[Senate Hearing 116-580]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 116-580

                          PROMOTING SAFE SKIES
                    THROUGH SCANNING AND SCREENING:
                    OVERSIGHT OF AIR CARGO SECURITY

=======================================================================

                             FIELD HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 24, 2020
                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation


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                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-661 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023                   
                


       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                  ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                       John Keast, Staff Director
                  Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel
                                 ------                                

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman       EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts, 
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                      Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas,                     AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on February 24, 2020................................     1
Statement of Senator Markey......................................     1

                               Witnesses

John Beckius, Executive Director, Air Cargo Division, 
  Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Edward Freni, Director of Aviation, Massachusetts Port Authority.     7
    Prepared statement...........................................    10
Steven N. Urchuk, Chief Technology Officer, Analogic Corporation.    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    13
Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association.....    14
    Prepared statement...........................................    16
Jennifer Ritter, Flight Attendant, United Airlines, Association 
  of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO.............................    19
    Prepared statement...........................................    21

 
                          PROMOTING SAFE SKIES
                    THROUGH SCANNING AND SCREENING:
                    OVERSIGHT OF AIR CARGO SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2020

                               U.S. Senate,
                          Subcommittee on Security,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Boston, MA.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in 
the Cathy Leonard-McLean Community Room, Rental Car Center, 
Logan Airport, Hon. Ed Markey, presiding.
    Present: Senator Markey [presiding].

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Good morning. As the Ranking Member of the 
Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security, I call this important 
hearing to order and I thank everyone for being here today. 
Before I introduce our topic and our witnesses, I would like to 
express my gratitude to the Commerce Committee Chairman Roger 
Wicker, Ranking Member Maria Cantwell, and Subcommittee 
Chairman Sullivan for supporting my request to hold this field 
hearing.
    I believe today's proceeding will be an excellent 
opportunity to both conduct oversight and learn from the 
Massachusetts model of aviation security. I would also like to 
offer special thanks to the Massachusetts Port Authority and 
its CEO, Lisa Wieland. Among many responsibilities, Massport 
owns and operates Logan International Airport, the site of 
today's field hearing. Massport was generous enough to not only 
host this proceeding, but to send Ed Freni, its Director of 
Aviation, to testify as an expert witness and I look forward to 
hearing from his remarks.
    Early in the morning on September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers 
took control of four airplanes and changed our country forever. 
Two of these aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11 and United 
Airlines Flight 175, departed right here from Boston's Logan 
Airport. 2,997 people were killed, in New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington, D.C. When remembering 9/11, many people only 
think about the victims at the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, and they should be remembered, but we here in Boston 
will never forget the lives of those who flew on the two planes 
that left Logan Airport that day.
    We still remember the workers from Massachusetts companies 
like TJX, Akamai, and Genzyme, as well as so many others who 
were tragically killed that September morning. In total, 206 
victims of the September 11th attacks had ties to 
Massachusetts. Nearly two decades later, these losses remain 
devastating for communities across the commonwealth. They have 
also motivated the great minds of this state to fight for 
security and vigilance in our aviation system. In the aftermath 
of tragedy, we came together, technology companies, airports, 
airlines, flight attendants, pilots, and many more, to enhance 
safety in the skies.
    Here in Massachusetts, we continue to heed the call of the 
9/11 Commission, which described ``failures of imagination'' as 
a primary reason why we did not thwart the attacks before they 
happened. We know that the country must do more than simply 
prepare our defenses for the kinds of attacks we experienced 19 
years ago. We must anticipate the loopholes that terrorists 
could exploit today and in the future.
    That is why, when Congress passed a law in 2007 
implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, I 
secured a provision that required 100 percent screening of air 
cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Back then, and even 
today, that cargo occupies 50 percent of the space in the belly 
of passenger planes, and yet, prior to my law, almost all of 
this cargo was not scanned for liquid, plastic, or conventional 
explosives.
    They scanned the bags of passengers but not of those 
companies that were using the same planes for cargo. It made no 
sense whatsoever. So, imagine that--before 2007, half of the 
items that the flying public sat directly above did not belong 
to anyone onboard and no one had physically checked them for 
dangerous content or material. It was a glaring loophole in our 
aviation security system just waiting to be exploited. And that 
is why I was so proud to have closed it.
    The reason that I knew about it was personnel here at Logan 
Airport, including one particular gate attendant who had me 
look out the window at a cargo truck that was coming across the 
tarmac and he said to me, ``this is how crazy it is, none of 
the cargo in that truck is going to be checked before it is put 
on the plane that you are about to fly on, Congressman.'' We 
have to close that loophole. And he was very aware, of course, 
because Mohammed Atta and the other terrorist had been scoping 
out Logan Airport for months before then. And so from that 
moment on that became my mission, because on that issue and 
many others it was the information that was given to me from 
the personnel at Logan Airport as to where the apertures were, 
where the potential vulnerabilities were that would have to be 
shut down.
    Now in order to meet my 100 percent screening mandate, the 
Transportation Security Administration established the 
Certified Cargo Screening Program. This program achieves 
security while maintaining a steady flow of commercial goods by 
allowing entities up and down the supply chain to scan air 
cargo before it is loaded into the belly of passenger aircraft. 
Cargo screening facilities must be certified and overseen by 
the TSA, as well as use-only TSA approved technologies and 
systems. There are currently 850 certified cargo screening 
facilities in the United States, including 41 in Massachusetts. 
Through this system, we are keeping passenger airlines secured 
from previously unknown threats.
    Making sure TSA's 100 percent screening program stays 
effective is one of my top priorities, and a primary focus of 
today's hearing will be determining what work remains to be 
done. I intend to ask questions that will assess the challenges 
we face in deploying the latest and greatest cargo screening 
technologies, as well as how TSA's strained budget may be 
impacting its ability to oversee air cargo security. But air 
cargo is not the only area where threats might lurk. That's why 
I also want to hear about our passenger and baggage screening 
systems, the danger that drones flying near airports pose to 
airplanes, and the cybersecurity of our increasingly 
computerized aviation system. I have invited today's panelists 
because they can speak to all of these issues and much more. 
Our witnesses are experts who understand that ``never forget'' 
is more than a slogan, it is a commitment to action.
    The effort to keep our skies safe and secure is as 
important as it has ever been, and I look forward to hearing 
your testimony on how we fulfill this ongoing mission. And I 
want to thank all of you for being here and am glad now to 
introduce you to the audience. First is Mr. John Beckius, the 
Executive Director of TSA's Air Cargo Division.
    This committee rightly established his office in the TSA 
Modernization Act of 2018 to help improve our security 
programs, and I am proud of this accomplishment. I am grateful 
to hear his perspective on the current state of air cargo 
security. Next is Mr. Ed Freni, the Director of Aviation for 
the Massachusetts Port Authority. Mr. Freni manages all airside 
and landside activities at Boston Logan International Airport, 
Hanscom Field in Bedford, and Worcester Regional Airport. He 
helped develop Logan's famous daily security briefing after the 
September 11th attacks and has an extensive history of 
fostering safety innovations at Massport.
    Our third witness is Mr. Steve Urchuk, the Chief Technology 
Officer for Analogic. Analogic is a technology company based in 
Peabody, Massachusetts, that makes the kind of cutting-edge 
scanning equipment that we need to secure air cargo, airports, 
and airplanes. Mr. Urchuk's company employs over 500 people in 
the commonwealth and exemplifies why Massachusetts isn't just 
the bay state, it is the brain state that is leading the charge 
for enhancing aviation security, and we are so proud of what 
you do.
    Next is Mr. Brandon Fried, the Executive Director of the 
Airforwarders Association, a national group representing the 
freight forwarding companies that serve as certified air cargo 
screeners. With more than 38 years in the air cargo industry, 
Mr. Fried has tremendous expertise to identify and discuss 
today's security challenges.
    And finally, Ms. Jennifer Ritter is a flight attendant for 
United Airlines and a leader in the Association of Flight 
Attendants. Ms. Ritter represents an essential community that 
serves on the front-lines of aviation security. Flight 
attendants are our truly first responders in the sky. Ms. 
Ritter will offer the Committee an invaluable perspective that 
we must hear.
    So I thank each and every one of our witnesses for being 
here today and I invite Mr. Beckius, whenever you are ready, to 
please begin.

                   STATEMENT OF JOHN BECKIUS,

            EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIR CARGO DIVISION,

             TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Beckius. Good morning, Ranking Member Markey. I am John 
Beckius, the Executive Director of TSA's Air Cargo Division. 
Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding TSA's 
Certified Cargo Screening Program. I am honored to be here and 
grateful for the Subcommittee's continued support of TSA.
    My testimony will highlight the benefits provided by the 
CCSP, areas where the program can be strengthened, and the 
actions we are taking to address those matters. The TSA 
Modernization Act significantly enhanced our ability to execute 
our mission and its implementation is a priority for the 
agency. As it relates to air cargo, the TSA Modernization Act 
includes a number of critically important provisions, including 
direction to establish an air cargo division, which I now lead.
    Additionally, the Act required TSA to complete a 
feasibility study and a pilot program regarding the use of 
computed tomography units for air cargo screening as well as a 
review of the CCSP. TSA established the CCSP in 2009 as part of 
its strategy to meet the implementing recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007 to screen 100 percent of the cargo 
transported on passenger aircraft by August 3, 2010. To 
accomplish that goal, TSA established the CCSP to allow United 
States-based air cargo screening facilities to become certified 
to screen air cargo under the CCSP and receive designation as a 
certified cargo screening facility. The CCSP was developed----
    Senator Markey. And again, CCSP is?
    Mr. Beckius. Certified Cargo Screening Program.
    Senator Markey. OK.
    Mr. Beckius. Sorry, sir.
    Senator Markey. No, just--just want to keep everyone in the 
game here.
    Mr. Beckius. Yes, thank you. The Certified Cargo Screening 
Program was developed to allow U.S. air cargo supply chain 
shippers and indirect air carriers to screen their cargo before 
tendering it to domestic and foreign passenger air carriers, 
helping to alleviate the cargo screening burden on the 
carriers. Through the Certified Cargo Screening Program, 
shippers and indirect air carriers volunteered to abide by TSA 
regulations.
    Today, there are hundreds of certified cargo screening 
facilities in the United States, and these facilities are 
typically located near large commercial airports. Certified 
cargo screening facilities screen cargo using only TSA approved 
methods such as advanced technology X-ray, electronic metal 
detection, explosive trace detection, third-party K9 and 
physical search.
    TSA, through its compliance director and transportation 
security inspectors, conduct inspections of those entities to 
determine compliance with the Certified Cargo Screening 
Standard Security Program and other TSA regulations. Per the 
TSA Modernization Act, TSA reviewed the CCSP in 2019 to 
identify--to evaluate the program and identify vulnerabilities, 
and assess the effectiveness of information sharing with our 
air cargo security stakeholders. Through our review, TSA found 
the program contributed to unimpeded movement of goods through 
a secure U.S. supply chain. Many shippers view it as their 
preferred solution to transport commodities across the United 
States and abroad.
    Additionally, TSA effectively shares information with air 
cargo security stakeholders through the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee, working groups, industry conferences, and 
secure TSA web boards. Through our review, TSA also learned of 
a number of program vulnerabilities, including instances of 
ineffective screening or failure to screen, differences between 
the vetting requirements for cargo screeners at certified cargo 
screening facilities and those with passenger air carriers, as 
well as potential shortfalls in screening capacitors. Since 
then, TSA has taken numerous steps to improve the screening 
program.
    From a screening perspective, TSA supports innovative ways 
to improve security, effectiveness, and efficiency. To that 
end, TSA created and implemented a Certified Cargo Screening 
Program third-party K9, which permits private K9 companies to 
become TSA-regulated entities authorized to screen our cargo. 
We also work closely with screening technology manufacturers on 
assessing ways to improve technology to meet security standards 
and industry needs. TSA regularly updates the program to 
address vulnerabilities identified through agency reviews, 
inspections, engagements with industry, and threat 
intelligence.
    We are in the midst of planning new policies and procedures 
to improve the program moving forward, including updating 
security policies to meet heightened air cargo security 
requirements approved by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, as well as working with screening technology 
developers to increase the affordability and expanded use of 
computed tomography. Securing our Nation's aviation 
transportation system is complex and we cannot do it alone.
    The Certified Cargo Screening Program is an important tool 
that helps address evolving threats while also meets the needs 
of the air cargo industry to ensure air commerce remains both 
secure and efficient. TSA will continue to engage with 
stakeholders and Congress as we look to continue enhancing the 
security, posture, and effectiveness of air cargo security 
overall. Ranking Member Markey, thank you again for the 
opportunity to speak here today. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Beckius follows:]

   Prepared Statement of John Beckius, Executive Director, Air Cargo 
 Division, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
                           Homeland Security
    Good Morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to 
testify on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Certified 
Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). I am John Beckius, Executive Director 
of TSA's Air Cargo Division. I am honored to be here and grateful for 
the subcommittee's continued support for TSA and its critically 
important mission to secure the Nation's transportation system while 
ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA remains 
resolute in countering threats to aviation and protecting both the 
civil aviation system and traveling public. To that end, TSA 
continuously evaluates ways to raise the baseline for all elements of 
aviation security, including air cargo security. My testimony will 
highlight the benefits provided by CCSP, areas where the program can be 
strengthened based on our recent review of the program, and the actions 
we are taking to address those matters.
    The October 5, 2018 enactment of the TSA Modernization Act, the 
agency's first comprehensive reauthorization since inception, has 
significantly enhanced our ability to execute our mission, and its 
implementation is a priority for the Agency. As of today, TSA has 
completed nearly 80 percent of the Act's requirements that have 
deadlines. Of particular relevance to this hearing, the TSA 
Modernization Act includes a number of critically important provisions 
associated with air cargo security. These provisions include direction 
to establish an air cargo division, which is the organization I now 
lead, to complete a feasibility study and pilot program regarding the 
use of computed tomography units for air cargo screening, and to 
conduct a review of the CCSP.
    TSA established the CCSP in 2009 as part of its strategy to meet 
the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
(9/11 Act) mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on 
passenger aircraft by August 3, 2010. Prior to the enactment of the 9/
11 Act and the existence of the CCSP, only passenger air carriers were 
authorized to screen air cargo transported on their aircraft. To meet 
that requirement, TSA established a regulatory program that allows 
United States-located air cargo screening facilities to become 
certified to screen air cargo under the CCSP, and receive designation 
as Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF).
    There are currently 714 CCSFs throughout the United States, located 
primarily in close geographic proximity to the largest commercial 
airports. The CCSP was specifically developed to allow air cargo supply 
chain Shippers and Indirect Air Carriers (IACs) located in the United 
States to screen their air cargo before tendering it to domestic and 
foreign passenger carriers, helping to alleviate the cargo screening 
burden on the carriers.
    Through CCSP, Shippers and IACs may screen air cargo so long as 
they abide by TSA air cargo screening regulations. The TSA application 
process to become a CCSP holder and establish a CCSF screening 
location(s), requires the applicant to provide their legal operating 
business name, copies of government issued identifications of required 
employees, and a Security Threat Assessment for all required 
individuals. In order to become certified, a potential CCSF location 
must ensure TSA standards for physical access control to the facility, 
personnel security through employee vetting, procedural security to 
properly screen and maintain chain of custody for screening cargo, 
internal facility physical and security controls preventing access to 
screened cargo by unauthorized individuals. Once the information is 
reviewed and vetted by TSA, the applicant must have TSA certify a 
potential CCSF location not less than 90 calendar days before the 
applicant intends to begin operations.
    Once certified, CCSFs are required to screen cargo using only TSA-
approved screening technologies and methods. These include Advance 
Technology X-ray (AT X-ray), Explosive Trace Detection (ETD), 
Electronic Metal detection (EMD), Explosive Trace Detection (EDS), 
third party canines, and physical search. Once screened, the CCSF must 
implement chain-of custody measures within their facility and during 
transport to a passenger carrier or airport. Air cargo may only be 
screened and handled by employees vetted through a Security Threat 
Assessment (STA). These processes help ensure the security of the 
screening process and the screened cargo throughout the air cargo 
supply chain prior to tendering it to a passenger aircraft.
    TSA, through its Compliance Directorate and Transportation Security 
Inspectors, conducts inspections of CCSFs to determine compliance with 
49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1549, the Certified Cargo Screening 
Standard Security Program (CCSSSP), and other applicable TSA security 
requirements. Inspections of CCSFs address the full scope of cargo 
security requirements--from acceptance of air cargo to transfer of air 
cargo to a passenger aircraft--to determine compliance, as well as 
identify any security vulnerabilities.
    Currently there are 377 TSA Cargo Inspectors nationwide. In Fiscal 
Year 2019, TSA conducted 1,810 CCSF inspections. As a result of these 
inspections, there were 379 individual findings of violations of TSA 
security requirements, ranging from lower risk areas such as 
administrative and training requirements to 63 findings of violations 
that were subsequently investigated in high risk areas such as how 
cargo is accepted and screened. TSA may also address violations through 
on-the-spot discussion or corrections, dependent on the nature of the 
violation. TSA conducts at least one comprehensive inspection annually 
of each independent and Indirect Air Carrier CCSF.
    As required by the TSA Modernization Act, TSA reviewed the CCSP 
last year to evaluate the program, identify vulnerabilities, and assess 
the effectiveness of information sharing with air cargo security 
stakeholders. The report provided to Congress in July 2019 details our 
findings, improvements made, and planned actions.
    During our review, TSA has found that the CCSP has contributed to 
the unimpeded movement of goods through a secure U.S. supply chain and 
many shippers view it as their preferred solution to transport 
commodities across the United States and abroad. The program also 
allows regulated entities to contract with another entity to screen air 
cargo, if the regulated entity can not or does not want to screen air 
cargo.
    The review also found that TSA effectively shared information with 
air cargo security stakeholders through a variety of ways. For 
instance, TSA industry engagement managers work directly with air cargo 
associations and other industry stakeholders at the executive level, 
while TSA principal security inspectors provide CCSF-level engagement 
for policy interpretation and general guidance. TSA also shares 
information through the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Air 
Cargo subcommittee, industry working groups, industry conferences, 
speaking engagements, and secure TSA web boards.
    Through our review, TSA learned of a number of program 
vulnerabilities, including identified instances of ineffective 
screening or a failure to screen; differences between the vetting 
requirements for cargo screeners at CCSFs and the higher requirements 
for air cargo screeners employed by or acting as an authorized 
representative for a passenger air carrier; and, potential shortfalls 
in screening capacity. TSA has taken numerous steps to improve the 
screening program and the vulnerabilities identified in it.
    From a screening perspective, TSA is supporting innovative ways to 
improve both security effectiveness and efficiency. To that end, TSA 
created and implemented a CCSP canine program (CCSP-K9), generally 
known as ``third-party canine.'' This cargo screening program permits 
private canine companies to apply to become a TSA-regulated entity 
which is authorized to screen air cargo. The implementation of CCSP-K9 
provides another effective option to screen air cargo and may offset 
potential vulnerability issues due to expected increases in screening 
volume when International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) screening 
requirements for explosive detection for full all-cargo carriers takes 
effect in June 2021.
    TSA regularly updates the CCSP to address vulnerabilities 
identified by TSA reviews, TSA inspections, engagement with industry, 
and threat intelligence. For example, in December 2018, TSA enhanced 
existing security measures and established new procedures related to 
air cargo chain-of-custody, tendering, and screening technologies.
    In addition to what is currently being done to address the 
identified vulnerabilities, TSA is in the midst of planning new 
policies and procedures to improve the CCSP moving forward. For 
example, TSA is enacting new security policies consistent with 
heightened air cargo security standards approved by ICAO; working with 
screening technology developers to increase the affordability and 
expand the use of Computed Tomography (CT) technology in the cargo 
screening environment; and, exploring ways to apply screening best 
practices and options to require all CCSF employees to undergo a 
criminal history records check in addition to the current security 
threat assessment.
    Securing the Nation's aviation transportation system is a complex 
task and we cannot do it alone. The CCSP is an important tool that 
helps address evolving threats while also meeting the needs of the air 
cargo industry to ensure air cargo commerce remains both secure and 
efficient. The CCSP will continue to serve as a tool for the air cargo 
industry to meet the 100 percent screening requirements of the 9/11 Act 
and ensure the security of air cargo and the safety of the traveling 
public. With new innovative solutions, such as the CCSP-K9, the CCSP is 
well positioned to serve as a means to meet the expected increase in 
demand for air cargo screening capacity resulting from the change in 
ICAO standards, which take effect in June 2021. TSA will continue to 
engage with stakeholders and Congress as we look to continue enhancing 
the security posture and screening effectiveness of air cargo screening 
overall.
    Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you 
today. I look forward to your questions.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Beckius, very much. Mr. 
Freni.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD FRENI, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION, MASSACHUSETTS 
                         PORT AUTHORITY

    Mr. Freni. Good morning, Ranking member Markey. On behalf 
of the Massachusetts Port Authority, I want to thank you for 
the opportunity to testify before the Senate Commerce Committee 
on Security and for your ongoing commitment to innovation in 
aviation security. As the Director of Aviation at Massport, I 
would like to welcome you to Boston Logan International 
Airport. We are honored to host this important meeting and look 
forward to discussing ways to enhance security for air travel.
    At Massport, safety and security is our number one 
priority. As New England's most critical transportation 
infrastructure, moving people and cargo around the world, 
Massport is committed to addressing the security challenges of 
today and preparing for the threats of tomorrow. The dynamic 
nature of today's security threats, both physical and cyber, 
present an ever-changing environment for Massport and our 
partners worldwide. Working with our Federal partners, State, 
and local emergency responders and the greater airport 
community, we continually enhance and refresh our approach to 
emerging risks in order to maintain the highest level of safety 
and security at all our facilities.
    An informed, vigilant, and engaged airport community is and 
always will be our greatest asset in identifying potential 
risks. Education and engagement is a critical component of our 
overall safety program, which is based on lessons learned, real 
world experiences, and best practices that are part of our 
safety and security culture here at Massport. Most notably, 
since the tragedy of 9/11, Massport has implemented an 
aggressive, smart, and focused security initiatives to 
strengthen defenses against potential threats. Starting on the 
afternoon of 9/11 and continuing non-stop almost 20 years 
later, each and every day at 8:30 in the morning, leadership of 
Massport, the airlines, law enforcement agencies, contractors, 
vendors, and Federal partners convene to discuss topics of 
current significance and set the priorities and actions of the 
coming day.
    In fact, today we had about 70 people attend the 8:30 a.m. 
meeting--of which I was there. The security briefing, as we 
call it, is not just about what happened the past 24 hours and 
what is upcoming in the next 24 hours, it is an opportunity for 
the airport community to connect with peers and partners face 
to face. Whether it is coordinating response to the coronavirus 
outbreak or sharing intelligence on global security issues such 
as the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani or discussing 
the solutions to the evolving cyber security issues, Massport 
is leaning forward aggressively to help keep our employees, 
business partners, and traveling public safe.
    Many other airport management teams have looked to Boston 
as a model and have sought to establish a security briefing for 
the respective airports. However, no other airport in the U.S. 
has been able to match our track record on a day-in and day-out 
basis. Of significance to me personally, each and every 
stakeholder has a chance to participate and listen to 
discussion, ask questions, take back information to share with 
their organizations from a single source of truth and 
authority. This diverse group of professionals, providing 
expert perspectives and facts, instills confidence and is a 
powerful reminder of our mission every day. This is only 
possible due to the widespread commitment by every stakeholder 
involved in their willingness to be fully engaged as 
participants. The security briefing has created an enduring 
network within our community and has vastly strengthened the 
landscape of the airport.
    As an example, Boston Logan was selected by the TSA 
Innovation Task Force site in 2017. Through this program, the 
most advanced security technologies are tested in the field in 
participating airports. Working with the TSA, Massport deployed 
Automated Screening Lanes, ASLs, at almost every checkpoint at 
Logan Airport, significantly improving the screening process. 
Today, Boston Logan International Airport is the premier 
airport for the greater Boston metropolitan area, as well as 
the international gateway for much of New England. Logan's 
economic impact is estimated by the state to be more than $16.3 
billion annually. And in 2019, more than 42 million passengers 
traveled through Logan Airport to one of our 137 destinations, 
comprised of 79 nonstop domestic destinations and 58 nonstop 
international markets.
    Boston Logan is not only the gateway to the world for 
travelers, but it also helps power global commerce by moving a 
diverse and growing mix of cargo throughout the globe. In 2018, 
334,000 metric tons of cargo passed through the airport. Of 
that, 132,000 metric tons were international, and over 90 
percent in the belly cargo transported by passenger aircraft. 
Although belly cargo provides a great amount of flexibility for 
shippers, we are cognizant that terrorist organizations have 
tried to bypass passenger screening by sneaking explosives in 
cargo holds on commercial jets.
    In 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was able to mail 
explosives hidden in a printer cartridge as cargo aboard a 
Qatar Airways passenger plane. We commend the leadership of 
Senator Markey and others in Congress who helped pass 
legislation ensuring 100 percent of cargo transported on 
passenger aircraft is screened per the TSA regulations. This 
was a critical step in protecting the aviation industry. As a 
result of this law, the TSA created the Certified Cargo 
Screening Program, CCSP. This has allowed TSA-certified cargo 
screening facilities and vetted shippers to screen air cargo 
earlier in the supply chain. The facilities screen cargo using 
TSA-approved methods and chain-of-custody measures.
    The CCSP has been instrumental in ensuring cargo on 
passenger planes meets the screening standards mandated by law 
so that belly cargo does not become the soft underbelly of our 
aviation defense measures. Our passengers and flight crews 
expect it and deserve it. We also know terrorists have tried to 
exploit security loopholes in cargo-only flights. The so-called 
Islamic state terrorist group in 2017 was able to ship 
explosives from Turkey to Australia as part of a foiled plot.
    Massport supports rules by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization known as ICAO, requiring the screening of cargo 
transported on cargo-only aircraft by June 2021. According to 
the Federal Aviation Administration's, FAA's, Aerospace 
Forecast Fiscal Years 2019-2039 report, cargo-only carriers 
make up nearly 80 percent of the revenue ton-miles. Enhancing 
security on cargo-only flights will protect more lives in the 
air and on the ground. An important means of meeting that 
requirement is the use of TSA-certified third-party canine 
screening.
    Utilizing third-party canine screening allows airlines to 
inspect cargo without impeding the pace of commerce, and Logan 
is on track to implement this screening method. Moving cargo 
around the world in a safe and secure manner is a shared 
responsibility throughout the entire logistics chain. In order 
to have confidence in the shared responsibility system, we must 
have confidence in the people who are part of the system. 
Identifying threats from within, both on and off airports, is a 
key component of that. Massport served on the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee's Insider Threat committee, which provided 
recommendations to the TSA Administrator on inside threat best 
practices. We fully support those recommendations and encourage 
the TSA to adopt those standards.
    As the volume of passengers and cargo continue to increase, 
another challenge airports face is keeping pace with the 
infrastructure investment requirements needed to safely and 
securely move cargo. The FAA Aerospace Forecast report also 
predicts that U.S. airlines will reach 1.3 billion passengers 
in 2039, and nearly double the cargo traffic as measured by 
revenue ton miles. Airport operators need the support of our 
Federal partners to help us build modern and efficient 
facilities.
    Increasing the cap on the Passenger Facility Charge, PFC, 
is critical to our ability to meet increasing demands. Massport 
also supports legislation championed by Senator Markey that 
would ensure the September 11th Security Fee goes to its 
intended use, improving security at our airports via our 
partners at the TSA, instead of allowing Congress to reallocate 
those funds for other purposes.
    At Massport, our mission is to safely, securely, and 
efficiently connect Massachusetts and New England to the world. 
Massport supports our partners, particularly the TSA, Customs 
and Border Protection, and air carriers in their efforts to 
enhance security procedures across all of our facilities and 
for all cargo types.
    Through strong relationships with our partners, keen 
awareness, and mitigation of security threats, Massport strives 
to have the safest airports in the world. I want to thank you 
for the opportunity to testify in front of the Subcommittee 
today, and I would be glad to take any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Freni follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Edward Freni, Director of Aviation, 
                      Massachusetts Port Authority
    Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of the Massachusetts Port 
Authority, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Senate 
Commerce Subcommittee on Security, and for your ongoing commitment to 
innovation in aviation security. As the Director of Aviation at 
Massport, I'd like to welcome you to Boston Logan International 
Airport. We are honored to host this important hearing, and look 
forward to discussing ways to enhance the security of air travel.
    At Massport, safety and security is our number one priority. As New 
England's most critical transportation infrastructure, moving people 
and cargo around the world, Massport is committed to addressing the 
security challenges of today and preparing for the threats of tomorrow. 
The dynamic nature of today's security threats--both physical and 
cyber--present an ever-changing environment for Massport and our 
partners worldwide. Working with our Federal partners, state and local 
emergency responders, and the greater airport community, we continually 
enhance and refresh our approach to emerging risks in order to maintain 
the highest level of safety and security at all of our facilities.
    An informed, vigilant, and engaged airport community is--and always 
will be--our greatest asset in identifying potential risks. Education 
and engagement is a critical component of our overall safety program, 
which is based on lessons learned, real-world experiences, and best 
practices that are part of the safety and security culture here at 
Massport. Most notably, since the tragedy of September 11th, Massport 
has implemented an aggressive program of smart and focused security 
initiatives to strengthen defenses against potential threats. Starting 
on the afternoon of 9/11/2001, and continuing nonstop for almost 20 
years, each and every day at 8:30 in the morning leadership from 
Massport, the airlines, law enforcement agencies, contractors, vendors 
and Federal partners convene to discuss topics of current significance 
and set the priorities and actions for the coming day. The Security 
Briefing, as we call it, is not just about what happened in the past 24 
hours and what is upcoming in the next 24 hours; it is an opportunity 
for the airport community to connect with peers and partners face-to-
face. Whether it's coordinating a response to the Coronavirus outbreak, 
sharing intelligence on global security issues such as the death of 
Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, or discussing solutions to evolving 
cybersecurity issues, Massport is leaning forward aggressively to help 
keep our employees, business partners, and the traveling public safe.
    Many other airport management teams have looked to Boston as a 
model, and have sought to establish a Security Briefing for their 
respective airports; however, no other airport in the United States has 
been able to match our track record on a day-in and day-out basis. Of 
significance to me personally, each and every stakeholder has the 
chance to participate and listen to the discussion, ask questions, and 
take back information to share with their organizations from a single 
source of truth and authority. This diverse group of professionals 
providing expert perspectives and facts instills confidence, and is a 
powerful reminder of our mission every day. This is only possible due 
to the widespread commitment by every stakeholder involved, and their 
willingness to be fully engaged as participants.
    The Security Briefing has created an enduring network within our 
airport community, and has vastly strengthened the landscape of the 
Airport. As an example, Boston Logan was selected as a TSA Innovation 
Task Force site in 2017. Through this program, the most advanced 
security technologies are tested in the field at participating 
airports. Working with the TSA, Massport deployed Automated Screening 
Lanes (ASLs) at almost every checkpoint at Boston Logan, significantly 
improving the screening process.
    Today, Boston Logan International Airport is the premier airport 
for the greater Boston metropolitan area, as well as the international 
gateway for much of New England. Logan's economic impact is estimated 
by the state to be more than $16.3 billion annually. In 2019, more than 
42 million passengers traveled through Logan Airport to one of our 137 
nonstop destinations, comprised of 79 domestic and 58 international 
markets. Boston Logan is not only the gateway to the world for 
travelers, but it also helps power global commerce by moving a diverse 
and growing mix of cargo throughout the globe. In 2018, 334,000 metric 
tons of cargo passed through the airport. Of that, 132,000 metric tons 
were international, and over 90 percent is belly cargo transported on 
passenger aircraft.
    Although belly cargo provides a great amount of flexibility for 
shippers, we are cognizant that terrorist organizations have tried to 
bypass passenger screening by sneaking explosives in cargo holds on 
commercial jets. In 2010, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula was able 
to mail explosives hidden in a printer cartridge as cargo aboard a 
Qatar Airways passenger plane. We commend the leadership of Senator 
Markey and others in Congress who helped pass legislation ensuring 100 
percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened, per 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulations. This was a 
critical step in protecting the aviation industry. As a result of this 
law, the TSA created the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). This 
has allowed TSA-certified air cargo screening facilities and vetted 
shippers to screen air cargo earlier in the supply chain. The 
facilities screen cargo using TSA-approved methods and chain-of-custody 
measures. The CCSP has been instrumental in ensuring cargo on passenger 
planes meets the screening standards mandated by law so that belly 
cargo does not become the soft underbelly of our aviation defense 
measures. Our passengers and flight crews expect it, and deserve it.
    We also know terrorists also have tried to exploit security 
loopholes in cargo-only flights. The so-called Islamic State terrorist 
group in 2017 was able to ship explosives from Turkey to Australia as 
part of a foiled plot.i Massport supports rules by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requiring the 
screening of cargo transported on cargo-only aircraft by June 2021. 
According to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Aerospace 
Forecast Fiscal Years 2019-2039 report, cargo-only carriers make up 
nearly 80 percent of the revenue ton-miles.ii Enhancing 
security on cargo-only flights will protect more lives in the air and 
on the ground. An important means of meeting that requirement is the 
use of TSA-certified third-party canine screening. Utilizing third-
party canine screening allows airlines to inspect cargo without 
impeding the pace of commerce, and Logan is on track to implement this 
screening method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \i\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-security-raids/
islamic-state-behind-australians-foiled-etihad-meat-mincer-bomb-plot-
police-idUSKBN1AJ367
    \ii\ https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2019-39_FAA_
Aerospace_Forecast.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moving cargo around the world in a safe and secure manner is a 
shared responsibility throughout the entire logistics chain. In order 
to have confidence in the shared responsibility system, we must have 
confidence in the people who are part of the system. Identifying 
threats from within--both on and off airports--is a key component of 
that. Massport served on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee's 
Insider Threat Subcommittee, which provided recommendations to the TSA 
Administrator on insider threat best practices. We fully support those 
recommendations and encourage the TSA to adopt those standards.
    As the volume of passengers and cargo continue to increase, another 
challenge airports face is keeping pace with the infrastructure 
investment requirements needed to safely and securely move cargo. The 
FAA Aerospace Forecasts report also iii predicts that U.S. 
airlines will reach 1.3 billion passengers in 2039, and nearly double 
the cargo traffic as measured by revenue ton miles. Airport operators 
need the support of our Federal partners to help us build modern and 
efficient facilities. Increasing the cap on the Passenger Facility 
Charge is critical to our ability to meet increasing demands. Massport 
also supports legislation championed by Senator Markey that would 
ensure the September 11th Security Fee goes to its intended use--
improving security at our airports via our partners at the TSA, instead 
of allowing Congress to reallocate those funds for other purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \iii\ https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2019-39_FAA_
Aerospace_Forecast.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Massport, our mission is to safely, securely, and efficiently 
connect Massachusetts and New England to the world. Massport supports 
our partners, particularly the TSA, CBP and air carriers, in their 
efforts to enhance security procedures across all of our facilities and 
for all cargo types. Through strong relationships with our partners, 
keen awareness and mitigation of security threats, Massport strives to 
have the safest airports in the world. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify in front of the subcommittee today. I would be glad to take any 
questions.

    Senator Markey. Mr. Freni, thank you. Mr. Urchuk.

                STATEMENT OF STEVEN N. URCHUK, 
         CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, ANALOGIC CORPORATION

    Mr. Urchuk. Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of Analogic 
Corporation, thank you for the opportunity to testify before 
the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Security, and for your 
support of Massachusetts businesses and technology development. 
I am very pleased to appear before you to discuss Analogic 
Corporation's long, proud history of aviation security 
equipment design and manufacturing, and present our future 
technology roadmap to improve aviation security.
    Based north of Boston, Analogic employs over 570 technical, 
manufacturing, and administrative workers in Massachusetts, and 
has approximately 900 employees overall. In my current role as 
Chief Technology Officer, I am responsible for technology 
strategy and advance technology development at Analogic. 
Previously, I led Analogic's CT product development efforts for 
both medical and aviation security applications. For over 40 
years, Analogic has been a technology leader in the medical 
imaging field. We currently sell subsystems and full systems to 
X-ray, Magnetic Resonance, and Computed Tomography Original 
Equipment Manufacturers. And over the last 20 years, we 
pioneered the application of CT to explosive threat detection.
    In the U.S., through our partner L3Harris, we have 
delivered over 900 eXaminer 3Dx CT systems to the TSA for 
checked baggage screening. More recently, we have deployed over 
10 of our new ConneCT checkpoint CT systems to several U.S. 
airports, including Miami, Tampa, and Detroit, in cooperation 
with TSA and also American Airlines who sponsored some of those 
deployments. Delta Airlines has also recently informed Analogic 
of their decision to deploy ConneCT to their ongoing terminal 
improvements in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York's LaGuardia 
airports.
    Analogic is focused on commitment and years of experience 
with CT technology to bring to market the next generation in 3D 
X-ray imaging systems in the form of the ConneCT and similar 
products. Analogic innovations include compact, rugged system 
designs that eliminate the complexity and cost associated with 
conventional CT systems, and also advanced algorithm and 
networking capabilities to support threat detection and remote 
screening of luggage. Of particular interest for today's 
discussion, Analogic has extended the ConneCT technology 
platform to include a new 1000 item per hour, 1 meter wide by 
0.8 m high tunnel system that shares the same simplified design 
of our smaller checkpoint sibling. It is particularly well 
suited for air cargo screening, we believe, because in a 
passenger belly hole environment, cost effectiveness, threat 
detection are a premium--speed is perhaps not as important.
    Whereas, in dedicated passenger aircraft cargo screening, 
such as you have in the airport here today, very high 
throughput expensive conveyor systems are often used. Really, I 
think, when we think about these systems, the very low cost of 
ownership, upgradability, and a very effective threat detection 
system is key. And we believe that by leveraging latest 
technology developments, we can bring this--the type of 
solutions that are coming into the checkpoint and now into the 
air cargo environment in a very cost-effective manner.
    Analogic is committed to delivering this type of technology 
to this critically important market. Over the very near term, 
Analogic looks forward to working with the TSA and our trial 
partners to gain approval and then qualification of our 1,000 
bags per hour screening system. Under the TSA's Aviation Cargo 
Screening Technology List, we and our industry partners welcome 
the opportunity to develop screening solutions that meet the 
needs of the aviation security community.
    It is our hope that together we can define new screening 
methods that improve the security of our transportation system. 
I appreciate this opportunity to share our views, and I look 
forward to answering any question you may have. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Urchuk follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Steven N. Urchuk, Chief Technology Officer, 
                          Analogic Corporation
    Ranking Member Markey, on behalf of Analogic Corporation, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify before the Senate Commerce Subcommittee 
on Security, and for your support of Massachusetts businesses and 
technology development. I am very pleased to appear before you to 
discuss Analogic Corporation's long, proud history of aviation security 
equipment design and manufacturing and present our future technology 
roadmap to improve aviation screening. Based north of Boston, Analogic 
employs over 570 technical, manufacturing and administrative workers in 
Massachusetts and has approximately 900 employees overall. In my 
current role as Chief Technology Officer, I am responsible for 
technology strategy and advance technology development at Analogic. 
Previously, I led Analogic's CT product development efforts for both 
medical and aviation security applications.
    For over 40 years, Analogic has been a technology leader in the 
medical imaging field. We currently sell subsystems and full systems to 
X-ray, Magnetic Resonance and Computed Tomography (CT) Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). Over the last 20 years, we pioneered 
the application of CT to explosive threat detection. In the U.S., 
through our partner L3Harris, we have delivered over 900 eXaminer 3Dx 
CT systems to the TSA for checked baggage screening. More recently, 
Analogic has deployed over 10 of our new ConneCT checkpoint CT systems 
to several U.S. airports, including Miami, Tampa and Detroit, for 
checkpoint screening in partnership with TSA and American Airlines. 
Delta Airlines also recently informed Analogic of their decision to 
deploy ConneCT to their ongoing terminal improvements in Atlanta, Los 
Angeles and New York's LaGuardia airports.
    Analogic's focused commitment and years of experience with CT 
technology has allowed us to bring to market the next generation in 3D 
X-ray imaging in the form of the ConneCT. Key Analogic innovations 
include compact, rugged system designs that eliminate the complexity 
and cost associated with conventional CT systems and advanced algorithm 
and networking capabilities to support threat detection and remote 
screening. Of particular interest for today's discussion, Analogic has 
extended the ConneCT technology platform to include a new 1000 item per 
hour, 1 meter wide by 0.8 m high tunnel system that shares the same 
simplified design as its smaller checkpoint sibling, but is 
particularly well suited for the screening of the air cargo carried on 
passenger aircraft. In these environments, threat detection, 
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness are at a premium. Dedicated 
passenger aircraft cargo screening systems generally do not need the 
high throughput requirements normally associate with the premium 
checked baggage systems used at large airports and in the ultra-high-
speed screening of packages carried by delivery service companies on 
freight aircraft. They do, however, require low cost of ownership, 
upgradeability, and the effective, accurate threat detection that, so 
far, only CT can provide. Leveraging the latest technology and system 
designs, air cargo CT can be provided in an extremely cost-effective 
manner. Analogic is committed to delivering high-quality CT technology 
for this critically important market.
    Looking to the future, it's worth noting that unlike conventional 
X-ray systems, 3D imaging lends itself to automatic threat detection, 
which allows the equipment to be certified to TSA's air cargo standard 
and can be used to find prohibited items and other anomalies using 
machine learning algorithms. We expect remote screening, via locally 
and regionally networked workstations, to be an important component of 
air cargo screening. Connecting a geographically diverse set of systems 
to central locations should improve operational efficiency and ensure 
quality control of the screening process. There is also the potential 
to integrate secondary threat detection and analytics into the process, 
providing an additional layer of detection capability and operational 
awareness.
    The ability to integrate with different vendor solutions using an 
open platform is another emerging requirement in aviation security that 
should carry over to air cargo screening. The use of standardized data 
formats, such as DICOS for image data and threat reports, will be 
important. Similarly, third party algorithms, developed in cooperation 
with the equipment vendors will be needed. Finally, we expect that 
certain vendors may specialize in providing networking and image review 
services. Analogic welcomes these initiatives and anticipates there to 
be considerable technology and business model innovation as air cargo 
screening is modernized.
    Over the very near term, Analogic looks forward to working with the 
TSA and our trial partners to gain approval and then qualification of 
our 1000 bags hour screening system on TSA's Aviation Cargo Screening 
Technology List (ACSTL). We and our industry partners welcome the 
opportunity to develop screening solutions that meet the needs of the 
aviation security community. It is our hope that together we can define 
new screening methods that improve the security of our transportation 
system.
    I appreciate having this opportunity to share our views, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.

    Senator Markey. Thank you very much. Mr. Fried.

 STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIRFORWARDERS 
                          ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Fried. Senator Markey, thank you for this opportunity 
to present the views this morning at the Airforwarders 
Association on air cargo security. Our association represents 
250 air freight forwarders and supporting companies employing 
tens of thousands of employees and dedicated contractors 
ranging from firms with fewer than 20 people to organizations 
with over 1,000. We move freight globally in the most time and 
cost efficient manner being on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship. 
We are the travel agents for cargo.
    We have worked closely with TSA since its inception and 
committed millions of dollars to ensure that our role in the 
security chain is secure. We play an integral role to ensure 
the safety and security of shipments traveling on both domestic 
and international airlines. We know that terrorists remain 
interested in airplanes and therefore are looking for any 
possible vulnerabilities in the system.
    So as we have heard this morning, to meet the 2010 100 
percent air cargo screening requirement on passenger flights 
arriving and departing U.S. airports, TSA implemented this 
CCSP, certifying manufacturers, warehouses, distribution 
centers, and third-party logistics providers that voluntarily 
and successfully follow the TSA security standards. Without 
this program, screening would only take place at the airport, 
resulting in increased airport truck congestion, missed 
flights, and a significant adverse impact on U.S. trade. 
Establishing a certified cargo screening facility is not 
something we take lightly. It is costly, it is time consuming, 
and it is fraught with challenges. However, we remain committed 
to the belief that CCSP not only streamlines customers supply 
chains, but reduces bottlenecks at already congested airline 
cargo facilities.
    Now, as we have heard, in 2018, December 2018, the TSA 
approved the long-awaited Third Party Private Canine Program. 
The program allows private companies to train canines and 
handlers to screen air cargo before loading on passenger 
planes. A well-trained dog can detect explosive odors down to 
parts per trillion. Where it might take hours to screen a cargo 
shipment by X-ray or trace detection technology, an explosive 
detection trained dog team can search that same shipment 
efficiently and effectively in minutes.
    Despite the recent success using canines and cargo 
screening, technology still has a definitive role in the 
screening process. But TSA's vetting and certification of new 
technology is stalled. This delay leaves few machine options 
available to perform the tasks at a reasonable cost. We 
encourage TSA to continue searching for new solutions to fill 
that void. So TSA deputized the private sector to carry out 
cargo screening for shipments moving on passenger aircraft and 
has established an oversight and compliance structure for that 
cargo screening. However, the agency has not established a 
corresponding support structure for non-Governmental cargo 
screening which is critically important from the security 
perspective. The structure must be outcome equivalent to what 
TSA provides for passengers, cabin baggage, and checked baggage 
screening. The Airforwarders Association, therefore, endorses 
recommendations submitted last week by the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee at its quarterly meeting in Washington. 
Suggestions urge TSA to provide the minimum level of support to 
ensure that cargo screeners are empowered with the necessary 
skills, knowledge, guidance, and tools to effectively carry out 
their screening responsibilities before passenger flight 
loading and departure.
    For effective cargo security, consistent interpretations of 
regulations by TSA is essential. However, despite efforts to 
the contrary, work remains to be done to remove bureaucratic 
decision stovepipes within the agency. Our members operate 
offices throughout the United States and many TSA inspectors 
audit these facilities. And like any business investigated by 
the U.S. Government, we rely on the consistent interpretation 
of regulations from security--from facility to facility. We 
understand that 100 percent consistency is not always 
attainable. However, inconsistent interpretation of policy 
decisions and poor communication of those resolutions to the 
inspectors results in high cost to the industry and delays in 
our Nation's commerce.
    That is why we urge TSA Administrator Pekoske to ensure a 
solid mechanism that allows regulated parties to obtain 
official policy guidance from TSA headquarters policy staff 
when the interpretation of requirements varies among individual 
inspectors, and improve communication of policy decisions 
between the policy plans and engagement division and its cargo 
inspector workforce, and staff and fund the new TSA Air Cargo 
Division with the appropriate resources immediately, and 
finally, perhaps establish an industry ombudsman office to 
assure communication. Interpretation of policy and 
implementation of that policy should be in agreement.
    Security deteriorates when operators do not have a clear 
understanding of regulations due to inconsistent policy 
interpretations. I want to thank you again for your time this 
morning, and I look forward to your questions and comments.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Brandon Fried, Executive Director, 
                       Airforwarders Association
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present the views of 
the Airforwarders Association (AfA) on air cargo security.
    The Airforwarders Association (AfA) represents 250 airfreight 
forwarders and supporting companies employing tens of thousands of 
employees and dedicated contractors. Our members range from small 
businesses employing fewer than 20 people to large firms employing well 
over 1,000, and business models vary from domestic only operations to 
worldwide operations. Additionally, a few of our members operate their 
own aircraft. In short--[we are the travel agents for cargo]. We move 
freight throughout the United States and the world in the most time and 
cost-efficient manner, be it on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship.
    Security is at the forefront of our business. We believe that 
effective air cargo security depends upon a risk-based, multilayered 
approach. This strategy includes modern and intelligence-based shipper 
vetting, risk-based targeting, employee training, constant TSA audit 
oversight, and of course, 100 percent screening of each piece of air 
cargo before transport on a passenger flight.
    We have worked closely with TSA since its inception and committed 
millions of dollars over the past 19 years to ensure that our role in 
the security chain is secure. For example, our members have invested 
millions of dollars in security screening equipment, secure facilities, 
and employee background checks. We also maintain compliance with the 
Known Shipper Management System and the Indirect Air Carrier Management 
System along with annual security training to secure our portion of the 
global supply chain. In short, we play an integral role to ensure the 
safety and security of shipments traveling on both domestic and 
international airlines. We take this role very seriously. We know that 
terrorists remain interested in airplanes and therefore are looking for 
any possible vulnerabilities in the system. Throughout the past 19 
years, we have rolled up our sleeves to meet the requirements of the 
Aviation Transportation Security Act, and the 100 percent screening 
requirement for all shipments on passenger planes. We know what is at 
stake and we will do our part.
    As the e-commerce impact on global trade increases, recent studies 
indicate that almost 2 billion people globally purchased goods online 
last year. The Internet allows consumers to research and buy products 
online, connecting with sellers who often depend upon air cargo for 
fast and efficient delivery. But this demand has created significant 
truck congestion at the primary gateway airports. These bottlenecks 
occur as freight forwarders wait to tender and recover shipments from 
airlines that are screening cargo for those not enrolled in the 
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP).
The Certified Cargo Screening Program
    Facility complexity and insufficient land at our airports prevent a 
``one size fits all'' solution to the complex cargo screening dilemma. 
We are motivated to work cooperatively to ensure that many solutions 
are available to address the commercial concerns in the supply chain to 
ensure effective screening outcomes and to meet air cargo screening 
mandates. Screening a high percentage of air cargo upstream is a 
critical part of the solution, especially where U.S. manufacturing and 
supply chain logistics involve secure bulk packaging that must be 
maintained for the integrity of the product.
    In order to meet the 2010 mandated 100 percent air cargo screening 
requirement on passenger flights arriving and departing U.S. airports, 
the TSA implemented a supply chain solution to achieve the directive. 
This initiative, known as the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), 
certifies manufacturers, warehouses, distribution centers, third-party 
logistics providers, and similar facilities that voluntarily and 
successfully apply and follow the TSA-mandated security standards. CCSP 
is a crucial part of the risk-based multi-layered approach to air cargo 
security. The program strengthens security throughout the global supply 
chain, while simultaneously meeting the needs of the shipping public. 
We believe the strength of CCSP is that it provides for multiple 
options throughout the supply chain. These include the use of 
centralized third-party screening centers, third-party logistics 
providers, shipper or exporters, and freight-forwarder screening 
facilities.
    Additionally, all members of the supply chain have a vested 
business interest in a secure chain of custody to maintain the 
integrity of cargo. CCSP relies upon the shippers, forwarders, and 
airlines that have a strong record of safety and security.
    The CCSP decreases delays and expedites the supply chain flow of 
goods by conducting the piece-level screening prior to consolidation 
and full pallet screening away from the congested airport environment. 
Without the CCSP, forwarders with significant freight volumes, now 
screening in their facilities would rely on the airlines to perform 
physical screening of each piece of cargo. The result would cause even 
more truck congestion, missed flights, and a significant adverse impact 
on U.S. trade as airlines struggle to keep up with the demand to screen 
the cargo. In addition, delays can create security risks to safe 
flight. Cargo is most vulnerable to tampering and theft when at rest. 
By keeping our supply chains fluid, we reduce these risks.
    The Airforwarders Association and our members have continued to 
assist with the development and implementation of the Certified Cargo 
Screener Program (CCSP). We have worked closely with TSA to provide 
insight into the complexities of the air cargo supply chain, including 
the impact of time, temperature, and screening methodologies on the 
product. The AfA has consistently provided information, and 
enthusiastically encouraged our members' enrollment in CCSP. In fact, 
of the 147 Indirect Air Carriers in the CCSP, 27 or 18 percent are AfA 
members. However, those 27 AfA members operate 124 of the 331 approved 
CCSF locations, or 37 percent.
    Establishing a Certified Cargo Screening Facility is not something 
that Indirect Air Carriers take lightly. It is costly, time-consuming, 
and fraught with challenges. However, our industry remains committed to 
the belief that the CCSP not only streamlines customer supply chains 
but reduces bottlenecks at already congested airline cargo facilities. 
The freight forwarding industry, including AfA members, has invested 
tens of millions of dollars to ensure that CCSP works as intended.
Canines
    In December 2018, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) approved the long-awaited Third-Party Canine program (3PK9). The 
initiative is a variation of the previously established Certified Cargo 
Screening Program (CCSP) for forwarders and airlines. Under the 3PK9 
program, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA allow 
private companies to train canines and their human handlers to screen 
air cargo before loading onto passenger planes. The screening covers 
flights within or coming to the United States.
    Technological solutions are unable to match the speed and 
efficiency of a well-trained explosive detection canine team. The 
United States Defense Advanced Research Project proved this after 
spending $19 billion over six years in an attempt to create a 
technology that matches the efficiency of a dog. Well-trained dogs were 
extremely effective, screening at more than twenty times the speed of 
any technological solution because of their mobility. With X-ray, every 
single piece of cargo must go through a machine, and a screener must 
interpret each picture. Likewise, with trace detection, every single 
piece of freight must be swabbed. Both of these processes are 
incredibly time-consuming and labor-intensive. The cargo screening 
process without canines requires significant human resources, financial 
cost, and robs air cargo of its most precious commodity, which is time.
    Because a well-trained dog can detect explosive odors down to 
parts-per-trillion, dog teams can effectively sort at the pallet or 
unit load device (ULD) level. They can move around the cargo to search 
without interfering with the sorting process, packaging, or freight 
handling environment. Where it might take hours to screen a cargo 
shipment by X-ray or trace detection technology, an explosive detection 
trained dog can search that same shipment in a matter of minutes.
                           TSA and the Future
Screening Technology
    Despite the recent success using canines in cargo screening, 
technology still has a definitive role in the process. These machines 
mitigate false alarms or perform testing where the use of a dog is 
inappropriate. But TSA's vetting and certification of new technology, 
capable of screening whole pallets containing multiple commodities, 
have stalled. This delay leaves few machine options available to 
perform the task at a reasonable cost. We, therefore, encourage TSA to 
continue searching for new solutions to fill this necessary void. We 
also hope any newly vetted cargo screening technology has the same 
automated tools to assist screeners in the detection of suspicious 
items that TSA has provided in their own equipment to passenger baggage 
screeners.
More Robust TSA Support for Screeners
    In a sense, TSA ``deputized'' the private sector to carry out cargo 
screening for shipments moving on passenger aircraft. Since that time, 
TSA has established an oversight and compliance structure for private-
sector cargo screening. However, the agency has not established a 
corresponding ``support structure'' for non-governmental cargo 
screening, which is critically important from the security perspective. 
The structure must be outcome-equivalent to what TSA provides for 
passengers, cabin baggage, and checked baggage screening. TSA must 
provide the minimum level of support to ensure that cargo screeners are 
empowered with the necessary skills, knowledge, guidance, and tools to 
effectively carry out their screening responsibilities before passenger 
flight loading and departure.
    The Airforwarders Association therefore endorses recommendations 
submitted by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Air Cargo 
Subcommittee at its quarterly meeting in Washington last week. These 
include:

   TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated assistance to 
        regulated parties in their selection of the most competent 
        screeners

   TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated, comprehensive and 
        consistent cargo screener training programs to regulated 
        parties

   TSA provision of regulatorily-mandated cargo screener tests 
        to regulated parties

   TSA provision of needed threat-relevant updates and training 
        to regulated parties at the headquarters and local level

   TSA engagement to facilitate the availability of high-
        quality test objects, in both physical and virtual forms, that 
        are relevant to the current cargo security threat environment
Consistent Interpretation of Regulations is Essential
    The Airforwarders Association and its members work very closely 
with TSA, as mentioned, and holds a seat on the TSA Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee. This statutorily authorized committee provides TSA 
with a formalized mechanism for consultation with key industry partners 
on aviation security matters. These areas include the development, 
refinement, and implementation of aviation security policies, programs, 
rulemaking, and security directives. However, despite efforts to the 
contrary, work remains to be done to remove bureaucratic decision 
stovepipes within the agency.
    Our members operate offices throughout the United States, and 
therefore many TSA inspectors audit these facilities. Like any business 
investigated by the United States government, we rely on the consistent 
interpretation of regulations from facility to facility. We understand 
that people are people, and 100 percent consistency is not attainable. 
However, inconsistent interpretation of policy decisions and poor 
communication of those resolutions to the inspectors result in high 
costs to the industry and delays in our Nation's commerce. That is why 
we urge Administrator Pekoske to:

   Ensure a solid mechanism is in place that allows regulated 
        parties to obtain official policy guidance from TSA 
        headquarters policy staff when the interpretation of 
        requirements varies among individual inspectors.

   Improve communication of policy decisions between the 
        Policy, Plans & Engagement division, and its cargo security 
        inspector workforce.

   Staff and fund the new TSA Air Cargo Division with 
        appropriate resources immediately.

    Interpretation of policy and implementation of the policy should be 
in agreement. Security deteriorates when operators do not have a clear 
understanding of regulations due to inconsistent policy 
interpretations.
    Finally, Indirect Air Carriers continue to struggle with vague 
policy language in their security program concerning the definition of 
when cargo acceptance occurs by the regulated entity. The lack of a 
concise policy regarding this issue continues to impose legal costs on 
our members who must navigate the Letter of Investigation process 
defending themselves against a confusing policy that generates 
differing interpretations even within the agency. The Airforwarders 
Association once again requests that TSA immediately begin work to 
alleviate this confusion by establishing a joint mechanism with 
industry stakeholders to thoroughly examine multiple acceptance issues 
and determine the best policy solutions that make sense across all 
stakeholders in the real-world operational environment.
    Thank you for your time this morning, and I look forward to your 
questions and comments.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. And thank you again, Ms. 
Ritter, for being here and representing all the work that the 
flight attendants do every day. Thank you.

        STATEMENT OF JENNIFER RITTER, FLIGHT ATTENDANT,

UNITED AIRLINES, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS--CWA, AFL-CIO

    Ms. Ritter. Well, thank you Ranking Member Markey for 
having me here today. I would also like to thank Chairman 
Wicker and members of the Committee for holding the hearing. My 
name is Jennifer Ritter and I am here representing the 
Association of Flight Attendants, CWA, with 50,000 of 
aviation's first responders at 20 airlines.
    I am a Flight Attendant at United Airlines, and on 
September 11, 2001 I lost my good friends and my profession 
changed forever. But even as we grieved, we were comforted by 
Flight Attendants who had formerly flown at Pan Am during the 
loss of Flight 103. They helped us cope and have hope that we 
could make it through the grief that made it hard to breathe 
and made us wonder if we could ever find a new normal. We 
bonded in our grief and also in our commitment to work every 
day to close loopholes in aviation security.
    When Flight Attendants go to work, we do so trusting that 
every function of security is working all the way up to the 
aircraft door. We are aviation's last line of defense. We need 
the proper tools, training, staffing, and communications to 
perform our work and thwart any onboard security threats. But 
we cannot do anything about threats to our lives and those in 
our care outside of the aircraft cabin. Senator Markey knows 
well in his nearly two decades of work with us that 100 percent 
cargo screening is critically important to Flight Attendants. 
If we can't be sure this is done and done properly, we are in 
essence adding tremendous risk to our lives over a security 
loophole that is out of our control. That is not right and we 
urge this committee to take a very close look at this issue. 
Our Flight Attendant union supports of the 100 percent 
screening of cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft. We have 
worked on this issue in the TSA Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee Air Cargo Working Group, and of course we are proud 
to have worked with Senator Markey while he is still serving in 
the House of Representatives to make this law.
    In order to maintain this standard and ensure it is fully 
implemented, we support continued development and deployment of 
advanced cargo inspection technology. Canine inspection is an 
important part of screening but it must be done right. We are 
fully supportive of the Transportation Security 
Administration's own canine inspection teams for air cargo. We 
have many concerns, however, about third-party canine 
inspection services or those 3PK companies effectively self-
inspecting to meet TSA standards for canine team training, 
care, and rest periods. We understand proper funding and 
resources must be allocated for TSA to adequately perform 
security screening required by law.
    AFA supports the Faster Act, S. 472, which would ensure 
aviation security service fees pay for the costs of security 
screening. In addition to cargo screening, we support the Cyber 
AIR Act, S. 2181, which would help protect from and require 
disclosure of any attempted or successful cyber-attacks. One 
specific concern I have as a Flight Attendant is related not to 
malicious interference but something far more mundane, and that 
is the unintentional loading of lithium ion batteries into our 
cargo hold, for example, with last-minute gate checked bags. 
While lithium-ion batteries are permitted in carry-on baggage, 
such bags may still get gate checked at the gate when the 
overhead bins are full. Our agents working the flights do ask 
those passengers to ensure that any lithium-ion batteries are 
removed before the bags get taken to the cargo hold, but there 
is no enforcement.
    Effective passenger baggage and cargo screening is a vital 
part of our layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It 
is also a difficult job with massive responsibility. TSA must 
have the consistent long-term funding to close all potential 
security loopholes and give screeners the staffing support and 
training they need to do their jobs to help keep our skies safe 
and secure. Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation 
security. The Senate Homeland Security committee estimates that 
the 35-day Government shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years in 
worker productivity. This created a gaping hole in aviation 
security and it cannot ever be repeated by even a single day.
    We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to 
other security initiatives such as border security. Reduced 
staffing at checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience. When TSA 
is stretched thin, it increases the risk of a serious security 
breach. Flight attendants often bear the brunt of travelers 
frustrated by any inefficiencies in security screening, making 
our workplaces more volatile. We urge lawmakers to ensure 
funding is adequate and stable to maintain the successful 
mission of TSA.
    We thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member, and the members 
of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We are 
proud of our work as aviation's First Responders and the last 
line of defense in aviation security. As the great labor leader 
Mother Jones said, ``mourn the dead and fight for the living.''
    We commit to you to do this every day, and we appreciate 
your attention and oversight on such a critical matter for us 
as crew and the people who entrust us with their lives when 
they fly. This concludes my remarks. Thank you for having me 
here today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may 
have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Ritter follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Jennifer Ritter, Flight Attendant, United 
        Airlines, Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell and Members of the 
Committee:

    My name is Jennifer Ritter and I am here representing the 
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA with 50,000 of aviation's first 
responders at 20 airlines. I am a Flight Attendant at United Airlines 
and on September 11, 2001. I lost my good friends and my profession 
changed forever. But even as we grieved, we were comforted by Flight 
Attendants who had formerly flown at TWA and Pan Am during the loss of 
flights 800 and 103 respectively. They helped us cope and have hope 
that we could make it through the grief that made it hard to breathe 
and made us wonder if we could ever find a new normal. We bonded in our 
grief and also in our commitment to work every day to close loopholes 
in aviation security.
    When Flight Attendants go to work, we do so trusting that every 
function of security is working up to the aircraft door. We are 
aviation's last line of defense. We need the proper tools, training, 
staffing, and communications to perform our work and thwart any onboard 
security threats. But we cannot do anything about threats to our lives 
and those in our care outside of the aircraft cabin. Senator Markey 
knows well in his nearly two decades of work with us that 100 percent 
cargo screening is critically important to Flight Attendants. If we 
can't be sure this is done and done properly, we are in essence adding 
tremendous risk to our lives over a security loophole that is out of 
our control. That is not right and we urge this committee to take a 
very close look at this issue.
    Our Flight Attendant union supports of the 100 percent screening of 
cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft. We have worked on this issue 
in the TSA Aviation Security Advisory Committee Air Cargo Working Group 
and of course we are proud to have worked with Senator Markey while he 
still served in the House of Representatives to make this law. In order 
to maintain this standard and ensure is it fully implemented, we 
support continued development and deployment of advanced cargo 
inspection technology.
    Canine inspection is an important part of screening, but it must be 
done right. We are fully supportive of the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA) own canine inspection teams for air cargo. We 
have many concerns, however, about 3rd Party Canine (3PK) inspection 
services or those 3PK companies effectively self-inspecting to meet TSA 
Standards for canine team training, care and rest periods.
    We understand proper funding and resources must be allocated for 
TSA to adequately perform security screening required by law. AFA 
supports the Faster Act (S. 472), which would ensure aviation security 
service fees pay for the costs of security screening.
    In addition to cargo screening, we support the Cyber AIR Act (S. 
2181) which would help protect from and require discloser of any 
attempt or successful cyber-attacks.
Adequate Long-Term Funding
    Effective passenger, baggage, and cargo screening is a vital part 
of our layered defense against terrorism in the skies. It is also a 
difficult job with massive responsibility. TSA must have the 
consistent, long-term funding to close all potential security loopholes 
and give screeners the staffing, support and training they need to do 
their jobs to help keep our skies safe and secure.
    Government shutdowns result in weakened aviation security. The 
Senate Homeland Security Committee estimates that the 35-day Government 
Shutdown cost the DOT 2,413 years in worker productivity.\1\ This 
created a gaping hole in aviation security and it cannot ever be 
repeated by even a day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Shutdown cost DOT, DHS thousands of years in lost productivity, 
POLITICO Pro, https://t.co/O3478qNmFc?amp=1, September 17, 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We also oppose diverting funding and resources from TSA to other 
security initiatives, such as border security. Reduced staffing at 
checkpoints isn't just an inconvenience-when TSA is stretched thin, it 
increases the risk of a serious security breach.
    Flight Attendants often bear the brunt of travelers frustrated by 
any inefficiencies in security screening, making our workspace more 
volatile. We urge lawmakers to ensure funding is adequate and stable to 
maintain the successful mission of TSA.
Conclusion
    We thank the Chairman, the Ranking Member and the Members of this 
Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. We are proud of our work 
as aviation's first responders and the last line of defense in aviation 
security. As the great labor leader Mother Jones said, ``Mourn the dead 
and fight for the living.'' We commit to you to do this every day and 
we appreciate your attention and oversight on such a critical matter 
for us as crew, and the people who trust us with their lives when they 
fly.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Ms. Ritter. Thank you very much, 
and thanks to all of our witnesses. Now, we will begin the 
questions and answer period.
    When I fought to enact a 100 percent screening requirement 
for air cargo transported on passenger aircraft, I was opposed 
by the Bush Administration all 4 years. I could not get that 
law put on the books, and many in the air cargo industry also 
did not want to bear the cost or didn't think it was 
logistically feasible. So I am proud that we have proven all 
those naysayers wrong and we have developed a 100 percent 
screening system that promotes security while maintaining a 
steady flow of commercial goods.
    One of the keys to this success has been allowing TSA 
certified warehouses, distributors, and freight forwarders to 
scan air cargo as it moves through the supply chain. This 
approach provides essential scanning in a flexible and less 
costly way. But the system will only work as long as the TSA 
also provides robust oversight of certified cargo screeners and 
ensures that their security protocols are strong.
    So, Mr. Beckius, how much air cargo is transported on 
passenger planes every year?
    Mr. Beckius. In 2019, it was approximately 73 million tons.
    Senator Markey. So that is an enormous amount of cargo and 
it is all sitting directly under the feet of every passenger 
flying out of Logan or any other airport in the United States. 
And that is on average 50 percent of all the cargo that is in 
the belly of passenger planes. Half of it, half of the cargo is 
the bags of the passengers on that plane and the other half is 
cargo unrelated to those passengers and the passengers are not 
even aware that that cargo is there as well, that is unrelated 
to and has not gone through the screening process which the 
bags of the passengers have gone through.
    So that is why we have to make sure that it is 100 percent 
safe. So, Mr. Beckius, please again describe the main protocols 
that TSA monitors and evaluates for air cargo screeners. What 
security standards do you require cargo screens to meet to 
receive and maintain their certification?
    Mr. Beckius. Sure. So the requirements for the Certified 
Cargo Screening Program and those participants have numerous 
requirements. Obviously, the most important is the actual air 
cargo screening. And thanks to your legislation, that is done 
at 100 percent today. Only TSA approved equipment can be used, 
whether that is approved CT X-ray, K9, standard X-ray, those 
standards have to be met and evaluated by TSA, the carriers, 
and the Certified Cargo Screening Program holders can only use 
TSA approved equipment.
    In addition to the equipment, there is a layered approach 
in the security programs from vetting of their employees, 
access to the facilities, tamper-evident seals applied after 
screening, supply chain security until it arrives at a 
passenger facility, and then there is equipment security at the 
passenger air carrier until such time as it is loaded on an 
aircraft. So it is very much a layered approach, sir.
    Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Fried, you represent the 
companies that are subject to this TSA oversight. So what are 
some of the specific ways, from your perspective, that TSA 
could improve its certification and compliance mechanisms for 
air cargo screeners?
    Mr. Fried. Well, I think it all depends on a concise, 
written policy and consistent policy interpretations as I 
mentioned in my oral testimony today. I think that one of the 
biggest challenges that our members have----
    Senator Markey. Give me an example. What is an example of 
inconsistent----
    Mr. Fried. I just--you know, a lot of it, unfortunately 
Senator, for this year is sensitive security information, but 
there are ways that policy is written surrounding Certified 
Cargo Screening Program that tend to be confusing. And often 
times, that results in a--the misinterpretation might result in 
something not being done properly. It is not malicious, but at 
the same time it requires TSA inspectors to actually resolve 
internal communication issues where they have conflicts as to 
what that policy means. So I would tell you that when you ask 
me what actually needs to be done, I would tell you that it 
starts with more concise, clearly written policy so that 
everyone understands and everyone is on the same page.
    Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Beckius, how do you respond to 
Mr. Fried?
    Mr. Beckius. So I agree with Brandon that that is very 
important and we work consistently with our industry partners 
on that. So when we hear from the Association on an air carrier 
that they feel there is inconsistent policy in the field, we 
look at that from a headquarters perspective and try to 
determine where the disconnect is. Is it between--is it with 
the air carrier and they are misinterpreting the policy? Is it 
that the policy needs to be better clarified? Is there 
nationwide inconsistency or is it at a local level? And then we 
work within our building with security operations, our lawyers, 
and our policy writers to get that information back to industry 
and make sure it is clear.
    Senator Markey. OK--Mr. Fried give us an example, you know, 
you don't have to be detailed in a way that compromises 
security but what is an area where----
    Mr. Fried. Well, as an example, like exactly what did--you 
know, the dimensions of a designated screening area within a 
warehouse. That might be an area that might be misunderstood 
between the TSA and the actual air----
    Senator Markey. So what could a misunderstanding look like?
    Mr. Fried. Well, maybe it is the length and the width of 
the area. And so there would be an enforcement action against 
the certified cargo screening facilitator.
    Senator Markey. You are saying that TSA would arrive and 
say that your area is not properly secured----
    Mr. Fried. Oh, no, that is not the case at all. All these 
areas are extremely well secured. But maybe the dimensions 
might not be specific.
    Senator Markey. That is just a general--it is hard for me 
to understand. What do you mean?
    Mr. Fried. Well, again sir, I have to tell you that a lot 
of this is completely under sensitive security information so I 
can't divulge areas of enforcement or the program itself, but I 
can tell you that again----
    Senator Markey. You are saying it is totally secure?
    Mr. Fried. Yes.
    Senator Markey. OK, so we won't worry. But then you are 
simultaneously saying I can't give you any details because it--
again, you raise the subject area, which is the dimensions of 
the area. Can you speak more broadly to that?
    Mr. Fried. I could Senator, and the reality is that it 
doesn't actually create any threat to security. It could be a 
misinterpretation of how one carries out the screening and 
actually how one sets up the designated screening area. That 
might cause a letter of investigation from TSA and it is all 
based on just inconcise policy on how to actually set up a 
screening area.
    Senator Markey. Let me come back to you, Mr. Beckius. So 
what are we talking about here from your perspective, from the 
TSA perspective and going to these companies?
    Mr. Beckius. Sure. So once again we hear from industry that 
they have questions or concerns about a policy or regulation, 
we will work with our local inspectors, for instance, the eight 
here in Boston to try to come to a resolution and determine if 
the regulated party is out of compliance or whether our local 
inspector needed to readjust how they viewed the matter. And 
then we always make sure to circle back with the regulated 
party with a final response.
    Senator Markey. OK. So, Mr. Fried seems to be saying that 
many times TSA just isn't clear enough with the regulations. Is 
that what you are saying, Mr. Fried?
    Mr. Fried. Exactly. And that creates confusion.
    Senator Markey. Will you agree to meet with Mr. Fried then, 
in terms of----
    Mr. Beckius. So, Mr. Fried and I meet regularly.
    Senator Markey. OK. Well, what is the issue then, Mr. 
Fried? Why is it that these issues aren't resolved then?
    Mr. Fried. Senator, you know, I think we have to realize, 
as I said in my testimony, that they have 500 inspectors out 
there and 100 percent consistency and policy interpretation is, 
I would say, difficult for any organization to attain. So we 
are sympathetic to that, but often times what we find in the 
field is that the field inspector simply is carrying out policy 
on his or her own that is not consistent with the policy 
intent.
    Senator Markey. Do you agree with this, Mr. Beckius, that 
there are problems that go down to this local level?
    Mr. Beckius. So, I would not classify them as problems. I 
would say that if there is--if we receive information that an 
inspector in Boston viewed an issue different than an inspector 
in Chicago, my office will mediate that and ensure that any 
inconsistency is resolved.
    Senator Markey. All right, so the Committee would ask for a 
status update from both of you to the Committee within 60 days 
of the resolution of this issue just so that we have a formal 
response from the industry and from TSA. So will you both agree 
to give us an update in writing of what the resolution of this 
issue will be?
    Mr. Fried. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. OK. Thank you. Now, let me go over here to 
you, Ms. Ritter. You heard some of these, you know, some of 
these issues being discussed. I heard you talk about canines in 
your testimony. You know, can you now give your commentary in 
terms of how the Flight Attendants view these security issues 
and what you would like to see added to or resolved in terms of 
clarification?
    Ms. Ritter. We rely on the external security infrastructure 
to keep us safe because all we have control over is the 
aircraft cabin. We don't have access to the cargo hold from in-
flight and we have to trust that everything is being properly 
screened. And the one concern that I did raise was the item 
lithium ion batteries where passengers boarding the aircraft 
find that there's no more room in the overhead compartments and 
they are required to check their bag at the last minute, and 
they are asked to make sure that they take any lithium ion 
batteries out of their bags, but what if they forget something?
    There is no malicious intent there, but is that bag getting 
screened before it gets put in the cargo hold and how is that 
going to be handled? We are trained to handle runaway thermal 
events on the aircraft in the cabin. We have liquid 
extinguishers and liquids on board as well as thermal 
containment bags on most aircraft now, and we know how to 
handle those, but if something like that happens in a cargo 
hold, we are utterly unequipped to deal with it.
    Senator Markey. OK, so does one of the other witnesses want 
to address that question? It seems like a pretty significant 
problem, you know, where passengers are told there is no 
overhead space, please hand it to us and we will put it into 
the belly of the plane, and it has got lithium ion batteries 
that otherwise would be dealt with up above. So can you talk 
about that, Mr. Freni?
    Mr. Freni. Yes Senator, I think on the course of this 
conversation, I want to go back to how we resolve issues here 
on a local basis, particularly when we hear this kind of 
conversation. We have a real strong compliance group from TSA 
here at Logan Airport, always continuously inspecting. And we 
work with them hand in hand to make sure that all the things 
that you heard here are being adhered to.
    And if there is an issue, we work it out right away. At the 
8:30 meeting, we know each other, we see each other, we talk 
with each other. It doesn't take a lot of time if we see 
something that is out of the ordinary, particularly in the 
cargo areas where cargo was brought to Logan Airport. So we are 
confident that we are resolving these issues immediately.
    Senator Markey. So can you talk about this lithium ion 
issue?
    Mr. Freni. Yes. Also the carry-on bag program, I think, is 
another one where we have enhanced with our ASL machines. I 
think those automated screening lanes have really kind of honed 
in on anything that is unusual in the bag so I know our 
inspectors are watching for that. So it resolves the issue of 
getting on the airplane. The airlines have put out a mandate 
that they cannot be carried. So our TSA inspectors are watching 
for it and I think we have had a pretty good record of picking 
it up.
    Ms. Ritter. Lithium ion batteries are allowed in the cabin 
of the aircraft as carry-ons and so there is nothing preventing 
such a bag from getting checked. We have, at my airline, we 
have five boarding groups. And usually we have to start 
checking bags after the second group is boarded. That means 
that we have three groups of passengers with bags that are 
probably getting checked at the last minute, and we have to 
rely on them to be aware of what is in their bag and take it 
out before they board the aircraft.
    Senator Markey. So you are saying, in the passenger area 
you actually have equipment that could deal with a fire?
    Ms. Ritter. Correct.
    Senator Markey. But if it went into----
    Ms. Ritter. Halon extinguishers will put out a fire in the 
cargo hold but they will not prevent a re-ignition.
    Senator Markey. Yes, Mr. Fried?
    Mr. Fried. One of the things I would--you know, the 
Airforwarders Association is extremely concerned about this 
lithium battery check right now. And I would say that one of 
the things that are--two things we need is more efficient 
technology that can possibly scan for these lithium batteries, 
but one of the promising areas that we are seeing now is we 
have members in the canine community that are actually training 
these explosive trace detection dogs to screen and to detect 
lithium batteries, not only in cargo but luggage as well. I 
think that is a very promising area that we should be looking 
at very seriously.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Ms. Ritter, can I come back to 
you? I know you mentioned canines in your opening statement. 
Could you elaborate a little bit more about what your concerns 
are?
    Ms. Ritter. We do support the use of canines in aviation 
security, however, we do have a potential issue where a profit 
motive comes into play. These dogs are expensive to train and 
acquire and we are concerned that there may not be enough down 
time for the dogs or that they may be kept working longer than 
would normally be happening if they were Government mandated.
    Senator Markey. Yes, so this--but in general, you are 
satisfied with this area?
    Ms. Ritter. Sure.
    Senator Markey. So again, with this check bag phenomenon, 
obviously when airlines charge $30 to check one bag and a 
second bag is another $40 to check, so people try to cram it in 
up above.
    Ms. Ritter. And the kitchen sink.
    Senator Markey. And the kitchen sink. They don't want have 
to pay another 40 bucks for their bag to fly just from here to 
there for two hours, huh? It just seems like you are buying 
another ticket on the plane. So as a result, it winds up at the 
gate door with the gate attendant saying, we are going to have 
to put that in the belly of the plane.
    So you start to create a traffic jam with all of this 
baggage that people are trying to get up into the passenger 
section to avoid the extra 40 bucks, you know, for that extra 
bag. So can you talk a little bit about that, Ms. Ritter? Talk 
about that phenomenon that is now opening up in terms of the 
passenger trying to avoid these exorbitant, crazy fees that 
airlines now want to charge for the extra bag.
    Ms. Ritter. It is not just the fees they are trying to 
avoid, they don't want to have to wait in baggage claim either 
which is perfectly understandable, and we certainly do support 
having TSA check to make sure that everybody is only carrying 
on one suitcase and one personal item.
    Senator Markey. So it winds up with a passenger just with 
two bags being charged 30 bucks and another $40 for the second 
bag. So it is 140 bucks for the round trip with those two bags 
and obviously, you know, what is in those two bags, you know, 
and this goes to lithium ion or other issues if the passengers 
ride trying to get it up above in terms of what is the process 
done to make sure that there is a proper screening. Right, 
because you don't have fire extinguishers on the belly. So 
again, please elaborate a little bit more if you could.
    Mr. Ritter. There is only so much space that we have on the 
aircraft in the overhead compartments, and of course everybody 
is trying to avoid excess fees. Perfectly understandable.
    Senator Markey. OK. So TSA, if you could, Mr. Beckius, how 
do we handle this phenomenon where airlines are seeing this as 
an incredible profit maker for them to get the extra 40 bucks 
for the bag, but yet it creates issues for you.
    Mr. Beckius. Sure. So from a TSA perspective, it does 
create challenges for us at the checkpoint with the density of 
the bags, but TSA does not monitor or regulate the number of 
items a passenger can take through a checkpoint. We make sure 
that there are no prohibited items in those bags.
    Senator Markey. So, but is that increasing your logistical 
problem that the bag--let's say a lithium ion battery which 
would be OK up in the passenger cabin but is now in the belly 
of the plane. How do you resolve an issue like that given the 
also on-time departure goals of the airline and ensuring that 
simultaneously those bags that are now packed right there in 
that gate are properly screened?
    Mr. Beckius. Yes, and so unfortunately as the Executive 
Director for the Air Cargo Division, I am not intimately 
familiar with the checkpoint workings. I am happy to bring back 
any information you would like on that though.
    Senator Markey. So again, these are--these are issues to go 
on security so if you can report back on that, how is that 
handled and that increase in what is happening? And I just 
think it is absolutely incredible.
    Senator Wicker and I are very interested in this issue and 
we actually, you know, are trying our best to move legislation, 
Fair Fees Act on the forbidding airlines from imposing 
ridiculous fees act to prohibit airlines from charging 
unreasonable fees for checked bags and other ancillary charges 
like change and cancellation fees, and my legislation would 
protect consumers from price gouging and increase aviation 
security by encouraging people to stop overstuffing their 
carry-ons, relieving the pressure on the TSA checkpoint. But we 
need to ensure that we definitely deal with that issue.
    So, thank you for this discussion. I think it is very 
important and again, I would love to have this conversation 
continue here because we absolutely have to deal with a 
phenomenon that continues to this day. And that overstuffing 
ultimately, again, is an aperture. We know what Mohammed Atta 
and the other nine did here at Logan Airport looking at 
Portland, Maine as an aperture in terms of reduction of 
screening.
    And again, Logan went first and it had instituted the best 
system in the country that got model across the rest of the 
country, but new issues just continue to emerge here as there 
are changes and they are looking for those apertures. And we 
know that if they can be successful in creating another airline 
accident, that is just a dramatic reduction than an air travel 
across our country. We are seeing it in China right now.
    We are seeing just one incident somehow or other that 
translates the coronavirus into an airline industry crisis in 
their country that the airline industry did not anticipate. So 
let me move on if I can to the deployment of new technologies. 
Scanning and screening systems are constantly evolving as new 
innovations are created to increase to speed and quantity of 
cargo shipments while maintaining security. This continuous 
development requires the TSA to have a robust process for 
certifying the latest and greatest scanning technologies.
    And it also requires that we do all we can to ensure cargo 
screening facilities are adopting the same systems, and that is 
why I authored language in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018 
that instructed the TSA to study the feasibility of deploying 
computed tomography scanners to screen air cargo transported on 
passenger aircraft.
    CT scanners are a new technology that can render a 3D image 
of a containers' contents, allowing inspectors to more 
effectively search for hazardous materials than they can with 
the traditional X-ray machines used today. When paired with 
algorithms that can automatically analyze a 3D image for 
threat, CT scanners can become an even more advanced explosive 
detection system or EDS.
    Mr. Beckius, based on the TSA's feasibility study, where 
and how should we be focusing our efforts to deploy CT scanners 
and EDS in air cargo security? What should the Government do to 
promote widespread adoption of this technology?
    Mr. Beckius. Thank you for that question. So as you 
referenced, we did complete a feasibility study that was 
delivered to Congress in November, 2019. A couple of the 
challenges noted in that report is the expense of the machine 
at the--at the current status is a challenge for industry for 
some to purchase, as well as the limiting nature of the 
aperture of the machine does not allow for larger shipments to 
be screened, at least in the current state.
    Some of the potential positives are insertion of an EDS 
machine and what we would call an inline cargo system for small 
packages appears to be extremely positive and the potential for 
that. Also required by the Modernization Act was a pilot that 
we initiated in January. It is too early to provide details on 
that but we look forward to providing details at the 6-month 
part, also as required by the Modernization Act.
    Senator Markey. Mr. Urchuk, can you please talk about this 
issue in the modernization of the technology but not the 
implementation of the modernized technology?
    Mr. Urchuk. Well----
    Senator Markey. Can you move over that microphone a little 
bit closer to you?
    Mr. Urchuk. So, CT is actually an old technology. It has 
been around for about 40 years, and machines that once cost $1 
million in the hospital environment now might cost half a 
million or less.
    And in fact, if you go to an emergency room in a major 
hospital, you are likely to get a CT scan instead of a 2D X-
ray. That is because it provides more information that is 
critical for the physicians to make a diagnosis. In the 
security environment, there has been a similar history where 2D 
technology was initially deployed, some very, very basic 
systems. Then 3D technology, much after 9/11, and based on work 
the TSA and our laboratories the U.S. has sponsored.
    And I think really just recently with the check point 
solutions that have been deployed, CT is emerging as a cost-
effective, and so I think one of the most effective detection 
technologies that is available. And we think that by stretching 
what has been done there into the air cargo, we can start to 
address some of the limitations that are seen with current 
technologies, principally cost.
    Senator Markey. Yes. I know that, you know, when my wife 
who was a two-star Admiral in charge of women's health looked 
at this issue with regard to breast cancer detection in the 
1990s, they were still using 40 year old technologies all 
across the country, X-ray technologies rather than moving to 
CT, which would give a better imaging for breast cancer for 
women.
    And yet, they, you know, they were military technologies at 
the CIA, at the Pentagon, at NASA that had modern imaging 
technologies. Of course, they were top secret programs that 
would be used against the Soviet Union in terms of imaging but 
were yet to be fully implemented in terms of a real defense for 
women's health in our country to make sure we move toward that 
technology.
    So can we talk a little bit about that? Why we can't move 
more expeditiously toward giving all of that additional 
information? Of course, 3D is better than 2D which is better 
than 1D, which is better than X-ray. So talk about that a 
little bit more, Mr. Urchuk, and the need for us to move to the 
most modern technology.
    Mr. Urchuk. A side note on mammography, the technology that 
is used for 3D imaging and mammography now was pioneered at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital. People don't know and we are 
proud to actually participate in that, significantly.
    Senator Markey. I think part of the reason, and again, the 
whole point is that in modern technology you can see through 
more dense material in a woman's skin, you know, and get in 
deeper and find it earlier, and act in a preventive way to 
avoid that cancer from having grown.
    So, you know the same thing would be true here. The more 
dense the material and using the new technologies, is the 
earlier you would be able to see it and to act in a preventive 
way. So please, Mr. Urchuk.
    Mr. Urchuk. No, I think that is very true. The--it is 
almost universally true in medicine that 3D technologies tend 
to provide more information, better diagnosis, better results. 
And I think in imaging of luggage the same story holds. The 
more information you can have, the better chance either human 
or machine can define threats within the luggage.
    You know, specifically what holds back progress in some of 
these areas though has been the ability of a market to evolve, 
to warrant the development of this type of technology. Millions 
of dollars are required to develop systems, and I think things 
like the mandates for screening of cargo are helpful for 
industry. It allows us to make the investments over many, many 
years and ultimately culminate in another tool that goes into 
the set of solutions that are available for the regulators and 
the operators to use, whether that be technology, or canine, or 
other.
    Senator Markey. So, if I can come over to you back again--
to you, Mr. Beckius. So, what is the rate at which these new 
technologies are being adopted and deployed?
    Mr. Beckius. Not sure I can directly answer your question, 
but I can tell you that TSA stands ready to evaluate new 
equipment and technologies when they were when they are brought 
to us. We publish a stent information and standards on Federal 
business opportunity website, being very transparent with 
industry. We work with industry so they understand the 
qualification standards and then work closely with them as soon 
as they are ready to execute.
    Senator Markey. So under, you know, my language which I 
authored in the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, it instructed 
TSA to study the feasibility of deploying computed tomography 
scanners to screen air cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 
So my question ultimately is, you know, what is the result of 
that study and how quickly will it be implemented?
    Mr. Beckius. Sure, and really that is, when it is 
implemented is really up to industry. So we do think it is 
feasible and we stand ready to evaluate equipment when it is 
brought to us, but we have, aside from the one unit that is in 
the review stage with the field pilot that I spoke of, that is 
the only item that has been brought to us for evaluation at 
this point.
    Senator Markey. OK. So what is the reaction you are getting 
from the industry in terms of the implementation of that?
    Mr. Beckius. So, the reaction we have gotten is concerned 
with the cost and concern with the aperture size.
    Senator Markey. OK. So we are back to industry in 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 saying, oh, it is so difficult to 
implement. So let's go to you, Mr. Fried. What is there--how do 
you look at this issue in terms of being able to use CT 
scanners and EDS in cargo security?
    Mr. Fried. Well, you know, there have certainly been some 
significant strides in this technology. But the holy grail 
still remains a scanner. We need a scanner that has the 
ability, that has a large aperture that could screen pallets 
and containers that contain multiple commodities. So not just 
loaded tennis shoes, but tennis shoes, blenders, televisions, 
and whatnot because that is how air cargo pallets and 
containers are built. And that still remains elusive.
    Now, when we talk about finances and costs, obviously, you 
know, costs are always a consideration for any industry. It 
doesn't matter whether you are in air cargo or whether you are 
making widgets, you know, cost is always an issue. However, 
when costs are excessive and you just simply can't recover 
those costs, it is not workable for the industry and that is 
reality. That is a commercial reality that we all have to face.
    Senator Markey. So the commercial reality is what----
    Mr. Fried. The commercial reality is that you can't 
shoulder excessive costs that are unrecoverable. And so to that 
end, it is not as though the industry is not for security. 
Obviously, we are, we just have to find other paths. Now, 
remember Senator, your mandate is piece level. So right now we 
are screening each piece through technology individually and 
then building up the palate. And again, that is why we are so 
enthusiastic about the advent of the canines because the 
canines are, in fact, very workable.
    Senator Markey. Well, you know, I appreciate that. But I 
hope we have them on technology here. And there was a story 
yesterday, you may have seen it, that Al Qaeda and Isis in 
Africa are now in control of areas the size of multiple 
Afghanistans in Africa. And you know earlier we heard testimony 
about, you know, a detection of a threat that would be 
otherwise successful in just the last couple of years coming 
in, and it was detected in Europe, but it would have been 
headed toward the United States of America.
    This control of a much larger area in Africa now, again, is 
something that we have to be concerned about. Mr. Beckius, can 
you come back to that and talk about what might be possible 
that we could learn from with regard to my pilot program, which 
is meant to test and deploy CT tests so that we can reduce the 
cost and get it to the field so that TSA will be able to keep, 
you know, us updated on terms of the reduction in cost, Mr. 
Urchuk already talked about this, reduction in costs 
dramatically, in moving to a deployment strategy.
    Mr. Beckius. Yes, so I mean we are very eager for the 
continuation of the pilot and some results that come out of 
that because our goal is to provide industry with the best 
number of options to meet their screening needs as necessary. 
And one thing I would like to highlight is there really is no 
silver bullet for air cargo screening.
    And as an example, you could have a box of dense machine 
parts. Well, that is not best suited for an X-ray because you 
are not going to be able to tell what is in there. And 
likewise, you don't want to use an ETD on a box of frozen fish 
because it is no good for the swab. So we think that the most 
appropriate best mechanisms for industry is provided them a 
suite of screening options, and each operator is different and 
they need to evaluate their own operation.
    Senator Markey. So and again, let's go to this cost issue 
because I am concerned that budget pressures are impacting 
TSA's ability to effectively regulate and oversee air cargo 
security, especially as funding for these programs has gone 
down in real dollars since my 100 percent screening law was 
enacted. So here are the numbers. The TSA was appropriated $105 
million for air cargo security in Fiscal Year 2020, a figure 
considerably less than $123 million appropriated for air cargo 
security in Fiscal Year 2010, 10 years ago. It is less than 
2020 than it was in 2010.
    That is a drop of $18 million in real dollars, spendable 
dollars. So if we adjust for inflation, the decrease would be 
even greater. So to make the matter even more troubling, this 
funding decrease has occurred despite sustained growth in U.S. 
air cargo operations and the Federal Aviation Administration 
predicting that air cargo will keep growing at an average 
annual rate of 3.3 percent between 2019 and 2039. So Mr. 
Beckius, is the TSA being shortchanged by Congress? How has 
your diminished budget impacted TSA's ability to oversee the 
Certified Cargo Screening Program?
    Mr. Beckius. Sure. So, you know, we are appreciative of the 
budget provided us any year and work within that budget to do 
the best we can. I can tell you that we remain ready to 
evaluate new technology. The budget has had no impact on our 
ability to evaluate that. We are waiting for more to come in. 
And for our inspectors in the field, they continue to be out in 
the field, all 377 of them on the weekends, at noon on 
Tuesdays, and otherwise, ensuring that industry is in 
compliance with their standards.
    Senator Markey. Well, Mr. Fried, I see you shaking your 
head.
    Mr. Fried. Well, I would tell you Senator that, you know, 
unfortunately here in the United States our memories are short. 
And you know, we tend to forget the past very quickly and I 
would imagine while most of us remember September 11th vividly, 
we need to understand Congress has got to sufficiently fund the 
TSA. And they can't shortchange this agency. We are depending 
on this agency to keep us safe while flying and so the 
Airforwarders Association urges Congress to make sure the level 
of funding is adequate for it to carry out its mission.
    Senator Markey. Well again, I agree with you, Mr. Fried, 
and I am fighting for that to make sure that the funding is 
there. Unfortunately, TSA's budget issues are not limited to 
air cargo security or the annual appropriations process. The 
agency's overall funding has been further strained by the 
ongoing diversion of revenue from the 9/11 passenger security 
fee, which is $5.60 fee that every traveler pays when they buy 
a plane ticket.
    And it is supposed to cover these costs. But Congress 
originally mandated the fee on airline tickets in order to help 
finance the cost of protecting our Nation's aviation system, 
but in 2013 and since then, Congress began diverting one-third 
of the revenue generated from the 9/11 Security Fee just to 
deficit reduction. So here, a passenger is paying this fee. 
They might not be happy with it when looking at it, but it is 
supposed to be used in order to provide security.
    And now Congress takes a lot of that money, one-third of it 
and just puts it over into deficit reduction rather than toward 
the goal which it had intended. So this diversion of revenue is 
completely unacceptable. The TSA needs all of its resources to 
secure our airports in our skies. If the law is not changed 
nearly, get this number, $20 billion will be diverted away from 
aviation security by 2027 alone, including $1.4 billion--$1.4 
billion in 2020 alone that should have been spent on protecting 
the security of the aviation industry. So to address this 
issue, I have introduced the FASTER Act or the Funding for 
Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration Act.
    My legislation will secure the passenger planes much 
better. It will end the diversion of the 9/11 Security Fee and 
ensure that the money passengers fork over for security 
actually goes to their security. So to everyone on the panel, 
would you support immediate passage of the FASTER Act to have 
the fees be used for the security of the aviation issue? Let me 
come down to you, Ms. Ritter, so you can talk about that 
question.
    Ms. Ritter. Yes, we absolutely support that. We also feel 
that any efforts to hinder TSA workers' ability to unionize 
would be a hindrance to aviation security as well.
    Senator Markey. Yes. Thank you. So, we need to spend all 
the money in those fees on security. Mr. Fried.
    Mr. Fried. Yes, I would say unequivocally so. I think both 
passengers flying today would be appalled to see that this 
passenger fee was diverted to the general fund. So the 
Airforwarders Association absolutely endorses the legislation.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Urchuk.
    Mr. Urchuk. Yes, I believe the equipment vendors generally 
support the initiative.
    Senator Markey. Yes. Mr. Freni.
    Mr. Freni. Yes, Senator. It is in my remarks, suggested 
that very thing, 100 percent.
    Senator Markey. Yes, and I thank you, Mr. Freni, very much 
for your comments on the issue because it does go right to the 
question of a determination that was made as to how much money 
we are going to need in order to accomplish this goal. 
Passengers pay these fees for every flight they are taking out 
of Logan today. They are paying it on their ticket, and then 
the money in large measure is then diverted over to the general 
revenue, which may be used for other issues that are important.
    But again, the goal was to provide sufficient revenue so 
that all of these issues can be dealt with. So, Mr. Beckius, 
let me come to you in terms of the, you know, the perspective 
that you have, your agency has on to the diversion of these 
revenues away from your agency and over to other purposes 
within our society.
    Mr. Beckius. Yes. So Senator, you have my commitment that 
myself and my office will execute to the best of our abilities 
no matter what our budget is and you have that commitment 24/7.
    Senator Markey. No, I know that but we have a problem. We 
have a real problem because as Mr. Fried said well, there is a 
big cost that is attached to this. We provide for those costs 
to be dealt with the revenues that are raised from passenger 
fees on every ticket that is sold and then unfortunately these 
revenues get diverted into other purposes and it creates a real 
problem. So again, I am going to continue to move my FASTER Act 
and try to have that implemented because it is almost like a 
raid on revenues that are provided for but then they see it as 
a big honey pot, they can be diverted to other purposes, and 
then ultimately people say well there is not enough money to 
deal with this issue when in fact that revenue has been 
provided for.
    And as Mr. Freni raised that issue in his opening 
statement, which I very much appreciate, you know, from the 
Massport perspective, you know, passengers are paying the price 
but billions of dollars are being pretty much stolen away from 
these security programs to be used for other purposes. So let 
me move on onto drones because with more and more drones taking 
flight every day, the risk of a drone colliding with an 
airplane continues to rise.
    During December 2018 in an incident at Gatwick Airport in 
the United Kingdom, reports of a drone sighting on the runway 
led to 33 hours of disrupted travel that the BBC reported, that 
thousand flights were canceled or delayed as planes were 
grounded and that 140,000 passengers were caught up in the 
chaos. Drones have similarly been sighted here at Logan Airport 
during the past year. Thankfully travel was not disrupted but 
the economic consequences of drone delays at U.S. airports 
could be enormous. More importantly, should a drone actually 
strike a plane, the consequences of loss of life would be 
catastrophic.
    We need to be thinking about how to prevent such threats 
before tragedy strikes. Although the FAA has been charged with 
the primary responsibility to integrate drones into the 
national airspace, it is often local authorities that must be 
ready to take proactive measures in real time.
    Mr. Freni, do you feel that Massport has the support and 
tools it needs from the Federal Government to protect Logan 
Airport from unauthorized drones, and if not, what additional 
resources or guidance do you need?
    Mr. Freni. Well, Senator, we support the initiatives in the 
2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, making it a criminal offense to 
fly drones near airports. We think that is incredibly important 
and we strongly appeal to the--to this committee and Congress 
to take additional steps that would empower State or local 
partners to take charge of their own safety. There is no single 
commercial system to track or identify and neutralize drones or 
UAS's in the domestic airspace.
    So we support the FAA in its efforts to develop any 
solution or these solutions as soon as we can. You know, like 
you said, we have had incidences here at Logan. We have been 
very fortunate that nothing serious has happened but----
    Senator Markey. Can you talk about an individual incident 
that was of concern to you that you would hope could be avoided 
with better cooperation?
    Mr. Freni. One that comes--it is not the professional user 
that we worry about. You know, drones can be used, you know, in 
buildings and so forth. That we understand, but you know, it is 
the kind of the user that isn't really familiar with the 
impact. We had an incident some time ago where a drone was 
cited on the approach for right, a very important runway to us.
    Once it was reported, you know, we had our group that is 
internal, you know, try to get to--you know, the State police 
were involved, try to find out where that drone was launched 
from. It actually went down the runway and was cited to have 
fired into the runway. It was launched from a ship across the 
harbor. The person that launched it had no idea that he was 
doing anything wrong. Those are the ones we worry about.
    Senator Markey. He had no idea he was doing anything wrong?
    Mr. Freni. I mean when he was found, which he was 
fortunately, he didn't realize that he was that close. He 
wasn't a professional user. It was recreation. And you know, 
you just can imagine what you know, the impact could have been 
if it was reported by a pilot on approach to fort wright and we 
saw it at 200 feet and then it moved down the runway at about 
that altitude and then took off. I think he may have even lost 
control of exactly what his location was, but the fact that 
where he was on the boat across the harbor was in restricted 
airspace.
    Senator Markey. Yes, so, you know, I just saw a story over 
the last 3 days of an individual on the ground that was trying 
to blind a pilot and through good communications they were 
actually able to alert the local police and arrest that 
individual right on the ground. You may have seen that story, 
Mr. Fried. Are you aware of it, and what the circumstances were 
around that?
    Mr. Fried. Not specifically but I would tell you that, you 
know, we are--we hold a seat on the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee and I know for a fact, and Mr. Beckius can probably 
address this better than I can, but we received a very 
extensive presentation last Thursday in Washington on what TSA 
is doing to address this issue. And I would tell you it is 
nothing short of impressive. They are actually very focused on 
this issue and I assume will continue to be so.
    Senator Markey. So if I may go to you, Ms. Ritter, how 
concerned are you on flights in terms of the threat that it 
poses to pilots able to control these laser points?
    Ms. Ritter. Well going back to laser pointers, for example, 
and attempts to blind pilots. My husband is a pilot with 
another airline and he has reported to me on approach at night 
that he has experienced having green laser lights bouncing 
around in the cab in the flight deck and makes it very 
difficult to read the instruments on landing, which of course 
is a critical time when you are supposed to be paying close 
attention to what is happening on the monitors. And it is a 
serious concern to me as well drones. These are things that are 
out of our control when we are in the aircraft and we have to 
rely on forces on the ground to take care of those things.
    Senator Markey. So these drones and lasers are now great 
threats and so I was referring to a laser attack on pilot just 
the last several days but drones similarly. So talk a little 
bit if you could about your concern and your husband's concern 
about lasers and drones?
    Ms. Ritter. Well to us, it is personal. It is not just--you 
know, it is the aircraft, it is all the passengers on board. It 
is civilians on the ground who are unrelated to this and 
everybody is at risk when these things happen.
    Senator Markey. So let me come back over to you, Mr. 
Beckius. How is TSA helping airports like Logan deal with these 
threats of drones and the threats of lasers being used to 
attempt to blind pilots?
    Mr. Beckius. Sure. So unfortunately being the Executive 
Director for the Air Cargo Division, I am not intimately 
working on the drone issue. I can tell you though from an 
agency perspective that it is a priority, a top priority for 
both DHS and TSA.
    Senator Markey. Yes, well, I would ask for your agency to 
provide information to get back to the Committee so we can 
include it in the hearing record concerning what is the 
strategy which TSA is using to deal with drones and to deal 
with the laser issue. And I would also like to take advantage 
of having Massport here today and take it to talk about the 
coronavirus issue. And we now know that we have over 75,000 
people who have had the disease and 2,240 people have died, 
both primarily in China, but there are 34 confirmed cases here 
in the United States.
    I recognize that this is an issue that is something that 
Logan is very concerned about. We have to be. President Xi in 
China acted irresponsibly. China wants to be part of the World 
Trade Organization, but they are also part of the World Health 
Organization. So there is a concomitant responsibility to 
ensure that if you are going to be integrated into the trade 
protocol for the world, that if we have travel that is going to 
be taking place of passengers and cargo between the United 
States and China, that there is a responsibility to report 
early on what the health care risks are that are being created 
in your country.
    Obviously, China did not do that. So if you could just, Mr. 
Freni, talk a little bit about Logan and the protections, the 
precautions which you have put in place.
    Mr. Freni. So, as you may know, we had nonstop service from 
to specific locations in China, Shanghai and Beijing. 
Immediately after the break, the airlines that flew to those 
two destinations reduced their service. In fact canceled their 
service and haven't given us a specific date on when that will 
come back. A third airline flying from Hong Kong non-stop into 
Boston has reduced its schedule, and other affected areas, 
which we are still flying to.
    The good news is we engage with the CDC and they are here 
at Logan actively screening, working with Customs and Border 
Protection on a regular basis. Before the CDC arrived, Senator, 
we had the Customs folks would doing passive screening, looking 
for signs. We have seen a reduction in our passenger loads 
since January 28. We have--about 7 percent. We saw an uptick 
this week because we are on vacation, but that was on the 
domestic side.
    So the reduction of schedule has had an impact, and you 
know, again, we are working very closely. We provided space for 
the CDC to be here permanently again, and we work with them on 
a regular basis. We meet in the morning and talk about anything 
that we need to do to help them in the screening process. And 
like I said, we have had a reduction of incoming non-stop 
services.
    We also have to be concerned with connecting services, but 
everybody is aware of it. We have put out flyers. We have 
talked about, you know, signs and so again, you know, we do 
this every morning.
    Senator Markey. So, you are talking now with CDC?
    Mr. Freni. We actually have them onsite now. On site.
    Senator Markey. Were they in the meeting today?
    Mr. Freni. CDC was not but Customs Border Protection was. 
So they are working side by side with them in Terminal E which 
is our international gateway.
    Senator Markey. Alright, great. So, can I come back over to 
you, Ms. Ritter, and talk about what concerns you have about 
the coronavirus, you know, and the perspective Flight 
Attendants bring to this issue in order to protect against the 
spread?
    Ms. Ritter. Certainly. Thank you for the question, Senator 
Markey. We continue to call for implementation of contagious 
disease checklists, and we need gloves and kits on board the 
aircraft to handle any potentially infected passenger, or crew 
member for that matter, and for any medical personnel to assist 
in dealing with any potentially infected passengers.
    We have been dealing with a very fluid situation with a 
coronavirus. And in fact, our Hong Kong base with United 
Airlines is basically essentially shut down for the foreseeable 
future. The crew that are based there are no longer working, 
with covered pay protected. In the meantime, we have a lot of 
Flight Attendants who are based in the United States who are no 
longer able to fly their original schedules to China as those 
flights have all been reduced.
    And in the meantime, Flight Attendants who have been 
working to China previously are potentially now banned from 
entering other countries that have limits on entry to people 
who have been to China since January 15, and it is creating a 
bit of a scheduling nightmare for us as well. And we have 
concerns as far as we are not necessarily being informed as to 
what the most up-to-date procedures are.
    The information is coming out so quickly that it is very 
difficult to keep track of. Somebody who has been to China may 
still be told that they are all right to continue working their 
original schedule without self-quarantining themselves for 14 
days. They may be told that it is fine to work their flights or 
to commute back home to their home away from their base on 
aircraft.
    Senator Markey. So you are saying amongst Flight 
Attendants, they are just not clear, true direction that is 
being given to them about how they should----
    Ms. Ritter. We are getting updates so rapid-fire that it is 
very difficult to maintain a working knowledge of what the most 
up-to-date information is and what is accurate and what is 
really happening around the system.
    Senator Markey. So our Flight Attendants are concerned that 
there may be or have been exposed to the coronavirus----
    Ms. Ritter. Definitely, yes. Definitely, absolutely.
    Senator Markey. And you are saying there still isn't clear 
direction that is being given to the Flight Attendants?
    Ms. Ritter. Correct.
    Senator Markey. So, I think that is something that the 
Committee will follow up on as well with an important set of 
protections which Flight Attendants should be given and the 
passengers who are on those flights as well. So thank you. 
Cybersecurity. We know that those who mean to do us harm could 
try to exploit any technological vulnerability in our aviation 
system. That will inevitably include cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities moving forward.
    Our airplanes are increasingly computerized and new 
software is being rolled out every day. Evolving technologies 
offer enormous potential to improve safety and entertain 
passengers, but it will only take one hacker to access an 
aircraft navigation or flight control systems to cause 
disaster. Regrettably, after investigating the cybersecurity of 
our aviation system, I discovered that although airlines may 
frequently experience attempted cyber-attacks, their protocols 
and protections for cyber incidents need improvement.
    I also found that industry collaboration on cybersecurity 
is inconsistent. And that is why I have introduced the Cyber 
Air Act. The Cyber Air Act would require the airline industry 
to share information about cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
direct the FAA to establish cybersecurity protections for 
aircraft.
    Ms. Ritter, I am glad that the Association of Flight 
Attendants has endorsed my legislation. Can you explain the 
importance of cybersecurity in the skies or from a crew 
member's perspective?
    Ms. Ritter. From a crew members perspective, we are always 
concerned about what is happening in the cabin of the aircraft, 
whether there are people on board with ill intent who are 
perhaps coordinating among each other, who may not be sitting 
next to each other. If they are able to communicate via cyber 
methods and if they are able to hack into our onboard computer 
systems and affect the operation of the aircraft itself. These 
are all concerns of ours.
    Senator Markey. OK. So expand upon that a little bit in 
terms of what a coordinated effort could look like, because 
again, on each of those flights on 9/11, there were multiple 
people who got onto planes with, and again in those instances, 
box cutters because they were looking for the easiest way in 
order to accomplish their goal on that day. But with modern 
technologies, a similar group of four or five people might get 
onto a plane and have electronic equipment with them. What 
would be your concern in terms of what they might be able to 
accomplish?
    Ms. Ritter. Some of the information might be security 
sensitive as well. We do realize that there were--that the 
teams of people on the 9/11 flights had been preparing for that 
event for months and they had been scoping out our aircraft and 
our procedures onboard. And our concerns are that, you know, 
actors could be onboard our aircraft and be scattered around 
the plane. And somebody could provide a diversion on one area 
of the aircraft to distract the crew into a different area and 
take advantage of a lack of coverage in other areas.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. So coming back to you, Mr. 
Beckius. Does TSA believe that we need stronger protections 
against cybersecurity attacks in the aviation industry?
    Mr. Beckius. So yes, we do, and I would put this in the 
same category with the drones where I am not directly involved 
but this is another agency priority and I would be happy to 
bring back any information you would like.
    Senator Markey. And again, I would appreciate that 
information being given to us because that is something that we 
would like to include in the record of this hearing. Again, we 
are trying to deal comprehensively with what are the threats 
that could be posed to Logan Airport to passengers here to the 
flights that are taking off regardless of the subject material. 
Mr. Freni, have you, in your security briefings each morning, 
had a discussion about what the concerns are that you have here 
at Logan on those cybersecurity related issues?
    Mr. Freni. Yes, we have, Senator. We have our IT group, 
representatives there at the 8:30 a.m. every morning. We 
discuss in a private meeting afterwards if there are any 
threats that they have seen in our sites or in our systems, so 
we are talking about it every day. We watch it every day. So, 
and we talk to the airlines as well because they are 
represented at the 8:30 a.m. meetings and we find out from them 
if there is anything we can do to help support them in any way 
with their interconnectivity in the airport.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Let me come back to you, Mr. 
Fried. I understand that many of our air forwarders are 
increasingly suffering from ransomware attacks, a cyber threat 
that is increasingly prominent and dangerous in American 
industry. Mr. Fried, speak to the cyber threat that your air 
forwarders are experiencing and what the Federal Government can 
do to help your company shore up their cyber defenses.
    Mr. Fried. Thank you, Senator. Many industries are being 
affected by ransomware attacks. So the freight forwarding 
industry is not an exception. But I would tell you that these 
ransomware attacks are creating substantial severe financial 
impact on our industry and it affects many because the supply 
chain industry, the logistics industry is interconnected. So we 
deal with people not only here in the United States, but 
throughout the world. So a virus here can affect one of our 
partners overseas and that is an issue.
    Senator Markey. So if you would just step back for a 
second, just tell us a little story about how a ransomware 
attack then what was the attack and then what was the follow up 
from the attacker, and how you had to respond----
    Mr. Fried. So I point to a big one that occurred not too 
long ago with Maersk. Maersk is a big logistics provider, 
maritime logistics provider, but they have freight forwarding 
operations as well where they grabbed all the customers, did 
all the shipment data, and so--and held it hostage, if you 
will. And that way the shipments that are in transit can't get 
to the destinations on time. And obviously let's put the 
financial impact aside. Oftentimes, these shipments consist of 
medical devices, human organs, tissue for transplants, that 
type of thing and if those shipments can't get to the 
destinations on time, obviously, it is a matter of life and 
death.
    And I will tell you another area that is a big concern is 
when you pay these ransoms, as many have been forced to do, 
often times that money goes overseas to elicit organizations, 
often times they might be terrorist organizations. We don't 
know who is funding and obviously that is a big challenge.
    Senator Markey. And so--and you are saying the whole 
process ends paying off potentially terrorist groups?
    Mr. Fried. Right.
    Senator Markey. It is delaying the delivery of critical 
life-saving devices or other items that are critical----
    Mr. Fried. That is correct. It is not always about money.
    Senator Markey. It is not always about money. Yes, so is 
there something you would like to see the Federal Government do 
with regard to sharing of cybersecurity technology in order to 
reduce the potential for bad actors to impact the air traffic?
    Mr. Fried. Yes. So the Airforwarders Association believes 
that there needs to be a lot more information sharing on the 
part of the Federal Government, and it needs to be industry-
specific work groups that have to be ongoing so that this 
information is free flowing, obviously, even if it is in an 
enclosed, you know, confidential matter. And then there--an 
idea is that perhaps there should be some insurance mechanism 
that is provided by the Federal Government.
    Maybe something similar to flood insurance, you know, where 
if an industry or companies are impacted by ransomware attacks 
or some type of cybersecurity attack, they know that they 
have--they are confident that they have the protection of the 
U.S. Government to assist them in recovering costs. It is an 
idea.
    Senator Markey. So you are saying that it is now an 
industrywide risk that is being run, but there is right now no 
industry-specific working group between the industry and the 
Federal Government to deal with the issues----
    Mr. Fried. Right. So at this point in time, obviously, you 
know, they are probably some initiatives out there. I think 
they are few and far between but you know at the Airforwarders 
Association, we now have an actual technology cyber 
subcommittee that is focused just on this issue. It meets 
monthly and there are a lot of participants.
    Senator Markey. I appreciate that but you are saying that 
there is no Federal Government----
    Mr. Fried. Not to our knowledge. Nothing substantial.
    Senator Markey. I think that is something that we have to 
rectify. So we are going to--I am going to work on that. So, 
obviously we are just going back here earlier to my comments. I 
have talked about the need to have more information sharing. 
The industries and the Federal Government so that best 
practices are put in place, lessons that have already been 
learned are implemented in order to reduce the likelihood of 
the threat.
    And I think that is a big gap that continues to exist in 
some instances. You know, we just go back to, you know, this 
whole notion of kind of siloing all information and people just 
don't want to share it. right. And do you find that to be the 
case, Mr. Fried?
    Mr. Fried. Absolutely. I mean it is--you know, I mentioned 
earlier in my testimony that it is not only unique to TSA, it 
is many branches of the Federal Government. And this is 
obviously, the Federal Government works for us. There should be 
this this easy information-sharing, especially when it comes to 
our welfare.
    Senator Markey. And again, that is why I have introduced 
legislation to force the information sharing. You know, I saw 
that right after 9/11 where we had this integrated new 
Department of Homeland Security and they still all had their 
legacy computers. They couldn't even talk to each other, can't 
even talk to each other from FEMA over to the Coast Guard over 
to other agencies.
    There was no interoperability that would lead to a quick 
sharing of the information, and we know that that was a problem 
on 9/11 and it just continued to be. And then it goes to the 
culture of these agencies as well, you know, that still exists. 
And if we don't telescope the time-frame that we are going to 
take in order to ensure that this information is not a threat, 
we are going to wind up--not that we didn't understand the 
risk, the risk wasn't fully shared with everyone and the 
solutions that could have been put in place were as a result 
delayed.
    And these are very intelligent people who are attacking us, 
right. You know, Mohammed Atta was a very educated person. Very 
smart, highly educated individual, just as smart as our side. 
So we just, fall one--we know they are going to try to do what 
we know. They are doing it right now. So we just have to share 
the information with regard to where the threats are coming 
from and what can be done in order to protect against it. And 
again, that is why I introduced that legislation in order to 
deal with that threat as well, but it just keeps going back to 
air cargo security, how hard it is to deal with this inertia 
that exists in trying to move more rapidly in an era of 
technology to deal with these issues.
    And I will finish up with this last set of questions, if I 
may, and that is a conversation about scanning technologies, 
which wouldn't be complete without talking about passenger and 
baggage screening. The TSA screens 2.8 million passengers, 1.4 
million checked bags, and 5.1 million carry-on bags every 
single day of the year. These are enormous numbers, 
logistically difficult. The enormous scale of the operation 
demands that the best technologies are being deployed to keep 
travel flowing while promoting security and that is why I 
authored the language in the TSA Modernization Act that created 
another pilot program for deploying CT scanners, this time at 
the passenger checkpoint.
    Now, I understand that my pilot program is well underway 
and that the TSA expects to deploy 300 CT units to passenger 
checkpoints across the Nation at the end of 2020 or by the end 
of 2020, including here at Logan Airport. Mr. Beckius, please 
provide an update on this pilot program as well any other 
efforts that the TSA is undertaking or planning to undertake to 
increase the deployment of CT scanners beyond the initial 300 
units?
    Mr. Beckius. Senator, so I apologize that I don't have 
specifics on that but I will be glad to bring that back to you.
    Senator Markey. Mr. Freni, are you aware of what this 
program means for Logan airport and could you give us an update 
with regard to deploying these technologies here at Logan?
    Mr. Freni. Yes. Senator. In fact, Logan was the second 
airport in the U.S. to successfully deploy the 3D imaging 
enhancement threat detection. We have a strong relationship 
with the TSA. We were selected as a TSA innovation task force 
site to test the CT tomography, computer tomography system, and 
we have it here and we intend to increase the numbers as we 
deploy our ASL, which we have 23 ASL, automated screening 
lanes.
    Senator Markey. So I understand TSA's initial procurement 
for 300 CT units was awarded to a single vendor and I am 
concerned that this decision could impact our security 
readiness by opening up the technology supply chain to a single 
point of disruption, as well as, reduce the market competition 
we need to create the best scanning systems. Mr. Beckius, I 
know it is not in your lane but will you commit to considering 
a multi-vendor approach in the future procurements of CT 
scanners? It is the same issue obviously for the cargo that 
goes into the belly of the plane. Do you use multiple vendors 
for those technologies?
    Mr. Beckius. So we do and we welcome any vendor coming to 
TSA with their equipment for evaluation and qualification.
    Senator Markey. Yes. Well again, I think it is critical 
there to be for cargo or it be for this passenger screening 
that TSA, in its vendors strategy for the next round of 
procurements, that TSA is looking at multiple vendors to stay 
viable by investing Federal research dollars into multiple 
technologies in order to deal with this issue. If I could, Mr. 
Urchuk, how would you deal with this issue about what Congress 
should be doing in order to help companies like Analogic 
develop and deploy scanning technologies?
    Mr. Urchuk. So I think some of the initiatives that 
Department of Homeland Security does in terms of funding early 
stage technology, that is important, not necessarily from 
larger vendors such as ourselves, but often in partnership with 
vendors like ourselves. I think also middle level technology 
investments and technologies that need to be matured to be 
ready for deployment, that is valuable funding and up until 
recently, TSA has been supporting that. That has been critical.
    It is worthwhile noting we have a laboratory in New Jersey 
that is a leading center for explosive detection certification 
in the world. Without that laboratory that the DHS runs, we 
wouldn't have the equipment we are talking about today. So that 
is one gem in the system. It is underappreciated, I think. But 
finally, I think just come back to businesses such as ourselves 
need markets to justify our investments, and so it is 
challenging when a procurement goes perhaps the other way for 
someone other than ourselves. We need the ability to deploy 
this equipment to justify our investments and make progress.
    Senator Markey. So you are saying that having one company 
win everything----
    Mr. Urchuk. Was challenging, yes.
    Senator Markey. Yes, it was. But it also, you know creates 
an environment where the Darwinian paranoia inducing 
environment of competition doesn't continue to drive the entire 
industry when only one company wins.
    Mr. Urchuk. Yes, there can't be 10 suppliers of this type 
of equipment but there needs to be at least 2 to 3 healthy 
suppliers. And so I think supporting competition through 
deployment is beneficial.
    Senator Markey. Yes, overconfidence breeds complacency and 
complacency breeds disaster. So having more companies on the 
problem ensures that there is a more robust analysis of the 
emerging threats and not an easy reliance upon just one 
company's approach. And I think you are right, I think it just 
has to be something that we continue to look at. We don't want 
a sole source to in a way almost cutoff, you know, the ability 
to continue this technological advancement which is based upon 
a robust competition.
    So, I thank you, Mr. Urchuk, for your perspective on that. 
So what I am going to do is give each one of you 1 minute to 
summarize what it is that you want us to remember from your 
testimony today, and we'll go down in the same order, if we 
can, so that you can tell us what it is that here at Logan, 
here in Massachusetts, but for the whole country, we should 
retain in terms of what we have to do in the future to make 
this airline industry in all aspects safer and less penetrable 
by our enemies? Mr. Beckius.
    Mr. Beckius. Thank you, Senator. So the initial focus of 
the hearing was on the Certified Cargo Screening Program. So in 
summary, I would like to say that the health of that program is 
strong and TSA's development of the third-party canine program 
shows our commitment to continue to advance that program into 
the next generation. And then adding onto that, I would like to 
say that our compliance program with our hundreds of inspectors 
in the field, providing daily oversight to that program as well 
as other aspects of aviation security should give people 
confidence that TSA has a robust and secure compliance and 
enforcement program contributing to the safety of all.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Freni.
    Mr. Freni. Senator, thank you. I think I would like to 
leave this meeting letting the world know that we want to 
continue to be a test site here at Logan Airport for any 
technology that comes along. We open our doors to that. We have 
over the last 20 years and we will continue and our commitment 
is there as you have heard with everyone that attends our 8:30 
a.m. meeting, the relationship that we have built, and we want 
to offer that to continue. Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Mr. Urchuk.
    Mr. Urchuk. I guess the thing I would stress is just a need 
for a strong partnerships between industry, the TSA, and all 
the different stakeholders in the community, whether they be, 
for example, the freight forwarders organization in the airport 
or the airlines. That is critical for us to drive innovative 
solutions to the field.
    Senator Markey. Mr. Fried.
    Mr. Fried. Thank you, sir. I would say that the CCSP is the 
cornerstone for effective air cargo security. It is a supply 
chain solution that works. Canines and effective technology are 
crucial in meeting this challenge but both must be adequately 
funded with help of the Federal Government. Consistent rule 
interpretation within the TSA is very crucial for our members 
and our Nation's security, as is TSA screener support of the 
privatized screening industry. And the freight forwarders 
remain willing, able, and very hopeful of the future and we 
want to continue as a key ally in this fight. Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Ms. Ritter.
    Ms. Ritter. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to speak 
to you, Senator. We would just like to reiterate that the TSA 
must have the consistent long-term funding to close all 
potential security loopholes, and give screeners the staffing 
support and training they need to do to support us in the air. 
Flight Attendants are the First Responders and the last line of 
defense in the air and we take our job very seriously, and we 
would also like to see full implementation of the FAA 
Reauthorization Bill, including secondary flight deck 
barriers----
    Senator Markey. Including, I am sorry----
    Ms. Ritter. Secondary flight deck barriers that are 
supposed to be installed on all new aircraft, but the airlines 
are now interpreting that to mean all newly designed and rolled 
out aircraft as opposed to----
    Senator Markey. Expand upon that a little. We didn't touch 
on that question. I think it is important--it is important to 
get your perspective on that, please. Just lay out what that 
issue is.
    Ms. Ritter. Thank you. After 9/11, we developed a secondary 
flight deck barrier that provides another layer of security 
when the flight deck door is opened, for instance, when pilots 
come out to use the facilities or to pass a meal up to the 
flight deck, so that we have an extra three to 5 seconds if we 
are being charged by somebody in the cabin who is attempting to 
access the flight deck unauthorized.
    These were installed on a lot of aircraft and then they 
indeed started getting a little bit complacent and airlines 
stopped requiring them, and then they started removing them 
from already accepted aircraft that they had on the property.
    Senator Markey. And if I may, what was the justification 
given to you for the----
    Ms. Ritter. The weight of the flight deck barriers were 
considered a cost as far as fuel and added to what the airline 
saw as cut to the revenue.
    Senator Markey. Yes, I feel--thank you. Thank you for 
raising that issue and I am a co-sponsor of legislation to 
require secondary security barriers being put in place. There 
is kind of an assumption that what has happened in the past 
will not occur again.
    Ms. Ritter. Captain Saracini on flight 175 was right out of 
Boston here and his widow, Ellen Saracini, is a big proponent 
of that Act and we fully support it.
    Senator Markey. Yes, and that is very important, you know, 
set of protections which in my opinion we have to build in. 
Yes, this cost-cutting is always the enemy of security. 
Security winds up being something that is viewed as expendable, 
that we just don't have to be as concerned because the past 
could never happen again.
    And that is how we got into this situation in the first 
place. They are very smart people. They are targeting--U.S. 
airlines are at the top of the list of targets. They know that 
if they are successful in attacking the airline industry in any 
of its forms, that it has a devastating impact upon the 
economy. Flights went down by 25 to 30 percent out of Boston 
for 2 years after 9/11. That had a devastating impact upon our 
economy, upon the way we view our security in our country. We 
know this. So shortchanging issues like that is a huge mistake. 
That is why I partnered actually with the Flight Attendants to 
impose a complete and total block on TSA's ability to say, it 
was OK to stop bringing knives back into passenger cabins.
    My law passed and it was because of my conversations with 
the Flight Attendants. It is still the requirement to scan for 
knives going into the passenger cabins. And that was something 
that was going to be changed by TSA. So I did that, you know, 
saying let's not just assume it can't happen again. You don't 
know what the recombinant terrorists DNA can be inside a 
passenger cabin, especially as you are talking about 
technologies that four or five people could have in the cabin 
to create some new threat that our imaginations at this point 
have not yet been able to think through. Because that is all 
they think about all day long.
    So I thank you for that. And again, this just comes back to 
the issue of cost. As I said, $1.4 billion this year is going 
to be looted out of airline security to be used for who knows 
what in the Federal Government, really. Who knows what, when 
the whole point of having that passenger fee is to make sure 
that we do everything we can to make sure that there was not 
something that would make it possible to have a repetition of 
what happened on 9/11--$1.4 billion gone. And between now and 
2027, $20 billion, at the current pace, will not have been 
spent in order to build in these protections. Perhaps even 
inventing a lighter weight set of protections that could be put 
in place as the technologies evolve that would not lead to any 
substantial additional cost of fuel oil for the plane, but 
provide measurable additional protections for the passengers 
who would be on that plane.
    So again, this cost cutting is great for the short term for 
a CEO in terms of reporting to the shareholders, but the 
American people are the shareholders when it comes to airline 
security and they are paying the tax, you know, in order to 
ensure that those security provisions are put in place and that 
money as I said, is just looted, looted, you know, to do what, 
build a new miniature nuclear bomb, which the President wants, 
you know, to be able to make it possible to fight and win a 
nuclear war? Well, should we really be spending the money on 
that or should we be spending it on something that they know is 
a threat to them.
    Right now terrorists are looking at our airline industry in 
all of its forms in order to repeat what they did on 9/11 and 
they are constantly trying to do all around the world. And they 
are once again re-emerging in Africa over a massive amount of 
land and we should just assume that they are not resting and as 
a result we can't rest. So I thank you for again injecting that 
issue because it just really, really makes me mad, you know, 
that billions of dollars that should go to airline security is 
being looted for purposes that are not as important as what we 
are talking about here today.
    So I thank you all for this tremendous hearing today. The 
lessons, again, have to be relearned obviously in order to make 
sure that overconfidence does not breed complacency, and 
complacency once again breeding disaster. And that is why we 
have this hearing today because we were the target on 9/11. We 
were the target on Patriot's Day in 2013 with the Tsarnaev 
brothers. We are a target and we have to be the leader. And I 
thank the Massport Authority for being the leader, always 
trying to get to the front of the line in deploying the 
technologies and deploying the strategies.
    I thank you for the security meetings, which you have every 
single day, but I think it is imperative that we continue to 
upgrade our security. This is a never-ending battle, drones, 
lasers, new ways in which they can compromise the system. It is 
all coming our way. We should just ensure that we learn the 
lessons of our great witnesses here today.
    And I thank you all so much for what you are doing, and we 
will have the hearing record remain open for two weeks so that 
other Senators can ask questions, be put in the record, and 
transmitted to our witnesses for their inclusion in the 
official Congressional record. And we request from you that 
those additional questions be answered in a timely fashion. So 
it will be included in the permanent Congressional record.
    So with that, I thank you for your wonderful testimony 
today, and everyone who has come here today. We just have to 
keep our eye on this risk. With that, this hearing is 
adjourned. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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