and in our 
communities.
    Question 5. Does TSA coordinate with local fusion centers to share 
and receive threat information?
    Answer. Yes. Our local Field Intelligence Officer, and as needed 
the Regional Field Intelligence Manager, routinely collaborate and 
coordinate with the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center. TSA also 
has one FTE employee embedded at the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism 
Center to facilitate collaboration between the fusion center and the 
Federal government.

    Question 6. In some ways, the threats posing Americans are 
shifting, with more and more challenges coming from right here at home. 
How is the increasing threat of domestic terrorism impacting TSA's work 
and its collaboration with local law enforcement?
    Answer. While the threat from domestic terrorism has shifted in 
terms of ideology and intent, it is not a new phenomenon. The TSA 
remains concerned about the threat from Homegrown Violent Extremists 
(HVE) and lone offenders, some motivated by extremist ideology aligned 
with foreign terrorist organizations, or who are aligned with racially 
and ethnically motivated violent extremism, or even environmental 
rights extremism.
    The tactics used by each group for their individual purposes vary. 
Foreign terrorist organizations continue to use social media to 
encourage attacks on U.S. transportation systems and HVEs remain the 
greatest threat to highway motor carrier, mass transit, and passenger 
rail. Tactics include the use of rudimentary Improvised Explosive 
Devices, small arms, edged weapons, and vehicle ramming. Environmental 
Rights Extremists call for low-level disruptive activities against 
pipeline and freight rail, such as sabotage.
    TSA continues to engage the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and Department of Homeland Security Fusion Centers, as well as state 
and local law enforcement to stay abreast of localized threats to 
transportation in the Homeland, mainly through our Field Intelligence 
Officers. We also partner with FBI at the headquarters level to 
coordinate responses to domestic terrorism threats through multiple 
venues, including embedded liaisons at the National Joint Terrorism 
Task Force Civil Aviation Security Program and Domestic Terrorism 
Operations Section.

    McCarran International Airport TSA Pre-Check Pilot. I understand 
that TSA is evaluating facial recognition tools to automate the 
identity and boarding pass verification process in the United States. 
Currently, McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas is participating 
in a pilot program to test the automation of the identity verification 
portion of the new Travel Document Checker. Travelers in the TSA Pre-
check lane who volunteer will have their photo taken at the checkpoint 
and compared to an image taken from their ID.
    Question 7. For those who participate:

   What are the main differences passengers will experience 
        when going through this particular checkpoint as opposed to the 
        regular checkpoint?

   Will this program improve passenger experience?

    Question 8. Has the rollout helped or hurt current screening 
capacity?

    Question 9. Can you discuss why Las Vegas was selected for this 
pilot program?
    Answer. Prior to the Credential Authentication Technology with a 
camera (CAT-C) Phase I Pilot, TSA conducted an evaluation of the system 
against a checklist of government and industry standards to assess 
potential passenger usability issues. During the CAT-C Phase I Pilot, 
TSA administered and conducted passenger experience research to 
document passenger needs and gather passenger feedback, to analyze and 
understand the logistical and operational implications of facial 
recognition technology. Generally, many passengers expressed 
familiarity with biometric systems. Convenience and expedited 
processing were major draws for voluntary participation.
    Building on this passenger feedback, TSA conducted a short-term 
proof of concept at LAS for automating the identity verification 
portion of the TDC using biometric facial matching technology. The main 
difference from the regular checkpoint experience is that a voluntarily 
participating passenger had his or her photo taken by a camera 
positioned at the checkpoint for identity verification when this would 
usually be done manually by the TDC. The passenger then went through 
the normal screening process. No security screening was done by the 
CAT-C prototype device as a part of this pilot.
    TSA assessed its ability to compare the passenger's live facial 
image at the checkpoint against an image taken from the passenger's 
identity document for passengers who opted to participate. The CAT-C 
system was used to compare passenger identification documents with 
their live picture taken at the checkpoint. TSA, in coordination with 
DHS S&T, is performing analysis to understand the prototype device's 
matching performance in an operational environment and to identify 
human factors requirements needed to develop a user-friendly biometric 
solution that will benefit both TSOs and passengers. The impact of the 
use of this type of technology on current screening capacity is one of 
the items being analyzed by DHS S&T. This is in line with TSA's 
commitment to enhancing the passenger experience and adopting a user-
friendly system.
    Las Vegas was selected for the test site to provide FTE Global 
conference attendees from both government and industry an opportunity 
to test the biometric technology. The conference was held in Las Vegas 
on September 4-6, 2019.

    Question 10. My understanding is that through this technology TSA 
will collect the passenger's photo, along with ``certain biographic 
information'' and temporarily retain it for technical analysis.

   Can you please define:

  a.  What ``certain biographic information'' means?

  b.  How long ``temporarily retain'' lasts?

  c.  What ``technical analysis'' is and what exactly is being 
        analyzing?

   What is the scope of use for this information, how long will 
        it be held, and how is it secured? What happens to this 
        information when the pilot program ends?

   Is this information shared with other agencies within the 
        Federal government? Can you give this Committee assurances that 
        this information will not be sold, monetized, shared, or used 
        for anything other than research purposes?
    Answer. Information on TSA's procedures with respect to personally 
identifiable information (PII) as part of biometrics technology pilots 
is available via PIAs posted on the DHS Privacy website: https://
www.dhs.gov/publication/dhstsapia-046-travel-document-checker-
automation-using-facial-recognition.
    On August 23, 2019, TSA published a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
for Travel Document Checker Automation Using Facial Recognition (DHS/
TSA/PIA-046(a)) for a short-term proof of concept at the LAS. DHS 
conducts Privacy Impact Assessments on both programs and information 
technology systems, pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002 Section 
208 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Section 222. The PIA for the 
LAS pilot examined the privacy impact of the proof of concept, and 
TSA's use of facial recognition technology for identity verification at 
airport checkpoints. In reference to the facial recognition test at 
LAS, TSA collected the following passenger data: real-time images of 
the passenger's face (live photo from the checkpoint); passenger's 
photograph from the identity document; identification document issuance 
and expiration dates; date of travel; the type of identification 
document; the organization that issued the identification document 
(e.g., the state that issued the passenger's driver's license, or the 
U.S. Department of State in the case of passports); year of passenger's 
birth; and gender/Sex as listed in the identification document.
    This information was necessary to test the viability of comparing 
identification documents with live facial images with CAT with a CAT-C 
device. TSA only collected opt-in passenger PII directly relevant and 
necessary to assess critical operational and technological components.
    Data collected during the proof of concept was transferred on a 
weekly basis to S&T for analysis. S&T deleted the data no later than 
180 days following receipt in accordance with an approved TSA record 
retention schedule for security technology (N1-560-04-14, Item 2). S&T 
safeguarded the hard drive and the data it removed from the hard drive. 
S&T test data is maintained within secured DHS facilities, using DHS 
firewalls, stand-alone computers, or secured computer networks. Access 
to test data is limited to persons with an authorized need-to know, 
proper security clearances, and who have also completed annual privacy, 
information security, and physical security awareness courses
    S&T is currently evaluating the performance of the camera system 
(e.g., failure to acquire rate) and the system matching performance 
(e.g., false match rate, false non-match rate). S&T is also analyzing 
the variation in biometric performance based on reference image source 
(e.g., document type and document issue date). The results of the CAT-C 
evaluation will be used to help inform future TSA plans and biometrics 
requirements development and to identify and mitigate any performance 
issues and operational concerns.
    S&T did not employ the data obtained from this pilot for 
operational use, and no data sharing with other DHS components or 
outside of DHS occurred. The principal purpose of using PII during the 
proof of concept was to assess the operational and technological 
components of the CAT-C, including the viability of using facial 
recognition to automate the TDC process, and for no other purpose.
    Additionally, in any future biometric technology pilots involving 
the collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of PII, TSA will 
continue to be transparent by notifying the public and explaining the 
steps the agency is taking to safeguard individuals' information.
    In its development of biometric technologies for additional 
populations, TSA will comply with Section 208 of the E-Government Act 
of 2002, Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and DHS' 
privacy compliance process, including the Fair Information Practice 
Principles. TSA will also comply with applicable TSA, DHS, and Office 
of Management and Budget policies and authorities governing the 
handling of PII.
    As I understand it, the new optional TSA checkpoint deployed at 
McCarran also features a new body scanner that is first-of-its-kind TSA 
technology, allows all individuals to keep laptops in their bags, and 
includes a body scanner with flat panels--similar to what you walk 
through at a retail store--instead of an enclosed space like what is 
currently used across the country.

    Question 11. How successful have these technologies proven so far, 
and that is the timeline for these to be used at other airports?
    Answer. In collaboration with LAS, TSA's Innovation Checkpoint 
allows innovative technology and processes to be assessed in a live 
checkpoint environment. TSA will have the ability to drive decision 
making with data that better defines requirements, further develops 
innovative capabilities and improves processes. The Innovation 
Checkpoint will also drive enhancements to the passenger experience by 
utilizing data from human factor assessments and surveys. While not the 
only location TSA demonstrates emerging technology, it is a new key 
capability for TSA to drive innovative methods for effectiveness and 
efficiency in passenger screening.
    The Innovation Task Force (ITF) has recently completed the 
operational demonstration of the Enhanced Advanced Imaging Technology 
(eAIT) system (new body scanner), a dual flat-panel millimeter wave 
imaging system that has proven to improve on-person screening 
capabilities by providing simplified stance requirements, corrective 
feedback on improper positioning, and multiple secondary screening 
stations for alarm resolution. The ITF recently completed live 
operational demonstration activities for the eAIT system at Denver 
International Airport (DEN) and Los Angeles International Airport. 
Results showed that the unique capabilities provided by the eAIT system 
significantly increased throughput, reduced the false alarm rate (lower 
touch rate), and improved the overall passenger experience relative to 
currently deployed on-person screening systems. ITF intends to 
facilitate follow-on demonstrations of the eAIT system within the 
Innovation Checkpoint at LAS to assess alternative system 
configurations and impact to the overall checkpoint security system. In 
addition, the Requirements and Capabilities Analysis On-Person 
Screening Capability Management Office will be coordinating the 
continual operational assessment of various gifted eAIT systems at 
LaGuardia Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, 
and DEN.