[Senate Hearing 116-595]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-595
THE EMERGING SPACE ENVIRONMENT:
OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND
POLICY CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION AND SPACE
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 14, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-694 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION AND SPACE
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
ROY BLUNT, Missouri TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JERRY MORAN, Kansas GARY PETERS, Michigan
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JON TESTER, Montana
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MIKE LEE, Utah
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 14, 2019..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
Statement of Senator Sinema...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 32
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 38
Witnesses
Hon. James F. Bridenstine, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration....................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space Commerce,
Department of Commerce......................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Robert Cardillo, Former Director, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency............................................ 15
Lieutenant General David D. Thompson, Vice Commander, Air Force
Space Command.................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Colonel Pamela A. Melroy, United States Air Force (Ret.)/NASA
Astronaut, retired............................................. 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore
Capito to Hon. James F. Bridenstine............................ 43
THE EMERGING SPACE ENVIRONMENT:
OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND
POLICY CHALLENGES
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 14, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Thune, Moran, Sinema,
Cantwell, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. This hearing is called to order. Good
afternoon, and welcome.
Today's hearing is entitled ``The Emerging Space
Environment: Operational, Technical, and Policy Challenges.'' I
welcome each of the witnesses. Thank you for joining us here
today.
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched
Sputnik 1, the first satellite and manmade object in space.
Slightly larger than a beach ball, and with barely more onboard
technology than a beach ball, the satellite orbited the Earth
every 98 minutes, emitting a beeping radio beacon that was
picked up and rebroadcast in news reports all over the world.
Although Sputnik would orbit the Earth for only 96 days,
transmitting for only 21 of them, it was a pivotal moment in
our Nation's history that led to the ensuing space race, which
put men on the Moon and robotic rovers on distant planets, and
it fundamentally changed the course of human history.
It is fitting that this year, the 50th anniversary of the
Apollo 11 mission that put those first men on the Moon, we find
ourselves deeply engaged in discussions about the future of
space. From efforts to foster the growth of the commercial
space sector, to the return of American astronauts to the Moon
in the next few years, to the creation of a Space Force, the
space domain is more active than ever. The next 50 years in
space have the potential to be even more consequential than the
last 50 years. But, this will require a serious, sober look at
the road ahead of us.
As we look out over the space landscape today, what we see
is far different from the landscape of 1969. America and the
Soviet Union are no longer the only players in space.
Government space programs are no longer the only game in town.
And our technological capabilities, both in terms of our
ability to plan missions and what we are able to put in space,
and for how long, are, for better and for worse, exponentially
greater than they were when the space race began. No longer is
space just an uninhabited void or a scientific novelty. From
GPS and communication satellites to weather and imaging
satellites, space has become an integral part of the world
economy and of our everyday lives. It has become both the next
frontier of exploration and of international commerce and
economic growth. By some estimates, the space sector will grow
to nearly $3 trillion in value in the next three decades alone.
It is also my belief that the world's first trillionaire will
be made in space.
As commercial entities develop new capabilities for space,
many of which were inconceivable even a few short years ago,
and the government continues to leverage the commercial sector
for launch services and exploration technology, the theoretical
threats are becoming a reality.
We have to forthrightly acknowledge that space has also
become a domain of military competition. From the development
and testing of anti-satellite missiles to the possible
deployment of space-based weapon systems, the threats we face
to our burgeoning commercial space sector, our civil space,
exploration efforts, and to our national defense are real, and
it is long past time for the United States to act.
Since the ancient Greeks first put to sea, nations have
recognized the necessity of naval forces and maintaining a
superior capability to protect water-borne travel and commerce
from bad actors. Pirates threatened the open seas. And the same
is possible in space. In this same way, I believe we, too, must
now recognize the necessity of a Space Force to defend the
Nation and to protect space commerce and civil space
exploration.
As the United States looks to foster the commercialization
of space, return to the Moon, travel to Mars, and encourage
burgeoning industry, such as asteroid mining, in which a small
asteroid could contain rare materials, such as platinum, worth
billions, a Space Force may well prove necessary to help
provide certainty in ensuring that these efforts are
successful, have longevity, and are not to be subjected to the
whims of rogue or hostile nations. The importance of space to
the United States will only increase in the coming years, and
it is time that we recognize that reality and take concrete
action to secure our supremacy in it.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
what those steps might look like, how we might best coordinate
our actions, and how we, in Congress, can act to ensure that
the next 50 years and beyond are even more consequential and
impactful than the last.
I recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Sinema.
STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Sinema. Well, thank you, Chairman Cruz, for holding
this hearing. It's important that we develop thoughtful
strategies and approaches to space that maintain the United
States leadership and strengthen our country's security. I look
forward to working closely with you on this and other issues in
our committee's jurisdiction.
Thank you, to Administrator Bridenstine, Director
O'Connell, Mr. Cardillo, Colonel Melroy, and Lieutenant General
Thompson, for joining us today.
As you all know, space is important to U.S. communications,
national security, and research and development. In my home
state of Arizona, the space economy plays a particularly
important and growing role while Arizona is the fourth-biggest
state in aerospace and defense manufacturing, and Arizonans
from universities and private industry across the State help
our country lead in space. In order to protect America's status
as the global space leader, we need thoughtful solutions to
costly challenges, such as more congested space traffic,
orbital collisions, increasing amounts of debris, and the
growing risk of attacks on our assets in orbit.
The first major collision in space occurred in 2009, when
an inactive Russian satellite and an active U.S. commercial
communications satellite collided, resulting in extensive
debris that is still in orbit today. In addition to the
potential for major collisions, we must account for the threat
of space debris causing congestion and small-scale collisions.
There are more than 23,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than
4 inches in Earth orbit. These include old satellites,
disposable launch vehicles, and rogue parts. Even small pieces
of debris can be problematic for satellites and the
International Space Station. And beyond physical threats like
collision and debris, other countries are working on
technologies to interfere with and take down our satellites.
These threats continue to evolve, and the U.S. needs to be
prepared.
We are making substantial investments in space with
taxpayer dollars and sending new assets into orbit, but
currently there are very few rules of the road. So, although we
have mechanisms that notify operators if there's going to be a
collision, there are no rules that require operators to move.
So, we should find ways to address who has the responsibility
and prevent collisions for both our assets and operators and
for the international community. The United States should lead
the way by setting unified standards for all operators in
space. And we need clear strategies to prevent accidents and
attacks on our satellites. We should remove safety and security
issues so we can keep our assets in orbit and operational. And
these threats will increase as space becomes more and more
accessible. But, by addressing these concerns now, we can turn
our attention to emerging national security threats, continue
our space development, ensure that the United States remains
the international leader in space.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
I'll now introduce the witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Jim Bridenstine, who is the
current Administrator of NASA. In his role at NASA,
Administrator Bridenstine provides clarity to the agency's
goals and aligns the strategic and policy direction of NASA
with the interests and requirements of the agency's
stakeholders and constituent groups. Prior to joining NASA, he
represented Oklahoma's 1st Congressional District in the U.S.
House of Representatives, where he served on the Armed Services
and the Science, Space, and Technology Committees. Before
joining Congress, Administrator Bridenstine was the Executive
Director of the Tulsa Air and Space Museum and Planetarium,
and, before that, served honorably as a fighter pilot in the
United States Navy, where he flew combat missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Administrator Bridenstine completed a triple major
at Rice University and earned his MBA at Cornell University.
Our second witness is Mr. Kevin O'Connell, who is currently
the Director of the Office of Space Commerce at the Department
of Commerce. Over the course of his career, Mr. O'Connell has
garnered extensive experience in remote sensing
commercialization operations, national security, and
intelligence issues. He has extensive background in both the
public and private sectors, previously serving as the
Chair of NOAA's Federal Advisory Committee on Remote
Sensing and the Executive Secretary and Staff Director of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Additionally, Mr.
O'Connell served as the CEO of Innovative Analytics and
Training, focusing on market trends and analysis of geospatial
technologies and cloud computing, and is the first Director of
the RAND Corporation's Intelligence Policy Center. He received
his master's degree in public policy from the University of
Maryland--College Park.
Our third witness is Mr. Robert Cardillo, who recently
retired after 4 years of service as the Director of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. While at the agency,
Mr. Cardillo led 15,000 personnel, all deployed across 15 time
zones, and initiated and implemented plans to leverage the
burgeoning commercial entities in orbit around the Earth. Prior
to that, Mr. Cardillo served in various roles in the
intelligence community. While at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, Mr. Cardillo served as the Deputy
Director for Intelligence Integration. He was also the Deputy
Director at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he managed a
global network of 20,000 personnel to aid the U.S. military.
Mr. Cardillo received a bachelor's of art degree from Cornell
University and received his master's degree from Georgetown
University.
Our fourth witness is Lieutenant General David Thompson,
who is the Vice Commander of the Air Force Space Command. As
Vice Commander, Lieutenant General Thompson carries out Air
Force space missions through the integration of space policy,
guidance, coordination, and synchronization of space-related
activities. He is also responsible for preparing mission-ready
space forces and providing missile warning, navigation, and
timing information to the North American Aerospace Defense
Command. Lieutenant General Thompson received a bachelor of
science degree in aeronautical engineering from the U.S. Air
Force Academy. He also received a master of science degree in
aeronautics and astronautics from Purdue University.
And our final witness is Colonel Pam Melroy, who is the
founder and CEO of Melroy & Hollett Technology Partners and a
retired Air Force colonel. She spent over 14 years as an
astronaut, serving as a pilot on two Space Shuttle missions and
as the commander on STS-120, the second woman to serve as
commander of a Space Shuttle. Previously, Colonel Melroy served
as Deputy Director of the Tactical Technology Office at the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, otherwise known as
DARPA. She also served two roles at the FAA, one as Senior
Technical Advisor and Director of Field Operations for the
FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation, and the other
as Acting Deputy Associate Administrator of the FAA. Prior to
that, she also worked as Deputy Program Manager of the Space
Exploration Initiatives for Lockheed Martin. Colonel Melroy has
a bachelor's of art degree in physics and astronomy from
Wellesley College and a master's of science degree in Earth and
planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. She also graduated in 1985 from undergraduate pilot
training at Reese Air Force Base in Lubbock, Texas.
Administrator Bridenstine, we'll start with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BRIDENSTINE,
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member
Sinema, and members of the Committee. It's an honor to be here
representing 17,000 employees at NASA all across the United
States of America, and I can tell you that we, as an agency,
are very excited about our new direction to land the next man
and the first woman on the south pole of the Moon within 5
years.
Given the title of this hearing, I thought I would talk
about how NASA plays in our national security capabilities.
We're very unique. There are a lot of people on this panel that
are focused directly on national security. NASA plays in a
different way. A lot of national security practitioners use an
acronym we call DIME. And it identifies the different elements
of national power: diplomatic power, information power,
military power, which I think most are very familiar with, and
then economic power.
So, where does NASA play within the DIME philosophy? NASA,
of course, is very strong on the diplomatic side. When we think
about the International Space Station, for example, we have 15
different countries that operate the International Space
Station on a daily basis. We have had 103 different countries
actually do experiments on the International Space Station, and
we have had astronauts from 18 countries on the International
Space Station. The International Space Station is absolutely a
technological marvel, but, even more so, it is a diplomatic
marvel. Talk about something that would be very complicated to
get all of the nations of the world behind. This was it. And
yet, it has been achieved by some of the most impressive
spacefaring nations on the planet. So, I think, diplomatically,
NASA plays a role there.
When we talk about information, which is a piece of the
DIME theory that I think a lot of people don't often think
about, information is--we talk about Apollo 8. When our
astronauts broadcast from the Moon during that first Moon-
orbiting mission, it was on Christmas Eve. And when they
broadcast from the Moon, one out of every four people on the
planet heard or saw that broadcast, including tens of millions
of people behind the Iron Curtain. That's an amazing
information capability that NASA brings to bear, in fact, every
day.
Apollo 8 was December 24, 1968. But, since I've been the
NASA Administrator, I can give you example after example of
things that have happened just in my time. In November of last
year, we landed InSight on Mars. When we landed InSight on Mars
to do scientific discovery and exploration, what we saw was
that it was on the cover of every newspaper all around the
world. That's an impressive information tool for our country.
What does that mean? That means we have the ability, as an
agency, to change the perceptions of young people all over the
world toward the United States of America in a very positive
way.
So, I think, when you think about diplomacy, when you think
about information, NASA plays very strong in those domains.
On the military side, we intentionally make an effort not
to get involved in military operations, because we want to be
able to have partners all over the world. We have, in fact,
been partnering, interestingly, with Russia since 1975 with the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Program. The terrestrial disputes that exist
seemingly fall away when we go into space. And I think that's a
positive channel of communication for both of our nations.
The last piece, economic, NASA does play. We have an
intention of proving capability, proving technology, reducing
risk, and then commercializing. And that's exactly what we're
doing right now in low-Earth orbit. We want to see commercial
resupply of the International Space Station continue. We want
to see commercial crew be successful. I think we can do that,
in fact, this year, launch American astronauts on American
rockets from American soil for the first time since the
retirement of the Space Shuttle.
But, we also want to see commercial habitation in low-Earth
orbit. In other words, have the entire system of operations in
low-Earth orbit be commercialized. The question is, Why?
Because then we can use the resources that are given to us by
the taxpayer to do the things for which there is not yet a
commercial industry, retire risk there--namely, in this case,
at the Moon and then on to Mars; retire risk there, with the
intent to commercialize and move on. The Chairman mentioned the
idea of the ocean and how we ultimately have commerce on the
ocean that needs to be protected. That's a naval theory that
comes from somebody who I think is an impressive naval theorist
in history, Alfred Thayer Mahan. And his concept was, if you're
going to have commerce on the ocean, it needs to be protected.
Well, we are in a place now where NASA is working really hard
to help advance and develop commerce in space. And ultimately,
what we are seeing, unfortunately, is that that is not always
safe. And so, I think it's important that we consider the risk
to our civil agency, the risk to commercial industry, and
consider, ultimately, how it can be protected. And that,
ultimately, requires what we would see from the M in DIME,
which is military support, which is, ultimately, what the U.S.
Space Command is about and the U.S. Space Force is about.
So, while we don't play in the defense role, we don't play
in the national security role specifically, we do have roles in
diplomacy, in information, and in economics, and, of course, we
want to continue to have partnerships all over the world and
let our military partners make sure that our operations are
safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bridenstine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James F. Bridenstine, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and Members of the
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the emerging space environment.
NASA is going forward to the Moon. We are building a sustainable,
open architecture that returns humanity to our nearest neighbor as the
next step in our long-term drive to send humans on to Mars. We are
incentivizing speed, drawing on the commercial sector, and we look to
land humans on the Moon within five years. We are completing
development of Orion, the spacecraft that will carry humans to lunar
orbit, and the Space Launch System (SLS), the rocket on which Orion
will launch. We are pressing forward toward Exploration Mission-1 (EM-
1), an uncrewed test flight of Orion around the Moon. At the same time,
we are also pressing forward with the rapid development of the lunar
Gateway, a spacecraft that will orbit the Moon and serve as a reusable
command module enabling greater access for human missions to the lunar
surface than ever before. Working with commercial partners and
international partners, we seek to land humans on the surface of the
Moon's South Pole by 2024, develop a sustainable presence on and around
the Moon, and continue to build our experience and technology base to
enable human missions to Mars.
We are building for the long term, and this time we are going to
the Moon using an open, durable, reusable architecture that will
support exploration for decades to come. Sustainability on and around
the Moon requires cost-effective and reusable systems--tugs, landers,
and rovers--and an openness to partnerships from across the commercial
sector and around the world.
NASA will create new opportunities for collaboration with industry
on the International Space Station (ISS) that will enable exploration,
continue research that benefits humanity, and work to reduce operations
and maintenance costs while establishing the public-private
partnerships for exploration systems that will extend human presence
into the solar system. NASA is working to transition our work in low-
Earth orbit (LEO) to leverage commercially-provided services that help
enable deep space exploration and spur private sector growth in LEO. To
support this transition, the ISS will focus near-term activities on
supporting commercial industry as well as meeting government
requirements in LEO. In parallel, NASA is creating a focused effort
aimed at further developing long-term American commercial space
operations in LEO.
In November 2018, NASA selected nine companies as part of the
Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) procurement, making them
eligible to provide transportation services to the lunar surface for
science, technology, and exploration payloads. In February 2019, NASA
selected thirteen NASA-provided payloads that could be flown on the
early CLPS missions. NASA is now reviewing proposals from the CLPS
providers for the first commercial delivery service to transport some
of these payloads to the lunar surface. These missions will enable new
science and demonstrate new technologies supporting sustainable human
return to the lunar surface.
For human missions to the lunar surface, astronauts will employ
vehicles developed by the private sector and procured by NASA. NASA is
moving rapidly to support development of these critical pieces of the
exploration architecture. We will seek proposals from U.S. industry in
support of rapid development, integration, and crewed demonstration of
the lander as elements of a functional human landing system that can
fulfill NASA and industry requirements for a 2024 Moon landing. This
approach will enable rapid development and flight demonstrations of
human lunar landers.
We are actively seeking partner contributions and commercial
participation for our Moon to Mars exploration plans. NASA is working
to identify international and commercial partnership opportunities that
widen the pool of resources, enhance capabilities and sustainability,
and advance our most important exploration objectives. We are working
to take full advantage of the rapidly developing commercial space
sector to enhance sustainability and accelerate progress.
Key to these efforts is a stable, predictable regulatory
environment and strong mutually supportive relationships within the
U.S. government space community. Exploration will benefit from a
regulatory environment that enables a vibrant commercial sector. NASA
expects to incorporate emerging commercial capabilities into our
exploration plans, transition activity in LEO to the commercial sector
and leverage commercial capabilities wherever it is feasible to do so.
We look forward to working with our Federal partners to promote the
space economy both to return benefits to Earth and to support deep
space exploration.
Civil Military Coordination
As we work to deliver on our mission, the space domain is becoming
increasingly congested and contested, with a multitude of new space
actors as access to space becomes commonplace. At the same time,
economic and scientific opportunities are expanding in new areas of
space, including satellite Internet constellations in LEO, ISS
commercial opportunities, and new architectures to conduct scientific
Earth observation.
Today, national power is in part tied to space-based commerce and
operations. More than virtually any other nation, the U.S. is one of
the largest beneficiaries of the use of space and also one of the
countries most reliant upon it. The Global Positioning System (GPS)
timing signal is used to regulate the flow of electricity on our power
grids, synchronize cell towers and computer networks, and enable the
transfer of funds between bank accounts. If America's potential
adversaries disrupt GPS, the power grid, computer networks, cell
towers, and banking may degrade over time. Due to these dependencies,
potential adversaries have identified the American space enterprise as
the ``American Achilles heel'' and its potential disruption poses an
existential threat to our country.
Other countries also rely on space. Just as the U.S. Navy protects
access to and use of global shipping lanes, so the United States must
assure access to space to enable economic prosperity. Just as freedom
of the seas also extends to the world's scientific vessels--from Arctic
icebreakers to deep sea submarines--NASA requires freedom to operate in
space for its scientific spacecraft. Furthermore, in addition to our
commercial ISS cargo providers and soon, commercial crew providers,
NASA utilizes commercial satellites for remote sensing and Earth
observation, and commercial launch vehicles for major missions. In
addition to maintaining a safe, stable environment for our own
scientific and technology demonstration missions, we have a stake in
the safety of our commercial partners.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
NASA is a civilian space agency. However, we rely on the Air Force
and soon, the Space Force, to protect our assets and operations. Not
only do we operate billions of dollars of hardware in space, we work
diligently to ensure our astronauts aboard the ISS remain safe in
orbit.
SSA provides decision makers indications and warning of hazards and
threats: natural and manmade; non-hostile or hostile. SSA also
underpins efforts to preserve, protect, and defend assets in space to
include astronaut activities, the ISS and supporting safe management of
space traffic--fostering access to, and responsible use of, space for
all. Space Policy Directive-3 provides guidelines and initiatives to
ensure that America is a leader in providing a safe and secure
environment as space traffic increases. Common sense space situational
awareness and space traffic management will be good for our economy and
will help provide a more stable environment for the burgeoning space
economy.
NASA maintains a strong, cooperative relationship with the
Department of Defense (DoD) on SSA issues. NASA uses SSA information
from DoD to avoid collisions between its assets and other tracked
objects in Earth orbit. The Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA)
office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the Human Space Flight
Operations Directorate at the NASA Johnson Space Center comprise the
NASA spaceflight safety functions. These NASA spaceflight safety
functions currently maintain a direct interface with the U.S. Strategic
Command's (USSTRATCOM) Combined Space Operations Center and the U.S.
Air Force Space Command's 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS), in
order to ensure that the SSA needed for collision avoidance analysis is
provided to NASA in a timely manner.
NASA does not create or maintain a catalog for SSA, i.e., NASA does
not track detailed debris orbits, report where an object will be in the
coming days, or compute close approach predictions. This activity is
conducted by the DoD through the United States Space Surveillance
Network (SSN), which detects, identifies, tracks, and catalogs large
human-made objects (e.g., active/inactive spacecraft, spent rocket
bodies, or fragmentation debris) orbiting Earth as small as 10 cm in
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and objects as small as 1 m in Geosynchronous
Earth Orbit (GEO). The SSN is the responsibility of the USSTRATCOM
Joint Force Space Component Commander.
Because there are more small debris than large debris and, due to
the very high impact speed in space, mission-ending risks to human
spaceflight and robotic missions are actually driven by debris too
small to be tracked by the SSN, typically in the millimeter-size
regime. NASA uses ground-based radars and telescopes and in-situ
measurements to characterize such small debris. NASA uses the
measurement data on small debris to conduct orbital debris impact risk
assessments for human spaceflight and robotic missions and to support
the development and implementation of cost-effective impact protection
measures for the safe operations of the missions. NASA also shares the
modeling tools with the DoD and commercial operators to better protect
their operational satellites.
NASA belongs to major space debris organizations, such as Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) that seeks to develop
and propagate best practices to mitigate the risk from orbital debris.
In addition, the Agency has adopted the NASA Procedural Requirements
for Limiting Orbital Debris, a culmination of orbital debris mitigation
policies at NASA per the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standard Practices. The Agency also created the ``Debris Assessment
Software'' to assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris
assessments. NASA shares this software with the community. For
instance, many private organizations utilize the software to compile
their orbital debris mitigation plans required by the FCC.
As directed by SPD-3, NASA is leading an interagency working group
to update the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard
Practices to further strengthen the effort to mitigate the risk from
orbital debris. NASA looks forward to continuing to collaborate with
our interagency partners to ensure a safe and sustainable orbital
environment. As a leading user of space situational awareness data, and
a leader in characterizing the orbital debris environment, and the
world's leading space exploration agency, NASA is a major beneficiary
of the Administration's continuing attention to these issues.
Economic Opportunity
In 2018, the global space economy totaled nearly $400 billion
according to the Space Foundation. Space commerce has improved
conditions for humans on Earth including the way we communicate,
navigate, produce food and energy, predict weather, understand climate,
and provide disaster relief and national security. The space sector of
our economy is booming. In fact, from 2012-2018, U.S. companies
reestablished competitiveness in the global commercial launch market,
with our share growing from 0 percent to 65 percent. Satellite
communications manufacturing is a significant export for our country,
with around 60 percent of global commercial orders--the United States
is the best in the world at developing and building communication
satellites for television, radio, and Internet. In 2015, space-related
venture capital investment exceeded the previous 15 years combined and
we saw similarly high levels of investment in 2016 and 2017. The
majority of space firms in the world are headquartered in the United
States.
A stable space environment and a stable policy and regulatory
environment ensure these firms continue to do what they do best--
innovate and drive economic development.
Conclusion
The Administration is taking the next steps forward to advance
commerce, safety, and security in Earth's orbit. At NASA, we plan
missions based on our experience building spacecraft and operating in
space. We know it takes highly specialized knowledge, built over
decades of trial and error, to achieve brilliant results. We are
working with our colleagues across government to enable an environment
that can enable exploration, foster burgeoning and increasingly complex
space commerce, and prevent dangerous conjunctions, collisions, and
interactions around our planet.
Many steps have been taken, from debris mitigation practices
following the issuance of SPD-3, to our call for a dedicated Space
Force, which could begin consolidating the space expertise that exists
across the military, and organizing technology development in a more
efficient and coordinated manner.
This Administration is developing the next-generation of American
space launch capacity and developing deep space operational
capabilities that will project American prominence around the world,
extend global partnerships, and expand our strategic presence in the
solar system. NASA's exploration campaign will send Americans to the
lunar surface by 2024, develop a sustainable presence on and around the
Moon, and prepare for human exploration of Mars. This Administration
plans to develop American launch, in-space, and astronaut capabilities
that project American power around the world, extend global
partnerships, and establish a presence on the Moon. To support these
ambitious and transformational goals, we are seeking a space
environment which allows scientific observation, technology
demonstration, and human exploration to be conducted for peaceful uses
and free from malign interference.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I
look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. O'Connell.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. O'CONNELL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPACE
COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. O'Connell: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sinema, and members of the Subcommittee. I'm very pleased to
testify before you today alongside my distinguished colleagues.
For the last 10 months, I have run the Office of the
Director--I've served as the Office--the Director of the Office
of the Space Commerce within NOAA, of the Department of
Commerce. Our mandate there is to foster the economic
conditions and technological developments for the U.S.
commercial space industry.
Today's hearing will inevitably cross many functional and
organizational lines. My office was actually created 30 years
ago, when the idea of commercialization was purely a vision.
But, today we find ourselves at a key inflection point. A great
number of entrepreneurs, encouraged by administration
leadership, fast-moving technology, and enabling finance and
insurance, are creating highly innovative capabilities in the
market. They draw upon trends in standardization and
reusability, and they leverage fast-breaking developments in
artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
The U.S. innovative spirit is alive and well. So, let me
emphasize that one of the contexts for today's discussion is
that the future space operating environment will be
overwhelmingly commercial. How much commercial? Again, the
Chairman has already referred to this. Current forecasts
indicate a global space economy between $1 trillion and $3
trillion by 2040. At Commerce, we have actually spent a lot of
time with the organizations that are making those forecasts to
understand the drivers and impediments to that kind of economic
growth. Whatever the number, the space economy will continue to
have tremendous implications for our economic and national
security.
The reconstitution of the National Space Council has
facilitated mission alignment across the Executive Branch by
creating discussions on streamlining regulations on commercial
space, SPD-2, and space traffic management, or SPD-3. What is
also being pursued in parallel, however, is greater efficiency
within our organizations. The administration has requested
authority to elevate the Office of Space Commerce to a Bureau
of Space Commerce answering directly to the Secretary. Why?
Three ideas underpin this request. First, as a signal of the
importance of the U.S. commercial space industry to our
Nation's future. Second, as a way of leveraging the many
different commerce organizations in support of U.S. space
commerce. And third, as a way of ensuring that economic and
commercial views have equal representation in high-level
executive-branch discussions.
One of the issues that we have started to look at, at
Commerce, is how to improve the role of the U.S. Government
agencies in the space economy. The U.S. Government is still a
very powerful actor in commercial space markets, yet the
business models are changing. We are seeing a shift from the
traditional U.S. Government buyer-take-all to one where small
forward-leaning investments in the market stimulate demand and
thereby help companies attract additional investment from the
capital markets. This allows the government to explore
specific-use cases while providing critical resources toward
commercialization.
One other thing of note. While we're following the
macrolevel economic projections of the future space economy,
we're also trying to enrich our understanding of space-related
activities at the State and local levels in order to help guide
government and commercial investment.
The agencies represented at this table, and others, are
working hard to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation.
Agile regulatory and governance processes will be key to
enabling the exciting developments discussed above and to make
sure that the United States remains flag of choice for space
entrepreneurs. Why is this so important? Historically, we
argued about these issues in a vacuum. Today, however, we live
in a world with competing international visions for the future
of space and an increasingly competitive world. Collaboration
will be essential between those countries who believe in
innovation, genuine partnership, and free markets. At the end
of June, the Department of Commerce, in collaboration with the
Department of State, will co-host a Space Enterprise Summit
here in Washington to discuss the changing nature of
international cooperation and competition in space. And I hope
that some of you will be able to join us for those discussions.
Let me conclude my remarks by highlighting one other area
of cross-government integration, SPD-3, and the need to improve
space situational awareness and space traffic management. The
space congestion problem becomes more complex on a daily basis.
As discussed before the Congress last year by General Hyten,
Administrator Bridenstine, and Secretary Ross, the need to
adjust organizational lines between the DOD and the Department
of Commerce becomes more urgent. Commerce has moved out within
existing authorities and resources on SPD-3. For example, we're
receiving responses to an RFI designed to canvass companies,
whether those who will help mitigate the space debris problem
with new sensors or visualization tools or cloud computing
capabilities, as well as from current and future space
operators who will create wholly new demands for SSA and STM
services. The DOD-Commerce relationship has been exceptional.
Our partnership allows DOD to focus on the more pressing
mission of protecting U.S. space assets, including commercial
assets, and protecting and defending the United States and its
allies. But, it is also based on the need to harness the
innovation of the private sector and modernize our approaches
to this urgent problem. We will have to make effective speed,
not reckless speed, given the consequences. Why? SSA and STM
does not just affect on-orbit safety; its economic effects
trickle down through the entire space ecosystem.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your interest today. As we continue
to work through complex issues in the future space environment,
let's not forget the extraordinary role that the private sector
can play. Growing commercial success in space creates an
economic foundation for our resiliency in space and underpins
our national security and that of our allies. This is an
exciting time to be in the space business, and there's a lot of
work to be done here in furtherance of American prosperity and
security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statment of Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space
Commerce, Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and Members of the
Subcommittee. I am very pleased to testify today alongside
Administrator Bridenstine, Lt. Gen. Thompson, former NGA Director
Cardillo and Ms. Melroy. We continue to work often with their
organizations and other Executive Branch colleagues on space policy
issues, including the mandates of Space Policy Directives 2 and 3.
Today's hearing will inevitably cross many functional and
organizational lines. By now, anyone familiar with the space business
has heard projections of a space economy between $1 and $3 trillion
over the next two decades. At the Department of Commerce, we have been
spending lots of time with the organizations--think tanks, research
arms of large financial institutions, others--to understand the key
drivers and impediments to that space economy. Whatever the number, at
that size the space economy will have tremendous implications for our
economic and national security. Meanwhile, as we are all likely to
testify, the space environment is becoming more complex as many more
nations recognize the strategic importance of space for their own
reasons.
Within the Department, I oversee an office created over thirty
years ago, when space commercialization was merely a vision. Today,
entrepreneurs encouraged by Administration leadership, fast-moving
technology, and enabling ecosystem of investment and space insurance
are creating a diverse set of capabilities in the market. They are
enabled by standardization, reusability, and continuous learning, and
their products and services leverage blisteringly fast parallel
developments in artificial intelligence and cloud computing.
So to set one of the contexts for today's discussion, one aspect of
the future space operating environment is that it will be
overwhelmingly commercial. Commercial firms will continue to seek the
creation of wholly new services here on earth--just extending high-
speed communications and Internet access to areas not covered today
takes the space economy to $1trillion by 2040--while others seek to
build the space infrastructure to take us to the Moon, Mars, and
beyond. That infrastructure will include launch, habitation, and the
scientific research required to pursue our exploration goals in as safe
a manner as possible.
Every day at the Commerce Department, we see and often assist
innovative companies that are trying to come to market or even ones
that are already in the market. One company, for example, has the
ability to create the atmosphere of the Moon or Mars here on earth in
order to train future space workers on the environment they will work
in. My friend and colleague of over 20 years, Mr. Cardillo and I have
watched as satellite imagery processing has shifted from light tables
to artificial intelligence, accelerating and deepening our knowledge of
activities here on earth. The U.S. innovative spirit is alive and well.
The mandate of the Office of Space Commerce is to ``foster the
conditions for the economic growth and technological advancement of the
U.S. commercial space industry''. While we often work with firms to
explain how to engage with the U.S. government or deal with specific
regulatory matters, one of the ways in which we promote our commercial
space industry is to bring together industry groups to understand how
the nexus of policy, regulation, and developments in supporting
industries help drive or impede their progress.
Secretary Ross has hosted two space summits, for example, at the
Department of Commerce, on space finance and insurance. The space
technologies that present possibly the greatest potential, such as
space resource development, lunar habitation, on-orbit assembly, and
others, will require long-term capital investment. Our second summit
looked at the insurance implications of improved space situational
awareness as well as the role of space insurance in shifting risk. The
Secretary and I were in New York City a few weeks ago for updates from
those industries.
One of the issues we are starting to focus on is improving the role
of the U.S. government agencies in the space economy. The U.S.
government is still a very powerful actor in commercial space markets.
And the business models are changing: we are seeing an important shift
from the traditional ``U.S. government buyer take all'' approach to one
where small, forward leaning investments in the market both stimulate
demand and attract additional investment from diverse U.S. capital
markets. This allows the U.S. government to leverage commercial markets
and explore specific use cases while providing critical resources
toward commercialization. In other words, U.S. government agencies
should move beyond a ``wait and see'' mode and provide early, but
limited support for commercial firms. At the recent National Space
Symposium, Secretary Ross agreed that we would work with Administrator
Bridenstine and his team at NASA on LEO commercialization strategies.
One of the things that we have already done is to piggy-back on NASA's
sponsorship of the annual ``Space.com'' symposium in Houston to add new
discussion sessions on space commerce.
While we are following the macro-assessments of the future space
economy, we are also trying to enrich our understanding of space-
related activities at the state and local levels, in order to help
drive government and commercial understanding of unique niches within
the space economy. The Department's Economic Development Administration
(EDA) and Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) have grant-making
authority related to regional economic development, including space
commerce. Just last year, MBDA awarded a $400,000 grant to the Space
Foundation to directly facilitate an introduction to the field of space
commercialization in several communities throughout the country. The
office has begun working with the Bureau of Economic Analysis in order
to more fully understand the contribution of space to our national GDP.
Office of Space Commerce
The reconstitution of the National Space Council has been a
foundational step in focusing our attention on the challenges and
opportunities for U.S. commercial space, and its role in our larger
space, economic and national security strategies. It has facilitated
the alignment of space missions by creating efficiency across
government by facilitating venues for interaction, debate, cooperation.
The National Space Council's ``whole of government'' approach to space
decision-making forces lively interaction on complex issues that has
driven an unprecedented speed of government decision-making in these
areas.
What is being pursued in parallel is the creation of greater
efficiency within each of our organizations. The Administration has
requested authority to transfer the Office of Space Commerce from NOAA
to the Office of the Secretary. Three core ideas underpin the request
for the Office of Space Commerce: as a signal of the importance of the
U.S. commercial space industry to our Nation's economic and national
security future; as a way of leveraging the many different Commerce
bureaus and organizations to support U.S. space commerce; and as a way
of ensuring that economic and commercial views have equal
representation in high-level Executive Branch discussions.
Even as our discussions about the Office continue, the Department
and the Office of Space Commerce are working every single day to
advance U.S. commercial space interests. A large amount of our efforts
have been driven, naturally, by Space Policy Directives 2 (Streamlining
Commercial Space Regulations) and 3 (Space Traffic Management).
As just a few examples, we released our SPD-2 report with thirteen
recommendations for the preservation of satellite spectrum; we
submitted comments on the FCC NPRM and are leading an interagency
effort to ensure that any new space debris regulations reflect the
priorities of the Administration and our Executive Branch colleagues;
we issued two public notices soliciting comments on policy and
regulation regarding commercial space; and just this morning we
released an NPRM on commercial remote sensing that took a ``clean
sheet'' approach in an area moving along at rapid speed. We have issued
an RFI on SSA/STM capabilities, and we are working with our sister
agency NIST on a broad survey of existing technical space standards to
inform best practices in order to encourage space safety and
innovation.
The Executive Branch is working hard to encourage entrepreneurship
and innovation. Agile regulatory and governance processes will be key
to enabling the exciting developments that I discussed above and key to
making sure that the United States remains ``flag of choice'' for space
entrepreneurs. It will require continuing collaborative conversations
across the organizational lines at this table and others, such as FAA
and State.
Why is this so important? Historically, we argued about these
issues in a vacuum. Today, however, we live in a world with competing
international visions for the future of space and a hyper-competitive
world. Collaboration will be essential between those countries who
believe in innovation, genuine partnership, and free markets. You will
have seen Secretary Ross's signing of a space cooperation agreement
between the United States and Luxembourg last week as a reflection of
that. Further, at the end of June, the Department of Commerce, with the
Department of State, will co-host a third space summit to examine
international space partnerships--across government and industry
lines--to discuss the changing nature of cooperation and competition in
space. I hope that some of you will be able to join us for those
discussions.
Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management
Let me highlight one other area of cross-government integration:
SPD-3 and the need to improve space situational awareness (SSA) and
space traffic management (STM).
The strategic space situation and the space congestion problem
become more complex on a daily basis. As discussed before the Congress
last year by General Hyten, Administrator Bridenstine, and Secretary
Ross, the need to adjust organizational lines between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Commerce becomes more urgent. Commerce
has moved out, within existing authorities and resources, on SPD-3. As
I mentioned earlier, this week, we expect responses to an RFI designed
to canvass the landscape of companies, whether those who will help
mitigate the space debris problem--with either new sensors or
visualization tools or with cloud computing and machine learning
capabilities, or those who by virtue of exciting new concepts like
maneuverable ``space tugs'' or mega-constellations, will create wholly
new demands for SSA/STM services.
Almost every one of the SPD-3 activities involve broad interagency
coordination, but the Department of Defense, the USAF and the
Department of Commerce have been in lockstep from the start. Remember
that the logic of this partnership--designed to transition commercial
conjunction analysis and notification to Commerce by 2024--is to allow
DoD to focus on the more pressing mission of ensuring a peaceful space
environment, protecting critical U.S. space assets, and protecting and
defending the United States and its allies. But it is also based on the
need to harness the innovation of the private sector and modernize our
approaches against this urgent problem.
The Department's efforts are focused in a number of areas, which I
can highlight briefly. Within the next two months, DoD's Air Force
Research Lab (AFRL) will deliver to Commerce a first ``experimental''
part of our planned open architecture data repository (OADR). This will
complement already existing analytic, architectural, and data
management efforts within organizations like NOAA and Census within the
Department. The repository, which will continue to be based on DoD's
authoritative catalogue, will incorporate commercial and allied
commercial data and serve as the foundation upon which innovative
commercial capabilities can support the growing market. Industry and
academia will also play key roles in our efforts, as directed by SPD-3.
The nature of the space debris problem and the high-velocity nature
of global space markets mean that we have to move fast, likely faster
than the 2024 deadline. We will have to make effective speed, not
reckless speed, given the consequences. We must strengthen our already
strong interagency partnerships and enjoin the support of the Congress
in order to develop a state-of-the-art capability, one that advances
U.S. leadership and extends the tremendous partnerships we enjoy as a
nation on SSA and STM.
Why is this so important? SSA and STM does not just effect on-orbit
safety; it has huge economic effects that trickle down through the
entire space ecosystem, affecting technology and business models,
investment and insurance, and launch costs and schedules. In this
regard, the future of space safety lies in a portfolio of activities
from satellite design, to improved SSA, to changes in policy and
regulation. It is essential that we prioritize this issue with proper
resources across the board.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for your interest today. As you will inevitably
hear today, there are many operational, technical, and policy
challenges to sustaining American leadership in space. As we continue
to work together within the Executive Branch, and with the Congress,
let's not forget the extraordinary role that the private sector can
play in addressing those challenges. Growing commercial activity in
space creates an economic foundation for our resiliency in space, as
well as for those of our allies. This is an exciting time to be in the
space business and there's a lot of work to be done here, in
furtherance of American prosperity and American security. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Mr. Cardillo.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Cardillo. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sinema, thank
you very much for this opportunity. I've had the pleasure of
appearing in front of this and other committees for the past
three decades, but as a Federal Government and executive-branch
witness. This is my first time on the other side. But, it is
also a personal pleasure to appear with such distinguished
colleagues on this panel.
So, just a little context about where I'm at. It has been
three months since I left my position as the Director of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It has been 36 years
since I first raised my right hand and swore an oath to our
flag and joined the profession of the intelligence community.
I was fortunate to be introduced to a burgeoning imagery
business. But, at that time, 1983, it was a government-owned
imagery business. And it had to be, because of the necessity of
protection of that technology and the capabilities that we
uniquely had in space at that time. I was able to live through,
and help lead, the agency through its movement from analog to
digital, from going from only government-owned satellite
systems to a commercial mix, and moving on from that virtual
monopoly.
As Kevin mentioned, in 1992 we had the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act, which introduced the first introduction of a remote
sensing market. And the quote was that it should remain
exclusively the function of the private sector. That was 27
years ago. The beginning of commercial licensing also occurred.
I also experienced the fits and starts of PDD-23 in March
1994. I worked for DCI Tenet in 2002, when he gave a directive
to the intelligence community to--and directed that we should
rely predominantly on commercial satellite imagery, to the
greatest extent possible; President Bush, NSPD-27, authorizing
the commercial remote sensing space policy and maintaining our
leadership; all the way up to PPD-4 in 2010.
Now, I became Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in October 2014; coincidentally, 57 years
after that Sputnik mission. The debate was, when I reengaged
with my teammates--it was, How do we fully engage with this
growing U.S. commercial marketplace? How can we take best
advantage of this innovation that has been discussed by
Administrator Bridenstine and Mr. O'Connell? And I challenged
the agency at that time to find a way to succeed in the open;
meaning, we had a great past and a great history for providing
classified and closed support, mainly to the military and the
intelligence community, but we now had to find a way to take
advantage of the more open technology. That created new
partners, new vehicles, and new outcomes. And, as much as I
pushed when I was on the inside, in the very short period of
time that I've had since leaving government, I have become even
more excited about the possibility of such leverage. The
monopoly is over, but the race is on. And I would agree with my
colleagues that time is not on our side.
I think there also is an analogy with what we went through
in the digitization of the planet in the late 1990s, the advent
of the Internet and the introduction of the World Wide Web.
Literally, that world became digitized. I now think we have the
opportunity--as a matter of fact, I believe we're on the cusp
of making that physical reality of our planet the same type of
digital reality. Whether it's for farming, fishing,
construction, or insurance, one can imagine farmers getting
precise crop--precision prescriptions for their next yield. One
can imagine traffic patterns being updated through predictive
analytics, vice the reactive analytics we get today. One can
imagine insurance and credit flowing to markets that, before,
the risk was too high for them to do. But, I think we can now
provide them with the insights to manage that risk and increase
that investment.
All to say to this committee that I think that, as we, and
you, can lower barriers to increase the entrepreneurial
opportunities that have already been discussed, I think that we
can sustain, if not grow, American leadership in space. And I'm
sure that you will share my confidence that, should we play on
an--even a near level playing field, I'd bet on the American
ingenuity, the American innovation, and the values that we all
swore to uphold.
I look forward to your questions, and I appreciate the
opportunity to be here. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
General Thompson.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, VICE
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
General Thompson. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, and
distinguished members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear
before you today along with these exceptional space leaders,
and I'm privileged to work with General ``Jay'' Raymond as his
Vice Commander at Air Force Space Command.
Today, I represent, on their behalf, 26,000 men and women
who remain the best in the world at developing, fielding, and
operating space capabilities that serve our national leaders,
our joint forces, allies, and partners, and the global good.
These capabilities ensure our Armed Forces have no equal and
are a vital part of the commercial engine and civil society
that remain the envy of the world.
Today, there's unprecedented agreement among the Nation's
leaders that space has become a warfighting domain, just like
air, land, sea, and cyberspace before it. Our National Security
and National Defense Strategies reflect this reality,
emphasizing peace through strength and the need to maintain
U.S. leadership and freedom of action in space. We are now
dealing with the implications of that fact, driving tremendous
change in order to maintain our leadership and the ability to
operate in space under all conditions. Military, civil, and
commercial space cooperation is a critical element of our
efforts to organize, train, equip, and present space forces
that will deter adversary action in space and, if necessary,
fight and win in that domain.
With my posture statement on the record, I'd like to begin
with a few points:
First, the Air Force recognizes that it's impossible to
accomplish our space missions alone. We have a longstanding
record of cooperation with civil, commercial, intelligence
community, and other military organizations. We're committed to
maintaining and strengthening those relationships, and
identifying new ones, as well.
For example, the Air Force and NASA have a long history of
collaboration. John Glenn rode to space on an Air Force Atlas
rocket. The Apollo Moon Program, arguably the greatest
scientific and technical achievement of the 20th century, was
managed by an Air Force general, Sam Phillips. For years, the
Space Shuttle and International Space Station have served as a
testbed for DOD space-related research and experimentation. And
today, NASA and the Air Force continue to work closely with a
multitude of scientific, technical, and operational endeavors.
But, our relationship expands beyond NASA. We have a
decades-long relationship with the Federal Aviation
Administration, in commercial space launch, and with the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to provide
space-based meteorological data supporting military operations
and public safety. Recently, following the release of Space
Policy Directive-3, Air Force Space Command has been working
with the Department of Commerce on the transfer of space
traffic management responsibility and other initiatives that
support the Nation's civil, commercial, and military space
needs. And, of course, our half-century relationship with the
National Reconnaissance Office and other intelligence
organizations is well documented. That relationship has never
been stronger.
Air Force Space Command has also made significant progress
in expanding our commercial cooperation to enhance the national
security space posture. These efforts include transfer of the
commercial satellite communications provisioning responsibility
from the Defense Information Systems Agency to Air Force Space
Command, where we are already identifying innovative ways to
provide commercial satellite communications to warfighters.
We also established a Space Enterprise Consortium focused
on teaming with small, nontraditional new space companies to
increase our own agility, reduce costs, and accelerate
development timelines for space capabilities.
We're also teaming with DARPA and industry to assess the
new low-Earth orbit satellite architecture for a variety of
space missions, and we're executing a space-launch strategy
that depends on a viable commercial capability to meet routine
national security space-launch needs.
The Air Force and the Command will continue to foster our
relationships with all of these organizations in all of the
sectors, with a goal of maintaining a robust and vibrant
national security space enterprise. Congress has played a major
role in ensuring that case in the past, and we look forward to
your help in maintaining military, civil, and commercial space
cooperation in the future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General David D. Thompson,
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command
Introduction
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I'm honored to appear before you today in my capacity as
Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). It is a distinct
privilege to represent our commander, General Jay Raymond, and the
26,200 men and women of AFSPC who develop, field, and operate the space
capabilities that underpin the joint force, our Allies and partners and
the Nation. In recent years we have made tremendous progress along with
our National Security Space (NSS) partners in the on-going effort to
address the reality that strategic competitors have made space a
warfighting domain. Among these initiatives are the President's
issuance of four Space Policy Directives (SPD), direction to establish
a space-focused combatant command--U.S. Space Command, and the
Department of Defense (DoD) proposal for a sixth branch of the armed
forces--the U.S. Space Force. We expect the coming year will be equally
full of progress across these and other NSS endeavors.
Emerging Space Environment
Today, great power competition with China and Russia continues to
be the primary challenge to U.S. and global security. Both of these
nations seek to challenge peace, stability and U.S. leadership in all
domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. In the space domain in
particular, these competitors seek to deny the United States and its
Allies freedom of action, while developing their own capabilities to
project power and enhance their military strength.
Fortunately, this comes at a time when our National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, national leaders, and Air Force
plans, programs and operations are in unprecedented alignment. The
National Security Strategy dictates that we treat space as a priority
domain and vital interest, maintaining unfettered access and freedom to
operate in space for civil, military and economic benefit. The National
Defense Strategy establishes five priority missions: (1) defend the
homeland, (2) provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent,
(3) defeat a powerful conventional enemy, (4) deter opportunistic
aggression, and (5) disrupt violent extremists. Space capabilities play
a critical role in each one of the missions, supporting U.S. forces and
our allies and partners around the globe. Our primary objective remains
to deter conflict from extending to space; the best way to do this is
to be prepared to fight and win in space should deterrence fail.
Military, civil, and commercial space cooperation is critical to AFSPC
efforts to organize, train and equip space forces that will deter
adversary action in space, and if necessary, fight and win in the space
domain. My testimony focuses on current and future areas of cooperation
among military, commercial and civil space sectors.
Current Military-Civil-Commercial Space Cooperation
AFSPC recognizes that it is impossible to accomplish our mission
alone; we are committed to identifying new partners and solidifying
existing relationships as a core activity across many mission areas.
Assured Access to Space
For the first time in 20 years, the Air Force is postured to meet
national security launch needs through competition among multiple
launch providers. The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program,
formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program,
provides assured access to space for our most important national
security satellites. As the stewards of this capability for the
Department of Defense and the National Reconnaissance Office, we have
achieved unprecedented mission success by delivering 76 NSS launches to
orbit since 2002 without a launch failure. During this period, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has also used this
space launch capability to support numerous science, exploration and
other civil missions. While our priority remains ensuring the Nation
can launch all NSS payloads, our strategy to utilize launch services
from certified domestic launch providers supports their viability in
the globally competitive launch sector and helps to ensure this
fundamental element of space power is also available for civil,
commercial, scientific and exploratory purposes.
The Air Force has moved into the next phase of the NSSL program. In
October the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) entered into
development contracts with Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman and United
Launch Alliance called Launch Service Agreements. These public-private
partnerships leverage commercial launch investment and seek to end our
use of the Russian RD-180 engine ahead of the 2022 deadline. Earlier
this month, SMC released the Request for Proposal for Phase 2 launch
procurement contracts, which will use full and open competition to
procure launch services for launches starting in 2022. The Launch
Service Agreements are not prerequisites to winning NSSL Phase 2 launch
contracts. They are the best way to ensure commercially viable launch
systems are available and ready to meet our stressing NSS launch
requirements at that time.
Last year Congress recognized the potential for cost savings
associated with launch vehicle reusability, and the inherent
competitiveness this feature can provide. With launch service providers
demonstrating success at a rapid pace, reusable launch systems may
offer higher reliability, increased responsiveness and greater
flexibility in support of NSS missions. The Air Force is actively
evaluating the risks, benefits, and potential costs savings from
reusable launch vehicles for future missions. Evidence of this can be
seen in SMC and SpaceX's recent contract modification allowing the
reuse of the Falcon Heavy side core boosters for the Air Force's Space
Test Program-2 mission. This mission further demonstrates our
commitment to balance risk with increased responsiveness and
flexibility.
In 2019, the SMC-led DoD Space Test Program partnered with the
Defense Innovation Unit to pursue first use of small, ``venture-class''
launch services through the Rapid/Agile Launch Initiative (RALI). Under
this partnership, the Air Force procured five launches from venture-
class launch service providers using Other Transaction Authorities.
RALI demonstrates rapid procurement and the responsiveness of
commercial launch, dedicated launch for small payloads to militarily-
relevant orbits, and increased operational tempo over legacy launch
services. RALI leverages an expanding commercial launch market to
increase DoD's access to space.
AFSPC places a high priority on streamlining space launch
operations and identifying opportunities to improve our speed,
innovation, resiliency, and efficiency to satisfy national security
needs, and increase safety. This includes the architecture
transformation of both launch ranges that started in 2019 and will
continue through 2023. Changes in flight and ground systems will put us
on a path to support a 2025 implementation of the Autonomous Flight
Safety System for all commercial space launches. This enables us to
increase the pace of launch and reduce sustainment of costly
infrastructure, while maintaining public safety.
We are also working closely with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as they implement streamlined commercial launch
licensing approvals. The Air Force and FAA have a long history of
cooperation in space launch and use common standards to ensure the
safety of the public and critical launch infrastructure against the
hazards of launch operations. AFSPC installation commanders also work
closely with the FAA and launch provider to synchronize all activity on
the installation to ensure the commercial and military missions are
optimized in support of national objectives.
We have learned many lessons in recent years as our partnerships
with the FAA, NASA, and industry have matured. Finally, we are pleased
with the success of industry operating from Air Force-managed space
launch ranges and will continue to refine our processes and
requirements in pursuit of assured access to space.
Space-based Environmental Monitoring
Every military mission begins with a weather briefing; terrestrial
weather, space weather, or both. The data required to generate
forecasts for our forces is largely dependent on complex models, and
approximately 95 percent of the data that feeds these models comes from
space-based sensors or ground-based observatories looking into space.
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites have been
collecting weather data for U.S. military operations for more than five
decades and provide assured, reliable, global terrestrial and space
weather data to support DoD operations. A 1994 Presidential directive
realigned day-to-day operations of DMSP to the Department of Commerce's
(DoC) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and today
the DMSP constellation is operated by mission partners consisting of
the NOAA Office of Satellite and Product Operations and a detachment of
Air Force Space Command's 50th Operations Group, both located in
Suitland, Maryland. The 50th Operations Group detachment has Satellite
Control Authority and delegates day-to-day operations to the NOAA. A
backup operations center, operated by the Air Force Reserve's 6th Space
Operations Squadron, is located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
The Air Force's Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially
Hosted (REACH) program is a space weather and space situational
awareness project demonstrating the viability and effectiveness of a
commercially hosted, disaggregated architecture. REACH payload sensors
provide an unprecedented amount of space weather measurements for more
rapid satellite anomaly attribution. Working in partnership with
Iridium, Johns Hopkins, Harris Corporation and others, the program
fielded 32 REACH hosted payloads on-orbit in under 24 months at a total
cost of $18 million, a 92 percent cost savings from the original cost
estimate for the program. The successful launch of these payloads and
the critical data they provide made the REACH team a finalist for the
prestigious 2018 Collier Trophy recognizing achievement in aeronautics
and astronautics, and are an example of SMC innovation in developing
partnerships with industry to rapidly field new capabilities while
reducing cost and schedule.
Satellite Communications
To comply with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act,
responsibilities for DoD procurement of commercial satellite
communications (COMSATCOM) services transferred from the Defense
Information Systems Agency to AFSPC on December 11, 2018. Since that
date, AFSPC has been bringing together government and industry partners
to chart a way forward to both enhance satellite communications
(SATCOM) provisioning and our ability to provide SATCOM in a contested
environment. DoD and commercial industry have a long track record of
collaboration, partnership, and mission success in this area. That
being said, we are not content to rest on the laurels of that
partnership with all our commercial industry partners have to offer. To
that end, we currently have multiple ongoing and planned initiatives to
improve and expand upon current COMSATCOM use cases.
The AFSPC Commercial Satellite Communications Office (CSCO)
facilitates the acquisition and delivery of operationally responsive,
customer-focused, cost-effective COMSATCOM services and capabilities
for Combatant Commands, Services and agencies throughout the DoD, as
well as for federal agencies and foreign partners. The CSCO has two
business units, the COMSATCOM Solutions Branch and the Enhanced Mobile
Satellite Services (EMSS) Program. In Fiscal Year 2019, the CSCO has an
annual working capital budget of approximately $800 million.
The COMSATCOM Solutions Branch manages approximately 100 contracts
annually with commercial providers, providing approximately 9 GHz of
bandwidth across all commercial bands and 2.5 Gbps of throughput, with
a lifecycle value exceeding $5 billion. Supported missions include
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control;
logistics; research and development; special operations; and training.
The EMSS Program Office provides global mobile satellite
communications via the commercial Iridium low-Earth orbit (LEO)
satellite constellation. For a fixed annual rate, customers receive
unlimited voice and data on L-band devices, including satellite phones,
push-to-talk radios, and small form-factor sensors and trackers. EMSS
capabilities are meeting critical narrowband satellite communications
requirements for current operations, including tactical, warfighter and
disadvantaged user requirements. Currently over 100,000 devices are
provisioned to the DoD's wholly-owned and operated EMSS Gateway, where
all communications are securely processed and ingested into other
networks.
The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC), established in 2014 at the
Combined Space Operations Center, has proved beneficial to both
industry and government. The CIC improves our understanding of the
capabilities and limitations of the various commercial COMSATCOM and
space situational awareness (SSA) systems that the DoD procures to
satisfy warfighter needs, which improves industry's knowledge and
employment of their systems in response. More recently, the command
held two COMSATCOM industry day engagements. These events allowed the
government to glean a better understanding of how to better leverage
and incorporate existing and planned COMSATCOM capabilities into our
SATCOM Enterprise Vision and Strategy while providing industry the
opportunity to gain a better understanding of how the command intends
to capitalize on the value the COMSATCOM industry is building.
Innovation and rapid technology advancement are occurring
throughout the space industry, especially in ``New Space'' companies
with agile development and deployment processes. The Air Force is
looking to partner with commercial industry, the civil space sector,
and others to leverage these activities and increase agility, reduce
cost, improve technology and decrease program development cycles. SMC's
Space Enterprise Consortium aims to leverage this activity, minimizing
barriers to entry for small businesses and non-traditional vendors and
identify teaming opportunities to promote research and prototyping with
the Government. At present, AFSPC is using this tool to identify and
field a SATCOM Enterprise Management and Control capability to manage
and control a hybrid DoD SATCOM Enterprise consisting of purpose-built
DoD satellites and commercial SATCOM services.
Finally, the Air Force COMSATCOM Office is pursuing a research,
development, test, and engineering initiative to look at the use case
for commercial COMSATCOM services in the Arctic, as well as
commissioning a study to identify new government to industry business
models for acquiring and employing COMSATCOM capability that will
reduce the currently over 100 disparate contracts for commercial SATCOM
while simultaneously expanding the overall capability and capacity
available to our users.
Space Situational Awareness
In June 2018 the President signed SPD-3, which is intended to
ensure that the United States remains the leader in providing a safe
and secure operating environment as space traffic increases. This
policy establishes foundational principles, lays out goals, provides
guidance, and establishes clear roles and responsibilities. In
accordance with this policy, DoD will transition the non-military
aspects of space situational awareness and space safety monitoring and
responsibilities to the Department of Commerce.
For the last year AFSPC has collaborated closely with the DoC on
many fronts. In partnership with U.S. Strategic Command, there has been
an active dialogue to differentiate roles and responsibilities to meet
SPD-3 objectives. Next month the first DoC liaison will arrive at the
18th Space Control Squadron located at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California. This will mark the start of operational-level engagement
between the DoD and DoC related to the transfer of SSA domain knowledge
to the DoC in support of their efforts to comply with SPD-3.
SSA data sharing has been an area of great interaction and
opportunity. In May 2018, an unclassified data environment was created
to aggregate SSA data and to make that information easily accessible to
developers, operators and allies alike. Called the Unified Data Library
(UDL), this unclassified capability was built by the Air Force Research
Laboratory. Since its delivery last summer, the UDL capability has
grown exponentially and demonstrated its ability to be a marketplace
that aggregates commercial, Allied, Intelligence Community, and
academic data sets in a way that supports any data consumer at the
correct classification level. Today, 16 commercial data providers and
multiple non-traditional data providers like the University of Arizona
are feeding the UDL. We also have government data available from the
Naval Research Laboratory, the 18th Space Control Squadron, and others
at the unclassified level. The DoC is currently evaluating the
unclassified version of UDL to facilitate its broader Space Traffic
Management objectives, and expects a final decision on their desired
way ahead this summer.
Future Areas of Cooperation
AFSPC has made significant progress in expanding interagency and
commercial cooperation that enhance our position across the national
security space portfolio. Based on those recent successes, AFSPC will
continue to build our relationships with industry and other government
agencies.
Blackjack
Blackjack is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency- and
Air Force-initiated program to define, develop, and demonstrate
proliferated low-Earth orbit (PLEO) architectures to augment,
complement or replace existing satellite constellations at lower cost
and potentially higher resilience. The Blackjack program will deliver
up to 20 satellites to orbit by 2021 and has three main objectives: (1)
develop payload and mission-level autonomy software and demonstrate
autonomous orbital operations; (2) examine and implement advanced
commercial manufacturing techniques and commercial-off-the-shelf parts;
and (3) assess the ability of small spacecraft in LEO to support
national security space missions. AFSPC, Air Combat Command, and others
in the DoD have expressed significant interest in Blackjack and the
need for rapid deployment of a more resilient, distributed system. The
Blackjack program has recently awarded satellite bus and payload
contracts to industry partners.
CASINO
Commercially Augmented Space Inter-Networked Operations (CASINO) is
an umbrella program established by SMC to expand on operational
concepts prototyped by the Blackjack program. CASINO will
operationalize PLEO constellations by improving sensors and concepts of
operation and developing prototype payloads for additional mission
areas. CASINO is working with a variety of partners to determine
requirements, data transport and integration schemes, and cyber
security/Information Assurance needs for multiple mission areas. Use of
innovative commercial manufacturing and ``design for upgrade''
techniques will enable rapid production and lower cost, allowing for
continuous technology refresh and new technology insertion points not
currently available in NSS programs. Using commercial-like production
lines and replenishment concepts will drive up to 20 percent
constellation re-capitalization each year and allow for technology
insertion to outpace evolving and emerging threats. In addition, the
CASINO program examines the use of both military unique command and
control systems, and is coordinating with commercial PLEO operators on
approaches that would enable command and control of military payload
and data dissemination through existing commercial processing centers.
Mission Manifest Office
SMC, under the auspices of AFSPC, created the Mission Manifest
Office (MMO) to provide rapid, resilient and responsive launch
opportunities for small payloads to meet NSS objectives. As the front
door for operational launch, the MMO analyzes and identifies DoD,
civil, and Intelligence Community launch opportunities to determine
potential multi-manifest missions. As a result, the Air Force intends
to maximize on-orbit capability and reduce overall launch costs by
ensuring excess ``throw weight'' is used on every NSSL mission. As one
of the SMC 2.0 pacesetters, the MMO will be offering DoD, the
intelligence community and civil agencies opportunities to mature their
space technologies on the NASA Landsat-9 launch mission in 2020,
setting an important precedent for interagency collaboration for years
to come.
Space-based Environmental Monitoring
Air Force weather operators have a long history of leveraging U.S.
civil and allied Space Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM)
capabilities to support global operations. DMSP has served as the core
Air Force SBEM capability for close to sixty years. However, SBEM data
from NOAA, the European Consortium for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites, and the Japanese Space Agency have been
critical in providing meteorological data that DMSP alone cannot fully
provide. For the next generation, the Air Force is currently acquiring
the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave system to meet two requirements
that will not be fulfilled by civil or allied partners: monitoring of
ocean surface vector winds and tropical cyclone intensity. The Air
Force is also currently developing a unique set of small hosted sensors
to be flown in various orbits to sense energetic charged particles.
Finally, the Air Force is implementing a comprehensive strategy to meet
the two highest priority SBEM sensing needs under the Electro-Optical/
Infrared Weather System (EWS) acquisition: cloud characterization and
theater weather Imagery. EWS will be comprised of a hybrid architecture
of core Air Force sensing capabilities augmented by civil, allied, and
likely commercial capabilities. The continued miniaturization of cloud
imaging sensors combined with the emergence of ``NewSpace''
proliferated commercial space architectures provides an opportunity to
integrate commercial capabilities into the SBEM family of systems like
never before. This hybrid architecture approach will be much more
resilient than current and previous SBEM architectures and will be
scalable to meet requirements for more timely and actionable weather
information.
The Way Ahead
AFSPC has made significant progress in recent years to build and
foster close relationships with civilian and commercial space partners
to better leverage existing capabilities and to make smarter
investments going forward. The command will continue to strive to
ensure these relationships solidify over time to maintain a dominant
national space enterprise.
I thank the committee for your leadership and support; together we
will build a resilient and ready NSS enterprise that will continue to
serve as the foundation to our desire to maintain our military
advantage and promote American prosperity.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
Colonel Melroy.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL PAMELA A. MELROY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
(RET.)/NASA ASTRONAUT, RETIRED
Colonel Melroy. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member
Sinema, the other members of the Committee--and your wonderful
staff--for inviting me here today. It's a real honor to be on
this panel with my distinguished colleagues.
So, I'll get right to it. I consider that creating a
thoughtful, whole-of-government, space traffic management
oversight capability is one of the most urgent tasks facing the
government to support our needs across commercial, civil, and
national security sectors.
Currently, the DOD has statutory authority for collision
assessment and notification. However, the number of sensors
that they use is not sufficient to our growing needs. These
sensors can be affected by weather. They only take periodic
snapshots of the position of objects in space. Hours, and
sometimes even days, go by without updates to orbital
locations. Furthermore, we cannot reliably track debris 10
centimeters or less, and these objects present a hazard to
navigation for all satellites--civil, commercial, and national
security.
Many of the new proposed commercial activities also include
very dynamic operations, such as rendezvous, satellite
servicing, and debris removal. Many emerging space threats are
also highly dynamic. The ability to provide persistent custody
of resident space objects is urgently needed for both the
national security mission and also for a future civil space
traffic management oversight authority.
So, one solution is to incorporate a greater number of
sensors, potentially from commercial companies and private
entities, to help fill those data gaps. However, commercial
space surveillance data is actually still a nascent industry.
The Air Force and a civil space traffic management oversight
authority need to work together to give clarity so that
industry can position itself to provide the products and
services that the government needs. For example, the U.S.
Government needs to establish what data, and how much data, it
needs to acquire in order to properly serve the community.
Important work is still needed to establish the minimum
threshold of service that the government should provide to all
users, and how much data is necessary to provide that service.
Additionally, a decision has to be made as to how and where
that data will reside. If separate repositories are used for
DOD and the civil authority, how does the government ensure
that it's not paying twice for the same information?
There are also implications for the intelligence community
as we transition to a civil system. A system where open
information about satellite positions is broadly available
presents a challenge for conducting national security missions.
The reality is that the IC is already facing this challenge. As
an increasing number of independent domestic and international
sensor operators come online, any ability to remain undetected
in space is tenuous, at best.
A potential approach parallels how sensitive missions in
the national airspace are managed today. Currently, the FAA and
DOD coordinate, every day, at local and national levels to
protect information related to the presence of important assets
operating in the national airspace. The existence of the assets
is not disputed, but critical operational information is
protected. These issues have a workable whole-of-government
solution. However, until Congress takes action on the subject
of who should oversee the civil space traffic management
capability, the Air Force has no identifiable partner with
statutory authority and the appropriate resources for
coordination.
We're already behind the curve. The need is urgent. A
number of companies are actively seeking regulatory approval
from other countries for these dynamic on-orbit activities.
Other governments will be making decisions, setting precedents,
defining by default what the global safety system will
comprise. International regulations will be shaped by who
leads. And, without a civil authority, the U.S. is limited in
its influence on space traffic management oversight outcomes,
to the detriment of commercial, civil, and national security.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important
topic with you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Melroy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Pamela A. Melroy, United States Air Force
(Ret.)/NASA Astronaut, retired
Thank you Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, and your wonderful staff for inviting me
here today. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about the critical
operational, technical and policy challenges today in space across the
commercial, civil and national security sectors.
There are many opportunities that a growing commercial space
community have created across all three sectors. Low-cost launch
opportunities and reduction in the size of electronics have created a
renaissance in space research and new business models to support civil
and government missions. But along with the increasing engagement comes
many new challenges as well. We must encourage and nurture the economic
and national benefits derived from all of this activity, while
protecting national security interests. I believe that the definition
of a coherent, thoughtful and effect space traffic management
capability is one of the most urgent tasks facing the government in
this cause; this requirement underpins the needs across all three
sectors.
Currently the Department of Defense (DoD) has statutory authority
for conjunction assessment and notification. The Combined Space
Operations Center (CSpOC) has access to 29 sensors, 7 of them dedicated
full time, with 22 contributing and collateral sensors which are
available part-time. These sensors, scattered widely across the globe
and providing only poor coverage in the southern hemisphere, are not
sufficient for the challenges facing us now. They can be affected by
weather, and only take periodic snapshots of the location of objects in
space; hours and even days may go by without updates to orbital
locations. Furthermore, there are gaps in our capability to track
objects, for example, we cannot detect debris less than 10 centimeters
in size. These objects present a hazard to navigation for all
satellites--civil, commercial, and national security.
Many of the new proposed commercial activities include highly
dynamic operations including rendezvous and proximity operations,
satellite servicing, and debris removal missions. Consequently any
space traffic management will have to not only track and manage the
movements of satellites on orbit and but also be able to track the
small, but important debris. One way to create a robust space traffic
management system is to incorporate a greater number of sensors,
potentially from commercial companies and private entities to help
provide data that can fill current gaps in our ability to provide
persistent custody of all objects in space. Given the proliferation of
large satellite constellations and the growth in debris, the ability to
provide persistent custody of orbiting objects is urgently needed for
both the national security mission and for a future civil space traffic
management oversight authority.
While it's exciting to see the new capability that commercial
entities can bring to the table, commercial space surveillance data is
still a nascent industry. The Air Force and the civil space traffic
management oversight authority need to work together immediately to
give clarity and direction to how they intend to acquire the necessary
data. Only with clear direction can industry position itself to provide
the products and services the government needs. There are several
immediate and critical issues that the government needs to address.
First, the U.S. government needs to establish what data it needs or
desires to acquire to serve the domestic community. According to Space
Policy Directive-3, the Department of Commerce--as the administration's
nominated civil authority--will eventually take over conjunction
assessments and notifications currently performed by the Combined Space
Operations Center (CSpOC). Important work is still needed to establish
the minimum threshold of service that the government should provide to
all users, and how much data is necessary to provide that level of
service.
Second, a decision has to be made as to how and where that data
will reside. If multiple repositories are defined, for example, one for
DoD and one for the civilian community, how does the government ensure
it is not paying twice for the same information? Another critical
question concerns the relationship that DoD will decide to maintain
with partner countries and the sharing of critical data as it has done
in the past. Will commercial entities resist this sharing as affecting
their potential market? As the various government stakeholders struggle
with answering these complex questions they can turn to the many
lessons learned from both the commercial earth observation data
experience as well as commercial weather data.
Finally, let us all recognize that there are implications for the
intelligence community as we transition to an open civil system of
space situational awareness and space traffic management. A system
where open information about satellite position and orbit is available
to the general community will present a challenge for conducting
national security missions. Unfortunately, the reality of today,
however, is that the IC is already facing this challenge. As an
increasing number of independent domestic and international sensor
operators come on-line, anyone's ability to remain undetected is
tenuous. We have worked through such challenges before. The current
situation facing national security is analogous to the challenges
recently faced when commercial Earth observation capabilities expanded.
The solution was to issue licenses to U.S. companies with specific
restrictions on selling data about certain sensitive national security
locations.
However, then and now, we face the problem that commercial
companies from other countries are bound by no such restrictions. As
with the Earth observation paradigm shift, we face another with SSA/STM
no less intractable, but yet must be resolved. A potential approach
could be one that parallels how the national airspace today manages
sensitive missions. Currently, the FAA and DoD coordinate every day at
both local, regional and national levels with air traffic control to
protect information related to the presence of high value assets
operating in the national airspace. For example, military flights are
not included in the national airspace data provided through the popular
``Flight Aware'' application. These issues have workable solutions.
Clearly there are critical urgent questions that need to be
addressed and guidance provided to the greater community about the
approach the U.S. government is going to take. While there is evidence
of some activity, it does not appear strategic or coordinated to the
outside observer. The Department of Commerce recently issued an RFI on
space traffic management and space situational awareness topic. What is
not clear to the greater community is how this effort, along with some
others, are coordinated to create an ``all of government'' integrated
approach, including the DoD.
Thus, it is becoming urgent to resolve the impasse existing between
the Senate and the House on the subject of who should oversee the civil
space situational awareness and space traffic management capability for
the U.S. government. Industry does not know who to talk to so they are
trying to talk to everyone, which has the potential to muddy the waters
with a diversity of business desires rather than a thoughtful strategy.
Until this question is resolved the Air Force has no identifiable
partner to coordinate with that has statuary authority. And until this
decision is finalized, no civilian Executive Branch office has the
resources to address these critical issues.
We are already behind the curve; the commercial need is urgent.
Already a myriad of companies, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems,
Chandah Space Technologies, the Japanese company Astroscale, and the
Israeli company Effective Space are or soon will be actively seeking
regulatory approval for dynamic space activities. Equally important, in
absence of U.S. leadership and input on this global problem, other
national governments will be making decisions, setting precedents, and
defining by default what the global system will comprise. International
regulations will be shaped by who leads. We cannot afford not to be
part of that dynamic.
Recognizing the significance of this topic, there is substantial
activity underway on the topics of SSA/STM ongoing in consortia and
non-profit organizations. AIAA published a white paper in October 2017
and formed a working group to address some of the technical issues
around data. Their work includes the compilation of a lexicon and an
outline of the problem set that needs to be addressed across the
landscape of the SSA/STM eco-system. Secure World has also been very
active in this area. Industry consensus safety and technical standards
are being developed by the Consortium For Execution of Rendezvous and
Servicing Operations (CONFERS) and will be invaluable to these
regulators. While all of these efforts are admirable and will help
reach a solution, without a civil authority, the U.S. is limited in its
actions.
I would like to close with two important points. First, we need
immediate and urgent all-of-government vision and direction on the
definition of the U.S. SSA/STM capability. Next, we need reach out to
our international partners to provide input and strong U.S. leadership,
leveraging our world-leading technical expertise on this issue
globally.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important and
exciting topic with you, and I look forward to our discussion.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much, to each of the
witnesses, for your very helpful testimony.
I have long said that I agree with the President and the
administration on the need for the creation of a Space Force,
although I also have a standing request to the administration
that I want to be notified the day that James Tiberius Kirk
shows up to enlist.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cruz. Administrator Bridenstine----
Mr. Bridenstine. Sir.
Senator Cruz,--you said if you're going to have commerce on
the ocean, it needs to be protected, and the same is true in
space. Do you believe that a Space Force is an important, or
even necessary, component to ensuring that the partnerships we
have with commercial space and NASA continue to prosper, moving
forward into the future?
Mr. Bridenstine. I do, Chairman. And I will tell you, I've
been an advocate of the Space Force in my previous life in the
House of Representatives. We voted on it, in fact, in the
House. I was on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. It got
strong bipartisan support. Then I voted on it on the full Armed
Services Committee. Again, it got very strong bipartisan
support. I think, of the 60-some members on the Committee, only
2 voted against the underlying--or the National Defense
Authorization Act that actually had the Space Force embedded in
it. Then when we voted on it on the floor of the House, it got
344 votes. So, it passed the House of Representatives with very
strong bipartisan support. And, of course, I supported it all
along the way.
I will tell you, from my perspective--my new perspective as
the NASA Administrator, one of my biggest concerns is that the
enemies of the United States see the destruction of space as
part of their plans, should we end up in a war. And I think
it's important that, if we are to preserve space for
exploration and discovery and science and all of the things
that NASA does, we need to make sure that the enemies of the
United States understand that there is no advantage to
destroying space. They will gain no advantage over the United
States of America from destroying space. And if we can not only
signal that that's the case, but actually deliver on that, then
they won't make those investments, and then we can continue to
explore space together.
Senator Cruz. So, in your judgment, how would a strong and
robust Space Force benefit commercial space and space
exploration? And, in the converse, how would the absence of an
effective Space Force harm commercial space and space
exploration?
Mr. Bridenstine. Sir, I think it goes straight to your
opening statement about commerce. What NASA is attempting to do
is develop space, especially, right now, low-Earth orbit, where
we're having great success in the commercialization of space.
So, we are proving technology, we're retiring risk, and we're
developing commercial markets. Now commercial industry is
taking over a lot of those capabilities that NASA used to do
exclusively. If commercial industry is going to continue to
make those investments--and we're talking about big
investments, as you correctly identified--if they're going to
continue to make those investments, they need to have
assurances that their investments are going to be safe and
protected. And I think that's, ultimately, why what NASA is
doing is important for commercialization. And what
commercialization is doing is important for economic growth,
but it's also important that it be protected. If we have that
protection, we will continue to see growth. If we--conversely,
to your point, if we don't have that protection, we will not
continue to see growth, and those investments will never be
made.
Senator Cruz. General Thompson, in your judgment, how
should the Space Force or Space Development Agency be designed
to ensure that the Department of Defense is effectively
capitalizing on the investments being made on the commercial
space front?
General Thompson. Thank you, Senator Cruz. I would say a
couple of things in that regard.
First of all, when it comes to the Space Force itself, I
think the proposal that was put forward by the Department of
Defense is the best approach, going forward, for the Department
and the Nation, for two reasons. First of all, it's effective,
because it takes the existing Department of Defense oversight
and management structure, it creates a four-star member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate for all of those
capabilities, both in a warfighting sense and a development
sense. But, that Space Force is also efficient, because it also
capitalizes on the support and infrastructure and other
capabilities the Air Force already has and provides for the
majority of the space forces today.
When it comes to capitalizing on commercial investment, it
also will consolidate--a Space Force would also consolidate all
of those activities into one organization. Today, we have the
Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles that builds
large-scale, incredibly capable assets for the Nation,
primarily from a military perspective. We've got--we recently
established, with the help of Congress, the Space Rapid
Capabilities Office to fill holes in the need to defend and
protect those capabilities. And then the Department recently
created the Space Development Agency to specifically focus on
and leverage commercial capabilities. Those organizations all
need to work together. They can work together inside the
current structure today, but a Space Force would help them
organize and operate more effectively.
Senator Cruz. I very much agree with you that creating a
separate Space Force unifying the command will elevate the
focus on the theater, elevate the resources, the leadership,
the focus on defending what is likely to be one of, if not the
most, contested theater, for decades going forward.
General Thompson. And, Senator Cruz, if I may, also the
fact that the President has already created a U.S. Space
Command, a combatant command for space, I think helps a great
deal.
Senator Cruz. Absolutely.
OK, a final question. As you know, Space Policy Directive-3
directs the Department of Commerce to be the focal point for
civil and commercial space situational awareness and space
traffic management efforts. And, as the leading spacefaring
nation in the world, we have a lot invested in our ability to
safely conduct space operations and to track debris. And our
needs in this area will only grow as space traffic and space
commerce increase. Who, exactly, owns space traffic management?
And who should own it? Whoever wants to----
General Thompson. Senator Cruz, if I may. Sir, I would say,
in a de facto sense today, the Air Force owns space traffic
management. And the reason is, as Senator Sinema stated, as an
outcome of the collision between the Russian Cosmos and the
Iridium satellite in 2009, no one else in the world could track
these objects, could do the calculations required to determine
whether they--or whether they were a threat to each other,
simply by their orbital motion. And so, as an outcome of that
event in 2009, the Air Force took on the responsibility,
because it was the only organization in the world that could,
and perhaps today may still be the only organization, although
there's a lot of great commercial and civil and other
capability. Air Force--the Air Force is an armed service, it is
not a regulatory agency, so I would say that we will do the--
this job as long as the Nation and the world requires, but it
is probably best suited for civil and other organizations in
that regard.
Senator Cruz. Does anyone disagree or have a differing
perspective?
Mr. Bridenstine. I will tell you, Senator Cruz, I've---in
the House of Representatives, I took a position that the FAA
Office of Commercial Space Transportation should have that
role. I now see it quite differently. I think the Office of the
Secretary of Commerce should have that role. And I say that
because what we are trying to do is develop commerce in space.
That's what we're trying to achieve here. And I think that, if
an agency that is responsible for developing commerce is also
responsible for developing the rules by which people operate in
space, I think, ultimately, it will--it'll put us in a much
better position in the future.
I will also say that, under all circumstances, it should
not be the Department of Defense that does space situational
awareness and space traffic management. That is a construct of
the past, and it is certainly not going to work in the future.
When I was in the House, we heard testimony after testimony
from generals and admirals, Strategic Command, Air Force Space
Command, and overwhelmingly they kept saying, ``We do not want
to be the FAA for space anymore.'' There was a day when that
was necessary. We're well past that day. It needs to be done by
a civil sector, by a civil agency. And I think it can be
largely, in my view, commercialized. So, if the Commerce
Department were to say, ``We can license private companies that
can provide the data and the information, and then if somebody
wants to launch into space, you have to prove to Commerce that
you have SSA--space situational awareness and space traffic
management being provided by one of the commercial operators,''
that puts us in a position where there is opportunity to reform
the system in the future.
I get concerned when I hear people talk about creating a
new government program for SSA and STM that won't have the
ability to modify, it won't have the ability to change. In the
1950s, when we created the current Air Traffic Management
System, we used a network of radars and voice communication.
I'm a Navy pilot by trade. In the 2000s, we were using a
network of radars and voice communications. technology has
changed, but our system did not change. I think it's important
that, when we construct the next-generation Space Traffic
Management System, it should have the ability to change--I
think commercialization helps that--so that, ultimately, we
have numerous providers that are competing on cost and
innovation to get more data and better data for a safer space
traffic management environment.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Senator Sinema.
Oh, I'm--Colonel Melroy, did you have something to add?
Colonel Melroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do.
I think there are pros and cons. The discussion is,
essentially, Department of Commerce or Department of
Transportation. The Department of Transportation, where I was
at the Office of Commercial Space, was working very closely
with the Air Force, and has many people who have been thinking
about this for a long time and actually ready to catch the
football that they knew was coming at them. So, they have the
resources. They have the people who have been thinking about
this.
The other side of the coin is, the administration has, in
SPD-3, said Department of Commerce. And I think Administrator
Bridenstine has made some really good points about why Commerce
is such an important place for that kind of civil oversight
function.
I think there are--arguably, you would say that the
Executive Branch is in the best position to decide amongst
themselves who they think--the organization that is most
willing and most prepared to take it on. So, I think that's a
very important thing.
The problem is, we have a third option, here, and that's
where we're at right now: we don't have anyone. And I would
argue, that's the worst option.
So, in my mind, I think there are pros and cons that are
worth debating, but the important thing is that we need to get
off the worst option and get on to one of the other two. And if
there are issues and concerns, then they need to be addressed,
but we need to move forward.
Mr. O'Connell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I think we stand at a moment where we're able to think
about the disruption, if you will, of the space debris problem.
And it's going to come largely through the good efforts that
have been done, historically, by the Air Force, but
increasingly by the developments in the commercial world. And,
as I said, there's a very interesting, diverse community of
companies that are coming forward. You and I grew up in the age
of satellite imagery, when people were coming to market with 1-
meter electro optical systems. This is not that market. This is
a market that is filled with radars and RF sensors and electro
optical telescopes, as well as a wide range of visualization
tools that are completely different extensions of what we do
today. And so, the concept of space traffic management is, in
and of itself, a bit outdated. What we're really trying to do
is to improve the quality, speed, and accuracy of data to
satellite operators so that they have a self-interest in
knowing where they are and getting out of the way of people who
might be in harm's way or collaborating with others. And so,
it's really a time to think about this in a fundamentally
different way.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Senator Sinema.
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on this conversation, I--these are really
interesting discussions about Commerce as an option. I'm
interested in learning a little bit more about FAA as an
option.
So, Colonel Melroy, do you think the FAA could--would be a
good or a poor choice to task with space traffic management?
And if the FAA is a good option, would they also be responsible
for tracking objects in space and preventing space collisions?
Colonel Melroy. Senator, these are great questions. I think
I'm going to go back and remind everyone that there are pros
and cons on both sides, right? There is something to be said
for having all the oversight concentrated in one place. And
Commerce currently has other regulatory oversight with regards
to Earth observation and imaging. And having a concentration in
a single place, I think, you know, the--definitely has some
benefits, from a regulatory perspective.
Unfortunately, right now the FAA has the people who have
been thinking about this for a while, and actually have been
embedded in the community and understand it. In fact, when I
was at the FAA, I hired an employee to sit in the then JSpOC,
now CSpOC, to begin to absorb the lessons that would be needed
to be learned, going forward.
I think, either way, there are going to have to be some
adjustments that get made. Whether the Department of
Transportation or the Department of Commerce takes over
oversight, these are issues that do have to be addressed. But,
I have full confidence in this committee that you can absorb
this information that we're sharing with you about some of the
pros and cons, and make sure that the legislation appropriately
deals with that.
Senator Sinema. Thank you.
My next set of questions are for Administrator Bridenstine.
Orbital debris, as we've talked about, is an increasing problem
that can potentially interfere with civil, military, and
commercial space operations. I'm wondering if you could tell us
a little bit about the efforts to update the U.S. Orbital
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. And how will the U.S.
work with the international community on adoption of standards
around debris mitigation?
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, ma'am. So, NASA is part of what we
call the Interagency Space Debris Coordination Committee. And
what this is--this is a--all the different space agencies in
the world that have the preponderance of assets in space. And
this group of space agencies has done modeling and made a
determination that the type of collision--I think it was you
that referenced it in your testimony, the Iridium-Cosmos
collision from 2009----
Senator Sinema. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine.--that type of collision is going to
happen, on average, every 5 to 9 years. And that's if launch
cadences stay the same. Launch cadences are not going to stay
the same. And every time we launch something into orbit, there
will--by default, there will be some level of debris created.
We, as an agency, work very hard on making sure we mitigate, as
much as possible, those debris-creating events, and then also,
ultimately, helping set the standard--as you identified, we set
a standard that then our commercial partners follow, and then
commercial industry-at-large follows those standards. And then,
eventually, those standards get accepted as norms of behavior
in the international community, and then our international
partners follow suit.
So, we have, as an agency, been leading on this for a very
long period of time. And we need to continue leading. We need
to make sure that, when we--you know, when we move forward on
all the activities--like I said, launch cadence is going to
stay the same. That's what the study said. If it stays the
same, we're going to have a collision every 5 to 9 years. It's
not going to stay the----
Senator Sinema. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine. We're talking about launching thousands
and thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit for low-
latency, high-throughput communications. In other words, we
need to get really good at debris mitigation. We also need to
get really good at situational awareness. We need more data,
and better data. We need that data to be shared, and we need
people to be able to respond to that information in realtime.
We need a single integrated space picture.
So, I will tell you, this is something we're--at NASA,
we're thinking about all the time. We're one agency of many
that deal with this. But, certainly, we are keenly aware of the
issue, and trying to do everything we can to mitigate it.
Senator Sinema. So, a follow-up question. It sounds like
NASA understands the increased risk, because, as more traffic
goes into space, then there'll be more debris.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Sinema. So, the mitigation work makes a lot of
sense. What, if anything, can be done about removal of debris
that exists already?
Mr. Bridenstine. So, that's the next order of challenge.
So, there's the mitigation, which preventing--preventing it
from happening. And then, ultimately--then there's the
situational awareness and traffic management piece. And then,
finally, there's the remediation, How do we remove----
Senator Sinema. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine.--orbital debris? So, in this case, the
Federal Communication Commission actually has authority to
write the rules for geostationary orbit. So, if a satellite
comes to the end of its useful life, they have requirements for
it to be supersynched; in other words, put into deep space for
storage. In other words, it's a dead satellite, we've got to
get it out of the way. In low-Earth orbit, there are other
agencies, in this case, that have jurisdiction, that say that
we have to de-orbit satellites in low-Earth orbit. So, those
are remediation capabilities. Then there's the challenge of the
debris that exists, and, How do we get that removed? So, what
NASA is doing right now is, we're investing in technologies;
namely, robotic servicing of satellites, robotic technologies,
rendezvous and proximity operations in order to, no kidding,
come in close proximity with other satellites and then
robotically service those satellites. So, we can actually
extend the life of a satellite so the satellite does not become
orbital debris. And maybe eventually, depending on resources,
we could actually grapple satellites and take dead objects out
of orbit altogether--larger objects. The challenge is, anything
that we're going to do in that capacity is going to be
something that we can see. We're talking about objects that are
larger than 10 centimeters.
Senator Sinema. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine. I will tell you, Ranking Member, I am not
worried about the objects we can see. I'm worried about--for
every object we can see, there are 10 to 100 objects that are
smaller than 10 centimeters in diameter, that ultimately are
traveling at 17,500 miles per hour, and every bit as dangerous
as an object that's----
Senator Sinema. Right.
Mr. Bridenstine.--10 centimeters. So, I'm more worried
about what we can't see. And that's why we have to increase the
network of sensors around the world. It's why we have to
improve the data that we receive, and how we process that data.
Senator Sinema. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to all of our witnesses today. And thank you,
Chairman, for holding this hearing. I yield back.
Senator Cruz. Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, to all of our witnesses. Fascinating topic,
and appreciate your insight.
I'm going to--I want to follow up a little bit on the space
debris. But, before I do that, Mr. Bridenstine, I wanted to ask
you a question. As you know, we're approaching the 50th
anniversary of humanity's giant leap and the Apollo landing,
something I know that you are particularly passionate about, as
well. And last week, we had Jeff Bezos unveil a new Moon
lander. There's numerous public and private missions that have
been planned for the lunar surface, as well. I know NASA has
issued guidance for the protection of the human heritage site
of the Apollo 11 landing. I'm working on legislation now to
codify that. But, I would like your thoughts. Would you support
enacting statutory protections to preserve and honor the Apollo
landing sites on the Moon?
Mr. Bridenstine. Senator, yes, sir. It needs to be
protected. There's going to come a day when we have humans
living and working on the Moon. And that will be a monument for
all of history. So----
Senator Peters. And----
Mr. Bridenstine.--yes, sir. I'd protect--I believe we
should be protecting it.
Senator Peters. Great. Well, I appreciate that. And then I
would assume you'll be working with some of your counterparts
with other countries that may be going to the Moon, as well, to
make sure that we all can agree that this is a human heritage
site that we should protect?
Mr. Bridenstine. I think there's broad agreement on that.
Senator Peters. Great.
The--back to the orbital debris, which is clearly a
significant problem, as all of you have articulated. I'd like
to hear the panel's thoughts on the Kessler Effect, which--I
believe it's a scenario where space junk crashes into
satellites, and then it creates even more debris, and then
there's, basically, an ever-continuing chain reaction that
eventually spins out of control. Some think we may be in a
slow-motion effect like that right now. Are you aware of, or
have any accurate estimates of, a probability of this kind of
chain reaction? And what are the estimates of it? Have any of
you done any work in that area? Because we may already be down
that path right now, but, as you mentioned, Mr. Bridenstine,
this'll--this is going to accelerate. It will likely be an
exponential acceleration and, with this kind of effect, be very
difficult to control.
Colonel Melroy. Senator, I'd just like to comment. I think
the technical issues that Administrator Bridenstine brought up
about objects less than 10 centimeters is really, really
important. DARPA did a study called Catcher's Mitt, which said
that the other thing that could be done is that there are some
few dozen very large objects--they're actually upper stages
that have been left in orbit, and they are the most massive
objects. And so, they have the greatest potential to create a
huge amount of debris. So, there are policy issues that we have
not discussed around third-party liability, the key one being,
if you go to grab a hold of a piece of debris and, oops,
something doesn't go well, more debris is generated.
Senator Peters. Right.
Colonel Melroy. There's a liability issue associated with
that. One of the opportunities, I think, that the U.S. has to
show leadership on this topic is to accept that the U.S. has
liability under the Outer Space Treaty, and go and clean up our
upper stages, or at least a handful of them. It would have a
huge impact on preventing something like the Kessler Syndrome.
The other comment that I would make about the Kessler
Syndrome is, our Earth is astounding in its ability to heal
itself. And eventually--if we follow debris mitigation
standards, eventually objects in low-Earth orbit will get
flushed in and reenter and burn up in the atmosphere, we think.
And so, there's the potential, if we are mitigating, if we
clean up the worst and the largest objects, that--there's hope
that the Kessler Syndrome won't come to pass.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Sir, I would say that the Kessler Syndrome
is something we think about, it's something that we need to
prevent from happening. We're not there yet. But, given the
amount of activity that we see coming with these massive
constellations of communication satellites launching into low-
Earth orbit, it's something we need to be very aware of, and we
need to do everything we can to prevent it from happening.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
One final question, Mr. Bridenstine. Clearly, investments
in space power our manufacturing, our aerospace industry, as
you've all highlighted, the importance of space exploration and
space commercial activities. Certainly why I've--a big
supporter of the SLS, the Orion Programs. But, while I support
these programs, I think it's also very important that NASA
focuses on its science budget and its important science
mission, which has always been a core part of NASA. And that's
why I'm concerned about the new directive to rapidly speed up
our mission to the Moon, as to what that can mean for the
overall science budget. So, Administrator, if you could just
assure us that NASA will not sacrifice the scientific
investments to fund these kinds of exploration activities, that
that still remains a core mission, and one that we're going to
continue to fully support.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, sir. And I can tell you, I'm very
proud of the fact--when the President and the Vice President
gave us direction, ``We need to accelerate the path to the
Moon,'' I made it very clear what works and what doesn't work,
because this has been tried before in history. The Space
Exploration Initiative, back in the 1990s, the Vision for Space
Exploration, in the early 2000s. In each case, the effort was
made to achieve the end state by cannibalizing one part of NASA
to feed another part of NASA. I made the case very strongly
that we should not be working toward this goal by cannibalizing
the Science Mission Directorate nor by cannibalizing the
International Space Station. And the $1.6 billion that we have
for now going to the Moon does not come from any part of NASA.
It comes from outside of NASA. It was the case that I made when
they said we wanted to accelerate, and we were successful in
achieving that.
Senator Peters. And how confident are you that $1.6 billion
is enough?
Mr. Bridenstine. So, it is enough for 2020. It gets us out
of the gate very strongly. It helps us, ultimately, continue
with SLS, which I know you're very keen on. It is also a
necessary piece to getting a lander. So, we are currently
building Gateway, which is in orbit around the Moon--which will
be in orbit around the Moon. We need to aggregate, at the
Gateway, a landing system. And this $1.6 billion, the majority
of it, goes toward procuring that landing system. A lot of that
money was to be spent in 2025, 2026, 2027, and 2028. We've now
moved that up so that, when we launch our first humans to the
Gateway in 2000--well, I should say, 2024, they will actually
have a lander already aggregated at the Gateway for--by which
our next man and first woman will have access to the surface of
the Moon.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cruz. All right. A few more questions.
Mr. Cardillo, a large part of the discussion surrounding
the creation of the Space Force is what role the intelligence
community should play, given its diverse equities. What is your
view on the role that the intelligence community should have in
the Space Force? And specifically, should NRO, NGA, and others
be included in the Space Force from the beginning?
Mr. Cardillo. So, first, to answer the role question, I
think it's quite analogous to the role we played in other
domains. We're statutory--I say ``we''--NGA is statutorily
responsible for providing safety of navigation, wherever it
occurs, whether that be land, sea, or air today. I would extend
that argument to the space domain. And we've actually worked
with the Air Force in the past about how that will happen, not
on a traffic management perspective, which has already been
discussed, but more about safe operations and secure
operations, because, besides debris, there are digital and
cyber activities, which also could pose a threat to our
operating environment.
To the second question about what should be in and what
should be out, I'm a big proponent of transferring knowledge,
experience, and expertise, but I don't believe transferring
agencies, such as NGA or NRO, now into an entity such as a
Space Force would make any more sense than it would have to
have taken the NGA that does maritime safety and transitioned
that to the Navy. I think you--I think the Nation gets--is well
served by the consolidation of that expertise that can be
applied across different domains. I would say the same things
about my former colleagues at the NRO, who have got a--60 years
of expertise with launching and operating satellites. And I
think that, too, can be transferred without moving the
organization itself.
Senator Cruz. All right. Let's talk--a different area--
let's talk about leadership. Last month, Ms. Chaplain, the
Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing at the Government
Accountability Office, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the Space Force proposal, stating, quote,
``It appears that there will be a number of space acquisition
activities outside the Space Force, including the Missile
Defense Agency, the NRO, and some military space service
activities, but, so far, it is uncertain what the overall
governance structure for space will be.'' If there are
conflicts in requirements, funding, or priorities between
agencies that are not in the Space Force, who resolves them and
makes a final decision? In your minds, Mr. Cardillo and General
Thompson, both, where should the interagency dialogues on
disputes and solutions live?
Mr. Cardillo. It's an excellent question. Whenever somebody
says it's an excellent question, it means it's a hard question.
But, let me enjoy my former government status now and just say
that--look, I am a big supporter of the reemergence and the
energy that has been put into the Space Council. Conversations
that occurred at lower levels in the past have now been
highlighted and elevated, and I think the Nation's better
served by that. I would offer that that could be an avenue to
answer your question about differences or equities that might
cross lines over where good, patriotic Americans from one
agency would disagree about the best path forward. That
response, by the way, has not been coordinated with the Space
Council, as to whether or not they would accept said
adjudication, but I guess I'm just saying I like the momentum
that we've got now. I think those conversations are elevated. I
think the adjudication of that answer, that--the complexity of
it, I think, should at least be originated there at the
Council. And how and where they designate it, you know, for
lead to do the adjudication, I think, is work to be done.
General Thompson. Senator, I agree with Mr. Cardillo in
many cases. One of the reasons this debate started, 2 or so
years ago, was because that there were so many organizations
who had some role in space. And I'll say, specifically,
national security space, although, as Administrator Bridenstine
said, there are many aspects to space. One of the arguments
was, there were far too many organizations and people involved
in national security space alone. In fact, at one point, I
believe, the comment was, there are 60 or so organizations. And
so, the conversation that started here in Congress, that was
taken up by the President, it's now made this a kitchen-table
conversation.
Since that began, we've actually created some more space
organizations. And so, in a sense, we're making that
coordination more complicated. I believe it's now time to start
consolidating some of those. And I believe, absolutely, the
Space Force is one of the ways that can bring some of those
disparate organizations that exist today, bring a focus, bring
an organizational structure on top, but so that that one
organization, at least when it comes to the national security
space organization, can carry the advocacy, can make the
decisions, and perform an integrating role with the rest of the
interagency, the way we do in many other ways today.
Senator Cruz. OK. Last set of questions is addressed to all
the witnesses.
Morgan Stanley reported, last November, that, quote, ``The
revenue generated by the global space industry may increase to
$1.1 trillion or more by 2040. The development of reusable
rockets, greater use of broadband technologies and orbits are a
couple of examples of the contributing factors to the potential
economic growth.'' The report goes on to say that a U.S. Space
Command could, quote, ``benefit aerospace companies'' and help,
quote, ``focus and accelerate investment in innovative
technologies and capabilities.'' In the judgment of the
witnesses on the panel, to what degree do you believe a strong
U.S. military presence in space will contribute to a thriving
economy in low-Earth orbit?
Mr. O'Connell. Senator? Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I'm firmly of the belief that a strong military presence
will very much encourage the growth that we've talked about
already in this hearing and in the Morgan Stanley projections
already. As we've looked at that, as I mentioned in my
testimony, we've looked at where the calculations are coming
from for those estimates, going forward. And the simple
breakdown of that is that, if I simply take the functions that
are being performed on Earth today, and extend them into the
population that doesn't have--the half of the population that
doesn't--for example, broadband communications, high-speed
communications, and Internet--you get to a trillion dollars
quickly. A modest 5-percent growth off the $400 billion economy
we see today, over the next 20 years, you get beyond the
trillion dollars. Where the additional calculations come from
have to do with the things that will go on in space and will
then affect both things on Earth and the exploration goals that
the Nation, rightly, has.
I will cut it another way for you, which is that we see the
functions that were traditionally commercial functions---remote
sensing, communications, weather--we see companies coming
forward in the market every single day at Commerce that are
going to disrupt those business models at the same time as
companies will come forward with new ideas that are going to
change the landscape of exploration, things that we do on the
Moon and Mars and beyond. And so, there are both of those
camps. Those can only benefit from a robust U.S. military
presence in space, similar to the naval examples that we've
talked about today.
Mr. Cardillo. I would just add a bit to what the
Administrator said earlier about your question about risk. I
firmly believe that the fundamentals of this American
experiment really haven't changed, that investors have to
quantify the amount of risk versus potential reward. To the
extent that entities such as Space Command or Space Force or
better traffic management or increased understanding and
awareness can reduce the first component, the second will rise.
We will get more investment. Our system works that way. And
that's why I, again, believe in the--putting the bet on us is
the right one to do. So, anything that reduces that
uncertainty, I think, will increase the opportunity for future
investment.
And let's face it, that has been our system for over 200
years, and I think it'll serve us well, going forward, as long
as we reduce unnecessary barriers and increase the--as I said,
that broad-based information to make those bets.
Senator Cruz. Well articulated.
Mr. Bridenstine. Chairman, I would double down on your
statement earlier today. You mentioned that you believe the
world's first trillionaire is going to be somebody who is
exploring space. That was a--actually the result of a study
done by Goldman Sachs. And they indicated that that would be
the case. So, the question is--we talk about rare Earth metals.
And what a lot of people don't realize is that rare Earth
metals are not Earth metals at all; they're from asteroid
impacts; in many cases, from billions of years ago. And it just
so happens that these asteroids in deep space have a tremendous
amount of very valuable metals in them. Right now, NASA is
doing a mission at an asteroid in deep space called Bennu. So,
we have entered orbit around this asteroid in deep space. And,
in fact, we're going to actually do, for the first time in the
history of the world, a return from Bennu with a sample. So,
this little robot is going to down, grab a sample from Bennu,
and bring it home. And there's a reason to do this. Number one,
we want to be able to characterize these asteroids in deep
space so that we can protect the Earth, quite frankly. The
evidence is in: the dinosaurs did not have a space program. We
do. So, we want to be able to characterize any kind of threat
that might be out there.
But, the other thing that's important is, we're going to be
able to get really good information about what these asteroids
are composed of. We have another mission that's going out to
the asteroid belt. And there's an object out there that is a
massive steel ball. And I have to--I don't want to say how big
it is, but it's a really big steel ball. If the NASA
Administrator gives a stat that's incorrect, I get corrected
immediately all over the world. So--but, this big steel ball is
potentially a planetary core from the past in the asteroid
belt, and people have suggested that it's worth--if you could
bring it back to Earth, it would be worth more than the GDP of
the United States of America because of all of the precious
metals that are there. So, we want to go characterize that
through the Psyche Mission that we're developing right now.
So, there are a lot of reasons that it's important to
protect space. There's a lot we don't yet know, and a lot that
we're researching, and I do believe that, when we make these
discoveries, there's going to be an entrepreneurial effort to
go forth and do amazing things, just like back when people came
to the New World.
Senator Cruz. So, the ship that you have at the deep space
asteroid, is it being piloted by Bruce Willis?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. If you think that will help, we'll do
it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cruz. Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
this important hearing.
And, you know, when I hear these expectations and
opportunities in space, obviously I think of the companies in
our state, SpaceX and Blue Origin and--now, I don't know if
it's fair to say trillionaires, when these guys are already
billionaires, but hopefully it'll be a more impacting event
with many, many different products and avenues for people to
pursue.
I wanted to ask you, Mr. Bridenstine, about weather
forecasting and 5G and the degradation that some spectrum sales
could have on our weather forecasting. I think I heard that you
had some similar concerns, maybe in front of another committee,
but my colleague Senator Wyden and I have sent a letter to the
head of the FCC asking for them to make sure that we're not
impacting what would be the 24 gigahertz band that would impact
that vital information. So, do you think that it is possible to
give us, basically, by which band we're talking about and
access to impact our weather forecasting?
Mr. Bridenstine. It's a--I think an important question. I
would answer it this way. The 24 gigahertz band is critically
important for our ability to characterize the amount of water
vapor in the atmosphere. NASA is sensing the Earth in every
part of the electromagnetic spectrum all the time. 24 gigahertz
gives us the opportunity to characterize the amount--the
quantity and the energy state of the water vapor in the
atmosphere. And that, ultimately, is what helps us make
determinations as far as weather prediction.
Now, NASA does not do weather prediction. We build
satellites for NOAA, in the Commerce Department, so that they
can do the operational weather prediction. But, there is a risk
that, if we do not have access to that spectrum, that our
weather forecasting could be degraded. We are working right now
with the FCC to kind of work through a solution. And that is
underway right now. But, this is of concern to us and
certainly----
Senator Cantwell. What kind of degradation? Are you talking
about in time and information?
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. So, we talk about weather forecasts
in terms of a 7-day weather forecast. So, if, instead of
getting all of the data we are currently getting, if it
degrades to a certain percentage--the less data we're able to
glean from that part of the spectrum, the more degraded our
weather forecasts get. So, if we lose--and I don't know what
the specific numbers are, but if we lose, say, 50 percent of
the data, then maybe instead of 7-day weather forecasts, we
would get a 3- or 4-day weather forecast. So, these are the
kind of impacts that we're trying to work through and
understand and work with the FCC in order to mitigate what
those impacts would be through this spectrum----
Senator Cantwell. Well, the reason why I'm bringing this
up, Mr. Chairman, is, it does have a connection to our very
subject this morning. How do you do space launch if you don't
know weather forecasting?
Mr. Bridenstine. No, that's--we agree. I'll let the
Department of Commerce talk about this.
Mr. O'Connell. Sure. Thank you.
The--we would echo, entirely, the comments made by the
Administrator here, concerns about a deep reduction in quality
of our Earth observation--Earth observations for weather
prediction and things like that. And so, whenever we have these
spectrum auctions of any kind, we really need to be very
careful. At times, I worry that we think that there is a one-
to-one comparison for the impacts in the terrestrial world as
there are in space. And, in fact, they're not. I mean, when
you're working in space, you have a slightly different
scientific buffer that you need. And when you're going to beam
back capabilities from 4 billion miles away, I don't have the
ability to chop up that spectrum in as small a chunk as you
would, typically, on the ground. And so, wherever these
spectrum decisions are being made, we have to be very sensitive
to the impacts on the space community and then, Senator, as you
suggest, its impacts on things we're going to do in space from
Earth.
Senator Cantwell. Well, the reason why my colleague from
the Northwest, Senator Wyden, and I sent this letter is
because, I can tell you, people of the Pacific Northwest know
what storms are all about. And we know what hot, dry seasons
are doing to us as it relates to fire. And so, we need the
weather forecasting, and we need it in advance. We don't need
it 3 days out, 2 days out. We need it to know where and how to
get the resources to the location. So, we're very concerned,
and we hope the FCC will stop their process until they can
assure us that this weather forecasting information is going to
be available, because of the impacts of weather on our
communities and safety. But, we also see, just in this panel
and discussion, how much--in the previous hearing we had last
week, the advent of how many launches we're talking about now
with various capabilities, that we need to be able to plan
those launches----
Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
Senator Cantwell.--and to plan those launches in launch
windows that get delicate on their own right. Right? There's
complexities to those launches. They need to know what their
weather windows are going to be.
Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
Senator Cantwell. So, it seems to me that, whatever the FCC
is doing over there, it's not paying enough attention to this
very important issue as it relates to both the safety and
security of our citizens and having good weather forecasting
data. And we're working very hard on this, because--we've
always worked hard on this, because we've had some shadow
issues with Doppler systems and things that have prevented us
either--we had two back-to-back 100-year floods that we lost
life, and it--and after that, NOAA decided, ``Yes, you need a
Doppler system for the coast, because you're not getting
accurate information.'' And then we've had impact and loss of
life of firefighters because they were sent out when we didn't
fully understand wind conditions that were clearly seen in
Seattle, but not seen in the central part of the State--again,
because they didn't have the kind of visibility. So, we're
for--particularly now that every particle in a storm can be an
algorithm, we are all for having that data and information, and
calculating it to make us better prepared. And I certainly
would want it for our space missions, as well. I would want
them to have the certainty and assurance that we're going to be
able to understand the launch windows and not wreak havoc with
everybody related to the launch, not just in the space
industry, but commercial travel and everything else that goes
with that, because we don't have a picture of what the weather
conditions are because we sold the spectrum all to somebody
else. So, I hope that we can clear this up and get an answer
from Ajit Pai in the FCC.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, if would be all right if I could
just comment, because we think what you're saying is very
important, and we want to make sure that we're doing the right
thing by our country.
A couple of things. When we talk about the--where NASA and
NOAA--where we play is in that 23.6 gigahertz spectrum. The
auction, of course, is 24 gigahertz. So, it's not the exact
spectrum where we operate. That 23.6 gigahertz is not
determined--it's not like we can go to a different part of the
spectrum. It's set by physics. We are sensing, passively, the
energy state of water molecules in the atmosphere. Now, that is
set by physics. We can't just go to a different part of the
spectrum.
Now, here's the thing. In that 24 gigahertz spectrum that
is auctioned, I think it's important to note that, if the
decibel level is low enough, then it won't bleed into that 23.6
gigahertz where we are operating and sensing the Earth for
weather forecasting and Earth Science and climate.
So, I think there could be an elegant solution here. And
certainly, we are paying very close attention to it. But, the
decibel level is what--is really what matters here. And if that
decibel level is too high, then it will impact us. If it's not
too high, it won't impact----
Senator Cantwell. Well, interference are always the issues
in spectrum. Always. And so, I just think it's too important--
all of these things are too important for the public and
commerce and everything else, the applications that all this is
going to allow to get this right. So, I hope that we can get it
right.
Thank you----
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes----
Senator Cantwell.--Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bridenstine.--ma'am.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. And, Administrator Bridenstine, you testified
about physics, a minute ago. I was told there would be no math
at this hearing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cruz. So, I want to thank each of the witnesses for
your very helpful and learned testimony. I think this was a
productive hearing. And I appreciate the time and energy you
put into the testimony.
The hearing record will remain open for two weeks. During
this time, Senators are asked to submit any questions for the
record. And, upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to
submit your written answers to the Subcommittee as soon as
possible.
And, with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito
to Hon. James F. Bridenstine
Question 1. Orbital debris has become an increasingly challenging
and potentially dangerous obstacles for satellites. With years of space
activity and recent events, thousands of small pieces of debris has
increased the risk of impacts to the International Space Station (ISS)
by an estimated 44 percent over a 10-day period. Administrator
Bridenstine, we have talked about this before and most recently in
March, but I would like to revisit with you and ask the other panelists
about the potential of robotic satellite serving offers in this space.
Can this capability be a tool in our efforts to combat space
debris? I am proud of the work being done in West Virginia in this
field--on projects such as RESTORE-L--and feel this capability can be a
solution.
Answer. Restore-L technologies include an autonomous relative
navigation system with supporting avionics, and dexterous robotic arms
and software. The suite is completed by a tool drive that supports a
collection of sophisticated robotic tools for robotic spacecraft
refueling, and a propellant transfer system that delivers measured
amounts of fuel at the proper temperature, rate, and pressure.
The autonomous relative navigation system is potentially applicable
to orbital debris remediation should there be a need to navigate to and
approach debris. While the dexterous robotic arms could potentially be
applied for active debris removal, the size of the debris would be a
limiting factor to its applicability as well as the orientation/
tumbling nature of the debris.
Question 2. It is clear that China has significant ambitions over
the next 10 to 15 years to develop the capabilities in order to conduct
manned lunar missions and set the stage for a new age in space
exploration.
You state in your testimony that you expect NASA to meet its
deadline of 2024 for NASA's next mission to the Moon (aka Artemis).
Could you elaborate on some of the initiatives NASA is undertaking to
meet the accelerated deadline?
Answer. On March 26, 2019, the Vice President announced at a
meeting of the National Space Council in Huntsville, Alabama, that, at
the direction of the President of the United States, it is the stated
policy of the United States of America to return American astronauts to
the Moon within five years and that, when the first American astronauts
return to the lunar surface, they will take their first steps on the
Moon's South Pole. On May 13, 2019, NASA submitted a revised FY 2020
budget to Congress that would provide a ``down payment'' of $1.6B to
achieve this aim. Our goal is to leverage and build upon our existing
work and plans to achieve these new goals.
Schedule performance by the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion are
critical to achieving a human return to the Moon by 2024 with Artemis
3. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD)
completed an assessment of alternate approaches for hardware processing
and facilities utilization for key components, with the goal of
maintaining an early as possible date for the launch of the uncrewed
Artemis 1 mission. The NASA Office of the Chief Financial Officer
performed a schedule risk assessment of the Artemis 1 launch date,
including the integrated schedule and associated risk factors ahead of
Artemis 1. NASA leadership is currently evaluating these results as
they consider a new launch date.
The Agency is also focusing on completing a minimum-capability
version of the lunar Gateway to support the lunar landing of Artemis 3.
In this approach, we would begin with the Gateway's Power and
Propulsion Element (awarded to Maxar Technologies on May 23, 2019) and
a basic habitation capability, which would support the 2024 mission.
For missions to the lunar surface, the current plan is for
astronauts to employ a transfer vehicle to travel from the Gateway to
low lunar orbit, a descent vehicle to land on the surface of the Moon,
and an ascent vehicle to return to the Gateway. The vehicles will be
developed by the private sector and procured by NASA. NASA is moving
rapidly to support development of these critical pieces of the
exploration architecture.
On February 7, 2019, NASA released a solicitation under Appendix E
of the second Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships
(NextSTEP-2) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) to seek proposals from
industry in support of design analysis, technology maturation, system
development and integration, and spaceflight demonstrations for a human
lunar landing system. Proposals were received March 25, 2019 and
selections were announced on May 16, 2019. The 11 companies selected
will conduct studies and undertake preliminary design and development
work of prototype components and sub-systems of human lander
capabilities for the Artemis lunar exploration program over the next
six months. Appendix E is a six-month risk reduction effort including
studies and prototype development.
Following the March 26 announcement by Vice President Pence that
charged NASA to send humans to the lunar South Pole by 2024, NASA
assessed options to expedite the work. Appendix E will continue and
will be used to guide NASA's Human Lander System (HLS) requirements,
formulation and planning. The HLS capability development and crewed
flight demonstration will be competed under a new, full and open
solicitation, NextSTEP Appendix H, Integrated Human Landing System. The
updated Appendix H pre-solicitation notice was released on April 26,
2019 and signals the Agency's intent, by summer 2019, to seek proposals
from industry in support of rapid development and demonstration of
integrated human lunar landing systems, including elements such as a
descent element, ascent element, and transfer vehicle. NASA will seek
proposals from U.S. industry for the development, integration, and
crewed demonstration of these elements as a functional human landing
system that can fulfill NASA and industry requirements, and meet the
challenge to send the next man, and the first woman, to the Moon by
2024.
All of NASA's technical efforts to meet the Artemis 3 deadline of
2024 are dependent upon the Agency receiving the necessary resources in
a timely manner. NASA appreciates Congress' consistent support for its
exploration efforts, and is ready to provide the information Congress
requires for its consideration of this bold new initiative.
Question 3. The ISS can bring down the cost and risk for missions
to the Moon and Mars, giving us a head start. With renewed interest in
lunar missions, what technological developments can we do on the ISS
that we can use to go back to the moon?
Answer. In order to prepare for human expeditions into deep space,
the Agency must first conduct breakthrough research and test the
advanced technology necessary to keep crews safe and productive on
long-duration space exploration missions. NASA plans to continue to use
the International Space Station (ISS) as a testbed to fill critical
gaps in technologies that will be needed for long-duration deep space
missions. For example, elements of the ISS life support and other
habitation systems (e.g., oxygen generation and carbon dioxide removal
systems) will be evolved into the systems that will be used for deep
space exploration missions and undergo long-duration testing. It is
NASA's plan to first develop and demonstrate many critical technology
capabilities using LEO platforms prior to deploying these capabilities
beyond LEO. This approach is much more cost-effective and faster than
conducting this research in cislunar space because of the risks
inherent in operating so far from the Earth.
NASA is also developing a flexible spacesuit architecture with
common core subsystems that can be modified to support the needs of
specific destinations from LEO to the lunar surface. The Agency plans
to conduct a suit demonstration utilizing the new spacesuit
architecture optimized for LEO on ISS to validate the performance of
the exploration Portable Life Support System (PLSS). The Agency is
currently assessing plans to ensure continued support of both the ISS
EVA requirements and the distinct requirements associated with a lunar
surface suit. NASA intends to demonstrate the core spacesuit
technologies and subsystems applicable to both ISS-based operations and
surface exploration through a series of subsystem demonstrations at ISS
beginning in 2019 and culminating in delivery of a complete suit system
in 2023 for an on-orbit demonstration at ISS prior to the 2024 mission.
Additionally, ISS is necessary to support space biomedical research
to mitigate 22 human health and performance risks identified by NASA's
Human Research Program to enable safe long-duration ISS missions and
future deep space missions. The ISS biomedical research is expanding
our capabilities to protect the health and safety of astronauts and
include investigations on deep space habitat standards and systems,
behavioral health countermeasures, innovative medical technologies for
exploration, countermeasures for crew visual changes, space radiation
protection, advanced food and pharmaceutical systems, and validation of
physiological countermeasures to ensure crew health during extended
one-year ISS missions and all phases of future exploration missions.
Question 4. The ISS--and any commercial space station--will be able
to serve as a second staging grounds for testing mechanical equipment
for further space travel. If such a transition were to take place--from
the ISS to a commercial entity or entities--how could we get around
this bottleneck from ground to space flight?
Answer. NASA does not anticipate a bottleneck in LEO as commercial
opportunities are opened up and realized. The Agency is creating new
opportunities for collaboration with industry on the ISS and developing
public-private partnerships for exploration systems that will extend
human presence into the solar system. As detailed in the 2018 ISS
Transition Report,\1\ one of the criteria for transitioning away from
ISS to a commercial platform or platforms will be the availability and
capability of these platforms to meet NASA's LEO requirements. These
partnerships will further accelerate the transition of human
spaceflight operations in LEO to commercial partners for NASA and non-
NASA needs. To support this transition, the ISS will focus near-term
activities on supporting commercial industry as well as meeting
government requirements, such as exploration research and development,
in LEO. In parallel, NASA is creating a focused effort aimed at long-
term American operations in LEO independent of the ISS through
collaboration with commercial partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Space Station Transition Report, March 30, 2018,
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
iss_transition_report_180330.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA will have significant requirements for access to LEO in the
foreseeable future. These include continued microgravity research as
well as accommodations for U.S. crewmembers for training, procedure
validation, and proficiency purposes. It is essential that there not be
a gap in access to LEO, which is why the Administration's policy is to
maintain continuous access to LEO throughout the transition of NASA's
funding for its LEO requirements, whether this means transitioning the
operations of the ISS to private industry through public-private
partnership, augmenting the ISS with privately developed modules,
combining portions of the ISS with a new private platform, or beginning
anew with a free-flying platform.
Question 5. In addition, what should Congress keep in mind in order
to spur competition in LEO (low earth orbit)?
Answer. On June 7, 2019, NASA released a number of documents
designed to encourage the development of a robust LEO economy,
including a policy on the commercial use of ISS, a revised forecast of
the Agency's needs in LEO, and a larger strategy for the
commercialization of LEO. These and other documents that may be of
interest to Congress can be accessed at the newly established web page
below.
https://www.nasa.gov/leo-economy/welcome-to-low-earth-orbit-economy
[all]