[Senate Hearing 116-595]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                                        S. Hrg. 116-595

                    THE EMERGING SPACE ENVIRONMENT:
                      OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND
                           POLICY CHALLENGES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION AND SPACE

                                 of the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 14, 2019

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation




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       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                                 ------                                

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION AND SPACE

TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman            KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  GARY PETERS, Michigan
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          JON TESTER, Montana
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MIKE LEE, Utah  
















                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on May 14, 2019.....................................     1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................     1
Statement of Senator Sinema......................................     2
Statement of Senator Peters......................................    32
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    38

                               Witnesses

Hon. James F. Bridenstine, Administrator, National Aeronautics 
  and Space Administration.......................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space Commerce, 
  Department of Commerce.........................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    12
Robert Cardillo, Former Director, National Geospatial-
  Intelligence Agency............................................    15
Lieutenant General David D. Thompson, Vice Commander, Air Force 
  Space Command..................................................    16
    Prepared statement...........................................    18
Colonel Pamela A. Melroy, United States Air Force (Ret.)/NASA 
  Astronaut, retired.............................................    22
    Prepared statement...........................................    24

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore 
  Capito to Hon. James F. Bridenstine............................    43

 
                    THE EMERGING SPACE ENVIRONMENT: 
                      OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND 
                           POLICY CHALLENGES 

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 14, 2019

                               U.S. Senate,
                Subcommittee on Aviation and Space,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in 
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Thune, Moran, Sinema, 
Cantwell, and Peters.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

    Senator Cruz. This hearing is called to order. Good 
afternoon, and welcome.
    Today's hearing is entitled ``The Emerging Space 
Environment: Operational, Technical, and Policy Challenges.'' I 
welcome each of the witnesses. Thank you for joining us here 
today.
    On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched 
Sputnik 1, the first satellite and manmade object in space. 
Slightly larger than a beach ball, and with barely more onboard 
technology than a beach ball, the satellite orbited the Earth 
every 98 minutes, emitting a beeping radio beacon that was 
picked up and rebroadcast in news reports all over the world. 
Although Sputnik would orbit the Earth for only 96 days, 
transmitting for only 21 of them, it was a pivotal moment in 
our Nation's history that led to the ensuing space race, which 
put men on the Moon and robotic rovers on distant planets, and 
it fundamentally changed the course of human history.
    It is fitting that this year, the 50th anniversary of the 
Apollo 11 mission that put those first men on the Moon, we find 
ourselves deeply engaged in discussions about the future of 
space. From efforts to foster the growth of the commercial 
space sector, to the return of American astronauts to the Moon 
in the next few years, to the creation of a Space Force, the 
space domain is more active than ever. The next 50 years in 
space have the potential to be even more consequential than the 
last 50 years. But, this will require a serious, sober look at 
the road ahead of us.
    As we look out over the space landscape today, what we see 
is far different from the landscape of 1969. America and the 
Soviet Union are no longer the only players in space. 
Government space programs are no longer the only game in town. 
And our technological capabilities, both in terms of our 
ability to plan missions and what we are able to put in space, 
and for how long, are, for better and for worse, exponentially 
greater than they were when the space race began. No longer is 
space just an uninhabited void or a scientific novelty. From 
GPS and communication satellites to weather and imaging 
satellites, space has become an integral part of the world 
economy and of our everyday lives. It has become both the next 
frontier of exploration and of international commerce and 
economic growth. By some estimates, the space sector will grow 
to nearly $3 trillion in value in the next three decades alone. 
It is also my belief that the world's first trillionaire will 
be made in space.
    As commercial entities develop new capabilities for space, 
many of which were inconceivable even a few short years ago, 
and the government continues to leverage the commercial sector 
for launch services and exploration technology, the theoretical 
threats are becoming a reality.
    We have to forthrightly acknowledge that space has also 
become a domain of military competition. From the development 
and testing of anti-satellite missiles to the possible 
deployment of space-based weapon systems, the threats we face 
to our burgeoning commercial space sector, our civil space, 
exploration efforts, and to our national defense are real, and 
it is long past time for the United States to act.
    Since the ancient Greeks first put to sea, nations have 
recognized the necessity of naval forces and maintaining a 
superior capability to protect water-borne travel and commerce 
from bad actors. Pirates threatened the open seas. And the same 
is possible in space. In this same way, I believe we, too, must 
now recognize the necessity of a Space Force to defend the 
Nation and to protect space commerce and civil space 
exploration.
    As the United States looks to foster the commercialization 
of space, return to the Moon, travel to Mars, and encourage 
burgeoning industry, such as asteroid mining, in which a small 
asteroid could contain rare materials, such as platinum, worth 
billions, a Space Force may well prove necessary to help 
provide certainty in ensuring that these efforts are 
successful, have longevity, and are not to be subjected to the 
whims of rogue or hostile nations. The importance of space to 
the United States will only increase in the coming years, and 
it is time that we recognize that reality and take concrete 
action to secure our supremacy in it.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about 
what those steps might look like, how we might best coordinate 
our actions, and how we, in Congress, can act to ensure that 
the next 50 years and beyond are even more consequential and 
impactful than the last.
    I recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Sinema.

               STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

    Senator Sinema. Well, thank you, Chairman Cruz, for holding 
this hearing. It's important that we develop thoughtful 
strategies and approaches to space that maintain the United 
States leadership and strengthen our country's security. I look 
forward to working closely with you on this and other issues in 
our committee's jurisdiction.
    Thank you, to Administrator Bridenstine, Director 
O'Connell, Mr. Cardillo, Colonel Melroy, and Lieutenant General 
Thompson, for joining us today.
    As you all know, space is important to U.S. communications, 
national security, and research and development. In my home 
state of Arizona, the space economy plays a particularly 
important and growing role while Arizona is the fourth-biggest 
state in aerospace and defense manufacturing, and Arizonans 
from universities and private industry across the State help 
our country lead in space. In order to protect America's status 
as the global space leader, we need thoughtful solutions to 
costly challenges, such as more congested space traffic, 
orbital collisions, increasing amounts of debris, and the 
growing risk of attacks on our assets in orbit.
    The first major collision in space occurred in 2009, when 
an inactive Russian satellite and an active U.S. commercial 
communications satellite collided, resulting in extensive 
debris that is still in orbit today. In addition to the 
potential for major collisions, we must account for the threat 
of space debris causing congestion and small-scale collisions. 
There are more than 23,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than 
4 inches in Earth orbit. These include old satellites, 
disposable launch vehicles, and rogue parts. Even small pieces 
of debris can be problematic for satellites and the 
International Space Station. And beyond physical threats like 
collision and debris, other countries are working on 
technologies to interfere with and take down our satellites. 
These threats continue to evolve, and the U.S. needs to be 
prepared.
    We are making substantial investments in space with 
taxpayer dollars and sending new assets into orbit, but 
currently there are very few rules of the road. So, although we 
have mechanisms that notify operators if there's going to be a 
collision, there are no rules that require operators to move. 
So, we should find ways to address who has the responsibility 
and prevent collisions for both our assets and operators and 
for the international community. The United States should lead 
the way by setting unified standards for all operators in 
space. And we need clear strategies to prevent accidents and 
attacks on our satellites. We should remove safety and security 
issues so we can keep our assets in orbit and operational. And 
these threats will increase as space becomes more and more 
accessible. But, by addressing these concerns now, we can turn 
our attention to emerging national security threats, continue 
our space development, ensure that the United States remains 
the international leader in space.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    I'll now introduce the witnesses.
    Our first witness is Mr. Jim Bridenstine, who is the 
current Administrator of NASA. In his role at NASA, 
Administrator Bridenstine provides clarity to the agency's 
goals and aligns the strategic and policy direction of NASA 
with the interests and requirements of the agency's 
stakeholders and constituent groups. Prior to joining NASA, he 
represented Oklahoma's 1st Congressional District in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, where he served on the Armed Services 
and the Science, Space, and Technology Committees. Before 
joining Congress, Administrator Bridenstine was the Executive 
Director of the Tulsa Air and Space Museum and Planetarium, 
and, before that, served honorably as a fighter pilot in the 
United States Navy, where he flew combat missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Administrator Bridenstine completed a triple major 
at Rice University and earned his MBA at Cornell University.
    Our second witness is Mr. Kevin O'Connell, who is currently 
the Director of the Office of Space Commerce at the Department 
of Commerce. Over the course of his career, Mr. O'Connell has 
garnered extensive experience in remote sensing 
commercialization operations, national security, and 
intelligence issues. He has extensive background in both the 
public and private sectors, previously serving as the
    Chair of NOAA's Federal Advisory Committee on Remote 
Sensing and the Executive Secretary and Staff Director of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Additionally, Mr. 
O'Connell served as the CEO of Innovative Analytics and 
Training, focusing on market trends and analysis of geospatial 
technologies and cloud computing, and is the first Director of 
the RAND Corporation's Intelligence Policy Center. He received 
his master's degree in public policy from the University of 
Maryland--College Park.
    Our third witness is Mr. Robert Cardillo, who recently 
retired after 4 years of service as the Director of the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. While at the agency, 
Mr. Cardillo led 15,000 personnel, all deployed across 15 time 
zones, and initiated and implemented plans to leverage the 
burgeoning commercial entities in orbit around the Earth. Prior 
to that, Mr. Cardillo served in various roles in the 
intelligence community. While at the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, Mr. Cardillo served as the Deputy 
Director for Intelligence Integration. He was also the Deputy 
Director at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he managed a 
global network of 20,000 personnel to aid the U.S. military. 
Mr. Cardillo received a bachelor's of art degree from Cornell 
University and received his master's degree from Georgetown 
University.
    Our fourth witness is Lieutenant General David Thompson, 
who is the Vice Commander of the Air Force Space Command. As 
Vice Commander, Lieutenant General Thompson carries out Air 
Force space missions through the integration of space policy, 
guidance, coordination, and synchronization of space-related 
activities. He is also responsible for preparing mission-ready 
space forces and providing missile warning, navigation, and 
timing information to the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command. Lieutenant General Thompson received a bachelor of 
science degree in aeronautical engineering from the U.S. Air 
Force Academy. He also received a master of science degree in 
aeronautics and astronautics from Purdue University.
    And our final witness is Colonel Pam Melroy, who is the 
founder and CEO of Melroy & Hollett Technology Partners and a 
retired Air Force colonel. She spent over 14 years as an 
astronaut, serving as a pilot on two Space Shuttle missions and 
as the commander on STS-120, the second woman to serve as 
commander of a Space Shuttle. Previously, Colonel Melroy served 
as Deputy Director of the Tactical Technology Office at the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, otherwise known as 
DARPA. She also served two roles at the FAA, one as Senior 
Technical Advisor and Director of Field Operations for the 
FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation, and the other 
as Acting Deputy Associate Administrator of the FAA. Prior to 
that, she also worked as Deputy Program Manager of the Space 
Exploration Initiatives for Lockheed Martin. Colonel Melroy has 
a bachelor's of art degree in physics and astronomy from 
Wellesley College and a master's of science degree in Earth and 
planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. She also graduated in 1985 from undergraduate pilot 
training at Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas.
    Administrator Bridenstine, we'll start with your testimony.

            STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BRIDENSTINE,

              ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS

                    AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member 
Sinema, and members of the Committee. It's an honor to be here 
representing 17,000 employees at NASA all across the United 
States of America, and I can tell you that we, as an agency, 
are very excited about our new direction to land the next man 
and the first woman on the south pole of the Moon within 5 
years.
    Given the title of this hearing, I thought I would talk 
about how NASA plays in our national security capabilities. 
We're very unique. There are a lot of people on this panel that 
are focused directly on national security. NASA plays in a 
different way. A lot of national security practitioners use an 
acronym we call DIME. And it identifies the different elements 
of national power: diplomatic power, information power, 
military power, which I think most are very familiar with, and 
then economic power.
    So, where does NASA play within the DIME philosophy? NASA, 
of course, is very strong on the diplomatic side. When we think 
about the International Space Station, for example, we have 15 
different countries that operate the International Space 
Station on a daily basis. We have had 103 different countries 
actually do experiments on the International Space Station, and 
we have had astronauts from 18 countries on the International 
Space Station. The International Space Station is absolutely a 
technological marvel, but, even more so, it is a diplomatic 
marvel. Talk about something that would be very complicated to 
get all of the nations of the world behind. This was it. And 
yet, it has been achieved by some of the most impressive 
spacefaring nations on the planet. So, I think, diplomatically, 
NASA plays a role there.
    When we talk about information, which is a piece of the 
DIME theory that I think a lot of people don't often think 
about, information is--we talk about Apollo 8. When our 
astronauts broadcast from the Moon during that first Moon-
orbiting mission, it was on Christmas Eve. And when they 
broadcast from the Moon, one out of every four people on the 
planet heard or saw that broadcast, including tens of millions 
of people behind the Iron Curtain. That's an amazing 
information capability that NASA brings to bear, in fact, every 
day.
    Apollo 8 was December 24, 1968. But, since I've been the 
NASA Administrator, I can give you example after example of 
things that have happened just in my time. In November of last 
year, we landed InSight on Mars. When we landed InSight on Mars 
to do scientific discovery and exploration, what we saw was 
that it was on the cover of every newspaper all around the 
world. That's an impressive information tool for our country. 
What does that mean? That means we have the ability, as an 
agency, to change the perceptions of young people all over the 
world toward the United States of America in a very positive 
way.
    So, I think, when you think about diplomacy, when you think 
about information, NASA plays very strong in those domains.
    On the military side, we intentionally make an effort not 
to get involved in military operations, because we want to be 
able to have partners all over the world. We have, in fact, 
been partnering, interestingly, with Russia since 1975 with the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Program. The terrestrial disputes that exist 
seemingly fall away when we go into space. And I think that's a 
positive channel of communication for both of our nations.
    The last piece, economic, NASA does play. We have an 
intention of proving capability, proving technology, reducing 
risk, and then commercializing. And that's exactly what we're 
doing right now in low-Earth orbit. We want to see commercial 
resupply of the International Space Station continue. We want 
to see commercial crew be successful. I think we can do that, 
in fact, this year, launch American astronauts on American 
rockets from American soil for the first time since the 
retirement of the Space Shuttle.
    But, we also want to see commercial habitation in low-Earth 
orbit. In other words, have the entire system of operations in 
low-Earth orbit be commercialized. The question is, Why? 
Because then we can use the resources that are given to us by 
the taxpayer to do the things for which there is not yet a 
commercial industry, retire risk there--namely, in this case, 
at the Moon and then on to Mars; retire risk there, with the 
intent to commercialize and move on. The Chairman mentioned the 
idea of the ocean and how we ultimately have commerce on the 
ocean that needs to be protected. That's a naval theory that 
comes from somebody who I think is an impressive naval theorist 
in history, Alfred Thayer Mahan. And his concept was, if you're 
going to have commerce on the ocean, it needs to be protected. 
Well, we are in a place now where NASA is working really hard 
to help advance and develop commerce in space. And ultimately, 
what we are seeing, unfortunately, is that that is not always 
safe. And so, I think it's important that we consider the risk 
to our civil agency, the risk to commercial industry, and 
consider, ultimately, how it can be protected. And that, 
ultimately, requires what we would see from the M in DIME, 
which is military support, which is, ultimately, what the U.S. 
Space Command is about and the U.S. Space Force is about.
    So, while we don't play in the defense role, we don't play 
in the national security role specifically, we do have roles in 
diplomacy, in information, and in economics, and, of course, we 
want to continue to have partnerships all over the world and 
let our military partners make sure that our operations are 
safe.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bridenstine follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Hon. James F. Bridenstine, Administrator, 
             National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and Members of the 
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
to discuss the emerging space environment.
    NASA is going forward to the Moon. We are building a sustainable, 
open architecture that returns humanity to our nearest neighbor as the 
next step in our long-term drive to send humans on to Mars. We are 
incentivizing speed, drawing on the commercial sector, and we look to 
land humans on the Moon within five years. We are completing 
development of Orion, the spacecraft that will carry humans to lunar 
orbit, and the Space Launch System (SLS), the rocket on which Orion 
will launch. We are pressing forward toward Exploration Mission-1 (EM-
1), an uncrewed test flight of Orion around the Moon. At the same time, 
we are also pressing forward with the rapid development of the lunar 
Gateway, a spacecraft that will orbit the Moon and serve as a reusable 
command module enabling greater access for human missions to the lunar 
surface than ever before. Working with commercial partners and 
international partners, we seek to land humans on the surface of the 
Moon's South Pole by 2024, develop a sustainable presence on and around 
the Moon, and continue to build our experience and technology base to 
enable human missions to Mars.
    We are building for the long term, and this time we are going to 
the Moon using an open, durable, reusable architecture that will 
support exploration for decades to come. Sustainability on and around 
the Moon requires cost-effective and reusable systems--tugs, landers, 
and rovers--and an openness to partnerships from across the commercial 
sector and around the world.
    NASA will create new opportunities for collaboration with industry 
on the International Space Station (ISS) that will enable exploration, 
continue research that benefits humanity, and work to reduce operations 
and maintenance costs while establishing the public-private 
partnerships for exploration systems that will extend human presence 
into the solar system. NASA is working to transition our work in low-
Earth orbit (LEO) to leverage commercially-provided services that help 
enable deep space exploration and spur private sector growth in LEO. To 
support this transition, the ISS will focus near-term activities on 
supporting commercial industry as well as meeting government 
requirements in LEO. In parallel, NASA is creating a focused effort 
aimed at further developing long-term American commercial space 
operations in LEO.
    In November 2018, NASA selected nine companies as part of the 
Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) procurement, making them 
eligible to provide transportation services to the lunar surface for 
science, technology, and exploration payloads. In February 2019, NASA 
selected thirteen NASA-provided payloads that could be flown on the 
early CLPS missions. NASA is now reviewing proposals from the CLPS 
providers for the first commercial delivery service to transport some 
of these payloads to the lunar surface. These missions will enable new 
science and demonstrate new technologies supporting sustainable human 
return to the lunar surface.
    For human missions to the lunar surface, astronauts will employ 
vehicles developed by the private sector and procured by NASA. NASA is 
moving rapidly to support development of these critical pieces of the 
exploration architecture. We will seek proposals from U.S. industry in 
support of rapid development, integration, and crewed demonstration of 
the lander as elements of a functional human landing system that can 
fulfill NASA and industry requirements for a 2024 Moon landing. This 
approach will enable rapid development and flight demonstrations of 
human lunar landers.
    We are actively seeking partner contributions and commercial 
participation for our Moon to Mars exploration plans. NASA is working 
to identify international and commercial partnership opportunities that 
widen the pool of resources, enhance capabilities and sustainability, 
and advance our most important exploration objectives. We are working 
to take full advantage of the rapidly developing commercial space 
sector to enhance sustainability and accelerate progress.
    Key to these efforts is a stable, predictable regulatory 
environment and strong mutually supportive relationships within the 
U.S. government space community. Exploration will benefit from a 
regulatory environment that enables a vibrant commercial sector. NASA 
expects to incorporate emerging commercial capabilities into our 
exploration plans, transition activity in LEO to the commercial sector 
and leverage commercial capabilities wherever it is feasible to do so. 
We look forward to working with our Federal partners to promote the 
space economy both to return benefits to Earth and to support deep 
space exploration.
Civil Military Coordination
    As we work to deliver on our mission, the space domain is becoming 
increasingly congested and contested, with a multitude of new space 
actors as access to space becomes commonplace. At the same time, 
economic and scientific opportunities are expanding in new areas of 
space, including satellite Internet constellations in LEO, ISS 
commercial opportunities, and new architectures to conduct scientific 
Earth observation.
    Today, national power is in part tied to space-based commerce and 
operations. More than virtually any other nation, the U.S. is one of 
the largest beneficiaries of the use of space and also one of the 
countries most reliant upon it. The Global Positioning System (GPS) 
timing signal is used to regulate the flow of electricity on our power 
grids, synchronize cell towers and computer networks, and enable the 
transfer of funds between bank accounts. If America's potential 
adversaries disrupt GPS, the power grid, computer networks, cell 
towers, and banking may degrade over time. Due to these dependencies, 
potential adversaries have identified the American space enterprise as 
the ``American Achilles heel'' and its potential disruption poses an 
existential threat to our country.
    Other countries also rely on space. Just as the U.S. Navy protects 
access to and use of global shipping lanes, so the United States must 
assure access to space to enable economic prosperity. Just as freedom 
of the seas also extends to the world's scientific vessels--from Arctic 
icebreakers to deep sea submarines--NASA requires freedom to operate in 
space for its scientific spacecraft. Furthermore, in addition to our 
commercial ISS cargo providers and soon, commercial crew providers, 
NASA utilizes commercial satellites for remote sensing and Earth 
observation, and commercial launch vehicles for major missions. In 
addition to maintaining a safe, stable environment for our own 
scientific and technology demonstration missions, we have a stake in 
the safety of our commercial partners.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
    NASA is a civilian space agency. However, we rely on the Air Force 
and soon, the Space Force, to protect our assets and operations. Not 
only do we operate billions of dollars of hardware in space, we work 
diligently to ensure our astronauts aboard the ISS remain safe in 
orbit.
    SSA provides decision makers indications and warning of hazards and 
threats: natural and manmade; non-hostile or hostile. SSA also 
underpins efforts to preserve, protect, and defend assets in space to 
include astronaut activities, the ISS and supporting safe management of 
space traffic--fostering access to, and responsible use of, space for 
all. Space Policy Directive-3 provides guidelines and initiatives to 
ensure that America is a leader in providing a safe and secure 
environment as space traffic increases. Common sense space situational 
awareness and space traffic management will be good for our economy and 
will help provide a more stable environment for the burgeoning space 
economy.
    NASA maintains a strong, cooperative relationship with the 
Department of Defense (DoD) on SSA issues. NASA uses SSA information 
from DoD to avoid collisions between its assets and other tracked 
objects in Earth orbit. The Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) 
office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the Human Space Flight 
Operations Directorate at the NASA Johnson Space Center comprise the 
NASA spaceflight safety functions. These NASA spaceflight safety 
functions currently maintain a direct interface with the U.S. Strategic 
Command's (USSTRATCOM) Combined Space Operations Center and the U.S. 
Air Force Space Command's 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS), in 
order to ensure that the SSA needed for collision avoidance analysis is 
provided to NASA in a timely manner.
    NASA does not create or maintain a catalog for SSA, i.e., NASA does 
not track detailed debris orbits, report where an object will be in the 
coming days, or compute close approach predictions. This activity is 
conducted by the DoD through the United States Space Surveillance 
Network (SSN), which detects, identifies, tracks, and catalogs large 
human-made objects (e.g., active/inactive spacecraft, spent rocket 
bodies, or fragmentation debris) orbiting Earth as small as 10 cm in 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and objects as small as 1 m in Geosynchronous 
Earth Orbit (GEO). The SSN is the responsibility of the USSTRATCOM 
Joint Force Space Component Commander.
    Because there are more small debris than large debris and, due to 
the very high impact speed in space, mission-ending risks to human 
spaceflight and robotic missions are actually driven by debris too 
small to be tracked by the SSN, typically in the millimeter-size 
regime. NASA uses ground-based radars and telescopes and in-situ 
measurements to characterize such small debris. NASA uses the 
measurement data on small debris to conduct orbital debris impact risk 
assessments for human spaceflight and robotic missions and to support 
the development and implementation of cost-effective impact protection 
measures for the safe operations of the missions. NASA also shares the 
modeling tools with the DoD and commercial operators to better protect 
their operational satellites.
    NASA belongs to major space debris organizations, such as Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) that seeks to develop 
and propagate best practices to mitigate the risk from orbital debris. 
In addition, the Agency has adopted the NASA Procedural Requirements 
for Limiting Orbital Debris, a culmination of orbital debris mitigation 
policies at NASA per the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practices. The Agency also created the ``Debris Assessment 
Software'' to assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris 
assessments. NASA shares this software with the community. For 
instance, many private organizations utilize the software to compile 
their orbital debris mitigation plans required by the FCC.
    As directed by SPD-3, NASA is leading an interagency working group 
to update the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices to further strengthen the effort to mitigate the risk from 
orbital debris. NASA looks forward to continuing to collaborate with 
our interagency partners to ensure a safe and sustainable orbital 
environment. As a leading user of space situational awareness data, and 
a leader in characterizing the orbital debris environment, and the 
world's leading space exploration agency, NASA is a major beneficiary 
of the Administration's continuing attention to these issues.
Economic Opportunity
    In 2018, the global space economy totaled nearly $400 billion 
according to the Space Foundation. Space commerce has improved 
conditions for humans on Earth including the way we communicate, 
navigate, produce food and energy, predict weather, understand climate, 
and provide disaster relief and national security. The space sector of 
our economy is booming. In fact, from 2012-2018, U.S. companies 
reestablished competitiveness in the global commercial launch market, 
with our share growing from 0 percent to 65 percent. Satellite 
communications manufacturing is a significant export for our country, 
with around 60 percent of global commercial orders--the United States 
is the best in the world at developing and building communication 
satellites for television, radio, and Internet. In 2015, space-related 
venture capital investment exceeded the previous 15 years combined and 
we saw similarly high levels of investment in 2016 and 2017. The 
majority of space firms in the world are headquartered in the United 
States.
    A stable space environment and a stable policy and regulatory 
environment ensure these firms continue to do what they do best--
innovate and drive economic development.
Conclusion
    The Administration is taking the next steps forward to advance 
commerce, safety, and security in Earth's orbit. At NASA, we plan 
missions based on our experience building spacecraft and operating in 
space. We know it takes highly specialized knowledge, built over 
decades of trial and error, to achieve brilliant results. We are 
working with our colleagues across government to enable an environment 
that can enable exploration, foster burgeoning and increasingly complex 
space commerce, and prevent dangerous conjunctions, collisions, and 
interactions around our planet.
    Many steps have been taken, from debris mitigation practices 
following the issuance of SPD-3, to our call for a dedicated Space 
Force, which could begin consolidating the space expertise that exists 
across the military, and organizing technology development in a more 
efficient and coordinated manner.
    This Administration is developing the next-generation of American 
space launch capacity and developing deep space operational 
capabilities that will project American prominence around the world, 
extend global partnerships, and expand our strategic presence in the 
solar system. NASA's exploration campaign will send Americans to the 
lunar surface by 2024, develop a sustainable presence on and around the 
Moon, and prepare for human exploration of Mars. This Administration 
plans to develop American launch, in-space, and astronaut capabilities 
that project American power around the world, extend global 
partnerships, and establish a presence on the Moon. To support these 
ambitious and transformational goals, we are seeking a space 
environment which allows scientific observation, technology 
demonstration, and human exploration to be conducted for peaceful uses 
and free from malign interference.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I 
look forward to answering your questions.

    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Bridenstine.
    Mr. O'Connell.

  STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. O'CONNELL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPACE 
                COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

    Mr. O'Connell: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Sinema, and members of the Subcommittee. I'm very pleased to 
testify before you today alongside my distinguished colleagues.
    For the last 10 months, I have run the Office of the 
Director--I've served as the Office--the Director of the Office 
of the Space Commerce within NOAA, of the Department of 
Commerce. Our mandate there is to foster the economic 
conditions and technological developments for the U.S. 
commercial space industry.
    Today's hearing will inevitably cross many functional and 
organizational lines. My office was actually created 30 years 
ago, when the idea of commercialization was purely a vision. 
But, today we find ourselves at a key inflection point. A great 
number of entrepreneurs, encouraged by administration 
leadership, fast-moving technology, and enabling finance and 
insurance, are creating highly innovative capabilities in the 
market. They draw upon trends in standardization and 
reusability, and they leverage fast-breaking developments in 
artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
    The U.S. innovative spirit is alive and well. So, let me 
emphasize that one of the contexts for today's discussion is 
that the future space operating environment will be 
overwhelmingly commercial. How much commercial? Again, the 
Chairman has already referred to this. Current forecasts 
indicate a global space economy between $1 trillion and $3 
trillion by 2040. At Commerce, we have actually spent a lot of 
time with the organizations that are making those forecasts to 
understand the drivers and impediments to that kind of economic 
growth. Whatever the number, the space economy will continue to 
have tremendous implications for our economic and national 
security.
    The reconstitution of the National Space Council has 
facilitated mission alignment across the Executive Branch by 
creating discussions on streamlining regulations on commercial 
space, SPD-2, and space traffic management, or SPD-3. What is 
also being pursued in parallel, however, is greater efficiency 
within our organizations. The administration has requested 
authority to elevate the Office of Space Commerce to a Bureau 
of Space Commerce answering directly to the Secretary. Why? 
Three ideas underpin this request. First, as a signal of the 
importance of the U.S. commercial space industry to our 
Nation's future. Second, as a way of leveraging the many 
different commerce organizations in support of U.S. space 
commerce. And third, as a way of ensuring that economic and 
commercial views have equal representation in high-level 
executive-branch discussions.
    One of the issues that we have started to look at, at 
Commerce, is how to improve the role of the U.S. Government 
agencies in the space economy. The U.S. Government is still a 
very powerful actor in commercial space markets, yet the 
business models are changing. We are seeing a shift from the 
traditional U.S. Government buyer-take-all to one where small 
forward-leaning investments in the market stimulate demand and 
thereby help companies attract additional investment from the 
capital markets. This allows the government to explore 
specific-use cases while providing critical resources toward 
commercialization.
    One other thing of note. While we're following the 
macrolevel economic projections of the future space economy, 
we're also trying to enrich our understanding of space-related 
activities at the State and local levels in order to help guide 
government and commercial investment.
    The agencies represented at this table, and others, are 
working hard to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Agile regulatory and governance processes will be key to 
enabling the exciting developments discussed above and to make 
sure that the United States remains flag of choice for space 
entrepreneurs. Why is this so important? Historically, we 
argued about these issues in a vacuum. Today, however, we live 
in a world with competing international visions for the future 
of space and an increasingly competitive world. Collaboration 
will be essential between those countries who believe in 
innovation, genuine partnership, and free markets. At the end 
of June, the Department of Commerce, in collaboration with the 
Department of State, will co-host a Space Enterprise Summit 
here in Washington to discuss the changing nature of 
international cooperation and competition in space. And I hope 
that some of you will be able to join us for those discussions.
    Let me conclude my remarks by highlighting one other area 
of cross-government integration, SPD-3, and the need to improve 
space situational awareness and space traffic management. The 
space congestion problem becomes more complex on a daily basis. 
As discussed before the Congress last year by General Hyten, 
Administrator Bridenstine, and Secretary Ross, the need to 
adjust organizational lines between the DOD and the Department 
of Commerce becomes more urgent. Commerce has moved out within 
existing authorities and resources on SPD-3. For example, we're 
receiving responses to an RFI designed to canvass companies, 
whether those who will help mitigate the space debris problem 
with new sensors or visualization tools or cloud computing 
capabilities, as well as from current and future space 
operators who will create wholly new demands for SSA and STM 
services. The DOD-Commerce relationship has been exceptional. 
Our partnership allows DOD to focus on the more pressing 
mission of protecting U.S. space assets, including commercial 
assets, and protecting and defending the United States and its 
allies. But, it is also based on the need to harness the 
innovation of the private sector and modernize our approaches 
to this urgent problem. We will have to make effective speed, 
not reckless speed, given the consequences. Why? SSA and STM 
does not just affect on-orbit safety; its economic effects 
trickle down through the entire space ecosystem.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for your interest today. As we continue 
to work through complex issues in the future space environment, 
let's not forget the extraordinary role that the private sector 
can play. Growing commercial success in space creates an 
economic foundation for our resiliency in space and underpins 
our national security and that of our allies. This is an 
exciting time to be in the space business, and there's a lot of 
work to be done here in furtherance of American prosperity and 
security.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]

  Prepared Statment of Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space 
                    Commerce, Department of Commerce
    Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and Members of the 
Subcommittee. I am very pleased to testify today alongside 
Administrator Bridenstine, Lt. Gen. Thompson, former NGA Director 
Cardillo and Ms. Melroy. We continue to work often with their 
organizations and other Executive Branch colleagues on space policy 
issues, including the mandates of Space Policy Directives 2 and 3.
    Today's hearing will inevitably cross many functional and 
organizational lines. By now, anyone familiar with the space business 
has heard projections of a space economy between $1 and $3 trillion 
over the next two decades. At the Department of Commerce, we have been 
spending lots of time with the organizations--think tanks, research 
arms of large financial institutions, others--to understand the key 
drivers and impediments to that space economy. Whatever the number, at 
that size the space economy will have tremendous implications for our 
economic and national security. Meanwhile, as we are all likely to 
testify, the space environment is becoming more complex as many more 
nations recognize the strategic importance of space for their own 
reasons.
    Within the Department, I oversee an office created over thirty 
years ago, when space commercialization was merely a vision. Today, 
entrepreneurs encouraged by Administration leadership, fast-moving 
technology, and enabling ecosystem of investment and space insurance 
are creating a diverse set of capabilities in the market. They are 
enabled by standardization, reusability, and continuous learning, and 
their products and services leverage blisteringly fast parallel 
developments in artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
    So to set one of the contexts for today's discussion, one aspect of 
the future space operating environment is that it will be 
overwhelmingly commercial. Commercial firms will continue to seek the 
creation of wholly new services here on earth--just extending high-
speed communications and Internet access to areas not covered today 
takes the space economy to $1trillion by 2040--while others seek to 
build the space infrastructure to take us to the Moon, Mars, and 
beyond. That infrastructure will include launch, habitation, and the 
scientific research required to pursue our exploration goals in as safe 
a manner as possible.
    Every day at the Commerce Department, we see and often assist 
innovative companies that are trying to come to market or even ones 
that are already in the market. One company, for example, has the 
ability to create the atmosphere of the Moon or Mars here on earth in 
order to train future space workers on the environment they will work 
in. My friend and colleague of over 20 years, Mr. Cardillo and I have 
watched as satellite imagery processing has shifted from light tables 
to artificial intelligence, accelerating and deepening our knowledge of 
activities here on earth. The U.S. innovative spirit is alive and well.
    The mandate of the Office of Space Commerce is to ``foster the 
conditions for the economic growth and technological advancement of the 
U.S. commercial space industry''. While we often work with firms to 
explain how to engage with the U.S. government or deal with specific 
regulatory matters, one of the ways in which we promote our commercial 
space industry is to bring together industry groups to understand how 
the nexus of policy, regulation, and developments in supporting 
industries help drive or impede their progress.
    Secretary Ross has hosted two space summits, for example, at the 
Department of Commerce, on space finance and insurance. The space 
technologies that present possibly the greatest potential, such as 
space resource development, lunar habitation, on-orbit assembly, and 
others, will require long-term capital investment. Our second summit 
looked at the insurance implications of improved space situational 
awareness as well as the role of space insurance in shifting risk. The 
Secretary and I were in New York City a few weeks ago for updates from 
those industries.
    One of the issues we are starting to focus on is improving the role 
of the U.S. government agencies in the space economy. The U.S. 
government is still a very powerful actor in commercial space markets. 
And the business models are changing: we are seeing an important shift 
from the traditional ``U.S. government buyer take all'' approach to one 
where small, forward leaning investments in the market both stimulate 
demand and attract additional investment from diverse U.S. capital 
markets. This allows the U.S. government to leverage commercial markets 
and explore specific use cases while providing critical resources 
toward commercialization. In other words, U.S. government agencies 
should move beyond a ``wait and see'' mode and provide early, but 
limited support for commercial firms. At the recent National Space 
Symposium, Secretary Ross agreed that we would work with Administrator 
Bridenstine and his team at NASA on LEO commercialization strategies. 
One of the things that we have already done is to piggy-back on NASA's 
sponsorship of the annual ``Space.com'' symposium in Houston to add new 
discussion sessions on space commerce.
    While we are following the macro-assessments of the future space 
economy, we are also trying to enrich our understanding of space-
related activities at the state and local levels, in order to help 
drive government and commercial understanding of unique niches within 
the space economy. The Department's Economic Development Administration 
(EDA) and Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) have grant-making 
authority related to regional economic development, including space 
commerce. Just last year, MBDA awarded a $400,000 grant to the Space 
Foundation to directly facilitate an introduction to the field of space 
commercialization in several communities throughout the country. The 
office has begun working with the Bureau of Economic Analysis in order 
to more fully understand the contribution of space to our national GDP.
Office of Space Commerce
    The reconstitution of the National Space Council has been a 
foundational step in focusing our attention on the challenges and 
opportunities for U.S. commercial space, and its role in our larger 
space, economic and national security strategies. It has facilitated 
the alignment of space missions by creating efficiency across 
government by facilitating venues for interaction, debate, cooperation. 
The National Space Council's ``whole of government'' approach to space 
decision-making forces lively interaction on complex issues that has 
driven an unprecedented speed of government decision-making in these 
areas.
    What is being pursued in parallel is the creation of greater 
efficiency within each of our organizations. The Administration has 
requested authority to transfer the Office of Space Commerce from NOAA 
to the Office of the Secretary. Three core ideas underpin the request 
for the Office of Space Commerce: as a signal of the importance of the 
U.S. commercial space industry to our Nation's economic and national 
security future; as a way of leveraging the many different Commerce 
bureaus and organizations to support U.S. space commerce; and as a way 
of ensuring that economic and commercial views have equal 
representation in high-level Executive Branch discussions.
    Even as our discussions about the Office continue, the Department 
and the Office of Space Commerce are working every single day to 
advance U.S. commercial space interests. A large amount of our efforts 
have been driven, naturally, by Space Policy Directives 2 (Streamlining 
Commercial Space Regulations) and 3 (Space Traffic Management).
    As just a few examples, we released our SPD-2 report with thirteen 
recommendations for the preservation of satellite spectrum; we 
submitted comments on the FCC NPRM and are leading an interagency 
effort to ensure that any new space debris regulations reflect the 
priorities of the Administration and our Executive Branch colleagues; 
we issued two public notices soliciting comments on policy and 
regulation regarding commercial space; and just this morning we 
released an NPRM on commercial remote sensing that took a ``clean 
sheet'' approach in an area moving along at rapid speed. We have issued 
an RFI on SSA/STM capabilities, and we are working with our sister 
agency NIST on a broad survey of existing technical space standards to 
inform best practices in order to encourage space safety and 
innovation.
    The Executive Branch is working hard to encourage entrepreneurship 
and innovation. Agile regulatory and governance processes will be key 
to enabling the exciting developments that I discussed above and key to 
making sure that the United States remains ``flag of choice'' for space 
entrepreneurs. It will require continuing collaborative conversations 
across the organizational lines at this table and others, such as FAA 
and State.
    Why is this so important? Historically, we argued about these 
issues in a vacuum. Today, however, we live in a world with competing 
international visions for the future of space and a hyper-competitive 
world. Collaboration will be essential between those countries who 
believe in innovation, genuine partnership, and free markets. You will 
have seen Secretary Ross's signing of a space cooperation agreement 
between the United States and Luxembourg last week as a reflection of 
that. Further, at the end of June, the Department of Commerce, with the 
Department of State, will co-host a third space summit to examine 
international space partnerships--across government and industry 
lines--to discuss the changing nature of cooperation and competition in 
space. I hope that some of you will be able to join us for those 
discussions.
Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management
    Let me highlight one other area of cross-government integration: 
SPD-3 and the need to improve space situational awareness (SSA) and 
space traffic management (STM).
    The strategic space situation and the space congestion problem 
become more complex on a daily basis. As discussed before the Congress 
last year by General Hyten, Administrator Bridenstine, and Secretary 
Ross, the need to adjust organizational lines between the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Commerce becomes more urgent. Commerce 
has moved out, within existing authorities and resources, on SPD-3. As 
I mentioned earlier, this week, we expect responses to an RFI designed 
to canvass the landscape of companies, whether those who will help 
mitigate the space debris problem--with either new sensors or 
visualization tools or with cloud computing and machine learning 
capabilities, or those who by virtue of exciting new concepts like 
maneuverable ``space tugs'' or mega-constellations, will create wholly 
new demands for SSA/STM services.
    Almost every one of the SPD-3 activities involve broad interagency 
coordination, but the Department of Defense, the USAF and the 
Department of Commerce have been in lockstep from the start. Remember 
that the logic of this partnership--designed to transition commercial 
conjunction analysis and notification to Commerce by 2024--is to allow 
DoD to focus on the more pressing mission of ensuring a peaceful space 
environment, protecting critical U.S. space assets, and protecting and 
defending the United States and its allies. But it is also based on the 
need to harness the innovation of the private sector and modernize our 
approaches against this urgent problem.
    The Department's efforts are focused in a number of areas, which I 
can highlight briefly. Within the next two months, DoD's Air Force 
Research Lab (AFRL) will deliver to Commerce a first ``experimental'' 
part of our planned open architecture data repository (OADR). This will 
complement already existing analytic, architectural, and data 
management efforts within organizations like NOAA and Census within the 
Department. The repository, which will continue to be based on DoD's 
authoritative catalogue, will incorporate commercial and allied 
commercial data and serve as the foundation upon which innovative 
commercial capabilities can support the growing market. Industry and 
academia will also play key roles in our efforts, as directed by SPD-3.
    The nature of the space debris problem and the high-velocity nature 
of global space markets mean that we have to move fast, likely faster 
than the 2024 deadline. We will have to make effective speed, not 
reckless speed, given the consequences. We must strengthen our already 
strong interagency partnerships and enjoin the support of the Congress 
in order to develop a state-of-the-art capability, one that advances 
U.S. leadership and extends the tremendous partnerships we enjoy as a 
nation on SSA and STM.
    Why is this so important? SSA and STM does not just effect on-orbit 
safety; it has huge economic effects that trickle down through the 
entire space ecosystem, affecting technology and business models, 
investment and insurance, and launch costs and schedules. In this 
regard, the future of space safety lies in a portfolio of activities 
from satellite design, to improved SSA, to changes in policy and 
regulation. It is essential that we prioritize this issue with proper 
resources across the board.
Conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for your interest today. As you will inevitably 
hear today, there are many operational, technical, and policy 
challenges to sustaining American leadership in space. As we continue 
to work together within the Executive Branch, and with the Congress, 
let's not forget the extraordinary role that the private sector can 
play in addressing those challenges. Growing commercial activity in 
space creates an economic foundation for our resiliency in space, as 
well as for those of our allies. This is an exciting time to be in the 
space business and there's a lot of work to be done here, in 
furtherance of American prosperity and American security. Thank you.

    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Mr. Cardillo.

    STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                 GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Mr. Cardillo. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, thank 
you very much for this opportunity. I've had the pleasure of 
appearing in front of this and other committees for the past 
three decades, but as a Federal Government and executive-branch 
witness. This is my first time on the other side. But, it is 
also a personal pleasure to appear with such distinguished 
colleagues on this panel.
    So, just a little context about where I'm at. It has been 
three months since I left my position as the Director of the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It has been 36 years 
since I first raised my right hand and swore an oath to our 
flag and joined the profession of the intelligence community.
    I was fortunate to be introduced to a burgeoning imagery 
business. But, at that time, 1983, it was a government-owned 
imagery business. And it had to be, because of the necessity of 
protection of that technology and the capabilities that we 
uniquely had in space at that time. I was able to live through, 
and help lead, the agency through its movement from analog to 
digital, from going from only government-owned satellite 
systems to a commercial mix, and moving on from that virtual 
monopoly.
    As Kevin mentioned, in 1992 we had the Land Remote Sensing 
Policy Act, which introduced the first introduction of a remote 
sensing market. And the quote was that it should remain 
exclusively the function of the private sector. That was 27 
years ago. The beginning of commercial licensing also occurred.
    I also experienced the fits and starts of PDD-23 in March 
1994. I worked for DCI Tenet in 2002, when he gave a directive 
to the intelligence community to--and directed that we should 
rely predominantly on commercial satellite imagery, to the 
greatest extent possible; President Bush, NSPD-27, authorizing 
the commercial remote sensing space policy and maintaining our 
leadership; all the way up to PPD-4 in 2010.
    Now, I became Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in October 2014; coincidentally, 57 years 
after that Sputnik mission. The debate was, when I reengaged 
with my teammates--it was, How do we fully engage with this 
growing U.S. commercial marketplace? How can we take best 
advantage of this innovation that has been discussed by 
Administrator Bridenstine and Mr. O'Connell? And I challenged 
the agency at that time to find a way to succeed in the open; 
meaning, we had a great past and a great history for providing 
classified and closed support, mainly to the military and the 
intelligence community, but we now had to find a way to take 
advantage of the more open technology. That created new 
partners, new vehicles, and new outcomes. And, as much as I 
pushed when I was on the inside, in the very short period of 
time that I've had since leaving government, I have become even 
more excited about the possibility of such leverage. The 
monopoly is over, but the race is on. And I would agree with my 
colleagues that time is not on our side.
    I think there also is an analogy with what we went through 
in the digitization of the planet in the late 1990s, the advent 
of the Internet and the introduction of the World Wide Web. 
Literally, that world became digitized. I now think we have the 
opportunity--as a matter of fact, I believe we're on the cusp 
of making that physical reality of our planet the same type of 
digital reality. Whether it's for farming, fishing, 
construction, or insurance, one can imagine farmers getting 
precise crop--precision prescriptions for their next yield. One 
can imagine traffic patterns being updated through predictive 
analytics, vice the reactive analytics we get today. One can 
imagine insurance and credit flowing to markets that, before, 
the risk was too high for them to do. But, I think we can now 
provide them with the insights to manage that risk and increase 
that investment.
    All to say to this committee that I think that, as we, and 
you, can lower barriers to increase the entrepreneurial 
opportunities that have already been discussed, I think that we 
can sustain, if not grow, American leadership in space. And I'm 
sure that you will share my confidence that, should we play on 
an--even a near level playing field, I'd bet on the American 
ingenuity, the American innovation, and the values that we all 
swore to uphold.
    I look forward to your questions, and I appreciate the 
opportunity to be here. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    General Thompson.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, VICE 
               COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

    General Thompson. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and 
distinguished members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear 
before you today along with these exceptional space leaders, 
and I'm privileged to work with General ``Jay'' Raymond as his 
Vice Commander at Air Force Space Command.
    Today, I represent, on their behalf, 26,000 men and women 
who remain the best in the world at developing, fielding, and 
operating space capabilities that serve our national leaders, 
our joint forces, allies, and partners, and the global good. 
These capabilities ensure our Armed Forces have no equal and 
are a vital part of the commercial engine and civil society 
that remain the envy of the world.
    Today, there's unprecedented agreement among the Nation's 
leaders that space has become a warfighting domain, just like 
air, land, sea, and cyberspace before it. Our National Security 
and National Defense Strategies reflect this reality, 
emphasizing peace through strength and the need to maintain 
U.S. leadership and freedom of action in space. We are now 
dealing with the implications of that fact, driving tremendous 
change in order to maintain our leadership and the ability to 
operate in space under all conditions. Military, civil, and 
commercial space cooperation is a critical element of our 
efforts to organize, train, equip, and present space forces 
that will deter adversary action in space and, if necessary, 
fight and win in that domain.
    With my posture statement on the record, I'd like to begin 
with a few points:
    First, the Air Force recognizes that it's impossible to 
accomplish our space missions alone. We have a longstanding 
record of cooperation with civil, commercial, intelligence 
community, and other military organizations. We're committed to 
maintaining and strengthening those relationships, and 
identifying new ones, as well.
    For example, the Air Force and NASA have a long history of 
collaboration. John Glenn rode to space on an Air Force Atlas 
rocket. The Apollo Moon Program, arguably the greatest 
scientific and technical achievement of the 20th century, was 
managed by an Air Force general, Sam Phillips. For years, the 
Space Shuttle and International Space Station have served as a 
testbed for DOD space-related research and experimentation. And 
today, NASA and the Air Force continue to work closely with a 
multitude of scientific, technical, and operational endeavors.
    But, our relationship expands beyond NASA. We have a 
decades-long relationship with the Federal Aviation 
Administration, in commercial space launch, and with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to provide 
space-based meteorological data supporting military operations 
and public safety. Recently, following the release of Space 
Policy Directive-3, Air Force Space Command has been working 
with the Department of Commerce on the transfer of space 
traffic management responsibility and other initiatives that 
support the Nation's civil, commercial, and military space 
needs. And, of course, our half-century relationship with the 
National Reconnaissance Office and other intelligence 
organizations is well documented. That relationship has never 
been stronger.
    Air Force Space Command has also made significant progress 
in expanding our commercial cooperation to enhance the national 
security space posture. These efforts include transfer of the 
commercial satellite communications provisioning responsibility 
from the Defense Information Systems Agency to Air Force Space 
Command, where we are already identifying innovative ways to 
provide commercial satellite communications to warfighters.
    We also established a Space Enterprise Consortium focused 
on teaming with small, nontraditional new space companies to 
increase our own agility, reduce costs, and accelerate 
development timelines for space capabilities.
    We're also teaming with DARPA and industry to assess the 
new low-Earth orbit satellite architecture for a variety of 
space missions, and we're executing a space-launch strategy 
that depends on a viable commercial capability to meet routine 
national security space-launch needs.
    The Air Force and the Command will continue to foster our 
relationships with all of these organizations in all of the 
sectors, with a goal of maintaining a robust and vibrant 
national security space enterprise. Congress has played a major 
role in ensuring that case in the past, and we look forward to 
your help in maintaining military, civil, and commercial space 
cooperation in the future.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Thompson follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General David D. Thompson, 
                Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command
Introduction
    Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, I'm honored to appear before you today in my capacity as 
Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). It is a distinct 
privilege to represent our commander, General Jay Raymond, and the 
26,200 men and women of AFSPC who develop, field, and operate the space 
capabilities that underpin the joint force, our Allies and partners and 
the Nation. In recent years we have made tremendous progress along with 
our National Security Space (NSS) partners in the on-going effort to 
address the reality that strategic competitors have made space a 
warfighting domain. Among these initiatives are the President's 
issuance of four Space Policy Directives (SPD), direction to establish 
a space-focused combatant command--U.S. Space Command, and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) proposal for a sixth branch of the armed 
forces--the U.S. Space Force. We expect the coming year will be equally 
full of progress across these and other NSS endeavors.
Emerging Space Environment
    Today, great power competition with China and Russia continues to 
be the primary challenge to U.S. and global security. Both of these 
nations seek to challenge peace, stability and U.S. leadership in all 
domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. In the space domain in 
particular, these competitors seek to deny the United States and its 
Allies freedom of action, while developing their own capabilities to 
project power and enhance their military strength.
    Fortunately, this comes at a time when our National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, national leaders, and Air Force 
plans, programs and operations are in unprecedented alignment. The 
National Security Strategy dictates that we treat space as a priority 
domain and vital interest, maintaining unfettered access and freedom to 
operate in space for civil, military and economic benefit. The National 
Defense Strategy establishes five priority missions: (1) defend the 
homeland, (2) provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, 
(3) defeat a powerful conventional enemy, (4) deter opportunistic 
aggression, and (5) disrupt violent extremists. Space capabilities play 
a critical role in each one of the missions, supporting U.S. forces and 
our allies and partners around the globe. Our primary objective remains 
to deter conflict from extending to space; the best way to do this is 
to be prepared to fight and win in space should deterrence fail. 
Military, civil, and commercial space cooperation is critical to AFSPC 
efforts to organize, train and equip space forces that will deter 
adversary action in space, and if necessary, fight and win in the space 
domain. My testimony focuses on current and future areas of cooperation 
among military, commercial and civil space sectors.
Current Military-Civil-Commercial Space Cooperation
    AFSPC recognizes that it is impossible to accomplish our mission 
alone; we are committed to identifying new partners and solidifying 
existing relationships as a core activity across many mission areas.
Assured Access to Space
    For the first time in 20 years, the Air Force is postured to meet 
national security launch needs through competition among multiple 
launch providers. The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, 
formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, 
provides assured access to space for our most important national 
security satellites. As the stewards of this capability for the 
Department of Defense and the National Reconnaissance Office, we have 
achieved unprecedented mission success by delivering 76 NSS launches to 
orbit since 2002 without a launch failure. During this period, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has also used this 
space launch capability to support numerous science, exploration and 
other civil missions. While our priority remains ensuring the Nation 
can launch all NSS payloads, our strategy to utilize launch services 
from certified domestic launch providers supports their viability in 
the globally competitive launch sector and helps to ensure this 
fundamental element of space power is also available for civil, 
commercial, scientific and exploratory purposes.
    The Air Force has moved into the next phase of the NSSL program. In 
October the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) entered into 
development contracts with Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman and United 
Launch Alliance called Launch Service Agreements. These public-private 
partnerships leverage commercial launch investment and seek to end our 
use of the Russian RD-180 engine ahead of the 2022 deadline. Earlier 
this month, SMC released the Request for Proposal for Phase 2 launch 
procurement contracts, which will use full and open competition to 
procure launch services for launches starting in 2022. The Launch 
Service Agreements are not prerequisites to winning NSSL Phase 2 launch 
contracts. They are the best way to ensure commercially viable launch 
systems are available and ready to meet our stressing NSS launch 
requirements at that time.
    Last year Congress recognized the potential for cost savings 
associated with launch vehicle reusability, and the inherent 
competitiveness this feature can provide. With launch service providers 
demonstrating success at a rapid pace, reusable launch systems may 
offer higher reliability, increased responsiveness and greater 
flexibility in support of NSS missions. The Air Force is actively 
evaluating the risks, benefits, and potential costs savings from 
reusable launch vehicles for future missions. Evidence of this can be 
seen in SMC and SpaceX's recent contract modification allowing the 
reuse of the Falcon Heavy side core boosters for the Air Force's Space 
Test Program-2 mission. This mission further demonstrates our 
commitment to balance risk with increased responsiveness and 
flexibility.
    In 2019, the SMC-led DoD Space Test Program partnered with the 
Defense Innovation Unit to pursue first use of small, ``venture-class'' 
launch services through the Rapid/Agile Launch Initiative (RALI). Under 
this partnership, the Air Force procured five launches from venture-
class launch service providers using Other Transaction Authorities. 
RALI demonstrates rapid procurement and the responsiveness of 
commercial launch, dedicated launch for small payloads to militarily-
relevant orbits, and increased operational tempo over legacy launch 
services. RALI leverages an expanding commercial launch market to 
increase DoD's access to space.
    AFSPC places a high priority on streamlining space launch 
operations and identifying opportunities to improve our speed, 
innovation, resiliency, and efficiency to satisfy national security 
needs, and increase safety. This includes the architecture 
transformation of both launch ranges that started in 2019 and will 
continue through 2023. Changes in flight and ground systems will put us 
on a path to support a 2025 implementation of the Autonomous Flight 
Safety System for all commercial space launches. This enables us to 
increase the pace of launch and reduce sustainment of costly 
infrastructure, while maintaining public safety.
    We are also working closely with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) as they implement streamlined commercial launch 
licensing approvals. The Air Force and FAA have a long history of 
cooperation in space launch and use common standards to ensure the 
safety of the public and critical launch infrastructure against the 
hazards of launch operations. AFSPC installation commanders also work 
closely with the FAA and launch provider to synchronize all activity on 
the installation to ensure the commercial and military missions are 
optimized in support of national objectives.
    We have learned many lessons in recent years as our partnerships 
with the FAA, NASA, and industry have matured. Finally, we are pleased 
with the success of industry operating from Air Force-managed space 
launch ranges and will continue to refine our processes and 
requirements in pursuit of assured access to space.
Space-based Environmental Monitoring
    Every military mission begins with a weather briefing; terrestrial 
weather, space weather, or both. The data required to generate 
forecasts for our forces is largely dependent on complex models, and 
approximately 95 percent of the data that feeds these models comes from 
space-based sensors or ground-based observatories looking into space. 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites have been 
collecting weather data for U.S. military operations for more than five 
decades and provide assured, reliable, global terrestrial and space 
weather data to support DoD operations. A 1994 Presidential directive 
realigned day-to-day operations of DMSP to the Department of Commerce's 
(DoC) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and today 
the DMSP constellation is operated by mission partners consisting of 
the NOAA Office of Satellite and Product Operations and a detachment of 
Air Force Space Command's 50th Operations Group, both located in 
Suitland, Maryland. The 50th Operations Group detachment has Satellite 
Control Authority and delegates day-to-day operations to the NOAA. A 
backup operations center, operated by the Air Force Reserve's 6th Space 
Operations Squadron, is located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
    The Air Force's Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially 
Hosted (REACH) program is a space weather and space situational 
awareness project demonstrating the viability and effectiveness of a 
commercially hosted, disaggregated architecture. REACH payload sensors 
provide an unprecedented amount of space weather measurements for more 
rapid satellite anomaly attribution. Working in partnership with 
Iridium, Johns Hopkins, Harris Corporation and others, the program 
fielded 32 REACH hosted payloads on-orbit in under 24 months at a total 
cost of $18 million, a 92 percent cost savings from the original cost 
estimate for the program. The successful launch of these payloads and 
the critical data they provide made the REACH team a finalist for the 
prestigious 2018 Collier Trophy recognizing achievement in aeronautics 
and astronautics, and are an example of SMC innovation in developing 
partnerships with industry to rapidly field new capabilities while 
reducing cost and schedule.
Satellite Communications
    To comply with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, 
responsibilities for DoD procurement of commercial satellite 
communications (COMSATCOM) services transferred from the Defense 
Information Systems Agency to AFSPC on December 11, 2018. Since that 
date, AFSPC has been bringing together government and industry partners 
to chart a way forward to both enhance satellite communications 
(SATCOM) provisioning and our ability to provide SATCOM in a contested 
environment. DoD and commercial industry have a long track record of 
collaboration, partnership, and mission success in this area. That 
being said, we are not content to rest on the laurels of that 
partnership with all our commercial industry partners have to offer. To 
that end, we currently have multiple ongoing and planned initiatives to 
improve and expand upon current COMSATCOM use cases.
    The AFSPC Commercial Satellite Communications Office (CSCO) 
facilitates the acquisition and delivery of operationally responsive, 
customer-focused, cost-effective COMSATCOM services and capabilities 
for Combatant Commands, Services and agencies throughout the DoD, as 
well as for federal agencies and foreign partners. The CSCO has two 
business units, the COMSATCOM Solutions Branch and the Enhanced Mobile 
Satellite Services (EMSS) Program. In Fiscal Year 2019, the CSCO has an 
annual working capital budget of approximately $800 million.
    The COMSATCOM Solutions Branch manages approximately 100 contracts 
annually with commercial providers, providing approximately 9 GHz of 
bandwidth across all commercial bands and 2.5 Gbps of throughput, with 
a lifecycle value exceeding $5 billion. Supported missions include 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control; 
logistics; research and development; special operations; and training.
    The EMSS Program Office provides global mobile satellite 
communications via the commercial Iridium low-Earth orbit (LEO) 
satellite constellation. For a fixed annual rate, customers receive 
unlimited voice and data on L-band devices, including satellite phones, 
push-to-talk radios, and small form-factor sensors and trackers. EMSS 
capabilities are meeting critical narrowband satellite communications 
requirements for current operations, including tactical, warfighter and 
disadvantaged user requirements. Currently over 100,000 devices are 
provisioned to the DoD's wholly-owned and operated EMSS Gateway, where 
all communications are securely processed and ingested into other 
networks.
    The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC), established in 2014 at the 
Combined Space Operations Center, has proved beneficial to both 
industry and government. The CIC improves our understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of the various commercial COMSATCOM and 
space situational awareness (SSA) systems that the DoD procures to 
satisfy warfighter needs, which improves industry's knowledge and 
employment of their systems in response. More recently, the command 
held two COMSATCOM industry day engagements. These events allowed the 
government to glean a better understanding of how to better leverage 
and incorporate existing and planned COMSATCOM capabilities into our 
SATCOM Enterprise Vision and Strategy while providing industry the 
opportunity to gain a better understanding of how the command intends 
to capitalize on the value the COMSATCOM industry is building.
    Innovation and rapid technology advancement are occurring 
throughout the space industry, especially in ``New Space'' companies 
with agile development and deployment processes. The Air Force is 
looking to partner with commercial industry, the civil space sector, 
and others to leverage these activities and increase agility, reduce 
cost, improve technology and decrease program development cycles. SMC's 
Space Enterprise Consortium aims to leverage this activity, minimizing 
barriers to entry for small businesses and non-traditional vendors and 
identify teaming opportunities to promote research and prototyping with 
the Government. At present, AFSPC is using this tool to identify and 
field a SATCOM Enterprise Management and Control capability to manage 
and control a hybrid DoD SATCOM Enterprise consisting of purpose-built 
DoD satellites and commercial SATCOM services.
    Finally, the Air Force COMSATCOM Office is pursuing a research, 
development, test, and engineering initiative to look at the use case 
for commercial COMSATCOM services in the Arctic, as well as 
commissioning a study to identify new government to industry business 
models for acquiring and employing COMSATCOM capability that will 
reduce the currently over 100 disparate contracts for commercial SATCOM 
while simultaneously expanding the overall capability and capacity 
available to our users.
Space Situational Awareness
    In June 2018 the President signed SPD-3, which is intended to 
ensure that the United States remains the leader in providing a safe 
and secure operating environment as space traffic increases. This 
policy establishes foundational principles, lays out goals, provides 
guidance, and establishes clear roles and responsibilities. In 
accordance with this policy, DoD will transition the non-military 
aspects of space situational awareness and space safety monitoring and 
responsibilities to the Department of Commerce.
    For the last year AFSPC has collaborated closely with the DoC on 
many fronts. In partnership with U.S. Strategic Command, there has been 
an active dialogue to differentiate roles and responsibilities to meet 
SPD-3 objectives. Next month the first DoC liaison will arrive at the 
18th Space Control Squadron located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
California. This will mark the start of operational-level engagement 
between the DoD and DoC related to the transfer of SSA domain knowledge 
to the DoC in support of their efforts to comply with SPD-3.
    SSA data sharing has been an area of great interaction and 
opportunity. In May 2018, an unclassified data environment was created 
to aggregate SSA data and to make that information easily accessible to 
developers, operators and allies alike. Called the Unified Data Library 
(UDL), this unclassified capability was built by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory. Since its delivery last summer, the UDL capability has 
grown exponentially and demonstrated its ability to be a marketplace 
that aggregates commercial, Allied, Intelligence Community, and 
academic data sets in a way that supports any data consumer at the 
correct classification level. Today, 16 commercial data providers and 
multiple non-traditional data providers like the University of Arizona 
are feeding the UDL. We also have government data available from the 
Naval Research Laboratory, the 18th Space Control Squadron, and others 
at the unclassified level. The DoC is currently evaluating the 
unclassified version of UDL to facilitate its broader Space Traffic 
Management objectives, and expects a final decision on their desired 
way ahead this summer.
Future Areas of Cooperation
    AFSPC has made significant progress in expanding interagency and 
commercial cooperation that enhance our position across the national 
security space portfolio. Based on those recent successes, AFSPC will 
continue to build our relationships with industry and other government 
agencies.
Blackjack
    Blackjack is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency- and 
Air Force-initiated program to define, develop, and demonstrate 
proliferated low-Earth orbit (PLEO) architectures to augment, 
complement or replace existing satellite constellations at lower cost 
and potentially higher resilience. The Blackjack program will deliver 
up to 20 satellites to orbit by 2021 and has three main objectives: (1) 
develop payload and mission-level autonomy software and demonstrate 
autonomous orbital operations; (2) examine and implement advanced 
commercial manufacturing techniques and commercial-off-the-shelf parts; 
and (3) assess the ability of small spacecraft in LEO to support 
national security space missions. AFSPC, Air Combat Command, and others 
in the DoD have expressed significant interest in Blackjack and the 
need for rapid deployment of a more resilient, distributed system. The 
Blackjack program has recently awarded satellite bus and payload 
contracts to industry partners.
CASINO
    Commercially Augmented Space Inter-Networked Operations (CASINO) is 
an umbrella program established by SMC to expand on operational 
concepts prototyped by the Blackjack program. CASINO will 
operationalize PLEO constellations by improving sensors and concepts of 
operation and developing prototype payloads for additional mission 
areas. CASINO is working with a variety of partners to determine 
requirements, data transport and integration schemes, and cyber 
security/Information Assurance needs for multiple mission areas. Use of 
innovative commercial manufacturing and ``design for upgrade'' 
techniques will enable rapid production and lower cost, allowing for 
continuous technology refresh and new technology insertion points not 
currently available in NSS programs. Using commercial-like production 
lines and replenishment concepts will drive up to 20 percent 
constellation re-capitalization each year and allow for technology 
insertion to outpace evolving and emerging threats. In addition, the 
CASINO program examines the use of both military unique command and 
control systems, and is coordinating with commercial PLEO operators on 
approaches that would enable command and control of military payload 
and data dissemination through existing commercial processing centers.
Mission Manifest Office
    SMC, under the auspices of AFSPC, created the Mission Manifest 
Office (MMO) to provide rapid, resilient and responsive launch 
opportunities for small payloads to meet NSS objectives. As the front 
door for operational launch, the MMO analyzes and identifies DoD, 
civil, and Intelligence Community launch opportunities to determine 
potential multi-manifest missions. As a result, the Air Force intends 
to maximize on-orbit capability and reduce overall launch costs by 
ensuring excess ``throw weight'' is used on every NSSL mission. As one 
of the SMC 2.0 pacesetters, the MMO will be offering DoD, the 
intelligence community and civil agencies opportunities to mature their 
space technologies on the NASA Landsat-9 launch mission in 2020, 
setting an important precedent for interagency collaboration for years 
to come.
Space-based Environmental Monitoring
    Air Force weather operators have a long history of leveraging U.S. 
civil and allied Space Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) 
capabilities to support global operations. DMSP has served as the core 
Air Force SBEM capability for close to sixty years. However, SBEM data 
from NOAA, the European Consortium for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites, and the Japanese Space Agency have been 
critical in providing meteorological data that DMSP alone cannot fully 
provide. For the next generation, the Air Force is currently acquiring 
the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave system to meet two requirements 
that will not be fulfilled by civil or allied partners: monitoring of 
ocean surface vector winds and tropical cyclone intensity. The Air 
Force is also currently developing a unique set of small hosted sensors 
to be flown in various orbits to sense energetic charged particles. 
Finally, the Air Force is implementing a comprehensive strategy to meet 
the two highest priority SBEM sensing needs under the Electro-Optical/
Infrared Weather System (EWS) acquisition: cloud characterization and 
theater weather Imagery. EWS will be comprised of a hybrid architecture 
of core Air Force sensing capabilities augmented by civil, allied, and 
likely commercial capabilities. The continued miniaturization of cloud 
imaging sensors combined with the emergence of ``NewSpace'' 
proliferated commercial space architectures provides an opportunity to 
integrate commercial capabilities into the SBEM family of systems like 
never before. This hybrid architecture approach will be much more 
resilient than current and previous SBEM architectures and will be 
scalable to meet requirements for more timely and actionable weather 
information.
The Way Ahead
    AFSPC has made significant progress in recent years to build and 
foster close relationships with civilian and commercial space partners 
to better leverage existing capabilities and to make smarter 
investments going forward. The command will continue to strive to 
ensure these relationships solidify over time to maintain a dominant 
national space enterprise.
    I thank the committee for your leadership and support; together we 
will build a resilient and ready NSS enterprise that will continue to 
serve as the foundation to our desire to maintain our military 
advantage and promote American prosperity.

    Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
    Colonel Melroy.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL PAMELA A. MELROY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
                 (RET.)/NASA ASTRONAUT, RETIRED

    Colonel Melroy. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member 
Sinema, the other members of the Committee--and your wonderful 
staff--for inviting me here today. It's a real honor to be on 
this panel with my distinguished colleagues.
    So, I'll get right to it. I consider that creating a 
thoughtful, whole-of-government, space traffic management 
oversight capability is one of the most urgent tasks facing the 
government to support our needs across commercial, civil, and 
national security sectors.
    Currently, the DOD has statutory authority for collision 
assessment and notification. However, the number of sensors 
that they use is not sufficient to our growing needs. These 
sensors can be affected by weather. They only take periodic 
snapshots of the position of objects in space. Hours, and 
sometimes even days, go by without updates to orbital 
locations. Furthermore, we cannot reliably track debris 10 
centimeters or less, and these objects present a hazard to 
navigation for all satellites--civil, commercial, and national 
security.
    Many of the new proposed commercial activities also include 
very dynamic operations, such as rendezvous, satellite 
servicing, and debris removal. Many emerging space threats are 
also highly dynamic. The ability to provide persistent custody 
of resident space objects is urgently needed for both the 
national security mission and also for a future civil space 
traffic management oversight authority.
    So, one solution is to incorporate a greater number of 
sensors, potentially from commercial companies and private 
entities, to help fill those data gaps. However, commercial 
space surveillance data is actually still a nascent industry. 
The Air Force and a civil space traffic management oversight 
authority need to work together to give clarity so that 
industry can position itself to provide the products and 
services that the government needs. For example, the U.S. 
Government needs to establish what data, and how much data, it 
needs to acquire in order to properly serve the community. 
Important work is still needed to establish the minimum 
threshold of service that the government should provide to all 
users, and how much data is necessary to provide that service. 
Additionally, a decision has to be made as to how and where 
that data will reside. If separate repositories are used for 
DOD and the civil authority, how does the government ensure 
that it's not paying twice for the same information?
    There are also implications for the intelligence community 
as we transition to a civil system. A system where open 
information about satellite positions is broadly available 
presents a challenge for conducting national security missions. 
The reality is that the IC is already facing this challenge. As 
an increasing number of independent domestic and international 
sensor operators come online, any ability to remain undetected 
in space is tenuous, at best.
    A potential approach parallels how sensitive missions in 
the national airspace are managed today. Currently, the FAA and 
DOD coordinate, every day, at local and national levels to 
protect information related to the presence of important assets 
operating in the national airspace. The existence of the assets 
is not disputed, but critical operational information is 
protected. These issues have a workable whole-of-government 
solution. However, until Congress takes action on the subject 
of who should oversee the civil space traffic management 
capability, the Air Force has no identifiable partner with 
statutory authority and the appropriate resources for 
coordination.
    We're already behind the curve. The need is urgent. A 
number of companies are actively seeking regulatory approval 
from other countries for these dynamic on-orbit activities. 
Other governments will be making decisions, setting precedents, 
defining by default what the global safety system will 
comprise. International regulations will be shaped by who 
leads. And, without a civil authority, the U.S. is limited in 
its influence on space traffic management oversight outcomes, 
to the detriment of commercial, civil, and national security.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important 
topic with you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Colonel Melroy follows:]

Prepared Statement of Colonel Pamela A. Melroy, United States Air Force 
                     (Ret.)/NASA Astronaut, retired
    Thank you Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, and your wonderful staff for inviting me 
here today. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about the critical 
operational, technical and policy challenges today in space across the 
commercial, civil and national security sectors.
    There are many opportunities that a growing commercial space 
community have created across all three sectors. Low-cost launch 
opportunities and reduction in the size of electronics have created a 
renaissance in space research and new business models to support civil 
and government missions. But along with the increasing engagement comes 
many new challenges as well. We must encourage and nurture the economic 
and national benefits derived from all of this activity, while 
protecting national security interests. I believe that the definition 
of a coherent, thoughtful and effect space traffic management 
capability is one of the most urgent tasks facing the government in 
this cause; this requirement underpins the needs across all three 
sectors.
    Currently the Department of Defense (DoD) has statutory authority 
for conjunction assessment and notification. The Combined Space 
Operations Center (CSpOC) has access to 29 sensors, 7 of them dedicated 
full time, with 22 contributing and collateral sensors which are 
available part-time. These sensors, scattered widely across the globe 
and providing only poor coverage in the southern hemisphere, are not 
sufficient for the challenges facing us now. They can be affected by 
weather, and only take periodic snapshots of the location of objects in 
space; hours and even days may go by without updates to orbital 
locations. Furthermore, there are gaps in our capability to track 
objects, for example, we cannot detect debris less than 10 centimeters 
in size. These objects present a hazard to navigation for all 
satellites--civil, commercial, and national security.
    Many of the new proposed commercial activities include highly 
dynamic operations including rendezvous and proximity operations, 
satellite servicing, and debris removal missions. Consequently any 
space traffic management will have to not only track and manage the 
movements of satellites on orbit and but also be able to track the 
small, but important debris. One way to create a robust space traffic 
management system is to incorporate a greater number of sensors, 
potentially from commercial companies and private entities to help 
provide data that can fill current gaps in our ability to provide 
persistent custody of all objects in space. Given the proliferation of 
large satellite constellations and the growth in debris, the ability to 
provide persistent custody of orbiting objects is urgently needed for 
both the national security mission and for a future civil space traffic 
management oversight authority.
    While it's exciting to see the new capability that commercial 
entities can bring to the table, commercial space surveillance data is 
still a nascent industry. The Air Force and the civil space traffic 
management oversight authority need to work together immediately to 
give clarity and direction to how they intend to acquire the necessary 
data. Only with clear direction can industry position itself to provide 
the products and services the government needs. There are several 
immediate and critical issues that the government needs to address. 
First, the U.S. government needs to establish what data it needs or 
desires to acquire to serve the domestic community. According to Space 
Policy Directive-3, the Department of Commerce--as the administration's 
nominated civil authority--will eventually take over conjunction 
assessments and notifications currently performed by the Combined Space 
Operations Center (CSpOC). Important work is still needed to establish 
the minimum threshold of service that the government should provide to 
all users, and how much data is necessary to provide that level of 
service.
    Second, a decision has to be made as to how and where that data 
will reside. If multiple repositories are defined, for example, one for 
DoD and one for the civilian community, how does the government ensure 
it is not paying twice for the same information? Another critical 
question concerns the relationship that DoD will decide to maintain 
with partner countries and the sharing of critical data as it has done 
in the past. Will commercial entities resist this sharing as affecting 
their potential market? As the various government stakeholders struggle 
with answering these complex questions they can turn to the many 
lessons learned from both the commercial earth observation data 
experience as well as commercial weather data.
    Finally, let us all recognize that there are implications for the 
intelligence community as we transition to an open civil system of 
space situational awareness and space traffic management. A system 
where open information about satellite position and orbit is available 
to the general community will present a challenge for conducting 
national security missions. Unfortunately, the reality of today, 
however, is that the IC is already facing this challenge. As an 
increasing number of independent domestic and international sensor 
operators come on-line, anyone's ability to remain undetected is 
tenuous. We have worked through such challenges before. The current 
situation facing national security is analogous to the challenges 
recently faced when commercial Earth observation capabilities expanded. 
The solution was to issue licenses to U.S. companies with specific 
restrictions on selling data about certain sensitive national security 
locations.
    However, then and now, we face the problem that commercial 
companies from other countries are bound by no such restrictions. As 
with the Earth observation paradigm shift, we face another with SSA/STM 
no less intractable, but yet must be resolved. A potential approach 
could be one that parallels how the national airspace today manages 
sensitive missions. Currently, the FAA and DoD coordinate every day at 
both local, regional and national levels with air traffic control to 
protect information related to the presence of high value assets 
operating in the national airspace. For example, military flights are 
not included in the national airspace data provided through the popular 
``Flight Aware'' application. These issues have workable solutions.
    Clearly there are critical urgent questions that need to be 
addressed and guidance provided to the greater community about the 
approach the U.S. government is going to take. While there is evidence 
of some activity, it does not appear strategic or coordinated to the 
outside observer. The Department of Commerce recently issued an RFI on 
space traffic management and space situational awareness topic. What is 
not clear to the greater community is how this effort, along with some 
others, are coordinated to create an ``all of government'' integrated 
approach, including the DoD.
    Thus, it is becoming urgent to resolve the impasse existing between 
the Senate and the House on the subject of who should oversee the civil 
space situational awareness and space traffic management capability for 
the U.S. government. Industry does not know who to talk to so they are 
trying to talk to everyone, which has the potential to muddy the waters 
with a diversity of business desires rather than a thoughtful strategy. 
Until this question is resolved the Air Force has no identifiable 
partner to coordinate with that has statuary authority. And until this 
decision is finalized, no civilian Executive Branch office has the 
resources to address these critical issues.
    We are already behind the curve; the commercial need is urgent. 
Already a myriad of companies, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, 
Chandah Space Technologies, the Japanese company Astroscale, and the 
Israeli company Effective Space are or soon will be actively seeking 
regulatory approval for dynamic space activities. Equally important, in 
absence of U.S. leadership and input on this global problem, other 
national governments will be making decisions, setting precedents, and 
defining by default what the global system will comprise. International 
regulations will be shaped by who leads. We cannot afford not to be 
part of that dynamic.
    Recognizing the significance of this topic, there is substantial 
activity underway on the topics of SSA/STM ongoing in consortia and 
non-profit organizations. AIAA published a white paper in October 2017 
and formed a working group to address some of the technical issues 
around data. Their work includes the compilation of a lexicon and an 
outline of the problem set that needs to be addressed across the 
landscape of the SSA/STM eco-system. Secure World has also been very 
active in this area. Industry consensus safety and technical standards 
are being developed by the Consortium For Execution of Rendezvous and 
Servicing Operations (CONFERS) and will be invaluable to these 
regulators. While all of these efforts are admirable and will help 
reach a solution, without a civil authority, the U.S. is limited in its 
actions.
    I would like to close with two important points. First, we need 
immediate and urgent all-of-government vision and direction on the 
definition of the U.S. SSA/STM capability. Next, we need reach out to 
our international partners to provide input and strong U.S. leadership, 
leveraging our world-leading technical expertise on this issue 
globally.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important and 
exciting topic with you, and I look forward to our discussion.

    Senator Cruz. Thank you very much, to each of the 
witnesses, for your very helpful testimony.
    I have long said that I agree with the President and the 
administration on the need for the creation of a Space Force, 
although I also have a standing request to the administration 
that I want to be notified the day that James Tiberius Kirk 
shows up to enlist.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cruz. Administrator Bridenstine----
    Mr. Bridenstine. Sir.
    Senator Cruz,--you said if you're going to have commerce on 
the ocean, it needs to be protected, and the same is true in 
space. Do you believe that a Space Force is an important, or 
even necessary, component to ensuring that the partnerships we 
have with commercial space and NASA continue to prosper, moving 
forward into the future?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I do, Chairman. And I will tell you, I've 
been an advocate of the Space Force in my previous life in the 
House of Representatives. We voted on it, in fact, in the 
House. I was on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. It got 
strong bipartisan support. Then I voted on it on the full Armed 
Services Committee. Again, it got very strong bipartisan 
support. I think, of the 60-some members on the Committee, only 
2 voted against the underlying--or the National Defense 
Authorization Act that actually had the Space Force embedded in 
it. Then when we voted on it on the floor of the House, it got 
344 votes. So, it passed the House of Representatives with very 
strong bipartisan support. And, of course, I supported it all 
along the way.
    I will tell you, from my perspective--my new perspective as 
the NASA Administrator, one of my biggest concerns is that the 
enemies of the United States see the destruction of space as 
part of their plans, should we end up in a war. And I think 
it's important that, if we are to preserve space for 
exploration and discovery and science and all of the things 
that NASA does, we need to make sure that the enemies of the 
United States understand that there is no advantage to 
destroying space. They will gain no advantage over the United 
States of America from destroying space. And if we can not only 
signal that that's the case, but actually deliver on that, then 
they won't make those investments, and then we can continue to 
explore space together.
    Senator Cruz. So, in your judgment, how would a strong and 
robust Space Force benefit commercial space and space 
exploration? And, in the converse, how would the absence of an 
effective Space Force harm commercial space and space 
exploration?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Sir, I think it goes straight to your 
opening statement about commerce. What NASA is attempting to do 
is develop space, especially, right now, low-Earth orbit, where 
we're having great success in the commercialization of space. 
So, we are proving technology, we're retiring risk, and we're 
developing commercial markets. Now commercial industry is 
taking over a lot of those capabilities that NASA used to do 
exclusively. If commercial industry is going to continue to 
make those investments--and we're talking about big 
investments, as you correctly identified--if they're going to 
continue to make those investments, they need to have 
assurances that their investments are going to be safe and 
protected. And I think that's, ultimately, why what NASA is 
doing is important for commercialization. And what 
commercialization is doing is important for economic growth, 
but it's also important that it be protected. If we have that 
protection, we will continue to see growth. If we--conversely, 
to your point, if we don't have that protection, we will not 
continue to see growth, and those investments will never be 
made.
    Senator Cruz. General Thompson, in your judgment, how 
should the Space Force or Space Development Agency be designed 
to ensure that the Department of Defense is effectively 
capitalizing on the investments being made on the commercial 
space front?
    General Thompson. Thank you, Senator Cruz. I would say a 
couple of things in that regard.
    First of all, when it comes to the Space Force itself, I 
think the proposal that was put forward by the Department of 
Defense is the best approach, going forward, for the Department 
and the Nation, for two reasons. First of all, it's effective, 
because it takes the existing Department of Defense oversight 
and management structure, it creates a four-star member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate for all of those 
capabilities, both in a warfighting sense and a development 
sense. But, that Space Force is also efficient, because it also 
capitalizes on the support and infrastructure and other 
capabilities the Air Force already has and provides for the 
majority of the space forces today.
    When it comes to capitalizing on commercial investment, it 
also will consolidate--a Space Force would also consolidate all 
of those activities into one organization. Today, we have the 
Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles that builds 
large-scale, incredibly capable assets for the Nation, 
primarily from a military perspective. We've got--we recently 
established, with the help of Congress, the Space Rapid 
Capabilities Office to fill holes in the need to defend and 
protect those capabilities. And then the Department recently 
created the Space Development Agency to specifically focus on 
and leverage commercial capabilities. Those organizations all 
need to work together. They can work together inside the 
current structure today, but a Space Force would help them 
organize and operate more effectively.
    Senator Cruz. I very much agree with you that creating a 
separate Space Force unifying the command will elevate the 
focus on the theater, elevate the resources, the leadership, 
the focus on defending what is likely to be one of, if not the 
most, contested theater, for decades going forward.
    General Thompson. And, Senator Cruz, if I may, also the 
fact that the President has already created a U.S. Space 
Command, a combatant command for space, I think helps a great 
deal.
    Senator Cruz. Absolutely.
    OK, a final question. As you know, Space Policy Directive-3 
directs the Department of Commerce to be the focal point for 
civil and commercial space situational awareness and space 
traffic management efforts. And, as the leading spacefaring 
nation in the world, we have a lot invested in our ability to 
safely conduct space operations and to track debris. And our 
needs in this area will only grow as space traffic and space 
commerce increase. Who, exactly, owns space traffic management? 
And who should own it? Whoever wants to----
    General Thompson. Senator Cruz, if I may. Sir, I would say, 
in a de facto sense today, the Air Force owns space traffic 
management. And the reason is, as Senator Sinema stated, as an 
outcome of the collision between the Russian Cosmos and the 
Iridium satellite in 2009, no one else in the world could track 
these objects, could do the calculations required to determine 
whether they--or whether they were a threat to each other, 
simply by their orbital motion. And so, as an outcome of that 
event in 2009, the Air Force took on the responsibility, 
because it was the only organization in the world that could, 
and perhaps today may still be the only organization, although 
there's a lot of great commercial and civil and other 
capability. Air Force--the Air Force is an armed service, it is 
not a regulatory agency, so I would say that we will do the--
this job as long as the Nation and the world requires, but it 
is probably best suited for civil and other organizations in 
that regard.
    Senator Cruz. Does anyone disagree or have a differing 
perspective?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I will tell you, Senator Cruz, I've---in 
the House of Representatives, I took a position that the FAA 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation should have that 
role. I now see it quite differently. I think the Office of the 
Secretary of Commerce should have that role. And I say that 
because what we are trying to do is develop commerce in space. 
That's what we're trying to achieve here. And I think that, if 
an agency that is responsible for developing commerce is also 
responsible for developing the rules by which people operate in 
space, I think, ultimately, it will--it'll put us in a much 
better position in the future.
    I will also say that, under all circumstances, it should 
not be the Department of Defense that does space situational 
awareness and space traffic management. That is a construct of 
the past, and it is certainly not going to work in the future. 
When I was in the House, we heard testimony after testimony 
from generals and admirals, Strategic Command, Air Force Space 
Command, and overwhelmingly they kept saying, ``We do not want 
to be the FAA for space anymore.'' There was a day when that 
was necessary. We're well past that day. It needs to be done by 
a civil sector, by a civil agency. And I think it can be 
largely, in my view, commercialized. So, if the Commerce 
Department were to say, ``We can license private companies that 
can provide the data and the information, and then if somebody 
wants to launch into space, you have to prove to Commerce that 
you have SSA--space situational awareness and space traffic 
management being provided by one of the commercial operators,'' 
that puts us in a position where there is opportunity to reform 
the system in the future.
    I get concerned when I hear people talk about creating a 
new government program for SSA and STM that won't have the 
ability to modify, it won't have the ability to change. In the 
1950s, when we created the current Air Traffic Management 
System, we used a network of radars and voice communication. 
I'm a Navy pilot by trade. In the 2000s, we were using a 
network of radars and voice communications. technology has 
changed, but our system did not change. I think it's important 
that, when we construct the next-generation Space Traffic 
Management System, it should have the ability to change--I 
think commercialization helps that--so that, ultimately, we 
have numerous providers that are competing on cost and 
innovation to get more data and better data for a safer space 
traffic management environment.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Senator Sinema.
    Oh, I'm--Colonel Melroy, did you have something to add?
    Colonel Melroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do.
    I think there are pros and cons. The discussion is, 
essentially, Department of Commerce or Department of 
Transportation. The Department of Transportation, where I was 
at the Office of Commercial Space, was working very closely 
with the Air Force, and has many people who have been thinking 
about this for a long time and actually ready to catch the 
football that they knew was coming at them. So, they have the 
resources. They have the people who have been thinking about 
this.
    The other side of the coin is, the administration has, in 
SPD-3, said Department of Commerce. And I think Administrator 
Bridenstine has made some really good points about why Commerce 
is such an important place for that kind of civil oversight 
function.
    I think there are--arguably, you would say that the 
Executive Branch is in the best position to decide amongst 
themselves who they think--the organization that is most 
willing and most prepared to take it on. So, I think that's a 
very important thing.
    The problem is, we have a third option, here, and that's 
where we're at right now: we don't have anyone. And I would 
argue, that's the worst option.
    So, in my mind, I think there are pros and cons that are 
worth debating, but the important thing is that we need to get 
off the worst option and get on to one of the other two. And if 
there are issues and concerns, then they need to be addressed, 
but we need to move forward.
    Mr. O'Connell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I think we stand at a moment where we're able to think 
about the disruption, if you will, of the space debris problem. 
And it's going to come largely through the good efforts that 
have been done, historically, by the Air Force, but 
increasingly by the developments in the commercial world. And, 
as I said, there's a very interesting, diverse community of 
companies that are coming forward. You and I grew up in the age 
of satellite imagery, when people were coming to market with 1-
meter electro optical systems. This is not that market. This is 
a market that is filled with radars and RF sensors and electro 
optical telescopes, as well as a wide range of visualization 
tools that are completely different extensions of what we do 
today. And so, the concept of space traffic management is, in 
and of itself, a bit outdated. What we're really trying to do 
is to improve the quality, speed, and accuracy of data to 
satellite operators so that they have a self-interest in 
knowing where they are and getting out of the way of people who 
might be in harm's way or collaborating with others. And so, 
it's really a time to think about this in a fundamentally 
different way.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Senator Sinema.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Following up on this conversation, I--these are really 
interesting discussions about Commerce as an option. I'm 
interested in learning a little bit more about FAA as an 
option.
    So, Colonel Melroy, do you think the FAA could--would be a 
good or a poor choice to task with space traffic management? 
And if the FAA is a good option, would they also be responsible 
for tracking objects in space and preventing space collisions?
    Colonel Melroy. Senator, these are great questions. I think 
I'm going to go back and remind everyone that there are pros 
and cons on both sides, right? There is something to be said 
for having all the oversight concentrated in one place. And 
Commerce currently has other regulatory oversight with regards 
to Earth observation and imaging. And having a concentration in 
a single place, I think, you know, the--definitely has some 
benefits, from a regulatory perspective.
    Unfortunately, right now the FAA has the people who have 
been thinking about this for a while, and actually have been 
embedded in the community and understand it. In fact, when I 
was at the FAA, I hired an employee to sit in the then JSpOC, 
now CSpOC, to begin to absorb the lessons that would be needed 
to be learned, going forward.
    I think, either way, there are going to have to be some 
adjustments that get made. Whether the Department of 
Transportation or the Department of Commerce takes over 
oversight, these are issues that do have to be addressed. But, 
I have full confidence in this committee that you can absorb 
this information that we're sharing with you about some of the 
pros and cons, and make sure that the legislation appropriately 
deals with that.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you.
    My next set of questions are for Administrator Bridenstine. 
Orbital debris, as we've talked about, is an increasing problem 
that can potentially interfere with civil, military, and 
commercial space operations. I'm wondering if you could tell us 
a little bit about the efforts to update the U.S. Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. And how will the U.S. 
work with the international community on adoption of standards 
around debris mitigation?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, ma'am. So, NASA is part of what we 
call the Interagency Space Debris Coordination Committee. And 
what this is--this is a--all the different space agencies in 
the world that have the preponderance of assets in space. And 
this group of space agencies has done modeling and made a 
determination that the type of collision--I think it was you 
that referenced it in your testimony, the Iridium-Cosmos 
collision from 2009----
    Senator Sinema. Right.
    Mr. Bridenstine.--that type of collision is going to 
happen, on average, every 5 to 9 years. And that's if launch 
cadences stay the same. Launch cadences are not going to stay 
the same. And every time we launch something into orbit, there 
will--by default, there will be some level of debris created. 
We, as an agency, work very hard on making sure we mitigate, as 
much as possible, those debris-creating events, and then also, 
ultimately, helping set the standard--as you identified, we set 
a standard that then our commercial partners follow, and then 
commercial industry-at-large follows those standards. And then, 
eventually, those standards get accepted as norms of behavior 
in the international community, and then our international 
partners follow suit.
    So, we have, as an agency, been leading on this for a very 
long period of time. And we need to continue leading. We need 
to make sure that, when we--you know, when we move forward on 
all the activities--like I said, launch cadence is going to 
stay the same. That's what the study said. If it stays the 
same, we're going to have a collision every 5 to 9 years. It's 
not going to stay the----
    Senator Sinema. Right.
    Mr. Bridenstine. We're talking about launching thousands 
and thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit for low-
latency, high-throughput communications. In other words, we 
need to get really good at debris mitigation. We also need to 
get really good at situational awareness. We need more data, 
and better data. We need that data to be shared, and we need 
people to be able to respond to that information in realtime. 
We need a single integrated space picture.
    So, I will tell you, this is something we're--at NASA, 
we're thinking about all the time. We're one agency of many 
that deal with this. But, certainly, we are keenly aware of the 
issue, and trying to do everything we can to mitigate it.
    Senator Sinema. So, a follow-up question. It sounds like 
NASA understands the increased risk, because, as more traffic 
goes into space, then there'll be more debris.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Sinema. So, the mitigation work makes a lot of 
sense. What, if anything, can be done about removal of debris 
that exists already?
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, that's the next order of challenge. 
So, there's the mitigation, which preventing--preventing it 
from happening. And then, ultimately--then there's the 
situational awareness and traffic management piece. And then, 
finally, there's the remediation, How do we remove----
    Senator Sinema. Right.
    Mr. Bridenstine.--orbital debris? So, in this case, the 
Federal Communication Commission actually has authority to 
write the rules for geostationary orbit. So, if a satellite 
comes to the end of its useful life, they have requirements for 
it to be supersynched; in other words, put into deep space for 
storage. In other words, it's a dead satellite, we've got to 
get it out of the way. In low-Earth orbit, there are other 
agencies, in this case, that have jurisdiction, that say that 
we have to de-orbit satellites in low-Earth orbit. So, those 
are remediation capabilities. Then there's the challenge of the 
debris that exists, and, How do we get that removed? So, what 
NASA is doing right now is, we're investing in technologies; 
namely, robotic servicing of satellites, robotic technologies, 
rendezvous and proximity operations in order to, no kidding, 
come in close proximity with other satellites and then 
robotically service those satellites. So, we can actually 
extend the life of a satellite so the satellite does not become 
orbital debris. And maybe eventually, depending on resources, 
we could actually grapple satellites and take dead objects out 
of orbit altogether--larger objects. The challenge is, anything 
that we're going to do in that capacity is going to be 
something that we can see. We're talking about objects that are 
larger than 10 centimeters.
    Senator Sinema. Right.
    Mr. Bridenstine. I will tell you, Ranking Member, I am not 
worried about the objects we can see. I'm worried about--for 
every object we can see, there are 10 to 100 objects that are 
smaller than 10 centimeters in diameter, that ultimately are 
traveling at 17,500 miles per hour, and every bit as dangerous 
as an object that's----
    Senator Sinema. Right.
    Mr. Bridenstine.--10 centimeters. So, I'm more worried 
about what we can't see. And that's why we have to increase the 
network of sensors around the world. It's why we have to 
improve the data that we receive, and how we process that data.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to all of our witnesses today. And thank you, 
Chairman, for holding this hearing. I yield back.
    Senator Cruz. Senator Peters.

                STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, to all of our witnesses. Fascinating topic, 
and appreciate your insight.
    I'm going to--I want to follow up a little bit on the space 
debris. But, before I do that, Mr. Bridenstine, I wanted to ask 
you a question. As you know, we're approaching the 50th 
anniversary of humanity's giant leap and the Apollo landing, 
something I know that you are particularly passionate about, as 
well. And last week, we had Jeff Bezos unveil a new Moon 
lander. There's numerous public and private missions that have 
been planned for the lunar surface, as well. I know NASA has 
issued guidance for the protection of the human heritage site 
of the Apollo 11 landing. I'm working on legislation now to 
codify that. But, I would like your thoughts. Would you support 
enacting statutory protections to preserve and honor the Apollo 
landing sites on the Moon?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Senator, yes, sir. It needs to be 
protected. There's going to come a day when we have humans 
living and working on the Moon. And that will be a monument for 
all of history. So----
    Senator Peters. And----
    Mr. Bridenstine.--yes, sir. I'd protect--I believe we 
should be protecting it.
    Senator Peters. Great. Well, I appreciate that. And then I 
would assume you'll be working with some of your counterparts 
with other countries that may be going to the Moon, as well, to 
make sure that we all can agree that this is a human heritage 
site that we should protect?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I think there's broad agreement on that.
    Senator Peters. Great.
    The--back to the orbital debris, which is clearly a 
significant problem, as all of you have articulated. I'd like 
to hear the panel's thoughts on the Kessler Effect, which--I 
believe it's a scenario where space junk crashes into 
satellites, and then it creates even more debris, and then 
there's, basically, an ever-continuing chain reaction that 
eventually spins out of control. Some think we may be in a 
slow-motion effect like that right now. Are you aware of, or 
have any accurate estimates of, a probability of this kind of 
chain reaction? And what are the estimates of it? Have any of 
you done any work in that area? Because we may already be down 
that path right now, but, as you mentioned, Mr. Bridenstine, 
this'll--this is going to accelerate. It will likely be an 
exponential acceleration and, with this kind of effect, be very 
difficult to control.
    Colonel Melroy. Senator, I'd just like to comment. I think 
the technical issues that Administrator Bridenstine brought up 
about objects less than 10 centimeters is really, really 
important. DARPA did a study called Catcher's Mitt, which said 
that the other thing that could be done is that there are some 
few dozen very large objects--they're actually upper stages 
that have been left in orbit, and they are the most massive 
objects. And so, they have the greatest potential to create a 
huge amount of debris. So, there are policy issues that we have 
not discussed around third-party liability, the key one being, 
if you go to grab a hold of a piece of debris and, oops, 
something doesn't go well, more debris is generated.
    Senator Peters. Right.
    Colonel Melroy. There's a liability issue associated with 
that. One of the opportunities, I think, that the U.S. has to 
show leadership on this topic is to accept that the U.S. has 
liability under the Outer Space Treaty, and go and clean up our 
upper stages, or at least a handful of them. It would have a 
huge impact on preventing something like the Kessler Syndrome.
    The other comment that I would make about the Kessler 
Syndrome is, our Earth is astounding in its ability to heal 
itself. And eventually--if we follow debris mitigation 
standards, eventually objects in low-Earth orbit will get 
flushed in and reenter and burn up in the atmosphere, we think. 
And so, there's the potential, if we are mitigating, if we 
clean up the worst and the largest objects, that--there's hope 
that the Kessler Syndrome won't come to pass.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Bridenstine.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Sir, I would say that the Kessler Syndrome 
is something we think about, it's something that we need to 
prevent from happening. We're not there yet. But, given the 
amount of activity that we see coming with these massive 
constellations of communication satellites launching into low-
Earth orbit, it's something we need to be very aware of, and we 
need to do everything we can to prevent it from happening.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    One final question, Mr. Bridenstine. Clearly, investments 
in space power our manufacturing, our aerospace industry, as 
you've all highlighted, the importance of space exploration and 
space commercial activities. Certainly why I've--a big 
supporter of the SLS, the Orion Programs. But, while I support 
these programs, I think it's also very important that NASA 
focuses on its science budget and its important science 
mission, which has always been a core part of NASA. And that's 
why I'm concerned about the new directive to rapidly speed up 
our mission to the Moon, as to what that can mean for the 
overall science budget. So, Administrator, if you could just 
assure us that NASA will not sacrifice the scientific 
investments to fund these kinds of exploration activities, that 
that still remains a core mission, and one that we're going to 
continue to fully support.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, sir. And I can tell you, I'm very 
proud of the fact--when the President and the Vice President 
gave us direction, ``We need to accelerate the path to the 
Moon,'' I made it very clear what works and what doesn't work, 
because this has been tried before in history. The Space 
Exploration Initiative, back in the 1990s, the Vision for Space 
Exploration, in the early 2000s. In each case, the effort was 
made to achieve the end state by cannibalizing one part of NASA 
to feed another part of NASA. I made the case very strongly 
that we should not be working toward this goal by cannibalizing 
the Science Mission Directorate nor by cannibalizing the 
International Space Station. And the $1.6 billion that we have 
for now going to the Moon does not come from any part of NASA. 
It comes from outside of NASA. It was the case that I made when 
they said we wanted to accelerate, and we were successful in 
achieving that.
    Senator Peters. And how confident are you that $1.6 billion 
is enough?
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, it is enough for 2020. It gets us out 
of the gate very strongly. It helps us, ultimately, continue 
with SLS, which I know you're very keen on. It is also a 
necessary piece to getting a lander. So, we are currently 
building Gateway, which is in orbit around the Moon--which will 
be in orbit around the Moon. We need to aggregate, at the 
Gateway, a landing system. And this $1.6 billion, the majority 
of it, goes toward procuring that landing system. A lot of that 
money was to be spent in 2025, 2026, 2027, and 2028. We've now 
moved that up so that, when we launch our first humans to the 
Gateway in 2000--well, I should say, 2024, they will actually 
have a lander already aggregated at the Gateway for--by which 
our next man and first woman will have access to the surface of 
the Moon.
    Senator Peters. Thank you. Appreciate it.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, sir.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Cruz. All right. A few more questions.
    Mr. Cardillo, a large part of the discussion surrounding 
the creation of the Space Force is what role the intelligence 
community should play, given its diverse equities. What is your 
view on the role that the intelligence community should have in 
the Space Force? And specifically, should NRO, NGA, and others 
be included in the Space Force from the beginning?
    Mr. Cardillo. So, first, to answer the role question, I 
think it's quite analogous to the role we played in other 
domains. We're statutory--I say ``we''--NGA is statutorily 
responsible for providing safety of navigation, wherever it 
occurs, whether that be land, sea, or air today. I would extend 
that argument to the space domain. And we've actually worked 
with the Air Force in the past about how that will happen, not 
on a traffic management perspective, which has already been 
discussed, but more about safe operations and secure 
operations, because, besides debris, there are digital and 
cyber activities, which also could pose a threat to our 
operating environment.
    To the second question about what should be in and what 
should be out, I'm a big proponent of transferring knowledge, 
experience, and expertise, but I don't believe transferring 
agencies, such as NGA or NRO, now into an entity such as a 
Space Force would make any more sense than it would have to 
have taken the NGA that does maritime safety and transitioned 
that to the Navy. I think you--I think the Nation gets--is well 
served by the consolidation of that expertise that can be 
applied across different domains. I would say the same things 
about my former colleagues at the NRO, who have got a--60 years 
of expertise with launching and operating satellites. And I 
think that, too, can be transferred without moving the 
organization itself.
    Senator Cruz. All right. Let's talk--a different area--
let's talk about leadership. Last month, Ms. Chaplain, the 
Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing at the Government 
Accountability Office, testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on the Space Force proposal, stating, quote, 
``It appears that there will be a number of space acquisition 
activities outside the Space Force, including the Missile 
Defense Agency, the NRO, and some military space service 
activities, but, so far, it is uncertain what the overall 
governance structure for space will be.'' If there are 
conflicts in requirements, funding, or priorities between 
agencies that are not in the Space Force, who resolves them and 
makes a final decision? In your minds, Mr. Cardillo and General 
Thompson, both, where should the interagency dialogues on 
disputes and solutions live?
    Mr. Cardillo. It's an excellent question. Whenever somebody 
says it's an excellent question, it means it's a hard question. 
But, let me enjoy my former government status now and just say 
that--look, I am a big supporter of the reemergence and the 
energy that has been put into the Space Council. Conversations 
that occurred at lower levels in the past have now been 
highlighted and elevated, and I think the Nation's better 
served by that. I would offer that that could be an avenue to 
answer your question about differences or equities that might 
cross lines over where good, patriotic Americans from one 
agency would disagree about the best path forward. That 
response, by the way, has not been coordinated with the Space 
Council, as to whether or not they would accept said 
adjudication, but I guess I'm just saying I like the momentum 
that we've got now. I think those conversations are elevated. I 
think the adjudication of that answer, that--the complexity of 
it, I think, should at least be originated there at the 
Council. And how and where they designate it, you know, for 
lead to do the adjudication, I think, is work to be done.
    General Thompson. Senator, I agree with Mr. Cardillo in 
many cases. One of the reasons this debate started, 2 or so 
years ago, was because that there were so many organizations 
who had some role in space. And I'll say, specifically, 
national security space, although, as Administrator Bridenstine 
said, there are many aspects to space. One of the arguments 
was, there were far too many organizations and people involved 
in national security space alone. In fact, at one point, I 
believe, the comment was, there are 60 or so organizations. And 
so, the conversation that started here in Congress, that was 
taken up by the President, it's now made this a kitchen-table 
conversation.
    Since that began, we've actually created some more space 
organizations. And so, in a sense, we're making that 
coordination more complicated. I believe it's now time to start 
consolidating some of those. And I believe, absolutely, the 
Space Force is one of the ways that can bring some of those 
disparate organizations that exist today, bring a focus, bring 
an organizational structure on top, but so that that one 
organization, at least when it comes to the national security 
space organization, can carry the advocacy, can make the 
decisions, and perform an integrating role with the rest of the 
interagency, the way we do in many other ways today.
    Senator Cruz. OK. Last set of questions is addressed to all 
the witnesses.
    Morgan Stanley reported, last November, that, quote, ``The 
revenue generated by the global space industry may increase to 
$1.1 trillion or more by 2040. The development of reusable 
rockets, greater use of broadband technologies and orbits are a 
couple of examples of the contributing factors to the potential 
economic growth.'' The report goes on to say that a U.S. Space 
Command could, quote, ``benefit aerospace companies'' and help, 
quote, ``focus and accelerate investment in innovative 
technologies and capabilities.'' In the judgment of the 
witnesses on the panel, to what degree do you believe a strong 
U.S. military presence in space will contribute to a thriving 
economy in low-Earth orbit?
    Mr. O'Connell. Senator? Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I'm firmly of the belief that a strong military presence 
will very much encourage the growth that we've talked about 
already in this hearing and in the Morgan Stanley projections 
already. As we've looked at that, as I mentioned in my 
testimony, we've looked at where the calculations are coming 
from for those estimates, going forward. And the simple 
breakdown of that is that, if I simply take the functions that 
are being performed on Earth today, and extend them into the 
population that doesn't have--the half of the population that 
doesn't--for example, broadband communications, high-speed 
communications, and Internet--you get to a trillion dollars 
quickly. A modest 5-percent growth off the $400 billion economy 
we see today, over the next 20 years, you get beyond the 
trillion dollars. Where the additional calculations come from 
have to do with the things that will go on in space and will 
then affect both things on Earth and the exploration goals that 
the Nation, rightly, has.
    I will cut it another way for you, which is that we see the 
functions that were traditionally commercial functions---remote 
sensing, communications, weather--we see companies coming 
forward in the market every single day at Commerce that are 
going to disrupt those business models at the same time as 
companies will come forward with new ideas that are going to 
change the landscape of exploration, things that we do on the 
Moon and Mars and beyond. And so, there are both of those 
camps. Those can only benefit from a robust U.S. military 
presence in space, similar to the naval examples that we've 
talked about today.
    Mr. Cardillo. I would just add a bit to what the 
Administrator said earlier about your question about risk. I 
firmly believe that the fundamentals of this American 
experiment really haven't changed, that investors have to 
quantify the amount of risk versus potential reward. To the 
extent that entities such as Space Command or Space Force or 
better traffic management or increased understanding and 
awareness can reduce the first component, the second will rise. 
We will get more investment. Our system works that way. And 
that's why I, again, believe in the--putting the bet on us is 
the right one to do. So, anything that reduces that 
uncertainty, I think, will increase the opportunity for future 
investment.
    And let's face it, that has been our system for over 200 
years, and I think it'll serve us well, going forward, as long 
as we reduce unnecessary barriers and increase the--as I said, 
that broad-based information to make those bets.
    Senator Cruz. Well articulated.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Chairman, I would double down on your 
statement earlier today. You mentioned that you believe the 
world's first trillionaire is going to be somebody who is 
exploring space. That was a--actually the result of a study 
done by Goldman Sachs. And they indicated that that would be 
the case. So, the question is--we talk about rare Earth metals. 
And what a lot of people don't realize is that rare Earth 
metals are not Earth metals at all; they're from asteroid 
impacts; in many cases, from billions of years ago. And it just 
so happens that these asteroids in deep space have a tremendous 
amount of very valuable metals in them. Right now, NASA is 
doing a mission at an asteroid in deep space called Bennu. So, 
we have entered orbit around this asteroid in deep space. And, 
in fact, we're going to actually do, for the first time in the 
history of the world, a return from Bennu with a sample. So, 
this little robot is going to down, grab a sample from Bennu, 
and bring it home. And there's a reason to do this. Number one, 
we want to be able to characterize these asteroids in deep 
space so that we can protect the Earth, quite frankly. The 
evidence is in: the dinosaurs did not have a space program. We 
do. So, we want to be able to characterize any kind of threat 
that might be out there.
    But, the other thing that's important is, we're going to be 
able to get really good information about what these asteroids 
are composed of. We have another mission that's going out to 
the asteroid belt. And there's an object out there that is a 
massive steel ball. And I have to--I don't want to say how big 
it is, but it's a really big steel ball. If the NASA 
Administrator gives a stat that's incorrect, I get corrected 
immediately all over the world. So--but, this big steel ball is 
potentially a planetary core from the past in the asteroid 
belt, and people have suggested that it's worth--if you could 
bring it back to Earth, it would be worth more than the GDP of 
the United States of America because of all of the precious 
metals that are there. So, we want to go characterize that 
through the Psyche Mission that we're developing right now.
    So, there are a lot of reasons that it's important to 
protect space. There's a lot we don't yet know, and a lot that 
we're researching, and I do believe that, when we make these 
discoveries, there's going to be an entrepreneurial effort to 
go forth and do amazing things, just like back when people came 
to the New World.
    Senator Cruz. So, the ship that you have at the deep space 
asteroid, is it being piloted by Bruce Willis?
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. If you think that will help, we'll do 
it.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cruz. Senator Cantwell.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for 
this important hearing.
    And, you know, when I hear these expectations and 
opportunities in space, obviously I think of the companies in 
our state, SpaceX and Blue Origin and--now, I don't know if 
it's fair to say trillionaires, when these guys are already 
billionaires, but hopefully it'll be a more impacting event 
with many, many different products and avenues for people to 
pursue.
    I wanted to ask you, Mr. Bridenstine, about weather 
forecasting and 5G and the degradation that some spectrum sales 
could have on our weather forecasting. I think I heard that you 
had some similar concerns, maybe in front of another committee, 
but my colleague Senator Wyden and I have sent a letter to the 
head of the FCC asking for them to make sure that we're not 
impacting what would be the 24 gigahertz band that would impact 
that vital information. So, do you think that it is possible to 
give us, basically, by which band we're talking about and 
access to impact our weather forecasting?
    Mr. Bridenstine. It's a--I think an important question. I 
would answer it this way. The 24 gigahertz band is critically 
important for our ability to characterize the amount of water 
vapor in the atmosphere. NASA is sensing the Earth in every 
part of the electromagnetic spectrum all the time. 24 gigahertz 
gives us the opportunity to characterize the amount--the 
quantity and the energy state of the water vapor in the 
atmosphere. And that, ultimately, is what helps us make 
determinations as far as weather prediction.
    Now, NASA does not do weather prediction. We build 
satellites for NOAA, in the Commerce Department, so that they 
can do the operational weather prediction. But, there is a risk 
that, if we do not have access to that spectrum, that our 
weather forecasting could be degraded. We are working right now 
with the FCC to kind of work through a solution. And that is 
underway right now. But, this is of concern to us and 
certainly----
    Senator Cantwell. What kind of degradation? Are you talking 
about in time and information?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. So, we talk about weather forecasts 
in terms of a 7-day weather forecast. So, if, instead of 
getting all of the data we are currently getting, if it 
degrades to a certain percentage--the less data we're able to 
glean from that part of the spectrum, the more degraded our 
weather forecasts get. So, if we lose--and I don't know what 
the specific numbers are, but if we lose, say, 50 percent of 
the data, then maybe instead of 7-day weather forecasts, we 
would get a 3- or 4-day weather forecast. So, these are the 
kind of impacts that we're trying to work through and 
understand and work with the FCC in order to mitigate what 
those impacts would be through this spectrum----
    Senator Cantwell. Well, the reason why I'm bringing this 
up, Mr. Chairman, is, it does have a connection to our very 
subject this morning. How do you do space launch if you don't 
know weather forecasting?
    Mr. Bridenstine. No, that's--we agree. I'll let the 
Department of Commerce talk about this.
    Mr. O'Connell. Sure. Thank you.
    The--we would echo, entirely, the comments made by the 
Administrator here, concerns about a deep reduction in quality 
of our Earth observation--Earth observations for weather 
prediction and things like that. And so, whenever we have these 
spectrum auctions of any kind, we really need to be very 
careful. At times, I worry that we think that there is a one-
to-one comparison for the impacts in the terrestrial world as 
there are in space. And, in fact, they're not. I mean, when 
you're working in space, you have a slightly different 
scientific buffer that you need. And when you're going to beam 
back capabilities from 4 billion miles away, I don't have the 
ability to chop up that spectrum in as small a chunk as you 
would, typically, on the ground. And so, wherever these 
spectrum decisions are being made, we have to be very sensitive 
to the impacts on the space community and then, Senator, as you 
suggest, its impacts on things we're going to do in space from 
Earth.
    Senator Cantwell. Well, the reason why my colleague from 
the Northwest, Senator Wyden, and I sent this letter is 
because, I can tell you, people of the Pacific Northwest know 
what storms are all about. And we know what hot, dry seasons 
are doing to us as it relates to fire. And so, we need the 
weather forecasting, and we need it in advance. We don't need 
it 3 days out, 2 days out. We need it to know where and how to 
get the resources to the location. So, we're very concerned, 
and we hope the FCC will stop their process until they can 
assure us that this weather forecasting information is going to 
be available, because of the impacts of weather on our 
communities and safety. But, we also see, just in this panel 
and discussion, how much--in the previous hearing we had last 
week, the advent of how many launches we're talking about now 
with various capabilities, that we need to be able to plan 
those launches----
    Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
    Senator Cantwell.--and to plan those launches in launch 
windows that get delicate on their own right. Right? There's 
complexities to those launches. They need to know what their 
weather windows are going to be.
    Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
    Senator Cantwell. So, it seems to me that, whatever the FCC 
is doing over there, it's not paying enough attention to this 
very important issue as it relates to both the safety and 
security of our citizens and having good weather forecasting 
data. And we're working very hard on this, because--we've 
always worked hard on this, because we've had some shadow 
issues with Doppler systems and things that have prevented us 
either--we had two back-to-back 100-year floods that we lost 
life, and it--and after that, NOAA decided, ``Yes, you need a 
Doppler system for the coast, because you're not getting 
accurate information.'' And then we've had impact and loss of 
life of firefighters because they were sent out when we didn't 
fully understand wind conditions that were clearly seen in 
Seattle, but not seen in the central part of the State--again, 
because they didn't have the kind of visibility. So, we're 
for--particularly now that every particle in a storm can be an 
algorithm, we are all for having that data and information, and 
calculating it to make us better prepared. And I certainly 
would want it for our space missions, as well. I would want 
them to have the certainty and assurance that we're going to be 
able to understand the launch windows and not wreak havoc with 
everybody related to the launch, not just in the space 
industry, but commercial travel and everything else that goes 
with that, because we don't have a picture of what the weather 
conditions are because we sold the spectrum all to somebody 
else. So, I hope that we can clear this up and get an answer 
from Ajit Pai in the FCC.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Well, if would be all right if I could 
just comment, because we think what you're saying is very 
important, and we want to make sure that we're doing the right 
thing by our country.
    A couple of things. When we talk about the--where NASA and 
NOAA--where we play is in that 23.6 gigahertz spectrum. The 
auction, of course, is 24 gigahertz. So, it's not the exact 
spectrum where we operate. That 23.6 gigahertz is not 
determined--it's not like we can go to a different part of the 
spectrum. It's set by physics. We are sensing, passively, the 
energy state of water molecules in the atmosphere. Now, that is 
set by physics. We can't just go to a different part of the 
spectrum.
    Now, here's the thing. In that 24 gigahertz spectrum that 
is auctioned, I think it's important to note that, if the 
decibel level is low enough, then it won't bleed into that 23.6 
gigahertz where we are operating and sensing the Earth for 
weather forecasting and Earth Science and climate.
    So, I think there could be an elegant solution here. And 
certainly, we are paying very close attention to it. But, the 
decibel level is what--is really what matters here. And if that 
decibel level is too high, then it will impact us. If it's not 
too high, it won't impact----
    Senator Cantwell. Well, interference are always the issues 
in spectrum. Always. And so, I just think it's too important--
all of these things are too important for the public and 
commerce and everything else, the applications that all this is 
going to allow to get this right. So, I hope that we can get it 
right.
    Thank you----
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes----
    Senator Cantwell.--Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bridenstine.--ma'am.
    Mr. O'Connell. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. And, Administrator Bridenstine, you testified 
about physics, a minute ago. I was told there would be no math 
at this hearing.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cruz. So, I want to thank each of the witnesses for 
your very helpful and learned testimony. I think this was a 
productive hearing. And I appreciate the time and energy you 
put into the testimony.
    The hearing record will remain open for two weeks. During 
this time, Senators are asked to submit any questions for the 
record. And, upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to 
submit your written answers to the Subcommittee as soon as 
possible.
    And, with that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito 
                      to Hon. James F. Bridenstine
    Question 1. Orbital debris has become an increasingly challenging 
and potentially dangerous obstacles for satellites. With years of space 
activity and recent events, thousands of small pieces of debris has 
increased the risk of impacts to the International Space Station (ISS) 
by an estimated 44 percent over a 10-day period. Administrator 
Bridenstine, we have talked about this before and most recently in 
March, but I would like to revisit with you and ask the other panelists 
about the potential of robotic satellite serving offers in this space.
    Can this capability be a tool in our efforts to combat space 
debris? I am proud of the work being done in West Virginia in this 
field--on projects such as RESTORE-L--and feel this capability can be a 
solution.
    Answer. Restore-L technologies include an autonomous relative 
navigation system with supporting avionics, and dexterous robotic arms 
and software. The suite is completed by a tool drive that supports a 
collection of sophisticated robotic tools for robotic spacecraft 
refueling, and a propellant transfer system that delivers measured 
amounts of fuel at the proper temperature, rate, and pressure.
    The autonomous relative navigation system is potentially applicable 
to orbital debris remediation should there be a need to navigate to and 
approach debris. While the dexterous robotic arms could potentially be 
applied for active debris removal, the size of the debris would be a 
limiting factor to its applicability as well as the orientation/
tumbling nature of the debris.

    Question 2. It is clear that China has significant ambitions over 
the next 10 to 15 years to develop the capabilities in order to conduct 
manned lunar missions and set the stage for a new age in space 
exploration.
    You state in your testimony that you expect NASA to meet its 
deadline of 2024 for NASA's next mission to the Moon (aka Artemis). 
Could you elaborate on some of the initiatives NASA is undertaking to 
meet the accelerated deadline?
    Answer. On March 26, 2019, the Vice President announced at a 
meeting of the National Space Council in Huntsville, Alabama, that, at 
the direction of the President of the United States, it is the stated 
policy of the United States of America to return American astronauts to 
the Moon within five years and that, when the first American astronauts 
return to the lunar surface, they will take their first steps on the 
Moon's South Pole. On May 13, 2019, NASA submitted a revised FY 2020 
budget to Congress that would provide a ``down payment'' of $1.6B to 
achieve this aim. Our goal is to leverage and build upon our existing 
work and plans to achieve these new goals.
    Schedule performance by the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion are 
critical to achieving a human return to the Moon by 2024 with Artemis 
3. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) 
completed an assessment of alternate approaches for hardware processing 
and facilities utilization for key components, with the goal of 
maintaining an early as possible date for the launch of the uncrewed 
Artemis 1 mission. The NASA Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
performed a schedule risk assessment of the Artemis 1 launch date, 
including the integrated schedule and associated risk factors ahead of 
Artemis 1. NASA leadership is currently evaluating these results as 
they consider a new launch date.
    The Agency is also focusing on completing a minimum-capability 
version of the lunar Gateway to support the lunar landing of Artemis 3. 
In this approach, we would begin with the Gateway's Power and 
Propulsion Element (awarded to Maxar Technologies on May 23, 2019) and 
a basic habitation capability, which would support the 2024 mission.
    For missions to the lunar surface, the current plan is for 
astronauts to employ a transfer vehicle to travel from the Gateway to 
low lunar orbit, a descent vehicle to land on the surface of the Moon, 
and an ascent vehicle to return to the Gateway. The vehicles will be 
developed by the private sector and procured by NASA. NASA is moving 
rapidly to support development of these critical pieces of the 
exploration architecture.
    On February 7, 2019, NASA released a solicitation under Appendix E 
of the second Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships 
(NextSTEP-2) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) to seek proposals from 
industry in support of design analysis, technology maturation, system 
development and integration, and spaceflight demonstrations for a human 
lunar landing system. Proposals were received March 25, 2019 and 
selections were announced on May 16, 2019. The 11 companies selected 
will conduct studies and undertake preliminary design and development 
work of prototype components and sub-systems of human lander 
capabilities for the Artemis lunar exploration program over the next 
six months. Appendix E is a six-month risk reduction effort including 
studies and prototype development.
    Following the March 26 announcement by Vice President Pence that 
charged NASA to send humans to the lunar South Pole by 2024, NASA 
assessed options to expedite the work. Appendix E will continue and 
will be used to guide NASA's Human Lander System (HLS) requirements, 
formulation and planning. The HLS capability development and crewed 
flight demonstration will be competed under a new, full and open 
solicitation, NextSTEP Appendix H, Integrated Human Landing System. The 
updated Appendix H pre-solicitation notice was released on April 26, 
2019 and signals the Agency's intent, by summer 2019, to seek proposals 
from industry in support of rapid development and demonstration of 
integrated human lunar landing systems, including elements such as a 
descent element, ascent element, and transfer vehicle. NASA will seek 
proposals from U.S. industry for the development, integration, and 
crewed demonstration of these elements as a functional human landing 
system that can fulfill NASA and industry requirements, and meet the 
challenge to send the next man, and the first woman, to the Moon by 
2024.
    All of NASA's technical efforts to meet the Artemis 3 deadline of 
2024 are dependent upon the Agency receiving the necessary resources in 
a timely manner. NASA appreciates Congress' consistent support for its 
exploration efforts, and is ready to provide the information Congress 
requires for its consideration of this bold new initiative.

    Question 3. The ISS can bring down the cost and risk for missions 
to the Moon and Mars, giving us a head start. With renewed interest in 
lunar missions, what technological developments can we do on the ISS 
that we can use to go back to the moon?
    Answer. In order to prepare for human expeditions into deep space, 
the Agency must first conduct breakthrough research and test the 
advanced technology necessary to keep crews safe and productive on 
long-duration space exploration missions. NASA plans to continue to use 
the International Space Station (ISS) as a testbed to fill critical 
gaps in technologies that will be needed for long-duration deep space 
missions. For example, elements of the ISS life support and other 
habitation systems (e.g., oxygen generation and carbon dioxide removal 
systems) will be evolved into the systems that will be used for deep 
space exploration missions and undergo long-duration testing. It is 
NASA's plan to first develop and demonstrate many critical technology 
capabilities using LEO platforms prior to deploying these capabilities 
beyond LEO. This approach is much more cost-effective and faster than 
conducting this research in cislunar space because of the risks 
inherent in operating so far from the Earth.
    NASA is also developing a flexible spacesuit architecture with 
common core subsystems that can be modified to support the needs of 
specific destinations from LEO to the lunar surface. The Agency plans 
to conduct a suit demonstration utilizing the new spacesuit 
architecture optimized for LEO on ISS to validate the performance of 
the exploration Portable Life Support System (PLSS). The Agency is 
currently assessing plans to ensure continued support of both the ISS 
EVA requirements and the distinct requirements associated with a lunar 
surface suit. NASA intends to demonstrate the core spacesuit 
technologies and subsystems applicable to both ISS-based operations and 
surface exploration through a series of subsystem demonstrations at ISS 
beginning in 2019 and culminating in delivery of a complete suit system 
in 2023 for an on-orbit demonstration at ISS prior to the 2024 mission.
    Additionally, ISS is necessary to support space biomedical research 
to mitigate 22 human health and performance risks identified by NASA's 
Human Research Program to enable safe long-duration ISS missions and 
future deep space missions. The ISS biomedical research is expanding 
our capabilities to protect the health and safety of astronauts and 
include investigations on deep space habitat standards and systems, 
behavioral health countermeasures, innovative medical technologies for 
exploration, countermeasures for crew visual changes, space radiation 
protection, advanced food and pharmaceutical systems, and validation of 
physiological countermeasures to ensure crew health during extended 
one-year ISS missions and all phases of future exploration missions.

    Question 4. The ISS--and any commercial space station--will be able 
to serve as a second staging grounds for testing mechanical equipment 
for further space travel. If such a transition were to take place--from 
the ISS to a commercial entity or entities--how could we get around 
this bottleneck from ground to space flight?
    Answer. NASA does not anticipate a bottleneck in LEO as commercial 
opportunities are opened up and realized. The Agency is creating new 
opportunities for collaboration with industry on the ISS and developing 
public-private partnerships for exploration systems that will extend 
human presence into the solar system. As detailed in the 2018 ISS 
Transition Report,\1\ one of the criteria for transitioning away from 
ISS to a commercial platform or platforms will be the availability and 
capability of these platforms to meet NASA's LEO requirements. These 
partnerships will further accelerate the transition of human 
spaceflight operations in LEO to commercial partners for NASA and non-
NASA needs. To support this transition, the ISS will focus near-term 
activities on supporting commercial industry as well as meeting 
government requirements, such as exploration research and development, 
in LEO. In parallel, NASA is creating a focused effort aimed at long-
term American operations in LEO independent of the ISS through 
collaboration with commercial partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Space Station Transition Report, March 30, 2018, 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
iss_transition_report_180330.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NASA will have significant requirements for access to LEO in the 
foreseeable future. These include continued microgravity research as 
well as accommodations for U.S. crewmembers for training, procedure 
validation, and proficiency purposes. It is essential that there not be 
a gap in access to LEO, which is why the Administration's policy is to 
maintain continuous access to LEO throughout the transition of NASA's 
funding for its LEO requirements, whether this means transitioning the 
operations of the ISS to private industry through public-private 
partnership, augmenting the ISS with privately developed modules, 
combining portions of the ISS with a new private platform, or beginning 
anew with a free-flying platform.

    Question 5. In addition, what should Congress keep in mind in order 
to spur competition in LEO (low earth orbit)?
    Answer. On June 7, 2019, NASA released a number of documents 
designed to encourage the development of a robust LEO economy, 
including a policy on the commercial use of ISS, a revised forecast of 
the Agency's needs in LEO, and a larger strategy for the 
commercialization of LEO. These and other documents that may be of 
interest to Congress can be accessed at the newly established web page 
below.
    https://www.nasa.gov/leo-economy/welcome-to-low-earth-orbit-economy

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