[Senate Hearing 116-588]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                                 


                                                        S. Hrg. 116-588
 
                         EXAMINING THE FEDERAL
     AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JUNE 17, 2020

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
                             
                             
  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                           
                             


                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
                
                       ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 52-680              WASHINGTON : 2023
             
                
                
                
       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                      
                            C O N T E N T S
                            

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on June 17, 2020....................................     1
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     1
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     4
Statement of Senator Blunt.......................................    16
Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    17
Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    19
Statement of Senator Schatz......................................    20
Statement of Senator Moran.......................................    21
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    23
    Letter dated October 24, 2019 to Stephen M. Dickson from Hon. 
      Richared Blumenthal........................................    25
Statement of Senator Scott.......................................    25
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    27
Statement of Senator Udall.......................................    28
Statement of Senator Rosen.......................................    29
Statement of Senator Duckworth...................................    31
Statement of Senator Baldwin.....................................    34
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    36
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................    37
Statement of Senator Sinema......................................    39

                               Witnesses

Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration.................................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Michael Stumo, Father of Samya Rose Stumo, Victim of Ethiopian 
  Airlines Flight ET302..........................................    41
    Prepared statement...........................................    43

                                Appendix

Letter dated June 5, 2020 from Curtis Ewbank.....................    57
Letter dated June 5, 2020 from Zipporah Kuria, daughter of Joseph 
  Kuria Waithaka--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302........    60
Letter dated June 10, 2020 from Tom Kabau, on behalf of family of 
  George Kabau--victim, Ethiopian Flight ET 302..................    61
Letter dated June 11, 2020 from K. Jade Ballard, family of Micah 
  John Messent--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302............    63
Letter dated June 16, 2020 from Virginie Fricaudet, sister of 
  Xavier Fricaudet, victim--Ethiopian Flight ET302...............    65
Letter dated June 16, 2020 from Nancy MacPherson, MD, Cottage 
  Medical Clinic, partner of Matt Messent's brother Micah 
  Messent--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302)................    66
Letter from Catherine Berthet, Cesar Blavet and Njaka 
  Ralairivelo, mother, brother and fiance of Camille Geoffrey--
  victim Ethiopian Flight ET302).................................    68
Letter dated June 15, 2020 from Matthieu Willm, brother of 
  Clemence-Isuare Boutant-Willm--victim, Ethiopian Flight ET302..    70
Letter dated June 29, 2020 from Ivy Macharia, daughter of Juliah 
  Mwashi; J.M., minor daughter of Juliah Mwashi; Florah Mwashi, 
  sister of Juliah Mwashi and David Mwashi, brother of Juliah 
  Mwashi--victim, Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302................    72
Javier de Luis, prepared statement...............................    73
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Stephen M. 
  Dickson by:
    Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................    74
    Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................    76
    Hon. Mike Lee................................................    79
    Hon. Gary Peters.............................................    80
    Hon. Tammy Baldwin...........................................    82
    Hon. Jon Tester..............................................    83
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    84


                         EXAMINING THE FEDERAL



     AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2020

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger Wicker, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Thune, Blunt, Cruz, 
Fischer, Moran, Sullivan, Young, Scott, Cantwell, Klobuchar, 
Blumenthal, Schatz, Markey, Udall, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, 
and Rosen.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    The Chairman. Good morning. Today, the Committee convenes 
for a hearing on the Federal Aviation Administration's 
Oversight of Aircraft Certification. I welcome our witnesses, 
FAA Administrator Stephen Dickson and Michael Stumo, father of 
Samya Rose Stumo who tragically died on Ethiopian Airlines 
flight 302, and thank them for participating. March 10 marked 
the 1-year anniversary of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines 
flight 302, which was preceded by the loss of Lion Air flight 
610. The aircraft involved in both accidents was the Boeing 737 
MAX. Our deepest sympathies continue to go out to the families 
of those loved ones who are among the 346 souls lost in these 
crashes.
    Since the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the Committee has heard 
from many whistleblowers at the FAA, at Boeing, and in the 
aviation industry. It is increasingly clear from our 
investigation that the FAA has a number of serious problems to 
address. My investigations staff has interviewed dozens of 
witnesses, reviewed many thousands of documents and e-mails, 
and been diligent in pursuit of these facts, no matter where 
they lead. However, I must express my profound frustration with 
the agency's lack of responsiveness to most of my requests, 
dating back to last April, for documents that stem from 
whistleblower disclosures.
    On April 2, 2019, I sent then Acting Administrator Daniel 
Elwell a letter requesting information about training and 
certification of the FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors. Following 
the FAA's responses to my initial request, I sent a follow up 
letter on July 31, 2019, to Acting Administrator Elwell 
requesting additional information on 65 specific items. These 
65 specific items included such serious matters as allegations 
of whistleblower retaliation by senior FAA managers. Nearly one 
year later, we have received complete responses for about 10 
percent of those items and partial responses for another 30 
percent. We have not received any response to over half of 
these requests.
    Given the subject matter of today's hearing, 12--I would 
note that 12 of the requests that FAA has not responded to 
pertain directly to the 737 MAX certification, directly to 
today's subject matter. On August 1, 2019, committee staff 
asked the Department of Transportation, DOT, counsel to 
identify which item of the requests each production was 
responsive to, and whether the production represented a 
complete response.
    This request has been reiterated several times but has not 
been consistently followed by DOT. The committee has made every 
effort to aid in document production. Back in September 2019, 
the Committee staff sent the FAA a prioritized list of 10 of 
the most significant requests, 10. Two of these 10 items were 
emphasized again on December 18, 2019. Over the course of 9 
months, we have received completed responses to 2 prioritized 
requests, partial responses to 6, and no response at all to 2 
of the top 10 items. In one case, staff requested e-mails 
between two FAA employees during a short period of time. The 
agency provided a response but it did not include a specific e-
mail we were pursuing. Additional narrowing to a specific date 
by staff was required to produce the specific e-mail sought.
    The FAA has still not produced the additional e-mails 
between these employees that I requested on July 31, 2019. 
Today is June 17. We have not received any documents since 
April 27 of this year. The lack of timely and complete 
responses to our document requests forced the Committee staff 
to seek FAA staff interviews beginning in October 2019. The DOT 
response and handling of the interview requests has been very 
slow.
    In 7 months, our investigations team has been able to 
interview only four FAA staff members of the 21 we have 
requested to interview. And then came the virus. Recognizing 
the COVID-19 impact, on April 6, 2020, committee staff 
requested to move forward with brief written interrogatories of 
multiple FAA employees to expedite gathering relevant 
information with minimal impact on involved parties. DOT staff 
did not provide a definitive answer on the feasibility of 
written interrogatories until April 30, almost a month later, 
when they stated that in-person or virtual interviews were 
preferred. On May 5, as a result of DOT rejecting the 
interrogatory approach, the Committee staff requested to 
interview the next FAA employee.
    On May 11, DOT staff stated that they were working to make 
the next interviewee available--that was May 5. As of today, 
June 17, 2020, committee staff have not heard back on when this 
interview can take place. Administrator Dickson, in our 
telephone conversation last Thursday, I raised a number of 
these matters and spoke of our entire frustration generally. 
You promised me that your team would work with my staff quickly 
to get back on track. I am extremely disappointed that we have 
not made significant progress since that phone call.
    My staff followed up immediately after our call to set up a 
meeting with the staff member you identified. That request was 
acknowledged, but no attempt was made to set up the meeting. 
Last Friday evening, my staff reiterated our meeting request 
and provided a comprehensive list of all outstanding document 
and interview requests. My team asked to schedule a call on 
Monday, which was denied, but your team offered to meet this 
Thursday, tomorrow, one day after this hearing. The entire 
purpose, or the large purpose, of the meeting was to get 
answers before this hearing, not wait until after its 
conclusion. It is my understanding that our teams did speak 
last night after my staff insisted on the timely nature of the 
call, but no progress was made on resolving the multitude of 
outstanding issues.
    This record of delay and non-responsiveness clearly shows 
at best an unwillingness to cooperate in Congressional 
oversight. It is hard not to conclude your team at the FAA has 
deliberately attempted to keep us in the dark, and by that I 
mean our investigations staff, our committee, and me. It is 
hard not to characterize our relationship during this entire 
process as being adversarial on the part of the FAA.
    Administrator Dickson, I hold you responsible for this as 
the head of the agency. During your confirmation hearing, I 
asked you this question as we ask all nominees, ``If confirmed, 
will you pledge to work collaboratively with this committee and 
provide thorough and timely responses?'' You answered, yes, as 
we require all nominees to do. The lack of cooperation by your 
agency calls into question the commitment behind that pledge. 
We are not embarking on a fishing expedition. Our requests for 
documents and interviews have been very specific in content and 
reasonable in scope.
    I can only assume that the agency's stonewalling of my 
investigation suggests discomfort for what might ultimately be 
revealed. I expect to receive an explanation today at this 
hearing for the failure to comply with the Committee's 
requests. As I mentioned, part of the Committee's investigation 
involves the 737 MAX. Following the Ethiopian Airlines crash, 
the FAA grounded the fleet of 737 MAX airplanes.
    Over a year later, the plane has still not been cleared to 
return to passenger service. The FAA, Boeing, and international 
regulators involved in the recertification process should take 
whatever time is needed to get the recertification right. As 
the recertification continues, a number of reviews, including 
this committee's investigation, have raised concerns about how 
the MAX was designed and certified, how pilots were trained, 
and the nature of the relationship between the FAA and Boeing. 
The FAA needs to hold accountable anyone at the agency or at 
Boeing who broke the rules or fell short of meeting 
expectations.
    Last October, this committee was the first on Capitol Hill 
to convene an oversight hearing with Boeing leadership. Today, 
we will hear from Administrator Dickson on what happened during 
the original certification process, the steps that the agency 
is taking to return the MAX to safe flight, and how the agency 
can help prevent future tragedies. The MAX recertification is a 
critical component of rebuilding public and international trust 
in the FAA. Before the MAX crashes, the FAA was the 
unquestioned gold standard with regard to aviation safety. 
Congress has an important role to play in helping restore the 
confidence in the agency.
    As a result of the Committee's investigations, and findings 
from the National Transportation Safety Board, from the Joint 
Authorities Technical Review, and from the Department of 
Transportation, Ranking Member Cantwell and I have worked hard 
together and have introduced legislation, the Aircraft Safety 
and Certification Reform Act, to improve aviation safety. Our 
legislation creates a new requirement for manufacturers to 
prioritize safety, it reforms the Organization Designation 
Authorization or ODA system, creates a new emphasis on 
understanding how pilots interact with modern aircraft and 
other human factors, enhances protection for whistleblowers, 
and bolsters Congressional oversight.
    This Monday, a day before yesterday, the Ranking Member's 
staff requested that Mr. Stumo be allowed to testify. In spite 
of the lateness of this request, we were able to accommodate 
such a request by adding a second panel for Mr. Stumo. I look 
forward to a detailed discussion of the FAA's aircraft 
certification process and how it can be improved so that these 
tragedies do not happen.
    I also expect an explanation of the agency's unwillingness 
to respond to this Committee's requests for information. I now 
recognize my friend and colleague and Ranking Member, Senator 
Cantwell, for her opening statement.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, and thank you 
for your statement. I want to say that as Ranking Member on our 
side of the aisle, we stand with you for any information 
requests and efforts to get the FAA to comply with what the 
majority has been requesting, so thank you for that statement. 
I want to take a moment to recognize the families who have lost 
loved ones in the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air tragedies. I 
can't imagine the loss of life and the pain that you are still 
feeling. I appreciate your vigilance, just as I have 
appreciated the vigilance of the Colgan Air families who often 
attend our hearings and comment of safety measures before the 
Committee.
    It can't be easy to continue that role, but we thank you 
for doing it. All of the voices in these efforts to make our 
skies safer are important. I also look forward to hearing the 
testimony of Michael Stumo. We have to get this right, for his 
daughter and the 346 victims of those crashes. Today's 
discussion is about leadership, about restoring America's 
leadership in aviation safety. Safety is job one. It is job one 
in a critical sector that employs 2.5 million people, 150,000 
in the State of Washington, but safety is job one because it 
involves so many lives.
    The leadership task begins with the FAA, and you, 
Administrator Dickson. We look forward to hearing how your 
efforts to build the FAA's oversight and capacity to improve 
safety in response to these two accidents have been undertaken. 
There have been numerous reports issued since the accidents, 
and unfortunately, the FAA response to a number of those 
investigations concerning the MAX seem more a rigid acceptance 
of the status quo than the needed changes that we want to see 
at the FAA. No matter what the structure of the FAA, it must be 
clear that it is an independent agency with oversight of 
certification. We need to have the best work force, which I 
believe we do in the Northwest, but we must have experts and 
investigators that are qualified and technically trained at the 
FAA to oversee, in a sufficient manner, the compliance process.
    Now, there is a lot of discussion about Wall Street and the 
approach to aviation of value engineering. I am going to tell 
you something about the Northwest. The pride of the Northwest 
is about innovation and solid engineering, and solid 
engineering advancements. It is not about doing things on the 
quick, it is about doing things deliberately and getting safety 
right. And I want to see a certification process where we are 
listening to those engineers at the beginning of the process, 
who are calling out some of these safety issues.
    The FAA management needs to be willing to back up those 
engineers on the ground who are calling out safety concerns at 
the earliest phases of the process, not at the end, and 
certainly not after certification. The FAA's system of 
delegation dates back to 1958--actually it can be traced back 
to 1927 when private doctors were used to conduct pilot health 
checks in the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce. 
However, it was the FAA's own action taking authority in the 
delegation of manufacturers for technical approvals that 
started in 2005 under the ODA system. Under this program, the 
industry engineers were acting on behalf of the FAA. These 
lines of oversight and communication were fragmented.
    I believe, and I think the Chairman believes as well, we 
need a system of certification where hardworking engineers, and 
engineering safety, is driving the certification process, not 
the other way around. We can't have planes certified, and then 
after the certification, have them grounded because of unsafe 
features. A technical review by the international safety 
authorities, Joint Authority Technical Review, JATR, identified 
a number of problems with the ODA program and FAA oversight. 
Specifically, the need for a more holistic review and the fact 
that engineering expertise needed to have open communication 
systems and the technology level--the technical expertise level 
of those engineers needed to be there.
    So Mr. Dickson, today I hope that we will hear about what 
the FAA believes needs to be reformed in this program. What 
reforms, of those suggested by Chairman Wicker and myself, do 
you support. I want to thank Chairman Wicker and his team, and 
my team, for working so collaboratively with us and their hard 
work in introducing this legislation that the Chairman just 
mentioned. I believe it does fundamentally change the way the 
FAA oversees the certification of large commercial aircrafts. 
Specifically, our bill, the Aircraft Safety and Certification 
Reform Act of 2020, will revamp the ODA and make sure that the 
FAA stays in the driver's seat of certification. Under our 
bill, the FAA will once again be responsible for directly 
appointing and approving the engineers who are tasked with 
carrying out the certification on behalf of the Administrator.
    In addition, the FAA will assign safety advisors to closely 
monitor the performance of these designees, and we also create 
a new whistleblower protection to fortify the channels of 
communication and reporting safety. Critically, our bill will 
end any semblance of self-certification by repealing sections 
that would give the FAA additional authority for delegation 
under specific provisions. Our bill also requires 
implementation of the NTSB recommendations on safety automation 
and pilot response, as well as safety management systems for 
aircraft manufacturers. I believe these new standards would 
address the issues of multiple flight alerts, and the need for 
pilot training.
    So I want to thank Senator Duckworth for her work with me 
on this legislation, the Aviation Automation and Human Factors 
Safety Act. The FAA must keep pace with the skills, and have 
the technical capacity to handle an increasingly complex 
aircraft technology. Automation has certainly helped safety, 
but the amount of automation and uncontrolled commands and 
alerts can be confusing, particularly when you only have 
seconds to respond. So understanding the interactions between 
human, technology, and operation environment is becoming more 
critical to safety in aviation.
    That is why the bill with Chairman Wicker also establishes 
a Center of Excellence for flight automation and human factors 
and creates an office, the FAA office of continuing education 
and training, to make sure that those inspectors maintain and 
keep the expertise necessary to do the oversight that is 
required by the FAA. We also need science and technical 
advisors to address these developing new technologies.
    With technology changing, building skills is important, and 
I want to thank Senator Moran for introducing the Foreign Civil 
Aviation Authority Assistance and Capacity-Building Act, which 
will increase global pilot standards and FAA's bilateral to 
improve pilot training. The United States needs to be loud and 
clear that we want to see strong airmanship. That is to say, a 
pilot needs to be able to fly the plane without the automation. 
And I hope that we, and you, will help lead that effort on an 
international basis. We also need a strong aviation workforce 
for the future, and that is why I have partnered with Senator 
Blunt with The National Air Grant Fellowship Program Act of 
2020, which would create an aerospace policy fellowship, and 
leader for the future act.
    It is clear the race for aviation around the globe is on. 
But we cannot have that race for competition drive us away from 
a solid safety and certification regime. The solution to that 
competition, I believe, is to hire and retain the best safety 
experts that we can find. So I look forward to hearing the ways 
in which you believe the FAA needs to improve the process.
    Again, I want to thank Chairman Wicker for his leadership 
on the bill that we just introduced, and thank him for his 
focus on this issue. We do need to hold manufacturers 
accountable for compliance and safety standards through the 
process. I look forward to continuing to work with him on that. 
We need to have certain design features that we know are 
compliant with the airworthiness standard. No one wants to see 
a process where, at the end of the process, it is not clear 
that the data indicates actual compliance. I will have many 
questions about this.
    So Mr. Dickson, today we are looking forward to the 
leadership that you will provide in addressing these issues. 
Safety has to be paramount, and the FAA has to be independent. 
So thank you for being here, and I look forward to hearing from 
both our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Administrator 
Dickson, I am sure you will want to respond to many of the 
statements made in my opening statement, but specifically just 
to reiterate, my investigative staff began this effort on July 
31 of last year. And as I pointed out, we have received no 
response to over half of the items requested. Even after we 
narrowed down the scope of our requests significantly, there 
has been a lack of cooperation. So please explain to the 
Committee your position in this regard and then we will have 
follow-up questions also, sir.

 STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
                    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Dickson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Cantwell, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting 
me here----
    The Chairman. Sir, you have an opening statement and feel 
free to summarize that in 5 minutes also. I neglected that step 
so----
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Please proceed.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for inviting me here today to speak 
with you about the FAA's oversight of aircraft certification 
and to provide you with an update on the 737 MAX. But first I 
want to assure the families of those who lost their lives in 
the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air accidents that you and your 
loved ones are foremost in our thoughts.
    I think of you every day, and it is good to see Michael and 
Nadia and the other family members with us this morning. The 
lessons learned from these accidents will lead to increased 
safety worldwide. Our pledge is not only in words, but in the 
implementation of tangible and lasting improvements that will 
result, in part, from the observations and recommendations we 
have received from many review bodies including this committee.
    Now before I turn to the focus of the hearing, I would like 
to take a moment to address some of the challenges the aviation 
industry has faced during the ongoing public health emergency. 
Aviation employees have worked diligently these past months, 
despite the risk to themselves, to safely transport passengers 
and much needed supplies.
    Now the traveler demand is beginning to return, the FAA 
fully supports and strongly encourages the industry's adoption 
of precautions to protect employee and passenger health. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as 
international public health agencies advised that face 
coverings are especially important in situations where social 
distancing is not feasible. Secretary Chao and the Department 
of Transportation have been clear that air passengers should 
wear face coverings to protect themselves and those around 
them, and that we expect the traveling public to follow aircrew 
directions and Airline public health policies.
    As we move through the phases of reopening, we will 
continue to apply our aviation expertise to help lead efforts 
with other Federal agencies industry and our international 
partners to address public health risk in the air 
transportation system. Now with respect to aircraft 
certification and our evaluation of the 737 MAX for return to 
service, the FAA continues to follow a thorough process guided 
by a data-driven, methodical review of Boeing's proposed 
modifications.
    In the U.S., our return to service decision will rest 
solely on the FAA's analysis of Boeing's work in these areas. 
At the same time, we will continue to provide assistance and 
work closely with our international counterparts as they make 
their own evaluations. Ultimately when the aircraft resumes 
passenger flights, it will be because safety issues have been 
addressed and because pilots around the world have received the 
training that they need to safely operate the aircraft.
    Before that happens, the FAA must conduct a certification 
flight test and complete a pilot training assessment by the 
Joint Operations Evaluation Board or JOEB, which includes the 
FAA as well as our international partners and lined pilots from 
U.S. and foreign air carriers. Once that assessment is 
complete, the FAA's Boeing 737 Flight Standardization Board 
will issue a public report addressing the JOEB's findings.
    Additionally, the FAA and the Multi-Agency Technical 
Advisory Board will review all final design documentation. The 
last steps for the FAA to approve each U.S. carriers' updated 
pilot training program, issue a continued airworthiness 
notification to the international community, and publish an 
airworthiness directive of advising operators of required 
corrective actions. As I have said many times, I will not sign 
off on this aircraft until all FAA technical reviews are 
complete. I also intend to pilot the aircraft myself before the 
FAA makes any ungrounding decision.
    Now, beyond the MAX, our commitment to improve the margin 
of safety for the aviation industry globally will start with 
aircraft certification but will ultimately be much broader. The 
FAA recently provided the Committee with its action plan in 
response to the recommendations of the secretary special 
committee to review the FAA's aircraft certification process. 
The plan describes the FAA's actions, both planned and 
underway, to address not only the recommendations from the 
special committee, but also the Joint Authorities Technical 
Review, the NTSB, the Indonesian National Transportation Safety 
Committee, and the FAA's own findings.
    Now beyond certification, the FAA is tackling 
interconnected aviation safety issues not only in the United 
States but internationally as well. We are prepared to take the 
lead in this new phase of worldwide safety. For example, we 
presented a working paper at ICAO last year on pilot training 
and automation dependency. This material was recently added 
into an ICAO proposal in the formation of a personnel training 
and licensing panel.
    Our action plan focuses on 10 areas for global aviation 
safety, including safety management systems, data, and 
innovation, and we have aligned our RFI 2021 budget request to 
support this activity. We are asking to recruit additional 
specialized employees such as human factors experts and 
software engineers, and will invest additional money to bolster 
improvements to successful information sharing programs such as 
ASIAS.
    I have said many times that safety is a journey not a 
destination. We must never allow ourselves to become 
complacent. Always we must keep in mind the passengers and 
their loved ones for whom we work. This concludes my statement 
and I will be glad to answer your question, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dickson follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, 
                    Federal Aviation Administration
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
Committee:

    Thank you for inviting me here today to speak with you about the 
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of aircraft 
certification and to provide you with an update concerning the Boeing 
737 MAX. At the outset, on behalf of the United States Department of 
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to acknowledge, as 
we have before, the families of the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines 
and Lion Air accidents and extend, once again, our continued deepest 
sympathies and condolences to them. These tragic accidents should not 
have happened, and thus underscore and reaffirm the seriousness with 
which we approach aviation safety every day. We want the families, and 
the world, to know that we continue to work tirelessly to see that the 
lessons learned from these accidents will result in a higher margin of 
safety for the aviation industry globally.
    Before I continue to the focus of this hearing, I want to digress 
for a moment to address some of the challenges the aviation industry 
has faced during the ongoing public health emergency. Aviation 
employees have worked diligently these past months--despite the risks 
to themselves--to safely transport supplies and passengers at a time 
when our Nation has needed them.
    Secretary Chao and the Department of Transportation have been clear 
that passengers should wear face coverings while traveling by air, for 
their own protection and the protection of those around them. Face 
coverings are especially important in situations where social 
distancing is not feasible. This comes as a health guideline from the 
agency responsible for public health, the CDC.
    Of course, across the transportation system every mode is 
different. But when it comes to air travel, the DOT and the FAA expect 
the traveling public to follow airline crew directions and policies, 
which are in place for passenger protection and the health of air 
crews, and to take very seriously the precautions recommended by the 
CDC and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). As we 
move through the phases of reopening, the FAA will continue to support 
airlines and their front-line employees as they implement these CDC 
guidelines. And we will continue to apply our aviation expertise to 
help lead efforts with other Federal agencies, with industry, and with 
our international partners to address public health risk in the air 
transportation system, both internationally and here in the United 
States.
    I would also like to add that despite the public health challenges 
associated with COVID-19, our commitment to aviation safety has never 
wavered and our air transportation system remains safe, resilient, and 
flexible, thanks to the sustained focus and hard work of aviation 
professionals in the FAA and industry.
Status of the 737 MAX Return-to-Service
    Safety is the core of the FAA's mission and is our first priority. 
We are working diligently so that accidents like the ones that occurred 
in Indonesia and Ethiopia--resulting in the tragic loss of 346 lives--
do not occur again. The FAA continues to follow a thorough process for 
returning the 737 MAX to service. As we have stated many times in the 
past, this process is not guided by a calendar or schedule. Safety is 
the driving consideration. I unequivocally support the dedicated 
professionals of the FAA in continuing to adhere to a data-driven, 
methodical analysis, review, and validation of the modified flight 
control systems and pilot training required to safely return the 737 
MAX to commercial service. I have directed FAA employees to take the 
time needed to do that work.
    With respect to our international partners, the FAA clearly 
understands its responsibilities as the aviation safety regulator for 
the State of Design for the 737 MAX. Last fall, we met with more than 
50 foreign civil aviation officials, all of whom have provided input to 
the FAA. We have continued to have regular dialogue with them during 
the COVID-19 public health emergency. Each respective nation will make 
its own decision for clearing the 737 MAX for flight, however, we are 
also conducting and planning additional outreach activities to engage 
with our international partners, including providing support on return-
to-service issues; maintaining transparency through communication and 
information sharing; and scheduling meetings for technical discussions.
    As I have stated before, the FAA's return-to-service decision on 
the 737 MAX will rest solely on the FAA's analysis of the data to 
determine whether Boeing's proposed software updates and pilot training 
address the known issues for grounding the aircraft. The FAA fully 
controls the approval process for the flight control systems and is not 
delegating anything to Boeing. The FAA will even retain authority to 
issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates of 
airworthiness for all new 737 MAX airplanes manufactured since the 
grounding. When the 737 MAX is returned to service, it will be because 
the safety issues have been addressed and pilots have received all of 
the training they need to safely operate the aircraft.
    Actions that must still take place before the aircraft will return 
to service include a certification flight test and completion of work 
by the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB), which includes the FAA 
and our international partners from Canada, Europe, and Brazil. The 
JOEB will evaluate pilot training needs using line pilots of various 
experience levels from both U.S. carriers as well as international 
carriers. The FAA's Flight Standardization Board for the Boeing 737 
will issue a report addressing the findings of the JOEB, and the report 
will be made available for public review and comment. Additionally, the 
FAA will review all final design documentation, which also will be 
reviewed by the multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB), made up of 
FAA Chief Scientists and experts from the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.
    The FAA will issue a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the 
International Community providing notice of pending significant safety 
actions and will publish an Airworthiness Directive advising operators 
of required corrective actions. I will not sign off on the aircraft 
until all FAA technical reviews are complete, I fly it myself using my 
experience as an Air Force and commercial pilot, and I am satisfied 
that I would put my own family on it without a second thought.
Oversight of Aircraft Certification
    Safety is a journey, not a destination--a journey we undertake each 
and every day with humility. Today's unprecedented U.S. safety record 
was built on the willingness of aviation professionals to embrace hard 
lessons and to proactively seek continuous improvement. The FAA both 
welcomes and recognizes the importance of scrutiny of our processes and 
procedures. In addition to this Committee's work and other 
congressional reviews, several independent reviews have been initiated 
to look at different aspects of the 737 MAX certification and the FAA's 
certification and delegation processes generally.
    The unprecedented Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), 
commissioned by the FAA, was the first review to be completed and 
entailed the participation of nine other civil aviation authorities 
joining the FAA to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 
certification of the automated flight control system on the 737 MAX. 
The JATR was chaired by former National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) Chairman Christopher Hart and was comprised of a team of experts 
from the FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
and the aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the 
European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Never before have 10 authorities come together to conduct 
this type of review. The JATR provided its unvarnished and independent 
review and we appreciated their recommendations when they were released 
this past fall.
    The FAA has also received recommendations from the NTSB and the 
Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee's (KNKT) accident 
report on Lion Air Flight 610. Earlier this year, the Ethiopian Civil 
Aviation Authority released an interim accident report on Ethiopian 
Airlines Flight 302, with recommendations. Further, the Secretary of 
Transportation's Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft 
Certification Process released its recommendations in January of this 
year. The Special Committee was established to advise and provide 
recommendations to the Department on policy-level topics related to 
aircraft certification.
    The FAA recently shared with Congress its Action Plan in response 
to the recommendations of the Special Committee. The plan discusses in 
depth the FAA's actions, both planned and underway, to address the 
recommendations. Importantly, the FAA developed its plan not solely in 
response to the Special Committee recommendations, but also in the 
context of the other recommendations received from the JATR, NTSB, and 
KNKT, as well as FAA's own findings. The actions described in the FAA's 
Action Plan are responsive to all recommendations received and apply to 
the entirety of the FAA's approach to aircraft certification. The plan 
reflects the FAA's commitment to improving our certification process 
domestically, and to improving aviation safety globally. We believe 
that transparency, open and honest communication, and our willingness 
to improve our systems and processes are the keys to restoring public 
trust in the FAA and in the safety of the 737 MAX when it is returned 
to service.
Moving Forward
    Beyond the 737 MAX, the FAA is committed to addressing issues 
regarding aircraft certification processes and aviation safety 
generally, not only in the United States, but internationally as well. 
Over the years, the FAA has exercised a leadership role in the 
promotion and development of global aviation safety. We have helped 
raise the bar on safety standards and practices worldwide working with 
the ICAO and other civil aviation authorities. We have an opportunity 
to do even more. We are committed to expanding our efforts with other 
authorities around the world and to fostering safety standards and 
policies at ICAO to help meet the public's expectations of the highest 
possible levels of safety globally, even in areas the FAA does not 
regulate directly. Without safety as a foundation, we cannot have a 
vibrant aviation industry in any country, much less between countries. 
Our international air transportation network is a tightly woven fabric 
that is dependent on all of us making safety our core value. To that 
end, at the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly the U.S. presented a 
working paper, Pilot Training Improvements to Address Automation 
Dependency, with several of our international partners. The paper was 
accepted and in May of this year we were able to get it included in an 
ICAO proposal on the establishment of a Personnel Training and 
Licensing Panel which will be considered in July.
    In our continuing efforts to raise the bar for aviation safety 
across the globe, it will be important for the FAA and our 
international partners to foster improvements in standards and 
approaches not just for how aircraft are designed and produced, but 
also how they are maintained and operated. We at the FAA are prepared 
to take the lead in this new phase of system safety. As noted in our 
Action Plan responding to the recommendations of the Special Committee 
our actions will address specific areas of focus including, safety 
management systems, system safety, globalization, data, internal 
coordination between certification and flight standards teams, 
personnel, delegation, amended type certificates, innovation, and 
existing recommendations. Our strategy to implement these action items 
will coalesce around several major themes discussed briefly below.
Holistic Approach
    In the context of aircraft certification, a holistic approach means 
that an aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all of its 
subsystems, including the flight crew. The aircraft is not a collection 
of parts or systems, but should be viewed as a whole. A holistic 
approach to aircraft certification would not rely upon item-by-item 
reviews in isolation, but would take into account the interactions and 
interdependencies between all systems and the crew. Such an approach 
would link all safety requirements for type certification to other 
aspects of safe operation including, for example, pilot training and 
operational performance.
Human Factors
    Human factors considerations are an important part of the machine 
design process, which will need to take into account safety and 
performance levels of human users. As aircraft systems become more 
complex and the level of automation increases, the integration of human 
factors into the design of aircraft will be increasingly important. 
Human factors considerations must include trained and qualified 
personnel who will be responsible for operating and maintaining these 
increasingly safe and complex aircraft.
Workforce of the Future
    In order to meet the safety needs of a rapidly evolving aerospace 
system, the FAA will need to recruit, hire, maintain, and retain a 
workforce with the necessary technical expertise, capabilities, and 
adaptability. Our efforts must ensure that we are able to hire and 
retain the right people with the right skills and mindset, engaged at 
the right time, with systemic coordination between certification and 
operational suitability.
Information and Coordinated Data Flow
    Ensuring a coordinated and flexible flow of information during any 
oversight process is critical. In the context of aviation safety, the 
concept of sharing information cuts across many initiatives that the 
FAA continues to examine for potential expansion. These include the 
following important categories, all of which are part of the broader 
information and data flow theme:

  1.  Safety Management Systems. Safety Management Systems (SMS) 
        establish a commitment, in this case on the part of the 
        manufacturer, to continually improving safety. SMS identifies 
        and manages risk and provides safety assurance by continually 
        evaluating risk controls and by creating a positive safety 
        culture within a workforce. Integrating a safety management 
        system into the processes for design and production, as well as 
        operations, enables insight into the connections and 
        interrelationship between systems.

  2.  Big Data. The FAA must continue leaning into our role as a data-
        driven, risk-based, decision-making oversight organization that 
        prioritizes safety above all else. We do that by breaking down 
        silos between organizations and implementing programs like SMS 
        supported by compliance programs and informed by data. We look 
        at the aviation ecosystem as a whole, including how all the 
        parts interact: aircraft, weather, pilots, engineers, flight 
        attendants, technicians, mechanics, dispatchers, air traffic 
        controllers, safety inspectors, training programs, 
        certification, passengers--everyone and everything in the 
        operating environment. This includes building upon the 
        successes we have had collaborating with industry and 
        implementing voluntary safety information sharing programs. In 
        the broader context of the overall importance of data to a 
        safety regulator such as the FAA, we are examining the data we 
        have, identifying data we may need, and looking for new methods 
        to analyze and integrate data to increase safety.

  3.  Just Culture. In addition to the technical work required for 
        truly integrated data, a key enabler of a data-driven safety 
        organization is a healthy and robust reporting culture. A good 
        safety culture produces the data needed to understand what's 
        actually happening. If we know about safety concerns and we 
        know where threats are coming from and how errors are 
        occurring, we can mitigate the risks and fix the processes that 
        led to those errors. A good safety culture demands that we 
        infuse that safety data into all of our processes from top to 
        bottom--in a continuous loop. To be successful, a safety 
        organization relies on a Just Culture that places great value 
        on front-line employees and empowers those involved in the 
        operation to raise and report safety concerns in a timely, 
        systematic way, without fearing retaliation. A Just Culture 
        starts at the top. It's something leadership has to nurture, 
        encourage, and support everywhere in the organization. 
        Employees have to see the results, see what the data is 
        showing, and see how the organization is using analytic tools 
        to identify concerns and errors and put actions in place to 
        mitigate them. Employees and organizations need to see results 
        that come from leveraging safety data and technical expertise 
        into a safer operation.
Initial Action
    As we move ahead to implement these strategies, we have developed a 
budget request to address specific related needs. For example, the FY 
2021 President's Budget requests funding to recruit additional 
specialized skilled employees, such as more human factors experts and 
software engineers. The request would also fund a new system that 
tracks employee training, qualifications, and certifications to ensure 
our aviation safety workforce has the skills and knowledge required to 
execute our oversight functions. This action addresses some of the 
findings of this committee's investigatory work that has assisted in 
pointing out inconsistencies with our tracking systems.
    Consistent with Congressional direction, the budget request will 
support our new office to oversee Organization Designation 
Authorization (ODA). While the ODA program has been in place since 
2005, the creation of a single office supports standardized outcomes 
and improvements across the ODA program. Further, the budget request 
will support improvements to voluntary information sharing programs 
such as Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) and 
the Aviation Safety Reporting Program. These programs are critical 
tools in the FAA's toolbox, facilitating the collection of safety data 
that allows the FAA to identify trends and improve upon aviation 
safety. Each of these requests provide a snapshot of our concerted 
effort to continually improve aviation safety.
Conclusion
    Aviation's hard lessons and the hard work in response to those 
lessons--from both government and industry--have paved the way to 
creating a global aviation system with an enviable safety record. But 
as I mentioned earlier, safety is a journey, not a destination. We have 
achieved unprecedented levels of safety in the United States. Yet what 
we have done in the past and what we are doing now is not good enough 
for the future in an increasingly complex and interconnected world. We 
must build on the lessons learned, and we must never allow ourselves to 
become complacent.
    The United States has been, and will continue to be, the global 
leader in aviation safety. We are confident that continuing to approach 
this task with a spirit of humility, openness, hard work, and 
transparency will bolster aviation safety worldwide.
    This concludes my statement. I will be glad to answer your 
questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator. Well, 
let's go ahead then. I sort of jumped the gun a few moments 
ago. Senator Cantwell and I normally reserve our opening 
remarks to 5 minutes. This is--the tone of my remarks today I 
think people would recognize is not really our style. But I 
hope you understand, Mr. Administrator, the very serious way 
that I see the lack of response from your agency.
    And so I will certainly give you an opportunity to respond 
to my complaints in my opening statement and to the ones I have 
mentioned to you personally over the phone again. Again, my 
investigative team began their work July 31 and have received 
no response to over half of the items in the request. Do you 
view this as acceptable and can you explain to the Committee 
what has happened in the FAA in this regard?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always appreciate 
the opportunity for dialogue. As you mentioned our conversation 
last Thursday and our oversight team had connected with your 
staff last night. And I believe that will put us in a position 
to make progress. As I have said many times, I am totally 
committed to the oversight process. I realize that it is an 
important matter for you. You have made that clear. You have 
made it doubly clear this morning, and I appreciate that.
    I also want you to know that it is very important to the 
agency and it is a responsibility I take very seriously. In 
my--I believe it's inaccurate to portray the agency as 
unresponsive. We have provided responses in the seven major 
subject areas in the July request. There is still ongoing work 
and I would just point out that we have a number of 
investigations underway that were already supporting the OIG, 
the OSC, the NTSB, and others, and some of the information 
requests have to--implicate matters within those investigations 
and we certainly don't want to prejudice the outcome of those.
    However, you know, we are going to redouble our efforts. 
You know, I hear your frustration and that is not OK with me. 
That is not where we want to be. I am trying to promote a 
culture both within the agency and really with all of our 
stakeholders of transparency and openness and this is an 
opportunity for us to do that. So I look forward to continuing 
to work with you to raise the bar on aviation safety, again in 
the U.S. and globally.
    The Chairman. Well, I would reiterate that the climate in 
your agency with regard to the requests for information and 
documents from this committee and from our staff has been most 
unsatisfactory. For example, we asked for copies of e-mails 
between two parties and were asked to make that more specific. 
And then when we pinpoint the very day and time of the e-mail, 
the response from employees at FAA has been a reluctance to 
supply that to us.
    Now, we have an important responsibility to the taxpayers. 
This is part of our constitutional responsibility, to provide 
oversight. And to me, there is no excuse for that. Let me make 
this suggestion to the you, Mr. Administrator. It would seem to 
me beneficial if you could name one specific senior person 
under your supervision to be the contact with our staff 
directors on this matter.
    And that person would be responsible for making sure the 
agency provided satisfactory responses, be reportable to you, 
and my staff director would be reportable to me, and at least 
there would be a direct conduit of information and requests 
directly from this senior staff person to you the 
administrator. Would you be willing to agree to that procedure 
based on my frustration?
    Mr. Dickson. Mr. Chairman, we will set up a process to have 
more dynamic communication as you suggest.
    The Chairman. Well, but I am making a specific----
    Mr. Dickson. I understand.
    The Chairman.--suggestion to you and you are not willing to 
accept that at this point?
    Mr. Dickson. Mr. Chairman, we will agree to that.
    The Chairman. OK, I appreciate it. Senator Cantwell.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator 
Dickson, I would like to ask several questions just to get you 
on the record on changes that we would like to see at the FAA, 
both in the legislation we have proposed and things that we 
think continue to need to be addressed beyond this legislation. 
So if you could help me out with as much yes and no that would 
be so helpful. Should aircraft manufacturers be accountable for 
compliance of design data submitted to the FAA approval? Yes or 
no?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. Do you believe that this 
accountabilities should exist throughout the certification 
process not just at the end of the certification process when 
safety concerns are harder to address and designs are tougher 
to rework and correct?
    Mr. Dickson. Without speaking to the specifics, I am not 
knowledgeable of some of the details that you are referring to 
but I believe that that the holistic approach that you referred 
to that a safety management system would provide would produce 
that result.
    Senator Cantwell. So the answer is yes, you think----
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. Applicants must certify that data 
design complies with airworthiness standards? That's a good 
idea.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. And if the FAA receives a report of 
non-compliance, the FAA should ensure that corrective action is 
taken prior to issuing a certificate? Yes?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. And if non-compliance is discovered 
after an issuance of certificate, do you believe the 
manufacturer should be required to correct it for future 
production of aircraft?
    Mr. Dickson. That is in the continuing operational safety 
realm and that is what our directive process provides for. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. Well, certainly I have concerns that 
that is not what has taken place in the past and it is good to 
hear that that is what you think should take place now. I think 
the end result of aircraft certification process is, you know, 
the FAA approval of--you know, it is the approval of the type 
certificate, but we want to make sure that as we go through 
this process and one of the failures of the 737 MAX, which is 
just unacceptable, is that we need to make sure that that 
compliance and airworthiness requirements are met. So do you 
agree that the purpose of the aircraft certification is to 
achieve compliance?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. And in order to achieve compliance 
FAA must validate the manufacturers design data is compliant 
with applicable airworthiness standards?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, I would say just it is actually 
a higher bar than compliance. Compliance with individual rules 
does not necessarily produce a safe outcome and that is what we 
are trying to deal with.
    Senator Cantwell. Well, I agree that from the holistic 
perspective, but I am just trying to point out that the process 
that we have today between the beginning of the process on the 
type certificate and the final airworthiness approval certainly 
in the MAX situation didn't catch the problems and certainly 
had information--so that is why there is data in your questions 
and answers to that are so important and hopefully that will 
help us in moving forward on this legislation. If I could ask 
you now about the bill that Senator Wicker and I introduced. Do 
you agree that in order to raise the bar the FAA should be 
directly appointing these ODA members?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, the--without commenting specifically 
on the bill, I think that we need to certainly take a systems 
approach, and you know, we need to have strong oversight of the 
ODA. We already approved----
    Senator Cantwell. Mr. Dickson, I am not as genteel as the 
Chairman who resides from a state where genteel approaches 
exist and are perfected. I am a little more blunt, OK, so I 
don't want to be stonewalled here. Do you believe the FAA 
should retain and appoint these individuals and oversee them in 
the process? Yes or no?
    Mr. Dickson. It is not something that--we certainly approve 
their qualifications and their background. The individual 
selection is not something that I believe would add to the 
safety of the process, but it is something that we are 
certainly anxious to work with the Committee on and see if 
there is a way that we can add that in.
    Senator Cantwell. Mr. Dickson, it is a little hard--just 
have to view you through the lens here because this gentleman--
but this is the very point. We need an independent FAA. We need 
the lines of communication between these whistleblowers or 
whoever it is on the engineering, you know, the SPIA member who 
is on the ground who says, look this is a problem. He needs to 
be backed up by the FAA, but if you don't have a direct line to 
that employee, and you don't approve him in the final and you 
don't oversee his work and you don't have the right expertise 
at the FAA, then he is not going to be backed up by you.
    Mr. Dickson. Could not agree more.
    Senator Cantwell. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Senator Blunt.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

    Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. On this 
topic of just being responsive. I am sure you know that this is 
really a concern to every member of the Committee and you have 
heard that clearly today. I hope that the process you and the 
Chairman have agreed to actually produces a different result, 
but often the request, Mr. Administrator, is not that hard to 
respond to and it is just agencies continue to create problems 
for themselves and difficulties for us by not just responding 
with information you have as opposed to analyzing whether you 
should respond with that to that request.
    There is virtually never a question that eventually you are 
going to be required to respond or that you should respond or 
that the law requires you to respond or that when you testified 
along with many others at your confirmation hearing, you have 
agreed to always respond and always respond quickly. If that 
question is not asked at a confirmation hearing, it is an 
oversight. And you have heard some of that today.
    I am not sure you and colleagues around this Department and 
many others can ever hear enough of that because it is a 
constant problem, almost always self-inflicted, by an agency's 
refusal to have somebody who will take responsibility. So maybe 
your agreement today to allow that to happen, really important.
    I may go over a little of what Senator Cantwell has already 
asked about, but on the ODA office, do you think that the 
legislation that has been introduced by the Chairman and the 
Ranking Member for additional oversight mechanisms would 
benefit the process of how ODA personnel and procedures are 
approved?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator. And there 
are many elements of the proposed legislation that are exactly 
on point in terms of implementing systematic approaches and 
strong oversight and a data-driven process between the 
manufacturer and the FAA. So--and also strengthening the 
workforce aspects. What we really need is a systems approach 
and system thinking system engineers, human factors and 
individuals. And those additional resources would be very 
helpful.
    Senator Blunt. So in 2018, Senator Cantwell and I worked 
hard to get the 2018 FAA Act--all the members of this 
committee, but I chaired the subcommittee at the time and she 
was the leading Democrat on the Subcommittee that brought this 
legislation forward. Can you give me an update on how the 
implementation of the 2018 FAA Act as it relates to these 
programs has occurred, and has the FAA implementation created 
any changes--implemented any changes to its oversight of the 
ODAs since the 737 crashes?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. The ODA office has been--was 
implemented within the last year, and we have set up the 
framework and the process to essentially oversee and audit of 
all 79 ODAs. And we have money in our budget request for the 
upcoming fiscal year to continue to develop and permanently 
staff that office.
    And we will continue to do that. We have also recently 
selected a project manager who will be reporting to me 
quarterly on the execution around a lot of the issues that are 
in the proposed legislation, the Committee's version, that will 
hit a lot of the same themes in terms of implementing the 
recommendations from the special committee report, the Joint 
Authorities Technical Review, and the NTSB recommendations.
    Senator Blunt. And you mentioned that on recertifying the 
plane we are talking about, that you would fly that yourself 
before it was recertified. What kind of special information or 
training would a skilled pilot like you need before he got in 
the cockpit of a plane that was in the process of being 
certified again?
    Mr. Dickson. Well Senator, I have got quite a bit of flying 
time on the 737 on previous versions, and I have been out too 
in my first month on the job. I went out to Seattle and have 
flown the various profiles. So I am very familiar with the 
system.
    Also my Deputy, Dan Elwell, and I will be completing the 
same simulator training that the Joint Operations Evaluation 
Board Pilots will be going through, and then I will complete a 
flight profile on the aircraft as well. So we will have several 
days of preparation to get ready for that event.
    Senator Blunt. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt. Senator Klobuchar 
joins us remotely.

               STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman, Senator Cantwell for holding this hearing. And 
Administrator Dickson, thank you for being here. And I 
especially want to acknowledge the families out there. I am so 
glad that I know Senator Cantwell worked to have Mr. Stumo be 
able to testify.
    I am so sorry for your loss, Mr. Stumo, and I think your 
courage in coming forward for your daughter is going to make a 
difference not just for your family, but for so many other 
families out there. So I wanted to start, Mr. Dickson, these 
two tragic plane crashes as we know Boeing 737 MAX in Indonesia 
and Ethiopia took the lives of over 300 people, including by 
the way, one of my constituents, Mr. Hussein, St. Cloud, 
Minnesota. And at the Committee's hearing in October, I 
expressed concerns with the findings of a report from the 
Department of Transportation's Inspector General that found 
that the FAA conducted oversight of only 4 percent of Airline 
manufacturers, employees responsible for conducting the 
certification. The same report also found that one manufacturer 
approved about 95 percent of the certifications for its own 
aircraft.
    So knowing that this delegation program contributed to the 
FAA's oversight failure for the 737 MAX certification, are you 
concerned about how widely the program is used for 
certifications and how little oversight there is? And I guess 
the second question would be, you know, you released the plans 
to improve the certification process, but it would not change 
the program by which the FAA delegates authorities or really 
address this undue pressure for manufacturers' issues. So, 
could you talk about where you are on this and what you think 
about my concerns about whether or not this is going to improve 
things enough. Thank you.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for your question, Senator. And I 
share your perspective on the families. And as I said, we owe 
it to them and to the public to do this right. With respect to 
the amount of delegation, it depends on the--you know, 
delegation, the ODA process is based on trust and I would say 
it is a trust but verify system. And it is a privilege. It has 
to be earned. And early in a certification process there is 
typically only very routine items that are delegated.
    There are four parts of the certification process in terms 
of establishing the certification basis, and actually the only 
part that is actually delegated is analysis and testing. And 
those are the items that you see as we see data as a process 
continues over a period typically of five to 7 years in most 
cases, that there may be an opportunity to delegate additional 
items in terms of certification analysis and testing only. The 
final decision remain----
    Senator Klobuchar [continuing]. But the undue pressure 
issue is what I am concerned about given what we saw with that 
internal serving at Boeing where one third of employees said 
they felt this pressure.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I think that is an extremely important 
issue. We continue to investigate instances of undue pressure. 
But specifically this is why safety management systems are so 
important because the only way to address that culture issue is 
by increasing the ability for frontline folks, both within the 
agency frankly and within the manufacturer, to bring issues 
forward in real time. And one of the benefits of safety 
management systems is that it puts safety responsibility where 
it belongs at the highest levels of the manufacturer. It also 
promotes transparency.
    Senator Klobuchar. All right. OK, let's move on, Mr. 
Dickson. I don't see the timer here, but I am going to ask you 
just two more questions. In September, the NTSB noted in its 
report that the underlying assumptions Boeing made about how 
pilots would react under certain conditions were severely 
flawed, the assumptions were. And have you started looking at 
the approval of other aircraft, non-Boeing aircraft or other 
Boeing aircraft, based on the recommendations regarding these 
pilot assumptions because to me that was--anyone, even someone 
who is not a pilot, saw this as a problem.
    Mr. Dickson. It is a great question. Human factors issues 
and pilot performance and the pilot as integral to the design 
of the aircraft is something that we are reviewing very closely 
as part of not only the return to service of the MAX, but also 
our certification processes in general. It is a key pillar of 
our strategy.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Last, in January the special 
committee commissioned by Secretary Chao to review the crashes 
has recommended that the FAA should expand its efforts to 
improve international standards. This bill was already 
referenced with Senator Moran and Senator Capito, and of 
course, Senator Cantwell.
    And I am one of the co-sponsors, the Foreign Civil Aviation 
Authority Assistance and Capacity Building Act, to help improve 
international pilot training. Do you agree that the FAA should 
work with our international partners to develop important 
international pilot training safety standards for the aviation 
workforce and industry? I think we all know as I know from my 
constituent dying in that crash that no one is immune. Our 
Americans are going to be on flights all over the world.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, wholeheartedly agree and the 
ICAO effort that I talked about before is the activity that 
were already undertaking in this area and we look forward to 
continuing to engage both bilaterally and regionally on pilot 
training and qualification issues around the world.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. And I would 
note that technically our clock is supposed to be on the 
screen----
    Senator Klobuchar.--I will fix it. I will fix it.
    The Chairman. OK. Next is Senator Fischer, also joining us 
remotely.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator 
Dickson, welcome this morning. Good to have you here. The Joint 
Authorities Technical Review said that the FAA was not 
completely unaware of MCAS, but because the information and 
discussions about MCAS were so fragmented, were delivered to 
disconnect groups, it was difficult to recognize the impact and 
the implications of this system.
    Last October, I asked then Boeing President and CEO Dennis 
Muilenburg about that fragmentation of communications between 
Boeing and FAA, which he responded that Boeing needed to make 
changes to improve communication with the agencies.
    Do you agree that the communication between Boeing and FAA 
was--that it was fragmented to the point that relevant 
information was not provided to the agency? And if so, how will 
steps that you have outlined such as a safety management system 
and a ``just culture'' improve that communication?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator. A couple 
of points there. I agree that, and I think our views and the 
other reviews have shown that information was presented in a 
fragmented manner and it was difficult to follow the entire 
thread, and this was part of the major issue that we are 
dealing with. Within the agency, we have recently taken steps 
to have our pilots and our flight standards group involved 
earlier in the certification process throughout.
    This is part of our effort to make sure that human factor 
considerations are taken into account and integrated into the 
design process. As you mentioned, safety management systems, as 
I mentioned a few minutes ago, are probably the biggest game 
changer in my experience in terms of turning a culture around 
and making it more transparent and focused again at the highest 
levels and throughout the organization on safety and quality.
    And it also puts the agency in a much stronger position in 
terms of being able to oversee the entire certification process 
because it is less transactional. It is not, you know, a 
question-and-answer. It is actually a data feed where we are 
actually privy to the picture as the program progresses. So 
there is a lot that goes into that. Again, data is very 
important and communications are very important, but that will 
definitely put us in a much better place.
    Senator Fischer. And also, Mr. Dickson, we are seeing that 
aircraft are becoming more automated and that means that there 
is more systems that can affect the aircraft controls without 
any kind of pilot input. During a hearing last year, DOT 
Inspector General testified that ``reliance in automation is a 
growing concern among industry experts who have questioned 
whether pilots receive enough training and enough experience to 
maintain manual flying proficiency.'' Do you share that concern 
about automation?
    Mr. Dickson. I do. And automation is a benefit and it has 
led--it has been part of the improvement in aviation safety 
that we have seen over the years, but the individual still has 
to be engaged with the machine.
    And to the extent that we are over-reliant and we lose 
situational awareness flying the airplane, you still have to 
manage your flight path and you have to stay mentally engaged 
with the aircraft. So there is a balance and that is why 
integrating human factors and human capabilities into aircraft 
design has always been important but it is more important now 
and going into the future than it ever has been.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Schatz.

                STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 
conducting this hearing. And Mr. Dickson, I wanted to change 
the topic a little bit from certification reform to flying 
safely during the pandemic. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization recently issued recommendations for travel during 
the pandemic, and I just want to get your views on those 
recommendations and what the FAA is going to do to integrate 
that into their process?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator 
Schatz. And actually those ICAO recommendations were the result 
of work that we did in the agency and brought forth to ICAO 
through the ICAO Council on Aviation Recovery Task Force.
    And I selected my Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell to lead 
that effort, and he worked with the Council and with 
authorities around the world to bring those guidelines forward. 
We are working on a similar process within the U.S. Government 
and certainly involving the CDC and others to have a similar 
set of measures and guidelines promulgated for travel within 
the U.S. so that we are----
    Senator Schatz. When you say measures and guidelines, do 
you mean rules or do you mean guidelines?
    Mr. Dickson. I mean guidelines. As the Secretary has said, 
these will not be regulatory mandates, but they will be very 
specific and we expect for air carriers and the public to 
follow those guidelines as well as airports. And we are working 
with the air carriers on this. We are using their safety 
management systems and the data that is coming out of those 
systems to monitor their----
    Senator Schatz. Does this sound like a philosophical thing 
for you folks? I mean I really--I mean this sincerely, I just 
don't get why you wouldn't want this to be mandatory. I don't 
understand why we are sort of going with a sort of private 
sector driven approach here or a voluntary approach or 
federalism approach.
    Is this just a matter of your approach to what the Federal 
Government should do? It seems to me that when you are talking 
about aviation, it is certainly Federal, and when you are 
talking about pandemic, it sort of falls into the category 
squarely of the kind--aviation safety. It is the kind of thing 
that you ought to make mandatory if you have come to certain 
conclusions about how to fly safely. So what gives here? How 
come you don't want to make a rule?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I appreciate the question, Senator. I am 
coming at this and the agency comes at this from an aviation 
safety perspective. So there are many things, there is a lot of 
data that we have that we get from the commercial aviation 
carriers and we need to make sure that there is not an impact 
on aviation safety.
    With respect to public health, that is the CDC and of 
course they have responsibilities for sectors of transportation 
and really the entire public health situation that goes well 
beyond aviation.
    So we are acting as a facilitator in that process. But if 
there is a nexus for aviation safety, then we are concerned 
about that and that is what we are working with the carriers on 
and in the interagency process within the Government, to make 
sure that we have consistent guidelines out there.
    Senator Schatz. OK, I got it. And I, you know, look we do 
we have a difference of opinion here. I think I, you know, I am 
hoping we will be able to get some bipartisan support for some 
person mandatory rules here, but I don't want to chew up all my 
time. I want to ask two more quick questions. Is flying safe 
from the standpoint of coronavirus?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, I believe so with the--but again, we all 
have a role to play. We have to protect each other. And again, 
the air carriers and the airports and TSA and all stakeholders 
out there, the FAA's air traffic organization, we have to make 
sure that we are operating the system safely and consistently 
and predictably.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you. And one final question, on May 
1, the D.C. Circuit ruled in the case of Hawaii Kalisch 
Coalition Malama Pono that the FAA must establish air tour 
management plans for all covered parks within two years. I am 
assuming that you will implement that as soon as possible and 
especially in those parks where this is an area of contention?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator, we are--I am familiar with the 
ruling and I believe that we are working with the Park Service 
now and have a preliminary plan that will be presented on 
August 30.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Senator Moran.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

    Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Dickson, 
thank you for being here, and to the second panel, to the 
witness there, condolences from me and my colleagues in the 
Committee. We thank you for your presence here today to help us 
better understand the importance of the decisions that the FAA 
and the Congress may make in regard to Airline safety. We have 
come a long way in that regard but recognize it is a never-
ending attempt to advance safety and I am pleased that you are 
here. I am sorry that you are here for the reason that you are.
    Mr. Dickson, let me first indicate to the Chairman, 
Chairman Wicker, thank you for your efforts. I don't know 
exactly the information that you are seeking from the FAA, but 
I am always pleased when Congressional efforts are made for 
greater oversight and please consider me an ally in any way 
that I can be of help in the effort to make sure that the FAA 
and other agencies respond to Congressional inquiries.
    Mr. Dickson, you have been useful to me, valuable to me, 
and your responses are opportunities to have conversations both 
in person before COVID-19 and then subsequently by phone and I 
thank you for that. I am surprised, I certainly am not at all 
suggesting that anything but safety should drive the 
recertification process, but it surprises me how long it has 
taken and it surprises me because I assume that the plane, 
which was previously certified, the 737 MAX, it should--if it 
was already certified, it seems to me that the changes 
necessary to satisfy the needs for safety would be rather 
modest.
    And I guess I am asking is that just a false assumption 
that--and if so, how did we get to a point in which the 
magnitude of the problems with the 737 MAX were so great that 
it is taking a significantly long time to get them fixed? And 
tell me again, during our last conversation you indicated 
midsummer. Is that still the case and has COVID-19 slowed down 
the process in recertification?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thanks for the question, Senator. To 
your last point, you know, we are not on any timeline. We are 
narrowing the issues and we have not had any impact with COVID-
19 up to this point. When we get to the Joint Operation 
Evaluation Board, obviously that involves international pilots 
and international travel, and so there are a couple of 
alternatives that we are looking at to have the processes in 
place to be able to support that work.
    But up to this point, the process has proceeded without 
interruption. One of the--you raised a great question and I 
think it needs to be clear that the redesign of the airplane is 
not just limited to changing MCAS functionality. The entire 
flight control system beginning--Boeing undertook this in the 
June, July time-frame of last year, became a much more 
ambitious project, and there is much more redundancy.
    The flight control computers and pitch compare their 
signals dynamically. That is an extremely ambitious project. 
And as we have moved forward, when you make a system like that 
more robust what happens is it implicates--there are 
interdependencies with other subsystems on the aircraft that 
have to be taken into account.
    So, you know again, this is--we have moved forward, I 
think, very diligently and very carefully, and as you know, we 
have retained all matters within the FAA including the--we will 
issue the airworthiness certificate ourselves. But that is why 
this is such a journey that we have been on.
    Senator Moran. Well, Administrator, I am in no way 
suggesting that anything but safety ought to drive your time-
frame and the question was really, and we can have this 
conversation ourselves, was does the magnitude of the changes 
necessary, does it suggest that the certification initially was 
significantly flawed to begin with? And I will be glad to 
follow up. I want to just touch on a couple of other things in 
the 30 seconds I have left. I want to explore with you and will 
submit a question writing about how do we get the FAA to be in 
a better position to adopt new innovations and move in 
advancing aviation safety through technology? I think there are 
some significant opportunities and I want to make sure that we 
don't lose the chance to pursue those innovations as we pursue 
certification.
    The workforce in Kansas, but across the country, is 
damaged. Its absence is noted. Furloughs are prevalent across 
our aviation and aerospace industry in Wichita and South 
Central Kansas, but elsewhere in our state as well. We are 
working to find a path for a public-private partnership that 
keeps those employees in place and on a payroll. And I would 
seek your advice and suggestions in that regard.
    And finally, I appreciate Senator Cantwell's cooperation 
along with Senators Klobuchar and Capito in regard to Senate 
Bill 3959. And again, because of the lack of time that I have, 
I guess there is no time left. I will follow up with you in 
writing unless we have a second round of questions.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moran. And before I go to 
Senator Blumenthal, let me remind members that we have a series 
of two votes beginning 11:45 a.m. I have talked with Senator 
Cantwell. Our intention is simply to share the gavel, proceed 
on, and do the best we can to conclude both panels of this 
hearing. We are required by the next committee to surrender 
this room no later than 1 p.m. and I feel surely that we will 
be able to do that. And I also appreciate members being so 
thoughtful as to the 5-minute time-frame with the questions.
    Senator Blumenthal, you are recognized.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be 
even less genteel than Senator Cantwell. I find your responses 
with all due respect, Administrator Dickson, to be totally 
unsatisfactory. The culture of secrecy at the FAA has only been 
aggravated under your tenure. You have completely refused to 
respond to any of my letters requesting information, not even 
an explanation--neither there nor here.
    I see no way you can continue in this job if you fail to be 
more responsive to this committee. And I think it begins today 
with a commitment to end that culture of secrecy, to commit to 
major reforms of the kind that the Chairman and Ranking Member 
have suggested in their legislation. I welcome it because it 
includes stronger protections for whistleblowers such as I 
suggested in the bipartisan--in the reform proposal that I 
advanced with support from Senators Markey, Udall, Warren and 
Feinstein. Not only protection for whistleblowers, but minimum 
qualifications for the engineers performing work on behalf of 
the FAA, targeted audits of ODA units, minimum addressing 
concerns about compensations, and bonuses for meeting 
performance goals.
    The fact of the matter is that the FAA has been complicit 
in these crashes by failing to do more diligent oversight. It 
has almost been like a dog watching TV and there have to be 
reforms that take back major swathes of the authority that have 
been delegated. The FAA has to do the work, not just oversee 
it. It has to perform work that involves certification. And so 
let me ask you first, why can the FAA not take back the 
authority it has delegated over critical safety features?
    Mr. Dickson. Well Senator, I vehemently disagree with your 
characterization of my level--desire for transparency. And I 
just want to reiterate the commitment that I made to the 
Chairman. I will make it to you as well. We want to collaborate 
and work together with the Committee to raise the bar on 
aviation safety. Critical, novel technologies, those are things 
that are typically not delegated by the agency. As I said in my 
remarks earlier, testing and analysis typically on more routine 
matters and early in its certification process are typically 
delegated, but that is----
    Senator Blumenthal. But you did delegate that authority 
with respect to the 737?
    Mr. Dickson. No, sir. No, not until very late in the 
project.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, late in the project is often the 
critical phase in the project. Let me move on to another area 
and I will invite you to expand on your answer in written 
responses. Would you join me in supporting a prohibition on 
preemption of claims made against a manufacturer or Airline 
simply because there has been certification by the FAA? Right 
now Boeing is taking the position that it will deny all claims 
against it simply because the FAA certified the 737.
    Mr. Dickson. I would be happy to work with you on that 
proposal, Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I was hoping for a yes.
    Mr. Dickson. I am not prepared to respond on that point 
today.
    Senator Blumenthal. Will you join me in supporting time 
limits on the certificates or certification of specific Airline 
types?
    Mr. Dickson. I believe you are talking about the changed 
product rule, and, or amended type certificates, and that is 
one of the areas that we are looking at and that is harmonized 
globally with the other states of design and we are looking at 
that process.
    Whether time limits are the most effective way to deal with 
that remains to be seen. That current rule actually enables 
safe additions to be brought into very safe existing designs 
more effectively and it is actually in many cases used less in 
the U.S. than with other states of design. So something we will 
have to look at very closely.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me just say concluding, left to its 
own devices, the aviation certification system puts corporate 
profits before consumer safety, and this system has to be 
radically reformed. I am going to ask that my letter of October 
24, 2019, which is among many that you haven't answered, be put 
in the record. I hope that you will provide an answer in light 
of your responses here. And it will help to rebuild trust.
    The Chairman. Is that to the Administrator, sir? Is that a 
letter to the Administrator?
    Senator Blumenthal. It is.
    The Chairman. Without objection. It will be done.
    [The letter referred to follows:]

                                       United States Senate
                                   Washington, DC, October 24, 2019

Mr. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
Washington, DC.

Dear Administrator Dickson:

    I write to request all documents concerning safety procedures and 
standards used in certification and oversight of the Boeing 737 MAX. I 
specifically ask that you provide immediately documents demonstrating 
Boeing employees' awareness of issues with the Boeing 737 MAX flight 
control system (MCAS) and all e-mail or text correspondence between 
Boeing employees and staff at the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). While I appreciate the FAA providing the Committee with certain 
e-mails and instant messages last Friday, our oversight responsibility 
requires those documents in their full versions, without redactions.
    The e-mails and instant messages provided are deeply disturbing--
indeed some are shocking--showing serious internal concerns among 
Boeing employees and possible misrepresentations. They raise serious 
questions generally about how forthcoming Boeing was in communications 
with the FAA regarding the MCAS. As you are aware, the 2016 e-mails 
from Mark Forkner, Boeing's Chief Technical Pilot on the 737 MAX at the 
time, are heavily redacted, concealing, for example, the identities of 
the FAA employees who received them. I have reason to believe that the 
FAA has additional records related to the 737 MAX that would be of 
interest to the Committee, including responses from FAA employees to 
Mr. Forkner's e-mails.
    I am requesting the FAA respond immediately with the unredacted e-
mails and any relevant supplemental records so that I can assess these 
documents before the Committee's hearing with Boeing executives on 
October 29, 2019.
    The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has 
the responsibility and right to exercise oversight authority related to 
the tragic 737 MAX crashes and the events leading to them. I ask that 
the FAA provide me with the requested material by no later than October 
28, 2019.
    Thank you for your attention to this request, and I expect your 
full cooperation.
            Sincerely,
                                        Richard Blumenthal,
                                                  United States Senate.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Scott.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Scott. I want thank you, Chairman Wicker, for 
holding this important hearing. I want to first thank Mr. Stumo 
for being here with us today to provide your testimony. My 
heart goes out to you and your family for your loss. And I 
think it takes a lot of courage to be able to come and do this 
today.
    Administrator Dickson, I want to thank you for being here 
today and I want to thank you for your efforts to restructure 
and improve the FAA to make sure it can again be a global 
leader in safety and assertiveness. So, can you talk a little 
bit about how you restructured the FAA to increase 
accountability and ensure that, you know, you have the capacity 
again to be the global leader in safety and the certification 
process?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator Scott. The level of 
engagement globally in my first few months has been extremely 
impressive and I am very proud to have the privilege of leading 
45,000 professionals at the agency. They are extremely 
committed. We started out--we start out with core values. You 
know, we are a technical organization. As has been said many 
times, our top priority is safety. We have got to be driven by 
core values. Rules aren't going to get us where we need to be. 
We have got to have an approach where we are transparent. We 
can have professional disagreements, but we have got to have a 
way to make sure that we are looking at all sides of every 
perspective.
    So one of the things I really pushed is to deal with issues 
from a one agency perspective. What I find and I have seen this 
in the private sector as well is you will have a Department, or 
in my case a line of business or a staff office, that is 
pursuing its own goals and objectives and maybe even using its 
own data.
    And so what we have to do is work across the entire agency 
perspective, because we have a lot of data and there have been 
a lot of problems solved over the years that have created 
various pockets, but we have got to be able to see the whole 
picture. And that is one of the things that we are really 
working on. What I mentioned in response to Senator Klobuchar's 
question gets to this point: it is a more seamless integration 
between our flight standards group and our aircraft 
certification group.
    Senator Scott. Thank you. Does your certification process 
incorporate any cross checking or something similar so you 
reduce the possibility of factors like human error?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, yes, that has always been a part of the 
process. But the--what we are looking at as we mentioned in our 
response to the Secretary's Special Committee report is we are 
looking at some of the assumptions around human error and how 
those can be incorporated into aircraft design all along more 
effectively.
    Senator Scott. OK. When you think about the issues with the 
737 MAX and the certification process, are you reassessing the 
certification process for all aircraft that you certify?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. That is what our--all of the reviews 
that have been done, the work of the Committee, the dialogue 
that we have had internally within the agency, it is all 
leading as to a more robust process. I believe that the biggest 
thing that we can do is implement safety management systems for 
manufacturers and we are working on that right now. We plan to 
initiate rulemaking on that shortly. And I am a big supporter 
that I have seen the benefits in the Airline industry. We need 
to take those same kinds of benefits into the manufacturing 
sector.
    Senator Scott. What is your communication plan to make 
sure, you know, everybody gets more comfortable that the FAA is 
changed and that the certification process works and that it 
is--if you get an FAA certification, you know, you are clearly 
going to be safe or as safe as you can be?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we have got--you know, aviation again, 
is the safest form of travel. Our commercial aviation sector 
accident rate is down 94 percent in the last 20 years. And you 
know, we have had hundreds of millions of flights over the last 
decade with a sterling safety record.
    One death is one too many, and of course the 346 deaths 
that we saw in these two accidents are tragic and unacceptable. 
So we have got to keep raising the bar with aviation within the 
U.S. but we have also got to take the responsibility that U.S. 
products are being maintained and operated around the world and 
so we need to raise that bar around the world as well.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator Markey.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. You should have known about the safety of 
the Boeing 737 MAX before it ever took off. The tragic fate of 
Lion Air flight 7610 should have led to an immediate grounding 
of this plane, yet the FAA allowed the clearly unsafe 737 MAX 
to keep flying for 5 months after the first crash which killed 
189 people. During these 5 months, the FAA repeatedly said it 
did not have enough data to ground the MAX. However, we have 
since learned that the FAA conducted an unpublished risk 
assessment after the Lion Air tragedy.
    This report predicted 15 more fatal crashes in the life of 
the MAX, 15 more crashes. The FAA knew that the 737 MAX was not 
safe and still let it fly. The FAA knew and it gambled with 
thousands of lives. The FAA only changed course after 157 more 
people died on the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, but this 
second tragedy never had to happen. If the FAA had been 
transparent with its data, everyone would have demanded the MAX 
be grounded before a second crash.
    It is now your responsibility to make sure the FAA is 
completely transparent while it reviews whether to unground the 
MAX. Will you commit to making every document and study related 
to the ungrounding of 737 MAX public?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, I appreciate the question. The 
document that you are referring to is actually not a predictive 
document, it is a decision support tool. It really is an 
actuarial calculation that is designed to, when an unsafe 
condition is identified, designed to make sure that we are----
    Senator Markey. Will you make every document available--
every document? It is an easy question. It is an easy question, 
Mr. Dickson. Will you make every document available for the 
public?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not sure what normal protocol is 
on that but we will be as transparent as we possibly can.
    Senator Markey. No. No, that is not the question. Not as 
you can. That is what happened the last time. You weren't 
transparent the last time. Will you commit to making every 
document public?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not in a position to commit to 
that at this point.
    Senator Markey. Well, if you are not then you are part of a 
cover-up--then you are just--you are complicit. You are not 
providing the information which is going to be needed. And I 
just want to follow up for a second on what Senator Blumenthal 
was just asking because despite all of its wrongdoing, Boeing 
has barely been held accountable for these tragic crashes. 
Although Boeing's former CEO was fired, he left the company 
with a $60 million golden parachute.
    Boeing's new CEO was sent off at an offer of $7 million 
bonus for rushing the MAX back into service. And Boeing has 
failed to even settle the claims of victims' families in the 
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 lawsuits. And I find this lack of 
accountability absolutely outrageous. The flying public cannot 
trust that Boeing has learned its lessons until the company and 
people responsible are held to task for the 346 deaths they 
caused.
    So I am appalled, but not surprised Boeing is now arguing 
in court that the FAA certification of the 737 MAX should 
shield it from liability to the victims? families, even though 
the plane was clearly unsafe and defective. Again, I want to 
follow up on Senator Blumenthal. Administrator Dickson, do you 
support Boeing's position or should the victims' families be 
able to hold Boeing accountable for a defective plane 
regardless of whether the company complied with broken FAA 
regulations?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, I am not in a position to comment on 
that, but I would certainly be willing to follow up with you on 
that question.
    Senator Markey. Look, there is no way that Boeing should 
escape liability. I think you know that and I think it is going 
to be important for you ultimately to make a statement to the 
effect that Boeing had a responsibility to ensure that this 
plane was safe, and if it did not act that way, that they 
should be held accountable. And I think the FAA and you should 
make a statement to that effect.
    Mr. Dickson. Senator Markey, I just want to make clear that 
the responsibility to produce a safe product does belong with 
Boeing. Absolutely.
    Senator Markey. OK, and I think that is important for 
people to hear. Boeing has responsibility for making a safe 
product. And am glad you clarified that.
    Mr. Dickson. Absolutely.
    Senator Markey. Because it is important for the record to 
indicate that it is not just the FAA but Boeing itself that has 
responsibility. And if they did not discharge that 
responsibility, they should be made liable to these families.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Udall.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

    Senator Udall. And thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell. 
Administrator Dickson, the duty of our committee is to closely 
examine the failures of both the Federal Aviation 
Administration and Boeing to prevent the tragedies that 
occurred last year. We must re-examine the current system that 
allow for a much too cozy relationship between regulators and 
companies including Boeing.
    I want to make this point crystal clear. Boeing's efforts 
to push for more self-certification and to push the FAA to move 
faster and faster to approve the 737 MAX were totally 
counterproductive and resulted in tragedy. This continues to be 
a case study of the complete and total failure of self-
regulation.
    And I think this will go down as one of the big mistakes in 
history in this area. Mr. Dickson, last month in the FAA's 
response to the special committee's report, you said the 
Administration would increase staff at the office at the middle 
of this investigation, the organization, designation, authority 
of the ODA office. The 2018 FAA bill required that FAA do so. 
Why has it taken over a year and hundreds of lives lost before 
you committed to expanding this office as required by law?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator Udall, appreciate your question. We 
stood up the ODA office toward the end--well actually well in 
advance of the budget request, but we didn't have the resources 
at that point for permanently staffing it. That is what that 
2021 request will allow us to do.
    Senator Udall. I support legislation before this Committee 
that would reform the ODA process. I believe that it is 
essential to prevent future accidents. Does the FAA recommend 
any reforms to ODA?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. As I have mentioned several times 
this morning, certainly the implementation of safety management 
systems, the use of safety risk management integrated system, 
safety assessments, is very important as well as the 
consideration of the operating environment around the globe. 
These are some of the recommendations that we have responded to 
and I think they are very consistent with where the Committee 
is headed in this area.
    Senator Udall. Have you implemented those changes already?
    Mr. Dickson. Well with respect to the--we are working on 
them. We are in the process of--we have plans to recruit in 
system safety engineers and software engineers as well, as well 
as additional human factors experts. We are also on our triple 
7x certification plan. We are using a technical advisory board 
as we did with the MAX. And as you know with the 737 MAX, we 
have retained every aspect of that project as well, including 
the issuance of the individual aircraft air awarding 
certificates and we will continue to do that until we see that 
through.
    Senator Udall. An important component in the certification 
process is that the FAA must be made aware of changes a company 
makes to its equipment, but reports say that the FAA was not 
aware of the significance of the changes Boeing made to the 
equipment of the 737 MAX. What specific steps or policy changes 
has Boeing made to regain trust of the FAA and the American 
people, and how can you assure us that Boeing will truly comply 
with all regulatory requirements in the future?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, it is a great question. Boeing 
has voluntarily implemented some aspects of safety management 
system. They have made some changes to their internal 
processes. We are seeing a culture shift in some areas, but 
there is more work to be done, and we are going to stay right 
on that process to make sure that we see this through as we 
continue to reform our processes in the agency around voluntary 
safety reporting and safety management systems as well.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
    Senator Rosen.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member 
Cantwell, Administrator Dickson, and Mr. Stumo. I am incredibly 
sorry for your loss and for the loss of all the souls on planes 
that crashed in this fashion. And so today I want to talk a 
little bit about Boeing, more Boeing specific questions 
building on some of the topics that have already been asked. 
And I would like to revisit a topic that I raised with Boeing 
CEO when he came before this panel.
    According to news reports, when the Brazilian National 
Civil Aviation Agency came to the U.S. in 2017 to test out the 
MAX 8, they determined the changes made to the old 737 were 
significant enough that they needed much more information from 
Boeing and were going to provide it to their pilots. When 
Brazil's Aviation Authority eventually published it, they 
published their pilot training requirements, it was therefore 
able to flag the MCAS as one of the changes that the pilots 
needed to take into consideration when flying the MAX 8.
    And yet, for U.S. pilots, MCAS was not mentioned in their 
manual. So Administrator Dickson, why was that the case and why 
didn't the FAA not seek additional information for Boeing on 
the MCAS system?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator Rosen, thank you for the question. I 
am on record and I strongly believe that it should have been in 
the material, in the operations material that was provided to 
the pilots. Anything that affects the flight control system of 
the airplane, the pilots should have. So I think that I have 
concerns about how that was initially done.
    Senator Rosen. I appreciate that. So, can you assure us 
that moving forward, the FAA will make it a practice when other 
countries make significant changes to their product manuals 
based on major operational changes, that the FAA will consider 
or absolutely do this, doing so as well and notifying our U.S. 
Airlines and pilots to prevent any tragedies?
    Mr. Dickson. That is a great question. We do that now 
through the certification management team with the other states 
of design. And depending on the operating environment in 
different parts of the world or how pilots are trained, there 
may be differences of opinion of exactly what those details 
are, but yes, I can----
    Senator Rosen. Would you agree with me that it might be 
better to over-inform than to not inform at all so that way on 
the off chance that somebody might not know, isn't it always 
better to give a little bit more information?
    Mr. Dickson. I would--that is how I was going to finish the 
sentence. So I think that if there is any doubt that having 
that information available is always going to be a better place 
to be.
    Senator Rosen. And then I would just like to follow up with 
those little time I have left more broadly. Can you please 
speak to what steps you are taking to ensure that manufacturers 
disclose those safety critical systems that are not activated 
by the flight crew? How do you plan to be sure that this 
information is disclosed in pilot manuals because they need to 
know what is under their control and what maybe isn't, how they 
do the overrides.
    Mr. Dickson. So really two things. The integration of the 
pilots earlier in the design process is going to be very 
important. In fact, we are undertaking training our technical 
pilots and our inspectors within the FAA who aren't 
certification experts but who are in that aircraft evaluation 
group, train them on things like system safety assessments and 
certification processes so they are actually embedded earlier 
on in the certification process. And that will put us in a much 
better position to have visibility into those issues during 
the--as a certification of a particular project goes forward.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator 
Duckworth. We are able to be joined remotely by Senator 
Duckworth.

              STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

    Senator Duckworth. Hello, can you hear me now?
    The Chairman. Yes, OK. Thank you. Yes, glad to hear your 
voice.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. 
Administrator Dickson, I apologize I can't be on video right 
now, but it is good to see you again. I have several questions 
for you. So in the interest of time, please limit your answers 
to yes and no. Given that the FAA is responsible for aviation 
safety in the United States, your agency can take corrective 
measures including legal enforcement actions for violations of 
the Federal aviation regulations. Is this correct?
    Mr. Dickson. That is correct.
    Senator Duckworth. It is FAA--I am sorry. It is FAA policy 
to investigate complaints of low-flying aircraft that endanger 
persons or property. Is that correct?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, any kind of reckless operation of an 
aircraft is responsibility of the pilot in command and that is 
something that we would want to investigate and look into.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Now, with some flexibility 
for helicopters in my FAR AIM manual from 2018, so maybe some 
things have changed but I doubt it, FAA regulations require a 
minimum altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle for 
congested areas, including any open-air assembly of person. Is 
this correct?
    Mr. Dickson. I believe that is correct. I would have to go 
back and verify that for myself.
    Senator Duckworth. I don't. You fly--you are used to bigger 
and faster aircraft--but I did----
    Mr. Dickson. You need to check me out on a helicopter 
sometime.
    Senator Duckworth. Well, you know the last one I flew got a 
big hole in the--so I might not be the right person----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Duckworth. And Mr. Dickson, this military related 
to--Lakota--pull up the slide. This aircraft was flown roughly 
100 feet above peaceful protesters in downtown Washington, D.C. 
on June 1. Are you as outraged as I am about this extremely 
dangerous maneuver?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not . . . well, we are looking into that, 
Senator. I am aware of the circumstances and we're looking at 
this from a compliance with air traffic regulations in addition 
to the operation of the aircraft and it is an ongoing 
investigation. I believe what you are referring to took place 
within the prohibited area, which is not under active control. 
But the pilot in command still is responsible for following the 
safety regulations.
    Senator Duckworth. OK. Well--I am going to have to question 
you along those lines in just a minute. But before that, the 
International Red Cross emblem, as you can see on this Lakota 
aircraft, is painted on, is a university recognized symbol of 
Medical Aid and its use is prohibited under the Geneva 
Convention.
    If staff could pull up slide two. Mr. Dickson, what about 
this UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flown above protesters on the 
same night? Like the Lakota, did this helicopter endanger 
civilians on the ground and potentially violate FAA safety 
regulations?
    Mr. Dickson. We have not--again, it is under investigation. 
We are looking into it carefully and I would be happy to follow 
up with you once we have completed our review.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. These helicopters were 
reportedly flown by the D.C. National Guard, which is the only 
National Guard unit in the Nation that reports directly to the 
President of the United States due to D.C.'s unique political 
status.
    According to local news reports, the downward force of this 
helicopter's rotor blade, more commonly known as rotor wash, 
knocked a nearby small tree. Mr. Dickson, as you said, you are 
talking about looking into it. Are you saying that the D.C. 
flight status district office has opened an investigation into 
these events?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, we have opened an investigation.
    Senator Duckworth. When do you expect the investigation's 
final report to be available?
    Mr. Dickson. I do not know this morning, but I will follow 
up with you as it proceeds.
    Senator Duckworth. Wonderful. So you will commit to 
providing my office with the copy of the report as soon as 
possible?
    Mr. Dickson. We will provide you with the results of the 
investigation, yes.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Now, if staff can pull up 
slide three, please. Mr. Dickson, from an aviation safety 
perspective, do you agree with this tweet from President Trump 
who is condoning dangerous maneuvers to intimidate American 
protesters on American soil? He tweeted, ``the problem is not 
the very talented, low-flying helicopter pilots wanting to save 
our city, the problem is the arsonists, looters, criminals, and 
anarchists, wanting to destroy it and our country.'' Do you 
agree with this tweet?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not really--I am not familiar with--it is 
the first time I have seen it. But I am not familiar with it. 
And I don't know how it applies--I am not sure how it applies 
to this particular situation. But as I said Senator, we will 
look into the facts of this particular event.
    The Chairman. Senator Duckworth, we have had a technical 
issue. I believe you have referred to three slides and let's 
enter those into the record, without objection. Is there any 
objection?
    [No response.]
    [The information referred to follows:]

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    The Chairman. Then it will be done. Thank you, Senator 
Duckworth.
    Senator Baldwin.

               STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I--Mr. Dickson, 
this past December, Amy Gannon and her 13 year old daughter, 
Jocelyn were killed in a helicopter crash while on a family 
vacation in Hawaii. Amy Gannon was a local business leader and 
an advocate for entrepreneurs in Wisconsin and she was an 
energetic and positive presence for the Madison area in 
Wisconsin and, in fact, the whole state.
    I understand that there is an ongoing NTSB investigation 
into that helicopter crash, but I would also note for you and 
this committee the serious whistleblower allegations of 
misconduct at the FAA and that the whistleblower has said that 
he was prevented from inspecting the Safari aviation aircraft 
prior to its crash in December.
    So Mr. Dickson, can I have your commitment to working with 
me to help ensure that what happened to the Gannon family is 
not repeated for any other family?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. As I have said many times, you 
know, we have got to make sure that we are doing everything 
possible to promote aviation safety. Helicopter air tours and 
other operations of this type are not where they need to be 
from a safety perspective and it is a big focus for the agency. 
We are engaged in training our inspectors to make sure that 
they have the appropriate background and familiarity with this 
type of operation. So we would welcome working with you on this 
subject.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Mr. Dickson, in December, 
Senator Duckworth and I sent you and Secretary Chao a letter 
following up on a bipartisan amendment with now Chairman Wicker 
that we have included in the FAA Reauthorization Act. That 
amendment required the Department of Transportation to review 
existing regulations and standards ensuring assistance for 
passengers with disabilities in air transportation.
    Specifically, our letter noted a concern that current 
regulations do not require hands-on training for employees or 
contractors when moving passengers, including those with spinal 
cord injuries. Passengers have been dropped during the transfer 
process and this is unacceptable. I have not yet received a 
response to our letter which requested an update on your review 
of existing regulations and standards. Can you share that 
update with me now?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, this is a matter that is not within, 
specifically within the FAA's purview. It is within the 
aviation policy area of the Department, but I will take--right 
after this hearing, I will take it and we will get an update 
for you from the Department.
    Senator Baldwin. Mr. Chairman, I can't currently see the 
time clock.
    The Chairman. A minute and a half.
    Senator Baldwin. Oh, excellent. So I--Administrator 
Dickson, at your confirmation hearing before this committee 
just over a year ago, I noted the ongoing investigations at the 
FAA here in Congress and within the DOT Inspector Generals and 
the Department of Justice. I asked you then, if confirmed, what 
would you require of Boeing before ungrounded the 737 MAX? In 
the year that you have been Administrator of the FAA, some of 
these investigations have, in fact, concluded and produced 
reports with recommendations and other investigations, 
including the Department of Transportation Office of 
Investigator General audit, have not yet concluded.
    We continue to see reports in the media of Boeing's plans. 
Most recently that Boeing is aiming at conducting a key 
certification test later this month. So I want to ask you the 
very same question that I asked you a little over a year ago, 
as head of FAA, what will you require of Boeing before giving 
the green light to ungrounded that 737 MAX?
    Mr. Dickson. We will--it is a great question. We will 
require every step of the process to be completed. We are not 
on any timeline. I have said many times to my team that we are 
going to retain every aspect and we will work the process 
through to completion however long that takes. We won't have 
undue delays. We will be ready to go.
    But one of the things that we have been working with Boeing 
on, and we have seen some improvements, have been to give us 
complete data submissions in the certification work as we have 
gone forward and we will continue to do that. Also, as we work 
forward, there are some civil penalty actions that we have 
taken.
    I believe it is the second largest civil penalty in the 
history of the FAA against Boeing, and we will continue to look 
at their performance, and I reserve the right to hold them 
accountable moving forward as well on that way if that is 
necessary.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Cruz.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dickson, a 
little over a year ago, you sat before this committee at your 
confirmation hearing. At the time I and others told you to be 
pissed off at what had happened. You have been in office 329 
days. We have heard today that you are stonewalling the 
Chairman's investigations, that you are refusing to answer 
multiple letters from at least one of my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle, Senator Blumenthal, and that you have 
yet to provide responsive documents to Mr. Stumo's FOIA request 
filed 8 months ago. May I ask you some simple questions? In the 
process of certification of the 737 MAX, did Boeing lie to the 
FAA?
    Mr. Dickson. I can't say--I mean, definitely there was 
incomplete information and fragmented information that was 
provided. No doubt.
    Senator Cruz. Why did one of their senior test pilots, Mr. 
Forker, write in a text, ``so I basically lied to the 
regulators unknowingly.''?
    Mr. Dickson. I don't know. I can't speak for him. I don't 
know what he meant by that, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. So in 329 days what have you been doing if 
not figuring out whether they lied and what they lied about?
    Mr. Dickson. I am interested in learning from the past and 
making the process and the agency more effective and better 
going forward. The important point is that the information was 
not provided in the way that it needed to be provided. That in 
itself degrades the trust that we need to have as a foundation 
to the certification process.
    Senator Cruz. OK. Let's learn----
    Mr. Dickson. Whether an individual lied, I can't----
    Senator Cruz. Let's learn from the past. Did the FAA screw-
up in certifying the 737 MAX?
    Mr. Dickson. I have concerns I would say that there were 
mistakes made, yes.
    Senator Cruz. So, in Washington the passive voice is a 
classic tell. Mistakes were made is a great way of avoiding 
responsibility because there is no actor in that phrase 
mistakes were made. Who made the mistakes and why? Don't speak 
in the passive voice.
    Mr. Dickson. The manufacturer made mistakes and the FAA 
made mistakes in its oversight of the manufacturer.
    Senator Cruz. And what were the mistakes and why were they 
made?
    Mr. Dickson. The full implications of the flight control 
system were not understood as design changes were made.
    Senator Cruz. Has anyone at FAA been fired?
    Mr. Dickson. There have been changes in leadership in 
various areas. No one has been fired over this particular 
matter up to this point.
    Senator Cruz. Has anyone been disciplined over this matter?
    Mr. Dickson. No, not specifically.
    Senator Cruz. So unknown somebodies made unspecified 
mistakes for which there have been no repercussions. Is that 
right?
    Mr. Dickson. I would not say that there have not been 
repercussions.
    Senator Cruz. Well, please tell us the repercussions.
    Mr. Dickson. The repercussions are that we are--we have 
significant reforms we are making to the process and we are 
standing up audit processes and review processes and more 
robust safety systems so that we can be more effective in the 
future as an organization.
    Senator Cruz. Is there a systemic problem of agency capture 
at the FAA?
    Mr. Dickson. You know, I remember us having this 
conversation, Senator, and I don't believe that it is agency 
capture but I do believe that when you have very capable 
technical subject matter experts, that they get focused on 
their checklist, or their part of the process, they hold 
themselves accountable for that, and they don't always see the 
whole picture.
    So that is why we need as leaders to make sure that we are 
taking an integrated approach in our dealings, in this case 
what the manufacturer, air carrier, whatever the private sector 
regulated party is that we are responsible for overseeing.
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Dickson, in your opening statement, you 
said, ``safety is a journey not a destination.'' For the 346 
souls lost on the two 737 MAXs that crashed, safety was all 
about arriving at their destination. They should have arrived 
at the destination had Boeing not covered up serious safety 
concerns, number one, and had the FAA done its job of making 
sure that the MCAS was not put in the field without pilots 
being appropriately trained.
    I think the concern this committee has is we are not seeing 
from you any of the urgency of fixing this problem. It is very 
easy to go into an agency and yourself get captured by the 
agency. You understand, sir? You do not work for the Airlines 
and you do not work for Boeing. You work for the American 
people. And this committee expects transparency.
    This committee expects that when we ask questions 
specifically about malfeasance that cost the lives of 346 
people, that you will be forthcoming and answer those 
questions. And I am hopeful that is the conduct we will see 
going forward. Thank you.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Thune [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Now I 
thank the Chairman for holding today's hearing is part of this 
committee's continued oversight of aircraft certification in 
the wake of the two tragic crashes in Indonesian and Ethiopia. 
My deepest sympathies remain with the families of the victims 
and we want to thank them for being here today.
    And I want to associate myself with the comments that have 
already been made by the Chairman and other members of the 
Committee emphasizing the importance of being responsive to 
requests for documents and other information as we conduct 
oversight. I hope you are hearing loudly and clearly, Mr. 
Dickson, how critical that is to the work that we do and the 
work that you do in order to keep the flying public safe.
    One of the major lessons that we learned from these tragic 
accidents is that a thorough consideration of human factors 
should become a more fundamental component of the design and 
testing of new aircraft, especially as avionics systems become 
increasingly complex. Where do you see opportunities for the 
FAA to improve its consideration of human factors in the 
aircraft certification process?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, Senator. First of all, 
it is bolstering our human factors expertise. So there is a 
workforce component in addition to working with Academia and 
NASA on these issues. Frankly, also involving our pilots and 
our flight standards group, our aircraft evaluation group into 
the certification process as an earlier and more integrated 
point in the process.
    It will allow us to take a more holistic view of that role 
of the human in aircraft design and not look at them as 
independently as they have been in the past. And because it is 
more than a matter of just training a pilot to operate a 
particular machine. We want to make sure that the pilot is 
viewed as a part of the design.
    Senator Thune. Good. Well, that was one of the things I 
think that we learned as there were gaps in training as well 
and seems like a bit serious issue to be addressed. You 
mentioned in your testimony the FAA will need to ensure that 
personnel receive the training they need to adequately adapt to 
an industry that is constantly adopting new technologies and 
implementing complex systems. In line with that discussion, 
what initiatives is FAA pursuing to ensure the current 
personnel have the training they need as well as recruit and 
hire new personnel?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, that is, again a great question. Our 
aviation safety organization has a 10-year workforce plan and 
we are in the process of continually reviewing our needs. In 
our response to the Secretary's Special Committee report, we 
will have a focus again on human factors experts but also 
system engineers, software engineers, and data scientists so 
that we can stay ahead of new technologies as they are 
introduced.
    Senator Thune. Your testimony also discussed, and you 
mentioned it just previously here. The FAA has plans to adopt a 
more holistic approach when it comes to certification 
consistent with recommendations from the special committee to 
review the FAA's aircraft certification process. This includes 
better coordination between various FAA offices and adoption of 
a safety management system for aircraft manufacturers. How does 
the FAA plan to improve coordination between offices such as 
the Aircraft Certification Service and flight standards 
responsible for different aspects of the certification process?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. We have recently 
initiated a program to train our aviation safety inspectors who 
are involved in the aircraft evaluation group on many of the 
processes that our aircraft certification engineers actually 
use so that they are able to participate more fully in all 
phases of that process.
    In addition to that, we are standing up a project 
management or program management function that will take these 
programs where you have over a period of years and sometimes 
you have personnel changes and people who may not be there 
throughout the whole 5 to 7 years of the project to make sure 
that the entire project hangs together from beginning to end. 
So those two functions should improve the coordination. That is 
the goal between those two parts of the agency.
    Senator Thune. Can you speak quickly here to how requiring 
adoption of a safety management system for manufacturers would 
benefit FAA's oversight of the certification process?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. SMS has many benefits. I think 
it is actually the most important step that we can take to 
improve aircraft certification. On the company's side the 
manufacturer puts, again, safety responsibility where it 
belongs and it promotes transparency and voluntary employee 
reporting on safety issues.
    And it refocuses accountability for product safety to the 
highest levels of the company. On the agency side, it allows us 
to oversee the system and the process, and it reinforces the 
sharing of data in a dynamic process between the manufacturer 
and the agency.
    So it greatly improves the regulator's ability to identify 
hazards and manage our oversight before a compliance bust 
actually occurs. We don't have to wait for that because we are 
getting a data feed all throughout the process.
    Senator Thune. Good. Thank you. And my time has expired. 
Next up, and I think she is with us remotely, is Senator 
Sinema. And upon the conclusion of Senator Sinema questions 
pending any other Senators' appearances, we will move to the 
second panel.
    Senator Sinema.

               STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator 
Dickson, many Airlines require passengers and crew to wear 
masks on airplanes. Hpwever, reports have shown that 
enforcement for non-compliance has been uneven and difficult.
    The CDC tells us that masking is a vital tool for public 
health, particularly in places where social distancing is not 
possible like airplane cabins. The FAA needs to do more to 
ensure that the aviation system is mitigating the spread of the 
virus. Right now the FAA only has recommendations but no 
Federal requirements for masks. Why isn't the FAA mandating 
masks on flights, and what more can you do to ensure that 
passengers are wearing masks?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator, and we have been 
working throughout as the aviation safety authority to provide 
our aviation expertise to the public health authorities. And as 
Secretary Chao has said, we believe that is--our space is in 
aviation safety and their space is in public health.
    Having said that, we have made those standards available to 
the Airlines and to labor, stakeholders, and others. I have 
told them very specifically that I expect for them to abide by 
and enforce those standards, including the wearing of face 
coverings on commercial aircraft. And we will continue to do 
that.
    We are seeing in recent days the adoption of more stringent 
enforcement on the part of the Airlines and we will continue to 
monitor that situation using the Airlines' safety systems to 
make sure that they are following through.
    Senator Sinema. So, does the FAA plan to mandate that masks 
are worn on flights? It sounds like you are recommending this 
and you are telling us about your expectation, but there is no 
enforcement mechanism.
    Mr. Dickson. We do not plan to provide an enforcement 
specifically on that issue. However, we are reviewing their 
voluntary safety programs to make sure that they are following 
through.
    Senator Sinema. On a related topic, as you might know, I am 
working on legislation with Senator Cruz to create a contact 
tracing mechanism for international travelers as they enter our 
country during COVID-19. Given your position on the Interagency 
Task Force addressing COVID related issues, can you discuss the 
importance of contact tracing mechanisms for travelers during 
pandemics and detail any ongoing efforts that you are taking to 
address this issue?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, Senator. We have been 
involved in the contact tracing work since the very early days, 
really dating back to January, frankly. And again, we are using 
our aviation expertise to act as a facilitator between the 
Airlines in this case and the public health authorities who can 
manage that data. And the question is, that is a need that we 
all have, we all agree with that.
    The Department is engaged in this as well. And we certainly 
have an open mind, but we are trying to make sure that that 
information gets ingested into the systems where the CDC can 
conduct the contact tracing that it needs to conduct.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Airports in Arizona, including 
Sky Harbor and Phoenix, Tucson and the Phoenix Mesa Gateway, 
have asked for more tools to speed up the construction of the 
airport infrastructure. Earlier this week, I introduced 
legislation with Senator Young, the Expedited Delivery of 
Airport Infrastructure Act, to incentivize more efficient 
completion of airport construction projects.
    Our bill would allow airports to use airport improvement 
program funds to incentivize faster airport projects. Have you 
had a chance to review our legislation and do you have any 
thoughts on helping airports expedite these projects?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator. I am familiar with 
the proposal. I have not actually seen the legislative text. 
But from what I understand, it is consistent with the need to 
streamline and facilitate infrastructure projects. So as I 
understand it, it is something that we would support and the 
Department would support.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back my time.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you very, very much. And now 
pursuant to the statement made by Mr. Thune, we will move to 
the next panel. Mr. Administrator, thank you very much for your 
presentation today, and we certainly look forward to following 
up with you----
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.--on all other matters. Let me go ahead and 
before we excuse you, we will have questions for the record as 
I am sure you are familiar. Upon receipt, we ask you to submit 
your written answers to the Committee as soon as possible. And 
I am sure you will do that. So at this point, thank you, sir.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
    The Chairman. And if staff will assist Mr. Stumo in coming 
to the microphone, we will begin our second panel. And a vote 
is occurring. And again, we are going to pass the gavel around 
and try to accommodate Senators and the schedule. And so if we 
are ready, our next panel is Mr. Michael Stumo.
    As we said earlier, father of Samya Rose Stumo who 
tragically died on Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. Mr. Stumo, 
thank you for your presence today. And you have a written 
statement which will be submitted in its entirety and we ask 
you now to summarize your testimony. You are recognized.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL STUMO, FATHER OF SAMYA ROSE STUMO, VICTIM 
               OF ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT ET302

    Mr. Stumo. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member 
Cantwell, members of this committee. Chairman Wicker and 
Ranking Member Cantwell, appreciate your recent legislative 
proposal, which is an improvement. I will have some ideas from 
me and the families in how it can be further improved. The ET 
302 families are also indebted to you, Ranking Member Cantwell, 
for dedicating time and effort to learning about our families, 
the facts, and the solutions so there is not a third crash. 
Samya's 26th birthday will be in less than 2 weeks. I speak for 
my family. I don't speak for the other ET 302 families.
    The Lion Air plane crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 
2018 killing all 189 passengers. That Boeing 737 MAX 8 was only 
three months old. After an angle of attack sensor failed, the 
pilots fought with what we now know is the MCAS system for 13 
minutes before the crash. FAA didn't ground the plane. Boeing 
put out a statement saying, ``the MAX 8 is as safe as any 
airplane that has ever flown the skies.'' It was not. March 10, 
my daughter Samy was traveling on her first international trip 
for her employer, Thinkwell.
    She flew from Dulles to Ethiopia for a layover. After she 
arrived, she texted us, just landed in Addis Ababa, another two 
hours to Nairobi. She never made it. Samya boarded the MAX 
around 8:30 local time. That aircraft was only about four 
months old. Again, the angle of attack sensor failed and this 
new plane. the MCAS, again, repeatedly engaged in pushing the 
nose down to the ground. Samya experienced six minutes of 
roller coaster terror. So did the others on the plane.
    The plane plowed into an Ethiopian farm field, buried 
itself dozens of feet into the ground. When my family and I 
visited the crash site, we saw that the plane and the 
passengers had broken into small pieces, and were mixed 
together with jet fuel. The first crash should not have 
happened. The second crash is inexcusable. Between the crashes 
and December 18--December 3, 2018, we now know that FAA had 
done an internal risk assessments projecting 15 more crashes of 
the MAX in its lifetime.
    In a slideshow dated December 18, 2018, Boeing was 
reassuring FAA that pilots could handle MCAS failures. They 
could respond immediately, react immediately, fix it 
immediately. FAA, we now know, secretly asked Boeing for a 
software fix in 10 months to keep the plane going. The crash 
happened before 10 months was up. They gambled, we lost. So the 
MAX was a plane developed in the Obama era, but certified March 
2017. It was a deadly aircraft with ill-fitting engines bolted 
to a fifty-year-old fuselage. Rather than fixing the 
aerodynamic design of the aircraft, Boeing took the cheap way 
out using glitchy software that relied upon input from a single 
sensor to push the nose of the plane down to the ground in 
certain situations.
    This was a pattern at Boeing. In 2013, they minimized the 
MCAS to FAA saying it was an extension of the existing speed 
trim system. Everything I am saying here has all been found in 
reports. And those reports are linked in my testimony. In 2016, 
they drastically strengthened the MCAS and designated it as a 
safety-critical system. And that phrase means something, 
safety-critical systems.
    We now know that the chief Boeing test pilot bragged about 
Jedi mind trick in the FAA into accepting less pilot training. 
In 2017 another Boeing employee said, ``the airplane is 
designed by clowns who, in turn, were supervised by monkeys.'' 
In 2018, yet another employee wrote, ``I still haven't been 
forgiven by God for covering up what I did last year.'' Boeing 
engineers told us--have told us the families that the FAA and 
industry is allowed undue influence on safety engineers to 
creep in.
    The prior system resisted undue influence because FAA 
appointed, they removed, and they supervised Boeing engineers 
involved with certification duties. Now FAA allows Boeing to 
self-certify. Boeing engineers are cut off from FAA technical 
specialists. By reporting only to Boeing managers, profit and 
timeline pressures can overwhelm the safety culture. The prior 
system resisted undue influence. The current ODA practice 
invites undue influence.
    Last October, a committee of International Aviation 
Regulators, the Joint Authorities Technical Review Committee 
released a report critical of FAA and the MAX. The report also 
found the undue influence, found many problems with the FAA 
reducing direct involvement with critical-safety systems. That 
is what the international report found. They were too much 
reducing direct involvement with critical-safety systems. They 
determined that the FAA engineering staff overseeing Boeing 
were too few, too unqualified to do so.
    FAA has never responded to that report. EASA, the European 
agency and Transport Canada told FAA last year they will 
independently validate its findings rather than deferring as 
they have to FAA. The FAA's core vision appears to be to reduce 
this direct involvement in certification and merely push paper 
and watch PowerPoint presentations.
    The agency seems comfortable to be as one Boeing employee 
said, ``dogs watching TV.'' I expect better. So do the ET 302 
families and the flying public. My time is up. I am happy to 
spell out the legislative changes in any question/answer 
session. Thank you for allowing me.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Stumo follows:]

Prepared Statement of Michael Stumo, Father of Samya Rose Stumo, Victim 
                   of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302
    Thank you Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and the members 
of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for holding 
this hearing and allowing me to submit this written statement.
    My name is Michael Stumo and I am the father of Samya Rose Stumo 
who died on flight ET302 on March 10, 2019. Her 26th birthday will be 
in less than two weeks. I speak for my family but not for the other 
ET302 families.
    Recent legislation introduced by Senators Wicker and Cantwell 
improves upon a prior version of the bill. But it is not yet supported 
by my family or, as many have communicated to me, the other families of 
Flight ET302. My testimony includes several issues that must be 
addressed in future improvements to this legislation.
1. The JT610 Crash
    A Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018 
killing all 189 passengers. The Lion Air plane was only three months 
old. The flight JT610 pilots fought with what we now know was the MCAS 
system for 13 minutes before the crash. An angle of attack (AoA) sensor 
had previously malfunctioned and been replaced. The replacement sensor 
again malfunctioned, there was no redundancy in case of failure and 
thus the MCAS system repeatedly pushed the nose down until it 
overpowered the pilots and slammed the plane into the sea.
    After that crash, the JT610 pilot's mother, Sangeeta Suneja, raised 
the alarm about the plane and called for simulator training. But few 
paid attention to her. Many blamed the pilots. Boeing said the MAX 8 
``is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.''
    It was not. My family and I now know much more than before.
2. The ET302 Crash
    On March 10 last year, my daughter Samya was traveling on her first 
international assignment for her employer. She had recently graduated 
from the University of Copenhagen School of Public Health and landed 
her dream job at ThinkWell in January 2019 to help cause patient 
centered change in the global health field.
    Samya flew from Dulles to Addis Ababa. After she arrived, Samya 
texted us, ``Just landed in Addis Ababa--another 2 hours to Nairobi.'' 
She boarded a Boeing 737 MAX 8 at around 8:30a local Addis time. She 
sat in seat 16J, an aisle seat.
    Flight ET302 was a daily flight between the two cities, often 
carrying U.S. diplomats to and from Nairobi. The plane was only four 
months old.
    As flight ET302 took off, something went wrong with the left hand 
angle of attack (AoA) sensor. There was another AoA sensor on the co-
pilots' side. It was working properly but it was not connected to the 
MCAS system.
    The MCAS system wrongly kicked in, repeatedly pushing the nose down 
soon after takeoff. Captain Sully Sullenberger said:

        ``the failure of an AOA sensor quickly caused multiple 
        instrument indication anomalies and cockpit warnings. And 
        because in this airplane type the AOA sensors provide 
        information to airspeed and altitude displays, the failure 
        triggered false warnings simultaneously of speed being too low 
        and also of speed being too fast. The too slow warning was a 
        `stick-shaker' rapidly and loudly shaking the pilot's control 
        wheel. The too fast warning was a `clacker', another loud 
        repetitive noise signaling overspeed. These sudden loud false 
        warnings would have created major distractions and would have 
        made it even harder to quickly analyze the situation and take 
        effective corrective action.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Attachment 3: Testimony of Sully Sullenberger, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, June 
19, 2019 (attached)

    For several minutes, the captain used brute physical force to pull 
the control yoke back up. He became exhausted and asked for the first 
officer's help. During the six minute flight, my daughter was terrified 
riding this roller coaster. At 8:43 am local time, the plane plowed 
into the ground, in an Ethiopian farm field, and buried itself dozens 
of feet below the surface.
    The plane and the passengers disintegrated into pieces. Their parts 
were mixed up with the jet fuel. I was there. My family and I were at 
the crash site. We saw the wreckage. My wife and son saw body parts 
exposed to the elements.
3. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 Development and Concealment
    The MAX is an Obama era plane that was certified to fly in March 
2017, the third month of the Trump administration.
    It is a deadly aircraft with ill-fitting engines bolted onto a 50 
year old aircraft design. Rather than physically fixing the aerodynamic 
design of the aircraft, Boeing took the cheap route. It used glitchy 
software that relied upon input from a single sensor to push the nose 
of the plane towards the ground in certain conditions.
    Even today, the FAA still has not resolved the issue of whether 
MCAS exists to make the MAX handle like prior planes or to resolve 
aerodynamic instability. Until FAA can answer that question, the MAX 
should not fly again. It may be that the aircraft is so flawed that 
physical changes, rather than software fixes, are required.
    Boeing hid MCAS for many years. In June 2013 the company first 
devised a plan to conceal MCAS from the public and to minimize its 
existence for the FAA. It was described as merely ``an addition to [the 
existing] speed trim [system]''.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``The Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft: Costs, Consequences, and Lessons 
from its Design, Development and Certification,'' The House Committee 
on Transportation & Infrastructure, p7, March 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016, Boeing drastically strengthened MCAS' ability to push the 
MAX's nose down. It never informed the FAA or anyone else of this 
change. Neither Boeing nor FAA performed a safety assessment which was 
necessary for critical safety systems. In May 2019, then-Acting FAA 
Administrator Dan Elwell admitted that Boeing and the FAA failed to 
designate MCAS as a safety critical system.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The MCAS violated Boeing's internal requirements requiring that the 
systems should ``not interfere with dive recovery'' and ``not have any 
objectionable interaction with the piloting of the airplane.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The effort to hide MCAS continued throughout 2016 as the FAA 
allowed Boeing to remove references to MCAS from Boeing's Flight Crew 
Operations Manual.\5\ The company wanted to avoid simulator training. 
In November 2016, Boeing chief technical pilot Mark Forkner wrote to a 
colleague that he was ``jedi-mind tricking regulators into accepting'' 
lesser pilot training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One Boeing employee rejoiced when the FAA said there should only be 
computer-based training, without a simulator. ``You can be away from an 
NG for 30 years and still be able to jump into a MAX? LOVE IT!! . . . 
This is a big part of the operating cost structure in our marketing 
decks.''
    In 2017, a Boeing employee wrote, about the MAX, ``This airplane is 
designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys.'' In 2018, 
another employee wrote ``I still haven't been forgiven by God for the 
covering up I did last year.''
    The FAA's years long drive to delegate everything and relegate 
staff to paper pushers and presentation watchers resulted in Boeing 
employees mocking them as ``dogs watching TV.'' The FAA remains happy 
to be sidelined, rather than have direct involvement in certification.
4. Between the Crashes: What were they doing?
    After the Lion Air crash, FAA knew that MCAS was a problem, but 
failed to ground the plane. They blamed the pilots for not winning the 
fight with the then-secret MCAS system.
    One can argue whether the FAA and Boeing should have known about 
the aerodynamics issues, the AoA sensor and MCAS's catastrophic risks 
before JT610. But after JT610, there is no excuse.
    On December 3, 2018, the FAA's internal risk assessment projected 
that there would be at least 15 more MAX crashes without a fix.\6\ The 
agency did not require Boeing to fix the problem but instead issued an 
Airworthiness Directive that still did not disclose the MCAS. Rather it 
re-iterated the procedure for handling runaway trim, which Captain 
Sullenberger said was very different. American Airlines pilots, in a 
meeting with Boeing, complained that the company hid MCAS from them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Attachment 4: Boeing slides prepared for FAA, December 18, 
2020, obtained and publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But secretly the FAA asked Boeing for a software fix within 10 
months. My daughter died in the ET302 crash before the 10 months were 
up. They gambled with her life, and we lost. As did 156 others on the 
plane.
    Even in December 2018, Boeing was falsely reassuring the FAA that 
pilots could handle MCAS failures. In a slide deck obtained by the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Boeing told FAA 
that:

   repeated MCAS activation were readily recognizable and able 
        to be counteracted;

   the action to counter the failure should not require 
        exceptional piloting skill or strength;

   the pilot will take immediate action to counter; and

   trained flight crew memory procedures shall be followed.

        (See attached Boeing slide deck from December 18, 2018, page 
        11).

    There was no evidence that pilots could react immediately. In fact, 
Boeing own analysis revealed that if pilots took more than 10 seconds 
to react, the result would be catastrophic.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ The Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft, supra at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. FAA Resistance and Denial Continues
    To this day, the FAA has not admitted any mistakes. Instead, it 
strategically shifts the focus to its US-centric history of no recent 
crashes despite the international reach of America's aviation system. 
My family hoped that new Administrator Steve Dickson would show 
leadership and clean up the agency. But he has not. No new management 
team has been chosen. Nobody who made mistakes has been disciplined. 
Transparency is proclaimed in words but not by deeds.
    Administrator Dickson, Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell and others 
promised that families would receive answers to our questions and be 
informed of the agency's actions as it determines whether and when to 
unground the MAX. We received no documents when we asked for them.
    We were then told to submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request. We did so on October 28 2019. But the FAA has still refused to 
provide us with any documents in response to that request.
    A passenger advocacy group, Flyers Rights, requested information, 
pursuant to FOIA, about the data and analysis surrounding whether and 
when to return the MAX to service. FAA refused to provide the 
information. Flyers Rights went to court seeking an order requiring the 
FAA to provide the information. The FAA has used every legal tool in 
its arsenal to prevent disclosure of the documents requested.
    On August 1, 2019, my wife Nadia and son Tor met with FAA Safety 
Director Ali Bahrami who previously worked for an aviation industry 
lobby group. He was a substantial part of the FAA's ``blame the pilots 
and leave Boeing alone'' approach. Bahrami never admitted to my family 
that the FAA made a mistake by not classifying the MCAS as a critical 
safety system. When my son asked if there was anything he would do 
differently, he said ``no, they did everything right.''
    Having been denied information and assistance from the FAA, we 
searched for answers on our own. We learned from Boeing engineers that 
the change from Designated Engineering Representative (DER) to 
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) was a clever and opaque 
bureaucratic alphabet soup method to hamstring the safety culture at 
Boeing.
    Under DER, the FAA appointed, supervised and removed the Boeing 
engineers that were designated with certification authority. Boeing 
paid the engineers, but the DER reported both to FAA and Boeing. That 
dual chain of command prevented the profit and timeline pressures of 
Boeing managers from overruling safety concerns.
    That safety culture changed when FAA changed to ODA and Boeing was 
designated as an organization with certification authority. The Boeing 
engineers, now called ARs, were isolated from their FAA counterparts, 
reporting only to Boeing managers. Boeing engineers with safety 
concerns could be shut down and reassigned if company profit or 
timeline goals were threatened.
    While it is easy to lose the thread among the acronyms, this 
organizational culture and chain of command dynamic must be grasped and 
fixed. Boeing engineers told me that the DER system resisted undue 
influence while the ODA system invited undue influence.
    The Joint Authority Technical Review, composed of international 
aviation agency experts, found that ``there are signs of undue pressure 
on [Boeing engineers] performing delegated functions''.\8\ Congress 
needs to re-establish the direct communication between FAA and Boeing 
engineers at the ground level. FAA also needs to be able to appoint, 
supervise and remove those Boeing engineers so they cannot be subject 
to undue influence from Boeing managers to compromise safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), ``Boeing 737 MAX 
Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations,'' 
pg 28, October 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Joint Authorities Technical Review report also found dozens of 
faults with FAA's certification process. It found, for example, that 
the FAA's Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO) office is 
simply not equipped with the quantity and quality of personnel that can 
oversee Boeing. FAA has not responded to that report.
    The FAA will continue delegating to Boeing unless Congress stops it 
from doing so.
    In March 2017, the FAA released a report called ``A Blueprint for 
AIR Transformation''. Dorenda Baker, Executive Director of the Aircraft 
Certification Service, signed the document.
    The AIR Transformation report is a blizzard of management 
consulting words conveying aspirations towards communications with 
stakeholders, innovation and strategic vision. But the core of that 
report was intended to continue getting FAA out of the business of 
direct involvement in critical paths of the certification process. 
Three unions--PASS, NATCA and AFSCME--wrote a dissenting report showing 
how the FAA's paper-pushing, management consulting approach compromises 
the safety of aircraft passengers.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``Aircraft Certification `Transformation' Pre-Decisional 
Involvement Report, Union Recommendations and Dissenting Opinion, 
February 6, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FAA's core vision is apparently to push paper and watch power 
point presentations compiled by Boeing. The public expects FAA to 
engage in direct involvement, acting as the check on an aircraft 
manufacturer's urge to cut corners to save a buck.
    The FAA currently shows no intention of freeing itself from capture 
and directly engaging in certification functions rather than merely 
pushing paper. A recent Special Committee report of hand-picked 
industry insiders issued a January 16, 2020 document that copied and 
pasted past FAA talking points about delegation and its long and safe 
history.\10\ Unsurprisingly, FAA agreed saying that ``the delegation 
system allows U.S. industry and innovation to thrive''.\11\ Nobody--
except FAA and its handpicked insider committee--believes that this 
version of delegation is fine. Congress must be very specific in 
demanding more direct involvement by FAA in the certification process 
because FAA will not otherwise do it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``Official Report of the Special Committee to review the 
Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Certification Process,'' 
Chaired by Lee Moak and Darren W. McDew, January 16, 2020.
    \11\ ``Response to Official Report of the Special Committee on the 
Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Certification Process,'' 
Federal Aviation Administration, April 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The October 2019 JATR report, appointed by FAA, found dozens of 
problems with FAA's delegation process and the certification of the 
MAX. FAA has not responded to the JATR report, apparently choosing only 
to respond to more friendly reports.
    I have also been told by inside whistleblowers that Boeing did not 
engage in safety assessments of critical systems beyond MCAS in the 
MAX. Safety assessment is an analysis of the identified hazards for a 
system and demonstrates compliance with airworthiness regulations. 
Congress should require FAA to disclose the safety assessments for all 
critical systems in the MAX before it is allowed to fly again.
6. Legislation needed
    ET302 victims families were very disappointed at the lack of 
substance in the first draft of legislation filed in the Senate this 
month. The second draft filed recently is improved in that it obligates 
FAA to appoint, remove and communicate with Boeing engineers performing 
certification work. It also protects whistleblowers throughout the 
supply chain.
    While the recent legislation filed by the Chairman and Ranking 
Member improves on a prior version of the bill, this second draft is 
not yet supported by my family. We believe that other ET302 families 
also oppose it without many more improvements. The legislation must 
also include:

        1. Rebalance of delegation. It is absolutely critical that 
        excessive delegation is fixed. FAA must not be allowed to slump 
        further into paper-pusher status, distant from Boeing 
        engineering and the plant production floor.

        FAA must retain direct involvement in critical safety systems--
        as well as novel and new systems--and not delegate its 
        functions to Boeing. Critical safety systems are those deemed 
        major, hazardous or catastrophic. FAA must verify that the 
        fault tree analysis and other analysis are performed to 
        guarantee redundancies and fail safes to prevent failure. New 
        and novel systems are, like MCAS, those not included on 
        aircraft and not fully tested in the past.

        2. Lifetime limit for type certificates. The Boeing board, 
        including current CEO David Calhoun, rejected the option to 
        develop a new aircraft to compete with Airbus, opting to amend 
        the old 737 model. They did so to cut corners, save money, 
        extract profit from legacy product, and avoid many current FAA 
        safety rules. The original 737 was certified in 1967. Fifty 
        three years later, it is clear that it should no longer have 
        modern engines and software bolted on to its old fuselage. 
        Boeing should have chosen innovation rather than profitable but 
        unsafe stagnation. A lifetime limit on type certificates should 
        be mandated, and no more future aircraft designs should be 
        based on the 737.

        3. FAA certification should not equal immunity for Boeing. 
        Boeing management may bow their heads and express sorrow for 
        the crash. But in private they are doing everything possible to 
        prevent families from holding Boeing accountable. Boeing is 
        asserting, in court, that the fact of FAA certification pre-
        empts families from making claims for the loss of our loved 
        ones. Boeing's conduct should not be awarded with immunity. 
        This bill should make clear that FAA certification is the bare 
        minimum that manufacturers like Boeing should meet. While I 
        hope no family has to experience the loss of a loved one in a 
        plane crash, legislation should preserve the right to hold all 
        responsible parties accountable.

        4. End the secrecy. The National Transportation Safety Board 
        (NTSB) and the FAA have invoked every possible law to prevent 
        families, Congress and the public from receiving information 
        about the causes of the crash and the future ungrounding 
        analysis. The NTSB has prevented the release of many documents 
        held by Boeing. The FAA has refused to comply with families 
        FOIA requests citing expansive caselaw protecting company 
        claims of confidentiality despite the public safety concerns. 
        The result is zero production of documents to the public. This 
        Committee should substantially narrow the scope of legal 
        provisions that hide documents, data and analysis relating to a 
        crash from the public.

        5. Penalties must apply or new law does not matter: Boeing has 
        paid civil penalties in the past, but that has not stopped the 
        company from misleading the FAA, pilots and the public. The 
        company pays the penalty from general funds and goes about 
        generating more profit. Criminal penalties with the threat of 
        jail time have the needed deterrent effect for individuals who 
        must then invoke their personal morality rather than company 
        goals.

        6. Implement the JATR recommendations. The FAA refused to 
        respond to the Joint Authorities Technical Review report which 
        it commissioned. The international participants in the report 
        were not cozy industry insiders and therefore produced a solid 
        set of findings and recommendations. FAA can congratulate 
        itself for safety. But the public does not trust it and foreign 
        aviation agencies are not deferring to it any longer. This 
        committee's bill should require the FAA to implement the 
        recommendations in the JATR report.

    Thank you.
Attachments
    The attachments referenced below can be found on the govinfo.gov 
website.
1.  FOIA letter, Michael Stumo and Nadia Milleron to FAA, October 28, 
        2019 (pg 10).

2.  Joint Authorities Technical Review report, October 11, 2019 (pp 11-
        81).

3.  Testimony of Sully Sullenberger, U.S. House of Representatives, 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, June 19, 2019 
        (pp 82-86).

4.  Boeing slides prepared for FAA, December 18, 2019, obtained and 
        publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
        on Transportation and Infrastructure (pp 89-131).

5.  FAA Quantitative Risk Assessment, December 3, 2018, obtained and 
        publicly disclosed by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
        on Transportation and Infrastructure (pg 132).

6.  Letter from Mattieu Willm, a French aeronautical engineer who lost 
        his sister, Clemence-Isaure Boutan-Willm in the ET302 crash, 
        dated June 15, 2020 (pp 133-135).

    The Chairman. There just aren't any words we can say. In my 
opening statement, I mentioned several frustrations I had with 
information requests. Your written testimony discusses this 
also, so can you describe the current status of your requests?
    Mr. Stumo. Our request for further improvement, and we 
appreciate the movement that has been made so far in the 
legislation. Our requests are to further rebalance delegation 
on a substantive level. We appreciate that the FAA under your 
bill would appoint, remove, and have direct communication with 
the Boeing engineers responsible for certification, but 
rebalancing delegation--again, with this whole thing with the 
JATR report found that the agency wants to reduce direct 
involvement certification, just push paper.
    Instead the Congress must require that FAA do its job with 
safety-critical systems. That they retain and not delegate 
authority over safety critical systems. That means not only 
those determined hazardous and catastrophic if they fail but 
also major. Because we see that Boeing tried to fit the MCAS 
into the major category, which isn't quite as bad as the 
hazardous or catastrophic, so that it could minimize 
involvement--minimize many things and push profits.
    So safety-critical systems is something the FAA should 
retain. We should have an FAA red team to look over what the 
blue team, so to speak, of the manufacturing engineers are 
doing. Number two is a lifetime limit for type certificates 
that the MAX was certified the year I was born, 1967. I am 53 
and that family is 53. They are trying to cram new engines on 
an old fuselage, putting new software on old computers that 
don't talk to each other, and at some point you got to innovate 
and make a new plane. And that is before 50 years, maybe 25 
years, but at some point you make a new plane and you don't--
you make a 21st century aircraft.
    And from Boeing's perspective, it is so the Brazilians and 
Chinese don't catch up to them like the Japanese did to Ford 
and GM in the 70s. Next, FAA certification as we have seen is 
flawed. It is not very good in many cases and it should not 
equal immunity. Boeing apologizes and says they are going to--
they are very sorry. We are going to do better but in court 
they put claims that say we don't have to pay anything because 
the FAA certified and that makes us immune. And that is wrong.
    And the FAA in other cases has supported that position and 
I don't like it and that should change. And that is, 
legislation should make that clear. Last, FAA and NTSB secrecy 
must end. Any excuse they can have to not--you know, you hear 
the words, but we know words and actions are different.
    Any excuse to not respond, whether it is you know, we are 
too busy or when they do, that is confidential and proprietary 
information and you have seen it. When Boeing or these, when 
they send documents in and they get out the rubber stamp and 
everything says confidential and privileged, even if it is the 
dinner menu. And then they all say export control.
    And then for NTSB, which is blocking disclosure of 
documents that happened between the crashes, they see NX13 
covers the dinner menu of ICAO. And so at some point this--they 
are just going to use those privileged and confidential excuses 
as broadly as they can and there is no penalty for abusing it. 
And so Congress has to step in and rebalance the public 
interest. So those are what I would say. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you for your testimony. And I am 
sure you had no intention of becoming an expert in this subject 
matter, but we appreciate your insights. Senator Cantwell.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Stumo, 
thank you for being here and your wife as well. And again, my 
condolences to you and all the families who have been impacted 
by this. And again, my thanks for your continued oversight and 
communication on these issues because as I said, I have seen 
with the Colgan Air families that they have made an impact on 
what we have been able to do on safety.
    And so I am sure that you will have the same impact, but 
nonetheless a very painful experience to continue to focus on 
these issues. But I thank you. I wanted to go over a couple of 
things about your testimony to ask further details on. I agree 
we need the FAA to remain in the driver's seat when it comes to 
the certification process and that is what that legislation 
does, as you say, making sure that they have oversight over the 
employees and the process on a supervisory role and owning the 
system.
    That is what Chairman Wicker and I have also agreed to in 
the legislation. I was a little--I am not little. I was very 
surprised to hear that the FAA Administrator not fully support 
that concept today. Do you have any comments on that?
    Mr. Stumo. We have seen a consistent set of reports from 
FAA, including a 20--I think it was a 2017 air transformation 
report that is full of, and I refer to it in my written 
testimony, that is full of management consulting baloney about 
goals and aspirations. But what it boils down to is a dedicated 
internal, it appears from the outside, a dedicated internal 
process that they are going to withdraw from, you know, the 
direct involvement in certification.
    And apparently that includes appointing, removing, and 
communicating with the Boeing engineers doing a public service 
with its certification duties. So it seems to be deeply 
embedded and I was surprised too to see how resistant that the 
Administrator was to the mere fact that, hey, why don't you 
just you know, take a look at these folks. They are not 
appointing the janitor they approved. You can remove if they 
screw up because we all know people screw up and you make an 
appointment and you wish you hadn't.
    And you have supervision that is going on in between 
because that is what we have heard from Boeing engineers that 
have been around in the DER system and the ODA system, that if 
when you have Boeing appointments and they are siloed only on 
the Boeing side, the safety culture can get totally overwhelmed 
by the profit and timeline pressures which always exist, but 
you have got no one else. You are a Boeing engineer, you have 
got to respond to the Boeing manager and you don't have the FAA 
side because you don't even know who they are.
    And the BASO office, the Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight 
Office, has 27 engineers that are supposedly overseeing 1,500 
Boeing engineers and all they can do is look at reams of paper 
that get delivered and put rubber stamps to them. So there is 
something--you know, delegation has been around a long time, 
but we got to rebalance it in the way that your bill has stated 
and so I was indeed surprised.
    Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you for that. I also--you 
know, I agree with you and thank you for keeping, bringing up 
those numbers as it relates to the oversight office itself. 
Clearly our bill creates a new office and oversight of saying 
exactly the right level of expertise and technology oversight 
that is required. And so hopefully that will be fixed. It is 
very frustrating to hear the Administrator today not embrace 
these things as fully because it is very hard for us.
    You know, I mean we can pass a law but I mean--and we are 
going to stay on top of the FAA. I can guarantee you that. So 
we are going to get the right workforce there. I wanted to ask 
you, you mentioned this red team, blue team thing, which I 
think is comes up in a couple of different ways. You know, this 
idea of holistic approach. Do you think--I am interested 
because of what you said about the NTSB.
    Do you think that the NTSB and NASA could play a bigger 
role in the upfront part of the certification process when the 
type certificate is being considered and these ideas or new 
technology is being considered? Do you think outside groups 
like that of experts at the front end of the process can better 
identify risks?
    Mr. Stumo. I think it is very possible. I am going to draw 
a little bit on what Javier de Luis who lost his sister in the 
ET 302 crash said. Javier is an MIT aerospace engineer. He 
submitted testimony today and he has also said, you need to 
have that--getting a new aircraft designed and developed and 
certified is a major national event. And it takes--it is 
something that is, you know, and he is really all hands on deck 
and he did indeed support the fact of having a multi-agency 
involvement at the beginning.
    And you know, in this case we have a global duopoly of 
Boeing and Airbus. In our case we have Boeing but you know, it 
is a public-private partnership but along the lines I 
understand that Javier had also supported that given his deep 
knowledge at MIT in aerospace engineering. So I would tend to 
defer to and agree.
    Senator Cantwell. Right. I see my time has expired, Mr. 
Chairman. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Tell us again, sir, the name of the author of 
that paper Javier----
    Mr. Stumo. Javier de Luis.
    The Chairman. Alright. And do you have that--do you have 
his paper with you today?
    Mr. Stumo. I know he did submit. I can provide it to the 
Committee and I think it was submitted to staff.
    The Chairman. So we already have it. So, without objection, 
it will be placed in the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                  737 Max Safety and Return to Flight

                          Javier de Luis, PhD

    From the onset, the 737 Max has been constrained by design 
decisions that were made, in some cases, over 50 years ago. As has 
become well-known, the low ground clearance of the jet caused the 
placement of the new fuel-efficient, but larger, engines to be moved up 
ahead of the wing. This creates a lift force on the engine nacelles 
during takeoff, pitching the nose of the jet up, which can lead to the 
airplane stalling. To remedy this, Boeing designed the MCAS software 
system, which actuates the horizontal stabilizer in response to a high 
angle of attack reading from an external sensor, pitching the nose down 
and countering the additional lift.
    In attempting to incorporate these new larger engines into a legacy 
design, Boeing was attempting to reap the benefits of new technology 
(e.g., fuel efficiency), while simultaneously not paying any price for 
updating the rest of the airplane system. It wanted to keep as much of 
the ``old'' design as possible, saving significant development and 
certification costs. But the new engines didn't fit under the wings, so 
they moved them, creating an additional problem. They then tried to 
solve this additional problem by once again trying to reap the benefits 
of using a (cheaper) software solution, without again paying the price 
of updating the rest of the airplane system. So instead of running the 
MCAS software on a computer system designed to modern aerospace safety 
standards, it decided to run it on the same computer architecture that 
has been present in the 737's since 1996, consisting of two computer 
systems, but only one operating during any single flight. So instead of 
redundant computers and sensors, with fault tolerance, data validation, 
voting, etc., the 737 Max ran the MCAS software on a single computer, 
receiving readings from a single angle of attack sensor.
    Boeing keeps attempting to fit a round peg into a square hole. 
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with wanting to upgrade an 
airframe (the square hole) to use new engines (the round peg). However, 
when they realized they did not fit, the answer they choose was to try 
to fit another round peg (the MCAS software) into the square hole of a 
1996-vintage computer architecture.
    This pattern appears to be continuing. From reports in the media, 
Boeing will now modify the 737 Max to use both computers and both sets 
of sensors simultaneously. While that may produce a slightly safer 
systems, at a basic level having two measurements means that if they 
ever do not agree, the pilot will have no way of knowing which one is 
right. Hardly a good solution.
    It has also been reported that if the two sensors do not agree, the 
computers will be instructed to shut down MCAS. While this would have 
likely prevented the two recent crashes, it poses another question: 
what is the impact if MCAS shuts down? Presumably, MCAS is there for a 
reason. Boeing has never released any data to show conclusively whether 
MCAS is there to prevent a stall condition from developing, or simply 
to smooth out the handling of the aircraft during certain maneuvers. If 
it's the former, shutting down MCAS could be catastrophic. If it's the 
latter, pilots would need to be trained in order to become proficient 
flying an aircraft with new handling characteristics that are present 
when MCAS is shut down. And if that is the case, then why have MCAS 
present at all?
    There have been recent reports that European regulators will insist 
that Boeing eventually incorporate a ``synthetic airspeed'' measurement 
into the MCAS logic. Depending on how this is done, it may introduce a 
second semi-independent measurement (in addition to the angle of attack 
sensors) that can be used by the computers to decide to activate MCAS. 
This is a step in the right direction, but without increasing the 
redundancy across the entire system, it is a small step and will still 
not make the 737 Max as safe as other modern aircraft. And even so, 
reports indicate that this modification will not need to be 
incorporated prior the return to flight. This is unacceptable. Boeing 
has had over a year to design a solution which addresses the 
shortcomings of this airplane. It has not done so because it continues 
to try to cut corners and do what it perceives as being quickest and 
cheapest, with safety as a secondary concern.
    If Boeing wants to use 21st century technology to address technical 
issues, then we need to insist that it be held to 21st century 
standards of safety and reliability. It cannot have it both ways.

    The Chairman. There are no other members--Senator Markey, 
we are told. Yes? Yes, you are recognized, sir.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Markey, do you have a copy of that 
document that you referred to, that was not predictive but 
mentioned the 15 aircraft accidents that might occur?
    Senator Markey. I think my staff has access to it and we 
will get it to you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. OK. Well, let's put that in the record, 
without objection.
    Mr. Stumo. Mr. Chairman if I could help on that, it is when 
I submitted my written testimony.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Mr. Stumo. It was included in that as well if my exhibits 
were included.
    The Chairman. All right, so thank you and Mr. Markey, you 
are recognized.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I 
want to thank Michael Stumo and to your spouse Nadia for being 
here today and for your tireless work to put a spotlight on 
this inexcusable tragedy and the need to reform our broken 
aviation certification system. And again, I offer my 
condolences to you for the loss of your brilliant, accomplished 
daughter. It was an unfortunate, unfortunate tragedy here that 
has taken her from you.
    But I admire so much what you and your wife have done to 
make sure that you focus on this issue to guarantee that there 
is accountability. And that the FAA and Boeing be made 
accountable. So I thank you so much because never again should 
we see--have to suffer what you suffered. And I am happy that 
Administrator Dickson just affirmed Boeing's legal 
responsibility for the defective 737 MAX.
    Now, we need to guarantee the following cannot block your 
family's legal claims in court. So, Mr. Stumo, can you speak 
further to Boeing's unacceptable attempts to evade 
accountability and how can Congress help you all hold this 
company responsible for its wrongdoing?
    Mr. Stumo. Well, I want to say it is not just us, there is 
156 others that died in that crash and a lot of other families 
have been very active in their home countries, in Canada, in 
Europe, the French, German, and Norwegian, Swedes, in Africa, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda. Many families have their own 
individual hurts that they are trying to recover from.
    So I am a bit uncomfortable just having the focus on me, 
but we are in the U.S. and under COVID we are in Washington but 
there is others that are doing a lot. But you see on from our 
perspective we see a dichotomy between public actions and words 
and private behavior, where you have Boeing repeatedly tell the 
camera that they are very sorry, Muilenburg, Calhoun, the new 
CEO who was around during this whole era of certification of 
the MAX and made the decision against--was on the Board of 
Directors when they made the decision against developing a new 
plane and extracting more value out of the aged 737 family.
    But they apologize in public. Say we are sorry. We are 
going to look into it. We are going to be making some changes 
and you know, we are working diligently to, you know, 
compensate and to make everything right. And then you look in 
the documents and they have, you know, they say, no we don't 
have to pay anything because the FAA certified it and that 
means the family doesn't have their own claims. It is just not 
right and they know it. That is why they didn't say it in 
public, they only said it in private.
    Senator Markey. So, what from your perspective, again, 
should everyone who is watching this hearing know about the 
families and the accountability you want from Boeing on this 
issue?
    Mr. Stumo. Boeing has a responsibility to produce safe 
planes. They are a great company with a great history that has 
lost its way with chasing profit and value engineering and 
getting rid of engineers and getting rid of talent over the 
time to extract profit and delivering it to shareholders, stock 
buybacks, and executives.
    We need to have, you know, as a national championed company 
for the U.S., they have got duties to America. They have got 
duties to passengers. They have got duties to us and they could 
have made a great 21st century plane. They didn't. The FAA has 
to do its job and not be a paper pushing agency, not be dogs 
watching TV.
    I am concerned that the SMS safety management system that 
sounds like a decent idea is not directly on point, that will 
fix the fact that the FAA is not directly involved in 
certification. That it is more paper to push. And when you have 
a company that is dedicated to misleading and hiding things, 
that they will mislead it and hide it in the paperwork when you 
are not onsite. So that is what I think.
    Senator Markey. So when you talk to the Boeing officials, 
if you have talked to them or your lawyers have talked to them, 
how would you characterize their response back to you?
    Mr. Stumo. Well, we don't talk to them much because we are 
all represented. But I just--I saw, you know, a lot of times 
Boeing would apologize to cameras about what happened but 
various--but only once when shamed in doing it did Muilenburg 
actually turn to the families and say he was sorry. And Calhoun 
has not talked to us but they haven't apologized to families, 
they have only apologized to cameras. But we haven't talked to 
many Boeing executives.
    Senator Markey. So what does that tell you that they are 
unwilling to actually apologize to the families?
    Mr. Stumo. It is always a concern that it is just a PR 
management issue.
    Senator Markey. Meaning?
    Mr. Stumo. It is not real.
    Senator Markey. It is not real. They speak to cameras, but 
not to families. Meaning they just need some public statement 
that kind of satisfies the minimum requirement that they say 
that they are sorry, but they don't want to actually have to 
meet with the families themselves in order to have that kind 
of--an accountability?
    Mr. Stumo. Yes. You know, Ethiopian Airlines CEO sent all 
the families a letter of sorrow and an apology early on. 
Ethiopian Airlines has done a lot of other things wrong. Boeing 
didn't do what they could have. When I need to apologize to my 
wife, I don't do it to a camera and I don't do to somebody 
else. I do to her and that is how you do it in human society.
    Senator Markey. Yes, so, you know absolutely they are--they 
have been irresponsible and they are clearly engaged in a 
systematic cover-up and our job will be to help you to make 
sure that every single piece of information is made available 
publicly so that we guarantee that this spotlight is so bright 
that we will not ever have to see a hearing like this have to 
be conducted. But not until we have collected all of that 
information.
    Not until Boeing is made accountable in court will we in 
fact know that we have done our job for you and for all of the 
families, Mr. Stumo, and we thank you for being here today in 
order to make sure that the voices of the families are heard. 
Thank you so much for your willingness to do this.
    Mr. Stumo. Thank you.
    Senator Cantwell [presiding]. Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. 
Thank you for being here today and on so many other occasions 
lending your voice and face to this reform effort not just in 
memory of your daughter, but to save other lives. And to you 
and all of the families that have lost loved ones, this 
committee has an obligation not only to express condolences but 
to put our action where our mouth is and really adopt reforms 
that, in fact, will prevent these kinds of tragedies in the 
future.
    You were here to hear Administrator Dickson, and I am just 
going to go through your testimony. On the rebalance of 
delegation, you may have heard my question about the FAA taking 
back the delegation at the very least of involvement in 
critical safety systems. Were you satisfied with the answer 
that he gave?
    Mr. Stumo. No. No, there seemed to be an unwillingness to 
do so and it seems wrong. I mean we have got to have the red 
team involved with systems that are deemed major, hazardous, or 
catastrophic if they go bad. We can't just rely on the internal 
checks and balances of a manufacturer depending upon the 
vagaries of what CEO is in charge or what Boeing manager is in 
charge or who is on duty at the time.
    Senator Blumenthal. On the issue of lifetime limits for 
type certificates, I think you may have said to me at one point 
during our private conversations that right now in effect they 
can bolt a new system onto an old fuselage and just slide it 
through for certification. Were you satisfied with the answer 
that he gave me when I asked about limits on the lifetime of 
certificates?
    Mr. Stumo. No, there needs to be a lifetime--they need to 
figure out a lifetime limit and it is more than the MCAS in 
this system. There is a lot involved because they didn't have a 
flight crew alert system that like those that were required in 
aircraft since 1982, the kind of flight crew alert system, 
which has red, blue, or red, yellow, and green lights all in 
one place that you can prioritize things that may or may not be 
going wrong. In this case because the MAX was an amended type 
certificate, one of many in this old fuselage, they had this 
whole cacophony of stick shakers and pull up and pull up and 
going too fast and going too slow.
    Sully Sullenberger described it very adeptly in his 
testimony before the House where he had a hard time pulling out 
of this thing and they are trying to describe it as just, you 
know, run away trim. So the reason they have those rules from 
1982, which was when this MAX was 25 years old and now 28 years 
later they don't have it, is because they grandfathered in old 
tech when they have, you know--when new safety regulations come 
into effect, these new aircraft, it is a method of skirting it 
apparently.
    Single string rudder controls, you know, various parts of 
the plane get grandfathered in but 28 years ago you had to have 
a flight crew alert system. Maybe that would have made the 
difference in alerting this crew what to pay attention to 
instead of shocking them with all kinds of conflicting alerts.
    Senator Blumenthal. And I think on the other issues that I 
asked him that are in your testimony on FAA certification in 
effect equaling immunity for Boeing, the culture of secrecy 
that we see, I think you would agree that his answers were 
totally unsatisfactory.
    Mr. Stumo. Well, the answer has always been on secrecy. The 
transparent--we will be very ,very transparent. We have heard 
it as family since the beginning and we haven't even gotten one 
document.
    Senator Blumenthal. And neither have we. No meaningful 
documents, at least in response to my questions. So I can 
pledge to you and I think others in the Committee will join me 
in this view that the bills now pending can be greatly 
strengthened and improved. I have offered one. The Ranking 
Member and Chairman have offered another. I think theirs is 
very commendable in the progress that it reflects.
    I am going to be offering amendments to mine and theirs in 
the mark-up, I hope there will be one, that would in effect 
require a take-back in delegation on those critical safety 
systems, require more transparency, require an end to 
preemption so that families have their day in court so that the 
courthouse doors are open to them in spite of FAA 
certification, require that other even stronger reforms be 
adopted.
    I think your testimony and your work on highlighting how 
the FAA has become a captive of the industry, how it has become 
in effect, as you say, a dog watching TV, how it has enabled 
the industry to put profits ahead of safety. All those points 
that you have made and all the work that you have done, I hope 
will have an impact on this committee. And I think what is 
needed is really radical far-reaching reform. The public 
demands it and the industry has reached a crossroads, a real 
turning point and it has choices to make.
    But I think Congress can no longer leave those choices 
exclusively to the industry. I think that voluntary compliance, 
delegated certification are going to be a thing of the past. 
And I want to thank you for your being a whistleblower and a 
watchdog, which is what we need. We need in effect in this 
system an institutional watchdog, not a lap dog. So thank you 
very much to you and your family for all the work that you have 
done. Thank you.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Stumo, 
I want to follow up on a couple of things just quickly. I do 
have to run and vote in a minute, so if you see me dash out, it 
is because I think there will probably be holding it just until 
I get there.
    And so I did want to ask, we also introduced a bill with 
Senator Moran today about the standards that we would like to 
see on an international basis and you mentioned Captain 
Sullenberger a couple of times so I wondered if you had given 
any thought to this larger issue of how do we make sure that 
the pilot--definitely need the FAA system improved but also 
want pilot standards to be there and if you had given any 
thoughts about that.
    Mr. Stumo. Yes, sure. You know aviation--the U.S. Aviation 
system is inherently global. The Boeing planes are sold 
everywhere, you know, families are riding everywhere and you 
know it used to be FAA rules were a gold standard. But 
certainly how do you, you know, how do you have, to the extent 
we improve here, how do you know rightly have an 
extraterritorial reach to what we do? I mean certainly the 
human factors approach and I would like to be--on the human 
factors, it is all about not excessive reliance on the human, 
which is fallible to be the last, you know, last chance before 
as one said, a smoking hole because you need the machine to be 
hardened and have redundancy in hardening.
    So you are not, you know, I am going to make five mistakes 
before I go to bed tonight. And pilots make mistakes too. They 
have bad days. You can't rely on that. So you got to have the 
machine right too but I guess I am in favor of doing as best we 
can to have an international reach for the bill, the Flight 
Aviation safety systems in Ethiopia and Kenya. And I think our 
Kenyan and Ethiopian families would agree. It is not that great 
and so that generally I would be supportive.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got to run.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, and thank you 
all. If there are no other questions, then we will move to 
close the hearing. The hearing record will remain open for two 
weeks. During this time Senators are asked to submit any 
questions for the record. Upon receipt, each witness is 
requested to submit written answers to the Committee as soon as 
possible.
    So thanks to both of our witnesses and thanks particularly 
to you, Mr. Stumo. We very much appreciate your insights and 
there is just no way to express our condolences adequately. 
With that, this hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

Curtis Ewbank
Renton, WA

June 5, 2020

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

Dear Senate Commerce Committee,

    I am writing in advance of the June 17th hearing with FAA 
administrator Steve Dickson to express my concerns regarding the 737 
MAX, the FAA's handling of the process, and other important information 
related to aviation safety. I do this as a private pilot, and a flight 
deck engineer with experience at Boeing during the development of the 
737 MAX who has shared these concerns with the company, the FBI (at 
their request), and the House Transportation Committee via Mr. Doug 
Pasternak, after Rep. DeFazio read about my internal ethics complaint 
in the Seattle Times article ``Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades 
before fatal crashes, whistleblower says.'' The safety of the public is 
paramount, and developing regulations and processes that adequately 
protect that safety is a complex process. That complexity stems from 
the nature of the pilot's task of integrating an understanding of 
automated functions and the aerodynamic state of the airplane; a pilot 
uses everything from indicators, control force feel, ``seat of the 
pants,'' prior experience, and training to develop appropriate 
responses to whatever situation arises. Ensuring safety in this 
environment requires a holistic, scientific approach to ensure each 
pilot is presented with a consistent, salient flight deck and airplane.
    The 737 MAX was not originally designed and certified with that 
approach. The 737 MAX's original certification was accomplished with 
hand-waving and deception to hide the numerous ways the 1960s-era 
design of the 737 does not meet current regulatory standards or a 
modern concept of aviation safety. The Boeing Company bears the 
majority of the responsibility for this deception against the public, 
but the FAA is also responsible for allowing such reckless disregard of 
regulations and aviation safety.
    This disregard is flagrant; with a practical understanding of the 
pilot task and detailed knowledge of Boeing design philosophy and 
history it is an unavoidable conclusion. Airplanes are complex systems, 
and such knowledge-in-depth is required to fully understand the 
practical effects of the certification process and regulations. 
Unfortunately, many of the high-level decision makers and 
representatives of Boeing and the FAA do not have this working 
knowledge; they get their information through extended chains of 
command that end up working like the children's game of ``Telephone.'' 
As a result, these representatives have given incorrect information and 
even outright lies to Congress, further complicating attempts to 
implement the lessons learned from these tragic accidents.
    An excellent example of the way this working knowledge is 
misapplied at a high level is the recent DOT advisory committee report. 
One of the report's conclusions was that if the 737 MAX had been 
certified as an all-new jet, it ``would not have produced more rigorous 
scrutiny . . . and would not have produced a safer airplane.'' This 
conclusion is utterly incorrect, and combined with the conclusion that 
the ODA system can remain largely intact, is horrifically bad advice. 
By failing to understand how having the 737 MAX merely meet existing 
regulations would improve aviation safety the DOT advisory committee 
actually poses a serious threat to aviation safety and the flying 
public. These conclusions show the committee is not working in the 
public interest. For that reason, its conclusions should be disregarded 
and the committee disbanded.
    Allow me to provide several explanations of important regulations 
and their implications to demonstrate that the DOT advisory committee's 
conclusion that an all-new jet certification would not have resulted in 
a safer airplane is false. In general, if the 737 MAX had stepped up to 
a full version of FAA regulations it would have resulted in a safer 
airplane as indicated by a reduced chance of crew error, greater chance 
of finding the possibility for that error during design, and creating a 
flight deck ``more conducive to coherent thought'' in the scenarios 
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302 encountered.
    The specific areas are:

   The new 25.1302 regulation. This regulation was created in 
        conjunction with the European Aviation Safety Agency for the 
        purpose of evaluating flight deck systems for potential crew 
        error. This would be an extensive evaluation for a completely 
        new aircraft type that would help ensure aviation safety. 
        However, as the 737 MAX was an amended type certificate, Boeing 
        argued that according to the changed product rule it only had 
        to evaluate changed systems. As Boeing was also trying to 
        change the flight deck as little as possible to minimize 
        training differences, this certification tactic severely 
        limited the range of human factors evaluation of 737 MAX 
        systems. MCAS design was a victim of this ``slice and dice'' 
        approach; crew interfaces for Air Data were unchanged and 
        Autoflight only had minor changes. Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun was 
        correct when he admitted that assumptions about crew reaction 
        time for MCAS failures were wrong, but there were many places 
        where those system interactions should have been analyzed but 
        were not due to the means of compliance granted to Boeing for 
        its amended type certificate. This lack of analysis reduces the 
        overall safety of the 737 MAX as compared to a newly developed 
        airframe. And this use of the changed product rule to avoid 
        scrutiny on unchanged systems is enormously important to the 
        future of aviation safety--the changed/unchanged system line on 
        the 777X is even more convoluted and involves more complicated 
        systems than the 737 MAX.

   The 25.1322 Crew Alerting regulation. Boeing sought and was 
        was granted a complex exemption to the new version of this 
        regulation. The newest amendment level of 25.1322 essentially 
        requires what Boeing calls the Engine Indicating and Crew 
        Alerting System (EICAS), a system designed with the latest 
        understanding of human factors to present information to flight 
        crews and prompt appropriate reactions in critical scenarios. 
        The 737 does not use this system; it relies on crew alerting 
        methods developed two decades prior to EICAS that have known 
        flaws when compared to EICAS. These flaws were known to Boeing 
        as it worked with the FAA to certify the 737 MAX, and awareness 
        of this was creatively hidden or outright withheld from 
        regulators during the certification process. Here are some 
        examples of these flaws:

     Lack of an ability to suppress the aural component of 
            the Overspeed Warning. EICAS design requires the Warning 
            level of alert, which requires immediate crew awareness and 
            response, to have two attention-getting senses. These are 
            typically sight, with a light, and sound, with a tone. 
            Historically the aural components were continuous as long 
            as the alert condition persisted. However, after the crash 
            of Birgenair 301 in 1996, Boeing pilots and engineers 
            decided a means of acknowledging and canceling an aural 
            alert was necessary to prevent crew distraction in critical 
            troubleshooting times. All Boeing models, except the 737, 
            gained this capability through EICAS. The 737's older 
            system was not updated due to cost. On Ethiopian 302 the 
            overspeed aural was sounding continuously during the last 
            minutes of flight.

     The ambiguous Autothrottle Disconnect alert. FAA 
            regulation 25.1329(k) requires the Autothrottle Disconnect 
            alert to be a Caution, which typically has an aural 
            component and an amber visual indication on EICAS 
            airplanes. The Autothrottle Disconnect alert on the 737 is 
            a red flashing light with no aural which does not fit any 
            of the standard alert definitions (or 25.1329(k), which is 
            notably absent from 737 MAX cert plans). The Autothrottle 
            Disconnect alert also shares the same physical panel space 
            with an Airspeed Deviation alert that illuminates the same 
            light flashing amber. Confusion between these two alerts 
            has led to incidents in the past. During 737 MAX 
            certification EASA requested information about known 
            incidents and Boeing management withheld information 
            responsive to their request.

     The now-infamous AoA Disagree alert. Boeing has 
            acknowledged the alert was not properly implemented on the 
            accident aircraft, but both Boeing and former FAA acting 
            administrator Dan Elwell have asserted that the alert was 
            not essential to the safety of the airplane. That assertion 
            is grossly incorrect--documentation of the alert's 
            development in 2005, after a series of incidents where AoA 
            vanes stuck at a stop on takeoff, clearly states that the 
            alert was made basic for safety, so that flight crews could 
            better understand the disparate effects of a stuck AoA 
            vane. This outright deception about the rationale for the 
            alert after two fatal accidents is not the only unfortunate 
            aspect of this alert. On EICAS airplanes, air data disagree 
            alerts are Caution-level, with an aural to provide 
            immediate awareness to the flight crew of the condition. 
            There is no Caution aural on the 737, so an AoA Disagree 
            alert will only be picked up during the flight crew's 
            instrument scan, which could delay awareness of the alert 
            for a critical amount of time. In a highly speculative 
            thought experiment, consider the potential accident 
            sequence had the two accident airplanes been equipped with 
            the alerting system required by current regulations. AoA 
            Disagree would have annunciated shortly after takeoff with 
            an aural for immediate awareness, prompting the crew to 
            appropriate action--in this case the Airspeed Unreliable 
            checklist. The first memory item step of Airspeed 
            Unreliable is to keep the airplane in its current 
            configuration, i.e., do not change the flap setting. 
            Crucially MCAS is not active with flaps down (which is 
            normal takeoff configuration), so a fully-functional alert 
            combined with the required alerting system may have been 
            able to give the crew enough awareness to avoid MCAS 
            activation altogether. Boeing's and the FAA's deception 
            around the rationale for the development of this alert 
            should be highly suspect.

   Air Data system design. The 737's air data system 
        architecture is a carryover from the days when airspeed and 
        altitude instruments were hard-plumbed with tubes from the 
        pitot and static ports. On the 737 NG and MAX, pitot and static 
        data is transmitted over databuses to computers and then 
        displayed on each pilot's forward display. Even though the 
        computers are theoretically capable of switching data sources, 
        the 737 has no means for the flight crew to do this, unlike 
        every other Boeing model. This capability is strangely not 
        required by FAA regulations, even though studies in the wake of 
        Air France 447 demonstrated the importance of pilots being 
        presented with correct aircraft state data, or the means to 
        select correct data should displayed data be erroneous. I 
        specifically advocated for a system that would have enabled 
        this on the 737, synthetic airspeed, but upper management shut 
        down the project over cost and training concerns. The known 
        unreliability of air data, due to the potential for erroneous 
        data caused by external factors, makes the initial design of 
        MCAS simply unacceptable. The importance of error-checked 
        sensor inputs to automatic functions is well known and should 
        have been thoroughly incorporated into an understanding of 
        aviation safety after Turkish 1951.

    These three areas, not to mention numerous others related to 
control forces being too high in certain flight control modes and the 
relative authority of the stabilizer, elevator, and the pitch-up moment 
from the engines, demonstrate that had the 737 MAX been certified to a 
full set of FAA regulations it would have been a safer airplane merely 
by entering the market with the most up-to-date understanding of system 
design and critical human-machine interfaces. Current FAA regulations 
require this understanding; during development of the 737 MAX Boeing 
sought ways to rationalize not updating the aircraft systems to that 
level, and the FAA permitted it to do so. The result is 346 lives lost.
    I have no doubt the FAA and lawmakers are under considerable 
pressure to allow the 737 MAX to return to service as quickly as 
possible and as soon as the public MCAS flaw is fixed. However, given 
the numerous other known flaws in the airframe, it will be just a 
matter of time before another flight crew is overwhelmed by a design 
flaw known to Boeing and further lives are senselessly lost. These 
design flaws and the systemic problems that allow them to threaten the 
public must be fixed before the 737 MAX is allowed to return to 
service.
    I left my job at the Boeing Company in 2015 in protest of 
management actions to rationalize the poor design of the 737 MAX. I did 
not think I could do my duty as an engineer to protect the safety of 
the public in the environment created by management at Boeing. In 2018 
I returned to the company, and quickly witnessed the nightmare of the 
very accidents I had tried to prevent happen in real life. Prior to my 
departure in 2015, my manager argued against the design changes I 
wanted to make by stating, ``People have to die before Boeing will 
change things.'' The time for change is now. The country is grappling 
with a wide range of issues at the moment, but the reduction in travel 
demand provided by the COVID-19 pandemic gives us time to adequately 
repair the aviation regulation system before new airplane designs are 
required.
    I recommend the following actions:

   A thorough revamp of all FAA regulations to ensure they 
        reflect a modern understanding of computer technology and 
        human-machine interfaces.

   A thorough revamp of the manufacturer-FAA certification 
        information pipeline. The current ODA process allows Boeing to 
        hide information it doesn't want the FAA to know via management 
        pressure. Boeing is working on developing aircraft using a 
        ``digital twin'' system that allows digital models to be 
        evaluated for design suitability prior to actual hardware 
        build. The FAA should develop the means to evaluate these 
        models for regulatory compliance and require Boeing to submit 
        them at multiple stages of the design process to ensure no 
        compliance information is hidden from the regulator.

   As a near-to-final certification step, the FAA would conduct 
        a battery of system tests on actual hardware at its own 
        facility to ensure the final aircraft design complies fully 
        with regulations.

   Create a system where ethical concerns about designs can be 
        evaluated independently of the Boeing Company. In other 
        engineering disciplines there exists the Professional Engineer 
        (PE) certification, which puts an engineer's license on the 
        line when they sign off on designs. There is not an Aerospace 
        PE, and the decision to sign off on any particular design at 
        Boeing has been culturally expropriated from the engineers to 
        management. Aviation safety would be better assured if ethical 
        concerns about designs were evaluated by an independent expert 
        panel rather than internal Boeing corporate counsel seeking to 
        protect the company from liability.

   These recommendations create a requirement for a significant 
        amount of technical knowledge in the FAA. If the FAA prefers to 
        remain focused on finding regulatory compliance only, it may be 
        better to perform these tasks in a separate public institution 
        such as a NASA center or National Laboratory. Such a technical 
        center focused on end-to-end evaluations of automation and 
        human interfaces with automated systems would have public 
        safety benefits beyond aviation, potentially anywhere from 
        evaluation of NASA Commercial Crew vehicles to working with 
        NHTSA to ensure systems like Tesla's Autopilot are in line with 
        the best scientific understanding of how to operate complex 
        systems in high-risk environments.

    It is not possible to say that the current commercial airplane 
certification process can ensure the safety of the public to the best 
of our ability without reforms such as these in place. The 737 MAX 
should not be recertified until such reforms are made and all known 
technical flaws with the airframe are corrected. In fact, if the FAA 
was truly regulating in the public interest, it would take action 
against Boeing for its continued deception and gross errors in the 
design and production of the 737 MAX by withdrawing Boeing's production 
certificate. That certificate can be restored once Boeing and the FAA 
have sufficiently revised their processes.
    Thank you for your time, and for being willing to seriously re-
evaluate and restructure the aviation safety system in this country. If 
you would like to contact me for further discussion, you can reach me 
via the provided information.
            Sincerely,
                                             Curtis Ewbank.
                                 ______
                                 
From: Zipporah Kuria 
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 at 16:19
Subject: Aviation Safety Improvement Act of 2020 (ET302 Family)

Dear Commerce Committee Members:

    We lost our father, Joseph Kuria Waithaka, on March 10th in Boeing 
737 MAX crash. Since the crash, heinous discoveries of how preventable 
the second crash was, are made month after month. With each discovery, 
the pain of the loss of our Dad deepens.
    Boeing concealed vital from the FAA, while the FAA completely 
relinquished their responsibility to certify the Max adequately to 
Boeing. The equivalent of asking a child to write their own test and 
award themselves the mark they think they deserve, before rubber-
stamping it. As a result of the flawed type certification process: 
System Safety Assessments were omitted on crucial systems like the MCAS 
and outdated technology was installed on to the Max. Boeing's excessive 
ambition lead to overexerting their workers and straining their 
suppliers. When Whistle-blowers came forward to report these issues, 
the fatal ET302 aircraft was still in production and no action was 
taken and 157 lives were lost.
    Boeing and the FAA knew that MCAS was a catastrophic risk after the 
October 2018, Lion Air crash. The MAX should have been ground 
immediately after the first crash, and nothing was done. The crash that 
killed my Dad and 156 others would be the first of 15 crashes predicted 
by the Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) after the 
first crash. It's hard to call the second crash an accident when it was 
already forecasted, but profit margins were at risk and lives came 
second.
    The FAA publicly made false promises to keep the ET302 families 
informed and to remain transparent. Instead, they continue to stonewall 
families, while maintaining and prioritising their cosy relationship 
with Boeing.
    Administrator Steve Dickson has failed to identify, hold 
accountable, and discipline those who were responsible for the 
mismanagement of the Max certification. Our loved ones lost their 
lives, we lost them, and not a single individual has lost so much as a 
penny of their from their paychecks. Instead of the FAA cooperating to 
protect lives, they remain complicit in risking them to protect a 
corporation.
    Bereaved families have appealed to Chairman Wickers and committee 
members to address the freedom Boeing has been given by the FAA, to 
profit at any cost without taking any responsibility.
    Chairman Wicker introduced The Aviation Safety Improvement Act of 
2020, which is just a protection ploy for Boeing. Does not require any 
correctional actions, but ratifies the same framework that resulted in 
my father's death. It's chilling that Chairman Wicker's Act implies 
that merely investigating issues is sufficient.
    No other families should have to work through the ongoing trauma 
and tragedy we continue to deal with, due to failure in leadership. My 
Dad shouldn't have to been shattered into a thousand pieces in a field 
far from his family, because people who had the power to do something 
decide not to.
    We appeal to the Commerce Committee to refuse to be complicit in 
more families lining graves with the blood of their loved ones, while 
corporations continue to line their pockets. To choose to protect the 
people they represent and to honour the memories of the 346 lives lost. 
It was only by divine intervention that the first plane crashed into 
the ocean and the second into a field. What if the third is over Time 
Square, London bridge or Capitol Hill? Will it take the loss of a 
thousand or thousands of lives before real action is taken to protect 
the public?
    The Commerce Committee has the opportunity to pioneer real change 
in Aviation Safety. The ET302 families are counting on you to take the 
action required to ensure that the history doesn't repeat itself.
    Thank you.
            Best regards,
                                            Zipporah Kuria,
                                 Daughter of Joseph Kuria Waithaka.
                                 ______
                                 
10 June 2020

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington DC, 20510

``Forwarded on a Without Prejudice Basis''

Dear Committee Members,

RE: DEFECTS AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIRCRAFT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT BILL OF 
            2020

    I write to you on behalf of the family of George Wanderi Kabau, a 
cheerful and highly safety conscious young man who suffered wrongful 
death before his prime due to the very avoidable Ethiopian Airlines 
Flight ET 302 crash on the nasty morning of 10 March 2019.
    Our family has a very legitimate and valid basis to express our 
utter disappointment with the proposed Aircraft Safety Improvement Bill 
of 2020, as we lost our beloved George Kabau due to the callous 
negligence, recklessness and deceitful actions of a United States 
corporation and regulator, which resulted in the manufacture, 
certification and sale of a fundamentally defective Max 737 passenger 
jet. In particular, you, as Members of the Committee, are bestowed with 
the magnanimous duty of safeguarding the future safety of the flying 
public, not just for Americans, but for the entire world by proposing 
and endorsing adequate legislative interventions. If you neglect your 
duty, may you know that unsafe flights will be a threat and trauma to 
everyone, including yourself, and your families nd friends.
    Before delving into the deficiencies and defects of the proposed 
legislation, it is fitting that I summarily contextualise the 
regulatory and safety issue at hand. As you are all aware, the wrongful 
deaths of George Kabau and 345 others (from both Flight ET 302 and the 
earlier Lion Air crash in Indonesia) would never have occurred if the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) undertook its regulatory duty 
rigorously, competently and honestly. Our loved ones who perished would 
be with us today if there was no deliberate misrepresentation and 
concealment, by both the Boeing Corporation and the FAA, of the 
stalling risks of the fundamentally unstable passenger jet that relied 
on an inherently catastrophic and defective Maneuvering Characteristics 
Augmentation System (MCAS) software that obtained data from an 
unreliable and unsafe single angle of attack sensor. It is needless to 
state that the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes exemplified a 
callous culture of regulatory capture at the FAA, and the resultant 
negligence, sloppiness and cosiness rendered it totally incapable of 
curbing Boeing's corporate recklessness and disgraceful prioritisation 
of profits over safety in the manufacture and marketing of the 737 Max 
passenger jets, among other aircraft varieties.
    George was a highly disciplined and focused 29 years old Electrical 
Engineer with immense potential and promise. He believed in and lived 
by the tenets of hard work, honesty and service to the community, and 
was passionate about his work at General Electric Healthcare. George's 
life, ideals and dreams were taken away by the shameful corporate 
greed, deceit and recklessness of Boeing that FAA knowingly failed to 
curb and prevent.
    The proposed Aircraft Safety Improvement Act of 2020, fails to 
guarantee the flying public of a quality aircraft certification process 
by continuing to endorse and affirm the same Organization Designation 
Authorizations (ODA) system of self-certification that resulted in 
Boeing deceitfully manufacturing and selling a fundamentally defective 
passenger jet. In that context, it is also regrettable that the 
proposed legislation fails to focus on tangible, quantifiable and 
explicit expansion of the FAA's staff technical and training capacity 
so that they can independently evaluate and certify aircrafts. As such, 
FAA may as well continue with its excessive delegation of its 
regulatory duties to Boeing and others. This self-certification model 
is contradictory both in theory and practice, and should not be 
regarded as amounting to any quality certification process.
    In addition, the legislation fails to enunciate criminal penalties 
for aircraft manufacturers and FAA staff who knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently make misrepresentations or deceitful statements on the 
airworthiness of aircrafts whether during the certification process or 
any other period; or who knowingly conceal defects in aircrafts.
    For and on behalf of the family of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302 
victim George kabau

                                                 Tom Kabau,
                                                        Nairobi, Kenya.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 
                                 
                                 ______
                                 
Virginie FRICAUDET
49 rue Victor Hugo
94140 Alfortville
FRANCE
[email protected]

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate Washington DC, 20510

June 16, 2020

Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator 
            Steve Dickson

Dear Senator,

    I am the sister of Xavier FRICAUDET who tragically perished in the 
crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th, 2019. He was 
38 and was to marry with Natalia, his fiancee, four months after the 
crash.
    Xavier was a traveler and an adventurer at heart. We was as 
intellectual as sportive. But what made him most endearing to everyone 
was that he was sensitive, discreet, gentle and attentive, curious and 
cultured, and had a subtle sense of humor.
    He was a teacher. He devoted 12 years of his life to French 
National Education. After his graduation, he passed 8 years in Guyana, 
accepting the most difficult positions in inaccessible areas of the 
Amazon, 3 years in Saint Petersburg in Russia, before leaving for 
Nairobi in Kenya. He never stopped training to be able to teach 
everybody, from indigenous children to mental diseased children or 
future teachers.
    I am writing this letter on behalf of Xavier's family and friends.
    I have also the duty, as President of the French victims' 
association (Flight ET 302--Solidarity & Justice), to write this letter 
on behalf of our 300 members who help us contributing to the search for 
the truth about the causes of the crash of the Boeing 737 max flight 
ET302 and participating in any action to improve the safety of air 
transport.
    It is no secret that the second crash should have never occurred 
because Boeing 737 Max has an unsafe, single chain design.
    Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong assumptions, 
were non comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two crashes 
demonstrated it. 346 people paid these errors with their life. There 
have been huge failures in the design process, as well as in the 
certification process.
    As a sky consumer, and as an interconnected citizen of the world, I 
am sure that the changes in the American aeronautical regulations that 
you are studying have a global impact. That's why the regulatory 
enforcement project that you are currently studying must be thought 
globally, and not only at the American level, because the civil 
aviation regulation is a global, interconnected, regulatory system.
    The certification authorities of many countries have trusted the 
work of the FAA and have not looked into the safety of the new MCAS 
system. If bilateral agreements between countries were a force for the 
aeronautical industry, to avoid multiplying the costs of certification, 
the two accidents of the Boeing 737 Max showed that it was also a huge 
weakness.
    With both tragedies of the Boeing 737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have 
broken trust between national certification authorities. As a 
consequence, EASA decided to no longer rely on the bilateral agreement 
with the FAA for the certification of modifications to the Boeing Max, 
but to recertify itself all the flight control systems.
    The bill should consider not only the design and certification 
process, but also the whole airworthiness regulatory framework.
    The second accident should never have occurred. After the Lion Air 
JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that Boeing could ignore 
the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also unbelievable that they 
issued an Airworthiness Directive with a runaway trim procedure that 
was inefficient in some parts of the flight envelope. It is as much 
unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved this procedure. Given 
all the failures and shortcomings known by Boeing, the 737 Max should 
have been grounded promptly after the first crash. If appropriate 
reactions and decisions had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the 
first crash, Xavier would still be alive, as well as all 156 passengers 
and crew who lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA 
had all the information to issue appropriate reaction after the first 
crash.
    I deeply hope that the bill will bring regulatory improvements to 
meet the challenge to restore confidence in overall aviation safety, 
and will be designed to handle not only national U.S. issues, but also 
to take into account its worldwide impacts, so that my brother and the 
346 passenger and crew did not die for nothing, and to avoid such 
disaster occurring again.
            Best Regards,
                                         Virginie FRICAUDET

Sister of late Xavier FRICAUDET, on behalf of Francois and Roseline 
FRICAUDET, his parents, Matthieu and Helene, his brother and sister, 
Natalia Kitseleva, his fiancee and on behalf of all Xavier's relatives 
and friends.

President of the Association
FLIGHT ET302--SOLIDARITY & JUSTICE


                                 ______
                                 
Nancy MacPherson
190B Cliffe Ave
Courtenay, British Columbia
Canada
V9N 2H5

June 16, 2020

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
USA Senate
Washington DC, 20510

Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator

Dear Senate Committee,

    Micah Messent was killed in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash 
in Addis Ababa March 10th, 2019. He was a chosen Canadian delegate to 
the 4th United Nations Assembly of the Environment which was being held 
in Nairobi, Kenya.
    My name is Nancy MacPherson, I am the partner of Matt Messent, 
Micah's oldest brother. I feel compelled to write this letter so no 
other family has to face the pain and suffering I have seen Micah's 
family go through.
    My partner Matt is a millwright, he works at a local ski resort. 
Everyday thousands of people trust their lives to ride the ski lifts he 
repairs and maintains: Safety is his priority everyday at his job. I am 
a medical doctor and family physician, it is well known that health 
care has improved its safety protocol by looking to models of flight 
protocol safety.
    As the technical aspects leading to the Ethiopian Air 302 crash 
emerged it was painfully clear the second Boeing 737 MAX8 crash could 
have been prevented had action been taken after the first Lion Air 610 
Crash, which killed189 people. In total, 346 people lost their lives 
and 346 families are suffering like our family.
    In the previous senate hearing and whistleblower testimonial it 
emerged that modelling predicted an estimated 15 fatal crashes due to 
flaws in the Boeing 737 Max 8 design. Previous testimony and aviation 
reports clearly outline faults in the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft and 
system failures in the FAA certification process that led to these two 
crashes. With this letter, I want to tell the human side of this 
tragedy.
    Micah was excited to attend this meeting and he shared his 
exuberance with family before he departed. He made a point of driving 
up island, three hours one way, with his loved partner Kidston Short, 
to see all his family before his big trip. His Grandmother, Edna Camp 
had prepared a binder for him from clippings of the recent Economist 
and National Geographic articles about Kenya and the region. It would 
be the first time Micah would travel internationally.
    Micah, the youngest of five children, had a fun loving approachable 
way about him. Matt, my partner, has great pride and love for his 
family as did Micah. What a welcoming home, I thought to myself the 
first Christmas we spent together. How close the five siblings were 
laughing, hugging, singing, sharing food and Christmas cheer.
    Because of Micah's humility, his family only learned of the depth 
and breadth of his influence and inspiration on both a professional and 
personal level after his passing. Micah was 23 years old. Over the last 
year he has received multiple accolades and awards created in his 
honour.
    At Micah's University graduation, I remember Matt and Jasper 
standing for a photo with Micah, so proud of their younger Brother. 
Micah was the first in their immediate family to graduate from 
university. He planned to go into law and work for recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights. Micah had his whole life ahead of him.
    Micah's death was devastating to the family and to my partner, 
Matt. He often repeats that he could not do anything to save his baby 
brother. Matt has recurrent nightmares of Micah's last moments on the 
plane, and of seeing his brother and other passengers catch on fire as 
the plane is plummeting to their deaths.
    Suzanne Camp and John Messent lost their youngest son. Jade Ballard 
(Wes Ballard), Amber Tansky (Walter Tansky), Matt Messent (Nancy 
MacPherson) and Jasper Messent (Brianna Savary) lost their youngest 
brother. Kidston Short lost her partner. Edna Camp lost her grandson. 
My son, Calder Messent lost his uncle. My nieces and nephews, Olivia 
Ballard, Ethan Tansky, Scotia Tansky and Ryker Tanksy lost their uncle. 
Aunts and Uncles lost their nephew. Cousins lost their cousin.
    There is an emptiness in the house when we come together as a 
family now, life will never be the same. Micah's joy and light that he 
shared made everyone around him shine brighter. My son Calder Messent 
will miss the golden feeling his family once had.
    I hope that in your wisdom you will look at the system that allowed 
this second crash to happen and take the steps necessary so no other 
family will have to relive this preventable tragedy.
            Sincerely,
                                      Nancy MacPherson, MD,
                                                Cottage Medical Clinic.
                                 ______
                                 
Catherine BERTHET
Cesar BLAVET
6 Chemin De la Cour du Moulin
78380 BOUGIVAL
FRANCE
Mail: [email protected]

Njaka RALAIARIVELO
18 Impasse des Sitelles
44220 COUERON
FRANCE
Mail: [email protected]

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate
Washington DC, 20510

Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator

Dear Senator,

    We are writing you as mother, brother and fiance of Camille 
Geoffroy, one of the 157 passengers who tragically lost their lives in 
the crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th, 2019 in 
Ethiopia. Camille was 28 and on her way to Nairobi in order to join the 
American humanitarian NGO One Acre Fund as humanitarian worker based in 
Kakamega, Kenya. Since then, we have been struggling with Camille's 
loss as this tragedy has left us alone with our pain, our tears and 
without any future whereas Camille had her whole life to both live and 
enjoy.
    During her lifetime among us, Camille has dedicated herself to help 
people by serving as humanitarian worker for several NGOs. On the 
meantime, Camille' last goals were to commit with more personal life 
achievements as celebrating her own wedding and being a mother. Camille 
was the one the three of us used to love the most as she also left 
behind tens of family members and friends who are still mourning her 
and are struggling with the saddest thought that Camille will never be 
part of their lives anymore.
    Therefore, in memory of Camille, Cesar, Njaka and I are writing 
this letter in regard with both upcoming hearing of FAA Administrator 
Steve Dickson and the Aviation Safety Bill which is currently discussed 
at the U.S. Senate.
    Much has been written on the Boeing 737 Max. It has an unsafe, 
single chain design. Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong 
assumptions, were non-comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two 
crashes demonstrated it. 346 people have paid the cost of these errors 
with their life. There have been huge failures in the design process, 
as well as in the certification process. These accidents caused a 
tremendous loss of confidence, not only towards Boeing and the FAA, but 
also towards the entire aeronautical industry.
    Our purpose is not to comment all the failures but to raise 
awareness to avoid them to occur again thanks to the safety bill, even 
if this wouldn't fit in a 2 pages' letter. But, as mourning mother, 
brother and fiance, and also as close relatives to other family victims 
and ourselves sometimes passengers, we have suffered the most about 
what has happened so that we are standing to highlight two crucial 
points: the current international scope of the safety bill you are 
considering, and the fact that the second crash should have never 
occurred.
    We are aware that, as French citizens, we do not have any 
legitimacy to express an opinion on an American bill. However, we would 
like to draw your attention to the fact that the changes in the 
American aeronautical regulations that you are studying have a global 
impact due to the agreements between certification authorities. For 
example, an FAA certified aircraft in the United States is not fully 
recertified in Europe thanks to the bilateral agreement between the FAA 
and EASA. EASA trusts the FAA for its certification work, and 
recertifies only certain specific points, for example where there are 
regulatory differences. If these agreements were a force for the 
aeronautical industry, to avoid multiplying the costs of certification, 
the two accidents of the Boeing 737 Max showed that it was also a huge 
weakness. Indeed, due to bilateral agreements, the certification 
authorities of many countries have trusted the work of the FAA, and 
have not looked into the safety of the new MCAS system.
    We do believe that the regulatory enforcement project that you are 
currently studying must be thought of globally, and not only at the 
American level, because the civil aviation regulation is a global, 
interconnected, regulatory system. For example, it should consider the 
consequences of bilateral agreements and better frame them, to prevent 
a chain reaction like the tragedy of the Boeing 737 Max from happening 
again. Worldwide aviation regulations are largely based on trust 
between national certification authorities. With the tragedies of the 
Boeing 737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have broken that trust. This was 
expressed publicly by Patrick Ky, Executive Director of EASA, during a 
hearing in September 2019 at the EU parliament.\1\ As a consequence, 
following the accident of flight ET302, EASA decided to no longer rely 
on the bilateral agreement with the FAA for the certification of 
modifications to the Boeing Max, but to recertify itself all the flight 
control systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https:ljmultimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/committee-transport-
tourism-ordinary-meeting-ordinary-meeting_20190903-1000-COMMITTEE-
TRAN_vd
    Interesting sequences are (approx.):
       from 10:35:00 to 10:46:20: point by Patrick Ky on Boeing 
737 Max
       from 11:28:30 to 11:39:25: answers from Patrick Ky on 
questions related to FAA
       from 11:54:45 to 11:56:07: answers from Patrick Ky on 
questions return into service schedule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hence, we would like to point out that it would be very useful for 
the American Senate to consider hearing Patrick Ky, executive Director 
of EASA, and why not, other leaders of certification authorities from 
other countries. This would allow the Senate to better understand the 
international consequences of the bill on the overall safety of flight, 
due to bilateral agreements. Secondly, the bill should consider not 
only the design and certification process, but also the whole 
airworthiness regulatory framework. The two Boeing 737 Max accidents 
highlighted terrible shortcomings in the airworthiness process, and in 
the response to an accident.
    In particular, the second accident should never have occurred. 
After the Lion Air JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that 
Boeing could ignore the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also 
unbelievable that they delivered an Airworthiness Directive with a 
runaway trim procedure that was inefficient in some parts of the flight 
envelope. It is as much unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved 
this procedure. Given all the failures and shortcomings known by 
Boeing, the 737 Max should have been grounded promptly after the first 
crash. Here again, due to bilateral agreements, other certification 
authorities like EASA in Europe completely relied on FAA and Boeing 
reactions to the first crash. If appropriate reactions and decisions 
had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the first crash, Camille 
would be still alive with us, as well as all 157 passengers and crew 
who lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA had all the 
information to issue appropriate reaction after the first crash.
    As a conclusion, we sincerely hope that the bill will bring 
regulatory improvements to meet the challenge to restore confidence in 
overall aviation safety, and will be designed to handle not only 
national U.S. issues, but also to take into account its worldwide 
impacts, so that our beloved Camille and the 346 passenger and crew did 
not die for nothing, and to avoid such disaster occurring again.
            Best Regards,
                                         Catherine BERTHET,
                                              Cesar BLAVET,
                                         Njaka RALAIRIVELO.


                                 ______
                                 
Matthieu WILLM
7, avenue Marcel Proust
75016 PARIS
FRANCE

e-mail: [email protected]

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
US Senate
Washington DC, 20510

Subject: Aviation Safety Bill & 17th June hearing of FAA Administrator

Dear Senator,

    I am the brother of Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm, who lost her 
life in the crash of the Boeing 737 Max of flight ET302 on March 10th, 
2019. She was 44, and left behind her widowed husband and two children, 
aged 9 and 11 when the accident occurred. Clemence-Isaure devoted her 
life to others and made it her job. She worked for several NGOs for 20 
years. On March 10th, 2019, she was flying from home to Nairobi for her 
work to provide humanitarian training.
    I am writing this letter on behalf of Clemence-Isaure's family 
about the upcoming hearing of FAA Administrator Steve Dickson, and 
about the Aviation Safety Bill that is currently discussed at the U.S. 
Senate.
    Much has been written on the Boeing 737 Max. It has an unsafe, 
single chain design. Safety assessments were fragmented, based on wrong 
assumptions, were non-comprehensive, and actually wrong, as the two 
crashes demonstrated it. 346 people paid these errors with their life. 
There have been huge failures in the design process, as well as in the 
certification process. These accidents caused a tremendous loss of 
confidence, not only towards Boeing and the FAA, but also towards the 
entire aeronautical industry.
    My purpose is not to comment all the failures and how to avoid them 
again thanks to the safety bill, this wouldn't fit in a 3 pages letter. 
But, as a mourning brother and as an engineer for the aeronautical 
industry, I rather chose to highlight two important points: the 
actually international scope of the safety bill you are considering, 
and the fact that the second crash should have never occurred.
    I am aware that, as a French citizen, I do not have the legitimacy 
to express an opinion on an American bill. However, I would like to 
draw your attention to the fact that the changes in the American 
aeronautical regulations that you are studying have a global impact due 
to the agreements between certification authorities. For example, an 
FAA certified aircraft in the United States is not fully recertified in 
Europe thanks to the bilateral agreement between the FAA and EASA. EASA 
trusts the FAA for its certification work, and recertifies only certain 
specific points, for example where there are regulatory differences. If 
these agreements were a force for the aeronautical industry, to avoid 
multiplying the costs of certification, the two accidents of the Boeing 
737 Max showed that it was also a huge weakness. Indeed, due to 
bilateral agreements, the certification authorities of many countries 
have trusted the work of the FAA, and have not looked into the safety 
of the new MCAS system.
    I think that the regulatory enforcement project that you are 
currently studying must be thought of globally, and not only at the 
American level, because the civil aviation regulation is a global, 
interconnected, regulatory system. For example, it should consider the 
consequences of bilateral agreements and better frame them, to prevent 
a chain reaction like the tragedy of the Boeing 737 Max from happening 
again.
    Worldwide aviation regulations are largely based on trust between 
national certification authorities. With the tragedies of the Boeing 
737 Max, Boeing and the FAA have broken that trust. This was expressed 
publicly by Patrick Ky, Executive Director of EASA, during a hearing in 
September 2019 at the EU parliament.\1\ As a consequence, following the 
accident of flight ET302, EASA decided to no longer rely on the 
bilateral agreement with the FAA for the certification of modifications 
to the Boeing Max, but to recertify itself all the flight control 
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https:ljmultimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/committee-transport-
tourism-ordinary-meeting-ordinary-meeting_20190903-1000-COMMITTEE-
TRAN_vd
    Interesting sequences are (approx.):
       from 10:35:00 to 10:46:20: point by Patrick Ky on Boeing 
737 Max
       from 11:28:30 to 11:39:25: answers from Patrick Ky on 
questions related to FAA
       from 11:54:45 to 11:56:07: answers from Patrick Ky on 
questions return into service schedule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hence, I think it would be very useful for the American Senate to 
consider hearing Patrick Ky, executive Director of EASA, and why not, 
other leaders of certification authorities from other countries. This 
would allow the Senate to better understand the international 
consequences of the bill on the overall safety of flight, due to 
bilateral agreements.
    Secondly, the bill should consider not only the design and 
certification process, but also the whole airworthiness regulatory 
framework. The two Boeing 737 Max accidents highlighted terrible 
shortcomings in the airworthiness process, and in the response to an 
accident.
    In particular, the second accident should never have occurred. 
After the Lion Air JT610 accident, it is absolutely impossible that 
Boeing could ignore the weaknesses of the 737 Max design. It is also 
unbelievable that they issued an Airworthiness Directive with a runaway 
trim procedure that was inefficient in some parts of the flight 
envelope. It is as much unbelievable that the FAA ``blindly'' approved 
this procedure. Given all the failures and shortcomings known by 
Boeing, the 737 Max should have been grounded promptly after the first 
crash. Here again, due to bilateral agreements, other certification 
authorities like EASA in Europe completely relied on FAA and Boeing 
reactions to the first crash. If appropriate reactions and decisions 
had been made by Boeing and the FAA after the first crash, Clemence-
Isaure would be still alive, as well as all 157 passengers and crew who 
lost their lives on March 10th 2019. Boeing and the FAA had all the 
information to issue appropriate reaction after the first crash.
    As a conclusion, I sincerely hope that the bill will bring 
regulatory improvements to meet the challenge to restore confidence in 
overall aviation safety, and will be designed to handle not only 
national U.S. issues, but also to take into account its worldwide 
impacts, so that my sister and the 346 passenger and crew did not die 
for nothing, and to avoid such disaster occurring again.
            Best Regards,
                    Matthieu Willm, June 15th, 2020.
    Brother of late Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm, on behalf of Denis 
Boutant, her husband, Lilas and Zelie her 2 two daughters, Elisabeth 
Willm her mother, Vincent and Violaine Willm, her brother and sister 
and on behalf of all Clemence-Isaure's family and friends.


                                 ______
                                 
                                                      June 29, 2020
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

RE: Committee hearing on the Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform 
            Act of 2020

Dear Senators:

    We are the immediate family of Juliah Mwashi who was a victim of 
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET 302. We thank you and commend you for 
investigating the circumstances surrounding the two deadly crashes of 
the Boeing 737 MAX involving Lion Air flight 610 and flight 302. We 
applaud your efforts to improve safety within the aviation industry 
through the bipartisan Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform Act of 
20200F\1\ that was the subject of the committee's hearing on June 17. 
We believe the proposed legislation is a good initial step towards 
improving aviation safety for the traveling public. However, we urge 
you to consider stronger measures to ensure more accountability and 
oversight, especially during aircraft development and testing phases. 
We also urge you to hold accountable those involved in the design, 
approval and what appears to be deception regarding the MAX 
certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Aviation Safety and Certification Reform Act of 2020, https://
www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/D77B2879-F3DB-40F8-8450-
94EB20415EA8, June 17, 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Juliah was an advocate through and through. Her latest mission was 
to foster female leaders of the next generation. Before her life was 
cut short, she was a branch coordinator of the Young Leaders and the 
Youth Exchange South to South (YESS) Girls Movement programs at the 
Kenyan Girl Guide Association. She was always smiling and cared deeply 
for her family, especially her daughters. We are committed to allowing 
her death to serve as a catalyst for change. One that we hope prevents 
other families from suffering the same kind of devastating loss.
    We and the families of the other victims who perished in the MAX 
crashes wake up daily to the horrible reality that our loved ones were 
taken away from us because of Boeing's greed and the fact that it 
valued profits far more than human life.
    In the years leading up to these tragedies, every effort was made 
to reduce corporate oversight and governance. This hands-off approach 
grew more intense under the current administration. In 2018, just weeks 
before the Lion Air flight 610 crash, Congress yielded to the demands 
of aircraft manufacturers, primarily Boeing, and relaxed Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations when it approved the FAA's 
Reauthorization Act. It stripped nearly all authority over the 
certification process from the agency and placed it in the hands of 
those companies that were to be regulated.
    Earlier this year, the FAA announced its intention to maintain the 
existing weakened and flawed regulatory scheme that was used to approve 
the MAX.1F\2\ This is ill-advised and hardly the type of remedy that 
will prevent more catastrophic crashes. Ensuring more accountability 
and oversight during critical phases of certification, such as aircraft 
development and testing phases, will require Congress to restore actual 
oversight to the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ FAA response to 737 MAX crash report preserves Boeing's big 
role in certifying its own planes, Seattle Times, https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-response-to-max-
crash-report-preserves-boeings-big-role-in-certifying-its-own-planes/, 
May 19, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, we call on Congress to eliminate the Organization 
Designation Authorization (ODA) component of the certification process. 
The ODA allows aircraft manufacturers like Boeing to essentially self-
certify. The ODA shifts the authority to select and manage the 
manufacturer's employees who are ``loaned'' to the agency from the 
manufacturer. The employees are deemed experts and serve to advise the 
agency throughout the certification process to spare the agency the 
cost of hiring and training its own experts. There are no safeguards in 
place to prevent manufacturers from exercising undue influence over or 
exerting pressure on their employees to approve aircraft regardless of 
their defects or risks to the traveling public. That is, in fact, what 
happened with the MAX.
    We understand that before the ODA was established, the Designate 
Engineering Representative (DER) program provided separate lines of 
authority. Therefore, the DER from a manufacturer would be less likely 
to experience the significant pressure from its employer to rush a 
defective aircraft to market. Such a program with separate lines of 
authority and an agency with the authority to act independently is 
critical to restoring the culture of safety that the U.S. aviation 
industry was known globally for, for many decades. We are not asking 
for a specific program but we are asking that Congress restore full 
oversight authority to the FAA immediately.
    Finally, our family implores you to demand accountability for what 
has already happened. We understand the need for thorough fact-finding 
probes and investigations, yet we are quickly approaching the second 
anniversary of the first tragic crash and neither Boeing nor the FAA 
nor any individuals involved with certifying the MAX have been punished 
for their wrongdoing and misguided decisions to put profits ahead of 
human life.
    Despite all the evidence showing that Boeing carelessly thumbed its 
nose at safety regulations throughout the MAX's development, the 
company and its top executives have not been held accountable. While 
its former CEO was forced to resign, he walked out the door with a 
hefty severance package. When the internal conversations were released 
earlier this year showing the callousness of some Boeing managers and 
executives, even when the company's own engineers warned that the MAX 
was dangerous, we were devastated all over again. One employee even 
said he would not put his family on the MAX should it ever be 
certified. Yet, greed kept this information hidden until after 346 
lives were sacrificed on board two of those airplanes. Allowing this 
kind of negligent and reckless corporate behavior to exist with 
impunity reflects the heavy-handedness of corporate giants like Boeing 
in controlling the oversight process.
    Once again, we thank you for your efforts to uncover the truth and 
rectify the troubled regulatory framework of the U.S. aviation sector. 
We hope that you will allow our sister and mother's death to remind you 
of the grave consequences of failing to make the necessary changes to 
prevent other similar tragedies in the future. Restore the FAA's 
authority so that it once again can provide independent oversight and 
foster a culture of safety. Please give Juliah and the other crash 
victims justice by refusing to allow those responsible to escape 
accountability. We ask that you add this letter to the public record 
for the above referenced committee hearing.
            Sincerely,
                                              Ivy Macharia,
                                             Daughter of Juliah Mwashi.
                                                      J.M.,
                                       Minor daughter of Juliah Mwashi.
                                             Florah Mwashi,
                                               Sister of Juliah Mwashi.
                                              David Mwashi,
                                              Brother of Juliah Mwashi.
                                 ______
                                 
                      Statement of Javier de Luis
    I would like to thank Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and 
the members of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
for holding this hearing and allowing me to submit this written 
statement.
    My name is Javier de Luis. My sister, Graziella de Luis, was on 
board Ethiopian 302 when it crashed last year. She was a U.S. citizen, 
living in Rome and working for the UN. Her loss is compounded for me 
because, as an aerospace engineer (MIT, PhD) with over three decades of 
experience in this industry, I am very familiar with the development 
and certification of complex aerospace systems. The information that 
has come out since the crash detailing the design, testing and 
certification failures on the part of Boeing and the FAA, provide a 
constant reminder to me that this tragedy should not have happened. 
This was not an act of God, this was a failure of man.
    I will not rehash Michael Stumo's excellent and detailed testimony 
that he has submitted to this Committee. I wholeheartedly concur with 
all his points and associated recommendations. I will take this 
opportunity to briefly highlight three key issues that I feel deserve 
your attention, and should be addressed in any proposed legislation.

  1.  MCAS. When the accidents happened, initial reports referred to 
        MCAS as a ``stall prevention system''. Later, we were told that 
        it wasn't there to prevent stalls, but to smooth out the 
        handling of the aircraft during certain flight conditions. 
        However, as yet no data has been made available to any 
        independent reviewer that shows how this airplane behaves with 
        and without MCAS. I would like to ask a very simple question: 
        is this airplane stable with MCAS turned off? If it is, then 
        why keep it, given its central role in these two accidents? If 
        it isn't, then it would seem that turning MCAS off when the 
        angle of attack sensors disagree, as has been proposed as part 
        of the return to flight, might not be a good idea. The secrecy 
        surrounding this system should give us pause. The committee 
        should insist that this data be made available for review, 
        something that the Joint Authority Technical Review report 
        requested over eight months ago.

  2.  Amended certificates. There is a ftm.damental incompatibility 
        between a 50 year old airplane design decisions and modem 
        aircraft systems. The 737 Max has two computers, but only 
        operated one at time, along with associated single sensors for 
        key measurements, including angle of attack. This design 
        architecture dates back to the 1960s, when there were no 
        computers in the cockpit. At that time, it made sense to have 
        one set of instruments reporting to the pilot, and one to the 
        co-pilot. Modem aircraft are not designed this way. There are 
        multiple and redundant computers and sensors, with data being 
        analyzed hundreds of times per second to quickly identify when 
        something goes wrong or a sensor goes bad. When faced with a 
        difficult aerodynamic problem with the Max, Boeing decided to 
        solve it inexpensively through software instead of making 
        costlier airframe changes. And this would have been fine, 
        except that they decided to run this software fix on systems 
        that did not and still do not have the level of redundancy and 
        reliability that we expect. Essentially, they hacked together a 
        21st century software fix on a 1960s hardware system. The FAA 
        allowed this to happen, because it lacked expertise and 
        visibility into the design. This cannot be allowed to continue. 
        Boeing cannot be allowed to continue to certify its own 
        designs, especially those systems that directly impact vehicle 
        safety, with little to no outside review.

  3.  FAA Expertise. I feel that it is important to remember that no 
        new data came out of the Ethiopia crash that was not already 
        there and available after Indonesia. Let me repeat: we learned 
        nothing new after the crash that killed my sister that was not 
        already known after the Lion Air crash four months prior. If 
        the FAA (and NTSB) had properly evaluated what that data was 
        telling them and grounded the fleet after the Indonesian crash, 
        my sister would be alive today. This is not 20/20 hindsight. 
        All the data was there and available, and it clearly showed 
        that they had a systemic software problem that affected 
        multiple aircraft systems, but they treated it as if it was a 
        simple fix, telling pilots to simply turn the MCAS system off. 
        To do its job properly, the FAA must be required to draw in 
        experts from outside (academia, National Academies, government 
        labs), to assist them in this work. Otherwise, they will 
        understandably rely on the engineers at Boeing, which, as we 
        have seen in the months since the crash, can have different 
        incentives that do not necessarily line up with the public 
        interest.

    Thank you for your time and the opportunity to provide this 
testimony,
                                       Javier de Luis, PhD.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    Question 1. As you know, Kansas is renowned in the world of 
aviation and for bringing new technology to market. How can the FAA 
better position themselves to consider and adopt new innovations, which 
can be essential in advancing aviation safety?
    Answer. The FAA is always looking to facilitate the safe 
introduction of new technologies and enable innovation. To support 
innovation in aviation, the FAA Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) 
continues to expand the FAA's use of performance based regulations, 
rather than prescribing a single means to achieve safety. The revision 
to title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 23 was a significant 
milestone to enable approaches to achieve safety by adopting 
performance based regulations and leveraging industry experts in the 
development of consensus standards as a means of compliance.\1\ While 
consensus standards provide one means of compliance, the performance-
based regulations allow for additional innovative means to achieve 
safety. AIR's Policy and Innovation Division supports aerospace 
innovation by creating novel means of compliance and develops and 
maintains AIR regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Consensus Standards are specifications developed or adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies, which may provide performance-
based or design-specific technical specifications and related 
management systems practices. PL-104-113: National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act of 1995 requires Federal agencies to use voluntary 
consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FAA also promotes early engagement with industry, well in 
advance of the certification phase where the FAA traditionally starts 
to get involved in new technology. Early engagement is helping new 
entrants understand the data and information they need to provide to 
the agency to demonstrate safety compliance for their new and 
innovative products and allows the FAA to understand trends and 
emerging technology in the market. This may save companies time and 
money by allowing them to make design adjustments earlier in their 
certification process. It also allows the FAA to plan for needed 
resources and expertise.
    To foster operational innovation, the FAA's Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) Integration Office works with new entrants, as well as 
incumbent UAS operators, via our Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP) 
initiative. Through PSPs, the FAA works with specific UAS companies or 
UAS operators to safely enable increasingly complex UAS operational 
capabilities while sharing operational data that supports the FAA's 
policy making and standards development activities. In addition, 
through the PSPs, the FAA provides technical assistance for UAS 
operators that need support navigating the operational approval 
process(es) to enable specific drone-related activities.

    Additionally, the issue of advancing new technologies is also 
addressed in the Joint Authorities Technical Review and Special 
Committee report, which includes recommendations to the FAA in 
advancing guidance and standards. Ensuring the most up to date guidance 
is essential in moving forward in the field of aviation, although the 
acceptance guidance and standards can oftentimes be delayed. How do you 
suggest addressing this issue?
    Answer. The FAA agrees that it is critical to foster advances in 
new technology. This improves safety as well as enhances the capability 
and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS). We are standing 
up the Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation in the Aircraft 
Certification Service in Aviation Safety (``the Center'') within the 
Aircraft Certification Service. The Center is already engaged with 
industry on approximately 90 projects. We continually reach out to 
industry to foster innovative technologies in design and production 
processes, as well as new methods for demonstrating compliance to 
safety requirements during product certification. The Center also 
coordinates across the FAA in the introduction of new product and 
equipment designs, operating models, and integration of unique aircraft 
into the NAS.
    The Secretary of Transportation established the Safety Oversight 
and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC) in August of 2019, per the 
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The SOCAC advises the Secretary on 
policy and guidance recommendations as well as options to expedite the 
rulemaking process. By working with the SOCAC, the FAA will ensure a 
coordinated effort, focusing on consensus standards, with input from 
industry, labor organizations, and safety experts.

    Question 2. As you know, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has 
negatively affected the aviation industry as a whole, including our 
manufacturing and maintenance workforce, which has experienced waves of 
furloughs and lay-offs. If we continue to lose these skilled workers, 
what do you see as the potential impact?
    Answer. The FAA takes a systemic approach to industry oversight 
supported by robust processes that govern production, maintenance, and 
operations, to ensure changes do not adversely impact safety in the 
NAS. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aviation industry has 
been forced to reduce production, maintenance, and operations 
activities. Sadly, many workers and their families have had to, or may 
still, suffer furloughs and, in some cases, lay-offs. At the same time, 
the industry must find ways to retain experienced workers to continue 
to meet safety requirements as well as to monitor and manage the risks 
to our aviation systems. The aviation industry may experience a rebound 
in workforce demand when demand for commercial and general aviation 
operations increases.

    Question 3. During your testimony, you commented on the importance 
of expanding the FAA's efforts with other authorities around the world 
and in fostering safety standards and policies at ICAO to help achieve 
the highest possible levels of safety globally.
    I recently introduced S. 3959, along with Ranking Member Cantwell, 
Sen. Capito and Sen. Klobuchar, which provides additional resources for 
increased engagement by the FAA to promote collaboration and data 
sharing on an international level. Additionally, this legislation would 
work to address human-machine interface concerns, by providing 
resources to the ICAO's working group that addresses this important 
topic. Can you describe how this legislation will work toward advancing 
a more holistic level of aviation safety on a global level?
    Answer. Education, training, familiarization, and harmonized global 
standards are the best ways to achieve a holistic level of global 
aviation safety to the benefit of U.S. citizens traveling worldwide. 
The FAA plays an extremely important leadership role in this effort.
    Each of the factors below are important elements of advancing 
global aviation safety and include:

   Data sharing, including efforts to establish the legal and 
        technical frameworks necessary for secure data exchange;

   Ensuring domestic and international pilot training keep pace 
        with innovation and increasingly automated aircraft systems to 
        ensure continued safety levels; and

   Promotion of U.S. regulatory approaches and research on 
        pilot training and human machine interface improvements at ICAO 
        and in other international venues.

    The FAA can positively influence global aviation safety through 
international leadership and technical exchanges and assistance, 
including those related to safety and management oversight and 
assistance.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to 

                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    Question 1. One of the concerns in the wake of these recent crashes 
has been the usage of automation in the cockpit and pilot training on 
these systems. I certainly believe that automation can and has improved 
aviation safety, but I believe that it is imperative to ensure pilots 
are properly trained on how to interact with these systems.
    As aircraft become more automated, what oversight changes are being 
considered at the FAA to ensure pilots also become more proficient in 
managing these multiple automation systems?
    Answer. The FAA shares the belief that pilots must know and 
understand the systems of the aircraft they are flying. Through the 
issuance of the Airmen Certification Standards (ACS), which are the 
testing standards for pilots to receive a certificate or rating in the 
United States, the FAA is driving that message, particularly for 
automated systems. Publication of the ACS informs training providers 
and applicants, which ultimately drives training program content.
    The ACS is part of the safety management system (SMS) framework 
that the FAA uses to mitigate risks associated with airman 
certification training and testing. Specifically, the ACS, associated 
guidance, and test question components of the airman certification 
system are constructed around the four functional components of an SMS:

   Safety Policy that defines and describes aeronautical 
        knowledge, flight proficiency, and risk management as 
        integrated components of the airman certification system;

   Safety Risk Management processes through which internal and 
        external stakeholders identify and evaluate regulatory changes, 
        safety recommendations, or other factors that require 
        modification of airman testing and training materials;

   Safety Assurance processes to ensure the prompt and 
        appropriate incorporation of changes to training or testing 
        that may arise from new regulations and safety recommendations; 
        and

   Safety Promotion in the form of ongoing engagement with both 
        external stakeholders (e.g., the aviation training industry) 
        and FAA policy divisions.

    The FAA developed the ACS along with associated guidance and 
updated reference material in collaboration with a diverse group of 
aviation training experts as part of a workgroup under the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The goal is to drive a systematic 
approach to all components of the airman certification system, 
including knowledge test question development and conduct of the 
practical test.
    In June 2019, the Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating ACS (ATP 
ACS) became effective. This transition from the Practical Test 
Standards enabled the standard to be updated to reflect new technology 
pilots will find on the flight deck and new aircraft systems that are 
incorporated into the design of aircraft. By adding a knowledge 
standard, the FAA specifically added a requirement for the pilot 
seeking a multiengine airplane ATP certificate, to demonstrate an 
understanding of ``[a]irplane automation components (i.e., flight 
director, autopilot), their relationship to each other, and how to 
manage the automation for flight''. For many of the tasks to be tested 
for the certificate or type rating, an applicant is expected to 
demonstrate the ability to identify, assess, and mitigate risks that 
can result from a failure to manage automation and navigation 
equipment. Finally, in a message to evaluators using the ATP ACS, the 
FAA states that during the practical test, ``the applicant is expected 
to demonstrate automation management skills by utilizing installed, 
available, or airborne equipment such as autopilot, avionics and 
systems displays, and/or a flight management system (FMS). The 
evaluator is expected to test the applicant's knowledge of the systems 
that are installed and operative during both the oral and flight 
portions of the practical test.''
    In addition to the ARAC tasking for the ACS work, the FAA tasked 
the Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC) to 
recommend pilot training for flight-path-management-related topics to 
include automated systems, pilot monitoring, manual flight operations, 
and others. The FAA's intent is to use these recommendations as the 
basis for new industry guidance on Flight Path Management. Ultimately, 
Flight Path Management comes down to three critical items, whether or 
not the airplane is being manually flown or in some state of automated 
flight: 1) knowing where your airplane is supposed to be (the flight 
clearance); 2) putting the airplane where it is supposed to be 
(ensuring the flight path matches the clearance); and 3) keeping the 
airplane there (actively monitoring). The guidance could be used by 
airlines for training pilots on these topics, including managing 
automated systems. This specific guidance would facilitate improved FAA 
oversight of airlines and their pilot training programs as well as 
other operators and training providers of transport category airplanes.

    How is the FAA working with airplane manufacturers to address and 
examine the ongoing operational challenges with aircraft automation?
    Answer. The FAA works with airplane manufacturers to address 
ongoing operational challenges with aircraft automation in both design 
and operations, which are overseen, respectively, by the Aircraft 
Certification Service (AIR) and the Flight Standards Service (FS). The 
FAA recognizes the importance of increased integration, communication, 
and collaboration between these two offices. This collaboration is 
especially important in our oversight and certification activities.
    The FAA requires the design of the aircraft systems, including 
autoflight systems, to be evaluated for potential pilot errors (14 CFR 
25.1302 and 25.1329). This work is performed by AIR. FS evaluates the 
same aircraft systems for ``suitability for use'' in ongoing airline 
operations and to specify what minimum pilot training is required. In 
these evaluations, the manufacturer must describe how it has accounted 
for and will address lessons learned from previous accidents and 
airline experience.

    Question 2. At the 2019 International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) General Assembly, the FAA presented a working paper that made 
recommendations on this issue and also asked ICAO to assemble a new 
working group to address pilot training and automation dependency. I 
applaud the FAA's actions and their further coordination with ICAO on 
establishing this new working group.
    Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, are things on track to establish the 
Personnel Training and Licensing Panel?
    What kind of feedback has the FAA received from ICAO?
    Answer. Since the 40th Assembly, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) has progressed the dialogue regarding the creation 
of a new technical panel covering personnel training and licensing. 
During its most recent session earlier this year, the ICAO Air 
Navigation Commission approved the establishment of a new Personnel 
Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP). On August 17, ICAO formally 
notified member States of the establishment of the PTLP, requested 
nominations for membership, and provided a preliminary Terms of 
Reference and work program. The first meeting is planned for mid-fall.

    Question 3. I appreciate your statements with regards to expanding 
the FAA's efforts with other foreign civil aviation authorities around 
the world in order to improve aviation safety globally. I believe that 
the United States plays a critical role in fostering improved standards 
globally. It is for this reason I joined with my colleagues Ranking 
Member Cantwell, Senator Moran, and Senator Klobuchar on introducing S. 
3959, the Foreign Civil Aviation Authority Assistance Act yesterday.
    When the FAA has dispatched experts to other countries to provide 
technical assistance, has this been helpful in building continued 
outreach with these countries?
    Answer. Dispatching FAA experts to provide technical assistance to 
other countries has significantly contributed to the safe and seamless 
global aviation network we have today. Active FAA engagement with civil 
aviation authorities and partners around the world has helped harmonize 
and obtain global acceptance of U.S. standards and procedures. As such, 
a willingness to render FAA technical assistance builds lasting 
relationships that are critically important in maintaining trust and 
partnership with our global counterparts. Additionally, the competitive 
nature of the aviation industry requires proactive engagement as other 
nations aggressively pursue global influence. FAA outreach and 
technical assistance helps ensure that the U.S. industry can compete 
fairly in the global marketplace and that U.S. safety standards and 
processes become the foundation for global standards. In the long term 
and to remain a global leader, the FAA must continue to maximize 
opportunities to engage with domestic and international partners to 
advocate continuous safety improvement and increase compliance with and 
bolstering of international safety standards. Over the years and since 
my arrival at the agency, I have found international aviation 
authorities to be very receptive to and anxious for FAA leadership.

    Question 4. I appreciate your statements and the FAA's commitment 
to nurturing a healthy and robust reporting culture. Following the 737 
MAX crashes, communications between FAA personnel and Boeing's 737 
Chief Technical Officer at the time highlighted a concerning culture at 
Boeing. And I appreciate the FAA's prompt criticism of Boeing's failure 
to disclose those communications and your request for an immediate 
explanation.
    How does the FAA plan to instill this type of Just Culture, as you 
describe in your testimony, going forward?
    Answer. The FAA is committed to cultivating a just culture that 
promotes continuous improvement of safety systems and outcomes. In 
2018, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS-1) worked 
with senior Aviation Safety (AVS) organization leadership to establish 
a strategic plan. On April 18, 2019, AVS published the AVS Strategic 
Plan, which includes a focus on improving the safety culture, not just 
in skills and processes, but in behaviors and relationships as well. As 
part of this strategic plan, and to maximize employee engagement in 
getting to the next level of safety, AVS management and employee 
representatives are working together to create a Voluntary Safety 
Reporting Program (VSRP) as one significant initiative to continue 
fostering a just safety culture. The VSRP will be an internal system 
that will help identify safety risks at all levels. It will establish a 
voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive environment that encourages 
open reporting of aviation safety issues and concerns. As we see with 
industry voluntary safety reporting programs, the non-punitive nature 
of VSRP is of particular importance, because it clearly puts the focus 
on fixing safety issues, not targeting people. The VSRP will mirror 
successful, well-established programs that already exist within FAA and 
industry, including the option to file anonymously and for an 
independent, neutral team to review and investigate safety issues. Our 
goal is for the VSRP to be transparent, timely, visible, and 
responsive, with a tracking system to identify patterns in the data. I 
am a strong advocate for the VSRP, and believe this program is 
foundational to the type of open, transparent and collaborative just 
culture we seek.
    In addition, the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) has 
established initiatives to support the development, production, and 
maintenance of safe, compliant products. These initiatives focus on 
formalizing expectations for industry self-correction and voluntary 
disclosures; monitoring and improving system safety and performance; 
and incorporating the compliance philosophy into international 
agreements. More information about these initiatives and efforts to 
cultivate a just culture are available on our website.

    Question 5. I appreciate the efforts DOT and the FAA are taking to 
protect passengers and employees during this time. I believe efforts 
like the ones you described in your testimony (complying with CDC 
guidelines and requesting passengers wear face coverings while flying) 
can play a positive role in keeping travelers safe and secure in the 
short-term. In your opinion, what further measures are needed in order 
to rebuild passenger confidence?
    Answer. Government, aviation, and public health leaders must work 
together to meaningfully reduce the public health risk and restore 
passenger, aviation workforce, including crew, and public confidence in 
air travel. The FAA has been deeply engaged in these efforts with the 
CDC and the Departments of Homeland Security and State since the early 
stages of the COVID-19 public health crisis. In the first week of 
February, FAA published a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) that 
contained CDC guidance for airlines and crews on ways to ensure the 
health of flight crews traveling overseas. That document has been 
updated three times--most recently in mid-May--to reflect changes in 
virus spread and update health protocols to protect air crews.
    On July 2, 2020, the Department of Transportation, the Department 
of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services 
jointly published Runway to Recovery, which provides general guidance 
and specific recommendations for reducing public health risk in 
passenger aviation environments. The measures discussed include 
requiring face coverings, promoting social distancing, enhancing 
cleaning and disinfection, and minimizing in-person interactions. This 
document will continue to be updated based on the latest public health 
research on COVID-19 and the best strategies to mitigate its spread.
    To affect public health risk reduction in the global air 
transportation, FAA's Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell has been leading 
the U.S. delegation's participation in the ICAO Council Aviation 
Recovery Taskforce (CART). The CART also developed and published a set 
of recommendations, which, like the Runway to Recovery, provide 
guidance to the aviation industry about measures to take to reduce 
public health risk in aviation through its ``Take-off Guidance, which 
was published in early June 2020. These two documents, which are 
closely aligned, provide substantial guidance on ways to reduce public 
health risk and build passenger and workforce confidence.
    The Department of Transportation also sent approximately 87 million 
cloth facial coverings to airports for passenger use. This will help 
protect passengers and crew and boost passenger confidence in America's 
transportation systems. These 87 million cloth facial coverings are in 
addition to the over 4 million cloth facial coverings the Department 
provided earlier this year to critical infrastructure workers in the 
aviation sector. More information about these and other COVID-related 
agency actions is available on our website.
                                 ______
                                 
      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mike Lee to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    Question 1. The Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft 
Certification Process at the Department of Transportation released a 
report that included a number of recommendations for the FAA to 
consider related to improving the FAA's aircraft certification process. 
The report included a recommendation that the FAA mandate Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) for design and manufacturing organizations.

    a. What are the core safety improvements for an organization that 
SMS brings to the table?
    Answer. Safety Management Systems (SMS) enable the FAA and also 
individual manufacturers or operators to coordinate risk management 
processes and feedback loops within and between design, manufacturing, 
operation, and maintenance functions. Another key benefit of SMS is 
that it moves visibility of and accountability for safety issues to the 
leadership level of the organization. The integration of safety 
management principles into design and manufacturing processes bring 
with it a holistic systems approach to safety that can better identify 
and address issues or trends before they surface.
    Importantly, SMS clearly places responsibility for safety assurance 
with designers and manufacturers, with the FAA continuing to provide 
regulatory oversight. Data sharing is the norm, and all parties inform 
each other about safety insights. This results from all parties sharing 
an open, trusting culture characterized by a commitment to compliance, 
self-correction, and voluntary disclosure, and to operating with a 
safety-first mindset. Safety is also enhanced in a systematic way, 
rather than through individual reports or anecdotal information, so 
that the FAA has the necessary insight to oversee and assess the 
manufacturer's safety performance.

    b. Are there any notable concerns with a government mandatory SMS 
for design and manufacturing organizations?
    Answer. The FAA must ensure that any SMS requirements are 
appropriately scoped and structured to achieve the desired safety 
benefits, without imposing an undue burden on small design and 
production approval holders. To support this, the FAA is exploring a 
strategy to scale implementation costs of SMS to the risk a product 
presents to the aviation system.
    FAA requirements for SMS will not only promote standardization but 
also streamline fair global market access for U.S. design and 
manufacturing companies. A mandated SMS, as opposed to the current 
voluntary system, will enable the FAA to meet international SMS 
standards as described in International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Annex 19.

    c. When SMS is introduced into an organization, is it considered an 
entirely new system or does it build upon an organization's existing 
safety checks, processes, and procedures?
    Answer. SMS builds upon existing processes and procedures. SMS is 
integrated into the management systems of the organization, and becomes 
a way of doing business and is infused in an organization's existing 
system. Inherently, SMS enables an integration function that ties 
together risk management in an organization to enhance a system 
perspective of safety. As noted above, this system approach to safety 
has proven to be extremely effective in all segments of aviation where 
mandatory SMS has been adopted.
    d. What percentage of U.S. certified design and manufacturing 
organizations participate in the FAA's voluntary SMS program?
    Answer. Currently 12 of the 71 companies (approximately 17 percent) 
with both a type and production certificate are participating in the 
Aircraft Certification Voluntary SMS program.

    Question 2. Has the FAA conducted a cost-benefit analysis on a 
mandatory SMS for design and manufacturing organizations? Can you 
provide any data to better understand the regulatory costs associated 
with SMS compliance?
    Answer. The FAA recently initiated a rulemaking project that would 
update title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 21 (design and 
production), 91 (air tours), 135 (commuter and on demand air carriers) 
and 145 (repair stations) to require persons subject to those parts to 
meet the SMS requirements codified in 14 CFR part 5. The FAA will 
carefully assess the costs and benefits of SMS for these entities as 
part of the rulemaking process and present our findings for public 
comment.

    Question 3. ICAO's SMS standards offer flexibility for member 
states to structure implementation of SMS to fit the unique needs of 
their aviation industries. Does the FAA believe the same flexibility 
should be given from the FAA to U.S. design and manufacturing 
organizations in implementing mandatory SMS?
    Answer. Yes, the FAA believes that SMS should offer flexibility. 
The FAA's SMS requirements, described in 14 CFR part 5, are 
performance-based and enable design and manufacturing organizations to 
implement SMS within the context of their existing systems.

    Question 4. What foreign countries (if any) have a mandatory SMS 
requirement for design and manufacturing organizations that produce 
aircraft that operate within the United States under Part 121?
    Answer. No other countries have made SMS mandatory for the design 
and manufacturing of aircraft that operate under 14 CFR part 121 in the 
United States. The European Aviation Safety Agency, however, has issued 
a Notice of Proposed Amendment that would require SMS for design and 
manufacturing organizations, but the rule has not reached final 
publication. SMS for design and manufacturing organizations is also 
being discussed in Canada and Brazil.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    Last year at your confirmation hearing, we discussed the Inspector 
General's report ``Enhanced FAA Oversight Could Reduce Hazards 
Associated with Increased Use of Flight Deck Automation'' and its 
recommendations regarding pilot training guidance and standards. There 
has since been near universal agreement from technical experts, 
including the National Transportation Safety Board, that assumptions 
about pilot training were not representative of the real-world.

    Question 1. What progress has been made since we last spoke about 
this at your confirmation hearing last Spring?
    Michigan is home to about 50 aircraft suppliers that supply Boeing 
with both commercial and defense related aircraft. As of February, 
expectations were for global demand to include 17,000 new jet aircraft. 
Now, that number is barely a fraction of where it was. The pandemic is 
having a devastating impact down the supply chain--sadly we've seen 
parts suppliers lay off hundreds of people in Michigan.
    Answer. Since we spoke at my confirmation hearing, the FAA's 
Aircraft Evaluation Division (AED) has increased its participation in 
Aircraft Certification evaluations of flight deck systems and in 
reviews of system safety assessment assumptions about pilot 
performance, including pilot responses to failures. The Aircraft 
Evaluation Division also recently hired six human factors specialists 
to support this effort as well as to assist with conducting operational 
and maintenance evaluations.
    Domestically, the FAA has been very active in the development of 
new rules and guidance for the improvement and maintenance of air 
carrier pilot manual flying proficiency. The FAA has always required 
demonstrating and maintaining proficiency of manual flying skills. The 
FAA requires at least 21 and potentially 32 maneuvers to be performed 
manually during air carrier pilot training and checking (e.g., 
takeoffs, steep turns, stall prevention and recovery, upset prevention 
and recovery, manually controlled instrument approaches). Air carrier 
pilots must also satisfactorily perform loss of reliable airspeed, 
which reinforces the need for pilots to ignore erroneous indications 
and manually fly the aircraft with sole reference to pitch and power 
displays.
    The FAA also agrees that at a global level, if automation 
dependency and degradation of manual flight operations skills are not 
satisfactorily addressed in existing standards, there may be a high 
level of variation in the approach utilized by individual civil 
aviation authorities (CAA) regarding how associated risks may be 
addressed in regulation or guidance. This variation adds an additional 
layer of complexity to addressing automation dependency and degradation 
of manual flight operations skills worldwide.
    In September 2019, the FAA presented a working paper at the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) General Assembly 
seeking the establishment of a new panel that would address pilot 
training and automation dependency. This panel would be an important 
step in understanding the scope of automation dependency globally and 
bring the international community together to work towards accepted 
solutions that could reduce the variability in how the issue is 
addressed by individual CAAs.
    With broad support for establishing a panel at the General 
Assembly, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission approved the establishment 
of a new Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in June 2020. 
The United States has been named a member of this panel and the panel's 
work is anticipated to begin in early 2021. The FAA will continue to 
advocate for taking steps to address automation dependency, manual 
flight operations proficiency, and improving pilot management of 
automated systems globally.
    Finally, we continue to address the recommendations from the 
Secretary's Special Committee on the FAA's Aircraft Certification 
Process, which include improving the consideration of operational 
environments during the type certification process, and enhancing the 
coordination between the FAA's Aircraft Certification and Flight 
Standards functions. These actions are a key part of ensuring pilot 
training assumptions reflect real-world operations not only in the 
U.S., but globally.

    Question 2. Given the state of aircraft manufacturing, have you 
been in contact with other Federal agencies regarding concerns about a 
potential impact on our Nation's manufacturing readiness level from a 
national security perspective?
    Answer. The FAA understands that the national health emergency has 
resulted in a reduction in airline operations and aviation 
manufacturing production. Through outreach and communication with 
various manufacturers, the FAA has noted that many companies have 
slowed or stopped production and have had to furlough or lay-off 
employees. The FAA is monitoring these changes and is continuing to 
conduct risk-based oversight to ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements, and ensure that products and articles conform, and are in 
a condition for safe operations. The Department of Transportation also 
coordinated with the Department of Treasury under The Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, from which airlines were 
eligible to receive more than $50 billion in grants and loans. The 
separate loan program made $25 billion available to airlines and 
certified repair stations, which serve as a critical link in the 
manufacturing production chain. The FAA has not been involved in any 
official outreach to other Federal agencies regarding concerns about a 
potential impact on our Nation's manufacturing readiness level from a 
national security perspective.

    Reports indicated that the Boeing initially relied on the 
outsourcing of some of the 737 MAX work overseas, which could have 
contributed to the challenges with the MCAS.

    Question 3. Has FAA looked into this?
    Answer. Boeing utilizes both domestic and international suppliers 
for design and production work associated with its airplane production 
programs. Boeing did not utilize any international suppliers for design 
and production components of the 737 MAX Maneuvering Characteristics 
Augmentation System (MCAS). Additionally, from information obtained 
during the 737 MAX accident investigations, as well as other 
investigations of the 737 MAX certification, the FAA is not aware of 
any international supplier work that contributed to the 737 MAX 
accidents or challenges with the MCAS.

    When the previous CEO of Boeing testified before our committee last 
October, I asked him whether Boeing made a mistake in opposing robust 
independent regulatory oversight from FAA due to ``regulatory costs.'' 
After pressing him on the matter, he agreed that in hindsight, Boeing 
undervalued the role of an independent oversight. One example is that 
[Boeing] company managers rejected a backup system for determining 
speed, which might have alerted pilots to problems linked to two 737 
MAX crashes. A similar backup system is installed on the larger Boeing 
787 jet, but it was rejected for the 737 MAX because it could increase 
costs and training requirements for pilots.

    Question 4. What has FAA done to make sure this type of corner 
cutting is avoided?
    Answer. The FAA validates compliance with regulations and provides 
exceptions supported by safety data. The FAA has also increased our 
involvement in the review of the system safety analysis for major type 
design changes. Specifically, the FAA is increasing involvement in 
projects with a focus on assumptions made in support of critical 
failure conditions and evaluation of related probabilities of failure 
occurrence that would indicate the need for possible system 
redundancies. In addition, we are working closely with Boeing as it 
establishes a comprehensive Safety Management System so that decisions, 
such as those noted above, would be determined using a risk-based 
decision-making process. We have consistently made it clear that safety 
and quality need to be the top priorities in the design and 
manufacturing processes. Boeing's work to develop its Safety Management 
System is foundational to that effort and FAA will be closely 
monitoring its performance as SMS is implemented and operationalized.

    As ranking member of the Senate's Homeland Security Committee, I 
deal a lot with cybersecurity challenges in the Federal government. To 
deal with threats, the Federal government actually hires hackers to 
find our vulnerabilities and ensure the safe use of computer systems. 
The process that produced the MCAS does not seem to have followed this 
philosophy of inviting regulators to find its vulnerabilities. In fact, 
regulators claimed to not fully understand the MCAS.

    Question 5. How is FAA addressing this?
    Answer. Industry standards were applied to the development and 
certification of the flight control computer (FCC) software, including 
MCAS. These industry standards provide established processes to 
identify and address vulnerabilities in the design of software. This 
process includes extensive FAA involvement in the verification and 
validation aspects throughout the software development lifecycle, 
including four phases or stages of involvement (SOI) that `audit' the 
software requirements, analysis, and accomplishments. The audits ensure 
through robust development assurance process application that safety 
requirements are incorporated and the software will perform reliably. 
Although improvements regarding the implementation of the processes may 
be appropriate, the processes were properly applied to the MCAS, using 
assumptions that were consistent with industry practice and 
understanding prior to the accidents.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Baldwin to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    The Department of Transportation's Special Committee to Enhance 
Aviation Safety, commissioned to review the procedures of the FAA for 
product certification and processes followed by the FAA and Boeing 
during the certification of the 737 MAX 8, released findings and 
recommendations in January. Within its report, the Committee made 
findings and offered recommendations on better data gathering and 
utilization, noting that ``Better data gathering, targeted analysis by 
experts, and the use of all available data to develop and implement 
corrective actions to mitigate risk would bolster aviation safety.''
    FAA's timelines for delivering data tools for risk-based decision-
making occur between 2021 and 2025.

    Question 1. In the interim, what is FAA doing to provide the agency 
with sufficient tools to leverage the large amounts of data the agency 
has access to, but is unable to use for safety analysis because of 
limitations in IT infrastructure?
    Answer. The FAA assembled a Safety Data and Analysis Team (SDAT) of 
cross-functional subject matter experts representing all FAA lines of 
business and staff offices to improve the way safety data is 
consolidated, managed, and accessed agency-wide. This team has 
identified the safety data systems that are being registered in the 
agency's Enterprise Information Management (EIM) data repository. This 
repository provides awareness, centralization, and accessibility for 
improved data-driven, risk-based decision making. As part of the SDAT's 
efforts, the FAA developed a data governance portal to improve the 
quality of FAA's data inventory and ensure that data is easily 
discoverable. It also verifies the existence of key information to be 
used for statistical and reference purposes that has been captured in 
the portal for critical enterprise data assets.
    Additionally, offices across the FAA are collaborating, in 
conjunction with the FAA Chief Data Office, to apply data cleaning/
analysis tools and techniques to fuse previously separate aircraft 
safety data to provide a more complete, life-cycle view of aircraft 
safety. As part of these efforts, the FAA is developing and 
implementing analytic tools and capabilities needed to identify and 
assess aviation safety risk. These tools aim to support data 
visualization and understanding by the broad FAA workforce, as well as 
advanced analytics including text mining, machine learning, anomaly 
detection, regression, Bayesian networks, and causal diagrams.

   What is FAA's timeline for having sufficient data available 
        for broader use by FAA, including Aircraft Certification 
        engineers and inspectors, to make data-driven risk-based 
        analysis possible?
    Answer. The FAA currently collects and monitors safety data; 
however, the FAA is always looking for new sources of data and 
continues to build our capacity for enhanced trend analysis and 
decision-making. In alignment with FAA's commitment to data viability, 
information sharing, and integration of safety data at the agency 
level, the FAA implemented a five-year strategic Safety Data and 
Analysis Team (SDAT) Strategic Plan in FY19 plan to fulfill several 
major initiatives to improve agency safety data.

   Will this solution be in place prior to the MAX 737 8 return 
        to service?
    Answer. Foundational elements of the solution will be in place upon 
MAX 737-8 return to service with additional functionality being added 
as data and tools are approved for EIM use.

    The FY20 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act included $5 million for a veteran's pilot 
training grant program at FAA, in line with my bipartisan American 
Aviator Act.

    Question 2. What is FAA's current timeline to make grants available 
for eligible flight schools?
    Answer. The FAA initiated the Paperwork Reduction Act on the 
veterans pilot training grant in February 2020. The FAA continues to 
work with DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center leading 
the Forces to Flyers research initiative in order to incorporate 
applicable findings from the research program into the development of a 
grant program geared toward veterans.
    Forces to Flyers was a three-year research initiative announced in 
2017 to explore how best to assist veterans transitioning to new 
careers as pilots and form successful education paths. Due to the 
COVID-19 situation, results from Forces to Flyers research program were 
delayed because academic school years were disrupted, but the program 
recently wrapped up in October. We are awaiting the final report and 
its findings, and will then assess next steps. Additionally, the FAA 
has been actively working and making significant progress on two other 
new grant programs authorized in the FAA Reauthorization Act for 
workforce development of pilots and maintenance technicians.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jon Tester to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    Question 1. It is evident, through internal messages or 
whistleblower complaints, that both FAA and Boeing ODA employees face a 
lot of outside pressure to do their jobs as quickly as possible, 
because time and money are on the line. What steps are you taking to 
ensure that every single ODA employee feels like safety is their number 
one priority?
    Answer. The FAA is actively working to review and reform certain 
ODA practices and will issue an updated policy in 2021 addressing undue 
pressure and further defining communication expectations. This policy 
will emphasize safety as the top priority by providing clarity on undue 
pressure and the appropriate communication between unit members and the 
FAA. Specific to Boeing, the FAA has issued a proposed civil penalty 
against The Boeing Company (Boeing) related to `undue pressure' of 
Boeing ODA unit members. In addition, we have been working with Boeing 
to incorporate changes into the Boeing ODA procedures to establish 
additional restrictions that further protect ODA unit members from 
interference or undue pressure while executing their duties on behalf 
of the FAA. The FAA is also working closely with Boeing as it 
establishes a comprehensive Safety Management System, which will 
include continuous monitoring of Boeing's internal performance 
associated with the ODA as well as the broader company. The Boeing SMS 
will be foundational to ensuring that each employee clearly understands 
that safety is the number one priority, and that production deadlines 
and financial considerations are always subordinate to safety and 
quality. FAA will be closely monitoring their SMS as it is implemented 
and operationalized in 2021.

    Question 2. Both of the aircraft in question received recent 
routine maintenance prior to the crashes. Not only did these 
inspections fail to see the flaws with the Angle of Attack sensors, 
they also failed to flag certain wiring bundles as a potential hazard. 
What are you doing to ensure that the FAA leads the world in ensuring 
mechanical safety standards, and that as we move forward with aircraft 
safety improvements, we are keeping maintenance in mind?
    Answer. While we currently only have the final accident report for 
Lion Air, based on our review of the accident data, it is believed that 
only the Lion Air accident had an indication of maintenance associated 
with the AOA sensor. The AOA sensor on that Lion Air airplane received 
routine shop maintenance prior to the accident, during which it may 
have been mis-calibrated. However, the accident investigation could not 
confirm whether the AOA sensor was properly installed. The FAA verified 
that the established maintenance installation instructions would have 
identified a mis-calibrated AOA sensor on the airplane. Established 
maintenance practices would not require identification and separation 
of wires within AOA sensor wire bundles.
    Subsequent to the two 737 MAX accidents, Boeing reviewed the 
engineering analysis of the AOA sensor wire bundles. Based on this 
review, the FAA requested a design change, via a notice of proposed 
rulemaking revising the routing of AOA sensor wiring to separate the 
power and control wires. This design change complies with later safety 
standards than those that were applied to earlier versions of the 737.

    Question 3. The recent Department of Transportation Special 
Committee report came back with several recommendations for improving 
aircraft certification, including improving data sharing and management 
practices. What is the timeline for having sufficient data available 
for broader FAA workforce to do their job of making data-driven risk-
based analysis using the information that is currently available to 
them?
    Answer. In alignment with FAA's commitment to data viability, 
information sharing, and integration of safety data at the agency 
level, the FAA implemented a five-year strategic plan in FY 2019 to 
fulfill several major initiatives to improve agency safety data. A 
fundamental component of this plan is to develop and implement an 
Enterprise Information Management (EIM) platform that the FAA workforce 
can leverage to collect, store, access, and analyze agency data. The 
EIM platform is an FAA-developed, cloud-based, big data platform that 
consists of two key items:

   A large repository or ``Data Mall'' for FAA data that is 
        organized and cataloged for easy access, but safeguarded to 
        preserve its integrity and to protect data from unauthorized 
        access.

   A collection of curated technologies and tools to enable FAA 
        personnel to efficiently transform data into information.

    By Fall 2021, the FAA anticipates having governance in place, which 
will:

   Engage the FAA workforce in data management oversight and 
        sharing. This includes engaging data information stewards, end 
        users, and members of leadership to evaluate the effectiveness 
        of data governance in terms of data availability, metadata, and 
        data integrity.

   Continuously expand the establishment for safety data 
        governance requirements using a systematic approach beginning 
        with the most critical safety data resources.

   Refine our concepts, capabilities, and tools for advanced 
        safety analysis to identify and assess safety risk through on-
        going workforce engagement.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                        Hon. Stephen M. Dickson
    As part of the FAA's settlement agreement, FAA agreed to a ``Two 
Step'' process to address the concerns of Phoenix's surrounding 
communities and held a series of workshops in April of last year. The 
FAA received 1,526 comments from the Step Two workshops, almost all of 
them regarding noise and flight path concerns. The City of Scottsdale 
spent a significant amount of time and money to study and present 
alternatives to these newly proposed routes. In its response this past 
January, the FAA summarily rejected the proposals, stating that they 
would decrease safety and cause conflicts with other air traffic with 
no detailed explanation. The FAA also stated that it ``intends to 
continue the dialogue with local stakeholders about issues that are of 
interest to them, as we do in communities throughout the United 
States.''
    It has been six months since the FAA's response and the Agency has 
not yet initiated any dialog.

    Question 1. When and how will the FAA begin substantive discussions 
with citizens of impacted communities regarding this longstanding 
concern?
    Answer. The FAA appreciates the City of Scottsdale's thoughtful 
participation in the Step Two workshops, which were conducted as part 
of an agreement with the City of Phoenix and groups representing 
historic neighborhoods in Phoenix. The FAA complied with the terms of 
the agreement by implementing nine replacement west-bound departure 
procedures, which were the subject of a recently decided lawsuit, City 
of Phoenix, Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017). 
``Step Two'' of that process was designed to solicit information from 
the public that could be considered if, and when, the FAA began to 
modernize and improve the safety and efficiency of other aspects of 
that regional airspace. As part of the two-step process outlined in the 
agreement, the FAA conducted six public workshops and solicited public 
comments on two occasions.
    Although Step Two of that information-gathering process 
successfully concluded without FAA publishing any new air-traffic 
procedures, the FAA considered all of the public comments it received, 
including the proposal from the City of Scottsdale. The FAA's ``Summary 
of Step Two Comments,'' which was issued on January 10, 2020, listed 
some of the reasons the FAA had concerns with Scottsdale's proposals. 
Subsequently, the City of Scottsdale filed a lawsuit against the FAA, 
which is currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit.
    The FAA has since met twice with the City of Scottsdale. During 
those meetings, the FAA discussed the City's proposals and further 
explained why FAA believed they were not viable due to concerns about 
their safety and efficiency. The FAA continues to strive for ever-
increasing safety and efficiency of the national airspace, and to this 
end anticipates eventually proposing some procedure changes similar to 
those notional concepts shown to the public during the 2019 workshops.
    Those changes are being considered by the FAA for their potential 
to enhance safety and efficiency, however the City of Scottsdale noted 
in their May 23, 2019 comments on FAA's Step Two process that ``the FAA 
Concept 1 is a step in the right direction'' from the City's point of 
view. At the same time, FAA also received comments from other members 
of the public that did not support the notional concepts. These 
proposals are in the very preliminary stages, and any further 
development would first require the FAA to convene a Full Working Group 
pursuant to FAA Order 7100.41, Performance Based Navigation 
Implementation Process. As explained in the order, the working group 
would include airport authorities affected by the procedure changes, 
which would include both Phoenix and Scottsdale. FAA would look to the 
airport authorities to represent community interests and concerns 
during the working group's deliberations. In addition, FAA would 
provide opportunities for communities to engage in the process, seeking 
input from airport authorities and the local communities to understand 
the communities' challenges. The time-frame for any working group to 
convene, design air-traffic procedures, and begin implementation, is 
extremely long due to limited resources and the significant staffing 
constraints resulting from the COVID-19 public health emergency. Any 
future air-traffic procedures proposed as a result of that process will 
be developed in full compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act and the FAA's own processes for public engagement prior to 
implementation.

    Question 2. Is the FAA committed to considering changes that will 
provide some resolution to the citizens communities impacted by noise 
from eastbound departures?
    Answer. In FAA's enabling statute, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40101, Congress 
directed the FAA to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system 
in the world. Congress conferred the FAA with exclusive jurisdiction 
over the airspace to accomplish this mission. When the FAA implements 
air traffic procedures in pursuit of this mission, it must therefore 
prioritize the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System. 
As part of its work, the FAA engages with communities across the Nation 
and considers the input it receives. As an example, the FAA provides 
support to roundtables that represent communities surrounding airports, 
and considers recommended changes endorsed by those groups.
    With respect to the eastbound departures implemented in 2014 at 
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, the FAA completed an 
environmental review before implementing those procedures. The noise 
analysis supporting that environmental review concluded the procedures 
did not have the potential to cause any significant noise impacts. When 
the FAA refers to ``significant impact'' it is a reference to an 
objective legal standard. It is not FAA making a subjective statement 
about how any one person may perceive any type of noise.
    As mentioned above, FAA may propose additional changes to 
procedures at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport to improve the 
safety and efficiency of aircraft operations. A portion of those 
changes could affect eastbound departures and may also reduce some of 
the aircraft operations over Scottsdale. The working group that designs 
any such procedures will include representatives from both the 
Scottsdale and Phoenix Airports. Once those procedures are designed, 
they will be subject to environmental review and will be made available 
to the public prior to implementation.
    It is important to note that procedure changes can change the 
location of noise from aircraft operations, but they do not eliminate 
the noise itself. One purpose of the environmental review process will 
be to determine whether, and to what extent, the aircraft noise is 
being shifted to a different community.

    During the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC) meeting held this past 
December in McLean, VA, your Director of Air Traffic Operations in the 
FAA Western Service Area (Ms. Kim Stover) stressed the importance of 
``strategic engagement with communities.'' Community engagement and 
related noise concerns were made a standing agenda item for future NAC 
meetings. The NAC also reiterated that FAA's Regional Administrators 
should lead the community engagement team in their regions by 
supporting Community Roundtables and Congressional meetings.

    Question 3. Do you support frequent and effective community 
engagements with Arizona communities as FAA seeks to implement NextGen 
procedures there?
    Answer. Absolutely yes. The FAA values engagement with communities 
across the Nation as it implements procedure changes, including in 
Arizona. In 2018, as part of an agreement with the City of Phoenix, FAA 
replaced nine departure procedures that were at issue in City of 
Phoenix, Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017). Prior to 
implementing those procedures, the FAA prepared a noise screening 
analysis report to determine the noise impact of those procedures. The 
noise analysis concluded the procedures requested by the City of 
Phoenix would not result in a significant noise impact relative to the 
no action scenario. Even though an environmental impact statement was 
not required, the FAA shared the results of its environmental review 
with the public, held three workshops, and invited comments before 
implementing the procedures.
    Following the implementation of those procedures, the FAA held 
three more workshops to discuss the effectiveness of those procedures 
and invite comments on the potential for additional airspace changes. 
Although the FAA decided in January 2020 not to take any additional 
action as part of its agreement with the City of Phoenix and various 
historic groups, that decision does not preclude the agency from 
continuing to advance its mission to improve the safety and efficiency 
of the airspace above Phoenix and surrounding communities. The FAA has 
since met twice with the City of Scottsdale to discuss the possibility 
of future air-traffic procedure changes, even before any formal process 
has established what those air-traffic procedures might look like. 
However, as noted above, we are in very preliminary stages and intend 
to engage the affected airports authorities and local communities 
throughout the process.
    In the years since 2012, when Congress directed FAA to expedite 
implementation of Performance Based Navigation procedures nationwide, 
the FAA has developed a comprehensive and effective public engagement 
strategy that exceeds the agency's legal obligations under the National 
Environmental Policy Act and Administrative Procedure Act. These 
policies are explained on the agency's website: https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/community_involvement/. FAA will continue to use and refine 
those approaches in the coming years, and looks forward to continuing 
its community engagement efforts in Arizona and across the county.

    Question 4. Is the FAA considering lowering or altering its 
threshold for ``significant noise'' from 65 to 60 day-night average 
sound level or reducing in all residential areas to 55 DNL? If not, why 
not?
    Answer. The FAA defines significant noise exposure to residential 
land use as DNL 65dB. This threshold is based on Federal land use 
policy guidelines; codified under 14 CFR Part 150 and adopted for 
purposes of defining the significant noise impact criteria for 
assessment of Federal actions under National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). In the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, we were asked to evaluate 
alternative metrics to current average day-night level standard, such 
as use of actual noise sampling to address community airplane noise 
concerns. Please review our FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018: Section 
188 Report to Congress for the results of that effort.\1\
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    \1\ https://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/congress/media/Day-
Night_Average_Sound_
Levels_COMPLETED_report_w_letters.pdf

    Question 5. Does the FAA have a legal duty to protect the residents 
who live under flight paths from aircraft noise created by the FAA's 
changes to flight procedures at Phoenix Sky Harbor airport?
    Answer. Title 49, U.S. Code, section 40103(b) addresses ``the use 
of the navigable airspace'' and provides in subsection (b)(2) that 
``[t]he Administrator shall prescribe air traffic regulations on the 
flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for . . . 
protecting individuals . . . on the ground.'' Title 49, U.S. Code, 
section 44715(a)(1)(A) states, in pertinent part: ``To relieve and 
protect the public health and welfare from aircraft noise, the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, as he deems 
necessary, shall prescribe . . . regulations to control and abate 
aircraft noise.'' Under both of these statutory provisions, the FAA has 
discretion to determine what, if any, regulations are warranted in 
particular circumstances.
    Environmental considerations, including the potential impacts of 
aircraft noise from air traffic procedures, are a concern that the FAA 
takes seriously. When the FAA creates or amends air traffic procedures, 
it is required to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), as well as implementing regulations issued by the Council on 
Environmental Quality, and FAA's own NEPA procedures set forth in FAA 
Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures. These 
procedures require the analysis, and in many cases disclosure, of 
impacts in a range of environmental impact categories, including noise.
    Under NEPA, if an air traffic procedure proposed by FAA would cause 
a ``significant'' increase in noise, FAA must first prepare an 
``environmental impact statement.'' FAA's NEPA procedures define a 
``significance threshold'' for noise. Specifically, as set forth in FAA 
Order 1050.1F (Exhibit 4-1), an action would cause a significant noise 
impact if it would increase noise by DNL 1.5 dB in an area that is or 
would be exposed to noise above the DNL 65 dB level. An environmental 
impact statement must consider reasonable alternatives to the agency's 
proposal and consider input from the public. Although FAA has a legal 
duty under NEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to proposed actions 
that would have a significant noise impact, NEPA does not impose a duty 
to select the alternative with the least noise impact, nor does it 
impose a duty to mitigate noise impacts.
    In 2014, FAA proposed a number of procedure changes at Phoenix Sky 
Harbor Airport. As part of its NEPA review for those procedures, FAA 
prepared a noise screening analysis report to assess the environmental 
impact of those procedures. The noise screen concluded that the 
procedures would not cause a significant noise impact. More recently, 
in 2018, as part of an agreement with the City of Phoenix, FAA replaced 
nine departure procedures that were at issue in City of Phoenix, 
Arizona v. Huerta, 869 F. 3d 963 (D.C. Circuit 2017). Prior to 
implementing those procedures, FAA prepared another noise screening 
analysis report to determine the noise impact of those procedures. The 
noise analysis again concluded the procedures requested by the City of 
Phoenix would not result in a significant noise impact relative to the 
no action scenario. Even though an environmental impact statement was 
not required, FAA shared the results of its environmental review with 
the public and invited comments, which were considered by FAA, before 
implementing the procedures.

    Question 6. Does the FAA have the legal authority to mandate that 
all passengers and crew wear masks on commercial passenger flights 
during the pandemic? Has your staff performed a legal analysis? If yes, 
will you share that legal analysis?
    Answer. The FAA is responsible for promoting safe flight of civil 
aircraft in air commerce. Aviation safety is its mission. While the FAA 
remains steadfast in its focus on safety of flight during the COVID-19 
public health emergency, it is not a public health agency. Applicable 
statutes and case law do not provide the FAA with a clear mandate or 
guidance on protecting crewmember or passenger health with measures 
that are not directly related to the safety of flight. Therefore, the 
FAA would need to find a nexus between aviation safety and public 
health in order to use its legal authority to institute a mandate to 
wear face coverings on commercial passenger flights during the COVID-19 
public health emergency. In the past, the FAA has not used its aviation 
safety authority in prior public health emergencies to address public 
health concerns that do not threaten safety of flight. Using FAA safety 
authorities to address public health issues related to communicable 
diseases would be a significant policy change and expansion of the 
FAA's jurisdiction. The FAA has limited public health expertise and 
relies upon U.S. government public health agencies with that expertise 
to determine what public health actions might be appropriate. Through 
the COVID-19 public health emergency, the FAA has provided its aviation 
safety expertise to such agencies in review of their public health 
guidelines that could apply in an aviation environment. The FAA has 
collaborated with and looks to those agencies for promulgation of 
guidance and regulations on public health for passengers and 
crewmembers.