[Senate Hearing 116-588]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-588
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-680 WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 17, 2020.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 4
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 16
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 17
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 19
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 20
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 21
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 23
Letter dated October 24, 2019 to Stephen M. Dickson from Hon.
Richared Blumenthal........................................ 25
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 25
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 27
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 28
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 29
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 31
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 34
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 36
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 37
Statement of Senator Sinema...................................... 39
Witnesses
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Michael Stumo, Father of Samya Rose Stumo, Victim of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight ET302.......................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Appendix
Letter dated June 5, 2020 from Curtis Ewbank..................... 57
Letter dated June 5, 2020 from Zipporah Kuria, daughter of Joseph
Kuria Waithaka--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302........ 60
Letter dated June 10, 2020 from Tom Kabau, on behalf of family of
George Kabau--victim, Ethiopian Flight ET 302.................. 61
Letter dated June 11, 2020 from K. Jade Ballard, family of Micah
John Messent--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302............ 63
Letter dated June 16, 2020 from Virginie Fricaudet, sister of
Xavier Fricaudet, victim--Ethiopian Flight ET302............... 65
Letter dated June 16, 2020 from Nancy MacPherson, MD, Cottage
Medical Clinic, partner of Matt Messent's brother Micah
Messent--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302)................ 66
Letter from Catherine Berthet, Cesar Blavet and Njaka
Ralairivelo, mother, brother and fiance of Camille Geoffrey--
victim Ethiopian Flight ET302)................................. 68
Letter dated June 15, 2020 from Matthieu Willm, brother of
Clemence-Isuare Boutant-Willm--victim, Ethiopian Flight ET302.. 70
Letter dated June 29, 2020 from Ivy Macharia, daughter of Juliah
Mwashi; J.M., minor daughter of Juliah Mwashi; Florah Mwashi,
sister of Juliah Mwashi and David Mwashi, brother of Juliah
Mwashi--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302................ 72
Javier de Luis, prepared statement............................... 73
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Stephen M.
Dickson by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 74
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 76
Hon. Mike Lee................................................ 79
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 80
Hon. Tammy Baldwin........................................... 82
Hon. Jon Tester.............................................. 83
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 84
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger Wicker,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Thune, Blunt, Cruz,
Fischer, Moran, Sullivan, Young, Scott, Cantwell, Klobuchar,
Blumenthal, Schatz, Markey, Udall, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth,
and Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
The Chairman. Good morning. Today, the Committee convenes
for a hearing on the Federal Aviation Administration's
Oversight of Aircraft Certification. I welcome our witnesses,
FAA Administrator Stephen Dickson and Michael Stumo, father of
Samya Rose Stumo who tragically died on Ethiopian Airlines
flight 302, and thank them for participating. March 10 marked
the 1-year anniversary of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines
flight 302, which was preceded by the loss of Lion Air flight
610. The aircraft involved in both accidents was the Boeing 737
MAX. Our deepest sympathies continue to go out to the families
of those loved ones who are among the 346 souls lost in these
crashes.
Since the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the Committee has heard
from many whistleblowers at the FAA, at Boeing, and in the
aviation industry. It is increasingly clear from our
investigation that the FAA has a number of serious problems to
address. My investigations staff has interviewed dozens of
witnesses, reviewed many thousands of documents and e-mails,
and been diligent in pursuit of these facts, no matter where
they lead. However, I must express my profound frustration with
the agency's lack of responsiveness to most of my requests,
dating back to last April, for documents that stem from
whistleblower disclosures.
On April 2, 2019, I sent then Acting Administrator Daniel
Elwell a letter requesting information about training and
certification of the FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors. Following
the FAA's responses to my initial request, I sent a follow up
letter on July 31, 2019, to Acting Administrator Elwell
requesting additional information on 65 specific items. These
65 specific items included such serious matters as allegations
of whistleblower retaliation by senior FAA managers. Nearly one
year later, we have received complete responses for about 10
percent of those items and partial responses for another 30
percent. We have not received any response to over half of
these requests.
Given the subject matter of today's hearing, 12--I would
note that 12 of the requests that FAA has not responded to
pertain directly to the 737 MAX certification, directly to
today's subject matter. On August 1, 2019, committee staff
asked the Department of Transportation, DOT, counsel to
identify which item of the requests each production was
responsive to, and whether the production represented a
complete response.
This request has been reiterated several times but has not
been consistently followed by DOT. The committee has made every
effort to aid in document production. Back in September 2019,
the Committee staff sent the FAA a prioritized list of 10 of
the most significant requests, 10. Two of these 10 items were
emphasized again on December 18, 2019. Over the course of 9
months, we have received completed responses to 2 prioritized
requests, partial responses to 6, and no response at all to 2
of the top 10 items. In one case, staff requested e-mails
between two FAA employees during a short period of time. The
agency provided a response but it did not include a specific e-
mail we were pursuing. Additional narrowing to a specific date
by staff was required to produce the specific e-mail sought.
The FAA has still not produced the additional e-mails
between these employees that I requested on July 31, 2019.
Today is June 17. We have not received any documents since
April 27 of this year. The lack of timely and complete
responses to our document requests forced the Committee staff
to seek FAA staff interviews beginning in October 2019. The DOT
response and handling of the interview requests has been very
slow.
In 7 months, our investigations team has been able to
interview only four FAA staff members of the 21 we have
requested to interview. And then came the virus. Recognizing
the COVID-19 impact, on April 6, 2020, committee staff
requested to move forward with brief written interrogatories of
multiple FAA employees to expedite gathering relevant
information with minimal impact on involved parties. DOT staff
did not provide a definitive answer on the feasibility of
written interrogatories until April 30, almost a month later,
when they stated that in-person or virtual interviews were
preferred. On May 5, as a result of DOT rejecting the
interrogatory approach, the Committee staff requested to
interview the next FAA employee.
On May 11, DOT staff stated that they were working to make
the next interviewee available--that was May 5. As of today,
June 17, 2020, committee staff have not heard back on when this
interview can take place. Administrator Dickson, in our
telephone conversation last Thursday, I raised a number of
these matters and spoke of our entire frustration generally.
You promised me that your team would work with my staff quickly
to get back on track. I am extremely disappointed that we have
not made significant progress since that phone call.
My staff followed up immediately after our call to set up a
meeting with the staff member you identified. That request was
acknowledged, but no attempt was made to set up the meeting.
Last Friday evening, my staff reiterated our meeting request
and provided a comprehensive list of all outstanding document
and interview requests. My team asked to schedule a call on
Monday, which was denied, but your team offered to meet this
Thursday, tomorrow, one day after this hearing. The entire
purpose, or the large purpose, of the meeting was to get
answers before this hearing, not wait until after its
conclusion. It is my understanding that our teams did speak
last night after my staff insisted on the timely nature of the
call, but no progress was made on resolving the multitude of
outstanding issues.
This record of delay and non-responsiveness clearly shows
at best an unwillingness to cooperate in Congressional
oversight. It is hard not to conclude your team at the FAA has
deliberately attempted to keep us in the dark, and by that I
mean our investigations staff, our committee, and me. It is
hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire
process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA.
Administrator Dickson, I hold you responsible for this as
the head of the agency. During your confirmation hearing, I
asked you this question as we ask all nominees, ``If confirmed,
will you pledge to work collaboratively with this committee and
provide thorough and timely responses?'' You answered, yes, as
we require all nominees to do. The lack of cooperation by your
agency calls into question the commitment behind that pledge.
We are not embarking on a fishing expedition. Our requests for
documents and interviews have been very specific in content and
reasonable in scope.
I can only assume that the agency's stonewalling of my
investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be
revealed. I expect to receive an explanation today at this
hearing for the failure to comply with the Committee's
requests. As I mentioned, part of the Committee's investigation
involves the 737 MAX. Following the Ethiopian Airlines crash,
the FAA grounded the fleet of 737 MAX airplanes.
Over a year later, the plane has still not been cleared to
return to passenger service. The FAA, Boeing, and international
regulators involved in the recertification process should take
whatever time is needed to get the recertification right. As
the recertification continues, a number of reviews, including
this committee's investigation, have raised concerns about how
the MAX was designed and certified, how pilots were trained,
and the nature of the relationship between the FAA and Boeing.
The FAA needs to hold accountable anyone at the agency or at
Boeing who broke the rules or fell short of meeting
expectations.
Last October, this committee was the first on Capitol Hill
to convene an oversight hearing with Boeing leadership. Today,
we will hear from Administrator Dickson on what happened during
the original certification process, the steps that the agency
is taking to return the MAX to safe flight, and how the agency
can help prevent future tragedies. The MAX recertification is a
critical component of rebuilding public and international trust
in the FAA. Before the MAX crashes, the FAA was the
unquestioned gold standard with regard to aviation safety.
Congress has an important role to play in helping restore the
confidence in the agency.
As a result of the Committee's investigations, and findings
from the National Transportation Safety Board, from the Joint
Authorities Technical Review, and from the Department of
Transportation, Ranking Member Cantwell and I have worked hard
together and have introduced legislation, the Aircraft Safety
and Certification Reform Act, to improve aviation safety. Our
legislation creates a new requirement for manufacturers to
prioritize safety, it reforms the Organization Designation
Authorization or ODA system, creates a new emphasis on
understanding how pilots interact with modern aircraft and
other human factors, enhances protection for whistleblowers,
and bolsters Congressional oversight.
This Monday, a day before yesterday, the Ranking Member's
staff requested that Mr. Stumo be allowed to testify. In spite
of the lateness of this request, we were able to accommodate
such a request by adding a second panel for Mr. Stumo. I look
forward to a detailed discussion of the FAA's aircraft
certification process and how it can be improved so that these
tragedies do not happen.
I also expect an explanation of the agency's unwillingness
to respond to this Committee's requests for information. I now
recognize my friend and colleague and Ranking Member, Senator
Cantwell, for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, and thank you
for your statement. I want to say that as Ranking Member on our
side of the aisle, we stand with you for any information
requests and efforts to get the FAA to comply with what the
majority has been requesting, so thank you for that statement.
I want to take a moment to recognize the families who have lost
loved ones in the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air tragedies. I
can't imagine the loss of life and the pain that you are still
feeling. I appreciate your vigilance, just as I have
appreciated the vigilance of the Colgan Air families who often
attend our hearings and comment of safety measures before the
Committee.
It can't be easy to continue that role, but we thank you
for doing it. All of the voices in these efforts to make our
skies safer are important. I also look forward to hearing the
testimony of Michael Stumo. We have to get this right, for his
daughter and the 346 victims of those crashes. Today's
discussion is about leadership, about restoring America's
leadership in aviation safety. Safety is job one. It is job one
in a critical sector that employs 2.5 million people, 150,000
in the State of Washington, but safety is job one because it
involves so many lives.
The leadership task begins with the FAA, and you,
Administrator Dickson. We look forward to hearing how your
efforts to build the FAA's oversight and capacity to improve
safety in response to these two accidents have been undertaken.
There have been numerous reports issued since the accidents,
and unfortunately, the FAA response to a number of those
investigations concerning the MAX seem more a rigid acceptance
of the status quo than the needed changes that we want to see
at the FAA. No matter what the structure of the FAA, it must be
clear that it is an independent agency with oversight of
certification. We need to have the best work force, which I
believe we do in the Northwest, but we must have experts and
investigators that are qualified and technically trained at the
FAA to oversee, in a sufficient manner, the compliance process.
Now, there is a lot of discussion about Wall Street and the
approach to aviation of value engineering. I am going to tell
you something about the Northwest. The pride of the Northwest
is about innovation and solid engineering, and solid
engineering advancements. It is not about doing things on the
quick, it is about doing things deliberately and getting safety
right. And I want to see a certification process where we are
listening to those engineers at the beginning of the process,
who are calling out some of these safety issues.
The FAA management needs to be willing to back up those
engineers on the ground who are calling out safety concerns at
the earliest phases of the process, not at the end, and
certainly not after certification. The FAA's system of
delegation dates back to 1958--actually it can be traced back
to 1927 when private doctors were used to conduct pilot health
checks in the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce.
However, it was the FAA's own action taking authority in the
delegation of manufacturers for technical approvals that
started in 2005 under the ODA system. Under this program, the
industry engineers were acting on behalf of the FAA. These
lines of oversight and communication were fragmented.
I believe, and I think the Chairman believes as well, we
need a system of certification where hardworking engineers, and
engineering safety, is driving the certification process, not
the other way around. We can't have planes certified, and then
after the certification, have them grounded because of unsafe
features. A technical review by the international safety
authorities, Joint Authority Technical Review, JATR, identified
a number of problems with the ODA program and FAA oversight.
Specifically, the need for a more holistic review and the fact
that engineering expertise needed to have open communication
systems and the technology level--the technical expertise level
of those engineers needed to be there.
So Mr. Dickson, today I hope that we will hear about what
the FAA believes needs to be reformed in this program. What
reforms, of those suggested by Chairman Wicker and myself, do
you support. I want to thank Chairman Wicker and his team, and
my team, for working so collaboratively with us and their hard
work in introducing this legislation that the Chairman just
mentioned. I believe it does fundamentally change the way the
FAA oversees the certification of large commercial aircrafts.
Specifically, our bill, the Aircraft Safety and Certification
Reform Act of 2020, will revamp the ODA and make sure that the
FAA stays in the driver's seat of certification. Under our
bill, the FAA will once again be responsible for directly
appointing and approving the engineers who are tasked with
carrying out the certification on behalf of the Administrator.
In addition, the FAA will assign safety advisors to closely
monitor the performance of these designees, and we also create
a new whistleblower protection to fortify the channels of
communication and reporting safety. Critically, our bill will
end any semblance of self-certification by repealing sections
that would give the FAA additional authority for delegation
under specific provisions. Our bill also requires
implementation of the NTSB recommendations on safety automation
and pilot response, as well as safety management systems for
aircraft manufacturers. I believe these new standards would
address the issues of multiple flight alerts, and the need for
pilot training.
So I want to thank Senator Duckworth for her work with me
on this legislation, the Aviation Automation and Human Factors
Safety Act. The FAA must keep pace with the skills, and have
the technical capacity to handle an increasingly complex
aircraft technology. Automation has certainly helped safety,
but the amount of automation and uncontrolled commands and
alerts can be confusing, particularly when you only have
seconds to respond. So understanding the interactions between
human, technology, and operation environment is becoming more
critical to safety in aviation.
That is why the bill with Chairman Wicker also establishes
a Center of Excellence for flight automation and human factors
and creates an office, the FAA office of continuing education
and training, to make sure that those inspectors maintain and
keep the expertise necessary to do the oversight that is
required by the FAA. We also need science and technical
advisors to address these developing new technologies.
With technology changing, building skills is important, and
I want to thank Senator Moran for introducing the Foreign Civil
Aviation Authority Assistance and Capacity-Building Act, which
will increase global pilot standards and FAA's bilateral to
improve pilot training. The United States needs to be loud and
clear that we want to see strong airmanship. That is to say, a
pilot needs to be able to fly the plane without the automation.
And I hope that we, and you, will help lead that effort on an
international basis. We also need a strong aviation workforce
for the future, and that is why I have partnered with Senator
Blunt with The National Air Grant Fellowship Program Act of
2020, which would create an aerospace policy fellowship, and
leader for the future act.
It is clear the race for aviation around the globe is on.
But we cannot have that race for competition drive us away from
a solid safety and certification regime. The solution to that
competition, I believe, is to hire and retain the best safety
experts that we can find. So I look forward to hearing the ways
in which you believe the FAA needs to improve the process.
Again, I want to thank Chairman Wicker for his leadership
on the bill that we just introduced, and thank him for his
focus on this issue. We do need to hold manufacturers
accountable for compliance and safety standards through the
process. I look forward to continuing to work with him on that.
We need to have certain design features that we know are
compliant with the airworthiness standard. No one wants to see
a process where, at the end of the process, it is not clear
that the data indicates actual compliance. I will have many
questions about this.
So Mr. Dickson, today we are looking forward to the
leadership that you will provide in addressing these issues.
Safety has to be paramount, and the FAA has to be independent.
So thank you for being here, and I look forward to hearing from
both our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Administrator
Dickson, I am sure you will want to respond to many of the
statements made in my opening statement, but specifically just
to reiterate, my investigative staff began this effort on July
31 of last year. And as I pointed out, we have received no
response to over half of the items requested. Even after we
narrowed down the scope of our requests significantly, there
has been a lack of cooperation. So please explain to the
Committee your position in this regard and then we will have
follow-up questions also, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Dickson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Cantwell, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting
me here----
The Chairman. Sir, you have an opening statement and feel
free to summarize that in 5 minutes also. I neglected that step
so----
Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Please proceed.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for inviting me here today to speak
with you about the FAA's oversight of aircraft certification
and to provide you with an update on the 737 MAX. But first I
want to assure the families of those who lost their lives in
the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air accidents that you and your
loved ones are foremost in our thoughts.
I think of you every day, and it is good to see Michael and
Nadia and the other family members with us this morning. The
lessons learned from these accidents will lead to increased
safety worldwide. Our pledge is not only in words, but in the
implementation of tangible and lasting improvements that will
result, in part, from the observations and recommendations we
have received from many review bodies including this committee.
Now before I turn to the focus of the hearing, I would like
to take a moment to address some of the challenges the aviation
industry has faced during the ongoing public health emergency.
Aviation employees have worked diligently these past months,
despite the risk to themselves, to safely transport passengers
and much needed supplies.
Now the traveler demand is beginning to return, the FAA
fully supports and strongly encourages the industry's adoption
of precautions to protect employee and passenger health. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as
international public health agencies advised that face
coverings are especially important in situations where social
distancing is not feasible. Secretary Chao and the Department
of Transportation have been clear that air passengers should
wear face coverings to protect themselves and those around
them, and that we expect the traveling public to follow aircrew
directions and Airline public health policies.
As we move through the phases of reopening, we will
continue to apply our aviation expertise to help lead efforts
with other Federal agencies industry and our international
partners to address public health risk in the air
transportation system. Now with respect to aircraft
certification and our evaluation of the 737 MAX for return to
service, the FAA continues to follow a thorough process guided
by a data-driven, methodical review of Boeing's proposed
modifications.
In the U.S., our return to service decision will rest
solely on the FAA's analysis of Boeing's work in these areas.
At the same time, we will continue to provide assistance and
work closely with our international counterparts as they make
their own evaluations. Ultimately when the aircraft resumes
passenger flights, it will be because safety issues have been
addressed and because pilots around the world have received the
training that they need to safely operate the aircraft.
Before that happens, the FAA must conduct a certification
flight test and complete a pilot training assessment by the
Joint Operations Evaluation Board or JOEB, which includes the
FAA as well as our international partners and lined pilots from
U.S. and foreign air carriers. Once that assessment is
complete, the FAA's Boeing 737 Flight Standardization Board
will issue a public report addressing the JOEB's findings.
Additionally, the FAA and the Multi-Agency Technical
Advisory Board will review all final design documentation. The
last steps for the FAA to approve each U.S. carriers' updated
pilot training program, issue a continued airworthiness
notification to the international community, and publish an
airworthiness directive of advising operators of required
corrective actions. As I have said many times, I will not sign
off on this aircraft until all FAA technical reviews are
complete. I also intend to pilot the aircraft myself before the
FAA makes any ungrounding decision.
Now, beyond the MAX, our commitment to improve the margin
of safety for the aviation industry globally will start with
aircraft certification but will ultimately be much broader. The
FAA recently provided the Committee with its action plan in
response to the recommendations of the secretary special
committee to review the FAA's aircraft certification process.
The plan describes the FAA's actions, both planned and
underway, to address not only the recommendations from the
special committee, but also the Joint Authorities Technical
Review, the NTSB, the Indonesian National Transportation Safety
Committee, and the FAA's own findings.
Now beyond certification, the FAA is tackling
interconnected aviation safety issues not only in the United
States but internationally as well. We are prepared to take the
lead in this new phase of worldwide safety. For example, we
presented a working paper at ICAO last year on pilot training
and automation dependency. This material was recently added
into an ICAO proposal in the formation of a personnel training
and licensing panel.
Our action plan focuses on 10 areas for global aviation
safety, including safety management systems, data, and
innovation, and we have aligned our RFI 2021 budget request to
support this activity. We are asking to recruit additional
specialized employees such as human factors experts and
software engineers, and will invest additional money to bolster
improvements to successful information sharing programs such as
ASIAS.
I have said many times that safety is a journey not a
destination. We must never allow ourselves to become
complacent. Always we must keep in mind the passengers and
their loved ones for whom we work. This concludes my statement
and I will be glad to answer your question, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dickson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the
Committee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to speak with you about the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of aircraft
certification and to provide you with an update concerning the Boeing
737 MAX. At the outset, on behalf of the United States Department of
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to acknowledge, as
we have before, the families of the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines
and Lion Air accidents and extend, once again, our continued deepest
sympathies and condolences to them. These tragic accidents should not
have happened, and thus underscore and reaffirm the seriousness with
which we approach aviation safety every day. We want the families, and
the world, to know that we continue to work tirelessly to see that the
lessons learned from these accidents will result in a higher margin of
safety for the aviation industry globally.
Before I continue to the focus of this hearing, I want to digress
for a moment to address some of the challenges the aviation industry
has faced during the ongoing public health emergency. Aviation
employees have worked diligently these past months--despite the risks
to themselves--to safely transport supplies and passengers at a time
when our Nation has needed them.
Secretary Chao and the Department of Transportation have been clear
that passengers should wear face coverings while traveling by air, for
their own protection and the protection of those around them. Face
coverings are especially important in situations where social
distancing is not feasible. This comes as a health guideline from the
agency responsible for public health, the CDC.
Of course, across the transportation system every mode is
different. But when it comes to air travel, the DOT and the FAA expect
the traveling public to follow airline crew directions and policies,
which are in place for passenger protection and the health of air
crews, and to take very seriously the precautions recommended by the
CDC and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). As we
move through the phases of reopening, the FAA will continue to support
airlines and their front-line employees as they implement these CDC
guidelines. And we will continue to apply our aviation expertise to
help lead efforts with other Federal agencies, with industry, and with
our international partners to address public health risk in the air
transportation system, both internationally and here in the United
States.
I would also like to add that despite the public health challenges
associated with COVID-19, our commitment to aviation safety has never
wavered and our air transportation system remains safe, resilient, and
flexible, thanks to the sustained focus and hard work of aviation
professionals in the FAA and industry.
Status of the 737 MAX Return-to-Service
Safety is the core of the FAA's mission and is our first priority.
We are working diligently so that accidents like the ones that occurred
in Indonesia and Ethiopia--resulting in the tragic loss of 346 lives--
do not occur again. The FAA continues to follow a thorough process for
returning the 737 MAX to service. As we have stated many times in the
past, this process is not guided by a calendar or schedule. Safety is
the driving consideration. I unequivocally support the dedicated
professionals of the FAA in continuing to adhere to a data-driven,
methodical analysis, review, and validation of the modified flight
control systems and pilot training required to safely return the 737
MAX to commercial service. I have directed FAA employees to take the
time needed to do that work.
With respect to our international partners, the FAA clearly
understands its responsibilities as the aviation safety regulator for
the State of Design for the 737 MAX. Last fall, we met with more than
50 foreign civil aviation officials, all of whom have provided input to
the FAA. We have continued to have regular dialogue with them during
the COVID-19 public health emergency. Each respective nation will make
its own decision for clearing the 737 MAX for flight, however, we are
also conducting and planning additional outreach activities to engage
with our international partners, including providing support on return-
to-service issues; maintaining transparency through communication and
information sharing; and scheduling meetings for technical discussions.
As I have stated before, the FAA's return-to-service decision on
the 737 MAX will rest solely on the FAA's analysis of the data to
determine whether Boeing's proposed software updates and pilot training
address the known issues for grounding the aircraft. The FAA fully
controls the approval process for the flight control systems and is not
delegating anything to Boeing. The FAA will even retain authority to
issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates of
airworthiness for all new 737 MAX airplanes manufactured since the
grounding. When the 737 MAX is returned to service, it will be because
the safety issues have been addressed and pilots have received all of
the training they need to safely operate the aircraft.
Actions that must still take place before the aircraft will return
to service include a certification flight test and completion of work
by the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB), which includes the FAA
and our international partners from Canada, Europe, and Brazil. The
JOEB will evaluate pilot training needs using line pilots of various
experience levels from both U.S. carriers as well as international
carriers. The FAA's Flight Standardization Board for the Boeing 737
will issue a report addressing the findings of the JOEB, and the report
will be made available for public review and comment. Additionally, the
FAA will review all final design documentation, which also will be
reviewed by the multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB), made up of
FAA Chief Scientists and experts from the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.
The FAA will issue a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the
International Community providing notice of pending significant safety
actions and will publish an Airworthiness Directive advising operators
of required corrective actions. I will not sign off on the aircraft
until all FAA technical reviews are complete, I fly it myself using my
experience as an Air Force and commercial pilot, and I am satisfied
that I would put my own family on it without a second thought.
Oversight of Aircraft Certification
Safety is a journey, not a destination--a journey we undertake each
and every day with humility. Today's unprecedented U.S. safety record
was built on the willingness of aviation professionals to embrace hard
lessons and to proactively seek continuous improvement. The FAA both
welcomes and recognizes the importance of scrutiny of our processes and
procedures. In addition to this Committee's work and other
congressional reviews, several independent reviews have been initiated
to look at different aspects of the 737 MAX certification and the FAA's
certification and delegation processes generally.
The unprecedented Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR),
commissioned by the FAA, was the first review to be completed and
entailed the participation of nine other civil aviation authorities
joining the FAA to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
certification of the automated flight control system on the 737 MAX.
The JATR was chaired by former National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) Chairman Christopher Hart and was comprised of a team of experts
from the FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
and the aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the
European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab
Emirates. Never before have 10 authorities come together to conduct
this type of review. The JATR provided its unvarnished and independent
review and we appreciated their recommendations when they were released
this past fall.
The FAA has also received recommendations from the NTSB and the
Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee's (KNKT) accident
report on Lion Air Flight 610. Earlier this year, the Ethiopian Civil
Aviation Authority released an interim accident report on Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302, with recommendations. Further, the Secretary of
Transportation's Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft
Certification Process released its recommendations in January of this
year. The Special Committee was established to advise and provide
recommendations to the Department on policy-level topics related to
aircraft certification.
The FAA recently shared with Congress its Action Plan in response
to the recommendations of the Special Committee. The plan discusses in
depth the FAA's actions, both planned and underway, to address the
recommendations. Importantly, the FAA developed its plan not solely in
response to the Special Committee recommendations, but also in the
context of the other recommendations received from the JATR, NTSB, and
KNKT, as well as FAA's own findings. The actions described in the FAA's
Action Plan are responsive to all recommendations received and apply to
the entirety of the FAA's approach to aircraft certification. The plan
reflects the FAA's commitment to improving our certification process
domestically, and to improving aviation safety globally. We believe
that transparency, open and honest communication, and our willingness
to improve our systems and processes are the keys to restoring public
trust in the FAA and in the safety of the 737 MAX when it is returned
to service.
Moving Forward
Beyond the 737 MAX, the FAA is committed to addressing issues
regarding aircraft certification processes and aviation safety
generally, not only in the United States, but internationally as well.
Over the years, the FAA has exercised a leadership role in the
promotion and development of global aviation safety. We have helped
raise the bar on safety standards and practices worldwide working with
the ICAO and other civil aviation authorities. We have an opportunity
to do even more. We are committed to expanding our efforts with other
authorities around the world and to fostering safety standards and
policies at ICAO to help meet the public's expectations of the highest
possible levels of safety globally, even in areas the FAA does not
regulate directly. Without safety as a foundation, we cannot have a
vibrant aviation industry in any country, much less between countries.
Our international air transportation network is a tightly woven fabric
that is dependent on all of us making safety our core value. To that
end, at the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly the U.S. presented a
working paper, Pilot Training Improvements to Address Automation
Dependency, with several of our international partners. The paper was
accepted and in May of this year we were able to get it included in an
ICAO proposal on the establishment of a Personnel Training and
Licensing Panel which will be considered in July.
In our continuing efforts to raise the bar for aviation safety
across the globe, it will be important for the FAA and our
international partners to foster improvements in standards and
approaches not just for how aircraft are designed and produced, but
also how they are maintained and operated. We at the FAA are prepared
to take the lead in this new phase of system safety. As noted in our
Action Plan responding to the recommendations of the Special Committee
our actions will address specific areas of focus including, safety
management systems, system safety, globalization, data, internal
coordination between certification and flight standards teams,
personnel, delegation, amended type certificates, innovation, and
existing recommendations. Our strategy to implement these action items
will coalesce around several major themes discussed briefly below.
Holistic Approach
In the context of aircraft certification, a holistic approach means
that an aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all of its
subsystems, including the flight crew. The aircraft is not a collection
of parts or systems, but should be viewed as a whole. A holistic
approach to aircraft certification would not rely upon item-by-item
reviews in isolation, but would take into account the interactions and
interdependencies between all systems and the crew. Such an approach
would link all safety requirements for type certification to other
aspects of safe operation including, for example, pilot training and
operational performance.
Human Factors
Human factors considerations are an important part of the machine
design process, which will need to take into account safety and
performance levels of human users. As aircraft systems become more
complex and the level of automation increases, the integration of human
factors into the design of aircraft will be increasingly important.
Human factors considerations must include trained and qualified
personnel who will be responsible for operating and maintaining these
increasingly safe and complex aircraft.
Workforce of the Future
In order to meet the safety needs of a rapidly evolving aerospace
system, the FAA will need to recruit, hire, maintain, and retain a
workforce with the necessary technical expertise, capabilities, and
adaptability. Our efforts must ensure that we are able to hire and
retain the right people with the right skills and mindset, engaged at
the right time, with systemic coordination between certification and
operational suitability.
Information and Coordinated Data Flow
Ensuring a coordinated and flexible flow of information during any
oversight process is critical. In the context of aviation safety, the
concept of sharing information cuts across many initiatives that the
FAA continues to examine for potential expansion. These include the
following important categories, all of which are part of the broader
information and data flow theme:
1. Safety Management Systems. Safety Management Systems (SMS)
establish a commitment, in this case on the part of the
manufacturer, to continually improving safety. SMS identifies
and manages risk and provides safety assurance by continually
evaluating risk controls and by creating a positive safety
culture within a workforce. Integrating a safety management
system into the processes for design and production, as well as
operations, enables insight into the connections and
interrelationship between systems.
2. Big Data. The FAA must continue leaning into our role as a data-
driven, risk-based, decision-making oversight organization that
prioritizes safety above all else. We do that by breaking down
silos between organizations and implementing programs like SMS
supported by compliance programs and informed by data. We look
at the aviation ecosystem as a whole, including how all the
parts interact: aircraft, weather, pilots, engineers, flight
attendants, technicians, mechanics, dispatchers, air traffic
controllers, safety inspectors, training programs,
certification, passengers--everyone and everything in the
operating environment. This includes building upon the
successes we have had collaborating with industry and
implementing voluntary safety information sharing programs. In
the broader context of the overall importance of data to a
safety regulator such as the FAA, we are examining the data we
have, identifying data we may need, and looking for new methods
to analyze and integrate data to increase safety.
3. Just Culture. In addition to the technical work required for
truly integrated data, a key enabler of a data-driven safety
organization is a healthy and robust reporting culture. A good
safety culture produces the data needed to understand what's
actually happening. If we know about safety concerns and we
know where threats are coming from and how errors are
occurring, we can mitigate the risks and fix the processes that
led to those errors. A good safety culture demands that we
infuse that safety data into all of our processes from top to
bottom--in a continuous loop. To be successful, a safety
organization relies on a Just Culture that places great value
on front-line employees and empowers those involved in the
operation to raise and report safety concerns in a timely,
systematic way, without fearing retaliation. A Just Culture
starts at the top. It's something leadership has to nurture,
encourage, and support everywhere in the organization.
Employees have to see the results, see what the data is
showing, and see how the organization is using analytic tools
to identify concerns and errors and put actions in place to
mitigate them. Employees and organizations need to see results
that come from leveraging safety data and technical expertise
into a safer operation.
Initial Action
As we move ahead to implement these strategies, we have developed a
budget request to address specific related needs. For example, the FY
2021 President's Budget requests funding to recruit additional
specialized skilled employees, such as more human factors experts and
software engineers. The request would also fund a new system that
tracks employee training, qualifications, and certifications to ensure
our aviation safety workforce has the skills and knowledge required to
execute our oversight functions. This action addresses some of the
findings of this committee's investigatory work that has assisted in
pointing out inconsistencies with our tracking systems.
Consistent with Congressional direction, the budget request will
support our new office to oversee Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA). While the ODA program has been in place since
2005, the creation of a single office supports standardized outcomes
and improvements across the ODA program. Further, the budget request
will support improvements to voluntary information sharing programs
such as Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) and
the Aviation Safety Reporting Program. These programs are critical
tools in the FAA's toolbox, facilitating the collection of safety data
that allows the FAA to identify trends and improve upon aviation
safety. Each of these requests provide a snapshot of our concerted
effort to continually improve aviation safety.
Conclusion
Aviation's hard lessons and the hard work in response to those
lessons--from both government and industry--have paved the way to
creating a global aviation system with an enviable safety record. But
as I mentioned earlier, safety is a journey, not a destination. We have
achieved unprecedented levels of safety in the United States. Yet what
we have done in the past and what we are doing now is not good enough
for the future in an increasingly complex and interconnected world. We
must build on the lessons learned, and we must never allow ourselves to
become complacent.
The United States has been, and will continue to be, the global
leader in aviation safety. We are confident that continuing to approach
this task with a spirit of humility, openness, hard work, and
transparency will bolster aviation safety worldwide.
This concludes my statement. I will be glad to answer your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator. Well,
let's go ahead then. I sort of jumped the gun a few moments
ago. Senator Cantwell and I normally reserve our opening
remarks to 5 minutes. This is--the tone of my remarks today I
think people would recognize is not really our style. But I
hope you understand, Mr. Administrator, the very serious way
that I see the lack of response from your agency.
And so I will certainly give you an opportunity to respond
to my complaints in my opening statement and to the ones I have
mentioned to you personally over the phone again. Again, my
investigative team began their work July 31 and have received
no response to over half of the items in the request. Do you
view this as acceptable and can you explain to the Committee
what has happened in the FAA in this regard?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always appreciate
the opportunity for dialogue. As you mentioned our conversation
last Thursday and our oversight team had connected with your
staff last night. And I believe that will put us in a position
to make progress. As I have said many times, I am totally
committed to the oversight process. I realize that it is an
important matter for you. You have made that clear. You have
made it doubly clear this morning, and I appreciate that.
I also want you to know that it is very important to the
agency and it is a responsibility I take very seriously. In
my--I believe it's inaccurate to portray the agency as
unresponsive. We have provided responses in the seven major
subject areas in the July request. There is still ongoing work
and I would just point out that we have a number of
investigations underway that were already supporting the OIG,
the OSC, the NTSB, and others, and some of the information
requests have to--implicate matters within those investigations
and we certainly don't want to prejudice the outcome of those.
However, you know, we are going to redouble our efforts.
You know, I hear your frustration and that is not OK with me.
That is not where we want to be. I am trying to promote a
culture both within the agency and really with all of our
stakeholders of transparency and openness and this is an
opportunity for us to do that. So I look forward to continuing
to work with you to raise the bar on aviation safety, again in
the U.S. and globally.
The Chairman. Well, I would reiterate that the climate in
your agency with regard to the requests for information and
documents from this committee and from our staff has been most
unsatisfactory. For example, we asked for copies of e-mails
between two parties and were asked to make that more specific.
And then when we pinpoint the very day and time of the e-mail,
the response from employees at FAA has been a reluctance to
supply that to us.
Now, we have an important responsibility to the taxpayers.
This is part of our constitutional responsibility, to provide
oversight. And to me, there is no excuse for that. Let me make
this suggestion to the you, Mr. Administrator. It would seem to
me beneficial if you could name one specific senior person
under your supervision to be the contact with our staff
directors on this matter.
And that person would be responsible for making sure the
agency provided satisfactory responses, be reportable to you,
and my staff director would be reportable to me, and at least
there would be a direct conduit of information and requests
directly from this senior staff person to you the
administrator. Would you be willing to agree to that procedure
based on my frustration?
Mr. Dickson. Mr. Chairman, we will set up a process to have
more dynamic communication as you suggest.
The Chairman. Well, but I am making a specific----
Mr. Dickson. I understand.
The Chairman.--suggestion to you and you are not willing to
accept that at this point?
Mr. Dickson. Mr. Chairman, we will agree to that.
The Chairman. OK, I appreciate it. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator
Dickson, I would like to ask several questions just to get you
on the record on changes that we would like to see at the FAA,
both in the legislation we have proposed and things that we
think continue to need to be addressed beyond this legislation.
So if you could help me out with as much yes and no that would
be so helpful. Should aircraft manufacturers be accountable for
compliance of design data submitted to the FAA approval? Yes or
no?
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Do you believe that this
accountabilities should exist throughout the certification
process not just at the end of the certification process when
safety concerns are harder to address and designs are tougher
to rework and correct?
Mr. Dickson. Without speaking to the specifics, I am not
knowledgeable of some of the details that you are referring to
but I believe that that the holistic approach that you referred
to that a safety management system would provide would produce
that result.
Senator Cantwell. So the answer is yes, you think----
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Applicants must certify that data
design complies with airworthiness standards? That's a good
idea.
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And if the FAA receives a report of
non-compliance, the FAA should ensure that corrective action is
taken prior to issuing a certificate? Yes?
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And if non-compliance is discovered
after an issuance of certificate, do you believe the
manufacturer should be required to correct it for future
production of aircraft?
Mr. Dickson. That is in the continuing operational safety
realm and that is what our directive process provides for. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Well, certainly I have concerns that
that is not what has taken place in the past and it is good to
hear that that is what you think should take place now. I think
the end result of aircraft certification process is, you know,
the FAA approval of--you know, it is the approval of the type
certificate, but we want to make sure that as we go through
this process and one of the failures of the 737 MAX, which is
just unacceptable, is that we need to make sure that that
compliance and airworthiness requirements are met. So do you
agree that the purpose of the aircraft certification is to
achieve compliance?
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And in order to achieve compliance
FAA must validate the manufacturers design data is compliant
with applicable airworthiness standards?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, I would say just it is actually
a higher bar than compliance. Compliance with individual rules
does not necessarily produce a safe outcome and that is what we
are trying to deal with.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I agree that from the holistic
perspective, but I am just trying to point out that the process
that we have today between the beginning of the process on the
type certificate and the final airworthiness approval certainly
in the MAX situation didn't catch the problems and certainly
had information--so that is why there is data in your questions
and answers to that are so important and hopefully that will
help us in moving forward on this legislation. If I could ask
you now about the bill that Senator Wicker and I introduced. Do
you agree that in order to raise the bar the FAA should be
directly appointing these ODA members?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, the--without commenting specifically
on the bill, I think that we need to certainly take a systems
approach, and you know, we need to have strong oversight of the
ODA. We already approved----
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Dickson, I am not as genteel as the
Chairman who resides from a state where genteel approaches
exist and are perfected. I am a little more blunt, OK, so I
don't want to be stonewalled here. Do you believe the FAA
should retain and appoint these individuals and oversee them in
the process? Yes or no?
Mr. Dickson. It is not something that--we certainly approve
their qualifications and their background. The individual
selection is not something that I believe would add to the
safety of the process, but it is something that we are
certainly anxious to work with the Committee on and see if
there is a way that we can add that in.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Dickson, it is a little hard--just
have to view you through the lens here because this gentleman--
but this is the very point. We need an independent FAA. We need
the lines of communication between these whistleblowers or
whoever it is on the engineering, you know, the SPIA member who
is on the ground who says, look this is a problem. He needs to
be backed up by the FAA, but if you don't have a direct line to
that employee, and you don't approve him in the final and you
don't oversee his work and you don't have the right expertise
at the FAA, then he is not going to be backed up by you.
Mr. Dickson. Could not agree more.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. On this
topic of just being responsive. I am sure you know that this is
really a concern to every member of the Committee and you have
heard that clearly today. I hope that the process you and the
Chairman have agreed to actually produces a different result,
but often the request, Mr. Administrator, is not that hard to
respond to and it is just agencies continue to create problems
for themselves and difficulties for us by not just responding
with information you have as opposed to analyzing whether you
should respond with that to that request.
There is virtually never a question that eventually you are
going to be required to respond or that you should respond or
that the law requires you to respond or that when you testified
along with many others at your confirmation hearing, you have
agreed to always respond and always respond quickly. If that
question is not asked at a confirmation hearing, it is an
oversight. And you have heard some of that today.
I am not sure you and colleagues around this Department and
many others can ever hear enough of that because it is a
constant problem, almost always self-inflicted, by an agency's
refusal to have somebody who will take responsibility. So maybe
your agreement today to allow that to happen, really important.
I may go over a little of what Senator Cantwell has already
asked about, but on the ODA office, do you think that the
legislation that has been introduced by the Chairman and the
Ranking Member for additional oversight mechanisms would
benefit the process of how ODA personnel and procedures are
approved?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator. And there
are many elements of the proposed legislation that are exactly
on point in terms of implementing systematic approaches and
strong oversight and a data-driven process between the
manufacturer and the FAA. So--and also strengthening the
workforce aspects. What we really need is a systems approach
and system thinking system engineers, human factors and
individuals. And those additional resources would be very
helpful.
Senator Blunt. So in 2018, Senator Cantwell and I worked
hard to get the 2018 FAA Act--all the members of this
committee, but I chaired the subcommittee at the time and she
was the leading Democrat on the Subcommittee that brought this
legislation forward. Can you give me an update on how the
implementation of the 2018 FAA Act as it relates to these
programs has occurred, and has the FAA implementation created
any changes--implemented any changes to its oversight of the
ODAs since the 737 crashes?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. The ODA office has been--was
implemented within the last year, and we have set up the
framework and the process to essentially oversee and audit of
all 79 ODAs. And we have money in our budget request for the
upcoming fiscal year to continue to develop and permanently
staff that office.
And we will continue to do that. We have also recently
selected a project manager who will be reporting to me
quarterly on the execution around a lot of the issues that are
in the proposed legislation, the Committee's version, that will
hit a lot of the same themes in terms of implementing the
recommendations from the special committee report, the Joint
Authorities Technical Review, and the NTSB recommendations.
Senator Blunt. And you mentioned that on recertifying the
plane we are talking about, that you would fly that yourself
before it was recertified. What kind of special information or
training would a skilled pilot like you need before he got in
the cockpit of a plane that was in the process of being
certified again?
Mr. Dickson. Well Senator, I have got quite a bit of flying
time on the 737 on previous versions, and I have been out too
in my first month on the job. I went out to Seattle and have
flown the various profiles. So I am very familiar with the
system.
Also my Deputy, Dan Elwell, and I will be completing the
same simulator training that the Joint Operations Evaluation
Board Pilots will be going through, and then I will complete a
flight profile on the aircraft as well. So we will have several
days of preparation to get ready for that event.
Senator Blunt. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt. Senator Klobuchar
joins us remotely.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Cantwell for holding this hearing. And
Administrator Dickson, thank you for being here. And I
especially want to acknowledge the families out there. I am so
glad that I know Senator Cantwell worked to have Mr. Stumo be
able to testify.
I am so sorry for your loss, Mr. Stumo, and I think your
courage in coming forward for your daughter is going to make a
difference not just for your family, but for so many other
families out there. So I wanted to start, Mr. Dickson, these
two tragic plane crashes as we know Boeing 737 MAX in Indonesia
and Ethiopia took the lives of over 300 people, including by
the way, one of my constituents, Mr. Hussein, St. Cloud,
Minnesota. And at the Committee's hearing in October, I
expressed concerns with the findings of a report from the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General that found
that the FAA conducted oversight of only 4 percent of Airline
manufacturers, employees responsible for conducting the
certification. The same report also found that one manufacturer
approved about 95 percent of the certifications for its own
aircraft.
So knowing that this delegation program contributed to the
FAA's oversight failure for the 737 MAX certification, are you
concerned about how widely the program is used for
certifications and how little oversight there is? And I guess
the second question would be, you know, you released the plans
to improve the certification process, but it would not change
the program by which the FAA delegates authorities or really
address this undue pressure for manufacturers' issues. So,
could you talk about where you are on this and what you think
about my concerns about whether or not this is going to improve
things enough. Thank you.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for your question, Senator. And I
share your perspective on the families. And as I said, we owe
it to them and to the public to do this right. With respect to
the amount of delegation, it depends on the--you know,
delegation, the ODA process is based on trust and I would say
it is a trust but verify system. And it is a privilege. It has
to be earned. And early in a certification process there is
typically only very routine items that are delegated.
There are four parts of the certification process in terms
of establishing the certification basis, and actually the only
part that is actually delegated is analysis and testing. And
those are the items that you see as we see data as a process
continues over a period typically of five to 7 years in most
cases, that there may be an opportunity to delegate additional
items in terms of certification analysis and testing only. The
final decision remain----
Senator Klobuchar [continuing]. But the undue pressure
issue is what I am concerned about given what we saw with that
internal serving at Boeing where one third of employees said
they felt this pressure.
Mr. Dickson. Well, I think that is an extremely important
issue. We continue to investigate instances of undue pressure.
But specifically this is why safety management systems are so
important because the only way to address that culture issue is
by increasing the ability for frontline folks, both within the
agency frankly and within the manufacturer, to bring issues
forward in real time. And one of the benefits of safety
management systems is that it puts safety responsibility where
it belongs at the highest levels of the manufacturer. It also
promotes transparency.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. OK, let's move on, Mr.
Dickson. I don't see the timer here, but I am going to ask you
just two more questions. In September, the NTSB noted in its
report that the underlying assumptions Boeing made about how
pilots would react under certain conditions were severely
flawed, the assumptions were. And have you started looking at
the approval of other aircraft, non-Boeing aircraft or other
Boeing aircraft, based on the recommendations regarding these
pilot assumptions because to me that was--anyone, even someone
who is not a pilot, saw this as a problem.
Mr. Dickson. It is a great question. Human factors issues
and pilot performance and the pilot as integral to the design
of the aircraft is something that we are reviewing very closely
as part of not only the return to service of the MAX, but also
our certification processes in general. It is a key pillar of
our strategy.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Last, in January the special
committee commissioned by Secretary Chao to review the crashes
has recommended that the FAA should expand its efforts to
improve international standards. This bill was already
referenced with Senator Moran and Senator Capito, and of
course, Senator Cantwell.
And I am one of the co-sponsors, the Foreign Civil Aviation
Authority Assistance and Capacity Building Act, to help improve
international pilot training. Do you agree that the FAA should
work with our international partners to develop important
international pilot training safety standards for the aviation
workforce and industry? I think we all know as I know from my
constituent dying in that crash that no one is immune. Our
Americans are going to be on flights all over the world.
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, wholeheartedly agree and the
ICAO effort that I talked about before is the activity that
were already undertaking in this area and we look forward to
continuing to engage both bilaterally and regionally on pilot
training and qualification issues around the world.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. And I would
note that technically our clock is supposed to be on the
screen----
Senator Klobuchar.--I will fix it. I will fix it.
The Chairman. OK. Next is Senator Fischer, also joining us
remotely.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator
Dickson, welcome this morning. Good to have you here. The Joint
Authorities Technical Review said that the FAA was not
completely unaware of MCAS, but because the information and
discussions about MCAS were so fragmented, were delivered to
disconnect groups, it was difficult to recognize the impact and
the implications of this system.
Last October, I asked then Boeing President and CEO Dennis
Muilenburg about that fragmentation of communications between
Boeing and FAA, which he responded that Boeing needed to make
changes to improve communication with the agencies.
Do you agree that the communication between Boeing and FAA
was--that it was fragmented to the point that relevant
information was not provided to the agency? And if so, how will
steps that you have outlined such as a safety management system
and a ``just culture'' improve that communication?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator. A couple
of points there. I agree that, and I think our views and the
other reviews have shown that information was presented in a
fragmented manner and it was difficult to follow the entire
thread, and this was part of the major issue that we are
dealing with. Within the agency, we have recently taken steps
to have our pilots and our flight standards group involved
earlier in the certification process throughout.
This is part of our effort to make sure that human factor
considerations are taken into account and integrated into the
design process. As you mentioned, safety management systems, as
I mentioned a few minutes ago, are probably the biggest game
changer in my experience in terms of turning a culture around
and making it more transparent and focused again at the highest
levels and throughout the organization on safety and quality.
And it also puts the agency in a much stronger position in
terms of being able to oversee the entire certification process
because it is less transactional. It is not, you know, a
question-and-answer. It is actually a data feed where we are
actually privy to the picture as the program progresses. So
there is a lot that goes into that. Again, data is very
important and communications are very important, but that will
definitely put us in a much better place.
Senator Fischer. And also, Mr. Dickson, we are seeing that
aircraft are becoming more automated and that means that there
is more systems that can affect the aircraft controls without
any kind of pilot input. During a hearing last year, DOT
Inspector General testified that ``reliance in automation is a
growing concern among industry experts who have questioned
whether pilots receive enough training and enough experience to
maintain manual flying proficiency.'' Do you share that concern
about automation?
Mr. Dickson. I do. And automation is a benefit and it has
led--it has been part of the improvement in aviation safety
that we have seen over the years, but the individual still has
to be engaged with the machine.
And to the extent that we are over-reliant and we lose
situational awareness flying the airplane, you still have to
manage your flight path and you have to stay mentally engaged
with the aircraft. So there is a balance and that is why
integrating human factors and human capabilities into aircraft
design has always been important but it is more important now
and going into the future than it ever has been.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Schatz.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
conducting this hearing. And Mr. Dickson, I wanted to change
the topic a little bit from certification reform to flying
safely during the pandemic. The International Civil Aviation
Organization recently issued recommendations for travel during
the pandemic, and I just want to get your views on those
recommendations and what the FAA is going to do to integrate
that into their process?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator
Schatz. And actually those ICAO recommendations were the result
of work that we did in the agency and brought forth to ICAO
through the ICAO Council on Aviation Recovery Task Force.
And I selected my Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell to lead
that effort, and he worked with the Council and with
authorities around the world to bring those guidelines forward.
We are working on a similar process within the U.S. Government
and certainly involving the CDC and others to have a similar
set of measures and guidelines promulgated for travel within
the U.S. so that we are----
Senator Schatz. When you say measures and guidelines, do
you mean rules or do you mean guidelines?
Mr. Dickson. I mean guidelines. As the Secretary has said,
these will not be regulatory mandates, but they will be very
specific and we expect for air carriers and the public to
follow those guidelines as well as airports. And we are working
with the air carriers on this. We are using their safety
management systems and the data that is coming out of those
systems to monitor their----
Senator Schatz. Does this sound like a philosophical thing
for you folks? I mean I really--I mean this sincerely, I just
don't get why you wouldn't want this to be mandatory. I don't
understand why we are sort of going with a sort of private
sector driven approach here or a voluntary approach or
federalism approach.
Is this just a matter of your approach to what the Federal
Government should do? It seems to me that when you are talking
about aviation, it is certainly Federal, and when you are
talking about pandemic, it sort of falls into the category
squarely of the kind--aviation safety. It is the kind of thing
that you ought to make mandatory if you have come to certain
conclusions about how to fly safely. So what gives here? How
come you don't want to make a rule?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I appreciate the question, Senator. I am
coming at this and the agency comes at this from an aviation
safety perspective. So there are many things, there is a lot of
data that we have that we get from the commercial aviation
carriers and we need to make sure that there is not an impact
on aviation safety.
With respect to public health, that is the CDC and of
course they have responsibilities for sectors of transportation
and really the entire public health situation that goes well
beyond aviation.
So we are acting as a facilitator in that process. But if
there is a nexus for aviation safety, then we are concerned
about that and that is what we are working with the carriers on
and in the interagency process within the Government, to make
sure that we have consistent guidelines out there.
Senator Schatz. OK, I got it. And I, you know, look we do
we have a difference of opinion here. I think I, you know, I am
hoping we will be able to get some bipartisan support for some
person mandatory rules here, but I don't want to chew up all my
time. I want to ask two more quick questions. Is flying safe
from the standpoint of coronavirus?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, I believe so with the--but again, we all
have a role to play. We have to protect each other. And again,
the air carriers and the airports and TSA and all stakeholders
out there, the FAA's air traffic organization, we have to make
sure that we are operating the system safely and consistently
and predictably.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. And one final question, on May
1, the D.C. Circuit ruled in the case of Hawaii Kalisch
Coalition Malama Pono that the FAA must establish air tour
management plans for all covered parks within two years. I am
assuming that you will implement that as soon as possible and
especially in those parks where this is an area of contention?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, we are--I am familiar with the
ruling and I believe that we are working with the Park Service
now and have a preliminary plan that will be presented on
August 30.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Dickson,
thank you for being here, and to the second panel, to the
witness there, condolences from me and my colleagues in the
Committee. We thank you for your presence here today to help us
better understand the importance of the decisions that the FAA
and the Congress may make in regard to Airline safety. We have
come a long way in that regard but recognize it is a never-
ending attempt to advance safety and I am pleased that you are
here. I am sorry that you are here for the reason that you are.
Mr. Dickson, let me first indicate to the Chairman,
Chairman Wicker, thank you for your efforts. I don't know
exactly the information that you are seeking from the FAA, but
I am always pleased when Congressional efforts are made for
greater oversight and please consider me an ally in any way
that I can be of help in the effort to make sure that the FAA
and other agencies respond to Congressional inquiries.
Mr. Dickson, you have been useful to me, valuable to me,
and your responses are opportunities to have conversations both
in person before COVID-19 and then subsequently by phone and I
thank you for that. I am surprised, I certainly am not at all
suggesting that anything but safety should drive the
recertification process, but it surprises me how long it has
taken and it surprises me because I assume that the plane,
which was previously certified, the 737 MAX, it should--if it
was already certified, it seems to me that the changes
necessary to satisfy the needs for safety would be rather
modest.
And I guess I am asking is that just a false assumption
that--and if so, how did we get to a point in which the
magnitude of the problems with the 737 MAX were so great that
it is taking a significantly long time to get them fixed? And
tell me again, during our last conversation you indicated
midsummer. Is that still the case and has COVID-19 slowed down
the process in recertification?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thanks for the question, Senator. To
your last point, you know, we are not on any timeline. We are
narrowing the issues and we have not had any impact with COVID-
19 up to this point. When we get to the Joint Operation
Evaluation Board, obviously that involves international pilots
and international travel, and so there are a couple of
alternatives that we are looking at to have the processes in
place to be able to support that work.
But up to this point, the process has proceeded without
interruption. One of the--you raised a great question and I
think it needs to be clear that the redesign of the airplane is
not just limited to changing MCAS functionality. The entire
flight control system beginning--Boeing undertook this in the
June, July time-frame of last year, became a much more
ambitious project, and there is much more redundancy.
The flight control computers and pitch compare their
signals dynamically. That is an extremely ambitious project.
And as we have moved forward, when you make a system like that
more robust what happens is it implicates--there are
interdependencies with other subsystems on the aircraft that
have to be taken into account.
So, you know again, this is--we have moved forward, I
think, very diligently and very carefully, and as you know, we
have retained all matters within the FAA including the--we will
issue the airworthiness certificate ourselves. But that is why
this is such a journey that we have been on.
Senator Moran. Well, Administrator, I am in no way
suggesting that anything but safety ought to drive your time-
frame and the question was really, and we can have this
conversation ourselves, was does the magnitude of the changes
necessary, does it suggest that the certification initially was
significantly flawed to begin with? And I will be glad to
follow up. I want to just touch on a couple of other things in
the 30 seconds I have left. I want to explore with you and will
submit a question writing about how do we get the FAA to be in
a better position to adopt new innovations and move in
advancing aviation safety through technology? I think there are
some significant opportunities and I want to make sure that we
don't lose the chance to pursue those innovations as we pursue
certification.
The workforce in Kansas, but across the country, is
damaged. Its absence is noted. Furloughs are prevalent across
our aviation and aerospace industry in Wichita and South
Central Kansas, but elsewhere in our state as well. We are
working to find a path for a public-private partnership that
keeps those employees in place and on a payroll. And I would
seek your advice and suggestions in that regard.
And finally, I appreciate Senator Cantwell's cooperation
along with Senators Klobuchar and Capito in regard to Senate
Bill 3959. And again, because of the lack of time that I have,
I guess there is no time left. I will follow up with you in
writing unless we have a second round of questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moran. And before I go to
Senator Blumenthal, let me remind members that we have a series
of two votes beginning 11:45 a.m. I have talked with Senator
Cantwell. Our intention is simply to share the gavel, proceed
on, and do the best we can to conclude both panels of this
hearing. We are required by the next committee to surrender
this room no later than 1 p.m. and I feel surely that we will
be able to do that. And I also appreciate members being so
thoughtful as to the 5-minute time-frame with the questions.
Senator Blumenthal, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be
even less genteel than Senator Cantwell. I find your responses
with all due respect, Administrator Dickson, to be totally
unsatisfactory. The culture of secrecy at the FAA has only been
aggravated under your tenure. You have completely refused to
respond to any of my letters requesting information, not even
an explanation--neither there nor here.
I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be
more responsive to this committee. And I think it begins today
with a commitment to end that culture of secrecy, to commit to
major reforms of the kind that the Chairman and Ranking Member
have suggested in their legislation. I welcome it because it
includes stronger protections for whistleblowers such as I
suggested in the bipartisan--in the reform proposal that I
advanced with support from Senators Markey, Udall, Warren and
Feinstein. Not only protection for whistleblowers, but minimum
qualifications for the engineers performing work on behalf of
the FAA, targeted audits of ODA units, minimum addressing
concerns about compensations, and bonuses for meeting
performance goals.
The fact of the matter is that the FAA has been complicit
in these crashes by failing to do more diligent oversight. It
has almost been like a dog watching TV and there have to be
reforms that take back major swathes of the authority that have
been delegated. The FAA has to do the work, not just oversee
it. It has to perform work that involves certification. And so
let me ask you first, why can the FAA not take back the
authority it has delegated over critical safety features?
Mr. Dickson. Well Senator, I vehemently disagree with your
characterization of my level--desire for transparency. And I
just want to reiterate the commitment that I made to the
Chairman. I will make it to you as well. We want to collaborate
and work together with the Committee to raise the bar on
aviation safety. Critical, novel technologies, those are things
that are typically not delegated by the agency. As I said in my
remarks earlier, testing and analysis typically on more routine
matters and early in its certification process are typically
delegated, but that is----
Senator Blumenthal. But you did delegate that authority
with respect to the 737?
Mr. Dickson. No, sir. No, not until very late in the
project.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, late in the project is often the
critical phase in the project. Let me move on to another area
and I will invite you to expand on your answer in written
responses. Would you join me in supporting a prohibition on
preemption of claims made against a manufacturer or Airline
simply because there has been certification by the FAA? Right
now Boeing is taking the position that it will deny all claims
against it simply because the FAA certified the 737.
Mr. Dickson. I would be happy to work with you on that
proposal, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I was hoping for a yes.
Mr. Dickson. I am not prepared to respond on that point
today.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you join me in supporting time
limits on the certificates or certification of specific Airline
types?
Mr. Dickson. I believe you are talking about the changed
product rule, and, or amended type certificates, and that is
one of the areas that we are looking at and that is harmonized
globally with the other states of design and we are looking at
that process.
Whether time limits are the most effective way to deal with
that remains to be seen. That current rule actually enables
safe additions to be brought into very safe existing designs
more effectively and it is actually in many cases used less in
the U.S. than with other states of design. So something we will
have to look at very closely.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me just say concluding, left to its
own devices, the aviation certification system puts corporate
profits before consumer safety, and this system has to be
radically reformed. I am going to ask that my letter of October
24, 2019, which is among many that you haven't answered, be put
in the record. I hope that you will provide an answer in light
of your responses here. And it will help to rebuild trust.
The Chairman. Is that to the Administrator, sir? Is that a
letter to the Administrator?
Senator Blumenthal. It is.
The Chairman. Without objection. It will be done.
[The letter referred to follows:]
United States Senate
Washington, DC, October 24, 2019
Mr. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Washington, DC.
Dear Administrator Dickson:
I write to request all documents concerning safety procedures and
standards used in certification and oversight of the Boeing 737 MAX. I
specifically ask that you provide immediately documents demonstrating
Boeing employees' awareness of issues with the Boeing 737 MAX flight
control system (MCAS) and all e-mail or text correspondence between
Boeing employees and staff at the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). While I appreciate the FAA providing the Committee with certain
e-mails and instant messages last Friday, our oversight responsibility
requires those documents in their full versions, without redactions.
The e-mails and instant messages provided are deeply disturbing--
indeed some are shocking--showing serious internal concerns among
Boeing employees and possible misrepresentations. They raise serious
questions generally about how forthcoming Boeing was in communications
with the FAA regarding the MCAS. As you are aware, the 2016 e-mails
from Mark Forkner, Boeing's Chief Technical Pilot on the 737 MAX at the
time, are heavily redacted, concealing, for example, the identities of
the FAA employees who received them. I have reason to believe that the
FAA has additional records related to the 737 MAX that would be of
interest to the Committee, including responses from FAA employees to
Mr. Forkner's e-mails.
I am requesting the FAA respond immediately with the unredacted e-
mails and any relevant supplemental records so that I can assess these
documents before the Committee's hearing with Boeing executives on
October 29, 2019.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has
the responsibility and right to exercise oversight authority related to
the tragic 737 MAX crashes and the events leading to them. I ask that
the FAA provide me with the requested material by no later than October
28, 2019.
Thank you for your attention to this request, and I expect your
full cooperation.
Sincerely,
Richard Blumenthal,
United States Senate.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Scott.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Scott. I want thank you, Chairman Wicker, for
holding this important hearing. I want to first thank Mr. Stumo
for being here with us today to provide your testimony. My
heart goes out to you and your family for your loss. And I
think it takes a lot of courage to be able to come and do this
today.
Administrator Dickson, I want to thank you for being here
today and I want to thank you for your efforts to restructure
and improve the FAA to make sure it can again be a global
leader in safety and assertiveness. So, can you talk a little
bit about how you restructured the FAA to increase
accountability and ensure that, you know, you have the capacity
again to be the global leader in safety and the certification
process?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator Scott. The level of
engagement globally in my first few months has been extremely
impressive and I am very proud to have the privilege of leading
45,000 professionals at the agency. They are extremely
committed. We started out--we start out with core values. You
know, we are a technical organization. As has been said many
times, our top priority is safety. We have got to be driven by
core values. Rules aren't going to get us where we need to be.
We have got to have an approach where we are transparent. We
can have professional disagreements, but we have got to have a
way to make sure that we are looking at all sides of every
perspective.
So one of the things I really pushed is to deal with issues
from a one agency perspective. What I find and I have seen this
in the private sector as well is you will have a Department, or
in my case a line of business or a staff office, that is
pursuing its own goals and objectives and maybe even using its
own data.
And so what we have to do is work across the entire agency
perspective, because we have a lot of data and there have been
a lot of problems solved over the years that have created
various pockets, but we have got to be able to see the whole
picture. And that is one of the things that we are really
working on. What I mentioned in response to Senator Klobuchar's
question gets to this point: it is a more seamless integration
between our flight standards group and our aircraft
certification group.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Does your certification process
incorporate any cross checking or something similar so you
reduce the possibility of factors like human error?
Mr. Dickson. Again, yes, that has always been a part of the
process. But the--what we are looking at as we mentioned in our
response to the Secretary's Special Committee report is we are
looking at some of the assumptions around human error and how
those can be incorporated into aircraft design all along more
effectively.
Senator Scott. OK. When you think about the issues with the
737 MAX and the certification process, are you reassessing the
certification process for all aircraft that you certify?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. That is what our--all of the reviews
that have been done, the work of the Committee, the dialogue
that we have had internally within the agency, it is all
leading as to a more robust process. I believe that the biggest
thing that we can do is implement safety management systems for
manufacturers and we are working on that right now. We plan to
initiate rulemaking on that shortly. And I am a big supporter
that I have seen the benefits in the Airline industry. We need
to take those same kinds of benefits into the manufacturing
sector.
Senator Scott. What is your communication plan to make
sure, you know, everybody gets more comfortable that the FAA is
changed and that the certification process works and that it
is--if you get an FAA certification, you know, you are clearly
going to be safe or as safe as you can be?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we have got--you know, aviation again,
is the safest form of travel. Our commercial aviation sector
accident rate is down 94 percent in the last 20 years. And you
know, we have had hundreds of millions of flights over the last
decade with a sterling safety record.
One death is one too many, and of course the 346 deaths
that we saw in these two accidents are tragic and unacceptable.
So we have got to keep raising the bar with aviation within the
U.S. but we have also got to take the responsibility that U.S.
products are being maintained and operated around the world and
so we need to raise that bar around the world as well.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. You should have known about the safety of
the Boeing 737 MAX before it ever took off. The tragic fate of
Lion Air flight 7610 should have led to an immediate grounding
of this plane, yet the FAA allowed the clearly unsafe 737 MAX
to keep flying for 5 months after the first crash which killed
189 people. During these 5 months, the FAA repeatedly said it
did not have enough data to ground the MAX. However, we have
since learned that the FAA conducted an unpublished risk
assessment after the Lion Air tragedy.
This report predicted 15 more fatal crashes in the life of
the MAX, 15 more crashes. The FAA knew that the 737 MAX was not
safe and still let it fly. The FAA knew and it gambled with
thousands of lives. The FAA only changed course after 157 more
people died on the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, but this
second tragedy never had to happen. If the FAA had been
transparent with its data, everyone would have demanded the MAX
be grounded before a second crash.
It is now your responsibility to make sure the FAA is
completely transparent while it reviews whether to unground the
MAX. Will you commit to making every document and study related
to the ungrounding of 737 MAX public?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, I appreciate the question. The
document that you are referring to is actually not a predictive
document, it is a decision support tool. It really is an
actuarial calculation that is designed to, when an unsafe
condition is identified, designed to make sure that we are----
Senator Markey. Will you make every document available--
every document? It is an easy question. It is an easy question,
Mr. Dickson. Will you make every document available for the
public?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not sure what normal protocol is
on that but we will be as transparent as we possibly can.
Senator Markey. No. No, that is not the question. Not as
you can. That is what happened the last time. You weren't
transparent the last time. Will you commit to making every
document public?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not in a position to commit to
that at this point.
Senator Markey. Well, if you are not then you are part of a
cover-up--then you are just--you are complicit. You are not
providing the information which is going to be needed. And I
just want to follow up for a second on what Senator Blumenthal
was just asking because despite all of its wrongdoing, Boeing
has barely been held accountable for these tragic crashes.
Although Boeing's former CEO was fired, he left the company
with a $60 million golden parachute.
Boeing's new CEO was sent off at an offer of $7 million
bonus for rushing the MAX back into service. And Boeing has
failed to even settle the claims of victims' families in the
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 lawsuits. And I find this lack of
accountability absolutely outrageous. The flying public cannot
trust that Boeing has learned its lessons until the company and
people responsible are held to task for the 346 deaths they
caused.
So I am appalled, but not surprised Boeing is now arguing
in court that the FAA certification of the 737 MAX should
shield it from liability to the victims? families, even though
the plane was clearly unsafe and defective. Again, I want to
follow up on Senator Blumenthal. Administrator Dickson, do you
support Boeing's position or should the victims' families be
able to hold Boeing accountable for a defective plane
regardless of whether the company complied with broken FAA
regulations?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not in a position to comment on
that, but I would certainly be willing to follow up with you on
that question.
Senator Markey. Look, there is no way that Boeing should
escape liability. I think you know that and I think it is going
to be important for you ultimately to make a statement to the
effect that Boeing had a responsibility to ensure that this
plane was safe, and if it did not act that way, that they
should be held accountable. And I think the FAA and you should
make a statement to that effect.
Mr. Dickson. Senator Markey, I just want to make clear that
the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with
Boeing. Absolutely.
Senator Markey. OK, and I think that is important for
people to hear. Boeing has responsibility for making a safe
product. And am glad you clarified that.
Mr. Dickson. Absolutely.
Senator Markey. Because it is important for the record to
indicate that it is not just the FAA but Boeing itself that has
responsibility. And if they did not discharge that
responsibility, they should be made liable to these families.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. And thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell.
Administrator Dickson, the duty of our committee is to closely
examine the failures of both the Federal Aviation
Administration and Boeing to prevent the tragedies that
occurred last year. We must re-examine the current system that
allow for a much too cozy relationship between regulators and
companies including Boeing.
I want to make this point crystal clear. Boeing's efforts
to push for more self-certification and to push the FAA to move
faster and faster to approve the 737 MAX were totally
counterproductive and resulted in tragedy. This continues to be
a case study of the complete and total failure of self-
regulation.
And I think this will go down as one of the big mistakes in
history in this area. Mr. Dickson, last month in the FAA's
response to the special committee's report, you said the
Administration would increase staff at the office at the middle
of this investigation, the organization, designation, authority
of the ODA office. The 2018 FAA bill required that FAA do so.
Why has it taken over a year and hundreds of lives lost before
you committed to expanding this office as required by law?
Mr. Dickson. Senator Udall, appreciate your question. We
stood up the ODA office toward the end--well actually well in
advance of the budget request, but we didn't have the resources
at that point for permanently staffing it. That is what that
2021 request will allow us to do.
Senator Udall. I support legislation before this Committee
that would reform the ODA process. I believe that it is
essential to prevent future accidents. Does the FAA recommend
any reforms to ODA?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. As I have mentioned several times
this morning, certainly the implementation of safety management
systems, the use of safety risk management integrated system,
safety assessments, is very important as well as the
consideration of the operating environment around the globe.
These are some of the recommendations that we have responded to
and I think they are very consistent with where the Committee
is headed in this area.
Senator Udall. Have you implemented those changes already?
Mr. Dickson. Well with respect to the--we are working on
them. We are in the process of--we have plans to recruit in
system safety engineers and software engineers as well, as well
as additional human factors experts. We are also on our triple
7x certification plan. We are using a technical advisory board
as we did with the MAX. And as you know with the 737 MAX, we
have retained every aspect of that project as well, including
the issuance of the individual aircraft air awarding
certificates and we will continue to do that until we see that
through.
Senator Udall. An important component in the certification
process is that the FAA must be made aware of changes a company
makes to its equipment, but reports say that the FAA was not
aware of the significance of the changes Boeing made to the
equipment of the 737 MAX. What specific steps or policy changes
has Boeing made to regain trust of the FAA and the American
people, and how can you assure us that Boeing will truly comply
with all regulatory requirements in the future?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, it is a great question. Boeing
has voluntarily implemented some aspects of safety management
system. They have made some changes to their internal
processes. We are seeing a culture shift in some areas, but
there is more work to be done, and we are going to stay right
on that process to make sure that we see this through as we
continue to reform our processes in the agency around voluntary
safety reporting and safety management systems as well.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Rosen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
Cantwell, Administrator Dickson, and Mr. Stumo. I am incredibly
sorry for your loss and for the loss of all the souls on planes
that crashed in this fashion. And so today I want to talk a
little bit about Boeing, more Boeing specific questions
building on some of the topics that have already been asked.
And I would like to revisit a topic that I raised with Boeing
CEO when he came before this panel.
According to news reports, when the Brazilian National
Civil Aviation Agency came to the U.S. in 2017 to test out the
MAX 8, they determined the changes made to the old 737 were
significant enough that they needed much more information from
Boeing and were going to provide it to their pilots. When
Brazil's Aviation Authority eventually published it, they
published their pilot training requirements, it was therefore
able to flag the MCAS as one of the changes that the pilots
needed to take into consideration when flying the MAX 8.
And yet, for U.S. pilots, MCAS was not mentioned in their
manual. So Administrator Dickson, why was that the case and why
didn't the FAA not seek additional information for Boeing on
the MCAS system?
Mr. Dickson. Senator Rosen, thank you for the question. I
am on record and I strongly believe that it should have been in
the material, in the operations material that was provided to
the pilots. Anything that affects the flight control system of
the airplane, the pilots should have. So I think that I have
concerns about how that was initially done.
Senator Rosen. I appreciate that. So, can you assure us
that moving forward, the FAA will make it a practice when other
countries make significant changes to their product manuals
based on major operational changes, that the FAA will consider
or absolutely do this, doing so as well and notifying our U.S.
Airlines and pilots to prevent any tragedies?
Mr. Dickson. That is a great question. We do that now
through the certification management team with the other states
of design. And depending on the operating environment in
different parts of the world or how pilots are trained, there
may be differences of opinion of exactly what those details
are, but yes, I can----
Senator Rosen. Would you agree with me that it might be
better to over-inform than to not inform at all so that way on
the off chance that somebody might not know, isn't it always
better to give a little bit more information?
Mr. Dickson. I would--that is how I was going to finish the
sentence. So I think that if there is any doubt that having
that information available is always going to be a better place
to be.
Senator Rosen. And then I would just like to follow up with
those little time I have left more broadly. Can you please
speak to what steps you are taking to ensure that manufacturers
disclose those safety critical systems that are not activated
by the flight crew? How do you plan to be sure that this
information is disclosed in pilot manuals because they need to
know what is under their control and what maybe isn't, how they
do the overrides.
Mr. Dickson. So really two things. The integration of the
pilots earlier in the design process is going to be very
important. In fact, we are undertaking training our technical
pilots and our inspectors within the FAA who aren't
certification experts but who are in that aircraft evaluation
group, train them on things like system safety assessments and
certification processes so they are actually embedded earlier
on in the certification process. And that will put us in a much
better position to have visibility into those issues during
the--as a certification of a particular project goes forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
Duckworth. We are able to be joined remotely by Senator
Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Hello, can you hear me now?
The Chairman. Yes, OK. Thank you. Yes, glad to hear your
voice.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.
Administrator Dickson, I apologize I can't be on video right
now, but it is good to see you again. I have several questions
for you. So in the interest of time, please limit your answers
to yes and no. Given that the FAA is responsible for aviation
safety in the United States, your agency can take corrective
measures including legal enforcement actions for violations of
the Federal aviation regulations. Is this correct?
Mr. Dickson. That is correct.
Senator Duckworth. It is FAA--I am sorry. It is FAA policy
to investigate complaints of low-flying aircraft that endanger
persons or property. Is that correct?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, any kind of reckless operation of an
aircraft is responsibility of the pilot in command and that is
something that we would want to investigate and look into.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Now, with some flexibility
for helicopters in my FAR AIM manual from 2018, so maybe some
things have changed but I doubt it, FAA regulations require a
minimum altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle for
congested areas, including any open-air assembly of person. Is
this correct?
Mr. Dickson. I believe that is correct. I would have to go
back and verify that for myself.
Senator Duckworth. I don't. You fly--you are used to bigger
and faster aircraft--but I did----
Mr. Dickson. You need to check me out on a helicopter
sometime.
Senator Duckworth. Well, you know the last one I flew got a
big hole in the--so I might not be the right person----
[Laughter.]
Senator Duckworth. And Mr. Dickson, this military related
to--Lakota--pull up the slide. This aircraft was flown roughly
100 feet above peaceful protesters in downtown Washington, D.C.
on June 1. Are you as outraged as I am about this extremely
dangerous maneuver?
Mr. Dickson. I am not . . . well, we are looking into that,
Senator. I am aware of the circumstances and we're looking at
this from a compliance with air traffic regulations in addition
to the operation of the aircraft and it is an ongoing
investigation. I believe what you are referring to took place
within the prohibited area, which is not under active control.
But the pilot in command still is responsible for following the
safety regulations.
Senator Duckworth. OK. Well--I am going to have to question
you along those lines in just a minute. But before that, the
International Red Cross emblem, as you can see on this Lakota
aircraft, is painted on, is a university recognized symbol of
Medical Aid and its use is prohibited under the Geneva
Convention.
If staff could pull up slide two. Mr. Dickson, what about
this UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flown above protesters on the
same night? Like the Lakota, did this helicopter endanger
civilians on the ground and potentially violate FAA safety
regulations?
Mr. Dickson. We have not--again, it is under investigation.
We are looking into it carefully and I would be happy to follow
up with you once we have completed our review.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. These helicopters were
reportedly flown by the D.C. National Guard, which is the only
National Guard unit in the Nation that reports directly to the
President of the United States due to D.C.'s unique political
status.
According to local news reports, the downward force of this
helicopter's rotor blade, more commonly known as rotor wash,
knocked a nearby small tree. Mr. Dickson, as you said, you are
talking about looking into it. Are you saying that the D.C.
flight status district office has opened an investigation into
these events?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, we have opened an investigation.
Senator Duckworth. When do you expect the investigation's
final report to be available?
Mr. Dickson. I do not know this morning, but I will follow
up with you as it proceeds.
Senator Duckworth. Wonderful. So you will commit to
providing my office with the copy of the report as soon as
possible?
Mr. Dickson. We will provide you with the results of the
investigation, yes.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Now, if staff can pull up
slide three, please. Mr. Dickson, from an aviation safety
perspective, do you agree with this tweet from President Trump
who is condoning dangerous maneuvers to intimidate American
protesters on American soil? He tweeted, ``the problem is not
the very talented, low-flying helicopter pilots wanting to save
our city, the problem is the arsonists, looters, criminals, and
anarchists, wanting to destroy it and our country.'' Do you
agree with this tweet?
Mr. Dickson. I am not really--I am not familiar with--it is
the first time I have seen it. But I am not familiar with it.
And I don't know how it applies--I am not sure how it applies
to this particular situation. But as I said Senator, we will
look into the facts of this particular event.
The Chairman. Senator Duckworth, we have had a technical
issue. I believe you have referred to three slides and let's
enter those into the record, without objection. Is there any
objection?
[No response.]
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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The Chairman. Then it will be done. Thank you, Senator
Duckworth.
Senator Baldwin.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I--Mr. Dickson,
this past December, Amy Gannon and her 13 year old daughter,
Jocelyn were killed in a helicopter crash while on a family
vacation in Hawaii. Amy Gannon was a local business leader and
an advocate for entrepreneurs in Wisconsin and she was an
energetic and positive presence for the Madison area in
Wisconsin and, in fact, the whole state.
I understand that there is an ongoing NTSB investigation
into that helicopter crash, but I would also note for you and
this committee the serious whistleblower allegations of
misconduct at the FAA and that the whistleblower has said that
he was prevented from inspecting the Safari aviation aircraft
prior to its crash in December.
So Mr. Dickson, can I have your commitment to working with
me to help ensure that what happened to the Gannon family is
not repeated for any other family?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. As I have said many times, you
know, we have got to make sure that we are doing everything
possible to promote aviation safety. Helicopter air tours and
other operations of this type are not where they need to be
from a safety perspective and it is a big focus for the agency.
We are engaged in training our inspectors to make sure that
they have the appropriate background and familiarity with this
type of operation. So we would welcome working with you on this
subject.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Mr. Dickson, in December,
Senator Duckworth and I sent you and Secretary Chao a letter
following up on a bipartisan amendment with now Chairman Wicker
that we have included in the FAA Reauthorization Act. That
amendment required the Department of Transportation to review
existing regulations and standards ensuring assistance for
passengers with disabilities in air transportation.
Specifically, our letter noted a concern that current
regulations do not require hands-on training for employees or
contractors when moving passengers, including those with spinal
cord injuries. Passengers have been dropped during the transfer
process and this is unacceptable. I have not yet received a
response to our letter which requested an update on your review
of existing regulations and standards. Can you share that
update with me now?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, this is a matter that is not within,
specifically within the FAA's purview. It is within the
aviation policy area of the Department, but I will take--right
after this hearing, I will take it and we will get an update
for you from the Department.
Senator Baldwin. Mr. Chairman, I can't currently see the
time clock.
The Chairman. A minute and a half.
Senator Baldwin. Oh, excellent. So I--Administrator
Dickson, at your confirmation hearing before this committee
just over a year ago, I noted the ongoing investigations at the
FAA here in Congress and within the DOT Inspector Generals and
the Department of Justice. I asked you then, if confirmed, what
would you require of Boeing before ungrounded the 737 MAX? In
the year that you have been Administrator of the FAA, some of
these investigations have, in fact, concluded and produced
reports with recommendations and other investigations,
including the Department of Transportation Office of
Investigator General audit, have not yet concluded.
We continue to see reports in the media of Boeing's plans.
Most recently that Boeing is aiming at conducting a key
certification test later this month. So I want to ask you the
very same question that I asked you a little over a year ago,
as head of FAA, what will you require of Boeing before giving
the green light to ungrounded that 737 MAX?
Mr. Dickson. We will--it is a great question. We will
require every step of the process to be completed. We are not
on any timeline. I have said many times to my team that we are
going to retain every aspect and we will work the process
through to completion however long that takes. We won't have
undue delays. We will be ready to go.
But one of the things that we have been working with Boeing
on, and we have seen some improvements, have been to give us
complete data submissions in the certification work as we have
gone forward and we will continue to do that. Also, as we work
forward, there are some civil penalty actions that we have
taken.
I believe it is the second largest civil penalty in the
history of the FAA against Boeing, and we will continue to look
at their performance, and I reserve the right to hold them
accountable moving forward as well on that way if that is
necessary.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Cruz.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dickson, a
little over a year ago, you sat before this committee at your
confirmation hearing. At the time I and others told you to be
pissed off at what had happened. You have been in office 329
days. We have heard today that you are stonewalling the
Chairman's investigations, that you are refusing to answer
multiple letters from at least one of my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle, Senator Blumenthal, and that you have
yet to provide responsive documents to Mr. Stumo's FOIA request
filed 8 months ago. May I ask you some simple questions? In the
process of certification of the 737 MAX, did Boeing lie to the
FAA?
Mr. Dickson. I can't say--I mean, definitely there was
incomplete information and fragmented information that was
provided. No doubt.
Senator Cruz. Why did one of their senior test pilots, Mr.
Forker, write in a text, ``so I basically lied to the
regulators unknowingly.''?
Mr. Dickson. I don't know. I can't speak for him. I don't
know what he meant by that, Senator.
Senator Cruz. So in 329 days what have you been doing if
not figuring out whether they lied and what they lied about?
Mr. Dickson. I am interested in learning from the past and
making the process and the agency more effective and better
going forward. The important point is that the information was
not provided in the way that it needed to be provided. That in
itself degrades the trust that we need to have as a foundation
to the certification process.
Senator Cruz. OK. Let's learn----
Mr. Dickson. Whether an individual lied, I can't----
Senator Cruz. Let's learn from the past. Did the FAA screw-
up in certifying the 737 MAX?
Mr. Dickson. I have concerns I would say that there were
mistakes made, yes.
Senator Cruz. So, in Washington the passive voice is a
classic tell. Mistakes were made is a great way of avoiding
responsibility because there is no actor in that phrase
mistakes were made. Who made the mistakes and why? Don't speak
in the passive voice.
Mr. Dickson. The manufacturer made mistakes and the FAA
made mistakes in its oversight of the manufacturer.
Senator Cruz. And what were the mistakes and why were they
made?
Mr. Dickson. The full implications of the flight control
system were not understood as design changes were made.
Senator Cruz. Has anyone at FAA been fired?
Mr. Dickson. There have been changes in leadership in
various areas. No one has been fired over this particular
matter up to this point.
Senator Cruz. Has anyone been disciplined over this matter?
Mr. Dickson. No, not specifically.
Senator Cruz. So unknown somebodies made unspecified
mistakes for which there have been no repercussions. Is that
right?
Mr. Dickson. I would not say that there have not been
repercussions.
Senator Cruz. Well, please tell us the repercussions.
Mr. Dickson. The repercussions are that we are--we have
significant reforms we are making to the process and we are
standing up audit processes and review processes and more
robust safety systems so that we can be more effective in the
future as an organization.
Senator Cruz. Is there a systemic problem of agency capture
at the FAA?
Mr. Dickson. You know, I remember us having this
conversation, Senator, and I don't believe that it is agency
capture but I do believe that when you have very capable
technical subject matter experts, that they get focused on
their checklist, or their part of the process, they hold
themselves accountable for that, and they don't always see the
whole picture.
So that is why we need as leaders to make sure that we are
taking an integrated approach in our dealings, in this case
what the manufacturer, air carrier, whatever the private sector
regulated party is that we are responsible for overseeing.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Dickson, in your opening statement, you
said, ``safety is a journey not a destination.'' For the 346
souls lost on the two 737 MAXs that crashed, safety was all
about arriving at their destination. They should have arrived
at the destination had Boeing not covered up serious safety
concerns, number one, and had the FAA done its job of making
sure that the MCAS was not put in the field without pilots
being appropriately trained.
I think the concern this committee has is we are not seeing
from you any of the urgency of fixing this problem. It is very
easy to go into an agency and yourself get captured by the
agency. You understand, sir? You do not work for the Airlines
and you do not work for Boeing. You work for the American
people. And this committee expects transparency.
This committee expects that when we ask questions
specifically about malfeasance that cost the lives of 346
people, that you will be forthcoming and answer those
questions. And I am hopeful that is the conduct we will see
going forward. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Now I
thank the Chairman for holding today's hearing is part of this
committee's continued oversight of aircraft certification in
the wake of the two tragic crashes in Indonesian and Ethiopia.
My deepest sympathies remain with the families of the victims
and we want to thank them for being here today.
And I want to associate myself with the comments that have
already been made by the Chairman and other members of the
Committee emphasizing the importance of being responsive to
requests for documents and other information as we conduct
oversight. I hope you are hearing loudly and clearly, Mr.
Dickson, how critical that is to the work that we do and the
work that you do in order to keep the flying public safe.
One of the major lessons that we learned from these tragic
accidents is that a thorough consideration of human factors
should become a more fundamental component of the design and
testing of new aircraft, especially as avionics systems become
increasingly complex. Where do you see opportunities for the
FAA to improve its consideration of human factors in the
aircraft certification process?
Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, Senator. First of all,
it is bolstering our human factors expertise. So there is a
workforce component in addition to working with Academia and
NASA on these issues. Frankly, also involving our pilots and
our flight standards group, our aircraft evaluation group into
the certification process as an earlier and more integrated
point in the process.
It will allow us to take a more holistic view of that role
of the human in aircraft design and not look at them as
independently as they have been in the past. And because it is
more than a matter of just training a pilot to operate a
particular machine. We want to make sure that the pilot is
viewed as a part of the design.
Senator Thune. Good. Well, that was one of the things I
think that we learned as there were gaps in training as well
and seems like a bit serious issue to be addressed. You
mentioned in your testimony the FAA will need to ensure that
personnel receive the training they need to adequately adapt to
an industry that is constantly adopting new technologies and
implementing complex systems. In line with that discussion,
what initiatives is FAA pursuing to ensure the current
personnel have the training they need as well as recruit and
hire new personnel?
Mr. Dickson. Well, that is, again a great question. Our
aviation safety organization has a 10-year workforce plan and
we are in the process of continually reviewing our needs. In
our response to the Secretary's Special Committee report, we
will have a focus again on human factors experts but also
system engineers, software engineers, and data scientists so
that we can stay ahead of new technologies as they are
introduced.
Senator Thune. Your testimony also discussed, and you
mentioned it just previously here. The FAA has plans to adopt a
more holistic approach when it comes to certification
consistent with recommendations from the special committee to
review the FAA's aircraft certification process. This includes
better coordination between various FAA offices and adoption of
a safety management system for aircraft manufacturers. How does
the FAA plan to improve coordination between offices such as
the Aircraft Certification Service and flight standards
responsible for different aspects of the certification process?
Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. We have recently
initiated a program to train our aviation safety inspectors who
are involved in the aircraft evaluation group on many of the
processes that our aircraft certification engineers actually
use so that they are able to participate more fully in all
phases of that process.
In addition to that, we are standing up a project
management or program management function that will take these
programs where you have over a period of years and sometimes
you have personnel changes and people who may not be there
throughout the whole 5 to 7 years of the project to make sure
that the entire project hangs together from beginning to end.
So those two functions should improve the coordination. That is
the goal between those two parts of the agency.
Senator Thune. Can you speak quickly here to how requiring
adoption of a safety management system for manufacturers would
benefit FAA's oversight of the certification process?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. SMS has many benefits. I think
it is actually the most important step that we can take to
improve aircraft certification. On the company's side the
manufacturer puts, again, safety responsibility where it
belongs and it promotes transparency and voluntary employee
reporting on safety issues.
And it refocuses accountability for product safety to the
highest levels of the company. On the agency side, it allows us
to oversee the system and the process, and it reinforces the
sharing of data in a dynamic process between the manufacturer
and the agency.
So it greatly improves the regulator's ability to identify
hazards and manage our oversight before a compliance bust
actually occurs. We don't have to wait for that because we are
getting a data feed all throughout the process.
Senator Thune. Good. Thank you. And my time has expired.
Next up, and I think she is with us remotely, is Senator
Sinema. And upon the conclusion of Senator Sinema questions
pending any other Senators' appearances, we will move to the
second panel.
Senator Sinema.
STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator
Dickson, many Airlines require passengers and crew to wear
masks on airplanes. Hpwever, reports have shown that
enforcement for non-compliance has been uneven and difficult.
The CDC tells us that masking is a vital tool for public
health, particularly in places where social distancing is not
possible like airplane cabins. The FAA needs to do more to
ensure that the aviation system is mitigating the spread of the
virus. Right now the FAA only has recommendations but no
Federal requirements for masks. Why isn't the FAA mandating
masks on flights, and what more can you do to ensure that
passengers are wearing masks?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator, and we have been
working throughout as the aviation safety authority to provide
our aviation expertise to the public health authorities. And as
Secretary Chao has said, we believe that is--our space is in
aviation safety and their space is in public health.
Having said that, we have made those standards available to
the Airlines and to labor, stakeholders, and others. I have
told them very specifically that I expect for them to abide by
and enforce those standards, including the wearing of face
coverings on commercial aircraft. And we will continue to do
that.
We are seeing in recent days the adoption of more stringent
enforcement on the part of the Airlines and we will continue to
monitor that situation using the Airlines' safety systems to
make sure that they are following through.
Senator Sinema. So, does the FAA plan to mandate that masks
are worn on flights? It sounds like you are recommending this
and you are telling us about your expectation, but there is no
enforcement mechanism.
Mr. Dickson. We do not plan to provide an enforcement
specifically on that issue. However, we are reviewing their
voluntary safety programs to make sure that they are following
through.
Senator Sinema. On a related topic, as you might know, I am
working on legislation with Senator Cruz to create a contact
tracing mechanism for international travelers as they enter our
country during COVID-19. Given your position on the Interagency
Task Force addressing COVID related issues, can you discuss the
importance of contact tracing mechanisms for travelers during
pandemics and detail any ongoing efforts that you are taking to
address this issue?
Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, Senator. We have been
involved in the contact tracing work since the very early days,
really dating back to January, frankly. And again, we are using
our aviation expertise to act as a facilitator between the
Airlines in this case and the public health authorities who can
manage that data. And the question is, that is a need that we
all have, we all agree with that.
The Department is engaged in this as well. And we certainly
have an open mind, but we are trying to make sure that that
information gets ingested into the systems where the CDC can
conduct the contact tracing that it needs to conduct.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Airports in Arizona, including
Sky Harbor and Phoenix, Tucson and the Phoenix Mesa Gateway,
have asked for more tools to speed up the construction of the
airport infrastructure. Earlier this week, I introduced
legislation with Senator Young, the Expedited Delivery of
Airport Infrastructure Act, to incentivize more efficient
completion of airport construction projects.
Our bill would allow airports to use airport improvement
program funds to incentivize faster airport projects. Have you
had a chance to review our legislation and do you have any
thoughts on helping airports expedite these projects?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator. I am familiar with
the proposal. I have not actually seen the legislative text.
But from what I understand, it is consistent with the need to
streamline and facilitate infrastructure projects. So as I
understand it, it is something that we would support and the
Department would support.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back my time.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very, very much. And now
pursuant to the statement made by Mr. Thune, we will move to
the next panel. Mr. Administrator, thank you very much for your
presentation today, and we certainly look forward to following
up with you----
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman.--on all other matters. Let me go ahead and
before we excuse you, we will have questions for the record as
I am sure you are familiar. Upon receipt, we ask you to submit
your written answers to the Committee as soon as possible. And
I am sure you will do that. So at this point, thank you, sir.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
The Chairman. And if staff will assist Mr. Stumo in coming
to the microphone, we will begin our second panel. And a vote
is occurring. And again, we are going to pass the gavel around
and try to accommodate Senators and the schedule. And so if we
are ready, our next panel is Mr. Michael Stumo.
As we said earlier, father of Samya Rose Stumo who
tragically died on Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. Mr. Stumo,
thank you for your presence today. And you have a written
statement which will be submitted in its entirety and we ask
you now to summarize your testimony. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL STUMO, FATHER OF SAMYA ROSE STUMO, VICTIM
OF ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT ET302
Mr. Stumo. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
Cantwell, members of this committee. Chairman Wicker and
Ranking Member Cantwell, appreciate your recent legislative
proposal, which is an improvement. I will have some ideas from
me and the families in how it can be further improved. The ET
302 families are also indebted to you, Ranking Member Cantwell,
for dedicating time and effort to learning about our families,
the facts, and the solutions so there is not a third crash.
Samya's 26th birthday will be in less than 2 weeks. I speak for
my family. I don't speak for the other ET 302 families.
The Lion Air plane crashed into the Java Sea on October 29,
2018 killing all 189 passengers. That Boeing 737 MAX 8 was only
three months old. After an angle of attack sensor failed, the
pilots fought with what we now know is the MCAS system for 13
minutes before the crash. FAA didn't ground the plane. Boeing
put out a statement saying, ``the MAX 8 is as safe as any
airplane that has ever flown the skies.'' It was not. March 10,
my daughter Samy was traveling on her first international trip
for her employer, Thinkwell.
She flew from Dulles to Ethiopia for a layover. After she
arrived, she texted us, just landed in Addis Ababa, another two
hours to Nairobi. She never made it. Samya boarded the MAX
around 8:30 local time. That aircraft was only about four
months old. Again, the angle of attack sensor failed and this
new plane. the MCAS, again, repeatedly engaged in pushing the
nose down to the ground. Samya experienced six minutes of
roller coaster terror. So did the others on the plane.
The plane plowed into an Ethiopian farm field, buried
itself dozens of feet into the ground. When my family and I
visited the crash site, we saw that the plane and the
passengers had broken into small pieces, and were mixed
together with jet fuel. The first crash should not have
happened. The second crash is inexcusable. Between the crashes
and December 18--December 3, 2018, we now know that FAA had
done an internal risk assessments projecting 15 more crashes of
the MAX in its lifetime.
In a slideshow dated December 18, 2018, Boeing was
reassuring FAA that pilots could handle MCAS failures. They
could respond immediately, react immediately, fix it
immediately. FAA, we now know, secretly asked Boeing for a
software fix in 10 months to keep the plane going. The crash
happened before 10 months was up. They gambled, we lost. So the
MAX was a plane developed in the Obama era, but certified March
2017. It was a deadly aircraft with ill-fitting engines bolted
to a fifty-year-old fuselage. Rather than fixing the
aerodynamic design of the aircraft, Boeing took the cheap way
out using glitchy software that relied upon input from a single
sensor to push the nose of the plane down to the ground in
certain situations.
This was a pattern at Boeing. In 2013, they minimized the
MCAS to FAA saying it was an extension of the existing speed
trim system. Everything I am saying here has all been found in
reports. And those reports are linked in my testimony. In 2016,
they drastically strengthened the MCAS and designated it as a
safety-critical system. And that phrase means something,
safety-critical systems.
We now know that the chief Boeing test pilot bragged about
Jedi mind trick in the FAA into accepting less pilot training.
In 2017 another Boeing employee said, ``the airplane is
designed by clowns who, in turn, were supervised by monkeys.''
In 2018, yet another employee wrote, ``I still haven't been
forgiven by God for covering up what I did last year.'' Boeing
engineers told us--have told us the families that the FAA and
industry is allowed undue influence on safety engineers to
creep in.
The prior system resisted undue influence because FAA
appointed, they removed, and they supervised Boeing engineers
involved with certification duties. Now FAA allows Boeing to
self-certify. Boeing engineers are cut off from FAA technical
specialists. By reporting only to Boeing managers, profit and
timeline pressures can overwhelm the safety culture. The prior
system resisted undue influence. The current ODA practice
invites undue influence.
Last October, a committee of International Aviation
Regulators, the Joint Authorities Technical Review Committee
released a report critical of FAA and the MAX. The report also
found the undue influence, found many problems with the FAA
reducing direct involvement with critical-safety systems. That
is what the international report found. They were too much
reducing direct involvement with critical-safety systems. They
determined that the FAA engineering staff overseeing Boeing
were too few, too unqualified to do so.
FAA has never responded to that report. EASA, the European
agency and Transport Canada told FAA last year they will
independently validate its findings rather than deferring as
they have to FAA. The FAA's core vision appears to be to reduce
this direct involvement in certification and merely push paper
and watch PowerPoint presentations.
The agency seems comfortable to be as one Boeing employee
said, ``dogs watching TV.'' I expect better. So do the ET 302
families and the flying public. My time is up. I am happy to
spell out the legislative changes in any question/answer
session. Thank you for allowing me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stumo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Stumo, Father of Samya Rose Stumo, Victim
of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302
Thank you Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and the members
of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for holding
this hearing and allowing me to submit this written statement.
My name is Michael Stumo and I am the father of Samya Rose Stumo
who died on flight ET302 on March 10, 2019. Her 26th birthday will be
in less than two weeks. I speak for my family but not for the other
ET302 families.
Recent legislation introduced by Senators Wicker and Cantwell
improves upon a prior version of the bill. But it is not yet supported
by my family or, as many have communicated to me, the other families of
Flight ET302. My testimony includes several issues that must be
addressed in future improvements to this legislation.
1. The JT610 Crash
A Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018
killing all 189 passengers. The Lion Air plane was only three months
old. The flight JT610 pilots fought with what we now know was the MCAS
system for 13 minutes before the crash. An angle of attack (AoA) sensor
had previously malfunctioned and been replaced. The replacement sensor
again malfunctioned, there was no redundancy in case of failure and
thus the MCAS system repeatedly pushed the nose down until it
overpowered the pilots and slammed the plane into the sea.
After that crash, the JT610 pilot's mother, Sangeeta Suneja, raised
the alarm about the plane and called for simulator training. But few
paid attention to her. Many blamed the pilots. Boeing said the MAX 8
``is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.''
It was not. My family and I now know much more than before.
2. The ET302 Crash
On March 10 last year, my daughter Samya was traveling on her first
international assignment for her employer. She had recently graduated
from the University of Copenhagen School of Public Health and landed
her dream job at ThinkWell in January 2019 to help cause patient
centered change in the global health field.
Samya flew from Dulles to Addis Ababa. After she arrived, Samya
texted us, ``Just landed in Addis Ababa--another 2 hours to Nairobi.''
She boarded a Boeing 737 MAX 8 at around 8:30a local Addis time. She
sat in seat 16J, an aisle seat.
Flight ET302 was a daily flight between the two cities, often
carrying U.S. diplomats to and from Nairobi. The plane was only four
months old.
As flight ET302 took off, something went wrong with the left hand
angle of attack (AoA) sensor. There was another AoA sensor on the co-
pilots' side. It was working properly but it was not connected to the
MCAS system.
The MCAS system wrongly kicked in, repeatedly pushing the nose down
soon after takeoff. Captain Sully Sullenberger said:
``the failure of an AOA sensor quickly caused multiple
instrument indication anomalies and cockpit warnings. And
because in this airplane type the AOA sensors provide
information to airspeed and altitude displays, the failure
triggered false warnings simultaneously of speed being too low
and also of speed being too fast. The too slow warning was a
`stick-shaker' rapidly and loudly shaking the pilot's control
wheel. The too fast warning was a `clacker', another loud
repetitive noise signaling overspeed. These sudden loud false
warnings would have created major distractions and would have
made it even harder to quickly analyze the situation and take
effective corrective action.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Attachment 3: Testimony of Sully Sullenberger, U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, June
19, 2019 (attached)
For several minutes, the captain used brute physical force to pull
the control yoke back up. He became exhausted and asked for the first
officer's help. During the six minute flight, my daughter was terrified
riding this roller coaster. At 8:43 am local time, the plane plowed
into the ground, in an Ethiopian farm field, and buried itself dozens
of feet below the surface.
The plane and the passengers disintegrated into pieces. Their parts
were mixed up with the jet fuel. I was there. My family and I were at
the crash site. We saw the wreckage. My wife and son saw body parts
exposed to the elements.
3. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 Development and Concealment
The MAX is an Obama era plane that was certified to fly in March
2017, the third month of the Trump administration.
It is a deadly aircraft with ill-fitting engines bolted onto a 50
year old aircraft design. Rather than physically fixing the aerodynamic
design of the aircraft, Boeing took the cheap route. It used glitchy
software that relied upon input from a single sensor to push the nose
of the plane towards the ground in certain conditions.
Even today, the FAA still has not resolved the issue of whether
MCAS exists to make the MAX handle like prior planes or to resolve
aerodynamic instability. Until FAA can answer that question, the MAX
should not fly again. It may be that the aircraft is so flawed that
physical changes, rather than software fixes, are required.
Boeing hid MCAS for many years. In June 2013 the company first
devised a plan to conceal MCAS from the public and to minimize its
existence for the FAA. It was described as merely ``an addition to [the
existing] speed trim [system]''.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``The Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft: Costs, Consequences, and Lessons
from its Design, Development and Certification,'' The House Committee
on Transportation & Infrastructure, p7, March 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2016, Boeing drastically strengthened MCAS' ability to push the
MAX's nose down. It never informed the FAA or anyone else of this
change. Neither Boeing nor FAA performed a safety assessment which was
necessary for critical safety systems. In May 2019, then-Acting FAA
Administrator Dan Elwell admitted that Boeing and the FAA failed to
designate MCAS as a safety critical system.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The MCAS violated Boeing's internal requirements requiring that the
systems should ``not interfere with dive recovery'' and ``not have any
objectionable interaction with the piloting of the airplane.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effort to hide MCAS continued throughout 2016 as the FAA
allowed Boeing to remove references to MCAS from Boeing's Flight Crew
Operations Manual.\5\ The company wanted to avoid simulator training.
In November 2016, Boeing chief technical pilot Mark Forkner wrote to a
colleague that he was ``jedi-mind tricking regulators into accepting''
lesser pilot training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One Boeing employee rejoiced when the FAA said there should only be
computer-based training, without a simulator. ``You can be away from an
NG for 30 years and still be able to jump into a MAX? LOVE IT!! . . .
This is a big part of the operating cost structure in our marketing
decks.''
In 2017, a Boeing employee wrote, about the MAX, ``This airplane is
designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys.'' In 2018,
another employee wrote ``I still haven't been forgiven by God for the
covering up I did last year.''
The FAA's years long drive to delegate everything and relegate
staff to paper pushers and presentation watchers resulted in Boeing
employees mocking them as ``dogs watching TV.'' The FAA remains happy
to be sidelined, rather than have direct involvement in certification.
4. Between the Crashes: What were they doing?
After the Lion Air crash, FAA knew that MCAS was a problem, but
failed to ground the plane. They blamed the pilots for not winning the
fight with the then-secret MCAS system.
One can argue whether the FAA and Boeing should have known about
the aerodynamics issues, the AoA sensor and MCAS's catastrophic risks
before JT610. But after JT610, there is no excuse.
On December 3, 2018, the FAA's internal risk assessment projected
that there would be at least 15 more MAX crashes without a fix.\6\ The
agency did not require Boeing to fix the problem but instead issued an
Airworthiness Directive that still did not disclose the MCAS. Rather it
re-iterated the procedure for handling runaway trim, which Captain
Sullenberger said was very different. American Airlines pilots, in a
meeting with Boeing, complained that the company hid MCAS from them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Attachment 4: Boeing slides prepared for FAA, December 18,
2020, obtained and publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But secretly the FAA asked Boeing for a software fix within 10
months. My daughter died in the ET302 crash before the 10 months were
up. They gambled with her life, and we lost. As did 156 others on the
plane.
Even in December 2018, Boeing was falsely reassuring the FAA that
pilots could handle MCAS failures. In a slide deck obtained by the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Boeing told FAA
that:
repeated MCAS activation were readily recognizable and able
to be counteracted;
the action to counter the failure should not require
exceptional piloting skill or strength;
the pilot will take immediate action to counter; and
trained flight crew memory procedures shall be followed.
(See attached Boeing slide deck from December 18, 2018, page
11).
There was no evidence that pilots could react immediately. In fact,
Boeing own analysis revealed that if pilots took more than 10 seconds
to react, the result would be catastrophic.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft, supra at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. FAA Resistance and Denial Continues
To this day, the FAA has not admitted any mistakes. Instead, it
strategically shifts the focus to its US-centric history of no recent
crashes despite the international reach of America's aviation system.
My family hoped that new Administrator Steve Dickson would show
leadership and clean up the agency. But he has not. No new management
team has been chosen. Nobody who made mistakes has been disciplined.
Transparency is proclaimed in words but not by deeds.
Administrator Dickson, Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell and others
promised that families would receive answers to our questions and be
informed of the agency's actions as it determines whether and when to
unground the MAX. We received no documents when we asked for them.
We were then told to submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request. We did so on October 28 2019. But the FAA has still refused to
provide us with any documents in response to that request.
A passenger advocacy group, Flyers Rights, requested information,
pursuant to FOIA, about the data and analysis surrounding whether and
when to return the MAX to service. FAA refused to provide the
information. Flyers Rights went to court seeking an order requiring the
FAA to provide the information. The FAA has used every legal tool in
its arsenal to prevent disclosure of the documents requested.
On August 1, 2019, my wife Nadia and son Tor met with FAA Safety
Director Ali Bahrami who previously worked for an aviation industry
lobby group. He was a substantial part of the FAA's ``blame the pilots
and leave Boeing alone'' approach. Bahrami never admitted to my family
that the FAA made a mistake by not classifying the MCAS as a critical
safety system. When my son asked if there was anything he would do
differently, he said ``no, they did everything right.''
Having been denied information and assistance from the FAA, we
searched for answers on our own. We learned from Boeing engineers that
the change from Designated Engineering Representative (DER) to
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) was a clever and opaque
bureaucratic alphabet soup method to hamstring the safety culture at
Boeing.
Under DER, the FAA appointed, supervised and removed the Boeing
engineers that were designated with certification authority. Boeing
paid the engineers, but the DER reported both to FAA and Boeing. That
dual chain of command prevented the profit and timeline pressures of
Boeing managers from overruling safety concerns.
That safety culture changed when FAA changed to ODA and Boeing was
designated as an organization with certification authority. The Boeing
engineers, now called ARs, were isolated from their FAA counterparts,
reporting only to Boeing managers. Boeing engineers with safety
concerns could be shut down and reassigned if company profit or
timeline goals were threatened.
While it is easy to lose the thread among the acronyms, this
organizational culture and chain of command dynamic must be grasped and
fixed. Boeing engineers told me that the DER system resisted undue
influence while the ODA system invited undue influence.
The Joint Authority Technical Review, composed of international
aviation agency experts, found that ``there are signs of undue pressure
on [Boeing engineers] performing delegated functions''.\8\ Congress
needs to re-establish the direct communication between FAA and Boeing
engineers at the ground level. FAA also needs to be able to appoint,
supervise and remove those Boeing engineers so they cannot be subject
to undue influence from Boeing managers to compromise safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), ``Boeing 737 MAX
Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations,''
pg 28, October 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Joint Authorities Technical Review report also found dozens of
faults with FAA's certification process. It found, for example, that
the FAA's Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO) office is
simply not equipped with the quantity and quality of personnel that can
oversee Boeing. FAA has not responded to that report.
The FAA will continue delegating to Boeing unless Congress stops it
from doing so.
In March 2017, the FAA released a report called ``A Blueprint for
AIR Transformation''. Dorenda Baker, Executive Director of the Aircraft
Certification Service, signed the document.
The AIR Transformation report is a blizzard of management
consulting words conveying aspirations towards communications with
stakeholders, innovation and strategic vision. But the core of that
report was intended to continue getting FAA out of the business of
direct involvement in critical paths of the certification process.
Three unions--PASS, NATCA and AFSCME--wrote a dissenting report showing
how the FAA's paper-pushing, management consulting approach compromises
the safety of aircraft passengers.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Aircraft Certification `Transformation' Pre-Decisional
Involvement Report, Union Recommendations and Dissenting Opinion,
February 6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA's core vision is apparently to push paper and watch power
point presentations compiled by Boeing. The public expects FAA to
engage in direct involvement, acting as the check on an aircraft
manufacturer's urge to cut corners to save a buck.
The FAA currently shows no intention of freeing itself from capture
and directly engaging in certification functions rather than merely
pushing paper. A recent Special Committee report of hand-picked
industry insiders issued a January 16, 2020 document that copied and
pasted past FAA talking points about delegation and its long and safe
history.\10\ Unsurprisingly, FAA agreed saying that ``the delegation
system allows U.S. industry and innovation to thrive''.\11\ Nobody--
except FAA and its handpicked insider committee--believes that this
version of delegation is fine. Congress must be very specific in
demanding more direct involvement by FAA in the certification process
because FAA will not otherwise do it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Official Report of the Special Committee to review the
Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Certification Process,''
Chaired by Lee Moak and Darren W. McDew, January 16, 2020.
\11\ ``Response to Official Report of the Special Committee on the
Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Certification Process,''
Federal Aviation Administration, April 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The October 2019 JATR report, appointed by FAA, found dozens of
problems with FAA's delegation process and the certification of the
MAX. FAA has not responded to the JATR report, apparently choosing only
to respond to more friendly reports.
I have also been told by inside whistleblowers that Boeing did not
engage in safety assessments of critical systems beyond MCAS in the
MAX. Safety assessment is an analysis of the identified hazards for a
system and demonstrates compliance with airworthiness regulations.
Congress should require FAA to disclose the safety assessments for all
critical systems in the MAX before it is allowed to fly again.
6. Legislation needed
ET302 victims families were very disappointed at the lack of
substance in the first draft of legislation filed in the Senate this
month. The second draft filed recently is improved in that it obligates
FAA to appoint, remove and communicate with Boeing engineers performing
certification work. It also protects whistleblowers throughout the
supply chain.
While the recent legislation filed by the Chairman and Ranking
Member improves on a prior version of the bill, this second draft is
not yet supported by my family. We believe that other ET302 families
also oppose it without many more improvements. The legislation must
also include:
1. Rebalance of delegation. It is absolutely critical that
excessive delegation is fixed. FAA must not be allowed to slump
further into paper-pusher status, distant from Boeing
engineering and the plant production floor.
FAA must retain direct involvement in critical safety systems--
as well as novel and new systems--and not delegate its
functions to Boeing. Critical safety systems are those deemed
major, hazardous or catastrophic. FAA must verify that the
fault tree analysis and other analysis are performed to
guarantee redundancies and fail safes to prevent failure. New
and novel systems are, like MCAS, those not included on
aircraft and not fully tested in the past.
2. Lifetime limit for type certificates. The Boeing board,
including current CEO David Calhoun, rejected the option to
develop a new aircraft to compete with Airbus, opting to amend
the old 737 model. They did so to cut corners, save money,
extract profit from legacy product, and avoid many current FAA
safety rules. The original 737 was certified in 1967. Fifty
three years later, it is clear that it should no longer have
modern engines and software bolted on to its old fuselage.
Boeing should have chosen innovation rather than profitable but
unsafe stagnation. A lifetime limit on type certificates should
be mandated, and no more future aircraft designs should be
based on the 737.
3. FAA certification should not equal immunity for Boeing.
Boeing management may bow their heads and express sorrow for
the crash. But in private they are doing everything possible to
prevent families from holding Boeing accountable. Boeing is
asserting, in court, that the fact of FAA certification pre-
empts families from making claims for the loss of our loved
ones. Boeing's conduct should not be awarded with immunity.
This bill should make clear that FAA certification is the bare
minimum that manufacturers like Boeing should meet. While I
hope no family has to experience the loss of a loved one in a
plane crash, legislation should preserve the right to hold all
responsible parties accountable.
4. End the secrecy. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and the FAA have invoked every possible law to prevent
families, Congress and the public from receiving information
about the causes of the crash and the future ungrounding
analysis. The NTSB has prevented the release of many documents
held by Boeing. The FAA has refused to comply with families
FOIA requests citing expansive caselaw protecting company
claims of confidentiality despite the public safety concerns.
The result is zero production of documents to the public. This
Committee should substantially narrow the scope of legal
provisions that hide documents, data and analysis relating to a
crash from the public.
5. Penalties must apply or new law does not matter: Boeing has
paid civil penalties in the past, but that has not stopped the
company from misleading the FAA, pilots and the public. The
company pays the penalty from general funds and goes about
generating more profit. Criminal penalties with the threat of
jail time have the needed deterrent effect for individuals who
must then invoke their personal morality rather than company
goals.
6. Implement the JATR recommendations. The FAA refused to
respond to the Joint Authorities Technical Review report which
it commissioned. The international participants in the report
were not cozy industry insiders and therefore produced a solid
set of findings and recommendations. FAA can congratulate
itself for safety. But the public does not trust it and foreign
aviation agencies are not deferring to it any longer. This
committee's bill should require the FAA to implement the
recommendations in the JATR report.
Thank you.
Attachments
The attachments referenced below can be found on the govinfo.gov
website.
1. FOIA letter, Michael Stumo and Nadia Milleron to FAA, October 28,
2019 (pg 10).
2. Joint Authorities Technical Review report, October 11, 2019 (pp 11-
81).
3. Testimony of Sully Sullenberger, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, June 19, 2019
(pp 82-86).
4. Boeing slides prepared for FAA, December 18, 2019, obtained and
publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure (pp 89-131).
5. FAA Quantitative Risk Assessment, December 3, 2018, obtained and
publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure (pg 132).
6. Letter from Mattieu Willm, a French aeronautical engineer who lost
his sister, Clemence-Isaure Boutan-Willm in the ET302 crash,
dated June 15, 2020 (pp 133-135).
The Chairman. There just aren't any words we can say. In my
opening statement, I mentioned several frustrations I had with
information requests. Your written testimony discusses this
also, so can you describe the current status of your requests?
Mr. Stumo. Our request for further improvement, and we
appreciate the movement that has been made so far in the
legislation. Our requests are to further rebalance delegation
on a substantive level. We appreciate that the FAA under your
bill would appoint, remove, and have direct communication with
the Boeing engineers responsible for certification, but
rebalancing delegation--again, with this whole thing with the
JATR report found that the agency wants to reduce direct
involvement certification, just push paper.
Instead the Congress must require that FAA do its job with
safety-critical systems. That they retain and not delegate
authority over safety critical systems. That means not only
those determined hazardous and catastrophic if they fail but
also major. Because we see that Boeing tried to fit the MCAS
into the major category, which isn't quite as bad as the
hazardous or catastrophic, so that it could minimize
involvement--minimize many things and push profits.
So safety-critical systems is something the FAA should
retain. We should have an FAA red team to look over what the
blue team, so to speak, of the manufacturing engineers are
doing. Number two is a lifetime limit for type certificates
that the MAX was certified the year I was born, 1967. I am 53
and that family is 53. They are trying to cram new engines on
an old fuselage, putting new software on old computers that
don't talk to each other, and at some point you got to innovate
and make a new plane. And that is before 50 years, maybe 25
years, but at some point you make a new plane and you don't--
you make a 21st century aircraft.
And from Boeing's perspective, it is so the Brazilians and
Chinese don't catch up to them like the Japanese did to Ford
and GM in the 70s. Next, FAA certification as we have seen is
flawed. It is not very good in many cases and it should not
equal immunity. Boeing apologizes and says they are going to--
they are very sorry. We are going to do better but in court
they put claims that say we don't have to pay anything because
the FAA certified and that makes us immune. And that is wrong.
And the FAA in other cases has supported that position and
I don't like it and that should change. And that is,
legislation should make that clear. Last, FAA and NTSB secrecy
must end. Any excuse they can have to not--you know, you hear
the words, but we know words and actions are different.
Any excuse to not respond, whether it is you know, we are
too busy or when they do, that is confidential and proprietary
information and you have seen it. When Boeing or these, when
they send documents in and they get out the rubber stamp and
everything says confidential and privileged, even if it is the
dinner menu. And then they all say export control.
And then for NTSB, which is blocking disclosure of
documents that happened between the crashes, they see NX13
covers the dinner menu of ICAO. And so at some point this--they
are just going to use those privileged and confidential excuses
as broadly as they can and there is no penalty for abusing it.
And so Congress has to step in and rebalance the public
interest. So those are what I would say. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for your testimony. And I am
sure you had no intention of becoming an expert in this subject
matter, but we appreciate your insights. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Stumo,
thank you for being here and your wife as well. And again, my
condolences to you and all the families who have been impacted
by this. And again, my thanks for your continued oversight and
communication on these issues because as I said, I have seen
with the Colgan Air families that they have made an impact on
what we have been able to do on safety.
And so I am sure that you will have the same impact, but
nonetheless a very painful experience to continue to focus on
these issues. But I thank you. I wanted to go over a couple of
things about your testimony to ask further details on. I agree
we need the FAA to remain in the driver's seat when it comes to
the certification process and that is what that legislation
does, as you say, making sure that they have oversight over the
employees and the process on a supervisory role and owning the
system.
That is what Chairman Wicker and I have also agreed to in
the legislation. I was a little--I am not little. I was very
surprised to hear that the FAA Administrator not fully support
that concept today. Do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Stumo. We have seen a consistent set of reports from
FAA, including a 20--I think it was a 2017 air transformation
report that is full of, and I refer to it in my written
testimony, that is full of management consulting baloney about
goals and aspirations. But what it boils down to is a dedicated
internal, it appears from the outside, a dedicated internal
process that they are going to withdraw from, you know, the
direct involvement in certification.
And apparently that includes appointing, removing, and
communicating with the Boeing engineers doing a public service
with its certification duties. So it seems to be deeply
embedded and I was surprised too to see how resistant that the
Administrator was to the mere fact that, hey, why don't you
just you know, take a look at these folks. They are not
appointing the janitor they approved. You can remove if they
screw up because we all know people screw up and you make an
appointment and you wish you hadn't.
And you have supervision that is going on in between
because that is what we have heard from Boeing engineers that
have been around in the DER system and the ODA system, that if
when you have Boeing appointments and they are siloed only on
the Boeing side, the safety culture can get totally overwhelmed
by the profit and timeline pressures which always exist, but
you have got no one else. You are a Boeing engineer, you have
got to respond to the Boeing manager and you don't have the FAA
side because you don't even know who they are.
And the BASO office, the Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight
Office, has 27 engineers that are supposedly overseeing 1,500
Boeing engineers and all they can do is look at reams of paper
that get delivered and put rubber stamps to them. So there is
something--you know, delegation has been around a long time,
but we got to rebalance it in the way that your bill has stated
and so I was indeed surprised.
Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you for that. I also--you
know, I agree with you and thank you for keeping, bringing up
those numbers as it relates to the oversight office itself.
Clearly our bill creates a new office and oversight of saying
exactly the right level of expertise and technology oversight
that is required. And so hopefully that will be fixed. It is
very frustrating to hear the Administrator today not embrace
these things as fully because it is very hard for us.
You know, I mean we can pass a law but I mean--and we are
going to stay on top of the FAA. I can guarantee you that. So
we are going to get the right workforce there. I wanted to ask
you, you mentioned this red team, blue team thing, which I
think is comes up in a couple of different ways. You know, this
idea of holistic approach. Do you think--I am interested
because of what you said about the NTSB.
Do you think that the NTSB and NASA could play a bigger
role in the upfront part of the certification process when the
type certificate is being considered and these ideas or new
technology is being considered? Do you think outside groups
like that of experts at the front end of the process can better
identify risks?
Mr. Stumo. I think it is very possible. I am going to draw
a little bit on what Javier de Luis who lost his sister in the
ET 302 crash said. Javier is an MIT aerospace engineer. He
submitted testimony today and he has also said, you need to
have that--getting a new aircraft designed and developed and
certified is a major national event. And it takes--it is
something that is, you know, and he is really all hands on deck
and he did indeed support the fact of having a multi-agency
involvement at the beginning.
And you know, in this case we have a global duopoly of
Boeing and Airbus. In our case we have Boeing but you know, it
is a public-private partnership but along the lines I
understand that Javier had also supported that given his deep
knowledge at MIT in aerospace engineering. So I would tend to
defer to and agree.
Senator Cantwell. Right. I see my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Tell us again, sir, the name of the author of
that paper Javier----
Mr. Stumo. Javier de Luis.
The Chairman. Alright. And do you have that--do you have
his paper with you today?
Mr. Stumo. I know he did submit. I can provide it to the
Committee and I think it was submitted to staff.
The Chairman. So we already have it. So, without objection,
it will be placed in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
737 Max Safety and Return to Flight
Javier de Luis, PhD
From the onset, the 737 Max has been constrained by design
decisions that were made, in some cases, over 50 years ago. As has
become well-known, the low ground clearance of the jet caused the
placement of the new fuel-efficient, but larger, engines to be moved up
ahead of the wing. This creates a lift force on the engine nacelles
during takeoff, pitching the nose of the jet up, which can lead to the
airplane stalling. To remedy this, Boeing designed the MCAS software
system, which actuates the horizontal stabilizer in response to a high
angle of attack reading from an external sensor, pitching the nose down
and countering the additional lift.
In attempting to incorporate these new larger engines into a legacy
design, Boeing was attempting to reap the benefits of new technology
(e.g., fuel efficiency), while simultaneously not paying any price for
updating the rest of the airplane system. It wanted to keep as much of
the ``old'' design as possible, saving significant development and
certification costs. But the new engines didn't fit under the wings, so
they moved them, creating an additional problem. They then tried to
solve this additional problem by once again trying to reap the benefits
of using a (cheaper) software solution, without again paying the price
of updating the rest of the airplane system. So instead of running the
MCAS software on a computer system designed to modern aerospace safety
standards, it decided to run it on the same computer architecture that
has been present in the 737's since 1996, consisting of two computer
systems, but only one operating during any single flight. So instead of
redundant computers and sensors, with fault tolerance, data validation,
voting, etc., the 737 Max ran the MCAS software on a single computer,
receiving readings from a single angle of attack sensor.
Boeing keeps attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole.
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with wanting to upgrade an
airframe (the square hole) to use new engines (the round peg). However,
when they realized they did not fit, the answer they choose was to try
to fit another round peg (the MCAS software) into the square hole of a
1996-vintage computer architecture.
This pattern appears to be continuing. From reports in the media,
Boeing will now modify the 737 Max to use both computers and both sets
of sensors simultaneously. While that may produce a slightly safer
systems, at a basic level having two measurements means that if they
ever do not agree, the pilot will have no way of knowing which one is
right. Hardly a good solution.
It has also been reported that if the two sensors do not agree, the
computers will be instructed to shut down MCAS. While this would have
likely prevented the two recent crashes, it poses another question:
what is the impact if MCAS shuts down? Presumably, MCAS is there for a
reason. Boeing has never released any data to show conclusively whether
MCAS is there to prevent a stall condition from developing, or simply
to smooth out the handling of the aircraft during certain maneuvers. If
it's the former, shutting down MCAS could be catastrophic. If it's the
latter, pilots would need to be trained in order to become proficient
flying an aircraft with new handling characteristics that are present
when MCAS is shut down. And if that is the case, then why have MCAS
present at all?
There have been recent reports that European regulators will insist
that Boeing eventually incorporate a ``synthetic airspeed'' measurement
into the MCAS logic. Depending on how this is done, it may introduce a
second semi-independent measurement (in addition to the angle of attack
sensors) that can be used by the computers to decide to activate MCAS.
This is a step in the right direction, but without increasing the
redundancy across the entire system, it is a small step and will still
not make the 737 Max as safe as other modern aircraft. And even so,
reports indicate that this modification will not need to be
incorporated prior the return to flight. This is unacceptable. Boeing
has had over a year to design a solution which addresses the
shortcomings of this airplane. It has not done so because it continues
to try to cut corners and do what it perceives as being quickest and
cheapest, with safety as a secondary concern.
If Boeing wants to use 21st century technology to address technical
issues, then we need to insist that it be held to 21st century
standards of safety and reliability. It cannot have it both ways.
The Chairman. There are no other members--Senator Markey,
we are told. Yes? Yes, you are recognized, sir.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Markey, do you have a copy of that
document that you referred to, that was not predictive but
mentioned the 15 aircraft accidents that might occur?
Senator Markey. I think my staff has access to it and we
will get it to you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. OK. Well, let's put that in the record,
without objection.
Mr. Stumo. Mr. Chairman if I could help on that, it is when
I submitted my written testimony.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Stumo. It was included in that as well if my exhibits
were included.
The Chairman. All right, so thank you and Mr. Markey, you
are recognized.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I
want to thank Michael Stumo and to your spouse Nadia for being
here today and for your tireless work to put a spotlight on
this inexcusable tragedy and the need to reform our broken
aviation certification system. And again, I offer my
condolences to you for the loss of your brilliant, accomplished
daughter. It was an unfortunate, unfortunate tragedy here that
has taken her from you.
But I admire so much what you and your wife have done to
make sure that you focus on this issue to guarantee that there
is accountability. And that the FAA and Boeing be made
accountable. So I thank you so much because never again should
we see--have to suffer what you suffered. And I am happy that
Administrator Dickson just affirmed Boeing's legal
responsibility for the defective 737 MAX.
Now, we need to guarantee the following cannot block your
family's legal claims in court. So, Mr. Stumo, can you speak
further to Boeing's unacceptable attempts to evade
accountability and how can Congress help you all hold this
company responsible for its wrongdoing?
Mr. Stumo. Well, I want to say it is not just us, there is
156 others that died in that crash and a lot of other families
have been very active in their home countries, in Canada, in
Europe, the French, German, and Norwegian, Swedes, in Africa,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda. Many families have their own
individual hurts that they are trying to recover from.
So I am a bit uncomfortable just having the focus on me,
but we are in the U.S. and under COVID we are in Washington but
there is others that are doing a lot. But you see on from our
perspective we see a dichotomy between public actions and words
and private behavior, where you have Boeing repeatedly tell the
camera that they are very sorry, Muilenburg, Calhoun, the new
CEO who was around during this whole era of certification of
the MAX and made the decision against--was on the Board of
Directors when they made the decision against developing a new
plane and extracting more value out of the aged 737 family.
But they apologize in public. Say we are sorry. We are
going to look into it. We are going to be making some changes
and you know, we are working diligently to, you know,
compensate and to make everything right. And then you look in
the documents and they have, you know, they say, no we don't
have to pay anything because the FAA certified it and that
means the family doesn't have their own claims. It is just not
right and they know it. That is why they didn't say it in
public, they only said it in private.
Senator Markey. So, what from your perspective, again,
should everyone who is watching this hearing know about the
families and the accountability you want from Boeing on this
issue?
Mr. Stumo. Boeing has a responsibility to produce safe
planes. They are a great company with a great history that has
lost its way with chasing profit and value engineering and
getting rid of engineers and getting rid of talent over the
time to extract profit and delivering it to shareholders, stock
buybacks, and executives.
We need to have, you know, as a national championed company
for the U.S., they have got duties to America. They have got
duties to passengers. They have got duties to us and they could
have made a great 21st century plane. They didn't. The FAA has
to do its job and not be a paper pushing agency, not be dogs
watching TV.
I am concerned that the SMS safety management system that
sounds like a decent idea is not directly on point, that will
fix the fact that the FAA is not directly involved in
certification. That it is more paper to push. And when you have
a company that is dedicated to misleading and hiding things,
that they will mislead it and hide it in the paperwork when you
are not onsite. So that is what I think.
Senator Markey. So when you talk to the Boeing officials,
if you have talked to them or your lawyers have talked to them,
how would you characterize their response back to you?
Mr. Stumo. Well, we don't talk to them much because we are
all represented. But I just--I saw, you know, a lot of times
Boeing would apologize to cameras about what happened but
various--but only once when shamed in doing it did Muilenburg
actually turn to the families and say he was sorry. And Calhoun
has not talked to us but they haven't apologized to families,
they have only apologized to cameras. But we haven't talked to
many Boeing executives.
Senator Markey. So what does that tell you that they are
unwilling to actually apologize to the families?
Mr. Stumo. It is always a concern that it is just a PR
management issue.
Senator Markey. Meaning?
Mr. Stumo. It is not real.
Senator Markey. It is not real. They speak to cameras, but
not to families. Meaning they just need some public statement
that kind of satisfies the minimum requirement that they say
that they are sorry, but they don't want to actually have to
meet with the families themselves in order to have that kind
of--an accountability?
Mr. Stumo. Yes. You know, Ethiopian Airlines CEO sent all
the families a letter of sorrow and an apology early on.
Ethiopian Airlines has done a lot of other things wrong. Boeing
didn't do what they could have. When I need to apologize to my
wife, I don't do it to a camera and I don't do to somebody
else. I do to her and that is how you do it in human society.
Senator Markey. Yes, so, you know absolutely they are--they
have been irresponsible and they are clearly engaged in a
systematic cover-up and our job will be to help you to make
sure that every single piece of information is made available
publicly so that we guarantee that this spotlight is so bright
that we will not ever have to see a hearing like this have to
be conducted. But not until we have collected all of that
information.
Not until Boeing is made accountable in court will we in
fact know that we have done our job for you and for all of the
families, Mr. Stumo, and we thank you for being here today in
order to make sure that the voices of the families are heard.
Thank you so much for your willingness to do this.
Mr. Stumo. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell [presiding]. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Thank you for being here today and on so many other occasions
lending your voice and face to this reform effort not just in
memory of your daughter, but to save other lives. And to you
and all of the families that have lost loved ones, this
committee has an obligation not only to express condolences but
to put our action where our mouth is and really adopt reforms
that, in fact, will prevent these kinds of tragedies in the
future.
You were here to hear Administrator Dickson, and I am just
going to go through your testimony. On the rebalance of
delegation, you may have heard my question about the FAA taking
back the delegation at the very least of involvement in
critical safety systems. Were you satisfied with the answer
that he gave?
Mr. Stumo. No. No, there seemed to be an unwillingness to
do so and it seems wrong. I mean we have got to have the red
team involved with systems that are deemed major, hazardous, or
catastrophic if they go bad. We can't just rely on the internal
checks and balances of a manufacturer depending upon the
vagaries of what CEO is in charge or what Boeing manager is in
charge or who is on duty at the time.
Senator Blumenthal. On the issue of lifetime limits for
type certificates, I think you may have said to me at one point
during our private conversations that right now in effect they
can bolt a new system onto an old fuselage and just slide it
through for certification. Were you satisfied with the answer
that he gave me when I asked about limits on the lifetime of
certificates?
Mr. Stumo. No, there needs to be a lifetime--they need to
figure out a lifetime limit and it is more than the MCAS in
this system. There is a lot involved because they didn't have a
flight crew alert system that like those that were required in
aircraft since 1982, the kind of flight crew alert system,
which has red, blue, or red, yellow, and green lights all in
one place that you can prioritize things that may or may not be
going wrong. In this case because the MAX was an amended type
certificate, one of many in this old fuselage, they had this
whole cacophony of stick shakers and pull up and pull up and
going too fast and going too slow.
Sully Sullenberger described it very adeptly in his
testimony before the House where he had a hard time pulling out
of this thing and they are trying to describe it as just, you
know, run away trim. So the reason they have those rules from
1982, which was when this MAX was 25 years old and now 28 years
later they don't have it, is because they grandfathered in old
tech when they have, you know--when new safety regulations come
into effect, these new aircraft, it is a method of skirting it
apparently.
Single string rudder controls, you know, various parts of
the plane get grandfathered in but 28 years ago you had to have
a flight crew alert system. Maybe that would have made the
difference in alerting this crew what to pay attention to
instead of shocking them with all kinds of conflicting alerts.
Senator Blumenthal. And I think on the other issues that I
asked him that are in your testimony on FAA certification in
effect equaling immunity for Boeing, the culture of secrecy
that we see, I think you would agree that his answers were
totally unsatisfactory.
Mr. Stumo. Well, the answer has always been on secrecy. The
transparent--we will be very ,very transparent. We have heard
it as family since the beginning and we haven't even gotten one
document.
Senator Blumenthal. And neither have we. No meaningful
documents, at least in response to my questions. So I can
pledge to you and I think others in the Committee will join me
in this view that the bills now pending can be greatly
strengthened and improved. I have offered one. The Ranking
Member and Chairman have offered another. I think theirs is
very commendable in the progress that it reflects.
I am going to be offering amendments to mine and theirs in
the mark-up, I hope there will be one, that would in effect
require a take-back in delegation on those critical safety
systems, require more transparency, require an end to
preemption so that families have their day in court so that the
courthouse doors are open to them in spite of FAA
certification, require that other even stronger reforms be
adopted.
I think your testimony and your work on highlighting how
the FAA has become a captive of the industry, how it has become
in effect, as you say, a dog watching TV, how it has enabled
the industry to put profits ahead of safety. All those points
that you have made and all the work that you have done, I hope
will have an impact on this committee. And I think what is
needed is really radical far-reaching reform. The public
demands it and the industry has reached a crossroads, a real
turning point and it has choices to make.
But I think Congress can no longer leave those choices
exclusively to the industry. I think that voluntary compliance,
delegated certification are going to be a thing of the past.
And I want to thank you for your being a whistleblower and a
watchdog, which is what we need. We need in effect in this
system an institutional watchdog, not a lap dog. So thank you
very much to you and your family for all the work that you have
done. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Stumo,
I want to follow up on a couple of things just quickly. I do
have to run and vote in a minute, so if you see me dash out, it
is because I think there will probably be holding it just until
I get there.
And so I did want to ask, we also introduced a bill with
Senator Moran today about the standards that we would like to
see on an international basis and you mentioned Captain
Sullenberger a couple of times so I wondered if you had given
any thought to this larger issue of how do we make sure that
the pilot--definitely need the FAA system improved but also
want pilot standards to be there and if you had given any
thoughts about that.
Mr. Stumo. Yes, sure. You know aviation--the U.S. Aviation
system is inherently global. The Boeing planes are sold
everywhere, you know, families are riding everywhere and you
know it used to be FAA rules were a gold standard. But
certainly how do you, you know, how do you have, to the extent
we improve here, how do you know rightly have an
extraterritorial reach to what we do? I mean certainly the
human factors approach and I would like to be--on the human
factors, it is all about not excessive reliance on the human,
which is fallible to be the last, you know, last chance before
as one said, a smoking hole because you need the machine to be
hardened and have redundancy in hardening.
So you are not, you know, I am going to make five mistakes
before I go to bed tonight. And pilots make mistakes too. They
have bad days. You can't rely on that. So you got to have the
machine right too but I guess I am in favor of doing as best we
can to have an international reach for the bill, the Flight
Aviation safety systems in Ethiopia and Kenya. And I think our
Kenyan and Ethiopian families would agree. It is not that great
and so that generally I would be supportive.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got to run.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, and thank you
all. If there are no other questions, then we will move to
close the hearing. The hearing record will remain open for two
weeks. During this time Senators are asked to submit any
questions for the record. Upon receipt, each witness is
requested to submit written answers to the Committee as soon as
possible.
So thanks to both of our witnesses and thanks particularly
to you, Mr. Stumo. We very much appreciate your insights and
there is just no way to express our condolences adequately.
With that, this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Curtis Ewbank
Renton, WA
June 5, 2020
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senate Commerce Committee,
I am writing in advance of the June 17th hearing with FAA
administrator Steve Dickson to express my concerns regarding the 737
MAX, the FAA's handling of the process, and other important information
related to aviation safety. I do this as a private pilot, and a flight
deck engineer with experience at Boeing during the development of the
737 MAX who has shared these concerns with the company, the FBI (at
their request), and the House Transportation Committee via Mr. Doug
Pasternak, after Rep. DeFazio read about my internal ethics complaint
in the Seattle Times article ``Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades
before fatal crashes, whistleblower says.'' The safety of the public is
paramount, and developing regulations and processes that adequately
protect that safety is a complex process. That complexity stems from
the nature of the pilot's task of integrating an understanding of
automated functions and the aerodynamic state of the airplane; a pilot
uses everything from indicators, control force feel, ``seat of the
pants,'' prior experience, and training to develop appropriate
responses to whatever situation arises. Ensuring safety in this
environment requires a holistic, scientific approach to ensure each
pilot is presented with a consistent, salient flight deck and airplane.
The 737 MAX was not originally designed and certified with that
approach. The 737 MAX's original certification was accomplished with
hand-waving and deception to hide the numerous ways the 1960s-era
design of the 737 does not meet current regulatory standards or a
modern concept of aviation safety. The Boeing Company bears the
majority of the responsibility for this deception against the public,
but the FAA is also responsible for allowing such reckless disregard of
regulations and aviation safety.
This disregard is flagrant; with a practical understanding of the
pilot task and detailed knowledge of Boeing design philosophy and
history it is an unavoidable conclusion. Airplanes are complex systems,
and such knowledge-in-depth is required to fully understand the
practical effects of the certification process and regulations.
Unfortunately, many of the high-level decision makers and
representatives of Boeing and the FAA do not have this working
knowledge; they get their information through extended chains of
command that end up working like the children's game of ``Telephone.''
As a result, these representatives have given incorrect information and
even outright lies to Congress, further complicating attempts to
implement the lessons learned from these tragic accidents.
An excellent example of the way this working knowledge is
misapplied at a high level is the recent DOT advisory committee report.
One of the report's conclusions was that if the 737 MAX had been
certified as an all-new jet, it ``would not have produced more rigorous
scrutiny . . . and would not have produced a safer airplane.'' This
conclusion is utterly incorrect, and combined with the conclusion that
the ODA system can remain largely intact, is horrifically bad advice.
By failing to understand how having the 737 MAX merely meet existing
regulations would improve aviation safety the DOT advisory committee
actually poses a serious threat to aviation safety and the flying
public. These conclusions show the committee is not working in the
public interest. For that reason, its conclusions should be disregarded
and the committee disbanded.
Allow me to provide several explanations of important regulations
and their implications to demonstrate that the DOT advisory committee's
conclusion that an all-new jet certification would not have resulted in
a safer airplane is false. In general, if the 737 MAX had stepped up to
a full version of FAA regulations it would have resulted in a safer
airplane as indicated by a reduced chance of crew error, greater chance
of finding the possibility for that error during design, and creating a
flight deck ``more conducive to coherent thought'' in the scenarios
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302 encountered.
The specific areas are:
The new 25.1302 regulation. This regulation was created in
conjunction with the European Aviation Safety Agency for the
purpose of evaluating flight deck systems for potential crew
error. This would be an extensive evaluation for a completely
new aircraft type that would help ensure aviation safety.
However, as the 737 MAX was an amended type certificate, Boeing
argued that according to the changed product rule it only had
to evaluate changed systems. As Boeing was also trying to
change the flight deck as little as possible to minimize
training differences, this certification tactic severely
limited the range of human factors evaluation of 737 MAX
systems. MCAS design was a victim of this ``slice and dice''
approach; crew interfaces for Air Data were unchanged and
Autoflight only had minor changes. Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun was
correct when he admitted that assumptions about crew reaction
time for MCAS failures were wrong, but there were many places
where those system interactions should have been analyzed but
were not due to the means of compliance granted to Boeing for
its amended type certificate. This lack of analysis reduces the
overall safety of the 737 MAX as compared to a newly developed
airframe. And this use of the changed product rule to avoid
scrutiny on unchanged systems is enormously important to the
future of aviation safety--the changed/unchanged system line on
the 777X is even more convoluted and involves more complicated
systems than the 737 MAX.
The 25.1322 Crew Alerting regulation. Boeing sought and was
was granted a complex exemption to the new version of this
regulation. The newest amendment level of 25.1322 essentially
requires what Boeing calls the Engine Indicating and Crew
Alerting System (EICAS), a system designed with the latest
understanding of human factors to present information to flight
crews and prompt appropriate reactions in critical scenarios.
The 737 does not use this system; it relies on crew alerting
methods developed two decades prior to EICAS that have known
flaws when compared to EICAS. These flaws were known to Boeing
as it worked with the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, and awareness
of this was creatively hidden or outright withheld from
regulators during the certification process. Here are some
examples of these flaws:
Lack of an ability to suppress the aural component of
the Overspeed Warning. EICAS design requires the Warning
level of alert, which requires immediate crew awareness and
response, to have two attention-getting senses. These are
typically sight, with a light, and sound, with a tone.
Historically the aural components were continuous as long
as the alert condition persisted. However, after the crash
of Birgenair 301 in 1996, Boeing pilots and engineers
decided a means of acknowledging and canceling an aural
alert was necessary to prevent crew distraction in critical
troubleshooting times. All Boeing models, except the 737,
gained this capability through EICAS. The 737's older
system was not updated due to cost. On Ethiopian 302 the
overspeed aural was sounding continuously during the last
minutes of flight.
The ambiguous Autothrottle Disconnect alert. FAA
regulation 25.1329(k) requires the Autothrottle Disconnect
alert to be a Caution, which typically has an aural
component and an amber visual indication on EICAS
airplanes. The Autothrottle Disconnect alert on the 737 is
a red flashing light with no aural which does not fit any
of the standard alert definitions (or 25.1329(k), which is
notably absent from 737 MAX cert plans). The Autothrottle
Disconnect alert also shares the same physical panel space
with an Airspeed Deviation alert that illuminates the same
light flashing amber. Confusion between these two alerts
has led to incidents in the past. During 737 MAX
certification EASA requested information about known
incidents and Boeing management withheld information
responsive to their request.
The now-infamous AoA Disagree alert. Boeing has
acknowledged the alert was not properly implemented on the
accident aircraft, but both Boeing and former FAA acting
administrator Dan Elwell have asserted that the alert was
not essential to the safety of the airplane. That assertion
is grossly incorrect--documentation of the alert's
development in 2005, after a series of incidents where AoA
vanes stuck at a stop on takeoff, clearly states that the
alert was made basic for safety, so that flight crews could
better understand the disparate effects of a stuck AoA
vane. This outright deception about the rationale for the
alert after two fatal accidents is not the only unfortunate
aspect of this alert. On EICAS airplanes, air data disagree
alerts are Caution-level, with an aural to provide
immediate awareness to the flight crew of the condition.
There is no Caution aural on the 737, so an AoA Disagree
alert will only be picked up during the flight crew's
instrument scan, which could delay awareness of the alert
for a critical amount of time. In a highly speculative
thought experiment, consider the potential accident
sequence had the two accident airplanes been equipped with
the alerting system required by current regulations. AoA
Disagree would have annunciated shortly after takeoff with
an aural for immediate awareness, prompting the crew to
appropriate action--in this case the Airspeed Unreliable
checklist. The first memory item step of Airspeed
Unreliable is to keep the airplane in its current
configuration, i.e., do not change the flap setting.
Crucially MCAS is not active with flaps down (which is
normal takeoff configuration), so a fully-functional alert
combined with the required alerting system may have been
able to give the crew enough awareness to avoid MCAS
activation altogether. Boeing's and the FAA's deception
around the rationale for the development of this alert
should be highly suspect.
Air Data system design. The 737's air data system
architecture is a carryover from the days when airspeed and
altitude instruments were hard-plumbed with tubes from the
pitot and static ports. On the 737 NG and MAX, pitot and static
data is transmitted over databuses to computers and then
displayed on each pilot's forward display. Even though the
computers are theoretically capable of switching data sources,
the 737 has no means for the flight crew to do this, unlike
every other Boeing model. This capability is strangely not
required by FAA regulations, even though studies in the wake of
Air France 447 demonstrated the importance of pilots being
presented with correct aircraft state data, or the means to
select correct data should displayed data be erroneous. I
specifically advocated for a system that would have enabled
this on the 737, synthetic airspeed, but upper management shut
down the project over cost and training concerns. The known
unreliability of air data, due to the potential for erroneous
data caused by external factors, makes the initial design of
MCAS simply unacceptable. The importance of error-checked
sensor inputs to automatic functions is well known and should
have been thoroughly incorporated into an understanding of
aviation safety after Turkish 1951.
These three areas, not to mention numerous others related to
control forces being too high in certain flight control modes and the
relative authority of the stabilizer, elevator, and the pitch-up moment
from the engines, demonstrate that had the 737 MAX been certified to a
full set of FAA regulations it would have been a safer airplane merely
by entering the market with the most up-to-date understanding of system
design and critical human-machine interfaces. Current FAA regulations
require this understanding; during development of the 737 MAX Boeing
sought ways to rationalize not updating the aircraft systems to that
level, and the FAA permitted it to do so. The result is 346 lives lost.
I have no doubt the FAA and lawmakers are under considerable
pressure to allow the 737 MAX to return to service as quickly as
possible and as soon as the public MCAS flaw is fixed. However, given
the numerous other known flaws in the airframe, it will be just a
matter of time before another flight crew is overwhelmed by a design
flaw known to Boeing and further lives are senselessly lost. These
design flaws and the systemic problems that allow them to threaten the
public must be fixed before the 737 MAX is allowed to return to
service.
I left my job at the Boeing Company in 2015 in protest of
management actions to rationalize the poor design of the 737 MAX. I did
not think I could do my duty as an engineer to protect the safety of
the public in the environment created by management at Boeing. In 2018
I returned to the company, and quickly witnessed the nightmare of the
very accidents I had tried to prevent happen in real life. Prior to my
departure in 2015, my manager argued against the design changes I
wanted to make by stating, ``People have to die before Boeing will
change things.'' The time for change is now. The country is grappling
with a wide range of issues at the moment, but the reduction in travel
demand provided by the COVID-19 pandemic gives us time to adequately
repair the aviation regulation system before new airplane designs are
required.
I recommend the following actions:
A thorough revamp of all FAA regulations to ensure they
reflect a modern understanding of computer technology and
human-machine interfaces.
A thorough revamp of the manufacturer-FAA certification
information pipeline. The current ODA process allows Boeing to
hide information it doesn't want the FAA to know via management
pressure. Boeing is working on developing aircraft using a
``digital twin'' system that allows digital models to be
evaluated for design suitability prior to actual hardware
build. The FAA should develop the means to evaluate these
models for regulatory compliance and require Boeing to submit
them at multiple stages of the design process to ensure no
compliance information is hidden from the regulator.
As a near-to-final certification step, the FAA would conduct
a battery of system tests on actual hardware at its own
facility to ensure the final aircraft design complies fully
with regulations.
Create a system where ethical concerns about designs can be
evaluated independently of the Boeing Company. In other
engineering disciplines there exists the Professional Engineer
(PE) certification, which puts an engineer's license on the
line when they sign off on designs. There is not an Aerospace
PE, and the decision to sign off on any particular design at
Boeing has been culturally expropriated from the engineers to
management. Aviation safety would be better assured if ethical
concerns about designs were evaluated by an independent expert
panel rather than internal Boeing corporate counsel seeking to
protect the company from liability.
These recommendations create a requirement for a significant
amount of technical knowledge in the FAA. If the FAA prefers to
remain focused on finding regulatory compliance only, it may be
better to perform these tasks in a separate public institution
such as a NASA center or National Laboratory. Such a technical
center focused on end-to-end evaluations of automation and
human interfaces with automated systems would have public
safety benefits beyond aviation, potentially anywhere from
evaluation of NASA Commercial Crew vehicles to working with
NHTSA to ensure systems like Tesla's Autopilot are in line with
the best scientific understanding of how to operate complex
systems in high-risk environments.
It is not possible to say that the current commercial airplane
certification process can ensure the safety of the public to the best
of our ability without reforms such as these in place. The 737 MAX
should not be recertified until such reforms are made and all known
technical flaws with the airframe are corrected. In fact, if the FAA
was truly regulating in the public interest, it would take action
against Boeing for its continued deception and gross errors in the
design and production of the 737 MAX by withdrawing Boeing's production
certificate. That certificate can be restored once Boeing and the FAA
have sufficiently revised their processes.
Thank you for your time, and for being willing to seriously re-
evaluate and restructure the aviation safety system in this country. If
you would like to contact me for further discussion, you can reach me
via the provided information.
Sincerely,
Curtis Ewbank.
______
From: Zipporah Kuria
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 at 16:19
Subject: Aviation Safety Improvement Act of 2020 (ET302 Family)
Dear Commerce Committee Members:
We lost our father, Joseph Kuria Waithaka, on March 10th in Boeing
737 MAX crash. Since the crash, heinous discoveries of how preventable
the second crash was, are made month after month. With each discovery,
the pain of the loss of our Dad deepens.
Boeing concealed vital from the FAA, while the FAA completely
relinquished their responsibility to certify the Max adequately to
Boeing. The equivalent of asking a child to write their own test and
award themselves the mark they think they deserve, before rubber-
stamping it. As a result of the flawed type certification process:
System Safety Assessments were omitted on crucial systems like the MCAS
and outdated technology was installed on to the Max. Boeing's excessive
ambition lead to overexerting their workers and straining their
suppliers. When Whistle-blowers came forward to report these issues,
the fatal ET302 aircraft was still in production and no action was
taken and 157 lives were lost.
Boeing and the FAA knew that MCAS was a catastrophic risk after the
October 2018, Lion Air crash. The MAX should have been ground
immediately after the first crash, and nothing was done. The crash that
killed my Dad and 156 others would be the first of 15 crashes predicted
by the Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) after the
first crash. It's hard to call the second crash an accident when it was
already forecasted, but profit margins were at risk and lives came
second.
The FAA publicly made false promises to keep the ET302 families
informed and to remain transparent. Instead, they continue to stonewall
families, while maintaining and prioritising their cosy relationship
with Boeing.
Administrator Steve Dickson has failed to identify, hold
accountable, and discipline those who were responsible for the
mismanagement of the Max certification. Our loved ones lost their
lives, we lost them, and not a single individual has lost so much as a
penny of their from their paychecks. Instead of the FAA cooperating to
protect lives, they remain complicit in risking them to protect a
corporation.
Bereaved families have appealed to Chairman Wickers and committee
members to address the freedom Boeing has been given by the FAA, to
profit at any cost without taking any responsibility.
Chairman Wicker introduced The Aviation Safety Improvement Act of
2020, which is just a protection ploy for Boeing. Does not require any
correctional actions, but ratifies the same framework that resulted in
my father's death. It's chilling that Chairman Wicker's Act implies
that merely investigating issues is sufficient.
No other families should have to work through the ongoing trauma
and tragedy we continue to deal with, due to failure in leadership. My
Dad shouldn't have to been shattered into a thousand pieces in a field
far from his family, because people who had the power to do something
decide not to.
We appeal to the Commerce Committee to refuse to be complicit in
more families lining graves with the blood of their loved ones, while
corporations continue to line their pockets. To choose to protect the
people they represent and to honour the memories of the 346 lives lost.
It was only by divine intervention that the first plane crashed into
the ocean and the second into a field. What if the third is over Time
Square, London bridge or Capitol Hill? Will it take the loss of a
thousand or thousands of lives before real action is taken to protect
the public?
The Commerce Committee has the opportunity to pioneer real change
in Aviation Safety. The ET302 families are counting on you to take the
action required to ensure that the history doesn't repeat itself.
Thank you.
Best regards,
Zipporah Kuria,
Daughter of Joseph Kuria Waithaka.
______
10 June 2020
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington DC, 20510
``Forwarded on a Without Prejudice Basis''
Dear Committee Members,
RE: DEFECTS AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIRCRAFT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT BILL OF
2020
I write to you on behalf of the family of George Wanderi Kabau, a
cheerful and highly safety conscious young man who suffered wrongful
death before his prime due to the very avoidable Ethiopian Airlines
Flight ET 302 crash on the nasty morning of 10 March 2019.
Our family has a very legitimate and valid basis to express our
utter disappointment with the proposed Aircraft Safety Improvement Bill
of 2020, as we lost our beloved George Kabau due to the callous
negligence, recklessness and deceitful actions of a United States
corporation and regulator, which resulted in the manufacture,
certification and sale of a fundamentally defective Max 737 passenger
jet. In particular, you, as Members of the Committee, are bestowed with
the magnanimous duty of safeguarding the future safety of the flying
public, not just for Americans, but for the entire world by proposing
and endorsing adequate legislative interventions. If you neglect your
duty, may you know that unsafe flights will be a threat and trauma to
everyone, including yourself, and your families nd friends.
Before delving into the deficiencies and defects of the proposed
legislation, it is fitting that I summarily contextualise the
regulatory and safety issue at hand. As you are all aware, the wrongful
deaths of George Kabau and 345 others (from both Flight ET 302 and the
earlier Lion Air crash in Indonesia) would never have occurred if the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) undertook its regulatory duty
rigorously, competently and honestly. Our loved ones who perished would
be with us today if there was no deliberate misrepresentation and
concealment, by both the Boeing Corporation and the FAA, of the
stalling risks of the fundamentally unstable passenger jet that relied
on an inherently catastrophic and defective Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System (MCAS) software that obtained data from an
unreliable and unsafe single angle of attack sensor. It is needless to
state that the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes exemplified a
callous culture of regulatory capture at the FAA, and the resultant
negligence, sloppiness and cosiness rendered it totally incapable of
curbing Boeing's corporate recklessness and disgraceful prioritisation
of profits over safety in the manufacture and marketing of the 737 Max
passenger jets, among other aircraft varieties.
George was a highly disciplined and focused 29 years old Electrical
Engineer with immense potential and promise. He believed in and lived
by the tenets of hard work, honesty and service to the community, and
was passionate about his work at General Electric Healthcare. George's
life, ideals and dreams were taken away by the shameful corporate
greed, deceit and recklessness of Boeing that FAA knowingly failed to
curb and prevent.
The proposed Aircraft Safety Improvement Act of 2020, fails to
guarantee the flying public of a quality aircraft certification process
by continuing to endorse and affirm the same Organization Designation
Authorizations (ODA) system of self-certification that resulted in
Boeing deceitfully manufacturing and selling a fundamentally defective
passenger jet. In that context, it is also regrettable that the
proposed legislation fails to focus on tangible, quantifiable and
explicit expansion of the FAA's staff technical and training capacity
so that they can independently evaluate and certify aircrafts. As such,
FAA may as well continue with its excessive delegation of its
regulatory duties to Boeing and others. This self-certification model
is contradictory both in theory and practice, and should not be
regarded as amounting to any quality certification process.
In addition, the legislation fails to enunciate criminal penalties
for aircraft manufacturers and FAA staff who knowingly, recklessly or
negligently make misrepresentations or deceitful statements on the
airworthiness of aircrafts whether during the certification process or
any other period; or who knowingly conceal defects in aircrafts.
For and on behalf of the family of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302
victim George kabau
Tom Kabau,
Nairobi, Kenya.
______
______
Virginie FRICAUDET
49 rue Victor Hugo
94140 Alfortville
FRANCE
[email protected]
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate Washington DC, 20510
June 16, 2020
Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator
Steve Dickson
Dear Senator,
I am the sister of Xavier FRICAUDET who tragically perished in the
crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th, 2019. He was
38 and was to marry with Natalia, his fiancee, four months after the
crash.
Xavier was a traveler and an adventurer at heart. We was as
intellectual as sportive. But what made him most endearing to everyone
was that he was sensitive, discreet, gentle and attentive, curious and
cultured, and had a subtle sense of humor.
He was a teacher. He devoted 12 years of his life to French
National Education. After his graduation, he passed 8 years in Guyana,
accepting the most difficult positions in inaccessible areas of the
Amazon, 3 years in Saint Petersburg in Russia, before leaving for
Nairobi in Kenya. He never stopped training to be able to teach
everybody, from indigenous children to mental diseased children or
future teachers.
I am writing this letter on behalf of Xavier's family and friends.
I have also the duty, as President of the French victims'
association (Flight ET 302--Solidarity & Justice), to write this letter
on behalf of our 300 members who help us contributing to the search for
the truth about the causes of the crash of the Boeing 737 max flight
ET302 and participating in any action to improve the safety of air
transport.
It is no secret that the second crash should have never occurred
because Boeing 737 Max has an unsafe, single chain design.
Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong assumptions,
were non comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two crashes
demonstrated it. 346 people paid these errors with their life. There
have been huge failures in the design process, as well as in the
certification process.
As a sky consumer, and as an interconnected citizen of the world, I
am sure that the changes in the American aeronautical regulations that
you are studying have a global impact. That's why the regulatory
enforcement project that you are currently studying must be thought
globally, and not only at the American level, because the civil
aviation regulation is a global, interconnected, regulatory system.
The certification authorities of many countries have trusted the
work of the FAA and have not looked into the safety of the new MCAS
system. If bilateral agreements between countries were a force for the
aeronautical industry, to avoid multiplying the costs of certification,
the two accidents of the Boeing 737 Max showed that it was also a huge
weakness.
With both tragedies of the Boeing 737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have
broken trust between national certification authorities. As a
consequence, EASA decided to no longer rely on the bilateral agreement
with the FAA for the certification of modifications to the Boeing Max,
but to recertify itself all the flight control systems.
The bill should consider not only the design and certification
process, but also the whole airworthiness regulatory framework.
The second accident should never have occurred. After the Lion Air
JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that Boeing could ignore
the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also unbelievable that they
issued an Airworthiness Directive with a runaway trim procedure that
was inefficient in some parts of the flight envelope. It is as much
unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved this procedure. Given
all the failures and shortcomings known by Boeing, the 737 Max should
have been grounded promptly after the first crash. If appropriate
reactions and decisions had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the
first crash, Xavier would still be alive, as well as all 156 passengers
and crew who lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA
had all the information to issue appropriate reaction after the first
crash.
I deeply hope that the bill will bring regulatory improvements to
meet the challenge to restore confidence in overall aviation safety,
and will be designed to handle not only national U.S. issues, but also
to take into account its worldwide impacts, so that my brother and the
346 passenger and crew did not die for nothing, and to avoid such
disaster occurring again.
Best Regards,
Virginie FRICAUDET
Sister of late Xavier FRICAUDET, on behalf of Francois and Roseline
FRICAUDET, his parents, Matthieu and Helene, his brother and sister,
Natalia Kitseleva, his fiancee and on behalf of all Xavier's relatives
and friends.
President of the Association
FLIGHT ET302--SOLIDARITY & JUSTICE
______
Nancy MacPherson
190B Cliffe Ave
Courtenay, British Columbia
Canada
V9N 2H5
June 16, 2020
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
USA Senate
Washington DC, 20510
Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator
Dear Senate Committee,
Micah Messent was killed in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash
in Addis Ababa March 10th, 2019. He was a chosen Canadian delegate to
the 4th United Nations Assembly of the Environment which was being held
in Nairobi, Kenya.
My name is Nancy MacPherson, I am the partner of Matt Messent,
Micah's oldest brother. I feel compelled to write this letter so no
other family has to face the pain and suffering I have seen Micah's
family go through.
My partner Matt is a millwright, he works at a local ski resort.
Everyday thousands of people trust their lives to ride the ski lifts he
repairs and maintains: Safety is his priority everyday at his job. I am
a medical doctor and family physician, it is well known that health
care has improved its safety protocol by looking to models of flight
protocol safety.
As the technical aspects leading to the Ethiopian Air 302 crash
emerged it was painfully clear the second Boeing 737 MAX8 crash could
have been prevented had action been taken after the first Lion Air 610
Crash, which killed189 people. In total, 346 people lost their lives
and 346 families are suffering like our family.
In the previous senate hearing and whistleblower testimonial it
emerged that modelling predicted an estimated 15 fatal crashes due to
flaws in the Boeing 737 Max 8 design. Previous testimony and aviation
reports clearly outline faults in the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft and
system failures in the FAA certification process that led to these two
crashes. With this letter, I want to tell the human side of this
tragedy.
Micah was excited to attend this meeting and he shared his
exuberance with family before he departed. He made a point of driving
up island, three hours one way, with his loved partner Kidston Short,
to see all his family before his big trip. His Grandmother, Edna Camp
had prepared a binder for him from clippings of the recent Economist
and National Geographic articles about Kenya and the region. It would
be the first time Micah would travel internationally.
Micah, the youngest of five children, had a fun loving approachable
way about him. Matt, my partner, has great pride and love for his
family as did Micah. What a welcoming home, I thought to myself the
first Christmas we spent together. How close the five siblings were
laughing, hugging, singing, sharing food and Christmas cheer.
Because of Micah's humility, his family only learned of the depth
and breadth of his influence and inspiration on both a professional and
personal level after his passing. Micah was 23 years old. Over the last
year he has received multiple accolades and awards created in his
honour.
At Micah's University graduation, I remember Matt and Jasper
standing for a photo with Micah, so proud of their younger Brother.
Micah was the first in their immediate family to graduate from
university. He planned to go into law and work for recognition of
Indigenous Peoples' Rights. Micah had his whole life ahead of him.
Micah's death was devastating to the family and to my partner,
Matt. He often repeats that he could not do anything to save his baby
brother. Matt has recurrent nightmares of Micah's last moments on the
plane, and of seeing his brother and other passengers catch on fire as
the plane is plummeting to their deaths.
Suzanne Camp and John Messent lost their youngest son. Jade Ballard
(Wes Ballard), Amber Tansky (Walter Tansky), Matt Messent (Nancy
MacPherson) and Jasper Messent (Brianna Savary) lost their youngest
brother. Kidston Short lost her partner. Edna Camp lost her grandson.
My son, Calder Messent lost his uncle. My nieces and nephews, Olivia
Ballard, Ethan Tansky, Scotia Tansky and Ryker Tanksy lost their uncle.
Aunts and Uncles lost their nephew. Cousins lost their cousin.
There is an emptiness in the house when we come together as a
family now, life will never be the same. Micah's joy and light that he
shared made everyone around him shine brighter. My son Calder Messent
will miss the golden feeling his family once had.
I hope that in your wisdom you will look at the system that allowed
this second crash to happen and take the steps necessary so no other
family will have to relive this preventable tragedy.
Sincerely,
Nancy MacPherson, MD,
Cottage Medical Clinic.
______
Catherine BERTHET
Cesar BLAVET
6 Chemin De la Cour du Moulin
78380 BOUGIVAL
FRANCE
Mail: [email protected]
Njaka RALAIARIVELO
18 Impasse des Sitelles
44220 COUERON
FRANCE
Mail: [email protected]
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate
Washington DC, 20510
Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator
Dear Senator,
We are writing you as mother, brother and fiance of Camille
Geoffroy, one of the 157 passengers who tragically lost their lives in
the crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th, 2019 in
Ethiopia. Camille was 28 and on her way to Nairobi in order to join the
American humanitarian NGO One Acre Fund as humanitarian worker based in
Kakamega, Kenya. Since then, we have been struggling with Camille's
loss as this tragedy has left us alone with our pain, our tears and
without any future whereas Camille had her whole life to both live and
enjoy.
During her lifetime among us, Camille has dedicated herself to help
people by serving as humanitarian worker for several NGOs. On the
meantime, Camille' last goals were to commit with more personal life
achievements as celebrating her own wedding and being a mother. Camille
was the one the three of us used to love the most as she also left
behind tens of family members and friends who are still mourning her
and are struggling with the saddest thought that Camille will never be
part of their lives anymore.
Therefore, in memory of Camille, Cesar, Njaka and I are writing
this letter in regard with both upcoming hearing of FAA Administrator
Steve Dickson and the Aviation Safety Bill which is currently discussed
at the U.S. Senate.
Much has been written on the Boeing 737 Max. It has an unsafe,
single chain design. Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong
assumptions, were non-comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two
crashes demonstrated it. 346 people have paid the cost of these errors
with their life. There have been huge failures in the design process,
as well as in the certification process. These accidents caused a
tremendous loss of confidence, not only towards Boeing and the FAA, but
also towards the entire aeronautical industry.
Our purpose is not to comment all the failures but to raise
awareness to avoid them to occur again thanks to the safety bill, even
if this wouldn't fit in a 2 pages' letter. But, as mourning mother,
brother and fiance, and also as close relatives to other family victims
and ourselves sometimes passengers, we have suffered the most about
what has happened so that we are standing to highlight two crucial
points: the current international scope of the safety bill you are
considering, and the fact that the second crash should have never
occurred.
We are aware that, as French citizens, we do not have any
legitimacy to express an opinion on an American bill. However, we would
like to draw your attention to the fact that the changes in the
American aeronautical regulations that you are studying have a global
impact due to the agreements between certification authorities. For
example, an FAA certified aircraft in the United States is not fully
recertified in Europe thanks to the bilateral agreement between the FAA
and EASA. EASA trusts the FAA for its certification work, and
recertifies only certain specific points, for example where there are
regulatory differences. If these agreements were a force for the
aeronautical industry, to avoid multiplying the costs of certification,
the two accidents of the Boeing 737 Max showed that it was also a huge
weakness. Indeed, due to bilateral agreements, the certification
authorities of many countries have trusted the work of the FAA, and
have not looked into the safety of the new MCAS system.
We do believe that the regulatory enforcement project that you are
currently studying must be thought of globally, and not only at the
American level, because the civil aviation regulation is a global,
interconnected, regulatory system. For example, it should consider the
consequences of bilateral agreements and better frame them, to prevent
a chain reaction like the tragedy of the Boeing 737 Max from happening
again. Worldwide aviation regulations are largely based on trust
between national certification authorities. With the tragedies of the
Boeing 737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have broken that trust. This was
expressed publicly by Patrick Ky, Executive Director of EASA, during a
hearing in September 2019 at the EU parliament.\1\ As a consequence,
following the accident of flight ET302, EASA decided to no longer rely
on the bilateral agreement with the FAA for the certification of
modifications to the Boeing Max, but to recertify itself all the flight
control systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https:ljmultimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/committee-transport-
tourism-ordinary-meeting-ordinary-meeting_20190903-1000-COMMITTEE-
TRAN_vd
Interesting sequences are (approx.):
from 10:35:00 to 10:46:20: point by Patrick Ky on Boeing
737 Max
from 11:28:30 to 11:39:25: answers from Patrick Ky on
questions related to FAA
from 11:54:45 to 11:56:07: answers from Patrick Ky on
questions return into service schedule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hence, we would like to point out that it would be very useful for
the American Senate to consider hearing Patrick Ky, executive Director
of EASA, and why not, other leaders of certification authorities from
other countries. This would allow the Senate to better understand the
international consequences of the bill on the overall safety of flight,
due to bilateral agreements. Secondly, the bill should consider not
only the design and certification process, but also the whole
airworthiness regulatory framework. The two Boeing 737 Max accidents
highlighted terrible shortcomings in the airworthiness process, and in
the response to an accident.
In particular, the second accident should never have occurred.
After the Lion Air JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that
Boeing could ignore the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also
unbelievable that they delivered an Airworthiness Directive with a
runaway trim procedure that was inefficient in some parts of the flight
envelope. It is as much unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved
this procedure. Given all the failures and shortcomings known by
Boeing, the 737 Max should have been grounded promptly after the first
crash. Here again, due to bilateral agreements, other certification
authorities like EASA in Europe completely relied on FAA and Boeing
reactions to the first crash. If appropriate reactions and decisions
had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the first crash, Camille
would be still alive with us, as well as all 157 passengers and crew
who lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA had all the
information to issue appropriate reaction after the first crash.
As a conclusion, we sincerely hope that the bill will bring
regulatory improvements to meet the challenge to restore confidence in
overall aviation safety, and will be designed to handle not only
national U.S. issues, but also to take into account its worldwide
impacts, so that our beloved Camille and the 346 passenger and crew did
not die for nothing, and to avoid such disaster occurring again.
Best Regards,
Catherine BERTHET,
Cesar BLAVET,
Njaka RALAIRIVELO.
______
Matthieu WILLM
7, avenue Marcel Proust
75016 PARIS
FRANCE
e-mail: [email protected]
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate
Washington DC, 20510
Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator
Dear Senator,
I am the brother of Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm, who lost her
life in the crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th,
2019. She was 44, and left behind her widowed husband and two children,
aged 9 and 11 when the accident occurred. Clemence-Isaure devoted her
life to others and made it her job. She worked for several NGOs for 20
years. On March 10th, 2019, she was flying from home to Nairobi for her
work to provide humanitarian training.
I am writing this letter on behalf of Clemence-Isaure's family
about the upcoming hearing of FAA Administrator Steve Dickson, and
about the Aviation Safety Bill that is currently discussed at the U.S.
Senate.
Much has been written on the Boeing 737 Max. It has an unsafe,
single chain design. Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong
assumptions, were non-comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two
crashes demonstrated it. 346 people paid these errors with their life.
There have been huge failures in the design process, as well as in the
certification process. These accidents caused a tremendous loss of
confidence, not only towards Boeing and the FAA, but also towards the
entire aeronautical industry.
My purpose is not to comment all the failures and how to avoid them
again thanks to the safety bill, this wouldn't fit in a 3 pages letter.
But, as a mourning brother and as an engineer for the aeronautical
industry, I rather chose to highlight two important points: the
actually international scope of the safety bill you are considering,
and the fact that the second crash should have never occurred.
I am aware that, as a French citizen, I do not have the legitimacy
to express an opinion on an American bill. However, I would like to
draw your attention to the fact that the changes in the American
aeronautical regulations that you are studying have a global impact due
to the agreements between certification authorities. For example, an
FAA certified aircraft in the United States is not fully recertified in
Europe thanks to the bilateral agreement between the FAA and EASA. EASA
trusts the FAA for its certification work, and recertifies only certain
specific points, for example where there are regulatory differences. If
these agreements were a force for the aeronautical industry, to avoid
multiplying the costs of certification, the two accidents of the Boeing
737 Max showed that it was also a huge weakness. Indeed, due to
bilateral agreements, the certification authorities of many countries
have trusted the work of the FAA, and have not looked into the safety
of the new MCAS system.
I think that the regulatory enforcement project that you are
currently studying must be thought of globally, and not only at the
American level, because the civil aviation regulation is a global,
interconnected, regulatory system. For example, it should consider the
consequences of bilateral agreements and better frame them, to prevent
a chain reaction like the tragedy of the Boeing 737 Max from happening
again.
Worldwide aviation regulations are largely based on trust between
national certification authorities. With the tragedies of the Boeing
737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have broken that trust. This was expressed
publicly by Patrick Ky, Executive Director of EASA, during a hearing in
September 2019 at the EU parliament.\1\ As a consequence, following the
accident of flight ET302, EASA decided to no longer rely on the
bilateral agreement with the FAA for the certification of modifications
to the Boeing Max, but to recertify itself all the flight control
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https:ljmultimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/committee-transport-
tourism-ordinary-meeting-ordinary-meeting_20190903-1000-COMMITTEE-
TRAN_vd
Interesting sequences are (approx.):
from 10:35:00 to 10:46:20: point by Patrick Ky on Boeing
737 Max
from 11:28:30 to 11:39:25: answers from Patrick Ky on
questions related to FAA
from 11:54:45 to 11:56:07: answers from Patrick Ky on
questions return into service schedule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hence, I think it would be very useful for the American Senate to
consider hearing Patrick Ky, executive Director of EASA, and why not,
other leaders of certification authorities from other countries. This
would allow the Senate to better understand the international
consequences of the bill on the overall safety of flight, due to
bilateral agreements.
Secondly, the bill should consider not only the design and
certification process, but also the whole airworthiness regulatory
framework. The two Boeing 737 Max accidents highlighted terrible
shortcomings in the airworthiness process, and in the response to an
accident.
In particular, the second accident should never have occurred.
After the Lion Air JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that
Boeing could ignore the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also
unbelievable that they issued an Airworthiness Directive with a runaway
trim procedure that was inefficient in some parts of the flight
envelope. It is as much unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved
this procedure. Given all the failures and shortcomings known by
Boeing, the 737 Max should have been grounded promptly after the first
crash. Here again, due to bilateral agreements, other certification
authorities like EASA in Europe completely relied on FAA and Boeing
reactions to the first crash. If appropriate reactions and decisions
had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the first crash, Clemence-
Isaure would be still alive, as well as all 157 passengers and crew who
lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA had all the
information to issue appropriate reaction after the first crash.
As a conclusion, I sincerely hope that the bill will bring
regulatory improvements to meet the challenge to restore confidence in
overall aviation safety, and will be designed to handle not only
national U.S. issues, but also to take into account its worldwide
impacts, so that my sister and the 346 passenger and crew did not die
for nothing, and to avoid such disaster occurring again.
Best Regards,
Matthieu Willm, June 15th, 2020.
Brother of late Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm, on behalf of Denis
Boutant, her husband, Lilas and Zelie her 2 two daughters, Elisabeth
Willm her mother, Vincent and Violaine Willm, her brother and sister
and on behalf of all Clemence-Isaure's family and friends.
______
June 29, 2020
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
RE: Committee hearing on the Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform
Act of 2020
Dear Senators:
We are the immediate family of Juliah Mwashi who was a victim of
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET 302. We thank you and commend you for
investigating the circumstances surrounding the two deadly crashes of
the Boeing 737 MAX involving Lion Air flight 610 and flight 302. We
applaud your efforts to improve safety within the aviation industry
through the bipartisan Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform Act of
20200F\1\ that was the subject of the committee's hearing on June 17.
We believe the proposed legislation is a good initial step towards
improving aviation safety for the traveling public. However, we urge
you to consider stronger measures to ensure more accountability and
oversight, especially during aircraft development and testing phases.
We also urge you to hold accountable those involved in the design,
approval and what appears to be deception regarding the MAX
certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aviation Safety and Certification Reform Act of 2020, https://
www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/D77B2879-F3DB-40F8-8450-
94EB20415EA8, June 17, 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Juliah was an advocate through and through. Her latest mission was
to foster female leaders of the next generation. Before her life was
cut short, she was a branch coordinator of the Young Leaders and the
Youth Exchange South to South (YESS) Girls Movement programs at the
Kenyan Girl Guide Association. She was always smiling and cared deeply
for her family, especially her daughters. We are committed to allowing
her death to serve as a catalyst for change. One that we hope prevents
other families from suffering the same kind of devastating loss.
We and the families of the other victims who perished in the MAX
crashes wake up daily to the horrible reality that our loved ones were
taken away from us because of Boeing's greed and the fact that it
valued profits far more than human life.
In the years leading up to these tragedies, every effort was made
to reduce corporate oversight and governance. This hands-off approach
grew more intense under the current administration. In 2018, just weeks
before the Lion Air flight 610 crash, Congress yielded to the demands
of aircraft manufacturers, primarily Boeing, and relaxed Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations when it approved the FAA's
Reauthorization Act. It stripped nearly all authority over the
certification process from the agency and placed it in the hands of
those companies that were to be regulated.
Earlier this year, the FAA announced its intention to maintain the
existing weakened and flawed regulatory scheme that was used to approve
the MAX.1F\2\ This is ill-advised and hardly the type of remedy that
will prevent more catastrophic crashes. Ensuring more accountability
and oversight during critical phases of certification, such as aircraft
development and testing phases, will require Congress to restore actual
oversight to the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ FAA response to 737 MAX crash report preserves Boeing's big
role in certifying its own planes, Seattle Times, https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-response-to-max-
crash-report-preserves-boeings-big-role-in-certifying-its-own-planes/,
May 19, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, we call on Congress to eliminate the Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) component of the certification process.
The ODA allows aircraft manufacturers like Boeing to essentially self-
certify. The ODA shifts the authority to select and manage the
manufacturer's employees who are ``loaned'' to the agency from the
manufacturer. The employees are deemed experts and serve to advise the
agency throughout the certification process to spare the agency the
cost of hiring and training its own experts. There are no safeguards in
place to prevent manufacturers from exercising undue influence over or
exerting pressure on their employees to approve aircraft regardless of
their defects or risks to the traveling public. That is, in fact, what
happened with the MAX.
We understand that before the ODA was established, the Designate
Engineering Representative (DER) program provided separate lines of
authority. Therefore, the DER from a manufacturer would be less likely
to experience the significant pressure from its employer to rush a
defective aircraft to market. Such a program with separate lines of
authority and an agency with the authority to act independently is
critical to restoring the culture of safety that the U.S. aviation
industry was known globally for, for many decades. We are not asking
for a specific program but we are asking that Congress restore full
oversight authority to the FAA immediately.
Finally, our family implores you to demand accountability for what
has already happened. We understand the need for thorough fact-finding
probes and investigations, yet we are quickly approaching the second
anniversary of the first tragic crash and neither Boeing nor the FAA
nor any individuals involved with certifying the MAX have been punished
for their wrongdoing and misguided decisions to put profits ahead of
human life.
Despite all the evidence showing that Boeing carelessly thumbed its
nose at safety regulations throughout the MAX's development, the
company and its top executives have not been held accountable. While
its former CEO was forced to resign, he walked out the door with a
hefty severance package. When the internal conversations were released
earlier this year showing the callousness of some Boeing managers and
executives, even when the company's own engineers warned that the MAX
was dangerous, we were devastated all over again. One employee even
said he would not put his family on the MAX should it ever be
certified. Yet, greed kept this information hidden until after 346
lives were sacrificed on board two of those airplanes. Allowing this
kind of negligent and reckless corporate behavior to exist with
impunity reflects the heavy-handedness of corporate giants like Boeing
in controlling the oversight process.
Once again, we thank you for your efforts to uncover the truth and
rectify the troubled regulatory framework of the U.S. aviation sector.
We hope that you will allow our sister and mother's death to remind you
of the grave consequences of failing to make the necessary changes to
prevent other similar tragedies in the future. Restore the FAA's
authority so that it once again can provide independent oversight and
foster a culture of safety. Please give Juliah and the other crash
victims justice by refusing to allow those responsible to escape
accountability. We ask that you add this letter to the public record
for the above referenced committee hearing.
Sincerely,
Ivy Macharia,
Daughter of Juliah Mwashi.
J.M.,
Minor daughter of Juliah Mwashi.
Florah Mwashi,
Sister of Juliah Mwashi.
David Mwashi,
Brother of Juliah Mwashi.
______
Statement of Javier de Luis
I would like to thank Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and
the members of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
for holding this hearing and allowing me to submit this written
statement.
My name is Javier de Luis. My sister, Graziella de Luis, was on
board Ethiopian 302 when it crashed last year. She was a U.S. citizen,
living in Rome and working for the UN. Her loss is compounded for me
because, as an aerospace engineer (MIT, PhD) with over three decades of
experience in this industry, I am very familiar with the development
and certification of complex aerospace systems. The information that
has come out since the crash detailing the design, testing and
certification failures on the part of Boeing and the FAA, provide a
constant reminder to me that this tragedy should not have happened.
This was not an act of God, this was a failure of man.
I will not rehash Michael Stumo's excellent and detailed testimony
that he has submitted to this Committee. I wholeheartedly concur with
all his points and associated recommendations. I will take this
opportunity to briefly highlight three key issues that I feel deserve
your attention, and should be addressed in any proposed legislation.
1. MCAS. When the accidents happened, initial reports referred to
MCAS as a ``stall prevention system''. Later, we were told that
it wasn't there to prevent stalls, but to smooth out the
handling of the aircraft during certain flight conditions.
However, as yet no data has been made available to any
independent reviewer that shows how this airplane behaves with
and without MCAS. I would like to ask a very simple question:
is this airplane stable with MCAS turned off? If it is, then
why keep it, given its central role in these two accidents? If
it isn't, then it would seem that turning MCAS off when the
angle of attack sensors disagree, as has been proposed as part
of the return to flight, might not be a good idea. The secrecy
surrounding this system should give us pause. The committee
should insist that this data be made available for review,
something that the Joint Authority Technical Review report
requested over eight months ago.
2. Amended certificates. There is a ftm.damental incompatibility
between a 50 year old airplane design decisions and modem
aircraft systems. The 737 Max has two computers, but only
operated one at time, along with associated single sensors for
key measurements, including angle of attack. This design
architecture dates back to the 1960s, when there were no
computers in the cockpit. At that time, it made sense to have
one set of instruments reporting to the pilot, and one to the
co-pilot. Modem aircraft are not designed this way. There are
multiple and redundant computers and sensors, with data being
analyzed hundreds of times per second to quickly identify when
something goes wrong or a sensor goes bad. When faced with a
difficult aerodynamic problem with the Max, Boeing decided to
solve it inexpensively through software instead of making
costlier airframe changes. And this would have been fine,
except that they decided to run this software fix on systems
that did not and still do not have the level of redundancy and
reliability that we expect. Essentially, they hacked together a
21st century software fix on a 1960s hardware system. The FAA
allowed this to happen, because it lacked expertise and
visibility into the design. This cannot be allowed to continue.
Boeing cannot be allowed to continue to certify its own
designs, especially those systems that directly impact vehicle
safety, with little to no outside review.
3. FAA Expertise. I feel that it is important to remember that no
new data came out of the Ethiopia crash that was not already
there and available after Indonesia. Let me repeat: we learned
nothing new after the crash that killed my sister that was not
already known after the Lion Air crash four months prior. If
the FAA (and NTSB) had properly evaluated what that data was
telling them and grounded the fleet after the Indonesian crash,
my sister would be alive today. This is not 20/20 hindsight.
All the data was there and available, and it clearly showed
that they had a systemic software problem that affected
multiple aircraft systems, but they treated it as if it was a
simple fix, telling pilots to simply turn the MCAS system off.
To do its job properly, the FAA must be required to draw in
experts from outside (academia, National Academies, government
labs), to assist them in this work. Otherwise, they will
understandably rely on the engineers at Boeing, which, as we
have seen in the months since the crash, can have different
incentives that do not necessarily line up with the public
interest.
Thank you for your time and the opportunity to provide this
testimony,
Javier de Luis, PhD.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
Question 1. As you know, Kansas is renowned in the world of
aviation and for bringing new technology to market. How can the FAA
better position themselves to consider and adopt new innovations, which
can be essential in advancing aviation safety?
Answer. The FAA is always looking to facilitate the safe
introduction of new technologies and enable innovation. To support
innovation in aviation, the FAA Aircraft Certification Service (AIR)
continues to expand the FAA's use of performance based regulations,
rather than prescribing a single means to achieve safety. The revision
to title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 23 was a significant
milestone to enable approaches to achieve safety by adopting
performance based regulations and leveraging industry experts in the
development of consensus standards as a means of compliance.\1\ While
consensus standards provide one means of compliance, the performance-
based regulations allow for additional innovative means to achieve
safety. AIR's Policy and Innovation Division supports aerospace
innovation by creating novel means of compliance and develops and
maintains AIR regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Consensus Standards are specifications developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, which may provide performance-
based or design-specific technical specifications and related
management systems practices. PL-104-113: National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act of 1995 requires Federal agencies to use voluntary
consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA also promotes early engagement with industry, well in
advance of the certification phase where the FAA traditionally starts
to get involved in new technology. Early engagement is helping new
entrants understand the data and information they need to provide to
the agency to demonstrate safety compliance for their new and
innovative products and allows the FAA to understand trends and
emerging technology in the market. This may save companies time and
money by allowing them to make design adjustments earlier in their
certification process. It also allows the FAA to plan for needed
resources and expertise.
To foster operational innovation, the FAA's Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) Integration Office works with new entrants, as well as
incumbent UAS operators, via our Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP)
initiative. Through PSPs, the FAA works with specific UAS companies or
UAS operators to safely enable increasingly complex UAS operational
capabilities while sharing operational data that supports the FAA's
policy making and standards development activities. In addition,
through the PSPs, the FAA provides technical assistance for UAS
operators that need support navigating the operational approval
process(es) to enable specific drone-related activities.
Additionally, the issue of advancing new technologies is also
addressed in the Joint Authorities Technical Review and Special
Committee report, which includes recommendations to the FAA in
advancing guidance and standards. Ensuring the most up to date guidance
is essential in moving forward in the field of aviation, although the
acceptance guidance and standards can oftentimes be delayed. How do you
suggest addressing this issue?
Answer. The FAA agrees that it is critical to foster advances in
new technology. This improves safety as well as enhances the capability
and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS). We are standing
up the Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation in the Aircraft
Certification Service in Aviation Safety (``the Center'') within the
Aircraft Certification Service. The Center is already engaged with
industry on approximately 90 projects. We continually reach out to
industry to foster innovative technologies in design and production
processes, as well as new methods for demonstrating compliance to
safety requirements during product certification. The Center also
coordinates across the FAA in the introduction of new product and
equipment designs, operating models, and integration of unique aircraft
into the NAS.
The Secretary of Transportation established the Safety Oversight
and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC) in August of 2019, per the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The SOCAC advises the Secretary on
policy and guidance recommendations as well as options to expedite the
rulemaking process. By working with the SOCAC, the FAA will ensure a
coordinated effort, focusing on consensus standards, with input from
industry, labor organizations, and safety experts.
Question 2. As you know, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has
negatively affected the aviation industry as a whole, including our
manufacturing and maintenance workforce, which has experienced waves of
furloughs and lay-offs. If we continue to lose these skilled workers,
what do you see as the potential impact?
Answer. The FAA takes a systemic approach to industry oversight
supported by robust processes that govern production, maintenance, and
operations, to ensure changes do not adversely impact safety in the
NAS. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aviation industry has
been forced to reduce production, maintenance, and operations
activities. Sadly, many workers and their families have had to, or may
still, suffer furloughs and, in some cases, lay-offs. At the same time,
the industry must find ways to retain experienced workers to continue
to meet safety requirements as well as to monitor and manage the risks
to our aviation systems. The aviation industry may experience a rebound
in workforce demand when demand for commercial and general aviation
operations increases.
Question 3. During your testimony, you commented on the importance
of expanding the FAA's efforts with other authorities around the world
and in fostering safety standards and policies at ICAO to help achieve
the highest possible levels of safety globally.
I recently introduced S. 3959, along with Ranking Member Cantwell,
Sen. Capito and Sen. Klobuchar, which provides additional resources for
increased engagement by the FAA to promote collaboration and data
sharing on an international level. Additionally, this legislation would
work to address human-machine interface concerns, by providing
resources to the ICAO's working group that addresses this important
topic. Can you describe how this legislation will work toward advancing
a more holistic level of aviation safety on a global level?
Answer. Education, training, familiarization, and harmonized global
standards are the best ways to achieve a holistic level of global
aviation safety to the benefit of U.S. citizens traveling worldwide.
The FAA plays an extremely important leadership role in this effort.
Each of the factors below are important elements of advancing
global aviation safety and include:
Data sharing, including efforts to establish the legal and
technical frameworks necessary for secure data exchange;
Ensuring domestic and international pilot training keep pace
with innovation and increasingly automated aircraft systems to
ensure continued safety levels; and
Promotion of U.S. regulatory approaches and research on
pilot training and human machine interface improvements at ICAO
and in other international venues.
The FAA can positively influence global aviation safety through
international leadership and technical exchanges and assistance,
including those related to safety and management oversight and
assistance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
Question 1. One of the concerns in the wake of these recent crashes
has been the usage of automation in the cockpit and pilot training on
these systems. I certainly believe that automation can and has improved
aviation safety, but I believe that it is imperative to ensure pilots
are properly trained on how to interact with these systems.
As aircraft become more automated, what oversight changes are being
considered at the FAA to ensure pilots also become more proficient in
managing these multiple automation systems?
Answer. The FAA shares the belief that pilots must know and
understand the systems of the aircraft they are flying. Through the
issuance of the Airmen Certification Standards (ACS), which are the
testing standards for pilots to receive a certificate or rating in the
United States, the FAA is driving that message, particularly for
automated systems. Publication of the ACS informs training providers
and applicants, which ultimately drives training program content.
The ACS is part of the safety management system (SMS) framework
that the FAA uses to mitigate risks associated with airman
certification training and testing. Specifically, the ACS, associated
guidance, and test question components of the airman certification
system are constructed around the four functional components of an SMS:
Safety Policy that defines and describes aeronautical
knowledge, flight proficiency, and risk management as
integrated components of the airman certification system;
Safety Risk Management processes through which internal and
external stakeholders identify and evaluate regulatory changes,
safety recommendations, or other factors that require
modification of airman testing and training materials;
Safety Assurance processes to ensure the prompt and
appropriate incorporation of changes to training or testing
that may arise from new regulations and safety recommendations;
and
Safety Promotion in the form of ongoing engagement with both
external stakeholders (e.g., the aviation training industry)
and FAA policy divisions.
The FAA developed the ACS along with associated guidance and
updated reference material in collaboration with a diverse group of
aviation training experts as part of a workgroup under the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The goal is to drive a systematic
approach to all components of the airman certification system,
including knowledge test question development and conduct of the
practical test.
In June 2019, the Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating ACS (ATP
ACS) became effective. This transition from the Practical Test
Standards enabled the standard to be updated to reflect new technology
pilots will find on the flight deck and new aircraft systems that are
incorporated into the design of aircraft. By adding a knowledge
standard, the FAA specifically added a requirement for the pilot
seeking a multiengine airplane ATP certificate, to demonstrate an
understanding of ``[a]irplane automation components (i.e., flight
director, autopilot), their relationship to each other, and how to
manage the automation for flight''. For many of the tasks to be tested
for the certificate or type rating, an applicant is expected to
demonstrate the ability to identify, assess, and mitigate risks that
can result from a failure to manage automation and navigation
equipment. Finally, in a message to evaluators using the ATP ACS, the
FAA states that during the practical test, ``the applicant is expected
to demonstrate automation management skills by utilizing installed,
available, or airborne equipment such as autopilot, avionics and
systems displays, and/or a flight management system (FMS). The
evaluator is expected to test the applicant's knowledge of the systems
that are installed and operative during both the oral and flight
portions of the practical test.''
In addition to the ARAC tasking for the ACS work, the FAA tasked
the Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC) to
recommend pilot training for flight-path-management-related topics to
include automated systems, pilot monitoring, manual flight operations,
and others. The FAA's intent is to use these recommendations as the
basis for new industry guidance on Flight Path Management. Ultimately,
Flight Path Management comes down to three critical items, whether or
not the airplane is being manually flown or in some state of automated
flight: 1) knowing where your airplane is supposed to be (the flight
clearance); 2) putting the airplane where it is supposed to be
(ensuring the flight path matches the clearance); and 3) keeping the
airplane there (actively monitoring). The guidance could be used by
airlines for training pilots on these topics, including managing
automated systems. This specific guidance would facilitate improved FAA
oversight of airlines and their pilot training programs as well as
other operators and training providers of transport category airplanes.
How is the FAA working with airplane manufacturers to address and
examine the ongoing operational challenges with aircraft automation?
Answer. The FAA works with airplane manufacturers to address
ongoing operational challenges with aircraft automation in both design
and operations, which are overseen, respectively, by the Aircraft
Certification Service (AIR) and the Flight Standards Service (FS). The
FAA recognizes the importance of increased integration, communication,
and collaboration between these two offices. This collaboration is
especially important in our oversight and certification activities.
The FAA requires the design of the aircraft systems, including
autoflight systems, to be evaluated for potential pilot errors (14 CFR
25.1302 and 25.1329). This work is performed by AIR. FS evaluates the
same aircraft systems for ``suitability for use'' in ongoing airline
operations and to specify what minimum pilot training is required. In
these evaluations, the manufacturer must describe how it has accounted
for and will address lessons learned from previous accidents and
airline experience.
Question 2. At the 2019 International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) General Assembly, the FAA presented a working paper that made
recommendations on this issue and also asked ICAO to assemble a new
working group to address pilot training and automation dependency. I
applaud the FAA's actions and their further coordination with ICAO on
establishing this new working group.
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, are things on track to establish the
Personnel Training and Licensing Panel?
What kind of feedback has the FAA received from ICAO?
Answer. Since the 40th Assembly, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has progressed the dialogue regarding the creation
of a new technical panel covering personnel training and licensing.
During its most recent session earlier this year, the ICAO Air
Navigation Commission approved the establishment of a new Personnel
Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP). On August 17, ICAO formally
notified member States of the establishment of the PTLP, requested
nominations for membership, and provided a preliminary Terms of
Reference and work program. The first meeting is planned for mid-fall.
Question 3. I appreciate your statements with regards to expanding
the FAA's efforts with other foreign civil aviation authorities around
the world in order to improve aviation safety globally. I believe that
the United States plays a critical role in fostering improved standards
globally. It is for this reason I joined with my colleagues Ranking
Member Cantwell, Senator Moran, and Senator Klobuchar on introducing S.
3959, the Foreign Civil Aviation Authority Assistance Act yesterday.
When the FAA has dispatched experts to other countries to provide
technical assistance, has this been helpful in building continued
outreach with these countries?
Answer. Dispatching FAA experts to provide technical assistance to
other countries has significantly contributed to the safe and seamless
global aviation network we have today. Active FAA engagement with civil
aviation authorities and partners around the world has helped harmonize
and obtain global acceptance of U.S. standards and procedures. As such,
a willingness to render FAA technical assistance builds lasting
relationships that are critically important in maintaining trust and
partnership with our global counterparts. Additionally, the competitive
nature of the aviation industry requires proactive engagement as other
nations aggressively pursue global influence. FAA outreach and
technical assistance helps ensure that the U.S. industry can compete
fairly in the global marketplace and that U.S. safety standards and
processes become the foundation for global standards. In the long term
and to remain a global leader, the FAA must continue to maximize
opportunities to engage with domestic and international partners to
advocate continuous safety improvement and increase compliance with and
bolstering of international safety standards. Over the years and since
my arrival at the agency, I have found international aviation
authorities to be very receptive to and anxious for FAA leadership.
Question 4. I appreciate your statements and the FAA's commitment
to nurturing a healthy and robust reporting culture. Following the 737
MAX crashes, communications between FAA personnel and Boeing's 737
Chief Technical Officer at the time highlighted a concerning culture at
Boeing. And I appreciate the FAA's prompt criticism of Boeing's failure
to disclose those communications and your request for an immediate
explanation.
How does the FAA plan to instill this type of Just Culture, as you
describe in your testimony, going forward?
Answer. The FAA is committed to cultivating a just culture that
promotes continuous improvement of safety systems and outcomes. In
2018, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS-1) worked
with senior Aviation Safety (AVS) organization leadership to establish
a strategic plan. On April 18, 2019, AVS published the AVS Strategic
Plan, which includes a focus on improving the safety culture, not just
in skills and processes, but in behaviors and relationships as well. As
part of this strategic plan, and to maximize employee engagement in
getting to the next level of safety, AVS management and employee
representatives are working together to create a Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program (VSRP) as one significant initiative to continue
fostering a just safety culture. The VSRP will be an internal system
that will help identify safety risks at all levels. It will establish a
voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive environment that encourages
open reporting of aviation safety issues and concerns. As we see with
industry voluntary safety reporting programs, the non-punitive nature
of VSRP is of particular importance, because it clearly puts the focus
on fixing safety issues, not targeting people. The VSRP will mirror
successful, well-established programs that already exist within FAA and
industry, including the option to file anonymously and for an
independent, neutral team to review and investigate safety issues. Our
goal is for the VSRP to be transparent, timely, visible, and
responsive, with a tracking system to identify patterns in the data. I
am a strong advocate for the VSRP, and believe this program is
foundational to the type of open, transparent and collaborative just
culture we seek.
In addition, the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) has
established initiatives to support the development, production, and
maintenance of safe, compliant products. These initiatives focus on
formalizing expectations for industry self-correction and voluntary
disclosures; monitoring and improving system safety and performance;
and incorporating the compliance philosophy into international
agreements. More information about these initiatives and efforts to
cultivate a just culture are available on our website.
Question 5. I appreciate the efforts DOT and the FAA are taking to
protect passengers and employees during this time. I believe efforts
like the ones you described in your testimony (complying with CDC
guidelines and requesting passengers wear face coverings while flying)
can play a positive role in keeping travelers safe and secure in the
short-term. In your opinion, what further measures are needed in order
to rebuild passenger confidence?
Answer. Government, aviation, and public health leaders must work
together to meaningfully reduce the public health risk and restore
passenger, aviation workforce, including crew, and public confidence in
air travel. The FAA has been deeply engaged in these efforts with the
CDC and the Departments of Homeland Security and State since the early
stages of the COVID-19 public health crisis. In the first week of
February, FAA published a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) that
contained CDC guidance for airlines and crews on ways to ensure the
health of flight crews traveling overseas. That document has been
updated three times--most recently in mid-May--to reflect changes in
virus spread and update health protocols to protect air crews.
On July 2, 2020, the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services
jointly published Runway to Recovery, which provides general guidance
and specific recommendations for reducing public health risk in
passenger aviation environments. The measures discussed include
requiring face coverings, promoting social distancing, enhancing
cleaning and disinfection, and minimizing in-person interactions. This
document will continue to be updated based on the latest public health
research on COVID-19 and the best strategies to mitigate its spread.
To affect public health risk reduction in the global air
transportation, FAA's Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell has been leading
the U.S. delegation's participation in the ICAO Council Aviation
Recovery Taskforce (CART). The CART also developed and published a set
of recommendations, which, like the Runway to Recovery, provide
guidance to the aviation industry about measures to take to reduce
public health risk in aviation through its ``Take-off Guidance, which
was published in early June 2020. These two documents, which are
closely aligned, provide substantial guidance on ways to reduce public
health risk and build passenger and workforce confidence.
The Department of Transportation also sent approximately 87 million
cloth facial coverings to airports for passenger use. This will help
protect passengers and crew and boost passenger confidence in America's
transportation systems. These 87 million cloth facial coverings are in
addition to the over 4 million cloth facial coverings the Department
provided earlier this year to critical infrastructure workers in the
aviation sector. More information about these and other COVID-related
agency actions is available on our website.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mike Lee to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
Question 1. The Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft
Certification Process at the Department of Transportation released a
report that included a number of recommendations for the FAA to
consider related to improving the FAA's aircraft certification process.
The report included a recommendation that the FAA mandate Safety
Management Systems (SMS) for design and manufacturing organizations.
a. What are the core safety improvements for an organization that
SMS brings to the table?
Answer. Safety Management Systems (SMS) enable the FAA and also
individual manufacturers or operators to coordinate risk management
processes and feedback loops within and between design, manufacturing,
operation, and maintenance functions. Another key benefit of SMS is
that it moves visibility of and accountability for safety issues to the
leadership level of the organization. The integration of safety
management principles into design and manufacturing processes bring
with it a holistic systems approach to safety that can better identify
and address issues or trends before they surface.
Importantly, SMS clearly places responsibility for safety assurance
with designers and manufacturers, with the FAA continuing to provide
regulatory oversight. Data sharing is the norm, and all parties inform
each other about safety insights. This results from all parties sharing
an open, trusting culture characterized by a commitment to compliance,
self-correction, and voluntary disclosure, and to operating with a
safety-first mindset. Safety is also enhanced in a systematic way,
rather than through individual reports or anecdotal information, so
that the FAA has the necessary insight to oversee and assess the
manufacturer's safety performance.
b. Are there any notable concerns with a government mandatory SMS
for design and manufacturing organizations?
Answer. The FAA must ensure that any SMS requirements are
appropriately scoped and structured to achieve the desired safety
benefits, without imposing an undue burden on small design and
production approval holders. To support this, the FAA is exploring a
strategy to scale implementation costs of SMS to the risk a product
presents to the aviation system.
FAA requirements for SMS will not only promote standardization but
also streamline fair global market access for U.S. design and
manufacturing companies. A mandated SMS, as opposed to the current
voluntary system, will enable the FAA to meet international SMS
standards as described in International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Annex 19.
c. When SMS is introduced into an organization, is it considered an
entirely new system or does it build upon an organization's existing
safety checks, processes, and procedures?
Answer. SMS builds upon existing processes and procedures. SMS is
integrated into the management systems of the organization, and becomes
a way of doing business and is infused in an organization's existing
system. Inherently, SMS enables an integration function that ties
together risk management in an organization to enhance a system
perspective of safety. As noted above, this system approach to safety
has proven to be extremely effective in all segments of aviation where
mandatory SMS has been adopted.
d. What percentage of U.S. certified design and manufacturing
organizations participate in the FAA's voluntary SMS program?
Answer. Currently 12 of the 71 companies (approximately 17 percent)
with both a type and production certificate are participating in the
Aircraft Certification Voluntary SMS program.
Question 2. Has the FAA conducted a cost-benefit analysis on a
mandatory SMS for design and manufacturing organizations? Can you
provide any data to better understand the regulatory costs associated
with SMS compliance?
Answer. The FAA recently initiated a rulemaking project that would
update title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 21 (design and
production), 91 (air tours), 135 (commuter and on demand air carriers)
and 145 (repair stations) to require persons subject to those parts to
meet the SMS requirements codified in 14 CFR part 5. The FAA will
carefully assess the costs and benefits of SMS for these entities as
part of the rulemaking process and present our findings for public
comment.
Question 3. ICAO's SMS standards offer flexibility for member
states to structure implementation of SMS to fit the unique needs of
their aviation industries. Does the FAA believe the same flexibility
should be given from the FAA to U.S. design and manufacturing
organizations in implementing mandatory SMS?
Answer. Yes, the FAA believes that SMS should offer flexibility.
The FAA's SMS requirements, described in 14 CFR part 5, are
performance-based and enable design and manufacturing organizations to
implement SMS within the context of their existing systems.
Question 4. What foreign countries (if any) have a mandatory SMS
requirement for design and manufacturing organizations that produce
aircraft that operate within the United States under Part 121?
Answer. No other countries have made SMS mandatory for the design
and manufacturing of aircraft that operate under 14 CFR part 121 in the
United States. The European Aviation Safety Agency, however, has issued
a Notice of Proposed Amendment that would require SMS for design and
manufacturing organizations, but the rule has not reached final
publication. SMS for design and manufacturing organizations is also
being discussed in Canada and Brazil.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
Last year at your confirmation hearing, we discussed the Inspector
General's report ``Enhanced FAA Oversight Could Reduce Hazards
Associated with Increased Use of Flight Deck Automation'' and its
recommendations regarding pilot training guidance and standards. There
has since been near universal agreement from technical experts,
including the National Transportation Safety Board, that assumptions
about pilot training were not representative of the real-world.
Question 1. What progress has been made since we last spoke about
this at your confirmation hearing last Spring?
Michigan is home to about 50 aircraft suppliers that supply Boeing
with both commercial and defense related aircraft. As of February,
expectations were for global demand to include 17,000 new jet aircraft.
Now, that number is barely a fraction of where it was. The pandemic is
having a devastating impact down the supply chain--sadly we've seen
parts suppliers lay off hundreds of people in Michigan.
Answer. Since we spoke at my confirmation hearing, the FAA's
Aircraft Evaluation Division (AED) has increased its participation in
Aircraft Certification evaluations of flight deck systems and in
reviews of system safety assessment assumptions about pilot
performance, including pilot responses to failures. The Aircraft
Evaluation Division also recently hired six human factors specialists
to support this effort as well as to assist with conducting operational
and maintenance evaluations.
Domestically, the FAA has been very active in the development of
new rules and guidance for the improvement and maintenance of air
carrier pilot manual flying proficiency. The FAA has always required
demonstrating and maintaining proficiency of manual flying skills. The
FAA requires at least 21 and potentially 32 maneuvers to be performed
manually during air carrier pilot training and checking (e.g.,
takeoffs, steep turns, stall prevention and recovery, upset prevention
and recovery, manually controlled instrument approaches). Air carrier
pilots must also satisfactorily perform loss of reliable airspeed,
which reinforces the need for pilots to ignore erroneous indications
and manually fly the aircraft with sole reference to pitch and power
displays.
The FAA also agrees that at a global level, if automation
dependency and degradation of manual flight operations skills are not
satisfactorily addressed in existing standards, there may be a high
level of variation in the approach utilized by individual civil
aviation authorities (CAA) regarding how associated risks may be
addressed in regulation or guidance. This variation adds an additional
layer of complexity to addressing automation dependency and degradation
of manual flight operations skills worldwide.
In September 2019, the FAA presented a working paper at the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) General Assembly
seeking the establishment of a new panel that would address pilot
training and automation dependency. This panel would be an important
step in understanding the scope of automation dependency globally and
bring the international community together to work towards accepted
solutions that could reduce the variability in how the issue is
addressed by individual CAAs.
With broad support for establishing a panel at the General
Assembly, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission approved the establishment
of a new Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in June 2020.
The United States has been named a member of this panel and the panel's
work is anticipated to begin in early 2021. The FAA will continue to
advocate for taking steps to address automation dependency, manual
flight operations proficiency, and improving pilot management of
automated systems globally.
Finally, we continue to address the recommendations from the
Secretary's Special Committee on the FAA's Aircraft Certification
Process, which include improving the consideration of operational
environments during the type certification process, and enhancing the
coordination between the FAA's Aircraft Certification and Flight
Standards functions. These actions are a key part of ensuring pilot
training assumptions reflect real-world operations not only in the
U.S., but globally.
Question 2. Given the state of aircraft manufacturing, have you
been in contact with other Federal agencies regarding concerns about a
potential impact on our Nation's manufacturing readiness level from a
national security perspective?
Answer. The FAA understands that the national health emergency has
resulted in a reduction in airline operations and aviation
manufacturing production. Through outreach and communication with
various manufacturers, the FAA has noted that many companies have
slowed or stopped production and have had to furlough or lay-off
employees. The FAA is monitoring these changes and is continuing to
conduct risk-based oversight to ensure compliance with regulatory
requirements, and ensure that products and articles conform, and are in
a condition for safe operations. The Department of Transportation also
coordinated with the Department of Treasury under The Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, from which airlines were
eligible to receive more than $50 billion in grants and loans. The
separate loan program made $25 billion available to airlines and
certified repair stations, which serve as a critical link in the
manufacturing production chain. The FAA has not been involved in any
official outreach to other Federal agencies regarding concerns about a
potential impact on our Nation's manufacturing readiness level from a
national security perspective.
Reports indicated that the Boeing initially relied on the
outsourcing of some of the 737 MAX work overseas, which could have
contributed to the challenges with the MCAS.
Question 3. Has FAA looked into this?
Answer. Boeing utilizes both domestic and international suppliers
for design and production work associated with its airplane production
programs. Boeing did not utilize any international suppliers for design
and production components of the 737 MAX Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System (MCAS). Additionally, from information obtained
during the 737 MAX accident investigations, as well as other
investigations of the 737 MAX certification, the FAA is not aware of
any international supplier work that contributed to the 737 MAX
accidents or challenges with the MCAS.
When the previous CEO of Boeing testified before our committee last
October, I asked him whether Boeing made a mistake in opposing robust
independent regulatory oversight from FAA due to ``regulatory costs.''
After pressing him on the matter, he agreed that in hindsight, Boeing
undervalued the role of an independent oversight. One example is that
[Boeing] company managers rejected a backup system for determining
speed, which might have alerted pilots to problems linked to two 737
MAX crashes. A similar backup system is installed on the larger Boeing
787 jet, but it was rejected for the 737 MAX because it could increase
costs and training requirements for pilots.
Question 4. What has FAA done to make sure this type of corner
cutting is avoided?
Answer. The FAA validates compliance with regulations and provides
exceptions supported by safety data. The FAA has also increased our
involvement in the review of the system safety analysis for major type
design changes. Specifically, the FAA is increasing involvement in
projects with a focus on assumptions made in support of critical
failure conditions and evaluation of related probabilities of failure
occurrence that would indicate the need for possible system
redundancies. In addition, we are working closely with Boeing as it
establishes a comprehensive Safety Management System so that decisions,
such as those noted above, would be determined using a risk-based
decision-making process. We have consistently made it clear that safety
and quality need to be the top priorities in the design and
manufacturing processes. Boeing's work to develop its Safety Management
System is foundational to that effort and FAA will be closely
monitoring its performance as SMS is implemented and operationalized.
As ranking member of the Senate's Homeland Security Committee, I
deal a lot with cybersecurity challenges in the Federal government. To
deal with threats, the Federal government actually hires hackers to
find our vulnerabilities and ensure the safe use of computer systems.
The process that produced the MCAS does not seem to have followed this
philosophy of inviting regulators to find its vulnerabilities. In fact,
regulators claimed to not fully understand the MCAS.
Question 5. How is FAA addressing this?
Answer. Industry standards were applied to the development and
certification of the flight control computer (FCC) software, including
MCAS. These industry standards provide established processes to
identify and address vulnerabilities in the design of software. This
process includes extensive FAA involvement in the verification and
validation aspects throughout the software development lifecycle,
including four phases or stages of involvement (SOI) that `audit' the
software requirements, analysis, and accomplishments. The audits ensure
through robust development assurance process application that safety
requirements are incorporated and the software will perform reliably.
Although improvements regarding the implementation of the processes may
be appropriate, the processes were properly applied to the MCAS, using
assumptions that were consistent with industry practice and
understanding prior to the accidents.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Baldwin to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
The Department of Transportation's Special Committee to Enhance
Aviation Safety, commissioned to review the procedures of the FAA for
product certification and processes followed by the FAA and Boeing
during the certification of the 737 MAX 8, released findings and
recommendations in January. Within its report, the Committee made
findings and offered recommendations on better data gathering and
utilization, noting that ``Better data gathering, targeted analysis by
experts, and the use of all available data to develop and implement
corrective actions to mitigate risk would bolster aviation safety.''
FAA's timelines for delivering data tools for risk-based decision-
making occur between 2021 and 2025.
Question 1. In the interim, what is FAA doing to provide the agency
with sufficient tools to leverage the large amounts of data the agency
has access to, but is unable to use for safety analysis because of
limitations in IT infrastructure?
Answer. The FAA assembled a Safety Data and Analysis Team (SDAT) of
cross-functional subject matter experts representing all FAA lines of
business and staff offices to improve the way safety data is
consolidated, managed, and accessed agency-wide. This team has
identified the safety data systems that are being registered in the
agency's Enterprise Information Management (EIM) data repository. This
repository provides awareness, centralization, and accessibility for
improved data-driven, risk-based decision making. As part of the SDAT's
efforts, the FAA developed a data governance portal to improve the
quality of FAA's data inventory and ensure that data is easily
discoverable. It also verifies the existence of key information to be
used for statistical and reference purposes that has been captured in
the portal for critical enterprise data assets.
Additionally, offices across the FAA are collaborating, in
conjunction with the FAA Chief Data Office, to apply data cleaning/
analysis tools and techniques to fuse previously separate aircraft
safety data to provide a more complete, life-cycle view of aircraft
safety. As part of these efforts, the FAA is developing and
implementing analytic tools and capabilities needed to identify and
assess aviation safety risk. These tools aim to support data
visualization and understanding by the broad FAA workforce, as well as
advanced analytics including text mining, machine learning, anomaly
detection, regression, Bayesian networks, and causal diagrams.
What is FAA's timeline for having sufficient data available
for broader use by FAA, including Aircraft Certification
engineers and inspectors, to make data-driven risk-based
analysis possible?
Answer. The FAA currently collects and monitors safety data;
however, the FAA is always looking for new sources of data and
continues to build our capacity for enhanced trend analysis and
decision-making. In alignment with FAA's commitment to data viability,
information sharing, and integration of safety data at the agency
level, the FAA implemented a five-year strategic Safety Data and
Analysis Team (SDAT) Strategic Plan in FY19 plan to fulfill several
major initiatives to improve agency safety data.
Will this solution be in place prior to the MAX 737 8 return
to service?
Answer. Foundational elements of the solution will be in place upon
MAX 737-8 return to service with additional functionality being added
as data and tools are approved for EIM use.
The FY20 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act included $5 million for a veteran's pilot
training grant program at FAA, in line with my bipartisan American
Aviator Act.
Question 2. What is FAA's current timeline to make grants available
for eligible flight schools?
Answer. The FAA initiated the Paperwork Reduction Act on the
veterans pilot training grant in February 2020. The FAA continues to
work with DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center leading
the Forces to Flyers research initiative in order to incorporate
applicable findings from the research program into the development of a
grant program geared toward veterans.
Forces to Flyers was a three-year research initiative announced in
2017 to explore how best to assist veterans transitioning to new
careers as pilots and form successful education paths. Due to the
COVID-19 situation, results from Forces to Flyers research program were
delayed because academic school years were disrupted, but the program
recently wrapped up in October. We are awaiting the final report and
its findings, and will then assess next steps. Additionally, the FAA
has been actively working and making significant progress on two other
new grant programs authorized in the FAA Reauthorization Act for
workforce development of pilots and maintenance technicians.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jon Tester to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
Question 1. It is evident, through internal messages or
whistleblower complaints, that both FAA and Boeing ODA employees face a
lot of outside pressure to do their jobs as quickly as possible,
because time and money are on the line. What steps are you taking to
ensure that every single ODA employee feels like safety is their number
one priority?
Answer. The FAA is actively working to review and reform certain
ODA practices and will issue an updated policy in 2021 addressing undue
pressure and further defining communication expectations. This policy
will emphasize safety as the top priority by providing clarity on undue
pressure and the appropriate communication between unit members and the
FAA. Specific to Boeing, the FAA has issued a proposed civil penalty
against The Boeing Company (Boeing) related to `undue pressure' of
Boeing ODA unit members. In addition, we have been working with Boeing
to incorporate changes into the Boeing ODA procedures to establish
additional restrictions that further protect ODA unit members from
interference or undue pressure while executing their duties on behalf
of the FAA. The FAA is also working closely with Boeing as it
establishes a comprehensive Safety Management System, which will
include continuous monitoring of Boeing's internal performance
associated with the ODA as well as the broader company. The Boeing SMS
will be foundational to ensuring that each employee clearly understands
that safety is the number one priority, and that production deadlines
and financial considerations are always subordinate to safety and
quality. FAA will be closely monitoring their SMS as it is implemented
and operationalized in 2021.
Question 2. Both of the aircraft in question received recent
routine maintenance prior to the crashes. Not only did these
inspections fail to see the flaws with the Angle of Attack sensors,
they also failed to flag certain wiring bundles as a potential hazard.
What are you doing to ensure that the FAA leads the world in ensuring
mechanical safety standards, and that as we move forward with aircraft
safety improvements, we are keeping maintenance in mind?
Answer. While we currently only have the final accident report for
Lion Air, based on our review of the accident data, it is believed that
only the Lion Air accident had an indication of maintenance associated
with the AOA sensor. The AOA sensor on that Lion Air airplane received
routine shop maintenance prior to the accident, during which it may
have been mis-calibrated. However, the accident investigation could not
confirm whether the AOA sensor was properly installed. The FAA verified
that the established maintenance installation instructions would have
identified a mis-calibrated AOA sensor on the airplane. Established
maintenance practices would not require identification and separation
of wires within AOA sensor wire bundles.
Subsequent to the two 737 MAX accidents, Boeing reviewed the
engineering analysis of the AOA sensor wire bundles. Based on this
review, the FAA requested a design change, via a notice of proposed
rulemaking revising the routing of AOA sensor wiring to separate the
power and control wires. This design change complies with later safety
standards than those that were applied to earlier versions of the 737.
Question 3. The recent Department of Transportation Special
Committee report came back with several recommendations for improving
aircraft certification, including improving data sharing and management
practices. What is the timeline for having sufficient data available
for broader FAA workforce to do their job of making data-driven risk-
based analysis using the information that is currently available to
them?
Answer. In alignment with FAA's commitment to data viability,
information sharing, and integration of safety data at the agency
level, the FAA implemented a five-year strategic plan in FY 2019 to
fulfill several major initiatives to improve agency safety data. A
fundamental component of this plan is to develop and implement an
Enterprise Information Management (EIM) platform that the FAA workforce
can leverage to collect, store, access, and analyze agency data. The
EIM platform is an FAA-developed, cloud-based, big data platform that
consists of two key items:
A large repository or ``Data Mall'' for FAA data that is
organized and cataloged for easy access, but safeguarded to
preserve its integrity and to protect data from unauthorized
access.
A collection of curated technologies and tools to enable FAA
personnel to efficiently transform data into information.
By Fall 2021, the FAA anticipates having governance in place, which
will:
Engage the FAA workforce in data management oversight and
sharing. This includes engaging data information stewards, end
users, and members of leadership to evaluate the effectiveness
of data governance in terms of data availability, metadata, and
data integrity.
Continuously expand the establishment for safety data
governance requirements using a systematic approach beginning
with the most critical safety data resources.
Refine our concepts, capabilities, and tools for advanced
safety analysis to identify and assess safety risk through on-
going workforce engagement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
As part of the FAA's settlement agreement, FAA agreed to a ``Two
Step'' process to address the concerns of Phoenix's surrounding
communities and held a series of workshops in April of last year. The
FAA received 1,526 comments from the Step Two workshops, almost all of
them regarding noise and flight path concerns. The City of Scottsdale
spent a significant amount of time and money to study and present
alternatives to these newly proposed routes. In its response this past
January, the FAA summarily rejected the proposals, stating that they
would decrease safety and cause conflicts with other air traffic with
no detailed explanation. The FAA also stated that it ``intends to
continue the dialogue with local stakeholders about issues that are of
interest to them, as we do in communities throughout the United
States.''
It has been six months since the FAA's response and the Agency has
not yet initiated any dialog.
Question 1. When and how will the FAA begin substantive discussions
with citizens of impacted communities regarding this longstanding
concern?
Answer. The FAA appreciates the City of Scottsdale's thoughtful
participation in the Step Two workshops, which were conducted as part
of an agreement with the City of Phoenix and groups representing
historic neighborhoods in Phoenix. The FAA complied with the terms of
the agreement by implementing nine replacement west-bound departure
procedures, which were the subject of a recently decided lawsuit, City
of Phoenix, Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017).
``Step Two'' of that process was designed to solicit information from
the public that could be considered if, and when, the FAA began to
modernize and improve the safety and efficiency of other aspects of
that regional airspace. As part of the two-step process outlined in the
agreement, the FAA conducted six public workshops and solicited public
comments on two occasions.
Although Step Two of that information-gathering process
successfully concluded without FAA publishing any new air-traffic
procedures, the FAA considered all of the public comments it received,
including the proposal from the City of Scottsdale. The FAA's ``Summary
of Step Two Comments,'' which was issued on January 10, 2020, listed
some of the reasons the FAA had concerns with Scottsdale's proposals.
Subsequently, the City of Scottsdale filed a lawsuit against the FAA,
which is currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.
The FAA has since met twice with the City of Scottsdale. During
those meetings, the FAA discussed the City's proposals and further
explained why FAA believed they were not viable due to concerns about
their safety and efficiency. The FAA continues to strive for ever-
increasing safety and efficiency of the national airspace, and to this
end anticipates eventually proposing some procedure changes similar to
those notional concepts shown to the public during the 2019 workshops.
Those changes are being considered by the FAA for their potential
to enhance safety and efficiency, however the City of Scottsdale noted
in their May 23, 2019 comments on FAA's Step Two process that ``the FAA
Concept 1 is a step in the right direction'' from the City's point of
view. At the same time, FAA also received comments from other members
of the public that did not support the notional concepts. These
proposals are in the very preliminary stages, and any further
development would first require the FAA to convene a Full Working Group
pursuant to FAA Order 7100.41, Performance Based Navigation
Implementation Process. As explained in the order, the working group
would include airport authorities affected by the procedure changes,
which would include both Phoenix and Scottsdale. FAA would look to the
airport authorities to represent community interests and concerns
during the working group's deliberations. In addition, FAA would
provide opportunities for communities to engage in the process, seeking
input from airport authorities and the local communities to understand
the communities' challenges. The time-frame for any working group to
convene, design air-traffic procedures, and begin implementation, is
extremely long due to limited resources and the significant staffing
constraints resulting from the COVID-19 public health emergency. Any
future air-traffic procedures proposed as a result of that process will
be developed in full compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act and the FAA's own processes for public engagement prior to
implementation.
Question 2. Is the FAA committed to considering changes that will
provide some resolution to the citizens communities impacted by noise
from eastbound departures?
Answer. In FAA's enabling statute, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40101, Congress
directed the FAA to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system
in the world. Congress conferred the FAA with exclusive jurisdiction
over the airspace to accomplish this mission. When the FAA implements
air traffic procedures in pursuit of this mission, it must therefore
prioritize the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System.
As part of its work, the FAA engages with communities across the Nation
and considers the input it receives. As an example, the FAA provides
support to roundtables that represent communities surrounding airports,
and considers recommended changes endorsed by those groups.
With respect to the eastbound departures implemented in 2014 at
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, the FAA completed an
environmental review before implementing those procedures. The noise
analysis supporting that environmental review concluded the procedures
did not have the potential to cause any significant noise impacts. When
the FAA refers to ``significant impact'' it is a reference to an
objective legal standard. It is not FAA making a subjective statement
about how any one person may perceive any type of noise.
As mentioned above, FAA may propose additional changes to
procedures at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport to improve the
safety and efficiency of aircraft operations. A portion of those
changes could affect eastbound departures and may also reduce some of
the aircraft operations over Scottsdale. The working group that designs
any such procedures will include representatives from both the
Scottsdale and Phoenix Airports. Once those procedures are designed,
they will be subject to environmental review and will be made available
to the public prior to implementation.
It is important to note that procedure changes can change the
location of noise from aircraft operations, but they do not eliminate
the noise itself. One purpose of the environmental review process will
be to determine whether, and to what extent, the aircraft noise is
being shifted to a different community.
During the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC) meeting held this past
December in McLean, VA, your Director of Air Traffic Operations in the
FAA Western Service Area (Ms. Kim Stover) stressed the importance of
``strategic engagement with communities.'' Community engagement and
related noise concerns were made a standing agenda item for future NAC
meetings. The NAC also reiterated that FAA's Regional Administrators
should lead the community engagement team in their regions by
supporting Community Roundtables and Congressional meetings.
Question 3. Do you support frequent and effective community
engagements with Arizona communities as FAA seeks to implement NextGen
procedures there?
Answer. Absolutely yes. The FAA values engagement with communities
across the Nation as it implements procedure changes, including in
Arizona. In 2018, as part of an agreement with the City of Phoenix, FAA
replaced nine departure procedures that were at issue in City of
Phoenix, Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017). Prior to
implementing those procedures, the FAA prepared a noise screening
analysis report to determine the noise impact of those procedures. The
noise analysis concluded the procedures requested by the City of
Phoenix would not result in a significant noise impact relative to the
no action scenario. Even though an environmental impact statement was
not required, the FAA shared the results of its environmental review
with the public, held three workshops, and invited comments before
implementing the procedures.
Following the implementation of those procedures, the FAA held
three more workshops to discuss the effectiveness of those procedures
and invite comments on the potential for additional airspace changes.
Although the FAA decided in January 2020 not to take any additional
action as part of its agreement with the City of Phoenix and various
historic groups, that decision does not preclude the agency from
continuing to advance its mission to improve the safety and efficiency
of the airspace above Phoenix and surrounding communities. The FAA has
since met twice with the City of Scottsdale to discuss the possibility
of future air-traffic procedure changes, even before any formal process
has established what those air-traffic procedures might look like.
However, as noted above, we are in very preliminary stages and intend
to engage the affected airports authorities and local communities
throughout the process.
In the years since 2012, when Congress directed FAA to expedite
implementation of Performance Based Navigation procedures nationwide,
the FAA has developed a comprehensive and effective public engagement
strategy that exceeds the agency's legal obligations under the National
Environmental Policy Act and Administrative Procedure Act. These
policies are explained on the agency's website: https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/community_involvement/. FAA will continue to use and refine
those approaches in the coming years, and looks forward to continuing
its community engagement efforts in Arizona and across the county.
Question 4. Is the FAA considering lowering or altering its
threshold for ``significant noise'' from 65 to 60 day-night average
sound level or reducing in all residential areas to 55 DNL? If not, why
not?
Answer. The FAA defines significant noise exposure to residential
land use as DNL 65dB. This threshold is based on Federal land use
policy guidelines; codified under 14 CFR Part 150 and adopted for
purposes of defining the significant noise impact criteria for
assessment of Federal actions under National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). In the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, we were asked to evaluate
alternative metrics to current average day-night level standard, such
as use of actual noise sampling to address community airplane noise
concerns. Please review our FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018: Section
188 Report to Congress for the results of that effort.\1\
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\1\ https://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/congress/media/Day-
Night_Average_Sound_
Levels_COMPLETED_report_w_letters.pdf
Question 5. Does the FAA have a legal duty to protect the residents
who live under flight paths from aircraft noise created by the FAA's
changes to flight procedures at Phoenix Sky Harbor airport?
Answer. Title 49, U.S. Code, section 40103(b) addresses ``the use
of the navigable airspace'' and provides in subsection (b)(2) that
``[t]he Administrator shall prescribe air traffic regulations on the
flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for . . .
protecting individuals . . . on the ground.'' Title 49, U.S. Code,
section 44715(a)(1)(A) states, in pertinent part: ``To relieve and
protect the public health and welfare from aircraft noise, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, as he deems
necessary, shall prescribe . . . regulations to control and abate
aircraft noise.'' Under both of these statutory provisions, the FAA has
discretion to determine what, if any, regulations are warranted in
particular circumstances.
Environmental considerations, including the potential impacts of
aircraft noise from air traffic procedures, are a concern that the FAA
takes seriously. When the FAA creates or amends air traffic procedures,
it is required to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), as well as implementing regulations issued by the Council on
Environmental Quality, and FAA's own NEPA procedures set forth in FAA
Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures. These
procedures require the analysis, and in many cases disclosure, of
impacts in a range of environmental impact categories, including noise.
Under NEPA, if an air traffic procedure proposed by FAA would cause
a ``significant'' increase in noise, FAA must first prepare an
``environmental impact statement.'' FAA's NEPA procedures define a
``significance threshold'' for noise. Specifically, as set forth in FAA
Order 1050.1F (Exhibit 4-1), an action would cause a significant noise
impact if it would increase noise by DNL 1.5 dB in an area that is or
would be exposed to noise above the DNL 65 dB level. An environmental
impact statement must consider reasonable alternatives to the agency's
proposal and consider input from the public. Although FAA has a legal
duty under NEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to proposed actions
that would have a significant noise impact, NEPA does not impose a duty
to select the alternative with the least noise impact, nor does it
impose a duty to mitigate noise impacts.
In 2014, FAA proposed a number of procedure changes at Phoenix Sky
Harbor Airport. As part of its NEPA review for those procedures, FAA
prepared a noise screening analysis report to assess the environmental
impact of those procedures. The noise screen concluded that the
procedures would not cause a significant noise impact. More recently,
in 2018, as part of an agreement with the City of Phoenix, FAA replaced
nine departure procedures that were at issue in City of Phoenix,
Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017). Prior to
implementing those procedures, FAA prepared another noise screening
analysis report to determine the noise impact of those procedures. The
noise analysis again concluded the procedures requested by the City of
Phoenix would not result in a significant noise impact relative to the
no action scenario. Even though an environmental impact statement was
not required, FAA shared the results of its environmental review with
the public and invited comments, which were considered by FAA, before
implementing the procedures.
Question 6. Does the FAA have the legal authority to mandate that
all passengers and crew wear masks on commercial passenger flights
during the pandemic? Has your staff performed a legal analysis? If yes,
will you share that legal analysis?
Answer. The FAA is responsible for promoting safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce. Aviation safety is its mission. While the FAA
remains steadfast in its focus on safety of flight during the COVID-19
public health emergency, it is not a public health agency. Applicable
statutes and case law do not provide the FAA with a clear mandate or
guidance on protecting crewmember or passenger health with measures
that are not directly related to the safety of flight. Therefore, the
FAA would need to find a nexus between aviation safety and public
health in order to use its legal authority to institute a mandate to
wear face coverings on commercial passenger flights during the COVID-19
public health emergency. In the past, the FAA has not used its aviation
safety authority in prior public health emergencies to address public
health concerns that do not threaten safety of flight. Using FAA safety
authorities to address public health issues related to communicable
diseases would be a significant policy change and expansion of the
FAA's jurisdiction. The FAA has limited public health expertise and
relies upon U.S. government public health agencies with that expertise
to determine what public health actions might be appropriate. Through
the COVID-19 public health emergency, the FAA has provided its aviation
safety expertise to such agencies in review of their public health
guidelines that could apply in an aviation environment. The FAA has
collaborated with and looks to those agencies for promulgation of
guidance and regulations on public health for passengers and
crewmembers.