[Senate Hearing 116-580]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-580
PROMOTING SAFE SKIES
THROUGH SCANNING AND SCREENING:
OVERSIGHT OF AIR CARGO SECURITY
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FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-661 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas, AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on February 24, 2020................................ 1
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 1
Witnesses
John Beckius, Executive Director, Air Cargo Division,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Edward Freni, Director of Aviation, Massachusetts Port Authority. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Steven N. Urchuk, Chief Technology Officer, Analogic Corporation. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association..... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Jennifer Ritter, Flight Attendant, United Airlines, Association
of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO............................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
PROMOTING SAFE SKIES
THROUGH SCANNING AND SCREENING:
OVERSIGHT OF AIR CARGO SECURITY
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Boston, MA.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in
the Cathy Leonard-McLean Community Room, Rental Car Center,
Logan Airport, Hon. Ed Markey, presiding.
Present: Senator Markey [presiding].
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Good morning. As the Ranking Member of the
Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security, I call this important
hearing to order and I thank everyone for being here today.
Before I introduce our topic and our witnesses, I would like to
express my gratitude to the Commerce Committee Chairman Roger
Wicker, Ranking Member Maria Cantwell, and Subcommittee
Chairman Sullivan for supporting my request to hold this field
hearing.
I believe today's proceeding will be an excellent
opportunity to both conduct oversight and learn from the
Massachusetts model of aviation security. I would also like to
offer special thanks to the Massachusetts Port Authority and
its CEO, Lisa Wieland. Among many responsibilities, Massport
owns and operates Logan International Airport, the site of
today's field hearing. Massport was generous enough to not only
host this proceeding, but to send Ed Freni, its Director of
Aviation, to testify as an expert witness and I look forward to
hearing from his remarks.
Early in the morning on September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers
took control of four airplanes and changed our country forever.
Two of these aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11 and United
Airlines Flight 175, departed right here from Boston's Logan
Airport. 2,997 people were killed, in New York, Pennsylvania,
and Washington, D.C. When remembering 9/11, many people only
think about the victims at the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and they should be remembered, but we here in Boston
will never forget the lives of those who flew on the two planes
that left Logan Airport that day.
We still remember the workers from Massachusetts companies
like TJX, Akamai, and Genzyme, as well as so many others who
were tragically killed that September morning. In total, 206
victims of the September 11th attacks had ties to
Massachusetts. Nearly two decades later, these losses remain
devastating for communities across the commonwealth. They have
also motivated the great minds of this state to fight for
security and vigilance in our aviation system. In the aftermath
of tragedy, we came together, technology companies, airports,
airlines, flight attendants, pilots, and many more, to enhance
safety in the skies.
Here in Massachusetts, we continue to heed the call of the
9/11 Commission, which described ``failures of imagination'' as
a primary reason why we did not thwart the attacks before they
happened. We know that the country must do more than simply
prepare our defenses for the kinds of attacks we experienced 19
years ago. We must anticipate the loopholes that terrorists
could exploit today and in the future.
That is why, when Congress passed a law in 2007
implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, I
secured a provision that required 100 percent screening of air
cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Back then, and even
today, that cargo occupies 50 percent of the space in the belly
of passenger planes, and yet, prior to my law, almost all of
this cargo was not scanned for liquid, plastic, or conventional
explosives.
They scanned the bags of passengers but not of those
companies that were using the same planes for cargo. It made no
sense whatsoever. So, imagine that--before 2007, half of the
items that the flying public sat directly above did not belong
to anyone onboard and no one had physically checked them for
dangerous content or material. It was a glaring loophole in our
aviation security system just waiting to be exploited. And that
is why I was so proud to have closed it.
The reason that I knew about it was personnel here at Logan
Airport, including one particular gate attendant who had me
look out the window at a cargo truck that was coming across the
tarmac and he said to me, ``this is how crazy it is, none of
the cargo in that truck is going to be checked before it is put
on the plane that you are about to fly on, Congressman.'' We
have to close that loophole. And he was very aware, of course,
because Mohammed Atta and the other terrorist had been scoping
out Logan Airport for months before then. And so from that
moment on that became my mission, because on that issue and
many others it was the information that was given to me from
the personnel at Logan Airport as to where the apertures were,
where the potential vulnerabilities were that would have to be
shut down.
Now in order to meet my 100 percent screening mandate, the
Transportation Security Administration established the
Certified Cargo Screening Program. This program achieves
security while maintaining a steady flow of commercial goods by
allowing entities up and down the supply chain to scan air
cargo before it is loaded into the belly of passenger aircraft.
Cargo screening facilities must be certified and overseen by
the TSA, as well as use-only TSA approved technologies and
systems. There are currently 850 certified cargo screening
facilities in the United States, including 41 in Massachusetts.
Through this system, we are keeping passenger airlines secured
from previously unknown threats.
Making sure TSA's 100 percent screening program stays
effective is one of my top priorities, and a primary focus of
today's hearing will be determining what work remains to be
done. I intend to ask questions that will assess the challenges
we face in deploying the latest and greatest cargo screening
technologies, as well as how TSA's strained budget may be
impacting its ability to oversee air cargo security. But air
cargo is not the only area where threats might lurk. That's why
I also want to hear about our passenger and baggage screening
systems, the danger that drones flying near airports pose to
airplanes, and the cybersecurity of our increasingly
computerized aviation system. I have invited today's panelists
because they can speak to all of these issues and much more.
Our witnesses are experts who understand that ``never forget''
is more than a slogan, it is a commitment to action.
The effort to keep our skies safe and secure is as
important as it has ever been, and I look forward to hearing
your testimony on how we fulfill this ongoing mission. And I
want to thank all of you for being here and am glad now to
introduce you to the audience. First is Mr. John Beckius, the
Executive Director of TSA's Air Cargo Division.
This committee rightly established his office in the TSA
Modernization Act of 2018 to help improve our security
programs, and I am proud of this accomplishment. I am grateful
to hear his perspective on the current state of air cargo
security. Next is Mr. Ed Freni, the Director of Aviation for
the Massachusetts Port Authority. Mr. Freni manages all airside
and landside activities at Boston Logan International Airport,
Hanscom Field in Bedford, and Worcester Regional Airport. He
helped develop Logan's famous daily security briefing after the
September 11th attacks and has an extensive history of
fostering safety innovations at Massport.
Our third witness is Mr. Steve Urchuk, the Chief Technology
Officer for Analogic. Analogic is a technology company based in
Peabody, Massachusetts, that makes the kind of cutting-edge
scanning equipment that we need to secure air cargo, airports,
and airplanes. Mr. Urchuk's company employs over 500 people in
the commonwealth and exemplifies why Massachusetts isn't just
the bay state, it is the brain state that is leading the charge
for enhancing aviation security, and we are so proud of what
you do.
Next is Mr. Brandon Fried, the Executive Director of the
Airforwarders Association, a national group representing the
freight forwarding companies that serve as certified air cargo
screeners. With more than 38 years in the air cargo industry,
Mr. Fried has tremendous expertise to identify and discuss
today's security challenges.
And finally, Ms. Jennifer Ritter is a flight attendant for
United Airlines and a leader in the Association of Flight
Attendants. Ms. Ritter represents an essential community that
serves on the front-lines of aviation security. Flight
attendants are our truly first responders in the sky. Ms.
Ritter will offer the Committee an invaluable perspective that
we must hear.
So I thank each and every one of our witnesses for being
here today and I invite Mr. Beckius, whenever you are ready, to
please begin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN BECKIUS,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIR CARGO DIVISION,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Beckius. Good morning, Ranking Member Markey. I am John
Beckius, the Executive Director of TSA's Air Cargo Division.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding TSA's
Certified Cargo Screening Program. I am honored to be here and
grateful for the Subcommittee's continued support of TSA.
My testimony will highlight the benefits provided by the
CCSP, areas where the program can be strengthened, and the
actions we are taking to address those matters. The TSA
Modernization Act significantly enhanced our ability to execute
our mission and its implementation is a priority for the
agency. As it relates to air cargo, the TSA Modernization Act
includes a number of critically important provisions, including
direction to establish an air cargo division, which I now lead.
Additionally, the Act required TSA to complete a
feasibility study and a pilot program regarding the use of
computed tomography units for air cargo screening as well as a
review of the CCSP. TSA established the CCSP in 2009 as part of
its strategy to meet the implementing recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007 to screen 100 percent of the cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by August 3, 2010. To
accomplish that goal, TSA established the CCSP to allow United
States-based air cargo screening facilities to become certified
to screen air cargo under the CCSP and receive designation as a
certified cargo screening facility. The CCSP was developed----
Senator Markey. And again, CCSP is?
Mr. Beckius. Certified Cargo Screening Program.
Senator Markey. OK.
Mr. Beckius. Sorry, sir.
Senator Markey. No, just--just want to keep everyone in the
game here.
Mr. Beckius. Yes, thank you. The Certified Cargo Screening
Program was developed to allow U.S. air cargo supply chain
shippers and indirect air carriers to screen their cargo before
tendering it to domestic and foreign passenger air carriers,
helping to alleviate the cargo screening burden on the
carriers. Through the Certified Cargo Screening Program,
shippers and indirect air carriers volunteered to abide by TSA
regulations.
Today, there are hundreds of certified cargo screening
facilities in the United States, and these facilities are
typically located near large commercial airports. Certified
cargo screening facilities screen cargo using only TSA approved
methods such as advanced technology X-ray, electronic metal
detection, explosive trace detection, third-party K9 and
physical search.
TSA, through its compliance director and transportation
security inspectors, conduct inspections of those entities to
determine compliance with the Certified Cargo Screening
Standard Security Program and other TSA regulations. Per the
TSA Modernization Act, TSA reviewed the CCSP in 2019 to
identify--to evaluate the program and identify vulnerabilities,
and assess the effectiveness of information sharing with our
air cargo security stakeholders. Through our review, TSA found
the program contributed to unimpeded movement of goods through
a secure U.S. supply chain. Many shippers view it as their
preferred solution to transport commodities across the United
States and abroad.
Additionally, TSA effectively shares information with air
cargo security stakeholders through the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, working groups, industry conferences, and
secure TSA web boards. Through our review, TSA also learned of
a number of program vulnerabilities, including instances of
ineffective screening or failure to screen, differences between
the vetting requirements for cargo screeners at certified cargo
screening facilities and those with passenger air carriers, as
well as potential shortfalls in screening capacitors. Since
then, TSA has taken numerous steps to improve the screening
program.
From a screening perspective, TSA supports innovative ways
to improve security, effectiveness, and efficiency. To that
end, TSA created and implemented a Certified Cargo Screening
Program third-party K9, which permits private K9 companies to
become TSA-regulated entities authorized to screen our cargo.
We also work closely with screening technology manufacturers on
assessing ways to improve technology to meet security standards
and industry needs. TSA regularly updates the program to
address vulnerabilities identified through agency reviews,
inspections, engagements with industry, and threat
intelligence.
We are in the midst of planning new policies and procedures
to improve the program moving forward, including updating
security policies to meet heightened air cargo security
requirements approved by the International Civil Aviation
Organization, as well as working with screening technology
developers to increase the affordability and expanded use of
computed tomography. Securing our Nation's aviation
transportation system is complex and we cannot do it alone.
The Certified Cargo Screening Program is an important tool
that helps address evolving threats while also meets the needs
of the air cargo industry to ensure air commerce remains both
secure and efficient. TSA will continue to engage with
stakeholders and Congress as we look to continue enhancing the
security, posture, and effectiveness of air cargo security
overall. Ranking Member Markey, thank you again for the
opportunity to speak here today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beckius follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Beckius, Executive Director, Air Cargo
Division, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
Good Morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Certified
Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). I am John Beckius, Executive Director
of TSA's Air Cargo Division. I am honored to be here and grateful for
the subcommittee's continued support for TSA and its critically
important mission to secure the Nation's transportation system while
ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA remains
resolute in countering threats to aviation and protecting both the
civil aviation system and traveling public. To that end, TSA
continuously evaluates ways to raise the baseline for all elements of
aviation security, including air cargo security. My testimony will
highlight the benefits provided by CCSP, areas where the program can be
strengthened based on our recent review of the program, and the actions
we are taking to address those matters.
The October 5, 2018 enactment of the TSA Modernization Act, the
agency's first comprehensive reauthorization since inception, has
significantly enhanced our ability to execute our mission, and its
implementation is a priority for the Agency. As of today, TSA has
completed nearly 80 percent of the Act's requirements that have
deadlines. Of particular relevance to this hearing, the TSA
Modernization Act includes a number of critically important provisions
associated with air cargo security. These provisions include direction
to establish an air cargo division, which is the organization I now
lead, to complete a feasibility study and pilot program regarding the
use of computed tomography units for air cargo screening, and to
conduct a review of the CCSP.
TSA established the CCSP in 2009 as part of its strategy to meet
the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(9/11 Act) mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 3, 2010. Prior to the enactment of the 9/
11 Act and the existence of the CCSP, only passenger air carriers were
authorized to screen air cargo transported on their aircraft. To meet
that requirement, TSA established a regulatory program that allows
United States-located air cargo screening facilities to become
certified to screen air cargo under the CCSP, and receive designation
as Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF).
There are currently 714 CCSFs throughout the United States, located
primarily in close geographic proximity to the largest commercial
airports. The CCSP was specifically developed to allow air cargo supply
chain Shippers and Indirect Air Carriers (IACs) located in the United
States to screen their air cargo before tendering it to domestic and
foreign passenger carriers, helping to alleviate the cargo screening
burden on the carriers.
Through CCSP, Shippers and IACs may screen air cargo so long as
they abide by TSA air cargo screening regulations. The TSA application
process to become a CCSP holder and establish a CCSF screening
location(s), requires the applicant to provide their legal operating
business name, copies of government issued identifications of required
employees, and a Security Threat Assessment for all required
individuals. In order to become certified, a potential CCSF location
must ensure TSA standards for physical access control to the facility,
personnel security through employee vetting, procedural security to
properly screen and maintain chain of custody for screening cargo,
internal facility physical and security controls preventing access to
screened cargo by unauthorized individuals. Once the information is
reviewed and vetted by TSA, the applicant must have TSA certify a
potential CCSF location not less than 90 calendar days before the
applicant intends to begin operations.
Once certified, CCSFs are required to screen cargo using only TSA-
approved screening technologies and methods. These include Advance
Technology X-ray (AT X-ray), Explosive Trace Detection (ETD),
Electronic Metal detection (EMD), Explosive Trace Detection (EDS),
third party canines, and physical search. Once screened, the CCSF must
implement chain-of custody measures within their facility and during
transport to a passenger carrier or airport. Air cargo may only be
screened and handled by employees vetted through a Security Threat
Assessment (STA). These processes help ensure the security of the
screening process and the screened cargo throughout the air cargo
supply chain prior to tendering it to a passenger aircraft.
TSA, through its Compliance Directorate and Transportation Security
Inspectors, conducts inspections of CCSFs to determine compliance with
49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1549, the Certified Cargo Screening
Standard Security Program (CCSSSP), and other applicable TSA security
requirements. Inspections of CCSFs address the full scope of cargo
security requirements--from acceptance of air cargo to transfer of air
cargo to a passenger aircraft--to determine compliance, as well as
identify any security vulnerabilities.
Currently there are 377 TSA Cargo Inspectors nationwide. In Fiscal
Year 2019, TSA conducted 1,810 CCSF inspections. As a result of these
inspections, there were 379 individual findings of violations of TSA
security requirements, ranging from lower risk areas such as
administrative and training requirements to 63 findings of violations
that were subsequently investigated in high risk areas such as how
cargo is accepted and screened. TSA may also address violations through
on-the-spot discussion or corrections, dependent on the nature of the
violation. TSA conducts at least one comprehensive inspection annually
of each independent and Indirect Air Carrier CCSF.
As required by the TSA Modernization Act, TSA reviewed the CCSP
last year to evaluate the program, identify vulnerabilities, and assess
the effectiveness of information sharing with air cargo security
stakeholders. The report provided to Congress in July 2019 details our
findings, improvements made, and planned actions.
During our review, TSA has found that the CCSP has contributed to
the unimpeded movement of goods through a secure U.S. supply chain and
many shippers view it as their preferred solution to transport
commodities across the United States and abroad. The program also
allows regulated entities to contract with another entity to screen air
cargo, if the regulated entity can not or does not want to screen air
cargo.
The review also found that TSA effectively shared information with
air cargo security stakeholders through a variety of ways. For
instance, TSA industry engagement managers work directly with air cargo
associations and other industry stakeholders at the executive level,
while TSA principal security inspectors provide CCSF-level engagement
for policy interpretation and general guidance. TSA also shares
information through the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Air
Cargo subcommittee, industry working groups, industry conferences,
speaking engagements, and secure TSA web boards.
Through our review, TSA learned of a number of program
vulnerabilities, including identified instances of ineffective
screening or a failure to screen; differences between the vetting
requirements for cargo screeners at CCSFs and the higher requirements
for air cargo screeners employed by or acting as an authorized
representative for a passenger air carrier; and, potential shortfalls
in screening capacity. TSA has taken numerous steps to improve the
screening program and the vulnerabilities identified in it.
From a screening perspective, TSA is supporting innovative ways to
improve both security effectiveness and efficiency. To that end, TSA
created and implemented a CCSP canine program (CCSP-K9), generally
known as ``third-party canine.'' This cargo screening program permits
private canine companies to apply to become a TSA-regulated entity
which is authorized to screen air cargo. The implementation of CCSP-K9
provides another effective option to screen air cargo and may offset
potential vulnerability issues due to expected increases in screening
volume when International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) screening
requirements for explosive detection for full all-cargo carriers takes
effect in June 2021.
TSA regularly updates the CCSP to address vulnerabilities
identified by TSA reviews, TSA inspections, engagement with industry,
and threat intelligence. For example, in December 2018, TSA enhanced
existing security measures and established new procedures related to
air cargo chain-of-custody, tendering, and screening technologies.
In addition to what is currently being done to address the
identified vulnerabilities, TSA is in the midst of planning new
policies and procedures to improve the CCSP moving forward. For
example, TSA is enacting new security policies consistent with
heightened air cargo security standards approved by ICAO; working with
screening technology developers to increase the affordability and
expand the use of Computed Tomography (CT) technology in the cargo
screening environment; and, exploring ways to apply screening best
practices and options to require all CCSF employees to undergo a
criminal history records check in addition to the current security
threat assessment.
Securing the Nation's aviation transportation system is a complex
task and we cannot do it alone. The CCSP is an important tool that
helps address evolving threats while also meeting the needs of the air
cargo industry to ensure air cargo commerce remains both secure and
efficient. The CCSP will continue to serve as a tool for the air cargo
industry to meet the 100 percent screening requirements of the 9/11 Act
and ensure the security of air cargo and the safety of the traveling
public. With new innovative solutions, such as the CCSP-K9, the CCSP is
well positioned to serve as a means to meet the expected increase in
demand for air cargo screening capacity resulting from the change in
ICAO standards, which take effect in June 2021. TSA will continue to
engage with stakeholders and Congress as we look to continue enhancing
the security posture and screening effectiveness of air cargo screening
overall.
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Beckius, very much. Mr.
Freni.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD FRENI, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION, MASSACHUSETTS
PORT AUTHORITY
Mr. Freni. Good morning, Ranking member Markey. On behalf
of the Massachusetts Port Authority, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to testify before the Senate Commerce Committee
on Security and for your ongoing commitment to innovation in
aviation security. As the Director of Aviation at Massport, I
would like to welcome you to Boston Logan International
Airport. We are honored to host this important meeting and look
forward to discussing ways to enhance security for air travel.
At Massport, safety and security is our number one
priority. As New England's most critical transportation
infrastructure, moving people and cargo around the world,
Massport is committed to addressing the security challenges of
today and preparing for the threats of tomorrow. The dynamic
nature of today's security threats, both physical and cyber,
present an ever-changing environment for Massport and our
partners worldwide. Working with our Federal partners, State,
and local emergency responders and the greater airport
community, we continually enhance and refresh our approach to
emerging risks in order to maintain the highest level of safety
and security at all our facilities.
An informed, vigilant, and engaged airport community is and
always will be our greatest asset in identifying potential
risks. Education and engagement is a critical component of our
overall safety program, which is based on lessons learned, real
world experiences, and best practices that are part of our
safety and security culture here at Massport. Most notably,
since the tragedy of 9/11, Massport has implemented an
aggressive, smart, and focused security initiatives to
strengthen defenses against potential threats. Starting on the
afternoon of 9/11 and continuing non-stop almost 20 years
later, each and every day at 8:30 in the morning, leadership of
Massport, the airlines, law enforcement agencies, contractors,
vendors, and Federal partners convene to discuss topics of
current significance and set the priorities and actions of the
coming day.
In fact, today we had about 70 people attend the 8:30 a.m.
meeting--of which I was there. The security briefing, as we
call it, is not just about what happened the past 24 hours and
what is upcoming in the next 24 hours, it is an opportunity for
the airport community to connect with peers and partners face
to face. Whether it is coordinating response to the coronavirus
outbreak or sharing intelligence on global security issues such
as the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani or discussing
the solutions to the evolving cyber security issues, Massport
is leaning forward aggressively to help keep our employees,
business partners, and traveling public safe.
Many other airport management teams have looked to Boston
as a model and have sought to establish a security briefing for
the respective airports. However, no other airport in the U.S.
has been able to match our track record on a day-in and day-out
basis. Of significance to me personally, each and every
stakeholder has a chance to participate and listen to
discussion, ask questions, take back information to share with
their organizations from a single source of truth and
authority. This diverse group of professionals, providing
expert perspectives and facts, instills confidence and is a
powerful reminder of our mission every day. This is only
possible due to the widespread commitment by every stakeholder
involved in their willingness to be fully engaged as
participants. The security briefing has created an enduring
network within our community and has vastly strengthened the
landscape of the airport.
As an example, Boston Logan was selected by the TSA
Innovation Task Force site in 2017. Through this program, the
most advanced security technologies are tested in the field in
participating airports. Working with the TSA, Massport deployed
Automated Screening Lanes, ASLs, at almost every checkpoint at
Logan Airport, significantly improving the screening process.
Today, Boston Logan International Airport is the premier
airport for the greater Boston metropolitan area, as well as
the international gateway for much of New England. Logan's
economic impact is estimated by the state to be more than $16.3
billion annually. And in 2019, more than 42 million passengers
traveled through Logan Airport to one of our 137 destinations,
comprised of 79 nonstop domestic destinations and 58 nonstop
international markets.
Boston Logan is not only the gateway to the world for
travelers, but it also helps power global commerce by moving a
diverse and growing mix of cargo throughout the globe. In 2018,
334,000 metric tons of cargo passed through the airport. Of
that, 132,000 metric tons were international, and over 90
percent in the belly cargo transported by passenger aircraft.
Although belly cargo provides a great amount of flexibility for
shippers, we are cognizant that terrorist organizations have
tried to bypass passenger screening by sneaking explosives in
cargo holds on commercial jets.
In 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was able to mail
explosives hidden in a printer cartridge as cargo aboard a
Qatar Airways passenger plane. We commend the leadership of
Senator Markey and others in Congress who helped pass
legislation ensuring 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft is screened per the TSA regulations. This
was a critical step in protecting the aviation industry. As a
result of this law, the TSA created the Certified Cargo
Screening Program, CCSP. This has allowed TSA-certified cargo
screening facilities and vetted shippers to screen air cargo
earlier in the supply chain. The facilities screen cargo using
TSA-approved methods and chain-of-custody measures.
The CCSP has been instrumental in ensuring cargo on
passenger planes meets the screening standards mandated by law
so that belly cargo does not become the soft underbelly of our
aviation defense measures. Our passengers and flight crews
expect it and deserve it. We also know terrorists have tried to
exploit security loopholes in cargo-only flights. The so-called
Islamic state terrorist group in 2017 was able to ship
explosives from Turkey to Australia as part of a foiled plot.
Massport supports rules by the International Civil Aviation
Organization known as ICAO, requiring the screening of cargo
transported on cargo-only aircraft by June 2021. According to
the Federal Aviation Administration's, FAA's, Aerospace
Forecast Fiscal Years 2019-2039 report, cargo-only carriers
make up nearly 80 percent of the revenue ton-miles. Enhancing
security on cargo-only flights will protect more lives in the
air and on the ground. An important means of meeting that
requirement is the use of TSA-certified third-party canine
screening.
Utilizing third-party canine screening allows airlines to
inspect cargo without impeding the pace of commerce, and Logan
is on track to implement this screening method. Moving cargo
around the world in a safe and secure manner is a shared
responsibility throughout the entire logistics chain. In order
to have confidence in the shared responsibility system, we must
have confidence in the people who are part of the system.
Identifying threats from within, both on and off airports, is a
key component of that. Massport served on the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee's Insider Threat committee, which provided
recommendations to the TSA Administrator on inside threat best
practices. We fully support those recommendations and encourage
the TSA to adopt those standards.
As the volume of passengers and cargo continue to increase,
another challenge airports face is keeping pace with the
infrastructure investment requirements needed to safely and
securely move cargo. The FAA Aerospace Forecast report also
predicts that U.S. airlines will reach 1.3 billion passengers
in 2039, and nearly double the cargo traffic as measured by
revenue ton miles. Airport operators need the support of our
Federal partners to help us build modern and efficient
facilities.
Increasing the cap on the Passenger Facility Charge, PFC,
is critical to our ability to meet increasing demands. Massport
also supports legislation championed by Senator Markey that
would ensure the September 11th Security Fee goes to its
intended use, improving security at our airports via our
partners at the TSA, instead of allowing Congress to reallocate
those funds for other purposes.
At Massport, our mission is to safely, securely, and
efficiently connect Massachusetts and New England to the world.
Massport supports our partners, particularly the TSA, Customs
and Border Protection, and air carriers in their efforts to
enhance security procedures across all of our facilities and
for all cargo types.
Through strong relationships with our partners, keen
awareness, and mitigation of security threats, Massport strives
to have the safest airports in the world. I want to thank you
for the opportunity to testify in front of the Subcommittee
today, and I would be glad to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freni follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Freni, Director of Aviation,
Massachusetts Port Authority
Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of the Massachusetts Port
Authority, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Senate
Commerce Subcommittee on Security, and for your ongoing commitment to
innovation in aviation security. As the Director of Aviation at
Massport, I'd like to welcome you to Boston Logan International
Airport. We are honored to host this important hearing, and look
forward to discussing ways to enhance the security of air travel.
At Massport, safety and security is our number one priority. As New
England's most critical transportation infrastructure, moving people
and cargo around the world, Massport is committed to addressing the
security challenges of today and preparing for the threats of tomorrow.
The dynamic nature of today's security threats--both physical and
cyber--present an ever-changing environment for Massport and our
partners worldwide. Working with our Federal partners, state and local
emergency responders, and the greater airport community, we continually
enhance and refresh our approach to emerging risks in order to maintain
the highest level of safety and security at all of our facilities.
An informed, vigilant, and engaged airport community is--and always
will be--our greatest asset in identifying potential risks. Education
and engagement is a critical component of our overall safety program,
which is based on lessons learned, real-world experiences, and best
practices that are part of the safety and security culture here at
Massport. Most notably, since the tragedy of September 11th, Massport
has implemented an aggressive program of smart and focused security
initiatives to strengthen defenses against potential threats. Starting
on the afternoon of 9/11/2001, and continuing nonstop for almost 20
years, each and every day at 8:30 in the morning leadership from
Massport, the airlines, law enforcement agencies, contractors, vendors
and Federal partners convene to discuss topics of current significance
and set the priorities and actions for the coming day. The Security
Briefing, as we call it, is not just about what happened in the past 24
hours and what is upcoming in the next 24 hours; it is an opportunity
for the airport community to connect with peers and partners face-to-
face. Whether it's coordinating a response to the Coronavirus outbreak,
sharing intelligence on global security issues such as the death of
Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, or discussing solutions to evolving
cybersecurity issues, Massport is leaning forward aggressively to help
keep our employees, business partners, and the traveling public safe.
Many other airport management teams have looked to Boston as a
model, and have sought to establish a Security Briefing for their
respective airports; however, no other airport in the United States has
been able to match our track record on a day-in and day-out basis. Of
significance to me personally, each and every stakeholder has the
chance to participate and listen to the discussion, ask questions, and
take back information to share with their organizations from a single
source of truth and authority. This diverse group of professionals
providing expert perspectives and facts instills confidence, and is a
powerful reminder of our mission every day. This is only possible due
to the widespread commitment by every stakeholder involved, and their
willingness to be fully engaged as participants.
The Security Briefing has created an enduring network within our
airport community, and has vastly strengthened the landscape of the
Airport. As an example, Boston Logan was selected as a TSA Innovation
Task Force site in 2017. Through this program, the most advanced
security technologies are tested in the field at participating
airports. Working with the TSA, Massport deployed Automated Screening
Lanes (ASLs) at almost every checkpoint at Boston Logan, significantly
improving the screening process.
Today, Boston Logan International Airport is the premier airport
for the greater Boston metropolitan area, as well as the international
gateway for much of New England. Logan's economic impact is estimated
by the state to be more than $16.3 billion annually. In 2019, more than
42 million passengers traveled through Logan Airport to one of our 137
nonstop destinations, comprised of 79 domestic and 58 international
markets. Boston Logan is not only the gateway to the world for
travelers, but it also helps power global commerce by moving a diverse
and growing mix of cargo throughout the globe. In 2018, 334,000 metric
tons of cargo passed through the airport. Of that, 132,000 metric tons
were international, and over 90 percent is belly cargo transported on
passenger aircraft.
Although belly cargo provides a great amount of flexibility for
shippers, we are cognizant that terrorist organizations have tried to
bypass passenger screening by sneaking explosives in cargo holds on
commercial jets. In 2010, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula was able
to mail explosives hidden in a printer cartridge as cargo aboard a
Qatar Airways passenger plane. We commend the leadership of Senator
Markey and others in Congress who helped pass legislation ensuring 100
percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened, per
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulations. This was a
critical step in protecting the aviation industry. As a result of this
law, the TSA created the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). This
has allowed TSA-certified air cargo screening facilities and vetted
shippers to screen air cargo earlier in the supply chain. The
facilities screen cargo using TSA-approved methods and chain-of-custody
measures. The CCSP has been instrumental in ensuring cargo on passenger
planes meets the screening standards mandated by law so that belly
cargo does not become the soft underbelly of our aviation defense
measures. Our passengers and flight crews expect it, and deserve it.
We also know terrorists also have tried to exploit security
loopholes in cargo-only flights. The so-called Islamic State terrorist
group in 2017 was able to ship explosives from Turkey to Australia as
part of a foiled plot.i Massport supports rules by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requiring the
screening of cargo transported on cargo-only aircraft by June 2021.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Aerospace
Forecast Fiscal Years 2019-2039 report, cargo-only carriers make up
nearly 80 percent of the revenue ton-miles.ii Enhancing
security on cargo-only flights will protect more lives in the air and
on the ground. An important means of meeting that requirement is the
use of TSA-certified third-party canine screening. Utilizing third-
party canine screening allows airlines to inspect cargo without
impeding the pace of commerce, and Logan is on track to implement this
screening method.
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\i\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-security-raids/
islamic-state-behind-australians-foiled-etihad-meat-mincer-bomb-plot-
police-idUSKBN1AJ367
\ii\ https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2019-39_FAA_
Aerospace_Forecast.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving cargo around the world in a safe and secure manner is a
shared responsibility throughout the entire logistics chain. In order
to have confidence in the shared responsibility system, we must have
confidence in the people who are part of the system. Identifying
threats from within--both on and off airports--is a key component of
that. Massport served on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee's
Insider Threat Subcommittee, which provided recommendations to the TSA
Administrator on insider threat best practices. We fully support those
recommendations and encourage the TSA to adopt those standards.
As the volume of passengers and cargo continue to increase, another
challenge airports face is keeping pace with the infrastructure
investment requirements needed to safely and securely move cargo. The
FAA Aerospace Forecasts report also iii predicts that U.S.
airlines will reach 1.3 billion passengers in 2039, and nearly double
the cargo traffic as measured by revenue ton miles. Airport operators
need the support of our Federal partners to help us build modern and
efficient facilities. Increasing the cap on the Passenger Facility
Charge is critical to our ability to meet increasing demands. Massport
also supports legislation championed by Senator Markey that would
ensure the September 11th Security Fee goes to its intended use--
improving security at our airports via our partners at the TSA, instead
of allowing Congress to reallocate those funds for other purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\iii\ https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2019-39_FAA_
Aerospace_Forecast.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At Massport, our mission is to safely, securely, and efficiently
connect Massachusetts and New England to the world. Massport supports
our partners, particularly the TSA, CBP and air carriers, in their
efforts to enhance security procedures across all of our facilities and
for all cargo types. Through strong relationships with our partners,
keen awareness and mitigation of security threats, Massport strives to
have the safest airports in the world. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify in front of the subcommittee today. I would be glad to take any
questions.
Senator Markey. Mr. Freni, thank you. Mr. Urchuk.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN N. URCHUK,
CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, ANALOGIC CORPORATION
Mr. Urchuk. Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of Analogic
Corporation, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security, and for your
support of Massachusetts businesses and technology development.
I am very pleased to appear before you to discuss Analogic
Corporation's long, proud history of aviation security
equipment design and manufacturing, and present our future
technology roadmap to improve aviation security.
Based north of Boston, Analogic employs over 570 technical,
manufacturing, and administrative workers in Massachusetts, and
has approximately 900 employees overall. In my current role as
Chief Technology Officer, I am responsible for technology
strategy and advance technology development at Analogic.
Previously, I led Analogic's CT product development efforts for
both medical and aviation security applications. For over 40
years, Analogic has been a technology leader in the medical
imaging field. We currently sell subsystems and full systems to
X-ray, Magnetic Resonance, and Computed Tomography Original
Equipment Manufacturers. And over the last 20 years, we
pioneered the application of CT to explosive threat detection.
In the U.S., through our partner L3Harris, we have
delivered over 900 eXaminer 3Dx CT systems to the TSA for
checked baggage screening. More recently, we have deployed over
10 of our new ConneCT checkpoint CT systems to several U.S.
airports, including Miami, Tampa, and Detroit, in cooperation
with TSA and also American Airlines who sponsored some of those
deployments. Delta Airlines has also recently informed Analogic
of their decision to deploy ConneCT to their ongoing terminal
improvements in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York's LaGuardia
airports.
Analogic is focused on commitment and years of experience
with CT technology to bring to market the next generation in 3D
X-ray imaging systems in the form of the ConneCT and similar
products. Analogic innovations include compact, rugged system
designs that eliminate the complexity and cost associated with
conventional CT systems, and also advanced algorithm and
networking capabilities to support threat detection and remote
screening of luggage. Of particular interest for today's
discussion, Analogic has extended the ConneCT technology
platform to include a new 1000 item per hour, 1 meter wide by
0.8 m high tunnel system that shares the same simplified design
of our smaller checkpoint sibling. It is particularly well
suited for air cargo screening, we believe, because in a
passenger belly hole environment, cost effectiveness, threat
detection are a premium--speed is perhaps not as important.
Whereas, in dedicated passenger aircraft cargo screening,
such as you have in the airport here today, very high
throughput expensive conveyor systems are often used. Really, I
think, when we think about these systems, the very low cost of
ownership, upgradability, and a very effective threat detection
system is key. And we believe that by leveraging latest
technology developments, we can bring this--the type of
solutions that are coming into the checkpoint and now into the
air cargo environment in a very cost-effective manner.
Analogic is committed to delivering this type of technology
to this critically important market. Over the very near term,
Analogic looks forward to working with the TSA and our trial
partners to gain approval and then qualification of our 1,000
bags per hour screening system. Under the TSA's Aviation Cargo
Screening Technology List, we and our industry partners welcome
the opportunity to develop screening solutions that meet the
needs of the aviation security community.
It is our hope that together we can define new screening
methods that improve the security of our transportation system.
I appreciate this opportunity to share our views, and I look
forward to answering any question you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Urchuk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven N. Urchuk, Chief Technology Officer,
Analogic Corporation
Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of Analogic Corporation, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before the Senate Commerce Subcommittee
on Security, and for your support of Massachusetts businesses and
technology development. I am very pleased to appear before you to
discuss Analogic Corporation's long, proud history of aviation security
equipment design and manufacturing and present our future technology
roadmap to improve aviation screening. Based north of Boston, Analogic
employs over 570 technical, manufacturing and administrative workers in
Massachusetts and has approximately 900 employees overall. In my
current role as Chief Technology Officer, I am responsible for
technology strategy and advance technology development at Analogic.
Previously, I led Analogic's CT product development efforts for both
medical and aviation security applications.
For over 40 years, Analogic has been a technology leader in the
medical imaging field. We currently sell subsystems and full systems to
X-ray, Magnetic Resonance and Computed Tomography (CT) Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). Over the last 20 years, we pioneered
the application of CT to explosive threat detection. In the U.S.,
through our partner L3Harris, we have delivered over 900 eXaminer 3Dx
CT systems to the TSA for checked baggage screening. More recently,
Analogic has deployed over 10 of our new ConneCT checkpoint CT systems
to several U.S. airports, including Miami, Tampa and Detroit, for
checkpoint screening in partnership with TSA and American Airlines.
Delta Airlines also recently informed Analogic of their decision to
deploy ConneCT to their ongoing terminal improvements in Atlanta, Los
Angeles and New York's LaGuardia airports.
Analogic's focused commitment and years of experience with CT
technology has allowed us to bring to market the next generation in 3D
X-ray imaging in the form of the ConneCT. Key Analogic innovations
include compact, rugged system designs that eliminate the complexity
and cost associated with conventional CT systems and advanced algorithm
and networking capabilities to support threat detection and remote
screening. Of particular interest for today's discussion, Analogic has
extended the ConneCT technology platform to include a new 1000 item per
hour, 1 meter wide by 0.8 m high tunnel system that shares the same
simplified design as its smaller checkpoint sibling, but is
particularly well suited for the screening of the air cargo carried on
passenger aircraft. In these environments, threat detection,
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness are at a premium. Dedicated
passenger aircraft cargo screening systems generally do not need the
high throughput requirements normally associate with the premium
checked baggage systems used at large airports and in the ultra-high-
speed screening of packages carried by delivery service companies on
freight aircraft. They do, however, require low cost of ownership,
upgradeability, and the effective, accurate threat detection that, so
far, only CT can provide. Leveraging the latest technology and system
designs, air cargo CT can be provided in an extremely cost-effective
manner. Analogic is committed to delivering high-quality CT technology
for this critically important market.
Looking to the future, it's worth noting that unlike conventional
X-ray systems, 3D imaging lends itself to automatic threat detection,
which allows the equipment to be certified to TSA's air cargo standard
and can be used to find prohibited items and other anomalies using
machine learning algorithms. We expect remote screening, via locally
and regionally networked workstations, to be an important component of
air cargo screening. Connecting a geographically diverse set of systems
to central locations should improve operational efficiency and ensure
quality control of the screening process. There is also the potential
to integrate secondary threat detection and analytics into the process,
providing an additional layer of detection capability and operational
awareness.
The ability to integrate with different vendor solutions using an
open platform is another emerging requirement in aviation security that
should carry over to air cargo screening. The use of standardized data
formats, such as DICOS for image data and threat reports, will be
important. Similarly, third party algorithms, developed in cooperation
with the equipment vendors will be needed. Finally, we expect that
certain vendors may specialize in providing networking and image review
services. Analogic welcomes these initiatives and anticipates there to
be considerable technology and business model innovation as air cargo
screening is modernized.
Over the very near term, Analogic looks forward to working with the
TSA and our trial partners to gain approval and then qualification of
our 1000 bags hour screening system on TSA's Aviation Cargo Screening
Technology List (ACSTL). We and our industry partners welcome the
opportunity to develop screening solutions that meet the needs of the
aviation security community. It is our hope that together we can define
new screening methods that improve the security of our transportation
system.
I appreciate having this opportunity to share our views, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Senator Markey. Thank you very much. Mr. Fried.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIRFORWARDERS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Fried. Senator Markey, thank you for this opportunity
to present the views this morning at the Airforwarders
Association on air cargo security. Our association represents
250 air freight forwarders and supporting companies employing
tens of thousands of employees and dedicated contractors
ranging from firms with fewer than 20 people to organizations
with over 1,000. We move freight globally in the most time and
cost efficient manner being on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship.
We are the travel agents for cargo.
We have worked closely with TSA since its inception and
committed millions of dollars to ensure that our role in the
security chain is secure. We play an integral role to ensure
the safety and security of shipments traveling on both domestic
and international airlines. We know that terrorists remain
interested in airplanes and therefore are looking for any
possible vulnerabilities in the system.
So as we have heard this morning, to meet the 2010 100
percent air cargo screening requirement on passenger flights
arriving and departing U.S. airports, TSA implemented this
CCSP, certifying manufacturers, warehouses, distribution
centers, and third-party logistics providers that voluntarily
and successfully follow the TSA security standards. Without
this program, screening would only take place at the airport,
resulting in increased airport truck congestion, missed
flights, and a significant adverse impact on U.S. trade.
Establishing a certified cargo screening facility is not
something we take lightly. It is costly, it is time consuming,
and it is fraught with challenges. However, we remain committed
to the belief that CCSP not only streamlines customers supply
chains, but reduces bottlenecks at already congested airline
cargo facilities.
Now, as we have heard, in 2018, December 2018, the TSA
approved the long-awaited Third Party Private Canine Program.
The program allows private companies to train canines and
handlers to screen air cargo before loading on passenger
planes. A well-trained dog can detect explosive odors down to
parts per trillion. Where it might take hours to screen a cargo
shipment by X-ray or trace detection technology, an explosive
detection trained dog team can search that same shipment
efficiently and effectively in minutes.
Despite the recent success using canines and cargo
screening, technology still has a definitive role in the
screening process. But TSA's vetting and certification of new
technology is stalled. This delay leaves few machine options
available to perform the tasks at a reasonable cost. We
encourage TSA to continue searching for new solutions to fill
that void. So TSA deputized the private sector to carry out
cargo screening for shipments moving on passenger aircraft and
has established an oversight and compliance structure for that
cargo screening. However, the agency has not established a
corresponding support structure for non-Governmental cargo
screening which is critically important from the security
perspective. The structure must be outcome equivalent to what
TSA provides for passengers, cabin baggage, and checked baggage
screening. The Airforwarders Association, therefore, endorses
recommendations submitted last week by the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee at its quarterly meeting in Washington.
Suggestions urge TSA to provide the minimum level of support to
ensure that cargo screeners are empowered with the necessary
skills, knowledge, guidance, and tools to effectively carry out
their screening responsibilities before passenger flight
loading and departure.
For effective cargo security, consistent interpretations of
regulations by TSA is essential. However, despite efforts to
the contrary, work remains to be done to remove bureaucratic
decision stovepipes within the agency. Our members operate
offices throughout the United States and many TSA inspectors
audit these facilities. And like any business investigated by
the U.S. Government, we rely on the consistent interpretation
of regulations from security--from facility to facility. We
understand that 100 percent consistency is not always
attainable. However, inconsistent interpretation of policy
decisions and poor communication of those resolutions to the
inspectors results in high cost to the industry and delays in
our Nation's commerce.
That is why we urge TSA Administrator Pekoske to ensure a
solid mechanism that allows regulated parties to obtain
official policy guidance from TSA headquarters policy staff
when the interpretation of requirements varies among individual
inspectors, and improve communication of policy decisions
between the policy plans and engagement division and its cargo
inspector workforce, and staff and fund the new TSA Air Cargo
Division with the appropriate resources immediately, and
finally, perhaps establish an industry ombudsman office to
assure communication. Interpretation of policy and
implementation of that policy should be in agreement.
Security deteriorates when operators do not have a clear
understanding of regulations due to inconsistent policy
interpretations. I want to thank you again for your time this
morning, and I look forward to your questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Fried, Executive Director,
Airforwarders Association
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present the views of
the Airforwarders Association (AfA) on air cargo security.
The Airforwarders Association (AfA) represents 250 airfreight
forwarders and supporting companies employing tens of thousands of
employees and dedicated contractors. Our members range from small
businesses employing fewer than 20 people to large firms employing well
over 1,000, and business models vary from domestic only operations to
worldwide operations. Additionally, a few of our members operate their
own aircraft. In short--[we are the travel agents for cargo]. We move
freight throughout the United States and the world in the most time and
cost-efficient manner, be it on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship.
Security is at the forefront of our business. We believe that
effective air cargo security depends upon a risk-based, multilayered
approach. This strategy includes modern and intelligence-based shipper
vetting, risk-based targeting, employee training, constant TSA audit
oversight, and of course, 100 percent screening of each piece of air
cargo before transport on a passenger flight.
We have worked closely with TSA since its inception and committed
millions of dollars over the past 19 years to ensure that our role in
the security chain is secure. For example, our members have invested
millions of dollars in security screening equipment, secure facilities,
and employee background checks. We also maintain compliance with the
Known Shipper Management System and the Indirect Air Carrier Management
System along with annual security training to secure our portion of the
global supply chain. In short, we play an integral role to ensure the
safety and security of shipments traveling on both domestic and
international airlines. We take this role very seriously. We know that
terrorists remain interested in airplanes and therefore are looking for
any possible vulnerabilities in the system. Throughout the past 19
years, we have rolled up our sleeves to meet the requirements of the
Aviation Transportation Security Act, and the 100 percent screening
requirement for all shipments on passenger planes. We know what is at
stake and we will do our part.
As the e-commerce impact on global trade increases, recent studies
indicate that almost 2 billion people globally purchased goods online
last year. The Internet allows consumers to research and buy products
online, connecting with sellers who often depend upon air cargo for
fast and efficient delivery. But this demand has created significant
truck congestion at the primary gateway airports. These bottlenecks
occur as freight forwarders wait to tender and recover shipments from
airlines that are screening cargo for those not enrolled in the
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP).
The Certified Cargo Screening Program
Facility complexity and insufficient land at our airports prevent a
``one size fits all'' solution to the complex cargo screening dilemma.
We are motivated to work cooperatively to ensure that many solutions
are available to address the commercial concerns in the supply chain to
ensure effective screening outcomes and to meet air cargo screening
mandates. Screening a high percentage of air cargo upstream is a
critical part of the solution, especially where U.S. manufacturing and
supply chain logistics involve secure bulk packaging that must be
maintained for the integrity of the product.
In order to meet the 2010 mandated 100 percent air cargo screening
requirement on passenger flights arriving and departing U.S. airports,
the TSA implemented a supply chain solution to achieve the directive.
This initiative, known as the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP),
certifies manufacturers, warehouses, distribution centers, third-party
logistics providers, and similar facilities that voluntarily and
successfully apply and follow the TSA-mandated security standards. CCSP
is a crucial part of the risk-based multi-layered approach to air cargo
security. The program strengthens security throughout the global supply
chain, while simultaneously meeting the needs of the shipping public.
We believe the strength of CCSP is that it provides for multiple
options throughout the supply chain. These include the use of
centralized third-party screening centers, third-party logistics
providers, shipper or exporters, and freight-forwarder screening
facilities.
Additionally, all members of the supply chain have a vested
business interest in a secure chain of custody to maintain the
integrity of cargo. CCSP relies upon the shippers, forwarders, and
airlines that have a strong record of safety and security.
The CCSP decreases delays and expedites the supply chain flow of
goods by conducting the piece-level screening prior to consolidation
and full pallet screening away from the congested airport environment.
Without the CCSP, forwarders with significant freight volumes, now
screening in their facilities would rely on the airlines to perform
physical screening of each piece of cargo. The result would cause even
more truck congestion, missed flights, and a significant adverse impact
on U.S. trade as airlines struggle to keep up with the demand to screen
the cargo. In addition, delays can create security risks to safe
flight. Cargo is most vulnerable to tampering and theft when at rest.
By keeping our supply chains fluid, we reduce these risks.
The Airforwarders Association and our members have continued to
assist with the development and implementation of the Certified Cargo
Screener Program (CCSP). We have worked closely with TSA to provide
insight into the complexities of the air cargo supply chain, including
the impact of time, temperature, and screening methodologies on the
product. The AfA has consistently provided information, and
enthusiastically encouraged our members' enrollment in CCSP. In fact,
of the 147 Indirect Air Carriers in the CCSP, 27 or 18 percent are AfA
members. However, those 27 AfA members operate 124 of the 331 approved
CCSF locations, or 37 percent.
Establishing a Certified Cargo Screening Facility is not something
that Indirect Air Carriers take lightly. It is costly, time-consuming,
and fraught with challenges. However, our industry remains committed to
the belief that the CCSP not only streamlines customer supply chains
but reduces bottlenecks at already congested airline cargo facilities.
The freight forwarding industry, including AfA members, has invested
tens of millions of dollars to ensure that CCSP works as intended.
Canines
In December 2018, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) approved the long-awaited Third-Party Canine program (3PK9). The
initiative is a variation of the previously established Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) for forwarders and airlines. Under the 3PK9
program, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA allow
private companies to train canines and their human handlers to screen
air cargo before loading onto passenger planes. The screening covers
flights within or coming to the United States.
Technological solutions are unable to match the speed and
efficiency of a well-trained explosive detection canine team. The
United States Defense Advanced Research Project proved this after
spending $19 billion over six years in an attempt to create a
technology that matches the efficiency of a dog. Well-trained dogs were
extremely effective, screening at more than twenty times the speed of
any technological solution because of their mobility. With X-ray, every
single piece of cargo must go through a machine, and a screener must
interpret each picture. Likewise, with trace detection, every single
piece of freight must be swabbed. Both of these processes are
incredibly time-consuming and labor-intensive. The cargo screening
process without canines requires significant human resources, financial
cost, and robs air cargo of its most precious commodity, which is time.
Because a well-trained dog can detect explosive odors down to
parts-per-trillion, dog teams can effectively sort at the pallet or
unit load device (ULD) level. They can move around the cargo to search
without interfering with the sorting process, packaging, or freight
handling environment. Where it might take hours to screen a cargo
shipment by X-ray or trace detection technology, an explosive detection
trained dog can search that same shipment in a matter of minutes.
TSA and the Future
Screening Technology
Despite the recent success using canines in cargo screening,
technology still has a definitive role in the process. These machines
mitigate false alarms or perform testing where the use of a dog is
inappropriate. But TSA's vetting and certification of new technology,
capable of screening whole pallets containing multiple commodities,
have stalled. This delay leaves few machine options available to
perform the task at a reasonable cost. We, therefore, encourage TSA to
continue searching for new solutions to fill this necessary void. We
also hope any newly vetted cargo screening technology has the same
automated tools to assist screeners in the detection of suspicious
items that TSA has provided in their own equipment to passenger baggage
screeners.
More Robust TSA Support for Screeners
In a sense, TSA ``deputized'' the private sector to carry out cargo
screening for shipments moving on passenger aircraft. Since that time,
TSA has established an oversight and compliance structure for private-
sector cargo screening. However, the agency has not established a
corresponding ``support structure'' for non-governmental cargo
screening, which is critically important from the security perspective.
The structure must be outcome-equivalent to what TSA provides for
passengers, cabin baggage, and checked baggage screening. TSA must
provide the minimum level of support to ensure that cargo screeners are
empowered with the necessary skills, knowledge, guidance, and tools to
effectively carry out their screening responsibilities before passenger
flight loading and departure.
The Airforwarders Association therefore endorses recommendations
submitted by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Air Cargo
Subcommittee at its quarterly meeting in Washington last week. These
include:
TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated assistance to
regulated parties in their selection of the most competent
screeners
TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated, comprehensive and
consistent cargo screener training programs to regulated
parties
TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated cargo screener tests
to regulated parties
TSA provision of needed threat-relevant updates and training
to regulated parties at the headquarters and local level
TSA engagement to facilitate the availability of high-
quality test objects, in both physical and virtual forms, that
are relevant to the current cargo security threat environment
Consistent Interpretation of Regulations is Essential
The Airforwarders Association and its members work very closely
with TSA, as mentioned, and holds a seat on the TSA Aviation Security
Advisory Committee. This statutorily authorized committee provides TSA
with a formalized mechanism for consultation with key industry partners
on aviation security matters. These areas include the development,
refinement, and implementation of aviation security policies, programs,
rulemaking, and security directives. However, despite efforts to the
contrary, work remains to be done to remove bureaucratic decision
stovepipes within the agency.
Our members operate offices throughout the United States, and
therefore many TSA inspectors audit these facilities. Like any business
investigated by the United States government, we rely on the consistent
interpretation of regulations from facility to facility. We understand
that people are people, and 100 percent consistency is not attainable.
However, inconsistent interpretation of policy decisions and poor
communication of those resolutions to the inspectors result in high
costs to the industry and delays in our Nation's commerce. That is why
we urge Administrator Pekoske to:
Ensure a solid mechanism is in place that allows regulated
parties to obtain official policy guidance from TSA
headquarters policy staff when the interpretation of
requirements varies among individual inspectors.
Improve communication of policy decisions between the
Policy, Plans & Engagement division, and its cargo security
inspector workforce.
Staff and fund the new TSA Air Cargo Division with
appropriate resources immediately.
Interpretation of policy and implementation of the policy should be
in agreement. Security deteriorates when operators do not have a clear
understanding of regulations due to inconsistent policy
interpretations.
Finally, Indirect Air Carriers continue to struggle with vague
policy language in their security program concerning the definition of
when cargo acceptance occurs by the regulated entity. The lack of a
concise policy regarding this issue continues to impose legal costs on
our members who must navigate the Letter of Investigation process
defending themselves against a confusing policy that generates
differing interpretations even within the agency. The Airforwarders
Association once again requests that TSA immediately begin work to
alleviate this confusion by establishing a joint mechanism with
industry stakeholders to thoroughly examine multiple acceptance issues
and determine the best policy solutions that make sense across all
stakeholders in the real-world operational environment.
Thank you for your time this morning, and I look forward to your
questions and comments.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. And thank you again, Ms.
Ritter, for being here and representing all the work that the
flight attendants do every day. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER RITTER, FLIGHT ATTENDANT,
UNITED AIRLINES, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS--CWA, AFL-CIO
Ms. Ritter. Well, thank you Ranking Member Markey for
having me here today. I would also like to thank Chairman
Wicker and members of the Committee for holding the hearing. My
name is Jennifer Ritter and I am here representing the
Association of Flight Attendants, CWA, with 50,000 of
aviation's first responders at 20 airlines.
I am a Flight Attendant at United Airlines, and on
September 11, 2001 I lost my good friends and my profession
changed forever. But even as we grieved, we were comforted by
Flight Attendants who had formerly flown at Pan Am during the
loss of Flight 103. They helped us cope and have hope that we
could make it through the grief that made it hard to breathe
and made us wonder if we could ever find a new normal. We
bonded in our grief and also in our commitment to work every
day to close loopholes in aviation security.
When Flight Attendants go to work, we do so trusting that
every function of security is working all the way up to the
aircraft door. We are aviation's last line of defense. We need
the proper tools, training, staffing, and communications to
perform our work and thwart any onboard security threats. But
we cannot do anything about threats to our lives and those in
our care outside of the aircraft cabin. Senator Markey knows
well in his nearly two decades of work with us that 100 percent
cargo screening is critically important to Flight Attendants.
If we can't be sure this is done and done properly, we are in
essence adding tremendous risk to our lives over a security
loophole that is out of our control. That is not right and we
urge this committee to take a very close look at this issue.
Our Flight Attendant union supports of the 100 percent
screening of cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft. We have
worked on this issue in the TSA Aviation Security Advisory
Committee Air Cargo Working Group, and of course we are proud
to have worked with Senator Markey while he is still serving in
the House of Representatives to make this law.
In order to maintain this standard and ensure it is fully
implemented, we support continued development and deployment of
advanced cargo inspection technology. Canine inspection is an
important part of screening but it must be done right. We are
fully supportive of the Transportation Security
Administration's own canine inspection teams for air cargo. We
have many concerns, however, about third-party canine
inspection services or those 3PK companies effectively self-
inspecting to meet TSA standards for canine team training,
care, and rest periods. We understand proper funding and
resources must be allocated for TSA to adequately perform
security screening required by law.
AFA supports the Faster Act, S. 472, which would ensure
aviation security service fees pay for the costs of security
screening. In addition to cargo screening, we support the Cyber
AIR Act, S. 2181, which would help protect from and require
disclosure of any attempted or successful cyber-attacks. One
specific concern I have as a Flight Attendant is related not to
malicious interference but something far more mundane, and that
is the unintentional loading of lithium ion batteries into our
cargo hold, for example, with last-minute gate checked bags.
While lithium-ion batteries are permitted in carry-on baggage,
such bags may still get gate checked at the gate when the
overhead bins are full. Our agents working the flights do ask
those passengers to ensure that any lithium-ion batteries are
removed before the bags get taken to the cargo hold, but there
is no enforcement.
Effective passenger baggage and cargo screening is a vital
part of our layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It
is also a difficult job with massive responsibility. TSA must
have the consistent long-term funding to close all potential
security loopholes and give screeners the staffing support and
training they need to do their jobs to help keep our skies safe
and secure. Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation
security. The Senate Homeland Security committee estimates that
the 35-day Government shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years in
worker productivity. This created a gaping hole in aviation
security and it cannot ever be repeated by even a single day.
We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to
other security initiatives such as border security. Reduced
staffing at checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience. When TSA
is stretched thin, it increases the risk of a serious security
breach. Flight attendants often bear the brunt of travelers
frustrated by any inefficiencies in security screening, making
our workplaces more volatile. We urge lawmakers to ensure
funding is adequate and stable to maintain the successful
mission of TSA.
We thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member, and the members
of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We are
proud of our work as aviation's First Responders and the last
line of defense in aviation security. As the great labor leader
Mother Jones said, ``mourn the dead and fight for the living.''
We commit to you to do this every day, and we appreciate
your attention and oversight on such a critical matter for us
as crew and the people who entrust us with their lives when
they fly. This concludes my remarks. Thank you for having me
here today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ritter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Ritter, Flight Attendant, United
Airlines, Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and Members of the
Committee:
My name is Jennifer Ritter and I am here representing the
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA with 50,000 of aviation's first
responders at 20 airlines. I am a Flight Attendant at United Airlines
and on September 11, 2001. I lost my good friends and my profession
changed forever. But even as we grieved, we were comforted by Flight
Attendants who had formerly flown at TWA and Pan Am during the loss of
flights 800 and 103 respectively. They helped us cope and have hope
that we could make it through the grief that made it hard to breathe
and made us wonder if we could ever find a new normal. We bonded in our
grief and also in our commitment to work every day to close loopholes
in aviation security.
When Flight Attendants go to work, we do so trusting that every
function of security is working up to the aircraft door. We are
aviation's last line of defense. We need the proper tools, training,
staffing, and communications to perform our work and thwart any onboard
security threats. But we cannot do anything about threats to our lives
and those in our care outside of the aircraft cabin. Senator Markey
knows well in his nearly two decades of work with us that 100 percent
cargo screening is critically important to Flight Attendants. If we
can't be sure this is done and done properly, we are in essence adding
tremendous risk to our lives over a security loophole that is out of
our control. That is not right and we urge this committee to take a
very close look at this issue.
Our Flight Attendant union supports of the 100 percent screening of
cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft. We have worked on this issue
in the TSA Aviation Security Advisory Committee Air Cargo Working Group
and of course we are proud to have worked with Senator Markey while he
still served in the House of Representatives to make this law. In order
to maintain this standard and ensure is it fully implemented, we
support continued development and deployment of advanced cargo
inspection technology.
Canine inspection is an important part of screening, but it must be
done right. We are fully supportive of the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) own canine inspection teams for air cargo. We
have many concerns, however, about 3rd Party Canine (3PK) inspection
services or those 3PK companies effectively self-inspecting to meet TSA
Standards for canine team training, care and rest periods.
We understand proper funding and resources must be allocated for
TSA to adequately perform security screening required by law. AFA
supports the Faster Act (S. 472), which would ensure aviation security
service fees pay for the costs of security screening.
In addition to cargo screening, we support the Cyber AIR Act (S.
2181) which would help protect from and require discloser of any
attempt or successful cyber-attacks.
Adequate Long-Term Funding
Effective passenger, baggage, and cargo screening is a vital part
of our layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It is also a
difficult job with massive responsibility. TSA must have the
consistent, long-term funding to close all potential security loopholes
and give screeners the staffing, support and training they need to do
their jobs to help keep our skies safe and secure.
Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation security. The
Senate Homeland Security Committee estimates that the 35-day Government
Shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years in worker productivity.\1\ This
created a gaping hole in aviation security and it cannot ever be
repeated by even a day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Shutdown cost DOT, DHS thousands of years in lost productivity,
POLITICO Pro, https://t.co/O3478qNmFc?amp=1, September 17, 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to other
security initiatives, such as border security. Reduced staffing at
checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience-when TSA is stretched thin, it
increases the risk of a serious security breach.
Flight Attendants often bear the brunt of travelers frustrated by
any inefficiencies in security screening, making our workspace more
volatile. We urge lawmakers to ensure funding is adequate and stable to
maintain the successful mission of TSA.
Conclusion
We thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member and the Members of this
Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We are proud of our work
as aviation's first responders and the last line of defense in aviation
security. As the great labor leader Mother Jones said, ``Mourn the dead
and fight for the living.'' We commit to you to do this every day and
we appreciate your attention and oversight on such a critical matter
for us as crew, and the people who trust us with their lives when they
fly.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Ms. Ritter. Thank you very much,
and thanks to all of our witnesses. Now, we will begin the
questions and answer period.
When I fought to enact a 100 percent screening requirement
for air cargo transported on passenger aircraft, I was opposed
by the Bush Administration all 4 years. I could not get that
law put on the books, and many in the air cargo industry also
did not want to bear the cost or didn't think it was
logistically feasible. So I am proud that we have proven all
those naysayers wrong and we have developed a 100 percent
screening system that promotes security while maintaining a
steady flow of commercial goods.
One of the keys to this success has been allowing TSA
certified warehouses, distributors, and freight forwarders to
scan air cargo as it moves through the supply chain. This
approach provides essential scanning in a flexible and less
costly way. But the system will only work as long as the TSA
also provides robust oversight of certified cargo screeners and
ensures that their security protocols are strong.
So, Mr. Beckius, how much air cargo is transported on
passenger planes every year?
Mr. Beckius. In 2019, it was approximately 73 million tons.
Senator Markey. So that is an enormous amount of cargo and
it is all sitting directly under the feet of every passenger
flying out of Logan or any other airport in the United States.
And that is on average 50 percent of all the cargo that is in
the belly of passenger planes. Half of it, half of the cargo is
the bags of the passengers on that plane and the other half is
cargo unrelated to those passengers and the passengers are not
even aware that that cargo is there as well, that is unrelated
to and has not gone through the screening process which the
bags of the passengers have gone through.
So that is why we have to make sure that it is 100 percent
safe. So, Mr. Beckius, please again describe the main protocols
that TSA monitors and evaluates for air cargo screeners. What
security standards do you require cargo screens to meet to
receive and maintain their certification?
Mr. Beckius. Sure. So the requirements for the Certified
Cargo Screening Program and those participants have numerous
requirements. Obviously, the most important is the actual air
cargo screening. And thanks to your legislation, that is done
at 100 percent today. Only TSA approved equipment can be used,
whether that is approved CT X-ray, K9, standard X-ray, those
standards have to be met and evaluated by TSA, the carriers,
and the Certified Cargo Screening Program holders can only use
TSA approved equipment.
In addition to the equipment, there is a layered approach
in the security programs from vetting of their employees,
access to the facilities, tamper-evident seals applied after
screening, supply chain security until it arrives at a
passenger facility, and then there is equipment security at the
passenger air carrier until such time as it is loaded on an
aircraft. So it is very much a layered approach, sir.
Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Fried, you represent the
companies that are subject to this TSA oversight. So what are
some of the specific ways, from your perspective, that TSA
could improve its certification and compliance mechanisms for
air cargo screeners?
Mr. Fried. Well, I think it all depends on a concise,
written policy and consistent policy interpretations as I
mentioned in my oral testimony today. I think that one of the
biggest challenges that our members have----
Senator Markey. Give me an example. What is an example of
inconsistent----
Mr. Fried. I just--you know, a lot of it, unfortunately
Senator, for this year is sensitive security information, but
there are ways that policy is written surrounding Certified
Cargo Screening Program that tend to be confusing. And often
times, that results in a--the misinterpretation might result in
something not being done properly. It is not malicious, but at
the same time it requires TSA inspectors to actually resolve
internal communication issues where they have conflicts as to
what that policy means. So I would tell you that when you ask
me what actually needs to be done, I would tell you that it
starts with more concise, clearly written policy so that
everyone understands and everyone is on the same page.
Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Beckius, how do you respond to
Mr. Fried?
Mr. Beckius. So I agree with Brandon that that is very
important and we work consistently with our industry partners
on that. So when we hear from the Association on an air carrier
that they feel there is inconsistent policy in the field, we
look at that from a headquarters perspective and try to
determine where the disconnect is. Is it between--is it with
the air carrier and they are misinterpreting the policy? Is it
that the policy needs to be better clarified? Is there
nationwide inconsistency or is it at a local level? And then we
work within our building with security operations, our lawyers,
and our policy writers to get that information back to industry
and make sure it is clear.
Senator Markey. OK--Mr. Fried give us an example, you know,
you don't have to be detailed in a way that compromises
security but what is an area where----
Mr. Fried. Well, as an example, like exactly what did--you
know, the dimensions of a designated screening area within a
warehouse. That might be an area that might be misunderstood
between the TSA and the actual air----
Senator Markey. So what could a misunderstanding look like?
Mr. Fried. Well, maybe it is the length and the width of
the area. And so there would be an enforcement action against
the certified cargo screening facilitator.
Senator Markey. You are saying that TSA would arrive and
say that your area is not properly secured----
Mr. Fried. Oh, no, that is not the case at all. All these
areas are extremely well secured. But maybe the dimensions
might not be specific.
Senator Markey. That is just a general--it is hard for me
to understand. What do you mean?
Mr. Fried. Well, again sir, I have to tell you that a lot
of this is completely under sensitive security information so I
can't divulge areas of enforcement or the program itself, but I
can tell you that again----
Senator Markey. You are saying it is totally secure?
Mr. Fried. Yes.
Senator Markey. OK, so we won't worry. But then you are
simultaneously saying I can't give you any details because it--
again, you raise the subject area, which is the dimensions of
the area. Can you speak more broadly to that?
Mr. Fried. I could Senator, and the reality is that it
doesn't actually create any threat to security. It could be a
misinterpretation of how one carries out the screening and
actually how one sets up the designated screening area. That
might cause a letter of investigation from TSA and it is all
based on just inconcise policy on how to actually set up a
screening area.
Senator Markey. Let me come back to you, Mr. Beckius. So
what are we talking about here from your perspective, from the
TSA perspective and going to these companies?
Mr. Beckius. Sure. So once again we hear from industry that
they have questions or concerns about a policy or regulation,
we will work with our local inspectors, for instance, the eight
here in Boston to try to come to a resolution and determine if
the regulated party is out of compliance or whether our local
inspector needed to readjust how they viewed the matter. And
then we always make sure to circle back with the regulated
party with a final response.
Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Fried seems to be saying that
many times TSA just isn't clear enough with the regulations. Is
that what you are saying, Mr. Fried?
Mr. Fried. Exactly. And that creates confusion.
Senator Markey. Will you agree to meet with Mr. Fried then,
in terms of----
Mr. Beckius. So, Mr. Fried and I meet regularly.
Senator Markey. OK. Well, what is the issue then, Mr.
Fried? Why is it that these issues aren't resolved then?
Mr. Fried. Senator, you know, I think we have to realize,
as I said in my testimony, that they have 500 inspectors out
there and 100 percent consistency and policy interpretation is,
I would say, difficult for any organization to attain. So we
are sympathetic to that, but often times what we find in the
field is that the field inspector simply is carrying out policy
on his or her own that is not consistent with the policy
intent.
Senator Markey. Do you agree with this, Mr. Beckius, that
there are problems that go down to this local level?
Mr. Beckius. So, I would not classify them as problems. I
would say that if there is--if we receive information that an
inspector in Boston viewed an issue different than an inspector
in Chicago, my office will mediate that and ensure that any
inconsistency is resolved.
Senator Markey. All right, so the Committee would ask for a
status update from both of you to the Committee within 60 days
of the resolution of this issue just so that we have a formal
response from the industry and from TSA. So will you both agree
to give us an update in writing of what the resolution of this
issue will be?
Mr. Fried. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. OK. Thank you. Now, let me go over here to
you, Ms. Ritter. You heard some of these, you know, some of
these issues being discussed. I heard you talk about canines in
your testimony. You know, can you now give your commentary in
terms of how the Flight Attendants view these security issues
and what you would like to see added to or resolved in terms of
clarification?
Ms. Ritter. We rely on the external security infrastructure
to keep us safe because all we have control over is the
aircraft cabin. We don't have access to the cargo hold from in-
flight and we have to trust that everything is being properly
screened. And the one concern that I did raise was the item
lithium ion batteries where passengers boarding the aircraft
find that there's no more room in the overhead compartments and
they are required to check their bag at the last minute, and
they are asked to make sure that they take any lithium ion
batteries out of their bags, but what if they forget something?
There is no malicious intent there, but is that bag getting
screened before it gets put in the cargo hold and how is that
going to be handled? We are trained to handle runaway thermal
events on the aircraft in the cabin. We have liquid
extinguishers and liquids on board as well as thermal
containment bags on most aircraft now, and we know how to
handle those, but if something like that happens in a cargo
hold, we are utterly unequipped to deal with it.
Senator Markey. OK, so does one of the other witnesses want
to address that question? It seems like a pretty significant
problem, you know, where passengers are told there is no
overhead space, please hand it to us and we will put it into
the belly of the plane, and it has got lithium ion batteries
that otherwise would be dealt with up above. So can you talk
about that, Mr. Freni?
Mr. Freni. Yes Senator, I think on the course of this
conversation, I want to go back to how we resolve issues here
on a local basis, particularly when we hear this kind of
conversation. We have a real strong compliance group from TSA
here at Logan Airport, always continuously inspecting. And we
work with them hand in hand to make sure that all the things
that you heard here are being adhered to.
And if there is an issue, we work it out right away. At the
8:30 meeting, we know each other, we see each other, we talk
with each other. It doesn't take a lot of time if we see
something that is out of the ordinary, particularly in the
cargo areas where cargo was brought to Logan Airport. So we are
confident that we are resolving these issues immediately.
Senator Markey. So can you talk about this lithium ion
issue?
Mr. Freni. Yes. Also the carry-on bag program, I think, is
another one where we have enhanced with our ASL machines. I
think those automated screening lanes have really kind of honed
in on anything that is unusual in the bag so I know our
inspectors are watching for that. So it resolves the issue of
getting on the airplane. The airlines have put out a mandate
that they cannot be carried. So our TSA inspectors are watching
for it and I think we have had a pretty good record of picking
it up.
Ms. Ritter. Lithium ion batteries are allowed in the cabin
of the aircraft as carry-ons and so there is nothing preventing
such a bag from getting checked. We have, at my airline, we
have five boarding groups. And usually we have to start
checking bags after the second group is boarded. That means
that we have three groups of passengers with bags that are
probably getting checked at the last minute, and we have to
rely on them to be aware of what is in their bag and take it
out before they board the aircraft.
Senator Markey. So you are saying, in the passenger area
you actually have equipment that could deal with a fire?
Ms. Ritter. Correct.
Senator Markey. But if it went into----
Ms. Ritter. Halon extinguishers will put out a fire in the
cargo hold but they will not prevent a re-ignition.
Senator Markey. Yes, Mr. Fried?
Mr. Fried. One of the things I would--you know, the
Airforwarders Association is extremely concerned about this
lithium battery check right now. And I would say that one of
the things that are--two things we need is more efficient
technology that can possibly scan for these lithium batteries,
but one of the promising areas that we are seeing now is we
have members in the canine community that are actually training
these explosive trace detection dogs to screen and to detect
lithium batteries, not only in cargo but luggage as well. I
think that is a very promising area that we should be looking
at very seriously.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Ms. Ritter, can I come back to
you? I know you mentioned canines in your opening statement.
Could you elaborate a little bit more about what your concerns
are?
Ms. Ritter. We do support the use of canines in aviation
security, however, we do have a potential issue where a profit
motive comes into play. These dogs are expensive to train and
acquire and we are concerned that there may not be enough down
time for the dogs or that they may be kept working longer than
would normally be happening if they were Government mandated.
Senator Markey. Yes, so this--but in general, you are
satisfied with this area?
Ms. Ritter. Sure.
Senator Markey. So again, with this check bag phenomenon,
obviously when airlines charge $30 to check one bag and a
second bag is another $40 to check, so people try to cram it in
up above.
Ms. Ritter. And the kitchen sink.
Senator Markey. And the kitchen sink. They don't want have
to pay another 40 bucks for their bag to fly just from here to
there for two hours, huh? It just seems like you are buying
another ticket on the plane. So as a result, it winds up at the
gate door with the gate attendant saying, we are going to have
to put that in the belly of the plane.
So you start to create a traffic jam with all of this
baggage that people are trying to get up into the passenger
section to avoid the extra 40 bucks, you know, for that extra
bag. So can you talk a little bit about that, Ms. Ritter? Talk
about that phenomenon that is now opening up in terms of the
passenger trying to avoid these exorbitant, crazy fees that
airlines now want to charge for the extra bag.
Ms. Ritter. It is not just the fees they are trying to
avoid, they don't want to have to wait in baggage claim either
which is perfectly understandable, and we certainly do support
having TSA check to make sure that everybody is only carrying
on one suitcase and one personal item.
Senator Markey. So it winds up with a passenger just with
two bags being charged 30 bucks and another $40 for the second
bag. So it is 140 bucks for the round trip with those two bags
and obviously, you know, what is in those two bags, you know,
and this goes to lithium ion or other issues if the passengers
ride trying to get it up above in terms of what is the process
done to make sure that there is a proper screening. Right,
because you don't have fire extinguishers on the belly. So
again, please elaborate a little bit more if you could.
Mr. Ritter. There is only so much space that we have on the
aircraft in the overhead compartments, and of course everybody
is trying to avoid excess fees. Perfectly understandable.
Senator Markey. OK. So TSA, if you could, Mr. Beckius, how
do we handle this phenomenon where airlines are seeing this as
an incredible profit maker for them to get the extra 40 bucks
for the bag, but yet it creates issues for you.
Mr. Beckius. Sure. So from a TSA perspective, it does
create challenges for us at the checkpoint with the density of
the bags, but TSA does not monitor or regulate the number of
items a passenger can take through a checkpoint. We make sure
that there are no prohibited items in those bags.
Senator Markey. So, but is that increasing your logistical
problem that the bag--let's say a lithium ion battery which
would be OK up in the passenger cabin but is now in the belly
of the plane. How do you resolve an issue like that given the
also on-time departure goals of the airline and ensuring that
simultaneously those bags that are now packed right there in
that gate are properly screened?
Mr. Beckius. Yes, and so unfortunately as the Executive
Director for the Air Cargo Division, I am not intimately
familiar with the checkpoint workings. I am happy to bring back
any information you would like on that though.
Senator Markey. So again, these are--these are issues to go
on security so if you can report back on that, how is that
handled and that increase in what is happening? And I just
think it is absolutely incredible.
Senator Wicker and I are very interested in this issue and
we actually, you know, are trying our best to move legislation,
Fair Fees Act on the forbidding airlines from imposing
ridiculous fees act to prohibit airlines from charging
unreasonable fees for checked bags and other ancillary charges
like change and cancellation fees, and my legislation would
protect consumers from price gouging and increase aviation
security by encouraging people to stop overstuffing their
carry-ons, relieving the pressure on the TSA checkpoint. But we
need to ensure that we definitely deal with that issue.
So, thank you for this discussion. I think it is very
important and again, I would love to have this conversation
continue here because we absolutely have to deal with a
phenomenon that continues to this day. And that overstuffing
ultimately, again, is an aperture. We know what Mohammed Atta
and the other nine did here at Logan Airport looking at
Portland, Maine as an aperture in terms of reduction of
screening.
And again, Logan went first and it had instituted the best
system in the country that got model across the rest of the
country, but new issues just continue to emerge here as there
are changes and they are looking for those apertures. And we
know that if they can be successful in creating another airline
accident, that is just a dramatic reduction than an air travel
across our country. We are seeing it in China right now.
We are seeing just one incident somehow or other that
translates the coronavirus into an airline industry crisis in
their country that the airline industry did not anticipate. So
let me move on if I can to the deployment of new technologies.
Scanning and screening systems are constantly evolving as new
innovations are created to increase to speed and quantity of
cargo shipments while maintaining security. This continuous
development requires the TSA to have a robust process for
certifying the latest and greatest scanning technologies.
And it also requires that we do all we can to ensure cargo
screening facilities are adopting the same systems, and that is
why I authored language in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018
that instructed the TSA to study the feasibility of deploying
computed tomography scanners to screen air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft.
CT scanners are a new technology that can render a 3D image
of a containers' contents, allowing inspectors to more
effectively search for hazardous materials than they can with
the traditional X-ray machines used today. When paired with
algorithms that can automatically analyze a 3D image for
threat, CT scanners can become an even more advanced explosive
detection system or EDS.
Mr. Beckius, based on the TSA's feasibility study, where
and how should we be focusing our efforts to deploy CT scanners
and EDS in air cargo security? What should the Government do to
promote widespread adoption of this technology?
Mr. Beckius. Thank you for that question. So as you
referenced, we did complete a feasibility study that was
delivered to Congress in November, 2019. A couple of the
challenges noted in that report is the expense of the machine
at the--at the current status is a challenge for industry for
some to purchase, as well as the limiting nature of the
aperture of the machine does not allow for larger shipments to
be screened, at least in the current state.
Some of the potential positives are insertion of an EDS
machine and what we would call an inline cargo system for small
packages appears to be extremely positive and the potential for
that. Also required by the Modernization Act was a pilot that
we initiated in January. It is too early to provide details on
that but we look forward to providing details at the 6-month
part, also as required by the Modernization Act.
Senator Markey. Mr. Urchuk, can you please talk about this
issue in the modernization of the technology but not the
implementation of the modernized technology?
Mr. Urchuk. Well----
Senator Markey. Can you move over that microphone a little
bit closer to you?
Mr. Urchuk. So, CT is actually an old technology. It has
been around for about 40 years, and machines that once cost $1
million in the hospital environment now might cost half a
million or less.
And in fact, if you go to an emergency room in a major
hospital, you are likely to get a CT scan instead of a 2D X-
ray. That is because it provides more information that is
critical for the physicians to make a diagnosis. In the
security environment, there has been a similar history where 2D
technology was initially deployed, some very, very basic
systems. Then 3D technology, much after 9/11, and based on work
the TSA and our laboratories the U.S. has sponsored.
And I think really just recently with the check point
solutions that have been deployed, CT is emerging as a cost-
effective, and so I think one of the most effective detection
technologies that is available. And we think that by stretching
what has been done there into the air cargo, we can start to
address some of the limitations that are seen with current
technologies, principally cost.
Senator Markey. Yes. I know that, you know, when my wife
who was a two-star Admiral in charge of women's health looked
at this issue with regard to breast cancer detection in the
1990s, they were still using 40 year old technologies all
across the country, X-ray technologies rather than moving to
CT, which would give a better imaging for breast cancer for
women.
And yet, they, you know, they were military technologies at
the CIA, at the Pentagon, at NASA that had modern imaging
technologies. Of course, they were top secret programs that
would be used against the Soviet Union in terms of imaging but
were yet to be fully implemented in terms of a real defense for
women's health in our country to make sure we move toward that
technology.
So can we talk a little bit about that? Why we can't move
more expeditiously toward giving all of that additional
information? Of course, 3D is better than 2D which is better
than 1D, which is better than X-ray. So talk about that a
little bit more, Mr. Urchuk, and the need for us to move to the
most modern technology.
Mr. Urchuk. A side note on mammography, the technology that
is used for 3D imaging and mammography now was pioneered at the
Massachusetts General Hospital. People don't know and we are
proud to actually participate in that, significantly.
Senator Markey. I think part of the reason, and again, the
whole point is that in modern technology you can see through
more dense material in a woman's skin, you know, and get in
deeper and find it earlier, and act in a preventive way to
avoid that cancer from having grown.
So, you know the same thing would be true here. The more
dense the material and using the new technologies, is the
earlier you would be able to see it and to act in a preventive
way. So please, Mr. Urchuk.
Mr. Urchuk. No, I think that is very true. The--it is
almost universally true in medicine that 3D technologies tend
to provide more information, better diagnosis, better results.
And I think in imaging of luggage the same story holds. The
more information you can have, the better chance either human
or machine can define threats within the luggage.
You know, specifically what holds back progress in some of
these areas though has been the ability of a market to evolve,
to warrant the development of this type of technology. Millions
of dollars are required to develop systems, and I think things
like the mandates for screening of cargo are helpful for
industry. It allows us to make the investments over many, many
years and ultimately culminate in another tool that goes into
the set of solutions that are available for the regulators and
the operators to use, whether that be technology, or canine, or
other.
Senator Markey. So, if I can come over to you back again--
to you, Mr. Beckius. So, what is the rate at which these new
technologies are being adopted and deployed?
Mr. Beckius. Not sure I can directly answer your question,
but I can tell you that TSA stands ready to evaluate new
equipment and technologies when they were when they are brought
to us. We publish a stent information and standards on Federal
business opportunity website, being very transparent with
industry. We work with industry so they understand the
qualification standards and then work closely with them as soon
as they are ready to execute.
Senator Markey. So under, you know, my language which I
authored in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, it instructed
TSA to study the feasibility of deploying computed tomography
scanners to screen air cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
So my question ultimately is, you know, what is the result of
that study and how quickly will it be implemented?
Mr. Beckius. Sure, and really that is, when it is
implemented is really up to industry. So we do think it is
feasible and we stand ready to evaluate equipment when it is
brought to us, but we have, aside from the one unit that is in
the review stage with the field pilot that I spoke of, that is
the only item that has been brought to us for evaluation at
this point.
Senator Markey. OK. So what is the reaction you are getting
from the industry in terms of the implementation of that?
Mr. Beckius. So, the reaction we have gotten is concerned
with the cost and concern with the aperture size.
Senator Markey. OK. So we are back to industry in 2003,
2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 saying, oh, it is so difficult to
implement. So let's go to you, Mr. Fried. What is there--how do
you look at this issue in terms of being able to use CT
scanners and EDS in cargo security?
Mr. Fried. Well, you know, there have certainly been some
significant strides in this technology. But the holy grail
still remains a scanner. We need a scanner that has the
ability, that has a large aperture that could screen pallets
and containers that contain multiple commodities. So not just
loaded tennis shoes, but tennis shoes, blenders, televisions,
and whatnot because that is how air cargo pallets and
containers are built. And that still remains elusive.
Now, when we talk about finances and costs, obviously, you
know, costs are always a consideration for any industry. It
doesn't matter whether you are in air cargo or whether you are
making widgets, you know, cost is always an issue. However,
when costs are excessive and you just simply can't recover
those costs, it is not workable for the industry and that is
reality. That is a commercial reality that we all have to face.
Senator Markey. So the commercial reality is what----
Mr. Fried. The commercial reality is that you can't
shoulder excessive costs that are unrecoverable. And so to that
end, it is not as though the industry is not for security.
Obviously, we are, we just have to find other paths. Now,
remember Senator, your mandate is piece level. So right now we
are screening each piece through technology individually and
then building up the palate. And again, that is why we are so
enthusiastic about the advent of the canines because the
canines are, in fact, very workable.
Senator Markey. Well, you know, I appreciate that. But I
hope we have them on technology here. And there was a story
yesterday, you may have seen it, that Al Qaeda and Isis in
Africa are now in control of areas the size of multiple
Afghanistans in Africa. And you know earlier we heard testimony
about, you know, a detection of a threat that would be
otherwise successful in just the last couple of years coming
in, and it was detected in Europe, but it would have been
headed toward the United States of America.
This control of a much larger area in Africa now, again, is
something that we have to be concerned about. Mr. Beckius, can
you come back to that and talk about what might be possible
that we could learn from with regard to my pilot program, which
is meant to test and deploy CT tests so that we can reduce the
cost and get it to the field so that TSA will be able to keep,
you know, us updated on terms of the reduction in cost, Mr.
Urchuk already talked about this, reduction in costs
dramatically, in moving to a deployment strategy.
Mr. Beckius. Yes, so I mean we are very eager for the
continuation of the pilot and some results that come out of
that because our goal is to provide industry with the best
number of options to meet their screening needs as necessary.
And one thing I would like to highlight is there really is no
silver bullet for air cargo screening.
And as an example, you could have a box of dense machine
parts. Well, that is not best suited for an X-ray because you
are not going to be able to tell what is in there. And
likewise, you don't want to use an ETD on a box of frozen fish
because it is no good for the swab. So we think that the most
appropriate best mechanisms for industry is provided them a
suite of screening options, and each operator is different and
they need to evaluate their own operation.
Senator Markey. So and again, let's go to this cost issue
because I am concerned that budget pressures are impacting
TSA's ability to effectively regulate and oversee air cargo
security, especially as funding for these programs has gone
down in real dollars since my 100 percent screening law was
enacted. So here are the numbers. The TSA was appropriated $105
million for air cargo security in Fiscal Year 2020, a figure
considerably less than $123 million appropriated for air cargo
security in Fiscal Year 2010, 10 years ago. It is less than
2020 than it was in 2010.
That is a drop of $18 million in real dollars, spendable
dollars. So if we adjust for inflation, the decrease would be
even greater. So to make the matter even more troubling, this
funding decrease has occurred despite sustained growth in U.S.
air cargo operations and the Federal Aviation Administration
predicting that air cargo will keep growing at an average
annual rate of 3.3 percent between 2019 and 2039. So Mr.
Beckius, is the TSA being shortchanged by Congress? How has
your diminished budget impacted TSA's ability to oversee the
Certified Cargo Screening Program?
Mr. Beckius. Sure. So, you know, we are appreciative of the
budget provided us any year and work within that budget to do
the best we can. I can tell you that we remain ready to
evaluate new technology. The budget has had no impact on our
ability to evaluate that. We are waiting for more to come in.
And for our inspectors in the field, they continue to be out in
the field, all 377 of them on the weekends, at noon on
Tuesdays, and otherwise, ensuring that industry is in
compliance with their standards.
Senator Markey. Well, Mr. Fried, I see you shaking your
head.
Mr. Fried. Well, I would tell you Senator that, you know,
unfortunately here in the United States our memories are short.
And you know, we tend to forget the past very quickly and I
would imagine while most of us remember September 11th vividly,
we need to understand Congress has got to sufficiently fund the
TSA. And they can't shortchange this agency. We are depending
on this agency to keep us safe while flying and so the
Airforwarders Association urges Congress to make sure the level
of funding is adequate for it to carry out its mission.
Senator Markey. Well again, I agree with you, Mr. Fried,
and I am fighting for that to make sure that the funding is
there. Unfortunately, TSA's budget issues are not limited to
air cargo security or the annual appropriations process. The
agency's overall funding has been further strained by the
ongoing diversion of revenue from the 9/11 passenger security
fee, which is $5.60 fee that every traveler pays when they buy
a plane ticket.
And it is supposed to cover these costs. But Congress
originally mandated the fee on airline tickets in order to help
finance the cost of protecting our Nation's aviation system,
but in 2013 and since then, Congress began diverting one-third
of the revenue generated from the 9/11 Security Fee just to
deficit reduction. So here, a passenger is paying this fee.
They might not be happy with it when looking at it, but it is
supposed to be used in order to provide security.
And now Congress takes a lot of that money, one-third of it
and just puts it over into deficit reduction rather than toward
the goal which it had intended. So this diversion of revenue is
completely unacceptable. The TSA needs all of its resources to
secure our airports in our skies. If the law is not changed
nearly, get this number, $20 billion will be diverted away from
aviation security by 2027 alone, including $1.4 billion--$1.4
billion in 2020 alone that should have been spent on protecting
the security of the aviation industry. So to address this
issue, I have introduced the FASTER Act or the Funding for
Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration Act.
My legislation will secure the passenger planes much
better. It will end the diversion of the 9/11 Security Fee and
ensure that the money passengers fork over for security
actually goes to their security. So to everyone on the panel,
would you support immediate passage of the FASTER Act to have
the fees be used for the security of the aviation issue? Let me
come down to you, Ms. Ritter, so you can talk about that
question.
Ms. Ritter. Yes, we absolutely support that. We also feel
that any efforts to hinder TSA workers' ability to unionize
would be a hindrance to aviation security as well.
Senator Markey. Yes. Thank you. So, we need to spend all
the money in those fees on security. Mr. Fried.
Mr. Fried. Yes, I would say unequivocally so. I think both
passengers flying today would be appalled to see that this
passenger fee was diverted to the general fund. So the
Airforwarders Association absolutely endorses the legislation.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Urchuk.
Mr. Urchuk. Yes, I believe the equipment vendors generally
support the initiative.
Senator Markey. Yes. Mr. Freni.
Mr. Freni. Yes, Senator. It is in my remarks, suggested
that very thing, 100 percent.
Senator Markey. Yes, and I thank you, Mr. Freni, very much
for your comments on the issue because it does go right to the
question of a determination that was made as to how much money
we are going to need in order to accomplish this goal.
Passengers pay these fees for every flight they are taking out
of Logan today. They are paying it on their ticket, and then
the money in large measure is then diverted over to the general
revenue, which may be used for other issues that are important.
But again, the goal was to provide sufficient revenue so
that all of these issues can be dealt with. So, Mr. Beckius,
let me come to you in terms of the, you know, the perspective
that you have, your agency has on to the diversion of these
revenues away from your agency and over to other purposes
within our society.
Mr. Beckius. Yes. So Senator, you have my commitment that
myself and my office will execute to the best of our abilities
no matter what our budget is and you have that commitment 24/7.
Senator Markey. No, I know that but we have a problem. We
have a real problem because as Mr. Fried said well, there is a
big cost that is attached to this. We provide for those costs
to be dealt with the revenues that are raised from passenger
fees on every ticket that is sold and then unfortunately these
revenues get diverted into other purposes and it creates a real
problem. So again, I am going to continue to move my FASTER Act
and try to have that implemented because it is almost like a
raid on revenues that are provided for but then they see it as
a big honey pot, they can be diverted to other purposes, and
then ultimately people say well there is not enough money to
deal with this issue when in fact that revenue has been
provided for.
And as Mr. Freni raised that issue in his opening
statement, which I very much appreciate, you know, from the
Massport perspective, you know, passengers are paying the price
but billions of dollars are being pretty much stolen away from
these security programs to be used for other purposes. So let
me move on onto drones because with more and more drones taking
flight every day, the risk of a drone colliding with an
airplane continues to rise.
During December 2018 in an incident at Gatwick Airport in
the United Kingdom, reports of a drone sighting on the runway
led to 33 hours of disrupted travel that the BBC reported, that
thousand flights were canceled or delayed as planes were
grounded and that 140,000 passengers were caught up in the
chaos. Drones have similarly been sighted here at Logan Airport
during the past year. Thankfully travel was not disrupted but
the economic consequences of drone delays at U.S. airports
could be enormous. More importantly, should a drone actually
strike a plane, the consequences of loss of life would be
catastrophic.
We need to be thinking about how to prevent such threats
before tragedy strikes. Although the FAA has been charged with
the primary responsibility to integrate drones into the
national airspace, it is often local authorities that must be
ready to take proactive measures in real time.
Mr. Freni, do you feel that Massport has the support and
tools it needs from the Federal Government to protect Logan
Airport from unauthorized drones, and if not, what additional
resources or guidance do you need?
Mr. Freni. Well, Senator, we support the initiatives in the
2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, making it a criminal offense to
fly drones near airports. We think that is incredibly important
and we strongly appeal to the--to this committee and Congress
to take additional steps that would empower State or local
partners to take charge of their own safety. There is no single
commercial system to track or identify and neutralize drones or
UAS's in the domestic airspace.
So we support the FAA in its efforts to develop any
solution or these solutions as soon as we can. You know, like
you said, we have had incidences here at Logan. We have been
very fortunate that nothing serious has happened but----
Senator Markey. Can you talk about an individual incident
that was of concern to you that you would hope could be avoided
with better cooperation?
Mr. Freni. One that comes--it is not the professional user
that we worry about. You know, drones can be used, you know, in
buildings and so forth. That we understand, but you know, it is
the kind of the user that isn't really familiar with the
impact. We had an incident some time ago where a drone was
cited on the approach for right, a very important runway to us.
Once it was reported, you know, we had our group that is
internal, you know, try to get to--you know, the State police
were involved, try to find out where that drone was launched
from. It actually went down the runway and was cited to have
fired into the runway. It was launched from a ship across the
harbor. The person that launched it had no idea that he was
doing anything wrong. Those are the ones we worry about.
Senator Markey. He had no idea he was doing anything wrong?
Mr. Freni. I mean when he was found, which he was
fortunately, he didn't realize that he was that close. He
wasn't a professional user. It was recreation. And you know,
you just can imagine what you know, the impact could have been
if it was reported by a pilot on approach to fort wright and we
saw it at 200 feet and then it moved down the runway at about
that altitude and then took off. I think he may have even lost
control of exactly what his location was, but the fact that
where he was on the boat across the harbor was in restricted
airspace.
Senator Markey. Yes, so, you know, I just saw a story over
the last 3 days of an individual on the ground that was trying
to blind a pilot and through good communications they were
actually able to alert the local police and arrest that
individual right on the ground. You may have seen that story,
Mr. Fried. Are you aware of it, and what the circumstances were
around that?
Mr. Fried. Not specifically but I would tell you that, you
know, we are--we hold a seat on the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee and I know for a fact, and Mr. Beckius can probably
address this better than I can, but we received a very
extensive presentation last Thursday in Washington on what TSA
is doing to address this issue. And I would tell you it is
nothing short of impressive. They are actually very focused on
this issue and I assume will continue to be so.
Senator Markey. So if I may go to you, Ms. Ritter, how
concerned are you on flights in terms of the threat that it
poses to pilots able to control these laser points?
Ms. Ritter. Well going back to laser pointers, for example,
and attempts to blind pilots. My husband is a pilot with
another airline and he has reported to me on approach at night
that he has experienced having green laser lights bouncing
around in the cab in the flight deck and makes it very
difficult to read the instruments on landing, which of course
is a critical time when you are supposed to be paying close
attention to what is happening on the monitors. And it is a
serious concern to me as well drones. These are things that are
out of our control when we are in the aircraft and we have to
rely on forces on the ground to take care of those things.
Senator Markey. So these drones and lasers are now great
threats and so I was referring to a laser attack on pilot just
the last several days but drones similarly. So talk a little
bit if you could about your concern and your husband's concern
about lasers and drones?
Ms. Ritter. Well to us, it is personal. It is not just--you
know, it is the aircraft, it is all the passengers on board. It
is civilians on the ground who are unrelated to this and
everybody is at risk when these things happen.
Senator Markey. So let me come back over to you, Mr.
Beckius. How is TSA helping airports like Logan deal with these
threats of drones and the threats of lasers being used to
attempt to blind pilots?
Mr. Beckius. Sure. So unfortunately being the Executive
Director for the Air Cargo Division, I am not intimately
working on the drone issue. I can tell you though from an
agency perspective that it is a priority, a top priority for
both DHS and TSA.
Senator Markey. Yes, well, I would ask for your agency to
provide information to get back to the Committee so we can
include it in the hearing record concerning what is the
strategy which TSA is using to deal with drones and to deal
with the laser issue. And I would also like to take advantage
of having Massport here today and take it to talk about the
coronavirus issue. And we now know that we have over 75,000
people who have had the disease and 2,240 people have died,
both primarily in China, but there are 34 confirmed cases here
in the United States.
I recognize that this is an issue that is something that
Logan is very concerned about. We have to be. President Xi in
China acted irresponsibly. China wants to be part of the World
Trade Organization, but they are also part of the World Health
Organization. So there is a concomitant responsibility to
ensure that if you are going to be integrated into the trade
protocol for the world, that if we have travel that is going to
be taking place of passengers and cargo between the United
States and China, that there is a responsibility to report
early on what the health care risks are that are being created
in your country.
Obviously, China did not do that. So if you could just, Mr.
Freni, talk a little bit about Logan and the protections, the
precautions which you have put in place.
Mr. Freni. So, as you may know, we had nonstop service from
to specific locations in China, Shanghai and Beijing.
Immediately after the break, the airlines that flew to those
two destinations reduced their service. In fact canceled their
service and haven't given us a specific date on when that will
come back. A third airline flying from Hong Kong non-stop into
Boston has reduced its schedule, and other affected areas,
which we are still flying to.
The good news is we engage with the CDC and they are here
at Logan actively screening, working with Customs and Border
Protection on a regular basis. Before the CDC arrived, Senator,
we had the Customs folks would doing passive screening, looking
for signs. We have seen a reduction in our passenger loads
since January 28. We have--about 7 percent. We saw an uptick
this week because we are on vacation, but that was on the
domestic side.
So the reduction of schedule has had an impact, and you
know, again, we are working very closely. We provided space for
the CDC to be here permanently again, and we work with them on
a regular basis. We meet in the morning and talk about anything
that we need to do to help them in the screening process. And
like I said, we have had a reduction of incoming non-stop
services.
We also have to be concerned with connecting services, but
everybody is aware of it. We have put out flyers. We have
talked about, you know, signs and so again, you know, we do
this every morning.
Senator Markey. So, you are talking now with CDC?
Mr. Freni. We actually have them onsite now. On site.
Senator Markey. Were they in the meeting today?
Mr. Freni. CDC was not but Customs Border Protection was.
So they are working side by side with them in Terminal E which
is our international gateway.
Senator Markey. Alright, great. So, can I come back over to
you, Ms. Ritter, and talk about what concerns you have about
the coronavirus, you know, and the perspective Flight
Attendants bring to this issue in order to protect against the
spread?
Ms. Ritter. Certainly. Thank you for the question, Senator
Markey. We continue to call for implementation of contagious
disease checklists, and we need gloves and kits on board the
aircraft to handle any potentially infected passenger, or crew
member for that matter, and for any medical personnel to assist
in dealing with any potentially infected passengers.
We have been dealing with a very fluid situation with a
coronavirus. And in fact, our Hong Kong base with United
Airlines is basically essentially shut down for the foreseeable
future. The crew that are based there are no longer working,
with covered pay protected. In the meantime, we have a lot of
Flight Attendants who are based in the United States who are no
longer able to fly their original schedules to China as those
flights have all been reduced.
And in the meantime, Flight Attendants who have been
working to China previously are potentially now banned from
entering other countries that have limits on entry to people
who have been to China since January 15, and it is creating a
bit of a scheduling nightmare for us as well. And we have
concerns as far as we are not necessarily being informed as to
what the most up-to-date procedures are.
The information is coming out so quickly that it is very
difficult to keep track of. Somebody who has been to China may
still be told that they are all right to continue working their
original schedule without self-quarantining themselves for 14
days. They may be told that it is fine to work their flights or
to commute back home to their home away from their base on
aircraft.
Senator Markey. So you are saying amongst Flight
Attendants, they are just not clear, true direction that is
being given to them about how they should----
Ms. Ritter. We are getting updates so rapid-fire that it is
very difficult to maintain a working knowledge of what the most
up-to-date information is and what is accurate and what is
really happening around the system.
Senator Markey. So our Flight Attendants are concerned that
there may be or have been exposed to the coronavirus----
Ms. Ritter. Definitely, yes. Definitely, absolutely.
Senator Markey. And you are saying there still isn't clear
direction that is being given to the Flight Attendants?
Ms. Ritter. Correct.
Senator Markey. So, I think that is something that the
Committee will follow up on as well with an important set of
protections which Flight Attendants should be given and the
passengers who are on those flights as well. So thank you.
Cybersecurity. We know that those who mean to do us harm could
try to exploit any technological vulnerability in our aviation
system. That will inevitably include cybersecurity
vulnerabilities moving forward.
Our airplanes are increasingly computerized and new
software is being rolled out every day. Evolving technologies
offer enormous potential to improve safety and entertain
passengers, but it will only take one hacker to access an
aircraft navigation or flight control systems to cause
disaster. Regrettably, after investigating the cybersecurity of
our aviation system, I discovered that although airlines may
frequently experience attempted cyber-attacks, their protocols
and protections for cyber incidents need improvement.
I also found that industry collaboration on cybersecurity
is inconsistent. And that is why I have introduced the Cyber
Air Act. The Cyber Air Act would require the airline industry
to share information about cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
direct the FAA to establish cybersecurity protections for
aircraft.
Ms. Ritter, I am glad that the Association of Flight
Attendants has endorsed my legislation. Can you explain the
importance of cybersecurity in the skies or from a crew
member's perspective?
Ms. Ritter. From a crew members perspective, we are always
concerned about what is happening in the cabin of the aircraft,
whether there are people on board with ill intent who are
perhaps coordinating among each other, who may not be sitting
next to each other. If they are able to communicate via cyber
methods and if they are able to hack into our onboard computer
systems and affect the operation of the aircraft itself. These
are all concerns of ours.
Senator Markey. OK. So expand upon that a little bit in
terms of what a coordinated effort could look like, because
again, on each of those flights on 9/11, there were multiple
people who got onto planes with, and again in those instances,
box cutters because they were looking for the easiest way in
order to accomplish their goal on that day. But with modern
technologies, a similar group of four or five people might get
onto a plane and have electronic equipment with them. What
would be your concern in terms of what they might be able to
accomplish?
Ms. Ritter. Some of the information might be security
sensitive as well. We do realize that there were--that the
teams of people on the 9/11 flights had been preparing for that
event for months and they had been scoping out our aircraft and
our procedures onboard. And our concerns are that, you know,
actors could be onboard our aircraft and be scattered around
the plane. And somebody could provide a diversion on one area
of the aircraft to distract the crew into a different area and
take advantage of a lack of coverage in other areas.
Senator Markey. Thank you. So coming back to you, Mr.
Beckius. Does TSA believe that we need stronger protections
against cybersecurity attacks in the aviation industry?
Mr. Beckius. So yes, we do, and I would put this in the
same category with the drones where I am not directly involved
but this is another agency priority and I would be happy to
bring back any information you would like.
Senator Markey. And again, I would appreciate that
information being given to us because that is something that we
would like to include in the record of this hearing. Again, we
are trying to deal comprehensively with what are the threats
that could be posed to Logan Airport to passengers here to the
flights that are taking off regardless of the subject material.
Mr. Freni, have you, in your security briefings each morning,
had a discussion about what the concerns are that you have here
at Logan on those cybersecurity related issues?
Mr. Freni. Yes, we have, Senator. We have our IT group,
representatives there at the 8:30 a.m. every morning. We
discuss in a private meeting afterwards if there are any
threats that they have seen in our sites or in our systems, so
we are talking about it every day. We watch it every day. So,
and we talk to the airlines as well because they are
represented at the 8:30 a.m. meetings and we find out from them
if there is anything we can do to help support them in any way
with their interconnectivity in the airport.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Let me come back to you, Mr.
Fried. I understand that many of our air forwarders are
increasingly suffering from ransomware attacks, a cyber threat
that is increasingly prominent and dangerous in American
industry. Mr. Fried, speak to the cyber threat that your air
forwarders are experiencing and what the Federal Government can
do to help your company shore up their cyber defenses.
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Senator. Many industries are being
affected by ransomware attacks. So the freight forwarding
industry is not an exception. But I would tell you that these
ransomware attacks are creating substantial severe financial
impact on our industry and it affects many because the supply
chain industry, the logistics industry is interconnected. So we
deal with people not only here in the United States, but
throughout the world. So a virus here can affect one of our
partners overseas and that is an issue.
Senator Markey. So if you would just step back for a
second, just tell us a little story about how a ransomware
attack then what was the attack and then what was the follow up
from the attacker, and how you had to respond----
Mr. Fried. So I point to a big one that occurred not too
long ago with Maersk. Maersk is a big logistics provider,
maritime logistics provider, but they have freight forwarding
operations as well where they grabbed all the customers, did
all the shipment data, and so--and held it hostage, if you
will. And that way the shipments that are in transit can't get
to the destinations on time. And obviously let's put the
financial impact aside. Oftentimes, these shipments consist of
medical devices, human organs, tissue for transplants, that
type of thing and if those shipments can't get to the
destinations on time, obviously, it is a matter of life and
death.
And I will tell you another area that is a big concern is
when you pay these ransoms, as many have been forced to do,
often times that money goes overseas to elicit organizations,
often times they might be terrorist organizations. We don't
know who is funding and obviously that is a big challenge.
Senator Markey. And so--and you are saying the whole
process ends paying off potentially terrorist groups?
Mr. Fried. Right.
Senator Markey. It is delaying the delivery of critical
life-saving devices or other items that are critical----
Mr. Fried. That is correct. It is not always about money.
Senator Markey. It is not always about money. Yes, so is
there something you would like to see the Federal Government do
with regard to sharing of cybersecurity technology in order to
reduce the potential for bad actors to impact the air traffic?
Mr. Fried. Yes. So the Airforwarders Association believes
that there needs to be a lot more information sharing on the
part of the Federal Government, and it needs to be industry-
specific work groups that have to be ongoing so that this
information is free flowing, obviously, even if it is in an
enclosed, you know, confidential matter. And then there--an
idea is that perhaps there should be some insurance mechanism
that is provided by the Federal Government.
Maybe something similar to flood insurance, you know, where
if an industry or companies are impacted by ransomware attacks
or some type of cybersecurity attack, they know that they
have--they are confident that they have the protection of the
U.S. Government to assist them in recovering costs. It is an
idea.
Senator Markey. So you are saying that it is now an
industrywide risk that is being run, but there is right now no
industry-specific working group between the industry and the
Federal Government to deal with the issues----
Mr. Fried. Right. So at this point in time, obviously, you
know, they are probably some initiatives out there. I think
they are few and far between but you know at the Airforwarders
Association, we now have an actual technology cyber
subcommittee that is focused just on this issue. It meets
monthly and there are a lot of participants.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that but you are saying that
there is no Federal Government----
Mr. Fried. Not to our knowledge. Nothing substantial.
Senator Markey. I think that is something that we have to
rectify. So we are going to--I am going to work on that. So,
obviously we are just going back here earlier to my comments. I
have talked about the need to have more information sharing.
The industries and the Federal Government so that best
practices are put in place, lessons that have already been
learned are implemented in order to reduce the likelihood of
the threat.
And I think that is a big gap that continues to exist in
some instances. You know, we just go back to, you know, this
whole notion of kind of siloing all information and people just
don't want to share it. right. And do you find that to be the
case, Mr. Fried?
Mr. Fried. Absolutely. I mean it is--you know, I mentioned
earlier in my testimony that it is not only unique to TSA, it
is many branches of the Federal Government. And this is
obviously, the Federal Government works for us. There should be
this this easy information-sharing, especially when it comes to
our welfare.
Senator Markey. And again, that is why I have introduced
legislation to force the information sharing. You know, I saw
that right after 9/11 where we had this integrated new
Department of Homeland Security and they still all had their
legacy computers. They couldn't even talk to each other, can't
even talk to each other from FEMA over to the Coast Guard over
to other agencies.
There was no interoperability that would lead to a quick
sharing of the information, and we know that that was a problem
on 9/11 and it just continued to be. And then it goes to the
culture of these agencies as well, you know, that still exists.
And if we don't telescope the time-frame that we are going to
take in order to ensure that this information is not a threat,
we are going to wind up--not that we didn't understand the
risk, the risk wasn't fully shared with everyone and the
solutions that could have been put in place were as a result
delayed.
And these are very intelligent people who are attacking us,
right. You know, Mohammed Atta was a very educated person. Very
smart, highly educated individual, just as smart as our side.
So we just, fall one--we know they are going to try to do what
we know. They are doing it right now. So we just have to share
the information with regard to where the threats are coming
from and what can be done in order to protect against it. And
again, that is why I introduced that legislation in order to
deal with that threat as well, but it just keeps going back to
air cargo security, how hard it is to deal with this inertia
that exists in trying to move more rapidly in an era of
technology to deal with these issues.
And I will finish up with this last set of questions, if I
may, and that is a conversation about scanning technologies,
which wouldn't be complete without talking about passenger and
baggage screening. The TSA screens 2.8 million passengers, 1.4
million checked bags, and 5.1 million carry-on bags every
single day of the year. These are enormous numbers,
logistically difficult. The enormous scale of the operation
demands that the best technologies are being deployed to keep
travel flowing while promoting security and that is why I
authored the language in the TSA Modernization Act that created
another pilot program for deploying CT scanners, this time at
the passenger checkpoint.
Now, I understand that my pilot program is well underway
and that the TSA expects to deploy 300 CT units to passenger
checkpoints across the Nation at the end of 2020 or by the end
of 2020, including here at Logan Airport. Mr. Beckius, please
provide an update on this pilot program as well any other
efforts that the TSA is undertaking or planning to undertake to
increase the deployment of CT scanners beyond the initial 300
units?
Mr. Beckius. Senator, so I apologize that I don't have
specifics on that but I will be glad to bring that back to you.
Senator Markey. Mr. Freni, are you aware of what this
program means for Logan airport and could you give us an update
with regard to deploying these technologies here at Logan?
Mr. Freni. Yes. Senator. In fact, Logan was the second
airport in the U.S. to successfully deploy the 3D imaging
enhancement threat detection. We have a strong relationship
with the TSA. We were selected as a TSA innovation task force
site to test the CT tomography, computer tomography system, and
we have it here and we intend to increase the numbers as we
deploy our ASL, which we have 23 ASL, automated screening
lanes.
Senator Markey. So I understand TSA's initial procurement
for 300 CT units was awarded to a single vendor and I am
concerned that this decision could impact our security
readiness by opening up the technology supply chain to a single
point of disruption, as well as, reduce the market competition
we need to create the best scanning systems. Mr. Beckius, I
know it is not in your lane but will you commit to considering
a multi-vendor approach in the future procurements of CT
scanners? It is the same issue obviously for the cargo that
goes into the belly of the plane. Do you use multiple vendors
for those technologies?
Mr. Beckius. So we do and we welcome any vendor coming to
TSA with their equipment for evaluation and qualification.
Senator Markey. Yes. Well again, I think it is critical
there to be for cargo or it be for this passenger screening
that TSA, in its vendors strategy for the next round of
procurements, that TSA is looking at multiple vendors to stay
viable by investing Federal research dollars into multiple
technologies in order to deal with this issue. If I could, Mr.
Urchuk, how would you deal with this issue about what Congress
should be doing in order to help companies like Analogic
develop and deploy scanning technologies?
Mr. Urchuk. So I think some of the initiatives that
Department of Homeland Security does in terms of funding early
stage technology, that is important, not necessarily from
larger vendors such as ourselves, but often in partnership with
vendors like ourselves. I think also middle level technology
investments and technologies that need to be matured to be
ready for deployment, that is valuable funding and up until
recently, TSA has been supporting that. That has been critical.
It is worthwhile noting we have a laboratory in New Jersey
that is a leading center for explosive detection certification
in the world. Without that laboratory that the DHS runs, we
wouldn't have the equipment we are talking about today. So that
is one gem in the system. It is underappreciated, I think. But
finally, I think just come back to businesses such as ourselves
need markets to justify our investments, and so it is
challenging when a procurement goes perhaps the other way for
someone other than ourselves. We need the ability to deploy
this equipment to justify our investments and make progress.
Senator Markey. So you are saying that having one company
win everything----
Mr. Urchuk. Was challenging, yes.
Senator Markey. Yes, it was. But it also, you know creates
an environment where the Darwinian paranoia inducing
environment of competition doesn't continue to drive the entire
industry when only one company wins.
Mr. Urchuk. Yes, there can't be 10 suppliers of this type
of equipment but there needs to be at least 2 to 3 healthy
suppliers. And so I think supporting competition through
deployment is beneficial.
Senator Markey. Yes, overconfidence breeds complacency and
complacency breeds disaster. So having more companies on the
problem ensures that there is a more robust analysis of the
emerging threats and not an easy reliance upon just one
company's approach. And I think you are right, I think it just
has to be something that we continue to look at. We don't want
a sole source to in a way almost cutoff, you know, the ability
to continue this technological advancement which is based upon
a robust competition.
So, I thank you, Mr. Urchuk, for your perspective on that.
So what I am going to do is give each one of you 1 minute to
summarize what it is that you want us to remember from your
testimony today, and we'll go down in the same order, if we
can, so that you can tell us what it is that here at Logan,
here in Massachusetts, but for the whole country, we should
retain in terms of what we have to do in the future to make
this airline industry in all aspects safer and less penetrable
by our enemies? Mr. Beckius.
Mr. Beckius. Thank you, Senator. So the initial focus of
the hearing was on the Certified Cargo Screening Program. So in
summary, I would like to say that the health of that program is
strong and TSA's development of the third-party canine program
shows our commitment to continue to advance that program into
the next generation. And then adding onto that, I would like to
say that our compliance program with our hundreds of inspectors
in the field, providing daily oversight to that program as well
as other aspects of aviation security should give people
confidence that TSA has a robust and secure compliance and
enforcement program contributing to the safety of all.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Freni.
Mr. Freni. Senator, thank you. I think I would like to
leave this meeting letting the world know that we want to
continue to be a test site here at Logan Airport for any
technology that comes along. We open our doors to that. We have
over the last 20 years and we will continue and our commitment
is there as you have heard with everyone that attends our 8:30
a.m. meeting, the relationship that we have built, and we want
to offer that to continue. Thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Urchuk.
Mr. Urchuk. I guess the thing I would stress is just a need
for a strong partnerships between industry, the TSA, and all
the different stakeholders in the community, whether they be,
for example, the freight forwarders organization in the airport
or the airlines. That is critical for us to drive innovative
solutions to the field.
Senator Markey. Mr. Fried.
Mr. Fried. Thank you, sir. I would say that the CCSP is the
cornerstone for effective air cargo security. It is a supply
chain solution that works. Canines and effective technology are
crucial in meeting this challenge but both must be adequately
funded with help of the Federal Government. Consistent rule
interpretation within the TSA is very crucial for our members
and our Nation's security, as is TSA screener support of the
privatized screening industry. And the freight forwarders
remain willing, able, and very hopeful of the future and we
want to continue as a key ally in this fight. Thank you.
Senator Markey. Ms. Ritter.
Ms. Ritter. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to speak
to you, Senator. We would just like to reiterate that the TSA
must have the consistent long-term funding to close all
potential security loopholes, and give screeners the staffing
support and training they need to do to support us in the air.
Flight Attendants are the First Responders and the last line of
defense in the air and we take our job very seriously, and we
would also like to see full implementation of the FAA
Reauthorization Bill, including secondary flight deck
barriers----
Senator Markey. Including, I am sorry----
Ms. Ritter. Secondary flight deck barriers that are
supposed to be installed on all new aircraft, but the airlines
are now interpreting that to mean all newly designed and rolled
out aircraft as opposed to----
Senator Markey. Expand upon that a little. We didn't touch
on that question. I think it is important--it is important to
get your perspective on that, please. Just lay out what that
issue is.
Ms. Ritter. Thank you. After 9/11, we developed a secondary
flight deck barrier that provides another layer of security
when the flight deck door is opened, for instance, when pilots
come out to use the facilities or to pass a meal up to the
flight deck, so that we have an extra three to 5 seconds if we
are being charged by somebody in the cabin who is attempting to
access the flight deck unauthorized.
These were installed on a lot of aircraft and then they
indeed started getting a little bit complacent and airlines
stopped requiring them, and then they started removing them
from already accepted aircraft that they had on the property.
Senator Markey. And if I may, what was the justification
given to you for the----
Ms. Ritter. The weight of the flight deck barriers were
considered a cost as far as fuel and added to what the airline
saw as cut to the revenue.
Senator Markey. Yes, I feel--thank you. Thank you for
raising that issue and I am a co-sponsor of legislation to
require secondary security barriers being put in place. There
is kind of an assumption that what has happened in the past
will not occur again.
Ms. Ritter. Captain Saracini on flight 175 was right out of
Boston here and his widow, Ellen Saracini, is a big proponent
of that Act and we fully support it.
Senator Markey. Yes, and that is very important, you know,
set of protections which in my opinion we have to build in.
Yes, this cost-cutting is always the enemy of security.
Security winds up being something that is viewed as expendable,
that we just don't have to be as concerned because the past
could never happen again.
And that is how we got into this situation in the first
place. They are very smart people. They are targeting--U.S.
airlines are at the top of the list of targets. They know that
if they are successful in attacking the airline industry in any
of its forms, that it has a devastating impact upon the
economy. Flights went down by 25 to 30 percent out of Boston
for 2 years after 9/11. That had a devastating impact upon our
economy, upon the way we view our security in our country. We
know this. So shortchanging issues like that is a huge mistake.
That is why I partnered actually with the Flight Attendants to
impose a complete and total block on TSA's ability to say, it
was OK to stop bringing knives back into passenger cabins.
My law passed and it was because of my conversations with
the Flight Attendants. It is still the requirement to scan for
knives going into the passenger cabins. And that was something
that was going to be changed by TSA. So I did that, you know,
saying let's not just assume it can't happen again. You don't
know what the recombinant terrorists DNA can be inside a
passenger cabin, especially as you are talking about
technologies that four or five people could have in the cabin
to create some new threat that our imaginations at this point
have not yet been able to think through. Because that is all
they think about all day long.
So I thank you for that. And again, this just comes back to
the issue of cost. As I said, $1.4 billion this year is going
to be looted out of airline security to be used for who knows
what in the Federal Government, really. Who knows what, when
the whole point of having that passenger fee is to make sure
that we do everything we can to make sure that there was not
something that would make it possible to have a repetition of
what happened on 9/11--$1.4 billion gone. And between now and
2027, $20 billion, at the current pace, will not have been
spent in order to build in these protections. Perhaps even
inventing a lighter weight set of protections that could be put
in place as the technologies evolve that would not lead to any
substantial additional cost of fuel oil for the plane, but
provide measurable additional protections for the passengers
who would be on that plane.
So again, this cost cutting is great for the short term for
a CEO in terms of reporting to the shareholders, but the
American people are the shareholders when it comes to airline
security and they are paying the tax, you know, in order to
ensure that those security provisions are put in place and that
money as I said, is just looted, looted, you know, to do what,
build a new miniature nuclear bomb, which the President wants,
you know, to be able to make it possible to fight and win a
nuclear war? Well, should we really be spending the money on
that or should we be spending it on something that they know is
a threat to them.
Right now terrorists are looking at our airline industry in
all of its forms in order to repeat what they did on 9/11 and
they are constantly trying to do all around the world. And they
are once again re-emerging in Africa over a massive amount of
land and we should just assume that they are not resting and as
a result we can't rest. So I thank you for again injecting that
issue because it just really, really makes me mad, you know,
that billions of dollars that should go to airline security is
being looted for purposes that are not as important as what we
are talking about here today.
So I thank you all for this tremendous hearing today. The
lessons, again, have to be relearned obviously in order to make
sure that overconfidence does not breed complacency, and
complacency once again breeding disaster. And that is why we
have this hearing today because we were the target on 9/11. We
were the target on Patriot's Day in 2013 with the Tsarnaev
brothers. We are a target and we have to be the leader. And I
thank the Massport Authority for being the leader, always
trying to get to the front of the line in deploying the
technologies and deploying the strategies.
I thank you for the security meetings, which you have every
single day, but I think it is imperative that we continue to
upgrade our security. This is a never-ending battle, drones,
lasers, new ways in which they can compromise the system. It is
all coming our way. We should just ensure that we learn the
lessons of our great witnesses here today.
And I thank you all so much for what you are doing, and we
will have the hearing record remain open for two weeks so that
other Senators can ask questions, be put in the record, and
transmitted to our witnesses for their inclusion in the
official Congressional record. And we request from you that
those additional questions be answered in a timely fashion. So
it will be included in the permanent Congressional record.
So with that, I thank you for your wonderful testimony
today, and everyone who has come here today. We just have to
keep our eye on this risk. With that, this hearing is
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]