[Senate Hearing 116-579]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-579
SPACE MISSIONS OF GLOBAL IMPORTANCE:
PLANETARY DEFENSE, SPACE WEATHER
PROTECTION, AND SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-660 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROY BLUNT, Missouri Ranking
TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JON TESTER, Montana
TODD YOUNG, Indiana KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
John Keast, Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Renae Black, Senior Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on February 12, 2020................................ 1
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Gardner..................................... 36
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 41
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 46
Witnesses
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D., Associate Administrator, Science Mission
Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration..... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
William Murtagh, Program Coordinator, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Space Weather Prediction Center,
U.S. Department of Commerce.................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce....................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering
and Engineering Mechanics Department, Cockrell School of
Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin................. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Thomas Zurbuchen,
Ph.D. by:
Hon. Mike Lee................................................ 49
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 49
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 50
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 51
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 53
Response to written questions submitted to William Murtagh by:
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 54
Response to written questions submitted to Kevin M. O'Connell by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 55
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 56
Response to written questions submitted to Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D.
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 57
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 58
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 59
SPACE MISSIONS OF GLOBAL IMPORTANCE:
PLANETARY DEFENSE, SPACE WEATHER
PROTECTION, AND SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger F.
Wicker, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Wicker [presiding], Gardner, Blackburn,
Scott, and Cantwell.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. Welcome.
This morning's hearing on Space Missions of Global
Importance will focus on three missions that often do not
receive the level of attention they deserve: planetary defense,
space weather protection, and space situational awareness. Our
ability to prepare for and mitigate asteroid impacts, solar
storms, and space debris is an important part of preserving
global commerce, and even human life. Sounds like a movie
script, but it is reality.
And here we are, welcoming our panel, today, who will help
the Committee and the public understand these issues. This
morning we are joined by: Dr. Thomas Zurbuchen, Associate
Administrator, Science Mission Directorate, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration; Mr. Kevin M. O'Connell,
Director, Office of Space Commerce, Department of Commerce; Mr.
William Murtagh, Director, Space Weather Prediction Center,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and Dr. Moriba
Jah, Professor at the University of Texas.
NASA is the lead agency tasked with detecting and
monitoring celestial projectiles that could impact Earth.
Avoiding a devastating asteroid or comet strike requires the
cataloging of those objects, monitoring them, and developing
capabilities to prevent an impact. This has been an education
to me as Chairman of this Committee.
Thanks to Earth's atmosphere, we rarely notice the impacts
from thousands of objects hitting our planet every day.
Fortunately, incidents such as the 1908 Tunguska event, which
flattened 80 million trees over 2,000 square kilometers of land
in Siberia, are exceedingly rare. Conservative estimates of
that kind of event put the explosive force at 185 times
stronger than the energy unleashed at Hiroshima. And sometimes,
as our colleagues from Arizona know, the craters left behind
from these events can become tourist destinations.
NASA has identified many of the largest near-Earth objects,
but more work is needed and we have given direction in this
regard. Congress has previously directed the agency to conduct
a survey of all near-Earth objects greater than 140 meters in
diameter. The NASA Authorization Act, reported favorably by
this committee, would require NASA to launch a space-based
telescope to facilitate detection. We look forward to hearing
about the future of NASA's planetary defense mission. The
Committee's NASA authorization bill also supports efforts to
study the physics of our Sun and its effects on Earth's
magnetic field. NASA missions such as the Parker Solar Probe
contribute to our understanding of the solar phenomena behind
space weather. NASA's work is complemented by NOAA's Space
Weather Prediction Center in Colorado.
Last year, this Committee marked up the Space Weather
Research and Forecasting Act sponsored by Senators Peters and
Gardner. This legislation would clarify responsibilities for
Federal agencies and establish an interagency working group to
coordinate these efforts. I look forward to working toward
passage of space weather legislation during this Congress.
High-energy space weather events can significantly disrupt
air travel, radio communications, and the electronic devices
that underpin our digital economy. The committee would benefit
from the witnesses' testimony on how the United States is
preparing for these events.
At the same time, hundreds of thousands of objects in orbit
are increasingly making space more unforgiving. Over 2,000
active satellites and over 500,000 pieces of debris larger than
a marble are currently orbiting Earth. Space situational
awareness programs and technology to track objects and avoid
collisions are increasingly important as the private sector
begins to populate space with so-called mega-constellations of
hundreds or thousands of satellites to provide connectivity
around the globe. In response to this challenge, the National
Space Council, chaired by Vice President Pence, has issued the
National Space Traffic Management Policy, which directs the
Secretary of Commerce to take the lead role in providing basic
space situational awareness data and space traffic management
services to the public.
Senator Cruz's Space Frontier Act would help the Department
of Commerce implement its assigned role by elevating the
current Office of Space Commerce to the Bureau of Space
Commerce and designate its leader as an Assistant Secretary.
This organization change--organizational change would give
space situational awareness the higher profile it deserves.
And one more paragraph. The United States has an
indispensable role in addressing the challenges of planetary
defense, space weather protection, and space situational
awareness. We are the world's preeminent spacefaring nation. I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how we
construct a policy framework to meet these challenges.
And I now turn to our Ranking Member, my friend Senator
Cantwell, for her opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this
hearing.
And welcome to the witnesses.
I so appreciate having a hearing about the space mission of
global importance. The space economy, to the State of
Washington, is tremendously important. It's a $1.8 billion
economy, and with companies like Blue Origin, SpaceX, and
Aerojet Rocketdyne, thousands of jobs are dependent on how the
country continues to move forward in this area.
The U.S. Government, industry, and citizens are
increasingly dependent on satellites for a number of critical
activities, including financial transactions, national
security, intelligence operations, forecasting of natural
disasters, and the services provided by in-space assets are
nearly ubiquitous in our daily lives, from everything from
Google Maps to weather apps to data from NOAA's satellite
fleet.
Satellites are also critically important for improving our
understanding of climate and how to help monitor our natural
resources. Many of these satellites aren't owned by a country,
but, instead, privately operated. The global commercial space
industry is already worth $385 billion. As I mentioned, in the
State of Washington it's a big economic impact, and we are
certainly proud of the long history that we have had with the
space industry.
It is critical that we manage space in a way that allows
that economy to continue to grow. Threats like orbital debris,
a congested space environment, space and weather, and near-
Earth asteroids all pose a threat to the satellites. Despite
the potential devastation of satellite collisions, a massive
space or weather event, or other impact of large asteroids
impacting Earth, we still don't know enough about these
incidents and possibilities. So, it is long past time for the
Federal Government to try to tackle these issues. For too long,
our science and observations have needed improvements,which is
why the Committee included a provision in our NASA
Authorization Act requesting that the administration study new
funding mechanisms to address missions of national importance.
Take planetary defense, for example. While cataloging near-
Earth asteroids is critical to safety and even survival, the
science of detecting these objects isn't at the cutting edge of
where we need to be. For a long time, the only way a mission to
detect these asteroids could be funded was by competing with
other missions in NASA. And we certainly don't want to continue
to see that happen. Consequently, an asteroid detection mission
was not approved, because it was not considered high enough on
the value chain for science. And the government needs to change
that.
Our understanding of space weather is still at its infancy,
and forecasters cannot currently predict with confidence how a
space weather event will impact life on Earth. And emissions
from the Sun can disrupt electrical power grids, communication
networks, and aircraft systems. In 1989, a geomagnetic solar
storm caused a 12-hour blackout in the entire providence of
Quebec, Canada. In 2005, solar activity severely degraded
airline pilot communications over the United States. So,
infrastructure in the high-altitude regions and such, as in
Washington State, where we're very vulnerable to space weather,
NOAA provides space weather warnings for the Nation.
Unfortunately, some of the satellites NOAA uses for space
weather forecasts are over 20 years old.
So, finally, we must tackle the challenge of orbital debris
and the congested space environment. There are currently more
than 2,200 active satellites in orbit, and several companies
have proposed launching new mega-constellations that could push
that number to the tens of thousands. In addition, there are
over a half a million pieces of orbital debris, much of which
is not tracked, and a collision between these could also be
very problematic. Near-collisions are happening with increasing
frequency. The United States and other spacefaring nations need
to improve our tracking of these objects. And today, the Air
Force provides thousands of notifications of those potential
collisions, most of which are ignored by the satellite
operators because they cannot rely on an unpredictable system.
We need to explore this and think about guidelines that we
should have for this kind of orbital debris and making sure we
don't have these collisions.
We need to dramatically increase our research dollars in
all of these areas. We need to ensure that agencies like NASA
can fund missions and operations to improve our understandings
of these threats and continue to give assessments to--here in
Washington, to policymakers so we can move forward.
My constituency is very excited about the future of space.
I guarantee it. That's why we call it the Space Needle. And we
will continue to want to push forward on this agenda. There are
many pioneers there, but we also have to do our job here in
making sure that we continue to fund the level of research and
development necessary for us to continue to be leaders in this
sector.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell, how long has the Space
Needle been around?
Senator Cantwell. 1963 World's Fair.
The Chairman. You know, it's still pretty special.
Senator Cantwell. Very special. Very special.
The Chairman. Impressive to a small-town Mississippi boy.
So, who wants to go first? Shall we start with NASA?
Dr. Zurbuchen, you're recognized for 5 minutes. And your
entire statement--all of your entire statements will be
submitted to the record. You're welcome----
STATEMENT OF THOMAS ZURBUCHEN, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, SCIENCE MISSION DIRECTORATE,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Zurbuchen. Thank you so much, sir. Usually, with my
last name, I'm last, you know? So, Chairman----
The Chairman. I know the feeling.
Dr. Zurbuchen. I know.
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of
the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today. Whether
through space weather observations, planetary defense, or
studying the Earth, NASA science provides tangible benefits
that help protect and improve life on Earth.
Our ability to understand and predict space weather is of
growing importance to our Nation's economy, national security,
and the safety of our astronauts, too. NASA's role is
threefold. We enable new understanding of how space weather
works. We develop new technologies and instruments, and
transition understanding models and technology for use by the
operational space weather agencies, NOAA, and the Department of
Defense.
NASA is a critical research arm of the Nation's space
weather effort. We study the Sun, how it influences the solar
system and affects technology on Earth. NASA has a fleet of
spacecraft strategically placed throughout our heliosphere,
from Parker Solar Probe and the recently launched--this week,
in fact--Solar Orbiter, nearest the Sun to the farthest human-
made objects, Voyager 1 and 2, now in interstellar space to
provide research data on space weather.
In preparation for future missions, NASA develops new
technologies and instruments. For example, NOAA Space Weather
Follow-on Mission relies, in part, on technologies developed in
NASA's Research Program.
NASA's scientists working closely with the Artemis Program
in Johnson Space Center to support the human exploration of
deep space. The multi-agency Community Coordinated Modeling
Center team at NASA Goddard works with NOAA's Space Weather
Prediction Center to provide data and forecasts to NASA
Johnson, who can then assess space weather risks to the ISS.
This experience will help NASA to protect Artemis astronauts
from space weather impacts at the Moon and eventually on their
way to Mars.
NASA also supports improvements in space weather prediction
models used by NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center, the U.S.
Government official resource for space weather forecasts.
Finally, in coordination with NOAA, we have initiated a
pilot program to expand the interagency capability to improve
space weather products and services for research to operations,
and operations to research.
The next risk I will talk about is planetary defense.
NASA's Planetary Defense Coordination Office is the primary
group responsible for the coordination of U.S. Government
efforts to find hazardous near-Earth objects and guide planning
for the response of any impact threat. This office detects,
tracks, and characterize NEOs, and coordinates U.S. efforts
within the national organizations. We fund the NEO Observation
Programs, the activities of the Minor Planet Center, and the
JPL Center for NEO Studies. When anyone around the world
detects a NEO, they voluntarily report the detection to that
office, which verifies the finding and coordinates follow up
observations, and makes the data publicly available for study.
JPL computes high-precision orbits for NEOs that are used to
predict if a NEO will approach Earth anytime in the next
century.
NASA met the congressional goal of discovering 90 percent
of the NEOs over 1 kilometer in 2011. Now we are focusing on
NEOs greater 140 meters in size, using ground- and space-based
capabilities. NASA and our partners have already discovered
about one-third of the predicted population of these asteroids.
The 2019 National Academy Study concluded none of the
considered alternatives is competitive with a thermal infrared
space telescope, in terms of detection capabilities or cost.
NASA's current planning is consistent with the goal of
implementing a NEO surveillance capability similar to the one
described in that report. In addition, NASA's DART mission is
scheduled to launch in 2021, will be the first planetary
defense-driven test of a kinetic impactor technique.
The United States lead the world in planetary defense, but
we are not alone. The International Asteroid Warning Network,
of which NASA is the leading member, is an operational network
that links together worldwide data processing and analysis
efforts.
No discussion of space missions to protect our planet would
be complete without touching on how we understand changing
conditions here on Earth. NASA's Earth Science develops new
observational capabilities and technologies to advance our
fundamental understanding of how the Earth works and improves
the lives of citizens in the United States and abroad. NASA
fosters global observations of our Earth system from a unique
vantage point of space, unlocking secrets and patterns in our
changing climate by looking for long-term trends in Earth
properties by following the National Academy's Decadal Survey.
NASA plans to provide continued support for the Earth Science
Division's important work to ensure the vast scientific
information produced by NASA's instruments can be used by
decisionmakers across the private sector and the U.S.
Government.
Thank you again for the invitation to be here with you
today. And I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Zurbuchen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D.,
Associate Administrator, Science Mission Directorate,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of the
Committees, I am honored to appear before this committee to discuss
Space Weather Protection, Planetary Defense and how we protect our home
planet.
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) leverages space-, air-,
and ground-based assets to answer fundamental questions about Earth,
the solar system and the universe, and our place in the cosmos. Our
scientists, engineers, and technologists work with a global community
of researchers to provide the scientific discoveries that advance
critical understanding and inform decision-making. Whether through
disaster response, natural resource management, planetary defense, or
space weather observations, NASA provides tangible benefits that help
protect and improve life on Earth. At the same time, NASA is leading
the quest to answer some of the most pressing human questions, among
them how Earth and the universe evolved, how life emerged, and whether
we are alone in the universe.
Space Weather
Space weather is the result of complex interactions between the
Sun, solar wind, Earth's magnetic field, and Earth's atmosphere. Our
ability to understand and predict space weather is of growing
importance to our Nation's economy, national security, and even NASA
Astronauts. NASA's role in space weather is threefold: we enable new
understanding of how space weather works, we develop new technologies
and instruments, and we transition understanding, models and technology
for use by the operational space weather agencies (NOAA and DOD).
NASA's Heliophysics Division is a crucial research arm of the
Nation's space weather effort, coordinating its efforts with NOAA, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
and Department of Defense (DoD). This division continues to study the
Sun, how it influences the very nature of space, the atmospheres of
planets and in the case of Earth, the technology that exists in low
earth orbit and on the surface. The extensive, dynamic solar atmosphere
surrounds the Sun, Earth, and planets and extends far out into the
solar system. Mapping out this interconnected system requires a
holistic study of the Sun's influence. NASA has a fleet of spacecraft
strategically placed throughout our heliosphere--from Parker Solar
Probe nearest the Sun, observing the very start of the solar wind, to
satellites around Earth, to the farthest human-made object, Voyager,
which is sending back observations on interstellar space. Each mission
is positioned at a critical, well-thought out vantage point to observe
and understand the flow of energy and particles throughout the solar
system.
Several key missions are particularly focused on improving our
understanding of space weather. The Parker Solar Probe traveling
through the Sun's atmosphere, or corona, is now joined by the ESA/NASA
Solar Orbiter mission, providing information about coronal heating and
the source of the solar wind. The Advanced Composition Explorer along
with NOAA's Deep Space Climate Observatory observe the solar wind as it
travels away from the Sun toward Earth and the other planets. The Solar
Dynamics Observatory, the Solar and Terrestrial Relations Observatory,
and the joint ESA/NASA Solar and Heliospheric Observatory all observe
solar eruptions on the Sun. The Global-scale Observations of the Limb
and Disk (GOLD) mission and the Ionospheric Connection (ICON) mission,
launched last year, are improving our understanding of what is
happening in the ionosphere. Each of these missions provide a different
view of the complex system that leads to the space weather we
experience. Looking to the future, the Heliophysics Division is
beginning to implement the Geospace Dynamics Constellation (GDC) which
will study the top-most region of the atmosphere that shields Earth's
surface from solar radiation. In this region, there are >20,000 objects
orbiting, including the International Space Station, weather,
communications, and other operational Government assets. These assets
may be adversely impacted when exposed to solar and geomagnetic
activity. For example, solar and geomagnetic activity in the past have
resulted in degraded communications, GPS positioning errors due to the
ionospheric disturbances, increased space-to-surface transmission noise
affecting military monitoring of the north pole region, satellite drag,
and rerouting of flights due to potential impacts to airplane flight
crew and passenger health.
In preparation for these missions, NASA develops new technologies
and instruments for measuring the effects and processes associated with
space weather. For example, NASA's historic Parker Solar Probe mission,
which has already completed four close approaches to our Sun, will
swoop closer to the Sun's surface than any spacecraft before it, facing
brutal heat and radiation conditions. The spacecraft will come as close
as 3.83 million miles (6.16 million kilometers) to the Sun, well within
the orbit of Mercury and more than seven times closer than any
spacecraft has come before. To perform these unprecedented
investigations, the spacecraft and instruments are protected from the
Sun's heat by a 4.5-inch-thick (11.43 cm) carbon-composite shield,
which needs to withstand temperatures outside the spacecraft that reach
nearly 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit (1,377 degrees Celsius). The compact,
solar-powered probe houses solar arrays that retract and extend as the
spacecraft swings toward or away from the Sun during several loops
around the inner solar system, making sure the panels stay at proper
temperatures and power levels. At its closest passes the spacecraft
must survive solar intensity of about 475 times what spacecraft
experience while orbiting Earth.
Through its Artemis program, NASA is accelerating its exploration
plans and working to land the first woman and next man on the Moon by
2024. To meet these objectives, we continue to accelerate development
of the systems required to ensure success. The Artemis missions will
send humans beyond the protection of Earth's magnetic field for the
first time since Apollo, and expose our astronauts and the systems upon
which they will depend to a potentially hazardous space weather
environment. NASA's Heliophysics division is working closely with the
Artemis Program to support the human exploration of deep space, and on
potential approaches to measure the radiation environment on and around
the Moon. These measurements would aid in the prediction and validation
of the radiation environment to which our astronauts will be subjected.
Looking further in the future to journeys to Mars, NASA astronauts will
need the capability to autonomously generate their own space weather
data and predictions. To this end, the Heliophysics Division is working
with the Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at the Johnson Space
Center on possible experiments in cislunar space to develop the science
and technology needed for such predictions.
NASA will conduct many more science investigations and technology
demonstrations on the Moon ahead of a human return through its
Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) initiative. Several payloads
among those already selected through this program earlier this year
will provide data of interest to solar and space physicists, and future
payloads could include dedicated space weather instruments. The Artemis
Program seeks to establish a sustainable architecture with our
commercial and international partners on the Moon and this architecture
will support a future of scientific research.
NASA already addresses space weather impacts on astronauts and
spacecraft while maintaining the International Space Station (ISS) and
protecting the astronauts living there. The Community Coordinated
Modeling Center team at the Goddard Space Flight Center works with
NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center to provide data and forecasts to
the SRAG, who can then assess risks to the ISS. This experience will
help NASA as it considers how best to protect Artemis astronauts from
space weather impacts. Space weather events are not only a concern for
our astronauts and spacecraft; airline travel, communications and
precision navigation and timing systems like the global positioning
system (GPS), and the electrical power grid, on which we depend each
day, can all be impacted by space weather.
In addition to research missions discussed already, NASA supports
improvements in space weather prediction models, such as those used by
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center, the U.S. government's official
source for space weather forecasts. The multi-agency Community
Coordinated Modeling Center plays a key role in supporting our sister
agencies by transitioning space research models to space weather
operations. NASA is also a member of the Space Weather Operations,
Research, and Mitigation (SWORM) Interagency Working Group run by the
National Science and Technology Council, which coordinates interagency
efforts to carry out the actions and meet the objectives identified in
the National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan.
NASA's Space Weather Science and Applications (SWxSA) program works
to effectively support the transition of heliophysics science results
to applications that enhance the user communities' ability to address
impacts caused by the dynamic space environment. This activity supports
interagency space weather efforts and is consistent with the
recommendations of the 2013 Decadal Survey for Solar and Space Physics.
Under SWxSA, NASA competitively funds ideas and products, leverages
existing agency capabilities, collaborates with other agencies, and
partners with user communities. NASA established SWxSA in collaboration
with sister Federal agencies, academia and industry. Recent
achievements include the award of grants that target research efforts
to advance science priorities identified by our operational agency
partner, investments in high end computing and the community
coordinated modeling center.
Furthermore, in coordination with NOAA, we have initiated a pilot
program to expand the interagency capability and improve space weather
products and services for Research to Operations and Operations to
Research (R2O2R). Together with NOAA, we are developing a shared
framework for research to operations, and once we have established an
effective and efficient process, we will explore the possibility to
further integrate NSF, DoD, academia and private industry into the
framework.
Planetary Defense
NASA's Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO) is the primary
group responsible for the coordination of U.S. Government efforts to
find hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs) and guide planning for the
response to an actual impact threat. PDCO accomplishes this important
task by supporting ground-and space-based assets in detecting,
tracking, and characterizing NEOs, as well as by coordinating U.S.
efforts for cooperating with multiple international organizations. The
PDCO funds NASA's NEO Observations Program, the activities of the Minor
Planet Center (MPC), and the JPL Center for NEO Studies (CNEOS).
Operating under the auspices of the International Astronomical Union,
the MPC is the central node for receiving observations from
observatories worldwide and distributing the most up-to-date database
of minor planets, comets, asteroids, and other small bodies in the
solar system.\1\ The MPC operates from the Smithsonian Astrophysical
Observatory at Harvard University. When any observatory around the
world detects a NEO, it voluntarily reports the detection to the MPC
for additional verification and follow-up observations, and makes all
data publicly available for study. The CNEOS computes high-precision
orbits for NEOs in support of the PDCO. These orbit solutions are used
to predict NEO close approaches to Earth, and produce comprehensive
assessments of impact probabilities of any NEO for at least the next
century.
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\1\ http://www.minorplanetcenter.net/
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These activities led to the accomplishment of the Spaceguard Survey
goal of discovering and cataloguing 90 percent of the predicted NEO
population greater than 1 kilometer in size, which was completed in
2011. The Spaceguard Survey results determined that there is very
little probability of a cataclysmic event in the next 100 years from
NEOs greater than 1 kilometer in size, but discovery of new NEOs in
this size range continue at the rate of about three to five per year.
However, risks remain from smaller, undiscovered NEOs that could cause
regional or localized destruction.
In 2005, Congress tasked NASA with the George E. Brown (GEB) Survey
of NEOs greater than 140 meters in size, with a goal of 90 percent
completion by 2020. Discovery of NEOs greater than 140 meters in size
is steadily progressing with current ground-, and space-based
capabilities. Over the past 20 years, NASA, with assistance from
partners, has discovered, tracked, and catalogued approximately one-
third of the predicted population of asteroids greater than 140 meters
in size. There are several survey programs supporting this effort,
including the Catalina Sky Survey, Pan-STARRS, and the NEOWISE project.
Of the roughly 21,665 Near Earth Asteroids found to date, almost 8,915
are larger than 140 meters in size, which translates to approximately
36 percent of the estimated total population of NEOs of this size. A
2017 updated report from the NEO Science Definition Team (SDT) has
validated the population estimate with more complete statistical
analysis and characterized the impact risk from NEOs larger than 140
meters in size more accurately.\2\
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\2\ https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/doc/2017_neo_sdt_final_e-version.pdf
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There also has been increasing awareness that objects on the order
of 30-140 meters in size pose a significant enough impact hazard that
they ought not to be ignored. For example, the Tunguska event in 1908,
which leveled trees over an area of about 2,000 square kilometers, is
estimated to have been caused by an airburst of an object roughly only
40-60 meters in size. The airburst over Chelyabinsk, Russia on February
15, 2013, was caused by a 20-meter sized object exploding in the
atmosphere. This well-documented airburst is estimated to have caused
more than $30 million in damages, mostly due to broken windows. Over
1,600 people reported to hospitals with injuries ranging from
lacerations from broken glass to concussions and mild burns.
In June 2018, the National Science and Technology Council Committee
on Homeland and National Security published the National Near-Earth
Object Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan (referred herein as ``the
Action Plan'').\3\ The Action Plan is a whole-of-government approach to
managing the NEO threat through all phases of a NEO impact timeline.
Underpinning the national efforts are five strategic goals:
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\3\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/National-
Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-23-pages-
1MB.pdf
Enhance NEO Detection, Tracking, and Characterization
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Capabilities
Improve NEO Modeling, Prediction, and Information
Integration
Develop Technologies for NEO Deflection and Disruption
Missions
Increase International Cooperation on NEO Preparation
Strengthen and Routinely Exercise NEO Impact Emergency
Procedures and Action Protocols
The development of the Action Plan included representatives from
the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency
Management Agency), Department of Defense, Department of State, NASA,
Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, National Science
Foundation, Department of Commerce, National Nuclear Security
Administration, and Executive Office of the President. The Action Plan
lays out a framework for addressing the variety of NEO impact hazards
through coordination of U.S. Federal Departments and Agencies that are
implementing the above goals.
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(NASEM), at NASA's request, produced the June 2019 report ``Finding
Hazardous Asteroids Using Infrared and Visible Wavelength Telescopes''
\4\ that notes the importance of ground- and space-based survey assets.
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\4\ https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25476/finding-hazardous-asteroids-
using-infrared-and-visible-wavelength-telescopes
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To date, a space-based infrared (IR) mission has been considered by
recent studies to be the most effective method to discover and
initially characterize relevant NEOs and increase the NEO detection
rate. IR CCD cameras would be capable of finding and characterizing
NEOs that are darker and fainter than those observable with any
telescope on the ground and would be more effective than a visible
space telescope. A survey spacecraft at the L1 or L2 Lagrange point
would allow for observation of asteroids both well ahead and behind
Earth along its orbital path while maintaining constant communication
range with Earth, allowing for the best and latest techniques in dark
object detection and characterization processing to be used. Currently,
NASA is continuing to mature concepts for a space-based NEO survey
capability aimed at significantly increasing the NEO detection rate.
This includes instrument and sensor development for a future infrared
space-based asset. The 2019 NASEM study concluded none of the
considered alternatives is competitive with a thermal-infrared space
telescope in terms of detection capabilities or cost. NASA's current
planning is consistent with the goal of implementing a NEO surveillance
capability similar to that described in the report.
Current research has identified three possible options that could
be employed to divert an object on a likely collision course with
Earth. The size of an asteroid and length of warning time influences
the most practical methods for deflecting an asteroid. With a
sufficiently long warning time, a gravity tractor could be used. A
gravity tractor is a spacecraft that would rendezvous with an asteroid
(but not land on its surface) and maintain a relative, optimal position
to use the mutual gravity attraction between the spacecraft and the
asteroid to slowly tug on it to alter the course of the asteroid. A
kinetic impactor is currently the simplest and most technologically
mature method available to defend against asteroids. In this technique,
a spacecraft is launched that simply slams itself into the asteroid at
a relative speed of several kilometers per second. For a complete
overview of possible mitigation techniques, please refer to the 2010
National Research Council report ``Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth-
Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies''.\5\ The limited
discussion here is about the three most viable techniques at this time,
due to their current technology readiness level. For large asteroids
that are identified with relatively short warning time, high-energy
release approaches, such as detonating a nuclear explosive device, may
be the most effective or even the only feasible way of preventing a
cataclysmic event.
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\5\ https://www.nap.edu/catalog/12842/defending-planet-earth-near-
earth-object-surveys-and-hazard-mitigation
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NASA's Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission is a
planetary defense-driven test of the kinetic impactor technique. DART
is in Phase C of development and is led by the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory with support from other NASA centers. DART's
primary objective is to demonstrate the effects of a kinetic impact on
the small moon of the asteroid Didymos. NASA is developing the DART
kinetic impactor demonstration for launch in summer 2021 and encounter
with Didymos by October 2022.
Bolstered by international communication and cooperation, the
United States also has an accurate and up-to-date picture of global
efforts in NEO activities. The International Asteroid Warning Network
(IAWN), of which NASA is a leading member, is an operational network
that links together the observatories and data processing and analysis
of institutions in many nations that are discovering, monitoring, and
characterizing the hazardous NEO population. The Space Mission Planning
Advisory Group (SMPAG) is a forum of the space capable nations' space
agencies and offices whose primary purpose is to prepare for an
international response to discovered NEO impact threats. There are
several nations (e.g., Europe, Russia, Japan, and China) leading
efforts that incorporate varying degrees of coordination and
cooperation with the United States, and provide opportunities to
collaborate or include data from observations to discover, track, and
characterize NEOs.
Protecting our home planet
No discussion of space missions to protect our planet would be
complete without touching on how NASA's missions help us understand
changing conditions here on Earth. NASA's Earth Science Division (ESD)
plays a unique and essential role in today's rapidly changing world.
ESD develops new observational capabilities and new technologies and
uses them to advance our fundamental understanding of how the Earth
works and improve the lives of citizens in the United States and in the
world. The agency fosters global observations of our Earth system from
the unique vantage point of space, the ISS, aircraft and in situ data,
and regional to global Earth system models. These observations allow
ESD to explore spatially, unearthing new discoveries in Earth's
forests, ice, oceans, and solid Earth, but also temporally, unlocking
secrets and patterns in our changing climate by looking at long-term
trends in Earth properties.
Two years ago, the National Academy of Sciences released the 2017-
2027 Decadal Survey for Earth Science and Applications from Space. The
Decadal Survey gives us the compass for the future of Earth science, as
well as a challenge. The reliance on Earth information in the daily
lives of people and businesses has been built on sustained efforts to
conduct exploratory and applied Earth Science. Sustaining and improving
our ability to understand the Earth system is challenging when it
changes (through both natural- and human-caused means) nearly as fast
as we characterize it. A robust, resilient, and appropriately balanced
Earth observation program will be necessary to meet the Nation's needs
for the coming decades.
The FY 2021 budget provides continued support for the Earth Science
Division's important work to ensure the vast scientific information
produced by NASA instruments can be used by decision-makers across the
private sector and the U.S. government.
Thank you for the invitation to be here with you today, and I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. Murtagh.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MURTAGH, PROGRAM
COORDINATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION SPACE WEATHER PREDICTION CENTER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Murtagh. Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
Cantwell, and members of the Committee. I am Bill Murtagh, the
Program Coordinator for NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center,
or SWPC, in Boulder, Colorado.
NOAA is the official U.S. Government source for civilian
space weather forecasts, warnings, and alerts to the public,
industry, and to government agencies. We do work very closely
with the U.S. Air Force, who is responsible for all DOD and
related national security needs for space weather information.
We work with NASA and other Federal agencies, as well as
private industry, academia, and international partners, to
ensure access to data and analysis that support our 24/7
mission to deliver products and services that protect our
society and economy from space weather events. These events
could drastically affect our electric power grid,
telecommunications, GPS-dependent technologies, astronauts and
space exploration, and, of course, aviation.
Critical to our mission operations are four things:
observations, forecasts and warnings, science, and
partnerships. And I'll briefly highlight each one of these.
For observations, NOAA uses an array of space- and ground-
based observations employing specialized instruments to support
our space weather forecast operations and related research.
NOAA operates at three viewpoints to acquire the space-based
observations necessary to meet SWPC's operational requirements.
Those three, in deep space, at the Lagrange point, located 1
million miles from Earth, to observe the solar wind; a
geostationary orbit for key observations of solar flares, of X-
rays, and energetic particle radiation; and lower-Earth orbit,
for measurements of the ionosphere.
NOAA leverages additional data from NASA and European
satellites. NOAA is in the process of developing the Space
Weather Follow-on Program, which will provide mission
continuity and augment capabilities at the L1 point and in
geostationary orbit.
Ground-based data are also important to the SWPC
operations; in particular, magnetic field observations provided
by the USGS which are critical in our geomagnetic storm warning
processes, also radio and solar observations provided by the
U.S. Air Force and solar magnetic field maps from the NSF.
In forecasts and warnings, once an eruption occurs, the
forecasters feed these observations into computer models to
determine the likely effects of solar events on Earth. These
models help forecasters estimate when the effects will begin,
how long they will last, and how severe the event will be.
Similar to the categories we use to classify hurricanes or
tornados, the space weather scales are used for communicating
the severity of space weather storms. These scales address
radio blackouts, solar flares, solar radiation storms due to
the sun-emitted energetic particles, and geomagnetic storms
from corona mass, ejected plasma, and magnetic fields. These--
the scales list possible impacts for each level of storming,
and indicate how often such events happen. NOAA's space weather
alerts and warnings are employed by Federal agencies and users
across many sectors to aid in national preparedness and
response to space weather.
That category of science, NOAA is also advancing a
Research-to-Operations process. This includes a new program,
the Earth Prediction Innovation Center, or EPIC. EPIC will use
the partnership with academic, the private sector, and relevant
agencies to test and validate new capabilities, and transition
those capabilities from research to operations, thereby
improving our existing forecast and warning capabilities. NOAA
is also exploring with NASA the potential for a space weather
testbed to further accelerate the transfer of research to
operations, and operations to research.
And finally, in partnerships, strong public, private,
academic partnerships are essential to maintain and improve the
observing networks, conduct the research, create the forecast
models, and supply the services necessary to support our
national security and economic prosperity. NOAA is committed to
working toward the growth of the private sector as our national
infrastructure and technological base becomes more sensitive to
the impacts of space weather, thus demanding more and improved
space weather services. NOAA will continue to explore
partnerships with commercial and academic community as we work
to maintain and improve our operational capabilities.
In closing, NOAA appreciates the ongoing support we have
received from Congress for our critically important space
weather programs. We will continue to work with other Federal
agencies and the private sector in this effort to enhance
American preparedness for, and resilience to, the effects of
space weather. And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murtagh follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Murtagh, Program Coordinator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Space Weather Prediction
Center, U.S. Department of Commerce
Introduction & NOAA's Role
Good morning Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members
of the Committee. My name is Bill Murtagh and I am the Program
Coordinator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) in the Department of
Commerce. Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing
about space weather. NOAA is the U.S. Government's official source of
civilian space weather forecasts, warnings, and alerts to the general
public, industry, and government agencies. NOAA works closely with our
partners in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 557th Weather Wing, who are
responsible for all Department of Defense (DOD) and related national
security needs for space weather information.
Through the SWPC, NOAA's mission is to deliver space weather
products and services that protect our society and economy from space
weather events that could wreak havoc on our Nation's electrical grid,
telecommunications, GPS-dependent technologies, astronauts and space
exploration, and aviation.
SWPC operates 24 hours a day providing observations/situational
awareness, forecasts, and warnings of space weather storms with advance
notice ranging from hours to days. In addition to the DOD, SWPC efforts
are closely integrated with other agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), National Science Foundation (NSF), and the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), as well as commercial service providers, private
industry, and academia. SWPC also works with international partners to
ensure access to essential data and analyses that support our mission,
and to ensure consistency in forecasts. It is SWPC's goal to produce
accurate and timely space weather products and decision-support tools
that protect national critical infrastructure.
Observation Platforms
NOAA's space weather products and services start with observations.
NOAA uses an array of space-and ground-based observatories that use
specialized instruments that support our space weather forecast
operations and related research.
NOAA, through its National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service, operates space-based observatories at three
viewpoints to meet SWPC's operational requirements: deep space Lagrange
point 1 (L1), the point located one million miles above the surface of
the Earth for solar wind measurements; in geostationary orbit at 22,240
miles for key observations of solar flares, x-rays, and energetic
particle radiation enhancements; and in low Earth orbit polar-orbit at
310 miles for measurements of the ionosphere. NOAA also ingests
supplemental information by leveraging additional data from NASA
research, and European research and operational satellites. NOAA is
currently in the process of developing the Space Weather Follow-On
(SWFO) program, which will provide mission continuity and augment
capabilities at the L1 point and geostationary orbit.
Ground-based data are also important in SWPC operations. The
underpinning data used by NOAA to supply geomagnetic storm warnings and
alerts are the ground-based magnetic field observations provided by the
USGS Geomagnetism Program. These observations describe the local
intensity of the changes in magnetic fields and allow NOAA to
characterize the intensity of geomagnetic storms. NOAA also relies on
the USAF Solar Electro-Optical Network (SEON) and NSF's Global
Oscillations Network Group (GONG). SEON provides continuous solar
optical observations and solar radio emissions from ground stations
around the world. GONG consists of a network of six stations that
provide continuous solar imaging and magnetograms.
Modeling and Product Dissemination
Using these observations, forecasters predict the probability of
eruptions on the Sun. When an eruption occurs, forecasters feed the
data from the data collection platforms into computer models to
determine the likely effects of solar events on Earth. The models help
forecasters estimate when the effects will begin, how long they will
last, and how severe the event will be. The model output will also
provide critical infrastructure owners and operators with key decision
points and thresholds for action, enabling more effective mitigation
procedures and practices. NOAA is actively working with NASA and NSF to
tap into their support of research and space weather modeling developed
in the academic community to increase forecast skill.
NOAA is also pursuing a more effective Research-to-Operations-to-
Research process through its new program, the Earth Prediction
Innovation Center (EPIC). EPIC will utilize partnerships with academia,
the private sector, and relevant agencies to validate and test new
capabilities (e.g., products, models, observations, applications, and
techniques), transition those capabilities from research to operations,
and establish a process to evaluate and improve existing operational
capabilities. As part of EPIC, space weather prediction models will
benefit from the increased focus on enterprise collaboration.
NOAA forecasters communicate current and forecasted space weather
conditions using a variety of products. Similar to the categories we
use to classify hurricanes, there are also Space Weather Scales for
communicating the relative severity of space weather storms. Space
weather scales communicate potential impacts such as Radio Blackouts
(from solar flares), Solar Radiation Storms (due to solar energetic
particles), and Geomagnetic Storms (from coronal mass ejections). The
scales list possible impacts for each level and indicate how often such
events happen. Watches, warnings, and alerts are issued by e-mail via a
product subscription service and by telephone notification to critical
customers such as power grid operators, FEMA, and Mission Control at
NASA. NOAA's space weather alerts and warnings are essential for
enhancing national preparedness for space weather.
In September 2019, NOAA and USGS announced the release of the new
Geoelectric Field model. This model indicates the level of space
weather impact affecting the U.S. electrical power grid and helps
operators mitigate effects on critical infrastructure. The model relies
on USGS magnetometers (described above), and work has already begun on
improving the product to include Canada and to add a prediction
capability that will rely on L1 measurements.
Commercial Sector Engagement
Additionally, NOAA continues to actively engage the commercial
sector on opportunities to meet U.S. government requirements for
weather and space weather information. NOAA ensures all space weather
data, real-time and retrospective, and services are made available to
the growing private sector service providers. The NOAA-private sector
partnership plays a vital role in meeting the Nation's needs for space
weather services. NOAA recognizes that a strong public-private
partnership is essential to establish the observing networks, conduct
research, create forecast models, and supply the services necessary to
support national security and economic prosperity. NOAA is committed to
working toward the growth of the private sector as the national
infrastructure demands more space weather services. These activities
are governed by the NOAA Policy on Partnerships in the Provision of
Environmental Information, NOAA Commercial Space Policy, and the NESDIS
Commercial Space Activities Assessment Process. NOAA will continue to
explore partnerships with the commercial sector as it maintains its
operational capabilities to provide space weather awareness.
NOAA's Interagency Coordination with SWORM
On March 26, 2019, the National Science and Technology Council
released the National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan. This is
an update to the original Strategy and Action Plan published in October
2015. The Strategy and Action Plan unites the U.S. national-and
homeland-security enterprise with the science and technology enterprise
to formulate a cohesive approach to enhance national preparedness for
space weather. Key to the success of this update was input from the
public on ways to leverage private capital and expertise on space
weather research, observations, forecasts, and mitigation of effects on
critical infrastructure. The National Science and Technology Council,
Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation (SWORM) Interagency
Working Group, comprised of over 20 Federal Departments and Agencies,
is the interagency body that defines, coordinates, and oversees
implementation of the objectives in the Strategy and Action Plan. This
important update seeks to improve the government's coordination on
long-term guidance for Federal programs and activities to enhance
national preparedness to space weather events. The new strategy aligns
with priorities identified by the Administration in the 2017 National
Security Strategy and the Space Policy Directives.
Conclusion
NOAA appreciates the on-going support we have received from
Congress for our critically-important space weather program. We will
continue to collaborate with other Federal agencies and the private
sector to develop and strengthen our activities in space weather
research and forecasting. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Murtagh.
Mr. O'Connell.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. O'CONNELL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPACE
COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. O'Connell. Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Chairman
Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of the Committee,
for inviting me to testify today about the urgent need to
improve the Nation's space situational awareness capabilities.
It is essential that we deal with this problem now as a key
enabler of our ambitious plans for space exploration and space
commerce.
Two weeks ago, on January 29th, two U.S. space objects, a
decommissioned space telescope and an experimental payload,
came into close approach in low-Earth orbit. Throughout the
day, the probability of conjunction dramatically increased from
1 in 1,000 to 1 in 20, signaling an extremely close approach.
To place this in context, satellite operators begin collision
planning avoidance maneuvers when the probability of collision
reaches 1 in 10,000. Neither object had any ability to
maneuver. Thankfully, the two objects narrowly passed, by some
calculations at a distance of only 18 meters. Experts predict
that if the two relatively large objects had collided, they
would have created a cloud of new debris of up to 15,000 new
debris objects.
Because the Department of Defense's Space Domain Awareness
Mission prioritizes threats to active satellites and the
International Space Station, it did not initially assign space
surveillance assets to this event. This is technically a
debris-on-debris event. Second, LEO labs, one of a number of
innovative U.S. companies already providing SSA services,
provided the initial, and then subsequent, warnings of the
possible conjunction. Third, this close approach between two
objects was only one of five similar events during that day.
Why does it matter? As challenging as the space debris
problem is today, it is bound to grow more complex. Space
debris creates risks to the International Space Station and the
billions of dollars of U.S. investment in space, including the
services they enable here on Earth. This year alone, if SpaceX
and OneWeb plans are successful, they will launch over 1,000
new satellites into low-Earth orbit, thereby increasing the
number of active satellites by almost 50 percent. The United
States and many other countries have very ambitious space plans
over the next decade.
Finally, as we consider the next wave of space commerce in
areas like satellite servicing, space manufacturing, and
tourism, and even early plans to remove space debris, those
will require much more timely, accurate, and continuous
monitoring of the space environment. Analysts are projecting
significantly higher probabilities of collision, which could
impact our ability to bring benefits to Earth from areas of
space for an entire generation.
Space Policy Directive 3 directed the Department of
Commerce to assume on-orbit collision avoidance notifications
for private sector and international users, a mission
traditionally held by the Department of Defense. Drawing upon a
range of national security sensors, DOD maintains a catalog of
roughly 26,000 space objects larger than the size of a
softball. DOD shares SSA-related data through agreements with
foreign military and other organizations, and it provides
information for space operator use through the Space-track.org
website.
The focal point for these activities in the Department of
Commerce is my office, the Office of Space Commerce. We
developed a strong partnership with DOD and the Space Force
officials to ensure a seamless transfer of these
responsibilities. Last year, the Department detailed the senior
commerce liaison to the 18th Space Control Squadron at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, where DOD provides us
access to their data, their systems, and their processes. We've
also participated in exercises designed to explore effective
integration of government and commerce SSA capabilities,
including those of our allies. Our partnership with NASA is
strong, and growing.
Our work on SSA internal to the office is focused in key
areas: industry engagement, improving international standards
and best practices, and the development of a modern system,
known as an Open Architecture Data Repository, or OADR. In
order to achieve these, we must have the right mix of mission-
critical staff.
In sum, the OADR is being designed to bring modern
commercial technologies and business concepts to the U.S. space
situational awareness enterprise. This will allow us to provide
collision-avoidance notices to a growing number of private-
sector and international operators. Ultimately, the OADR will
provide conjunction notice services that exceed current Federal
support and encourage the continued growth of a commercial
space safety industry.
Improving SSA is also an imperative of sustaining American
leadership in space. We've had extensive conversations with our
allies about the OADR and how they can bring civil and
commercial capabilities to bear as part of their
responsibilities in space safety and sustainability.
To summarize, the essential first step in creating a highly
effective civil space traffic management system, as directed by
SPD-3, is to improve space situational awareness. That system
would start with the data from DOD's authoritative catalog,
bolster it with commercial sensor capabilities, apply state-of-
the-art analytic and visualization tools, some from the space
industry but also from others from the much broader analytics
market, and use them in a modern operational concept in order
to warn satellite operators in a trusted, timely, and highly
accurate fashion.
From our vantage point at the Commerce Department, Mr.
Chairman, we see the elements necessary for a trillion-dollar
space economy over the next two decades, if not sooner.
Enabling an incredibly innovative U.S. ecosystem of
entrepreneurs as one of them, avoiding the very bad day and
decades-long consequences that space debris can cause is
another.
Thank you, and I'll look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin M. O'Connell, Director, Office of Space
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members of
the Committee. I am pleased to testify before the Committee to talk
about the urgent need to improve space situational awareness (SSA). My
testimony will cover the work the Administration is doing to address
this urgent need, and the responsibilities that have been given to the
Department of Commerce by the President and the National Space Council
in Space Policy Directive 3 on Space Traffic Management. I will also
discuss how the space environment is changing, the tremendous
opportunities to leverage commercial capabilities to enhance space
safety and sustainability, and why it is essential to do so in order to
achieve our ambitious pursuits from space exploration to space
commerce.
This hearing represents an important opportunity to discuss how our
collective efforts will promote responsible U.S. innovation,
investment, and space operations, and how commercial efforts can
support our Federal missions and the U.S. economy. The United States
currently has an opportunity to capture the lion's share of an expected
trillion-dollar space economy by 2040.
The Department's Direction to Establish an Open Architecture Data
Repository (OADR)
Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) directs the Department of Commerce
to develop a modern, open data repository as the place from which to
ultimately provide conjunction notifications. This state-of-the-art
open architecture data repository (OADR) will apply modern technology
and business approaches to space situational awareness, providing
conjunction analysis to private sector and international users.
The OADR will provide conjunction notification services for
participating commercial and international space operators that exceed
current Federal models. Participating members will serve as
contributors to the augmented space situational awareness repository as
well as reap the benefits of protecting their assets in space through
better understanding of the space traffic environment.
We believe that innovations can be applied across the board, from
sensors and analytic tools to new concepts of operations and warning
systems.
The OADR will also be designed to include a platform where
companies can interact with one another to create new commercial
service offerings around space safety and sustainability.
This is also an imperative of sustaining American leadership in
space. We have had extensive conversations with a number of U.S. allies
about the OADR and their interest in participation; our allies have
offered to consider bringing civil and commercial capabilities into the
OADR as part of their contribution.
The OADR will leverage commercial innovation to protect and enhance
civil and commercial space activities in real-time.
A Very Near Miss in Space--One of Many
Our work on the OADR cannot be timelier, as space traffic expands
and near misses are common news. On January 29, 2020, expert and even
public attention was captured by the close approach between two space
objects--a decommissioned U.S. space telescope (Infrared Astronomical
Satellite or IRAS) launched in 1983 and a U.S. experimental payload
(Gravity Gradient Stabilization Experiment or GGSE-4) launched in 1967.
Throughout the day, probability of a collision dramatically increased
from 1 in 1000 to 1 in 20, in other words an extremely close approach.
To place this in context, satellite operators begin planning collision
avoidance maneuvers for active space objects when the probability of
collision reaches 1 in 10,000.
Neither object had any ability to maneuver. Thankfully, the two
objects narrowly passed, by some calculations at only a distance of 18
meters. Some experts predict that if the two relatively large objects
had collided, at a relative speed of almost 33,000 miles per hour, they
could have created a debris cloud of up to 15,000 debris objects, one
of the largest such events in the history of spaceflight.
Even if you followed the news reporting on that close approach,
there are some things that you might not know. First, because the
Department of Defense (DoD) national security mission of Space Domain
Awareness prioritizes allocation of space surveillance and analysis
assets at monitoring threats to active satellites and the International
Space Station, DoD did not initially assign assets to this event (This
was technically a ``debris on debris'' event). DoD did ultimately raise
the priority for U.S. sensors as news of the possible conjunction
broke. Second, LeoLabs, one of a number of innovative U.S. companies
already providing space situational awareness services, provided the
initial and subsequent warnings of the possible conjunction. Third,
this close approach between two objects was only one of five similar
events during that day.
Why Does it Matter?
This recent event, and many like it, demonstrates the risk that
space debris creates for the astronauts on board the International
Space Station and the billions of dollars of U.S. government and
commercial investment, both in terms of spacecraft and in products and
services delivered on Earth. It also creates risks for the space
investments of many other countries, including our allies. As
challenging as the current space debris problem is, however, Space
Traffic Management is bound to become far more complex, given current
and planned future space operations.
Let me elaborate. In 2020 alone, Space X and Europe's Arianespace
have planned over twenty launches each. China is also planning over
forty launches this year. Many of these launches are designed to
release over twenty satellites. If the launch plans for Space X and
OneWeb in 2020 go as planned, the two companies alone will launch over
1,000 satellites, all to low earth orbit. Looking ahead, three American
companies have applied for licenses to launch a combined 57,000+
satellites over the next decade.
The problem is not confined to the launches of large satellite
constellations: modern design practices for smaller commercial
satellites may create vulnerability from smaller pieces of space
debris. As Secretary Ross likes to say, even a paint chip travelling at
thousands of miles per hour can do serious damage to a solar panel,
fuel tank, or other critical part of a satellite.
As new missions like satellite servicing, space tourism, and
commercial space stations emerge, they will critically depend on an
increased ability to understand the space environment in order to
ensure space safety and sustainability.
Analysts are projecting significantly higher probabilities of
collision which, if they occur, will create space debris in and near
operational orbits, potentially impacting the ability of commercial and
government satellites to bring national and economic benefit to this
Nation for a generation.
One visceral response to this increased threat to space operations
could be to limit launches or otherwise create a regulatory framework
that might inhibit use of space in the hope of mitigating a crisis.
This would be reactionary. In the Department's view, the best possible
approach right now to ensuring that space is used in a safe and
sustainable way is to better understand what goes on there. Only then
can the best possible regulatory instruments be crafted to ensure space
safety.
Unless we carefully consider the impact of regulation, space
operators will simply take their investment capital, ingenuity, and
potential space risk and launch from another country. Such an approach
will allow us to ultimately drive right-sized regulatory requirements
at Federal and international levels.
Let's look at this problem in another way. Today's growth in space
commerce is partly based on the application of commercial efficiencies
to what was a traditionally government-focused business model. The
commercial launch industry has transformed the industry by implementing
techniques such as launch vehicle reusability, miniaturization,
efficient production, and continuous learning, which are resulting in
the substantial lowering of costs associated with space access and
operations. A failure to improve our understanding of the space
environment and mitigate creation of additional space debris threatens
adding costs and complexity once again. Space debris is the ``speed
bump'' on the path to the trillion-dollar space economy.
Updating the Nation's SSA System--The Role of the Department of
Commerce
SPD-3 directed the Department of Commerce, in partnership with DoD,
to assume responsibility for private sector and international
notifications worldwide. Two key rationales exist for this transition.
First, DoD, through the Space Force, has been directed to provide
freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to space, and
to protect the interests of the United States in the space domain in
the face of rapidly changing threats. Second, as already mentioned, our
current SSA system needs to be modernized in order to effectively
coordinate activities in the rapidly changing space environment.
The focal point for all of these activities is the Office of Space
Commerce (OSC). At the Secretary's direction, OSC has moved quickly to
implement the Department's SPD-3 responsibilities. OSC's efforts begin
with leveraging the many different capabilities within the Department.
OSC's work on improving SSA is focused in three key areas:
improving standards and best practices, industry engagement, and the
development of the OADR. In order to achieve these goals OSC first
needs to have the right mix of critical mission staff.
Commerce has developed a strong and continuing partnership with DoD
and U.S. Air Force officials, at both senior leadership and staff
levels, to ensure a seamless transfer of these responsibilities. Last
year, the Department detailed a senior Commerce liaison to the 18th
Space Control Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), California,
where DoD is providing access to their current data, systems, and
processes for Commerce's awareness. Commerce is also participating,
sometimes as co-lead, in exercises, experiments, and war games designed
to help understand how to integrate government and commercial
capabilities. Secretary Ross visited Vandenberg AFB in late 2018 for a
first-hand view of the current SSA system and has spoken on numerous
occasions about the importance of improving space safety.
The Need to Incorporate New Technologies and Processes
For the past five decades, the operational support mission to
satellite owners has been a mission of the Department of Defense.
Drawing upon a range of radar and optical sensors designed for missile
warning and other national security purposes, the Department of Defense
maintains a catalogue of roughly 26,000 space objects larger than the
size of a softball. The Combined Forces Space Component Command, an
element of the United States Space Command, shares SSA-related data
through a series of agreements with foreign military and domestic and
international civil and commercial space organizations. It also
provides information for space operator and public use through the
Space-track.org website. While this approach served us well for the
space environment of the past, it will not serve us adequately for the
future.
Why not? Our national SSA system has not kept up with modern
technologies and organizational approaches characteristic of civil and
commercial space operations, mostly because of the press of national
security business. An improved understanding of the space environment
will benefit from the application of new sensors, analytic and
visualization tools, as well as a modern alerting and warning system.
While these capabilities were initially developed via traditional
government acquisition processes, today many of them are available in
the commercial market. Some of these come directly from space-focused
companies. Others come from the convergence of other technologies like
machine learning and cloud computing. The Department and the Office of
Space Commerce routinely engage with companies that have SSA-related
sensor and analytic capabilities, as well as other companies that have
ideas about innovative new services to help with space safety and
sustainability.
The Department of Commerce's SSA-related relationships are
especially strong with DoD and with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Commerce is currently evaluating the United
States Air Force's Unified Data Library as an initial input to the
future OADR, and we are working with the NASA Ames and Goddard Centers
on their conjunction analysis tools and models of the space
environment. Simultaneously, we are evaluating other technical and
system architectural concepts.
We cannot neglect attention to the downstream analytics and
notification parts of the enterprise. As national sensor capabilities
expand with the activation of the Space Fence, satellite operators are
concerned that they will receive an overwhelming number of conjunction
warnings per day if analysis and reporting tools are not upgraded as
well. This is likely to result in inaction. One overarching goal of all
of our efforts under SPD-3 is to produce actionable warnings that are
more precise, accurate, and timely in order to optimize satellite
operator actions.
Looking forward: FY 20, FY 21, and Beyond--
FY 2021 is a critically important building block year as we move
toward achieving the goals of SPD-3. In FY 2020, we have reprioritized
our activities to ensure that significant strides can be made in our
SSA-related activities.
With these core foundations set, FY 2021 is an important year to
continue our work on planning for the transition of SSA responsibility
for on-orbit collision avoidance support from the DOD to a civilian
agency. In FY 2021, the Department is aiming to achieve some key
milestones on our critical path for standing up the OADR on schedule:
I. Further developing the OADR design and our acquisition strategy
approaches;
II. Engaging with Federal agencies and the private sector on
standards and best practices related to space safety and
sustainability;
III. Conducting SSA development activities with industry; and
IV. Continuing to expand international partnerships for enhancing
global cooperation on sharing SSA data.
However, to ensure that the OADR can provide these critical
functions, even more needs to be done, as our mission and the need for
the OADR is essential.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to discuss the Department of Commerce's vision for the OADR and the
Office of Space Commerce. It is absolutely the right time to elevate
our focus on how commercial innovation can enhance Federal space
missions and protect the billions of dollars that U.S. companies are
investing in both traditional and paradigm-shifting space operations.
The Department appreciates Congress' ongoing support for these
efforts, which have continued to ensure that the United States remains
the flag of choice for space innovators and operators, and the ability
for U.S. technology to drive dramatically improved protection of U.S.
government missions and commercial assets. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before the Committee today. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jah.
STATEMENT OF MORIBA K. JAH, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR, AEROSPACE ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING
MECHANICS DEPARTMENT, COCKRELL SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, THE
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Dr. Jah. Yes. Good morning. Thank you very much, Chairman
Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, other members of this
committee.
I come to you today from the University of Texas at Austin,
where I'm an Associate Professor of Aerospace Engineering and
Engineering Mechanics.
So, near-Earth space is geopolitically contested, it's
commercially contested, and it's in dire need of environmental
protection, because it is a finite resource. All of outer space
might be infinite, but near-Earth space, where we place our
satellites, is a finite resource.
We see lots of stuff in the news these days. We just heard
a few members here talk about this near collision. If that
would have happened, many thousands of objects would have been
created, adding more and more to this population of rampant
debris. We even hear things like Russian satellites that might
be behaving in some way to generate extra interest in what they
might be up to. And we also heard, from Ms. Cantwell; she
described how ubiquitous space services and capabilities are to
people's lives. And nothing is guaranteeing the protection of
these things. There's no Space Vice, as it were.
We launch satellites into common neighborhoods. OK? We
don't just launch them anywhere in space. Common neighborhoods,
think of these as shipping lanes. And these lanes are very
dynamic. When most of the stuff in space kind of dies off, they
tend to stay there well beyond our lifetimes and that of our
children and children's children. That's something to really
think about.
We even have these things that are called ``graveyard
orbits.'' So, you know, we're good at having landfills here on
Earth, so we have an equivalent landfill in space. You know,
what could go wrong with that idea?
So, near-Earth space highways are becoming more crowded,
but we still lack this global set of norms of behavior on how
to manage that finite resource. Very recently, the European
Space Agency had the satellite Aeolus. There was this predicted
possible collision between Aeolus and one of SpaceX's Starlink
satellites. Apparently, the European Space Agency tried to get
a hold of SpaceX, wasn't able to, they decided to do an evasive
maneuver. At the end of the day, SpaceX said, ``Well, based on
the information that we had, it really didn't meet our
threshold for making some sort of decision to get out of the
way.'' All right. So, that means that not everybody has the
same idea of what risk on orbit means, not everybody computes
it the same way. Do we really want to get into this game of
chicken on orbit? And I would say, not so much.
We worry a lot about these collisions, but I'll say that
our problems don't end there, they just begin with the whole
collision stuff. Every domain of human activity suffers from
malicious behavior. And space is no different. OK? We speak
about space traffic management, except that we can't manage
what we don't know, and we don't know what we don't measure.
And so, fundamentally, one of the biggest hurdles in really
being able to make space transparent and predictable is sharing
of observational data. And we don't do that very well these
days.
We don't fully understand the effects and impacts of the
space environment on how space objects behave. And I think one
of the Achilles tendons of space situational awareness is that,
oftentimes, many different hypotheses explain the same
evidence, so there's a lot of ambiguity.
``Oh, my satellite stopped working. Why was it? Was it
because the Sun hiccupped? Was it because somebody did
something to me?'' It's very questionable. All this is
happening right before our eyes.
Space Policy Directive Number 3, signed June 18, 2018, laid
out a nice path on how to move forward on space situational
awareness, space traffic management. Goal number one, advance
the research behind the science and technology that underpins
that. And I can testify before you today that that has been
significantly underfunded. We, in academia, are very much ready
to do this research, but, overwhelmingly, you know, we have not
seen that funding. I don't know where the National Academies
stand on this issue. Where is the National Science Foundation?
It doesn't really fund research in this area. And I can tell
you, as an academic: all the time, I get people wanting to get
students to fill this growing space commerce work force, and
the guff is empty. We can't keep up with the demands to supply
competent people to work in all these endeavors.
So, I'll just say that Apollo did not happen without
academia. GPS did not happen without academia. SSA and space
traffic management can't really happen without academia.
Thank you for your time, and I'm looking forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jah follows:]
Prepared Statement of Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D., Associate Professor,
Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics Department, Cockrell
School of Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin
Mr. Committee Chairman Wicker, Ms. Ranking Member Cantwell, and
other members of this committee, thank you for the invitation to appear
before you today to share my perspectives regarding salient issues on
space safety, security, and sustainability. It is an honor to be seated
at this table with these great witnesses. It has been two years since I
last testified to this great body's subcommittee on Space, Science, and
Competitiveness. My name is Moriba Jah. I'm an astrodynamicist and
space environmentalist. My perspectives have been shaped through a 20-
year aerospace engineering career in government, industry and academia.
I started my career as a member of the technical staff of the NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Whilst there, I contributed to the navigation of
a variety of spacecraft to Mars and Asteroid Itokawa, and also
developed advanced spacecraft navigation algorithms toward autonomy and
improved orbital knowledge, beginning with Mars Global Surveyor and
ending with the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission. After JPL, I
worked as a Civil Servant in the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL),
where I led the design, development, and implementation of algorithms
that have successfully and autonomously detected, tracked, identified,
and characterized human-made objects in space, so called ``Resident
Space Objects,'' to include orbital debris. My last position within
AFRL was as the Mission Lead for Space Situational Awareness. Amongst
my achievements, I was given the highest award that can be earned as an
AFRL employee, that of AFRL Fellow. I currently serve on the faculty of
the Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics Department, in the
Cockrell School of Engineering at The University of Texas at Austin. At
UT Austin, I lead a transdisciplinary research program focused on
delivering pragmatic solutions to problems regarding space safety,
security, and sustainability. I am a Fellow of several organizations
and professional societies and serve as a chair and member of several
major space-related national and international technical committees.
However, I am here today as an individual citizen and the views I
express are mine alone. I'd like to also thank my wife Cassaundra, and
children Denali, Ari, and Satyana for lending me to you, today.
Executive Summary
Near Earth Space is (a) geopolitically contested (b) commercially
contested and (c) a finite resource in need of environmental
protection.
The entire set of space events and processes that occur and can
happen, as a whole, is unknowable for a myriad of reasons, not the
least of which that we still do not widely share our observations of
the space domain. If we wish to know something, we must measure it and
if we want to understand something, we must predict it! What do we call
this knowledge regarding causal relationships for things in space? We
call it Space Situational Awareness.
If we wish to protect ourselves from extraterrestrial hazards in
the form of near-Earth asteroids, space environment effects and impacts
on satellites and Earth-based infrastructure, as well as space
activities and services from loss, disruption, or degradation, we must
have timely and actionable Space Situational Awareness. Just a couple
of weeks ago, two dead satellites in Low Earth Orbit were predicted to
have an alarmingly high probability of collision \1\ but these
probabilities were quite varied: one entity said 1 in 10, another 1 in
100, another 1 in 1000. The decisions anyone might make given each of
those might be extremely different. Is there consensus in the combined
Space Situational Awareness? No! Case in point? Recently, there was a
predicted conjunction between Aeolus, a European Space Agency satellite
and a Starlink satellite belonging to the SpaceX Internet constellation
\2\. The European Space Agency attempted to contact SpaceX to
coordinate an evasive maneuver but antiquated methods (relying on e-
mail) of communication conjured a systemic obstacle in meaningful space
debris mitigation. The European Space Agency maneuvered Aeolus to
prevent the predicted collision. SpaceX stated in hindsight, obviating
the communication snafu, that they would not have maneuvered anyway
because their Space Situational Awareness and decision threshold
indicated it not sufficiently risky to them. Do we want to be ``playing
chicken'' in our orbital commons? We have no ``rules of the road'' for
space. The world's space debris experts agree that there is a very high
rate of non-compliance with space debris mitigation guidelines. It's
common practice to operate satellites long past their intended safe and
useful lifespan. Last but not least, the global Astronomy community has
taken issue with the exponential growth of resident space objects as
these ``corrupt'' their astronomical images and negatively impact the
science \3\. Humanity as a whole is left to suffer the consequences of
these behaviors.
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\1\ https://spacenews.com/potential-satellite-collision-shows-need-
for-active-debris-removal/
\2\ https://spacenews.com/esa-spacecraft-dodges-potential-
collision-with-starlink-satellite/
\3\ https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/01/30/
dangers-to-astronomy-intensify-with-spacexs-latest-starlink-launch/
#337a38a56a57
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A safe, secure, and sustainable space domain requires improved
transparency, predictability and for us to develop an independently
corroborated body of evidence of space activities, events, and actor
behaviors that can be used to hold people accountable and can inform
meaningful space policies, rules, regulations, and norms of behavior.
U.S. National Space Policy Directive #3, signed by President Trump
on June 18th of 2018, laid out very succinct goals to address these
issues. Its first goal is to advance Space Situational Awareness and
Space Traffic Management Science and Technology. It further states that
the United States should continue to engage in and enable Science and
Technology research and development to support the practical
applications of Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic
Management. These activities include (a) improving fundamental
knowledge of the space environment, such as the characterization of
Resident Space Objects, (b) advancing the Science and Technology of
critical Space Situational Awareness inputs such as an openly
accessible and curated set of multi-source observational data,
algorithms, and physics-based models necessary to improve Space
Situational Awareness capabilities, and (c) developing open-source
software to support big-data science and analytics. In summary, we must
develop the required science and technology to reliably deter, predict,
operate through, recover from, or attribute cause to the loss,
disruption, or degradation of any given space service, activity, or
capability. This means making space transparent and predictable, and
having the evidence to hold entities accountable.
Beyond examples I previously listed, I can personally attest to the
fact that we are significantly behind in this endeavor as evidenced by
our inability to accurately and precisely infer unique or unambiguous
causal relationships between space domain events and observed satellite
anomalies. You can read about these in the news frequently these days.
Satellites are experiencing malfunctions where the evidence could have
more than one explanation: was it the environment? was it caused by
another entity? If so, was it intentional? The information collection,
curation, analysis, and dissemination requirements for Space
Situational Awareness does not end with collision risk assessments or
re-entry predictions; they only begin there! The much more difficult
and critical requirement is to assemble the evidence of events,
processes, and activities in space that would need to be used to assign
culpability of negligent behavior, for instance, or assessing
compliance or the lack thereof with space policies. Nobody is
quantifying these needs. Every domain of human activity has experienced
malicious behavior and to think otherwise is naive at best. In the face
of a next ``space race'' or ``gold rush'' equivalent, driven by global
space commerce, it's not a matter of if, but when! The space domain is
holistically poorly monitored. We are unprepared and ill-equipped to
deal with disputes resulting from space activities and events.
The U.S. is home to some of the world's top-ranked research
institutions; these should be brought to bear to, once and for all,
bring us out of the dark ages in terms of space domain decision-making
knowledge and actualize us in order to meet the great demands of space
commerce, exploration, and other activities. A well-funded and
dedicated Space Situational Awareness Institute could undertake the
Science and Technology research and development we desperately require.
Europe and other countries are becoming leaders in these endeavors.
Academia, the source of the purported workforce to meet the demands of
operating so-called mega-constellations, has been mostly neglected in
this area. As a professor at a top-tiered research university, I alone
find myself turning away over a dozen qualified U.S. citizens every
year, from joining my research program due to an absence of resources
and financial support to perform clearly needed research.
The National Science Foundation does not fund Space Situational
Awareness research although there are many basic research problems
still salient in this mission area. The Air Force Research Laboratory
and Air Force Office of Scientific Research have been the only real,
and overwhelmingly underfunded, organizations making any semblance of
investments in Space Situational Awareness research. I know this
because I was the Mission Lead for Space Situational Awareness at the
Air Force Research Laboratory for several years. The National Academies
has several relevant boards that should be invoked to engage in studies
that inform a nationally committed roadmap of Space Situational
Awareness Science and Technology Research. Moreover, these research
outputs must be committed to being transitioned into operationally
relevant environments that could directly support the U.S. Department
of Commerce's stewardship of providing Basic Space Situational
Awareness and Space Traffic Management services and products to the
global community.
What are the next steps required to put this into effect?
Per National Space Policy Directive #3, provide the
Department of Commerce with an adequately funded and resourced
mandate to: 1) have a Space Traffic Management Pilot Program to
work with USSPACECOM and the community to provide the first
instance of a Civil Space Traffic Management system and 2)
begin collecting, curating, and exploiting multi-sourced
resident space object (e.g., non-Space Surveillance Network
tracking) data for orbital safety and sustainability purposes
that is open and widely accessible, with multi-tiered access
and dissemination (e.g., ASTRIAGraph \4\).
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\4\ http://bit.ly/astriagraph
Create or expand the existing role of NASA to: 1) uniquely
focus upon leading the scientific and technical requirements
for a robust, effective, and meaningful Civil Space Traffic
Management System, and 2) to work closely with other government
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agencies, industry, and academia.
Conjunction Analysis concerns itself with predicting
so-called ``close approaches'' between any two Resident
Space Objects \5\; it is a growing and changing field, and
research into new methods is critical to keep up with the
rapidly changing and marginally predictable space
environment. NASA already has an effort in this area (the
CARA Program at Goddard Space Flight Center) that can be
leveraged along with 30+ years of developing and executing
this capability for use by civil space operators. It is
government's role to retire risk, invest in Science and
Technology (S&T) Research and Development (R&D), and share
the results with the community to encourage growth.
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\5\ http://astriacss03.tacc.utexas.edu/ui/min.html
Invest in and expand the role of University Affiliated
Research Centers (UARCs) as foundational, dedicated, and
focused government-academic partnerships to solidify science
and technology (S&T) research and development for critical
space-related core technical competencies and technology risk-
retirement needed by the U.S. Space Exploration program and
Commercial Space Industry \6\.
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\6\ https://www.arlut.utexas.edu
Engage and craft mechanisms for Industry to get their
investment and participation in a Civil Space Traffic
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Management System:
Satellite manufacturers
Satellite launch providers
Space Insurance Brokers and Providers
Commercial Space Situational Awareness Providers
Space Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists
Space Service Users
At The University of Texas at Austin, we are taking our own steps
in a meaningful direction by (a) becoming the first academic partner to
the USSPACECOM in Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing, (b)
collaborating with the NASA CARA program, hosting their tools at the
Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) and leveraging our large scale
computing platforms to improve current state-of-practice regarding
collision risk assessments, (c) finalizing a fully executed set of
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with the
Department of Commerce's space weather prediction center and NOAA
satellite operations facility in Suitland MD, (d) advancing the state-
of-the-art in developing the world's first crowdsourced space traffic
monitoring system, ASTRIAGraph, initially funded by the Federal
Aviation Administration, (e) leading a dedicated transdisciplinary
academic programs in space safety, security, and sustainability.
Mr. Chairman, we have some wicked problems to solve in near earth
space and we need Congress to act now. Perfect is the enemy of good
enough! We know that we won't have a perfect system at the start but
let's create a system that is agile and adaptive to meet the growing
demands and as a community, we will iteratively refine our tradecraft
and collaboration and get better. This committee should provide the
required leadership; the opportunity to act is before you.
Narrative
In my vast travels around the globe, speaking to and collaborating
with space scientists, engineers, and policymakers, it is evident that
``American Exceptionalism'' is still invoked and desperately yearned
for, by many. America's leadership in the space domain, underscored by
taking on and delivering upon what seemed to be an impossible feat, to
send humans to another celestial body and return them safely, has
inspired not only our great nation, but an entire planet, and seeded
some of the world's most creative and innovative ideas.
Exploration is critical to who we are as a species; it drives our
growth and evolution. When our minds and bodies are idle, we tend to
self-defeating behaviors. What brings out the best in us? Rising to
great challenges, and working as a nation to overcome them. What got us
to the Moon and back, safely and repeatedly? Government, Industry and
Academia working seamlessly, together. No one sector could do it by
themselves.
The U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) currently has over 26,000
records active in its space situational awareness database, commonly
referred to as the Department of Defense ``catalog.'' Of these, well
over 18,000 records correspond to well-tracked, well-understood
Resident Space Objects in Earth-centric orbit, roughly 3,000 of which
are operational satellites; the rest are so-called ``space junk.'' The
remaining records in USSPACECOM's active space situational awareness
database are not as well-tracked or understood, which creates increased
uncertainty when operational satellites are screened against them to
identify possible orbital safety hazards, or conjunctions. The number
of Resident Space Objects is increasing given an increase in launches,
and on-orbit breakup events (i.e., when one Resident Space Object
collides with another, a satellite explodes, or breaks on its own due
to space aging and material fatigue and stresses). If we could track
every detected object, we could wrap a sensible Space Traffic
Management system around that and even develop empirically-based
policies and regulations. Unfortunately, it is hypothesized that we can
only track a few percent of the total number of Resident Space Objects
that can cause loss, disruption, or degradation to critical space
services, capabilities, and activities. In other words, we have an
orbital iceberg equivalent of sorts. The ability to track a Resident
Space Object depends on two main factors: our ability to detect the
object AND our ability to uniquely identify the object. This is to
underscore that an object that is detectable does not imply it is
trackable, and this is a critical distinction to make moving forward.
Tracking an object means that we know where it was, a notion of
where it is, and have some idea of what it is and where it will be.
Think of how we track air traffic, where the aircraft is in the
``custody'' of someone who monitors its motion and relationship to
other aircraft. The following Figure (1) puts into perspective the
problem we face in our inability to track more of the objects we can
detect. It was generated from real data collected by the U.S. Space
Surveillance Telescope, currently in Exmouth, Australia. It is worth
mentioning that we have the long-awaited Space Fence on Kwajalein, and
I've been told that the initial results are much like with the Space
Surveillance Telescope, as seen in Figure 1. When one has an exquisite
sensor and it's unique, you'll get very accurate observations during a
very small part of the total orbit and you'll be observing things that
other sensors will not or cannot. Think of a hula-hoop. An exquisite
sensor is having one hand on this hoop. Think about the variety of ways
in which the hula-hoop can rotate if you only grab it with one hand.
This is like the ambiguity you will have with a unique and exquisite
sensor. It will help but you'll have a large number of objects that you
can detect but will be unable to track.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
So, what prevents us from doing better at tracking objects in
space? First, we don't have ubiquitous observations, meaning we don't
persistently detect all objects all of the time. In fact, we generally
have very sparse observations on any given object in space. Globally,
we do not share observational data as a community. This lack of data
sharing is perhaps the single biggest problem in us having a more
robust space traffic monitoring and management capability. Secondly,
every single object in the world's largest space object catalog (that
of our DoD) is represented and modeled as a sphere, a cannonball in
space! Needless to say, there aren't many human-made cannonball-shaped
objects in space. Only those Resident Space Objects whose motion is not
significantly different from that of a sphere in between observations,
are ones we can ``track.'' Gravity is what I call an equal opportunity
accelerator: just tell me where you are and I will tell you your
acceleration due to gravity, regardless of your size, shape, material
constitution, orientation, etc. However, there are non-gravitational
forces experienced by every single Resident Space Object and all of
these depend on the object's physical characteristics. Thus, the lack
of a rigorous Resident Space Object characterization and classification
scheme is a strong contributor to our inability to track more objects
in space. When we wish to understand any population of things, we first
``tag'' individuals in that population and then ``track'' these
individuals through time, space, frequencies, and evaluate their
interaction with other individuals and their environment. We formulate
hypotheses, test them, and draw conclusions based upon evidence. We do
not do this, rigorously and scientifically, for Resident Space Objects,
in great part because we cannot physically go to them and tag them. If
we wish to someday have Norms of Behavior for Near Earth Space that led
to safety, security, and sustainability, we will need to know how many
classes or species of Resident Space Objects there are, and how each
class or specie moves, behaves, is influenced by the local space
environment, etc. Trucks carrying hazardous fuel are regulated
differently than Vespa scooters, Oil Tankers on our seas are regulated
differently than kayaks and canoes. So, why would we treat all Resident
Space Objects as the same thing . . . cannonballs? The following figure
(2) is a cartoon to show the difference between the limitations imposed
by assuming space objects to be cannonball-like versus what they
actually are like.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Lastly, regarding our inability to track more objects in space, are
the mathematics and physics we use to process the observed data and
infer physical quantities regarding these objects. It really matters .
. . call these our algorithms. Our representation of uncertainty is
demonstrably and inarguably oftentimes flawed, unrealistic, and
inconsistent amongst our software and tools. The following figure (3)
shows a picture our current problem with having multiple detections at
multiple times and having to find clever methods of uniquely
identifying objects in order to make them go from detectable to
trackable. Most Resident Space Objects are defunct and therefore do not
self-report their identities.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
If the Resident Space Object population was held constant, I'd say
we'd might have more time on our hands to figure this all out. However,
our global space environment is finite, getting increased traffic, and
all in the absence of global governance related to safety and
sustainability.
We don't even agree on what is on orbit or where it is. I know this
because I have developed the world's first crowdsourced space traffic
monitoring system, called ASTRIAGraph \7\ at The University of Texas at
Austin, initially funded by the FAA. Here, we combine multiple
independent sources of information and can visualize these all in a
common frame of reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://bit.ly/astriagraph
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure (4) shows an example of what this combined database of
Resident Space Objects looks like.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Our eventual goal is to make this like a ``Waze'' for space. To
wit, we seek to create a so-called participatory sensing capability
that openly allows and encourages those with sources of information
about anything in space, to make contributions and benefit from the
information that can only be inferred from the aggregated big-data
science and analytics.
To my earlier point, if one only had the USSPACECOM public catalog,
Figure (5) shows you what your space traffic map might look like.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Alternatively, if one only had the Russian JSC Vimpel catalog,
Figure (6) shows you what your space traffic map might look like.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Which source does one believe as accurate? These sets of
information reflect a very different space traffic picture. This is a
major source of ambiguity. Moreover, the problem gets a bit worse.
Figure (7) shows you an example of multiple opinions on a single common
Resident Space Object (FLOCK 1C 10 in this case).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The difference in positions between these is on the order of a few
hundred meters. However, when it comes to predicting a collision, this
variance alone could be the difference between a high or really low
collision probability and hence could lead to flawed decisions that
could have dire consequences.
As the cost of access to space is decreasing, the number of space
actors is increasing. It's like what the Transcontinental Railroad did
for helping businesses explode, connecting the East Coast and Western
Frontier. In the past 3 years, we saw a record-braking 104 satellites
being deployed by India's PSLV space capabilities. Unfortunately, while
they did assess potential collisions amongst these 104 satellites, no
one performed analyses of potential collisions between those 104 newly
deployed satellites and the remainder of the current Resident Space
Object population. OneWeb just recently launched their first batch of a
few dozen satellites with the aim of deploying over 1000 satellites
that will aim to provide global internet. SpaceX is well on its way
toward the same goal, having several hundred satellites already on
orbit and will surely aim to launch a planned 4000+ satellites.
As was experienced in the Western Frontier of old, the
environmental impact of runaway mining and prospecting was harsh and
detrimental in many instances. Examples are mercury poisoning, silt in
our water sources, etc. Our space environment is becoming much more
commercially driven and populated. Many ``New Space'' companies or
start-ups are getting significant investment from Angel Investors and
Venture Capitalists who are focused on getting a Return On Investment
(ROI) within a few years, believing Space Traffic and Orbital Safety to
be someone else's problem. I have personally found an absence of space
operations expertise amongst the workforce driving some of these ``New
Space'' ventures, causing me further concern regarding orbital safety
and long-term sustainability of space activities. There is a mentality
of ``take risks and fail often.'' While this worked well for software
companies in Silicon Valley, we can't afford to have this mentality in
space.
We should look to so-called tenets of Traditional Ecological
Knowledge (TEK) as a model for achieving space sustainability. Some of
our indigenous peoples have learned how to become sustainable over many
millennia. One tenet underscores the need to quantify the carrying
capacity of the environment before making decisions on how to interact
with it. My personal experiences have shown me that ``Mother Nature''
tends to seek states of equilibrium. Do we know what the carrying
capacity is for different orbits? If we launch 60+ satellites every
several weeks, to we know what the equilibrium state of the environment
will be? We are operating in the space domain well beyond our ability
to make sound and sustainable decisions, and this will be to our
eventual detriment.
I propose that Congress move to create a Civil Space Traffic
Management (CSTM) system led by the Department of Commerce (as directed
by national space policy) that will:
Accelerate the pace and reduce the costs of Civil Space
Traffic Management development by modernizing approaches to
Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management, with
focus on long-term sustainability of space activities, through
the creation of new federated data standards, measurement
standards, models and ontologies, open source software, and
big-data management and analysis techniques that aid in the
scientific evaluation of the efficacy and safety of space
operations, and attendant policies.
Act as an entity that could create consortia of industry,
academia, and government for collaboration and sharing of
databases, computational techniques, and standards.
Operate a Civil Space Traffic Management system that
provides the accuracies and products necessary to safely enable
innovative and non-traditional commercial uses of space.
The Civil Space Traffic Management Mission should be to:
Assure the safety of operations in space.
Maximize, encourage, and incentivize the use of commercial
capabilities and data sources.
Provide transparency, advocacy of informed guidelines, and
safety services as a public good to preserve the space
environment.
The Civil Space Traffic Management Primary Functions would be to:
Observe and Monitor: Space Domain and Traffic Observations,
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
Track and Catalog: Identify, Characterize, and Catalog
Objects; Relational Statistics, Catalog Updates, Traffic
Attribution, Achieve Track ``Custody''
Analyze and Inform: Information Dissemination, Safety
Products, Conjunction Data Messages
The Tenets of a Civil Space Traffic Management system would be to
provide and incentivize:
Open observational data--All collected or acquired data will
be made open and available for 3rd party analysis to improve
learning and enable high Quality of Service domain analysis.
Open catalog of space objects and events--All derived
conclusions from Civil Space Traffic Management data will be
made open and available for 3rd party verification and peer-
review of results and conclusions.
Open Safety Advisory Services--As these services are
intended to be a global public good, they will be made
available to the world.
Open and objective verification of data and analyses--As the
Civil Space Traffic Management capabilities and processes
improve, impartial feedback will be made available to all
service providers in the spirit of achieving increasingly
effective Quality of Service.
Open Market--It is not the role of the Department of
Commerce to define the economics of the data and/or analysis
marketplace. The intent of the Civil Space Traffic Management
is to empower industry to stay involved in the provision of
service to all space domain actors.
Open Workforce Development--It is to the benefit of all for
the specialized skills required of effective space traffic
managers to proliferate globally. To this end this Civil Space
Traffic Management will support mechanisms which result in the
education of additional skilled space traffic managers and
analysts.
The Benefits of a Civil Space Traffic Management system are that it
would:
Provide standard and benchmark data sets that enable
quantifiably consistent comparative analyses between competing
tools, techniques, and algorithms.
Provide the government with a transparent mechanism to guide
and exploit Civil Space Traffic Management activities and
capabilities AND a sustained/focused investment in STEM
education.
Provide industry with a free foundational Civil Space
Traffic Management service and a marketplace of focused, cost-
shared and openly available sciences and technologies that it
can ``pick up'' and operationalize/commercialize for its own
profit.
Provide academia with a sustained scientific and
technological Civil Space Traffic Management research and
educational investment, to ensure that the U.S. is stocked with
capable and skilled workforce to handle the scientific and
technological problems of tomorrow.
How does industry profit from such an activity, financially? It can
easily wrap profit-making services around the foundational ``for public
good'' layer of basic space situational awareness and space traffic
management services and products. It lowers the bar for entry for new
space initiatives as they don't need to shoulder the burden of self-
providing of these basic space situational awareness and space traffic
management services. It's like the benefit of the U.S. developed,
owned, and operated Global Positioning System (GPS)! Think of not only
the paradigm-changing science but explosion of commerce that has
resulted from this U.S. Government investment and service. Many
companies have developed profit-making applications which exploit the
layer of foundational service provided by GPS.
I also propose that the U.S Government create the NASA Space
Situational Awareness Institute using Cooperative Agreements (like the
NASA Astrobiology Institute) as a mechanism under which an academic
consortium could be assembled, invested in, and properly leveraged to
deliver on goal #1 of Space Policy Directive #3. The funding would need
to be appropriated and delivered to NASA with a strategic roadmap on
how the S&T is developed and transitioned to both government and
industry. Several University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) should
also be invoked, invested in, and leveraged, to be foundational
partners in this NASA Space Situational Awareness Institute. The UARCs
could provide foundational capabilities and sciences to NASA and those
Space Situational Awareness Institute academic members could then focus
uniquely on SSA needs and requirements, working closely with the
government and commercial communities.
The motto of my research program at UT Austin is:
Ex Coelestis, Scientia . . . Nihil Arcanum Est! This loosely
translates to, ``from the heavens, knowledge . . . nothing
hides!''
As Ever,
Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D.
The Chairman. Wow. Well, thank you very much.
Who--among the three of our first witnesses, who wants to,
sort of, summarize the division of authority and
responsibilities?
Mr. O'Connell, can you help us differentiate what you do
and what Mr. Murtagh does and what Dr. Zurbuchen does?
Mr. O'Connell. So, I would summarize it this way, Senator.
What Mr. Murtagh and I do are actually highly complementary.
We're both within NOAA right now.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. O'Connell. We actually strive to work much closer
together. What he's doing in the space weather arena is very
much complementary to what we're trying to do in the SSA arena,
on the one hand.
I think a commonality--I wouldn't speak to the authorities,
per se, but I'd say there's a strong commonality across all
three mission areas, in terms of the need to do better modeling
of objects in space, better analytics and prediction of how
things move, where they move, et cetera. And I think all of us
would agree that that kind of work needs to be done across all
three of these areas.
The Chairman. But, there's a reason to have two separate
offices in NOAA.
Mr. O'Connell. So, my office is in the Office of Space--is
the Office of Space Commerce.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. O'Connell. Bill Murtagh is in the Space Weather
Prediction Center. We're just in different pieces of NOAA right
now.
The Chairman. And, Dr. Zurbuchen, do you want to add
anything to that?
Dr. Zurbuchen. I mean, generally speaking, I think, in all
of these domains--and I agree with the professor over there
that, in space situational awareness piece, perhaps at lesser
levels at this moment in time as we're reacting to a--the Space
Policy Directive--but, in all these domains, NASA provides
research and support from that, and seeks to transition that
research to operational capabilities in other agencies. The one
exception, I would say that is there is that, in a case of, you
know, planetary defense, we do have an operational role, as
well; namely, the monitoring of the objects out there. There's
not another agency to transition that to. The response to it,
of course, is a multi-agency response.
The Chairman. OK. Now, I don't know if all four of you can
deal with this in the 3 minutes that I have left, but we've got
the Tunguska event in 1908, hundreds of times stronger than the
bomb at Hiroshima. You've got this air burst over Russia in
2013 caused by a 20-meter-sized object exploding. And then, Mr.
O'Connell, you mentioned in your testimony this near miss that
could have resulted in thousands of debris objects.
Ideally, how serious would these have been to folks living
on the Earth? And if we had the resources, how would you stop
these? What would you have done, back in 1908 or 2013, if you
had the resources?
Dr. Zurbuchen. On the impactor, the 1908 one, with the
tools that we currently have, our hope would be that we would
see it coming. So, we actually saw it on an early orbit, and we
should see them coming. Now, the reason I'm saying it, our hope
will be----
The Chairman. See it coming and you run?
Dr. Zurbuchen. No. Well--so, the first--see it coming. In
many cases, the right answer to, ``How do we react to that?''
is, in fact, running, because it--depending on which angle
we're at, you know, that--the idea is to get out of the way of
harm. Just like we evacuate our population with a hurricane, we
would, in this case, evacuate people from that. In some future,
we currently don't have, but we're working on, what we'd
actually like to see is the option of deflecting it. That's why
we do the collision experiment with DART, to learn that
technology, how to deflect an object out of its path, away--
either in the ocean or away from Earth entirely. That takes
energy, but that's a future that we want to build. At this
moment in time, the answer, mostly, is to know exactly where
it's coming, and protect life and property, wherever possible.
Mr. Murtagh. Senator----
The Chairman. I'd like to comment briefly. The----
Mr. Murtagh.--one thing to add to the list, you didn't
mention--so, there was an event, a space weather event in 2012
that was a near miss. We often categorize it as a century-class
event. It was--the eruption occurred on the other side of the
Sun. It wasn't facing the Earth. But, we believe that that
particular event was similar to a big event that occurred in
1859, and it would have a significant impact on Earth, and
especially the electric power grid. So, everything we're
talking about with the observations, the research, and getting
the research into operations, is all about better predicting
those kind of big events.
The Chairman. If you know it's coming, what do you do?
Mr. Murtagh. We alert the power grid, in particular, as
much notice as possible, and they take the action necessary to
mitigate from the induced current that's going to occur once
that eruption hits us here at Earth. It's all about timely and
accurate notification, and they must do the right thing.
The Chairman. Why don't the other two of you take half a
minute each.
Mr. O'Connell. Thanks, Senator.
By coincidence, the event that I discussed took place in
low-Earth orbit over Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. But, in fact,
people on Earth were not really expected to be impacted, had
there been a collision. And, in fact, many of the objects might
have burned up coming through the atmosphere. Almost all of
them would have burned up.
The threat we're really concerned about is the----
The Chairman. Almost all of them.
Mr. O'Connell.--the threat to investment, to all of the--
threat to investment of all the billions of dollars that we
have invested in space, and those of our allies, et cetera, for
the services that we expect on Earth. And that's what we're
really worried about. Less, the debris coming down. There are
rare occurrences of debris falling around the world. Very, very
small numbers of examples. But, the impact we're really worried
about is the effect on space commerce and our national security
satellites and the Space Station, and things like that.
The Chairman. Dr. Jah.
Dr. Jah. I don't have too much to add to what has
previously been said, except for the fact that--what I tell my
students is, in order to know something, you have to measure
it. And if you want to understand it, you have to predict it.
And we can't predict very well. And so, we--that really hinders
our decisionmaking process.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtagh, following up, writ large, on space weather
forecasting, why not launch a satellite sooner than 2024?
Mr. Murtagh. So, we--the satellites we have in place right
now, the DSCOVR spacecraft, we had an issue with it, but,
fortunately, it'll be back in operations by the beginning of
next month. And that's our solar wind satellite. And we've also
still have the NASA ACE spacecraft. So, we've got two
spacecraft up there now providing us this key information. So,
the planned launch in 2024, we believe, and Dr. Zurbuchen can
correct me if I'm wrong here, but I think ACE should be good,
fuel-wise. True----
Dr. Zurbuchen. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtagh. --2025.
Dr. Zurbuchen. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtagh. So, we have two spacecraft up there right now
that will provide those critical solar wind measurements. So,
the timing should be just right to get that into orbit, the new
space weather follow-on, by----
Senator Cantwell. So, there's no additional information or
support that you would like to see?
Mr. Murtagh. So, the--we have--currently, our biggest
concern is the SOHO spacecraft. The SOHO was launched December
1995. You mentioned earlier that--how old some of these
spacecraft are.
Senator Cantwell. Right.
Mr. Murtagh. There's a coronagraph onboard that spacecraft.
It is a single-point failure, to some degree. But, NASA--again,
thank you--have a STEREO mission, and the STEREO spacecraft
that's going around the Sun in the next 4 or 5 years will be in
a location that it will--and it has a coronagraph--will help
us. So, we won't be blind. We'll be hurting a little bit if we
lose that spacecraft, but we won't be blind. But, we have to
get the coronagraph and the solar wind measurements in space by
2024.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. Well, mark me down as somebody who
wants to be more aggressive in this space. So, I think this is
critical data and information and we should be as aggressive as
we can possibly be.
I feel the same way about satellites for our information as
it relates to weather. We're seeing dramatic shifts in weather
events. And having data, since you can measure every algorithm
in a storm now, means you have greater predictability. I feel
the same way about space.
Mr. Murtagh. Yes. I----
Senator Cantwell. We're not staying ahead. I'm--you know,
we're not--I don't know that we're hearing about European space
forecasts, but we're definitely hearing about European weather
forecasts that have become the standard above ours. So, look,
if we want to be the leaders here in space, then we need to
have the information.
Dr. Jah, we haven't gotten enough to you today on the other
aspect. You know, it's so interesting. There are so many bills
in Congress, saying, ``Let's map the oceans. Let's get the
information out there.'' And yet, here we are, with all this
debris in space. And it could be very easy to map it and do
something to better measure that. And yet, we're not doing
that. You mentioned that this, you know, space situational
awareness, the--you know, the data and algorithms that could be
developed and that it could be open source, which is also
interesting, so then we can pair this big data and analytics
with it. I mean, that's, like, ``Well, let's go.'' When you say
things like that, I'm, like, ``Let's go. What's holding us back
from doing that?'' Because that's just really basic, you know,
almost, like, software and information application to a problem
that we know we have that's probably a pretty low-cost
development. It's, like, that doesn't cost us a lot of money to
get that done, particularly if you're adding in open source.
Dr. Jah. Yes. So, thank you very much for that.
One of the things that I'll say is, everybody thinks it's a
good idea, but who's going to go first? And I think that's been
part of this issue, is that, by and large, there has been no
dedicated funding to actually make this happen. And so, it's
all best-efforts basis. What--you know, it's the ``stone soup''
sort of model. The ``stone soup'' model is slow. It's a bit
lethargic. I feel that if there were some dedicated resources
to making this happen, you're going to find no shortage of
people, not just in the United States, but even abroad, who
would be willing to contribute to this, and really build it up.
Senator Cantwell. Not to put you on the spot, but maybe
your Senator will show up here, at some point in time, and say,
``Yes, let's give it to the''--you're at University of Austin?
Where are you? Texas. University of Texas. So, with a small
amount of money, you could start that project.
Dr. Jah. Yes, absolutely. I would say that we have started
already, actually. We've started, initially funded by the FAA,
to build this sort of crowd-source space-traffic monitoring
system. We're partnering with Department of Commerce, with
CRADAs, with NASA, with Space Act Agreements to get their
information. Also, we're the first academic partner to U.S.
Space Command for SSA data-sharing. So, we're piecing these
things together. But, it's not--it could be accelerated if
there was dedicated funding.
Senator Cantwell. Yes.
Yes, Mr. O'Connell.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator.
This is exactly the idea of this open architecture data
repository that we're talking about. Again, we're working with
Dr. Jah and a number of other people to do this. What we really
want to do--by definition, the data that Defense provides is
limited because of classification and sensitivity and things.
So, the data that they send out on Space Safety, by definition,
control. We're going to take that as the basis for what we do
in the architecture, add commercial data, and allow for a truly
open exchange between commercial vendors, allies, and others,
and apply this heavy analytics that you're--you've spoken about
previously. This is a problem that is ripe for a big-data
analytics problem. When Defense got into this originally, those
capabilities did not exist. Increasingly, they are coming
forward in the market at rapid speed, both in the space
business, but also from a much larger----
Senator Cantwell. Right. From the larger----
Mr. O'Connell.--commercial base.
Senator Cantwell. Right. That's why I'm saying this isn't
really that hard. It's just, like, ``Let's give some money to a
university, or whoever, to get the project going.''
Mr. O'Connell. And this is exactly our plan at Commerce, as
well.
Senator Cantwell. You have a budget request? Is that what--
--
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, we----
Senator Cantwell.--you're saying?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, ma'am, we absolutely do.
Senator Cantwell. What is it?
Mr. O'Connell. The President's budget request is $15
million for the Office of Space Commerce for 2021.
Senator Cantwell. OK. But, that includes this----
Mr. O'Connell. Oh, absolutely, the----
Senator Cantwell.--development of a software open-
architecture system.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Mr. O'Connell. The bulk of our resource request in 2021 is
for the Space Situational Awareness Mission that I've described
here today.
Senator Cantwell. Is that enough, Dr. Jah, to do the kind
of mapping that we're talking about?
Dr. Jah. Yes. So--you know, I've been looking at this for
quite some time, and I would say that if we had something on
the order of $15 million a year to bring just--not just
University of Texas, but other research institutions to work as
a consortium toward this, I think we'd start seeing very quick
results, and you'd start seeing things turn around in a
positive direction rather quickly.
Senator Cantwell. Great.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell [presiding]. I think--Senator Gardner.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell.
And, to the panelists today, thank you very much for being
here today to help educate us on needs, but also your service
to our country. Thank you very much.
Dr. Murtagh, welcome from Boulder, Colorado. We're proud of
the work that you do, grateful for it. So, thank you very much.
In preparation for today's hearing, I checked out
SpaceWeather.com and was looking--learned a couple of things
there. Number one, the satellite, SOHO, that we've talked about
is flaking insulation and makes the coronagraphs a little--look
a little streaky. I've learned about that. And I also learned
that cosmic rays are surging, which sounds a little too hip for
Congress right now, so I don't know if you could talk, in
SpaceWeather, in terms of what that means, and then get into a
little bit about the Space Weather bill that we have.
Mr. Murtagh. Well, the cosmic-rays-are-surging piece, first
of all, it's--the sun goes through an 11-year cycle--solar
maximum, solar minimum. And when it's solar maximum, the--we
see a lot of sunspots. And, essentially, the Sun, during its
maximum, it prohibits the influx of cosmic radiation from deep
space, from outside the sphere of influence from the Sun. But,
during solar minimum, when things quieten down, it allows for
more enhanced cosmic radiation. So, it comes into play for
NASA, for the astronauts. It even comes into play for aviation
interests at high latitudes. So, really, it's just an inverse
cycle. Right now, in solar minimum, the Sun is quiet, we're not
seeing big eruptions, but we are seeing the highest levels of
background cosmic radiation. So, that's what that's about. It's
easily predictable. It's just up and down with the--an inverse
with the solar cycle.
Senator Gardner. Very good. Thank you.
And, you know, Senator Peters and I have been working on,
as you know the Space Weather Research and Forecasting Act
since 2016. The bill is aimed--as we've talked about here
today, the bill is aimed at ensuring that we have a clear,
unified Federal approach on space weather. We're continuing to
work with our colleagues in the House on this measure. And in
your witness--in your written testimony today, you described
NOAA's work with its Federal partners. And so, if you could
just, to the Committee, why, from your perspective, it's
important to have a clear, unified, long-term strategy to space
weather at the Federal level.
Mr. Murtagh. The space weather impacts so many different
technologies, so many different critical infrastructures. It
was--we recognized, a decade ago, we needed to--all the Federal
departments and agencies needed to work together to--we needed
some kind of cohesive approach to address this threat. So, at
the White House, in the last administration, continuing through
this administration, the Space Weather Operations and Research
and Mitigation Committee, or Task Force, was formed with 20
different Federal departments and agencies to define the
actions necessary to mitigate this threat of space weather.
What we're very excited about with the action in Congress is,
this will codify many of the actions that we have defined in
that action plan. An action plan--as you know, an action plan
or strategy, in itself, sure, it's good, but it doesn't have
the force of law, if you will. We either need executive order
or we need something from Congress to really move this thing
along, especially when you've got so many different agencies,
so many different departments involved in it. That's what the
legislation is doing. I commend you for your leadership on
that. It identifies lots of the things that we've identified in
the strategy and action plan that must happen if we are going
to make this Nation more resilient to space weather.
Senator Gardner. Very good. And you mentioned NSF, as well.
This Committee has done a lot of work on the National Science
Foundation, and increased funding along the way. Could you talk
about which NSF directorates the administration is working with
and consulting to bolster its space weather efforts?
Mr. Murtagh. Sure. So, we work with different groups in the
NSF. For different--for instance, we get the GONG information,
which is a ground network, where we work with the National
Solar Observatory. That information is critical for our
prediction. We work with the NSF headquarters, the GEO group on
the information that they provide. They do a lot of funding for
some of the critical research needs, so we work closely with
them. They're part of that White House group I was mentioning.
So, they're in lockstep with us every step of the way and with,
also, NASA. We actually have an MOU, a memorandum of agreement,
between the three different agencies, identifying roles and
responsibilities and how we can work best together.
Senator Gardner. Very good. Thank you.
And I'm going to cut it short, because I've got to go vote,
as has everybody on the Committee. So, I'm going to put the
Committee in a brief recess for a few minutes. Senator Wicker--
Chairman Wicker will be right back to resume the hearing
immediately. So, we'll have a few minutes of a break, and then
we will get back to business.
So, with that, I will put the Committee into recess.
The Chairman has just taken the Committee out of recess,
so----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [presiding]. Well, hello. So, what did I miss?
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I don't--you know, I don't know why the
leadership does this to us. It's--we're in the middle of four
votes. And normally, we wouldn't have these until, say, noon or
maybe early afternoon. But, for some reason, it was deemed
proper to have them at 10:30 today. And so, here we are.
I'll tell you that Mr. Thune, our Whip, denies any
responsibility for causing this.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So, what have we missed? Let's summarize. Who
would like to--let's pretend I'm the last questioner, which I
will not be. What would you like to follow up on that other
Senators have asked about?
Mr. O'Connell.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator.
I wanted to go back to your question a few minutes ago on
authorities, and I'd like to frame it in a slightly different
way.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. O'Connell. Because people sometimes ask me, Why would
the Commerce Department be involved in this mission area? And
I'd like to say that we are already tapping into a wide range
of skills and expertise within the Department. On the one hand,
with NOAA, my colleague Bill Murtagh here, the Space Weather
Prediction Center--and again, there's a nice technical affinity
between space weather and what we have to do on space
situational awareness. But, obviously, as we sit here, NOAA's
protecting satellites from space debris 24/7 at a facility not
too far from here. And so, we're drawing upon that expertise.
But, that's only one part of what we're doing in pursuit of our
SSA mission. We're drawing on the National Institutes for
Standards and technology and their role in both evaluating and
organizing standards development. Dr. Jah talked about the need
for rules of the road, which is different from the technology
architecture that I mentioned as well. We have NTIA, other
parts of the Department. And so, what we're trying to do from
the office in pursuit of this specific mission is leverage the
entire Department to help out as we try to improve the Nation's
space situational awareness capabilities. And, as well, we're
working very closely with NASA--in particular, up to at Goddard
and out at Ames, the two centers there, because they have
activities underway which are centrally related to what we're
doing on SSA.
The Chairman. OK. Anybody want to follow up on that?
OK, there--we had testimony, before I left the room about a
near miss, where, basically it was described as a ``game of
chicken.'' And--was that your testimony, Dr. Jah? And,
basically, those were two objects that are operational and
could have been moved. And I think one eventually was. How--
what percent of the Defense and space-related potential
accidents would be described in that category, as opposed to
the ones where--that you can't move them at all, it's just a
matter of hoping they don't hit and dealing with that if it
happens?
Dr. Jah. Yes. So, I can't give you actual percentages, but
I can tell you this. We've created a conjunction streaming
service--it's a website that anybody in the public can access--
where you can actually see, over a continuous 20-minute window,
how many things come within, say, 10 kilometers of each other.
And it happens a lot.
The Chairman. Who has access to that?
Dr. Jah. Yes, you do right now on your cellphone.
The Chairman. OK.
Dr. Jah. Yes. I--I'll give you the website here in----
The Chairman. Well, come up here and help me. No, no, I'm
just kidding.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Jah. OK. Yes, but these things happen very frequently
all the time between debris-on-debris, one thing works and the
other thing's dead, two things are working. I would say one of
the major issues that we have is ignorance. We're very ignorant
of what's happening in space. The domain, as a whole, is poorly
monitored----
The Chairman. I mean, even people at the scientific
knowledge level of you four gentlemen, there's a lot you don't
know----
Dr. Jah. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. that you're ignorant about.
Dr. Jah. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. The thing is--look, let me put
it this way. The world's largest, most awesome catalog of
objects orbiting the Earth, maintained by the Department of
Defense, are all modeled as spheres, they're all assumed to be
cannonballs. You know how many of those things look like
cannonballs? Not much. So, the thing is, we don't have a
taxonomy, a classification scheme, for these human-made objects
in space. You know, we treat Vespa scooters and semis
differently, and we regulate them differently. We treat kayaks
and oil tankers differently on the oceans. But, in space,
everything's, like, the same thing. And it's not. So, there's a
lot that we don't know, actually.
The Chairman. In a situation that you've described, the
parties were SpaceX, on the one hand, and what was the other--
--
Dr. Jah. The European Space Agency.
The Chairman. OK. And in the end, the European Space
Agency----
Dr. Jah. Made the maneuver.
The Chairman.--out of an abundance of caution, made the
maneuver.
Dr. Jah. Yes.
The Chairman. I take it there's not an international
protocol about how that should be resolved.
Dr. Jah. Correct.
The Chairman. OK. And is that something we need on a global
basis, some----
Dr. Jah. Absolutely.
The Chairman.--International----
Dr. Jah. Yes, that is critical, that we get something like
that in place. And I would say, even more so, the body of
evidence that people have to make those decisions are all
different. And so, based on my information, looks like it's not
a hazard. Oh, but based on my information, it looks like--
there's no common pot of shareable knowledge to where everybody
can infer stuff from that same body of evidence so that they
can reach some sort of standard or some consensus.
The Chairman. OK. Are we anywhere down the road in
approaching some sort of international protocol?
Yes, Mr. O'Connell.
Mr. O'Connell. Senator, if I may.
As we speak, there's an interagency group in Vienna, at the
United Nations, the Science and Technical Working Group in
Vienna, which is actually working to promote space safety
standards. OK? It's been a long history there. And, in fact,
the Russians actually stalled the most basic of principles--
they're known as the 21 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines--
for the better part of a decade. Our diplomats, NASA, even
Commerce are in Vienna right now arguing for reasonable
approaches to international cooperation on this.
One of the aspects that they have explicitly included in
their efforts is the role of the private sector in space, and
how it's growing, and the extent to which we have to
accommodate a growing commercial space world into those rules
and standards. But, that part of the discussion, as well as
industry-based standards and best practices, have to be part of
this rules-of-the-road discussion that is--needs to happen in
parallel, some of the technical developments.
The Chairman. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is meeting in
Vienna next week. Do you think I should take time out to run
over to that office and chat with them?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, you're certainly more than welcome to.
I think the discussions are underway right now and this week,
so I don't think they'll still be in play. There is a--the U.N.
Space--Office of Outer Space Affairs that you could certainly
visit.
The Chairman. And that is a U.N. office----
Mr. O'Connell. That is a U.N. office.
The Chairman.--that is----
Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely.
The Chairman.--located----
Mr. O'Connell. And, of course, the U.S. mission in Vienna
is actively involved in this, as well, and they could probably
give you a readout of the developments that are taking place
this week.
The Chairman. OK.
Responses by Mr. Murtagh or Dr. Zurbuchen?
Mr. Murtagh. From the space weather perspective, it's
interesting that--just--you know, you're looking at this panel
here, Senator, and we are actually going to take one of Dr.
Jah's students in, in our center, this summer to work with us.
And we just sent one of our people into Kevin's office to work
with him, because the space environment--they--the density of
where these spacecraft are orbiting in low-Earth orbit can
change during space weather. And we get these big eruptions,
all of a sudden the spacecraft is traveling at this speed. It's
here now, it's supposed to be here in an hour from now, but
it's not. Why? Because one of these big eruptions. Obviously,
that plays into calculations of--for debris and collision
avoidance. So, that element of space weather is key. Dr. Jah
talked to me before this meeting just about how we're going to
work this together. But, it's a key piece. We've got to be able
to predict that better so they have the information, so that we
have the information necessary to protect these critical assets
in lower-Earth orbit.
The Chairman. OK. Just one moment. Let me check on--let me
try to be situationally aware of my colleagues.
We're--this first 15-minute vote is taking longer than 15
minutes.
So, let's do this. If we leave this hearing with one or two
takeaways, and if the listening public needs to know the basic
bottom line, who will help us with those goals? You want to
start, Dr. Zurbuchen?
Dr. Zurbuchen. I would say that the first bullet in a
summary like that would be that all of these elements that
we've talked about are absolutely important, and they're
increasingly important as we advance as a technological
society. Some of them have been with us for--well, all of them
have been with us for millennia. But, the impact of these
issues is increasingly important.
The second element is that the--there are multiple roles to
play. All of them need to be done in a coherent and a
deliberate fashion. The roles include research. There's much of
what we're looking at, in any one of those domains, that we
don't currently understand. We need to advance our
understanding to that. The second element is, there are
government regulatory functions that are in other agencies and
operational functions that need to be stood up. But, in all
cases, I think it's critical to understand that the
regulations, as well as the research, need to involve a broad
community of stakeholders outside of the government, such as
academia, and, increasingly, I believe, the commercial sector,
at the level that has been stated.
So, that's how I would summarize it.
The Chairman. All right.
Dr. Murtagh--Mr. Murtagh.
Mr. Murtagh. The--Senator, the observations that we rely on
to provide the alerts and warnings are critical. So, my message
would be that we have to support and recognize the value of
that information to our operations. Should we lose some of
those key spacecraft that we talk about, I won't say we're
blind, but we're darn close. It will impact our ability to
support this Nation's need for space weather services. And I
don't want to see that happen. So, observations are critical.
And one other piece I'd like to touch on--and Dr. Zurbuchen
just kind of teed it up for me--he talked about the research,
recognizing there's so--we have so much we need to do to better
understand and predict space weather. But, the next piece on
that is getting that research into operations, the--to have a
formal process to transition research to operations. Much like
the National Weather Service had for the--has for meteorology,
we need that in space weather. There's an awful lot of money
been pumped into the research, into the science community, some
great work being done, but there's this funnel. We need to get
that information into our operations center to improve our
predictions for the Nation.
The Chairman. Good.
Let's do this. We'll recognize Senator Scott at this point,
and then we do want to give our other two witnesses an
opportunity to summarize and follow up on what has been said by
the others, later on.
So, at this point, Senator Scott.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Scott. First, I want to thank Chairman Wicker for
holding this important hearing.
For Chairman Wicker's State and my State, the space
industry is a pretty big deal. And we're--it's very--you know,
we've got Kennedy Space Center. I just--I've only been here a
year. I finished 8 years as Governor, and we put a lot of money
into trying to--we--trying to make sure the Kennedy Space
Center and our entire Space Coast thrived. Right before I
became Governor is when the Obama administration stopped manned
flight, and it had a pretty big impact. But, now we can't find
enough people to work in our space industry, which is really
nice.
So, what do you think that we can do at the Federal level,
what can Congress do, to more effectively promote, you know,
at--both at the Federal level, at the State level, and at the
private level, growth and innovation in our space industry?
What do you think there are things we should be doing that
we're not doing? Or we should be doing better, or more of?
Mr. O'Connell. If I may. Thank you, Senator. Nice to see
you again.
Senator Scott. Nice seeing you.
Mr. O'Connell. There are a wide range of things that are
already underway. The first is to encourage the
entrepreneurship we see in this country. One of the best things
that I see in my job at the Office of Space Commerce is the
wide range of entrepreneurs that knock on our door every day.
The state of space entrepreneurship in this country is
absolutely incredible. It's backed by an ecosystem of finance
and insurance that actually helps enable it.
I think what we're trying to do is do a couple of things.
We're trying to streamline regulations related to that. And we
need your assistance in helping with that, modernizing some of
the legal basis for regulations that we have today. And then,
to the point of this hearing, we think the space situational
awareness mission is critically important.
Let me come at it from a slightly different perspective.
The growth that we're seeing in space commerce is really based
on the fact that we're applying business efficiencies to a
traditional government business model, if you will. And this is
why we see concepts of reusability and lean manufacturing, and
things like that. And the result of that has been that that has
lowered the cost of access to and operations in space.
The--one of the risks of space debris is that it will raise
those costs and complexities once again. And that's why, in the
plan that we have in Space Policy Directive 3, the initial
emphasis is on improving space situational awareness so people
understand where they are, where there's risk, and it's done in
a highly timely and accurate fashion for the kinds of space
missions that we see coming into space today.
Mr. Murtagh. I'll just piggyback a little bit on that. And
the proposed legislation from Senators Peter and Senator
Gardner on space weather kind of covers this. And it is
bringing in the private sector more into our community. We're a
little bit different, because we're the space weather. We've
got a budding kind of space weather services community out
there doing some really good work, really interesting work. One
company is--centers on the NOAA buoys. We arrange that through
the U.S. Air Force so that we're getting sensing the ionosphere
out in that remote area of the ocean, which will be very useful
to us. Another company is working with the Texas power grid on
assessing how vulnerable the grid is in Texas to geomagnetic
storms.
So, the private-sector growth, I think, is something we
should be supporting the legislators' language in the
legislation that helps do that. So, that's something I'm--I
feel very positive about that's coming out of Congress.
Dr. Zurbuchen. I spent the weekend at Kennedy, and we had
one of the most beautiful launches I've ever seen. It's really
great to launch in a full-moon night.
I believe one of the things that we're already doing--and
I'm excited to be doing with the kind of regulations that are
being set up, which is to take advantage of the industry that's
out there, in the sense that we actually can do things in a
different fashion. For example, as we go to the Moon, we do so
with commercial lunar payload services as the fastest element
of it, in which we--instead of building our own landers, we
actually go out there and say, ``Can we buy services from
companies that say that they can do so?'' And there are
companies all over the country that have built and are actually
in that segment now. The same is true with Earth observation
data. We have companies, for their own motivation, commercial
motivation, which is how a company should work, have built
satellites that are looking at the Earth in novel fashion, and
in a way we wouldn't have done with NASA. We now try to become
customers of those data by taking the data and actually finding
out what the right value is to make that data available to the
scientific community at large; and therefore, both helping the
companies, because there's an additional customer, but, at the
same time, also enhance the scientific community by making that
data available. So, it's elements like that, I think, will be
an important part of that answer.
Dr. Jah. I think, you know, for me, I remember the days of,
you know, at least studying, not personally, the renaissance
and how scientists used to have a lot of knowledge in different
parts of physics and mathematics. And these days, we've become
so specialized and problems have become so difficult that we
have these stovepipes of excellence. And I think we need a
better renaissance. We need to have a new renaissance for space
that recognizes that space weather, you know, planetary
defense, space situational awareness, all these things have
interdependencies and play with each other. So, there needs to
be a more holistic view in how to approach the problem. And I
think we could achieve great things if we did that.
Senator Scott. I have another question. Do you--are we out
of time?
The Chairman. You know, in light of the attendance, take as
much time as you'd like.
[Laughter.]
Senator Scott. So, in many areas, China has become our
adversary. And, I think, in space it's an area where China has
become an adversary. How, from a national security standpoint,
are we able to make sure that our advances, our innovation is
not being stolen and used by the Chinese government?
Dr. Jah. I'll put it this way. In my own research program,
one of my postdocs is from China. And when you go to a lot of
U.S. universities, you see a lot of people that are from China
and go back. Last year, I was invited to go there to give some
short courses on methods of orbit determination, and I will say
that they have very, very smart people over there.
One of the things that I've always done to try to make sure
that I'm at the leading edge is just to make sure that I'm out
in front of everybody else. We're not going to be able to
occult or become so insular that we can make sure or prevent
China from doing this, that, or the other. We just need to be
better. And to do that, we actually need to provide resources
to, again, get great U.S. citizens through that process of
STEM. And I think we're failing when it comes to that.
There are so many students, so many, they e-mail me all the
time, ``Dr. Jah, can I be part of your research program?'' ``I
don't have the resources to bring you on.'' And so, I'm turning
U.S. citizens away because--not because we don't have room. We
just don't have the support.
Senator Scott. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Connell. Senator, we know that China has very
ambitious space plans. One of the things we're doing in the
Office of Space Commerce is, we're hearing routinely from
industry about the kinds of behaviors that they are
experiencing in the market from Chinese competitors. And so,
many people in the U.S. Government are focused on the totality
of the China Space Program. We're focused on things like unfair
pricing, economic espionage, anticompetitive practices, things
like that. And we're going to increasingly call attention to
those kinds of behaviors as we see it in the market. Very
important problem to pay attention to.
Dr. Zurbuchen. Within NASA, of course, we have a series of
regulations that limit us from interaction with China at a
certain level, and we follow those rules. I would like to say
that, for us, relative to out-innovating everybody, whether
it's the Chinese, the Europeans, or anybody, is certainly a
goal that I see. I think we should always, every time, even in
a place where we're in a leadership position, we should be
nervous about that leadership position, because leaders who are
nervous remain leaders. And so, for me, I'm nervous, and I make
everybody nervous around me about that. And I will continue to
do so as I'm working in this agency.
I do believe that the second way of really leading in this
is to establish the standards of behavior, and internationally
enforce them. That is--and some of the--how science is done--
largely speaking, if you want to be a scientists of any
international stature, you have to follow the rules that,
largely, were developed in our society, were developed in our
agencies, and so forth. I want to be in the business to, kind
of, be first in places so we can actually establish the rules.
And I believe some of the discussions that we have on space
situational awareness, some of the other discussions, follow
that paradigm, as well. I think it's important that we set the
rules and we also, frankly, enforce them, whether it's in the
civil space or elsewhere.
Senator Scott. The Chinese government is clearly sending
people over here to steal our--steal--I mean, they're sending
them to our universities, they're doing a--they're
participating in research projects, basically, to steal things.
I mean, they--I mean, they are--they're clearly an adversary.
They don't want to play by the rules. They're never going to--I
don't care what they agree to, they're not going to do it. I
don't believe, in the new trade deal, they're comply with it.
So, I'm glad the Trump administration is trying things like
that. I just don't believe the Chinese government's ever going
to comply with anything. They never have in--they never have,
this Chinese government hasn't. So, I think we all have to be
very vigilant to stop the espionage and really understand they
are an adversary, they're not a friend.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jah, I've got, here, on the smartphone,
astriacss03.tacc
.utexas.edu----
Dr. Jah.--Ui/min.html. You got it.
The Chairman. There we go. OK.
Now--so, I press ``Go.'' How does the uninitiated, typical
Senate Committee Chairman----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--understand this graph that's got dots going
up and out? Is there a part of that website that gives us, as
laymen, some idea about actually what we're seeing?
Dr. Jah. Well, as you say exactly what you're saying, I'm
secretly e-mailing my grad students to create such a mechanism
to better inform you about what you're seeing. But, I can give
you a quick soundtrack. OK?
The Chairman. OK.
Dr. Jah. Basically, what we're doing is, we're taking all
the information that we believe we know about stuff in space,
and we're predicting, over a continuous 20-minute window, how
many of those objects, two at a time, might come within 10
kilometers of each other. And if there are any predicted
conjunctions, as we call them, any predicted two objects that
are going to come within, say, 10 kilometers of each other, it
plots that. And so, what you see is this sliding window. You
see these dots. The red dots are: both objects are debris, they
can't move, just like the stuff that happened over Pittsburgh,
recently. You will see some yellow dots: one of the things
could move, the other one, presumably, is defunct. And then the
green dots are: both could actually do something about it.
Twenty minutes is not long enough for it to be actionable.
Consider it a crawl-walk-run capability. But, it shows you that
there are many predicted conjunctions that are happening right
now, and continuously. So, even though conjunctions doesn't
equal collisions, thank goodness, because then, you know--yes,
we'd have a bigger problem on our hands. But, it tells you
there are many things crisscrossing each other constantly.
Now, one of the other things that you're going to see on
the top, you're going to see some histograms. The top-right
histogram is relative speed. And you're going to see a spike
somewhere around 15 kilometers per second. Yikes.
The Chairman. It's right there, yes.
Dr. Jah. Yes. So, 1 kilometer per second is the speed of a
bullet, 15 kilometers per second, you know, is quite fast. And
so, the damage that a very small thing could do at that speed
is considerable. And so, this is part of what we need to be
concerned about, is that, you know, we're sitting here in this
room, talking about these things, but things in space are
happening, regardless of what we discuss. So.
The Chairman. Good.
Well, I'm going to run, vote, and leave the gavel with
Senator Blackburn. I will be back.
Thank you so much.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here. I have to tell you, it's
a fascinating hearing.
And, Dr. Jah, it must be fascinating to be in your class. I
am sure that your University of Texas students enjoy taking
your class and learning from you.
Mr. O'Connell, I want to come to you first. Space Policy
Directive 3--and, of course, we apologize for being in and
out--in transferring from DOD to Commerce, if you would
comment--I don't know if anyone's asked you, but we would like
an update on how that transition is going, what you see as
problems, or has there been anything identified as needing
extra attention.
Mr. O'Connell. So, Senator, thank you very much for the
question.
We have moved out, from day one of Space Policy Directive 3
at the Commerce Department, to actually implement that. And I'm
not sure if you were here during part of my testimony. One of
the first things we did was establish a very close partnership
with the Department of Defense, and now the Space Force
officials who are going to actually help that. We actually
assigned a senior Commerce liaison at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California. So, he is literally sitting there, watching
how the system currently exists, how it operates today.
And, for those that don't know, Space Policy Directive 3
mandates this transition, for two important reasons. One,
because the Department of Defense has other missions it needs
to tend to in space. But, second, because the system that we
have in place today is in need of modernization. In particular,
it would not scale to the kind of commercial space world that
we're heading into at lightning speed.
And so, the partnership has been absolutely outstanding, so
far. Having somebody on the ground there at Vandenberg is very
important.
Another thing that we've done is that the Air Force shared
with us something called the Unified Data Library, which is a
tool that they have of sensor data as kind of a first step for
us to look on what we would put into our open architecture as
we develop it. And so, we've been evaluating that tool, what's
useful about it, you know, where are the places that we won't
be able to use it, even as we think about how to create this
architecture. We're thinking, partly, of leveraging some of
NOAA's cloud computing resources.
You know, some of this is really about applying modern
technology--a lot of this is about applying modern technology
and business concepts to the space situational awareness
enterprise. And I'll give you one simple example. If you were
to go to Vandenberg, you have an extensive operations floor for
the many different missions the Department of Defense operates
there. And sometimes people will say to me, ``Hey, Kevin, are
you trying to create another Vandenberg?'' Absolutely not. The
piece of this that we're going to transition is the on-orbit
collision notifications piece for the private sector and for
international actors. And so, in my mind, I have a modern
version of an operations center, a small activity. In fact,
Bill Murtagh, in the Space Weather Prediction Center, has a
modern government version of that kind of an operations
center--small number of people, lots of data, globally, that
they can leverage. We've also seen many commercial examples of
that.
And so, the partnership, again, is--been very strong. It's
continuing. It starts at the Secretary Ross and General Raymond
level, but it goes all the way down throughout the organization
and the different things that we have to do to move this along.
Senator Blackburn. Well, some of us that are working from
the Defense end on great-power competition----
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn.--and are needing those bright young
minds to come in, we realize, fully, that we need to think
differently about how we look at 21st-century warfare, how we
look at the utilization of everything that is going to be done
with spectrum that we're going to do with satellites, that
we're going to--how we're going to utilize these technologies,
and that, many times, we don't need to in-house something that
we need to do more to engage the commercial sector. So, we have
been interested in following this and looking at what you all
are going to do, and then rebooting the potential between NASA
and NOAA, and bringing Commerce to bear in this.
You all have been patient with us. I do have a couple of
other questions.
Dr. Murtagh, let me come to you. When we talk about
hazardous space weather, what are the limitations that are--
that you deal with when you are looking at the predictability
of space weather? Where are your limitations?
Mr. Murtagh. They are many.
Senator Blackburn. I know there are many----
Mr. Murtagh. Yes.
Senator Blackburn.--but----
Mr. Murtagh. And it'll----
Senator Blackburn.--build out a little bit of a framework.
Mr. Murtagh. Sure. It's--I'll start right at the Sun. We--
what we're looking for in the Space Weather Prediction Center
is the development of sunspots. That's kind of the----
Senator Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Murtagh.--localized magnetic stressed areas in the Sun
that will produce the eruptions. We have no real capability to
predict when those sunspots are going to----
Senator Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Murtagh.--occur. So, we could be sitting, today, very
quiet, and, 2 days from now, have a major sunspot cluster
evolve.
Senator Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Murtagh. So, that's a big drawback in our ability to
predict this stuff. And when they do occur, and the eruption
occurs, this coronal mass ejection is shot out into space,
sometimes right toward Earth. It's like a magnet just got shot
out into space. We don't know the magnetic structure within
that coronal mass ejection, we call it, so it takes, maybe, 20
or 30 hours to get from the Sun to the Earth, but, until it
hits that spacecraft, our buoy in space, that it's DSCOVR or
ACE spacecraft, we don't know what the magnetic structure is
like. And that is everything to us, because that'll tell us how
these two magnets, Earth's magnetic field and this Sun magnet
that just got shot out, how are they going to couple together.
Senator Blackburn. And so, this is----
Mr. Murtagh. But, that's a great----
Senator Blackburn.--what causes the national security and
the grid security risk.
Mr. Murtagh. That's correct. That last piece is the big
piece. We've got to get that information out to the grid. We
have a process where we notify the North American Electrical
Liability Corporation Reliability Centers, 20 of them around
the entire United States and Canada. As soon as we detect these
things and we recognize that they--the magnetic response will
be big, we get that information out to them immediately so that
they can redistribute that information to all their power-
generation and transmission entities in their areas of
responsibility to take the appropriate action to keep the
lights on.
Senator Blackburn. We thank you for that.
With that, no one else is here. Let me close our hearing.
The hearing record will remain open for two weeks. During
this time, Senators are asked to submit any questions for the
record. Upon receipt, the witnesses are requested to submit
their written answers to the Committee as soon as possible.
At this, I want to thank the witnesses for being here
today.
And the Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mike Lee to
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D.
Question 1. The Utah State University Space Dynamics Lab has long
partnered with the University of Arizona and NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory on the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveillance Mission. The
main purpose of the NEO Surveillance Mission is to help discover and
characterize potentially hazardous asteroids, which enables us to take
preventative action should we find an asteroid that is on a life-
threatening path towards Earth.
Could you provide a status update on the NEO Surveillance Mission?
Answer, The NASA Near-Earth Object Surveillance Mission (NEOSM)
Science Mission Directorate (SMD) flight project now in formulation
would accelerate the discovery of undetected NEOs (and therefore, the
completion of the George E. Brown (GEB) survey) by positioning a
spacecraft operating in the infrared part of the spectrum at the Sun-
Earth L1 gravity Lagrange point. A space-based, infrared capability was
recommended by the June 2019 National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report ``Finding Hazardous Asteroids
Using Infrared and Visible Wavelength Telescopes.'' In addition to
development and delivery to orbit, NASA capabilities include the
necessary analysis of data for detection, tracking and characterization
of potentially hazardous objects. NASA estimates that the GEB survey
goal would be achieved approximately 10 years after the mission begins
on-orbit operations.
FY 2020 funding for the mission is $35.6 million, consistent with
FY 2020 appropriations report language which allowed entry into the
formulation phase. As such, a mission management structure has been
established with all key stakeholders. The mission recently completed
its System Requirements Review (SRR)/mission definition review (MDR)
life-cycle review. It is anticipated that NEOSM will be ready to
complete the Key Decision Point-B (KDP-B) milestone by the end of
calendar year 2020.
Question 2. Is there a target launch date for the NEO Surveillance
Mission? And are there any current barriers that are delaying the
launch date?
Answer. The current budget projection for the Planetary Defense
Program supports a LRD of no earlier than 2029.There are currently no
technical barriers influencing the launch date.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D
Question. The Planetary Protection Independent Review Board issued
several recommendations in October 2019 regarding NASA's policy on
planetary protection. Given those recommendations, what will be NASA's
next steps to update the planetary protection standards, and will NASA
ensure those standards are not so burdensome that they stifle
commercial space activities?
Answer. NASA has already begun updates to its internal policies,
releasing two NASA Interim Directives on July 9, 2020--one for missions
to the Moon and one for future human missions to Mars. An update of the
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) for Planetary Protections is
underway and currently going through the formal Agency review process.
In addition, the Office of Planetary Protection is writing a NASA
Technical Standard that will provide clear guidance on the technical
processes and details missions can use to comply with the NPR. The
draft Standard reduces the burden of reporting and encourages missions
to incorporate technical innovations based on industry standards from
healthcare, biosafety, and other relevant sectors.
NASA continuously seeks the input of stakeholders on issues of
planetary protection, including the private sector. The Planetary
Protection Independent Review Board (PPIRB) chartered by NASA consisted
of members from multiple aerospace companies, research institutes,
academia, and a commercial trade organization. As NASA began the
process of implementing the recommendations of the PPIRB, it requested
that the Space Studies Board of the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine create a Committee on Planetary Protection
(CoPP) to provide advice on planetary protection policy. CoPP would
also provide advice on the knowledge and capability gaps NASA will need
to address in order to set planetary protection requirements for future
missions. NASA explicitly required that the CoPP members come from a
broad range of backgrounds and sectors, including commercial entities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D.
Question 1. In your testimony, you note that several agencies--
including NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of
Commerce--share responsibility for planetary defense from near-earth
objects such as the asteroid that exploded over Russia in 2013,
injuring over a thousand people. What steps is NASA taking to carry out
these defense efforts, and would additional resources enable NASA to
improve the effectiveness of these efforts?
Answer. In 2016, NASA established the Planetary Defense
Coordination Office (PDCO) to manage the ongoing mission of its
planetary defense program. The PDCO carries out a variety of planetary
defense efforts and works with several departments and agencies,
including the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DoD) and
Energy (DOE). Specifically, PDCO's responsibilities include:
Managing NASA's Planetary Defense Program;
Ensuring the early detection of potentially hazardous
objects (PHOs)--the subset of NEOs whose orbits predict they
will come within 5 million miles of Earth's orbit, and of a
size large enough (at least 30 to 50 meters) to reach Earth's
surface;
Tracking and characterizing PHOs and issuing warnings about
potential impacts;
Providing timely and accurate communications about PHOs;
Studying strategies and technologies for mitigating PHO
impacts; and,
Performing a lead role in coordinating U.S. Government
planning for response to an actual impact threat.
The highest priority for Planetary Defense is to find any potential
impacting object as early as possible to enable more options to
mitigate it. The President's FY 2021 budget request includes $150
million for planetary defense efforts, as NASA plans to continue
support for current NEO survey projects, enhance NEO detection and
tracking analysis capabilities, and continue instrument formulation for
a potential space-based infrared capability, the NEO Surveillance
Mission, that would support NEO survey objectives as identified in the
2019 National Academies study.
Question 2. NASA's missions are critical to efforts to address the
growing skills gap in our economy and inspire the next generation of
scientists and engineers. My bipartisan legislation with Senator Rubio,
the Supporting Veterans in STEM Careers Act, encourages veterans and
military spouses to pursue study in STEM fields and was signed into law
last week. What actions does NASA plan to take to continue its outreach
to encourage students and veterans to pursue careers in STEM fields?
Answer. NASA can only reach a sustained presence at the Moon
beginning in 2024, if we make a concerted effort to broaden
participation across all groups, but especially non-traditional
students and veterans who served our Nation. NASA funds over 8,000
interns each summer, many from minority-serving institutions. Veteran
preference regulations already assist our efforts to help veterans in
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) careers. For
outreach, NASA participates at air shows, Walter Reed Medical Center,
U.S. Science and Engineering Festival and other large-scale public
events to inspire students and veterans to pursue STEM fields.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D.
Near Earth Orbit Tracking
Question 1. Do you think we are overly reliant on medium and large
space monitoring telescopes and satellites for Near Earth Orbit
tracking?
Answer. No, there are currently no medium or large space-based
telescopes that perform NASA's Near-Earth Object (NEO) tracking
efforts. One small space telescope being used by NASA, NEOWISE, is
nearing its end of life. NASA's Planetary Defense Program sponsors
projects through its NEO Observations Program that employ a variety of
ground and space-based telescopes to search for NEOs, determine their
orbits, and measure their physical characteristics.
Question 2. Is there a role for small satellites fulfill that
mission or, at the least, be used to fill the gaps in current data sets
for Near Earth Orbit object tracking and warning?
Answer. Numerous methods for increasing the NEO detection rate,
including use of small satellites, have been assessed over the years by
multiple organizations, including the National Academies. These studies
concluded that small satellites could indeed increase the NEO detection
rate, but that a space-based telescope with at least a 0.5-meter
aperture looking in the mid-infrared part of the spectrum would
accelerate the discovery of undetected NEOs more quickly than any other
alternative. This size telescope is currently beyond small satellite
capabilities.
DoD and NASA Cooperation
Question 1. How can DoD and NASA better share data to further
planetary defense from impacts from outer space?
Question 2. Should DoD take a more pro-active role in this effort?
Answer. Currently, NASA and DoD share data related to planetary
defense, and both have an active role in implementing the National NEO
Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan--the goal of which is to help
organize and coordinate NEO-related efforts within Federal Departments
and Agencies, with a particular focus on efforts that are already
existing and resourced. The NASA NEO Observations program receives data
from DoD assets capable of detecting and tracking asteroids, such as
the new Space Surveillance Telescope about to begin operations in
Australia, and on bolides--large, naturally occurring meteors--as they
impact Earth's atmosphere. NASA, DoD, and others also routinely
exercise NEO impact emergency procedures and action protocols, thereby
improving emergency preparedness and response/recovery timelines. These
activities allow for satisfactory communication and data sharing across
not only NASA and DoD, but all Federal and international entities
involved.
Small Satellite Deployment
Question. How should we employ small satellites for research and
development of systems that are able to resist space weather effects on
our satellites?
Answer. Small satellites (SmallSats) have opened the window of
space research and technology development in many ways. Heliophysics,
and space weather in particular, can benefit greatly from multi-point
observations that are made possible by SmallSats and SmallSat
constellations. Due to SmallSats' size and their ability to make
coordinated measurements across vast regions in space, Heliophysics is
able to leverage them to make in-situ observations that help inform our
understanding of space weather effects. This improved understanding
helps enable the development of future systems that can resist space
weather effects on our satellites. Three examples relevant to space
weather research and development of resistance systems are:
1. Investigations of the variability of the ionosphere, which is key
to understanding the impact of space weather on global
navigation, communications, and positioning systems: Over the
last year and in the next 24 months, no fewer than 12 SmallSats
have been or will be launched to conduct research relevant to
characterizing space weather effects on spacecraft and their
instruments. Each investigation has a particular stand-alone
focus on research or technology development that together, will
act as pathfinders for future constellation missions of
SmallSats. These investigations will provide information that
can be used to improve spacecraft design, engineering, and
operations in order to protect spacecraft and instrumentation
from harmful radiation. The missions are: Auroral Emission
Radio Observer (AERO), Daily Atmospheric Ionospheric Limb
Imager Mission (DAILI), Electron Losses and Fields
Investigation (ELFIN), Enhanced Tandem Beacon Experiment (E-
TBEx), International Satellite Program in Research and
Education (INSPIRESat1), Lower Atmosphere/Ionosphere Coupling
Experiment (LAICE), Low-Latitude Ionosphere/Thermosphere
Enhancements in Density (LLITED), Oxygen Photometry of the
Atmospheric Limb (OPAL), Plasma Enhancements in the Ionosphere-
Thermosphere Satellite (PetitSat), Scintillation Observations
and Response of the Ionosphere to Electrodynamics (SORTIE),
Scintillation Prediction Observations Research Task (SPORT),
and Vector Interferometry Space Technology using AERO (VISTA).
Additionally, NASA takes advantage of rideshare opportunities
to advance space weather research. Space Environment Testbeds
(SET-1) is a rideshare with the U.S. Air Force Demonstration
and Science Experiments (DSX) mission. SET-1 studies how to
protect satellites in space by characterizing the harsh space
environment near Earth and how it affects spacecraft and their
instruments.
2. PUNCH and SunRISE selections: SmallSat constellations are being
developed to image the solar wind (PUNCH) and to study the Sun
in radio waves (SunRISE). The Polarimeter to Unify the Corona
and Heliosphere (PUNCH) mission will be a group of four small
satellites that will provide real-time images of the solar
atmosphere, studying the Sun's corona and monitoring for
coronal mass ejections (CMEs). The Sun Radio Interferometer
Space Experiment (SunRISE) mission will be an array of six
CubeSats operating like one large radio telescope and will
investigate how giant space weather storms from the Sun are
accelerated and released into planetary space.
3. Access to inter-planetary space: Increased and enhanced access to
inter-planetary space is enabling research with SmallSats
directly related to space weather around the Moon, at the Sun-
Earth Lagrange 1 point, and closer to the Sun with one
particular mission using solar sails.
Space Weather Mitigation Technology
There are several NASA programs that leverage suborbital flight for
research and tech development.
Question. Is there a role for these in developing space weather
mitigation technologies or practices?
Answer. Yes, suborbital flight programs for research and tech
development play a significant role in developing space weather
mitigation technologies and practices. The NASA suborbital sounding
rocket program has for over 40 years advanced technology and science,
much of which is relevant for developing technologies that help advance
our understanding of space weather. Compact in-situ measurement
techniques, sensors, and mirror technologies have been developed
through the sounding rocket program that are appropriate for SmallSats,
as well as large missions. Additionally, the Heliophysics Flight
Opportunities for Research and Technology (H-FORT) program element
supports Low-Cost Access to Space (LCAS) initiatives including
investigations conducted using suborbital vehicles (e.g., sounding
rockets, balloons, commercial reusable suborbital launch vehicles), as
well as CubeSats and the International Space Station (ISS).
Technologies utilized in H-FORT feed future dedicated Heliophysics
missions. Space weather research and technology development has been
and continues to be a beneficiary of these important programs; key
space missions directly relevant to space weather are enabled by
technologies and measurement techniques developed and matured through
these programs. Some examples of missions are: Advanced Composition
Explorer (ACE), Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer (FAS), Solar and
Heliophysics Observatory (SOHO), Time History of Events and Macroscale
Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS), and Transition Region and
Coronal Explorer (TRACE). Recent technology advancements in detectors
and measurement techniques on sounding rockets such as the High
Resolution Coronal Imager (Hi-C) and Chromospheric Layer
Spectropolarimeter (CLASP) show great promise for advancement and
improvement of future missions for space weather. Hi-C is a sub-orbital
telescope designed to take high-resolution images of the Sun's corona
and CLASP is an ultraviolet sun-gazing instrument used to study the
solar atmosphere. Both Hi-C and CLASP are launched from the White Sands
Missile Range in New Mexico.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Thomas Zurbuchen, Ph.D.
Detecting Near-Earth Objects
Thank you, Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Cantwell, for holding
this hearing and to our witnesses, for holding today's hearing.
As Ranking Member on the Aviation and Space Subcommittee, I'm proud
to have joined Subcommittee Chairman Cruz, Chairman Wicker, and Ranking
Member Cantwell in introducing legislation to address a number of space
missions of global importance.
Late last year, this committee passed our NASA Authorization Act of
2019, which includes language directing NASA to ensure that missions of
national importance do not have to compete for funding with high-
priority science missions.
In the Space Frontier Act, which passed the Senate unanimously last
Congress and passed out of this committee last year, clearer rules of
the road for orbital debris mitigation and space weather forecasting
are established.
This is a pivotal time for our national security and space
leadership. Decisions we make and legislation we pass now will
determine if we are prepared for the future development of space.
We must address these challenges head-on with strong bipartisan
solutions.
Our leadership on planetary defense, space weather, and space
situational awareness will set global standards and ensure America's
national security remains strong.
As you know, in 2005 Congress passed the George E. Brown Jr. Near-
Earth Object Survey Act, which requires NASA to plan, develop, and
implement a program to survey threats posed by near-Earth objects, or
asteroids, which could collide with Earth. Congress required NASA to
catalog at least 90 percent of near-Earth objects by December 30, 2020.
With the deadline now less than a year away, NASA is not on track to
meet this goal.
Last summer, the National Academies of Science found that in order
to meet its congressionally mandated goal, NASA should fund a dedicated
space-based infrared telescope.
Fortunately, researchers from the University of Arizona and NASA's
Jet Propulsion Laboratory have spent the past decade developing the
type of telescope recommended by the National Academies. I am pleased
that NASA finally announced last fall that it would fund this project
but I am concerned that the administration has waited this long to
fulfill a Congressional mandate. Additionally, just this week, the
administration failed to dedicate funding for this mission in their
budget proposal.
Question 1. Now that you have committed to the mission, how do you
plan on funding it and how long does NASA expect it will take to launch
the mission and complete the George E. Brown Jr. Survey?
Question 2. And how can this committee help to ensure that the
survey is completed as quickly as possible?
Answer. The President's FY 2021 budget requests $150 million for
NASA's Planetary Defense Program, including funding for an infrared
instrument project for detection and tracking of NEOs. The current
mission concept, the Near-Earth object (NEO) Surveillance Mission,
would accelerate the discovery of undetected NEOs (and therefore, the
completion of the George E. Brown survey) by positioning a spacecraft
operating in the infrared part of the spectrum at the Sun-Earth L1
gravity Lagrange point. We estimate the George E. Brown survey would be
completed approximately 10 years after the launch of a space-based
infrared mission. Ultimately, an important step Congress could take is
to fully fund the Administration's budget request for Planetary
Defense.
Question 3. Given that NASA has failed to prioritize the completion
of the George E. Brown Jr. survey and the development of a space-based
infrared telescope mission until now, do you believe that NASA is the
appropriate agency to handle planetary defense missions?
Question 4. Why should this committee not assign that
responsibility to another Federal agency that will be able to act more
quickly?
Answer. NASA leads the world in the detection and characterization
of NEOs, and NASA-sponsored NEO search projects are responsible for the
discovery of over 96 percent of all NEOs found since our program began
in 1998. NASA leads a wide array of activities related to NEOs,
including a long-standing, ground-based observing campaign, focused
flight missions to study both asteroids and comets, as well as
conceptual studies and technology development to improve our ability to
find NEOs. NASA uses radar techniques to better characterize the
orbits, shapes, and sizes of observable NEOs, and funds research
activities to better understand their composition and nature. NASA also
funds the key reporting and dissemination infrastructure that allows
for world-wide follow-up observations of NEOs as well as research-
related activities, including computer modeling, sample analysis, and
workshops to disseminate information about NEOs to the larger
scientific and engineering community.
Because of this history and expertise, NASA's Planetary Defense
Coordination Office (PDCO) is uniquely suited to handle planetary
defense missions and is considered the primary Government group
responsible for the coordination of U.S. Government efforts to find
hazardous NEOs and guide planning for the response to an actual impact
threat. In this role, NASA coordinates with other Government agencies,
such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Defense, on planetary defense activities and to implement the National
NEO Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan--which seeks to leverage and
enhance existing assets and capabilities to effectively manage the
risks associated with NEOs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
William Murtagh
Space Weather Prediction
While NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center is a model for
coordinating and disseminating information related to space weather
events, I am concerned that the satellite infrastructure NOAA uses to
make space weather predictions is rapidly aging. Currently, NOAA's
solar-monitoring satellites do not have total coverage of the sun,
meaning it is possible to fail to immediately detect a coronal mass-
ejection.
Fortunately, researchers at Arizona State University have developed
a proposal for a cube-satellite, called the Space Weather and Impact
Monitoring Satellite. If a network of these cube-satellites were
funded, NOAA could be guaranteed to have 360-degree coverage of the
sun, to ensure that any coronal event was detected as early as
possible.
Question 1. Do you believe there could be value in a cube-sat
constellation being deployed to better predict space weather?
Answer. Cube satellites (cubesats) have the potential to lower
costs and provide greater diversity of coverage relative to our current
generation of observational satellites. However, the sensors that
provide our solar observations are currently too large to be flown on
cubesats. NOAA is continually monitoring the evolution of satellite and
sensor technologies to determine how smaller satellites (smallsats),
including cubesats, could provide greater utility for NOAA's space
missions in the future; particularly the NASA and NSF-funded technology
development, demonstrations and science missions that enable
heliophysics smallsat constellations. NOAA also sees future
possibilities for in situ measurements from cubesats in low earth orbit
and geostationary orbit, as well as possibilities for complementing the
solar imaging provided on NOAA geostationary platforms and the
hemispheric imaging coverage provided by geostationary payloads like
the recently launched NASA Global-scale Observations of the Limb and
Disk mission manifested on a commercial satellite.
Technology demonstration missions, such as those proposed by
research institutions like Arizona State University, are important
early incubation steps necessary to advance miniaturization, artificial
intelligence, and constellation operation concepts. The recently
completed multi-year NOAA Satellite Observing Systems Architecture
(NSOSA) study considered the use of smallsats to meet future space-
weather in situ and solar imagery needs. The findings and conclusions
of the study can be found in the response to Question 2 below.
Question 2. What would the advantages or disadvantages of a space
weather cube-sat constellation be to the work currently done at the
Space Weather Prediction Center?
Answer. The observing requirements for the National Weather
Service's Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) are independent of the
particular type of satellite that is taking the measurement(s). With
respect to coronal imaging, SWPC requires a robust continuous view of
the Sun with high dynamic range and low data latency.
NOAA currently collects observations from several highly capable
smallsats, including NOAA's DSCOVR mission and NASA's Advanced
Composite Explorer mission. NOAA's Space Weather Follow-On represents a
new smallsat mission that will be continuing these observations
starting in 2024. The NSOSA study considered the use of smallsats to
meet future space-weather in situ and solar imagery needs. The study
found that the expected size, weight, and power requirements of the
current instruments indicated a need for spacecraft larger than
cubesats to meet NOAA's current space weather mission. To provide
future solar observations NOAA will embrace a hybrid constellation with
many sizes of satellites matched to mission need. NOAA recognizes the
need to incorporate critical new technology development and
demonstration; will continue to study cubesat and related emerging
technologies; and will evaluate their applicability to our mission.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Kevin M. O'Connell
Civilian Space Situational Awareness Funding
This Administration has proposed shifting the responsibility for
alerting commercial satellite operators about potential in-space
collisions from the Department of Defense to your office at the
Department of Commerce. In order to consider such a shift, Congress
needs to know what resources are needed and how exactly the Department
of Commerce will use those resources.
Question 1. If Congress approves giving the Department of Commerce
civilian space situational awareness responsibilities, how much funding
will the department need to perform these operations?
Answer. The President's FY 2021 Budget includes $15 million for a
consolidated Office of Space Commerce (OSC) and Commercial Remote
Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA) in the Office of the Secretary.
Current spend plans anticipate over $10 million to be devoted to
establishing the Department's commercial space situational awareness
(SSA) services and information responsibilities in FY21. This includes
an increase (of 13 FTE) in space-qualified staff and will allow OSC to
further leverage commercial capabilities that are already in the market
through new SSA-related sensors, analytic tools, visualization
capabilities, and more.
Question 2. Is this a shift of funding from the Department of
Defense or new resources?
Answer. Currently, the 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS) at
Vandenberg Air Force Base provides the space traffic management (STM)
function for military, commercial, and civilian satellite operators.
The Department of Defense (DOD) systems primarily support the larger
space domain awareness (SDA) mission and contribute to performing the
STM function for military, civil, and commercial satellite operators as
a subset of the SDA mission. These resources cannot be transferred to
the Department of Commerce (DOC) as DOD requires use of these systems
for the broader SDA mission including continued STM for military
satellite operators. DOC's implementation will allow DOD to devote its
full attention to the increasingly complex national security defense
needs in space, and DOC to build a modern infrastructure that builds
upon DOD SDA data and capitalizes on commercial SSA data and other
capabilities.
Orbital Debris Regulations
Current Federal guidelines require that satellites deorbit within
25 years after the end of operations.
Question. Given the congestion of space, should that requirement be
revisited?
Answer. Last year, the U.S. Government revised its U.S. Government
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP). As part of that
update, the 25-year rule was reaffirmed as a minimum requirement for
the government's space assets. However, the revised ODMSP also
identified disposal options that involve immediate removal of the space
object from Earth orbit as preferred disposal options, and specified
for the first time that objects disposed of via passive atmospheric re-
entry should be left in orbits that will limit orbital lifetime to a
period that is ``as short as practicable.'' In April, and as part of a
rulemaking proceeding occurring in parallel with the ODMSP revisions,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking that sought comments on possible requirements to
facilitate the ``as short as practicable'' approach. These requirements
include a possible requirement for spacecraft maneuverability or
shorter timeframes for post-mission orbital lifetimes such as five
years. Further, there are many older space debris objects left on-
orbit. This has adversely impacted specific orbital debris regimes. DOC
led a Commercial Orbital Debris Interagency Working Group to inform the
FCC rulemaking process.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Kevin M. O'Connell
Department of Commerce Involvement in Space
Question 1. How does the Department of Commerce fit into space
operations?
Answer. Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3) directs the Department of
Commerce (DOC) to provide on-orbit collision avoidance support
services. The Department of Defense (DOD) currently provides these
services to commercial, civilian, and military operators; however, DOD
will only be required by law to provide these services in the interest
of national security beginning in 2024. Two key rationales exist for
this transition: first, DOD has been directed to further focus on its
mission to protect and defend the space domain against current and
emerging hostile threats. As commercial space activities expand and
grow more complex, DOD plans to exit the commercial notifications part
of the business to focus on national security. Second, there are
opportunities to modernize the SSA system that we use today with a wide
range of new sensors, analytics, and visualization to enhance SSA and
enable a modern alerting and warning system. Commercial companies are
the source of much of this innovation and modernization. DOC has
ongoing and substantive interaction with the U.S. commercial space
community and is aware of these developments, and is able to leverage
these capabilities in the implementation of SPD-3.
Question 2. Why should the Department of Commerce be involved in
Space Traffic Management over any other civil agency?
Answer. DOC has a wide range of resources, skills, capabilities,
and experience in the many areas necessary to successfully complete the
transition of space situational awareness services from DOD. Key
Commerce organizations include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), which has deep experience in space situational
awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM), most importantly
protecting 16 essential satellites from space debris in four space
orbits, as well as in the related field of space weather prediction.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
experience in promoting standards--essential to the ``rules of the
road'' needed for space safety--as well as cybersecurity and repository
expertise. The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) promotes rules related to the prevention of
radiofrequency interference, including for space, as well as important
relations with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The
Department's National Technical Information Service (NTIS) works with
academia, industry and non-profits on approaches to data science and
improved decision-making: these computational methods will continue to
be essential for improving the accuracy of conjunction assessments.
Externally, we have also been working closely with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on their collision
avoidance efforts for NOAA and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
satellites, space science collaboration, and established relationships
with international partners.
Further, the Department is one of the Nation's lead ``data
agencies'' with a wide range of experience using complex data sets,
including those related to public safety. It works with large volumes
of data, giving it considerable experience with cloud-based data
management, analytics, and dissemination approaches for public
consumption. As the number of government and commercial satellites
grows, and our understanding of the space environment improves,
improved management of and access to space debris data will be key to
space safety. The DOC's experience and relationship with industry can
be further leveraged to create a cost effective, efficient and scalable
solution to enhance SSA and improve orbital safety while helping to
grow and expand the overall space economy.
DoD and Space Traffic Management
Major General Stephen Whiting, who oversees space traffic
management for the Department of Defense, recently said that the
Department of Defense is ``eager'' to transfer space traffic management
responsibilities to the Department of Commerce.
Question 1. What is the current collaboration between the
Department of Commerce and the DOD on space traffic management?
Answer. Since the announcement of Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3),
which directs the Department of Commerce (DOC) to provide on-orbit
collision avoidance support services, DOC has developed a strong and
continuing partnership with the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Air
Force, and U.S. Space Force officials, at senior and at working levels,
to ensure a seamless transfer of these responsibilities. Last summer,
DOC detailed a senior Commerce liaison to the 18th Space Control
Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), where the U.S. Air Force
presently conducts the space situational awareness (SSA) mission. DOD
is providing access to their current data, systems, and processes for
DOC awareness, and ongoing bi-weekly discussions cover issues such as
data validation, data architectures, and synergies across the two
Departments. These discussions also include the ultimate drive for
efficiency in data buys and other commercial interactions. DOC has
participated, sometimes as co-lead, in exercises, experiments, and war
games designed to help understand how to transition and integrate
national and commercial capabilities. Secretary Ross visited Vandenberg
AFB in November of 2018 for a first-hand view of the current SSA
system.
In addition to the new SSA functions directed to DOC in SPD-3, the
Office of Space Commerce performs a vital advocacy mission on behalf of
the U.S. Commercial Space Industry. Title 51 U.S.C. has long provided
authorities to the Office of Space Commerce in DOC to foster conditions
for economic growth and technological advancement of U.S. space
commerce industry, streamline and anticipate licensing/regulatory/
export reforms, and promote international norms, standards, sustainable
practices. As recent examples, the Office of Space Commerce has worked
on streamlining the regulatory environment for commercial space
operators through changes in the Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs rules.
Question 2. Would the space traffic management system be able to
utilize the investments of the Department of Defense, such as Space
Fence, to execute the civil and commercial mission?
Answer. DOC's space situational awareness-related relationships are
especially strong with DOD and with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). DOC has spent significant amount of time
evaluating the United States Air Force's Unified Data Library as an
initial input to the future Open Architecture Data Repository, and we
are working with NASA on their conjunction analysis tools and models of
the space environment. DOC will continue to leverage DOD systems and
products as we migrate to a commercial based service that will support
our basic operation requirements and facilitate commercial market
development to include advanced products for various stakeholders. DOC
will also continue to be integrated with DOD to ensure the safety of
our space environment.
Question 3. What, if anything, needs to happen from a policy and
funding standpoint so that the Department of Defense can focus more on
its priority mission areas instead of space traffic control?
Answer. SPD-3 tasked DOC with providing on-orbit collision
avoidance support services, a role which DOD currently supports. DOC
has moved aggressively to implement the SPD-3 responsibilities for
space traffic coordination and management within current resources. The
President's FY 2021 Budget includes additional resources to ramp up
these support services at DOC.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D.
Question. Current Federal guidelines require that satellites
deorbit within 25 years after the end of operations. Given the
congestion of space, should that requirement be revisited?
Answer. I have yet to see how sensitive the answer is to the
underlying modeling and data assumptions. To wit, I've never seen a 25-
year rule study that I would consider to be either rigorous or subject
to wide peer-review and scrutiny. For instance, there are half a dozen
or so scientific models for the Earth's atmosphere. How do the results
from the 25-year rule studies vary if each one is used independently?
What about the assumptions regarding how actively controlled satellites
will behave? Currently, SpaceX has automated much of the Starlink
Satellite maneuvers. No one knows what is the onboard logic making
maneuver decisions. So, there is no way that any U.S. Government study
can say it has rigorously or comprehensively assessed the impacts and
effects on space traffic and space debris for this 25-year rule. Yes,
this should not only be revisited but a group of experts should be
brought to bear to jointly perform this study and assessment,
leveraging high performance computing capabilities and physics-based
models, as well as gathering operationally relevant inputs from the
actual satellite operators, with an agreement to properly protect their
intellectual property. In fact, the National Academies via one or
multiple boards, should be brought to bear on this subject. I'm
currently not a member but would gladly volunteer to be directly
engaged in this if it came to be.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D.
International Cooperation on Space Issues
Last year I introduced Senate Resolution 386, which supports
international cooperation and continued U.S. leadership to maintain
access to space while achieving advances in space technology. I have
heard from stakeholders in the space industry in New Mexico that it is
important that the United States work with other countries to address
concerns that a growing level of space traffic is posing.
Question 1. What is your perspective on the United States working
with the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space to advance the
21 guidelines to promote sustainable and safe operations in space?
Answer. I strongly believe that one of the best things the United
States could do to both demonstrate leadership and aid in the long-term
sustainability of space is to make as many of the 21 UN COPUOS LTS
Guidelines into U.S. Space Law. In fact, I formally briefed at the 2019
UN COPUOS STSC in February in Vienna on this topic \1\. The actual
slides I used are in the footnotes of this page. One caveat with making
one or more of these guidelines into law is how to enforce? Moreover, I
argue that one cannot enforce what is unknown, and one cannot know what
is not measured. Therefore, the basis of making these guidelines into
successful space law is to first focus on comprehensive space activity
monitoring and assessment, and identifying the required body of
evidence required to enforce any given space law.
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\1\ https://www.dropbox.com/s/tip2dod3wpqab6u/
AIAA%20Presentation%20-%20M%20Jah%
20-%20COPUOS%20STSC%20-%20Vienna%20-%20Feb2019.pdf?dl=0
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Another issue to consider is that there is no open and transparent
global Space Traffic Monitoring system. The closest thing to that is
perhaps ASTRIAGraph \2\ and this is not an operational platform. The
Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics (KIAM), in Moscow, Russia, has
signed an agreement with the UN Office of Outer Space Activities (UN
OOSA) to deploy low-cost telescopes to developing space nations for
educational purposes \3\. We all know that these sensor observations
will also be feeding Russia's Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST)
capabilities. The U.S. is being left behind in these endeavors and
other nations are filling up the apparent leadership vacuums. We in the
U.S. could establish a U.S. led academic consortium for Space
Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management that could then
incorporate international academic partners, strategically. We would
need the support and financial resources to make this become manifest,
but I am fully confident that we at UT Austin could organize and lead
such an effort.
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\2\ http://bit.ly/astriagraph
\3\ http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=55062
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To be sure, an academic consortium does not provide the complete
and consistent operational capability required to address the precise
real-time needs of the planet's space traffic. Among other concerns,
academia is unlikely to ever have the exquisite sensing capabilities
that governments and industry possess. This is what industry must work
with the Department of Commerce to deliver.
Nevertheless, an academic consortium serves several valuable roles:
(a) pragmatically demonstrates what a meaningful partnership looks
like, (b) explores the art of the possible, and (c) delivers this
tradecraft into the current state of practice. We are continuing to
expand our partnerships with academic institutions worldwide in this
shared computational and research environment we've begun to develop at
UT Austin.
Question 2. Do you see a value in Congress expressing its support
for this effort?
Answer. Indeed, and in fact I do not see this being successful or
meaningful in the absence of significant congressional involvement and
shepherding.
Autonomous Satellites
Companies like SpaceX and others are trying to develop satellites
that can autonomously maneuver in space when there is a danger of a
close approach or collision.
Question. Do you think there is promise in the near term for
satellites that can autonomously avoid debris?
Answer. I believe that ultimately, space operations autonomy is the
only long-term solution to collision avoidance. However, what SpaceX
has done is to prematurely deploy this capability based upon flawed
information. Yes, we should automate maneuvers but not do so in the
absence of quantifying the effects and impacts (to included possible
unintended consequences) in the presence of flawed and incomplete
information because we actually risk making matters worse than before.
Independent Space Situational Awareness Institute
In the opening remarks that you provided to the Committee, you
state that the U.S. should consider creating a, ``well-funded and
dedicated Space Situational Awareness Institute [that could] undertake
the Science and Technology research and development we desperately
require.''
Question 1. In your opinion, should this organization have a degree
of independence to carry out its work?
Answer. Indeed, this organization should be comprised of research
institutions that could be funded in part by Cooperative Agreements
with the U.S. Government. A great example is the NASA Astrobiology
Institute. This proposed SSA Institute should also have an advisory
board comprised of interagency government staff and should be given a
mandate to host an annual workshop where the National Space Council is
directly briefed on research results and how these are being
successfully transitioned into operationally relevant environments. The
National Academies should be invoked to help the SSA Institute in
making it successful. The National Science Foundation should have a
portion of its budget dedicated to supporting the fundamental research
of the SSA Institute.
Question 2. And would the Federally Funded Research and Development
Center model be a good fit for such an institute?
Answer. I believe that a more effective model is having a
consortium of research institutions, FFRDCs and University Affiliated
Research Centers included, via Cooperative Agreements; 5-year terms can
be put in place and those that are thriving and relevant can re-
compete. The NASA Astrobiology Institute is an example as a potential
model.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Moriba K. Jah, Ph.D.
University Collaborations on Space Situational Awareness
As the number of satellites in-orbit increases, the risk of a
collision in-orbit increases. We can all agree that a more
comprehensive system of space traffic management is needed as low-earth
orbit becomes increasingly commercially viable.
There are not yet sufficient resources available at the Department
of Defense, Department of Commerce, or NASA to develop a modern-day
space traffic management system, universities have been stepping up.
For example, at the University of Arizona, Dr. Vishnu Reddy and a
team of five undergraduate students build the RAPTORS telescope, which
can track satellites and debris in low-earth orbit. The students were
able to build two 24-inch telescopes in seven months for about $30,000.
The RAPTORS telescopes have been used in NASA-led international
exercises, and the University is now exploring opportunities to use the
telescopes to support work being done at the Air Force Research
Laboratory.
This is one example of how universities are able to make critical
contributions to space missions of national importance. More often than
not, universities complete their missions on-time, and under-budget.
Question 1. As we consider how to best mitigate orbital collisions,
what roles can universities play?
Answer. First, thanks for this question. I was actually a member of
the faculty recruitment committee that hired Vishnu Reddy and I
consider him to be both a colleague and friend. He's awesome. In fact,
my ASTRIANet telescopes were initially designed by him!
In terms of orbital collision mitigation, we at UT Asutin have
developed and deployed the world's first Conjunction Streaming Service
(CSS) that can be viewed here: http://astriacss03.tacc.utexas.edu/ui/
min.html
What you'll see are some dotted lines streaming continuously, over
the next 20 minutes. What we have done is take the currently available
public space object catalog and computed which pair of objects are
predicted to come closer than 10 kilometers from each other, and those
that meet that criterion are plotted. Green dots are a pair of working
satellites, yellow dots are when one is working and the other is not,
and red dots re two dead objects or debris.
I feel confident that universities could collaborate on scaling
this to a week-long predictive window and on top of that, compute
collision risks and deliver an automated service to the community for
those objects with high likelihood of collision. This would require so-
called Conjunction Data Messages (CDMs) as inputs, and in turn these
CDMs are a result of statistically comparing predicted space object
trajectories. These space object trajectories are informed by sensor
observations. Ultimately, we universities require sensor observations
to then level-up the information to eventually yield these collision
alerts. The problem is in hand if we can receive the sensor data.
Universities tend to be funding sinks not sources, so we would need
funding to either have our own sensors and/or purchase senor data (or
receive these from the U.S. government as Government Purpose Rights
data).
Question 2. Are their programs at the Department of Defense,
Department of Commerce, or NASA to support university collaborations?
Answer. The answer to this is quite varied. For the DoD, there is
some S&T research funding via the Air Force Research laboratory (AFRL)
and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The funding
from AFRL is disparate, inconsistent, and oftentimes funding redundant
things. In other words, it is not coordinated across the enterprise.
There is no AFRL-strategic funding for SSA/STM research. There was a
Senior Scientist for Space Situational Awareness, but that position
disappeared when Dr Tom Cooley accepted the position as Chief Scientist
for the AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate. I'd highly suggest creating
this Senior Scientist for SSA position again.
Regarding AFOSR, there was a Program Office for SSA there, but that
position has gone away since Dr Stacie Williams accepted a position
with DARPA. IT is unlikely that AFOSR will fill that with another SSA
person unless they are encouraged to do so. Moreover, anything less
than say $6-10M per annum for this SSA portfolio would not do the area
any justice so to speak. I would say that having a AFOSR
Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) on SSA would
make a lot of sense and really start to tackle the foundational
scientific roadblocks that currently exist.
Regarding Dept of Commerce, no, there is no funding for SSA/STM
there. There should be, given Space Policy Directive #3.
Regarding NASA, there is also no funding for SSA/STM. My
recommendation has (and is) to have a NASA SSA Institute (set up like
the NASA Astrobiology Institute) whereby research institutions are
enlisted via Cooperative Agreements (5-year terms) and NASA Goddard
could administer it under the leadership of Lauri Kraft Newman who
currently leads the NASA CARA project which is the most relevant to
this mission area.
Question 3. What further steps can this committee take to promote
further collaboration?
Answer. I would recommend the following:
1. Enable the development and sustainability of a core academic
consortium within the U.S. to focus uniquely on the scientific
and technological (S&T) hurdles regarding space safety,
security, and sustainability relevant to Space Situational
Awareness and Space Traffic Management needs, per national
Space Policy Directive #3. This can be done via:
a. AFOSR/AFRL MURI on SSA
b. NASA SSA Institute via Cooperative Agreements
2. Have this consortium become indispensable partners to the
Department of Commerce and focus the relationship on successful
Tech. Transfer into their Open Architecture Data Repository
(OADR) and operationally relevant frameworks.
3. Incentivize Industry partnership by requiring companies to take
the S&T developed by the academic consortium and finish
maturing/operationalizing these for the Department of Commerce.
Have industry contribute some of their own resources/funding to
be a part of this endeavor, like a membership fee that goes to
helping develop and mature the S&T.
4. Enlist the National Academies to also work with this academic
consortium on exploring the solution space to meet national and
international SSA/STM needs.
5. Require the academic consortium to host an annual symposium to
report out on S&T research results, with at least some aspect
of this open to the public. Have it in DC!
6. Resurrect the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) and use it as
a sort of sabbatical for academics to allow them to work
directly with government staff on these SSA/STM problems.
[all]