[Senate Hearing 116-560]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 116-560

                    REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 
                    STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________


                              JULY 30, 2020

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov



                                 ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

48-763 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2022








                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman        

MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas                      CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia

              Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director        
            Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  




                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     2

Pompeo, Hon. Michael R., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of 
  State, Washington, DC..........................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................    58

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    59

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................   105

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson...............................   106

Responses of Secretary Michael Pompeo to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.....................................   106

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons......................   121

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine.................................   123

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Edward Markey.............................   125

Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz..................................   130

Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the 
  State Department, Dated July 28, 2020..........................   131

Columns From the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News 
  Concerning Peter Kassig and Three Other Americans Who Lost 
  Their Lives at the Hands of ISIS...............................   177

                                 (iii)

  

 
     REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2020

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:33 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch, 
chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson, 
Gardner, Romney, Graham, Barrasso, Portman, Paul, Young, Cruz, 
Perdue, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, 
and Merkley.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Good morning, everyone. Today we have with us Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo to discuss the State Department's fiscal year 
2021 budget request though, if history is any judge, Secretary 
Pompeo, you will face a wide variety of questions that extend 
beyond the Department's budget, which I know you can handle.
    The United States and our allies and partners continue to 
face serious foreign challenges that will test us for decades 
to come. China, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, 
is our chief competitor. Russia too remains a key adversary.
    The efforts of these two nations to sow discord, wreak 
havoc, and undo the free and open international order upon 
which shared prosperity and security are built have reached new 
heights. They have stepped up disinformation and manipulated 
international institutions, suppressed the voices of freedom 
and democracy, propped up heinous dictators, coerced and 
invaded their neighbors, and denied millions of people access 
to lifesaving humanitarian assistance.
    We have a long road ahead of us in this new era of great 
power competition. We need sustained political will. These 
challenges require nothing less.
    On top of all of this, we are confronted by a new and acute 
challenge: a biological enemy that we still do not fully 
understand, an enemy that in 6 short months has inflicted 
levels of physical and economic harm upon the world that we 
have not seen in more than 100 years.
    Here again, China especially, but also Russia has played a 
destructive role. From withholding vital global health data to 
spreading disinformation and actively stealing vaccine 
research, China and Russia have again chosen to be and proven 
themselves to be adversaries.
    Sanctioning bad actors will never be enough. To confront 
these and other challenges, the Department will need to rely 
upon a vast array of tools and resources. Our diplomats must be 
backed by effective and efficient assistance so they can help 
partners help themselves and contribute to the growth of 
healthier, more stable societies.
    We are eager to support a budget that will advance these 
critical interests and support the State Department's most 
critical resources: its people.
    As the coronavirus emerged from China and accelerated 
across the globe, you were forced to pull back thousands of our 
diplomats and their families, but you did not just pack up and 
go without a thought of your fellow Americans. Instead, the 
Department launched an unprecedented mission to help return 
more than 100,000 Americans safely home. All of us who 
participated in that are greatly appreciative of the 
Department's work in that regard. In some cases, this involved 
convincing countries to reopen their airspace for flights and 
roads for transport. In other places, you even chartered planes 
to get our American people home.
    There are lots of folks who may never come in contact with 
the Department. Yet now there are more than 100,000 Americans 
who can personally attest to the tremendous work that the 
Department does for our people every day.
    As the challenges get more numerous and complex, we want to 
support a State Department that is up to the task, fully 
funded, staffed, and equipped to advance U.S. national 
interests on all fronts and at all times.
    We obviously have threats that impede this, be it health or 
security, but as the saying goes, all politics are local. Our 
adversaries understand this all too well. We need our diplomats 
to be local, too.
    On a personal note in closing, let me say I want to 
publicly thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your accessibility that 
you have had as Secretary. As you know, in operating this 
committee, it is essential that I have instant access to facts 
and information, and at times when I have not been able to get 
that through the usual intelligence channels, you have always 
made yourself instantly accessible. I sincerely appreciate 
that.
    When I am asked for advice from other second branch 
entities or individuals or even allies of ours, it is 
absolutely imperative that I have this information. You have 
always provided that. When you answer the phone, sometimes I 
never know where you are in the globe or what time it is, but 
you have always made it happen. For that, I have been and 
remain very grateful.
    With that, Senator Menendez.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for joining us this morning, Mr. Secretary. It 
has been a while since you have joined us, and I appreciate 
your enthusiasm for fulfilling this part of your constitutional 
responsibilities.
    If past is precedent, I do not imagine we are going to see 
you here anytime soon. So while this is your opportunity to 
defend your stunningly ill-conceived request to slash the 
budget of our foreign policy instruments, I would also like to 
take a wholesale look at how your Department has represented 
the American people and American interests on the world stage 
over the past year. Unfortunately, that view is not good, to 
say the least.
    Under your watch, the United States has faced setback after 
setback on the world stage, ceding leverage and influence to 
our stated adversaries. Today, Iran is much closer to a nuclear 
bomb than when you came into office, and despite your maximum 
pressure campaign, Iran and its proxies continue to create 
problems throughout the Middle East.
    While the 2017 National Security Strategy details that, 
``Russia wants to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide 
us from our allies and partners, and undermine the legitimacy 
of democracies,'' the President and your Administration has at 
best not seriously addressed this threat.
    You have never fully used the tools we provided in CAATSA, 
and at worst simply abetted Putin's efforts, withdrawing forces 
from Germany, failing to take action when evidence emerged that 
Russia was paying bounties to kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 
and twice redirecting funds from the European Deterrence 
Initiative to pay for President Trump's wasteful border wall in 
September of 2019 and April 2020.
    Meanwhile the Administration's confrontational bluster 
against China has not stopped China's march in the South China 
Sea, in Hong Kong, in suppressing and oppressing its own 
people.
    Our North Korea diplomacy, which you assured this committee 
you would have wrapped up within a year about 2 years ago, 
appears to have flat-lined, leaving North Korea with a more 
capable nuclear and ballistic missile program.
    Across Africa, the State Department has been woefully 
absent on issue after issue after issue, most recently in its 
engagement on negotiations related to management of Nile 
waters.
    In the western hemisphere, the entirety of our approach 
seems to be xenophobic, anti-immigrant hysteria, and bullying, 
all while gutting our institutional capacity to deal with the 
root causes of migration. There is bipartisan support for a 
Venezuela policy. Yet, your approach has left millions of 
Venezuelans still suffering, and the Administration will not 
even support those who are already exiled here. Even as we 
struggle with an opioid epidemic, you propose cutting our 
international narcotics and law enforcement.
    On climate change, your Department has not just failed to 
be part of the solution, but is becoming part of the problem, 
actively undermining international efforts to safeguard our 
planet's future.
    Our allies in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East routinely 
wonder out loud whether we can really be counted on.
    Our values have been denigrated from President Trump's 
reported green-lighting of concentration camps in Xinjiang to 
the revisionist and sometimes repulsive views espoused by your 
so-called Unalienable Rights Commission.
    In the face of a global pandemic when our scientists, our 
technology, and our diplomats should be leading the global 
response, we have instead taken a back seat and are witnessing 
the collapse of leadership both home and abroad.
    Rather than putting forth a real strategy, our leaders 
point fingers at China and the World Health Organization, are 
absent from critical global meetings, and refuse to be straight 
with Congress and the American people on the public health 
threat. All the while, infections and deaths surge across the 
country.
    Of course, as we all know, the strength of our diplomacy 
starts and ends with the strength of our diplomatic corps.
    Earlier this week, I released a report, Diplomacy in 
Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State 
Department. I have a copy here just in case you have not seen 
it. I would ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. It will be entered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Menendez. The report found a State Department at 
risk of catastrophic failure, with career diplomats describing 
a ``complete and utter disdain for their expertise,'' and even 
``a contempt for career employees,'' many asking ``if their 
service is still valued.''
    Even as President Trump refers to our diplomats as the 
``Deep State Department,'' you have stood at his shoulder and 
said nothing, exemplified by your refusal to stand behind 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch.
    The result is an exodus of expertise. Seven percent of the 
Department's staff left in the first year and a half of the 
Administration. While I realize that you were not at the 
Department during that time, the Department has continued to 
suffer persistent vacancies without Senate-confirmed nominees. 
In response, the Administration repeatedly puts forth 
candidates who do not possess the qualifications, the demeanor, 
nor the temperament to serve in leadership positions and 
represent the American people abroad.
    When you send us qualified nominees, Mr. Secretary, we act. 
We have confirmed more than 190 nominees, and dozens have 
advanced quickly and without incidence, but you continuously 
send us nominees who have misled Congress, who have made 
offensive or racist statements, who have sexual harassment 
lawsuits and allegations against them, who have supported 
torture, and whose conduct would disqualify them for service in 
any other Administration.
    The Administration promised us ``the best people, the very 
best, terrific, tremendous,'' but Mr. Secretary, the best 
people do not seem to want to work for you.
    Finally, let me just touch on a few oversight issues which 
I know you were passionate about as a former Member of 
Congress.
    At your direction, the President recently removed the State 
Department's Inspector General, who was investigating perhaps, 
among other things, last year's emergency declaration of arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia, about which I, along with a bipartisan 
group of colleagues, raised serious concerns.
    Additionally, we have learned of allegations of you using 
your office to promote your own personal, domestic political 
agenda, hosting lavish dinners at the Department and creating 
at least the appearance of using taxpayer resources to impress 
high profile political donors.
    While this hearing is ostensibly convened for the 
President's fiscal year 2021 budget request, you and I and 
everybody on this dais knows that the President's wish to 
completely gut our international affairs budget by a shocking 
34 percent is dead on arrival. That said, I have to say I must 
say I am tempted to provide you with a budget request and see 
how you could actually operate under it.
    Even if this budget hearing were not months after the fact 
and far too late in the legislative process, let me just say it 
is fundamentally misguided and unsuited to the needs of 
safeguarding our nation's security.
    Now, I recognize you will take issue with much of what I 
have said, Mr. Secretary, but facts are stubborn things.
    When you entered office, I offered a hand to work with you 
in areas where we could have built real agendas with bipartisan 
political buy-in: Venezuela, Iran, Russia, China, and indeed, I 
am disappointed.
    As I look at your tenure in office and at the track record 
of this Administration, I am disappointed that instead of 
making America first among the nations of the world, you have 
instead relinquished our leadership to the applause and 
approval of China and Russia. That makes America last.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. As we proceed--first, let me say, obviously, 
those views are the views of Senator Menendez, individually, 
not those of this chairman or the majority of this committee.
    For the members of this committee, we have an 11:30 hard 
stop. That will give us time for a round of questions. I am 
going to take a short break about halfway through.
    As usual, we would stick with what has been the 
longstanding commitment of this committee for civility. When 
the witness is asked a question, we are going to give the 
witness a full opportunity to answer that question and not 
interrupt his answer simply because he is doing so well at 
answering the question. I will enforce that strictly.
    With that, Secretary Pompeo, the floor is yours.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may have a 
parliamentary inquiry. You just discussed the procedural 
process.
    If we are going to have answers that are filibusters, I do 
not expect that we are going to allow that either.
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez, I will run the committee 
and I will do it as I have indicated. We are not going to 
interrupt answers from the witness.
    With that, Secretary Pompeo.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member 
Menendez. I have a full statement. In the interest of time, I 
will just read the first approximately one-third of that. If I 
could get your agreement to put the rest of the statement, I 
would appreciate that.
    The Chairman. We will do that, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Pompeo. Thank you very much.
    Today I am here to present the and testify about the 
President's 2021 budget. It requests nearly $41 billion for the 
State Department and USAID, enabling both agencies to protect 
U.S. citizens, increase American prosperity, and advance the 
development of democratic societies. Critically, it reflects a 
commitment to the strategic, efficient use of resources to 
provide better results for the American people.
    That is the top line analysis, but I want to make a broader 
point that our diplomatic expenditures reflect America's 
values.
    Two weeks ago in Philadelphia, I unveiled the report of the 
State Department's Commission on Unalienable Rights. My message 
that day was simple: the Trump administration places our 
founding principles at the very core of American diplomacy. I 
want to talk about how we have done that in three areas.
    First, securing the American people's freedoms against 
authoritarian threats, securing American lives during the 
pandemic, and helping friends across the world secure those 
very unalienable rights.
    On authoritarian threats, we have evaluated the world with 
the same realism that the American Founders did. We see the 
Islamic Republic of Iran for what it is, an aggressor not a 
victim. We have gone full bore on our maximum pressure 
campaign. Since May of 2018, we have slashed the vital oil 
revenues the regime uses for terrorism and illegal nuclear 
activities by 90 percent. We have rallied nations to our side 
through diplomacy. Witness the designations of Hezbollah from 
European and South American countries. We have bolstered our 
military companies vis-a-vis Tehran.
    There is more work to do. The Security Council must renew 
the UN arms embargo against Iran before it expires on October 
18.
    Iran already mines ships in the Strait of Hormuz, launches 
missile at Saudi oil facilities, and ships arms to the Houthis.
    Should the Security Council fail to act, Iran will have a 
freer hand to sow destruction across the Middle East and indeed 
the world.
    Russia, too, is a destabilizing authoritarian force in 
Ukraine, in Libya, in Syria, and inside of Western democracies.
    This Administration has acted to protect our interests and 
our friends. We have issued the Crimea Declaration. We have 
supplied Ukraine with lethal military hardware. We have 
sanctioned more than 360 Russian targets for everything from 
human rights abuses to supporting the murderous Assad regime, 
to operating mercenaries and proxy forces around the world.
    The State Department's fiscal year 2021 request for the 
Global Engagement Center is $138 million, more than double its 
current level. We will not tolerate disinformation and other 
propaganda directed by the Kremlin or any of our other 
adversaries.
    Further on Russia, 2 weeks ago, the State Department 
removed Nord Stream 2's exemption under CAATSA, and in 
December, the Administration's swift implementation of PEESA, 
an important bipartisan endeavor, effectively halted 
construction of the pipeline.
    We are the toughest Administration ever on Russia.
    Most importantly, on China, we see the Chinese Communist 
Party also for what it is: the central threat of our times. Our 
vigorous diplomacy has helped lead an international awakening 
to the threat of the CCP.
    Senators, the tide is turning. 30-plus countries and 
territories have become 5G clean countries, banning untrusted 
vendors from their networks. When we talked about this a year 
ago, that number was in the single digits.
    In our hemisphere, Canada has stood firm against the 
Chinese Communist Party's hostage-taking. Its three major 
telecom carriers have also banned untrusted vendors.
    Belize and Haiti have denounced Beijing's national security 
law targeting Hong Kong.
    Denmark has rejected the CCP's attempted censorship of 
Danish newspapers.
    Sweden has closed its Confucius Institutes.
    Lithuanian intelligence services identified China as a 
potential threat for the first time.
    In the region, in the Indo-Pacific, Australia declared 
China's South China Sea claims unlawful and illegitimate, as 
have we.
    We are proud to have stepped up maritime maneuvers in that 
body of water alongside our friends from Australia and Japan 
and the United Kingdom.
    India has banned 106 Chinese applications that threatened 
its citizens' privacy and security.
    Our diplomatic efforts are working and momentum is building 
to mitigate the threats that the Chinese Communist Party 
presents.
    All 10 ASEAN nations have insisted that the South China Sea 
disputes must be settled on the basis of international law, 
including UNCLOS.
    Japan led the G7's condemnation of China's national 
security law targeting Hong Kong.
    The EU condemned the law too and also declared China a 
systemic rival just last year.
    We have agreed to start a dialogue channel focused solely 
on China at the EU's request.
    At NATO, Secretary General Stoltenberg has called to make 
China a greater part of that alliance's focus as well.
    We led a multilateral effort to ensure that the United 
Nations World Intellectual Property Organization elected a 
director from a country that actually gave a darn about 
intellectual property rights.
    Our Quad, the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, 
has been reinvigorated.
    We have worked hard at this. Our diplomats have done 
wonderful work. I am very proud of the progress we are making.
    In addition to these multilateral efforts, the Department 
of Justice is cracking down on Chinese IP threats.
    We sanctioned Chinese leaders for their brutality in 
Xinjiang, imposed export controls on companies that support it, 
and warned U.S. businesses against using slave labor in their 
supply chains.
    We have terminated special treatment agreements with Hong 
Kong in response to the CCP's actions to deny freedom to the 
people of Hong Kong.
    We closed our consulate in Houston because it was a den of 
spies.
    Our budget reflects the reality on the ground. We requested 
nearly $1.5 billion for foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific 
region, a 20 percent increase from the 2020 request. We want 
that part of the world to be free and open and prosperous.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I will close and am happy to take 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Pompeo follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Secretary Michael R. Pompeo

    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the 
President's FY 2021 Budget.
    This budget requests nearly $41 billion for the State Department 
and USAID, enabling both agencies to protect U.S. citizens, increase 
American prosperity, and advance the development of democratic 
societies.
    It generously supports key allies and partners like Colombia, 
Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.
    It includes $1.1 billion worth of investments in the State 
Department's global workforce, including staffing, training, and 
leveraging strategic data assets.
    And, critically, it reflects a commitment to the strategic, 
efficient use of resources to provide better results for the American 
people.
    That's the topline analysis. But I want to make a broader point 
that our diplomatic expenditures reflect American values: 2 weeks ago 
in Philadelphia, I unveiled the report of the State Department's 
Commission on Unalienable Rights.
    My message that day was simple: The Trump administration places our 
founding principles at the core of American diplomacy.
    Today I'd like to talk about how we've done it in three areas: 
Securing the American people's freedoms against authoritarian threats. 
Securing American lives during the pandemic. And helping friends across 
the world secure their own unalienable rights.
    First, on authoritarian threats: We've evaluated the world with the 
same realism the American founders did.
    We see the Islamic Republic of Iran for what it is: an aggressor, 
not a victim.
    We've gone full bore on our maximum pressure campaign.
    Since May 2018, we've slashed the vital oil revenues the regime 
uses for terrorism and illegal nuclear activities by 90 percent.
    We've rallied nations to our side through diplomacy--witness the 
designations of Hezbollah from European and South American friends.
    And we've bolstered our military readiness vis-a-vis Tehran.
    There's more work to do. The Security Council must renew the UN 
arms embargo against Iran before it expires on October 18.
    Iran already mines ships in the Strait of Hormuz, launches missiles 
at Saudi oil facilities, ships arms to the Houthis, and supports the 
illegitimate Maduro regime.
    If the Security Council fails to act, Iran will have a freer hand 
to sow destruction across the Middle East, and indeed the world.
    Russia too, is a destabilizing authoritarian force--in Ukraine, 
Syria, Libya, and inside Western democracies.
    This Administration has acted to protect our interests and our 
friends: We've issued the Crimea Declaration.
    We've supplied Ukraine with lethal military hardware.
    We've sanctioned more than 360 Russian targets for everything from 
human rights abuses, to supporting the murderous Assad regime, to 
operating mercenaries and proxy forces around the world.
    And the State Department's FY 2021 request for the Global 
Engagement Center is $138 million--more than double the current level. 
We won't tolerate disinformation and propaganda directed by the Kremlin 
or other adversaries.
    Further on Russia: 2 weeks ago, the State Department removed Nord 
Stream 2's exemption under CAATSA.
    And in December, the Administration's swift implementation of 
PEESA--an important bipartisan endeavor--effectively halted 
construction of the pipeline.
    We are the toughest Administration ever on Russia.
    And most importantly, China. We see the Chinese Communist Party for 
what it is: The central threat of our times.
    Our vigorous diplomacy has helped lead an international awakening 
to the threat of the CCP. Senators, the tide is turning: 30-plus 
countries and territories have become 5G ``Clean Countries,'' banning 
untrusted 5G vendors from their networks.
    In our hemisphere, Canada has stood firm against the CCP's hostage-
taking. Its three major telecom carriers have also banned untrusted 
vendors.
    Belize and Haiti have denounced Beijing's national security law 
targeting Hong Kong.
    In Europe, the U.K. has offered refuge to millions of Hong Kongers, 
and members of the U.K. Parliament have stood up a China Research Group 
to focus on the CCP threat.
    Denmark has rejected the CCP's attempted censorship of Danish 
newspapers and is alarmed by Chinese activity in the Arctic.
    Sweden closed all its Confucius Institutes.
    Lithuanian intelligence services identified China as a potential 
threat for the first time.
    In the Indo-Pacific, Australia declared China's South China Sea 
claims unlawful and illegitimate, as have we.
    We're proud to have stepped up maritime maneuvers in that body of 
water alongside friends like Australia, India, Japan, and the UK.
    India has banned 106 Chinese apps, including TikTok, that 
threatened its citizens' privacy and security.
    Momentum is building to mitigate CCP threats in multilateral 
settings, too: All 10 ASEAN nations have insisted that South China Sea 
disputes must be settled on the basis of international law, including 
UNCLOS.
    Japan led the G7's condemnation of China's national security law 
targeting Hong Kong.
    The EU condemned the law too, and also declared China a ``systemic 
rival'' last year.
    We've agreed to start a dialogue channel focused solely on China--
at the EU's request.
    Secretary General Stoltenberg has called for NATO to make China a 
greater part of the alliance's focus.
    We led a multilateral effort to ensure the UN's World Intellectual 
Property Organization elected a director from a country that actually 
respects intellectual property rights.
    The U.S., Australia, India, and Japan have reinvigorated the 
``Quad'' grouping.
    The new Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China--many of its members 
European leaders, in addition to Senators Menendez and Rubio--is 
growing.
    And for America's part, no Administration, Republican or Democrat, 
has been as aggressive in confronting China's malign actions as 
President Trump's: Our Department of Justice is cracking down hard on 
Chinese IP theft.
    We've sanctioned Chinese leaders for their brutality in Xinjiang, 
imposed export controls on companies supporting it, and warned U.S. 
companies against using slave labor in their supply chains.
    We've terminated special treatment agreements with Hong Kong in 
response to the CCP's crackdown.
    We closed the consulate in Houston because it was a den of spies.
    Our budget reflects realities on the ground. For example, we've 
requested $1.49 billion for foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific 
region, a 20 percent increase from the FY 2020 request. We want that 
part of the world to be free, open, and prosperous.
    Moving onto my second set of points . . . I want to make sure the 
American people know about the outstanding work their State Department 
did to save American lives as the pandemic from Wuhan spread throughout 
the world.
    From January 27 to June 10, our team successfully repatriated more 
than 100,000 Americans from 136 countries and territories.
    Many of these folks were in very vulnerable situations--senior 
citizens running low on medication, pregnant women needing medical 
care, and even an individual on a ventilator in Bhutan.
    We've also taken major steps to protect our diplomats around the 
world: We OK'd Global Authorized Departures for any at-risk team member 
to leave their post and get home.
    We pre-positioned medevac aircraft so planes could be wheels up 
within 6 hours to get our diplomats to the best medical facilities 
possible.
    We instituted thorough social distancing, telework, cleaning, and 
visitor screening precautions. We've given offices discretion to decide 
what's best for their teams and their rotations, and right now we're 
bringing back our teams in a conditions-based, phased approach.
    Finally, even as we've adjusted to the pandemic, the State 
Department and USAID have continued America's signature mission of 
upholding the unalienable rights of people around the world.
    To save lives in allied and partner countries, State and USAID have 
pledged $1.5 billion in financial support, supplies, and expertise to 
more than 120 countries since the outbreak began, as part of the U.S. 
Government's world-leading $20.5 billion to benefit the international 
response.
    We're proud to supplement the incredible generosity of the American 
people, who have given nearly $5 billion out of their own pockets to 
help those in need.
    But that's not all. We're also economically empowering women in the 
developing world. Our budget invests $200 million for our Women's 
Global Development and Prosperity (W-GDP) fund at USAID, doubling our 
commitment from last year. I want to thank senators Shaheen and Graham, 
and others for working with the Trump administration to move forward 
new legislation on this initiative.
    In the same vein of protecting unalienable rights, we've fought for 
the fundamental right to religious freedom.
    Our two State Department ministerials have galvanized global 
momentum to protect the right to worship. Our budget request provides 
$150 million to support persecuted communities globally.
    My administration colleagues and I take seriously the words of our 
first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson:

        ``Almighty God [has] created the mind free . . . No man shall 
        be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship or 
        ministry, or shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
        opinions or belief.''

    There are many more achievements we know Americans support: 
Destroying the ISIS caliphate; working with Mexico and Central American 
countries to address illegal immigration and a broken asylum-seeking 
system; bringing home Americans wrongfully detained abroad like Pastor 
Andrew Brunson, and Michael White; I could go on.
    I'm proud of a foreign policy that draws on our founding principles 
to confront threats, protect our people, and secure liberty for 
mankind. I hope you are too.
    And with that, I'm happy to take questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate that.
    We are going to do questioning on a seniority basis since 
it is the Secretary, a cabinet level, as opposed to the usual 
first come rule. Again, I would ask each member to be 
respectful of other members and stick to the 5 minutes you are 
allotted. Once we have gone around, we will make a 
determination of where we are going to go from there.
    With that, Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I see 7 minutes on the 
clock. Is that what it is going to be?
    The Chairman. I intended to do a five. Let us do a seven 
because that will just about take up the time, but we are going 
to have to stick right to that seven because otherwise people 
are not going to get a chance. So we will do seven.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, as I outlined in my 
opening statement, Vladimir Putin's investment in Donald Trump 
prior to the 2016 election clearly continues to pay off 
handsomely.
    Withdrawing troops from Germany. Troops in Germany is not 
about Germany. Troops in Germany is about our own national 
security interests.
    Redirecting funds from the European Deterrence Initiative. 
That is an initiative, as you well know, to deter Russia to pay 
for the President's ineffective border wall.
    Refusing to follow the law and impose meaningful sanctions 
under CAATSA.
    Perhaps most shocking, while we have all known for some 
time that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, both arms 
and resources, imposing bounties on the heads of U.S. service 
members is an outrageous escalation. President Trump 
astonishingly admitted in an interview on Tuesday that he has 
never raised the issue with Mr. Putin, even though he has 
spoken to him about seven times this year alone.
    Mr. Secretary, do you consider how you would react to such 
behavior from a Democratic President if you were sitting in 
your old House seat? Would you be okay with a President who 
abandoned our troops, but not even raising this with the 
Kremlin?
    Secretary Pompeo. Ranking Member, you have identified four 
items where you are concerned about our actions with respect to 
Russia. I would like to address each of them. That is what I 
think about as Secretary of State.
    Senator Menendez. I only asked one question.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I do not spend much time thinking 
about what I would have done were I still in the House of 
Representatives. I am very focused on my job as Secretary of 
State today.
    Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. Have you raised 
concerns with Russia, its Foreign Minister Lavrov, with respect 
to Russia reportedly placing bounties on the heads of service 
members in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Pompeo. I want to be very careful about what is a 
public record and what is intelligence-based, but yes, I can 
assure you and the American people that each time I have spoken 
with Foreign Minister Lavrov, I have raised all of the issues 
that put any American interests at risk, whether that is our 
soldiers on the ground in Syria, soldiers on the ground in 
Afghanistan, the activities that are taking place in Libya, the 
actions in Ukraine. Each and every one of these that 
potentially threaten American interests are things that I 
raised in my conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov, and I 
speak with some frequency.
    Senator Menendez. I appreciate that answer. I asked you 
specifically have you raised--this in the public sphere. I am 
not talking about classified materials.
    Secretary Pompeo. It does not mean it is not classified, 
Senator.
    Senator Menendez. There are public reports very well 
documented that the Russians were supposedly paying bounties to 
kill our service members. Have you raised that issue with 
Foreign Minister Lavrov?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am going to be more careful 
than you are being with respect to the intelligence. I am going 
to tell you that make no mistake about it. The proper people 
have been aware of every single threat to our soldiers on the 
ground in Afghanistan whether that was General Miller or my 
team at the embassy there in Kabul. Anytime there was a 
tactical threat on the lives or the health or the safety and 
security or our assets in place, we have this with our Russian 
counterparts not only at my level, but Ambassador Sullivan and 
every one of our team that interacts with the Russians. We have 
made very clear our expectations not to threaten us in 
Afghanistan.
    Senator Menendez. Let me turn to a few other questions. 
Maybe you can answer these just simply yes or no. I think they 
are just factual in nature.
    Did Turkey purchase the S-400 system from the Russian 
Federation?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Did Turkey pay approximately $2.5 billion 
for that system?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not aware of the amount of 
the transaction.
    Senator Menendez. They did pay them whatever the amount is. 
Right?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I believe that is correct 
although, Senator, let me just--I apologize. I am not certain 
that the cash has been exchanged.
    Senator Menendez. Does the Turkish Government currently 
have the S-400 in its possession?
    Secretary Pompeo. It has an S-400, yes.
    Senator Menendez. Did Turkey test the S-400 radar on an 
American built F-16 in November of 2019, as was publicly 
reported?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to answer that 
question. I am not going to discuss classified information in 
this setting.
    Senator Menendez. Has the President raised the S-400 with 
President Erdogan?
    Secretary Pompeo. I do not talk about things that the 
President speaks about with foreign counterparts. The White 
House is free to do that if they choose, but I am not going to.
    Senator Menendez. So let me ask you a simple question. You 
sent me a response on Monday saying that you take your 
responsibilities under CAATSA seriously and that you fully 
intend to comply with the law. Well, all of these elements 
clearly are in violation of CAATSA. So over a year since all of 
these facts have attached. When will the Administration follow 
the law and impose CAATSA sanctions on Turkey?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, in response to the Turkish 
Government's acquisition of the S-400, we have taken 
significant actions that have had a real impact on Turkey. We 
have pulled out a very significant weapons program that they 
were building significant pieces of inside of Turkey, the F-35 
program. We continue to evaluate how to apply sanctions in 
order to achieve our end objective. Our end objective is not to 
punish. It is to ensure that our NATO partner acts in a way 
that is consistent with American national security and the 
security of our NATO partners as well. Our diplomats, 
Ambassador Satterfield, on the ground are working diligently.
    Senator Menendez. I had a very pointed question. I know 
that you are a Harvard graduate, West Point graduate. You know 
what my question was. It is not about everything else. It is 
about CAATSA, but you have decided not to answer that.
    So let me go to the final question. You had the Inspector 
General of the State Department, Mr. Linick, ultimately fired. 
Is that correct?
    Secretary Pompeo. I recommended to the President that he be 
terminated, yes.
    Senator Menendez. You recommended it to the President that 
he be terminated, why? Because he was conducting investigations 
that may affect you?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, at the time I made the 
recommendation to the President, I was unaware of any of the 
investigations that were ongoing, that he had ongoing at the 
time, with one exception. I was aware of an investigation that 
he had asked me to provide testimony. I provided that 
testimony. Other than that, I was unaware of any investigation. 
It is not remotely the reason.
    Senator Menendez. Was your Under Secretary, Mr. Bulatao, 
aware, and did he not speak to you about it?
    Secretary Pompeo. He did not speak to me about it.
    Senator Menendez. Well, you said that the IG was not 
performing in the way he should have because he was not 
following, in essence, what you wanted to. Well, inspector 
generals are not supposed to follow what the department head 
wants to. They are supposed to be independent in pursuit of 
their mission.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for your 
service.
    I think we can all acknowledge the world is a complex and 
messy place. As the ranking member said, facts are stubborn 
things and administrations have track records.
    Just a quick review. You came into office--President Trump 
came into office with a big mess, a lot of messes that he had 
to clean up. Let me just go through them.
    Libya, a failed state because of President Obama's actions.
    Syria had gone from a few hundred dead over his 
Administration to basically a genocide, about a half a million 
people killed in Syria.
    What I consider as one of the historic blunders in foreign 
policy, the removal of troops from Iraq allowed ISIS to rise 
from the thoroughly defeated ashes of al Qaeda in Iraq.
    Crimea had been illegally annexed, eastern Ukraine invaded. 
President Obama did not provide the lethal defensive weaponry 
on a unanimous basis that Congress authorized him to do.
    North Korea was rampantly testing missiles and their 
nuclear weapons.
    Iran. Through that agreement, it changed their behavior for 
the worst. It emboldened them.
    Of course, illegal immigration, primarily in the form of 
family units exploiting laws that were not being enforced in 
this country, was exploding.
    So President Trump came into office with a lot of foreign 
policy messes.
    By the way, the last time I looked, under this 
Administration we have started no new wars. We have destroyed 
the physical caliphate of ISIS. General Soleimani, al Baghdadi 
are off the field.
    President Trump actually provided those lethal defensive 
weaponry, the Javelins, which helped stabilize the situation in 
Iran.
    Quite honestly, we have done a pretty good job at reducing 
that out-of-control illegal immigration from the southern 
border by diplomacy with Guatemala, is one of the things that 
occurred there.
    So I think we have to put those track records and compare 
them and talk honestly about these things.
    Now, the ranking member has been pretty brutal regarding 
the firing of Inspector General Linick. I was copied on a 
letter that Under Secretary of Management Bulatao wrote to Mr. 
Horowitz. I have read it. It is somewhat complex. I just want 
to give you an opportunity to talk about what happened.
    By the way, I am very sensitive to inspector generals--or 
trying to push inspector generals to investigate the leaks out 
of these departments. There were 126 leaks having to do with 
national security in the first 125 days of this Administration. 
That needs to be investigated. If you could describe the leaks 
that you were concerned about and exactly how Inspector General 
Linick did not handle that the way you thought it should be 
handled.
    Secretary Pompeo. Sure. So, thank you, Senator Johnson.
    Let me just say I value inspectors general as well. I had a 
great relationship with the Inspector General at the CIA when I 
was there. He did his job. He took care of the team. He was 
critical of the agency when we got it wrong. I know what a good 
IG can do. Inspector General Linick was not that.
    The incident you are referring to is that we had a very 
sensitive Inspector General report. When the final draft was 
prepared, it leaked. The Politico reporter I think said it came 
from two people close to the investigation. At that point, it 
was basically the IG's office and a couple others that actually 
knew about it and the full report, which had a real impact on 
senior State Department officials' lives. When we confronted 
the Inspector General, he was defensive. We then asked him to 
undertake a process. He ignored that request to inspect, to 
have a separate IG come and investigate.
    It is pretty complicated, but suffice it to say he did not 
comply with the instructions about how we felt that leak needed 
to be investigated so that we could have an independent 
investigator do it, and then he was not candid about that 
process either. He did not act with integrity throughout that 
process in a way that inspector generals have to be counted on 
to behave.
    Senator Johnson. Well, I have my own issues with Inspector 
General Linick. I will not go into those.
    Right now, I am being falsely--Senator Grassley and I are 
being falsely accused of peddling in Russian disinformation. 
Because of Acting Director of National Intelligence Grenell's 
efforts to declassify four footnotes in the Michael Horowitz's 
IG report, we now know that the Russian disinformation that was 
involved in the 2016 campaign was bought and paid for by the 
DNC, the Clinton campaign, and contained in the Steele dossier. 
That is the truth. That is the Russian--I have heard no outrage 
on the part of our Democratic colleagues about that Russian 
disinformation.
    We are still undergoing our investigation, and we are 
trying to see documents out of the State Department involved in 
the Steele dossier.
    Let me just ask you a specific question. In October 2016, 
former State Department official, Jonathan Winer, arranged for 
Christopher Steele to provide other State Department officials 
the anti-Trump dossier he compiled for the DNC and the Clinton 
campaign. That same month, Mr. Winer gave Mr. Steele 
information collected by Clinton supporters which Mr. Steele 
then passed on to the FBI.
    This conduct raises serious concerns under the Hatch Act, 
Federal Records Act, and other Department policies. Although 
then-IG Linick acknowledged conducting a review of this 
conduct, he has not published any of his findings and admitted 
that the OIG did not interview any of the key players.
    Are you aware of these issues? Can you commit that the 
Department will be responsive to our requests from Senator 
Grassley and myself? We need these documents.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we will do our best to be 
responsive. We understand the request. We are working through 
it, and yes, I am familiar with the information that you set 
forth there with respect to the behavior that took place in 
October of 2016 in the State Department.
    Senator Johnson. Were there any other specific instances 
that caused you to ask for the removal of Inspector General 
Linick?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, there were. There were several.
    Look, at the end, it is about the core mission 
accomplishing the core function. One of the central functions 
to make sure that we can represent to you all that the 
financial statement for the State Department is accurate, we 
have an audit team to do that. Inspector General Linick screwed 
that up. I will read from the investigative report. It said 
oversight by the OIG was demonstrably ineffective, ultimately 
placing the Department's information, as well as the 
reputation, human capital, and operations at considerable and 
unnecessary risk. That is an enormous failure for one of the 
most important tasks that the IG's office does, conduct the 
audit of the State Department's books.
    There is a handful of others. He refused to take care of 
his team in important ways. There were 10 percent fewer audits 
of our posts around the world. One of the most important 
functions, aside from the audit, is to travel around to posts 
and conduct audits to make sure that they are conducting 
business appropriately. We were down about 10 percent.
    I must tell you morale inside the IG's office of all--we 
have 38 Assistant Secretary level bureaus. The IG's office was 
the worst survey results of any of those 38. He did not take 
care of his people either.
    Senator Johnson. He also did not investigate the improper 
use of personal emails in the State Department, which was 
rampant under the previous Administration.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cardin. America's strength is in our values. We are 
the global leader for democratic values. We have been so 
recognized, and we have worked with the international community 
as the leader of the free world, with other countries that 
share our values. We led in that. One of the best examples was 
the passage of the Magnitsky sanctions, the Global Magnitsky, 
which was not just bipartisan. It was pretty much universal 
here in supporting and promoting U.S. values. I was glad to 
work with the late Senator McCain on the passage of that 
legislation. Now Canada, Europe, Australia are all following 
our leadership to enforce universally recognized democratic 
values.
    So when the United States isolates itself from our 
traditional allies, it affects our credibility as a global 
leader of the free world in promoting democratic values. So 
when we pulled out of the climate agreement, when we isolated 
ourselves on Iran, when our trade policies have been more 
bilateral rather than working with other countries in order to 
try to advance our causes against non-market economies or 
government-controlled economies, all that affects America's 
credibility.
    So when I look at your budget, I see a decline of 35 
percent in democracy funds. To me I do not understand that 
cut--35 percent--if we are going to be the leader in democratic 
values.
    Then I was pleased to hear you mention as the first order 
of your remarks today human rights and values, American values, 
but I was disappointed that you used the Commission on 
Unalienable Rights as the example. I say that because in my 
conversations with human rights advocates not just here, but 
globally, they look at the United States trying to promote a 
political agenda on rights rather than working with the 
international community, the free world, on democratic 
principles of human rights.
    So tell me how this commission has engaged the activists 
globally that are fighting every day for human rights when it 
is very much tied towards a particular political view rather 
than a universal view on human rights.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate the answer to talk 
a little bit about the commission and the objective I set out 
now just over a year ago with respect to it.
    I would urge everyone to take a look at it and read it. I 
think they did phenomenal work. I do not agree with everything 
that is in there. I do not think any of the 10 members that 
came from broad religious backgrounds, broad political 
backgrounds--I do not think any of the 10 of them agreed with 
just everything in there.
    What it set out to do was take on what is an enormous 
crisis in the 20th Century's Human Rights Project. We are in a 
really bad place all around the world. It was my view, as I 
watched the State Department, our DRL, all the folks who work 
on this who are great and amazing people--I watched as they 
were unmoored. They did not have a founding. So I wanted to go 
back and talk about how do we moor American foreign policy and 
American human rights policy and the traditions of the United 
States. So that is what the commission was asked to do.
    Senator Cardin. Well, I guess what I do not understand is 
what was the problem that you were trying to solve? There has 
been a great deal of debate----
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Cardin. --in establishing universal values of human 
rights, which has been the core for democratic states. Now, all 
of a sudden, we are picking winners and losers, but it looks 
like it is done on a political basis.
    Let me move to a second subject, if I might, on arms sales. 
We have a proud tradition of making sure that when we supply 
arms to other countries, that they are not used against our 
human rights values. We have seen in recent years that arms 
provided by the United States have ended up in the hands of 
actors that we do not want to see get those arms.
    What oversight are you deploying to make sure that arms 
that we make available to other countries are used for the 
intended purpose and do not end up for the wrong use?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have an elaborate process to 
do our best to verify that that does not happen. It is not that 
we do not have escapes, that there are not failures. It is 
certainly the case. That has been true for an awfully long 
time, but we have an elaborate process to validate and verify. 
We require representations. We do verification. We do 
inspections. We have big teams in multiple departments that 
have responsibility for doing their best to ensure that 
American weapon systems are used for their intended purpose 
when we sell them or provide them to our partners and allies 
around the world.
    Senator Cardin. Let me make this offer. I think this 
committee can help you in that regard. The jurisdictional 
battle between Defense and State sometimes presents challenges. 
State has the principal role for a good reason. There is some 
legislation that I have authored that would help in that 
regard. I would hope that you would engage us to give you the 
tools you need to take on sometimes the military aspects of the 
Defense Department that may not be as sensitive to these 
values.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate that very much. I 
do think the State Department is the proper place to lodge the 
primary responsibility for that activity. So I welcome your 
efforts there.
    Senator Cardin. The GAO recently issued a report that I had 
requested in regards to diversity, and the report is titled 
``State Department: Additional Steps Are Needed to Identify 
Potential Barriers to Diversity.'' They point out that from the 
period from 2002, well before your time, to 2018, we have seen 
a decline of minorities in positions within the State 
Department. It is particularly pronounced within the higher 
ranks.
    What steps are you taking to implement the GAO concerns?
    Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, I have seen that GAO report. 
I have seen the internal work we have done.
    I would characterize it over the last--that you were 
talking about from 2002 over the last decade roughly as flat. 
That is not good enough. That is multiple parties. This is not 
partisan at all. We want to get this right.
    We have undertaken a number of things. We have about a 
third today of our members who are minorities--excuse me--about 
44 percent of them are women. We have developed the Pickering-
Rangel program to bring more people in. We had double the 
applications this year. We have a big team that works on 
diversity and inclusion. We are almost finished with a major 
study that was begun, now I think, 13 months ago run by Carol 
Perez, our DGHR, to look at the failures. There has been a lot 
of money and effort on diversity and inclusion over this last 
decade with, to your point, relatively good outcomes for 
acquisition of new talented people, but less so at the senior 
levels. We are trying to identify why we have----
    Senator Cardin. I hope we could work together on that.
    Last point, just a point on the Western Hemisphere, on 
ranking. I would just urge you to evaluate working with us on 
the aid to the Northern Triangle to make sure that they have 
the help from the United States to deal with the economic 
issues which takes away the pressure of migration from the 
Northern Triangle.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
    Senator Gardner.
    Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary, for your service and being here 
today.
    Over the last several years on the Asia Subcommittee, we 
have been working together on this committee to shape a new 
policy toward the Indo-Pacific. The region, obviously, is 
burgeoning in population and promising commercial growth, and 
it is critical for global security and economic stability, but 
North Korea continues to seek nuclear weapons and to threaten 
its neighbors.
    China is an emerging global power that is intimidating its 
neighbors, brutally suppressing its own citizens, and 
attempting to remake the world order in its own image.
    In Burma, the military is committing grievous human rights 
abuses against the minority Rohingya population.
    It is more important than ever that the United States 
maintains a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, reaffirms 
alliances, encourages economic cooperation, and promotes human 
rights and the rule of law.
    The Administration and Congress must be united on 
implementing a long-term strategy that will benefit American 
national security interests, promote American businesses, and 
create jobs through trade promotion and opportunities, and 
project American values of respect for the human rights and 
freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.
    This includes countering China's growing militarization of 
the South China Sea and increasing malign influence in 
Southeast Asia, as well as ensuring that complete, verified, 
and irreversible denuclearization is achieved on the Korean 
Peninsula, as codified in U.S. law.
    The United States has always been and will always remain a 
Pacific power, and legislation like my Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act, or ARIA, ensures that the U.S. Government will 
speak with one voice to reassure our allies and to deter our 
adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region.
    In 2018, the Asia Subcommittee held a three-part hearing 
series. We talked about democracy, human rights, and rule of 
law. We found that mass concentration camps for Uighur Muslims 
necessitated a serious response from the U.S. and the 
international community, that crackdowns in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region are intensifying while Beijing continues to 
refuse negotiations with the Central Tibetan Administration, 
that human rights defenders in China are routinely jailed and 
tortured. I was obviously pleased to see that several Chinese 
officials were sanctioned for abuses against Uighurs and even 
11 Chinese entities implicated in similar abuses were added to 
the Commerce Department's Entity List.
    What is the Administration doing to address further Global 
Magnitsky sanctions and other remedies for these abuses?
    Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator Gardner, thanks. I am 
familiar with ARIA. It is great work. I want to thank this 
committee and frankly a broader group of Senators for the 
bipartisan legislation that we had with respect to the Uighurs 
and with respect to Hong Kong democracy, as well. It is very 
powerful when I can talk to my counterparts around the world 
and say that I have not only the support of Congress, but a 
bipartisan, almost unanimous support on our policy with respect 
to securing freedom against the threats that the Chinese 
Communist Party is presenting.
    As for what we will continue to do in western China with 
respect to the horrific human rights violations that are taking 
place against the ethnic minorities there, I do not want to get 
in front of the final decisions, but you can rest assured that 
there are further actions, including further actions with 
respect to human rights violations that the Department of State 
and the Department of the Treasury are working to complete.
    Senator Gardner. Mr. Secretary, yesterday I do not know if 
you had a chance to see some of the hearing in the House of 
Representatives regarding some of the tech companies operating 
in the United States. I will read you some of the comments they 
made. When asked whether or not China is stealing information 
from them, Apple CEO Tim Cook said he had no personal knowledge 
about Chinese technology theft. Jeff Bezos has no firsthand 
experience beyond knock-off products. Google CEO has said that 
they did not have any experience, later had clarified that 
remark.
    Can you talk a little bit about tech in China and what you 
see what is happening? Is it true that there is no Chinese 
technology theft of U.S. companies?
    Secretary Pompeo. Well, they need to get out more. I mean, 
there is a long history, decades-long history of Chinese 
intellectual property theft, including against technologies. I 
hear it. It is sometimes the case you hear it privately because 
there are continued threats made against their businesses that 
are operating not only in China, but threats to businesses that 
are actually working in other parts of Asia and Southeast Asia, 
as well. The Chinese Communist Party is completely willing to 
bully and to threaten to get companies to----
    Senator Gardner. Do you work with these tech companies at 
the State Department on intellectual property theft, cyber 
attack, those kinds of things?
    Secretary Pompeo. We do. We work closely with them, and on 
the side of protecting cyber, we have actually had some good 
work where we have worked alongside each other on important 
projects where we have reduced risk. So I thank them for that.
    The idea that anyone in the tech space could not know of 
what the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to steal and the 
cyber attacks they are making seems incredulous.
    Senator Gardner. In March of this year, as it related to 
some Chinese misinformation and the dissemination of 
misinformation when it came to the COVID-19 propaganda China 
was spreading, I suggested that the National Security Council 
set up a task force at the White House to counter that 
disinformation.
    Are the tech companies doing enough to combat Chinese 
disinformation?
    Secretary Pompeo. No. There is always more that they can 
do. There is more we can do as well.
    On that particular front, I must say I actually think the 
world mounted a very effective counter-campaign against the 
Chinese disinformation. As I have traveled and as I have spoken 
to my counterparts, I think the world understands that this 
virus emanated from China, from Wuhan in particular, and I 
think the world understands that the Chinese Communist Party 
showed up with PPE that did not work and covered up what they 
knew about that when they could have prevented this spread. So 
I think the Chinese efforts at disinformation have actually 
failed in this case.
    Senator Gardner. The Taiwan situation. I wanted to just ask 
a question about bilateral trade agreements and opportunities 
for Taiwan. Yesterday, I sent a letter to U.S. Trade 
Representative Lighthizer, Ambassador Lighthizer, asking for 
the U.S. to begin engaging in a bilateral trade agreement with 
Taiwan.
    Can you talk a little bit about the Administration's 
pursuit of such an agreement?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator Gardner, I would prefer to leave 
that to Ambassador Lighthizer to talk about that. We are aware 
that there is great interest in this. The State Department will 
have its part in that, but our primary work with respect to 
Taiwan is different from the trade piece of this. We have been 
diligent about making sure that we honor the commitments that 
we have made to the people of Taiwan, including approving arms 
sales that are important so that the Taiwanese can engage in 
the activities that they need to do so they can protect their 
democracy.
    Senator Gardner. The Administration's goal of complete, 
verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula remains.
    Secretary Pompeo. It does.
    Senator Gardner. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
    Were you involved in the decision to withdraw troops from 
Germany?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Shaheen. According to Secretary Esper, 6,400 of 
those troops, so over half of those who will be removed from 
Germany, will be coming back to the United States. They are not 
going to be going to parts of Europe to deter Russia, to parts 
of Asia to deter China. In fact, the only country that has 
publicly supported the removal of U.S. troops from Germany to 
date has been Russia.
    So can you share with us whether the impact of this 
decision on our efforts to counter China and Russia was taken 
into account? Was there any sort of strategic assessment done 
to support this decision?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator Shaheen, thanks for the question.
    Of course, there was, and we were very involved at the 
strategic level. Obviously, the troop level decisions and the 
like are primarily the Department of Defense and the 
President's role.
    You characterized the folks who were coming back to the 
United States as somehow being off the field. That is not the 
case. These units will participate in rotational activity. They 
will be forward deployed. They will not be stationed or 
garrisoned, but make no mistake about it. They will be fully 
available to assure that we can properly prosecute the 
challenges we have from the global powers.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Secretary, I assume that all of 
our troops who are in the United States are available to be 
forward deployed. Now, I recognize that there is certain 
training that needs to be part of them before they are 
deployed. I guess I do not understand. Was the effect of 
diplomatically alienating Germany, who is the largest and 
wealthiest country in the EU, who has been a historic strategic 
ally--was that also taken into consideration?
    Secretary Pompeo. Ma'am, this is personal for me. I fought 
on the border of East Germany when I was a young soldier. I was 
stationed there.
    Senator Shaheen. Yes. I am aware of that, and your unit is 
coming back to the United States.
    Secretary Pompeo. I know. It had been once before to Fort 
Polk. Then they went back to Germany.
    When I was there, there were six figures of soldiers there. 
Germany is no longer a frontline state.
    As far as strategic effort, Secretary General Stoltenberg, 
NATO Commander, was very much in the process of helping us 
think this through. I saw comments out of Russia this morning 
that are different than you described, that viewed the actions 
that we took as threatening because we will have soldiers that 
are deployed closer to the Russian border.
    Yes, this was a thoughtful process, the military piece of 
this run out of the Pentagon largely, but the State Department 
was fully involved in the strategic pieces of this. I am very 
confident that our mission to deter Russia, the NATO mission to 
deter mission we are still fully capable of executing. The 
precise number was 200,000 early, about 100,000 and some when I 
was there. Conditions have changed around the world, and our 
forces need to be repositioned to appropriately confront 
today's challenges.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I would just read from a report in 
``Bloomberg,'' that quotes Dmitry Peskov who is the press 
secretary for Vladimir Putin who says that `` `the fewer 
American soldiers on the European continent, the calmer it is 
in Europe,' Peskov said, answering a question on planned U.S. 
troop reductions in Germany.'' That does not sound to me like 
they think that this increases the threat from Russia.
    I would like to go on to another issue because I want to 
follow up on the question that Senator Menendez raised about 
the reports on bounties that Russia has put on our troops in 
Afghanistan by the Taliban. There was a report last night that 
said that State officials have secretly warned Russia against 
bounties on our troops, against killing our troops.
    What more do you think we should be doing to address that 
to prevent the Taliban and Russia from trying to murder our 
troops in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Pompeo. So there are many things, and we have 
been engaged in them consistently. There is intelligence 
collection so that if it happens, we can identify it, stop it, 
make sure that the actual tactical event does not take place. 
That is the task of not only DoD intelligence services, but our 
broader intelligence services. Our diplomats too make very 
clear our expectations and set a set of redlines. Then we have 
our larger Afghanistan policy. It is not just Russia that has 
been underwriting the Taliban for all these years. I know there 
is an awful lot of focus on that in this town, but let me tell 
you at the State Department and Department of Defense we are 
worried about Iranian support to the Taliban. We are worried 
about the Gulf money coming to the Taliban. We are----
    Senator Shaheen. I totally agree with that.
    Secretary Pompeo. We are working diligently against every 
one of those threats both diplomatically and from a security 
perspective to protect our soldiers.
    Then finally, to protect our soldiers further, we have been 
working diplomatically to get peace and reconciliation in 
Afghanistan. We have a ceasefire that began at the start of Eid 
al-Adha. We have now had a significant prisoner exchange. Since 
February 29, the agreement entered into, we have not had a 
single attack against an American soldier. This is the finest 
in American diplomacy, and I am incredibly proud of what my 
team has done, my State Department team has done, to protect 
American soldiers.
    Senator Shaheen. So do you think it would be helpful for 
President Trump to talk to Vladimir Putin and tell him that he 
needs to back off in terms of paying the Taliban to kill 
American troops?
    Secretary Pompeo. I always leave it to the President what 
he wants to say to other leaders. I do not think there is any 
doubt in the mind of every Russian leader, including Vladimir 
Putin, about the expectations of the United States of America 
not to kill Americans. I can promise you that the 300 Russians 
who were in Syria and who took action to threaten America who 
are no longer on this planet understand that too.
    Senator Shaheen. When you were here last time, we talked 
about the potential for negotiations with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. That was before an agreement was reached. There 
was an exchange that you and I had about the role of Afghan 
women in any talks with the Taliban. You said that Afghan women 
should fend for themselves.
    Well, we have seen the outcome of our reticence to support 
Afghan women. The agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban 
failed to mention the rights of Afghan women, and it contains 
no guarantees for their continued constitutional protection.
    Is the policy to have Afghan women fend for themselves 
consistent, do you believe, with the legal mandate for the U.S. 
to support ``the meaningful inclusion of women in peace talks'' 
as directed by the Women, Peace, and Security Act that was 
signed into law by President Trump?
    Secretary Pompeo. I would have to go look and see what I 
said.
    No. We are doing our level best to make sure that we 
protect every Afghan, male and female. I have seen the at least 
tentative composition of the Afghan negotiating team, and I 
think you will be pleased with it.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I am out of time, but the ``fend for 
themselves'' is an exact quote from your statement when you 
were before this committee.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Mr. Secretary, people always say actions speak louder than 
words. Do you think the specific action the United States of 
America took against General Soleimani sent a message to every 
country on this planet of what would happen to people who 
targeted United States soldiers on the battlefield?
    Secretary Pompeo. I do.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to see you and I appreciate 
you appearing before this committee.
    I am one of many who applauds your recent addresses with 
regards to China. In these you have called out their predatory 
behavior, economic, military, geopolitical, and you note that 
we have to confront China with our friends and allies if we are 
going to be successful in diverting them from their course of 
predation. It is a very welcome assessment, a very clear-eyed 
evaluation of China's intent and their actions, and a statement 
of what our mission must be with regards to China.
    It is also a welcomed departure from the President's 
fawning praise of Xi Jinping and celebration of agreements that 
China has not honored.
    It is also in my view inconsistent with actions that we 
have taken that have offended our allies at a time we need to 
be drawing them closer to us. One, of course, is the steel and 
aluminum tariffs against our friends and allies that I thought 
were misplaced. I would have rather focused our entire 
ammunition on China.
    The other, of course, is most recently, as Senator Shaheen 
has just indicated, the withdrawal of troops from Germany and 
doing so while expressing an intent to punish Germany for the 
fact that they spend approximately one and a half percent of 
their GDP on their military as opposed to the two percent NATO 
target, even though they have indicated that they are on track 
to get to the 2 percent number.
    I have heard from highest levels of the German Government 
that this is seen by them as an insult to Germany. I cannot 
imagine at a time when we need to be drawing in our friends and 
allies so that we can collectively confront China, that we want 
to insult them.
    My question is this, however, which is what actions will 
the Administration take to bring our allies together in a way 
that is different than what we have done in the past. I mean, I 
know there is always lots of talk going on and any 
Administration can talk about all the things happening, but are 
we going to do that is distinct, that is different, that is 
dramatic to bring the nations that follow the rule of law 
together so that we can hopefully reach some kind of a common 
approach or common strategy in how we are going to deal with 
China economically, militarily, geopolitically, and then 
collectively confront them with the intent of dissuading them 
from pursuing the course that they are on? We obviously do not 
want to go to war economically, militarily, or otherwise, but 
we do want to dissuade them. I think that can only happen when 
we are--as you have pointed out, when we can do that with 
others.
    I would note something you said at the Nixon Library. You 
said, ``maybe it is time for a new grouping of likeminded 
nations, a new alliance of democracies.'' I think that is a 
good idea, but I am interested in what actions of a new and 
dramatic nature are you considering or are you willing to take 
in order to accomplish the objective you described.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it is absolutely the case that 
to confront the Chinese Communist Party is going to take a 
global effort. That is absolutely true. That is why I talked 
about this idea perhaps of a new alliance of democracies. What 
shape that would take there is lots of discussion about and 
many conversations with friends in the region.
    Step one, Senator, to be honest with you has been to awaken 
the world to this threat. For an awful long time not just the 
United States, but the whole world saw that there were 
lucrative opportunities in China, and that was basically 
foreign policy. Sell as much as you can. Outsource jobs. Build 
supply chains. So I spent my first year and change traveling 
the world trying to raise awareness of the threat.
    I think that is new and different. You may say it is not 
enough, but it was not happening before. I went through the 
list of things that have begun to turn the tide.
    I will say there are still nations who understand this 
threat, but do not feel like they are empowered, that they are 
in a position where they withstand the threats that come from 
the Chinese Communist Party. So we are working--our diplomats--
trying to build out a set of relationships, and whether that is 
part of a formal organization or not, I am not sure I know the 
answer to yet, but to convince them, to convince them that 
America is prepared to lead in pushing back against the Chinese 
Communist Party, and when they do, we will be there to support 
them.
    We have some 26 lines of effort of the State Department, 
and there is probably an equal amount at the Department of 
Defense, all aimed centrally at building out this set of 
alliances both in Southeast Asia and more broadly with our Five 
Eyes partners and with the Quad to build out a set of 
commitments that can robustly communicate to the Chinese 
Communist Party that enough. You have to behave on the global 
stage. If you want to behave on the global stage, you have got 
to do it under a set of rules that has created so much 
prosperity around the world. That may be unsatisfying, Senator 
Romney, but it is still a real work in progress to get everyone 
fully aligned.
    I mentioned the EU dialogue. Very important. Foreign 
Minister Borrell, High Representative Borrell, asked me if we 
would have a dialogue with them on China. That took a lot of 
effort to get 27 EU nations to say, yes, this is something we 
have got to confront, to identify as a systemic rival. There is 
lots of spade work that goes into what seems pretty simple I 
suppose.
    Senator Romney. I think it is the most important work that 
we will be doing as a country and as an Administration as we 
face this challenge.
    Just a parenthetical comment that comes to mind, as you are 
speaking, and that relates to a discussion that was held 
earlier with regard to tech companies that Senator Johnson 
raised. I know there is great interest, sometimes politically, 
to go after some of the big tech companies, Google, Amazon, and 
so forth, Facebook, and berate them for their market power. If 
they violate American antitrust laws, why, that is totally 
appropriate.
    I would note that we are in a global competition, and China 
has been successful in driving a lot of Western companies out 
of business. They have not been successful in driving companies 
like these out of business. These are thriving and succeeding. 
The last thing we ought to be doing is trying to knock down 
businesses in the United States that are succeeding on a global 
stage. So we need to be careful not to flex our muscle and 
berate those entities that are successful and are beating 
China. I mean, Alibaba would like to replace Amazon. TikTok 
would like to replace Instagram. So it is just an area of 
concern, and I hope that you are able to point these things out 
to other members of the Administration who care deeply about 
that.
    Finally, were you surprised by the fact that--what was it--
57 countries supported China--53 countries supported China's 
crackdown on Hong Kong? Did that shock you as it did me?
    Secretary Pompeo. I was surprised and dismayed.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, for 
holding this important hearing today. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Let me just start with two specific issues, if I can, that 
I think are important. I want to associate myself with a number 
of areas that have been explored, but let me touch on these 
two.
    I am working with members of this committee and your 
Department to resolve terrorism-related claims against Sudan, 
which is in the middle of a critical democratic transition, to 
provide justice and compensation for over 700 terror victims 
and their family members and to move our bilateral relationship 
forward after 30 years under the brutal dictatorship of Omar 
al-Bashir. I just want to urge you and the Administration to do 
everything that you can to support Prime Minister Hamdok to 
make sure that we seize this opportunity to bring real justice 
to the victims and their American families and foreign 
nationals involved and to build a new democratic partner in the 
region.
    Have you personally engaged on this issue, and can you 
commit to working transparently with Congress as we try to find 
a solution urgently?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, thank you for your work. 
This is really important.
    We have proposed that there is legal peace resolution that 
would be in legislation that will be before Congress here in 
the very, very near term. We think it is the appropriate time 
to both bring justice to those from the 1998 bombings and get a 
real opportunity for Prime Minister Hamdok. I have talked to 
him a handful of times. I have talked to other of the leaders 
there in Sudan. This is an opportunity that does not come along 
often. We all know the history of Sudan and the tragedy there. 
There is a chance not only for democracy to begun to be built 
out, but perhaps regional opportunities that could flow from 
that as well. I think lifting the state sponsor of terrorism 
designation there, if we can take care of the victims of those 
tragedies, it would be a good thing for American foreign 
policy. I appreciate your assistance in that regard.
    Senator Coons. We have a number of members of this 
committee with strong interests, and it is my hope that we can 
move in a way that respects those constituent interests and 
also makes progress and does not miss this moment.
    On the Global Fragility Act, it is legislation that was 
bipartisan that I led here with Senator Graham and President 
Trump signed into law last December. It requires a long-term, 
whole-of-government strategy to address extremism and 
instability in fragile states.
    The first deliverable under this legislation, the Global 
Fragility Strategy, is due September 15. Congress really is not 
looking for old wine in new bottles. So we just urge you to 
look at the GFA as a tool to rethink our approach to these 
challenges and improve the way that State, AID, and DoD work 
together.
    How are you using the tools Congress provided in the GFA to 
address the consequences of this pandemic and development, 
governance, security? Can you commit that you will look hard at 
and resolve a technical issue on the creation of the prevention 
and stabilization fund, which was designed to replace and 
improve on the rapid response fund in the statute?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, I will get back to you on 
the last question that you asked. I am familiar with it, but 
not enough to answer your question, but I will get you an 
answer briefly.
    You are right. I am tracking the first deliverable. I will 
say I saw the first pass at this. You characterized it about 
right. There was not much that was original in there, and I 
have asked the team to go back and take a set of fresh looks, 
to ask for outside views from folks on Capitol Hill, people who 
are experts around the world to see if we cannot use this tool 
that you provided us on a bipartisan basis to actually deliver 
on the stated objectives of the law. It was an important piece 
of legislation, and I do not want to miss the chance to develop 
the strategy that can then underpin all the actions we can take 
once that strategy is done. It is not something that we intend 
to put on the shelf and admire, but something we hope creates 
operational opportunities underneath that strategy.
    Senator Coons. Thank you.
    Today is the funeral service for a friend and former 
colleague, Congressman John Lewis. I was struck by a comment 
made by your former colleague, former Secretary of Defense 
General Mattis, who wrote following the weeks of protests after 
the unlawful murder of George Floyd. General Mattis wrote, I 
have watched this week's unfolding events angry and appalled. 
The words ``equal justice under law'' are carved into the 
pediment of the Supreme Court, and that is what the protesters 
are rightly demanding.
    Do you agree with General Mattis? I am concerned about the 
general direction of the most senior levels of the State 
Department. This has been raised before. I will not go through 
the GAO report, but of 189 ambassadors representing us abroad, 
only three are African American, four are Hispanic. I recognize 
that diversity in the Department has been a long-term 
challenge, but I would be interested in hearing both do you 
agree with General Mattis' comments and what do you--are 
personally doing to mentor the next crop of senior leaders and 
to diversify the seventh floor leadership team.
    Secretary Pompeo. I actually think the seventh leadership 
team, my entire communications team, my Under Secretary for 
Management, my Under Secretary for Political Affairs are all 
part of diversity groups. I am proud of what our small team has 
done, but that does not begin to accomplish what we need to get 
done in the State Department to make sure we get this right.
    By the way, it is diversity inclusion that is broad based. 
We need to make sure that we have people from all across 
America with all viewpoints, every idea from all across 
America. We have been very narrow in how we have recruited from 
a certain set of institutions and certain universities, and we 
do not get a full spectrum of understandings of America or of 
the world if we are too narrow in how we think about diversity 
inclusion.
    So we are working hard at it. We have built out a set of 
programs. Your point about not having sufficient minority 
representation in our ambassadorial levels is absolutely true. 
I guess it was 3 days ago that a set of about 23 that will be 
coming to you shortly, we had more than half of them that were 
female, the first time that has ever happened. So we are making 
progress, but I would agree that the rate of change is 
insufficient.
    Senator Coons. How do you think our own failure to address 
structural racial inequality impacts our diplomacy overseas and 
impacts our ability to advocate around human rights issues?
    Secretary Pompeo. Well, it is important that we get it 
right at home. There is no doubt about that. I would tell you 
that we are a beacon for that around the world, and I think you 
can see it in the people who want to come to the United States 
of America because it is the freest nation. It is a place that 
you have immigrants from all across the world that want to come 
here. I am a believer that people vote with their feet. They 
see America still as this greatest, most exceptional nation. We 
are not without flaws, but I think as our diplomats travel the 
world, they can be very proud of our progress----
    Senator Coons. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask a last question 
about our election. President Trump has just tweeted that we 
should delay it. I am interested in whether you were able to 
vote by mail when you served abroad in the Army, whether you 
vote by mail in your home State of Kansas, whether like many of 
us who serve in Congress in both parties, you have availed 
yourself, as do virtually all of our diplomats and development 
professionals and armed forces members, of the opportunity to 
vote securely by mail. Have you done so, and do you have any 
concerns about the security of our election this November?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, I believe I have voted by 
absentee ballot. I think while I was a soldier and I also think 
when I was a Member of Congress, I did a couple times as well.
    The State Department has some role in making sure we have 
election security. It is not our primary focus. So I will leave 
to others those who have that primary centered focus.
    Senator Coons. Is there any reason for us to be concerned 
that those votes are fraudulent or somehow ineligible to be 
counted if cast by mail or by absentee ballot by our diplomats?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I must say having a small group 
of people vote by absentee ballot is very different than 
deciding that you are going to conduct a full in-mail balloting 
program. Those are two fundamentally different pieces I will 
leave to the professionals to identify the level of risk 
associated with that.
    I also know--and I saw this in my home State of Kansas--
when you change the voting rules in close to an election, it is 
a difficult task.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
    Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you.
    Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for coming in and 
being here.
    I know election security is not your area of expertise, but 
I think you can comment on what I am about to ask. I am sure 
you are well aware of influence efforts on the part of the 
Chinese and Taiwan to shape Taiwanese policies, policies of 
their government. I am certain, as most people on this 
committee I hope are aware of how they pressure political 
figures that they view are opposed to their interests. I think 
we have all witnessed--I think you will confirm this--worldwide 
that China has engaged in efforts of disinformation, 
particularly for example about the coronavirus.
    I am not asking you to comment specifically about our 
country. I think I am more than anything else asking if China 
ever decided they wanted to do those kinds of things to us, 
would you assess they have the capability to conduct a 
disinformation campaign to pressure American political figures, 
potentially even Members of Congress, the way we have seen them 
do with Taiwan and Australia and in other places. If they 
decided they wanted to do that--this is the second largest 
economy in the world, pretty significant capabilities. If they 
ever decided they wanted to come after us that way, they would 
have the capability to do it. Would they not?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, if I have just a second to 
respond to this. They certainly have the capability. I have 
talked about this. The Chinese united front is working here in 
the United States today. They are meeting with State 
legislators. They are meeting with governors. One of the things 
that was taking place out of the consulate in Houston were 
influence operations conducted by their diplomats. We have 
diplomats from all across the world who come to our offices as 
Members of Congress and talk to us about policy. What I am 
talking about is fundamentally different from that. So they not 
only have the capability, but the intention of conducting 
influence operations in the United States.
    I think we are a pretty resilient nation. I am confident 
that we will push back against that, but the world needs to 
understand that when it is happening here in the United States, 
it is happening in their countries too.
    Senator Rubio. Well, I think one of the things, the most 
interesting yesterday, is the four CEOs of these tech companies 
appeared I believe before a House committee yesterday, if I am 
not mistaken, and they were asked a very simple question. Do 
you believe--they were asked do they believe that China steals 
technology from U.S. firms. They were asked this question. I 
think there is pretty strong consensus across the board in both 
parties and in the media and elsewhere that the answer to that 
question is yes.
    The CEO of Apple said they have not experienced it. That 
was his answer.
    The CEO of Google said, neither have we.
    The CEO of Amazon says, oh, I have read that.
    Only the CEO of Facebook said, yes, absolutely.
    So Apple, Google, and Amazon answered that question by 
saying either they had not experienced it or they have read 
that somewhere, but would not comment further.
    Why would corporations such as this, some of whom, by the 
way, take it upon themselves to censor truth versus what is not 
true and what they believe some people should be saying and not 
others on the basis of what they judge to be true--why would 
three of the four CEOs of the four largest tech companies 
headquartered in the United States be afraid to answer that 
question?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I can only speculate. I mean, it 
is patently clear to anyone who is watching that the Chinese 
are engaged in intense efforts of intellectual property theft 
including to technology.
    Senator Rubio. Would it be fair in your mind to speculate 
that they try to influence people even in the business 
community?
    Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely.
    Senator Rubio. Okay.
    One more question. I think I know the answer to this as 
well, but would you agree with the belief I think again that is 
pretty widespread that China has systematically identified 
industries and technologies that they believe will be key to 
the 21st century? They actually wrote it, Made in China 2025. 
They have undertaken a systematic effort to dominate these 
industries while destroying our capability. That is what the IP 
theft is about, the forced transfer of technology, subsidies to 
their firms, blocking access to their markets. There is no 
doubt at this point that they have a very carefully crafted 
plan to dominate certain key industries for the 21st century 
and to wipe out not just our capabilities in those industries, 
but everybody else's. That is a fair assessment.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator Rubio. They have not been 
covert about this, right? They have spoken openly about how 
they are approaching their commercial interests. The only thing 
that they do not speak about is that rather than build these 
industries inside, the tools that they use are fundamentally 
different than the way western democracies do, right? We train 
our people. We build our businesses. We invest capital in the 
market. They run state-sponsored enterprises. They steal 
intellectual property. Then they endeavor to undermine the 
companies and threaten and bully countries around the world 
into buying their products.
    Senator Rubio. My last question is unrelated to China 
directly, but as you are well aware, there have been press 
reports, speculations, commentators, and the like that have 
made much about recent allegations and in one case an interview 
the President gave in which they took from it that the 
President would be willing to engage in negotiations with 
Maduro and the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
    As you understand our policy being in the position that you 
are in, could you envision, as long as this Administration is 
in office, we would ever negotiate with the Maduro regime for 
them to remain in power?
    Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely not. Our policy is not to 
negotiate with them for anything other than his departure from 
ruling that country.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    After the next questioner, we are going take a 10-minute 
recess, but right now, Senator Udall, the floor is yours.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Pompeo, I appreciate your time and testimony 
today.
    I want to start with an important subject, democracy 
promotion. Earlier this year, you called for free and fair 
elections in Venezuela and Nicaragua. If free and fair 
elections are held and the current occupants of power lose, the 
State Department then strongly encourages those leaders to step 
down from power. I think that sort of thing is an important 
pillar of our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis. Correct?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
    Senator Udall. I am hearing growing concern in this country 
about whether we are going to set a good example in our 
November election. In a recent Fox News interview, Chris 
Wallace asked President Trump whether he would give a ``direct 
answer that you will accept the election'' in November. In 
response, President Trump said I have to see. No. I am not 
going to just say yes. No. I am not going to say no. I didn't 
say last time either.
    During a 2016 debate, he stated, I will tell you at the 
time. I will keep you in suspense.
    He has also called voting by mail, as you know, one of the 
major ways Americans vote, especially in a pandemic--he said 
over and over again the election is rigged if it is vote by 
mail.
    So, Secretary Pompeo, if President Trump refuses to accept 
the upcoming November election due to his lack of faith in 
voting by mail, will you respect the results of a certified 
election as the State Department typically does throughout the 
world?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to speculate. You 
had about 15 ``ifs'' in there. You should know I have said 
repeatedly to this committee I will follow the rule of law, 
follow the Constitution. I have endeavored to do that in 
everything I have done, and I will continue to do that every 
day.
    Senator Udall. The President has made this a legitimate 
question in Americans' minds through his own statements. Former 
Pennsylvania Governor and Homeland Security Secretary Tom 
Ridge, a Republican, as you know, says ``I think it is very sad 
and very disappointing that with almost 5 months to go, the 
President seems to want to try to delegitimize the November 3 
election. It just seems to me that this may be an indication he 
is more worried about the outcome than he is worried about the 
fraud.''
    This is a serious domestic and foreign policy question. We 
need to set a good example about the peaceful transition of 
power or else we undermine our entire foreign policy.
    George Kennan wrote in his Long Telegram that in order to 
counter the Soviet Union, ``much depends on the health and 
vigor of our own society.'' I think that is just as true today 
about Russia, China, Venezuela, Iran, and other authoritarian 
regimes that we have challenges with. I can imagine few 
scenarios that would endanger our society more than a 
presidential candidate who refuses to accept the outcome of an 
election.
    Secretary Pompeo, this year the Committee to Protect 
Journalists issued a report on the harm this President has 
caused to journalists' First Amendment rights. In their 
summary, the committee states, ``the Trump administration has 
stepped up the prosecutions of news sources, interfered in the 
business of media owners, harassed journalists crossing U.S. 
borders, and empowered foreign leaders to restrict their own 
media, but Trump's most effective ploy has been to destroy the 
credibility of the press, dangerously undermining truth and 
consensus even as the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to kill tens 
of thousands of Americans.''
    Are you concerned that instead of promoting press freedom 
abroad, America is now providing moral support to authoritarian 
efforts to crack down on critical media outlets from Russia to 
China to Venezuela and beyond?
    Secretary Pompeo. No, I am not remotely concerned about 
that.
    Senator Udall. Over 150,000 Americans have now died from 
COVID-19 and we mourn their loss. Like most tragedies, this is 
one that could have been prevented. Like the President's 
response to Hurricane Maria and other disasters, the Federal 
Government's response has been nowhere near up to the 
challenge. Instead, this Administration is now trying to change 
the narrative by attacking its own citizens at home and 
weakening the United States abroad.
    Across the world, our allies in New Zealand, Japan, 
Australia, South Korea, and many in Europe have taken the 
science and the threat of COVID-19 seriously. The result is 
that they are beginning to return to normal. Even countries 
with very different systems than ours, such as Communist 
Vietnam and Cuba, are beginning to reemerge from this deadly 
disease.
    Secretary Pompeo, the best practices of these countries is 
simple: isolate, track and trace, quarantine, and wear a mask. 
We do not even know if the National Security Advisor has met 
with you or other members of the National Security Council 
lately. The U.S. has not done those things sufficiently, and 
here we are.
    Secretary Pompeo, you and the White House seem to want to 
blame China for our inability to respond to this pandemic as 
well as to our allies. Is it true that their handling of the 
virus--and it is true that their handling the virus at the 
early onset was problematic, but we are responsible for our own 
response. Do you think the President should look to Europe, 
South Korea, Japan, and other more successful nations to learn 
about how to better contain this pandemic?
    Secretary Pompeo. An awful lot to unpack there, Senator.
    First, I would tell you that some of the countries that you 
identified--you are looking at the data that they are putting 
out. It is worthless. So when you are comparing it to data from 
other countries, one ought not in a Senate hearing put that 
data forward as dispositive about the conditions on the ground 
in those countries. It is silly. They are not tracking. They 
are not counting cases. So we need to make sure we have a 
shared factual database.
    Yes, we should look everywhere to get best practices about 
how to respond to this. I know that our doctors--Dr. Birx who 
works for me is now over at the White House working on this. 
They have done that, and we will continue to do it to make sure 
we protect the American people in an appropriate way.
    Senator Udall. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
    With that, the committee is going to be at ease subject to 
the call of the chair for approximately 10 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Next up, Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you again.
    I appreciated your comments in the opening statement 
specifically related to Nord Stream 2, and I wanted to ask a 
little bit more about that because we know energy security is 
essential to national security. Nord Stream 2 threatens 
European energy security, increases Russian monopoly over the 
region. To me this pipeline is a Russian trap. I strongly 
support your recent announcement aimed at stopping this 
dangerous pipeline.
    As you know, Congress is working to quickly provide the 
Administration with additional tools to prevent Nord Stream 2 
from ever being completed. In the last few weeks, both the 
Senate and House passed their own versions of the National 
Defense Authorization Act. It includes new bipartisan Nord 
Stream 2 sanctions.
    Could you talk about the Administration's commitment to 
opposing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and applying sanctions 
against those companies aiding in the completion of this 
Russian trap?
    Secretary Pompeo. The irony is that this Administration is 
accused by some of not being tough on Russia. President Trump 
personally took on this. He saw that this was a threat, that 
this pipeline created enormous leverage for Russia not only 
against Germany and the broader Europe, but Ukraine as well. So 
we set about it with good support from Capitol Hill, and we got 
legislation that was appropriate to now have delayed this 
project significantly. When we need further tools, we are 
prepared to use those tools should you provide them to us.
    We have also used our diplomatic capabilities to make clear 
to countries that we are going to do the other end too. We are 
going to make sure that American LNG can be sold into these 
countries. We want Europe to have a secure, stable, diverse set 
of energy opportunities, and our Department of Energy has 
worked alongside of us to do that. Our E&R Department, 
Assistant Secretary Fannon, are working to make sure that 
Europe has real, secure, stable, safe energy sources that 
cannot be turned off in the event that Russia decides they want 
to do so. We think Nord Stream 2 is dangerous in that respect, 
and we do everything we can to make sure that that pipeline 
does not threaten Europe.
    Senator Barrasso. Mr. Secretary, I would like to move now 
to the Iranian arms embargo. The international arms embargo in 
Iran, as you know, is set to expire October of this year. To my 
great astonishment, we are having to persuade the international 
community of the importance of preventing Iran, the world's 
leading state sponsor of terror, from purchasing advanced 
weapons. It will dramatically increase the ability of Iran to 
arm terrorists in proxy groups across the region. We have seen 
that more weapons will likely flow to Hamas and the Houthis, 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Despite the terrible consequences, many 
experts believe that any extension of the Iranian arms embargo 
would be vetoed by Russia or by China.
    What do Russia and China want the Iran arms embargo--why 
would they want it to expire? Is the Chinese Communist Party 
really willing to betray global security in order to be Iran's 
arms dealer?
    Secretary Pompeo. Well, I hope not, but I expect so.
    We have been working to convince the Russians to permit 
this arms embargo to be extended. We are talking to the Chinese 
for months and months and months. We are working with our E3 
counterparts as well.
    We will submit a UN Security Council resolution in the near 
future. We will offer to extend this. This is one of the 
central failings of the JCPOA was to have only a 5-year ban on 
the Iranian capacity to both purchase weapon systems, build out 
air defense systems, the capacity to protect a nuclear program 
should they continue down that path, but also to sell weapons 
around the world and become again, as they were before, one of 
the world's largest arms dealers.
    We are going to do everything we can. We believe we have 
the capacity to do this at the United Nations. We hope that the 
UN Security Council will conclude that extending this arms 
embargo is the right thing. In the event they do not, we are 
going to use every tool that we have at our fingertips to make 
sure that that arms embargo is not lifted on October 18 of this 
year. We think it decreases stability in the Middle East. We 
think that would threaten Israel. We are confident it reduces 
American security as well.
    Senator Barrasso. On to religious freedom. Sam Brownback, a 
former member of this body, Ambassador-at-Large for 
International Religious Freedom, recently wrote humanity is why 
religious freedom will always win out against governments and 
non-state actors seeking to repress and control it.
    We have seen around the world authoritarian regimes 
continuing to attempt to restrict religious freedoms and the 
rights of individuals.
    Could you discuss efforts by the Administration that you 
have taken to promote international religious freedoms?
    Secretary Pompeo. So we have raised the priority of 
international religious freedom inside of the State Department. 
I think that has happened, and I think under President Trump 
and Vice President Pence that has happened all across the 
Administration. We use our diplomatic tools to encourage it. We 
build resilience. We work with religious communities in many 
countries to provide them security. The work that we are doing 
in northern Iraq today is a good example, but there are still 
lots of challenges. What is happening in Nigeria to Christians 
today, it is happening to Muslims in western China. Your point 
about the threat to religious freedom and the exercise of 
conscience for people of all faiths is under attack in too many 
places.
    The State Department has an important role to increase the 
capacity for people to exercise their rights of religious 
freedom. We held these two ministerials. We were not able to do 
it this year because of the virus, but we brought people from 
all across the world. The world's largest human rights 
gatherings in all of history were held at the State Department 
twice around the central idea that people need to be able to 
exercise this important right to just have their own faith.
    Senator Barrasso. Earlier today--I am going to move on to 
China--I think you called the Chinese Communist Party the 
central threat of our times. We had your Deputy here a couple 
of weeks ago, had a chance to talk about the issues related to 
China.
    To me they are working to expand their military 
capabilities to advance their global ambitions. They want to 
dominate globally. In the last few months, we have seen them 
increase military aggression whether it is near Taiwan, the 
South China Sea, Japan. We have seen incursions, what they have 
been doing in Hong Kong, what they have been doing at home.
    Can you talk about the recent confrontations by China and 
what that taught us about China's military ambitions, as well 
as their capabilities? Because when we go to secure briefings, 
we ask lots about their capabilities not just what they might 
do but what they can do, not will they or will they not, but 
can they or can they not.
    Secretary Pompeo. So I think these actions--and when you 
say recent, the last 24, 36 months. I think the actions are 
entirely consistent with what they have been signaling to the 
world for decades, you might even argue since 1989, but 
certainly since General Secretary Xi came to power. It is a 
desire to expand their power, their reach. They talk about 
this. They talk about bringing socialism with Chinese 
characteristics to the world. You identified some, but a claim 
that they have now made for real estate in Bhutan, the 
incursion that took place in India--these are indicative of 
Chinese intentions. They are testing. They are probing. They 
are probing the world to see if we are going to stand up to 
their threats or their bullying. I am more confident than I was 
even a year ago that the world is prepared to do that. There is 
a lot more work to do, and we need to be serious about it.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
    Let me say at the outset I am very grateful for your 
proposal to double the budget of the Global Engagement Center. 
This is, of course, a center to counteract propaganda outside 
of the United States that was established through legislation 
written by myself and Senator Portman. I am glad that you have 
recognized the importance and the good work of that center.
    Though we have spent a lot of time in this hearing talking 
about many of our concerns regarding our adversaries' desire to 
use propaganda not outside of the United States, but in fact 
inside of the United States to influence the 2020 election--and 
so I want to begin by asking you a question about that.
    Russia in particular has sought to weave together stories 
about U.S. persons and Ukrainian persons over the course of the 
past year in order to both try to sow chaos and dissent in the 
United States, but also to try to screw with Ukrainian politics 
as well. It is kind of a double whammy for the Russians. You 
can see those efforts ramping up as we head into the 2020 
election.
    Probably the most active foreign individual pushing 
narratives about the United States in Ukraine is a Ukrainian 
legislator by the name of Andrii Derkach. He was the individual 
that magically came into possession of secret audio recordings 
of Vice President Biden and then President Poroshenko. He has 
retained a government relations counsel here, and I would 
expect that he is going to be a pretty active presence in U.S. 
politics from here to the election.
    So just a simple question on behalf of my constituents and 
maybe my colleagues as well. Should we view Andrii Derkach as a 
credible source of information?
    Secretary Pompeo. I will answer your question, but let me 
say real quick because I think that is important. Thank you for 
the compliment. I want to make sure--the only thing I am 
worried about with asking for a doubling of the money is to 
make sure that we can deploy it. We have been pretty successful 
as it has grown, but when you expand something at 100 percent 
year on year, I have a team driving to make sure we do not 
misuse or waste those resources.
    I do not want to comment on any particular individual like 
Mr. Derkach.
    I will say this. We are taking seriously the threats that 
Russia will try to engage in disinformation campaigns, that 
there may be oligarchs that try and engage in this. There may 
be foreign actors, not just Russian. We were pretty successful 
at this in the 2018 election. I say we, not the State 
Department alone, but all the United States Government. I am 
confident we will be in this one as well.
    Senator Murphy. Why would you not be willing to opine on a 
specific individual if you had information to suggest that the 
source was not credible? It seems as if that is in fact a core 
function of the U.S. Government, if it has information that 
would suggest malign influence, to let Congress and the 
American people know.
    Secretary Pompeo. So when it is appropriate, I will. When 
there is still work ongoing and there is still unsettled 
intelligence around these things, I am going to try to be just 
a little bit more careful, Senator.
    Senator Murphy. Let me turn to China for a moment.
    China is clearly seeking to use the United States' failure 
to control COVID as a means to leapfrog us in our traditional 
leadership position when it comes to global health. Senator 
Romney referred to this earlier.
    I think we have given two big gifts to the Chinese since 
the beginning of this outbreak.
    The first was the President's just remarkable fawning over 
China's early response to the virus. Forty-seven different 
times he commended China for their response and their 
transparency.
    I think China also is pretty happy with our withdrawal from 
the WHO. I understand that you believe, as I understand it, 
that our withdrawal from the WHO is a lever to try to seek 
internal change. I would disagree. It also seems to allow for 
China to step in and occupy that vacuum. So as you step back 
and try to articulate this sort of broad strategy to counteract 
China's growing influence in the world, how does withdrawal 
from the WHO counteract the growing influence of China?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it is a good question. These are 
close calls sometimes. We left the UN Human Rights Council. The 
same argument was made, better to fight from within than to try 
and reform from outside. I think there are reasonable arguments 
that can be made on either side.
    The decision that the President made--and I concur with 
this decision--went through multiple rounds of reforms at the 
World Health Organization. Our team in Geneva fought for years, 
in previous administrations, too. Each time we got reforms, 
there was no capacity to make that a science-based organization 
and not a political one. There comes a point where you are 
spending half a billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money year on 
year that goes to benefit political actors inside the World 
Health Organization, and we ultimately made the conclusion that 
we were more likely to achieve the global health security 
issues that the United States cares about deeply if we did not 
participate any further in the World Health Organization.
    I am not at all convinced that it will be China that 
benefits from that. I am convinced that the world will benefit. 
We saw it with PEPFAR. We have seen it with GAVI. We have seen 
it other places. When the United States leads--and we will 
absolutely lead--good things can happen in the international 
health realm.
    Senator Murphy. It will not surprise you that I would 
dispute your characterization of the WHO. It is an 
international body. There is no way there will not be some 
level of politics affecting the decisions that a body made up 
of historic adversaries will go through. It is a science-based 
organization, and it is one that is indispensable to the 
continuation of our efforts to try to prevent the next disease. 
I really shudder to think about our ability to stop the next 
COVID if we are not back in the WHO.
    Finally, in the remaining time I have, this a complicated 
question. Again, back to Senator Romney's line of questioning 
about the capabilities that we should be developing with our 
allies to try counteract China.
    I just do not think it is sustainable for this 
Administration or any other Administration to try to go around 
the world bullying and shaming our friends and sort of half-
friends into not doing business with China. We have got to have 
an answer for the things that China is offering. On the 
technology front, we do not have a great answer for 5G, and we 
may not have a great answer for whatever China is going to put 
out there on AI or advanced battery technology.
    Is this not essential to our counter China strategy, not 
just to shame other countries into forsaking Chinese 
technology, but actually to work with our allies to develop our 
own alternatives?
    Secretary Pompeo. 1,000 percent. Absolutely, Senator 
Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 
having the opportunity to let us talk to the Secretary of State 
today. This has been very helpful and very informative.
    I will say with regard to China and developing technologies 
with our allies, we have a lot to do right here in the United 
States to get our own house in order. So we are pretty good at 
pointing fingers at China and it is usually appropriate, but we 
also are not doing much here to protect ourselves.
    I want to thank you because you have provided some great 
help from your career professionals with regard to our efforts 
to push back against China taking our technology. In 
particular, China has these programs. You mentioned they have 
been doing it for a while. They have been doing it for 2 
decades where they come over here, they find promising research 
and researchers. They systematically target them and then they 
take that research over to China. It is military. It is 
economic. It is health care. It is everything.
    Over the last couple years, we have worked hard on this 
with an investigation, a report, and now legislation called the 
Safeguarding American Innovation Act.
    With regard to the State Department piece of this, your 
career people have come and testified before us, said that they 
need more tools to be able to stop folks who they know are 
coming here to deal with export control technologies, who are 
coming over here to actually take--steal our stuff and take it 
back to China. They are unable to stop those people from coming 
in despite affiliations with the People's Liberation Army, 
affiliations with the Chinese Communist Party, and in many 
cases a history of taking research.
    So we worked with one of your Pearson fellows. You told me 
about the Pearson Fellowship and I took advantage of it. In the 
last year, Mark Wuebbels has been working with us. He is a 
Consular Affairs Officer. He has done a terrific job. We have 
put together some legislation that is very balanced. It says, 
hey, we want research. We want the American research enterprise 
to benefit from international cooperation, but we do not want 
to have this U.S. taxpayer-funded research being stolen. So I 
thank you for that.
    I would just ask you, do you agree that these new visa 
authorities we have in that legislation are helpful to protect 
taxpayer-funded research and intellectual property from our 
adversaries, including China?
    Secretary Pompeo. They definitely are, and we need an 
expanded tool set to make sure that we get this right. We are 
making progress. Our teams, working alongside the FBI to 
identify these risks, are working hard on this set of issues.
    I will say this, too. We all need to be candid. When we go 
back to our home States and we talk to the universities in our 
States, the educational industrial complex is alive and well. 
We need to be candid with them about what is taking place in 
some of these institutions of higher learning all across 
America and be thoughtful about how we respond to this 
influence and theft operation that is being conducted.
    Senator Portman. That is absolutely right. You know, there 
are five different provisions in the legislation. One of them 
relates directly to our universities and research institutions. 
To their credit, a number of them have worked with us and we 
have worked with them. Senator Carper and I have taken the lead 
on this in this legislation. It is a bipartisan bill, but there 
are universities and associations that are pushing back hard, 
and frankly I think they are naive and are not willing to face 
up to the threat that is out there. It is a national security 
threat.
    I am glad that over the last couple of weeks that we have 
had the opportunity to confirm some good nominees from the 
Department of State, and I am concerned that the backlog built 
up to the point where you really had a tough time running the 
Department. There is more to go. We have more nominees coming 
up next week. I understand we might have finally the nominee 
for Ambassador to Japan at a critical time.
    One I want to ask you about, though, in particular is 
Ukraine. Senator Cardin is not here today, but back in 2014, we 
went over to Ukraine right after the Revolution of Dignity. In 
those 6 years intervening, a lot of good has happened in 
Ukraine. A lot of bad has happened too. We see it right now we 
are once again at a tipping point. The ceasefire is not 
holding. I understand there have been about 100 violations of 
it recently. The Russian aggression continues. Ukraine made a 
decision 6 years ago to turn to us in the West, and yet we 
still have a situation where they are not getting the support 
that they need.
    So two questions for you. Number one, how important is it 
to get Lieutenant General Dayton confirmed as the Ambassador to 
Ukraine? I think he is highly qualified. I am really pleased 
with that nomination.
    Number two, do you agree with what we just did in the 
national defense authorization bill which was to have a record 
amount of lethal aid going to Ukraine? We have gone from 
roughly $50 million to $125 million in that legislation. Do you 
support that increased funding for lethal aid for Ukraine to be 
able to defend itself?
    Secretary Pompeo. I do. The Administration does support the 
increase in lethal aid. It is important to get the general out 
there, although I will say our charge on the ground there today 
is doing very, very good work, but it is important to get a 
confirmed Ambassador in that position.
    If I might just add this too. We are still thinking. It was 
a real loss when Ambassador Volcker departed. The work that he 
was doing was important to the State Department's overall 
effort in the region, and we are hoping to get that position 
with just the right person filled as well so that we have a 
full-on effort there to help the Ukrainian people maintain 
their democracy.
    Senator Portman. We will have a chance to talk to 
Lieutenant General Dayton at least remotely when he comes, but 
he has done a good job in my view of modernizing their military 
and knows the Ukrainian issues inside and out. He is the right 
person at the right time, and I am pleased he is going to step 
up and do it. It was a good choice.
    With regard to Germany, just my point of view for what it 
is worth. I am not asking you a question here particularly, but 
I think moving troops out of Germany is a good idea if they 
stay in Europe. In particular, Poland has been asking for years 
now to allow U.S. troops to come to Poland. They have even 
offered us a base. I was there several years ago where they 
agreed to pay for the base. I do not know if that is still an 
offer, but the Baltics, Eastern Europe in particular, it seems 
to me that is the appropriate place to move those troops. I 
agree that Germany is not the right place for the number of 
troops that we have. Rather, they should be closer to where the 
action is and frankly the countries that are at most risk right 
now.
    So I do not know if you have any comment on that, but I 
would hope that they would be able to stay in Europe.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the only thing I will add--I 
will leave it to the Department of Defense to talk about exact 
dispositions and numbers in particular countries.
    With respect to Poland, we do not yet have our defense 
cooperation agreement quite done. So the State Department is 
working diligently with our DoD colleagues to get that done so 
that in the event the Department of Defense makes that 
decision, the President concludes it is the right thing to do, 
we can put those forces in there in a way that protects them as 
well.
    Senator Portman. Finally, just on the Global Engagement 
Center, thanks to Senator Murphy for raising those issues. He 
asked the same kind of questions that I would have asked.
    Lea Gabrielle, in my view, is doing a terrific job with 
trying to reorder and take the DoD money that is now going 
directly to you and use it more effectively. We, of course, 
agree with you that that needs to be well spent.
    There is a timely example on this. The United States under 
your leadership has provided $2.3 billion of congressionally 
appropriated money to help other countries combat COVID-19. I 
think we have gotten very little credit for it. I hope that we 
can do more in terms of talking about what we are doing that is 
helpful, but what has happened is instead China and Russia are 
spreading disinformation, and we have heard about it here in 
this committee saying that the virus was created in a lab by 
Bill Gates or that COVID-19 was brought to China by American 
soldiers, and other false narratives. The Global Engagement 
Center is the perfect place to push back on that, and I hope we 
are doing that.
    I do not know if you have any comment on that.
    Secretary Pompeo. No, sir. We are working on that. It is 
important.
    I actually think with respect to COVID, I think the world 
gets it. I think they know who the bad actor here was. They 
cannot all say it publicly, but I am convinced that the efforts 
not only that the United States has made, but other countries, 
too, to push back against this disinformation have been 
powerful and effective.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, welcome.
    Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. The context in which we have this hearing is 
very, very complicated. It is just almost too much to talk 
about.
    In the last 24 hours, we passed 150,000 deaths in this 
country to coronavirus, and in my view and I think in the view 
of many, a sizable percentage of those were preventable had the 
United States handled the pandemic better. This morning, the 
Department of Commerce indicated that the economy, because of 
COVID, shrunk at the greatest rate ever in recorded history in 
the second quarter of the year.
    Then this morning, the President is suggesting that the 
presidential election should be delayed. I sort of want to 
start there. This is not something either you or I were 
prepared to talk about today because I think it happened in the 
middle of the hearing.
    The President sent out a tweet that said, ``Delay the 
election until people can properly, securely, and safely 
vote?'' Not saying it will happen, but raising a question. Can 
a President delay the November presidential election, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to enter a legal 
judgment on that on the fly this morning.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, you are an honors graduate of 
West Point. You are a graduate of the Harvard Law School. You 
were on the Harvard Law Review. I was at Harvard Law School, 
and I went to a lot of Red Sox games. I was not on the Harvard 
Law Review.
    Secretary Pompeo. Very kind of you. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. You are one of the most highly trained and 
accomplished lawyers who are part of this Administration. Can a 
President delay a presidential election?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the Department of Justice, 
others will make that legal determination. We all should want--
I know you do, too, Senator Kaine--to make sure we have an 
election that everyone is confident in.
    Senator Kaine. Are you indifferent to the date of the 
election?
    Secretary Pompeo. It should happen lawfully.
    Senator Kaine. Right. It should happen lawfully.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. So for the record, because you may not want 
to comment on it, but I do think it is important. A President 
cannot delay an election. The date of the election is 
established by Congress. It was established in 1845. There is 
no ability for a President to delay an election. I do not think 
it is that hard a question or one that should lead to any 
equivocation by somebody who is fourth in line of succession to 
be President of the United States. Let me ask another question.
    Was Marie Yovanovitch a talented public servant?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to comment on 
that personnel matter.
    Senator Kaine. Was she a valuable part of the State 
Department family?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, again, the President made the 
very clear decision that he preferred that she not be our 
Ambassador. It is fully within his right----
    Senator Kaine. That completely----
    Secretary Pompeo. Every one of us that takes on these jobs 
knows that at any minute we could be gone.
    Senator Kaine. I am not asking that. This is not a question 
about the President's power.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. I am asking about your opinion of her as a 
public servant.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I did not interact with 
Ambassador Yovanovitch.
    Senator Kaine. You did not?
    Secretary Pompeo. No, not significantly.
    Senator Kaine. So you do not really have--you do not 
consider that you have----
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to talk about 
this. There will be a place and a time for me to talk about 
this, and I am looking forward to that. It is not the case that 
I talk about personnel matters in public.
    Senator Kaine. You were very willing to tell us what you 
did not like about the Inspector General in response to Senator 
Menendez----
    Secretary Pompeo. I was. A very different situation, a 
very, very different situation. There have been accusations 
about misconduct and malfeasance and assertions that I fired 
someone because they were investigating me. It demands a 
response. There is going to be a public report. This is 
different.
    Senator Kaine. I want to make sure I understand your 
testimony.
    Secretary Pompeo. I have been steadfast in this.
    So you have asked me about other ambassadors before, too. I 
have not talked about them who were great and doing wonderful 
things. I did not say that either.
    Senator Kaine. I am trying to determine whether you have 
been steadfast or not since I have so many State Department 
employees that live in the Commonwealth of Virginia----
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. --who are very, very concerned about whether 
or not a Secretary of State might have the back of a career 
professional who is a valued person.
    You were on a phone call with President Trump and President 
Zelensky of Ukraine when the President said about Ambassador 
Yovanovitch she is going to go through some things. Do you know 
what the President meant when he said that?
    Secretary Pompeo. I do not.
    Senator Kaine. You were on that call. That has been 
reported----
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, I was.
    Senator Kaine. When he said that about Marie Yovanovitch, 
did you ever follow up and ask the President what he meant?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am confident that every action 
we took with Ambassador Yovanovitch was completely appropriate.
    Senator Kaine. That is not the question I asked.
    Secretary Pompeo. It is the truth.
    Senator Kaine. Well, that may be the truth, but how about 
answering my question?
    Secretary Pompeo. I am not going to talk about internal 
discussions at the State Department. You would not want me to, 
neither would your constituents, Senator Kaine. They would not 
want the Secretary of State to come up here and talk about 
internal conversations about personnel matters. You know that. 
That is not appropriate.
    Senator Kaine. Well, can you just listen to my question?
    Secretary Pompeo. Sure.
    Senator Kaine. You were on the phone call.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. You heard the President say that about Marie 
Yovanovitch, and my question to you is, did you ask what the 
President meant about that? Yes or no.
    Secretary Pompeo. The answer is I am not going to talk 
about either. I guess that you are asking did I ask the 
President----
    Senator Kaine. Yes.
    Secretary Pompeo. --what he meant. I do not talk about 
conversations----
    Senator Kaine. You told me you do not know what he meant.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. I just asked if you asked him.
    Secretary Pompeo. I appreciate your question and I hope you 
can appreciate why I do not talk about conversations with the 
President.
    Senator Kaine. Here was some testimony we heard in this 
room the other day from your, I believe it is, Executive 
Secretary, Lisa Kenna, who was here for a hearing about her 
nomination to be Ambassador to Peru. She said in her work with 
you, the work that her office does, they get correspondence for 
you. Some they open and sort of categorize and classify it 
before they deliver it to you. Then she said there is a second 
category of correspondence that they do not open. If it is 
personal to you, if it is for your eyes only, if it is 
something from another cabinet member, they would not open 
that, but they would just deliver it to you. She said there is 
a third category of documents that was documents delivered by 
Rudy Giuliani to you which did not go through the process of 
being opened and it also did not go through the process of 
coming to her and having it delivered to you. It came directly 
to you.
    What was your response to Rudy Giuliani's effort to sack 
Ambassador Yovanovitch? Did you say, hey, it is not your job? 
This is my job.
    Secretary Pompeo. The President of the United States has 
the unconditional right to have the ambassadors he wants.
    Senator Kaine. Stipulated for the record, but was your 
interaction with Rudy Giuliani?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate this. Do not go 
into great magical effects with respect to how a package came. 
That is all silliness. You should note for the record that that 
package was delivered to Capitol Hill by the former Inspector 
General who ran frantically to Capitol Hill and made a big 
news.
    Senator Kaine. My time is up. I am just going to say you 
might think this is silly. You might think these questions are 
silly, but when somebody works for their entire career for the 
State Department and they are slandered with lies and sacked 
for no good reason, that sends a message that could not be 
clearer to other State Department officials. It may be just a 
big joke. I mean, hey, look at you smiling and laughing and 
calling them silly. I do not think it is silly to Marie 
Yovanovitch or the people who work for you.
    Secretary Pompeo. I do not think it is silly to the United 
States Department of State to understand that every ambassador, 
every political appointee knows that when the President of the 
United States finds that they lack confidence in you, the 
President has the right to terminate them. It is that easy. It 
includes me.
    The Chairman. Senator Paul.
    Secretary Pompeo. You should note I did not slander anyone. 
This was handled appropriately and properly, Senator.
    Senator Paul. History demonstrates that wars are easier to 
start than they are to end.
    Secretary Pompeo. I think that is fair.
    Senator Paul. We have agreement. We have agreement.
    I think the Afghan war is a great example of that. You 
know, after nearly 20 years of war, many are questioning the 
mission. In fact, many have been questioning what the mission 
is in Afghanistan for a decade or more, including President 
Trump. I traveled with him to the sad duty at Dover receiving 
two of our soldiers home, and I know it affects him personally. 
I know he has been very public and very consistent and I think 
very sincere in wanting to end the war in Afghanistan.
    Army Lieutenant General Dan McNeill put it this way when 
asked about the mission. He says, I tried to get someone to 
define for me what winning meant even before I went over, and 
nobody could. Nobody would give me a good definition of what it 
meant. Some people were thinking in terms of Jeffersonian 
democracy, but that is just not going to happen in Afghanistan. 
The statement was 13 years ago.
    When asked about our mission, General Douglas Lute said, we 
were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan. We 
did not know what we were doing. What are we trying to do 
there? We did not have the foggiest notion of what we were 
doing. This is from 5 years ago.
    How long is it going to take? What is our current mission? 
Why are we in Afghanistan? Do we have a cogent military reason 
to be in Afghanistan right now?
    Secretary Pompeo. So the President has given two missions. 
One is to reduce our force posture, both the risk to our young 
men and women who are fighting there. The second is to ensure 
that there is not a terror attack that emanates from that 
space. We set about conducting a peace and reconciliation 
process. We have now reduced forces there by about half since 
their most recent peak. We are on our way to reduce even 
further.
    I am hopeful that we will get the Afghans to begin their 
negotiation because President Trump has made very clear his 
expectation. We have entered into an agreement that we will go 
to zero. We will get our forces out of there. I think it is May 
of next year. We are looking to do that on terms that make sure 
we protect America from a----
    Senator Paul. Would you agree that Afghanistan is just one 
of probably hundreds of places that we potentially have terror 
threats or radical Islamic threats and may not even be no 
longer the primary place?
    Secretary Pompeo. Hundreds. If you will give me dozens and 
dozens, yes, sir, absolutely.
    Senator Paul. Do you think that maybe it is--we talked 
about in Europe that we had hundreds of thousands of troops in 
Germany because there was the Soviet Union and they had--I do 
not know--2 million, 3 million people in their army. We had 
this sort of Cold War standoff.
    So circumstances have changed and maybe even in your 
opinion it has changed over whether or not we need so many 
troops in Germany. I applaud that.
    I think the same is in Afghanistan. It has certainly 
changed over 20 years. The war on terror is now and always has 
been sort of global one, but I think it may be a 20th century 
idea that we have to occupy territory so much that we have to 
have acres and we have to have large bases particularly in 
countries that are in prolonged civil war.
    The other question is, really is our goal in these 
locations around the world our national security, or is our 
goal sometimes muddied by the idea that basically we are in 
Afghanistan for the equal rights amendment or for women's 
rights or we are there for democracy or making a country out of 
Afghanistan? Are we there for building roads? We built a $45 
million natural gas, gas station in Afghanistan. They have no 
cars that run on natural gas. So we bought them cars that ran 
on natural gas. They have no money, so we gave them a credit 
card. My understanding is that the gas station was supposed to 
cost half a million. It cost $45 million and is no longer 
functioning. So, I mean, is our goal national security or is 
nation building part of what we should be doing as a country?
    Secretary Pompeo. I think President Trump has made it 
unambiguous. Our mission set there is American national 
security. Plain and simple.
    I would add only this. There are times in the world where 
we are better off if there are democratic nations. The State 
Department has designed to build resilience to do this kind of 
thing, but I do think our foreign policy sometimes has been 
overly ambitious about what it is we can accomplish through the 
use of military force with respect to getting other nations 
to----
    Senator Paul. I think encouraging democracy and being part 
of--supportive of democracy does not mean we have to pay for 
trying to institute our image in some other country because it 
just does not, frankly, work.
    When we look at trying to end the Afghan war, I think in 
some ways we are stuck in the sense that people have decided we 
can only leave with some sort of treaty with the Taliban, some 
sort of agreement with the Taliban.
    I am sort of the opinion that in some ways it might make it 
worse because I think that the Taliban are not necessarily 
trustworthy. If we leave under the agreement that they have to 
meet certain parameters, which is what we are looking towards, 
and then they break those parameters, we are right back in with 
a threat to stay in.
    I think it is almost that the threat has to be--and maybe 
the threat should have been this 20 or even 30 years ago. The 
threat should be that if you harbor terrorists that are 
organizing international terrorism that there will be military 
repercussions, but those do not have to be landing 50,000 
troops. It might be landing 50,000 bombs.
    Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely right.
    Senator Paul. So I think we need to think about what our--
and I think we have not escaped. We are still stuck in this 
idea of we have occupied this acreage and we have to do 
something with it, and we cannot leave until it is perfect. It 
is never going to be perfect there. The only thing I would just 
exhort you is that let us not base it completely on that we 
have to have a perfect deal to leave. I think there is always 
the threat that we can come back, and people say there are 10 
al Qaeda left in Afghanistan. They might be plotting right now.
    The President has admitted it. You have said they are a 
shadow of themselves. The President has admitted there have 
been reports that there are--now we are talking dozens, not 
hundreds. We are talking dozens, not thousands.
    The same with the Islamic State. General Lute came and 
spoke to one of our committees recently, and he said he could 
not name any group there that he thought had the capability to 
attack the United States. He said there was no evidence that 
the so-called Islamic State presents a threat to the U.S. from 
Afghanistan.
    So I do think we need to be mindful of that, but we do have 
to work towards finishing it. The only thing I would say in the 
end, because I do not want to finish this without mentioning 
that it takes friends of the President. The President has 
policy. People have to try to fulfill his policy. I think for a 
long time, for several years John Bolton was trying to thwart 
that, and John Bolton was an enemy of the President's policy. 
So I hope the people who are remaining will try to fulfill the 
President's policy and get us out of the war in Afghanistan.
    Thank you.
    Secretary Pompeo. If I may just take one second, Senator 
Risch, with your permission.
    The Chairman. You may.
    Secretary Pompeo. Your point, Senator Paul, about the 
global spectrum of terrorism and the fact that there are dozens 
of al Qaeda left in Afghanistan, I think that is the central 
thing that the American people need to understand. Wherever we 
were 15 or 20 years ago is not where we are today. Our 
resources, whether it is our decision in Germany or a decision 
about force posture in Asia or Africa or in Afghanistan or 
Syria or anyplace else--we need to make sure that it is updated 
for the actual threats presented to the United States of 
America. That is what President Trump is driving us to do.
    So thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Mr. Secretary.
    I am going to start with the events that have occurred in 
Hong Kong and what I really see as a violation of the agreement 
made with Britain, between China and Britain.
    Now that these events, this new Chinese law that really 
exerts enormous violations of civil rights in Hong Kong has 
occurred, should we extend asylum and visa opportunities to 
those who are being persecuted by the Chinese in Hong Kong?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are reviewing that. We are 
considering it. The British have made a good decision. The 
Australians have made a decision they are going to accept up to 
hundreds of thousands of people. We are looking at how best we 
might accomplish this and consistent with making sure that--we 
always want to encourage people to try to work from within to 
the extent they can as well. So it is important that we get 
this right. The President is actively considering how we ought 
to treat those who seek asylum coming to us from Hong Kong or 
to grant a visa program that surrounds that.
    Senator Merkley. Well, it sounds like you are open to the 
opportunity and are reviewing it. I do feel like there are 
folks who will be highly targeted, and they are concerned about 
being locked up for the rest of their lives, young folks, 18, 
20 years old, in Chinese prisons.
    Do the events in Hong Kong change our perspectives on 
Taiwan or make us think about ways to be more supportive of 
Taiwan? We obviously do a lot of arms sales and so forth. 
Should we be more active in supporting Taiwanese participation 
in international institutions?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, they are different situations. 
There was an agreement with Hong Kong. They are different, but 
I think it is fair to say that the Chinese Communist Party 
views them as the same. If you ask the Chinese Communist Party, 
they would both view them as part of their territory, and so 
that requires diligence.
    Your question about international organizations--not only 
the team that I have assigned to that, but the regional bureaus 
as well, are working on multiple fronts. We took a run at this 
in the World Health Assembly now a couple months back, and we 
have taken this on at the United Nations to make sure that 
Taiwan is represented in every place that it is appropriate 
that they be represented as part of formal and informal 
international gatherings.
    Senator Merkley. There is a longstanding convention that 
the President of the United States should not meet with the 
President of Taiwan because it would offend China. Do you agree 
with that longstanding convention?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, if I may defer that. I am happy 
to have a conversation with you about it.
    Here is what I will say with respect to Taiwan. There are a 
series of understandings that have been long held, multiple 
administrations, multiple parties. We intend to continue on 
with that. We understand the Taiwan Relations Act and the 
obligations that the United States Government has with respect 
to that.
    We are working to recognize the changes that General 
Secretary Xi has made with respect to this. We want to make 
sure we get this right.
    Senator Merkley. Saudi Arabia has been abetting the flight 
of Saudi nationals who have done horrific crimes in America. So 
really two questions.
    Do you agree that this effort to sweep people out of our 
country who have done or are charged with doing horrific things 
before they can be tried is unacceptable?
    Do you agree if it continues to occur, the U.S. should use 
significant diplomatic consequences for Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes to both questions, Senator.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    So there is the report that--well, we have done several 
things in regard to the situation in Xinjiang and the Chinese 
incarceration, basically slave camps of a million Uighurs. We 
have done some recent things, and I applaud those recent steps 
to impose sanctions to block exports that were done with forced 
labor in China.
    I also feel like there is another narrative that has 
undermined kind of the effectiveness of this. As we have heard 
about the President's comments in November 2017 trip to China 
where he indicated that President Xi should go ahead with 
building concentration camps and then again in June 2019, a 
year and a half later, our President, President Trump's 
conversation with President Xi saying again basically they 
should go ahead building the camps and it is the right thing to 
do.
    I think it is absolutely the wrong thing to do. We have 
done, as I noted, some steps that suggest that is--but should 
we be more robust at every level in condemning the Chinese 
enslavement of the Uighurs?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think the answer is yes. I am 
proud of what we have done, the way that the United States has 
responded, not only the responses we have taken directly, but 
the work we have done around the world to convince the whole 
world of what is taking place there.
    I have been disappointed to see Muslim countries not 
respond when there are often significant Muslim populations 
being impacted there in western China. We are urging them to 
take this on in a serious way.
    Then I guess the last thing I would say is I think with the 
objective of changing the behaviors that are taking place 
there, this is an important economic region. So the things that 
we are endeavoring to do--it is important we get the human 
rights piece of this right. It is important that we get the 
individual sanctions piece of this right, but it is very 
important--and I am really happy with the work we are making to 
convince businesses, not just American businesses because it is 
an international place of business, that they should really 
look hard at their supply chains not just their direct 
employees, but their supply chains and what is taking place 
there. I think if we get that right, we have the opportunity to 
change what is taking place there.
    Senator Merkley. A quick point and a final question because 
I am running out of time.
    The UN fact-finding mission on the Rohingya, the U.S. 
Holocaust Museum, a law group engaged by the State Department 
to investigate atrocities have all found strong evidence of 
genocide by Burma. I really hope the United States will declare 
it to be genocide because it is, and it would strengthen our 
representation and advocacy for human rights in the world.
    I want to turn to Honduras in my final question. The State 
Department Human Rights report talks about extrajudicial 
killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, detention, violence 
against indigenous Hondurans, violence against the LGBT 
communities. In addition, we had in October a U.S. federal 
court find that the president, Juan Orlando Hernandez, was 
implicated as a co-conspirator in widespread drug trafficking 
and money laundering.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
    Senator Merkley. There are huge reports of systemic 
corruption and human rights abuses.
    In the context of all of this, is it time to reevaluate our 
relationship, which has been quite cozy with the president of 
Honduras?
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are constantly demanding that 
the leadership in Honduras take these set of facts on board. We 
are well aware of what is taking place, and like in too many 
countries around the world, we have not had the effect that we 
desire. We are working on it.
    The Chairman. Senator Young.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Good to have you 
here.
    In response to media coverage over the last few days in the 
Washington Post, NBC News, the Daily Beast, and my hometown 
newspaper, the Indianapolis Star, I would like to bring up the 
situation of Peter Kassig and three other Americans who lost 
their lives at the hands of ISIS.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to request the following columns 
from the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News be added to 
the record.
    The Chairman. They will be included.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, you may recall meeting with 
the Kassig family last year, but as a brief refresher, in 
October 2013, Indiana native and former Army Ranger, Peter 
Kassig, was on a mission of mercy. He was delivering 
humanitarian aid to suffering people in Syria. He was taken 
hostage by ISIS, and sadly after months of torture and 
incredible hardship at the hands of these ISIS terrorists and 
in spite of his embrace of Islam, he was brutally beheaded. 
Sadly, three other Americans, James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and 
Kayla Mueller also lost their lives at the hands of ISIS 
murderers. I know each of their stories are familiar to other 
members of this committee.
    Since that time, some of the murderers, known as ``The 
Beatles,'' have been killed in U.S.-led drone strikes, but 
others remain at large. I know you agree, they must be brought 
to justice. I believe that the United States Government should 
work tirelessly, independently, and with the cooperation of 
allies to hunt down the killers of these Americans and bring 
them to justice here in the United States of America.
    Mr. Secretary, do you agree with me?
    Secretary Pompeo. I do, and you should know that the 
President of the United States agrees as well.
    Senator Young. What efforts can the State Department and 
our missions overseas take to bring this about?
    Secretary Pompeo. It is a broad effort. I think we are 
making progress. The Department of Defense, their intelligence 
assets, the broader set of U.S. intelligence assets, all aimed 
at making sure we understand and then working with important 
partners too who want justice, but have a different set of 
rules about how to think about that, so working to convince 
them that proceeding to bring them to justice is the right 
approach. I am very hopeful that we will, in the coming weeks, 
have a good outcome here.
    Senator Young. You alluded to different perspectives that 
exist out there. What precise obstacles stand in the way and 
what can you do to overcome them?
    Secretary Pompeo. So, an example. I will stay away from 
this particular incident, but an example is when we make a 
decision from time to time to bring someone back from someplace 
else, either through extradition or through another legal 
process, the countries say because we have the death penalty or 
because of a certain set of rules we have here, they will not 
either permit that to happen or share the information that we 
might need to complete a successful prosecution. One of our 
roles is to make sure that those countries will permit us to do 
that.
    Senator Young. I do want to interject--and it is important 
to note here, though you were just using an example--it is my 
understanding that the four families are no longer pursuing the 
death penalty for these terrorists. Their hope is that this 
shift will alleviate any challenges whatsoever that we have 
encountered with the British Government and their justice 
system in allowing the prosecution to move forward in the 
United States.
    Secretary Pompeo. I appreciate that, Senator Young. That is 
important. I will leave it at that.
    Senator Young. I am committed to working with you, and I 
suspect there are other members of this committee who will join 
me in that effort to ensure that justice is delivered and 
delivered here in the United States. Will you commit to working 
with me and this committee to ensure that we pursue this matter 
accordingly?
    Secretary Pompeo. Of course, yes, sir.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    I would like to move to the United Nations and how, over 
the past several years, Mr. Secretary, the U.S. has lost ground 
in its engagement with a number of UN bodies and programs. Most 
recently, the Administration formally submitted paperwork to 
withdraw from the World Health Organization.
    At the same time, the role and influence of other 
countries, particularly the Communist government in China, has 
been growing at the UN. It has expanded its role in a range of 
UN agencies, with Chinese nationals currently holding the top 
job in four of the organization's 15 specialized agencies: the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization, the International Telecom Union, and 
the UN Industrial Development Organization. For comparison, a 
French national leads two specialized agencies, the IMF and 
UNESCO. The UK leads one, the ILO, and the U.S. leads just one, 
the World Bank, although a U.S. national does lead the UN 
Children's Fund and the World Food Program, which are large and 
prominent UN organizations.
    So building on Senator Murphy's earlier line of 
questioning, why do we not look beyond the World Health 
Organization, and I ask you, Mr. Secretary, what implications 
does this losing of ground within UN bodies and agencies have 
on advancing U.S. national security interests and other foreign 
policy priorities that we might have in the UN system?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes. It is very significant, and it is at 
least a 15-year-long slide that has taken place and growth of 
the Chinese Communist Party's influence in these institutions 
and organizations.
    We have done a couple things to turn this around. We had 
real success at the World International Property Organization. 
The Chinese thought they had the fast track to that. We put up 
a good candidate. It was not an American candidate, but it was 
a candidate that we believe has an understanding of 
intellectual property in the same way that freedom-loving 
democracies do, and we crushed them. It was an amazing 
diplomatic effort. We built up coalitions with the Indians, the 
Brits, the Australians, and then built it out all across the 
world. We are asking for about $20 million in this budget to 
take the team that we built there and make it a permanent team 
that is focused on these major elections for these 15 
institutions, and then there is another set that are slightly 
different, but still very important.
    Then we have a second set of operations which is it is not 
just the leaders that matter at the UN organizations. They have 
big bureaucracies underneath them. We are sadly inadequately 
represented at every level inside of these international 
bodies, and it matters. It matters that there is someone there. 
It matters that they are American, but it matters, if they are 
not American, that they come from the nations that understand 
the rule of law and how the world ought to be conducted in a 
way that we do.
    So I have actually worked closely with about seven other 
countries to build out an effort that is very focused on 
exactly this. Sometimes, frankly, we have had opportunities. We 
were offered a place and did not put anybody forward. That is 
not the right way to go. We need to make sure we get it right. 
I am confident that in a year and 2 years, we will be in a 
better place than we are today, and I hope we will have the 
resources to do that. It is a little bit of a resource issue, 
but it is a lot of a focus issue. I think I have cleaned that 
up materially.
    The Chairman. Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to correct the record on a couple things here that 
have been said this morning.
    First of all, I believe that Secretary Tillerson's two 
predecessors oversaw probably one of the most major withdrawals 
in foreign policy from the global stage that America has ever 
seen. It created a power vacuum that allowed Iran, North Korea, 
Russia, China to step into that vacuum and, actually during 
that period of time, created a physical caliphate that allowed 
the rise of ISIS in Syria such that in January of 2017, Mr. 
Secretary, I believe that the world was more dangerous than any 
time in my lifetime. We faced five threats across five domains: 
Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, and terrorism across air, 
land, and sea. All of a sudden we woke up and realized that our 
would-be adversaries have been developing capability in cyber 
and space that the prior Administration had not really warned 
us about.
    So we woke up, and I think we have all now figured out in 
the United States--I think there is a consensus on both sides--
for the last 50 years, with all good intentions, we got China 
wrong. I think there is a general awakening that you have had 
three other cabinet members, along with yourself, make 
tremendous policy speeches here just in the last month. I would 
like to quote some of that that you wrote about.
    You had Secretary O'Brien, our National Security Advisor 
O'Brien, talk about ideology; FBI Director Wray talk about 
espionage; Attorney General Barr talk about economics; and you 
talked about the warning here. I am going to quote. This is 
your quote. ``We had a very clear purpose in those four 
speeches, a real mission. It was to explain the different 
facets of America's relationship with China, the massive 
imbalances in that relationship that have built up over 
decades, and the Chinese Communist Party's design for 
hegemony.''
    It is interesting you chose that word because the Chinese 
love to quote Confucius, and one of his famous sayings is just 
as there cannot be--and they do this recently. Just as there 
cannot be two suns in the sky, there cannot be two emperors on 
the earth. The word they use for emperor is not benign 
dictator, which is the most common use of that translation. It 
is hegemon. They want to be the hegemon that they feel like 
they were for 4,000 years.
    You said further, our goal was to make clear that the 
threats to Americans that President Trump's China policy aims 
to address are clear and our strategy for securing those 
freedoms established.
    You went on to say later in there in closing this out, you 
said securing--and I think this is the most important sentence 
in this speech in my opinion--securing our freedoms from the 
Chinese Communist Party is the mission of our time, and America 
is perfectly positioned to lead it because our founding 
principles give us that opportunity. A tremendous statement. 
That will go down in history.
    The fact that only 6 percent of China's population belong 
to the Communist Party, Mr. Secretary--I would argue that our 
fight is not with the Chinese people. It is with the Communist 
Party.
    There is a statement from the Administration here dated May 
26, 2020. It says we do not seek to contain China's development 
nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people.
    Can you articulate the threats the Chinese Communist Party 
threaten--makes or represents to our democracy and our freedoms 
here, and what are we doing as a Chinese strategy as we try to 
manage during your Administration here--as we try to manage 
this turn in our relationship with China to confront them, to 
stand up to them, but also to protect our freedoms here at 
home?
    Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, there are multiple fronts to 
this, and these are not created by the Department of State. 
They are created by what the Chinese Communist Party says, to 
your point. President Trump recognized that. He talked about it 
in his campaign back as far as 2015. We have got to get this 
imbalance corrected. When we do, there will be costs associated 
with that. We have got the largest increase in our military 
buildup that President Trump has led. We are very focused on an 
arms control strategic dialogue that we are having today. I was 
in Vienna on the 27 and 28 of this month, so a few days back. 
We know we need China to be part of that, too. They are now a 
significant nuclear power. We have seen what has happened on 
the economic front. We have seen their Belt and Road 
Initiative. So they are competing. Senator Rubio talked about 
their efforts in four or five technology spheres.
    This is a multi-front campaign. It will take not only the 
United States Government, but the United States citizens to 
understand this challenge. Then we have got to build out the 
global alliance.
    The last thing I will say here is I have seen it said that 
the United States is asking nations to pick sides between China 
and the United States. It is fundamentally false. We are asking 
every sovereign country to pick between freedom and tyranny. 
That is the choice every leader has got to make. When I go 
around the world, that is what I talk to them about, and they 
all know. They all know that the United States is the country 
that they want to be alongside. They all know that freedom and 
our value system and the rule of law and property rights and 
the protection of these unalienable rights is central to their 
country, and it is why I think the tide is turning around the 
world and that people are seeing the Chinese Communist Party 
for what it is, the threat to the security of their people.
    Senator Perdue. I agree with the tyranny/freedom. I 
characterize it a little different. There is state control and 
there is self-determination. The world is turning into a binary 
equation. Russia, China, Venezuela, and Cuba--if you add up all 
the GDPs of those state-controlled countries, it is probably 
less than $20 trillion. If you add up the GDP of all the rest 
that are self-determined, that is over $70 trillion, Mr. 
Secretary.
    I want to relate that back to the last question here that 
goes to your comments earlier about the number one thing--I 
think you agreed with it 1,000 percent with Senator Murphy--
about allies being the answer here with China. This is a huge 
effort. It is going to take years to develop.
    Right now we have an opportunity with the Quad, the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This is the United States, 
India, Japan, and Australia. A great development is happening 
right now that India is very strongly considering inviting 
Australia to that exercise, Malabar.
    Would you comment on how important this particular group is 
in relation to the bigger conversation you just mentioned? The 
fact that the GDP of the Quad is more than twice that of China 
today is not to be lost on the conversation. Would you just 
make one last comment on that, please?
    Secretary Pompeo. It is more populous than China as well. 
These are nations that all have elected leaders, all have 
democracies, all understand--in different cultures and 
different settings, all have a central understanding about how 
commercial enterprise should be conducted and how militaries 
should engage and about how security is actually achieved. The 
good news is I think this grouping is stronger than it has ever 
been. Maybe we were gifted by General Secretary Xi. He took 
actions that caused each of the leaders in those countries to 
recognize the value of this group.
    I meet with them with some frequency either by phone or in-
person, and we are working on economic efforts together. We are 
working on COVID responses together. There are lots of places 
where we are finding common touch points where we can develop 
real strength and unity that can, in fact, provide the bulwark 
that we can build out from all across the world.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    I appreciate the good job you do for our country and 
leaning into hard issues forcefully. We need more of that, not 
less.
    When it comes to a UN envoy for Libya, do you support that 
we need a new one?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Graham. Good. I am going to try to get a letter 
from everybody in the committee to the UN Secretary-General 
saying please appoint a special envoy. Mr. Secretary, anything 
we can do to up our game would be great. I know you work with 
the Berlin folks.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Graham. We will see if we can bring stability----
    Secretary Pompeo. We need the right one, too, Senator--I 
know you agree with that--not just a new one, but the right 
person as well.
    Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you very much.
    The Caesar Act. Thank you for using it quickly and holding 
Assad's son accountable is a great first step in what I think 
will be a long journey to punish this regime. Is more coming?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Graham. Thank you. Great job.
    I talked to General Mazlum yesterday with the SDF. 
Apparently, they have signed a deal with an American oil 
company to modernize the oilfields in northeastern Syria. Are 
you supportive of that?
    Secretary Pompeo. We are.
    Senator Graham. That would be a great way to help everybody 
in northeastern Syria.
    Secretary Pompeo. The deal took a little longer, Senator, 
than we had hoped, and we now are in implementation. It could 
be very powerful.
    Senator Graham. You have been terrific in that regard.
    When it comes to Afghanistan, is my understanding correct 
that any withdrawal from Afghanistan will be conditions based?
    Secretary Pompeo. That is correct.
    Senator Graham. The inter-Afghan dialogue hopefully will 
start here fairly soon?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Graham. Yes, hopefully.
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I do not mean to make light of that. 
We are very hopeful that in the next week--I have heard that I 
may have said that once before, but we see the conditions. They 
have now completed enough tasks that we think there is a real 
chance we can----
    Senator Graham. Well, in case the Taliban are following the 
hearing--I doubt if they are. I am a pretty hawkish guy on 
Afghanistan. You have been great on foreign policy in general 
from my point of view.
    I would like to end the war too, and I would like to get 
the Taliban integrated into a new Afghanistan that respects the 
rights of women, where everybody can have a say through the 
democratic process. The Taliban are part of the Afghan culture. 
They are a minority. They are by no means a dominant voice in 
Afghanistan, but if we could help Pakistan and Afghanistan 
achieve a working relationship they have never had before on 
terrorism, we could get an inner-Afghan dialogue started, I am 
willing to invest in an Afghanistan that has a place for the 
Taliban, but not to the exclusion of women or religious 
minorities. So count me in for your efforts, and I very much 
appreciate what Zalmay is doing and Adam.
    When it comes to China, is it fair to say that in 2020, the 
Chinese Communist Party is running concentration camps that 
house religious minorities?
    Secretary Pompeo. I would be careful about the language. I 
have described it this way, Senator.
    Senator Graham. Something like a concentration----
    Secretary Pompeo. It is the worst human rights violation 
that we have seen this century.
    Senator Graham. Okay. Fair enough. That is a good 
description.
    You closed the Houston consulate down because they were 
using the diplomatic platform to cheat, steal, and lie when it 
comes to intellectual property.
    Secretary Pompeo. Intellectual property and other items as 
well. Yes.
    Senator Graham. The special status of Hong Kong has been 
virtually destroyed. Is that fair to say?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
    Senator Graham. I appreciate you speaking about it and 
taking action.
    When it comes to the rule of law, the Chinese Communist 
Party sees it is more of a nuisance than anything else.
    Secretary Pompeo. I think the litter of promises broken 
across multiple forums demonstrates that they take those 
agreements for having very little value.
    Senator Graham. If you go a property dispute, you generally 
do not build a military base on the contested property. You 
actually go to some kind of court and work it out.
    We just passed in the Judiciary Committee legislation 
modeled on JASTA, allowing Americans who have been victims of 
the coronavirus to sue the Chinese Communist Party. Do you 
support that?
    Secretary Pompeo. I have not had a chance to take a look at 
it.
    Senator Graham. We will get it to you, and please get back 
to us if you could.
    Bottom line, Syria is never going to end until we get the 
entire fabric of Syrian society in a room working together. The 
northeastern footprint we have where we are working with the 
SDF who helped us destroy the ISIS caliphate--they did most of 
the heavy fighting--that gives us leverage. I appreciate you 
being an advocate for the SDF. I appreciate that you have tried 
to work with a new leadership in Iraq. It is important that 
ISIS never come back. It is important that we have a say about 
that part of the world.
    Finally, as to Iran, where do you see the Iranian regime in 
terms of their potency? Are the sanctions working, and what 
would you advise this committee to do going forward with Iran?
    Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, the sanctions have clearly 
had an impact. It has diminished their capacity to underwrite 
Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, but clearly has not achieved 
the ultimate objective, which is to change the behavior of the 
Iranian regime.
    So our view is this. We are happy to see them change, but 
until such time as they do, we see the best tool is to starve 
the regime of the capacity to inflict terror around the world. 
So your support in doing that is very important. I talked a 
little bit earlier--I think you had not arrived just yet--about 
the UN arms embargo that we are working so diligently to make 
sure it does not expire in a couple months.
    Senator Graham. Well, one last topic. Again, thank you. I 
think you have done a very good job from my point of view for 
our country, leaning into really difficult issues forcefully 
and with reason.
    Developmental aid. The House $3 trillion bill did not have 
any money for vaccines going to the developing world. The 
Republican bill has about $4 billion. I would urge you to work 
with us to try to find a way, if we can get a vaccine 
developed, to get it to the developing world, sort of like what 
we did with PEPFAR because it will do no good to eradicate it 
here if we do not eradicate it everywhere. Would you work with 
us in that regard?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes. We have presented something that we 
have given the name PIPER PRO that is modeled on PEPFAR that 
ultimately we think could be very successful. If we can get a 
vaccine, we are happy to work with you all on it.
    Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Graham.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, welcome.
    Secretary Pompeo. Senator.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you for your testimony, and thank you 
for your service as well.
    Let us cover a number of topics. Let us start with Nord 
Stream 2.
    You and I have worked for some time on Nord Stream 2 in 
stopping the completion of that pipeline. As you know, over a 
year ago, I joined with Senator Shaheen in passing bipartisan 
legislation. It went through both houses of Congress with 
overwhelming bicameral, bipartisan support imposing significant 
sanctions on companies that participated in laying the pipeline 
of Nord Stream 2. The President signed that legislation around 
7:00 p.m., if I remember correctly, on a Thursday, and 15 
minutes before his signature was on the page, the Swiss company 
that was laying the pipeline announced that they were 
immediately ceasing all pipeline construction activities. So 
those sanctions worked.
    Russia has not stopped. They have a pipeline that is 90 to 
95 percent complete. Now, the good thing about a pipeline is a 
pipeline that is 95 percent complete is a pipeline that is 0 
percent complete because it isn't transmitting anything until 
they connect the two ends. It is my intention that they never 
complete this pipeline.
    Both Russia and German continue to press forward 
aggressively to try to find ways to complete this pipeline. As 
you know, Senator Shaheen and I again introduced even stronger 
sanctions to any companies involved in any way whatsoever with 
the construction of the pipeline. Those stronger sanctions were 
included in the NDAA that passed this body with overwhelming 
bipartisan support just last week. So I am hopeful, as the NDAA 
moves forward, that we will have those stronger sanctions in 
effect.
    At the same time, you made an important decision within the 
State Department. Under CAATSA, the Administration has the 
authority, I believe, to sanction companies working to build 
this pipeline. Your predecessor, Secretary Tillerson, had 
issued, as I understand it, a guidance that was widely 
interpreted as essentially exempting Nord Stream 2. You made 
the right decision to rescind that guidance.
    Can you explain to the committee the importance of that 
guidance and what authority the Administration has right now 
today with no additional legislation to sanction any company, 
any German company, any other company that participates in any 
way with completing this pipeline?
    Secretary Pompeo. Yes. So thanks, Senator Cruz.
    The President made the decision to change that language. It 
was my recommendation. So I am not walking away from it, but I 
wanted to make sure everybody knew the President was fully on 
board with that change.
    That language was important because to your point--and this 
is a little bit too simple, but it was essentially a get out of 
jail free card for those conducting activities surrounding Nord 
Stream 2. That is no longer true. Both the State Department and 
the Department of the Treasury have made very clear in our 
conversations with those who have equipment there. We can see 
that they are responding, as are their insurers, the board of 
directors, their lawyers all understand the express threat that 
is posed to them for continuing to complete work on completion 
of the pipeline. We remain hopeful that those who have the 
capacity to finish this pipeline quickly will not be able to do 
so. They will choose not to because of these sanctions. Then we 
have the task of those that are harder to reach by sanctions, 
making sure that we do everything we can to stop them.
    The President has been so clear about the security threat 
that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline poses to Europe. We have not 
been able to convince the Germans of that. So we are taking 
action ourselves to try and accomplish that to preserve 
security for the European people.
    Senator Cruz. So, Secretary Pompeo, I know you care about 
this issue. I spent about 6 hours with the President yesterday 
on Air Force One, and Nord Stream 2 came up in considerable 
depth, as did the President's frustrations with the leadership 
of Germany.
    Let me point out that the State Department has a long 
tradition of sometimes obscure speech, perhaps rivaled only by 
the Federal Reserve. This is an issue in which ambiguity is not 
beneficial. As you know, the Russians are actively pushing 
disinformation, that there are not going to be sanctions for 
anyone involved in this pipeline. The Russians actively pushed 
disinformation that the bipartisan legislation I had introduced 
previously was not going to pass. That was wrong.
    Secretary Pompeo. I remember that.
    Senator Cruz. We had overwhelming bipartisan support that 
passed it into law.
    I believe under CAATSA, you have full legal authority right 
now to make clear and explicitly clear to anyone involved with 
constructing this pipeline that the consequences of doing so 
are catastrophic and not worth doing. So I would encourage the 
State Department--and I recognize you work within an 
Administration, and there may be other agencies that have 
different views, but if there are, those other agencies are not 
right in this matter. So I urge you to speak with absolute 
clarity because it is only that clarity I think that has any 
prayer of actually stopping the completion of this pipeline.
    If the pipeline is completed, it will do serious damages to 
the economic interests and the national security interests of 
Europe. It will do serious damage to the economic and national 
security interests of the United States. It will benefit Putin 
and put billions of dollars in his pocket.
    Secretary Pompeo. There is no need for ambiguity. The 
President has not been ambiguous about this at all. There was a 
reason that we made the change in that language, essentially 
the waiver language, if you will. We are fully intent on 
sanctioning those that violate the provisions that are 
contained there both in CAATSA and otherwise.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you. That is helpful.
    Let us shift to another area.
    Secretary Pompeo. I hope that is clear enough.
    Senator Cruz. That last statement had substantially greater 
clarity. So I am grateful and look forward to amplifying it 
loudly.
    Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. Let us shift to another topic that you and I 
have also discussed at length which is Iran snapback. I believe 
maximum pressure should be maximum pressure, that the Iranian 
regime, the ayatollah when he says death to America, that he 
means it, that when he says death to Israel, that it means it.
    Under the terms of the Obama Iran nuclear deal and the UN 
Security Council resolution implementing it, the United States 
has the authority to invoke snapback sanctions if and when Iran 
is in violation of the deal. We have that authority, even 
though we have withdrawn from that deal. Iran is now nakedly, 
openly, flagrantly flouting the deal. They are not pretending 
to comply with it. It is obvious they are defying it, and they 
are telling us they are defying it.
    Will the United States invoke the snapback sanctions which 
would result in re-imposing not just American sanctions, but 
far broader sanctions on Iran for their violations of the deal?
    Secretary Pompeo. I think the President has been very 
clear. We believe we have this authority. I have spoken to this 
a couple of times. We believe that under UN Security Council 
resolution 2231, we clearly have the authority to do this and 
that we are not going to permit this arms embargo to expire on 
October 18. We are going to introduce a UN Security Council 
resolution we hope will be met with approval from the other 
members of the P5. In the event that it is not, we are going to 
take the action necessary to ensure that this arms embargo does 
not expire. We have the capacity to execute snapback, and we 
are going to use it in a way that protects and defends America.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
    Mr. Secretary, we promised you a hard stop at 11:30. We 
like to keep our commitments, and we have by about 30 seconds 
according to my clock.
    Thank you so much for your service to the United States of 
America. Thank you for working with this committee as you have. 
We sincerely appreciate it.
    For information of the members, the record will remain open 
until close of business on Friday, and any responses that are 
given will be made part of the record.
    With that, again, thank you, Mr. Secretary, and this 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. What proportion of the Department's budget is devoted to 
the Indo-Pacific region, and how has that changed over the last 5 
years? What proportion of the Department's personnel are in the Indo-
Pacific region, and how has that changed over the last 5 years? What is 
the Department doing to ensure the budget and personnel meet the 
demands of this important region? Is the Department considering 
shifting more budgetary resources and greater numbers of its personnel 
to the Indo-Pacific region? Is there any flexibility you need from 
Congress to undertake such shifts?

    Answer. The Department allocated $1.5 billion to the Indo-Pacific 
in bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) resources in the FY 
2020 653(a) report and $798 million in the FY 2020 diplomatic 
engagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent 5 percent of the DE 
budget and 4 percent of the total State-USAID budget. (Note: The 
proportion compares Indo-Pacific FA funding with the total State-USAID 
FA budget, including not only regional funding, but significant 
centrally managed funds.) Since November 2017, the Department 
reprogrammed over $800 million in additional FA funds to the Indo-
Pacific. Over the last 5 years the Indo-Pacific DE budget and personnel 
levels averaged 5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged 4 
percent of the total. The Department concluded a review of resource 
needs and expects to internally realign positions to the region. 
Reducing statutorily directed spending and providing additional 
discretionary funding would improve our ability to meet the region's 
challenges.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Last year, President Trump inappropriately withheld 
millions of dollars of security assistance to Ukraine, in an effort to 
extract commitments from Ukraine that they would conduct an 
investigation into a political opponent of the President, leading to 
his impeachment. A series of outstanding questions about your 
involvement and knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the hold on 
security assistance to Ukraine remain. When and how did you first learn 
$141.5 million in foreign military assistance for Ukraine would not be 
immediately obligated?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those 
records for the information you request. Since January 2017, the U.S. 
Government has provided more than $1 billion in security assistance to 
Ukraine, including the provision of lethal defensive articles that were 
not provided prior to January 2017.

    Question. What role, if any, did you play in deciding to suspend 
such assistance?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. What was your understanding of the reasons for that 
delay?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Why were the funds ultimately delayed? Who made that 
decision?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer to those records for 
the information you request.

    Question. Do you think it is appropriate for the President to 
enlist the assistance of a foreign leader to investigate his opponents?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer to those records and 
my prior public statements for the information you request.

    Question. Are you aware of the President requesting or encouraging 
similar efforts of any other foreign officials?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Prior to the July 25 call, did you or did the Department 
communicate to Ukrainian officials that the President wanted to discuss 
corruption or investigations in Ukraine?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you communicate, or are you aware of efforts by U.S. 
officials to communicate, to Ukrainian officials the topics that the 
President wanted to discuss with President Zelenskyy?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Do you regularly receive transcripts or summaries of all 
of the President's calls with foreign leaders? Are you aware of any 
records of communications between the President and foreign leaders 
that have not been stored on the standard White House system for such 
calls and subsequently distributed to Cabinet-level officials?

    Answer. Questions related to White House systems should be directed 
to the White House.

    Question. When can I expect a response to my outstanding September 
24, 2019 and June 4, 2020, requests for documents on this subject?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those 
records for the information you request. Those proceedings are 
Constitutionally concluded.

    Question. In President Trump's July 25, 2019 phone call with 
President Zelenskyy, he repeatedly urged a foreign leader to speak with 
his private attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who had met with Ukrainian 
officials for months to pursue the personal political agenda of 
President Trump, allegedly with the help of the State Department. When 
did you first learn that Mr. Giuliani was seeking to meet with 
Ukrainian officials?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Were you aware of Mr. Giuliani's meetings with Ukrainian 
officials on or around the dates they happened?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Are you aware of other meetings between Mr. Giuliani and 
foreign officials?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you instruct anyone in the Department to not provide 
assistance to Mr. Giuliani regarding his meetings with foreign 
officials?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Were you aware that Special Envoy Kurt Volker or 
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland were engaged with Mr. 
Giuliani regarding Ukraine? If so, did you direct or approve of their 
efforts?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Who else from the Department received readouts of, met 
with, or spoke to Mr. Giuliani about his meetings with foreign 
officials?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. When is the last time you communicated with Rudy 
Giuliani?

    Answer. I do not recall when I last communicated with Mr. Giuliani.

    Question. Have you communicated with him or received information 
for issues other than Ukraine? If so, what?

    Answer. I have known Mr. Giuliani since before I was confirmed as 
Secretary of State.

    Question. In January 2020, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) determined that the Trump administration violated the Impoundment 
Control Act last year when it illegally withheld Congressionally-
appropriated Department of Defense security assistance to Ukraine for 
``policy reasons.'' However, GAO was unable to make a similar legal 
determination regarding foreign military financing funds appropriated 
to the State Department for Ukraine security assistance, ultimately 
because the Department failed to cooperate with GAO's request for 
information related to the circumstances and legal justification for 
the withholding of assistance. Please provide an explanation for the 
Department's failure to produce the necessary documentation to GAO 
regarding the security assistance hold.

    Answer. This matter is ongoing with the GAO and the Department will 
communicate with the GAO on this matter.

    Question. In May of 2018, then Congressman Pete Sessions wrote a 
letter addressed to you which urged you to remove Ambassador 
Yovanovitch from her post in Ukraine. Did you receive the letter? Did 
you respond to the letter?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. According to documents the Department produced to 
American Oversight pursuant to a FOIA request, on March 26, 2019, you 
``wanted to connect to Giuliani'' and were put in touch with him 
immediately. On March 27, a Department email stated that ``Mr. Giuliani 
has documents pursuant to his conversation with S the other day. If 
possible, he would like 10 min with S upon delivery.'' On March 28, a 
Department email stated that ``[Lisa Kenna] updated S[ecretary] re: Mr. 
G[iuliani]. S[ecretary] is happy to meet with him tomorrow.'' Why did 
you want to connect with Mr. Giuliani on March 26? What did you discuss 
with him?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Why did you feel it was necessary to speak and meet with 
Mr. Giuliani in your official capacity as the Secretary of State for 
the United States of America?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. At the time, what was your understanding of the role Mr. 
Giuliani was playing with regards to Ukraine policy? Did you have any 
concerns about that role?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. On July 23, 2020, Lisa Kenna told the Committee that, 
while serving as your Executive Secretary, she would review letters and 
memos for you or, if something was marked ``eyes only for the 
secretary'' and from other cabinet secretaries or the President, would 
not review it. However, when you received a package from Rudy Giuliani, 
she testified that it bypassed her and was delivered directly to your 
desk. Did you instruct that the package from Giuliani to bypass your 
executive secretary and be delivered directly to your desk? If so, why?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Was it marked ``eyes only for the Secretary,'' or 
something to similar effect?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Why was this package handled in a more discreet way than 
even packages from other cabinet secretaries or the President?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those 
records for the information you request.

    Question. According to an October 3, 2019 report in The Wall Street 
Journal, ``Trump Ordered Ukraine Ambassador Removed After Complaints 
From Giuliani, Others,'' Rudy Giuliani gave you ``a nine-page document 
dated March 28 that included a detailed timeline of the Bidens' 
dealings in Ukraine and allegations of impropriety against Ms. 
Yovanovitch, including that she was `very close' to Mr. Biden. `He 
called me back and he said they were going to investigate,' Mr. 
Giuliani said of the Secretary of State, saying Mr. Pompeo asked for 
additional documents to back up the allegations.'' Mr. Giuliani also 
told The New York Times, as quoted in a November 23, 2019 article, 
``New Documents Reveal Details of Pompeo's Role in Ukraine Affair,'' 
that ``Mr. Pompeo `said he was referring it for investigation.''' Did 
you review the documents that Mr. Giuliani sent you? If so, what was 
your impression of the information in the documents?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you think the documents contained any credible basis 
for removing Ambassador Yovanovitch?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you tell Mr. Giuliani that you were going to refer 
the matter for investigation? If so, why?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you refer the matter for investigation? If so, why?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. According to an October 2, 2019 report in USA Today, 
```Mysterious' packet of Ukraine disinformation arrives on Capitol Hill 
amid Trump impeachment inquiry,'' you gave the documents to the 
Counselor of the Department, Ulrich Brechbuhl, and told him that it 
``came over,'' which he presumed to mean it came from the White House. 
Did you instruct Counselor Brechbuhl to review the documents sent by 
Giuliani? If so, why?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Did you tell him that the documents came from Giuliani?

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Have you been offered or sent any information from 
Ukrainian parliamentarian Andrii Derkach, or on Derkach's behalf? If 
so, what has your response been?

    Answer. I have no recollection of any such information.

    Question. Have you issued any guidance to the Department regarding 
how to respond to or handle offers of information from foreign 
officials about the President's political opponents, or that could be 
used to aid any particular candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election? If so, what is that guidance?

    Answer. All Department personnel remain subject to and guided by 
all Federal laws relating to such matters.

    Question. According to a July 1, 2020 report in The Washington Post 
(``Hunt for Biden tapes in Ukraine by Trump allies revives prospect of 
foreign interference''), ``Giuliani told the Post that his pursuit of 
the Biden-Poroshenko calls was aided by someone inside the State 
Department. `A guy at the State Department who gave us a lot of 
information' consulted the archive of conversations between American 
leaders and their counterparts overseas to identify three conversations 
in February 2016 during which Biden mentioned the prosecutor general's 
name in conversations with Poroshenko, he said.'' Does it concern you 
that a State Department official may have provided Mr. Giuliani with 
this information?

    Answer. I have no basis to know whether any such alleged contact 
occurred.

    Question. Has the State Department initiated an investigation into 
whether a State Department official provided Mr. Giuliani, a private 
citizen, with sensitive U.S. Government information? If no, why not?

    Answer. I have no basis to know if any facts have been provided to 
the Department that would warrant the initiation of any such 
investigation.

    Question. Have you communicated to Mr. Giuliani about this claim?

    Answer. I have no recollection of any communication on this claim.

    Question. What steps are you taking to protect the State Department 
from, wittingly or unwittingly, providing information that could be 
used to aid any particular candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election?

    Answer. The Department is exercising all Constitutional care in 
provision of sensitive, internal, non-public records to Committees and 
Members of Congress.

    Question. ``Before serving in Ukraine, Ambassador Yovanovitch had 
more than 3 decades of service to the State Department, including 
Ambassador to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and posts in Somalia, Moscow, and 
others: a)When the President said in his July 25 call with President 
Zelenskyy--a call you listened to--that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
``going to go through some things,'' what, specifically, did you do in 
response? ``

    Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the 
Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records 
for the information you request.

    Question. Can you point me to where in the public record you 
defended Ambassador Yovanovitch between March 2019 and December 2019?

    Answer. During a November 18, 2019 Department press briefing, I 
made clear that I always defend State Department employees and that we 
have the greatest diplomatic corps in the history of the world. I have 
also made clear that I cannot get into issues associated with the House 
Impeachment proceedings or the Senate Impeachment Trial.

    Question. Do requests for information about the President's 
political opponents get treated differently than other congressional 
oversights requests to the State Department?

    Answer. No.

    Question. Why has the Department provided thousands of pages to 
Republican Chairmen in the Senate--without providing copies to this 
Committee--in response to requests for information about Joe Biden, the 
President's political opponent, but it has provided no documents in 
response to more than 10 requests for information from House Democratic 
Chairs and Democratic Senators about the Trump administration's 
withholding of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine?

    Answer. All documents produced by the Department in response to 
investigatory requests from Committee Chairs are provided to the Chairs 
and the Ranking Members of the requesting Committees conducting the 
investigation, consistent with long-standing practice. To the best of 
my knowledge the Department has not received any requests from the full 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee under letter of request from the 
Chairman on the topics you described. The investigation you reference 
was on corruption in Ukraine, not Joe Biden.

    Question. Do you believe it is appropriate to use the State 
Department as an instrument to further the President's personal and 
political goals?

    Answer. I am unaware of any such use of the Department of State for 
the purposes you suggest.

    Question. ``At the July 30, 2020 hearing, you stated that low 
morale was one reason, among others, for your recommendation to 
President Trump to remove Inspector General Linick. Specifically, you 
noted ``morale inside the IG's office . . . was the worst survey 
results of any of those 38 [Assistant Secretary level bureaus].''What 
morale data are you referring to and what time period is this data for 
in your analysis?''

    Answer. The data referenced in my testimony is from the results of 
the 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) of employees of the 
Office of the Inspector General. Following an effort to improve 
response rates over the previous FEVS, we doubled the total responses 
from 2017. In the 2019 FEVS, over half of our thirty-eight (38) 
Assistant Secretary-led bureaus improved or maintained in all three 
major index categories year over year. Only one bureau of the 38, which 
had the same leader in place, declined in all three index categories. 
That single bureau was the Office of the Inspector General.

    Question. Please provide a copy of the specific survey questions 
and results you were referring to in making your analysis.

    Answer. The results of the 2019 FEVS show that the OIG scores 
dropped year-over-year in all three major index categories: the 
Employee Engagement Index, the Global Satisfaction Index and the 
Diversity and Inclusion Index. The Global Satisfaction Index, which, 
among other things, measures the willingness of OIG employees to 
recommend the organization as a good place to work has exhibited a 
steady double-digit decline (>15 percent) since the 2016 FEVS survey. 
We were also alarmed by the insights provided by answers to several key 
survey questions:

   The people I work with cooperate to get the job done. The 
        OIG survey respondents had a 46 percent higher negative 
        response rate than the Department of State as a whole and also 
        a higher negative response rate than the government-wide 
        negative response rate.

   My organization has prepared employees for potential 
        security threats. Twenty-three percent of the OIG survey 
        respondents responded negatively to that, greater than three 
        times higher than the negative response rates of Department of 
        State and government-wide responses.

   Employees are protected from health and safety hazards on 
        the job. The OIG survey respondents neutral and negative 
        responses were almost 25 percent higher than Department of 
        State and government-wide response to this question.

    Question. On December 6, 2019, I sent the Department a letter 
requesting information about reported new limitations on the use of the 
Department's Operations Center and requesting a briefing with the 
Director of the Operations Center. I have yet to receive a response to 
my letter. Please detail all changes regarding the use of the Ops 
Center since July 2019, including but not limited to changes made to 
any process, procedure, notetaking, staffing, or access to any calls 
placed, facilitated, transcribed, memorialized, or recorded by the 
Operations Center and the justification for any change.

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. How soon after the President's July 25 call with 
President Zelenskyy were these changes instituted?

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. On what date was the decision made to limit the use of 
the Operations Center and access to calls with foreign leaders?

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. What was the basis for the decision, and who made it?

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. What is the current procedure for facilitating, listening 
to, and maintaining notes and call records for any calls placed, 
facilitated, transcribed, memorialized, or recorded by the Operations 
Center?

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. What changes have been made to any readouts of 
memorializing of calls? How are readouts and records of calls currently 
maintained and distributed?

    Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's 
ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the 
Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since 
its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an 
ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to 
the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational 
security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to 
support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have 
serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut 
diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel 
of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously 
reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review 
process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the 
effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its 
commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally 
sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution 
lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only 
personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information. 
Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes 
make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel 
receive information important to their duties.

    Question. In a November 7, 2019 response from the State Department 
to my October 28, 2019 letter to the White House Acting Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney requesting an investigation into outstanding allegations 
against pending nominees before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
the Department wrote that ``Bureau of Diplomatic Security does not 
conduct additional investigations of candidates once the President has 
submitted their nominations to the Senate, as such background 
investigations are a prerequisite to such nominations, not a continuing 
process or function of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.'' Is this 
statement still accurate? What is the basis for this statement?

    Answer. The statement you quote correctly reflects the generic 
nature of the process being discussed in that statement. The Department 
is prepared to arrange a further briefing for you from the appropriate 
subject-matter experts in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security so that you 
may fully understand this issue.

    Question. Has the Bureau of Diplomatic Security ever conducted an 
additional investigation regarding a nominee following the submission 
of a nomination to the Senate?

    Answer. I have no personal knowledge of the conduct of the Bureau 
of Diplomatic Security practice over the decades in this regard, but 
the offered briefing I reference in my answer to your preceding 
question may be able to address this.

    Question. I am extremely concerned by this Administration's 
notification of withdrawal from the WHO. During an unprecedented global 
health crisis, the WHO is the only organization with the global reach 
and mandate to assist and amplify any effort to mitigate the current 
crisis and prevent future pandemics. Simply put; our withdrawal cedes 
even further ground to China. How does our withdrawal from the WHO help 
U.S. efforts to counter Chinese efforts to gain influence in UN 
organizations?

    Answer. The United States and the Department are committed to 
upholding the UN and related institutions that have fostered global 
peace and prosperity over the past 75 years, including by continuing to 
be the largest financial contributor to these organizations, providing 
more than $12.2 billion in FY 2019 alone. The Department continuously 
works to ensure the American values of universality of human rights, 
the dignity and worth of individuals, peaceful resolution of conflict, 
sustainable economic prosperity, national sovereignty, transparency and 
the rule of law are protected and upheld at the UN and related 
international institutions.
    I share the Administration's and the Committee's concern regarding 
the People's Republic of China and its abuse of the UN to advance its 
narrow foreign policy objectives. The Department will continue our 
efforts in reforming organizations to improve transparency, 
accountability, and effectiveness and in pushing back against the PRC's 
problematic behavior within the UN and its related agencies, including 
its attempts to use the UN as a tool to promote its authoritarian 
ideology and signature, global, and unilateral foreign policy platform, 
the One Belt, One Road initiative, and advance its domestic agenda at 
the expense of the international community.

    Question. What countries have publicly expressed support for the 
U.S. decision to withdraw, and what countries have expressed support 
for our alternative proposal to fight pandemics?

    Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from 
the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. In the 
time before withdrawal becomes effective, we continue to engage 
countries and other regional organizations to prevent, detect, and 
respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at their source. As the 
failed response to COVID-19 by the WHO has clearly demonstrated, the 
international structures to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious-
disease outbreaks and protect American lives are lacking. Political 
pressure by the Chinese Communist Party degraded the capability of the 
WHO. It also discouraged leaders and scientists from speaking out about 
the CCP's and other governments' refusal to report transparently on 
outbreaks of dangerous pathogens.
    As the Department continues interagency discussions about our 
thoughts on future pandemic prevention, we know close coordination with 
other donor partners--a number of which have already reached out to 
us--will be critical to prevent future pandemics. For example, the U.S. 
rallied the multilateral Global Health Security Agenda Steering Group 
towards a shared dialogue on linkages between health security 
preparedness and COVID-19 response. The U.S. also continues to address 
the issue in high-level strategic dialogues, for example with 
governments including United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea and 
Australia to better coordinate, build momentum for international COVID-
19 response, and raise awareness for future preparedness against 
infectious disease threats.

    Question. The WHO and the CDC both recommend the use of the 
scientific name COVID-19 to reduce social stigma and avoid 
discrimination against specific racial or ethnic groups. However, a 
number of State Department officials have used other, non-scientific 
terms for the virus, such as ``Wuhan virus,'' including you and 
Ambassador Kyle McCarter, whose tweet using ``Wuhan flu'' further 
inflamed already existing racial and xenophobic tensions in Kenya, 
particularly against Asian populations. The U.S. insistence on the use 
of such terminology also reportedly hampered a G7 joint statement on 
COVID-19. You have repeatedly referred to COVID-19 as the ``Wuhan 
virus,'' ``China virus,'' and ``virus from Wuhan.'' Do you agree with 
the WHO and CDC guidance use of the scientific name to reduce social 
stigma and discrimination?

    Answer. On February 11, 2020, the International Committee on 
Taxonomy of Viruses formalized the etiologic agent as the ``severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2'', or SARS-CoV-2, and the name 
of the disease as COVID-19. The Department has consistently used those 
conventions across the enterprise since they were introduced by the 
WHO.
    The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in March 
that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the official 
name for the disease. The Department advised diplomatic posts to use 
the COVID-19 acronym, including in public-facing materials.

    Question. Has the Department issued a directive encouraging the use 
of the scientific term for the virus, COVID-19, and discouraging the 
use of any other non-scientific names? If so, when? To whom was that 
guidance sent?

    Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in 
March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the 
official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised 
diplomatic posts to use the COVID-19 acronym, including in public-
facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not 
synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised 
posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general 
category/type of virus.

    Question. What other steps is the Department taking to reduce the 
social stigma and discrimination associated with COVID-19?

    Answer. I have informed all Department employees of the importance 
of preventing stigma and discrimination, resiliency and mental health, 
and supporting each other through COVID-19 with the goal of raising 
awareness about the potential for stigma during the pandemic and 
setting the tone for Department leadership. This includes the 
importance of practicing inclusion remotely to avoid isolating or 
stigmatizing team members. In June we also launched TalentCare. 
TalentCare integrates the Department's workforce resilience initiatives 
so employees have a single touchpoint to access programs and resources 
that enhance health and well-being.

    Question. How will you hold officials accountable at the Department 
who do not use the WHO and CDC-recommended term COVID-19?

    Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in 
March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the 
official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised 
diplomatic posts to use the `COVID-19' acronym, including in public-
facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not 
synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised 
posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general 
category/type of virus. All personnel have intermediate and annual 
evaluations by their supervisors that assess performance.

    Question. In a May 3, 2020, interview, you claimed there was ``a 
significant amount of evidence'' pointing to the origination of the 
COVID-19 virus at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, directly 
contradicting an ODNI determination made 4 days prior that COVID-19 was 
not manmade or genetically modified. Do you still stand by that 
statement?

    Answer. The world still does not have all the information it needs 
from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) about the origins of the COVID-
19 pandemic. As the first to learn of the virus and the threat it 
posed, CCP officials in Wuhan and Beijing had a special responsibility 
to inform the Chinese people and the world of what they knew. The PRC 
Government instead failed to share information in a timely manner, 
delayed scientific collaboration, denied the world access to physical 
virus samples collected in Wuhan, and censored scientists and 
journalists. The United States will continue seeking full transparency 
from the PRC Government to understand the origin of the virus and 
reduce the risk of such a devastating global pandemic occurring again.

    Question. Do you agree with the findings of the ODNI determination 
about the origins of the COVID-19 virus?

    Answer. I agree with the findings. INR, as did other IC agencies, 
coordinated on the IC's assessment on the origin of the virus and 
concurred.

    Question. If not, what evidence do you have that points to a 
different conclusion?

    Answer. I agree with the conclusions.

    Question. Since the start of the pandemic the United States has 
failed to lead the international efforts to respond. We blocked 
consensus on a statement from the Security Council, and from the G7 by 
insisting on using divisive racially inflammatory rhetoric to describe 
the infection. On May 4th, the European Union and its partners hosted 
an international pledging conference on the development and deployment 
of diagnostics, treatments and vaccines against coronavirus with a goal 
of not only developing those tools, but of ensuring they are 
universally available and affordable. We did not participate. Can you 
give me specific examples of where we have used our convening power to 
mobilize collective action and generate a comprehensive response from 
other countries around the world? Have we hosted pledging conferences, 
for example? I've seen nothing so if you are mobilizing others, it is a 
pretty well-kept secret.

    Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from 
the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. Until 
that time, we continue to engage countries and other regional 
organizations to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of 
infectious diseases at their source. As the failed response to COVID-19 
by the WHO clearly demonstrated, the international structures to 
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious-disease outbreaks and 
protect American lives are lacking. Political pressure by the Chinese 
Communist Party has degraded the capability of the WHO. It also 
discouraged leaders and scientists from speaking out about the CCP's 
and other governments' refusal to report transparently on outbreaks of 
dangerous pathogens.
    As the Department continues with interagency discussions, and 
others discuss with the U.S. Government our thoughts on future pandemic 
prevention, we know close coordination with other donor partners--a 
number of which have already reached out to us--will be critical to 
prevent future pandemics. For example, the U.S. rallied the 
multilateral Global Health Security Agenda Steering Group towards a 
shared dialogue on linkages between health security preparedness and 
COVID-19 response. The U.S. continues to address the issue in high-
level strategic dialogues, for example with governments including 
United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea and Australia to better 
coordinate, build momentum for international COVID-19 response, and 
raise awareness for future preparedness against infectious disease 
threats.

    Question. What initiatives are we going to propose at the upcoming 
G-7 meeting? How are we leading at the United Nations?

    Answer. During our presidency of the G7 in 2020, the United States 
has led efforts to respond to and recover from the global COVID-19 
pandemic. We are marshalling the full power of our governments to: 
coordinate necessary public health measures to protect people at risk 
from COVID-19; restore economic growth and protect jobs; support global 
trade and investment; and encourage cooperation and information sharing 
through science, research, and technology. One successful effort within 
the G7 Foreign Ministers Track was the negotiation and endorsement of 
high-level transportation principles to help reinvigorate the global 
transportation system, restore passenger and crew confidence in travel, 
integrate evolving public health considerations into transportation and 
travel, and closely coordinate international approaches to the 
treatment of air crew and seafarers.
    In the UN, we adopted Resolution 2532 a little over a month ago, 
supporting the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire to 
secure a respite for countries and regions that, weakened by violence 
and conflict, are especially vulnerable to the virus, while continuing 
our legitimate counter-terrorism operations. We continue to support 
critical programs in health, water and sanitation, and protection.
    The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge, and the United States 
remains committed to working closely with our overseas partners as part 
of a collective global response. The U.S. Government (USG) has 
allocated $20.5 billion to benefit the global COVID-19 response, 
including through preparedness and response efforts, foreign 
assistance, and investments to rapidly accelerate the development and 
deployment of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. 
USG investments include $1.6 billion commitment to the Vaccine 
Alliance, GAVI announced in June 2020 in addition to our long-standing 
support to Gavi, UNICEF, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and 
Malaria, all of whom will be critical players in the distribution of 
COVID-19 vaccines. The United States leads the world in the effort to 
combat COVID-19 and will continue to seek opportunities to collaborate 
bilaterally or via multilateral fora and partnerships. We continue to 
work to ensure that USG investments, our scientific innovations, and 
our ``All-of-America'' approach to combatting the pandemic contribute 
to the broader worldwide effort against this deadly virus.

    Question. It will be difficult to lead if we are not properly 
prepared and resourced ourselves. Do the Department and USAID have the 
resources to help countries bring the pandemic under control?

    Answer. The impact of COVID-19 has been global in reach. Through 
generous funding from Congress, the Department of State and USAID have 
provided assistance to more than 120 countries. We continue to look for 
ways to build upon our decades-long leadership in health and 
humanitarian assistance. The United States cannot do it alone though. 
We will work closely with our other donor partners to identify ways to 
meet global needs and coordinate on ways to prevent future pandemics.
    The United States will continue to be the world's leader in 
humanitarian and health assistance, in no small part because of the 
support of Congress. We are now reviewing what further challenges we 
and our partners should address next and the costs of those 
interventions. For example, USAID is undertaking a time-bound strategic 
review to look over the horizon at evolving humanitarian, development, 
and wider national security and foreign policy priorities. The review 
will be guided by a set of strategic framing questions to provide 
structure to this process and lead to actionable recommendations to 
better position USAID for a world reshaped by COVID-19.

    Question. What does Congress need to provide in the next 
supplemental appropriations bill?

    Answer. Congress has appropriated a total of $2.3 billion to the 
Department of State and USAID to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
the COVID-19 pandemic through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123) and the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-
136).
    Ongoing needs are likely to include mitigating the pandemic's 
continuing impact on fee revenues that support consular services both 
domestically and abroad. I will work with Congress and OMB on any 
further requests for funding to support the Department's response to 
COVID-19 around the globe.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security has 
been in the news after the President deployed it to Portland, Oregon, 
to crack down on anti-racist protests . . . a development that--quite 
frankly--has further weakened our nation's global standing as a beacon 
of freedom of speech and assembly. But, another alarming trend is how 
DHS has distorted U.S. foreign policy towards Central America. DHS, not 
the State Department, has negotiated agreements with foreign 
governments--agreements that the Administration is hiding from this 
committee, despite repeated requests. DHS signed Safe Third Country 
agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to transfer asylum 
seekers from the United States, over your alleged objection to the 
White House and despite State Department data showing these countries' 
lack of capacity to implement them--data that has been provided 
privately to my office. Making matters worse, my office uncovered that 
DHS misused State Department funding, violated an agreement between the 
two agencies, and then lied about it. Time and again, the State 
Department has ceded its leadership to DHS. Last August, the New York 
Times reported that you met with the President and then-DHS Secretary 
McAleenan, and that you objected to the U.S. signing the Asylum 
Cooperative Agreement with Guatemala. Can you confirm this is true?

    Answer. I cannot comment upon New York Times reporting and 
anonymous leaks. My confidential communications within the Executive 
Branch are just that, confidential.

    Question. We know that the President sided with DHS rather than the 
State Department on a matter related to international agreements--over 
your objection. Why did that happen?

    Answer. I cannot comment on anonymous speculation over Executive 
Branch deliberative processes. My confidential communications within 
the Executive Branch are just that, confidential.

    Question. Given State Department data showing the lack of asylum 
capacity in the Northern Triangle, did you assess that Guatemala and 
Honduras provide adequate safety and sufficient asylum capacity to 
protect asylum seekers, as required by U.S. law?

    Answer. Under Section 208(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, the Attorney General and, by operation of the Homeland 
Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security make the 
determinations whether asylum seekers removed to a third country 
pursuant to a bilateral agreement (1) will not be persecuted on 
protected grounds and (2) will have access to full and fair procedures 
for determining their protection claims in that third country. I do not 
participate in making these domestic law determinations and did not do 
so with respect to the Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Guatemala and 
Honduras.

    Question. Why did the Department of State abandon its leadership 
and authority in these vital matters to DHS?

    Answer. It is the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security who have the statutory authority and obligation to determine 
whether a bilateral agreement complies with the ``Safe Third Country'' 
exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The State Department 
works with DHS to negotiate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with foreign 
governments, but does not participate in making these legal 
determinations.

    Question. Secretary Pompeo, the day after the release of the 
Commission on Unalienable Rights report you seemed to indicate that 
some rights are more important than others. You failed to extoll the 
importance of the rights enshrined in our own constitution including 
the right to peaceful assembly or the freedom of the press. 
Furthermore, you stated ``abortion is not a human right.'' This follows 
actions by the United States, under your leadership, at the UN to lobby 
UN Member States to oppose access to reproductive health care and 
threatening to veto a UN Security Council Resolution over the inclusion 
of reproductive health care for women who have survived sexual assault. 
Do you believe that property rights are more important than the rights 
of free speech or assembly?

    Answer. No. I believe property rights are vitally important and I 
believe that rights of free speech and assembly are vitally important.

    Question. Is it your belief that women who suffer rape or assault 
should not receive reproductive healthcare?

    Answer. I support a survivor-centered approach which empowers 
survivors of sexual violence, including rape and assault, by respecting 
their rights and prioritizing their needs. For the Trump 
Administration, this means working to ensure that survivors have access 
to appropriate, accessible, and quality health care, psychological and 
social support, security, and legal assistance.

    Question. Do you expect the United States to continue to be a 
shining example of a country founded on universal human rights values 
when you have produced a document effectively saying we need to limit 
our definition?

    Answer. Yes, I believe it is imperative for the United States to 
continue to be a shining example of a country dedicated to protecting 
and promoting universal human rights. I played no role in drafting the 
report, but note that nowhere in the report does it state we need to 
``limit our definition.''

    Question. The State Department has repeatedly used language urging 
``both sides'' to avoid provoking tensions whenever Turkey is involved 
in a dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, from its 
incursions of Greek airspace to its exploratory drilling in Cyprus EEZ 
to its illegitimate `maritime boundary agreement' with Libya's 
Government of National Accord, Turkey has clearly been the sole 
aggressor in the region. Is there any recent dispute in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in which Greece or Cyprus has `provoked tensions'? When 
will you and the State Department stop using equivocating language to 
describe disputes Turkey creates in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
publicly stand up to Turkey's aggression? How do you intend to hold 
Turkey accountable for that aggression against our partners?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned by Turkey's ongoing operations 
surveying for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus 
assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. We continue to urge 
Turkey publicly and privately to halt any plans for exploration and to 
avoid provocative steps that raise regional tensions.
    Resource development in the Eastern Mediterranean should promote 
cooperation and provide a foundation for durable energy security and 
economic prosperity throughout the region. We strongly support dialogue 
between Greece and Turkey and encourage the parties to resume 
discussing these issues.

    Question. I appreciate your work to boost U.S. support for the 
Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral, including your participation in 
``3+1'' summits, and I am pleased that State is moving forward with 
providing IMET to Cyprus in FY 2021 as laid out in my Eastern 
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, which became law 
last December. The East Med Act also called for the establishment of a 
U.S.-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center. What is the status of 
discussions around creating this Center? What is the timeline for 
establishing it?

    Answer. The Department's understanding is that the United States--
Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center has yet to be established due to 
lack of identified funding from Congress to support this effort. In the 
case of the Israel Center, Congress allocated $4 million per year for 5 
years to be matched by the Israeli Government and each nation's private 
sector. DoE has not yet done a regional center of this type.
    As the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act 
specifies, the DoE is charged with establishing this institution, in 
coordination with the State Department, we would ask you to consult 
with DoE for additional follow-up.

    Question. Earlier this year, I received a letter from State and 
USAID saying that the Administration is ending funding for humanitarian 
demining in Nagorno-Karabakh due to a supposed lack of remaining 
contamination and a desire to focus on preparing populations for peace. 
However, the amount of remaining contamination is unknown and poses a 
serious threat to the peace process given that anger and resentment 
from landmine accidents reduce the population's desire to see peace. 
While we all hope no further landmine accidents occur, if one does 
happen what effect does State assess that will have on the population's 
readiness for peace? Have State and USAID considered funding an 
independent assessment of remaining contamination, and continuing 
demining of known contamination in populated areas while the assessment 
is ongoing?

    Answer. Although a third-party assessment was considered, the 
available data was sufficient to determine the remaining mine 
contamination in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is 
light. With high-priority hazard areas already cleared and no civilian 
deaths in the past 5 years, landmines no longer pose the threat to 
local populations they once did. It would be unusual for the United 
States to continue demining in Nagorno-Karabakh, especially since 
unaddressed contamination elsewhere in the world poses grave threats 
and results in far higher casualty rates. Given limitations on official 
U.S. engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh, practical and oversight concerns 
raised serious questions about the reliability of conducting an 
assessment.

    Question. The majority of Northern Ireland's population opposed 
Brexit in the 2016 referendum, and the increasingly probable scenario 
that the EU and UK fail to reach a trade deal and revert to WTO rules 
on December 31 is deeply concerning. What impact does the State 
Department assess a reversion to WTO rules would have on the people and 
economy of Northern Ireland, including the impact on the Ireland-
Northern Ireland border? What engagements have you and others at the 
State Department had with the UK Government regarding how it will 
implement the Good Friday Agreement in such a scenario?

    Answer. Through the negotiation of a Withdrawal Agreement, the UK 
Government, Irish Government, and EU have been clear there will not be 
a return to a hard border on the island of Ireland. The Special Envoy 
to Northern Ireland has expressed to the Northern Ireland Office, the 
Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), European leaders, and members of the 
Northern Ireland devolved government U.S. concerns about any actions 
that may lead to a hard border. The Special Envoy maintains frequent 
and direct contact with Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon 
Lewis to discuss the Northern Ireland Protocol, a crucial part of the 
draft Withdrawal Agreement that addresses key provisions that would 
avoid the return of a hard border.

    Question. I understand that discussions are ongoing regarding a 
U.S.-UK free trade agreement or some other trade deal. Is it the 
Administration's position that full implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement is a necessary condition for signing any trade deal with the 
UK? What impact does the State Department assess any free trade deal 
would have on the economies of Northern Ireland and Ireland?

    Answer. The Administration is committed to maintaining peace, 
prosperity, and stability in Northern Ireland through the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement. The Administration has made clear that ongoing 
adherence to the Agreement is a necessary condition of any trade deal. 
Any free trade deal would be beneficial to the economy of Northern 
Ireland and would promote strong economic ties and investment.

    Question. What has Special Envoy Mulvaney done regarding Northern 
Ireland since starting the position earlier this year? What engagements 
has he had with British and Irish Government officials, officials in 
Northern Ireland, and civil society in Northern Ireland? What 
engagements has he had with the U.S. Congress given widespread 
Congressional interest in the area?

    Answer. Special Envoy Mulvaney has emphasized the U.S. role as an 
honest broker committed to maintaining peace, prosperity, and stability 
in Northern Ireland since he was appointed. Despite being unable to 
travel due to COVID-19, he has met with the UK, Irish, and EU 
ambassadors and has held virtual engagements with the U.S. Ambassadors 
to the UK and Ireland; the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; the 
Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister); the ministers of the devolved 
government in Northern Ireland; and numerous government officials, 
members of civil society, community leaders, and business 
representatives. He has briefed members of Congress, including 
Representatives King, Boyle, and Joyce, and Senator Cotton.

    Question. I am deeply concerned by the new Roskomnadzor order that 
would require media designated as ``foreign agents''--meaning U.S. 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) outlets--to add large labels to all of 
their published materials saying they are foreign agents. The intent of 
this order is clearly to discourage Russians from reading media that 
calls the Kremlin's lies into question. How has the State Department 
engaged with the Kremlin on this issue? What steps are you taking to 
reinforce our support for fair, independent coverage from USAGM and 
ensure that it remains accessible to the Russian people?

    Answer. We share your concern about the recent order published by 
Russian authorities that effectively targets U.S. Agency for Global 
Media-funded entities in Russia, a point I stressed publicly in my 
press statement on August 10. For more than 70 years, Voice of America 
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been vital sources of 
independent news and information for the people of Russia. 
Unfortunately, the proposed restrictions--which would permit 
substantial administrative penalties for non-compliance--coincide with 
increased repression by Russian authorities against already embattled 
journalists and independent press in Russia. We have urged the Russian 
Government to reconsider these actions, which will further damage the 
bilateral relationship, and to uphold its international obligations and 
commitments to freedom of expression.

    Question. While Bahrain has recently freed a number of prisoners or 
allowed them to finish their sentences outside of prison, including 
Nabeel Rajab, many others remain unjustly detained. Please describe the 
specific steps taken by the U.S. to urge Bahrain to further reduce the 
number of detained individuals in Bahrain and to implement further 
judicial and policing reform.

    Answer. The Department has identified cases of concern in Bahrain 
in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. U.S. officials have 
expressed concern about these to the government. The Government of 
Bahrain has implemented meaningful justice sector reforms in recent 
years, with the support of the U.S. Government. Justice sector 
development is among the areas of discussion between our two 
governments.

    Question. Media reports indicate that the Egyptian Government has 
taken delivery of the first shipment of Russian-made Su-35 fighter jets 
in violation of CAATSA. Last year, you and Secretary Esper sent a 
letter to the Egyptians warning that ``major new arms deals with Russia 
would--at a minimum--complicate future U.S. defense transactions with 
and security assistance to Egypt.'' Are you prepared to stand by this 
letter and enforce U.S. law?

    Answer. The Department is not aware of the delivery of any Su-35 
fighter jets to Egypt. We are, however, concerned about media reports 
indicating that five Su-35 fighter jets allegedly intended for eventual 
delivery to Egypt were spotted in Novosibirsk, Russia. We are closely 
monitoring the situation and continue to urge the government of Egypt 
to not take delivery of any Su-35 aircraft. I have made clear in public 
testimony to Congress and to the government of Egypt that CAATSA 
Section 231 requires imposition of sanctions on any person that 
knowingly engages in a significant transaction with the Russian defense 
or intelligence sectors, and that I take implementation of CAATSA 231 
seriously and intend to comply with the law.

    Question. If so, what steps is the Administration prepared to take 
and will those steps include sanctions?

    Answer. We have been very clear with senior levels of the Egyptian 
Government that CAATSA Section 231 requires imposition of sanctions on 
any person that knowingly engages in a significant transaction with the 
Russian defense or intelligence sectors, and that the delivery of Su-35 
fighter aircraft risks triggering CAATSA 231 sanctions. Egyptian 
officials have indicated that they understand. In addition to urging 
Egypt, as we do all our partners and allies, to avoid new major Russian 
arms purchases that risk triggering CAATSA 231 sanctions, we continue 
to engage Egypt to ensure the United States remains its partner of 
choice.

    Question. The Egyptian Government has still not adequately 
compensated April Corley, the American citizen badly injured by the 
Egyptian military when attack helicopters struck her sightseeing group 
after misidentifying them as terrorists. What steps is the United 
States taking to advocate for Ms. Corley and ensure that the Egyptian 
government reaches an equitable compensation agreement with her?

    Answer. The Department strongly supports April Corley and the 
Government of Egypt reaching a just resolution, and we continue to 
raise Ms. Corley's desire for fair compensation at very senior levels 
of the Egyptian Government. The Department is also in communication 
with Ms. Corley and her lawyers on the status of negotiations. As of 
April 6, Egypt told the Department that the private entity negotiating 
with Ms. Corley had been urged to reopen the negotiation channels with 
her lawyers to strike an agreement. We will continue to urge Egypt to 
resume negotiations with Ms. Corley's lawyers.

    Question. I am extremely concerned that Egyptian authorities 
detained family members of U.S. citizen Mohamad Soltan after raiding 
their homes. The timing of these raids and detentions shortly after Mr. 
Soltan sued former Egyptian Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, for alleged torture and other human 
rights violations. Does the State Department assess that Mr. Soltan's 
relatives were raided and detained in retribution for his lawsuit 
against Mr. al-Beblawi? Why or why not?

    Answer. We are aware of troubling media reports of raids on the 
homes of Mr. Soltan's Egyptian family and detention of his relatives. 
On July 8, I publicly urged Egyptian officials to stop any harassment 
of U.S. citizens or their families. We will continue to engage the 
Egyptian Government on this issue, because we take seriously all 
allegations of arbitrary arrest or detention in Egypt.

    Question. Does the State Department assess that the raid and 
detention of Mr. Soltan's relatives amount to a pattern of intimidation 
against Mr. Soltan, an American citizen? Why or why not?

    Answer. We note that these arrests occurred within 2 weeks of Mr. 
Soltan filing a civil lawsuit against Mr. Beblawi. We are monitoring 
the situation and plan to document such allegations in the Department's 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. I can assure you that the 
welfare of all Americans remains a top priority for the State 
Department, and we continue to press Egypt on its detention conditions, 
the need for timely and fair judicial processes, and for the respect of 
human rights in general.

    Question. What steps, if any, did the Administration take to urge 
the Egyptian Government to release Mr. Soltan's relatives?

    Answer. We continue to emphasize to the Government of Egypt that 
the United States rejects all forms of intimidation and have raised our 
concerns with senior Egyptian officials in Washington and Cairo. We 
have asked Egypt to disclose where Soltan's family members are being 
held and on July 8, I publicly urged Egyptian officials to stop any 
harassment of U.S. citizens and their families. In June and July 
respectively, the Bureaus of Near East Affairs and Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor issued public messages expressing that the Department 
takes all allegations of harassment of U.S. citizens and their families 
seriously.

    Question. Has the Administration urged the Egyptian Government not 
to take such action in the future?

    Answer. The United States has long emphasized the importance of 
respect for the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association, and we continue to do so. We have also raised with Egypt 
that the United States rejects all forms of intimidation and takes all 
allegations of arbitrary arrest or detention in Egypt seriously. On 
July 8, I publicly requested Egypt stop any harassment of U.S. citizens 
and their families.

    Question. Without taking a position on the merits of Mr. Soltan's 
lawsuit, I have questions about State Department's declaration on July 
17 that Mr. el-Beblawi should be immune from being under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act. Did the Egyptian Government specifically seek 
this determination and announcement? If so, who and when?

    Answer. In June, the Department received diplomatic correspondence 
from the Egyptian Embassy related to the immunity of Mr. el-Beblawi. It 
is the Department's standard practice, as set forth in the Foreign 
Affairs Manual (2 FAM 234.1-1), that in such cases, the Office of 
Foreign Missions (OFM) will provide a certification confirming any 
immunities enjoyed by the person at issue under international law. OFM 
provided such a certification to the Egyptian Embassy regarding Mr. el-
Beblawi on July 7.

    Question. Please provide the State Department's legal reasoning for 
why Mr. el-Beblawi is immune from such a lawsuit.

    Answer. Mr. el-Beblawi is the Principal Resident Representative of 
Egypt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pursuant to Article V, 
Section 15(4) of the Agreement Between the United Nations (UN) and the 
United States Regarding the Headquarters of the UN, principal resident 
representatives of members of a ``specialized agency'' are entitled to 
the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic envoys accredited to 
the United States. The Agreement between the UN and the IMF establishes 
that the IMF is a ``specialized agency.'' In the United States, the 
privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys (now called ``diplomatic 
agents'') are those provided under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (VCDR). Therefore, Mr. el-Beblawi enjoys the same immunities 
as would a diplomatic agent under the VCDR.

    Question. Regional aggression from Iranian proxies has continued 
since Qassem Soleimani was killed in January. And while your legally 
questionable strike against Qassem Soleimani perhaps, as General 
MacKenzie recently said put the Iranians ``on their heels'', he 
continued by saying that he ``draws no confidence from periods of 
quiet'' rather takes these moments to look very hard at what the 
Iranians have planned long term. Just this week, Israel said it stopped 
a Hezbollah infiltration under its border and there was an exchange of 
fire at the border. In Yemen, the Houthis continue to launch Iranian-
made ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, U.S. diplomatic and 
military facilities remain under constant threat with Camp Taji again 
coming under rocket fire earlier this week. Please describe what steps 
you are taking, in concert with our allies, to seriously address this 
ongoing Iranian aggression.

    Answer. In light of Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorism and 
attacks on its neighbors, it is imperative to remain vigilant against 
the threat of Iranian attacks. The JCPOA's failure to address Iran's 
support for armed proxies and partners in the region was one of the 
reasons that this Administration ultimately decided to exit the deal 
and institute the maximum pressure campaign. Since May 2018, we have 
deprived the regime of more than $70 billion in revenue, which has in 
turn meant the regime has less money to support its proxies. We have 
also maintained a clear and consistent line with the Iranian regime: 
any targeting of U.S. personnel, facilities, or interests will result 
in serious consequences.

    Question. While there is no question that Iran is suffering 
economically, its proxy networks continue to be active in promoting 
instability. What evidence do you have that the maximum pressure 
campaign has reduced the level of Iranian aggression or support for 
proxies in the region?

    Answer. The economic constraints caused by the maximum pressure 
campaign mean the Iranian regime has less money to support its proxies 
and terrorist activities. As a result, Hizballah Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah publicly appealed for donations for the first time 
ever. Hamas has also enacted what it calls an ``austerity plan'' to 
mitigate a lack of funds from Iran. Iranian partners and proxies in 
Syria and elsewhere are going unpaid, and the Iranian support they once 
relied upon is drying up.

    Question. Do you assess that Iran's financial duress has pushed 
them closer to and economic and security arrangement with China?

    Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is 
a partnership born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely 
weakened, in part by U.S. sanctions but also through its own 
mismanagement and corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for 
the Iranian people as long as the regime gains access to much-needed 
capital. The regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the 
agreement for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they 
are rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

    Question. How would increased Iranian and Chinese cooperation 
impact U.S. interests and efforts across the Middle East and Asia?

    Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year 
agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese 
investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. However, Chinese 
entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime, 
including through continued sanctionable purchases of Iranian 
petrochemicals and metals. We have made clear to the Chinese Government 
that we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions regime with 
respect to Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities that 
engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to 
conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the PRC is 
undermining its own stated goal of promoting stability in the Middle 
East.

    Question. Will you commit to sharing any classified evidence that 
would pertain to these answers to me or my staff in a secure setting?

    Answer. My staff and I are committed to keeping your staff, and any 
other member of the legislative branch, informed.

    Question. The Administration's maximum pressure campaign has not 
brought Iran back to the negotiating table. Nor has unilaterally 
withdrawing from the JCPOA, which I did not support, without the 
support of our allies. I remain concerned about Iran's nuclear progress 
over the past year. In the past months, Iran was closer to a nuclear 
break out than at any time over the past 5 years. In spite of the 
economic damage wrought by renewed sanctions, Iran has not shown any 
willingness to negotiate a new nuclear deal or even lessen its support 
for proxies that menace our allies and partners around the Middle East. 
The President has said that Iran will not be allowed to have the 
ability to have a nuclear weapon. Can you provide specific examples of 
how this Administration has increased constrained Iran's nuclear 
weapons' development?

    Answer. The JCPOA was a flawed deal because it did not permanently 
address our concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program and 
destabilizing conduct. The fact that Iran has been able to return to 
higher levels of nuclear enrichment so quickly and easily reflects the 
deal's deficiencies. The purpose of the maximum pressure campaign is to 
deprive the regime of revenue needed to foment its malign activities 
and bring Iran to the negotiation table to address both Iran's nuclear 
program as well as its other destabilizing activities. The United 
States is engaged in robust international engagement to bring 
multilateral pressure on Iran and to raise the costs of its nuclear 
escalation.

    Question. What is the Administration's red line as it considers the 
size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear program when considering 
whether military action is necessary to restrain Iran's nuclear 
program?

    Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will 
never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if, and 
under what circumstances, military action would be warranted is up to 
the President.

    Question. Does the red line cover the number of centrifuges?

    Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will 
never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and 
under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to 
the President.

    Question. Does the red line cover the ability to deliver a warhead 
via a ballistic missile?

    Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will 
never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and 
under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to 
the President.

    Question. Does the red line cover the level of uranium enrichment?

    Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will 
never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and 
under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to 
the President.

    Question. Will you commit to providing me and my staff a classified 
meeting to address this question?

    Answer. My staff and I are committed to keeping your staff, and any 
other member of the Legislative branch, informed.

    Question. Given Iran's unwillingness thus far to return to a 
negotiating table, what do you think would change that calculus?

    Answer. Iran is facing massive economic and political crises, 
including a large economic contraction, high unemployment, a currency 
crisis, and mass protests. The economic conditions, as well as the 
regime's credibility with its people, will not likely improve. Given 
this reality, the regime faces a stark choice: come to the negotiating 
table or face economic collapse.

    Question. While we ostensibly share the same goals regarding 
constraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and nefarious activities with our 
European partners, it seems the coalition is fraying. What steps are 
you taking to ensure that our European partners stay with us in a 
concerted joint effort to constrain Iran's ambitions.

    Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition 
to Iranian actions to advance its nuclear program beyond JCPOA limits 
and also share our concern regarding Iran's continued proliferation of 
weaponry to arm proxies and partners. Cooperation with European allies 
and partners to address the range of threats posed by Iran remains 
robust and we are in regular communication with our allies and partners 
regarding our Iran policy and how to raise the cost on Iran for its 
destabilizing activities.

    Question. The IAEA is becoming increasingly concerned about access 
to declared Iranian facilities. What steps are you taking to ensure the 
IAEA is empowered to fulfill it inspection responsibilities?

    Answer. The United States is committed to strengthening 
international safeguards globally and fully supports the efforts of the 
IAEA to fulfill its important mandate, including in Iran, which is 
required under its legally-binding safeguards agreements to provide the 
IAEA with access to locations specified by the agency. The IAEA 
Director General (DG) Rafael Grossi reported that since January 2020, 
Iran has refused to provide access to two locations not declared by 
Iran. In June 2020, we supported a strong IAEA Board of Governors 
resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without 
further delay. I recently met with DG Grossi, and we will continue to 
use our diplomacy to ensure the IAEA maintains full access to Iranian 
facilities.

    Question. What steps are you considering if the IAEA is denied 
access?

    Answer. On June 19, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a 
resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without any 
further delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations 
specified by the agency. We have made clear that if Iran fails to 
cooperate, the international community must be prepared to take further 
action.

    Question. While clearly not a supporter of the JCPOA, I was still 
concerned that unilaterally withdrawing from the agreement without a 
plan for how to replace it would alienate our allies and embolden our 
rivals. We are now trying to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran by 
October with no clear way of countering the inevitable Russian and 
Chinese veto of our efforts. What options do we have in the almost 
certain event of the arms embargo expiring?

    Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take 
collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the 
United States would have no choice but to initiate the snapback of UN 
sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining and proliferating deadly 
weapons throughout the region.

    Question. What assurances do you have from our European allies that 
they will join us in pursuing these options?

    Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition 
to Iran's continued proliferation of weaponry to arm proxies and 
partners. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take 
collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the 
United States would restore UN sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining 
and proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

    Question. Are you planning to invoke the snapback mechanism in the 
event the embargo is not extended?

    Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take 
collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the 
United States will have no choice but to trigger the snapback of all UN 
sanctions on Iran in order to prevent Iran from obtaining and 
proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

    Question. What are the implications for the future of UN sanctions 
if snapback is invoked and Russia and China or other countries do not 
comply with those sanctions?

    Answer. All UN member states are required to implement UN Security 
Council sanctions obligations. These obligations exist independent of 
non-compliance by individual Member States. The United States will 
continue to make every effort to ensure that all UN member states 
comply with their UN Security Council sanctions obligations.

    Question. How are you engaging with other countries to ensure that 
the current embargo is enforced?

    Answer. Cooperation with allies and partners to address the range 
of threats posed by Iran remains robust and in the context of Iranian 
conventional arms transfers, has resulted in several well-publicized 
interdictions conducted in recent years by U.S., French, Australian, 
and Saudi forces. We have also worked with both the United Nations and 
like-minded countries to shine a light on Iran's continued malign 
activities. In part due to our efforts, the UN Secretary General's June 
report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 
unequivocally concluded that the cruise missiles and unmanned aerial 
vehicles used in the September 14, 2019, attack on Saudi oil facilities 
were Iranian in origin.

    Question. I have still not received a good answer to my first two 
questions from January regarding the imminence and nature of the threat 
used to justify the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. U.S. personnel 
in Iraq are now under greater threat than they have been in recent 
history and the U.S. Embassy and Green Zone are rocketed on a near 
daily basis. Over the past year, U.S. presence in Iraq has been on 
ordered departure more days than not and the State Department has 
permanently decreased its positions in Iraq to roughly 80. Yet the 
State Department and USAID continue to program foreign assistance, 
including over half a billion dollars in Northern Iraq, at the same 
time it is downsizing its presence, thereby impeding its ability to 
oversee these funds and raising serious concerns about waste, fraud, 
and abuse. Do you expect any shortcomings in administering U.S. 
assistance in Iraq given the reduced staffing in the country?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID have long faced security 
challenges in delivering assistance in Iraq, which we seek to mitigate 
by drawing on additional support from Washington and from regional 
staff to supplement our mission. As a result, we do not expect any 
shortcomings in the Administration of U.S. assistance based on current 
staffing levels.

    Question. Do you believe our diplomatic presence in Iraq is large 
enough to adequately perform all the tasks we are asking of it?

    Answer. Our current staffing level (349 U.S. Direct Hires and Third 
Country Nationals) enables us to accomplish our mission in Iraq while 
accounting for the current security environment. However, staffing 
levels are not static and are constantly re-evaluated and adjusted to 
meet mission priorities. Our diplomatic presence is consistent with 
staffing levels previously notified to Congress in CN 19-327.

    Question. Given the staffing reductions, what steps are the State 
Department and USAID taking to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is 
properly administered?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID are committed to properly 
administering U.S. foreign assistance in Iraq. Last year, USAID 
increased its authorized expatriate staff in Iraq from 8 to 13, 
allowing us to better manage our resources in-country. The State 
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination manage 
their programs entirely from Washington, incorporating an in-country 
monitoring team. The Department of State and USAID also maintain a 
network of staff outside the country who provide support to the Iraq 
mission.

    Question. Lebanon's financial crisis is accelerating at an alarming 
rate with some economists warning that the country faces an economic 
collapse similar to Venezuela with the country's large middle class 
being pushed into poverty. Is U.S. economic assistance helping to 
mitigate Lebanon's financial crisis?

    Answer. U.S. economic assistance is reaching thousands of Lebanese 
people in a time of acute crisis. Our economic assistance, which 
included more than $117.5 million in FY 2019 economic support funds 
alone, promotes economic growth, supports workforce enhancement and 
education, and helps with the local provision of basic services. For 
instance, USAID expects to have created more than 3,000 new full-time 
jobs in Lebanon by September, and its assistance has led to education 
for more than 300,000 Lebanese children. However, a path out of 
Lebanon's crisis depends on Lebanese political leaders and whether they 
are prepared to implement the reforms necessary to put the country on a 
sustainable path.

    Question. What reforms do you think are most critical for Lebanon 
to pursuant to the IMF recommendations?

    Answer. Despite many months of discussions between the Lebanese 
Government and the International Monetary Fund, Lebanese leaders have 
not yet taken even the most preliminary steps toward reform that would 
be required for serious negotiations for an IMF program. Reforms are 
needed in a variety of areas, including in the electricity, customs, 
and telecoms sectors, as well as in fiscal policy, fiscal transparency, 
and finance and banking, among others. Progress in these areas would 
help put the Lebanese economy on a more sustainable path.

    Question. Do you assess this government as capable of making 
necessary reforms to the economy?

    Answer. The popular demand for real change in Lebanon could not be 
clearer, and the United States has called on Lebanon's political 
leaders to finally respond to the people's longstanding and legitimate 
demands for good governance, sound economic and financial reform, and 
an end to the endemic corruption that has stifled the country's 
tremendous potential. So far, Lebanese leaders have failed in their 
responsibility to meet the needs of the people and have resisted the 
kind of deep fundamental reforms that are needed. Lebanese leaders must 
demonstrate a political will and commitment to reform. It is what the 
Lebanese people expect and deserve.

    Question. Would Hezbollah benefit from an economic collapse in 
Lebanon?

    Answer. A stable and secure Lebanon is in the interest of the 
United States, the Lebanese people, and the region. Hizballah is a 
terrorist organization and a destabilizing force. It has benefitted 
from the lack of accountability and transparency in Lebanon. Its malign 
activities undermine the Lebanese state and threaten the country's 
security. Economic collapse would be harmful to the institutions in 
Lebanon we support and that help undermine Hizballah's influence.

    Question. Does such an economic collapse in Lebanon threaten the 
security of our ally, the State of Israel?

    Answer. Israel's security is a long-standing cornerstone of U.S. 
foreign policy. Economic collapse in Lebanon would have negative 
effects both on the state and beyond its borders, and Hizballah in this 
scenario could very well pose even more of a threat to Israel. Economic 
reform is key to Lebanon's stability and, therefore, to U.S. national 
security and the security of our partners.

    Question. Should the United States continue to provide economic 
assistance to Lebanon at the same level as in recent years?

    Answer. The President's Budget Request for FY 2021 reflects the 
level of U.S. assistance that we assess is appropriate to our efforts 
to assist in meeting the needs of the Lebanese people who continue to 
face persistent challenges. Our economic assistance addresses the needs 
of vulnerable communities, particularly those struggling due to 
declining economic opportunities and poor public services. By improving 
local governance, strengthening educational institutions, and enhancing 
and boosting economic growth, U.S. economic assistance activities also 
help to challenge the false narrative advanced by Hizballah, and its 
sponsor Iran, that it represents a viable alternative to legitimate 
Lebanese institutions.

    Question. U.S. security assistance has helped the Lebanese Armed 
Forces become a more effective and professional force for all Lebanese, 
regardless of sect, thereby undermining Hezbollah's claim that it is 
the only defender that Lebanon can count on. Do you agree with that 
statement?

    Answer. I strongly support the statement that U.S. security 
assistance has helped the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) become a more 
effective and professional force for all Lebanese, regardless of sect. 
The LAF remains one of the most respected institutions in Lebanon and 
the U.S.-LAF partnership builds the LAF's capacity as the sole 
legitimate defender of Lebanon's sovereignty. U.S. support for 
institutions like the LAF helps undermine Hizballah's influence and 
helps debunk Hizballah's false narrative of being Lebanon's protector.

    Question. Would a reduction in the capabilities of the Lebanese 
Armed Forces undermine Israeli security?

    Answer. Israel's security is a long-standing cornerstone of U.S. 
foreign policy. The United States has expressed publicly and privately 
deep concerns about Hizballah's continued efforts to expand its 
weaponry and project Iran's threats to Israel and the region. U.S. 
support for institutions like the Lebanese Armed Forces helps undermine 
Hizballah's influence.

    Question. Should the U.S. continue to provide security assistance 
to Lebanon at the same level as in recent years?

    Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) is a key component of U.S. policy in Lebanon. U.S. assistance to 
the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) helps to build capable 
and committed partner forces for the United States in a difficult 
region, as well as helping the Lebanese state protect its borders, 
effectively counter ISIS, and demonstrate it is the sole legitimate 
defender of Lebanon's sovereignty.

    Question. What would the implications be of reducing U.S. military 
assistance to the LAF?

    Answer. The LAF is one of our strongest counterterrorism partners 
in the region. A weakened LAF would enable Hizballah to expand its 
influence even further and increase the risk of instability inside 
Lebanon and beyond. Our assistance to the LAF helps ensure it remains a 
reliable and critical counterterrorism partner for the United States. 
In addition, a LAF weakened by reduced assistance from the United 
States might need to accept supplementary assistance from other 
nations, which may have objectives contrary to ours. Russia, for 
instance, has offered military assistance to the LAF in the past, and 
it was able to refuse, in large part, because of the strength and 
reliability of our own partnership.

    Question. Much like the Astana process in Syria, following their 
meeting in Ankara last week, it now appears that Turkey and Russia are 
poised to drive the geopolitical agenda in Libya and across the 
Mediterranean. Last week, there were also a number of reports that 
Russia is positioning more forces in Libya in support of Khalifa 
Heftar, adding more fuel to a fire already raging with weapons from 
other countries across the region. Is it your assessment that Russia 
and Turkey control the future of maritime security in the 
Mediterranean?

    Answer. Countering malign Russian influence remains a U.S. foreign 
policy priority worldwide. In Libya, we remain concerned by the 
continued influx of Russian military armaments and Russian-backed 
Wagner mercenaries from Russia, Syria, and other countries. Russia 
seeks to divide NATO Allies over Libya, establish a foothold on the 
Mediterranean, and exploit and control Libyan energy resources. The 
United States opposes any arrangement that allows Russia to dictate 
outcomes in Libya. From bases in Libya, Russia could challenge NATO 
area access in the Mediterranean and threaten European and U.S. assets 
and personnel stationed across the continent.
    To ensure regional security in the Mediterranean, we stress to 
Turkey and other NATO Allies, as well as our non-NATO partners in the 
region, countering Russian activity in Libya must be a top collective 
priority. We continue to urge Turkey, aligned with Libya's UN-
recognized Government of National Accord, to avoid pursuing any sort of 
arrangement with Russia in Libya; we want to see de-escalation on both 
sides. We continue to call on all Libyan and external actors to support 
UN-led negotiations towards a sustainable ceasefire, the resumption of 
oil sector operations, and an immediate return to UN-facilitated 
political negotiations.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that 
Turkey and Russia do not end up controlling maritime security in the 
eastern Mediterranean?

    Answer. We will continue to use our full diplomatic and economic 
leverage to stop Russia's destabilizing activities in Syria and Libya. 
We regularly warn Eastern Mediterranean allies and partners of Russia's 
intention to establish a permanent presence in the region. We ask them 
to deny Russia port visits and publicly condemn Russia's support for 
armed groups, including Russian proxy the Wagner group, and violations 
of the UN arms embargo in Libya.
    We have conveyed to Turkey repeatedly that its continued 
overflights of Greek territory, drilling activities in waters off 
Cyprus, signing of a maritime boundary memorandum of understanding with 
Libya, and ongoing operations surveying for energy resources in areas 
over which Greece and the Republic of Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the 
Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and unhelpful.

    Question. The Turkish-GNA maritime border agreement is based on a 
flawed reading of international law. Our partners including Greece and 
Cyprus have expressed vocal opposition to this agreement, which 
undermines U.S. security interests as well as broader security and 
energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. Will the United States 
insist that any potential future Libyan government eschew the 
underpinnings of this agreement and work with other Eastern 
Mediterranean countries to comply with international law and peaceful 
energy exploration?

    Answer. As we have said publicly and privately, the Memorandum of 
Understanding on maritime boundaries has raised tensions in the region 
and has been unhelpful to efforts to negotiate a solution to the 
conflict. The United States has called on all parties to refrain from 
actions that risk heightening tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
This development highlights the risk of the Libyan conflict taking on 
wider regional dimensions and the urgent need for all interested 
parties to work towards a negotiated solution.

    Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to counter Turkey's 
aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean?

    Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned with heightened 
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have conveyed to Turkey 
repeatedly that its continued overflights of Greek territory, its 
drilling activities in the waters off Cyprus, its signing of a maritime 
boundary MOU with Libya, and its ongoing operations surveying for 
natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert 
jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and 
unhelpful. We continue to press Turkey to meet its responsibilities 
under the existing Turkey-EU migration deal and to avoid provocative 
acts on the Turkey-Greece border.
    Turkey remains an important NATO Ally, and we will continue working 
with Turkey on areas of mutual interest while urging it to change 
course in areas of concern.

    Question. Over the past year, we have seen a lack of diplomatic 
engagement on Libya, coupled with mixed messages from President Trump, 
which allowed for General Haftar's ill-advised assault on Tripoli and 
open the way for Turkey and Russian footholds in the country. While I 
appreciate that you participated in the Berlin conference earlier this 
year, I fear that our absence is causing significant damage. Does the 
Administration have a strategy to deescalate the fighting in Libya and 
restart political talks? Will we see that strategy in writing by 
September 15 as required by the 2020 NDAA?

    Answer. As an active but neutral actor, the United States is 
pursuing diplomatic engagement with Libyan and external stakeholders 
across the conflict to find a solution. U.S. goals in Libya are to seek 
an immediate end to the conflict and return to political negotiations. 
The efforts of foreign actors to exploit the conflict pose grave 
threats to regional stability and global commerce. The Department of 
State is in the process of coordinating a joint report to Congress with 
the Department of Defense on the U.S. strategy on Libya.

    Question. Does that strategy have buy in from regional partners and 
allies, some of whom support the GNA and some of whom support the LNA?

    Answer. Through our diplomatic engagement, the United States is 
working to find a solution that ends foreign interference in Libya and 
protects the shared interests of the United States, our allies, and 
partners. Our approach includes engagement with all external actors in 
Libya--whether they support the GNA or LNA--with the goal of aligning 
them with the position of the United States in favor of a UN-
facilitated political process.

    Question. I understand the President has recently made some calls 
to foreign leaders encouraging them to cease their supply of weapons 
and support. How effective do you assess those engagements?

    Answer. The President's personal engagement has helped advance our 
policy of reducing foreign interference in Libya and supporting UN-
facilitated political dialogue.

    Question. What are the potential implications of direct 
confrontation between Turkey and Egypt in Libya?

    Answer. The Department of State is encouraging Egypt, Turkey, and 
other partners to use their influence to press Libyans including 
Khalifa Haftar, House of Representatives Speaker Agilah Saleh Issa, and 
Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj to de-escalate the conflict, support 
implementation of an immediate ceasefire, and engage in a UN-
facilitated political process to work for a peaceful solution. Any 
direct conflict between outside actors in Libya would have negative 
effects on the Libyan people and U.S. interests in the region.

    Question. One of the complications of the lack of U.S. engagement 
on Libya is that U.S. partners and allies are on both sides of the 
conflict, some supporting the GNA and some joining Russia to support 
the LNA and many violating the UN arms embargo on Libya to supply 
weapons and equipment to their proxies. What steps has the U.S. taken 
to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya?

    Answer. The United States supports Security Council Resolution 
2292, which provides vital authorities for member states to limit the 
destabilizing flows of arms to and from Libya. The Security Council 
renewed these authorities most recently in June. The United States has 
strongly supported a robust UN arms embargo and sanctions regime, and 
has used its position on the Security Council to ensure those continue. 
The United States has made clear to all actors, publicly and privately, 
the need to respect the arms embargo. Secretary Pompeo emphasized this 
in his remarks to the Berlin conference in January. The United States 
cooperates with the UN Security Council Libya Sanctions Committee Panel 
of Experts, which investigates alleged arms embargo violations, and 
encourages other countries to do so as well.

    Question. Have there been any repercussions for countries that have 
repeatedly violated the arms embargo?

    Answer. Individuals and entities that have participated in efforts 
to send arms to Libya have faced sanctions and criminal prosecution. EU 
Operation Irini and its predecessor, Operation Sophia, have interdicted 
vessels suspected of violating the embargo and shared information on 
alleged violations with the UN Security Council Libya Sanctions 
Committee Panel of Experts. Countries that sent arms and fighters to 
Libya have faced direct criticism from the international community, 
including the United States, as well as from independent NGOs.

    Question. Will the U.S. impose any repercussions for repeated 
violations of that embargo?

    Answer. The United States has consistently promoted accountability 
for violations of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Sanctions discourage 
violations and we will consider their targeted use when appropriate. We 
continue to press our partners to do the same and respect the embargo 
they committed to in Berlin. Countries that sent arms and fighters to 
Libya also faced direct and public criticism from the United States. In 
testimony before Congress, in public comments, and in my own remarks at 
the Berlin conference in January, the Department has not shied away 
from naming countries that have escalated the conflict. We also support 
international efforts to better enforce compliance with the embargo, 
including efforts by the European Union.

    Question. What is the Administration's broader policy toward 
foreign intervention in Libya? What is the State Department 
communicating to those foreign governments involved in Libya, many of 
whom are close U.S. partners like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates?

    Answer. The Administration opposes all foreign military 
interference in Libya, supports UN-led negotiations towards a 
sustainable ceasefire, and backs an immediate return to a UN-
facilitated political process. In recent weeks, we have seen Egypt take 
a more constructive approach and we encourage this positive 
development. We are urging foreign parties to end their military 
involvement in Libya and use their influence to encourage diverse 
Libyan participation in UN-facilitated security and political 
negotiations. We made clear there is no military solution and Libyan 
leadership and external backers must support a political settlement to 
this conflict.

    Question. The Turkish-GNA maritime border agreement is based on a 
flawed reading of international law. Will the United States insist that 
any potential future Libyan Government eschew the underpinnings of this 
agreement and work with other Eastern Mediterranean countries including 
Greece and Cyprus to comply with international law and peaceful energy 
exploration?

    Answer. As we have said publicly and privately, the Memorandum of 
Understanding on maritime boundaries has raised tensions in the region 
and has been unhelpful to efforts to negotiate a solution to the 
conflict. The United States has called on all parties to refrain from 
actions that risk heightening tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
This development highlights the risk of the Libyan conflict taking on 
wider regional dimensions and the urgent need for all interested 
parties to work towards a negotiated solution.

    Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to counter Turkey's 
aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean?

    Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned with heightened 
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have conveyed to Turkey 
repeatedly that its continued overflights of Greek territory, its 
drilling activities in the waters off Cyprus, its signing of a maritime 
boundary MOU with Libya, and its ongoing operations surveying for 
natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert 
jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and 
unhelpful. We continue to press Turkey to meet its responsibilities 
under the existing Turkey-EU migration deal and to avoid provocative 
acts on the Turkey-Greece border.
    Turkey remains an important NATO Ally, and we will continue working 
with Turkey on areas of mutual interest while urging it to change 
course in areas of concern.

    Question. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE are allowed to purchase armed 
drones from the U.S., will they be allowed to deploy those drones in 
Libya?

    Answer. We don't comment publicly on possible arms sales until and 
unless we notify them to Congress. Partners are required to follow 
``End Use'' requirements for all arms transfers as addressed in the 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance, standard terms and conditions for 
foreign military sales or other end use assurances as part of 
commercial sales agreements.

    Question. Ever since President Trump's hasty and ill-conceived 
withdrawal from much of northeast Syria last October, the U.S. has lost 
much of its diplomatic leverage and freedom of movement in Syria. Are 
U.S. troop movements in northeast Syria challenged on the ground by 
Russian soldiers and Assad regime fighters more or less frequently 
since October?

    Answer. The U.S. military continues to communicate with the Russian 
military in Syria via a de-confliction hotline. This is first and 
foremost a safety mechanism to prevent accidents and ensure the safe 
and professional conduct of our forces in close proximity. The 
Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to questions 
regarding U.S. troop movements, but the Department of State stresses in 
diplomatic exchanges with Moscow the importance of adherence to de-
confliction agreements and procedures.

    Question. How many USAID personnel are on the ground in Northeast 
Syria, compared to September 2019?

    Answer. As of July 21, 2020, the USAID has no personnel on the 
ground in Northeast Syria. This has not changed since September of 
2019.

    Question. Is it fair to say that it is harder to administer U.S. 
assistance without that same USAID presence, especially now when COVID 
had finally reared its head in Northeast and Northwest Syria?

    Answer. The ability of USAID to deliver assistance inside Syria 
depends on security, the availability of legitimate local partners, the 
legal ability to provide such aid, and risk-mitigation measures to 
avoid diversion to sanctioned groups. USAID has provided assistance 
remotely in Syria since 2012, and continues to do so. Our response to 
COVID-19 in Syria relies on the same trusted non-governmental 
organizations we have worked with to provide humanitarian assistance 
since before the pandemic. We continue to require post-award vetting 
for prime and sub-awardees and rigorous risk-mitigation plans for all 
implementing partners.

    Question. During the hearing you confirmed to Senator Graham the 
existence of a deal between an U.S.-based oil company, reported to be 
Delta Crescent Energy LLC, and Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria 
to develop oil fields there and that the United States is supportive of 
the deal. Does this company have an OFAC license allowing it to operate 
in Syria?

    Answer. Queries about private business contracts or whether private 
companies have authorizations or specific licenses should be directed 
to the entity or parties in question. More broadly, we ensure our 
sanctions are in line with our foreign policy interests and target the 
Assad regime's continued violence against the Syrian people. For all 
sanctions programs, including Syria, the U.S. Government considers on a 
case-by-case basis requests to authorize via specific licenses U.S. 
persons' involvement in normally prohibited; this may include 
activities in support of the Syrian opposition.

    Question. A significant amount of oil from Kurdish-controlled 
northeast Syria is sold to the Assad regime. Will any of the oil 
extracted from fields included in this deal be sold by Kurdish 
authorities to the Assad regime? If so, does this company's OFAC 
license allow for such sales?

    Answer. We are not involved in the commercial decisions of our 
local partners. As a matter of policy, we seek to cut off the regime's 
access to the international financial system and other sources of 
revenue it uses to perpetuate the Syrian conflict. Our sanctions 
programs, including any granting of licenses, reinforce that policy and 
our efforts to ensure compliance are rigorous. We remain committed to 
the unity and territorial integrity of Syria. The U.S. Government does 
not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria.

    Question. The recent expiration of the UN authorization for the Bab 
al-Salama border crossing from Turkey into northwest Syria means that 
nearby areas will now have to be reached from the Bab al-Hawa crossing 
which will require traversing Syrian territory that is controlled by 
the Turkish military or by Turkish-backed rebel groups. What assurances 
does the U.S. have from Turkey that cross-border assistance will be 
allowed to flow through these areas unmolested and undiverted and that 
humanitarian NGOs will be allowed to continue operating?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages with Turkey to urge 
access for international humanitarian organizations and to facilitate 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need in and through 
areas over which Turkey has influence. Turkey has played a vital role 
in the delivery of cross-border assistance since the UN authorized the 
program in 2014. In April and May of this year, Turkish facilitation of 
border movements resulted in the highest monthly volumes of cross-
border aid delivery on record.

    Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to help mitigate the 
logistical complications that arise from the closure of the Bab al-
Salama crossing?

    Answer. Prior to the July 11 vote in the UN Security Council on 
cross-border access to northwest Syria, UN partners pre-positioned 
humanitarian commodities inside northwest Syria to last several months. 
This allowed our UN and NGO humanitarian partners a period of 
transition as they adapted their activities and logistical arrangements 
to continue delivering assistance to vulnerable populations previously 
reached by the UN through Bab al-Salama. Having provided more than 
$11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance since the start of the crisis, 
the U.S. government continues to be the world-leader in ensuring life-
saving assistance reaches all Syrians in need.

    Question. The 12-month extension of the UN Security Council's 
authorization for the Bab al-Hawa crossing provides some much needed 
breathing space for both diplomats at the UN and humanitarian groups on 
the ground before the next reauthorization. Please describe the U.S.'s 
strategy for the next reauthorization in 12-months' time.

    Answer. The U.S. strategy comprises multiple lines of mutually 
reinforcing efforts. The Department of State and USAID remain in 
constant contact with those providing cross-border humanitarian 
assistance to Syrians, including the UN and non-governmental 
organizations. The Department continues to highlight shortcomings and 
concerns regarding cross-border access during monthly meetings in the 
UN Security Council and call for those responsible for interference 
with humanitarian aid and attacks on humanitarian workers to be held 
accountable. The Department communicates regularly with like-minded 
countries to provide the rationale and evidence needed to support a 
forward-leaning and well-justified renewal resolution.

    Question. How will the U.S. engage with like-minded countries on 
the Security Council to persuade other members of the Council to extend 
or expand the current authorization and to counter the efforts of 
Russia and China to end or further limit the current authorization?

    Answer. The Department of State remains in constant contact with UN 
Security Council like-minded countries to ensure message alignment, 
including emphasizing the Assad regime remains responsible for 
sufficient cross-line humanitarian assistance into Syria. The 
Department and USAID maintain contact with humanitarian partners in NY 
and on the ground. With the election of India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, 
and Norway for the 2021-2022 term of the Security Council, the 
Department and USAID will meet with each incoming Security Council 
member to clearly and convincingly convey the need to extend and expand 
this mechanism. The Department will facilitate a roundtable discussion, 
wherein Syrians will highlight the horrid conditions they endure.

    Question. Please describe U.S. engagement with the UN, its related 
agencies and other international aid agencies to create a contingency 
plan in the event that Russia and/or China veto the next authorization 
extension?

    Answer. The United States remains a strong supporter of UN agencies 
and other international organizations providing life-saving services in 
Syria. The UN and international humanitarian assistance partners do not 
have a ready alternative that would allow them to replicate the scale, 
timeliness, or reach of its current cross-border activities. The United 
States will support and advocate for the pre-positioning of commodities 
by the UN, including the World Food Program, as well as work with non-
governmental organizations and implementing partners to increase their 
capacity to take over essential activities. While these efforts will 
help continue to bring humanitarian assistance to Syrians in need, 
significant gaps will nevertheless remain.

    Question. With the implementation of sanctions under the Caesar 
Syria Civilian Protection Act underway, there are legitimate concerns 
about whether humanitarian carve-outs will be fully effective and 
protected. We are already hearing reports of some NGOs who have 
experienced financial difficulties due to the tightened restrictions. 
This has the unintended risk of inhibiting badly needed humanitarian 
aid. To date, how many organizations have reported to the United States 
or other partner countries that they are experiencing heightened 
challenges operating in Syria as a result of the sanctions imposed 
under the Caesar act?

    Answer. The Caesar Act and the U.S. Syria sanctions program do not 
target humanitarian assistance nor do those sanctions hinder our 
stabilization activities in northeastern Syria. The sanctions are 
intended to promote accountability for the Assad regime's violence and 
destruction.
    The United States works closely with international organizations 
and the broader humanitarian assistance community to address any 
obstacles. The Administration has had and welcomes further 
conversations with them to address obstacles, including ensuring 
financial institutions can do necessary due diligence and support 
organizations providing lifesaving aid.

    Question. What steps is the United States taking to reassure NGOs 
and their financial institutions that they are not subject to sanctions 
under the Caesar Act?

    Answer. The U.S. Government works closely with international 
organizations and the broader humanitarian assistance community to 
address any obstacles. We welcome conversations with humanitarian 
partners to work through any challenges, including ensuring financial 
institutions can undertake necessary due diligence and support 
organizations providing lifesaving aid to Syrians in need.
    Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control has issued several 
general licenses related to humanitarian assistance and trade with 
Syria. I refer you to them for additional information.

    Question. Following the initial optimism about the Arab uprisings, 
only one country--Tunisia--remains on a democratic path. Its successful 
transition should be a national security priority of the United States. 
However, for FY 2021, the President has requested only $84 million in 
economic and security aid, a 65 percent cut from Congress' FY 2020 
appropriation. Can you explain why the Administration is seeking such a 
dramatic cut in funding and what it says about the priority you attach 
to this important country, which has also been an important partner in 
countering terrorism?

    Answer. Security assistance levels requested for Tunisia in the FY 
2021 request are maintained at the same level as the FY 2020 request. 
We provide Economic Support Funds (ESF) to strengthen Tunisia's 
democratic institutions and believe the FY 2021 request level is 
appropriate. Tunisia also benefits from regional ESF under the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative and other governance and public diplomacy 
programs managed by the Department of State and USAID.

    Question. A political solution for Yemen unfortunately looks to be 
very far off with Houthi gains on the battlefield and conflict even 
among the anti-Houthi forces of the internationally recognized Yemeni 
Government and the Southern Transition Council. What specific steps has 
the United States taken in recent months to support a political 
solution in Yemen?

    Answer. Though the Southern Transition Council (STC) announced it 
``suspended'' negotiation of the Riyadh Agreement on August 25, the 
United States continues to work closely with our Saudi, UAE, and 
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) counterparts to encourage the ROYG 
and the STC to finalize the agreement.
    We continue to support the work of UN Special Envoy Martin 
Griffiths. There is no military solution in Yemen. The only way forward 
is a political solution that guarantees a unified, stable, and 
prosperous Yemen.

    Question. What steps is the United States taking to ensure that 
life-saving humanitarian medical assistance reaches those who need it 
most?

    Answer. COVID-19 poses a grave and unprecedented threat to 
humanitarian workers in Yemen, who bravely put their own lives on the 
line to continue their life-saving work. We honor those who have lost 
their lives or fallen ill while serving on the frontlines of the COVID-
19 response. We work with our partners, the UN, and Yemeni authorities 
to ensure aid staff can safely support response efforts and have the 
ability to enter and leave the country as necessary so humanitarian 
organizations can continue critical aid operations. This includes 
support for the logistics work overseen by WFP and the UN Humanitarian 
Air Service. We also continue to advocate jointly with other donors for 
all parties to the conflict to facilitate access of aid workers to 
those in need.

    Question. This Administration still has not shown how it has helped 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE improve its use of precision guided munitions 
and yet it would ease restriction on the sale of armed drones to 
countries like them. Will the Administration allow Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE to purchase armed drones from the United States?

    Answer. Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer 
(CAT) policy, all arms transfers to foreign partners are subject to 
case-by-case comprehensive consideration of U.S. interests, including 
any risk the transfer may contribute to human rights abuses, acts of 
gender-based violence, violence against children, violations of 
international humanitarian law, terrorism, mass atrocities, or 
transnational organized crime. The President's policy directs the U.S. 
Government to aid partners in reducing the risk of harm to civilians 
during military operations, and the Department of State will continue 
to conduct human rights reviews for foreign military sales and direct 
commercial sales. U.S. expertise and training are also shared to help 
mitigate the potential for harm to civilians and promote adherence to 
the law of armed conflict.

    Question. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE are allowed to purchase armed 
drones from the United States, will they be allowed to deploy those 
drones in Yemen?

    Answer. Consistent with section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
in cases of foreign military sales, partners agree to end-use 
requirements in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms 
and Conditions. Typically, the U.S. Government does not place end-use 
requirements that limit the equipment's geographic employment.

    Question. What are the specific categories of ``life-saving 
activities'' that are exempted under the March 27 suspension of USAID 
funding to North Yemen? Has USAID revisited these categories since the 
suspension to expand the definition of what's exempt under ``life-
saving activities'' to address the COVID-19 pandemic and other health 
issues facing the people of Yemen?

    Answer. The United States has provided nearly $16.7 million in 
funding to support COVID-19 response efforts. We continue to support 
the most critical life-saving activities in northern Yemen, including 
programs to treat malnutrition, provide clean water, and help to 
prevent cholera, COVID-19, and other communicable diseases. USAID will 
continue supporting operational costs to ensure INGO partners can 
maintain their capacity in northern Yemen. USAID continues to support 
UN partners countrywide. Through the World Food Program (WFP), USAID is 
supporting emergency food operations, including at a recalibrated level 
in the north set by WFP. Development assistance in Houthi-controlled 
areas remains suspended, with the exception of operational costs.

    Question. Has any of the suspended assistance been reprogrammed? If 
so, please provide a detailed breakdown of what programs were 
reprogrammed and where the funds have been reprogrammed to.

    Answer. USAID has not reprogrammed any suspended humanitarian or 
development funding within Yemen. As always, we allocate our 
humanitarian funding based on needs, with partners who can deliver on 
behalf of our mission and in a manner that manages U.S. taxpayer 
funding effectively and efficiently. In FY 2020, we continued 
programming carve-out activities with partners and support operational 
costs with suspended international NGOs in northern Yemen to retain a 
footprint in the hopes that current Houthi impediments to a principled 
response will be removed, and our partners can restart operations in 
reaching innocent Yemeni beneficiaries.

    Question. Please provide a detailed breakdown of the $225 million 
in emergency aid to the World Food Program including what programs 
these funds went to support and what portion of those funds was 
allocated for use in Houthi-controlled areas.

    Answer. The United States remains one of WFP's largest donors. 
WFP's decision to recalibrate programs in northern Yemen was a direct 
result of the untenable operating environment created by the Houthis' 
interference in aid operations. Time and again, the Houthis have failed 
to abide by their commitments to end their obstruction of WFP's 
operations and to allow WFP to implement necessary procedures to ensure 
food is reaching the most vulnerable Yemenis. As I announced on May 6, 
we provided nearly $225 million to support WFP's food assistance 
program in Yemen. This un-earmarked contribution was distributed 
countrywide by WFP. Nearly 75 percent of the in-kind food commodities 
from the contribution went to vulnerable Yemenis who live in northern 
Houthi-held areas.

    Question. Other international donors and aid agencies have avoided 
similar suspensions to assistance in Yemen while still working with the 
UN to push back against Houthi obstruction, including securing the 
walk-back of a 2 percent proposed tax on humanitarian assistance and 
biometric accountability measures. Please provide an assessment of why 
such a wide suspension of assistance was deemed necessary and a 
description of what, if any, steps were taken to coordinate this 
suspension with the UN, other donors and aid agencies, including USAID 
implementers.

    Answer. Houthi interference--including blocking aid projects, 
seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, and detaining and 
torturing aid workers--prevented critical, life-saving aid from 
reaching millions of Yemenis. The partial reduction in operations was 
undertaken in cooperation with other donor countries and the United 
Nations as a result of this undue interference. We met as a group in 
Brussels in February and unanimously concluded that the situation was 
untenable. We have met multiple times since then to evaluate the 
situation. In June, following months of collective advocacy and 
negotiation, the U.S. government joined other donors in sending letters 
to the Houthis and Yemeni officials in the south, reiterating the need 
for interference in aid operations to cease immediately.

    Question. Furthermore, please provide an update on the specific 
conditions that must still be met in order for USAID to consider 
lifting its aid suspension in Yemen.

    Answer. The United States, in cooperation with other donors and the 
UN, identified seven pre-conditions that need to be met in northern 
Yemen and agreed on 16 benchmarks to gauge progress in addressing 
these. A technical monitoring group meets monthly to evaluate the 
Houthi's progress. Among the benchmarks the Houthis have not met, they 
have not allowed the World Food Program's biometric registration pilot 
to move forward and have blocked independent needs assessments. Without 
these, we are concerned Houthi leaders could steer assistance away from 
the most vulnerable families to reward combatants and their own 
supporters. With USAID development funding, we need written approval 
from the Houthis allowing third-party monitoring before resuming any 
activities.

    Question. Are you confident that this suspension in assistance will 
not exacerbate Yemen's already dire humanitarian situation, especially 
with the spread of COVID-19 in the country?

    Answer. We remain concerned about the Houthis' disregard for the 
suffering their deliberate obstruction is causing their fellow Yemenis, 
and call on the Houthis to abide by humanitarian principles. The United 
States is the leading humanitarian donor in Yemen this year, providing 
more than $1.1 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance funding to Yemen 
since October 2018. The United States is committed to providing robust 
humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen where our partners are able to 
operate without interference. In fact, the United States has already 
provided significantly more humanitarian funding since the suspension 
went into effect in March than any other donor has provided in Yemen 
this year. We continue to encourage other donors to contribute 
additional funding and to fulfill pledges they have already made 
quickly.

    Question. Whether or not the suspension exacerbates Yemen's 
humanitarian crisis, will USAID consider lifting the suspension in 
assistance without those conditions being satisfied if conditions in 
Yemen worsen? If so, please provide metrics for how bad the 
humanitarian situation must become for USAID to lift the suspension 
without satisfying its conditions.

    Answer. The United States is committed to providing robust 
humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen where our partners are able to 
operate without interference. To meet the increasing needs resulting 
from the conflict, economic decline, and COVID-19, the United States 
has provided more humanitarian funding since the suspension went into 
effect in March than any other donor provided Yemen this year. USAID 
will continue supporting operational costs, ensuring international NGO 
partners maintain their capacity in northern Yemen to scale up in the 
event the benchmarks are achieved and/or humanitarian conditions 
deteriorate significantly. Through the World Food Program, USAID is 
supporting emergency food operations, including in the north. This 
support has helped prevent food security conditions from deteriorating 
further.

    Question. Has any of the suspended assistance for Yemen been 
reprogrammed elsewhere? If so, please provide a detailed breakdown of 
the amount of funds reprogrammed, their intended use in Yemen and what 
countries and programs they have been reprogrammed to.

    Answer. USAID has not reprogrammed any suspended humanitarian 
funding within Yemen. As always, we allocate our humanitarian funding 
based on needs, with partners who can deliver on behalf of our mission 
and in a manner that manages U.S. taxpayer funding effectively and 
efficiently. In FY 2020, USAID continued programming carve-out 
activities with partners and supporting operational costs with 
suspended international NGOs in northern Yemen to retain a footprint in 
the hope that current impediments to a principled response by the 
Houthis will be removed so that our partners can restart operations in 
reaching innocent Yemeni beneficiaries.

    Question. As we are now rapidly approaching the end of President 
Trump's first term, I would therefore like to ask you whether or not 
you have reached an agreement with North Korea on any of the goals you 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2018 that you would 
achieve within a year. Do you have an agreement with North Korea that: 
Provides a definition for denuclearization, meaning the dismantlement 
or removal of all nuclear weapons, facilities, technology, and material 
from North Korea?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Ends North Koreas production and enrichment of uranium 
and plutonium for military programs?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Permanently dismantles and disables North Korea's nuclear 
weapons infrastructure, including test sites, all nuclear weapons 
research and development facilities, particularly with respect to 
advanced centrifuges, and nuclear weapons enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Provides a full, complete and verifiable declaration of 
all North Korean nuclear activities?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Imposes robust restrictions to assure that North Korea's 
nuclear material, technology and expertise are not exported?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
press countries around the world to enforce the existing sanctions 
regime and to take actions to prevent both sanctions evasion and DPRK 
proliferation activities prohibited by the sanctions.

    Question. Dismantles all North Korean ballistic missiles and agrees 
to a prohibition on all ballistic missile development?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Puts in place sufficient safeguards to assure that no 
ballistic missiles and associated technology are proliferated or 
exported from North Korea?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
press countries around the world to enforce the existing sanctions 
regime and to take actions to prevent both sanctions evasion and DPRK 
proliferation activities prohibited by the sanctions.

    Question. Commits North Korea to robust compliance inspections 
including a verification regime for its nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs, including complete access to all nuclear related sites and 
facilities with real time verification including ``anywhere, anytime'' 
inspections and snap-back sanctions if North Korea is not in full 
compliance?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. Has no sunsets?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
the denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace 
on the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. And, that creates a roadmap for progress on sanctions 
relief dependent on dismantlement and removal of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs?

    Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving 
denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on 
the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK 
simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to 
work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain 
ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final, 
fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the 
North Korean people.

    Question. The Administration has said it is looking for 
``alternative partners'' to the WHO. Documents leaked in May referred 
to something called the Preparedness Initiative for Pandemics and 
Emergency Response, or PIPER. From what I understand the proposal under 
consideration is for a fund run by a governing body that will 
administer bilateral, multilateral, and private-sector funds to fight 
pandemics. It sounds very much like a convenient alternative to the 
World Health Organization. Is this the alternative to replace WHO? 
Where is the money slated for WHO going to go now that the President 
has withdrawn from WHO? Is it going to be channeled to PIPER?

    Answer. We are not seeking to establish an alternative to the World 
Health Organization (WHO). We are providing foreign assistance funding 
previously planned for the WHO to other global health organizations to 
address urgent needs around the world. However, we do believe there are 
gaps in the international system that were exposed by the Ebola, Zika, 
and COVID-19 health emergencies. Outbreaks and pandemics can impact any 
country and all aspects of society, and U.S. Government and 
multilateral organizations are not sufficiently organized to rapidly 
respond to pandemics. We learned we must strengthen and link early 
warning systems and other critical data sources, think holistically 
about preparedness, and build accountability into the international 
system. None of these lessons are wholly owned by any one institution.
    We believe there are a number of models that have been supported by 
the United States that advance global collaboration without undermining 
existing institutions. Examples include the Global Vaccine Alliance 
(Gavi) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
These successful efforts provide insight into how the U.S. Government 
and other donors could collaborate on pandemic prevention. As we look 
toward future efforts on pandemic prevention, we intend to work closely 
with Congress.

    Question. The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria launched a 
COVID-19 response mechanism. Does the Administration support funding 
for the Global Fund's COVID response mechanism? How much should we 
give? Has the Administration asked or proposed to the Global Fund that 
they take on funding and responsibilities related to pandemic response 
that would normally be undertaken by WHO?

    Answer. The United States joined the other members of the Global 
Fund's Board to approve the creation of the COVID-19 Response Mechanism 
(C19RM) and allowed up to $500 million of contributed funding, one-
third of which the United States provided to C19RM to protect the 
Fund's programming in HIV, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria affected by 
the pandemic. We agree the investment the United States made in 
establishing the Global Fund makes it an attractive vehicle to help 
combat the impact of COVID-19 on the three diseases. The U.S. 
Government is committed to maintaining the Global Fund's effective 
execution of programs in its core mandate of HIV, TB, and malaria. The 
United States does not support expanding the Global Fund's remit 
permanently beyond the three diseases. We have not asked, nor proposed, 
the Global Fund take on funding and responsibilities normally 
undertaken by the WHO as the Fund does not set normative guidance for 
combating the pandemics of HIV, TB, malaria, nor COVID-19.

    Question. For decades, the United States has provided critical, 
life-saving assistance to countries around the globe to alleviate 
severe humanitarian and health crises. USAID has notified Congress 
about the expenditure of approximately $202 million in Global Health 
Program, Emergency Reserve Funds and Economic Support Funds to purchase 
7,582 ventilators to distribute to up to 40 countries. I am concerned 
that the NSC's influence in these decisions both circumvents 
longstanding USAID procurement and accountability policies and 
interjects political agendas into USAID's mission. What needs-based 
assessments the NSC using to determine which countries will receive 
ventilators and how this aid is prioritized?

    Answer. The National Security Council (NSC) has said, ``With the 
United States now on track to produce over 100,000 high-quality 
ventilators this Summer, by far the highest production of ventilators 
in history, the President continues to reach out to our partners and 
allies around the world to ensure they can have access to high-quality, 
America-made, life-saving ventilators to meet their medical needs.''
    The U.S. Agency for International Development also would encourage 
the Committee to reach out directly to NSC Legislative Affairs for 
further information.

    Question. Any and all guidance by the NSC regarding the procurement 
process USAID should follow for the purchase of the ventilators it is 
distributing, including whether vendors or manufacturers are 
competitively bidding on contracts to provide ventilators.

    Answer. The provision of ventilators and medical supplies will in 
no way affect the availability of this critical equipment for the 
American people. We carefully balanced our domestic needs with those of 
the world, to ensure the availability of essential medical supplies, 
including ventilators, in the United States. At the early stages of the 
response to the pandemic in the United States, many models predicted a 
shortage of ventilators threatening a public-health catastrophe. The 
Administration organized an industrial ramp-up not seen since World War 
II, using the Defense Production Act to encourage private-sector 
companies to start producing ventilators or expand their existing 
production to meet anticipated demand. The United States is now on 
track to produce over 100,000 high-quality ventilators this summer. As 
a result, HHS, DHS, and the Directorate for Resilience at the NSC 
collaborated to identify vendors to satisfy the manufacturing needs of 
the ventilator-donation program. The NSC, working with HHS and DHS, 
assigned each vendor a series of countries and a number of ventilators. 
USAID, through the Global Health Supply-Chain-Procurement and Supply-
Management contract managed by Chemonic, Inc., procured the 
ventilators, assisted the vendors in delivering products meeting the 
specifications for each country and coordinated the delivery of the 
donations with U.S. embassies and national governments. No, the 
ventilators the NSC is requiring USAID to purchase were not originally 
contracted or procured by DHS or any other federal agency or 
department.

    Question. Is the NSC applying and adhering to the metrics and 
capacity requirements USAID has outlined in the respective 
Congressional Notifications for the provision of ventilators?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. What commitments are the Administration obtaining from 
foreign governments receiving U.S. assistance that they will engage in 
science-based public health actions and interventions to bend the curve 
of COVID-19 infections and make information about the spread of the 
disease public on a sustained basis?

    Answer. The United States received requests for assistance from 
nearly every government in the world. We have provided assistance to 
over 120 countries, reflecting a truly global diversity of approaches 
and needs in responding to COVID-19. Throughout the response, the U.S. 
Government has worked closely with Departments of Health and other 
science-based partners to implement interventions across a range of 
health and humanitarian needs. We will continue to work closely with 
these partners, as well as our own international implementing partners 
to implement a range of context-sensitive interventions based on the 
latest knowledge of the virus and its spread. USAID is focused on 
interventions that are proven and globally recognized as critical to 
the pandemic response.

    Question. I recently released a report titled Global Forced 
Migration: The Political Crisis of our Time which speaks to the urgent 
situation of at least 79.5 million people worldwide have been forcibly 
displaced due to persecution and conflict, the highest total on record. 
At every turn, this Administration has actively opposed efforts to 
support refugees and other vulnerable migrants, both domestically 
through our policies and programs, and internationally in important 
multilateral fora. For example, under your leadership, the Department 
of State's refugee resettlement program is operating at historic lows, 
and is on pace to admit the lowest number of refugees this fiscal year 
since the program began 40 years ago. The Department also withdrew its 
support from key multilateral instruments and global compacts designed 
to improve global responses and coordination to more effectively 
address the plight of migrants and refugees. And on the southern 
border, the Administration has implemented unlawful policies that have 
left thousands stranded in horrid conditions in Mexico and deported 
vulnerable asylum seekers back to the countries they fled in Central 
America. While you continue to champion the U.S. as the world's largest 
humanitarian donor, these actions reveal an Administration that is 
actively sabotaging every institutional mechanism designed to support 
vulnerable refugees and migrants. Your Department has also continued to 
defy requests from my committee regarding its policies and agreements 
related to migration. Does the Administration have a strategy--beyond 
simply provisioning funds--to address the global forced migration 
crisis?

    Answer. The President's National Security Strategy clearly outlines 
our commitment to champion American values by reducing human suffering. 
The United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian 
assistance even as we expect others to share the responsibility. We 
support displaced people close to their homes to help meet their needs 
until they can safely and voluntarily return home. At the Department of 
State and USAID, we work to provide protection and achieve durable 
solutions for the millions of forcibly displaced people across the 
globe. In addition, we aim our diplomacy at continuing to strengthen 
the global humanitarian architecture and at helping to ensure respect 
for international humanitarian laws and norms.

    Question. I am deeply concerned by the reports that the U.S. 
consistently advocated for removing references from sexual and 
reproductive health care from UN agreements. I understand this 
administration has argued they have other priorities, like economic 
empowerment and entrepreneurship. How can women develop and lead their 
own businesses and participate in the economy if they are not able to 
have autonomous control of their own bodies, supported by comprehensive 
access to sexual and reproductive health care?

    Answer. The United States continues to be the global leader in 
foreign assistance for women's health across their lifespan, including 
access to family planning. Consistent with the laws of the United 
States, taxpayer dollars should not be used to promote or provide 
abortion as a method of family planning. We strongly promote responsive 
interventions to meet the health needs of all women, at the UN and in 
other multilateral negotiations, as references to ambiguous terms and 
expressions inject unnecessary controversy, derailing opportunities to 
address critical women's health needs. We will continue to promote the 
highest attainable standards of health for women, in addition to 
women's full and free participation in their economies and societies.

    Question. Ethiopia's transition to an inclusive representative 
democracy is in jeopardy. There are alarming signs of backsliding 
including mass arrests, disappearances, arrest of opposition 
politicians and an internet blackout. Elections, scheduled for this 
year have been delayed indefinitely. Additionally, the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam project has caused serious tensions with Egypt and 
Sudan. You visited Ethiopia earlier this year. What actions have you 
taken in the wake of your visit to help ensure Ethiopia succeeds in its 
democratic transition, specifically with regards to calling out actions 
that close political space and violate human rights?

    Answer. Despite intermittent challenges our assessment continues to 
be that Prime Minister Abiy's administration remains committed to the 
reforms they championed when he came to power in 2018. We continue to 
engage diplomatically with the Ethiopian Government to assure them of 
our support and urge them to continue to uphold the rule of law, 
respect basic democratic principles, and work towards free and fair 
elections. Department leadership meets regularly with senior officials 
from the Ethiopian Government to reiterate our concerns regarding 
troubling reports of human rights violations and abuses and 
restrictions on basic freedoms.

    Question. What are the regional implications should the GERD 
negotiations fail, and how will that impact U.S. interests in the 
region? What role are you playing in the GERD negotiations? What role 
have you advocated for the State Department writ large in the GERD 
negotiations?

    Answer. The on-going GERD negotiations hold the promise of greater 
cooperation and sound management of the Blue Nile for power, 
agriculture, industry, and other uses that could improve the lives of 
the more than 250 million people of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. 
Treasury plays the lead role in the U.S. Government's participation in 
the GERD negotiations. The Department is in close contact with Treasury 
to ensure a unified U.S. policy. Secretary Mnuchin and I regularly 
discuss policy and negotiation developments, and I have spoken 
repeatedly with senior officials from all three countries on this 
issue. The Department is engaged through U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa, 
Cairo, Khartoum, and Pretoria, and the U.S. Mission to the African 
Union.

    Question. Do you support withholding U.S. assistance to Ethiopia as 
a bargaining tool in the GERD talks, even though doing so could imperil 
Ethiopia's fragile transition?

    Answer. The Department is committed to leveraging all available 
tools to promote outcomes that advance our interests around the world. 
We are considering a variety of methods to support Ethiopia, Egypt, and 
Sudan in reaching agreement on the GERD.

    Question. We are on the verge of losing the Sahel. Mali, which is 
suffering from a violent jihadist insurgency and a failing economy, has 
seen mass protests calling for President Ibrahim Keita to resign. There 
are no signs of progress on implementation of the Algiers Accord, and, 
across the Sahel, the fight against terrorism being waged by MINUSMA, 
the G-5 Sahel, and our European allies has been undermined by atrocious 
acts of violence perpetrated by state security forces. The 
Administration appointed a Special Envoy, but that in itself is not a 
strategy. What is our strategy for the Sahel?

    Answer. The Diplomatic Framework for the Sahel focuses on 
addressing the drivers of insecurity, containing the spread of 
violence, and stabilizing the region with the help of better 
coordinated international and U.S. interagency support. There are four 
key elements to this Framework: 1) improving coordination with other 
international and regional partners and international organizations; 2) 
promoting stability in Mali, including implementation of the Algiers 
Accord and improving the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping 
mission; 3) pressing and supporting governments to expand state 
legitimacy in the G5 Sahel countries and neighboring coastal states 
and; 4) preventing further spill over into the West African coastal 
countries.

    Question. What is the State Department doing to promote 
accountability for security forces that commit human rights abuses, and 
to prevent further abuse?

    Answer. Advancing respect for human rights and accountability for 
security forces is a central tenet of U.S. diplomacy reflected in our 
security cooperation. Continued engagement with partners helps mitigate 
human rights abuses and security force overreach by emphasizing the 
development of professional forces that respect human rights. Security 
assistance builds partner capacity to hold forces accountable and 
institutions capable of oversight. It promotes dialogue at high levels 
of government otherwise closed to international engagement. We support 
and adhere to the Leahy law, a powerful tool against human rights 
abuses that prevents foreign security forces guilty of abuses from 
receiving future assistance.

    Question. The Pentagon's review of troop deployments in Africa has 
unnerved our allies who rely on U.S. military support in the Sahel. 
What is the State Department doing to reassure our allies of the U.S. 
commitment to the Sahel? Do you support drawing down our military 
deployment in the Sahel?

    Answer. The State Department funds the majority of peace and 
security assistance in Africa. The Department of Defense's Blank Slate 
Review does not change my commitment to reduce threats and advance 
mutual interests with our African partners. Between Fiscal Years 2010 
and 2019, the Department of State obligated approximately $4.7 billion 
in bilateral security assistance to Africa, a significant portion of 
which assisted Sahel countries. The majority of the State Department's 
security assistance does not depend on the Department of Defense for 
implementation or oversight. I remain committed to maintaining this 
engagement, recognizing that some programs may require review and 
adjustment in light of reduced Department of Defense oversight and 
implementation capacity.

    Question. Analysis by the International Crisis Group suggests that 
insecurity and jihadist activity in Northwest Nigeria could turn that 
part of the country into a ``land bridge'' between terrorists in the 
Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin--a deeply troubling prospect, considering 
there has already been a 31 percent increase in violent incidents by 
Islamist militants in Africa in the last 12 months, according to at 
least one estimate. Do you agree with this assessment about Northwest 
Nigeria? What is the State Department doing to increase civilian 
security and prevent the expansion of jihadism in the Lake Chad Basin 
and northwest Nigeria?

    Answer. We are concerned by the rise in violence in Northwest 
Nigeria over recent months and the opportunities destabilization 
creates for terrorists. To assist in Nigeria's fight against ISIS-West 
Africa and Boko Haram, U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development actors 
are working to disrupt terrorist activities; weaken terrorist groups 
and promote defections; improve processes to screen, rehabilitate, and 
reintegrate ex-combatants; save lives through humanitarian assistance; 
support the Nigerian government to set the security and governance 
conditions necessary for the safe and voluntary return of displaced 
people to their communities; and address underlying drivers of 
terrorism.

    Question. During the budget hearing, in discussing the issue of 
diversity at the State Department, you noted that some members of your 
senior leadership team were part of ``diversity groups.'' You also 
rightly noted the lack of minority representation at the Ambassadorial 
level and that the rate of change in increasing diversity at the 
Department is insufficient. Please further explain your use of 
``diversity groups.'' To what groups are you referring?

    Answer. While the Department has made progress in promoting a 
diverse and inclusive workforce, I've stated in meetings with 
Department employees that we need to take a deeper look into these 
issues and take concrete steps to make meaningful change. I will 
continue to have these discussions and ask bureaus to strengthen their 
diversity and inclusion efforts in line with the Department's mission 
of working together to recruit, retain, and develop a diverse workforce 
to foster effective diplomacy. I support my senior leadership team's 
active engagement of our diverse employee affinity groups and 
articulation of the concerns of those whom have been historically 
underrepresented, such as women and minorities, in American diplomacy.

    Question. Please provide a demographic breakdown of diversity in 
the 7th floor's senior leadership team.

    Answer. The 7th floor senior leadership team consists of 26 men and 
11 women, of which 31 are White, 5 are Asian and 1 is African-American. 
Department-wide, 15 percent of senior leaders--members of the Senior 
Foreign Service, Senior Executive Service, and equivalents--are racial 
or ethnic minorities; and 34 percent are women. Among other efforts, my 
team and I are working to improve diversity through: requiring that 
employees, hiring managers, and members of selection and promotion 
panels receive formal training in mitigating unconscious bias; 
including diversity and inclusion as a leadership criteria for the 
Deputy Chief of Mission/Principal Officer Committee; and expanding the 
Pickering and Rangel Fellowship programs.

    Question. How are you personally promoting, mentoring, and 
supporting your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups in the Foreign Service? In the Civil Service?

    Answer. I will continue to promote efforts underway in the 
Department to ensure leaders under my direction are fostering a culture 
and environment of inclusion. I support the Department Diversity and 
Inclusion Strategic Plan's goals that speak to work/life wellness and 
increased workplace flexibilities in order to better support our 
workforce and retain talent. I support my senior leadership team's 
active engagement of our diverse employee affinity groups and 
articulation of the concerns of those who have been historically 
underrepresented in U.S. diplomacy. I will continue to support the 
requirement of all hiring managers and members of promotion panels to 
take formal Mitigating Unconscious Bias training.

    Question. Beyond recruiting candidates of diverse backgrounds into 
the Department, what steps are you taking to retain, train, and 
accomplish equitable outcomes for staff from historically 
underrepresented backgrounds?

    Answer. In January, Under Secretary Bulatao convened a Department-
wide taskforce comprised of representatives from every bureau in the 
Department to develop the Department's Diversity and Inclusion 
Strategic Plan (DISP). We did this to reiterate that diversity and 
inclusion must be a whole-of Department effort and wanted every 
employee to see themselves in our new strategic plan. I support the 
Department's efforts to review longstanding cultural practices and 
consider whether there have been unintended impacts on our ability to 
retain and promote a diverse workforce. I also support the DISP's goals 
of promoting work/life wellness and increased workplace flexibilities 
in order to better support our workforce and retain talent.

    Question. You said in a recent speech about the inalienable rights 
commission that The New York Times 1619 Project was ``a dark vision of 
America's birth. I reject it. It's a disturbed reading of history. It 
is a slander on our great people.'' Slavery was real, and our country 
is dealing with the consequences of systemic racism to this day. One 
impact of such racism could be the lack of diversity at the State 
Department, especially at the level of Assistant Secretary and above. A 
recent GAO study found that only 32 percent of the State Department's 
full-time, career employees were racial or ethnic minorities, and found 
differences in promotion outcomes between minorities and whites. The 
recent murder of George Floyd is an example of the impacts in the area 
of law enforcement. What have you done during your tenure to address 
systemic racism and the lack of diversity at the Department of State? 
What do you plan to do going forward?

    Answer. I am committed to taking a critical approach to reviewing 
policies, programs, and practices that affect how we recruit a talented 
and diverse workforce and create an inclusive environment where all our 
employees have the opportunity to contribute and rise through the ranks 
of our workforce. The Office of Civil Rights provides training around 
the world on discrimination and harassment and conducts investigations 
of allegations of discriminatory harassment and sexual harassment. This 
work allows leaders to make critical decisions on possible disciplinary 
action. We send out biannual reports on discipline to the workforce to 
spread awareness of accountability.

    Question. What is the State Department doing in the wake of George 
Floyd's murder and the Administration's poor response to ensure that 
the United States maintains its moral authority on the messages our 
diplomats deliver on respect for constitutional rights of peaceful 
assembly, human rights and rule of law?

    Answer. The discussions taking place in the United States, 
amplified by a free and independent media and our respect for 
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly, demonstrate our robust democracy, our vigorous debates, and 
our constant striving to be better. There can be no moral equivalence 
between actions in the United States and those of authoritarian regimes 
which violate and abuse human rights.
    The charges filed against Minnesota police officers for George 
Floyd's tragic death illustrate accountability, due process, and rule 
of law. The Department encourages our overseas missions to speak openly 
about these issues and how accountability measures in the United States 
serve as an example of our commitment to democratic principles and the 
rule of law.

    Question. I have been particularly concerned about reports of 
insensitive, offensive, or inconsistent messages from U.S. Ambassadors 
in the wake of these events. Have you provided any guidance to 
Ambassadors and Department senior officials regarding the tone and 
message that should be communicated to employees about the U.S. 
Government and Department of State's commitment to equality and against 
systemic racism? Please provide a copy of any such guidance.

    Answer. Following George Floyd's murder, Deputy Secretary Biegun 
communicated guidance to all Department employees, encouraging them to 
participate in constructive dialogue in the workplace. I also expressed 
my heartfelt condolences in my regular communication with Department 
employees. The Department is preparing our outgoing ambassadors, deputy 
chiefs of mission, and principal officers in executive training for 
their new positions, and all newly promoted senior executives in the 
Leading at the Executive Level Seminar on diversity and inclusion 
policy, including how they should convey the importance of equal 
protection and inclusion to their teams and take meaningful steps to 
achieve it in the organizations they lead.

    Question. According to recent reporting, U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom Robert ``Woody'' Johnson inappropriately promoted 
President Trump's golf resort, Trump Turnberry, to British Government 
officials as a potential site for the British Open golf tournament. 
What guidance, if any, has the Department provided to embassies and 
ambassadors against taking actions that would support, endorse, 
promote, or could otherwise be perceived as benefitting the Trump 
Organization? Do you support completing the Export Control Reform 
Initiative?

    Answer. The State Department conducts extensive training for 
embassies and ambassadors on ethics rules and requirements. All State 
Department ethics training and the briefings provided for each non-
career ambassador following confirmation emphasize the importance of 
compliance with the full range of ethics rules and obligations. This 
includes the obligation to ensure that officials not misuse their 
positions to benefit their own personal interest or that of other 
individuals with whom the official is affiliated. Rather, the 
Department emphasizes that officials must aim to serve the public 
interest. In addition, the Department's Office of Ethics and Financial 
Disclosure provides specific guidance about the promotion of any 
private business as matters arise.

    Question. The process for the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement will be complete on the eve of the 2020 election. Taking the 
shame of this tragedy aside, I have to ask . . . and before you say 
anything about the `the U.S. is leading on climate change . . . and 
whatever.' I want specific examples of this leadership. How are you 
leading? Don't just say you are, tell us how. Because when the 
President announced he was going to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris 
Agreement in June 2017, he said he was going to pursue a ``better 
deal'' to rival the Paris Agreement. Where is that ``Better Deal''? I 
can tell you where it is . . . but I want to hear where you think it 
is. I raise this issue as a warning for America. It's a harbinger that 
everyone must consider when this Administration boasts about abandoning 
other multilateral organizations like the WHO with lofty statements 
that you are going to create something better . . . you've had 3 and 
half years to deliver your ``better'' alternative to one of, if not 
the, first international agreement the Administration ripped up and you 
have nothing to show for it. So why should we trust anything will be 
different when it comes to your WHO 2.0 plan?

    Answer. I am proud of our record as a world leader in reducing all 
types of emissions, fostering resilience, growing our economy, and 
ensuring access to affordable energy for our citizens. Our success in 
reducing emissions is largely due to the development and deployment of 
innovative ``all of the above'' energy technologies, including nuclear, 
shale gas, transformational coal technologies, renewables, battery 
storage, and enhancing energy efficiency. U.S. energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions dropped nearly 16 percent between 2005 and 
2019, even as our economy grew substantially during this time and our 
economic competitors such as the People's Republic of China continued 
to rapidly increase their emissions. In international climate 
discussions, we continue to offer a realistic and pragmatic model--
backed by a record of real world results--showing innovation and open 
markets lead to greater prosperity, fewer emissions, and more secure 
sources of energy. We continue to work with our global partners to 
enhance resilience to the impacts of climate change and prepare for and 
respond to natural disasters. Please see QFR 281 for information on the 
World Health Organization.

    Question. As you know the CCP's so-called ``national security'' law 
for Hong Kong, which undermines Hong Kong's autonomy, encourages the 
crackdown on pro-democracy protestors, and effectively ends its ``one 
country, two systems'' policy, recently went into effect. Along with my 
colleagues, I introduced the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, which would 
provide those Hong Kongers who peacefully protested Beijing's corrupt 
justice system, and have a well-founded fear of persecution, to be 
eligible for Priority 2 Refugee status. What efforts, other than just 
harsh words and criticism aimed at the CCP for their erosion of Hong 
Kong's autonomy, is the State Department actively pursuing?

    Answer. The Departments of State and Treasury announced sanctions 
on August 7 on 11 individuals who were involved in developing, 
adopting, or implementing the National Security Law. I stated, 
``Today's actions send a clear message that the Hong Kong authorities' 
actions are unacceptable and in contravention of the PRC's commitments 
under `one country, two systems' and the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, a UN-registered treaty.'' The State Department will 
continue to work with the interagency on future actions against those 
who are responsible for actions detrimental to the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The Department of States 
also works closely with interagency partners on refugee issues, 
including for Hong Kong residents who express fear of persecution.

    Question. One of the major issues playing out in public currently 
is how Chinese companies are playing an increasingly dominant role in 
development and implementation of 5G mobile communications 
technologies. We are increasingly seeing the implementation of products 
from companies such as Huawei around the globe, ranging from Europe to 
Asia to Latin America to Africa. What security concerns does the 
Administration see in the proliferation of Chinese made 5G technologies 
around the globe?

    Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned about the dangers of 
networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by 
authoritarian governments that have no democratic checks and balances 
and no regard for human rights, privacy, or international norms. U.S. 
security concerns are much broader than industrial and political 
espionage. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could 
provide the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Communist Party-led, 
authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or 
weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide 
technological advances to the PRC's military forces.

    Question. What is the Administration doing to counter this spread?

    Answer. The Administration is taking strong action at home and 
abroad to confront this challenge. Domestically, President Trump signed 
an executive order on May 15, 2019 entitled ``Securing the Information 
and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain'' and a 
national emergency continuation notice on May 13, 2020. The executive 
order empowers the U.S. Department of Commerce to prohibit transactions 
involving information and communications technology or services 
designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign 
adversary and that pose an undue risk of sabotage or subversion to U.S. 
information and communications technology and services.
    Abroad, the Administration is implementing a coordinated set of 
measures to: (1) encourage countries to put in place risk-based 
security measures that prohibit the use of untrusted vendors like 
Huawei and ZTE in 5G and other next generation networks and (2) level 
the playing field for trusted vendors to compete and win.

    Question. Have our efforts to pressure countries to not use Huawei 
products been successful in light of the fact that so many countries 
continue to integrate their technologies into their infrastructure?

    Answer. Yes, we are seeing the tide turn against Huawei and 
untrusted technology vendors as additional countries put in place 
restrictions and a growing list of carriers choose to procure from 
trusted vendors. Australia and Japan were two of the earliest countries 
to put in place security measures to protect their 5G networks. 
Recently, a growing number of countries have likewise put in place 
strong security measures to protect their networks against untrusted 
vendors, including: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK. In addition, some of the largest 
telecom companies around the globe are also becoming ``Clean Telcos'' 
by choosing to work only with trusted vendors. We've seen this with 
Orange in France, Jio in India, Telstra in Australia, SK and KT in 
South Korea, NTT in Japan, and O2 in the UK. In June, the big three 
telecommunications companies in Canada decided to partner with 
Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung.

    Question. How will a Chinese centric 5G ecosystem affect U.S. and 
allied security?

    Answer. The risks from a People's Republic of China (PRC) 5G 
ecosystem to the security of the United States and our allies and 
partners are numerous, including espionage, disruption, and/or 
manipulation of networks enabling critical infrastructure and services. 
Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could provide the 
PRC's Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the capability and 
opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and 
infrastructure or provide technological advances to the PRC's military 
forces.

    Question. I'd like to ask about your knowledge of the events 
regarding the plight of Uyghurs in Xinjiang as described in Ambassador 
John Bolton's new book. The former National Security Advisor alleges 
that that the President of the United States gave an explicit approval 
to the President of China to ``go ahead'' with concentration camps 
estimated to be holding more than 1 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang, giving 
a green light to one of the most horrific gross human rights abuses on 
the planet today. This is extraordinarily startling and disturbing. If 
true, such a message would make a mockery of many of the public 
statements regarding the situation in Xinjiang that you and other 
members of the Trump administration have made over the past several 
years. Did the President of the United States give a green light to the 
President of China to build his concentration camps?

    Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in 
Xinjiang speak volumes, and the President himself has personally heard 
from those affected, including Jewher Ilham, the daughter of prominent 
Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti who was given a life sentence in 2014. More 
than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action 
to combat the People's Republic of China's campaign of repression in 
Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export 
restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business 
advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly 
condemning these human rights abuses.

    Question. I remain deeply concerned with China's pattern of 
aggression in territorial disputes with India. From the 2017 Doklam 
standoff, to the recent violence along the borders in Sikkim and 
Ladakh, to China's new claims to Bhutanese territory, the Chinese 
Government has sought to redraw the map of South Asia without 
respecting the region's people or governments. That aggression resulted 
in the tragic violence along the Line of Actual Control last month, and 
the international community must be clear that such behavior is 
unacceptable. The U.S.-India partnership can play a vital role in 
responding to Chinese aggression, and it is especially important that 
this partnership rest on the democratic values that the Chinese 
government lacks. How has the Department engaged with the Indian 
Government to develop a diplomatic strategy against Chinese efforts to 
violate the sovereignty of countries in South Asia?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the People's 
Republic of China's (PRC) continued pattern of aggressive actions along 
the Line of Actual Control with India. These actions mirror the PRC 
behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Our growing 
defense ties and regular high-level engagements with India, including 
the Quad, State-DoD 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, calls with senior Indian 
officials to discuss the border situation, and engagements by our 
ambassador in New Delhi, reinforce our shared commitment to a free and 
prosperous South Asia. In addition, Deputy Secretary of State Biegun's 
COVID-19 coordination calls with Indo-Pacific counterparts, including 
Indian Foreign Secretary Shringla, have fostered likeminded cooperation 
on supporting South Asian countries vulnerable to Chinese debt and 
economic pressure. We will continue to use upcoming dialogues, 
including our anticipated fall 2+2, to discuss the challenges that 
China poses to India and the region and to offer U.S. support to India 
and other South Asia nations that find their sovereignty and security 
at risk as a result of China's continued aggression.

    Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads 
into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud 
the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and 
Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which 
I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter 
BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to 
counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key 
capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its 
component parts?

    Answer. Our strategy is rooted in robust and continuous engagement 
with the EU, EU member states, and other European countries. Our 
strategy emphasizes the risks of dealing with Beijing while 
highlighting attractive U.S.-led alternatives.
    Beijing's One Belt, One Road strategy, also known as the Belt and 
Road Initiative, is designed to promote the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) industrial policies at the expense of foreign nations and foreign 
competitors. PRC state-owned firms made inroads in Europe after the 
European debt crisis of 2010, when Beijing scoured the continent for 
distressed assets. The Department of State, in coordination with the 
Treasury Department and other CFIUS member agencies, has conducted 
outreach with EU and other European partners to highlight potential 
vulnerabilities from PRC involvement in critical infrastructure and to 
encourage the adoption of strong, transparent, and national-security 
focused investment screening systems. Partly resulting from these 
robust efforts, the EU established an investment review framework that 
will become operational in October 2020, while 15 European governments 
are pursuing national-level investment review mechanisms to keep 
predatory state-led investments in check.
    At the same time, we are also rolling out new initiatives and 
financing to amplify private sector-led investments. We are working 
with our interagency partners at the Development Finance Corporation 
(DFC) and U.S. EXIM Bank to create sustainable opportunities that 
foster competition and benefit all parties.

    Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring 
Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That 
might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with 
whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the 
logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)'s malign behavior harms vital U.S. interests and undermines the 
sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world, 
and we will continue to pursue a wide range of options to address these 
concerns. In my speech at the Nixon Library in July, I explained that 
we have to keep in mind that the CCP is a Marxist-Leninist regime and 
that General Secretary Xi Jinping is a true believer in that bankrupt 
totalitarian ideology. I will not speculate on possible future actions, 
but will note that we will continue to highlight our concerns with the 
CCP's behavior and consider policies that would demonstrate our resolve 
on this issue.

    Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads 
into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud 
the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and 
Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which 
I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter 
BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to 
counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key 
capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its 
component parts?

    Answer. Our strategy is rooted in robust and continuous engagement 
with the EU, EU member states, and other European countries. Our 
strategy emphasizes the risks of dealing with Beijing while 
highlighting attractive U.S.-led alternatives.
    Beijing's One Belt, One Road strategy, also known as the Belt and 
Road Initiative, is designed to promote the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) industrial policies at the expense of foreign nations and foreign 
competitors. PRC state-owned firms made inroads in Europe after the 
European debt crisis of 2010, when Beijing scoured the continent for 
distressed assets. The Department of State, in coordination with the 
Treasury Department and other CFIUS member agencies, has conducted 
outreach with EU and other European partners to highlight potential 
vulnerabilities from PRC involvement in critical infrastructure and to 
encourage the adoption of strong, transparent, and national-security 
focused investment screening systems. Partly resulting from these 
robust efforts, the EU established an investment review framework that 
will become operational in October 2020, while 15 European governments 
are pursuing national-level investment review mechanisms to keep 
predatory state-led investments in check.
    At the same time, we are also rolling out new initiatives and 
financing to amplify private sector-led investments. We are working 
with our interagency partners at the Development Finance Corporation 
(DFC) and U.S. EXIM Bank to create sustainable opportunities that 
foster competition and benefit all parties.

    Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring 
Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That 
might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with 
whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the 
logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)'s malign behavior harms vital American interests and undermines 
the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the 
world, and we will continue to pursue a wide range of options to 
address these concerns. In my speech at the Nixon Library in July, I 
explained that we have to keep in mind that the CCP is a Marxist-
Leninist regime and that General Secretary Xi Jinping is a true 
believer in that bankrupt totalitarian ideology. I will not speculate 
on possible future actions, but will note that we will continue to 
highlight our concerns with the CCP's behavior and consider policies 
that would demonstrate our resolve on this issue.

    Question. Ambassador Lighthizer commented the other day that he has 
no idea what the end game is on China with this Administration's trade 
policy. Do you? And if so, what is it?

    Answer. The United States is committed to rebalancing the U.S.-
China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports 
fair trade, advances United States competitiveness, promotes U.S. 
exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to U.S. investment.

    Question. Aside from words of condemnation and economic sanctions, 
what other tools does the Trump administration have to counterbalance 
China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious 
regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?

    Answer. We continue to increase pressure on the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) government and take action to protect U.S. interests and 
values by imposing costs on malign PRC conduct. These costs are applied 
through visa restrictions, financial sanctions, and policy 
announcements, among other tools. We remain committed to supporting 
meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improving respect for their human 
rights, and helping to preserve their unique religious, cultural, and 
linguistic identity as well promoting access to Tibetan areas through 
the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act. Additionally, the Department of 
State continuously engages with our partners and allies around the 
world to encourage them to take similar steps.

    Question. China and Iran are reportedly discussing a multi-billion-
dollar trade and security deal. As you rightly pointed out at the 
hearing, there have long been reports about this kind of arrangement 
and nothing is set in stone. However, Chinese companies have helped 
Iran evade international and U.S. sanctions for years, and Chinese and 
Iranian leaders both employ repressive governing techniques. The 
Administration has repeatedly touted the success of its ``maximum 
pressure campaign'' as evidenced by Iran's economic decline. Do you see 
this economic devastation as making a partnership with China more 
appealing to Iranian leaders?

    Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is 
born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely weakened, in 
part by U.S. sanctions, but also through its own mismanagement and 
corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for the Iranian 
people as long as the regime gains access to much needed capital. The 
regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the agreement 
for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they are 
rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

    Question. What are your current bilateral and multilateral 
engagements with China regarding its potential investments and 
cooperation with Iran?

    Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year 
agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese 
investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism; however, Chinese 
entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime, 
including through the continued sanctionable purchases of Iranian 
petroleum, petrochemicals, and metals. We have made clear to the 
Chinese Government that we will continue to vigorously enforce our 
sanctions regime on Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities 
that engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to 
conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the People's 
Republic of China is undermining its own stated goal of promoting 
stability in the Middle East.

    Question. Does an increased security relationship between Iran and 
China help or hinder American interests in both the Middle East and 
Asia?

    Answer. We are closely monitoring the increasing security 
cooperation and deepening partnership between Iran and the People's 
Republic of China. We continue to work closely with allies and partners 
in the Middle East and Asia to safeguard U.S. interests and promote 
regional stability.

    Question. The continuing clampdown by the Chinese Government on the 
religious freedom of the Tibetan people is a matter of the utmost 
concern. What is the U.S. Government position on the right of Tibetan 
Buddhists in selecting a future Dalai Lama without the interference of 
any government, and what is the plan to push back against the planned 
interference of the Chinese Government?

    Answer. The United States prioritizes the promotion and protection 
of religious freedom, particularly in China, where people of all faiths 
face severe repression and discrimination. I remain concerned by the 
PRC's interference in the selection, education, and veneration of 
Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The U.S. Government believes 
Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all faith communities, must be able 
to select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders in accordance 
with their beliefs and without government interference. The succession 
or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, including the Dalai Lama, 
should be decided by Tibetan Buddhists without any government 
interference.

    Question. President Trump has not once publicly raised the issue of 
Tibet. Since 1997, all U.S. Presidents have publicly challenged the 
sitting Chinese President to negotiate with the Dalai Lama or his 
representative to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue. Would 
you recommend and make sure that President Trump calls publicly on the 
Chinese President to address the legitimate grievances of the Tibetan 
people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

    Answer. The United States remains deeply committed to Tibetans' 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Our long-standing policy is to 
encourage meaningful and direct dialogue between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, or his 
representatives, without preconditions, to seek a settlement that 
resolves differences. The U.S. Government believes that a negotiated 
resolution that leads to meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and ensures 
they are able to practice freely their religion, and to preserve their 
culture and language provides the best hope for long-term stability in 
the region. We continue to meet with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as a 
religious and spiritual leader revered by Tibetans and many around the 
world.

    Question. At a time when the relationship is facing increasing 
friction and when the risk of conflict is rising, do we need such a 
process?

    Answer. The Administration sees no value in engaging with Beijing 
in formal high-level dialogues when the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) offers no prospects for tangible results or constructive 
outcomes. We remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement 
and cooperation with the PRC Government where our interests align, even 
as we continue to compete vigorously when necessary.

    Question. Secretary Tillerson proposed a good framework at the 
beginning of the Administration, but obviously it has been abandoned. 
Why?

    Answer. While we no longer conduct dialogues for the sake of 
dialogue, we do continue to engage with People's Republic of China 
leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner on a wide range of 
issues, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments. This is 
particularly evident in our push for reciprocity in the U.S.-China 
bilateral relationship.

    Question. Given China and Russia's opposition to extending the UN 
arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire in a few short months, how 
do you see increased bilateral tension with China impacting its posture 
towards extending the arms embargo at the Security Council?

    Answer. We were disappointed by the People's Republic of China`s 
(PRC) recent decision to join Russia in voting against the resolution 
to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran due to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran's destabilizing behavior. As historical arms suppliers to Iran, 
both nations clearly have financial motives to end the embargo. The 
Islamic Republic has done nothing to merit the lifting of the embargo 
and continues to send weapons to armed groups all across the region in 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran's actions drive instability and 
exacerbate human suffering across the Middle East. Every country ought 
to have an interest in combating Iranian malign influence in order to 
foster regional stability and safeguard the free flow of commerce. 
Allowing Iran to purchase and proliferate even deadlier weapons would 
be an abdication of the UN Security Council's responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.

    Question. During recent UN Security Council negotiations over 
extending cross border humanitarian aid to Syria, Russia and China 
worked diligently to deny the humanitarian access to support the people 
of Syria. While it's clear Russia was leading this effort on behalf of 
its client in Damascus, China was only too happy to join. What are you 
doing to combat Chinese and Russian influence at the UN Security 
Council regarding Syria?

    Answer. Working with our partners and the UN in support of the 
Syrian people, the United States is combating People's Republic of 
China (PRC) and Russian malign influence at the UN Security Council on 
Syria in a multitude of ways and on two different fronts: political and 
humanitarian. The vote on cross-border assistance demonstrated that the 
Council was largely united in its support for the Syrian people and in 
the process we and our allies are isolating both Russia and the PRC in 
their support of the Assad regime. The United States worked with an 
overwhelming majority of the Security Council to overcome Russian and 
PRC intransigence and adopt a UN Security Council resolution to enable 
humanitarian assistance to reach many of those in need in Syria.

    Question. China has made significant investments into Arab Gulf 
countries with whom the United States has significant security 
relationships. Last month, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated: 
``We see China moving in, principally economically--but not 
completely--to establish a beachhead.'' What are the implications of 
increased Chinese investment in critical infrastructure projects in the 
Arab Gulf States?

    Answer. Chinese investment in the Gulf is focused on satisfying 
Beijing's domestic economic priorities, including its demand for energy 
and search for new export markets. In 2015, China became the biggest 
global importer of crude oil, with almost half of its supply coming 
from the Middle East. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the International 
Energy Agency had predicted that Chinese imports from the Gulf region 
would double by 2035. China also views the region as a market for 
construction, finance, and telecom infrastructure investments. While 
many of these projects may be benign, the lack of transparency in 
Chinese bids, Beijing's tendency to undermine free market dynamics 
through its heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises, and the routine 
inclusion of Chinese tech companies subject to the People's Republic of 
China's draconian national security laws as part of nearly every major 
infrastructure investment all raise red flags. In response, we are 
working with partners in the region to enhance tools to counter malign 
economic activity, such as investment screening capabilities.

    Question. Please describe your engagement with relevant leaders in 
these [Arab Gulf] countries regarding Chinese investment.

    Answer. Our engagement emphasizes that China's agenda in the Middle 
East is all about advancing China's interests--it is not about shared 
values, institution-building, or improving access to capital. Private 
investment that flows from the United States and Europe to the Middle 
East is consistent over time, far larger in terms of foreign direct 
investment stock, and is a stronger force for job creation, human 
capital cultivation, and regional economic development. While we do not 
ask our partners to turn away Chinese investment on principle, we have 
advocated for appropriate screening of investments that take the form 
of controlling stakes in critical infrastructure or dual-use 
technologies, while remaining vigilant for any malign People's Republic 
of China activities.

    Question. In what areas do you see Chinese investment as presenting 
direct threats to U.S. interests or equities?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) uses its One Belt, One 
Road initiative to reshape international norms, standards, and networks 
while creating leverage Beijing uses to extract political concessions 
from other countries, including U.S. partners and allies. PRC 
investments can provide Beijing with control of critical third-country 
infrastructure and key supply chains. PRC-controlled communications 
infrastructure is a threat to global data privacy and information 
security. The United States Government will continue working to 
mitigate these risks through a whole-of-government approach to 
investment screening, outreach to like-minded partners, and efforts to 
provide high-quality, sustainable alternatives to Chinese investment.

    Question. Chinese weapons, including armed drones have been 
repeatedly used by warring parties in the Yemen and Libya conflicts. 
Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed or unarmed 
drones, been used by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in 
the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have any of those uses resulted 
in civilian casualties?

    Answer. China has sold multiple weapons systems to Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, including armed drones to Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Available reporting suggests that Saudi 
Arabia employed its China-origin drones in Yemen, and the UAE used them 
in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia has also reportedly employed Chinese 
artillery pieces in Yemen. We cannot establish if any of these reported 
drone or artillery strikes resulted in civilian casualties.

    Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed 
drones, been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have 
any of those uses resulted in civilian casualties?

    Answer. We have no unclassified reporting to indicate that Chinese-
origin weapons have been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya.

    Question. What steps has the U.S. taken to prevent the purchase of 
Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed drones by countries 
included in the NEA bureau?

    Answer. The United States has urged countries to beware of 
unscrupulous actors like China offering deceptively cut-price defense 
systems and equipment. Such acquisitions are no bargain and are often 
accompanied by: the loss of sovereignty; resource extraction or debt-
trap diplomacy; the signing away of rights to critical physical or IT 
infrastructure; or the exploitation of intellectual property due to 
espionage or outright theft. We have emphasized to our partners 
globally that acquiring these systems does not strengthen their 
security, but rather undermines their interoperability with U.S. forces 
and should rightly be avoided. The United States will continue to offer 
assistance to allies and partners in need, and we will do so without 
those harmful strings attached.

    Question. I am deeply troubled by the letter on July 12 signed by 
several Muslim-majority countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Egypt, Algeria and Qatar that praises China for its ``remarkable 
achievements in the field of human rights'' while characterizing the 
detention and torture of Muslim Uighers as ``a series of counter-
terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting 
up vocational education and training centers.' What steps did the U.S. 
take to try to prevent these and other countries from signing such a 
letter whitewashing China's crimes against its own Uighur population?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) human rights abuses 
in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups 
are horrific. The Trump administration has led the global effort to 
spotlight and impose concrete costs on the PRC's continuous campaign of 
repression, which includes mass arbitrary detention, intrusive 
surveillance, forced labor, forced population control, and involuntary 
collection of biometric data. I will continue to call on all countries 
to join the United States in condemning these heinous human rights 
abuses.

    Question. What steps will the U.S. take to push these countries to 
recant their signatures and prevent future letters from being signed?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China's human rights abuses in 
Xinjiang against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups 
are horrific. I will continue to call on all countries to join the 
United States in condemning these abuses.

    Question. What initiatives are we going to propose at the upcoming 
G-7 meeting? How are we leading at the United Nations?

    Answer. The President has been clear that the WHO needs to get its 
act together. That begins with making substantive improvements to its 
ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks 
with transparency and accountability. Through the G7, UN, and 
likeminded partners, the United States will continue its efforts to 
reform the WHO and other international organizations to ensure they 
operate with transparency, fulfill their mandates, and hold governments 
accountable for their commitments under international law. There is 
shared recognition among the G7 of the WHO's failures during the 
current pandemic response. There is also significant common ground 
about how to address those problems and reform the organization so we 
can avoid a repeat of the COVID-19 disaster in the future.
    The President's priorities are to safeguard the health and safety 
of the American people and save lives around the world. As we redirect 
foreign assistance funding to other deserving global health 
organizations and urgent needs around the world, the United States has 
generously allocated more than $20.5 billion that will benefit the 
global COVID-19 pandemic response.

    Question. Has the Department issued a directive encouraging the use 
of the scientific term for COVID-19, and discouraging the use of any 
other non-scientific names? If so, when? To whom was that guidance 
sent?

    Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in 
March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the 
official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised 
diplomatic posts to use the ``COVID-19'' acronym, including in public-
facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not 
synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised 
posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general 
category/type of virus.

    Question. What other steps is the Department taking to reduce the 
social stigma and discrimination associated with COVID-19?

    Answer. I have informed all Department employees of the importance 
of preventing stigma and discrimination, promoting resiliency and 
mental health, and supporting each other through COVID-19 with the goal 
of raising awareness about the potential for stigma during the pandemic 
and setting the tone for what I expect from Department leadership. This 
includes the importance of practicing inclusion remotely to avoid 
isolating or stigmatizing team members. In June, we also launched 
TalentCare. TalentCare integrates the Department's workforce resilience 
initiatives so employees have a single touchpoint to access programs 
and resources that enhance health and well-being.

    Question. How will you hold officials accountable at the Department 
who do not use the WHO and CDC-recommended term COVID-19?

    Answer. On February 11, 2020, the International Committee on 
Taxonomy of Viruses formalized the etiologic agent as the ``severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2'', or SARS-CoV-2, and the name 
of the disease COVID-19. The Department has consistently used those 
conventions across the enterprise since they were introduced by the 
WHO.

    Question. COVID-19 is currently ``spreading like wildfire'' in 
South Africa and The Wall Street Journal reported that the virus ``is 
overpowering hospitals and has caused a dramatic increase in deaths'' 
in the country. The impacts of COVID-19 are straining the already weak 
health care systems in Africa. It is essential to aid low-income 
countries to help them control the pandemic as we wait for a vaccine. 
As one example, the Global Fund is helping countries respond to COVID-
19 and is uniquely positioned to shore up fragile health systems, 
protect health care workers with PPE, and make diagnostics and 
treatments available. What is the State Department doing to mitigate 
the effects of the pandemic in Africa by working through effective 
international partnerships, such as the Global Fund, which is already 
helping countries respond to COVID-19?

    Answer. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the State Department and 
USAID have invested more than $468 million in Africa in health and 
humanitarian assistance specifically aimed at helping governments, 
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations fight 
the pandemic. Additionally, our whole-of-government approach is helping 
confront the pandemic through American private businesses, non-profit 
groups, and individuals. PEPFAR coordinates with the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to ensure our efforts remain 
complementary. Over the last 17 years, PEPFAR has established labs and 
surveillance systems to help address the HIV pandemic that are now 
being leveraged to support diagnostics for COVID-19.

    Question. How will U.S. international funding to its partnerships 
provide life-saving services in Africa and protect Africa's most 
vulnerable peoples?

    Answer. The United States has a longstanding commitment to 
supporting life-saving services in Africa. Since the outbreak of COVID-
19, the U.S. Government has invested more than $468 million in Africa 
in health and humanitarian assistance to respond to the pandemic, 
including to protect the health of vulnerable people. We continue 
partnering with countries across Africa through global health security 
programs; responses to specific diseases like Ebola, polio, malaria, 
TB, and now COVID-19; and building national capacity to strengthen 
health systems to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease 
threats. PEPFAR continues to deliver lifesaving HIV prevention and 
treatment services and made significant progress toward controlling the 
HIV pandemic.

    Question. With Africa's CDC (Africa Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention) observing an increase of 100,000 new cases weekly in 
Africa, COVID-19 is having a large impact on the epidemics of HIV, 
tuberculosis (TB), and malaria, which continue to be widespread across 
the continent. The Imperial College London issued a report stating that 
``in high burden settings, HIV, TB, and malaria related deaths over 5 
years may be increased by up to 10, 2, and 36 percent, respectively'' 
due to COVID-19. Without decisive action, COVID-19 could wipe out 
nearly two decades of progress in combating these three diseases. The 
Global Fund is now working to address this through its COVID-19 
Response Mechanism and working to mitigate the risks the pandemic poses 
to HIV, TB, and malaria outcomes. Given the rapidly increasing rates of 
COVID-19 in Africa and the enormous challenges that the pandemic places 
on HIV, TB, and malaria progress, how can the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator help to ensure responses to COVID-19 globally are 
sufficiently prioritizing impacts on other epidemics like AIDS, TB, and 
malaria, and that programs supported through the President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are not disrupted or otherwise 
compromised by the COVID-19 response?

    Answer. PEPFAR, the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the 
Global Accelerator to End Tuberculosis funded by USAID continue to 
deliver life-saving prevention and treatment in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, including in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Since the 
onset of COVID-19, the U.S. Government has developed responses to 
ensure we preserve our gains in the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, and 
malaria as well as to address maternal and child health and voluntary 
family planning while continuing to serve, support, and protect our 
clients, communities, staff, health care workers, and partners around 
the world. The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) in 
the Department of State continues to coordinate the U.S. response with 
PMI and the TB Accelerator by engaging the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
TB, and malaria to ensure our respective efforts remain complementary, 
especially during the evolving pandemic.

    Question. Figures estimated by UNAIDS point to half a million 
deaths from AIDS-related illnesses in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020 and 
2021 due to possible disruptions of ARTs. When South Africa implemented 
a lockdown to slow the rate of COVID-19 infections, the lockdown caused 
enormous consequences for continued healthcare services and resources. 
A recent survey by the Global Fund shows widespread service disruptions 
in AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria responses as a result of COVID-
19, impacting approximately three-quarters of HIV, TB, and malaria 
programs. What specific actions can the State Department take to ensure 
that COVID-19's health and economic impacts--both direct and indirect--
on already overstretched health systems in vulnerable areas? What 
actions are you taking to work with international partners to mitigate 
these particular impacts of COVID-19?

    Answer. PEPFAR invests more than $900 million annually to support 
health infrastructure and capacity in partner countries, including by 
strengthening surveillance, laboratories, epidemiology, and public 
health interventions. These funds complement the healthcare investments 
of other programs in global health funded by USAID, such as the 
President's Malaria Initiative, the Global Accelerator to End 
Tuberculosis, maternal and child health and voluntary family planning. 
Over the last 17 years, PEPFAR has established 3,000 clinical 
laboratories and 28 national reference laboratories in sub-Saharan 
Africa. PEPFAR and USAID have established laboratories and surveillance 
to address HIV/AIDS and other diseases. The U.S. Government and our 
partners have leveraged these resources to support diagnostics for 
COVID-19 to help ensure people who are living with HIV and other 
conditions continue to receive care. Multiple health programs funded by 
the U.S. Government have adapted their delivery of care, medications, 
and immunizations during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, PEPFAR 
expanded the multi-month dispensation of anti-retroviral (ARVs) drugs 
and decentralized the delivery of ARVs by allowing non-clinical 
institutions to serve as distribution points, saving costs and reducing 
the frequency of patient visits to health facilities.

    Question. Sudan is currently experiencing widespread violence in 
Darfur, and there have been recent violent incidents in South Kordofan 
and Kassala. Conflict in these regions will impede Sudan's transition 
to a civilian-led, democratic government. What is the Administration 
doing to prevent further violence and improve civilian security in 
Sudan?

    Answer. The United States is supporting the Sudan Peace Process 
between the Sudanese civilian-led transitional government and armed 
opposition groups so both groups can reach a sustainable peace 
agreement. We have repeatedly raised our concerns about violence in 
Darfur, the Two Areas, and other areas; and we will continue to engage 
the government on human rights, security sector reform, and protection 
of civilians. The United States also supports UNAMID and the new 
special political mission in Sudan, UNITAMS, in their efforts to 
support Sudan in protecting civilians, to monitor human rights, to 
promote justice, and to assist the Sudanese Government to develop and 
implement a credible and sustainable Protection of Civilians strategy.

    Question. The dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project and management of the 
Nile waters has caused serious tensions in the Horn of Africa. Despite 
the sensitive diplomatic negotiations involved in the dispute, which 
would typically fall under the purview of the State Department, the 
Treasury Department is the lead agency handling this issue. What are 
the regional implications should the GERD negotiations fail, and how 
will that impact U.S. interests in the region? What role are you 
playing in the GERD negotiations? What role have you advocated for the 
State Department writ large in the GERD negotiations?

    Answer. The on-going GERD negotiations hold the promise of greater 
cooperation and sound management of the Blue Nile for power, 
agriculture, industry, and other uses that could improve the lives of 
the more than 250 million people of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The 
Treasury Department plays the lead role in the U.S. Government's 
participation in the GERD negotiations. The State Department is in 
close contact with the Treasury Department to ensure a unified U.S. 
policy. Secretary Mnuchin and I regularly discuss policy and 
negotiation developments, and I have spoken repeatedly with senior 
officials from all three countries on this issue. The State Department 
is engaged through U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa, Cairo, Khartoum, and 
Pretoria and the U.S. Mission to the African Union.

    Question. Foreign Policy reported that, ``several U.S. officials 
said that the Trump administration could move forward with aid cuts to 
Ethiopia if negotiations hit another impasse and the sides can't reach 
a final deal.'' Do you support the current aid freeze on Ethiopia to 
induce its cooperation on the GERD negotiations?

    Answer. The Department is committed to leveraging all available 
tools to promote outcomes that advance our interests around the world. 
As of July 30, no funding already obligated for Ethiopia has been 
affected by these considerations. The State Department will consult and 
notify Congress before reprogramming funds previously notified or 
justified bilaterally for Ethiopia, consistent with applicable 
requirements.

    Question. Ethiopia's transition to an inclusive representative 
democracy is in jeopardy. There are alarming signs of backsliding 
including mass arrests, disappearances, arrest of opposition 
politicians and an internet blackout. Elections, scheduled for this 
year have been delayed indefinitely. What actions have you taken in the 
wake of your visit to help ensure Ethiopia succeeds in its democratic 
transition, specifically with regards to calling out actions that close 
political space and violate human rights?

    Answer. Despite intermittent challenges, our assessment continues 
to be that Prime Minister Abiy's administration remains committed to 
the reforms they championed when he came to power in 2018. We continue 
to engage diplomatically with the Ethiopian Government to assure them 
of our support and to urge them to continue to uphold the rule of law, 
respect basic democratic principles, and work towards free and fair 
elections. Department leadership meets regularly with senior officials 
from the Ethiopian Government to reiterate our concerns regarding 
troubling reports of human rights abuses and restrictions on basic 
freedoms.

    Question. However, the transition remains extremely fragile, and 
could even fail without strong support. What specific programmatic 
activities to support the transition in Ethiopia will the FY 2021 
request support? What specific programs will the U.S. undertake to 
target youth in marginalized communities? What specific geographic 
areas will we target through such programs?

    Answer. The FY 2021 budget request includes funding for robust 
interagency support for Ethiopia's economic, security, and democratic 
reforms as well as efforts to strengthen constructive civic engagement 
and mitigate conflict. U.S. Government programming is inclusive of all 
Ethiopians, including a growing youth population throughout the 
country. The FY 2021 budget request includes programs for outreach and 
events in every region of Ethiopia, aligning with our assessment of 
where challenges are the greatest. The Department continues to assess 
the impact COVID-19 will have on our programming.

    Question. Last May, the White House announced the United States is 
undertaking a comprehensive review of its assistance programs to South 
Sudan to ensure our assistance does not contribute to, or prolong the 
conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior. When will the 
review be complete? What impact has it had on the FY 2021 budget 
request?

    Answer. The comprehensive review of assistance programs is being 
led by the National Security Council in conjunction with the 
interagency. The Department of State remains committed to ensuring our 
foreign assistance programs do not contribute to, prolong, or 
facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior in South Sudan and that these 
programs have sufficient safeguards in place, including robust 
monitoring and evaluation. The review has not had an impact on the FY 
2021 budget request.

    Question. Conflict between the Government of Cameroon and 
Anglophone separatists has killed thousands. What actions is the 
Administration taking to address ongoing violence and to foster a 
sustainable settlement between the government and Anglophone 
separatists?

    Answer. Coordinating closely with likeminded partners, Department 
of State officials continue to call for the government as well as the 
separatist groups to cease violence and engage in dialogue without 
preconditions, to ensure humanitarian workers can access the affected 
regions, and to allow for independent investigations of human rights 
violations and abuses, such as the February 14 killings in Ngarbuh, 
Northwest Region. We significantly reduced security assistance to 
Cameroon and removed eligibility for Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
benefits due to credible allegations of human rights violations by 
security forces. We believe the Swiss initiative is the most promising 
effort leading toward dialogue and will continue to support it.

    Question. The Pentagon's review of troop deployments in Africa has 
unnerved our allies who rely on U.S. military support in the Sahel. 
What is the State Department doing to reassure our allies of the U.S. 
commitment to continuing engagement in support of counterterrorism 
efforts in the Sahel? Do you support drawing down our military 
deployment in the Sahel or other parts of sub-Saharan Africa?

    Answer. The Department of State funds the majority of peace and 
security assistance in Africa. The Department of Defense's Blank Slate 
Review does not change my commitment to reduce threats and advance 
mutual interests with our African partners. Between Fiscal Years 2010 
and 2019, the Department of State obligated approximately $4.7 billion 
in bilateral security assistance to Africa, a significant portion of 
which assisted Sahel countries. The majority of the State Department's 
security assistance does not depend on Department of Defense for 
implementation or oversight. I remain committed to maintaining this 
engagement, recognizing that some programs may require review and 
adjustment in light of reduced Department of Defense oversight and 
implementation capacity.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. [Question for the Record Submitted is classified.]

    Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security 
interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission 
Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is 
prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.

    Question. Is the State Department aware of any Russian officials 
currently in the U.S. who have overstayed their visas? If so, will you 
work to ensure they are repatriated to Russia?

    Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security 
interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission 
Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is 
prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.

    Question. How is the State Department working to address the 
imbalance between U.S. personnel in Russia and Russian personnel in the 
U.S.?

    Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security 
interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission 
Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is 
prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson

    Question. You have been a strong voice for internet freedom and 
recently tweeted that ``the United States will not tolerate government 
imposed internet shutdowns and other forms of censorship.'' Is it the 
policy of the Department of State to support development and 
distribution of the tools needed to circumvent the internet censors of 
the Chinese Government? If so, what is the plan for doing so, and do 
you have the funding you need to achieve that goal?

    Answer. The Department of State supports the Administration's 
policy to protect and promote internet freedom as articulated in the 
U.S. National Cyber Strategy. As reflected in the Strategy, the United 
States takes a principled stand on protecting an open, interoperable, 
reliable, and secure internet and works to ensure that the U.S. 
approach to an open internet is the international standard. Department 
programs funded through Section 7065(a) of the 2019 SFOAA contribute to 
the Administration's strategic efforts by providing civil society and 
human rights defenders in China and other repressive environments with 
tailored and context-specific support that includes development, 
deployment, and support for technologies that counter censorship and/or 
enable secure communications. The Department will continue to optimize 
the use of available funds on programs best designed to protect and 
promote internet freedom.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Secretary Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. How have the events that triggered recent protests around 
our country--and the government's response--hindered our ability to 
promote human rights and democratic principles abroad?

    Answer. There is no change to the Department of State's work 
overseas promoting human rights and democratic principles. The 
discussions taking place in the United States, amplified by a free and 
independent media and our respect for fundamental freedoms such as 
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, demonstrate our robust 
democracy, our vigorous debates, and our constant striving to be 
better.
    The charges filed against the four Minnesota police officers for 
George Floyd's tragic death illustrate accountability, due process, and 
rule of law. The United States continues to serve as an example of our 
commitment to democratic principles through dedication to 
accountability at home and respect for fundamental freedoms.

    Question. What is the impact of the President's perceived affinity 
for authoritarian leaders on our human rights efforts around the globe?

    Answer. The United States is firmly committed to using its voice 
and position on the world stage to draw attention to human rights 
violations and abuses and promote accountability for human rights 
violators and abusers. I raise a wide range of human rights issues and 
concerns with leaders from around the world. The Department of State 
engages privately and publicly at all levels to promote the importance 
of democratic processes, rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to ensuring freedom, security, and prosperity. The 
United States will continue to stand up and speak out on human rights 
violations and abuses--wherever and by whomever they are committed.

    Question. Do you believe that other countries still regard the 
United States as a leader on human rights? If so, what examples of our 
leadership can you provide?

    Answer. Yes. During the current global health crisis, the United 
States is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to promote 
upholding democracy, human rights, and good governance as a critical 
component of responding effectively to the pandemic. For example, in 
May, the United States led a statement by the Freedom Online 
Coalition--a group of like-minded states seeking to advance internet 
freedom--on the human rights implications of certain measures 
introduced by governments in response to the COVID-19 crisis, such as 
the use of arbitrary or unlawful surveillance practices, network 
shutdowns, and censorship. This was the first time a group of 
governments took a public position promoting access to information 
online during this crisis.

    Question. You recently said that, ``[o]ur dedication to unalienable 
rights doesn't mean we have the capacity to tackle all human rights 
violations everywhere and at all times.'' In your view, which human 
rights violations should the United States focus on and which should we 
ignore? Do you consider women's rights and LGBTQ rights to be equally 
as important as the right to religious freedom?

    Answer. Any realistic foreign policy--including the promotion of 
human rights--must acknowledge the constraints imposed by finite 
resources and limited capacity. As the Commission on Unalienable Rights 
notes in its draft report, ``[W]hile it is important in principle to 
affirm the interdependence of all rights that pertain to human dignity, 
U.S. foreign policy can and should, consistent with the [Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights], determine which rights most accord with 
national principles, priorities, and interests at any given time. Such 
judgments must take into consideration both the distinctive U.S. 
contributions to the human rights project and also prudential judgments 
about current conditions, threats, and opportunities.'' As the report 
affirms throughout, human rights are the rights inherent in all 
persons. The Administration is committed to promoting human rights as a 
national security priority, and leads by example in our public 
commitments to the worldwide decriminalization of LGBTQ and in 
promoting the economic and societal empowerment of women.

    Question. Does the premise that internationally recognized human 
rights are subject to interpretation based on individual nation's 
traditions and values empower countries like China or Russia in their 
efforts to delegitimize human rights?

    Answer. No. While each state decides how rights are implemented 
domestically, human rights are still universal. Unfortunately, some 
nations simply ignore the universality of human rights. The Chinese 
Government represses members of religious and ethnic minority groups in 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and elsewhere, and undermines the freedoms guaranteed 
to Hong Kongers under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law. The Russian Government severely limits the exercise of human 
rights at home, including through growing restrictions and reprisals on 
individuals who exercise their freedom of expression, members of the 
political opposition, and certain religious minorities. We continue to 
work in multilateral fora and with like-minded partners to press 
countries such as China, Russia, and others to respect universal human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Question. As you have stated, the Commission's draft report is not 
a statement of policy. How will you ensure that the report is not used 
in official State Department business?

    Answer. The report is meant to inform policymaking; to serve as a 
reference for NGOs, teachers, and students; to assist in clarifying 
conceptual and terminological confusion; and to stimulate discussion 
regarding the promotion of human rights across the world. The report 
states: ``As elaborated by the Secretary, the Commission's instructions 
were to focus on principle, not policy formulation.'' Further, it 
notes, ``Recognizing that foreign policy must be tailored to changing 
circumstances and must necessarily consider many other factors along 
with human rights, the Commission did not seek to enter into debates 
about the application of human rights principles to particular current 
controversies.''

    Question. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women guarantees women's rights ``to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and 
to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them 
to exercise these rights.'' Do you acknowledge that access to 
reproductive health and family planning are human rights?

    Answer. I am committed to advancing the health and well-being of 
women and girls globally. The United States plays a leading role in 
supporting the rights of women and girls around the world, working to 
strengthen democratic, transparent, representative, and responsive 
governance that includes the voices of women and marginalized 
communities. The United States continues to provide more foreign 
assistance for women's and girls' health than any other country in the 
world, and we will continue to be a leading funder of (voluntary) 
family planning, child and maternal health, HIV/AIDS, cancer research 
and treatment, and other programs that address the life-long health 
needs of women and girls.

    Question. Do you think that providing women the tools and 
information they need to prevent unintended pregnancies is a worthy 
public health goal?

    Answer. The Administration is a strong defender of programs to 
improve the health, life, dignity, and well-being of women. The United 
States is the world's largest bilateral donor for essential health 
care, including voluntary and informed family planning.
    The Administration supports the empowerment of women and efforts to 
promote their access to health care across the lifespan, whether or not 
they are mothers. This includes maternal health and promoting the 
healthy timing and spacing of pregnancy through access to voluntary 
family planning. It also includes the prevention and treatment of 
sexually transmitted infections and their complications including HIV, 
the prevention and treatment of fistula and female genital mutilation 
and cutting, and other interventions to address health-care needs 
specific to women and girls, excluding abortion as a method of family 
planning.

    Question. Will U.S.-funded programs continue to support and supply 
a full range of (modern) contraceptive methods in order to ensure that 
women have access to the information, counseling, and methods best 
suited to their needs?

    Answer. As the world's largest bilateral donor of family-planning 
assistance, the United States remains committed to helping women and 
their children thrive. Preventing child and maternal deaths remains a 
priority for this Administration. Access to voluntary family planning 
is a key intervention for achieving the healthy timing and spacing of 
pregnancy, preventing child and maternal deaths, and for helping 
communities progress along the Journey to Self-Reliance.
    We know women need access to a range of contraceptive options over 
their reproductive years, as their fertility intentions will change 
over time. We best serve women when we provide them with access to a 
broad range of modern contraceptive options--from fertility-awareness 
methods, to short- and long-acting reversible methods, to voluntary 
permanent methods, as well as high-quality counseling so women can make 
their own informed decisions. We also are committed to supporting the 
development, introduction, and scale-up of a wide range of 
contraceptive methods to meet the voluntary family-planning needs of 
women and couples so they can time and space their families in the 
healthiest way possible.

    Question. You recently stated that, ``Even as we continue our 
robust COVID-19 response, the United States must start preparing for 
the next outbreak today.'' With 70 percent of the world still 
underprepared to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats, 
it is critical that the U.S. lead efforts to strengthen global pandemic 
preparedness. Looking ahead, how can we apply lessons learned from this 
pandemic to bolster future global pandemic preparedness?

    Answer. Achieving global health security and bolstering pandemic 
preparedness remain policy priorities of the Department of State. The 
COVID-19 outbreak reiterated three key themes that emerged from 
previous outbreaks of Zika and Ebola: the U.S. Government, our 
bilateral partners, and multilateral organizations must be better 
organized to rapidly respond to infectious disease threats and 
pandemics; we must strengthen transparent and trusted early warning 
systems and connect critical data sources; and we must think 
holistically about preparedness and build accountability into the 
international system. We will continue to leverage U.S. Government 
successes, including our whole-of-government support to the Global 
Health Security Agenda, to build country-level capacities and help 
partner countries fill gaps identified in their Joint External 
Evaluations and National Action Plans for Health Security. We are 
currently reviewing options to expand efforts in these areas.

    Question. What efforts is the State Department undertaking to 
prevent future infectious disease threats from spreading and to work 
with our allies to coordinate best practices?

    Answer. Global health security is a global responsibility and 
requires a transparent, trusted, and coordinated international 
approach. U.S. diplomacy is key to this effort. Our diplomatic outreach 
fosters collaboration between governments, nongovernmental 
organizations, the private sector, and other partners to encourage 
multisectoral approaches to bolster global health security. The 
Department of State continues to engage bilaterally, in multilateral 
fora, and through initiatives like the Global Health Security Agenda, 
to coordinate with allies and partners to strengthen the ability of 
countries around the world to better prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease threats.

    Question. How can we hope to protect Americans from pandemic 
disease and other global health challenges without participating in a 
multilateral coordinating authority like the WHO?

    Answer. The Administration is examining ways to use the expertise 
of key U.S. Government departments and agencies and the U.S. non-
governmental and private sectors to protect U.S. citizens and deliver 
essential support rapidly to other countries to prevent, detect, and 
respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at their source. Political 
pressure by the PRC and other malign actors has degraded the capability 
of the World Health Organization and left its leaders and scientists 
reluctant to speak out about the PRC's and other governments' refusal 
to report transparently on outbreaks of dangerous pathogens. The United 
States will continue to work with countries to develop tools to address 
infectious diseases and fill gaps created by the WHO's inaction.

    Question. Is the State Department concerned that a U.S. withdraw 
from the WHO will further strengthen China's role at the organization 
and other multilateral bodies?

    Answer. The United States remains an indispensable, committed 
partner of the international community, including the UN and its 
associated bodies by continuing to be the largest financial contributor 
to international organizations, providing over $12.2 billion in fiscal 
year 2019. The United States continuously works to ensure the U.S. 
values of universality of human rights, the dignity and worth of 
individuals, peaceful resolution of conflict, sustainable economic 
prosperity, national sovereignty, transparency, and the rule of law are 
protected and upheld at the UN and related international institutions.
    The Department of State proactively supports these values, the core 
pillars of the UN Charter--peace and security, sustainable development, 
and human rights--and advances the reforms the UN and its organizations 
require to be transparent, effective, and accountable institutions of 
the 21st century. The United States' demonstrated commitment to the UN 
and related agencies is critical to accomplishing the UN mission, 
maintaining its integrity and impartial role of serving all its 
members, and rejecting the efforts of the PRC to harness the UN to 
accomplish its own authoritarian goals.

    Question. Do you believe that a bilateral approach to complex and 
far-reaching global health crises is the most effective and efficient 
way to spend tax payer dollars?

    Answer. The United States leads the world in health and 
humanitarian aid in an ``All-of-America'' effort: our assistance 
accounts for more than 40 percent of total global health funding, or 
more than $140 billion since 2001. Similarly, the Administration is 
committed to ensuring our generosity directly reaches people around the 
world, while supporting the health-security priorities of the United 
States. The U.S. provides an average of $10 billion per year in global 
health funding--and this year, those funds will double as we surge to 
respond to the pandemic of COVID-19 around the world. The vast majority 
of these funds will be implemented bilaterally, allowing us to work 
closely with each country as they pursue their journey to self-
reliance. The Department works through and with multilateral 
organizations such as the Global Fund and Gavi. In addition, the United 
States has allocated more than $20.5 billion toward the global response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond our generous funding, the U.S. 
Government actively engages with our domestic and international 
partners to support a coordinated and coherent international response 
so we can direct U.S. funding and technical expertise to the areas of 
greatest need.

    Question. How does the Administration plan to allocate funding that 
would otherwise be obligated to WHO, especially in countries like 
Venezuela and Yemen, in which U.S. implementers have particular 
difficulty operating?

    Answer. On May 29, 2020, the President announced that the United 
States will be terminating its relationship with the WHO and 
redirecting WHO-related funding to other deserving and urgent global 
health organizations and needs around the world. While the United 
States was by far the leading contributor to the WHO, those 
contributions represented a small fraction--just 4 percent--of total 
U.S. funding to global health assistance every year. There is a wide 
range of excellent implementing partners available to us, partners that 
value transparency and are better able to provide value for U.S. 
taxpayers. In many cases, our teams in the field and here in Washington 
have already identified alternate implementers in challenging 
environments, such as World Vision in Afghanistan, the International 
Medical Corps in Iraq, the International Rescue Committee in Syria, and 
in environments where we do not discuss the names of our partners due 
to safety and operational considerations.

    Question. As you may be aware, the Republican HEALS Act would only 
provide approximately $4 billion for a contribution to The Gavi Vaccine 
Alliance and for distribution of a future COVID-19 vaccine abroad. Is 
this funding level adequate?

    Answer. The nature of a future COVID-19 vaccine remains to be seen. 
The funding needed to deploy a COVID-19 vaccine globally will be a 
global challenge requiring the entire international donor community. As 
we learn more, the Department of State will work with our partners to 
refine the estimates for anticipated global costs. The U.S. Government 
has already allocated $20.5 billion in funding to support the 
international response to the pandemic and is the global leader in 
health and humanitarian assistance. We just recently announced a 
commitment of $1.16 billion over FY 2020-2023 to Gavi, further 
reflecting our leadership in this area.
    The Department of State will continue to work with OMB and other 
departments and agencies to assess whether and to what extent 
additional U.S. Government funding will be needed.

    Question. To effectively respond to COVID-19 and the pandemic's 
secondary effects overseas, how much additional funding will the State 
Department and USAID need?

    Answer. Congress has appropriated a total of $2.3 billion to the 
Department of State and USAID to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic 
through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123) and the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136).
    Ongoing needs are likely to include mitigating the pandemic's 
continuing impact on fee revenues that support consular services both 
domestically and abroad. The Department will work with Congress and OMB 
on any further requests for funding to support the Department of 
State's response to COVID-19 around the globe.

    Question. If Congress is to appropriate additional funding for the 
international COVID-19 response, can you commit to expending new 
resources in an expeditious and transparent manner?

    Answer. Yes. The Department of State and USAID commit to expending 
funds appropriated for COVID-19 response in an expeditious and 
transparent manner, consistent with applicable congressional 
notification procedures and other requirements.

    Question. Rates of COVID-19 are increasing rapidly in Africa and 
posing enormous challenges to progress on other health challenges like 
HIV, TB, and malaria on the continent. How can Congress ensure that 
even as the U.S. responds to COVID-19 globally, we are also 
sufficiently prioritizing impacts on other epidemics like AIDS, TB and 
malaria?

    Answer. With the bipartisan support of Congress, PEPFAR continues 
to deliver lifesaving HIV prevention and treatment services and advance 
global progress toward controlling the HIV pandemic in the context of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, including in Africa. PEPFAR has taken decisive 
action since the onset of COVID-19 to confront the unique challenges it 
poses, ensuring we preserve our gains in the fight against HIV/AIDS and 
continue to serve, support, and protect our clients, communities, 
staff, health care workers, and partners around the world. PEPFAR 
coordinates closely with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria to ensure our respective efforts remain complementary, 
especially during the evolving COVID-19 pandemic.

    Question. Is the State Department considering launching a Grand 
Challenge to advance innovations to fight coronavirus as it did during 
the Ebola and Zika global health emergencies? If so, what resources are 
needed from Congress to support this work?

    Answer. As the Department of State and USAID have now committed or 
obligated nearly all of the COVID-19 supplemental resources provided by 
Congress, we are reviewing all available options to continue to 
mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 and better prepare for future 
pandemics. We are currently reviewing all of our resources and 
investments to consider how to utilize available funding sources such 
as prior year resources. The Department of State and USAID will 
continue to engage with Congress as those discussions progress.

    Question. What policy actions does the State Department intend to 
take to push back against negative trends in democracy and human rights 
that are tied to government responses to COVID-19?

    Answer. I have underscored that democracies are better equipped to 
address pandemics than authoritarian regimes. The Department of State 
is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to promote 
democracy, human rights, and good governance as key to an effective 
response to COVID-19. We are also closely monitoring concerning trends 
related to some governments' responses to the pandemic, including 
growing authoritarianism, crackdowns on fundamental freedoms, expanded 
use of surveillance tools, and targeting of vulnerable groups. We are 
leveraging bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and other foreign 
policy tools to promote democratic, rights-respecting responses and to 
counter authoritarian responses to the pandemic.

    Question. Russia's increasingly authoritarian governance under 
President Putin is deeply concerning. When President Trump seemingly 
ignores Russia's malign activities and expresses a desire to pursue 
cooperation with Russia on a range of issues, even calling for its 
inclusion in the G7, what message does it send to other countries--both 
our allies and our adversaries?

    Answer. We and the other members of the G7 have been clear: Russia 
must live up to its international commitments and accept responsibility 
for its destabilizing actions. The Administration will continue to 
impose costs on Russia and its proxies until Russia ends its aggression 
against Ukraine and ceases its efforts to undermine our democratic 
processes. The Administration has also been clear that the door to 
dialogue is open, should Russia choose to take credible steps toward a 
constructive path. Any change to G7 membership would require 
consultation with and consensus among members.

    Question. What is the Administration's ``redline'' with Russia? 
Russia has already attempted to interfere in our elections and faced 
little consequence, so there is reason to believe they would do so 
again. At what point will the White House more forcefully address 
malign Russian actions in the U.S.?

    Answer. The Administration has launched an unprecedented election 
security effort working on a whole-of-government basis to ensure the 
security of our elections. The Administration has been clear with the 
Russians that efforts to interfere will be met with consequences. We 
continue to maintain sanctions against Russians responsible for U.S. 
election interference and we continue to increase pressure on Russian 
oligarch and Internet Research Agency financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin. The 
Department's approach is to steadily raise the costs of Russia's 
ongoing malign actions until Vladimir Putin chooses a less 
confrontational foreign policy, while keeping the door open for 
dialogue that advances our national interests.

    Question. In addition to imposing robust sanctions against 
officials responsible for politically motivated imprisonment, how else 
can the U.S. Government ensure accountability for perpetrators of human 
rights abuses in Russia?

    Answer. The U.S. Government's commitment to democracy and civil 
society in Russia remains firm. We will continue to promote 
accountability for those responsible for human rights abuses, 
especially in cases where we can demonstrate that an individual's 
conduct meets the legal threshold for specific action. For example, the 
Department's July designation of Ramzan Kadyrov and members of his 
immediate family under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, was 
an important step that signaled our concern about the appalling human 
rights situation in Chechnya. We will continue to work with allies and 
partners through bilateral channels and at multilateral fora to condemn 
human rights abuses in Russia and press for accountability for 
perpetrators.

    Question. How can the United States combat Russia's weaponization 
of corruption? How can we be more proactive in engaging in anti-
corruption diplomacy?

    Answer. Our response to Russia's weaponization of corruption to 
achieve its political objectives continues to be rooted in democratic 
principles of transparency, accountability, and integrity. The United 
States will continue to proactively identify and publicly address 
Russian corruption and speedily impose sanctions on Russian officials, 
or those working on their behalf, who have engaged in corruption. We 
will also continue to work with our allies to press Russia to uphold 
its anticorruption obligations and defend against attempts by Russia to 
distort the international anticorruption framework or by Russian 
individuals and entities who are engaged in illegal activities 
including unlawful transfers of money into the United States.

    Question. On July 27, Germany, the current head of the G7's 
rotating presidency, rejected the suggestion that Russia be permitted 
to rejoin. What is the perceived benefit of rewarding Russia for its 
destabilizing behavior while alienating our allies?

    Answer. We and the other members of the G7 have been clear: Russia 
must live up to is international commitments and accept responsibility 
for its destabilizing actions. The Administration will continue to 
impose costs on Russia and its proxies until it ends its aggression 
against Ukraine and ceases its efforts to undermine our democratic 
processes. The Administration has also been clear that the door to 
dialogue is open, should Russia choose to take credible steps toward a 
constructive path. Any change to G7 membership would require 
consultation with and consensus among members.

    Question. Putin's successful manipulation of Russia's constitution 
last month may permit him to remain President, in effect, for life. 
What risks do you foresee in normalizing his anti-democratic 
tendencies?

    Answer. Russian President Vladimir Putin orchestrated a carefully 
manipulated vote on constitutional amendments in June and July that 
gives him the option to remain president through 2036. Putin's eroding 
public support drives his reliance on repression not only in the form 
of harsh treatment of perceived critics of the Kremlin, but also 
against groups such as religious and other minorities, civil society 
actors, rule of law advocates, and independent media outlets and 
journalists. The Russian people, like people everywhere, deserve a 
government that supports an open marketplace of ideas, transparent and 
accountable governance, equal treatment under the law, and the ability 
to exercise their rights without fear of retribution.

    Question. After the Administration ordered the Chinese Consulate in 
Houston closed on July 24, Beijing retaliated by ordering the closure 
of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. What immediate and long-term impacts 
will the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu have on U.S. 
diplomatic engagement in China?

    Answer. We were troubled and disappointed by the PRC's decision to 
withdraw consent for the operations of U.S. Consulate General Chengdu, 
which--unlike its counterpart in Houston--was not engaged in malign 
activities. The consulate had stood at the center of our relations with 
the people of southwest China, including Tibet, for 35 years. While 
this unfortunate decision will no doubt make efforts to engage 
diplomatically and represent U.S. interests across southwest China more 
difficult, we will strive to continue our outreach to the people of 
this important region through our other diplomatic posts in China.

    Question. What are the three top priority policy areas that the 
United States should be pursuing over the next 4 years to advance our 
competitive position vis-a-vis China, and how does the Administration's 
budget request reflect these priorities?

    Answer. As outlined in the U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), released in May, we seek to improve the 
resiliency of our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail 
against the challenges the PRC presents. Through diplomatic engagement 
and foreign assistance, the United States is building cooperative 
partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies, 
partners, and international organizations to support the shared 
principles of a free and open global order. We aim to compel Beijing to 
cease or reduce actions harmful to our national interests, as well as 
those of our allies and partners. We seek cooperation where our 
interests align, and strategic competition need not lead to 
confrontation or conflict. The Administration's budget request supports 
the strategic approach, including shoring up transparent and 
competitive markets globally.

    Question. What joint interests exist between China and the United 
States where cooperation is necessary?

    Answer. Strategic competition with the PRC need not lead to 
confrontation or conflict. The Department seeks cooperation where our 
interests align. We remain committed to achieving progress on a range 
of topics, such as implementing the Phase One trade deal, achieving 
DPRK denuclearization, and stemming the flow of fentanyl into the 
United States. However, we are willing to tolerate greater friction in 
the bilateral relationship, as we remain committed to our overarching 
goal of protecting U.S. vital national interests from malign PRC 
conduct.

    Question. How does the State Department assess risks to U.S. 
citizens arising from the imposition of national security legislation 
in Hong Kong? What are the most serious risks for U.S. citizens living 
in or visiting Hong Kong? What are the risks for U.S. citizens living 
elsewhere?

    Answer. Hong Kong's new National Security Law (NSL) poses a unique 
threat to U.S. citizens, both resident in Hong Kong and elsewhere. The 
NSL's provisions include several troubling components, including 
provisions stating that acts performed by the Office for Safeguarding 
National Security are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, and provisions giving the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress the power to interpret the 
law, among others. Article 38 of the NSL states the law applies to 
offenses committed outside the region by a person who is not a 
permanent resident of Hong Kong. This could potentially affect U.S. 
citizens who support freedom of expression and democracy in Hong Kong, 
even if they do so from the United States or elsewhere.

    Question. What unintended consequences may result from the new 
policy the U.S. is pursuing by deeming China's South China Sea land 
reclamation illegal? Are there additional resources you believe the 
United States needs to achieve its goals in the South China Sea?

    Answer. The decision to clarify our public position on PRC South 
China Sea claims was not taken lightly. With the new policy, the United 
States clearly stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in 
upholding their sovereign rights and interests, consistent with 
international law. We stand with the international community in defense 
of freedom of the seas, respect for sovereignty, and rejection of any 
push to impose ``might makes right'' in the South China Sea or the 
wider region.
    The United States continues to carefully monitor ongoing 
developments in the South China Sea, and continues to invest in our own 
maritime capabilities and strengthen security cooperation with 
Southeast Asian claimants, as well as Taiwan.

    Question. What specific strategy is the State Department following 
to broaden relations with Taiwan? How has this strategy changed in the 
wake of the most recent tensions?

    Answer. The United States is strengthening our unofficial 
relationship with Taiwan as a key partner in our vision for the Indo-
Pacific region. For decades, the United States has supported Taiwan's 
ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, and we will 
continue to support an effective deterrence capability for Taiwan. The 
United States is also taking a stand against PRC coercion and pressure 
to restrict Taiwan's international space. Through the American 
Institute in Taiwan, we are working to highlight Taiwan's strengths as 
a partner through Global Cooperation and Training Framework programs 
focused on issues including public health, women's empowerment, media 
disinformation, and the digital economy.

    Question. You have expressed outrage over Beijing's treatment of 
Uighurs in Western China, despite President Trump having taken no 
action when notified of resettlement camps in Xinjiang as early as 
2017. What has changed between 2017 and this year?

    Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in 
Xinjiang speak volumes. The President has personally heard from those 
affected, including Jewher Ilham, the daughter of imprisoned prominent 
Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. The United States has taken concrete action 
to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, including visa 
restrictions on officials, financial sanctions (on the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps and Politburo member Chen Quanguo), 
export restrictions, import restrictions, the release of a business 
advisory, and outreach to universities and businesses about the risks 
of doing business in Xinjiang. We have also joined with like-minded 
partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses.

    Question. What is your Department's plan to effectively counter 
China's culture of high-tech authoritarianism that has been brought to 
bear in Xinjiang and serves as a model for other authoritarian states?

    Answer. I have paid particular attention to Beijing's use of 
digital technologies to support repressive rule--particularly in 
Xinjiang. There are reports of pervasive, arbitrary high-tech 
surveillance and involuntary collection of personal data. The 
Department of State has conducted outreach to companies with business 
in Xinjiang to urge them to implement safeguards to ensure that their 
commercial activities do not contribute to these human rights abuses. 
Department of State initiatives also aim to address trends of digital 
illiberalism, both through measures to impose costs on repressive 
governments and complicit corporations and through efforts to promote 
the development and adoption of best practices to support digital 
freedom.

    Question. Congress has consistently appropriated aid to the 
Northern Triangle to address the root causes of migration, which has 
led to a reduction in homicides in El Salvador and Honduras and a 
strengthening of Guatemala's economy. Last year, however, the 
Administration cut off foreign assistance to the region. Do you think 
U.S. assistance focused on long-term priorities is a worthy investment 
in the Northern Triangle?

    Answer. Ongoing U.S. foreign assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador supports programs to continue and further our joint efforts 
to deter illegal immigration to the United States by working to 
strengthen governance and rule of law, improve civilian security, and 
augment private sector efforts to create economic opportunity in the 
region. Addressing the root causes of illegal immigration to the United 
States through this programming is a worthwhile investment to make the 
region more secure and prosperous, a key U.S. policy interest.

    Question. As you are aware, the U.S. has signed Asylum Cooperative 
Agreements with Northern Triangle countries to accept deportees for the 
United States, despite these countries' lack of capacity to process 
asylum seekers or to keep them safe. Is the Department tracking 
outcomes for deported migrants?

    Answer. Implementation of the U.S.-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative 
Agreement (ACA) has been paused since mid-March due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. From November 15, 2019, to March 16, 2020, DHS transferred to 
Guatemala 948 Salvadoran and Honduran nationals who expressed an intent 
to seek protection in the United States. Through our international 
organization partners, the Department of State is tracking outcomes of 
ACA transferees who applied for asylum and those who requested 
assistance to voluntarily return to their home countries. 
Implementation of the U.S.-Honduras ACA has yet to begin due to COVID-
19. The U.S.-El Salvador ACA has not yet entered into force.

    Question. How many migrants have been killed or assaulted after 
being deported from the U.S.?

    Answer. The Department of State does not track individual cases of 
deportees removed by the United States. We defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security for additional information on deportation.

    Question. How can we expect countries that are unable to care for 
their own citizens to provide economic and physical security for asylum 
seekers?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID continue to provide 
economic, security, and governance assistance in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Guatemala. Through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, we support international organization partners to provide 
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, refugees, and other vulnerable 
migrants. Through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, we support capacity building to address key 
challenges to civilian security. The Department of State also continues 
to engage diplomatically with these governments to help create a more 
transparent enabling economic environment that attracts private sector 
investment, thereby creating more economic opportunities for 
individuals.

    Question. If conditions in their home countries have not changed 
and migrants are sent back to the region from which they fled, what 
makes the Department think that they will not leave to seek asylum in 
the U.S. again?

    Answer. The Asylum Cooperative Agreements allow the United States 
to transfer individuals who express an intent or interest in seeking 
protection in the United States to a partner country where the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have determined they will 
have the opportunity to file a protection claim with that government.

    Question. ICE has deported hundreds of migrants who tested positive 
for COVID-19, despite multiple requests by countries to halt 
deportation flights and to conduct better health screenings. Is the 
U.S. risking a public health crisis by deporting individuals with 
COVID-19?

    Answer. Sustained cooperation on removal flights remains important, 
even with the present challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Every 
government has an international legal obligation to accept the return 
of its nationals whom another state seeks to expel, remove, or deport. 
The Department of State is aware some deportees have tested positive 
for COVID-19 after being removed by the U.S. Government. We refer you 
to the Department of Homeland Security for additional information on 
U.S. removal flight policies and procedures.
    Since mid-March, the U.S. Government has committed more than $137 
million in supplemental health, humanitarian, and economic assistance 
to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America and the Caribbean.

    Question. What could be the impact of deporting individuals with 
COVID-19 to Haiti, a country with just 60 ventilators for its 11 
million people?

    Answer. As of July 29, Haiti has 7,371 confirmed cases of COVID-19 
with 158 deaths. Haiti's COVID-19 Scientific Task Force has affirmed 
its satisfaction with the management of the pandemic in Haiti, and the 
WHO has cited the community-based homecare model in Haiti's West 
Department as a successful approach to managing the pandemic. We have 
provided $13.2 million in emergency health and humanitarian assistance 
to support Haiti's COVID-19 efforts.
    As agreed to by the Government of Haiti, all individuals manifested 
for removal to Haiti are tested by DHS and Customs Enforcement for 
COVID-19 within 72 hours prior to their departure from the United 
States; those who test positive are not removed. For additional details 
on ICE's removal procedures, we refer you to DHS.

    Question. How has the U.S.'s refusal to halt deportations, despite 
requests from multiple governments, impacted our bilateral relations 
with receiving countries?

    Answer. Every government has an international legal obligation to 
accept the return of its nationals whom another state seeks to expel, 
remove, or deport. Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean 
continue to receive their nationals. The United States Government 
supports our allies by remaining the largest contributor to global 
public health and continue to help friends and allies through an ``All 
of America'' effort that includes government, multilateral, business, 
faith-based, and other NGO aid.

    Question. The Administration's immigration policies have caused 
tens of thousands of non-Mexican citizens to spend months in Mexican 
border cities awaiting U.S. asylum hearings. There, most are subjected 
to substandard housing, are exposed to severe violence, and are 
vulnerable to COVID-19. As long as the Administration maintains 
``Remain in Mexico,'' metering, and other policies that keep asylum 
seekers in Mexico, is there any plan to provide assistance to Mexico to 
minimize the danger and suffering that these fleeing migrants face?

    Answer. The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) since the start of FY 2019 has provided 
more than $133 million in migration and refugee assistance (MRA) 
through our international partners in Mexico, including more than $2 
million in COVID-19-specific assistance to limit the spread of COVID-19 
among vulnerable migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Other ongoing 
PRM programming supports asylum seekers, refugees, and other vulnerable 
migrants, including individuals subject to the Migrant Protection 
Protocols (MPP), through activities to promote access to asylum and 
local integration opportunities, support for private and government-run 
shelters, and direct humanitarian assistance, including support to 
return home safely for individuals who wish to do so voluntarily.

    Question. Is there any plan to increase support for UNHCR to help 
Mexico process its increased flow of asylum seekers from Central 
America?

    Answer. The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM), has significantly scaled up humanitarian 
funding in Mexico. Since fiscal year 2019, in response to the increased 
numbers of asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants arriving at the U.S. 
southern border, PRM contributed more than $98 million to UNHCR's 
operations in Mexico. This includes support for direct emergency 
assistance, capacity building for Mexico's refugee agency (COMAR), and 
support for refugee integration. With this support, COMAR has expanded 
its field presence and increased its adjudication rate, and UNHCR 
helped more than 42,000 people through direct assistance.

    Question. In December of this year, Venezuela will hold a new round 
of legislative elections that will determine the makeup of the National 
Assembly and, in turn, the opposition coalition. In the face of the 
waning support and efforts by the Maduro government to delegitimize the 
opposition, it is likely that these elections will not be free or fair 
and that the Guaido-led opposition will lose its majority in the 
National Assembly. Does the U.S. Government plan to continue to 
recognize the Guaido government regardless of the results of December's 
election?

    Answer. Yes, we will continue to recognize Interim President 
Guaido's leadership regardless of the results of the December 6 
electoral event, which we, and many other countries, have assessed, 
will not be free and fair. The illegitimate Maduro regime continues to 
undermine the legitimacy of the democratic process, to include naming a 
new, regime-aligned National Electoral Council contrary to Venezuelan 
law, handing over the legal rights to parties to regime-allied figures, 
and the continued detention of hundreds of political prisoners. Twenty-
seven political parties intend to boycott the December 6 process based 
on their determination that it cannot be free and fair given these and 
other abuses. The recent Joint Declaration signed by over thirty 
countries, including members of the Lima Group and multiple EU member 
states, called for an inclusive transitional government and noted 
National Assembly elections alone do not present a political solution.

    Question. If not, what alternative options is the State Department 
considering?

    Answer. The Department of State will maintain its recognition of 
Interim President Guaido following the December 6 sham elections. 
Because the elections are already destined to be illegitimate, the 
United States and other countries do not intend to lend any credence to 
their results. U.S. recognition of Guaido is based on his status as the 
legitimate interim president pursuant to the Venezuelan constitution, 
which persists in the absence of a legitimate National Assembly. We do 
not accept the legitimate interim government can be removed through 
cheating, intimidation, and violence. We will continue to work towards 
a peaceful, democratic transition in line with the wishes of the 
Venezuelan people and in accordance with the internationally supported 
Democratic Transition Framework.

    Question. Since the signing of the Colombian peace accord in 2016, 
hundreds of social leaders have been assassinated. According to the 
Colombian think tank INDEPAZ, 166 such leaders were murdered in 2020 so 
far, with a disproportionate number belonging to indigenous 
communities. What are you doing to guarantee that the perpetrators of 
these crimes are brought to justice?

    Answer. Protecting Colombia's community leaders is a priority of 
U.S. diplomatic engagement and a focus of foreign assistance 
programming. The Colombian Government provides physical protection 
through its National Protection Unit (NPU) to over 5,000 community 
leaders under threat. The U.S. Government helped found the NPU in 2011, 
and continues to support Colombia's efforts to strengthen protection, 
bring perpetrators to justice, and prevent future violence. Foreign 
assistance programs, law enforcement, military, intelligence, and 
judicial cooperation all play a role in our joint efforts to strengthen 
Colombia's ability to dismantle criminal groups, reduce narcotics 
trafficking, and protect human rights.

    Question. How are you guaranteeing that the human rights conditions 
linked to U.S. military assistance are being fully implemented in 
Colombia?

    Answer. The Department of State works closely with U.S. interagency 
partners, and the Colombian Government, to ensure we direct all U.S. 
assistance to human rights-respecting security forces in an effective 
manner, in accordance with U.S. law. Under the Leahy law, we vet 
recipients to ensure assistance and equipment are only provided to 
security forces that meet our human rights standards. The Department of 
State's Colombia Foreign Military Financing and International Military 
Education and Training programs have dedicated resources for education 
and training that focuses on human rights, rule of law, and civilian 
control of the military.

    Question. Earlier this year, the Colombian press revealed that 
Colombian military intelligence was illegally spying on over 130 
members of the political opposition, journalists (including from U.S. 
news outlets), civil society, and others. Was U.S. assistance misused 
in any of these incidents?

    Answer. The Department can confirm that no U.S. assistance managed 
by the Department of State, including from security assistance 
accounts, was misused in these incidents. The Department affirms our 
unequivocal support for freedom of the press and condemn any arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with the privacy of journalists, including 
U.S. citizen journalists. We welcome the steps Colombian authorities 
have taken to investigate the alleged illegal acts and look forward to 
the just resolution of these allegations.

    Question. How will you work with Colombia to guarantee that 
commanders involved in this scandal are held accountable for these 
troubling incidents and to ensure they are not repeated?

    Answer. The Department expects our Colombian partners to meet the 
highest standards of conduct. President Duque has also made clear that 
he has zero tolerance for human rights abuses committed by security 
forces. We welcome the steps Colombian authorities have already taken 
to investigate the recent allegations, and note that Colombia has 
dismissed 12 implicated army officials. The Department of State will 
continue to closely follow Colombia's investigations in both the 
ordinary and military justice systems, and will continue to emphasize 
the importance of accountability for any abuses, including criminal 
accountability for any violations of law.

    Question. In the last year, the governments of Guatemala and 
Honduras ended two anti-corruption bodies: the MACCIH in Honduras and 
the CICIG in Guatemala. Despite this, the State Department certified 
that Honduras and Guatemala as meeting requirements to advance anti-
corruption efforts. Can you provide further insight into decision-
making behind these certifications?

    Answer. While the Governments of Guatemala and Honduras have faced 
challenges in several of the certification criteria, they have made 
progress and thus, the Department of State has determined that they met 
each criterion. In January, Guatemalan President Giammattei created an 
anti-corruption commission within the executive branch, and U.S. 
foreign assistance programs are helping to build the capacity of this 
commission. While the Department of State was disappointed the Honduran 
Government chose not to renew the mandate of MACCIH, a newly created 
anti-corruption unit within the public ministry (UFERCO) is a positive 
step. UFERCO has taken over MACCIH's investigations and is receiving 
U.S. assistance funding.

    Question. The Administration's maximum pressure campaign appears to 
have steered Iran more firmly into China's orbit. How effective can the 
Administration's campaign be if Iran and China have now publicly 
deepened their economic and security partnership?

    Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year 
agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese 
investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. For the Iranian 
regime, a closer partnership with China is a partnership born of 
desperation. Because the regime has been severely weakened, in part by 
U.S. sanctions, but also through its own mismanagement and corruption, 
it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for the Iranian people as long as 
the regime gains access to much-needed capital. The regime has been 
reluctant to publicly share details of the agreement for this very 
reason. The Iranian people know this, and they are rightly outraged by 
this hypocrisy.

    Question. Despite your appearance before the UN Security Council in 
June to urge an extension of the arms embargo on Iran; Britain, 
Germany, and France have continued to resist the U.S. approach. How 
important is multilateral pressure in seeking behavioral changes from 
Tehran? What is the State Department's plan to achieve consensus with 
our allies and partners on how to deal with Iran's destabilizing 
activities?

    Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition 
to Iranian actions to advance its nuclear program beyond JCPOA limits. 
They share our concern regarding Iran's continued proliferation of 
weaponry to arm proxies and partners. Cooperation with European allies 
and partners to address the range of threats posed by Iran remains 
robust and we are in regular communication with our allies and partners 
regarding our Iran policy and how to raise the costs on Iran for its 
destabilizing activities.

    Question. Had the Administration not unilaterally abandoned the 
JCPOA agreement negotiated with the P5+1, would you have had more 
success last month addressing the UN Arms Embargo with our allies in 
the UN Security Council?

    Answer. No one can argue that Iran's behavior merits the lifting of 
the UN arms embargo, which Iran has continuously and flagrantly 
violated since it was imposed under UNSCR 1747 (2007) and UNSCR 1929 
(2010).

    Question. You have repeatedly expressed the Administration's 
solidarity with the people of Iran. What is the Administration doing to 
mitigate the harmful unintended consequences of its sanctions policy on 
the Iranian people?

    Answer. We have repeatedly called on the Iranian Government to 
focus on their people's welfare, and our policy is aimed at depriving 
the regime of the funds to support their malign behavior. As a general 
matter, the United States does not use sanctions to target bona fide 
humanitarian-related trade, assistance, or activity and in the case of 
Iran, has publicized the availability of exceptions and authorizations 
that allow humanitarian trade and assistance. Furthermore, the Swiss 
Humanitarian Trade Arrangement, which has already facilitated 
transactions for the delivery of cancer and transplant drugs to Iran, 
is an additional mechanism for companies to export humanitarian goods 
to Iran.

    Question. You have spoken about an overlap in U.S. and Russian 
strategic goals in Afghanistan. However, it was reported in late June 
that Russia has been offering bounties to Taliban fighters in exchange 
for killing U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Is Russia committed to a stable 
and peaceful Afghanistan?

    Answer. We take any threat against U.S. citizens seriously and have 
repeatedly warned Russia not to endanger U.S. citizens or interests in 
Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world. Russian involvement in 
Afghanistan in ways that are adverse to or undermine U.S. objectives 
precedes this Administration. The Department has repeatedly noted and 
objected to their behavior.
    Of note, the specific allegation regarding bounties allegedly 
occurred before the U.S.-Taliban agreement was signed on February 29, 
2020. The Taliban committed not to threaten the security of the United 
States or our allies as part of the agreement and since the agreement, 
no attack against U.S. or Coalition forces has occurred. Facilitating a 
durable negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan requires 
acknowledging the role of influential countries in the region, 
including Russia, in order to dissuade behavior that endangers Afghan 
stability.

    Question. You said in a July press conference that the U.S. has 
told Russia for more than a decade to stop selling small arms in 
Afghanistan that put Americans at risk. Why is Russia not facing 
pressure campaigns similar to our approach to China and Iran?

    Answer. We take any threat against U.S. citizens seriously and have 
warned Russia repeatedly not to endanger U.S. citizens or interests in 
Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world. The United States currently 
has a significant pressure campaign against Russia, including an 
unprecedented sanctions campaign. We do share interests with Russia in 
Afghanistan, including on some counterterrorism and counternarcotics 
activities, while in other areas our interests diverge. It is in our 
interest to work together where possible to facilitate a negotiated 
political settlement that ends the war and ensures international 
terrorists cannot launch attacks from Afghanistan.

    Question. How can we ensure that human rights, including the rights 
of women and girls, are a key consideration in peace negotiations? How 
are we ensuring women are present in all levels of negotiations?

    Answer. Upholding human rights, including the rights of women and 
girls, is an important U.S. foreign policy priority. In Afghanistan, 
our significant civilian assistance in support of health, education, 
and economic empowerment, as well as our sustained policy advocacy for 
women and girls illustrate the importance the United States attaches to 
this priority. Intra-Afghan negotiations on the country's political 
future will take place among Afghans. Four of the 21 members of the 
team representing the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are women. We 
have made clear to all parties that we expect women to play a 
meaningful role throughout the negotiations. While the future of 
Afghanistan is for Afghans to decide, we strongly support the 
preservation and advancement of the social, economic, and political 
gains made since 2001. These gains include Afghanistan's democratic 
development and the protection and expansion of the human rights of all 
Afghans, including women, children, and minorities. We have also 
consistently shared the message that the decisions and conduct of both 
parties to intra-Afghan negotiations will impact the size and scope of 
future U.S. assistance.

    Question. How does the Administration's requested assistance for 
Afghanistan support, complement, or otherwise relate to ongoing U.S. 
military efforts and ``a peaceful resolution to the conflict?''

    Answer. Efforts to achieve peace, stability, and self-reliance in 
Afghanistan, including through the provision of security assistance, 
are designed to facilitate a durable, negotiated political settlement 
to the conflict in Afghanistan and to ensure that international 
terrorists can never use Afghanistan to threaten the security of the 
United States or its allies. U.S.-provided assistance aims to support 
effective governance, spur private sector investment, encourage 
tangible actions to combat corruption, protect the gains made over the 
last 19 years to advance the rights of all Afghans (and particularly 
the rights of women, children, and minorities), and to address emerging 
development opportunities and humanitarian needs, all of which help 
create an environment that supports a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. As preparations for negotiations to end the conflict in 
Afghanistan move forward, we are also identifying areas where our 
assistance could be repurposed to boost prospects for an inclusive and 
sustainable peace settlement.

    Question. The Administration stated in its budget request that it 
is seeking to draw down activities in Iraq and Afghanistan previously 
supported via Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. Please 
identify activities in Afghanistan you are seeking to scale down or 
eliminate, and discuss the strategic rationale for doing so.

    Answer. The Department of State assesses that the request for 
Afghanistan for FY 2021 would provide sufficient resources to support 
key priorities, including those that help to create conditions for an 
inclusive and sustainable peace settlement. We are also working with 
other donors to support Afghan government programs, spur private sector 
investment, protect the rights of all Afghans (particularly women, 
girls, and minorities), and address emerging development and 
humanitarian needs.

    Question. The Trump administration suspended most U.S. assistance 
to Yemen due to concerns about Houthi interference in humanitarian 
efforts, but OCHA head Mark Lowcock told the UN Security Council in a 
briefing on July 28 that ``overall, efforts to improve the operating 
environment in the north, where we have had most problems, are 
progressing.'' Do you agree with that assessment of progress?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has not suspended most aid to Yemen. 
The U.S. Government is the leading humanitarian donor to Yemen this 
year, despite suspending $50 million in humanitarian assistance and $23 
million in development funding. This suspension was undertaken in 
cooperation with other donor countries and the UN. A technical 
monitoring group of experts meets monthly to evaluate the Houthis' 
progress. That group has found major areas of concern yet to be 
addressed. Among these, the Houthis have not allowed the World Food 
Programme's biometric registration pilot to move forward and have 
blocked independent needs assessments. Without these, we are concerned 
Houthi leaders could steer assistance away from the most vulnerable 
families to reward combatants and their own supporters.

    Question. What benchmarks must be met before the Administration 
will lift the Yemen aid suspension?

    Answer. The United States, in cooperation with the UN and other 
donors, identified seven benchmarks that need to be met in northern 
Yemen and agreed on 16 benchmarks to gauge progress in addressing 
these. Among the benchmarks that have not been met, the Houthis have 
still not allowed the World Food Programme's biometric registration 
pilot to move forward, established standard operating procedures for 
NGOs to operate in their areas, or established procedures to allow 
independent needs assessments and project monitoring to move forward. 
Without these, we and other donors are concerned Houthi leaders will 
steer assistance away from the most vulnerable families to reward 
combatants and their own supporters.

    Question. How is the Administration ensuring that the suspension of 
most U.S. aid to Yemen in the midst of COVID-19 does not further 
exacerbate what was already the worst humanitarian crisis in the world?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has not suspended most aid to Yemen. In 
addition to the more than $1.1 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance 
funding to Yemen since October 2018, we have also provided nearly $16.7 
million in additional funding to support COVID-19 response efforts in 
Yemen. USAID has provided nearly $39 million and $33 million in 
dedicated health and WASH funding since FY 2019, to reduce the spread 
of communicable diseases like COVID-19 and cholera. We also continue to 
provide significant financial and diplomatic support for the safety and 
security of UN and other relief organizations in Yemen. Despite this 
crisis, the Houthis have not only failed to end their longstanding 
obstruction of aid, they also have refused to acknowledge that COVID-19 
is widespread in areas under their control or to take steps to prevent 
its spread.

    Question. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been 
parties to the conflict in Yemen that has caused this man-made 
humanitarian catastrophe. Indeed, Saudi and UAE airstrikes are 
responsible for the majority of civilian casualties over the past 5-
plus years of war. Meanwhile, these countries are failing to provide 
sufficient funding to address the most basic humanitarian needs of 
Yemen's people. What is the Administration doing to press Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates to contribute sufficient funding to the UN 
humanitarian response for Yemen?

    Answer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have provided significant 
humanitarian support to Yemen since the conflict began, providing 
nearly $1.5 billion to the UN humanitarian response in 2019 alone. 
COVID-19 has had significant economic effects on the Gulf countries, 
especially for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, we continue to engage 
with all donors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to ask they 
enhance their support for assistance needs in Yemen and for all 
assistance to be provided according to humanitarian principles. The 
United States cannot meet the humanitarian needs in Yemen alone. We 
also continue to support the peace process and to push for other means 
of addressing the humanitarian situation.

    Question. I believe a two-state solution, resulting from direct 
negotiations between the two sides, is the only way end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Does this Administration support a two-state 
solution?

    Answer. The Administration supports the U.S. Vision for Peace, 
which we believe is the best and most realistic framework to inform 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The plan outlines a 
clear path to a realistic two-state solution in which a secure and 
prosperous Palestinian state lives peacefully alongside a secure and 
prosperous State of Israel.

    Question. I believe that the Trump Peace Plan would make it more 
difficult for Israel and Palestine to return to direct negotiations and 
would hamper the ability of the United States to reclaim its role as an 
honest broker. Do you think a peace plan that does not include feedback 
from both parties can be successful?

    Answer. The Administration understands that Palestinian leaders do 
not like parts of President Trump's Vision for Peace, which is why the 
Administration has asked them to negotiate with Israel and present 
their objections within the context of direct talks based on the 
Vision. The Administration also encourages key regional and European 
partners to urge the Palestinians to bring their concerns to the 
negotiating table. The U.S. Vision for Peace is the most comprehensive 
and realistic framework to inform negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians.

    Question. Has the Administration expressed support for unilateral 
annexation of territory in the West Bank? How does unilateral 
annexation help get both sides of the conflict back to the negotiating 
table?

    Answer. As a result of the diplomatic breakthrough achieved through 
the Abraham Accords, and at the request of President Trump with the 
support of the United Arab Emirates, Israel will suspend declaring 
sovereignty over areas outlined in the President's Vision for Peace. 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has stated as recently as 
July that he is ready to engage in negotiations with Israel if it halts 
any actions to extend its sovereignty. Now that extension of 
sovereignty is on hold, the Department encourages the Palestinians to 
live up to this commitment and bring their concerns to the negotiating 
table within the context of direct talks based on the Vision. The only 
realistic path to end this conflict is through negotiations aimed at 
achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.

    Question. According to the findings of a GAO report titled, ``State 
Department: Additional steps are needed to identify potential barriers 
to diversity,'' close to 80 percent of Foreign Service officers and 60 
percent of Civil Service staff are white, and of 189 ambassadors, only 
three are African-American and four are Latino career diplomats. What 
can you do in the coming months to increase the number of racial and 
ethnic career diplomats in ambassadorships, the senior executive 
service, the Foreign Service, and mid-level careers to at least 20 
percent?

    Answer. The Department of State is currently undertaking a number 
of efforts to ensure leaders foster a culture of inclusion and help us 
retain and develop diverse talent. To achieve diversity at all levels, 
the Deputy Secretary and the Director General, along with other 
department leaders, have joined me in encouraging promising leaders 
from historically underrepresented backgrounds to put themselves 
forward for leadership positions. The Department also supports 
requiring all hiring managers and members of selection and promotion 
panels to receive formal training in mitigating unconscious bias in 
order to identify and mitigate potential for bias in the hiring and 
promotion processes.

    Question. What tools and mechanisms exist for State Department 
employees to express concerns about possible discrimination without 
fear of reprisal? Are these means adequate?

    Answer. The Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR) is a neutral, central 
office that manages the EEO process, as well as harassment inquiries. 
Employees may file EEO complaints, including those based on 
retaliation, to seek resolution/remedies. Retaliation is prohibited by 
law and is a disciplinable violation of Department of State policy. 
Employees may report concerns to ``Responsible Department Officials'' 
(e.g., supervisors, HR, Security Officers, etc.), who are mandated to 
report to S/OCR when they observe, are informed of, or reasonably 
suspect incidents of possible harassment and can be disciplined for 
failing to do so. Employees are informed of S/OCR's programs via 
mandatory No FEAR, leadership, and onsite trainings and Department 
Notices, cables, and bulletin boards worldwide.

    Question. The State Department has seen massive losses since the 
start of the Trump administration, losing significant diplomatic 
expertise as those in senior leadership have resigned or been removed. 
This, coupled with high numbers of unfilled leadership positions, has 
resulted in job satisfaction among State Department employees reaching 
their lowest levels in over a decade. How would you characterize the 
current level of morale in your Department? What could the State 
Department do better to improve morale and retention?

    Answer. The Department of State has a highly engaged workforce, 
evidenced by our 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Employee 
Engagement score. Our employees are committed to the organization and 
mission, and that allegiance manifests in the results we achieve. 
Consistent with our One Team One Mission Professional Ethos, we want 
all of our employees to feel empowered to create and sustain a 
workplace that encourages high morale and job satisfaction; but this 
responsibility is shared. Department leadership is committed to 
ensuring the Department of State remains an agency where all employees 
can have satisfying careers; and we will continue to partner with our 
employees throughout the agency and hold each other accountable in 
pursuit of that goal.

    Question. In 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency to 
complete $8 billion in military sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states. State Department Inspector General Steve Linick, fired on your 
recommendation, was reportedly investigating the State Department's 
role in this sale. As the world's oldest democracy and largest arms 
exporter, would you agree that the human rights standards the U.S. sets 
on arms transfers have global ramifications? Has your position on this 
claim changed during your tenure as Secretary?

    Answer. Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer 
(CAT) Policy, all arms transfers to foreign partners of the United 
States are subject to a comprehensive, case-by-case consideration of 
U.S. interests--including any risk the transfer may contribute to human 
rights abuses, including acts of gender-based violence, violence 
against children, violations of international humanitarian law, 
terrorism, mass atrocities, or transnational organized crime. For the 
first time, U.S. CAT Policy requires the U.S. Government to aid 
partners in reducing the risk of harm to civilians during military 
operations. The Department will continue to consider human rights 
alongside other factors when reviewing Foreign Military Sales and 
Direct Commercial Sales.

    Question. In June, Trump reportedly considered whether to end the 
system of congressional notification for foreign military sales. Do you 
support the right of Congress to review, and if necessary to block, 
weapons sales to foreign governments? What accountability exists for 
these sales if Congress is out of the loop and State Inspectors General 
reviewing the sales fear retribution?

    Answer. The Department of State's engagement with Congress on 
pending arms transfers is an essential element of executing our 
respective statutory duties under the Arms Export Control Act. The 
Department remains firmly committed to our collaboration and commit my 
team to continuing the conversation with committee staff on how we can 
more effectively further our shared objectives in support of U.S. 
national and economic security.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
               Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons

    Question. What is the Trump administration's policy toward foreign 
intervention in Libya?

    Answer. The Administration supports an immediate end to external 
interference and the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the 
conflict, and urge all sides to return to a UN-facilitated political 
process. Department officials have told involved countries they must 
stop fueling the conflict, respect the UN arms embargo, and uphold 
commitments made at the Berlin Conference on Libya in January. There is 
no durable military solution to the Libyan conflict. Ultimately, the 
Libyan people must resolve this crisis through political negotiations. 
The United States supports the UN Support Mission in Libya's work to 
facilitate a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.

    Question. What is the State Department communicating to those 
foreign governments involved in Libya, especially to Turkey, Egypt, and 
the United Arab Emirates?

    Answer. The Department's message to these governments, and to all 
others fueling the conflict in Libya is the same: now is the time to 
wind this conflict down. Libya is not the place for foreign governments 
to fight battles in pursuit of their own agendas.
    The Department is urging foreign parties to the conflict to leave 
Libya and support a ceasefire and a return to the UN-led political 
process. We press countries to use their influence to support all 
Libyan parties' participation in the UN-facilitated security talks as a 
first step toward securing a sustainable ceasefire. We have made clear 
there is no military solution and are urging Libyan leadership and the 
external backers to support a political settlement to this conflict.

    Question. In December 2019, Congress provided $75 million in FY 
2020 appropriations for humanitarian assistance to the West Bank and 
Gaza. When do you expect those dollars to be obligated?

    Answer. The FY 2020 section 653(a) report includes $75 million in 
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza, consistent 
with section 7019 of the FY 2020 appropriations act and the ESF table 
in the accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement. The Administration 
continues to ensure foreign assistance funds are used in accordance 
with U.S. national interests, applicable legal requirements, and are 
providing value to the U.S. taxpayer. U.S. foreign assistance is not 
the only tool available to unleash the economic potential of the 
Palestinian people and empower them to build a prosperous, vibrant 
society. The Administration's Vision for Peace includes the potential 
to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over 10 years, 
much of it from non-U.S. sources.

    Question. How do the Trump administration's decisions to end 
funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and for humanitarian assistance to 
the West Bank and Gaza affect stability in the West Bank and Gaza and 
Israel's security?

    Answer. The Administration made it clear when we provided our final 
contribution of $60 million in 2018 that the United States would no 
longer bear a disproportionate share of UNRWA's costs, and other 
countries must step up and do their part to advance regional security 
and stability. UNRWA continues to operate with an unsustainable 
business model, tied to an expanding community of beneficiaries. We 
continue to work closely with Israel and key regional partners on ways 
to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Hamas is 
primarily responsible for those conditions, having put its own 
interests above those of Gaza's residents.

    Question. Public reporting indicates that the Trump administration 
has suspended the process for Ethiopia to receive support from the new 
Development Finance Corporation, suspended the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation threshold process for Ethiopia, that USAID is under 
pressure to cancel all non-humanitarian assistance contracts for 
Ethiopia, and that the Trump administration is pressing the World Bank 
not to move programs forward for Ethiopia. Is it true that the United 
States is withholding or at any point threatened to withhold assistance 
to Ethiopia? If so, what was communicated to Ethiopia about why the 
assistance was withheld?

    Answer. As of July 30, no funding already obligated for Ethiopia 
has been affected by considerations related to the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD). Department officials are in regular contact 
with the Ethiopian, Egyptian, and Sudanese governments to stress the 
importance of reaching agreement on the GERD without delay.

    Question. Does withholding assistance support the democratic 
transition in Ethiopia and advance U.S. interests in East Africa? If 
so, how?

    Answer. Ethiopia is one of our strongest partners on the continent 
and we look forward to continuing to support the development of the 
nation's democracy and economy through a number of pre-existing 
programs, activities, and continued diplomatic engagement with the 
Ethiopian Government.

    Question. What public and private actions has the State Department 
taken to address the root causes of ethnic violence Ethiopia?

    Answer. The Department continues to engage all stakeholders and 
monitor the situation in Ethiopia very closely. The Department's Bureau 
for Conflict Stabilization (CSO) implements programming to provide data 
on drivers of tension across ethnic groups and assistance to support 
former armed groups' transition into viable political parties to 
contest national elections and prevent a return to hostilities. A CSO 
polling project will shed light on drivers of violence as well as 
potential resiliencies at the community level. The State Department's 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is supporting a 
program to address hate speech online, partnering with influencers, 
including in Oromia, at risk for ethnic violence. USAID also has 
several conflict mitigation and peacebuilding activities that seek to 
reduce ethnic tensions. We also continue to engage diplomatically with 
the government and Ethiopia's nascent civil society.

    Question. What public and private actions has the State Department 
taken to ensure elections are held in Ethiopia? What is the State 
Department's posture and strategy if elections are not held before the 
constitutionally-mandated October 2020 deadline?

    Answer. The State Department supports a number of initiatives aimed 
at facilitating free and fair elections in Ethiopia. USAID promotes 
competitive and representative multiparty political systems by 
assisting political parties to build inclusive internal structures, 
develop organizing strategies, and communicate on issue-based policies. 
Under this program, we also offer voter outreach and capacity building 
for party officials. Ethiopia's electoral commission has already 
indicated that elections will not be held until well after the country 
has recovered from COVID-19.

    Question. The Global Fragility Act of 2019 (division J, title V of 
Public Law 116-94) authorized the creation of a new Prevention and 
Stabilization Fund to replace the Relief and Recovery Fund in order to 
support the stabilization of conflict-affected areas and prevent global 
fragility. Contrary to the law and congressional intent, the State 
Department continues to use the Relief and Recovery Fund rather than 
the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, citing a lack of clarity in the 
legislation.
    Do you commit to working with the Congress to resolve this 
discrepancy and utilizing the Prevention and Stabilization Fund as 
authorized by the Global Fragility Act?

    Answer. The Department is committed to continuing to work with 
Congress in connection with the implementation of the Global Fragility 
Act. The Department seeks to harmonize provisions in the Act and the 
annual appropriations act related to the Prevention and Stabilization 
Fund, which we anticipate could potentially serve as an important tool 
for aligning policy and programmatic interventions under the Global 
Fragility Strategy.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. In November 2019, you announced that the United States 
would ``no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se inconsistent 
with international law'' and rescinded a 1978 legal opinion that then-
Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell provided to Congress reaching a contrary 
conclusion. The media has reported that this legal view is rooted in a 
40-page written opinion assembled by Ambassador Friedman and a team of 
attorneys led by then-Legal Adviser Jennifer Newstead, but it has not 
been released or provided to Congress. The media also reported that at 
a July 28 event to relaunch the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus, you 
cited telling ``the truth that Israeli civilian settlements in the West 
Bank are not per se inconsistent with international law'' as one of the 
Trump administration's accomplishments in the U.S.-Israel relationship. 
Will you provide this legal opinion in unclassified form to myself and 
other Members of the Committee so that it may be provided to the public 
to understand the Administration's rationale for overturning decades of 
bipartisan legal precedent on this issue?

    Answer. As Secretary Pompeo stated in November 2019, after 
carefully studying all sides of the legal debate and recognizing that 
U.S. public statements on settlement activities have been inconsistent 
over decades, it is the position of the U.S. Government that the 
establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not 
per se inconsistent with international law. Legal conclusions relating 
to individual cases of settlement activity must depend on an assessment 
of specific facts and circumstances surrounding the activity in 
question. Consistent with the long-standing practice of both Republican 
and Democratic administrations, the Department is not in a position to 
provide the legal advice prepared at the time as part of our internal 
review of this question.

    Question. Due to the Administration's termination of humanitarian 
aid to the West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA is in dire financial straits. For 
2020 to date, UNRWA has received funding and pledges that can cover 
less than 50 percent of its main budget and 60 percent of its planned 
COVID-19 response. It has received even less for its emergency budgets 
to respond to the acute humanitarian needs in Syria and Gaza, where 
Palestine refugees often live in abject poverty. The Agency's 
Commissioner-General said this month that absent additional funding, he 
will have to seek guidance on the programs that the Agency must 
prioritize over others. Does the Administration believe that if UNRWA 
stops feeding a million Gazans and assisting 400,000 Palestinians in 
Syria, turns half a million kids away from their schools, and closes 
its health network, the region will be more stable? As part of its 
response to address the COVID-19 pandemic globally, will the 
Administration restart U.S. humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, 
including UNRWA?

    Answer. The Administration announced in 2018 that the United States 
will no longer provide financial contributions to UNRWA. That has not 
changed. UNRWA's business model remains unsustainable and Palestinians 
deserve better than a service provision model that operates in 
permanent crisis mode.
    The United States is leading the world's humanitarian and health 
assistance response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Through USAID, we are 
providing $5 million in support of immediate, life-saving needs for 
Palestinian hospitals and households in the West Bank for Palestinians 
battling the COVID-19 pandemic. This decision does not prejudge future 
decisions about U.S. assistance in the West Bank and Gaza. We continue 
to assess how U.S. assistance can best be used to advance U.S. foreign 
policy and provide value to U.S. taxpayers.

    Question. I continued to be dismayed by Saudi Arabia's jailing of 
women's rights defenders, many who have been subject to torture 
including solitary confinement, electric shocks, flogging and sexual 
assault. This includes Virginia constituent Aziza al-Youssef who has 
been released from prison, but placed on a travel ban, and her son, 
Salah al-Haidar who remains in jail. I understand that the Saudi regime 
is now charging Salah, after more than a year in prison, on trumped up 
and baseless grounds under its ``anti-terrorism law'' that allows 
authorities to prosecute peaceful dissents with harsh penalties as 
``terrorist crimes.'' The regime is asking that Salah receive a 
sentence of between 9 and 33 years in total. Please provide me with an 
update on your personal engagement--as well as the work of other U.S. 
Government officials--to secure the release and dropping of all charges 
against Saudi women's rights defenders, particularly Aziza al-Youssef 
and her son Salah al-Haidar, and your efforts to facilitate their safe 
return to Virginia.

    Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than 
assisting U.S. citizens overseas. The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; 
the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; the Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs; the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor; and the Office of Global Women's Issues all engage on 
Ms. Yousef's and Mr. Haidar's cases. We have assessed that Mr. Haidar 
and Badr Al-Ibrahim (a U.S. citizen who was arrested at the same time) 
are wrongfully detained and have voiced our disappointment to Saudi 
Arabia for not dropping the baseless charges. We conduct regular 
consular visits and will continue to press for their release at our 
upcoming bilateral strategic dialogue and at every possible 
opportunity.

    Question. Following the 2016 killing of Berta Caceres, I remain 
concerned about human rights violations against Honduras's indigenous 
groups. In 2019, Honduras was the most dangerous country per capita for 
land and environmental defenders. Lethal attacks were particularly 
prevalent against women and against members of the Garifuna minority 
group--16 of whom were killed for defending their land. Most recently, 
five Garifuna land rights activists were abducted from their homes by 
heavily armed gunmen in police uniforms, leading to protests around the 
country. This follows the murder of a Garifuna leader weeks ago. What 
is the State Department doing to address the abduction of these five 
missing Garifuna activists? Additionally, please detail what the State 
Department is doing to protect environmental defenders and to hold the 
Government of Honduras accountable for its human rights violations.

    Answer. Officials from U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa meet regularly with 
top Honduran officials to advocate on human rights issues. This 
includes urging movement in the case of David Castillo, the ninth 
defendant accused in the Berta Caceres case; expressing concern over 
the Garifuna abductions and urging a transparent, expeditious, and 
thorough investigation; pushing for progress on the Guapinol Case, the 
mining and indigenous land rights dispute; and advocating for Honduras 
to implement the recommendations in the 2020 Trafficking In Persons 
Report. Additionally, we plan to virtually host the seventh Bilateral 
Human Rights Working Group dialogue with Honduras in October.

    Question. On July 30, a Spanish court found Victor Stemberger, a 
77-year old Virginian, guilty of drug smuggling and sentenced him to 7 
years in prison, rejecting his defense that he was duped. Mr. 
Stemberger's family believes that he was targeted by Nigerian based 
drug-traffickers as part of a sophisticated scheme that takes advantage 
of elderly American citizens. These traffickers frequently target 
individuals who have suffered from significant health challenges that 
limit their cognitive abilities. Mr. Stemberger suffered a brain 
aneurysm in 2005 that greatly diminished his logic and decision-making 
abilities, which a medical expert testified to at his trial. In a 
letter and memorandum regarding Mr. Stemberger's case dated October 28, 
2019, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that he was 
``fraudulently deceived by members of a narcotics trafficking network 
into unwittingly transporting concealed controlled substances.'' Given 
Mr. Stemberger's age and the significant risk to his health from COVID-
19 in prison, I urge the State Department to engage with the Spanish 
Government to ask that every consideration be made toward the 
compassionate and humanitarian release of Mr. Stemberger for his return 
to the United States in accordance with Spanish laws and regulations. I 
understand that the DOJ has requested that Mr. Stemberger be returned 
to the U.S. to help prosecution of those who victimized him and others. 
Please detail what next steps the State Department will take in regards 
to Mr. Stemberger's case and to secure a humanitarian release.

    Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than the 
safety and welfare of U.S. citizens abroad. Our embassy in Madrid 
continues to conduct regular consular visits to monitor Mr. 
Stemberger's health and welfare. Stemberger's attorney is pursuing 
humanitarian release within the Spanish judicial system. Options to 
appeal the lower court's decision remain available to Stemberger. We 
will continue to monitor Stemberger's welfare and case and remain in 
close contact with his family and legal representation. We defer to the 
DOJ on any questions concerning U.S. criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Edward Markey

    Question. Two weeks ago, in a deeply disturbing speech, you 
unveiled the draft report of your Commission on Unalienable Rights. By 
specifically elevating religious freedom and property rights, you are 
upending decades of human rights practice and civil rights victories. 
It also appears you and the commissioners are weaponizing religious 
liberty in order to curb human rights protections for vulnerable 
communities like women, girls and LGBTQI+ people--and encourage other 
countries to do the same. Do you believe that organizations and 
individuals should be able to promote stigma and discrimination in 
their communities by refusing to provide services to women, girls, and 
LGBTQI+ people based on so-called ``religious freedom''?

    Answer. The speech did not ``specifically elevate'' religious 
freedom and property rights above all other rights; it made a 
historical, descriptive claim about the importance America's founders 
attached to those two unalienable rights. Neither the speech nor the 
Commission's draft report ``upended decades of human rights practices 
and civil rights victories.'' Similarly, neither ``weaponized religious 
liberty in order to curb human rights protections.''

    Question. Did you recently send an email to the State Department, 
directing employees to use this report in their decision making? You 
have said that this commission report is not a statement of policy, so 
how will you ensure that the report is not being used in the official 
business of our foreign policy?

    Answer. On July 20, I emailed the State Department encouraging all 
employees to read the report thoroughly. I emphasized the report is a 
statement of principle, not policy, and it is highly relevant to our 
daily work. I indicated it should be used as a reference for every 
State Department employee involved in the difficult, complex questions 
surrounding the promotion and protection of human rights in our foreign 
policy.

    Question. How will the State Department ensure all of its COVID-19 
aid response is conflict sensitive and integrated into sectors 
including health? Will COVID-19 aid incorporate peacebuilding and a 
trauma-informed approach in order to reduce further violence and 
advance effective recovery for the long-term?

    Answer. In April, in collaboration with the interagency, the 
Department of State released the U.S. Government Action Plan to Support 
the International Response to COVID-19--``SAFER''--a comprehensive 
package of services to support our international partners around the 
world in combatting COVID-19. A key component of the SAFER package was 
to create tailored strategies in complex humanitarian crises, extremely 
fragile states, conflict zones, and high-density population centers and 
prioritize the most vulnerable, including those in ongoing pre-COVID-19 
humanitarian crises. This is a reflection of our existing commitment to 
use conflict as a lens for our existing work. With the COVID 
supplemental assistance provided by Congress we have also focused on 
providing support for WASH; food security; protection and security of 
children, orphans, displaced persons, and refugees; prevention of 
sexual abuse and exploitation; basic health care, including primary 
care; and coordination of humanitarian assistance in specific settings. 
The impacts of COVID-19 on communities impacted by conflict will 
continue, and the Department will continue to assess how we can 
mitigate or address them with available resources going forward.

    Question. How will the State Department ensure that COVID-19 
support is reaching the most vulnerable populations, including women, 
children, marginalized groups, and the poor?

    Answer. Given the unprecedented economic, health, and humanitarian 
impact of COVID-19, the Department of State and USAID utilized an All-
of-America approach, leveraging the unique expertise, capacities, and 
mechanisms of various U.S. Government departments and agencies to 
rapidly deploy and deliver essential support when, where, and to whom 
it is most critically needed. We have provided assistance to more than 
120 countries since the beginning of the U.S. response to COVID-19.
    We appreciate the supplemental funding that was provided by 
Congress to respond to the pandemic, including $908 million for 
International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugee Assistance. 
Specifically, we prioritized critical assistance in 63 countries that 
were in conflict or fragile before the pandemic. For example, USAID 
issued guidance for partners engaging in COVID-19 humanitarian response 
that outlines cross-cutting requirements for gender sensitivities, 
accountability to affected populations, and protection from sexual 
exploitation and abuse. We also recognize the impact that the COVID-19 
pandemic will have on women and girls, and we are supporting efforts to 
ensure survivors of gender-based violence have access to emergency 
assistance and improved protections. The impacts of COVID-19 on 
vulnerable individuals and communities will require a concerted, 
coordinated long-term recovery strategy between governments, 
multilateral financial institutions, humanitarian and development 
actors, and the private sector.

    Question. How does the State Department plan to address governments 
using COVID-19 as opportunity to infringe on human rights by closing 
civic space, cracking down against free speech and dissent, increased 
surveillance, and other methods?

    Answer. The Department has underscored that democracies are better 
equipped to address pandemics than authoritarian regimes. The 
Department is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to 
promote democracy, human rights, and good governance as key to an 
effective response to COVID-19. We are also closely monitoring 
concerning trends related to some governments' responses to the 
pandemic, including growing authoritarianism, crackdowns on fundamental 
freedoms, expanded use of surveillance tools, and targeting of 
vulnerable groups. We are leveraging bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy and other foreign policy tools to promote democratic, rights-
respecting responses and to counter authoritarian responses to the 
pandemic.

    Question. How do you justify the Administration's broad use of 
religious refusals in the context of foreign, development, and economic 
assistance when organizations and individuals use these excuses to 
endanger and discriminate against women, girls, and LGBTQI+ people in 
the provision of services provided with U.S. funds?

    Answer. Protecting and defending the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all people--including women, girls, and LGBTI persons--has 
long been and remains the foreign policy of the United States. In this 
regard, the United States continues to invest in the social, economic, 
and political empowerment of women and girls around the world and 
advances efforts to protect LGBTI persons from violence, 
criminalization, discrimination, and stigma.

    Question. How is the State Department tracking partners who refuse 
to provide services to individuals because of their sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or sex characteristics?

    Answer. The Department integrates inclusion and nondiscrimination 
principles into its policies and programming, and advances inclusion 
and nondiscrimination through programs that address the specific needs 
of historically marginalized and vulnerable populations. The Department 
continues to enforce its nondiscrimination policies for access to 
services to beneficiaries, which help ensure that no recipient of U.S. 
assistance discriminates against any beneficiary for any reason, 
including discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or sex characteristics.

    Question. The U.S. has historically used its unique power to 
sanction countries and people for wrongdoing in many forms including 
mass human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, and trafficking in 
drugs or humans. We use this power to respond and deter criminality. 
Yet the recent Executive Order directed at the ICC--an international 
judicial institution where American lawyers work--could target judicial 
professionals. Virtually all of our allies have judicial personnel that 
work at the highest levels of the Court. Has the Administration 
considered any options other than sanctioning allied nationals and/or 
an international tribunal working to hold alleged mass criminals 
accountable under the law?

    Answer. There has been longstanding bipartisan concern about 
illegitimate attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
exercise jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Events of the past several 
months have only exacerbated our concerns about the ICC. More than 300 
members of Congress, Republican and Democrat, recently signed letters 
expressing outrage over the ICC's efforts to target the United States 
and Israel, which likewise does not consent to its jurisdiction.
    In response, we have imposed a series of escalating consequences in 
response to the ICC's actions. In 2019, the Department announced a 
policy to deny entry into the United States to those most responsible 
for launching the investigation. We authorized imposition of additional 
sanctions only after it was apparent that less confrontational measures 
would not succeed.
    The United States fully shares the concerns the ICC was initially 
created to address, extending into prevention and mitigation of such 
mass atrocities, not only accountability after the fact. The ICC, a 
politicized and ineffective institution, had not contributed to that 
effort and has set out on a reckless path when it comes to the United 
States.

    Question. Have you evaluated what the impacts of sanctions would be 
on efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for crimes in places like 
Myanmar, Libya, Sudan, DRC, Mali, Central African Republic, Georgia, 
Venezuela, and the Philippines where there are few or no options for 
justice for atrocities that the United States has condemned, and if so 
what are they?

    Answer. No country has made greater lasting contributions to the 
cause of justice and accountability in armed conflict than the United 
States. We have consistently provided training on the rule of law and 
assistance to scores of partners and allies around the globe to help 
bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice. We do not need a 
corrupt and politicized international body in order to continue to 
advance U.S. longstanding efforts to hold those responsible for 
atrocities accountable.

    Question. North Korea continues to produce fissile material and to 
test and develop its ballistic missile systems. In an August 27, 2019 
speech, you said ``Americanism'' means ``telling the truth about the 
challenges we face'' and that ``we recognized that North Korea's rogue 
behavior could not be ignored.'' Even as North Korea repeatedly tested 
shorter-range missiles in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, 
and in a way that helps North Korea advance long-range missile 
technology according to the UN Panel of Experts, President Trump says 
he has ``no problem'' with the missile tests. What has the State 
Department done to counteract the President's statement that he has 
``no problem'' with shorter-range missile tests by the Kim regime?

    Answer. We call on North Korea to cease provocations, abide by UN 
Security Council resolutions, and return to sustained and substantive 
negotiations to achieve complete denuclearization. We continue to work 
with the international community to reinforce the need for full 
sanctions implementation. These tests underscore why we work to prevent 
transfers of equipment and technology that could support the DPRK's 
missile development efforts. The international community continues to 
send a strong signal that provocative behavior only exacerbates 
isolation and hinders progress in securing a bright future for all 
North Koreans.

    Question. The Chinese Government has now clearly broken its promise 
of autonomy for Hong Kong, but there are still a wide range of 
escalatory steps that Beijing can take to bring restrictions on Hong 
Kong's freedom in line with the repressive restrictions on the 
mainland. What is the State Department's strategy for addressing and 
publicizing further encroachments on human rights and democracy in Hong 
Kong?

    Answer. The Department of State and Consulate General Hong Kong 
consistently and vocally advocate for increased individual freedoms and 
protection of human rights in Hong Kong, especially following the 
imposition of the National Security Law (NSL). On August 7, the 
Departments of State and Treasury announced sanctions on 11 officials 
who were involved in the development, passage, or implementation of the 
NSL. The State Department also suspended three agreements with the 
Government of Hong Kong and encouraged like-minded countries to 
consider doing the same. We continue to engage political and civic 
leaders in Hong Kong and globally regarding our concerns over the NSL, 
and have spoken out publicly at the highest levels. We released a joint 
statement on August 9 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.

    Question. How do you propose to balance U.S. support for Burma's 
democratic transition, while intensively pursuing accountability for 
crimes committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in 
Burma?

    Answer. The United States must maintain its policy of principled 
engagement with Burma to move the country towards democratic civilian 
rule. That includes strengthening the capacity of civil society 
organizations, political parties, women and youth activists, and ethnic 
groups to more effectively engage in the democratic process; empowering 
public servants to be responsive to their constituents; strengthening 
the rule of law; and encouraging responsible investment and business 
practices to shrink the space for corruption.
    Promoting the rule of law, respecting, and protecting the rights of 
members of minority groups are critical to Burma's democratic 
transition. As such the United States will continue to take targeted 
actions against those responsible for serious human rights abuses, 
promote justice and accountability for victims, and defend human 
rights, including religious freedom. These actions, including the 
designation of the most senior Burmese military officials under the 
Global Magnitsky sanctions program, are consistent with our decades of 
support to the people of Burma. They also marginalize military leaders 
and empower the civilian government as it continues to pursue much-
needed reforms.

    Question. The U.S. Government has leveraged some sanctions against 
top Burmese military commanders, recognizing their role in the 
atrocities committed against the Rohingya. Given continued impunity and 
ongoing violence, it seems imperative to continue to build pressure. 
What other increased costs can the U.S. Government impose on the senior 
Burmese military command, to change their thinking and behavior? Do you 
agree that this should include sanctioning military-owned enterprises, 
noting that many of their owners and directors are the same senior 
leadership that we think should be sanctioned, and that likely it would 
impose a more powerful real world economic cost to them? How are you 
working with allies such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia to urge further targeted sanctions and other 
forms of pressure on Burma to change its thinking and behavior?

    Answer. Reforming the Burmese military, ending its decades of 
impunity, and placing it under civilian control is essential for the 
long-term success of Burma. The United States designated the Burmese 
military's Commander-in-Chief (CINC), deputy CINC, and seven other 
senior officers and two security force units under the Global Magnitsky 
sanctions program; designated the Commander-in-Chief, deputy CINC, and 
four other officers for involvement in gross violations of human rights 
under Section 7031(c) of the State Appropriations Act; and has strongly 
supported UN investigation mechanisms. We have worked with 
international allies and partners to expand targeted sanctions and will 
continue to support efforts to pursue justice and accountability. All 
policy tools remain under consideration to promote accountability for 
abuses, including, additional sanctions.
    We continue to support reforms that support Burma's democratic 
transition and economic transformation. We support inclusive economic 
growth and facilitation of responsible trade and investment, which in 
turn promote broad-based development and limit the influence of the 
military's economic interests. Promoting international trade and 
investment best practices is the surest way to shrink the operating 
space for military-owned businesses while supporting economic reforms.

    Question. What is the status of payments of U.S. arrears to 
international organizations in general, especially institutions 
critical to the global fight against COVID-19, including the World 
Health Organization?

    Answer. The most recent report to Congress on arrears at 
international organizations indicated approximately $625 million in 
U.S. arrears from CY 2017, 2018, and 2019 as of March 31, 2020, not 
including UN peacekeeping arrears and arrears at UNESCO. Of the 
approximately $625 million in arrears, the Department has since paid 
approximately $350 million, leaving a balance of approximately $275 
million. Roughly $80 million of the $275 million balance is arrears at 
WHO, and $160 million is arrears for the UN regular budget.

    Question. Given the Administration's determination to withdraw from 
the World Health Organization, how are you ensuring continued U.S. 
engagement with the WHO in the meantime, as the United States remains a 
full member at this time.

    Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from 
the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. In the 
time before our withdrawal becomes effective, we are continuing to 
engage the WHO on priority areas, such as the WHO's Independent Panel 
on Pandemic Preparedness Response (IPPR), a body created at the request 
of the United States and WHO Member States to evaluate the WHO-
coordinated COVID-19 response. Further, the Administration is examining 
ways to leverage the expertise of key U.S. Government Departments, 
agencies, and the U.S. private sector and civil society to protect 
Americans and deliver essential support rapidly to other countries to 
prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at 
their source.

    Question. Does the State Department have adequate PPE stocks to 
protect employees across all posts, domestic and overseas? Do you 
forecast any shortfalls or urgent needs in the next 6 months to a year?

    Answer. The Bureau of Medical Services (MED) follows Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) strategies to optimize the supply 
of PPE. The CDC recommends reserving PPE use to healthcare personnel 
(HCP) to protect themselves, patients, and others when providing care. 
MED procures and distributes PPE to Department HCP involved in direct 
patient care and testing, both domestically and at our overseas 
missions. Supplies include N-95 masks, isolation gowns, eye protection, 
gloves, and face shields. All overseas missions have a baseline level 
of supplies, with the ability to replenish PPE as needed. MED does not 
anticipate shortfalls or urgent and unmet requirements at this time.

    Question. Why has the State Department moved Washington, DC area 
facilities to phase 2, when your own criteria show the metro area does 
not yet qualify to proceed to phase 2, as the 24 day caseload average 
is not decreasing, public schools, daycares, and elder care options are 
not available to employees and their families, etc.? Why has the State 
Department ceased to track COVID-19 cases in their domestic facilities?

    Answer. While Diplomacy Strong provides a framework for mitigating 
COVID-19 risk, other factors also informed the decision to move 
Washington, DC-area facilities to Phase 2 by June 12 (Northern 
Virginia), June 19 (Maryland), and June 22 (the District of Columbia). 
In this case, the decision was informed by availability of robust 
contact tracing and rapid testing capability, as well as data 
indicating a decline in positive test cases among employees and the 
general public. The Department has not stopped tracking COVID-19 cases 
in domestic facilities. Telework flexibilities are still being 
encouraged given local conditions. Department leadership continues to 
monitor operational conditions and prioritize the safety and security 
of our people and assets.

    Question. On July 29, 2020, President Trump was asked by a member 
of the press about ``bringing China in'' to ``formal negotiations with 
Russia on arms control.'' He said in response to that question: ``We'll 
talk about that later. We're going to work on this first and we'll see. 
China right now is a much lesser nuclear power--you understand than 
Russia.'' Do you agree with the President that discussions about 
``bringing in China'' should occur after U.S. formal arms control 
negotiations with Russia?

    Answer. The United States is moving forward with the mandate 
President Trump gave us and will not allow China to exercise a veto 
over our relationship with Russia. We seek a new arms control treaty 
that covers all nuclear warheads, includes a strengthened verification 
regime, and limits China's unconstrained nuclear build-up. President 
Trump has made clear that the next arms control treaty entered in by 
the United States must be multilateral--it must include China. Our goal 
is to thwart a three-way nuclear arms race, and the most effective way 
to do that is a trilateral treaty.

    Question. You signaled in your Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(SFRC) testimony that the United States would attempt to snap-back UN 
Security Council sanctions that were relieved pursuant to UN Security 
Council 2231 if a U.S. led effort in the Council to extend the 
conventional arms embargo on Iran past October 2020 is not successful. 
Will the United States pursue a snap-back of UN Security Council 
sanctions if it is opposed by one or more U.S. allies on the Council?

    Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take 
collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the 
United States would have no choice but to initiate the snapback of UN 
sanctions on Iran in order to prevent it from obtaining and 
proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

    Question. Short of a snap-back of those sanctions, what statutory 
tools does the United States currently have at its disposal to 
designate actors who do trade in conventional arms with Iran?

    Answer. Section 107 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act of 2017 provides an authority to designate for sanctions 
any person who knowingly engages in any activity that materially 
contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or indirectly to 
or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle 
tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat 
aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems. 
Additionally, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
provides for penalties on entities and individuals for the transfer to 
or from Iran of equipment and technology, including conventional arms, 
controlled under multilateral control lists.

    Question. If UN Security Council sanctions are re-imposed and Iran 
moves to no longer be bound by any limitations under the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what is the State Department's 
strategy to ensure that Iran's ``breakout'' time to a nuclear weapon 
does not shorten?

    Answer. The Iranian regime uses its nuclear program to extort the 
international community and threaten regional and international 
security. For over a year, Iran has taken steps to move well beyond the 
limitations under the JCPOA, and in January 2020, Iranian officials 
announced that their nuclear program ``no longer faces any operational 
restrictions'' under the JCPOA. President Trump has made clear that we 
will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon. Nuclear brinksmanship 
will not strengthen Iran's position, but instead lead to further 
international isolation and pressure. We will continue imposing maximum 
pressure on the Iranian regime until it ceases its destabilizing 
activities and negotiates a comprehensive deal.

    Question. Can you explain the Administration's decision to end 
support for the Nagorno Karabakh landmine removal program, a decision 
that politicizes demining by selectively picking and choosing which 
civilians ``deserve'' to be protected from landmine deaths and 
injuries. Why are we playing games with humanitarian demining, and with 
the lives of innocent civilians in Nagorno Karabakh?

    Answer. In 2018, The HALO Trust reported it had cleared nearly 98 
percent of all landmines in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast. Current contamination is light and predominantly in sparsely 
populated and largely inaccessible areas or outside the territory 
bounded by the former Oblast where the United States provided funding. 
Although three demining technicians died tragically in March 2018, no 
civilian mine deaths have been reported since 2015. After nearly 20 
years and with the vast majority of mines cleared, more forward-looking 
priorities, including those aimed at preparing the populations for 
peace, provide the most effective use of taxpayer dollars and the best 
hope for long-term peace and prosperity in the region.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. In June, I along with Senator Shaheen and others, 
sponsored S. 3897, the Protecting Europe's Energy Security 
Clarification Act of 2020 (PEESCA), that amends the Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA) and leaves no room for uncertainty 
about the scope and intention of the sanctions mandated by PEESA. It 
clarifies that facilitating and insuring vessels for pipelaying 
activities, including support activities like digging trenches and rock 
laying, are indeed subject to mandatory sanctions pursuant to PEESA. It 
also includes expanded sanctions on port activities and certification 
of the pipeline for activation. It will be passed as part of this 
year's NDAA. However, in the meantime, there is still confusion among 
some of our global partners and those in the corporate world about 
whether pipelaying activities and insurance are subject to existing, 
mandatory PEESA sanctions. What is the Administration's view on the 
mandates and authorities it was given by Congress last year in PEESA?

    Answer. PEESA provides the United States with the authority to 
advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by 
addressing Russian pipeline projects that threaten Europe's energy 
security, and consequently Europe's political and economic security. 
PEESA targets vessels engaged in pipe-laying at depths of 100 feet or 
more below sea level for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a 
successor to either such project. PEESA refers to the scope of persons 
to be sanctioned, including those that have ``provided those vessels 
for the construction of such a project.'' The Department intends to 
provide PEESA guidance shortly that will clarify and broaden our 
interpretation to cover foreign firms or persons who provide services 
or goods necessary or essential to the provision or operation of a 
vessel engaged in the process of pipe-laying for such projects. This 
may include, but is not limited to, providing services or facilities 
for upgrades or installation of equipment for those vessels, or funding 
for upgrades or installation of equipment for those vessels.
                                 ______
                                 

      Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation 
              of the State Department, Dated July 28, 2020

[Editor's note.--This report can also be found at:
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Diplomacy%20in%20Crisis%20--%20SFRC%20Democratic%20Staff%20Report.pdf
and a Committee Print of this report can be found at:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-116SPRT42925/pdf/CPRT-
116SPRT42925.pdf ]

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 Columns From the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News Concerning 
  Peter Kassig and Three Other Americans Who Lost Their Lives at the 
                             Hands of ISIS


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