    [Senate Hearing 116-560]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 116-560

                        REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2021
                        STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JULY 30, 2020

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

                    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                     ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    48-763 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2022

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman

    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia

                  Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
                Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
                        John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

    Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     2

    Pompeo, Hon. Michael R., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
      State, Washington, DC..........................................     5
        Prepared Statement...........................................     8

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................    58

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    59

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................   105

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson...............................   106

    Responses of Secretary Michael Pompeo to Questions Submitted by
      Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.....................................   106

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons......................   121

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine.................................   123

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Edward Markey.............................   125

    Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz..................................   130

    Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the
      State Department, Dated July 28, 2020..........................   131

    Columns From the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News
      Concerning Peter Kassig and Three Other Americans Who Lost
      Their Lives at the Hands of ISIS...............................   177

                                     (iii)

         REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2020

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:33 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch,
    chairman of the committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson,
    Gardner, Romney, Graham, Barrasso, Portman, Paul, Young, Cruz,
    Perdue, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine,
    and Merkley.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Good morning, everyone. Today we have with us Secretary of
    State Mike Pompeo to discuss the State Department's fiscal year
    2021 budget request though, if history is any judge, Secretary
    Pompeo, you will face a wide variety of questions that extend
    beyond the Department's budget, which I know you can handle.
        The United States and our allies and partners continue to
    face serious foreign challenges that will test us for decades
    to come. China, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party,
    is our chief competitor. Russia too remains a key adversary.
        The efforts of these two nations to sow discord, wreak
    havoc, and undo the free and open international order upon
    which shared prosperity and security are built have reached new
    heights. They have stepped up disinformation and manipulated
    international institutions, suppressed the voices of freedom
    and democracy, propped up heinous dictators, coerced and
    invaded their neighbors, and denied millions of people access
    to lifesaving humanitarian assistance.
        We have a long road ahead of us in this new era of great
    power competition. We need sustained political will. These
    challenges require nothing less.
        On top of all of this, we are confronted by a new and acute
    challenge: a biological enemy that we still do not fully
    understand, an enemy that in 6 short months has inflicted
    levels of physical and economic harm upon the world that we
    have not seen in more than 100 years.
        Here again, China especially, but also Russia has played a
    destructive role. From withholding vital global health data to
    spreading disinformation and actively stealing vaccine
    research, China and Russia have again chosen to be and proven
    themselves to be adversaries.
        Sanctioning bad actors will never be enough. To confront
    these and other challenges, the Department will need to rely
    upon a vast array of tools and resources. Our diplomats must be
    backed by effective and efficient assistance so they can help
    partners help themselves and contribute to the growth of
    healthier, more stable societies.
        We are eager to support a budget that will advance these
    critical interests and support the State Department's most
    critical resources: its people.
        As the coronavirus emerged from China and accelerated
    across the globe, you were forced to pull back thousands of our
    diplomats and their families, but you did not just pack up and
    go without a thought of your fellow Americans. Instead, the
    Department launched an unprecedented mission to help return
    more than 100,000 Americans safely home. All of us who
    participated in that are greatly appreciative of the
    Department's work in that regard. In some cases, this involved
    convincing countries to reopen their airspace for flights and
    roads for transport. In other places, you even chartered planes
    to get our American people home.
        There are lots of folks who may never come in contact with
    the Department. Yet now there are more than 100,000 Americans
    who can personally attest to the tremendous work that the
    Department does for our people every day.
        As the challenges get more numerous and complex, we want to
    support a State Department that is up to the task, fully
    funded, staffed, and equipped to advance U.S. national
    interests on all fronts and at all times.
        We obviously have threats that impede this, be it health or
    security, but as the saying goes, all politics are local. Our
    adversaries understand this all too well. We need our diplomats
    to be local, too.
        On a personal note in closing, let me say I want to
    publicly thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your accessibility that
    you have had as Secretary. As you know, in operating this
    committee, it is essential that I have instant access to facts
    and information, and at times when I have not been able to get
    that through the usual intelligence channels, you have always
    made yourself instantly accessible. I sincerely appreciate
    that.
        When I am asked for advice from other second branch
    entities or individuals or even allies of ours, it is
    absolutely imperative that I have this information. You have
    always provided that. When you answer the phone, sometimes I
    never know where you are in the globe or what time it is, but
    you have always made it happen. For that, I have been and
    remain very grateful.
        With that, Senator Menendez.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for joining us this morning, Mr. Secretary. It
    has been a while since you have joined us, and I appreciate
    your enthusiasm for fulfilling this part of your constitutional
    responsibilities.
        If past is precedent, I do not imagine we are going to see
    you here anytime soon. So while this is your opportunity to
    defend your stunningly ill-conceived request to slash the
    budget of our foreign policy instruments, I would also like to
    take a wholesale look at how your Department has represented
    the American people and American interests on the world stage
    over the past year. Unfortunately, that view is not good, to
    say the least.
        Under your watch, the United States has faced setback after
    setback on the world stage, ceding leverage and influence to
    our stated adversaries. Today, Iran is much closer to a nuclear
    bomb than when you came into office, and despite your maximum
    pressure campaign, Iran and its proxies continue to create
    problems throughout the Middle East.
        While the 2017 National Security Strategy details that,
    ``Russia wants to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide
    us from our allies and partners, and undermine the legitimacy
    of democracies,'' the President and your Administration has at
    best not seriously addressed this threat.
        You have never fully used the tools we provided in CAATSA,
    and at worst simply abetted Putin's efforts, withdrawing forces
    from Germany, failing to take action when evidence emerged that
    Russia was paying bounties to kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan,
    and twice redirecting funds from the European Deterrence
    Initiative to pay for President Trump's wasteful border wall in
    September of 2019 and April 2020.
        Meanwhile the Administration's confrontational bluster
    against China has not stopped China's march in the South China
    Sea, in Hong Kong, in suppressing and oppressing its own
    people.
        Our North Korea diplomacy, which you assured this committee
    you would have wrapped up within a year about 2 years ago,
    appears to have flat-lined, leaving North Korea with a more
    capable nuclear and ballistic missile program.
        Across Africa, the State Department has been woefully
    absent on issue after issue after issue, most recently in its
    engagement on negotiations related to management of Nile
    waters.
        In the western hemisphere, the entirety of our approach
    seems to be xenophobic, anti-immigrant hysteria, and bullying,
    all while gutting our institutional capacity to deal with the
    root causes of migration. There is bipartisan support for a
    Venezuela policy. Yet, your approach has left millions of
    Venezuelans still suffering, and the Administration will not
    even support those who are already exiled here. Even as we
    struggle with an opioid epidemic, you propose cutting our
    international narcotics and law enforcement.
        On climate change, your Department has not just failed to
    be part of the solution, but is becoming part of the problem,
    actively undermining international efforts to safeguard our
    planet's future.
        Our allies in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East routinely
    wonder out loud whether we can really be counted on.
        Our values have been denigrated from President Trump's
    reported green-lighting of concentration camps in Xinjiang to
    the revisionist and sometimes repulsive views espoused by your
    so-called Unalienable Rights Commission.
        In the face of a global pandemic when our scientists, our
    technology, and our diplomats should be leading the global
    response, we have instead taken a back seat and are witnessing
    the collapse of leadership both home and abroad.
        Rather than putting forth a real strategy, our leaders
    point fingers at China and the World Health Organization, are
    absent from critical global meetings, and refuse to be straight
    with Congress and the American people on the public health
    threat. All the while, infections and deaths surge across the
    country.
        Of course, as we all know, the strength of our diplomacy
    starts and ends with the strength of our diplomatic corps.
        Earlier this week, I released a report, Diplomacy in
    Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation of the State
    Department. I have a copy here just in case you have not seen
    it. I would ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. It will be entered.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this hearing.]

        Senator Menendez. The report found a State Department at
    risk of catastrophic failure, with career diplomats describing
    a ``complete and utter disdain for their expertise,'' and even
    ``a contempt for career employees,'' many asking ``if their
    service is still valued.''
        Even as President Trump refers to our diplomats as the
    ``Deep State Department,'' you have stood at his shoulder and
    said nothing, exemplified by your refusal to stand behind
    Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch.
        The result is an exodus of expertise. Seven percent of the
    Department's staff left in the first year and a half of the
    Administration. While I realize that you were not at the
    Department during that time, the Department has continued to
    suffer persistent vacancies without Senate-confirmed nominees.
    In response, the Administration repeatedly puts forth
    candidates who do not possess the qualifications, the demeanor,
    nor the temperament to serve in leadership positions and
    represent the American people abroad.
        When you send us qualified nominees, Mr. Secretary, we act.
    We have confirmed more than 190 nominees, and dozens have
    advanced quickly and without incidence, but you continuously
    send us nominees who have misled Congress, who have made
    offensive or racist statements, who have sexual harassment
    lawsuits and allegations against them, who have supported
    torture, and whose conduct would disqualify them for service in
    any other Administration.
        The Administration promised us ``the best people, the very
    best, terrific, tremendous,'' but Mr. Secretary, the best
    people do not seem to want to work for you.
        Finally, let me just touch on a few oversight issues which
    I know you were passionate about as a former Member of
    Congress.
        At your direction, the President recently removed the State
    Department's Inspector General, who was investigating perhaps,
    among other things, last year's emergency declaration of arms
    sales to Saudi Arabia, about which I, along with a bipartisan
    group of colleagues, raised serious concerns.
        Additionally, we have learned of allegations of you using
    your office to promote your own personal, domestic political
    agenda, hosting lavish dinners at the Department and creating
    at least the appearance of using taxpayer resources to impress
    high profile political donors.
        While this hearing is ostensibly convened for the
    President's fiscal year 2021 budget request, you and I and
    everybody on this dais knows that the President's wish to
    completely gut our international affairs budget by a shocking
    34 percent is dead on arrival. That said, I have to say I must
    say I am tempted to provide you with a budget request and see
    how you could actually operate under it.
        Even if this budget hearing were not months after the fact
    and far too late in the legislative process, let me just say it
    is fundamentally misguided and unsuited to the needs of
    safeguarding our nation's security.
        Now, I recognize you will take issue with much of what I
    have said, Mr. Secretary, but facts are stubborn things.
        When you entered office, I offered a hand to work with you
    in areas where we could have built real agendas with bipartisan
    political buy-in: Venezuela, Iran, Russia, China, and indeed, I
    am disappointed.
        As I look at your tenure in office and at the track record
    of this Administration, I am disappointed that instead of
    making America first among the nations of the world, you have
    instead relinquished our leadership to the applause and
    approval of China and Russia. That makes America last.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. As we proceed--first, let me say, obviously,
    those views are the views of Senator Menendez, individually,
    not those of this chairman or the majority of this committee.
        For the members of this committee, we have an 11:30 hard
    stop. That will give us time for a round of questions. I am
    going to take a short break about halfway through.
        As usual, we would stick with what has been the
    longstanding commitment of this committee for civility. When
    the witness is asked a question, we are going to give the
    witness a full opportunity to answer that question and not
    interrupt his answer simply because he is doing so well at
    answering the question. I will enforce that strictly.
        With that, Secretary Pompeo, the floor is yours.
        Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may have a
    parliamentary inquiry. You just discussed the procedural
    process.
        If we are going to have answers that are filibusters, I do
    not expect that we are going to allow that either.
        The Chairman. Senator Menendez, I will run the committee
    and I will do it as I have indicated. We are not going to
    interrupt answers from the witness.
        With that, Secretary Pompeo.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
                  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
    Menendez. I have a full statement. In the interest of time, I
    will just read the first approximately one-third of that. If I
    could get your agreement to put the rest of the statement, I
    would appreciate that.
        The Chairman. We will do that, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Pompeo. Thank you very much.
        Today I am here to present the and testify about the
    President's 2021 budget. It requests nearly $41 billion for the
    State Department and USAID, enabling both agencies to protect
    U.S. citizens, increase American prosperity, and advance the
    development of democratic societies. Critically, it reflects a
    commitment to the strategic, efficient use of resources to
    provide better results for the American people.
        That is the top line analysis, but I want to make a broader
    point that our diplomatic expenditures reflect America's
    values.
        Two weeks ago in Philadelphia, I unveiled the report of the
    State Department's Commission on Unalienable Rights. My message
    that day was simple: the Trump administration places our
    founding principles at the very core of American diplomacy. I
    want to talk about how we have done that in three areas.
        First, securing the American people's freedoms against
    authoritarian threats, securing American lives during the
    pandemic, and helping friends across the world secure those
    very unalienable rights.
        On authoritarian threats, we have evaluated the world with
    the same realism that the American Founders did. We see the
    Islamic Republic of Iran for what it is, an aggressor not a
    victim. We have gone full bore on our maximum pressure
    campaign. Since May of 2018, we have slashed the vital oil
    revenues the regime uses for terrorism and illegal nuclear
    activities by 90 percent. We have rallied nations to our side
    through diplomacy. Witness the designations of Hezbollah from
    European and South American countries. We have bolstered our
    military companies vis-a-vis Tehran.
        There is more work to do. The Security Council must renew
    the UN arms embargo against Iran before it expires on October
    18.
        Iran already mines ships in the Strait of Hormuz, launches
    missile at Saudi oil facilities, and ships arms to the Houthis.
        Should the Security Council fail to act, Iran will have a
    freer hand to sow destruction across the Middle East and indeed
    the world.
        Russia, too, is a destabilizing authoritarian force in
    Ukraine, in Libya, in Syria, and inside of Western democracies.
        This Administration has acted to protect our interests and
    our friends. We have issued the Crimea Declaration. We have
    supplied Ukraine with lethal military hardware. We have
    sanctioned more than 360 Russian targets for everything from
    human rights abuses to supporting the murderous Assad regime,
    to operating mercenaries and proxy forces around the world.
        The State Department's fiscal year 2021 request for the
    Global Engagement Center is $138 million, more than double its
    current level. We will not tolerate disinformation and other
    propaganda directed by the Kremlin or any of our other
    adversaries.
        Further on Russia, 2 weeks ago, the State Department
    removed Nord Stream 2's exemption under CAATSA, and in
    December, the Administration's swift implementation of PEESA,
    an important bipartisan endeavor, effectively halted
    construction of the pipeline.
        We are the toughest Administration ever on Russia.
        Most importantly, on China, we see the Chinese Communist
    Party also for what it is: the central threat of our times. Our
    vigorous diplomacy has helped lead an international awakening
    to the threat of the CCP.
        Senators, the tide is turning. 30-plus countries and
    territories have become 5G clean countries, banning untrusted
    vendors from their networks. When we talked about this a year
    ago, that number was in the single digits.
        In our hemisphere, Canada has stood firm against the
    Chinese Communist Party's hostage-taking. Its three major
    telecom carriers have also banned untrusted vendors.
        Belize and Haiti have denounced Beijing's national security
    law targeting Hong Kong.
        Denmark has rejected the CCP's attempted censorship of
    Danish newspapers.
        Sweden has closed its Confucius Institutes.
        Lithuanian intelligence services identified China as a
    potential threat for the first time.
        In the region, in the Indo-Pacific, Australia declared
    China's South China Sea claims unlawful and illegitimate, as
    have we.
        We are proud to have stepped up maritime maneuvers in that
    body of water alongside our friends from Australia and Japan
    and the United Kingdom.
        India has banned 106 Chinese applications that threatened
    its citizens' privacy and security.
        Our diplomatic efforts are working and momentum is building
    to mitigate the threats that the Chinese Communist Party
    presents.
        All 10 ASEAN nations have insisted that the South China Sea
    disputes must be settled on the basis of international law,
    including UNCLOS.
        Japan led the G7's condemnation of China's national
    security law targeting Hong Kong.
        The EU condemned the law too and also declared China a
    systemic rival just last year.
        We have agreed to start a dialogue channel focused solely
    on China at the EU's request.
        At NATO, Secretary General Stoltenberg has called to make
    China a greater part of that alliance's focus as well.
        We led a multilateral effort to ensure that the United
    Nations World Intellectual Property Organization elected a
    director from a country that actually gave a darn about
    intellectual property rights.
        Our Quad, the United States, Australia, India, and Japan,
    has been reinvigorated.
        We have worked hard at this. Our diplomats have done
    wonderful work. I am very proud of the progress we are making.
        In addition to these multilateral efforts, the Department
    of Justice is cracking down on Chinese IP threats.
        We sanctioned Chinese leaders for their brutality in
    Xinjiang, imposed export controls on companies that support it,
    and warned U.S. businesses against using slave labor in their
    supply chains.
        We have terminated special treatment agreements with Hong
    Kong in response to the CCP's actions to deny freedom to the
    people of Hong Kong.
        We closed our consulate in Houston because it was a den of
    spies.
        Our budget reflects the reality on the ground. We requested
    nearly $1.5 billion for foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific
    region, a 20 percent increase from the 2020 request. We want
    that part of the world to be free and open and prosperous.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I will close and am happy to take
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Pompeo follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Secretary Michael R. Pompeo

        Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of
    the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
    President's FY 2021 Budget.
        This budget requests nearly $41 billion for the State Department
    and USAID, enabling both agencies to protect U.S. citizens, increase
    American prosperity, and advance the development of democratic
    societies.
        It generously supports key allies and partners like Colombia,
    Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.
        It includes $1.1 billion worth of investments in the State
    Department's global workforce, including staffing, training, and
    leveraging strategic data assets.
        And, critically, it reflects a commitment to the strategic,
    efficient use of resources to provide better results for the American
    people.
        That's the topline analysis. But I want to make a broader point
    that our diplomatic expenditures reflect American values: 2 weeks ago
    in Philadelphia, I unveiled the report of the State Department's
    Commission on Unalienable Rights.
        My message that day was simple: The Trump administration places our
    founding principles at the core of American diplomacy.
        Today I'd like to talk about how we've done it in three areas:
    Securing the American people's freedoms against authoritarian threats.
    Securing American lives during the pandemic. And helping friends across
    the world secure their own unalienable rights.
        First, on authoritarian threats: We've evaluated the world with the
    same realism the American founders did.
        We see the Islamic Republic of Iran for what it is: an aggressor,
    not a victim.
        We've gone full bore on our maximum pressure campaign.
        Since May 2018, we've slashed the vital oil revenues the regime
    uses for terrorism and illegal nuclear activities by 90 percent.
        We've rallied nations to our side through diplomacy--witness the
    designations of Hezbollah from European and South American friends.
        And we've bolstered our military readiness vis-a-vis Tehran.
        There's more work to do. The Security Council must renew the UN
    arms embargo against Iran before it expires on October 18.
        Iran already mines ships in the Strait of Hormuz, launches missiles
    at Saudi oil facilities, ships arms to the Houthis, and supports the
    illegitimate Maduro regime.
        If the Security Council fails to act, Iran will have a freer hand
    to sow destruction across the Middle East, and indeed the world.
        Russia too, is a destabilizing authoritarian force--in Ukraine,
    Syria, Libya, and inside Western democracies.
        This Administration has acted to protect our interests and our
    friends: We've issued the Crimea Declaration.
        We've supplied Ukraine with lethal military hardware.
        We've sanctioned more than 360 Russian targets for everything from
    human rights abuses, to supporting the murderous Assad regime, to
    operating mercenaries and proxy forces around the world.
        And the State Department's FY 2021 request for the Global
    Engagement Center is $138 million--more than double the current level.
    We won't tolerate disinformation and propaganda directed by the Kremlin
    or other adversaries.
        Further on Russia: 2 weeks ago, the State Department removed Nord
    Stream 2's exemption under CAATSA.
        And in December, the Administration's swift implementation of
    PEESA--an important bipartisan endeavor--effectively halted
    construction of the pipeline.
        We are the toughest Administration ever on Russia.
        And most importantly, China. We see the Chinese Communist Party for
    what it is: The central threat of our times.
        Our vigorous diplomacy has helped lead an international awakening
    to the threat of the CCP. Senators, the tide is turning: 30-plus
    countries and territories have become 5G ``Clean Countries,'' banning
    untrusted 5G vendors from their networks.
        In our hemisphere, Canada has stood firm against the CCP's hostage-
    taking. Its three major telecom carriers have also banned untrusted
    vendors.
        Belize and Haiti have denounced Beijing's national security law
    targeting Hong Kong.
        In Europe, the U.K. has offered refuge to millions of Hong Kongers,
    and members of the U.K. Parliament have stood up a China Research Group
    to focus on the CCP threat.
        Denmark has rejected the CCP's attempted censorship of Danish
    newspapers and is alarmed by Chinese activity in the Arctic.
        Sweden closed all its Confucius Institutes.
        Lithuanian intelligence services identified China as a potential
    threat for the first time.
        In the Indo-Pacific, Australia declared China's South China Sea
    claims unlawful and illegitimate, as have we.
        We're proud to have stepped up maritime maneuvers in that body of
    water alongside friends like Australia, India, Japan, and the UK.
        India has banned 106 Chinese apps, including TikTok, that
    threatened its citizens' privacy and security.
        Momentum is building to mitigate CCP threats in multilateral
    settings, too: All 10 ASEAN nations have insisted that South China Sea
    disputes must be settled on the basis of international law, including
    UNCLOS.
        Japan led the G7's condemnation of China's national security law
    targeting Hong Kong.
        The EU condemned the law too, and also declared China a ``systemic
    rival'' last year.
        We've agreed to start a dialogue channel focused solely on China--
    at the EU's request.
        Secretary General Stoltenberg has called for NATO to make China a
    greater part of the alliance's focus.
        We led a multilateral effort to ensure the UN's World Intellectual
    Property Organization elected a director from a country that actually
    respects intellectual property rights.
        The U.S., Australia, India, and Japan have reinvigorated the
    ``Quad'' grouping.
        The new Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China--many of its members
    European leaders, in addition to Senators Menendez and Rubio--is
    growing.
        And for America's part, no Administration, Republican or Democrat,
    has been as aggressive in confronting China's malign actions as
    President Trump's: Our Department of Justice is cracking down hard on
    Chinese IP theft.
        We've sanctioned Chinese leaders for their brutality in Xinjiang,
    imposed export controls on companies supporting it, and warned U.S.
    companies against using slave labor in their supply chains.
        We've terminated special treatment agreements with Hong Kong in
    response to the CCP's crackdown.
        We closed the consulate in Houston because it was a den of spies.
        Our budget reflects realities on the ground. For example, we've
    requested $1.49 billion for foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific
    region, a 20 percent increase from the FY 2020 request. We want that
    part of the world to be free, open, and prosperous.
        Moving onto my second set of points . . . I want to make sure the
    American people know about the outstanding work their State Department
    did to save American lives as the pandemic from Wuhan spread throughout
    the world.
        From January 27 to June 10, our team successfully repatriated more
    than 100,000 Americans from 136 countries and territories.
        Many of these folks were in very vulnerable situations--senior
    citizens running low on medication, pregnant women needing medical
    care, and even an individual on a ventilator in Bhutan.
        We've also taken major steps to protect our diplomats around the
    world: We OK'd Global Authorized Departures for any at-risk team member
    to leave their post and get home.
        We pre-positioned medevac aircraft so planes could be wheels up
    within 6 hours to get our diplomats to the best medical facilities
    possible.
        We instituted thorough social distancing, telework, cleaning, and
    visitor screening precautions. We've given offices discretion to decide
    what's best for their teams and their rotations, and right now we're
    bringing back our teams in a conditions-based, phased approach.
        Finally, even as we've adjusted to the pandemic, the State
    Department and USAID have continued America's signature mission of
    upholding the unalienable rights of people around the world.
        To save lives in allied and partner countries, State and USAID have
    pledged $1.5 billion in financial support, supplies, and expertise to
    more than 120 countries since the outbreak began, as part of the U.S.
    Government's world-leading $20.5 billion to benefit the international
    response.
        We're proud to supplement the incredible generosity of the American
    people, who have given nearly $5 billion out of their own pockets to
    help those in need.
        But that's not all. We're also economically empowering women in the
    developing world. Our budget invests $200 million for our Women's
    Global Development and Prosperity (W-GDP) fund at USAID, doubling our
    commitment from last year. I want to thank senators Shaheen and Graham,
    and others for working with the Trump administration to move forward
    new legislation on this initiative.
        In the same vein of protecting unalienable rights, we've fought for
    the fundamental right to religious freedom.
        Our two State Department ministerials have galvanized global
    momentum to protect the right to worship. Our budget request provides
    $150 million to support persecuted communities globally.
        My administration colleagues and I take seriously the words of our
    first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson:

            ``Almighty God [has] created the mind free . . . No man shall
            be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship or
            ministry, or shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
            opinions or belief.''

        There are many more achievements we know Americans support:
    Destroying the ISIS caliphate; working with Mexico and Central American
    countries to address illegal immigration and a broken asylum-seeking
    system; bringing home Americans wrongfully detained abroad like Pastor
    Andrew Brunson, and Michael White; I could go on.
        I'm proud of a foreign policy that draws on our founding principles
    to confront threats, protect our people, and secure liberty for
    mankind. I hope you are too.
        And with that, I'm happy to take questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate that.
        We are going to do questioning on a seniority basis since
    it is the Secretary, a cabinet level, as opposed to the usual
    first come rule. Again, I would ask each member to be
    respectful of other members and stick to the 5 minutes you are
    allotted. Once we have gone around, we will make a
    determination of where we are going to go from there.
        With that, Senator Menendez.
        Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I see 7 minutes on the
    clock. Is that what it is going to be?
        The Chairman. I intended to do a five. Let us do a seven
    because that will just about take up the time, but we are going
    to have to stick right to that seven because otherwise people
    are not going to get a chance. So we will do seven.
        Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, as I outlined in my
    opening statement, Vladimir Putin's investment in Donald Trump
    prior to the 2016 election clearly continues to pay off
    handsomely.
        Withdrawing troops from Germany. Troops in Germany is not
    about Germany. Troops in Germany is about our own national
    security interests.
        Redirecting funds from the European Deterrence Initiative.
    That is an initiative, as you well know, to deter Russia to pay
    for the President's ineffective border wall.
        Refusing to follow the law and impose meaningful sanctions
    under CAATSA.
        Perhaps most shocking, while we have all known for some
    time that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, both arms
    and resources, imposing bounties on the heads of U.S. service
    members is an outrageous escalation. President Trump
    astonishingly admitted in an interview on Tuesday that he has
    never raised the issue with Mr. Putin, even though he has
    spoken to him about seven times this year alone.
        Mr. Secretary, do you consider how you would react to such
    behavior from a Democratic President if you were sitting in
    your old House seat? Would you be okay with a President who
    abandoned our troops, but not even raising this with the
    Kremlin?
        Secretary Pompeo. Ranking Member, you have identified four
    items where you are concerned about our actions with respect to
    Russia. I would like to address each of them. That is what I
    think about as Secretary of State.
        Senator Menendez. I only asked one question.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I do not spend much time thinking
    about what I would have done were I still in the House of
    Representatives. I am very focused on my job as Secretary of
    State today.
        Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. Have you raised
    concerns with Russia, its Foreign Minister Lavrov, with respect
    to Russia reportedly placing bounties on the heads of service
    members in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Pompeo. I want to be very careful about what is a
    public record and what is intelligence-based, but yes, I can
    assure you and the American people that each time I have spoken
    with Foreign Minister Lavrov, I have raised all of the issues
    that put any American interests at risk, whether that is our
    soldiers on the ground in Syria, soldiers on the ground in
    Afghanistan, the activities that are taking place in Libya, the
    actions in Ukraine. Each and every one of these that
    potentially threaten American interests are things that I
    raised in my conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov, and I
    speak with some frequency.
        Senator Menendez. I appreciate that answer. I asked you
    specifically have you raised--this in the public sphere. I am
    not talking about classified materials.
        Secretary Pompeo. It does not mean it is not classified,
    Senator.
        Senator Menendez. There are public reports very well
    documented that the Russians were supposedly paying bounties to
    kill our service members. Have you raised that issue with
    Foreign Minister Lavrov?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am going to be more careful
    than you are being with respect to the intelligence. I am going
    to tell you that make no mistake about it. The proper people
    have been aware of every single threat to our soldiers on the
    ground in Afghanistan whether that was General Miller or my
    team at the embassy there in Kabul. Anytime there was a
    tactical threat on the lives or the health or the safety and
    security or our assets in place, we have this with our Russian
    counterparts not only at my level, but Ambassador Sullivan and
    every one of our team that interacts with the Russians. We have
    made very clear our expectations not to threaten us in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Menendez. Let me turn to a few other questions.
    Maybe you can answer these just simply yes or no. I think they
    are just factual in nature.
        Did Turkey purchase the S-400 system from the Russian
    Federation?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Menendez. Did Turkey pay approximately $2.5 billion
    for that system?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not aware of the amount of
    the transaction.
        Senator Menendez. They did pay them whatever the amount is.
    Right?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I believe that is correct
    although, Senator, let me just--I apologize. I am not certain
    that the cash has been exchanged.
        Senator Menendez. Does the Turkish Government currently
    have the S-400 in its possession?
        Secretary Pompeo. It has an S-400, yes.
        Senator Menendez. Did Turkey test the S-400 radar on an
    American built F-16 in November of 2019, as was publicly
    reported?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to answer that
    question. I am not going to discuss classified information in
    this setting.
        Senator Menendez. Has the President raised the S-400 with
    President Erdogan?
        Secretary Pompeo. I do not talk about things that the
    President speaks about with foreign counterparts. The White
    House is free to do that if they choose, but I am not going to.
        Senator Menendez. So let me ask you a simple question. You
    sent me a response on Monday saying that you take your
    responsibilities under CAATSA seriously and that you fully
    intend to comply with the law. Well, all of these elements
    clearly are in violation of CAATSA. So over a year since all of
    these facts have attached. When will the Administration follow
    the law and impose CAATSA sanctions on Turkey?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, in response to the Turkish
    Government's acquisition of the S-400, we have taken
    significant actions that have had a real impact on Turkey. We
    have pulled out a very significant weapons program that they
    were building significant pieces of inside of Turkey, the F-35
    program. We continue to evaluate how to apply sanctions in
    order to achieve our end objective. Our end objective is not to
    punish. It is to ensure that our NATO partner acts in a way
    that is consistent with American national security and the
    security of our NATO partners as well. Our diplomats,
    Ambassador Satterfield, on the ground are working diligently.
        Senator Menendez. I had a very pointed question. I know
    that you are a Harvard graduate, West Point graduate. You know
    what my question was. It is not about everything else. It is
    about CAATSA, but you have decided not to answer that.
        So let me go to the final question. You had the Inspector
    General of the State Department, Mr. Linick, ultimately fired.
    Is that correct?
        Secretary Pompeo. I recommended to the President that he be
    terminated, yes.
        Senator Menendez. You recommended it to the President that
    he be terminated, why? Because he was conducting investigations
    that may affect you?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, at the time I made the
    recommendation to the President, I was unaware of any of the
    investigations that were ongoing, that he had ongoing at the
    time, with one exception. I was aware of an investigation that
    he had asked me to provide testimony. I provided that
    testimony. Other than that, I was unaware of any investigation.
    It is not remotely the reason.
        Senator Menendez. Was your Under Secretary, Mr. Bulatao,
    aware, and did he not speak to you about it?
        Secretary Pompeo. He did not speak to me about it.
        Senator Menendez. Well, you said that the IG was not
    performing in the way he should have because he was not
    following, in essence, what you wanted to. Well, inspector
    generals are not supposed to follow what the department head
    wants to. They are supposed to be independent in pursuit of
    their mission.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
        Senator Johnson. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for your
    service.
        I think we can all acknowledge the world is a complex and
    messy place. As the ranking member said, facts are stubborn
    things and administrations have track records.
        Just a quick review. You came into office--President Trump
    came into office with a big mess, a lot of messes that he had
    to clean up. Let me just go through them.
        Libya, a failed state because of President Obama's actions.
        Syria had gone from a few hundred dead over his
    Administration to basically a genocide, about a half a million
    people killed in Syria.
        What I consider as one of the historic blunders in foreign
    policy, the removal of troops from Iraq allowed ISIS to rise
    from the thoroughly defeated ashes of al Qaeda in Iraq.
        Crimea had been illegally annexed, eastern Ukraine invaded.
    President Obama did not provide the lethal defensive weaponry
    on a unanimous basis that Congress authorized him to do.
        North Korea was rampantly testing missiles and their
    nuclear weapons.
        Iran. Through that agreement, it changed their behavior for
    the worst. It emboldened them.
        Of course, illegal immigration, primarily in the form of
    family units exploiting laws that were not being enforced in
    this country, was exploding.
        So President Trump came into office with a lot of foreign
    policy messes.
        By the way, the last time I looked, under this
    Administration we have started no new wars. We have destroyed
    the physical caliphate of ISIS. General Soleimani, al Baghdadi
    are off the field.
        President Trump actually provided those lethal defensive
    weaponry, the Javelins, which helped stabilize the situation in
    Iran.
        Quite honestly, we have done a pretty good job at reducing
    that out-of-control illegal immigration from the southern
    border by diplomacy with Guatemala, is one of the things that
    occurred there.
        So I think we have to put those track records and compare
    them and talk honestly about these things.
        Now, the ranking member has been pretty brutal regarding
    the firing of Inspector General Linick. I was copied on a
    letter that Under Secretary of Management Bulatao wrote to Mr.
    Horowitz. I have read it. It is somewhat complex. I just want
    to give you an opportunity to talk about what happened.
        By the way, I am very sensitive to inspector generals--or
    trying to push inspector generals to investigate the leaks out
    of these departments. There were 126 leaks having to do with
    national security in the first 125 days of this Administration.
    That needs to be investigated. If you could describe the leaks
    that you were concerned about and exactly how Inspector General
    Linick did not handle that the way you thought it should be
    handled.
        Secretary Pompeo. Sure. So, thank you, Senator Johnson.
        Let me just say I value inspectors general as well. I had a
    great relationship with the Inspector General at the CIA when I
    was there. He did his job. He took care of the team. He was
    critical of the agency when we got it wrong. I know what a good
    IG can do. Inspector General Linick was not that.
        The incident you are referring to is that we had a very
    sensitive Inspector General report. When the final draft was
    prepared, it leaked. The Politico reporter I think said it came
    from two people close to the investigation. At that point, it
    was basically the IG's office and a couple others that actually
    knew about it and the full report, which had a real impact on
    senior State Department officials' lives. When we confronted
    the Inspector General, he was defensive. We then asked him to
    undertake a process. He ignored that request to inspect, to
    have a separate IG come and investigate.
        It is pretty complicated, but suffice it to say he did not
    comply with the instructions about how we felt that leak needed
    to be investigated so that we could have an independent
    investigator do it, and then he was not candid about that
    process either. He did not act with integrity throughout that
    process in a way that inspector generals have to be counted on
    to behave.
        Senator Johnson. Well, I have my own issues with Inspector
    General Linick. I will not go into those.
        Right now, I am being falsely--Senator Grassley and I are
    being falsely accused of peddling in Russian disinformation.
    Because of Acting Director of National Intelligence Grenell's
    efforts to declassify four footnotes in the Michael Horowitz's
    IG report, we now know that the Russian disinformation that was
    involved in the 2016 campaign was bought and paid for by the
    DNC, the Clinton campaign, and contained in the Steele dossier.
    That is the truth. That is the Russian--I have heard no outrage
    on the part of our Democratic colleagues about that Russian
    disinformation.
        We are still undergoing our investigation, and we are
    trying to see documents out of the State Department involved in
    the Steele dossier.
        Let me just ask you a specific question. In October 2016,
    former State Department official, Jonathan Winer, arranged for
    Christopher Steele to provide other State Department officials
    the anti-Trump dossier he compiled for the DNC and the Clinton
    campaign. That same month, Mr. Winer gave Mr. Steele
    information collected by Clinton supporters which Mr. Steele
    then passed on to the FBI.
        This conduct raises serious concerns under the Hatch Act,
    Federal Records Act, and other Department policies. Although
    then-IG Linick acknowledged conducting a review of this
    conduct, he has not published any of his findings and admitted
    that the OIG did not interview any of the key players.
        Are you aware of these issues? Can you commit that the
    Department will be responsive to our requests from Senator
    Grassley and myself? We need these documents.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we will do our best to be
    responsive. We understand the request. We are working through
    it, and yes, I am familiar with the information that you set
    forth there with respect to the behavior that took place in
    October of 2016 in the State Department.
        Senator Johnson. Were there any other specific instances
    that caused you to ask for the removal of Inspector General
    Linick?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, there were. There were several.
        Look, at the end, it is about the core mission
    accomplishing the core function. One of the central functions
    to make sure that we can represent to you all that the
    financial statement for the State Department is accurate, we
    have an audit team to do that. Inspector General Linick screwed
    that up. I will read from the investigative report. It said
    oversight by the OIG was demonstrably ineffective, ultimately
    placing the Department's information, as well as the
    reputation, human capital, and operations at considerable and
    unnecessary risk. That is an enormous failure for one of the
    most important tasks that the IG's office does, conduct the
    audit of the State Department's books.
        There is a handful of others. He refused to take care of
    his team in important ways. There were 10 percent fewer audits
    of our posts around the world. One of the most important
    functions, aside from the audit, is to travel around to posts
    and conduct audits to make sure that they are conducting
    business appropriately. We were down about 10 percent.
        I must tell you morale inside the IG's office of all--we
    have 38 Assistant Secretary level bureaus. The IG's office was
    the worst survey results of any of those 38. He did not take
    care of his people either.
        Senator Johnson. He also did not investigate the improper
    use of personal emails in the State Department, which was
    rampant under the previous Administration.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
        Senator Cardin.
        Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cardin. America's strength is in our values. We are
    the global leader for democratic values. We have been so
    recognized, and we have worked with the international community
    as the leader of the free world, with other countries that
    share our values. We led in that. One of the best examples was
    the passage of the Magnitsky sanctions, the Global Magnitsky,
    which was not just bipartisan. It was pretty much universal
    here in supporting and promoting U.S. values. I was glad to
    work with the late Senator McCain on the passage of that
    legislation. Now Canada, Europe, Australia are all following
    our leadership to enforce universally recognized democratic
    values.
        So when the United States isolates itself from our
    traditional allies, it affects our credibility as a global
    leader of the free world in promoting democratic values. So
    when we pulled out of the climate agreement, when we isolated
    ourselves on Iran, when our trade policies have been more
    bilateral rather than working with other countries in order to
    try to advance our causes against non-market economies or
    government-controlled economies, all that affects America's
    credibility.
        So when I look at your budget, I see a decline of 35
    percent in democracy funds. To me I do not understand that
    cut--35 percent--if we are going to be the leader in democratic
    values.
        Then I was pleased to hear you mention as the first order
    of your remarks today human rights and values, American values,
    but I was disappointed that you used the Commission on
    Unalienable Rights as the example. I say that because in my
    conversations with human rights advocates not just here, but
    globally, they look at the United States trying to promote a
    political agenda on rights rather than working with the
    international community, the free world, on democratic
    principles of human rights.
        So tell me how this commission has engaged the activists
    globally that are fighting every day for human rights when it
    is very much tied towards a particular political view rather
    than a universal view on human rights.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate the answer to talk
    a little bit about the commission and the objective I set out
    now just over a year ago with respect to it.
        I would urge everyone to take a look at it and read it. I
    think they did phenomenal work. I do not agree with everything
    that is in there. I do not think any of the 10 members that
    came from broad religious backgrounds, broad political
    backgrounds--I do not think any of the 10 of them agreed with
    just everything in there.
        What it set out to do was take on what is an enormous
    crisis in the 20th Century's Human Rights Project. We are in a
    really bad place all around the world. It was my view, as I
    watched the State Department, our DRL, all the folks who work
    on this who are great and amazing people--I watched as they
    were unmoored. They did not have a founding. So I wanted to go
    back and talk about how do we moor American foreign policy and
    American human rights policy and the traditions of the United
    States. So that is what the commission was asked to do.
        Senator Cardin. Well, I guess what I do not understand is
    what was the problem that you were trying to solve? There has
    been a great deal of debate----
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Cardin. --in establishing universal values of human
    rights, which has been the core for democratic states. Now, all
    of a sudden, we are picking winners and losers, but it looks
    like it is done on a political basis.
        Let me move to a second subject, if I might, on arms sales.
    We have a proud tradition of making sure that when we supply
    arms to other countries, that they are not used against our
    human rights values. We have seen in recent years that arms
    provided by the United States have ended up in the hands of
    actors that we do not want to see get those arms.
        What oversight are you deploying to make sure that arms
    that we make available to other countries are used for the
    intended purpose and do not end up for the wrong use?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have an elaborate process to
    do our best to verify that that does not happen. It is not that
    we do not have escapes, that there are not failures. It is
    certainly the case. That has been true for an awfully long
    time, but we have an elaborate process to validate and verify.
    We require representations. We do verification. We do
    inspections. We have big teams in multiple departments that
    have responsibility for doing their best to ensure that
    American weapon systems are used for their intended purpose
    when we sell them or provide them to our partners and allies
    around the world.
        Senator Cardin. Let me make this offer. I think this
    committee can help you in that regard. The jurisdictional
    battle between Defense and State sometimes presents challenges.
    State has the principal role for a good reason. There is some
    legislation that I have authored that would help in that
    regard. I would hope that you would engage us to give you the
    tools you need to take on sometimes the military aspects of the
    Defense Department that may not be as sensitive to these
    values.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate that very much. I
    do think the State Department is the proper place to lodge the
    primary responsibility for that activity. So I welcome your
    efforts there.
        Senator Cardin. The GAO recently issued a report that I had
    requested in regards to diversity, and the report is titled
    ``State Department: Additional Steps Are Needed to Identify
    Potential Barriers to Diversity.'' They point out that from the
    period from 2002, well before your time, to 2018, we have seen
    a decline of minorities in positions within the State
    Department. It is particularly pronounced within the higher
    ranks.
        What steps are you taking to implement the GAO concerns?
        Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, I have seen that GAO report.
    I have seen the internal work we have done.
        I would characterize it over the last--that you were
    talking about from 2002 over the last decade roughly as flat.
    That is not good enough. That is multiple parties. This is not
    partisan at all. We want to get this right.
        We have undertaken a number of things. We have about a
    third today of our members who are minorities--excuse me--about
    44 percent of them are women. We have developed the Pickering-
    Rangel program to bring more people in. We had double the
    applications this year. We have a big team that works on
    diversity and inclusion. We are almost finished with a major
    study that was begun, now I think, 13 months ago run by Carol
    Perez, our DGHR, to look at the failures. There has been a lot
    of money and effort on diversity and inclusion over this last
    decade with, to your point, relatively good outcomes for
    acquisition of new talented people, but less so at the senior
    levels. We are trying to identify why we have----
        Senator Cardin. I hope we could work together on that.
        Last point, just a point on the Western Hemisphere, on
    ranking. I would just urge you to evaluate working with us on
    the aid to the Northern Triangle to make sure that they have
    the help from the United States to deal with the economic
    issues which takes away the pressure of migration from the
    Northern Triangle.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
        Senator Gardner.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary, for your service and being here
    today.
        Over the last several years on the Asia Subcommittee, we
    have been working together on this committee to shape a new
    policy toward the Indo-Pacific. The region, obviously, is
    burgeoning in population and promising commercial growth, and
    it is critical for global security and economic stability, but
    North Korea continues to seek nuclear weapons and to threaten
    its neighbors.
        China is an emerging global power that is intimidating its
    neighbors, brutally suppressing its own citizens, and
    attempting to remake the world order in its own image.
        In Burma, the military is committing grievous human rights
    abuses against the minority Rohingya population.
        It is more important than ever that the United States
    maintains a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, reaffirms
    alliances, encourages economic cooperation, and promotes human
    rights and the rule of law.
        The Administration and Congress must be united on
    implementing a long-term strategy that will benefit American
    national security interests, promote American businesses, and
    create jobs through trade promotion and opportunities, and
    project American values of respect for the human rights and
    freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.
        This includes countering China's growing militarization of
    the South China Sea and increasing malign influence in
    Southeast Asia, as well as ensuring that complete, verified,
    and irreversible denuclearization is achieved on the Korean
    Peninsula, as codified in U.S. law.
        The United States has always been and will always remain a
    Pacific power, and legislation like my Asia Reassurance
    Initiative Act, or ARIA, ensures that the U.S. Government will
    speak with one voice to reassure our allies and to deter our
    adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region.
        In 2018, the Asia Subcommittee held a three-part hearing
    series. We talked about democracy, human rights, and rule of
    law. We found that mass concentration camps for Uighur Muslims
    necessitated a serious response from the U.S. and the
    international community, that crackdowns in the Tibet
    Autonomous Region are intensifying while Beijing continues to
    refuse negotiations with the Central Tibetan Administration,
    that human rights defenders in China are routinely jailed and
    tortured. I was obviously pleased to see that several Chinese
    officials were sanctioned for abuses against Uighurs and even
    11 Chinese entities implicated in similar abuses were added to
    the Commerce Department's Entity List.
        What is the Administration doing to address further Global
    Magnitsky sanctions and other remedies for these abuses?
        Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator Gardner, thanks. I am
    familiar with ARIA. It is great work. I want to thank this
    committee and frankly a broader group of Senators for the
    bipartisan legislation that we had with respect to the Uighurs
    and with respect to Hong Kong democracy, as well. It is very
    powerful when I can talk to my counterparts around the world
    and say that I have not only the support of Congress, but a
    bipartisan, almost unanimous support on our policy with respect
    to securing freedom against the threats that the Chinese
    Communist Party is presenting.
        As for what we will continue to do in western China with
    respect to the horrific human rights violations that are taking
    place against the ethnic minorities there, I do not want to get
    in front of the final decisions, but you can rest assured that
    there are further actions, including further actions with
    respect to human rights violations that the Department of State
    and the Department of the Treasury are working to complete.
        Senator Gardner. Mr. Secretary, yesterday I do not know if
    you had a chance to see some of the hearing in the House of
    Representatives regarding some of the tech companies operating
    in the United States. I will read you some of the comments they
    made. When asked whether or not China is stealing information
    from them, Apple CEO Tim Cook said he had no personal knowledge
    about Chinese technology theft. Jeff Bezos has no firsthand
    experience beyond knock-off products. Google CEO has said that
    they did not have any experience, later had clarified that
    remark.
        Can you talk a little bit about tech in China and what you
    see what is happening? Is it true that there is no Chinese
    technology theft of U.S. companies?
        Secretary Pompeo. Well, they need to get out more. I mean,
    there is a long history, decades-long history of Chinese
    intellectual property theft, including against technologies. I
    hear it. It is sometimes the case you hear it privately because
    there are continued threats made against their businesses that
    are operating not only in China, but threats to businesses that
    are actually working in other parts of Asia and Southeast Asia,
    as well. The Chinese Communist Party is completely willing to
    bully and to threaten to get companies to----
        Senator Gardner. Do you work with these tech companies at
    the State Department on intellectual property theft, cyber
    attack, those kinds of things?
        Secretary Pompeo. We do. We work closely with them, and on
    the side of protecting cyber, we have actually had some good
    work where we have worked alongside each other on important
    projects where we have reduced risk. So I thank them for that.
        The idea that anyone in the tech space could not know of
    what the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to steal and the
    cyber attacks they are making seems incredulous.
        Senator Gardner. In March of this year, as it related to
    some Chinese misinformation and the dissemination of
    misinformation when it came to the COVID-19 propaganda China
    was spreading, I suggested that the National Security Council
    set up a task force at the White House to counter that
    disinformation.
        Are the tech companies doing enough to combat Chinese
    disinformation?
        Secretary Pompeo. No. There is always more that they can
    do. There is more we can do as well.
        On that particular front, I must say I actually think the
    world mounted a very effective counter-campaign against the
    Chinese disinformation. As I have traveled and as I have spoken
    to my counterparts, I think the world understands that this
    virus emanated from China, from Wuhan in particular, and I
    think the world understands that the Chinese Communist Party
    showed up with PPE that did not work and covered up what they
    knew about that when they could have prevented this spread. So
    I think the Chinese efforts at disinformation have actually
    failed in this case.
        Senator Gardner. The Taiwan situation. I wanted to just ask
    a question about bilateral trade agreements and opportunities
    for Taiwan. Yesterday, I sent a letter to U.S. Trade
    Representative Lighthizer, Ambassador Lighthizer, asking for
    the U.S. to begin engaging in a bilateral trade agreement with
    Taiwan.
        Can you talk a little bit about the Administration's
    pursuit of such an agreement?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator Gardner, I would prefer to leave
    that to Ambassador Lighthizer to talk about that. We are aware
    that there is great interest in this. The State Department will
    have its part in that, but our primary work with respect to
    Taiwan is different from the trade piece of this. We have been
    diligent about making sure that we honor the commitments that
    we have made to the people of Taiwan, including approving arms
    sales that are important so that the Taiwanese can engage in
    the activities that they need to do so they can protect their
    democracy.
        Senator Gardner. The Administration's goal of complete,
    verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean
    Peninsula remains.
        Secretary Pompeo. It does.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
        Were you involved in the decision to withdraw troops from
    Germany?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Shaheen. According to Secretary Esper, 6,400 of
    those troops, so over half of those who will be removed from
    Germany, will be coming back to the United States. They are not
    going to be going to parts of Europe to deter Russia, to parts
    of Asia to deter China. In fact, the only country that has
    publicly supported the removal of U.S. troops from Germany to
    date has been Russia.
        So can you share with us whether the impact of this
    decision on our efforts to counter China and Russia was taken
    into account? Was there any sort of strategic assessment done
    to support this decision?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator Shaheen, thanks for the question.
        Of course, there was, and we were very involved at the
    strategic level. Obviously, the troop level decisions and the
    like are primarily the Department of Defense and the
    President's role.
        You characterized the folks who were coming back to the
    United States as somehow being off the field. That is not the
    case. These units will participate in rotational activity. They
    will be forward deployed. They will not be stationed or
    garrisoned, but make no mistake about it. They will be fully
    available to assure that we can properly prosecute the
    challenges we have from the global powers.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Secretary, I assume that all of
    our troops who are in the United States are available to be
    forward deployed. Now, I recognize that there is certain
    training that needs to be part of them before they are
    deployed. I guess I do not understand. Was the effect of
    diplomatically alienating Germany, who is the largest and
    wealthiest country in the EU, who has been a historic strategic
    ally--was that also taken into consideration?
        Secretary Pompeo. Ma'am, this is personal for me. I fought
    on the border of East Germany when I was a young soldier. I was
    stationed there.
        Senator Shaheen. Yes. I am aware of that, and your unit is
    coming back to the United States.
        Secretary Pompeo. I know. It had been once before to Fort
    Polk. Then they went back to Germany.
        When I was there, there were six figures of soldiers there.
    Germany is no longer a frontline state.
        As far as strategic effort, Secretary General Stoltenberg,
    NATO Commander, was very much in the process of helping us
    think this through. I saw comments out of Russia this morning
    that are different than you described, that viewed the actions
    that we took as threatening because we will have soldiers that
    are deployed closer to the Russian border.
        Yes, this was a thoughtful process, the military piece of
    this run out of the Pentagon largely, but the State Department
    was fully involved in the strategic pieces of this. I am very
    confident that our mission to deter Russia, the NATO mission to
    deter mission we are still fully capable of executing. The
    precise number was 200,000 early, about 100,000 and some when I
    was there. Conditions have changed around the world, and our
    forces need to be repositioned to appropriately confront
    today's challenges.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I would just read from a report in
    ``Bloomberg,'' that quotes Dmitry Peskov who is the press
    secretary for Vladimir Putin who says that `` `the fewer
    American soldiers on the European continent, the calmer it is
    in Europe,' Peskov said, answering a question on planned U.S.
    troop reductions in Germany.'' That does not sound to me like
    they think that this increases the threat from Russia.
        I would like to go on to another issue because I want to
    follow up on the question that Senator Menendez raised about
    the reports on bounties that Russia has put on our troops in
    Afghanistan by the Taliban. There was a report last night that
    said that State officials have secretly warned Russia against
    bounties on our troops, against killing our troops.
        What more do you think we should be doing to address that
    to prevent the Taliban and Russia from trying to murder our
    troops in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Pompeo. So there are many things, and we have
    been engaged in them consistently. There is intelligence
    collection so that if it happens, we can identify it, stop it,
    make sure that the actual tactical event does not take place.
    That is the task of not only DoD intelligence services, but our
    broader intelligence services. Our diplomats too make very
    clear our expectations and set a set of redlines. Then we have
    our larger Afghanistan policy. It is not just Russia that has
    been underwriting the Taliban for all these years. I know there
    is an awful lot of focus on that in this town, but let me tell
    you at the State Department and Department of Defense we are
    worried about Iranian support to the Taliban. We are worried
    about the Gulf money coming to the Taliban. We are----
        Senator Shaheen. I totally agree with that.
        Secretary Pompeo. We are working diligently against every
    one of those threats both diplomatically and from a security
    perspective to protect our soldiers.
        Then finally, to protect our soldiers further, we have been
    working diplomatically to get peace and reconciliation in
    Afghanistan. We have a ceasefire that began at the start of Eid
    al-Adha. We have now had a significant prisoner exchange. Since
    February 29, the agreement entered into, we have not had a
    single attack against an American soldier. This is the finest
    in American diplomacy, and I am incredibly proud of what my
    team has done, my State Department team has done, to protect
    American soldiers.
        Senator Shaheen. So do you think it would be helpful for
    President Trump to talk to Vladimir Putin and tell him that he
    needs to back off in terms of paying the Taliban to kill
    American troops?
        Secretary Pompeo. I always leave it to the President what
    he wants to say to other leaders. I do not think there is any
    doubt in the mind of every Russian leader, including Vladimir
    Putin, about the expectations of the United States of America
    not to kill Americans. I can promise you that the 300 Russians
    who were in Syria and who took action to threaten America who
    are no longer on this planet understand that too.
        Senator Shaheen. When you were here last time, we talked
    about the potential for negotiations with the Taliban in
    Afghanistan. That was before an agreement was reached. There
    was an exchange that you and I had about the role of Afghan
    women in any talks with the Taliban. You said that Afghan women
    should fend for themselves.
        Well, we have seen the outcome of our reticence to support
    Afghan women. The agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban
    failed to mention the rights of Afghan women, and it contains
    no guarantees for their continued constitutional protection.
        Is the policy to have Afghan women fend for themselves
    consistent, do you believe, with the legal mandate for the U.S.
    to support ``the meaningful inclusion of women in peace talks''
    as directed by the Women, Peace, and Security Act that was
    signed into law by President Trump?
        Secretary Pompeo. I would have to go look and see what I
    said.
        No. We are doing our level best to make sure that we
    protect every Afghan, male and female. I have seen the at least
    tentative composition of the Afghan negotiating team, and I
    think you will be pleased with it.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I am out of time, but the ``fend for
    themselves'' is an exact quote from your statement when you
    were before this committee.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Mr. Secretary, people always say actions speak louder than
    words. Do you think the specific action the United States of
    America took against General Soleimani sent a message to every
    country on this planet of what would happen to people who
    targeted United States soldiers on the battlefield?
        Secretary Pompeo. I do.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Romney.
        Senator Romney. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to see you and I appreciate
    you appearing before this committee.
        I am one of many who applauds your recent addresses with
    regards to China. In these you have called out their predatory
    behavior, economic, military, geopolitical, and you note that
    we have to confront China with our friends and allies if we are
    going to be successful in diverting them from their course of
    predation. It is a very welcome assessment, a very clear-eyed
    evaluation of China's intent and their actions, and a statement
    of what our mission must be with regards to China.
        It is also a welcomed departure from the President's
    fawning praise of Xi Jinping and celebration of agreements that
    China has not honored.
        It is also in my view inconsistent with actions that we
    have taken that have offended our allies at a time we need to
    be drawing them closer to us. One, of course, is the steel and
    aluminum tariffs against our friends and allies that I thought
    were misplaced. I would have rather focused our entire
    ammunition on China.
        The other, of course, is most recently, as Senator Shaheen
    has just indicated, the withdrawal of troops from Germany and
    doing so while expressing an intent to punish Germany for the
    fact that they spend approximately one and a half percent of
    their GDP on their military as opposed to the two percent NATO
    target, even though they have indicated that they are on track
    to get to the 2 percent number.
        I have heard from highest levels of the German Government
    that this is seen by them as an insult to Germany. I cannot
    imagine at a time when we need to be drawing in our friends and
    allies so that we can collectively confront China, that we want
    to insult them.
        My question is this, however, which is what actions will
    the Administration take to bring our allies together in a way
    that is different than what we have done in the past. I mean, I
    know there is always lots of talk going on and any
    Administration can talk about all the things happening, but are
    we going to do that is distinct, that is different, that is
    dramatic to bring the nations that follow the rule of law
    together so that we can hopefully reach some kind of a common
    approach or common strategy in how we are going to deal with
    China economically, militarily, geopolitically, and then
    collectively confront them with the intent of dissuading them
    from pursuing the course that they are on? We obviously do not
    want to go to war economically, militarily, or otherwise, but
    we do want to dissuade them. I think that can only happen when
    we are--as you have pointed out, when we can do that with
    others.
        I would note something you said at the Nixon Library. You
    said, ``maybe it is time for a new grouping of likeminded
    nations, a new alliance of democracies.'' I think that is a
    good idea, but I am interested in what actions of a new and
    dramatic nature are you considering or are you willing to take
    in order to accomplish the objective you described.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it is absolutely the case that
    to confront the Chinese Communist Party is going to take a
    global effort. That is absolutely true. That is why I talked
    about this idea perhaps of a new alliance of democracies. What
    shape that would take there is lots of discussion about and
    many conversations with friends in the region.
        Step one, Senator, to be honest with you has been to awaken
    the world to this threat. For an awful long time not just the
    United States, but the whole world saw that there were
    lucrative opportunities in China, and that was basically
    foreign policy. Sell as much as you can. Outsource jobs. Build
    supply chains. So I spent my first year and change traveling
    the world trying to raise awareness of the threat.
        I think that is new and different. You may say it is not
    enough, but it was not happening before. I went through the
    list of things that have begun to turn the tide.
        I will say there are still nations who understand this
    threat, but do not feel like they are empowered, that they are
    in a position where they withstand the threats that come from
    the Chinese Communist Party. So we are working--our diplomats--
    trying to build out a set of relationships, and whether that is
    part of a formal organization or not, I am not sure I know the
    answer to yet, but to convince them, to convince them that
    America is prepared to lead in pushing back against the Chinese
    Communist Party, and when they do, we will be there to support
    them.
        We have some 26 lines of effort of the State Department,
    and there is probably an equal amount at the Department of
    Defense, all aimed centrally at building out this set of
    alliances both in Southeast Asia and more broadly with our Five
    Eyes partners and with the Quad to build out a set of
    commitments that can robustly communicate to the Chinese
    Communist Party that enough. You have to behave on the global
    stage. If you want to behave on the global stage, you have got
    to do it under a set of rules that has created so much
    prosperity around the world. That may be unsatisfying, Senator
    Romney, but it is still a real work in progress to get everyone
    fully aligned.
        I mentioned the EU dialogue. Very important. Foreign
    Minister Borrell, High Representative Borrell, asked me if we
    would have a dialogue with them on China. That took a lot of
    effort to get 27 EU nations to say, yes, this is something we
    have got to confront, to identify as a systemic rival. There is
    lots of spade work that goes into what seems pretty simple I
    suppose.
        Senator Romney. I think it is the most important work that
    we will be doing as a country and as an Administration as we
    face this challenge.
        Just a parenthetical comment that comes to mind, as you are
    speaking, and that relates to a discussion that was held
    earlier with regard to tech companies that Senator Johnson
    raised. I know there is great interest, sometimes politically,
    to go after some of the big tech companies, Google, Amazon, and
    so forth, Facebook, and berate them for their market power. If
    they violate American antitrust laws, why, that is totally
    appropriate.
        I would note that we are in a global competition, and China
    has been successful in driving a lot of Western companies out
    of business. They have not been successful in driving companies
    like these out of business. These are thriving and succeeding.
    The last thing we ought to be doing is trying to knock down
    businesses in the United States that are succeeding on a global
    stage. So we need to be careful not to flex our muscle and
    berate those entities that are successful and are beating
    China. I mean, Alibaba would like to replace Amazon. TikTok
    would like to replace Instagram. So it is just an area of
    concern, and I hope that you are able to point these things out
    to other members of the Administration who care deeply about
    that.
        Finally, were you surprised by the fact that--what was it--
    57 countries supported China--53 countries supported China's
    crackdown on Hong Kong? Did that shock you as it did me?
        Secretary Pompeo. I was surprised and dismayed.
        Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
        Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, for
    holding this important hearing today. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me just start with two specific issues, if I can, that
    I think are important. I want to associate myself with a number
    of areas that have been explored, but let me touch on these
    two.
        I am working with members of this committee and your
    Department to resolve terrorism-related claims against Sudan,
    which is in the middle of a critical democratic transition, to
    provide justice and compensation for over 700 terror victims
    and their family members and to move our bilateral relationship
    forward after 30 years under the brutal dictatorship of Omar
    al-Bashir. I just want to urge you and the Administration to do
    everything that you can to support Prime Minister Hamdok to
    make sure that we seize this opportunity to bring real justice
    to the victims and their American families and foreign
    nationals involved and to build a new democratic partner in the
    region.
        Have you personally engaged on this issue, and can you
    commit to working transparently with Congress as we try to find
    a solution urgently?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, thank you for your work.
    This is really important.
        We have proposed that there is legal peace resolution that
    would be in legislation that will be before Congress here in
    the very, very near term. We think it is the appropriate time
    to both bring justice to those from the 1998 bombings and get a
    real opportunity for Prime Minister Hamdok. I have talked to
    him a handful of times. I have talked to other of the leaders
    there in Sudan. This is an opportunity that does not come along
    often. We all know the history of Sudan and the tragedy there.
    There is a chance not only for democracy to begun to be built
    out, but perhaps regional opportunities that could flow from
    that as well. I think lifting the state sponsor of terrorism
    designation there, if we can take care of the victims of those
    tragedies, it would be a good thing for American foreign
    policy. I appreciate your assistance in that regard.
        Senator Coons. We have a number of members of this
    committee with strong interests, and it is my hope that we can
    move in a way that respects those constituent interests and
    also makes progress and does not miss this moment.
        On the Global Fragility Act, it is legislation that was
    bipartisan that I led here with Senator Graham and President
    Trump signed into law last December. It requires a long-term,
    whole-of-government strategy to address extremism and
    instability in fragile states.
        The first deliverable under this legislation, the Global
    Fragility Strategy, is due September 15. Congress really is not
    looking for old wine in new bottles. So we just urge you to
    look at the GFA as a tool to rethink our approach to these
    challenges and improve the way that State, AID, and DoD work
    together.
        How are you using the tools Congress provided in the GFA to
    address the consequences of this pandemic and development,
    governance, security? Can you commit that you will look hard at
    and resolve a technical issue on the creation of the prevention
    and stabilization fund, which was designed to replace and
    improve on the rapid response fund in the statute?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, I will get back to you on
    the last question that you asked. I am familiar with it, but
    not enough to answer your question, but I will get you an
    answer briefly.
        You are right. I am tracking the first deliverable. I will
    say I saw the first pass at this. You characterized it about
    right. There was not much that was original in there, and I
    have asked the team to go back and take a set of fresh looks,
    to ask for outside views from folks on Capitol Hill, people who
    are experts around the world to see if we cannot use this tool
    that you provided us on a bipartisan basis to actually deliver
    on the stated objectives of the law. It was an important piece
    of legislation, and I do not want to miss the chance to develop
    the strategy that can then underpin all the actions we can take
    once that strategy is done. It is not something that we intend
    to put on the shelf and admire, but something we hope creates
    operational opportunities underneath that strategy.
        Senator Coons. Thank you.
        Today is the funeral service for a friend and former
    colleague, Congressman John Lewis. I was struck by a comment
    made by your former colleague, former Secretary of Defense
    General Mattis, who wrote following the weeks of protests after
    the unlawful murder of George Floyd. General Mattis wrote, I
    have watched this week's unfolding events angry and appalled.
    The words ``equal justice under law'' are carved into the
    pediment of the Supreme Court, and that is what the protesters
    are rightly demanding.
        Do you agree with General Mattis? I am concerned about the
    general direction of the most senior levels of the State
    Department. This has been raised before. I will not go through
    the GAO report, but of 189 ambassadors representing us abroad,
    only three are African American, four are Hispanic. I recognize
    that diversity in the Department has been a long-term
    challenge, but I would be interested in hearing both do you
    agree with General Mattis' comments and what do you--are
    personally doing to mentor the next crop of senior leaders and
    to diversify the seventh floor leadership team.
        Secretary Pompeo. I actually think the seventh leadership
    team, my entire communications team, my Under Secretary for
    Management, my Under Secretary for Political Affairs are all
    part of diversity groups. I am proud of what our small team has
    done, but that does not begin to accomplish what we need to get
    done in the State Department to make sure we get this right.
        By the way, it is diversity inclusion that is broad based.
    We need to make sure that we have people from all across
    America with all viewpoints, every idea from all across
    America. We have been very narrow in how we have recruited from
    a certain set of institutions and certain universities, and we
    do not get a full spectrum of understandings of America or of
    the world if we are too narrow in how we think about diversity
    inclusion.
        So we are working hard at it. We have built out a set of
    programs. Your point about not having sufficient minority
    representation in our ambassadorial levels is absolutely true.
    I guess it was 3 days ago that a set of about 23 that will be
    coming to you shortly, we had more than half of them that were
    female, the first time that has ever happened. So we are making
    progress, but I would agree that the rate of change is
    insufficient.
        Senator Coons. How do you think our own failure to address
    structural racial inequality impacts our diplomacy overseas and
    impacts our ability to advocate around human rights issues?
        Secretary Pompeo. Well, it is important that we get it
    right at home. There is no doubt about that. I would tell you
    that we are a beacon for that around the world, and I think you
    can see it in the people who want to come to the United States
    of America because it is the freest nation. It is a place that
    you have immigrants from all across the world that want to come
    here. I am a believer that people vote with their feet. They
    see America still as this greatest, most exceptional nation. We
    are not without flaws, but I think as our diplomats travel the
    world, they can be very proud of our progress----
        Senator Coons. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask a last question
    about our election. President Trump has just tweeted that we
    should delay it. I am interested in whether you were able to
    vote by mail when you served abroad in the Army, whether you
    vote by mail in your home State of Kansas, whether like many of
    us who serve in Congress in both parties, you have availed
    yourself, as do virtually all of our diplomats and development
    professionals and armed forces members, of the opportunity to
    vote securely by mail. Have you done so, and do you have any
    concerns about the security of our election this November?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator Coons, I believe I have voted by
    absentee ballot. I think while I was a soldier and I also think
    when I was a Member of Congress, I did a couple times as well.
        The State Department has some role in making sure we have
    election security. It is not our primary focus. So I will leave
    to others those who have that primary centered focus.
        Senator Coons. Is there any reason for us to be concerned
    that those votes are fraudulent or somehow ineligible to be
    counted if cast by mail or by absentee ballot by our diplomats?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I must say having a small group
    of people vote by absentee ballot is very different than
    deciding that you are going to conduct a full in-mail balloting
    program. Those are two fundamentally different pieces I will
    leave to the professionals to identify the level of risk
    associated with that.
        I also know--and I saw this in my home State of Kansas--
    when you change the voting rules in close to an election, it is
    a difficult task.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
        Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for coming in and
    being here.
        I know election security is not your area of expertise, but
    I think you can comment on what I am about to ask. I am sure
    you are well aware of influence efforts on the part of the
    Chinese and Taiwan to shape Taiwanese policies, policies of
    their government. I am certain, as most people on this
    committee I hope are aware of how they pressure political
    figures that they view are opposed to their interests. I think
    we have all witnessed--I think you will confirm this--worldwide
    that China has engaged in efforts of disinformation,
    particularly for example about the coronavirus.
        I am not asking you to comment specifically about our
    country. I think I am more than anything else asking if China
    ever decided they wanted to do those kinds of things to us,
    would you assess they have the capability to conduct a
    disinformation campaign to pressure American political figures,
    potentially even Members of Congress, the way we have seen them
    do with Taiwan and Australia and in other places. If they
    decided they wanted to do that--this is the second largest
    economy in the world, pretty significant capabilities. If they
    ever decided they wanted to come after us that way, they would
    have the capability to do it. Would they not?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, if I have just a second to
    respond to this. They certainly have the capability. I have
    talked about this. The Chinese united front is working here in
    the United States today. They are meeting with State
    legislators. They are meeting with governors. One of the things
    that was taking place out of the consulate in Houston were
    influence operations conducted by their diplomats. We have
    diplomats from all across the world who come to our offices as
    Members of Congress and talk to us about policy. What I am
    talking about is fundamentally different from that. So they not
    only have the capability, but the intention of conducting
    influence operations in the United States.
        I think we are a pretty resilient nation. I am confident
    that we will push back against that, but the world needs to
    understand that when it is happening here in the United States,
    it is happening in their countries too.
        Senator Rubio. Well, I think one of the things, the most
    interesting yesterday, is the four CEOs of these tech companies
    appeared I believe before a House committee yesterday, if I am
    not mistaken, and they were asked a very simple question. Do
    you believe--they were asked do they believe that China steals
    technology from U.S. firms. They were asked this question. I
    think there is pretty strong consensus across the board in both
    parties and in the media and elsewhere that the answer to that
    question is yes.
        The CEO of Apple said they have not experienced it. That
    was his answer.
        The CEO of Google said, neither have we.
        The CEO of Amazon says, oh, I have read that.
        Only the CEO of Facebook said, yes, absolutely.
        So Apple, Google, and Amazon answered that question by
    saying either they had not experienced it or they have read
    that somewhere, but would not comment further.
        Why would corporations such as this, some of whom, by the
    way, take it upon themselves to censor truth versus what is not
    true and what they believe some people should be saying and not
    others on the basis of what they judge to be true--why would
    three of the four CEOs of the four largest tech companies
    headquartered in the United States be afraid to answer that
    question?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I can only speculate. I mean, it
    is patently clear to anyone who is watching that the Chinese
    are engaged in intense efforts of intellectual property theft
    including to technology.
        Senator Rubio. Would it be fair in your mind to speculate
    that they try to influence people even in the business
    community?
        Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely.
        Senator Rubio. Okay.
        One more question. I think I know the answer to this as
    well, but would you agree with the belief I think again that is
    pretty widespread that China has systematically identified
    industries and technologies that they believe will be key to
    the 21st century? They actually wrote it, Made in China 2025.
    They have undertaken a systematic effort to dominate these
    industries while destroying our capability. That is what the IP
    theft is about, the forced transfer of technology, subsidies to
    their firms, blocking access to their markets. There is no
    doubt at this point that they have a very carefully crafted
    plan to dominate certain key industries for the 21st century
    and to wipe out not just our capabilities in those industries,
    but everybody else's. That is a fair assessment.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator Rubio. They have not been
    covert about this, right? They have spoken openly about how
    they are approaching their commercial interests. The only thing
    that they do not speak about is that rather than build these
    industries inside, the tools that they use are fundamentally
    different than the way western democracies do, right? We train
    our people. We build our businesses. We invest capital in the
    market. They run state-sponsored enterprises. They steal
    intellectual property. Then they endeavor to undermine the
    companies and threaten and bully countries around the world
    into buying their products.
        Senator Rubio. My last question is unrelated to China
    directly, but as you are well aware, there have been press
    reports, speculations, commentators, and the like that have
    made much about recent allegations and in one case an interview
    the President gave in which they took from it that the
    President would be willing to engage in negotiations with
    Maduro and the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
        As you understand our policy being in the position that you
    are in, could you envision, as long as this Administration is
    in office, we would ever negotiate with the Maduro regime for
    them to remain in power?
        Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely not. Our policy is not to
    negotiate with them for anything other than his departure from
    ruling that country.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        After the next questioner, we are going take a 10-minute
    recess, but right now, Senator Udall, the floor is yours.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Pompeo, I appreciate your time and testimony
    today.
        I want to start with an important subject, democracy
    promotion. Earlier this year, you called for free and fair
    elections in Venezuela and Nicaragua. If free and fair
    elections are held and the current occupants of power lose, the
    State Department then strongly encourages those leaders to step
    down from power. I think that sort of thing is an important
    pillar of our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis. Correct?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. I am hearing growing concern in this country
    about whether we are going to set a good example in our
    November election. In a recent Fox News interview, Chris
    Wallace asked President Trump whether he would give a ``direct
    answer that you will accept the election'' in November. In
    response, President Trump said I have to see. No. I am not
    going to just say yes. No. I am not going to say no. I didn't
    say last time either.
        During a 2016 debate, he stated, I will tell you at the
    time. I will keep you in suspense.
        He has also called voting by mail, as you know, one of the
    major ways Americans vote, especially in a pandemic--he said
    over and over again the election is rigged if it is vote by
    mail.
        So, Secretary Pompeo, if President Trump refuses to accept
    the upcoming November election due to his lack of faith in
    voting by mail, will you respect the results of a certified
    election as the State Department typically does throughout the
    world?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to speculate. You
    had about 15 ``ifs'' in there. You should know I have said
    repeatedly to this committee I will follow the rule of law,
    follow the Constitution. I have endeavored to do that in
    everything I have done, and I will continue to do that every
    day.
        Senator Udall. The President has made this a legitimate
    question in Americans' minds through his own statements. Former
    Pennsylvania Governor and Homeland Security Secretary Tom
    Ridge, a Republican, as you know, says ``I think it is very sad
    and very disappointing that with almost 5 months to go, the
    President seems to want to try to delegitimize the November 3
    election. It just seems to me that this may be an indication he
    is more worried about the outcome than he is worried about the
    fraud.''
        This is a serious domestic and foreign policy question. We
    need to set a good example about the peaceful transition of
    power or else we undermine our entire foreign policy.
        George Kennan wrote in his Long Telegram that in order to
    counter the Soviet Union, ``much depends on the health and
    vigor of our own society.'' I think that is just as true today
    about Russia, China, Venezuela, Iran, and other authoritarian
    regimes that we have challenges with. I can imagine few
    scenarios that would endanger our society more than a
    presidential candidate who refuses to accept the outcome of an
    election.
        Secretary Pompeo, this year the Committee to Protect
    Journalists issued a report on the harm this President has
    caused to journalists' First Amendment rights. In their
    summary, the committee states, ``the Trump administration has
    stepped up the prosecutions of news sources, interfered in the
    business of media owners, harassed journalists crossing U.S.
    borders, and empowered foreign leaders to restrict their own
    media, but Trump's most effective ploy has been to destroy the
    credibility of the press, dangerously undermining truth and
    consensus even as the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to kill tens
    of thousands of Americans.''
        Are you concerned that instead of promoting press freedom
    abroad, America is now providing moral support to authoritarian
    efforts to crack down on critical media outlets from Russia to
    China to Venezuela and beyond?
        Secretary Pompeo. No, I am not remotely concerned about
    that.
        Senator Udall. Over 150,000 Americans have now died from
    COVID-19 and we mourn their loss. Like most tragedies, this is
    one that could have been prevented. Like the President's
    response to Hurricane Maria and other disasters, the Federal
    Government's response has been nowhere near up to the
    challenge. Instead, this Administration is now trying to change
    the narrative by attacking its own citizens at home and
    weakening the United States abroad.
        Across the world, our allies in New Zealand, Japan,
    Australia, South Korea, and many in Europe have taken the
    science and the threat of COVID-19 seriously. The result is
    that they are beginning to return to normal. Even countries
    with very different systems than ours, such as Communist
    Vietnam and Cuba, are beginning to reemerge from this deadly
    disease.
        Secretary Pompeo, the best practices of these countries is
    simple: isolate, track and trace, quarantine, and wear a mask.
    We do not even know if the National Security Advisor has met
    with you or other members of the National Security Council
    lately. The U.S. has not done those things sufficiently, and
    here we are.
        Secretary Pompeo, you and the White House seem to want to
    blame China for our inability to respond to this pandemic as
    well as to our allies. Is it true that their handling of the
    virus--and it is true that their handling the virus at the
    early onset was problematic, but we are responsible for our own
    response. Do you think the President should look to Europe,
    South Korea, Japan, and other more successful nations to learn
    about how to better contain this pandemic?
        Secretary Pompeo. An awful lot to unpack there, Senator.
        First, I would tell you that some of the countries that you
    identified--you are looking at the data that they are putting
    out. It is worthless. So when you are comparing it to data from
    other countries, one ought not in a Senate hearing put that
    data forward as dispositive about the conditions on the ground
    in those countries. It is silly. They are not tracking. They
    are not counting cases. So we need to make sure we have a
    shared factual database.
        Yes, we should look everywhere to get best practices about
    how to respond to this. I know that our doctors--Dr. Birx who
    works for me is now over at the White House working on this.
    They have done that, and we will continue to do it to make sure
    we protect the American people in an appropriate way.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        With that, the committee is going to be at ease subject to
    the call of the chair for approximately 10 minutes.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Next up, Senator Barrasso.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you again.
        I appreciated your comments in the opening statement
    specifically related to Nord Stream 2, and I wanted to ask a
    little bit more about that because we know energy security is
    essential to national security. Nord Stream 2 threatens
    European energy security, increases Russian monopoly over the
    region. To me this pipeline is a Russian trap. I strongly
    support your recent announcement aimed at stopping this
    dangerous pipeline.
        As you know, Congress is working to quickly provide the
    Administration with additional tools to prevent Nord Stream 2
    from ever being completed. In the last few weeks, both the
    Senate and House passed their own versions of the National
    Defense Authorization Act. It includes new bipartisan Nord
    Stream 2 sanctions.
        Could you talk about the Administration's commitment to
    opposing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and applying sanctions
    against those companies aiding in the completion of this
    Russian trap?
        Secretary Pompeo. The irony is that this Administration is
    accused by some of not being tough on Russia. President Trump
    personally took on this. He saw that this was a threat, that
    this pipeline created enormous leverage for Russia not only
    against Germany and the broader Europe, but Ukraine as well. So
    we set about it with good support from Capitol Hill, and we got
    legislation that was appropriate to now have delayed this
    project significantly. When we need further tools, we are
    prepared to use those tools should you provide them to us.
        We have also used our diplomatic capabilities to make clear
    to countries that we are going to do the other end too. We are
    going to make sure that American LNG can be sold into these
    countries. We want Europe to have a secure, stable, diverse set
    of energy opportunities, and our Department of Energy has
    worked alongside of us to do that. Our E&R Department,
    Assistant Secretary Fannon, are working to make sure that
    Europe has real, secure, stable, safe energy sources that
    cannot be turned off in the event that Russia decides they want
    to do so. We think Nord Stream 2 is dangerous in that respect,
    and we do everything we can to make sure that that pipeline
    does not threaten Europe.
        Senator Barrasso. Mr. Secretary, I would like to move now
    to the Iranian arms embargo. The international arms embargo in
    Iran, as you know, is set to expire October of this year. To my
    great astonishment, we are having to persuade the international
    community of the importance of preventing Iran, the world's
    leading state sponsor of terror, from purchasing advanced
    weapons. It will dramatically increase the ability of Iran to
    arm terrorists in proxy groups across the region. We have seen
    that more weapons will likely flow to Hamas and the Houthis,
    Hezbollah in Lebanon. Despite the terrible consequences, many
    experts believe that any extension of the Iranian arms embargo
    would be vetoed by Russia or by China.
        What do Russia and China want the Iran arms embargo--why
    would they want it to expire? Is the Chinese Communist Party
    really willing to betray global security in order to be Iran's
    arms dealer?
        Secretary Pompeo. Well, I hope not, but I expect so.
        We have been working to convince the Russians to permit
    this arms embargo to be extended. We are talking to the Chinese
    for months and months and months. We are working with our E3
    counterparts as well.
        We will submit a UN Security Council resolution in the near
    future. We will offer to extend this. This is one of the
    central failings of the JCPOA was to have only a 5-year ban on
    the Iranian capacity to both purchase weapon systems, build out
    air defense systems, the capacity to protect a nuclear program
    should they continue down that path, but also to sell weapons
    around the world and become again, as they were before, one of
    the world's largest arms dealers.
        We are going to do everything we can. We believe we have
    the capacity to do this at the United Nations. We hope that the
    UN Security Council will conclude that extending this arms
    embargo is the right thing. In the event they do not, we are
    going to use every tool that we have at our fingertips to make
    sure that that arms embargo is not lifted on October 18 of this
    year. We think it decreases stability in the Middle East. We
    think that would threaten Israel. We are confident it reduces
    American security as well.
        Senator Barrasso. On to religious freedom. Sam Brownback, a
    former member of this body, Ambassador-at-Large for
    International Religious Freedom, recently wrote humanity is why
    religious freedom will always win out against governments and
    non-state actors seeking to repress and control it.
        We have seen around the world authoritarian regimes
    continuing to attempt to restrict religious freedoms and the
    rights of individuals.
        Could you discuss efforts by the Administration that you
    have taken to promote international religious freedoms?
        Secretary Pompeo. So we have raised the priority of
    international religious freedom inside of the State Department.
    I think that has happened, and I think under President Trump
    and Vice President Pence that has happened all across the
    Administration. We use our diplomatic tools to encourage it. We
    build resilience. We work with religious communities in many
    countries to provide them security. The work that we are doing
    in northern Iraq today is a good example, but there are still
    lots of challenges. What is happening in Nigeria to Christians
    today, it is happening to Muslims in western China. Your point
    about the threat to religious freedom and the exercise of
    conscience for people of all faiths is under attack in too many
    places.
        The State Department has an important role to increase the
    capacity for people to exercise their rights of religious
    freedom. We held these two ministerials. We were not able to do
    it this year because of the virus, but we brought people from
    all across the world. The world's largest human rights
    gatherings in all of history were held at the State Department
    twice around the central idea that people need to be able to
    exercise this important right to just have their own faith.
        Senator Barrasso. Earlier today--I am going to move on to
    China--I think you called the Chinese Communist Party the
    central threat of our times. We had your Deputy here a couple
    of weeks ago, had a chance to talk about the issues related to
    China.
        To me they are working to expand their military
    capabilities to advance their global ambitions. They want to
    dominate globally. In the last few months, we have seen them
    increase military aggression whether it is near Taiwan, the
    South China Sea, Japan. We have seen incursions, what they have
    been doing in Hong Kong, what they have been doing at home.
        Can you talk about the recent confrontations by China and
    what that taught us about China's military ambitions, as well
    as their capabilities? Because when we go to secure briefings,
    we ask lots about their capabilities not just what they might
    do but what they can do, not will they or will they not, but
    can they or can they not.
        Secretary Pompeo. So I think these actions--and when you
    say recent, the last 24, 36 months. I think the actions are
    entirely consistent with what they have been signaling to the
    world for decades, you might even argue since 1989, but
    certainly since General Secretary Xi came to power. It is a
    desire to expand their power, their reach. They talk about
    this. They talk about bringing socialism with Chinese
    characteristics to the world. You identified some, but a claim
    that they have now made for real estate in Bhutan, the
    incursion that took place in India--these are indicative of
    Chinese intentions. They are testing. They are probing. They
    are probing the world to see if we are going to stand up to
    their threats or their bullying. I am more confident than I was
    even a year ago that the world is prepared to do that. There is
    a lot more work to do, and we need to be serious about it.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me say at the outset I am very grateful for your
    proposal to double the budget of the Global Engagement Center.
    This is, of course, a center to counteract propaganda outside
    of the United States that was established through legislation
    written by myself and Senator Portman. I am glad that you have
    recognized the importance and the good work of that center.
        Though we have spent a lot of time in this hearing talking
    about many of our concerns regarding our adversaries' desire to
    use propaganda not outside of the United States, but in fact
    inside of the United States to influence the 2020 election--and
    so I want to begin by asking you a question about that.
        Russia in particular has sought to weave together stories
    about U.S. persons and Ukrainian persons over the course of the
    past year in order to both try to sow chaos and dissent in the
    United States, but also to try to screw with Ukrainian politics
    as well. It is kind of a double whammy for the Russians. You
    can see those efforts ramping up as we head into the 2020
    election.
        Probably the most active foreign individual pushing
    narratives about the United States in Ukraine is a Ukrainian
    legislator by the name of Andrii Derkach. He was the individual
    that magically came into possession of secret audio recordings
    of Vice President Biden and then President Poroshenko. He has
    retained a government relations counsel here, and I would
    expect that he is going to be a pretty active presence in U.S.
    politics from here to the election.
        So just a simple question on behalf of my constituents and
    maybe my colleagues as well. Should we view Andrii Derkach as a
    credible source of information?
        Secretary Pompeo. I will answer your question, but let me
    say real quick because I think that is important. Thank you for
    the compliment. I want to make sure--the only thing I am
    worried about with asking for a doubling of the money is to
    make sure that we can deploy it. We have been pretty successful
    as it has grown, but when you expand something at 100 percent
    year on year, I have a team driving to make sure we do not
    misuse or waste those resources.
        I do not want to comment on any particular individual like
    Mr. Derkach.
        I will say this. We are taking seriously the threats that
    Russia will try to engage in disinformation campaigns, that
    there may be oligarchs that try and engage in this. There may
    be foreign actors, not just Russian. We were pretty successful
    at this in the 2018 election. I say we, not the State
    Department alone, but all the United States Government. I am
    confident we will be in this one as well.
        Senator Murphy. Why would you not be willing to opine on a
    specific individual if you had information to suggest that the
    source was not credible? It seems as if that is in fact a core
    function of the U.S. Government, if it has information that
    would suggest malign influence, to let Congress and the
    American people know.
        Secretary Pompeo. So when it is appropriate, I will. When
    there is still work ongoing and there is still unsettled
    intelligence around these things, I am going to try to be just
    a little bit more careful, Senator.
        Senator Murphy. Let me turn to China for a moment.
        China is clearly seeking to use the United States' failure
    to control COVID as a means to leapfrog us in our traditional
    leadership position when it comes to global health. Senator
    Romney referred to this earlier.
        I think we have given two big gifts to the Chinese since
    the beginning of this outbreak.
        The first was the President's just remarkable fawning over
    China's early response to the virus. Forty-seven different
    times he commended China for their response and their
    transparency.
        I think China also is pretty happy with our withdrawal from
    the WHO. I understand that you believe, as I understand it,
    that our withdrawal from the WHO is a lever to try to seek
    internal change. I would disagree. It also seems to allow for
    China to step in and occupy that vacuum. So as you step back
    and try to articulate this sort of broad strategy to counteract
    China's growing influence in the world, how does withdrawal
    from the WHO counteract the growing influence of China?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it is a good question. These are
    close calls sometimes. We left the UN Human Rights Council. The
    same argument was made, better to fight from within than to try
    and reform from outside. I think there are reasonable arguments
    that can be made on either side.
        The decision that the President made--and I concur with
    this decision--went through multiple rounds of reforms at the
    World Health Organization. Our team in Geneva fought for years,
    in previous administrations, too. Each time we got reforms,
    there was no capacity to make that a science-based organization
    and not a political one. There comes a point where you are
    spending half a billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money year on
    year that goes to benefit political actors inside the World
    Health Organization, and we ultimately made the conclusion that
    we were more likely to achieve the global health security
    issues that the United States cares about deeply if we did not
    participate any further in the World Health Organization.
        I am not at all convinced that it will be China that
    benefits from that. I am convinced that the world will benefit.
    We saw it with PEPFAR. We have seen it with GAVI. We have seen
    it other places. When the United States leads--and we will
    absolutely lead--good things can happen in the international
    health realm.
        Senator Murphy. It will not surprise you that I would
    dispute your characterization of the WHO. It is an
    international body. There is no way there will not be some
    level of politics affecting the decisions that a body made up
    of historic adversaries will go through. It is a science-based
    organization, and it is one that is indispensable to the
    continuation of our efforts to try to prevent the next disease.
    I really shudder to think about our ability to stop the next
    COVID if we are not back in the WHO.
        Finally, in the remaining time I have, this a complicated
    question. Again, back to Senator Romney's line of questioning
    about the capabilities that we should be developing with our
    allies to try counteract China.
        I just do not think it is sustainable for this
    Administration or any other Administration to try to go around
    the world bullying and shaming our friends and sort of half-
    friends into not doing business with China. We have got to have
    an answer for the things that China is offering. On the
    technology front, we do not have a great answer for 5G, and we
    may not have a great answer for whatever China is going to put
    out there on AI or advanced battery technology.
        Is this not essential to our counter China strategy, not
    just to shame other countries into forsaking Chinese
    technology, but actually to work with our allies to develop our
    own alternatives?
        Secretary Pompeo. 1,000 percent. Absolutely, Senator
    Murphy.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
        Senator Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    having the opportunity to let us talk to the Secretary of State
    today. This has been very helpful and very informative.
        I will say with regard to China and developing technologies
    with our allies, we have a lot to do right here in the United
    States to get our own house in order. So we are pretty good at
    pointing fingers at China and it is usually appropriate, but we
    also are not doing much here to protect ourselves.
        I want to thank you because you have provided some great
    help from your career professionals with regard to our efforts
    to push back against China taking our technology. In
    particular, China has these programs. You mentioned they have
    been doing it for a while. They have been doing it for 2
    decades where they come over here, they find promising research
    and researchers. They systematically target them and then they
    take that research over to China. It is military. It is
    economic. It is health care. It is everything.
        Over the last couple years, we have worked hard on this
    with an investigation, a report, and now legislation called the
    Safeguarding American Innovation Act.
        With regard to the State Department piece of this, your
    career people have come and testified before us, said that they
    need more tools to be able to stop folks who they know are
    coming here to deal with export control technologies, who are
    coming over here to actually take--steal our stuff and take it
    back to China. They are unable to stop those people from coming
    in despite affiliations with the People's Liberation Army,
    affiliations with the Chinese Communist Party, and in many
    cases a history of taking research.
        So we worked with one of your Pearson fellows. You told me
    about the Pearson Fellowship and I took advantage of it. In the
    last year, Mark Wuebbels has been working with us. He is a
    Consular Affairs Officer. He has done a terrific job. We have
    put together some legislation that is very balanced. It says,
    hey, we want research. We want the American research enterprise
    to benefit from international cooperation, but we do not want
    to have this U.S. taxpayer-funded research being stolen. So I
    thank you for that.
        I would just ask you, do you agree that these new visa
    authorities we have in that legislation are helpful to protect
    taxpayer-funded research and intellectual property from our
    adversaries, including China?
        Secretary Pompeo. They definitely are, and we need an
    expanded tool set to make sure that we get this right. We are
    making progress. Our teams, working alongside the FBI to
    identify these risks, are working hard on this set of issues.
        I will say this, too. We all need to be candid. When we go
    back to our home States and we talk to the universities in our
    States, the educational industrial complex is alive and well.
    We need to be candid with them about what is taking place in
    some of these institutions of higher learning all across
    America and be thoughtful about how we respond to this
    influence and theft operation that is being conducted.
        Senator Portman. That is absolutely right. You know, there
    are five different provisions in the legislation. One of them
    relates directly to our universities and research institutions.
    To their credit, a number of them have worked with us and we
    have worked with them. Senator Carper and I have taken the lead
    on this in this legislation. It is a bipartisan bill, but there
    are universities and associations that are pushing back hard,
    and frankly I think they are naive and are not willing to face
    up to the threat that is out there. It is a national security
    threat.
        I am glad that over the last couple of weeks that we have
    had the opportunity to confirm some good nominees from the
    Department of State, and I am concerned that the backlog built
    up to the point where you really had a tough time running the
    Department. There is more to go. We have more nominees coming
    up next week. I understand we might have finally the nominee
    for Ambassador to Japan at a critical time.
        One I want to ask you about, though, in particular is
    Ukraine. Senator Cardin is not here today, but back in 2014, we
    went over to Ukraine right after the Revolution of Dignity. In
    those 6 years intervening, a lot of good has happened in
    Ukraine. A lot of bad has happened too. We see it right now we
    are once again at a tipping point. The ceasefire is not
    holding. I understand there have been about 100 violations of
    it recently. The Russian aggression continues. Ukraine made a
    decision 6 years ago to turn to us in the West, and yet we
    still have a situation where they are not getting the support
    that they need.
        So two questions for you. Number one, how important is it
    to get Lieutenant General Dayton confirmed as the Ambassador to
    Ukraine? I think he is highly qualified. I am really pleased
    with that nomination.
        Number two, do you agree with what we just did in the
    national defense authorization bill which was to have a record
    amount of lethal aid going to Ukraine? We have gone from
    roughly $50 million to $125 million in that legislation. Do you
    support that increased funding for lethal aid for Ukraine to be
    able to defend itself?
        Secretary Pompeo. I do. The Administration does support the
    increase in lethal aid. It is important to get the general out
    there, although I will say our charge on the ground there today
    is doing very, very good work, but it is important to get a
    confirmed Ambassador in that position.
        If I might just add this too. We are still thinking. It was
    a real loss when Ambassador Volcker departed. The work that he
    was doing was important to the State Department's overall
    effort in the region, and we are hoping to get that position
    with just the right person filled as well so that we have a
    full-on effort there to help the Ukrainian people maintain
    their democracy.
        Senator Portman. We will have a chance to talk to
    Lieutenant General Dayton at least remotely when he comes, but
    he has done a good job in my view of modernizing their military
    and knows the Ukrainian issues inside and out. He is the right
    person at the right time, and I am pleased he is going to step
    up and do it. It was a good choice.
        With regard to Germany, just my point of view for what it
    is worth. I am not asking you a question here particularly, but
    I think moving troops out of Germany is a good idea if they
    stay in Europe. In particular, Poland has been asking for years
    now to allow U.S. troops to come to Poland. They have even
    offered us a base. I was there several years ago where they
    agreed to pay for the base. I do not know if that is still an
    offer, but the Baltics, Eastern Europe in particular, it seems
    to me that is the appropriate place to move those troops. I
    agree that Germany is not the right place for the number of
    troops that we have. Rather, they should be closer to where the
    action is and frankly the countries that are at most risk right
    now.
        So I do not know if you have any comment on that, but I
    would hope that they would be able to stay in Europe.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the only thing I will add--I
    will leave it to the Department of Defense to talk about exact
    dispositions and numbers in particular countries.
        With respect to Poland, we do not yet have our defense
    cooperation agreement quite done. So the State Department is
    working diligently with our DoD colleagues to get that done so
    that in the event the Department of Defense makes that
    decision, the President concludes it is the right thing to do,
    we can put those forces in there in a way that protects them as
    well.
        Senator Portman. Finally, just on the Global Engagement
    Center, thanks to Senator Murphy for raising those issues. He
    asked the same kind of questions that I would have asked.
        Lea Gabrielle, in my view, is doing a terrific job with
    trying to reorder and take the DoD money that is now going
    directly to you and use it more effectively. We, of course,
    agree with you that that needs to be well spent.
        There is a timely example on this. The United States under
    your leadership has provided $2.3 billion of congressionally
    appropriated money to help other countries combat COVID-19. I
    think we have gotten very little credit for it. I hope that we
    can do more in terms of talking about what we are doing that is
    helpful, but what has happened is instead China and Russia are
    spreading disinformation, and we have heard about it here in
    this committee saying that the virus was created in a lab by
    Bill Gates or that COVID-19 was brought to China by American
    soldiers, and other false narratives. The Global Engagement
    Center is the perfect place to push back on that, and I hope we
    are doing that.
        I do not know if you have any comment on that.
        Secretary Pompeo. No, sir. We are working on that. It is
    important.
        I actually think with respect to COVID, I think the world
    gets it. I think they know who the bad actor here was. They
    cannot all say it publicly, but I am convinced that the efforts
    not only that the United States has made, but other countries,
    too, to push back against this disinformation have been
    powerful and effective.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome.
        Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. The context in which we have this hearing is
    very, very complicated. It is just almost too much to talk
    about.
        In the last 24 hours, we passed 150,000 deaths in this
    country to coronavirus, and in my view and I think in the view
    of many, a sizable percentage of those were preventable had the
    United States handled the pandemic better. This morning, the
    Department of Commerce indicated that the economy, because of
    COVID, shrunk at the greatest rate ever in recorded history in
    the second quarter of the year.
        Then this morning, the President is suggesting that the
    presidential election should be delayed. I sort of want to
    start there. This is not something either you or I were
    prepared to talk about today because I think it happened in the
    middle of the hearing.
        The President sent out a tweet that said, ``Delay the
    election until people can properly, securely, and safely
    vote?'' Not saying it will happen, but raising a question. Can
    a President delay the November presidential election, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to enter a legal
    judgment on that on the fly this morning.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, you are an honors graduate of
    West Point. You are a graduate of the Harvard Law School. You
    were on the Harvard Law Review. I was at Harvard Law School,
    and I went to a lot of Red Sox games. I was not on the Harvard
    Law Review.
        Secretary Pompeo. Very kind of you. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. You are one of the most highly trained and
    accomplished lawyers who are part of this Administration. Can a
    President delay a presidential election?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the Department of Justice,
    others will make that legal determination. We all should want--
    I know you do, too, Senator Kaine--to make sure we have an
    election that everyone is confident in.
        Senator Kaine. Are you indifferent to the date of the
    election?
        Secretary Pompeo. It should happen lawfully.
        Senator Kaine. Right. It should happen lawfully.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. So for the record, because you may not want
    to comment on it, but I do think it is important. A President
    cannot delay an election. The date of the election is
    established by Congress. It was established in 1845. There is
    no ability for a President to delay an election. I do not think
    it is that hard a question or one that should lead to any
    equivocation by somebody who is fourth in line of succession to
    be President of the United States. Let me ask another question.
        Was Marie Yovanovitch a talented public servant?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to comment on
    that personnel matter.
        Senator Kaine. Was she a valuable part of the State
    Department family?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, again, the President made the
    very clear decision that he preferred that she not be our
    Ambassador. It is fully within his right----
        Senator Kaine. That completely----
        Secretary Pompeo. Every one of us that takes on these jobs
    knows that at any minute we could be gone.
        Senator Kaine. I am not asking that. This is not a question
    about the President's power.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. I am asking about your opinion of her as a
    public servant.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I did not interact with
    Ambassador Yovanovitch.
        Senator Kaine. You did not?
        Secretary Pompeo. No, not significantly.
        Senator Kaine. So you do not really have--you do not
    consider that you have----
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to talk about
    this. There will be a place and a time for me to talk about
    this, and I am looking forward to that. It is not the case that
    I talk about personnel matters in public.
        Senator Kaine. You were very willing to tell us what you
    did not like about the Inspector General in response to Senator
    Menendez----
        Secretary Pompeo. I was. A very different situation, a
    very, very different situation. There have been accusations
    about misconduct and malfeasance and assertions that I fired
    someone because they were investigating me. It demands a
    response. There is going to be a public report. This is
    different.
        Senator Kaine. I want to make sure I understand your
    testimony.
        Secretary Pompeo. I have been steadfast in this.
        So you have asked me about other ambassadors before, too. I
    have not talked about them who were great and doing wonderful
    things. I did not say that either.
        Senator Kaine. I am trying to determine whether you have
    been steadfast or not since I have so many State Department
    employees that live in the Commonwealth of Virginia----
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. --who are very, very concerned about whether
    or not a Secretary of State might have the back of a career
    professional who is a valued person.
        You were on a phone call with President Trump and President
    Zelensky of Ukraine when the President said about Ambassador
    Yovanovitch she is going to go through some things. Do you know
    what the President meant when he said that?
        Secretary Pompeo. I do not.
        Senator Kaine. You were on that call. That has been
    reported----
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, I was.
        Senator Kaine. When he said that about Marie Yovanovitch,
    did you ever follow up and ask the President what he meant?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am confident that every action
    we took with Ambassador Yovanovitch was completely appropriate.
        Senator Kaine. That is not the question I asked.
        Secretary Pompeo. It is the truth.
        Senator Kaine. Well, that may be the truth, but how about
    answering my question?
        Secretary Pompeo. I am not going to talk about internal
    discussions at the State Department. You would not want me to,
    neither would your constituents, Senator Kaine. They would not
    want the Secretary of State to come up here and talk about
    internal conversations about personnel matters. You know that.
    That is not appropriate.
        Senator Kaine. Well, can you just listen to my question?
        Secretary Pompeo. Sure.
        Senator Kaine. You were on the phone call.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. You heard the President say that about Marie
    Yovanovitch, and my question to you is, did you ask what the
    President meant about that? Yes or no.
        Secretary Pompeo. The answer is I am not going to talk
    about either. I guess that you are asking did I ask the
    President----
        Senator Kaine. Yes.
        Secretary Pompeo. --what he meant. I do not talk about
    conversations----
        Senator Kaine. You told me you do not know what he meant.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. I just asked if you asked him.
        Secretary Pompeo. I appreciate your question and I hope you
    can appreciate why I do not talk about conversations with the
    President.
        Senator Kaine. Here was some testimony we heard in this
    room the other day from your, I believe it is, Executive
    Secretary, Lisa Kenna, who was here for a hearing about her
    nomination to be Ambassador to Peru. She said in her work with
    you, the work that her office does, they get correspondence for
    you. Some they open and sort of categorize and classify it
    before they deliver it to you. Then she said there is a second
    category of correspondence that they do not open. If it is
    personal to you, if it is for your eyes only, if it is
    something from another cabinet member, they would not open
    that, but they would just deliver it to you. She said there is
    a third category of documents that was documents delivered by
    Rudy Giuliani to you which did not go through the process of
    being opened and it also did not go through the process of
    coming to her and having it delivered to you. It came directly
    to you.
        What was your response to Rudy Giuliani's effort to sack
    Ambassador Yovanovitch? Did you say, hey, it is not your job?
    This is my job.
        Secretary Pompeo. The President of the United States has
    the unconditional right to have the ambassadors he wants.
        Senator Kaine. Stipulated for the record, but was your
    interaction with Rudy Giuliani?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I appreciate this. Do not go
    into great magical effects with respect to how a package came.
    That is all silliness. You should note for the record that that
    package was delivered to Capitol Hill by the former Inspector
    General who ran frantically to Capitol Hill and made a big
    news.
        Senator Kaine. My time is up. I am just going to say you
    might think this is silly. You might think these questions are
    silly, but when somebody works for their entire career for the
    State Department and they are slandered with lies and sacked
    for no good reason, that sends a message that could not be
    clearer to other State Department officials. It may be just a
    big joke. I mean, hey, look at you smiling and laughing and
    calling them silly. I do not think it is silly to Marie
    Yovanovitch or the people who work for you.
        Secretary Pompeo. I do not think it is silly to the United
    States Department of State to understand that every ambassador,
    every political appointee knows that when the President of the
    United States finds that they lack confidence in you, the
    President has the right to terminate them. It is that easy. It
    includes me.
        The Chairman. Senator Paul.
        Secretary Pompeo. You should note I did not slander anyone.
    This was handled appropriately and properly, Senator.
        Senator Paul. History demonstrates that wars are easier to
    start than they are to end.
        Secretary Pompeo. I think that is fair.
        Senator Paul. We have agreement. We have agreement.
        I think the Afghan war is a great example of that. You
    know, after nearly 20 years of war, many are questioning the
    mission. In fact, many have been questioning what the mission
    is in Afghanistan for a decade or more, including President
    Trump. I traveled with him to the sad duty at Dover receiving
    two of our soldiers home, and I know it affects him personally.
    I know he has been very public and very consistent and I think
    very sincere in wanting to end the war in Afghanistan.
        Army Lieutenant General Dan McNeill put it this way when
    asked about the mission. He says, I tried to get someone to
    define for me what winning meant even before I went over, and
    nobody could. Nobody would give me a good definition of what it
    meant. Some people were thinking in terms of Jeffersonian
    democracy, but that is just not going to happen in Afghanistan.
    The statement was 13 years ago.
        When asked about our mission, General Douglas Lute said, we
    were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan. We
    did not know what we were doing. What are we trying to do
    there? We did not have the foggiest notion of what we were
    doing. This is from 5 years ago.
        How long is it going to take? What is our current mission?
    Why are we in Afghanistan? Do we have a cogent military reason
    to be in Afghanistan right now?
        Secretary Pompeo. So the President has given two missions.
    One is to reduce our force posture, both the risk to our young
    men and women who are fighting there. The second is to ensure
    that there is not a terror attack that emanates from that
    space. We set about conducting a peace and reconciliation
    process. We have now reduced forces there by about half since
    their most recent peak. We are on our way to reduce even
    further.
        I am hopeful that we will get the Afghans to begin their
    negotiation because President Trump has made very clear his
    expectation. We have entered into an agreement that we will go
    to zero. We will get our forces out of there. I think it is May
    of next year. We are looking to do that on terms that make sure
    we protect America from a----
        Senator Paul. Would you agree that Afghanistan is just one
    of probably hundreds of places that we potentially have terror
    threats or radical Islamic threats and may not even be no
    longer the primary place?
        Secretary Pompeo. Hundreds. If you will give me dozens and
    dozens, yes, sir, absolutely.
        Senator Paul. Do you think that maybe it is--we talked
    about in Europe that we had hundreds of thousands of troops in
    Germany because there was the Soviet Union and they had--I do
    not know--2 million, 3 million people in their army. We had
    this sort of Cold War standoff.
        So circumstances have changed and maybe even in your
    opinion it has changed over whether or not we need so many
    troops in Germany. I applaud that.
        I think the same is in Afghanistan. It has certainly
    changed over 20 years. The war on terror is now and always has
    been sort of global one, but I think it may be a 20th century
    idea that we have to occupy territory so much that we have to
    have acres and we have to have large bases particularly in
    countries that are in prolonged civil war.
        The other question is, really is our goal in these
    locations around the world our national security, or is our
    goal sometimes muddied by the idea that basically we are in
    Afghanistan for the equal rights amendment or for women's
    rights or we are there for democracy or making a country out of
    Afghanistan? Are we there for building roads? We built a $45
    million natural gas, gas station in Afghanistan. They have no
    cars that run on natural gas. So we bought them cars that ran
    on natural gas. They have no money, so we gave them a credit
    card. My understanding is that the gas station was supposed to
    cost half a million. It cost $45 million and is no longer
    functioning. So, I mean, is our goal national security or is
    nation building part of what we should be doing as a country?
        Secretary Pompeo. I think President Trump has made it
    unambiguous. Our mission set there is American national
    security. Plain and simple.
        I would add only this. There are times in the world where
    we are better off if there are democratic nations. The State
    Department has designed to build resilience to do this kind of
    thing, but I do think our foreign policy sometimes has been
    overly ambitious about what it is we can accomplish through the
    use of military force with respect to getting other nations
    to----
        Senator Paul. I think encouraging democracy and being part
    of--supportive of democracy does not mean we have to pay for
    trying to institute our image in some other country because it
    just does not, frankly, work.
        When we look at trying to end the Afghan war, I think in
    some ways we are stuck in the sense that people have decided we
    can only leave with some sort of treaty with the Taliban, some
    sort of agreement with the Taliban.
        I am sort of the opinion that in some ways it might make it
    worse because I think that the Taliban are not necessarily
    trustworthy. If we leave under the agreement that they have to
    meet certain parameters, which is what we are looking towards,
    and then they break those parameters, we are right back in with
    a threat to stay in.
        I think it is almost that the threat has to be--and maybe
    the threat should have been this 20 or even 30 years ago. The
    threat should be that if you harbor terrorists that are
    organizing international terrorism that there will be military
    repercussions, but those do not have to be landing 50,000
    troops. It might be landing 50,000 bombs.
        Secretary Pompeo. Absolutely right.
        Senator Paul. So I think we need to think about what our--
    and I think we have not escaped. We are still stuck in this
    idea of we have occupied this acreage and we have to do
    something with it, and we cannot leave until it is perfect. It
    is never going to be perfect there. The only thing I would just
    exhort you is that let us not base it completely on that we
    have to have a perfect deal to leave. I think there is always
    the threat that we can come back, and people say there are 10
    al Qaeda left in Afghanistan. They might be plotting right now.
        The President has admitted it. You have said they are a
    shadow of themselves. The President has admitted there have
    been reports that there are--now we are talking dozens, not
    hundreds. We are talking dozens, not thousands.
        The same with the Islamic State. General Lute came and
    spoke to one of our committees recently, and he said he could
    not name any group there that he thought had the capability to
    attack the United States. He said there was no evidence that
    the so-called Islamic State presents a threat to the U.S. from
    Afghanistan.
        So I do think we need to be mindful of that, but we do have
    to work towards finishing it. The only thing I would say in the
    end, because I do not want to finish this without mentioning
    that it takes friends of the President. The President has
    policy. People have to try to fulfill his policy. I think for a
    long time, for several years John Bolton was trying to thwart
    that, and John Bolton was an enemy of the President's policy.
    So I hope the people who are remaining will try to fulfill the
    President's policy and get us out of the war in Afghanistan.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Pompeo. If I may just take one second, Senator
    Risch, with your permission.
        The Chairman. You may.
        Secretary Pompeo. Your point, Senator Paul, about the
    global spectrum of terrorism and the fact that there are dozens
    of al Qaeda left in Afghanistan, I think that is the central
    thing that the American people need to understand. Wherever we
    were 15 or 20 years ago is not where we are today. Our
    resources, whether it is our decision in Germany or a decision
    about force posture in Asia or Africa or in Afghanistan or
    Syria or anyplace else--we need to make sure that it is updated
    for the actual threats presented to the United States of
    America. That is what President Trump is driving us to do.
        So thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Merkley.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Mr. Secretary.
        I am going to start with the events that have occurred in
    Hong Kong and what I really see as a violation of the agreement
    made with Britain, between China and Britain.
        Now that these events, this new Chinese law that really
    exerts enormous violations of civil rights in Hong Kong has
    occurred, should we extend asylum and visa opportunities to
    those who are being persecuted by the Chinese in Hong Kong?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are reviewing that. We are
    considering it. The British have made a good decision. The
    Australians have made a decision they are going to accept up to
    hundreds of thousands of people. We are looking at how best we
    might accomplish this and consistent with making sure that--we
    always want to encourage people to try to work from within to
    the extent they can as well. So it is important that we get
    this right. The President is actively considering how we ought
    to treat those who seek asylum coming to us from Hong Kong or
    to grant a visa program that surrounds that.
        Senator Merkley. Well, it sounds like you are open to the
    opportunity and are reviewing it. I do feel like there are
    folks who will be highly targeted, and they are concerned about
    being locked up for the rest of their lives, young folks, 18,
    20 years old, in Chinese prisons.
        Do the events in Hong Kong change our perspectives on
    Taiwan or make us think about ways to be more supportive of
    Taiwan? We obviously do a lot of arms sales and so forth.
    Should we be more active in supporting Taiwanese participation
    in international institutions?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, they are different situations.
    There was an agreement with Hong Kong. They are different, but
    I think it is fair to say that the Chinese Communist Party
    views them as the same. If you ask the Chinese Communist Party,
    they would both view them as part of their territory, and so
    that requires diligence.
        Your question about international organizations--not only
    the team that I have assigned to that, but the regional bureaus
    as well, are working on multiple fronts. We took a run at this
    in the World Health Assembly now a couple months back, and we
    have taken this on at the United Nations to make sure that
    Taiwan is represented in every place that it is appropriate
    that they be represented as part of formal and informal
    international gatherings.
        Senator Merkley. There is a longstanding convention that
    the President of the United States should not meet with the
    President of Taiwan because it would offend China. Do you agree
    with that longstanding convention?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, if I may defer that. I am happy
    to have a conversation with you about it.
        Here is what I will say with respect to Taiwan. There are a
    series of understandings that have been long held, multiple
    administrations, multiple parties. We intend to continue on
    with that. We understand the Taiwan Relations Act and the
    obligations that the United States Government has with respect
    to that.
        We are working to recognize the changes that General
    Secretary Xi has made with respect to this. We want to make
    sure we get this right.
        Senator Merkley. Saudi Arabia has been abetting the flight
    of Saudi nationals who have done horrific crimes in America. So
    really two questions.
        Do you agree that this effort to sweep people out of our
    country who have done or are charged with doing horrific things
    before they can be tried is unacceptable?
        Do you agree if it continues to occur, the U.S. should use
    significant diplomatic consequences for Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes to both questions, Senator.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you.
        So there is the report that--well, we have done several
    things in regard to the situation in Xinjiang and the Chinese
    incarceration, basically slave camps of a million Uighurs. We
    have done some recent things, and I applaud those recent steps
    to impose sanctions to block exports that were done with forced
    labor in China.
        I also feel like there is another narrative that has
    undermined kind of the effectiveness of this. As we have heard
    about the President's comments in November 2017 trip to China
    where he indicated that President Xi should go ahead with
    building concentration camps and then again in June 2019, a
    year and a half later, our President, President Trump's
    conversation with President Xi saying again basically they
    should go ahead building the camps and it is the right thing to
    do.
        I think it is absolutely the wrong thing to do. We have
    done, as I noted, some steps that suggest that is--but should
    we be more robust at every level in condemning the Chinese
    enslavement of the Uighurs?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think the answer is yes. I am
    proud of what we have done, the way that the United States has
    responded, not only the responses we have taken directly, but
    the work we have done around the world to convince the whole
    world of what is taking place there.
        I have been disappointed to see Muslim countries not
    respond when there are often significant Muslim populations
    being impacted there in western China. We are urging them to
    take this on in a serious way.
        Then I guess the last thing I would say is I think with the
    objective of changing the behaviors that are taking place
    there, this is an important economic region. So the things that
    we are endeavoring to do--it is important we get the human
    rights piece of this right. It is important that we get the
    individual sanctions piece of this right, but it is very
    important--and I am really happy with the work we are making to
    convince businesses, not just American businesses because it is
    an international place of business, that they should really
    look hard at their supply chains not just their direct
    employees, but their supply chains and what is taking place
    there. I think if we get that right, we have the opportunity to
    change what is taking place there.
        Senator Merkley. A quick point and a final question because
    I am running out of time.
        The UN fact-finding mission on the Rohingya, the U.S.
    Holocaust Museum, a law group engaged by the State Department
    to investigate atrocities have all found strong evidence of
    genocide by Burma. I really hope the United States will declare
    it to be genocide because it is, and it would strengthen our
    representation and advocacy for human rights in the world.
        I want to turn to Honduras in my final question. The State
    Department Human Rights report talks about extrajudicial
    killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, detention, violence
    against indigenous Hondurans, violence against the LGBT
    communities. In addition, we had in October a U.S. federal
    court find that the president, Juan Orlando Hernandez, was
    implicated as a co-conspirator in widespread drug trafficking
    and money laundering.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Merkley. There are huge reports of systemic
    corruption and human rights abuses.
        In the context of all of this, is it time to reevaluate our
    relationship, which has been quite cozy with the president of
    Honduras?
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are constantly demanding that
    the leadership in Honduras take these set of facts on board. We
    are well aware of what is taking place, and like in too many
    countries around the world, we have not had the effect that we
    desire. We are working on it.
        The Chairman. Senator Young.
        Senator Young.
        Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Good to have you
    here.
        In response to media coverage over the last few days in the
    Washington Post, NBC News, the Daily Beast, and my hometown
    newspaper, the Indianapolis Star, I would like to bring up the
    situation of Peter Kassig and three other Americans who lost
    their lives at the hands of ISIS.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to request the following columns
    from the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News be added to
    the record.
        The Chairman. They will be included.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this hearing.]

        Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, you may recall meeting with
    the Kassig family last year, but as a brief refresher, in
    October 2013, Indiana native and former Army Ranger, Peter
    Kassig, was on a mission of mercy. He was delivering
    humanitarian aid to suffering people in Syria. He was taken
    hostage by ISIS, and sadly after months of torture and
    incredible hardship at the hands of these ISIS terrorists and
    in spite of his embrace of Islam, he was brutally beheaded.
    Sadly, three other Americans, James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and
    Kayla Mueller also lost their lives at the hands of ISIS
    murderers. I know each of their stories are familiar to other
    members of this committee.
        Since that time, some of the murderers, known as ``The
    Beatles,'' have been killed in U.S.-led drone strikes, but
    others remain at large. I know you agree, they must be brought
    to justice. I believe that the United States Government should
    work tirelessly, independently, and with the cooperation of
    allies to hunt down the killers of these Americans and bring
    them to justice here in the United States of America.
        Mr. Secretary, do you agree with me?
        Secretary Pompeo. I do, and you should know that the
    President of the United States agrees as well.
        Senator Young. What efforts can the State Department and
    our missions overseas take to bring this about?
        Secretary Pompeo. It is a broad effort. I think we are
    making progress. The Department of Defense, their intelligence
    assets, the broader set of U.S. intelligence assets, all aimed
    at making sure we understand and then working with important
    partners too who want justice, but have a different set of
    rules about how to think about that, so working to convince
    them that proceeding to bring them to justice is the right
    approach. I am very hopeful that we will, in the coming weeks,
    have a good outcome here.
        Senator Young. You alluded to different perspectives that
    exist out there. What precise obstacles stand in the way and
    what can you do to overcome them?
        Secretary Pompeo. So, an example. I will stay away from
    this particular incident, but an example is when we make a
    decision from time to time to bring someone back from someplace
    else, either through extradition or through another legal
    process, the countries say because we have the death penalty or
    because of a certain set of rules we have here, they will not
    either permit that to happen or share the information that we
    might need to complete a successful prosecution. One of our
    roles is to make sure that those countries will permit us to do
    that.
        Senator Young. I do want to interject--and it is important
    to note here, though you were just using an example--it is my
    understanding that the four families are no longer pursuing the
    death penalty for these terrorists. Their hope is that this
    shift will alleviate any challenges whatsoever that we have
    encountered with the British Government and their justice
    system in allowing the prosecution to move forward in the
    United States.
        Secretary Pompeo. I appreciate that, Senator Young. That is
    important. I will leave it at that.
        Senator Young. I am committed to working with you, and I
    suspect there are other members of this committee who will join
    me in that effort to ensure that justice is delivered and
    delivered here in the United States. Will you commit to working
    with me and this committee to ensure that we pursue this matter
    accordingly?
        Secretary Pompeo. Of course, yes, sir.
        Senator Young. Thank you.
        I would like to move to the United Nations and how, over
    the past several years, Mr. Secretary, the U.S. has lost ground
    in its engagement with a number of UN bodies and programs. Most
    recently, the Administration formally submitted paperwork to
    withdraw from the World Health Organization.
        At the same time, the role and influence of other
    countries, particularly the Communist government in China, has
    been growing at the UN. It has expanded its role in a range of
    UN agencies, with Chinese nationals currently holding the top
    job in four of the organization's 15 specialized agencies: the
    International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and
    Agricultural Organization, the International Telecom Union, and
    the UN Industrial Development Organization. For comparison, a
    French national leads two specialized agencies, the IMF and
    UNESCO. The UK leads one, the ILO, and the U.S. leads just one,
    the World Bank, although a U.S. national does lead the UN
    Children's Fund and the World Food Program, which are large and
    prominent UN organizations.
        So building on Senator Murphy's earlier line of
    questioning, why do we not look beyond the World Health
    Organization, and I ask you, Mr. Secretary, what implications
    does this losing of ground within UN bodies and agencies have
    on advancing U.S. national security interests and other foreign
    policy priorities that we might have in the UN system?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes. It is very significant, and it is at
    least a 15-year-long slide that has taken place and growth of
    the Chinese Communist Party's influence in these institutions
    and organizations.
        We have done a couple things to turn this around. We had
    real success at the World International Property Organization.
    The Chinese thought they had the fast track to that. We put up
    a good candidate. It was not an American candidate, but it was
    a candidate that we believe has an understanding of
    intellectual property in the same way that freedom-loving
    democracies do, and we crushed them. It was an amazing
    diplomatic effort. We built up coalitions with the Indians, the
    Brits, the Australians, and then built it out all across the
    world. We are asking for about $20 million in this budget to
    take the team that we built there and make it a permanent team
    that is focused on these major elections for these 15
    institutions, and then there is another set that are slightly
    different, but still very important.
        Then we have a second set of operations which is it is not
    just the leaders that matter at the UN organizations. They have
    big bureaucracies underneath them. We are sadly inadequately
    represented at every level inside of these international
    bodies, and it matters. It matters that there is someone there.
    It matters that they are American, but it matters, if they are
    not American, that they come from the nations that understand
    the rule of law and how the world ought to be conducted in a
    way that we do.
        So I have actually worked closely with about seven other
    countries to build out an effort that is very focused on
    exactly this. Sometimes, frankly, we have had opportunities. We
    were offered a place and did not put anybody forward. That is
    not the right way to go. We need to make sure we get it right.
    I am confident that in a year and 2 years, we will be in a
    better place than we are today, and I hope we will have the
    resources to do that. It is a little bit of a resource issue,
    but it is a lot of a focus issue. I think I have cleaned that
    up materially.
        The Chairman. Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to correct the record on a couple things here that
    have been said this morning.
        First of all, I believe that Secretary Tillerson's two
    predecessors oversaw probably one of the most major withdrawals
    in foreign policy from the global stage that America has ever
    seen. It created a power vacuum that allowed Iran, North Korea,
    Russia, China to step into that vacuum and, actually during
    that period of time, created a physical caliphate that allowed
    the rise of ISIS in Syria such that in January of 2017, Mr.
    Secretary, I believe that the world was more dangerous than any
    time in my lifetime. We faced five threats across five domains:
    Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, and terrorism across air,
    land, and sea. All of a sudden we woke up and realized that our
    would-be adversaries have been developing capability in cyber
    and space that the prior Administration had not really warned
    us about.
        So we woke up, and I think we have all now figured out in
    the United States--I think there is a consensus on both sides--
    for the last 50 years, with all good intentions, we got China
    wrong. I think there is a general awakening that you have had
    three other cabinet members, along with yourself, make
    tremendous policy speeches here just in the last month. I would
    like to quote some of that that you wrote about.
        You had Secretary O'Brien, our National Security Advisor
    O'Brien, talk about ideology; FBI Director Wray talk about
    espionage; Attorney General Barr talk about economics; and you
    talked about the warning here. I am going to quote. This is
    your quote. ``We had a very clear purpose in those four
    speeches, a real mission. It was to explain the different
    facets of America's relationship with China, the massive
    imbalances in that relationship that have built up over
    decades, and the Chinese Communist Party's design for
    hegemony.''
        It is interesting you chose that word because the Chinese
    love to quote Confucius, and one of his famous sayings is just
    as there cannot be--and they do this recently. Just as there
    cannot be two suns in the sky, there cannot be two emperors on
    the earth. The word they use for emperor is not benign
    dictator, which is the most common use of that translation. It
    is hegemon. They want to be the hegemon that they feel like
    they were for 4,000 years.
        You said further, our goal was to make clear that the
    threats to Americans that President Trump's China policy aims
    to address are clear and our strategy for securing those
    freedoms established.
        You went on to say later in there in closing this out, you
    said securing--and I think this is the most important sentence
    in this speech in my opinion--securing our freedoms from the
    Chinese Communist Party is the mission of our time, and America
    is perfectly positioned to lead it because our founding
    principles give us that opportunity. A tremendous statement.
    That will go down in history.
        The fact that only 6 percent of China's population belong
    to the Communist Party, Mr. Secretary--I would argue that our
    fight is not with the Chinese people. It is with the Communist
    Party.
        There is a statement from the Administration here dated May
    26, 2020. It says we do not seek to contain China's development
    nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people.
        Can you articulate the threats the Chinese Communist Party
    threaten--makes or represents to our democracy and our freedoms
    here, and what are we doing as a Chinese strategy as we try to
    manage during your Administration here--as we try to manage
    this turn in our relationship with China to confront them, to
    stand up to them, but also to protect our freedoms here at
    home?
        Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, there are multiple fronts to
    this, and these are not created by the Department of State.
    They are created by what the Chinese Communist Party says, to
    your point. President Trump recognized that. He talked about it
    in his campaign back as far as 2015. We have got to get this
    imbalance corrected. When we do, there will be costs associated
    with that. We have got the largest increase in our military
    buildup that President Trump has led. We are very focused on an
    arms control strategic dialogue that we are having today. I was
    in Vienna on the 27 and 28 of this month, so a few days back.
    We know we need China to be part of that, too. They are now a
    significant nuclear power. We have seen what has happened on
    the economic front. We have seen their Belt and Road
    Initiative. So they are competing. Senator Rubio talked about
    their efforts in four or five technology spheres.
        This is a multi-front campaign. It will take not only the
    United States Government, but the United States citizens to
    understand this challenge. Then we have got to build out the
    global alliance.
        The last thing I will say here is I have seen it said that
    the United States is asking nations to pick sides between China
    and the United States. It is fundamentally false. We are asking
    every sovereign country to pick between freedom and tyranny.
    That is the choice every leader has got to make. When I go
    around the world, that is what I talk to them about, and they
    all know. They all know that the United States is the country
    that they want to be alongside. They all know that freedom and
    our value system and the rule of law and property rights and
    the protection of these unalienable rights is central to their
    country, and it is why I think the tide is turning around the
    world and that people are seeing the Chinese Communist Party
    for what it is, the threat to the security of their people.
        Senator Perdue. I agree with the tyranny/freedom. I
    characterize it a little different. There is state control and
    there is self-determination. The world is turning into a binary
    equation. Russia, China, Venezuela, and Cuba--if you add up all
    the GDPs of those state-controlled countries, it is probably
    less than $20 trillion. If you add up the GDP of all the rest
    that are self-determined, that is over $70 trillion, Mr.
    Secretary.
        I want to relate that back to the last question here that
    goes to your comments earlier about the number one thing--I
    think you agreed with it 1,000 percent with Senator Murphy--
    about allies being the answer here with China. This is a huge
    effort. It is going to take years to develop.
        Right now we have an opportunity with the Quad, the
    Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This is the United States,
    India, Japan, and Australia. A great development is happening
    right now that India is very strongly considering inviting
    Australia to that exercise, Malabar.
        Would you comment on how important this particular group is
    in relation to the bigger conversation you just mentioned? The
    fact that the GDP of the Quad is more than twice that of China
    today is not to be lost on the conversation. Would you just
    make one last comment on that, please?
        Secretary Pompeo. It is more populous than China as well.
    These are nations that all have elected leaders, all have
    democracies, all understand--in different cultures and
    different settings, all have a central understanding about how
    commercial enterprise should be conducted and how militaries
    should engage and about how security is actually achieved. The
    good news is I think this grouping is stronger than it has ever
    been. Maybe we were gifted by General Secretary Xi. He took
    actions that caused each of the leaders in those countries to
    recognize the value of this group.
        I meet with them with some frequency either by phone or in-
    person, and we are working on economic efforts together. We are
    working on COVID responses together. There are lots of places
    where we are finding common touch points where we can develop
    real strength and unity that can, in fact, provide the bulwark
    that we can build out from all across the world.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        I appreciate the good job you do for our country and
    leaning into hard issues forcefully. We need more of that, not
    less.
        When it comes to a UN envoy for Libya, do you support that
    we need a new one?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Good. I am going to try to get a letter
    from everybody in the committee to the UN Secretary-General
    saying please appoint a special envoy. Mr. Secretary, anything
    we can do to up our game would be great. I know you work with
    the Berlin folks.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Graham. We will see if we can bring stability----
        Secretary Pompeo. We need the right one, too, Senator--I
    know you agree with that--not just a new one, but the right
    person as well.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you very much.
        The Caesar Act. Thank you for using it quickly and holding
    Assad's son accountable is a great first step in what I think
    will be a long journey to punish this regime. Is more coming?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Thank you. Great job.
        I talked to General Mazlum yesterday with the SDF.
    Apparently, they have signed a deal with an American oil
    company to modernize the oilfields in northeastern Syria. Are
    you supportive of that?
        Secretary Pompeo. We are.
        Senator Graham. That would be a great way to help everybody
    in northeastern Syria.
        Secretary Pompeo. The deal took a little longer, Senator,
    than we had hoped, and we now are in implementation. It could
    be very powerful.
        Senator Graham. You have been terrific in that regard.
        When it comes to Afghanistan, is my understanding correct
    that any withdrawal from Afghanistan will be conditions based?
        Secretary Pompeo. That is correct.
        Senator Graham. The inter-Afghan dialogue hopefully will
    start here fairly soon?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Yes, hopefully.
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes. I do not mean to make light of that.
    We are very hopeful that in the next week--I have heard that I
    may have said that once before, but we see the conditions. They
    have now completed enough tasks that we think there is a real
    chance we can----
        Senator Graham. Well, in case the Taliban are following the
    hearing--I doubt if they are. I am a pretty hawkish guy on
    Afghanistan. You have been great on foreign policy in general
    from my point of view.
        I would like to end the war too, and I would like to get
    the Taliban integrated into a new Afghanistan that respects the
    rights of women, where everybody can have a say through the
    democratic process. The Taliban are part of the Afghan culture.
    They are a minority. They are by no means a dominant voice in
    Afghanistan, but if we could help Pakistan and Afghanistan
    achieve a working relationship they have never had before on
    terrorism, we could get an inner-Afghan dialogue started, I am
    willing to invest in an Afghanistan that has a place for the
    Taliban, but not to the exclusion of women or religious
    minorities. So count me in for your efforts, and I very much
    appreciate what Zalmay is doing and Adam.
        When it comes to China, is it fair to say that in 2020, the
    Chinese Communist Party is running concentration camps that
    house religious minorities?
        Secretary Pompeo. I would be careful about the language. I
    have described it this way, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Something like a concentration----
        Secretary Pompeo. It is the worst human rights violation
    that we have seen this century.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Fair enough. That is a good
    description.
        You closed the Houston consulate down because they were
    using the diplomatic platform to cheat, steal, and lie when it
    comes to intellectual property.
        Secretary Pompeo. Intellectual property and other items as
    well. Yes.
        Senator Graham. The special status of Hong Kong has been
    virtually destroyed. Is that fair to say?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
        Senator Graham. I appreciate you speaking about it and
    taking action.
        When it comes to the rule of law, the Chinese Communist
    Party sees it is more of a nuisance than anything else.
        Secretary Pompeo. I think the litter of promises broken
    across multiple forums demonstrates that they take those
    agreements for having very little value.
        Senator Graham. If you go a property dispute, you generally
    do not build a military base on the contested property. You
    actually go to some kind of court and work it out.
        We just passed in the Judiciary Committee legislation
    modeled on JASTA, allowing Americans who have been victims of
    the coronavirus to sue the Chinese Communist Party. Do you
    support that?
        Secretary Pompeo. I have not had a chance to take a look at
    it.
        Senator Graham. We will get it to you, and please get back
    to us if you could.
        Bottom line, Syria is never going to end until we get the
    entire fabric of Syrian society in a room working together. The
    northeastern footprint we have where we are working with the
    SDF who helped us destroy the ISIS caliphate--they did most of
    the heavy fighting--that gives us leverage. I appreciate you
    being an advocate for the SDF. I appreciate that you have tried
    to work with a new leadership in Iraq. It is important that
    ISIS never come back. It is important that we have a say about
    that part of the world.
        Finally, as to Iran, where do you see the Iranian regime in
    terms of their potency? Are the sanctions working, and what
    would you advise this committee to do going forward with Iran?
        Secretary Pompeo. So, Senator, the sanctions have clearly
    had an impact. It has diminished their capacity to underwrite
    Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, but clearly has not achieved
    the ultimate objective, which is to change the behavior of the
    Iranian regime.
        So our view is this. We are happy to see them change, but
    until such time as they do, we see the best tool is to starve
    the regime of the capacity to inflict terror around the world.
    So your support in doing that is very important. I talked a
    little bit earlier--I think you had not arrived just yet--about
    the UN arms embargo that we are working so diligently to make
    sure it does not expire in a couple months.
        Senator Graham. Well, one last topic. Again, thank you. I
    think you have done a very good job from my point of view for
    our country, leaning into really difficult issues forcefully
    and with reason.
        Developmental aid. The House $3 trillion bill did not have
    any money for vaccines going to the developing world. The
    Republican bill has about $4 billion. I would urge you to work
    with us to try to find a way, if we can get a vaccine
    developed, to get it to the developing world, sort of like what
    we did with PEPFAR because it will do no good to eradicate it
    here if we do not eradicate it everywhere. Would you work with
    us in that regard?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes. We have presented something that we
    have given the name PIPER PRO that is modeled on PEPFAR that
    ultimately we think could be very successful. If we can get a
    vaccine, we are happy to work with you all on it.
        Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome.
        Secretary Pompeo. Senator.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you for your testimony, and thank you
    for your service as well.
        Let us cover a number of topics. Let us start with Nord
    Stream 2.
        You and I have worked for some time on Nord Stream 2 in
    stopping the completion of that pipeline. As you know, over a
    year ago, I joined with Senator Shaheen in passing bipartisan
    legislation. It went through both houses of Congress with
    overwhelming bicameral, bipartisan support imposing significant
    sanctions on companies that participated in laying the pipeline
    of Nord Stream 2. The President signed that legislation around
    7:00 p.m., if I remember correctly, on a Thursday, and 15
    minutes before his signature was on the page, the Swiss company
    that was laying the pipeline announced that they were
    immediately ceasing all pipeline construction activities. So
    those sanctions worked.
        Russia has not stopped. They have a pipeline that is 90 to
    95 percent complete. Now, the good thing about a pipeline is a
    pipeline that is 95 percent complete is a pipeline that is 0
    percent complete because it isn't transmitting anything until
    they connect the two ends. It is my intention that they never
    complete this pipeline.
        Both Russia and German continue to press forward
    aggressively to try to find ways to complete this pipeline. As
    you know, Senator Shaheen and I again introduced even stronger
    sanctions to any companies involved in any way whatsoever with
    the construction of the pipeline. Those stronger sanctions were
    included in the NDAA that passed this body with overwhelming
    bipartisan support just last week. So I am hopeful, as the NDAA
    moves forward, that we will have those stronger sanctions in
    effect.
        At the same time, you made an important decision within the
    State Department. Under CAATSA, the Administration has the
    authority, I believe, to sanction companies working to build
    this pipeline. Your predecessor, Secretary Tillerson, had
    issued, as I understand it, a guidance that was widely
    interpreted as essentially exempting Nord Stream 2. You made
    the right decision to rescind that guidance.
        Can you explain to the committee the importance of that
    guidance and what authority the Administration has right now
    today with no additional legislation to sanction any company,
    any German company, any other company that participates in any
    way with completing this pipeline?
        Secretary Pompeo. Yes. So thanks, Senator Cruz.
        The President made the decision to change that language. It
    was my recommendation. So I am not walking away from it, but I
    wanted to make sure everybody knew the President was fully on
    board with that change.
        That language was important because to your point--and this
    is a little bit too simple, but it was essentially a get out of
    jail free card for those conducting activities surrounding Nord
    Stream 2. That is no longer true. Both the State Department and
    the Department of the Treasury have made very clear in our
    conversations with those who have equipment there. We can see
    that they are responding, as are their insurers, the board of
    directors, their lawyers all understand the express threat that
    is posed to them for continuing to complete work on completion
    of the pipeline. We remain hopeful that those who have the
    capacity to finish this pipeline quickly will not be able to do
    so. They will choose not to because of these sanctions. Then we
    have the task of those that are harder to reach by sanctions,
    making sure that we do everything we can to stop them.
        The President has been so clear about the security threat
    that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline poses to Europe. We have not
    been able to convince the Germans of that. So we are taking
    action ourselves to try and accomplish that to preserve
    security for the European people.
        Senator Cruz. So, Secretary Pompeo, I know you care about
    this issue. I spent about 6 hours with the President yesterday
    on Air Force One, and Nord Stream 2 came up in considerable
    depth, as did the President's frustrations with the leadership
    of Germany.
        Let me point out that the State Department has a long
    tradition of sometimes obscure speech, perhaps rivaled only by
    the Federal Reserve. This is an issue in which ambiguity is not
    beneficial. As you know, the Russians are actively pushing
    disinformation, that there are not going to be sanctions for
    anyone involved in this pipeline. The Russians actively pushed
    disinformation that the bipartisan legislation I had introduced
    previously was not going to pass. That was wrong.
        Secretary Pompeo. I remember that.
        Senator Cruz. We had overwhelming bipartisan support that
    passed it into law.
        I believe under CAATSA, you have full legal authority right
    now to make clear and explicitly clear to anyone involved with
    constructing this pipeline that the consequences of doing so
    are catastrophic and not worth doing. So I would encourage the
    State Department--and I recognize you work within an
    Administration, and there may be other agencies that have
    different views, but if there are, those other agencies are not
    right in this matter. So I urge you to speak with absolute
    clarity because it is only that clarity I think that has any
    prayer of actually stopping the completion of this pipeline.
        If the pipeline is completed, it will do serious damages to
    the economic interests and the national security interests of
    Europe. It will do serious damage to the economic and national
    security interests of the United States. It will benefit Putin
    and put billions of dollars in his pocket.
        Secretary Pompeo. There is no need for ambiguity. The
    President has not been ambiguous about this at all. There was a
    reason that we made the change in that language, essentially
    the waiver language, if you will. We are fully intent on
    sanctioning those that violate the provisions that are
    contained there both in CAATSA and otherwise.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you. That is helpful.
        Let us shift to another area.
        Secretary Pompeo. I hope that is clear enough.
        Senator Cruz. That last statement had substantially greater
    clarity. So I am grateful and look forward to amplifying it
    loudly.
        Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cruz. Let us shift to another topic that you and I
    have also discussed at length which is Iran snapback. I believe
    maximum pressure should be maximum pressure, that the Iranian
    regime, the ayatollah when he says death to America, that he
    means it, that when he says death to Israel, that it means it.
        Under the terms of the Obama Iran nuclear deal and the UN
    Security Council resolution implementing it, the United States
    has the authority to invoke snapback sanctions if and when Iran
    is in violation of the deal. We have that authority, even
    though we have withdrawn from that deal. Iran is now nakedly,
    openly, flagrantly flouting the deal. They are not pretending
    to comply with it. It is obvious they are defying it, and they
    are telling us they are defying it.
        Will the United States invoke the snapback sanctions which
    would result in re-imposing not just American sanctions, but
    far broader sanctions on Iran for their violations of the deal?
        Secretary Pompeo. I think the President has been very
    clear. We believe we have this authority. I have spoken to this
    a couple of times. We believe that under UN Security Council
    resolution 2231, we clearly have the authority to do this and
    that we are not going to permit this arms embargo to expire on
    October 18. We are going to introduce a UN Security Council
    resolution we hope will be met with approval from the other
    members of the P5. In the event that it is not, we are going to
    take the action necessary to ensure that this arms embargo does
    not expire. We have the capacity to execute snapback, and we
    are going to use it in a way that protects and defends America.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        Mr. Secretary, we promised you a hard stop at 11:30. We
    like to keep our commitments, and we have by about 30 seconds
    according to my clock.
        Thank you so much for your service to the United States of
    America. Thank you for working with this committee as you have.
    We sincerely appreciate it.
        For information of the members, the record will remain open
    until close of business on Friday, and any responses that are
    given will be made part of the record.
        With that, again, thank you, Mr. Secretary, and this
    hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                  ----------

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

        Question. What proportion of the Department's budget is devoted to
    the Indo-Pacific region, and how has that changed over the last 5
    years? What proportion of the Department's personnel are in the Indo-
    Pacific region, and how has that changed over the last 5 years? What is
    the Department doing to ensure the budget and personnel meet the
    demands of this important region? Is the Department considering
    shifting more budgetary resources and greater numbers of its personnel
    to the Indo-Pacific region? Is there any flexibility you need from
    Congress to undertake such shifts?

        Answer. The Department allocated $1.5 billion to the Indo-Pacific
    in bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) resources in the FY
    2020 653(a) report and $798 million in the FY 2020 diplomatic
    engagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent 5 percent of the DE
    budget and 4 percent of the total State-USAID budget. (Note: The
    proportion compares Indo-Pacific FA funding with the total State-USAID
    FA budget, including not only regional funding, but significant
    centrally managed funds.) Since November 2017, the Department
    reprogrammed over $800 million in additional FA funds to the Indo-
    Pacific. Over the last 5 years the Indo-Pacific DE budget and personnel
    levels averaged 5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged 4
    percent of the total. The Department concluded a review of resource
    needs and expects to internally realign positions to the region.
    Reducing statutorily directed spending and providing additional
    discretionary funding would improve our ability to meet the region's
    challenges.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

        Question. Last year, President Trump inappropriately withheld
    millions of dollars of security assistance to Ukraine, in an effort to
    extract commitments from Ukraine that they would conduct an
    investigation into a political opponent of the President, leading to
    his impeachment. A series of outstanding questions about your
    involvement and knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the hold on
    security assistance to Ukraine remain. When and how did you first learn
    $141.5 million in foreign military assistance for Ukraine would not be
    immediately obligated?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those
    records for the information you request. Since January 2017, the U.S.
    Government has provided more than $1 billion in security assistance to
    Ukraine, including the provision of lethal defensive articles that were
    not provided prior to January 2017.

        Question. What role, if any, did you play in deciding to suspend
    such assistance?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. What was your understanding of the reasons for that
    delay?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Why were the funds ultimately delayed? Who made that
    decision?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer to those records for
    the information you request.

        Question. Do you think it is appropriate for the President to
    enlist the assistance of a foreign leader to investigate his opponents?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer to those records and
    my prior public statements for the information you request.

        Question. Are you aware of the President requesting or encouraging
    similar efforts of any other foreign officials?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Prior to the July 25 call, did you or did the Department
    communicate to Ukrainian officials that the President wanted to discuss
    corruption or investigations in Ukraine?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you communicate, or are you aware of efforts by U.S.
    officials to communicate, to Ukrainian officials the topics that the
    President wanted to discuss with President Zelenskyy?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Do you regularly receive transcripts or summaries of all
    of the President's calls with foreign leaders? Are you aware of any
    records of communications between the President and foreign leaders
    that have not been stored on the standard White House system for such
    calls and subsequently distributed to Cabinet-level officials?

        Answer. Questions related to White House systems should be directed
    to the White House.

        Question. When can I expect a response to my outstanding September
    24, 2019 and June 4, 2020, requests for documents on this subject?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those
    records for the information you request. Those proceedings are
    Constitutionally concluded.

        Question. In President Trump's July 25, 2019 phone call with
    President Zelenskyy, he repeatedly urged a foreign leader to speak with
    his private attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who had met with Ukrainian
    officials for months to pursue the personal political agenda of
    President Trump, allegedly with the help of the State Department. When
    did you first learn that Mr. Giuliani was seeking to meet with
    Ukrainian officials?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Were you aware of Mr. Giuliani's meetings with Ukrainian
    officials on or around the dates they happened?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Are you aware of other meetings between Mr. Giuliani and
    foreign officials?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you instruct anyone in the Department to not provide
    assistance to Mr. Giuliani regarding his meetings with foreign
    officials?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Were you aware that Special Envoy Kurt Volker or
    Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland were engaged with Mr.
    Giuliani regarding Ukraine? If so, did you direct or approve of their
    efforts?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Who else from the Department received readouts of, met
    with, or spoke to Mr. Giuliani about his meetings with foreign
    officials?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. When is the last time you communicated with Rudy
    Giuliani?

        Answer. I do not recall when I last communicated with Mr. Giuliani.

        Question. Have you communicated with him or received information
    for issues other than Ukraine? If so, what?

        Answer. I have known Mr. Giuliani since before I was confirmed as
    Secretary of State.

        Question. In January 2020, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) determined that the Trump administration violated the Impoundment
    Control Act last year when it illegally withheld Congressionally-
    appropriated Department of Defense security assistance to Ukraine for
    ``policy reasons.'' However, GAO was unable to make a similar legal
    determination regarding foreign military financing funds appropriated
    to the State Department for Ukraine security assistance, ultimately
    because the Department failed to cooperate with GAO's request for
    information related to the circumstances and legal justification for
    the withholding of assistance. Please provide an explanation for the
    Department's failure to produce the necessary documentation to GAO
    regarding the security assistance hold.

        Answer. This matter is ongoing with the GAO and the Department will
    communicate with the GAO on this matter.

        Question. In May of 2018, then Congressman Pete Sessions wrote a
    letter addressed to you which urged you to remove Ambassador
    Yovanovitch from her post in Ukraine. Did you receive the letter? Did
    you respond to the letter?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. According to documents the Department produced to
    American Oversight pursuant to a FOIA request, on March 26, 2019, you
    ``wanted to connect to Giuliani'' and were put in touch with him
    immediately. On March 27, a Department email stated that ``Mr. Giuliani
    has documents pursuant to his conversation with S the other day. If
    possible, he would like 10 min with S upon delivery.'' On March 28, a
    Department email stated that ``[Lisa Kenna] updated S[ecretary] re: Mr.
    G[iuliani]. S[ecretary] is happy to meet with him tomorrow.'' Why did
    you want to connect with Mr. Giuliani on March 26? What did you discuss
    with him?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Why did you feel it was necessary to speak and meet with
    Mr. Giuliani in your official capacity as the Secretary of State for
    the United States of America?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. At the time, what was your understanding of the role Mr.
    Giuliani was playing with regards to Ukraine policy? Did you have any
    concerns about that role?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. On July 23, 2020, Lisa Kenna told the Committee that,
    while serving as your Executive Secretary, she would review letters and
    memos for you or, if something was marked ``eyes only for the
    secretary'' and from other cabinet secretaries or the President, would
    not review it. However, when you received a package from Rudy Giuliani,
    she testified that it bypassed her and was delivered directly to your
    desk. Did you instruct that the package from Giuliani to bypass your
    executive secretary and be delivered directly to your desk? If so, why?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Was it marked ``eyes only for the Secretary,'' or
    something to similar effect?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Why was this package handled in a more discreet way than
    even packages from other cabinet secretaries or the President?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive, and I refer you to those
    records for the information you request.

        Question. According to an October 3, 2019 report in The Wall Street
    Journal, ``Trump Ordered Ukraine Ambassador Removed After Complaints
    From Giuliani, Others,'' Rudy Giuliani gave you ``a nine-page document
    dated March 28 that included a detailed timeline of the Bidens'
    dealings in Ukraine and allegations of impropriety against Ms.
    Yovanovitch, including that she was `very close' to Mr. Biden. `He
    called me back and he said they were going to investigate,' Mr.
    Giuliani said of the Secretary of State, saying Mr. Pompeo asked for
    additional documents to back up the allegations.'' Mr. Giuliani also
    told The New York Times, as quoted in a November 23, 2019 article,
    ``New Documents Reveal Details of Pompeo's Role in Ukraine Affair,''
    that ``Mr. Pompeo `said he was referring it for investigation.''' Did
    you review the documents that Mr. Giuliani sent you? If so, what was
    your impression of the information in the documents?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you think the documents contained any credible basis
    for removing Ambassador Yovanovitch?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you tell Mr. Giuliani that you were going to refer
    the matter for investigation? If so, why?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you refer the matter for investigation? If so, why?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. According to an October 2, 2019 report in USA Today,
    ```Mysterious' packet of Ukraine disinformation arrives on Capitol Hill
    amid Trump impeachment inquiry,'' you gave the documents to the
    Counselor of the Department, Ulrich Brechbuhl, and told him that it
    ``came over,'' which he presumed to mean it came from the White House.
    Did you instruct Counselor Brechbuhl to review the documents sent by
    Giuliani? If so, why?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Did you tell him that the documents came from Giuliani?

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Have you been offered or sent any information from
    Ukrainian parliamentarian Andrii Derkach, or on Derkach's behalf? If
    so, what has your response been?

        Answer. I have no recollection of any such information.

        Question. Have you issued any guidance to the Department regarding
    how to respond to or handle offers of information from foreign
    officials about the President's political opponents, or that could be
    used to aid any particular candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential
    election? If so, what is that guidance?

        Answer. All Department personnel remain subject to and guided by
    all Federal laws relating to such matters.

        Question. According to a July 1, 2020 report in The Washington Post
    (``Hunt for Biden tapes in Ukraine by Trump allies revives prospect of
    foreign interference''), ``Giuliani told the Post that his pursuit of
    the Biden-Poroshenko calls was aided by someone inside the State
    Department. `A guy at the State Department who gave us a lot of
    information' consulted the archive of conversations between American
    leaders and their counterparts overseas to identify three conversations
    in February 2016 during which Biden mentioned the prosecutor general's
    name in conversations with Poroshenko, he said.'' Does it concern you
    that a State Department official may have provided Mr. Giuliani with
    this information?

        Answer. I have no basis to know whether any such alleged contact
    occurred.

        Question. Has the State Department initiated an investigation into
    whether a State Department official provided Mr. Giuliani, a private
    citizen, with sensitive U.S. Government information? If no, why not?

        Answer. I have no basis to know if any facts have been provided to
    the Department that would warrant the initiation of any such
    investigation.

        Question. Have you communicated to Mr. Giuliani about this claim?

        Answer. I have no recollection of any communication on this claim.

        Question. What steps are you taking to protect the State Department
    from, wittingly or unwittingly, providing information that could be
    used to aid any particular candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential
    election?

        Answer. The Department is exercising all Constitutional care in
    provision of sensitive, internal, non-public records to Committees and
    Members of Congress.

        Question. ``Before serving in Ukraine, Ambassador Yovanovitch had
    more than 3 decades of service to the State Department, including
    Ambassador to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and posts in Somalia, Moscow, and
    others: a)When the President said in his July 25 call with President
    Zelenskyy--a call you listened to--that Ambassador Yovanovitch was
    ``going to go through some things,'' what, specifically, did you do in
    response? ``

        Answer. The records of the House Impeachment proceedings and the
    Senate Impeachment Trial are extensive and I refer you to those records
    for the information you request.

        Question. Can you point me to where in the public record you
    defended Ambassador Yovanovitch between March 2019 and December 2019?

        Answer. During a November 18, 2019 Department press briefing, I
    made clear that I always defend State Department employees and that we
    have the greatest diplomatic corps in the history of the world. I have
    also made clear that I cannot get into issues associated with the House
    Impeachment proceedings or the Senate Impeachment Trial.

        Question. Do requests for information about the President's
    political opponents get treated differently than other congressional
    oversights requests to the State Department?

        Answer. No.

        Question. Why has the Department provided thousands of pages to
    Republican Chairmen in the Senate--without providing copies to this
    Committee--in response to requests for information about Joe Biden, the
    President's political opponent, but it has provided no documents in
    response to more than 10 requests for information from House Democratic
    Chairs and Democratic Senators about the Trump administration's
    withholding of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine?

        Answer. All documents produced by the Department in response to
    investigatory requests from Committee Chairs are provided to the Chairs
    and the Ranking Members of the requesting Committees conducting the
    investigation, consistent with long-standing practice. To the best of
    my knowledge the Department has not received any requests from the full
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee under letter of request from the
    Chairman on the topics you described. The investigation you reference
    was on corruption in Ukraine, not Joe Biden.

        Question. Do you believe it is appropriate to use the State
    Department as an instrument to further the President's personal and
    political goals?

        Answer. I am unaware of any such use of the Department of State for
    the purposes you suggest.

        Question. ``At the July 30, 2020 hearing, you stated that low
    morale was one reason, among others, for your recommendation to
    President Trump to remove Inspector General Linick. Specifically, you
    noted ``morale inside the IG's office . . . was the worst survey
    results of any of those 38 [Assistant Secretary level bureaus].''What
    morale data are you referring to and what time period is this data for
    in your analysis?''

        Answer. The data referenced in my testimony is from the results of
    the 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) of employees of the
    Office of the Inspector General. Following an effort to improve
    response rates over the previous FEVS, we doubled the total responses
    from 2017. In the 2019 FEVS, over half of our thirty-eight (38)
    Assistant Secretary-led bureaus improved or maintained in all three
    major index categories year over year. Only one bureau of the 38, which
    had the same leader in place, declined in all three index categories.
    That single bureau was the Office of the Inspector General.

        Question. Please provide a copy of the specific survey questions
    and results you were referring to in making your analysis.

        Answer. The results of the 2019 FEVS show that the OIG scores
    dropped year-over-year in all three major index categories: the
    Employee Engagement Index, the Global Satisfaction Index and the
    Diversity and Inclusion Index. The Global Satisfaction Index, which,
    among other things, measures the willingness of OIG employees to
    recommend the organization as a good place to work has exhibited a
    steady double-digit decline (>15 percent) since the 2016 FEVS survey.
    We were also alarmed by the insights provided by answers to several key
    survey questions:

       The people I work with cooperate to get the job done. The
            OIG survey respondents had a 46 percent higher negative
            response rate than the Department of State as a whole and also
            a higher negative response rate than the government-wide
            negative response rate.

       My organization has prepared employees for potential
            security threats. Twenty-three percent of the OIG survey
            respondents responded negatively to that, greater than three
            times higher than the negative response rates of Department of
            State and government-wide responses.

       Employees are protected from health and safety hazards on
            the job. The OIG survey respondents neutral and negative
            responses were almost 25 percent higher than Department of
            State and government-wide response to this question.

        Question. On December 6, 2019, I sent the Department a letter
    requesting information about reported new limitations on the use of the
    Department's Operations Center and requesting a briefing with the
    Director of the Operations Center. I have yet to receive a response to
    my letter. Please detail all changes regarding the use of the Ops
    Center since July 2019, including but not limited to changes made to
    any process, procedure, notetaking, staffing, or access to any calls
    placed, facilitated, transcribed, memorialized, or recorded by the
    Operations Center and the justification for any change.

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. How soon after the President's July 25 call with
    President Zelenskyy were these changes instituted?

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. On what date was the decision made to limit the use of
    the Operations Center and access to calls with foreign leaders?

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. What was the basis for the decision, and who made it?

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. What is the current procedure for facilitating, listening
    to, and maintaining notes and call records for any calls placed,
    facilitated, transcribed, memorialized, or recorded by the Operations
    Center?

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. What changes have been made to any readouts of
    memorializing of calls? How are readouts and records of calls currently
    maintained and distributed?

        Answer. The Operations Center is integral to the Department's
    ability to carry out its global mission and remain connected to the
    Department's global workforce on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. Since
    its inception in 1961 the Operations center has strived to remain an
    ever evolving and an ever-improving unit than can respond quickly to
    the ever-changing environment of international events. Operational
    security is a key priority for the Operations Center's capacity to
    support U.S. foreign policy. Leaks of sensitive information can have
    serious implications for U.S. policy implementation, undercut
    diplomatic relations and national security, and endanger the personnel
    of the U.S. and its allies. To this end, the Department continuously
    reviews and refines its information security policies to ensure the
    security of sensitive information. As part of this ongoing review
    process, in early 2020 the Department reviewed and verified the
    effectiveness of existing security practices and reemphasized its
    commitment to preventing unauthorized disclosure of operationally
    sensitive information, including by application of existing ``need-to-
    know'' policies, which review resulted in the updating of distribution
    lists for sensitive information, continuing to ensure that only
    personnel with the required need-to-know receive such information.
    Department personnel rotations and portfolio responsibility changes
    make such reviews essential to ensure that the correct personnel
    receive information important to their duties.

        Question. In a November 7, 2019 response from the State Department
    to my October 28, 2019 letter to the White House Acting Chief of Staff
    Mick Mulvaney requesting an investigation into outstanding allegations
    against pending nominees before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
    the Department wrote that ``Bureau of Diplomatic Security does not
    conduct additional investigations of candidates once the President has
    submitted their nominations to the Senate, as such background
    investigations are a prerequisite to such nominations, not a continuing
    process or function of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.'' Is this
    statement still accurate? What is the basis for this statement?

        Answer. The statement you quote correctly reflects the generic
    nature of the process being discussed in that statement. The Department
    is prepared to arrange a further briefing for you from the appropriate
    subject-matter experts in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security so that you
    may fully understand this issue.

        Question. Has the Bureau of Diplomatic Security ever conducted an
    additional investigation regarding a nominee following the submission
    of a nomination to the Senate?

        Answer. I have no personal knowledge of the conduct of the Bureau
    of Diplomatic Security practice over the decades in this regard, but
    the offered briefing I reference in my answer to your preceding
    question may be able to address this.

        Question. I am extremely concerned by this Administration's
    notification of withdrawal from the WHO. During an unprecedented global
    health crisis, the WHO is the only organization with the global reach
    and mandate to assist and amplify any effort to mitigate the current
    crisis and prevent future pandemics. Simply put; our withdrawal cedes
    even further ground to China. How does our withdrawal from the WHO help
    U.S. efforts to counter Chinese efforts to gain influence in UN
    organizations?

        Answer. The United States and the Department are committed to
    upholding the UN and related institutions that have fostered global
    peace and prosperity over the past 75 years, including by continuing to
    be the largest financial contributor to these organizations, providing
    more than $12.2 billion in FY 2019 alone. The Department continuously
    works to ensure the American values of universality of human rights,
    the dignity and worth of individuals, peaceful resolution of conflict,
    sustainable economic prosperity, national sovereignty, transparency and
    the rule of law are protected and upheld at the UN and related
    international institutions.
        I share the Administration's and the Committee's concern regarding
    the People's Republic of China and its abuse of the UN to advance its
    narrow foreign policy objectives. The Department will continue our
    efforts in reforming organizations to improve transparency,
    accountability, and effectiveness and in pushing back against the PRC's
    problematic behavior within the UN and its related agencies, including
    its attempts to use the UN as a tool to promote its authoritarian
    ideology and signature, global, and unilateral foreign policy platform,
    the One Belt, One Road initiative, and advance its domestic agenda at
    the expense of the international community.

        Question. What countries have publicly expressed support for the
    U.S. decision to withdraw, and what countries have expressed support
    for our alternative proposal to fight pandemics?

        Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from
    the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. In the
    time before withdrawal becomes effective, we continue to engage
    countries and other regional organizations to prevent, detect, and
    respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at their source. As the
    failed response to COVID-19 by the WHO has clearly demonstrated, the
    international structures to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious-
    disease outbreaks and protect American lives are lacking. Political
    pressure by the Chinese Communist Party degraded the capability of the
    WHO. It also discouraged leaders and scientists from speaking out about
    the CCP's and other governments' refusal to report transparently on
    outbreaks of dangerous pathogens.
        As the Department continues interagency discussions about our
    thoughts on future pandemic prevention, we know close coordination with
    other donor partners--a number of which have already reached out to
    us--will be critical to prevent future pandemics. For example, the U.S.
    rallied the multilateral Global Health Security Agenda Steering Group
    towards a shared dialogue on linkages between health security
    preparedness and COVID-19 response. The U.S. also continues to address
    the issue in high-level strategic dialogues, for example with
    governments including United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea and
    Australia to better coordinate, build momentum for international COVID-
    19 response, and raise awareness for future preparedness against
    infectious disease threats.

        Question. The WHO and the CDC both recommend the use of the
    scientific name COVID-19 to reduce social stigma and avoid
    discrimination against specific racial or ethnic groups. However, a
    number of State Department officials have used other, non-scientific
    terms for the virus, such as ``Wuhan virus,'' including you and
    Ambassador Kyle McCarter, whose tweet using ``Wuhan flu'' further
    inflamed already existing racial and xenophobic tensions in Kenya,
    particularly against Asian populations. The U.S. insistence on the use
    of such terminology also reportedly hampered a G7 joint statement on
    COVID-19. You have repeatedly referred to COVID-19 as the ``Wuhan
    virus,'' ``China virus,'' and ``virus from Wuhan.'' Do you agree with
    the WHO and CDC guidance use of the scientific name to reduce social
    stigma and discrimination?

        Answer. On February 11, 2020, the International Committee on
    Taxonomy of Viruses formalized the etiologic agent as the ``severe
    acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2'', or SARS-CoV-2, and the name
    of the disease as COVID-19. The Department has consistently used those
    conventions across the enterprise since they were introduced by the
    WHO.
        The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in March
    that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the official
    name for the disease. The Department advised diplomatic posts to use
    the COVID-19 acronym, including in public-facing materials.

        Question. Has the Department issued a directive encouraging the use
    of the scientific term for the virus, COVID-19, and discouraging the
    use of any other non-scientific names? If so, when? To whom was that
    guidance sent?

        Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in
    March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the
    official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised
    diplomatic posts to use the COVID-19 acronym, including in public-
    facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not
    synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised
    posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general
    category/type of virus.

        Question. What other steps is the Department taking to reduce the
    social stigma and discrimination associated with COVID-19?

        Answer. I have informed all Department employees of the importance
    of preventing stigma and discrimination, resiliency and mental health,
    and supporting each other through COVID-19 with the goal of raising
    awareness about the potential for stigma during the pandemic and
    setting the tone for Department leadership. This includes the
    importance of practicing inclusion remotely to avoid isolating or
    stigmatizing team members. In June we also launched TalentCare.
    TalentCare integrates the Department's workforce resilience initiatives
    so employees have a single touchpoint to access programs and resources
    that enhance health and well-being.

        Question. How will you hold officials accountable at the Department
    who do not use the WHO and CDC-recommended term COVID-19?

        Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in
    March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the
    official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised
    diplomatic posts to use the `COVID-19' acronym, including in public-
    facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not
    synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised
    posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general
    category/type of virus. All personnel have intermediate and annual
    evaluations by their supervisors that assess performance.

        Question. In a May 3, 2020, interview, you claimed there was ``a
    significant amount of evidence'' pointing to the origination of the
    COVID-19 virus at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, directly
    contradicting an ODNI determination made 4 days prior that COVID-19 was
    not manmade or genetically modified. Do you still stand by that
    statement?

        Answer. The world still does not have all the information it needs
    from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) about the origins of the COVID-
    19 pandemic. As the first to learn of the virus and the threat it
    posed, CCP officials in Wuhan and Beijing had a special responsibility
    to inform the Chinese people and the world of what they knew. The PRC
    Government instead failed to share information in a timely manner,
    delayed scientific collaboration, denied the world access to physical
    virus samples collected in Wuhan, and censored scientists and
    journalists. The United States will continue seeking full transparency
    from the PRC Government to understand the origin of the virus and
    reduce the risk of such a devastating global pandemic occurring again.

        Question. Do you agree with the findings of the ODNI determination
    about the origins of the COVID-19 virus?

        Answer. I agree with the findings. INR, as did other IC agencies,
    coordinated on the IC's assessment on the origin of the virus and
    concurred.

        Question. If not, what evidence do you have that points to a
    different conclusion?

        Answer. I agree with the conclusions.

        Question. Since the start of the pandemic the United States has
    failed to lead the international efforts to respond. We blocked
    consensus on a statement from the Security Council, and from the G7 by
    insisting on using divisive racially inflammatory rhetoric to describe
    the infection. On May 4th, the European Union and its partners hosted
    an international pledging conference on the development and deployment
    of diagnostics, treatments and vaccines against coronavirus with a goal
    of not only developing those tools, but of ensuring they are
    universally available and affordable. We did not participate. Can you
    give me specific examples of where we have used our convening power to
    mobilize collective action and generate a comprehensive response from
    other countries around the world? Have we hosted pledging conferences,
    for example? I've seen nothing so if you are mobilizing others, it is a
    pretty well-kept secret.

        Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from
    the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. Until
    that time, we continue to engage countries and other regional
    organizations to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of
    infectious diseases at their source. As the failed response to COVID-19
    by the WHO clearly demonstrated, the international structures to
    prevent, detect, and respond to infectious-disease outbreaks and
    protect American lives are lacking. Political pressure by the Chinese
    Communist Party has degraded the capability of the WHO. It also
    discouraged leaders and scientists from speaking out about the CCP's
    and other governments' refusal to report transparently on outbreaks of
    dangerous pathogens.
        As the Department continues with interagency discussions, and
    others discuss with the U.S. Government our thoughts on future pandemic
    prevention, we know close coordination with other donor partners--a
    number of which have already reached out to us--will be critical to
    prevent future pandemics. For example, the U.S. rallied the
    multilateral Global Health Security Agenda Steering Group towards a
    shared dialogue on linkages between health security preparedness and
    COVID-19 response. The U.S. continues to address the issue in high-
    level strategic dialogues, for example with governments including
    United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea and Australia to better
    coordinate, build momentum for international COVID-19 response, and
    raise awareness for future preparedness against infectious disease
    threats.

        Question. What initiatives are we going to propose at the upcoming
    G-7 meeting? How are we leading at the United Nations?

        Answer. During our presidency of the G7 in 2020, the United States
    has led efforts to respond to and recover from the global COVID-19
    pandemic. We are marshalling the full power of our governments to:
    coordinate necessary public health measures to protect people at risk
    from COVID-19; restore economic growth and protect jobs; support global
    trade and investment; and encourage cooperation and information sharing
    through science, research, and technology. One successful effort within
    the G7 Foreign Ministers Track was the negotiation and endorsement of
    high-level transportation principles to help reinvigorate the global
    transportation system, restore passenger and crew confidence in travel,
    integrate evolving public health considerations into transportation and
    travel, and closely coordinate international approaches to the
    treatment of air crew and seafarers.
        In the UN, we adopted Resolution 2532 a little over a month ago,
    supporting the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire to
    secure a respite for countries and regions that, weakened by violence
    and conflict, are especially vulnerable to the virus, while continuing
    our legitimate counter-terrorism operations. We continue to support
    critical programs in health, water and sanitation, and protection.
        The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge, and the United States
    remains committed to working closely with our overseas partners as part
    of a collective global response. The U.S. Government (USG) has
    allocated $20.5 billion to benefit the global COVID-19 response,
    including through preparedness and response efforts, foreign
    assistance, and investments to rapidly accelerate the development and
    deployment of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics.
    USG investments include $1.6 billion commitment to the Vaccine
    Alliance, GAVI announced in June 2020 in addition to our long-standing
    support to Gavi, UNICEF, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and
    Malaria, all of whom will be critical players in the distribution of
    COVID-19 vaccines. The United States leads the world in the effort to
    combat COVID-19 and will continue to seek opportunities to collaborate
    bilaterally or via multilateral fora and partnerships. We continue to
    work to ensure that USG investments, our scientific innovations, and
    our ``All-of-America'' approach to combatting the pandemic contribute
    to the broader worldwide effort against this deadly virus.

        Question. It will be difficult to lead if we are not properly
    prepared and resourced ourselves. Do the Department and USAID have the
    resources to help countries bring the pandemic under control?

        Answer. The impact of COVID-19 has been global in reach. Through
    generous funding from Congress, the Department of State and USAID have
    provided assistance to more than 120 countries. We continue to look for
    ways to build upon our decades-long leadership in health and
    humanitarian assistance. The United States cannot do it alone though.
    We will work closely with our other donor partners to identify ways to
    meet global needs and coordinate on ways to prevent future pandemics.
        The United States will continue to be the world's leader in
    humanitarian and health assistance, in no small part because of the
    support of Congress. We are now reviewing what further challenges we
    and our partners should address next and the costs of those
    interventions. For example, USAID is undertaking a time-bound strategic
    review to look over the horizon at evolving humanitarian, development,
    and wider national security and foreign policy priorities. The review
    will be guided by a set of strategic framing questions to provide
    structure to this process and lead to actionable recommendations to
    better position USAID for a world reshaped by COVID-19.

        Question. What does Congress need to provide in the next
    supplemental appropriations bill?

        Answer. Congress has appropriated a total of $2.3 billion to the
    Department of State and USAID to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
    the COVID-19 pandemic through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
    Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123) and the
    Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-
    136).
        Ongoing needs are likely to include mitigating the pandemic's
    continuing impact on fee revenues that support consular services both
    domestically and abroad. I will work with Congress and OMB on any
    further requests for funding to support the Department's response to
    COVID-19 around the globe.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security has
    been in the news after the President deployed it to Portland, Oregon,
    to crack down on anti-racist protests . . . a development that--quite
    frankly--has further weakened our nation's global standing as a beacon
    of freedom of speech and assembly. But, another alarming trend is how
    DHS has distorted U.S. foreign policy towards Central America. DHS, not
    the State Department, has negotiated agreements with foreign
    governments--agreements that the Administration is hiding from this
    committee, despite repeated requests. DHS signed Safe Third Country
    agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to transfer asylum
    seekers from the United States, over your alleged objection to the
    White House and despite State Department data showing these countries'
    lack of capacity to implement them--data that has been provided
    privately to my office. Making matters worse, my office uncovered that
    DHS misused State Department funding, violated an agreement between the
    two agencies, and then lied about it. Time and again, the State
    Department has ceded its leadership to DHS. Last August, the New York
    Times reported that you met with the President and then-DHS Secretary
    McAleenan, and that you objected to the U.S. signing the Asylum
    Cooperative Agreement with Guatemala. Can you confirm this is true?

        Answer. I cannot comment upon New York Times reporting and
    anonymous leaks. My confidential communications within the Executive
    Branch are just that, confidential.

        Question. We know that the President sided with DHS rather than the
    State Department on a matter related to international agreements--over
    your objection. Why did that happen?

        Answer. I cannot comment on anonymous speculation over Executive
    Branch deliberative processes. My confidential communications within
    the Executive Branch are just that, confidential.

        Question. Given State Department data showing the lack of asylum
    capacity in the Northern Triangle, did you assess that Guatemala and
    Honduras provide adequate safety and sufficient asylum capacity to
    protect asylum seekers, as required by U.S. law?

        Answer. Under Section 208(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, the Attorney General and, by operation of the Homeland
    Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security make the
    determinations whether asylum seekers removed to a third country
    pursuant to a bilateral agreement (1) will not be persecuted on
    protected grounds and (2) will have access to full and fair procedures
    for determining their protection claims in that third country. I do not
    participate in making these domestic law determinations and did not do
    so with respect to the Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Guatemala and
    Honduras.

        Question. Why did the Department of State abandon its leadership
    and authority in these vital matters to DHS?

        Answer. It is the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
    Security who have the statutory authority and obligation to determine
    whether a bilateral agreement complies with the ``Safe Third Country''
    exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The State Department
    works with DHS to negotiate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with foreign
    governments, but does not participate in making these legal
    determinations.

        Question. Secretary Pompeo, the day after the release of the
    Commission on Unalienable Rights report you seemed to indicate that
    some rights are more important than others. You failed to extoll the
    importance of the rights enshrined in our own constitution including
    the right to peaceful assembly or the freedom of the press.
    Furthermore, you stated ``abortion is not a human right.'' This follows
    actions by the United States, under your leadership, at the UN to lobby
    UN Member States to oppose access to reproductive health care and
    threatening to veto a UN Security Council Resolution over the inclusion
    of reproductive health care for women who have survived sexual assault.
    Do you believe that property rights are more important than the rights
    of free speech or assembly?

        Answer. No. I believe property rights are vitally important and I
    believe that rights of free speech and assembly are vitally important.

        Question. Is it your belief that women who suffer rape or assault
    should not receive reproductive healthcare?

        Answer. I support a survivor-centered approach which empowers
    survivors of sexual violence, including rape and assault, by respecting
    their rights and prioritizing their needs. For the Trump
    Administration, this means working to ensure that survivors have access
    to appropriate, accessible, and quality health care, psychological and
    social support, security, and legal assistance.

        Question. Do you expect the United States to continue to be a
    shining example of a country founded on universal human rights values
    when you have produced a document effectively saying we need to limit
    our definition?

        Answer. Yes, I believe it is imperative for the United States to
    continue to be a shining example of a country dedicated to protecting
    and promoting universal human rights. I played no role in drafting the
    report, but note that nowhere in the report does it state we need to
    ``limit our definition.''

        Question. The State Department has repeatedly used language urging
    ``both sides'' to avoid provoking tensions whenever Turkey is involved
    in a dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, from its
    incursions of Greek airspace to its exploratory drilling in Cyprus EEZ
    to its illegitimate `maritime boundary agreement' with Libya's
    Government of National Accord, Turkey has clearly been the sole
    aggressor in the region. Is there any recent dispute in the Eastern
    Mediterranean in which Greece or Cyprus has `provoked tensions'? When
    will you and the State Department stop using equivocating language to
    describe disputes Turkey creates in the Eastern Mediterranean and
    publicly stand up to Turkey's aggression? How do you intend to hold
    Turkey accountable for that aggression against our partners?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned by Turkey's ongoing operations
    surveying for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus
    assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. We continue to urge
    Turkey publicly and privately to halt any plans for exploration and to
    avoid provocative steps that raise regional tensions.
        Resource development in the Eastern Mediterranean should promote
    cooperation and provide a foundation for durable energy security and
    economic prosperity throughout the region. We strongly support dialogue
    between Greece and Turkey and encourage the parties to resume
    discussing these issues.

        Question. I appreciate your work to boost U.S. support for the
    Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral, including your participation in
    ``3+1'' summits, and I am pleased that State is moving forward with
    providing IMET to Cyprus in FY 2021 as laid out in my Eastern
    Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, which became law
    last December. The East Med Act also called for the establishment of a
    U.S.-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center. What is the status of
    discussions around creating this Center? What is the timeline for
    establishing it?

        Answer. The Department's understanding is that the United States--
    Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center has yet to be established due to
    lack of identified funding from Congress to support this effort. In the
    case of the Israel Center, Congress allocated $4 million per year for 5
    years to be matched by the Israeli Government and each nation's private
    sector. DoE has not yet done a regional center of this type.
        As the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act
    specifies, the DoE is charged with establishing this institution, in
    coordination with the State Department, we would ask you to consult
    with DoE for additional follow-up.

        Question. Earlier this year, I received a letter from State and
    USAID saying that the Administration is ending funding for humanitarian
    demining in Nagorno-Karabakh due to a supposed lack of remaining
    contamination and a desire to focus on preparing populations for peace.
    However, the amount of remaining contamination is unknown and poses a
    serious threat to the peace process given that anger and resentment
    from landmine accidents reduce the population's desire to see peace.
    While we all hope no further landmine accidents occur, if one does
    happen what effect does State assess that will have on the population's
    readiness for peace? Have State and USAID considered funding an
    independent assessment of remaining contamination, and continuing
    demining of known contamination in populated areas while the assessment
    is ongoing?

        Answer. Although a third-party assessment was considered, the
    available data was sufficient to determine the remaining mine
    contamination in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is
    light. With high-priority hazard areas already cleared and no civilian
    deaths in the past 5 years, landmines no longer pose the threat to
    local populations they once did. It would be unusual for the United
    States to continue demining in Nagorno-Karabakh, especially since
    unaddressed contamination elsewhere in the world poses grave threats
    and results in far higher casualty rates. Given limitations on official
    U.S. engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh, practical and oversight concerns
    raised serious questions about the reliability of conducting an
    assessment.

        Question. The majority of Northern Ireland's population opposed
    Brexit in the 2016 referendum, and the increasingly probable scenario
    that the EU and UK fail to reach a trade deal and revert to WTO rules
    on December 31 is deeply concerning. What impact does the State
    Department assess a reversion to WTO rules would have on the people and
    economy of Northern Ireland, including the impact on the Ireland-
    Northern Ireland border? What engagements have you and others at the
    State Department had with the UK Government regarding how it will
    implement the Good Friday Agreement in such a scenario?

        Answer. Through the negotiation of a Withdrawal Agreement, the UK
    Government, Irish Government, and EU have been clear there will not be
    a return to a hard border on the island of Ireland. The Special Envoy
    to Northern Ireland has expressed to the Northern Ireland Office, the
    Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), European leaders, and members of the
    Northern Ireland devolved government U.S. concerns about any actions
    that may lead to a hard border. The Special Envoy maintains frequent
    and direct contact with Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon
    Lewis to discuss the Northern Ireland Protocol, a crucial part of the
    draft Withdrawal Agreement that addresses key provisions that would
    avoid the return of a hard border.

        Question. I understand that discussions are ongoing regarding a
    U.S.-UK free trade agreement or some other trade deal. Is it the
    Administration's position that full implementation of the Good Friday
    Agreement is a necessary condition for signing any trade deal with the
    UK? What impact does the State Department assess any free trade deal
    would have on the economies of Northern Ireland and Ireland?

        Answer. The Administration is committed to maintaining peace,
    prosperity, and stability in Northern Ireland through the Belfast/Good
    Friday Agreement. The Administration has made clear that ongoing
    adherence to the Agreement is a necessary condition of any trade deal.
    Any free trade deal would be beneficial to the economy of Northern
    Ireland and would promote strong economic ties and investment.

        Question. What has Special Envoy Mulvaney done regarding Northern
    Ireland since starting the position earlier this year? What engagements
    has he had with British and Irish Government officials, officials in
    Northern Ireland, and civil society in Northern Ireland? What
    engagements has he had with the U.S. Congress given widespread
    Congressional interest in the area?

        Answer. Special Envoy Mulvaney has emphasized the U.S. role as an
    honest broker committed to maintaining peace, prosperity, and stability
    in Northern Ireland since he was appointed. Despite being unable to
    travel due to COVID-19, he has met with the UK, Irish, and EU
    ambassadors and has held virtual engagements with the U.S. Ambassadors
    to the UK and Ireland; the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; the
    Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister); the ministers of the devolved
    government in Northern Ireland; and numerous government officials,
    members of civil society, community leaders, and business
    representatives. He has briefed members of Congress, including
    Representatives King, Boyle, and Joyce, and Senator Cotton.

        Question. I am deeply concerned by the new Roskomnadzor order that
    would require media designated as ``foreign agents''--meaning U.S.
    Agency for Global Media (USAGM) outlets--to add large labels to all of
    their published materials saying they are foreign agents. The intent of
    this order is clearly to discourage Russians from reading media that
    calls the Kremlin's lies into question. How has the State Department
    engaged with the Kremlin on this issue? What steps are you taking to
    reinforce our support for fair, independent coverage from USAGM and
    ensure that it remains accessible to the Russian people?

        Answer. We share your concern about the recent order published by
    Russian authorities that effectively targets U.S. Agency for Global
    Media-funded entities in Russia, a point I stressed publicly in my
    press statement on August 10. For more than 70 years, Voice of America
    and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been vital sources of
    independent news and information for the people of Russia.
    Unfortunately, the proposed restrictions--which would permit
    substantial administrative penalties for non-compliance--coincide with
    increased repression by Russian authorities against already embattled
    journalists and independent press in Russia. We have urged the Russian
    Government to reconsider these actions, which will further damage the
    bilateral relationship, and to uphold its international obligations and
    commitments to freedom of expression.

        Question. While Bahrain has recently freed a number of prisoners or
    allowed them to finish their sentences outside of prison, including
    Nabeel Rajab, many others remain unjustly detained. Please describe the
    specific steps taken by the U.S. to urge Bahrain to further reduce the
    number of detained individuals in Bahrain and to implement further
    judicial and policing reform.

        Answer. The Department has identified cases of concern in Bahrain
    in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. U.S. officials have
    expressed concern about these to the government. The Government of
    Bahrain has implemented meaningful justice sector reforms in recent
    years, with the support of the U.S. Government. Justice sector
    development is among the areas of discussion between our two
    governments.

        Question. Media reports indicate that the Egyptian Government has
    taken delivery of the first shipment of Russian-made Su-35 fighter jets
    in violation of CAATSA. Last year, you and Secretary Esper sent a
    letter to the Egyptians warning that ``major new arms deals with Russia
    would--at a minimum--complicate future U.S. defense transactions with
    and security assistance to Egypt.'' Are you prepared to stand by this
    letter and enforce U.S. law?

        Answer. The Department is not aware of the delivery of any Su-35
    fighter jets to Egypt. We are, however, concerned about media reports
    indicating that five Su-35 fighter jets allegedly intended for eventual
    delivery to Egypt were spotted in Novosibirsk, Russia. We are closely
    monitoring the situation and continue to urge the government of Egypt
    to not take delivery of any Su-35 aircraft. I have made clear in public
    testimony to Congress and to the government of Egypt that CAATSA
    Section 231 requires imposition of sanctions on any person that
    knowingly engages in a significant transaction with the Russian defense
    or intelligence sectors, and that I take implementation of CAATSA 231
    seriously and intend to comply with the law.

        Question. If so, what steps is the Administration prepared to take
    and will those steps include sanctions?

        Answer. We have been very clear with senior levels of the Egyptian
    Government that CAATSA Section 231 requires imposition of sanctions on
    any person that knowingly engages in a significant transaction with the
    Russian defense or intelligence sectors, and that the delivery of Su-35
    fighter aircraft risks triggering CAATSA 231 sanctions. Egyptian
    officials have indicated that they understand. In addition to urging
    Egypt, as we do all our partners and allies, to avoid new major Russian
    arms purchases that risk triggering CAATSA 231 sanctions, we continue
    to engage Egypt to ensure the United States remains its partner of
    choice.

        Question. The Egyptian Government has still not adequately
    compensated April Corley, the American citizen badly injured by the
    Egyptian military when attack helicopters struck her sightseeing group
    after misidentifying them as terrorists. What steps is the United
    States taking to advocate for Ms. Corley and ensure that the Egyptian
    government reaches an equitable compensation agreement with her?

        Answer. The Department strongly supports April Corley and the
    Government of Egypt reaching a just resolution, and we continue to
    raise Ms. Corley's desire for fair compensation at very senior levels
    of the Egyptian Government. The Department is also in communication
    with Ms. Corley and her lawyers on the status of negotiations. As of
    April 6, Egypt told the Department that the private entity negotiating
    with Ms. Corley had been urged to reopen the negotiation channels with
    her lawyers to strike an agreement. We will continue to urge Egypt to
    resume negotiations with Ms. Corley's lawyers.

        Question. I am extremely concerned that Egyptian authorities
    detained family members of U.S. citizen Mohamad Soltan after raiding
    their homes. The timing of these raids and detentions shortly after Mr.
    Soltan sued former Egyptian Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi under the
    Torture Victim Protection Act, for alleged torture and other human
    rights violations. Does the State Department assess that Mr. Soltan's
    relatives were raided and detained in retribution for his lawsuit
    against Mr. al-Beblawi? Why or why not?

        Answer. We are aware of troubling media reports of raids on the
    homes of Mr. Soltan's Egyptian family and detention of his relatives.
    On July 8, I publicly urged Egyptian officials to stop any harassment
    of U.S. citizens or their families. We will continue to engage the
    Egyptian Government on this issue, because we take seriously all
    allegations of arbitrary arrest or detention in Egypt.

        Question. Does the State Department assess that the raid and
    detention of Mr. Soltan's relatives amount to a pattern of intimidation
    against Mr. Soltan, an American citizen? Why or why not?

        Answer. We note that these arrests occurred within 2 weeks of Mr.
    Soltan filing a civil lawsuit against Mr. Beblawi. We are monitoring
    the situation and plan to document such allegations in the Department's
    Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. I can assure you that the
    welfare of all Americans remains a top priority for the State
    Department, and we continue to press Egypt on its detention conditions,
    the need for timely and fair judicial processes, and for the respect of
    human rights in general.

        Question. What steps, if any, did the Administration take to urge
    the Egyptian Government to release Mr. Soltan's relatives?

        Answer. We continue to emphasize to the Government of Egypt that
    the United States rejects all forms of intimidation and have raised our
    concerns with senior Egyptian officials in Washington and Cairo. We
    have asked Egypt to disclose where Soltan's family members are being
    held and on July 8, I publicly urged Egyptian officials to stop any
    harassment of U.S. citizens and their families. In June and July
    respectively, the Bureaus of Near East Affairs and Democracy, Human
    Rights, and Labor issued public messages expressing that the Department
    takes all allegations of harassment of U.S. citizens and their families
    seriously.

        Question. Has the Administration urged the Egyptian Government not
    to take such action in the future?

        Answer. The United States has long emphasized the importance of
    respect for the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and
    association, and we continue to do so. We have also raised with Egypt
    that the United States rejects all forms of intimidation and takes all
    allegations of arbitrary arrest or detention in Egypt seriously. On
    July 8, I publicly requested Egypt stop any harassment of U.S. citizens
    and their families.

        Question. Without taking a position on the merits of Mr. Soltan's
    lawsuit, I have questions about State Department's declaration on July
    17 that Mr. el-Beblawi should be immune from being under the Torture
    Victim Protection Act. Did the Egyptian Government specifically seek
    this determination and announcement? If so, who and when?

        Answer. In June, the Department received diplomatic correspondence
    from the Egyptian Embassy related to the immunity of Mr. el-Beblawi. It
    is the Department's standard practice, as set forth in the Foreign
    Affairs Manual (2 FAM 234.1-1), that in such cases, the Office of
    Foreign Missions (OFM) will provide a certification confirming any
    immunities enjoyed by the person at issue under international law. OFM
    provided such a certification to the Egyptian Embassy regarding Mr. el-
    Beblawi on July 7.

        Question. Please provide the State Department's legal reasoning for
    why Mr. el-Beblawi is immune from such a lawsuit.

        Answer. Mr. el-Beblawi is the Principal Resident Representative of
    Egypt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pursuant to Article V,
    Section 15(4) of the Agreement Between the United Nations (UN) and the
    United States Regarding the Headquarters of the UN, principal resident
    representatives of members of a ``specialized agency'' are entitled to
    the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic envoys accredited to
    the United States. The Agreement between the UN and the IMF establishes
    that the IMF is a ``specialized agency.'' In the United States, the
    privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys (now called ``diplomatic
    agents'') are those provided under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
    Relations (VCDR). Therefore, Mr. el-Beblawi enjoys the same immunities
    as would a diplomatic agent under the VCDR.

        Question. Regional aggression from Iranian proxies has continued
    since Qassem Soleimani was killed in January. And while your legally
    questionable strike against Qassem Soleimani perhaps, as General
    MacKenzie recently said put the Iranians ``on their heels'', he
    continued by saying that he ``draws no confidence from periods of
    quiet'' rather takes these moments to look very hard at what the
    Iranians have planned long term. Just this week, Israel said it stopped
    a Hezbollah infiltration under its border and there was an exchange of
    fire at the border. In Yemen, the Houthis continue to launch Iranian-
    made ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, U.S. diplomatic and
    military facilities remain under constant threat with Camp Taji again
    coming under rocket fire earlier this week. Please describe what steps
    you are taking, in concert with our allies, to seriously address this
    ongoing Iranian aggression.

        Answer. In light of Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorism and
    attacks on its neighbors, it is imperative to remain vigilant against
    the threat of Iranian attacks. The JCPOA's failure to address Iran's
    support for armed proxies and partners in the region was one of the
    reasons that this Administration ultimately decided to exit the deal
    and institute the maximum pressure campaign. Since May 2018, we have
    deprived the regime of more than $70 billion in revenue, which has in
    turn meant the regime has less money to support its proxies. We have
    also maintained a clear and consistent line with the Iranian regime:
    any targeting of U.S. personnel, facilities, or interests will result
    in serious consequences.

        Question. While there is no question that Iran is suffering
    economically, its proxy networks continue to be active in promoting
    instability. What evidence do you have that the maximum pressure
    campaign has reduced the level of Iranian aggression or support for
    proxies in the region?

        Answer. The economic constraints caused by the maximum pressure
    campaign mean the Iranian regime has less money to support its proxies
    and terrorist activities. As a result, Hizballah Secretary General
    Hassan Nasrallah publicly appealed for donations for the first time
    ever. Hamas has also enacted what it calls an ``austerity plan'' to
    mitigate a lack of funds from Iran. Iranian partners and proxies in
    Syria and elsewhere are going unpaid, and the Iranian support they once
    relied upon is drying up.

        Question. Do you assess that Iran's financial duress has pushed
    them closer to and economic and security arrangement with China?

        Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is
    a partnership born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely
    weakened, in part by U.S. sanctions but also through its own
    mismanagement and corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for
    the Iranian people as long as the regime gains access to much-needed
    capital. The regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the
    agreement for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they
    are rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

        Question. How would increased Iranian and Chinese cooperation
    impact U.S. interests and efforts across the Middle East and Asia?

        Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year
    agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese
    investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. However, Chinese
    entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime,
    including through continued sanctionable purchases of Iranian
    petrochemicals and metals. We have made clear to the Chinese Government
    that we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions regime with
    respect to Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities that
    engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to
    conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the PRC is
    undermining its own stated goal of promoting stability in the Middle
    East.

        Question. Will you commit to sharing any classified evidence that
    would pertain to these answers to me or my staff in a secure setting?

        Answer. My staff and I are committed to keeping your staff, and any
    other member of the legislative branch, informed.

        Question. The Administration's maximum pressure campaign has not
    brought Iran back to the negotiating table. Nor has unilaterally
    withdrawing from the JCPOA, which I did not support, without the
    support of our allies. I remain concerned about Iran's nuclear progress
    over the past year. In the past months, Iran was closer to a nuclear
    break out than at any time over the past 5 years. In spite of the
    economic damage wrought by renewed sanctions, Iran has not shown any
    willingness to negotiate a new nuclear deal or even lessen its support
    for proxies that menace our allies and partners around the Middle East.
    The President has said that Iran will not be allowed to have the
    ability to have a nuclear weapon. Can you provide specific examples of
    how this Administration has increased constrained Iran's nuclear
    weapons' development?

        Answer. The JCPOA was a flawed deal because it did not permanently
    address our concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program and
    destabilizing conduct. The fact that Iran has been able to return to
    higher levels of nuclear enrichment so quickly and easily reflects the
    deal's deficiencies. The purpose of the maximum pressure campaign is to
    deprive the regime of revenue needed to foment its malign activities
    and bring Iran to the negotiation table to address both Iran's nuclear
    program as well as its other destabilizing activities. The United
    States is engaged in robust international engagement to bring
    multilateral pressure on Iran and to raise the costs of its nuclear
    escalation.

        Question. What is the Administration's red line as it considers the
    size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear program when considering
    whether military action is necessary to restrain Iran's nuclear
    program?

        Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will
    never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if, and
    under what circumstances, military action would be warranted is up to
    the President.

        Question. Does the red line cover the number of centrifuges?

        Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will
    never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and
    under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to
    the President.

        Question. Does the red line cover the ability to deliver a warhead
    via a ballistic missile?

        Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will
    never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and
    under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to
    the President.

        Question. Does the red line cover the level of uranium enrichment?

        Answer. The President has been clear that the United States will
    never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Any decision on if and
    under what circumstances military action would be warranted is up to
    the President.

        Question. Will you commit to providing me and my staff a classified
    meeting to address this question?

        Answer. My staff and I are committed to keeping your staff, and any
    other member of the Legislative branch, informed.

        Question. Given Iran's unwillingness thus far to return to a
    negotiating table, what do you think would change that calculus?

        Answer. Iran is facing massive economic and political crises,
    including a large economic contraction, high unemployment, a currency
    crisis, and mass protests. The economic conditions, as well as the
    regime's credibility with its people, will not likely improve. Given
    this reality, the regime faces a stark choice: come to the negotiating
    table or face economic collapse.

        Question. While we ostensibly share the same goals regarding
    constraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and nefarious activities with our
    European partners, it seems the coalition is fraying. What steps are
    you taking to ensure that our European partners stay with us in a
    concerted joint effort to constrain Iran's ambitions.

        Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition
    to Iranian actions to advance its nuclear program beyond JCPOA limits
    and also share our concern regarding Iran's continued proliferation of
    weaponry to arm proxies and partners. Cooperation with European allies
    and partners to address the range of threats posed by Iran remains
    robust and we are in regular communication with our allies and partners
    regarding our Iran policy and how to raise the cost on Iran for its
    destabilizing activities.

        Question. The IAEA is becoming increasingly concerned about access
    to declared Iranian facilities. What steps are you taking to ensure the
    IAEA is empowered to fulfill it inspection responsibilities?

        Answer. The United States is committed to strengthening
    international safeguards globally and fully supports the efforts of the
    IAEA to fulfill its important mandate, including in Iran, which is
    required under its legally-binding safeguards agreements to provide the
    IAEA with access to locations specified by the agency. The IAEA
    Director General (DG) Rafael Grossi reported that since January 2020,
    Iran has refused to provide access to two locations not declared by
    Iran. In June 2020, we supported a strong IAEA Board of Governors
    resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without
    further delay. I recently met with DG Grossi, and we will continue to
    use our diplomacy to ensure the IAEA maintains full access to Iranian
    facilities.

        Question. What steps are you considering if the IAEA is denied
    access?

        Answer. On June 19, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a
    resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA without any
    further delay, including by providing prompt access to the locations
    specified by the agency. We have made clear that if Iran fails to
    cooperate, the international community must be prepared to take further
    action.

        Question. While clearly not a supporter of the JCPOA, I was still
    concerned that unilaterally withdrawing from the agreement without a
    plan for how to replace it would alienate our allies and embolden our
    rivals. We are now trying to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran by
    October with no clear way of countering the inevitable Russian and
    Chinese veto of our efforts. What options do we have in the almost
    certain event of the arms embargo expiring?

        Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take
    collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the
    United States would have no choice but to initiate the snapback of UN
    sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining and proliferating deadly
    weapons throughout the region.

        Question. What assurances do you have from our European allies that
    they will join us in pursuing these options?

        Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition
    to Iran's continued proliferation of weaponry to arm proxies and
    partners. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take
    collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the
    United States would restore UN sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining
    and proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

        Question. Are you planning to invoke the snapback mechanism in the
    event the embargo is not extended?

        Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take
    collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the
    United States will have no choice but to trigger the snapback of all UN
    sanctions on Iran in order to prevent Iran from obtaining and
    proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

        Question. What are the implications for the future of UN sanctions
    if snapback is invoked and Russia and China or other countries do not
    comply with those sanctions?

        Answer. All UN member states are required to implement UN Security
    Council sanctions obligations. These obligations exist independent of
    non-compliance by individual Member States. The United States will
    continue to make every effort to ensure that all UN member states
    comply with their UN Security Council sanctions obligations.

        Question. How are you engaging with other countries to ensure that
    the current embargo is enforced?

        Answer. Cooperation with allies and partners to address the range
    of threats posed by Iran remains robust and in the context of Iranian
    conventional arms transfers, has resulted in several well-publicized
    interdictions conducted in recent years by U.S., French, Australian,
    and Saudi forces. We have also worked with both the United Nations and
    like-minded countries to shine a light on Iran's continued malign
    activities. In part due to our efforts, the UN Secretary General's June
    report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231
    unequivocally concluded that the cruise missiles and unmanned aerial
    vehicles used in the September 14, 2019, attack on Saudi oil facilities
    were Iranian in origin.

        Question. I have still not received a good answer to my first two
    questions from January regarding the imminence and nature of the threat
    used to justify the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. U.S. personnel
    in Iraq are now under greater threat than they have been in recent
    history and the U.S. Embassy and Green Zone are rocketed on a near
    daily basis. Over the past year, U.S. presence in Iraq has been on
    ordered departure more days than not and the State Department has
    permanently decreased its positions in Iraq to roughly 80. Yet the
    State Department and USAID continue to program foreign assistance,
    including over half a billion dollars in Northern Iraq, at the same
    time it is downsizing its presence, thereby impeding its ability to
    oversee these funds and raising serious concerns about waste, fraud,
    and abuse. Do you expect any shortcomings in administering U.S.
    assistance in Iraq given the reduced staffing in the country?

        Answer. The Department of State and USAID have long faced security
    challenges in delivering assistance in Iraq, which we seek to mitigate
    by drawing on additional support from Washington and from regional
    staff to supplement our mission. As a result, we do not expect any
    shortcomings in the Administration of U.S. assistance based on current
    staffing levels.

        Question. Do you believe our diplomatic presence in Iraq is large
    enough to adequately perform all the tasks we are asking of it?

        Answer. Our current staffing level (349 U.S. Direct Hires and Third
    Country Nationals) enables us to accomplish our mission in Iraq while
    accounting for the current security environment. However, staffing
    levels are not static and are constantly re-evaluated and adjusted to
    meet mission priorities. Our diplomatic presence is consistent with
    staffing levels previously notified to Congress in CN 19-327.

        Question. Given the staffing reductions, what steps are the State
    Department and USAID taking to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is
    properly administered?

        Answer. The Department of State and USAID are committed to properly
    administering U.S. foreign assistance in Iraq. Last year, USAID
    increased its authorized expatriate staff in Iraq from 8 to 13,
    allowing us to better manage our resources in-country. The State
    Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the
    Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination manage
    their programs entirely from Washington, incorporating an in-country
    monitoring team. The Department of State and USAID also maintain a
    network of staff outside the country who provide support to the Iraq
    mission.

        Question. Lebanon's financial crisis is accelerating at an alarming
    rate with some economists warning that the country faces an economic
    collapse similar to Venezuela with the country's large middle class
    being pushed into poverty. Is U.S. economic assistance helping to
    mitigate Lebanon's financial crisis?

        Answer. U.S. economic assistance is reaching thousands of Lebanese
    people in a time of acute crisis. Our economic assistance, which
    included more than $117.5 million in FY 2019 economic support funds
    alone, promotes economic growth, supports workforce enhancement and
    education, and helps with the local provision of basic services. For
    instance, USAID expects to have created more than 3,000 new full-time
    jobs in Lebanon by September, and its assistance has led to education
    for more than 300,000 Lebanese children. However, a path out of
    Lebanon's crisis depends on Lebanese political leaders and whether they
    are prepared to implement the reforms necessary to put the country on a
    sustainable path.

        Question. What reforms do you think are most critical for Lebanon
    to pursuant to the IMF recommendations?

        Answer. Despite many months of discussions between the Lebanese
    Government and the International Monetary Fund, Lebanese leaders have
    not yet taken even the most preliminary steps toward reform that would
    be required for serious negotiations for an IMF program. Reforms are
    needed in a variety of areas, including in the electricity, customs,
    and telecoms sectors, as well as in fiscal policy, fiscal transparency,
    and finance and banking, among others. Progress in these areas would
    help put the Lebanese economy on a more sustainable path.

        Question. Do you assess this government as capable of making
    necessary reforms to the economy?

        Answer. The popular demand for real change in Lebanon could not be
    clearer, and the United States has called on Lebanon's political
    leaders to finally respond to the people's longstanding and legitimate
    demands for good governance, sound economic and financial reform, and
    an end to the endemic corruption that has stifled the country's
    tremendous potential. So far, Lebanese leaders have failed in their
    responsibility to meet the needs of the people and have resisted the
    kind of deep fundamental reforms that are needed. Lebanese leaders must
    demonstrate a political will and commitment to reform. It is what the
    Lebanese people expect and deserve.

        Question. Would Hezbollah benefit from an economic collapse in
    Lebanon?

        Answer. A stable and secure Lebanon is in the interest of the
    United States, the Lebanese people, and the region. Hizballah is a
    terrorist organization and a destabilizing force. It has benefitted
    from the lack of accountability and transparency in Lebanon. Its malign
    activities undermine the Lebanese state and threaten the country's
    security. Economic collapse would be harmful to the institutions in
    Lebanon we support and that help undermine Hizballah's influence.

        Question. Does such an economic collapse in Lebanon threaten the
    security of our ally, the State of Israel?

        Answer. Israel's security is a long-standing cornerstone of U.S.
    foreign policy. Economic collapse in Lebanon would have negative
    effects both on the state and beyond its borders, and Hizballah in this
    scenario could very well pose even more of a threat to Israel. Economic
    reform is key to Lebanon's stability and, therefore, to U.S. national
    security and the security of our partners.

        Question. Should the United States continue to provide economic
    assistance to Lebanon at the same level as in recent years?

        Answer. The President's Budget Request for FY 2021 reflects the
    level of U.S. assistance that we assess is appropriate to our efforts
    to assist in meeting the needs of the Lebanese people who continue to
    face persistent challenges. Our economic assistance addresses the needs
    of vulnerable communities, particularly those struggling due to
    declining economic opportunities and poor public services. By improving
    local governance, strengthening educational institutions, and enhancing
    and boosting economic growth, U.S. economic assistance activities also
    help to challenge the false narrative advanced by Hizballah, and its
    sponsor Iran, that it represents a viable alternative to legitimate
    Lebanese institutions.

        Question. U.S. security assistance has helped the Lebanese Armed
    Forces become a more effective and professional force for all Lebanese,
    regardless of sect, thereby undermining Hezbollah's claim that it is
    the only defender that Lebanon can count on. Do you agree with that
    statement?

        Answer. I strongly support the statement that U.S. security
    assistance has helped the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) become a more
    effective and professional force for all Lebanese, regardless of sect.
    The LAF remains one of the most respected institutions in Lebanon and
    the U.S.-LAF partnership builds the LAF's capacity as the sole
    legitimate defender of Lebanon's sovereignty. U.S. support for
    institutions like the LAF helps undermine Hizballah's influence and
    helps debunk Hizballah's false narrative of being Lebanon's protector.

        Question. Would a reduction in the capabilities of the Lebanese
    Armed Forces undermine Israeli security?

        Answer. Israel's security is a long-standing cornerstone of U.S.
    foreign policy. The United States has expressed publicly and privately
    deep concerns about Hizballah's continued efforts to expand its
    weaponry and project Iran's threats to Israel and the region. U.S.
    support for institutions like the Lebanese Armed Forces helps undermine
    Hizballah's influence.

        Question. Should the U.S. continue to provide security assistance
    to Lebanon at the same level as in recent years?

        Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces
    (LAF) is a key component of U.S. policy in Lebanon. U.S. assistance to
    the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) helps to build capable
    and committed partner forces for the United States in a difficult
    region, as well as helping the Lebanese state protect its borders,
    effectively counter ISIS, and demonstrate it is the sole legitimate
    defender of Lebanon's sovereignty.

        Question. What would the implications be of reducing U.S. military
    assistance to the LAF?

        Answer. The LAF is one of our strongest counterterrorism partners
    in the region. A weakened LAF would enable Hizballah to expand its
    influence even further and increase the risk of instability inside
    Lebanon and beyond. Our assistance to the LAF helps ensure it remains a
    reliable and critical counterterrorism partner for the United States.
    In addition, a LAF weakened by reduced assistance from the United
    States might need to accept supplementary assistance from other
    nations, which may have objectives contrary to ours. Russia, for
    instance, has offered military assistance to the LAF in the past, and
    it was able to refuse, in large part, because of the strength and
    reliability of our own partnership.

        Question. Much like the Astana process in Syria, following their
    meeting in Ankara last week, it now appears that Turkey and Russia are
    poised to drive the geopolitical agenda in Libya and across the
    Mediterranean. Last week, there were also a number of reports that
    Russia is positioning more forces in Libya in support of Khalifa
    Heftar, adding more fuel to a fire already raging with weapons from
    other countries across the region. Is it your assessment that Russia
    and Turkey control the future of maritime security in the
    Mediterranean?

        Answer. Countering malign Russian influence remains a U.S. foreign
    policy priority worldwide. In Libya, we remain concerned by the
    continued influx of Russian military armaments and Russian-backed
    Wagner mercenaries from Russia, Syria, and other countries. Russia
    seeks to divide NATO Allies over Libya, establish a foothold on the
    Mediterranean, and exploit and control Libyan energy resources. The
    United States opposes any arrangement that allows Russia to dictate
    outcomes in Libya. From bases in Libya, Russia could challenge NATO
    area access in the Mediterranean and threaten European and U.S. assets
    and personnel stationed across the continent.
        To ensure regional security in the Mediterranean, we stress to
    Turkey and other NATO Allies, as well as our non-NATO partners in the
    region, countering Russian activity in Libya must be a top collective
    priority. We continue to urge Turkey, aligned with Libya's UN-
    recognized Government of National Accord, to avoid pursuing any sort of
    arrangement with Russia in Libya; we want to see de-escalation on both
    sides. We continue to call on all Libyan and external actors to support
    UN-led negotiations towards a sustainable ceasefire, the resumption of
    oil sector operations, and an immediate return to UN-facilitated
    political negotiations.

        Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that
    Turkey and Russia do not end up controlling maritime security in the
    eastern Mediterranean?

        Answer. We will continue to use our full diplomatic and economic
    leverage to stop Russia's destabilizing activities in Syria and Libya.
    We regularly warn Eastern Mediterranean allies and partners of Russia's
    intention to establish a permanent presence in the region. We ask them
    to deny Russia port visits and publicly condemn Russia's support for
    armed groups, including Russian proxy the Wagner group, and violations
    of the UN arms embargo in Libya.
        We have conveyed to Turkey repeatedly that its continued
    overflights of Greek territory, drilling activities in waters off
    Cyprus, signing of a maritime boundary memorandum of understanding with
    Libya, and ongoing operations surveying for energy resources in areas
    over which Greece and the Republic of Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the
    Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and unhelpful.

        Question. The Turkish-GNA maritime border agreement is based on a
    flawed reading of international law. Our partners including Greece and
    Cyprus have expressed vocal opposition to this agreement, which
    undermines U.S. security interests as well as broader security and
    energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. Will the United States
    insist that any potential future Libyan government eschew the
    underpinnings of this agreement and work with other Eastern
    Mediterranean countries to comply with international law and peaceful
    energy exploration?

        Answer. As we have said publicly and privately, the Memorandum of
    Understanding on maritime boundaries has raised tensions in the region
    and has been unhelpful to efforts to negotiate a solution to the
    conflict. The United States has called on all parties to refrain from
    actions that risk heightening tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
    This development highlights the risk of the Libyan conflict taking on
    wider regional dimensions and the urgent need for all interested
    parties to work towards a negotiated solution.

        Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to counter Turkey's
    aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean?

        Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned with heightened
    tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have conveyed to Turkey
    repeatedly that its continued overflights of Greek territory, its
    drilling activities in the waters off Cyprus, its signing of a maritime
    boundary MOU with Libya, and its ongoing operations surveying for
    natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert
    jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and
    unhelpful. We continue to press Turkey to meet its responsibilities
    under the existing Turkey-EU migration deal and to avoid provocative
    acts on the Turkey-Greece border.
        Turkey remains an important NATO Ally, and we will continue working
    with Turkey on areas of mutual interest while urging it to change
    course in areas of concern.

        Question. Over the past year, we have seen a lack of diplomatic
    engagement on Libya, coupled with mixed messages from President Trump,
    which allowed for General Haftar's ill-advised assault on Tripoli and
    open the way for Turkey and Russian footholds in the country. While I
    appreciate that you participated in the Berlin conference earlier this
    year, I fear that our absence is causing significant damage. Does the
    Administration have a strategy to deescalate the fighting in Libya and
    restart political talks? Will we see that strategy in writing by
    September 15 as required by the 2020 NDAA?

        Answer. As an active but neutral actor, the United States is
    pursuing diplomatic engagement with Libyan and external stakeholders
    across the conflict to find a solution. U.S. goals in Libya are to seek
    an immediate end to the conflict and return to political negotiations.
    The efforts of foreign actors to exploit the conflict pose grave
    threats to regional stability and global commerce. The Department of
    State is in the process of coordinating a joint report to Congress with
    the Department of Defense on the U.S. strategy on Libya.

        Question. Does that strategy have buy in from regional partners and
    allies, some of whom support the GNA and some of whom support the LNA?

        Answer. Through our diplomatic engagement, the United States is
    working to find a solution that ends foreign interference in Libya and
    protects the shared interests of the United States, our allies, and
    partners. Our approach includes engagement with all external actors in
    Libya--whether they support the GNA or LNA--with the goal of aligning
    them with the position of the United States in favor of a UN-
    facilitated political process.

        Question. I understand the President has recently made some calls
    to foreign leaders encouraging them to cease their supply of weapons
    and support. How effective do you assess those engagements?

        Answer. The President's personal engagement has helped advance our
    policy of reducing foreign interference in Libya and supporting UN-
    facilitated political dialogue.

        Question. What are the potential implications of direct
    confrontation between Turkey and Egypt in Libya?

        Answer. The Department of State is encouraging Egypt, Turkey, and
    other partners to use their influence to press Libyans including
    Khalifa Haftar, House of Representatives Speaker Agilah Saleh Issa, and
    Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj to de-escalate the conflict, support
    implementation of an immediate ceasefire, and engage in a UN-
    facilitated political process to work for a peaceful solution. Any
    direct conflict between outside actors in Libya would have negative
    effects on the Libyan people and U.S. interests in the region.

        Question. One of the complications of the lack of U.S. engagement
    on Libya is that U.S. partners and allies are on both sides of the
    conflict, some supporting the GNA and some joining Russia to support
    the LNA and many violating the UN arms embargo on Libya to supply
    weapons and equipment to their proxies. What steps has the U.S. taken
    to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya?

        Answer. The United States supports Security Council Resolution
    2292, which provides vital authorities for member states to limit the
    destabilizing flows of arms to and from Libya. The Security Council
    renewed these authorities most recently in June. The United States has
    strongly supported a robust UN arms embargo and sanctions regime, and
    has used its position on the Security Council to ensure those continue.
    The United States has made clear to all actors, publicly and privately,
    the need to respect the arms embargo. Secretary Pompeo emphasized this
    in his remarks to the Berlin conference in January. The United States
    cooperates with the UN Security Council Libya Sanctions Committee Panel
    of Experts, which investigates alleged arms embargo violations, and
    encourages other countries to do so as well.

        Question. Have there been any repercussions for countries that have
    repeatedly violated the arms embargo?

        Answer. Individuals and entities that have participated in efforts
    to send arms to Libya have faced sanctions and criminal prosecution. EU
    Operation Irini and its predecessor, Operation Sophia, have interdicted
    vessels suspected of violating the embargo and shared information on
    alleged violations with the UN Security Council Libya Sanctions
    Committee Panel of Experts. Countries that sent arms and fighters to
    Libya have faced direct criticism from the international community,
    including the United States, as well as from independent NGOs.

        Question. Will the U.S. impose any repercussions for repeated
    violations of that embargo?

        Answer. The United States has consistently promoted accountability
    for violations of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Sanctions discourage
    violations and we will consider their targeted use when appropriate. We
    continue to press our partners to do the same and respect the embargo
    they committed to in Berlin. Countries that sent arms and fighters to
    Libya also faced direct and public criticism from the United States. In
    testimony before Congress, in public comments, and in my own remarks at
    the Berlin conference in January, the Department has not shied away
    from naming countries that have escalated the conflict. We also support
    international efforts to better enforce compliance with the embargo,
    including efforts by the European Union.

        Question. What is the Administration's broader policy toward
    foreign intervention in Libya? What is the State Department
    communicating to those foreign governments involved in Libya, many of
    whom are close U.S. partners like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates?

        Answer. The Administration opposes all foreign military
    interference in Libya, supports UN-led negotiations towards a
    sustainable ceasefire, and backs an immediate return to a UN-
    facilitated political process. In recent weeks, we have seen Egypt take
    a more constructive approach and we encourage this positive
    development. We are urging foreign parties to end their military
    involvement in Libya and use their influence to encourage diverse
    Libyan participation in UN-facilitated security and political
    negotiations. We made clear there is no military solution and Libyan
    leadership and external backers must support a political settlement to
    this conflict.

        Question. The Turkish-GNA maritime border agreement is based on a
    flawed reading of international law. Will the United States insist that
    any potential future Libyan Government eschew the underpinnings of this
    agreement and work with other Eastern Mediterranean countries including
    Greece and Cyprus to comply with international law and peaceful energy
    exploration?

        Answer. As we have said publicly and privately, the Memorandum of
    Understanding on maritime boundaries has raised tensions in the region
    and has been unhelpful to efforts to negotiate a solution to the
    conflict. The United States has called on all parties to refrain from
    actions that risk heightening tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
    This development highlights the risk of the Libyan conflict taking on
    wider regional dimensions and the urgent need for all interested
    parties to work towards a negotiated solution.

        Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to counter Turkey's
    aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean?

        Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned with heightened
    tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have conveyed to Turkey
    repeatedly that its continued overflights of Greek territory, its
    drilling activities in the waters off Cyprus, its signing of a maritime
    boundary MOU with Libya, and its ongoing operations surveying for
    natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert
    jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean are provocative and
    unhelpful. We continue to press Turkey to meet its responsibilities
    under the existing Turkey-EU migration deal and to avoid provocative
    acts on the Turkey-Greece border.
        Turkey remains an important NATO Ally, and we will continue working
    with Turkey on areas of mutual interest while urging it to change
    course in areas of concern.

        Question. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE are allowed to purchase armed
    drones from the U.S., will they be allowed to deploy those drones in
    Libya?

        Answer. We don't comment publicly on possible arms sales until and
    unless we notify them to Congress. Partners are required to follow
    ``End Use'' requirements for all arms transfers as addressed in the
    Letter of Offer and Acceptance, standard terms and conditions for
    foreign military sales or other end use assurances as part of
    commercial sales agreements.

        Question. Ever since President Trump's hasty and ill-conceived
    withdrawal from much of northeast Syria last October, the U.S. has lost
    much of its diplomatic leverage and freedom of movement in Syria. Are
    U.S. troop movements in northeast Syria challenged on the ground by
    Russian soldiers and Assad regime fighters more or less frequently
    since October?

        Answer. The U.S. military continues to communicate with the Russian
    military in Syria via a de-confliction hotline. This is first and
    foremost a safety mechanism to prevent accidents and ensure the safe
    and professional conduct of our forces in close proximity. The
    Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to questions
    regarding U.S. troop movements, but the Department of State stresses in
    diplomatic exchanges with Moscow the importance of adherence to de-
    confliction agreements and procedures.

        Question. How many USAID personnel are on the ground in Northeast
    Syria, compared to September 2019?

        Answer. As of July 21, 2020, the USAID has no personnel on the
    ground in Northeast Syria. This has not changed since September of
    2019.

        Question. Is it fair to say that it is harder to administer U.S.
    assistance without that same USAID presence, especially now when COVID
    had finally reared its head in Northeast and Northwest Syria?

        Answer. The ability of USAID to deliver assistance inside Syria
    depends on security, the availability of legitimate local partners, the
    legal ability to provide such aid, and risk-mitigation measures to
    avoid diversion to sanctioned groups. USAID has provided assistance
    remotely in Syria since 2012, and continues to do so. Our response to
    COVID-19 in Syria relies on the same trusted non-governmental
    organizations we have worked with to provide humanitarian assistance
    since before the pandemic. We continue to require post-award vetting
    for prime and sub-awardees and rigorous risk-mitigation plans for all
    implementing partners.

        Question. During the hearing you confirmed to Senator Graham the
    existence of a deal between an U.S.-based oil company, reported to be
    Delta Crescent Energy LLC, and Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria
    to develop oil fields there and that the United States is supportive of
    the deal. Does this company have an OFAC license allowing it to operate
    in Syria?

        Answer. Queries about private business contracts or whether private
    companies have authorizations or specific licenses should be directed
    to the entity or parties in question. More broadly, we ensure our
    sanctions are in line with our foreign policy interests and target the
    Assad regime's continued violence against the Syrian people. For all
    sanctions programs, including Syria, the U.S. Government considers on a
    case-by-case basis requests to authorize via specific licenses U.S.
    persons' involvement in normally prohibited; this may include
    activities in support of the Syrian opposition.

        Question. A significant amount of oil from Kurdish-controlled
    northeast Syria is sold to the Assad regime. Will any of the oil
    extracted from fields included in this deal be sold by Kurdish
    authorities to the Assad regime? If so, does this company's OFAC
    license allow for such sales?

        Answer. We are not involved in the commercial decisions of our
    local partners. As a matter of policy, we seek to cut off the regime's
    access to the international financial system and other sources of
    revenue it uses to perpetuate the Syrian conflict. Our sanctions
    programs, including any granting of licenses, reinforce that policy and
    our efforts to ensure compliance are rigorous. We remain committed to
    the unity and territorial integrity of Syria. The U.S. Government does
    not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria.

        Question. The recent expiration of the UN authorization for the Bab
    al-Salama border crossing from Turkey into northwest Syria means that
    nearby areas will now have to be reached from the Bab al-Hawa crossing
    which will require traversing Syrian territory that is controlled by
    the Turkish military or by Turkish-backed rebel groups. What assurances
    does the U.S. have from Turkey that cross-border assistance will be
    allowed to flow through these areas unmolested and undiverted and that
    humanitarian NGOs will be allowed to continue operating?

        Answer. The United States regularly engages with Turkey to urge
    access for international humanitarian organizations and to facilitate
    delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need in and through
    areas over which Turkey has influence. Turkey has played a vital role
    in the delivery of cross-border assistance since the UN authorized the
    program in 2014. In April and May of this year, Turkish facilitation of
    border movements resulted in the highest monthly volumes of cross-
    border aid delivery on record.

        Question. What steps is the U.S. taking to help mitigate the
    logistical complications that arise from the closure of the Bab al-
    Salama crossing?

        Answer. Prior to the July 11 vote in the UN Security Council on
    cross-border access to northwest Syria, UN partners pre-positioned
    humanitarian commodities inside northwest Syria to last several months.
    This allowed our UN and NGO humanitarian partners a period of
    transition as they adapted their activities and logistical arrangements
    to continue delivering assistance to vulnerable populations previously
    reached by the UN through Bab al-Salama. Having provided more than
    $11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance since the start of the crisis,
    the U.S. government continues to be the world-leader in ensuring life-
    saving assistance reaches all Syrians in need.

        Question. The 12-month extension of the UN Security Council's
    authorization for the Bab al-Hawa crossing provides some much needed
    breathing space for both diplomats at the UN and humanitarian groups on
    the ground before the next reauthorization. Please describe the U.S.'s
    strategy for the next reauthorization in 12-months' time.

        Answer. The U.S. strategy comprises multiple lines of mutually
    reinforcing efforts. The Department of State and USAID remain in
    constant contact with those providing cross-border humanitarian
    assistance to Syrians, including the UN and non-governmental
    organizations. The Department continues to highlight shortcomings and
    concerns regarding cross-border access during monthly meetings in the
    UN Security Council and call for those responsible for interference
    with humanitarian aid and attacks on humanitarian workers to be held
    accountable. The Department communicates regularly with like-minded
    countries to provide the rationale and evidence needed to support a
    forward-leaning and well-justified renewal resolution.

        Question. How will the U.S. engage with like-minded countries on
    the Security Council to persuade other members of the Council to extend
    or expand the current authorization and to counter the efforts of
    Russia and China to end or further limit the current authorization?

        Answer. The Department of State remains in constant contact with UN
    Security Council like-minded countries to ensure message alignment,
    including emphasizing the Assad regime remains responsible for
    sufficient cross-line humanitarian assistance into Syria. The
    Department and USAID maintain contact with humanitarian partners in NY
    and on the ground. With the election of India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico,
    and Norway for the 2021-2022 term of the Security Council, the
    Department and USAID will meet with each incoming Security Council
    member to clearly and convincingly convey the need to extend and expand
    this mechanism. The Department will facilitate a roundtable discussion,
    wherein Syrians will highlight the horrid conditions they endure.

        Question. Please describe U.S. engagement with the UN, its related
    agencies and other international aid agencies to create a contingency
    plan in the event that Russia and/or China veto the next authorization
    extension?

        Answer. The United States remains a strong supporter of UN agencies
    and other international organizations providing life-saving services in
    Syria. The UN and international humanitarian assistance partners do not
    have a ready alternative that would allow them to replicate the scale,
    timeliness, or reach of its current cross-border activities. The United
    States will support and advocate for the pre-positioning of commodities
    by the UN, including the World Food Program, as well as work with non-
    governmental organizations and implementing partners to increase their
    capacity to take over essential activities. While these efforts will
    help continue to bring humanitarian assistance to Syrians in need,
    significant gaps will nevertheless remain.

        Question. With the implementation of sanctions under the Caesar
    Syria Civilian Protection Act underway, there are legitimate concerns
    about whether humanitarian carve-outs will be fully effective and
    protected. We are already hearing reports of some NGOs who have
    experienced financial difficulties due to the tightened restrictions.
    This has the unintended risk of inhibiting badly needed humanitarian
    aid. To date, how many organizations have reported to the United States
    or other partner countries that they are experiencing heightened
    challenges operating in Syria as a result of the sanctions imposed
    under the Caesar act?

        Answer. The Caesar Act and the U.S. Syria sanctions program do not
    target humanitarian assistance nor do those sanctions hinder our
    stabilization activities in northeastern Syria. The sanctions are
    intended to promote accountability for the Assad regime's violence and
    destruction.
        The United States works closely with international organizations
    and the broader humanitarian assistance community to address any
    obstacles. The Administration has had and welcomes further
    conversations with them to address obstacles, including ensuring
    financial institutions can do necessary due diligence and support
    organizations providing lifesaving aid.

        Question. What steps is the United States taking to reassure NGOs
    and their financial institutions that they are not subject to sanctions
    under the Caesar Act?

        Answer. The U.S. Government works closely with international
    organizations and the broader humanitarian assistance community to
    address any obstacles. We welcome conversations with humanitarian
    partners to work through any challenges, including ensuring financial
    institutions can undertake necessary due diligence and support
    organizations providing lifesaving aid to Syrians in need.
        Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control has issued several
    general licenses related to humanitarian assistance and trade with
    Syria. I refer you to them for additional information.

        Question. Following the initial optimism about the Arab uprisings,
    only one country--Tunisia--remains on a democratic path. Its successful
    transition should be a national security priority of the United States.
    However, for FY 2021, the President has requested only $84 million in
    economic and security aid, a 65 percent cut from Congress' FY 2020
    appropriation. Can you explain why the Administration is seeking such a
    dramatic cut in funding and what it says about the priority you attach
    to this important country, which has also been an important partner in
    countering terrorism?

        Answer. Security assistance levels requested for Tunisia in the FY
    2021 request are maintained at the same level as the FY 2020 request.
    We provide Economic Support Funds (ESF) to strengthen Tunisia's
    democratic institutions and believe the FY 2021 request level is
    appropriate. Tunisia also benefits from regional ESF under the Middle
    East Partnership Initiative and other governance and public diplomacy
    programs managed by the Department of State and USAID.

        Question. A political solution for Yemen unfortunately looks to be
    very far off with Houthi gains on the battlefield and conflict even
    among the anti-Houthi forces of the internationally recognized Yemeni
    Government and the Southern Transition Council. What specific steps has
    the United States taken in recent months to support a political
    solution in Yemen?

        Answer. Though the Southern Transition Council (STC) announced it
    ``suspended'' negotiation of the Riyadh Agreement on August 25, the
    United States continues to work closely with our Saudi, UAE, and
    Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) counterparts to encourage the ROYG
    and the STC to finalize the agreement.
        We continue to support the work of UN Special Envoy Martin
    Griffiths. There is no military solution in Yemen. The only way forward
    is a political solution that guarantees a unified, stable, and
    prosperous Yemen.

        Question. What steps is the United States taking to ensure that
    life-saving humanitarian medical assistance reaches those who need it
    most?

        Answer. COVID-19 poses a grave and unprecedented threat to
    humanitarian workers in Yemen, who bravely put their own lives on the
    line to continue their life-saving work. We honor those who have lost
    their lives or fallen ill while serving on the frontlines of the COVID-
    19 response. We work with our partners, the UN, and Yemeni authorities
    to ensure aid staff can safely support response efforts and have the
    ability to enter and leave the country as necessary so humanitarian
    organizations can continue critical aid operations. This includes
    support for the logistics work overseen by WFP and the UN Humanitarian
    Air Service. We also continue to advocate jointly with other donors for
    all parties to the conflict to facilitate access of aid workers to
    those in need.

        Question. This Administration still has not shown how it has helped
    Saudi Arabia and the UAE improve its use of precision guided munitions
    and yet it would ease restriction on the sale of armed drones to
    countries like them. Will the Administration allow Saudi Arabia and the
    UAE to purchase armed drones from the United States?

        Answer. Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer
    (CAT) policy, all arms transfers to foreign partners are subject to
    case-by-case comprehensive consideration of U.S. interests, including
    any risk the transfer may contribute to human rights abuses, acts of
    gender-based violence, violence against children, violations of
    international humanitarian law, terrorism, mass atrocities, or
    transnational organized crime. The President's policy directs the U.S.
    Government to aid partners in reducing the risk of harm to civilians
    during military operations, and the Department of State will continue
    to conduct human rights reviews for foreign military sales and direct
    commercial sales. U.S. expertise and training are also shared to help
    mitigate the potential for harm to civilians and promote adherence to
    the law of armed conflict.

        Question. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE are allowed to purchase armed
    drones from the United States, will they be allowed to deploy those
    drones in Yemen?

        Answer. Consistent with section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act,
    in cases of foreign military sales, partners agree to end-use
    requirements in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms
    and Conditions. Typically, the U.S. Government does not place end-use
    requirements that limit the equipment's geographic employment.

        Question. What are the specific categories of ``life-saving
    activities'' that are exempted under the March 27 suspension of USAID
    funding to North Yemen? Has USAID revisited these categories since the
    suspension to expand the definition of what's exempt under ``life-
    saving activities'' to address the COVID-19 pandemic and other health
    issues facing the people of Yemen?

        Answer. The United States has provided nearly $16.7 million in
    funding to support COVID-19 response efforts. We continue to support
    the most critical life-saving activities in northern Yemen, including
    programs to treat malnutrition, provide clean water, and help to
    prevent cholera, COVID-19, and other communicable diseases. USAID will
    continue supporting operational costs to ensure INGO partners can
    maintain their capacity in northern Yemen. USAID continues to support
    UN partners countrywide. Through the World Food Program (WFP), USAID is
    supporting emergency food operations, including at a recalibrated level
    in the north set by WFP. Development assistance in Houthi-controlled
    areas remains suspended, with the exception of operational costs.

        Question. Has any of the suspended assistance been reprogrammed? If
    so, please provide a detailed breakdown of what programs were
    reprogrammed and where the funds have been reprogrammed to.

        Answer. USAID has not reprogrammed any suspended humanitarian or
    development funding within Yemen. As always, we allocate our
    humanitarian funding based on needs, with partners who can deliver on
    behalf of our mission and in a manner that manages U.S. taxpayer
    funding effectively and efficiently. In FY 2020, we continued
    programming carve-out activities with partners and support operational
    costs with suspended international NGOs in northern Yemen to retain a
    footprint in the hopes that current Houthi impediments to a principled
    response will be removed, and our partners can restart operations in
    reaching innocent Yemeni beneficiaries.

        Question. Please provide a detailed breakdown of the $225 million
    in emergency aid to the World Food Program including what programs
    these funds went to support and what portion of those funds was
    allocated for use in Houthi-controlled areas.

        Answer. The United States remains one of WFP's largest donors.
    WFP's decision to recalibrate programs in northern Yemen was a direct
    result of the untenable operating environment created by the Houthis'
    interference in aid operations. Time and again, the Houthis have failed
    to abide by their commitments to end their obstruction of WFP's
    operations and to allow WFP to implement necessary procedures to ensure
    food is reaching the most vulnerable Yemenis. As I announced on May 6,
    we provided nearly $225 million to support WFP's food assistance
    program in Yemen. This un-earmarked contribution was distributed
    countrywide by WFP. Nearly 75 percent of the in-kind food commodities
    from the contribution went to vulnerable Yemenis who live in northern
    Houthi-held areas.

        Question. Other international donors and aid agencies have avoided
    similar suspensions to assistance in Yemen while still working with the
    UN to push back against Houthi obstruction, including securing the
    walk-back of a 2 percent proposed tax on humanitarian assistance and
    biometric accountability measures. Please provide an assessment of why
    such a wide suspension of assistance was deemed necessary and a
    description of what, if any, steps were taken to coordinate this
    suspension with the UN, other donors and aid agencies, including USAID
    implementers.

        Answer. Houthi interference--including blocking aid projects,
    seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, and detaining and
    torturing aid workers--prevented critical, life-saving aid from
    reaching millions of Yemenis. The partial reduction in operations was
    undertaken in cooperation with other donor countries and the United
    Nations as a result of this undue interference. We met as a group in
    Brussels in February and unanimously concluded that the situation was
    untenable. We have met multiple times since then to evaluate the
    situation. In June, following months of collective advocacy and
    negotiation, the U.S. government joined other donors in sending letters
    to the Houthis and Yemeni officials in the south, reiterating the need
    for interference in aid operations to cease immediately.

        Question. Furthermore, please provide an update on the specific
    conditions that must still be met in order for USAID to consider
    lifting its aid suspension in Yemen.

        Answer. The United States, in cooperation with other donors and the
    UN, identified seven pre-conditions that need to be met in northern
    Yemen and agreed on 16 benchmarks to gauge progress in addressing
    these. A technical monitoring group meets monthly to evaluate the
    Houthi's progress. Among the benchmarks the Houthis have not met, they
    have not allowed the World Food Program's biometric registration pilot
    to move forward and have blocked independent needs assessments. Without
    these, we are concerned Houthi leaders could steer assistance away from
    the most vulnerable families to reward combatants and their own
    supporters. With USAID development funding, we need written approval
    from the Houthis allowing third-party monitoring before resuming any
    activities.

        Question. Are you confident that this suspension in assistance will
    not exacerbate Yemen's already dire humanitarian situation, especially
    with the spread of COVID-19 in the country?

        Answer. We remain concerned about the Houthis' disregard for the
    suffering their deliberate obstruction is causing their fellow Yemenis,
    and call on the Houthis to abide by humanitarian principles. The United
    States is the leading humanitarian donor in Yemen this year, providing
    more than $1.1 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance funding to Yemen
    since October 2018. The United States is committed to providing robust
    humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen where our partners are able to
    operate without interference. In fact, the United States has already
    provided significantly more humanitarian funding since the suspension
    went into effect in March than any other donor has provided in Yemen
    this year. We continue to encourage other donors to contribute
    additional funding and to fulfill pledges they have already made
    quickly.

        Question. Whether or not the suspension exacerbates Yemen's
    humanitarian crisis, will USAID consider lifting the suspension in
    assistance without those conditions being satisfied if conditions in
    Yemen worsen? If so, please provide metrics for how bad the
    humanitarian situation must become for USAID to lift the suspension
    without satisfying its conditions.

        Answer. The United States is committed to providing robust
    humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen where our partners are able to
    operate without interference. To meet the increasing needs resulting
    from the conflict, economic decline, and COVID-19, the United States
    has provided more humanitarian funding since the suspension went into
    effect in March than any other donor provided Yemen this year. USAID
    will continue supporting operational costs, ensuring international NGO
    partners maintain their capacity in northern Yemen to scale up in the
    event the benchmarks are achieved and/or humanitarian conditions
    deteriorate significantly. Through the World Food Program, USAID is
    supporting emergency food operations, including in the north. This
    support has helped prevent food security conditions from deteriorating
    further.

        Question. Has any of the suspended assistance for Yemen been
    reprogrammed elsewhere? If so, please provide a detailed breakdown of
    the amount of funds reprogrammed, their intended use in Yemen and what
    countries and programs they have been reprogrammed to.

        Answer. USAID has not reprogrammed any suspended humanitarian
    funding within Yemen. As always, we allocate our humanitarian funding
    based on needs, with partners who can deliver on behalf of our mission
    and in a manner that manages U.S. taxpayer funding effectively and
    efficiently. In FY 2020, USAID continued programming carve-out
    activities with partners and supporting operational costs with
    suspended international NGOs in northern Yemen to retain a footprint in
    the hope that current impediments to a principled response by the
    Houthis will be removed so that our partners can restart operations in
    reaching innocent Yemeni beneficiaries.

        Question. As we are now rapidly approaching the end of President
    Trump's first term, I would therefore like to ask you whether or not
    you have reached an agreement with North Korea on any of the goals you
    told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2018 that you would
    achieve within a year. Do you have an agreement with North Korea that:
    Provides a definition for denuclearization, meaning the dismantlement
    or removal of all nuclear weapons, facilities, technology, and material
    from North Korea?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Ends North Koreas production and enrichment of uranium
    and plutonium for military programs?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Permanently dismantles and disables North Korea's nuclear
    weapons infrastructure, including test sites, all nuclear weapons
    research and development facilities, particularly with respect to
    advanced centrifuges, and nuclear weapons enrichment and reprocessing
    facilities?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Provides a full, complete and verifiable declaration of
    all North Korean nuclear activities?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Imposes robust restrictions to assure that North Korea's
    nuclear material, technology and expertise are not exported?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    press countries around the world to enforce the existing sanctions
    regime and to take actions to prevent both sanctions evasion and DPRK
    proliferation activities prohibited by the sanctions.

        Question. Dismantles all North Korean ballistic missiles and agrees
    to a prohibition on all ballistic missile development?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Puts in place sufficient safeguards to assure that no
    ballistic missiles and associated technology are proliferated or
    exported from North Korea?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    press countries around the world to enforce the existing sanctions
    regime and to take actions to prevent both sanctions evasion and DPRK
    proliferation activities prohibited by the sanctions.

        Question. Commits North Korea to robust compliance inspections
    including a verification regime for its nuclear and ballistic missile
    programs, including complete access to all nuclear related sites and
    facilities with real time verification including ``anywhere, anytime''
    inspections and snap-back sanctions if North Korea is not in full
    compliance?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. Has no sunsets?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    the denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace
    on the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. And, that creates a roadmap for progress on sanctions
    relief dependent on dismantlement and removal of North Korea's nuclear
    weapons and ballistic missile programs?

        Answer. My colleagues and I have worked tirelessly toward achieving
    denuclearization in North Korea (DPRK) and a lasting, stable peace on
    the Korean Peninsula; but we cannot negotiate by ourselves. The DPRK
    simply has not yet made the decision to seriously engage in working-
    level denuclearization negotiations. In the meantime, we continue to
    work with our partners to maintain pressure on the DPRK and remain
    ready to seize the opportunity to negotiate a roadmap toward final,
    fully verified denuclearization and a bright economic future for the
    North Korean people.

        Question. The Administration has said it is looking for
    ``alternative partners'' to the WHO. Documents leaked in May referred
    to something called the Preparedness Initiative for Pandemics and
    Emergency Response, or PIPER. From what I understand the proposal under
    consideration is for a fund run by a governing body that will
    administer bilateral, multilateral, and private-sector funds to fight
    pandemics. It sounds very much like a convenient alternative to the
    World Health Organization. Is this the alternative to replace WHO?
    Where is the money slated for WHO going to go now that the President
    has withdrawn from WHO? Is it going to be channeled to PIPER?

        Answer. We are not seeking to establish an alternative to the World
    Health Organization (WHO). We are providing foreign assistance funding
    previously planned for the WHO to other global health organizations to
    address urgent needs around the world. However, we do believe there are
    gaps in the international system that were exposed by the Ebola, Zika,
    and COVID-19 health emergencies. Outbreaks and pandemics can impact any
    country and all aspects of society, and U.S. Government and
    multilateral organizations are not sufficiently organized to rapidly
    respond to pandemics. We learned we must strengthen and link early
    warning systems and other critical data sources, think holistically
    about preparedness, and build accountability into the international
    system. None of these lessons are wholly owned by any one institution.
        We believe there are a number of models that have been supported by
    the United States that advance global collaboration without undermining
    existing institutions. Examples include the Global Vaccine Alliance
    (Gavi) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
    These successful efforts provide insight into how the U.S. Government
    and other donors could collaborate on pandemic prevention. As we look
    toward future efforts on pandemic prevention, we intend to work closely
    with Congress.

        Question. The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria launched a
    COVID-19 response mechanism. Does the Administration support funding
    for the Global Fund's COVID response mechanism? How much should we
    give? Has the Administration asked or proposed to the Global Fund that
    they take on funding and responsibilities related to pandemic response
    that would normally be undertaken by WHO?

        Answer. The United States joined the other members of the Global
    Fund's Board to approve the creation of the COVID-19 Response Mechanism
    (C19RM) and allowed up to $500 million of contributed funding, one-
    third of which the United States provided to C19RM to protect the
    Fund's programming in HIV, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria affected by
    the pandemic. We agree the investment the United States made in
    establishing the Global Fund makes it an attractive vehicle to help
    combat the impact of COVID-19 on the three diseases. The U.S.
    Government is committed to maintaining the Global Fund's effective
    execution of programs in its core mandate of HIV, TB, and malaria. The
    United States does not support expanding the Global Fund's remit
    permanently beyond the three diseases. We have not asked, nor proposed,
    the Global Fund take on funding and responsibilities normally
    undertaken by the WHO as the Fund does not set normative guidance for
    combating the pandemics of HIV, TB, malaria, nor COVID-19.

        Question. For decades, the United States has provided critical,
    life-saving assistance to countries around the globe to alleviate
    severe humanitarian and health crises. USAID has notified Congress
    about the expenditure of approximately $202 million in Global Health
    Program, Emergency Reserve Funds and Economic Support Funds to purchase
    7,582 ventilators to distribute to up to 40 countries. I am concerned
    that the NSC's influence in these decisions both circumvents
    longstanding USAID procurement and accountability policies and
    interjects political agendas into USAID's mission. What needs-based
    assessments the NSC using to determine which countries will receive
    ventilators and how this aid is prioritized?

        Answer. The National Security Council (NSC) has said, ``With the
    United States now on track to produce over 100,000 high-quality
    ventilators this Summer, by far the highest production of ventilators
    in history, the President continues to reach out to our partners and
    allies around the world to ensure they can have access to high-quality,
    America-made, life-saving ventilators to meet their medical needs.''
        The U.S. Agency for International Development also would encourage
    the Committee to reach out directly to NSC Legislative Affairs for
    further information.

        Question. Any and all guidance by the NSC regarding the procurement
    process USAID should follow for the purchase of the ventilators it is
    distributing, including whether vendors or manufacturers are
    competitively bidding on contracts to provide ventilators.

        Answer. The provision of ventilators and medical supplies will in
    no way affect the availability of this critical equipment for the
    American people. We carefully balanced our domestic needs with those of
    the world, to ensure the availability of essential medical supplies,
    including ventilators, in the United States. At the early stages of the
    response to the pandemic in the United States, many models predicted a
    shortage of ventilators threatening a public-health catastrophe. The
    Administration organized an industrial ramp-up not seen since World War
    II, using the Defense Production Act to encourage private-sector
    companies to start producing ventilators or expand their existing
    production to meet anticipated demand. The United States is now on
    track to produce over 100,000 high-quality ventilators this summer. As
    a result, HHS, DHS, and the Directorate for Resilience at the NSC
    collaborated to identify vendors to satisfy the manufacturing needs of
    the ventilator-donation program. The NSC, working with HHS and DHS,
    assigned each vendor a series of countries and a number of ventilators.
    USAID, through the Global Health Supply-Chain-Procurement and Supply-
    Management contract managed by Chemonic, Inc., procured the
    ventilators, assisted the vendors in delivering products meeting the
    specifications for each country and coordinated the delivery of the
    donations with U.S. embassies and national governments. No, the
    ventilators the NSC is requiring USAID to purchase were not originally
    contracted or procured by DHS or any other federal agency or
    department.

        Question. Is the NSC applying and adhering to the metrics and
    capacity requirements USAID has outlined in the respective
    Congressional Notifications for the provision of ventilators?

        Answer. Yes.

        Question. What commitments are the Administration obtaining from
    foreign governments receiving U.S. assistance that they will engage in
    science-based public health actions and interventions to bend the curve
    of COVID-19 infections and make information about the spread of the
    disease public on a sustained basis?

        Answer. The United States received requests for assistance from
    nearly every government in the world. We have provided assistance to
    over 120 countries, reflecting a truly global diversity of approaches
    and needs in responding to COVID-19. Throughout the response, the U.S.
    Government has worked closely with Departments of Health and other
    science-based partners to implement interventions across a range of
    health and humanitarian needs. We will continue to work closely with
    these partners, as well as our own international implementing partners
    to implement a range of context-sensitive interventions based on the
    latest knowledge of the virus and its spread. USAID is focused on
    interventions that are proven and globally recognized as critical to
    the pandemic response.

        Question. I recently released a report titled Global Forced
    Migration: The Political Crisis of our Time which speaks to the urgent
    situation of at least 79.5 million people worldwide have been forcibly
    displaced due to persecution and conflict, the highest total on record.
    At every turn, this Administration has actively opposed efforts to
    support refugees and other vulnerable migrants, both domestically
    through our policies and programs, and internationally in important
    multilateral fora. For example, under your leadership, the Department
    of State's refugee resettlement program is operating at historic lows,
    and is on pace to admit the lowest number of refugees this fiscal year
    since the program began 40 years ago. The Department also withdrew its
    support from key multilateral instruments and global compacts designed
    to improve global responses and coordination to more effectively
    address the plight of migrants and refugees. And on the southern
    border, the Administration has implemented unlawful policies that have
    left thousands stranded in horrid conditions in Mexico and deported
    vulnerable asylum seekers back to the countries they fled in Central
    America. While you continue to champion the U.S. as the world's largest
    humanitarian donor, these actions reveal an Administration that is
    actively sabotaging every institutional mechanism designed to support
    vulnerable refugees and migrants. Your Department has also continued to
    defy requests from my committee regarding its policies and agreements
    related to migration. Does the Administration have a strategy--beyond
    simply provisioning funds--to address the global forced migration
    crisis?

        Answer. The President's National Security Strategy clearly outlines
    our commitment to champion American values by reducing human suffering.
    The United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian
    assistance even as we expect others to share the responsibility. We
    support displaced people close to their homes to help meet their needs
    until they can safely and voluntarily return home. At the Department of
    State and USAID, we work to provide protection and achieve durable
    solutions for the millions of forcibly displaced people across the
    globe. In addition, we aim our diplomacy at continuing to strengthen
    the global humanitarian architecture and at helping to ensure respect
    for international humanitarian laws and norms.

        Question. I am deeply concerned by the reports that the U.S.
    consistently advocated for removing references from sexual and
    reproductive health care from UN agreements. I understand this
    administration has argued they have other priorities, like economic
    empowerment and entrepreneurship. How can women develop and lead their
    own businesses and participate in the economy if they are not able to
    have autonomous control of their own bodies, supported by comprehensive
    access to sexual and reproductive health care?

        Answer. The United States continues to be the global leader in
    foreign assistance for women's health across their lifespan, including
    access to family planning. Consistent with the laws of the United
    States, taxpayer dollars should not be used to promote or provide
    abortion as a method of family planning. We strongly promote responsive
    interventions to meet the health needs of all women, at the UN and in
    other multilateral negotiations, as references to ambiguous terms and
    expressions inject unnecessary controversy, derailing opportunities to
    address critical women's health needs. We will continue to promote the
    highest attainable standards of health for women, in addition to
    women's full and free participation in their economies and societies.

        Question. Ethiopia's transition to an inclusive representative
    democracy is in jeopardy. There are alarming signs of backsliding
    including mass arrests, disappearances, arrest of opposition
    politicians and an internet blackout. Elections, scheduled for this
    year have been delayed indefinitely. Additionally, the Grand Ethiopian
    Renaissance Dam project has caused serious tensions with Egypt and
    Sudan. You visited Ethiopia earlier this year. What actions have you
    taken in the wake of your visit to help ensure Ethiopia succeeds in its
    democratic transition, specifically with regards to calling out actions
    that close political space and violate human rights?

        Answer. Despite intermittent challenges our assessment continues to
    be that Prime Minister Abiy's administration remains committed to the
    reforms they championed when he came to power in 2018. We continue to
    engage diplomatically with the Ethiopian Government to assure them of
    our support and urge them to continue to uphold the rule of law,
    respect basic democratic principles, and work towards free and fair
    elections. Department leadership meets regularly with senior officials
    from the Ethiopian Government to reiterate our concerns regarding
    troubling reports of human rights violations and abuses and
    restrictions on basic freedoms.

        Question. What are the regional implications should the GERD
    negotiations fail, and how will that impact U.S. interests in the
    region? What role are you playing in the GERD negotiations? What role
    have you advocated for the State Department writ large in the GERD
    negotiations?

        Answer. The on-going GERD negotiations hold the promise of greater
    cooperation and sound management of the Blue Nile for power,
    agriculture, industry, and other uses that could improve the lives of
    the more than 250 million people of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
    Treasury plays the lead role in the U.S. Government's participation in
    the GERD negotiations. The Department is in close contact with Treasury
    to ensure a unified U.S. policy. Secretary Mnuchin and I regularly
    discuss policy and negotiation developments, and I have spoken
    repeatedly with senior officials from all three countries on this
    issue. The Department is engaged through U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa,
    Cairo, Khartoum, and Pretoria, and the U.S. Mission to the African
    Union.

        Question. Do you support withholding U.S. assistance to Ethiopia as
    a bargaining tool in the GERD talks, even though doing so could imperil
    Ethiopia's fragile transition?

        Answer. The Department is committed to leveraging all available
    tools to promote outcomes that advance our interests around the world.
    We are considering a variety of methods to support Ethiopia, Egypt, and
    Sudan in reaching agreement on the GERD.

        Question. We are on the verge of losing the Sahel. Mali, which is
    suffering from a violent jihadist insurgency and a failing economy, has
    seen mass protests calling for President Ibrahim Keita to resign. There
    are no signs of progress on implementation of the Algiers Accord, and,
    across the Sahel, the fight against terrorism being waged by MINUSMA,
    the G-5 Sahel, and our European allies has been undermined by atrocious
    acts of violence perpetrated by state security forces. The
    Administration appointed a Special Envoy, but that in itself is not a
    strategy. What is our strategy for the Sahel?

        Answer. The Diplomatic Framework for the Sahel focuses on
    addressing the drivers of insecurity, containing the spread of
    violence, and stabilizing the region with the help of better
    coordinated international and U.S. interagency support. There are four
    key elements to this Framework: 1) improving coordination with other
    international and regional partners and international organizations; 2)
    promoting stability in Mali, including implementation of the Algiers
    Accord and improving the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping
    mission; 3) pressing and supporting governments to expand state
    legitimacy in the G5 Sahel countries and neighboring coastal states
    and; 4) preventing further spill over into the West African coastal
    countries.

        Question. What is the State Department doing to promote
    accountability for security forces that commit human rights abuses, and
    to prevent further abuse?

        Answer. Advancing respect for human rights and accountability for
    security forces is a central tenet of U.S. diplomacy reflected in our
    security cooperation. Continued engagement with partners helps mitigate
    human rights abuses and security force overreach by emphasizing the
    development of professional forces that respect human rights. Security
    assistance builds partner capacity to hold forces accountable and
    institutions capable of oversight. It promotes dialogue at high levels
    of government otherwise closed to international engagement. We support
    and adhere to the Leahy law, a powerful tool against human rights
    abuses that prevents foreign security forces guilty of abuses from
    receiving future assistance.

        Question. The Pentagon's review of troop deployments in Africa has
    unnerved our allies who rely on U.S. military support in the Sahel.
    What is the State Department doing to reassure our allies of the U.S.
    commitment to the Sahel? Do you support drawing down our military
    deployment in the Sahel?

        Answer. The State Department funds the majority of peace and
    security assistance in Africa. The Department of Defense's Blank Slate
    Review does not change my commitment to reduce threats and advance
    mutual interests with our African partners. Between Fiscal Years 2010
    and 2019, the Department of State obligated approximately $4.7 billion
    in bilateral security assistance to Africa, a significant portion of
    which assisted Sahel countries. The majority of the State Department's
    security assistance does not depend on the Department of Defense for
    implementation or oversight. I remain committed to maintaining this
    engagement, recognizing that some programs may require review and
    adjustment in light of reduced Department of Defense oversight and
    implementation capacity.

        Question. Analysis by the International Crisis Group suggests that
    insecurity and jihadist activity in Northwest Nigeria could turn that
    part of the country into a ``land bridge'' between terrorists in the
    Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin--a deeply troubling prospect, considering
    there has already been a 31 percent increase in violent incidents by
    Islamist militants in Africa in the last 12 months, according to at
    least one estimate. Do you agree with this assessment about Northwest
    Nigeria? What is the State Department doing to increase civilian
    security and prevent the expansion of jihadism in the Lake Chad Basin
    and northwest Nigeria?

        Answer. We are concerned by the rise in violence in Northwest
    Nigeria over recent months and the opportunities destabilization
    creates for terrorists. To assist in Nigeria's fight against ISIS-West
    Africa and Boko Haram, U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development actors
    are working to disrupt terrorist activities; weaken terrorist groups
    and promote defections; improve processes to screen, rehabilitate, and
    reintegrate ex-combatants; save lives through humanitarian assistance;
    support the Nigerian government to set the security and governance
    conditions necessary for the safe and voluntary return of displaced
    people to their communities; and address underlying drivers of
    terrorism.

        Question. During the budget hearing, in discussing the issue of
    diversity at the State Department, you noted that some members of your
    senior leadership team were part of ``diversity groups.'' You also
    rightly noted the lack of minority representation at the Ambassadorial
    level and that the rate of change in increasing diversity at the
    Department is insufficient. Please further explain your use of
    ``diversity groups.'' To what groups are you referring?

        Answer. While the Department has made progress in promoting a
    diverse and inclusive workforce, I've stated in meetings with
    Department employees that we need to take a deeper look into these
    issues and take concrete steps to make meaningful change. I will
    continue to have these discussions and ask bureaus to strengthen their
    diversity and inclusion efforts in line with the Department's mission
    of working together to recruit, retain, and develop a diverse workforce
    to foster effective diplomacy. I support my senior leadership team's
    active engagement of our diverse employee affinity groups and
    articulation of the concerns of those whom have been historically
    underrepresented, such as women and minorities, in American diplomacy.

        Question. Please provide a demographic breakdown of diversity in
    the 7th floor's senior leadership team.

        Answer. The 7th floor senior leadership team consists of 26 men and
    11 women, of which 31 are White, 5 are Asian and 1 is African-American.
    Department-wide, 15 percent of senior leaders--members of the Senior
    Foreign Service, Senior Executive Service, and equivalents--are racial
    or ethnic minorities; and 34 percent are women. Among other efforts, my
    team and I are working to improve diversity through: requiring that
    employees, hiring managers, and members of selection and promotion
    panels receive formal training in mitigating unconscious bias;
    including diversity and inclusion as a leadership criteria for the
    Deputy Chief of Mission/Principal Officer Committee; and expanding the
    Pickering and Rangel Fellowship programs.

        Question. How are you personally promoting, mentoring, and
    supporting your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
    underrepresented groups in the Foreign Service? In the Civil Service?

        Answer. I will continue to promote efforts underway in the
    Department to ensure leaders under my direction are fostering a culture
    and environment of inclusion. I support the Department Diversity and
    Inclusion Strategic Plan's goals that speak to work/life wellness and
    increased workplace flexibilities in order to better support our
    workforce and retain talent. I support my senior leadership team's
    active engagement of our diverse employee affinity groups and
    articulation of the concerns of those who have been historically
    underrepresented in U.S. diplomacy. I will continue to support the
    requirement of all hiring managers and members of promotion panels to
    take formal Mitigating Unconscious Bias training.

        Question. Beyond recruiting candidates of diverse backgrounds into
    the Department, what steps are you taking to retain, train, and
    accomplish equitable outcomes for staff from historically
    underrepresented backgrounds?

        Answer. In January, Under Secretary Bulatao convened a Department-
    wide taskforce comprised of representatives from every bureau in the
    Department to develop the Department's Diversity and Inclusion
    Strategic Plan (DISP). We did this to reiterate that diversity and
    inclusion must be a whole-of Department effort and wanted every
    employee to see themselves in our new strategic plan. I support the
    Department's efforts to review longstanding cultural practices and
    consider whether there have been unintended impacts on our ability to
    retain and promote a diverse workforce. I also support the DISP's goals
    of promoting work/life wellness and increased workplace flexibilities
    in order to better support our workforce and retain talent.

        Question. You said in a recent speech about the inalienable rights
    commission that The New York Times 1619 Project was ``a dark vision of
    America's birth. I reject it. It's a disturbed reading of history. It
    is a slander on our great people.'' Slavery was real, and our country
    is dealing with the consequences of systemic racism to this day. One
    impact of such racism could be the lack of diversity at the State
    Department, especially at the level of Assistant Secretary and above. A
    recent GAO study found that only 32 percent of the State Department's
    full-time, career employees were racial or ethnic minorities, and found
    differences in promotion outcomes between minorities and whites. The
    recent murder of George Floyd is an example of the impacts in the area
    of law enforcement. What have you done during your tenure to address
    systemic racism and the lack of diversity at the Department of State?
    What do you plan to do going forward?

        Answer. I am committed to taking a critical approach to reviewing
    policies, programs, and practices that affect how we recruit a talented
    and diverse workforce and create an inclusive environment where all our
    employees have the opportunity to contribute and rise through the ranks
    of our workforce. The Office of Civil Rights provides training around
    the world on discrimination and harassment and conducts investigations
    of allegations of discriminatory harassment and sexual harassment. This
    work allows leaders to make critical decisions on possible disciplinary
    action. We send out biannual reports on discipline to the workforce to
    spread awareness of accountability.

        Question. What is the State Department doing in the wake of George
    Floyd's murder and the Administration's poor response to ensure that
    the United States maintains its moral authority on the messages our
    diplomats deliver on respect for constitutional rights of peaceful
    assembly, human rights and rule of law?

        Answer. The discussions taking place in the United States,
    amplified by a free and independent media and our respect for
    fundamental freedoms such as freedom of association and peaceful
    assembly, demonstrate our robust democracy, our vigorous debates, and
    our constant striving to be better. There can be no moral equivalence
    between actions in the United States and those of authoritarian regimes
    which violate and abuse human rights.
        The charges filed against Minnesota police officers for George
    Floyd's tragic death illustrate accountability, due process, and rule
    of law. The Department encourages our overseas missions to speak openly
    about these issues and how accountability measures in the United States
    serve as an example of our commitment to democratic principles and the
    rule of law.

        Question. I have been particularly concerned about reports of
    insensitive, offensive, or inconsistent messages from U.S. Ambassadors
    in the wake of these events. Have you provided any guidance to
    Ambassadors and Department senior officials regarding the tone and
    message that should be communicated to employees about the U.S.
    Government and Department of State's commitment to equality and against
    systemic racism? Please provide a copy of any such guidance.

        Answer. Following George Floyd's murder, Deputy Secretary Biegun
    communicated guidance to all Department employees, encouraging them to
    participate in constructive dialogue in the workplace. I also expressed
    my heartfelt condolences in my regular communication with Department
    employees. The Department is preparing our outgoing ambassadors, deputy
    chiefs of mission, and principal officers in executive training for
    their new positions, and all newly promoted senior executives in the
    Leading at the Executive Level Seminar on diversity and inclusion
    policy, including how they should convey the importance of equal
    protection and inclusion to their teams and take meaningful steps to
    achieve it in the organizations they lead.

        Question. According to recent reporting, U.S. Ambassador to the
    United Kingdom Robert ``Woody'' Johnson inappropriately promoted
    President Trump's golf resort, Trump Turnberry, to British Government
    officials as a potential site for the British Open golf tournament.
    What guidance, if any, has the Department provided to embassies and
    ambassadors against taking actions that would support, endorse,
    promote, or could otherwise be perceived as benefitting the Trump
    Organization? Do you support completing the Export Control Reform
    Initiative?

        Answer. The State Department conducts extensive training for
    embassies and ambassadors on ethics rules and requirements. All State
    Department ethics training and the briefings provided for each non-
    career ambassador following confirmation emphasize the importance of
    compliance with the full range of ethics rules and obligations. This
    includes the obligation to ensure that officials not misuse their
    positions to benefit their own personal interest or that of other
    individuals with whom the official is affiliated. Rather, the
    Department emphasizes that officials must aim to serve the public
    interest. In addition, the Department's Office of Ethics and Financial
    Disclosure provides specific guidance about the promotion of any
    private business as matters arise.

        Question. The process for the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Paris
    Agreement will be complete on the eve of the 2020 election. Taking the
    shame of this tragedy aside, I have to ask . . . and before you say
    anything about the `the U.S. is leading on climate change . . . and
    whatever.' I want specific examples of this leadership. How are you
    leading? Don't just say you are, tell us how. Because when the
    President announced he was going to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris
    Agreement in June 2017, he said he was going to pursue a ``better
    deal'' to rival the Paris Agreement. Where is that ``Better Deal''? I
    can tell you where it is . . . but I want to hear where you think it
    is. I raise this issue as a warning for America. It's a harbinger that
    everyone must consider when this Administration boasts about abandoning
    other multilateral organizations like the WHO with lofty statements
    that you are going to create something better . . . you've had 3 and
    half years to deliver your ``better'' alternative to one of, if not
    the, first international agreement the Administration ripped up and you
    have nothing to show for it. So why should we trust anything will be
    different when it comes to your WHO 2.0 plan?

        Answer. I am proud of our record as a world leader in reducing all
    types of emissions, fostering resilience, growing our economy, and
    ensuring access to affordable energy for our citizens. Our success in
    reducing emissions is largely due to the development and deployment of
    innovative ``all of the above'' energy technologies, including nuclear,
    shale gas, transformational coal technologies, renewables, battery
    storage, and enhancing energy efficiency. U.S. energy-related
    greenhouse gas emissions dropped nearly 16 percent between 2005 and
    2019, even as our economy grew substantially during this time and our
    economic competitors such as the People's Republic of China continued
    to rapidly increase their emissions. In international climate
    discussions, we continue to offer a realistic and pragmatic model--
    backed by a record of real world results--showing innovation and open
    markets lead to greater prosperity, fewer emissions, and more secure
    sources of energy. We continue to work with our global partners to
    enhance resilience to the impacts of climate change and prepare for and
    respond to natural disasters. Please see QFR 281 for information on the
    World Health Organization.

        Question. As you know the CCP's so-called ``national security'' law
    for Hong Kong, which undermines Hong Kong's autonomy, encourages the
    crackdown on pro-democracy protestors, and effectively ends its ``one
    country, two systems'' policy, recently went into effect. Along with my
    colleagues, I introduced the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, which would
    provide those Hong Kongers who peacefully protested Beijing's corrupt
    justice system, and have a well-founded fear of persecution, to be
    eligible for Priority 2 Refugee status. What efforts, other than just
    harsh words and criticism aimed at the CCP for their erosion of Hong
    Kong's autonomy, is the State Department actively pursuing?

        Answer. The Departments of State and Treasury announced sanctions
    on August 7 on 11 individuals who were involved in developing,
    adopting, or implementing the National Security Law. I stated,
    ``Today's actions send a clear message that the Hong Kong authorities'
    actions are unacceptable and in contravention of the PRC's commitments
    under `one country, two systems' and the Sino-British Joint
    Declaration, a UN-registered treaty.'' The State Department will
    continue to work with the interagency on future actions against those
    who are responsible for actions detrimental to the protection of human
    rights and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The Department of States
    also works closely with interagency partners on refugee issues,
    including for Hong Kong residents who express fear of persecution.

        Question. One of the major issues playing out in public currently
    is how Chinese companies are playing an increasingly dominant role in
    development and implementation of 5G mobile communications
    technologies. We are increasingly seeing the implementation of products
    from companies such as Huawei around the globe, ranging from Europe to
    Asia to Latin America to Africa. What security concerns does the
    Administration see in the proliferation of Chinese made 5G technologies
    around the globe?

        Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned about the dangers of
    networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by
    authoritarian governments that have no democratic checks and balances
    and no regard for human rights, privacy, or international norms. U.S.
    security concerns are much broader than industrial and political
    espionage. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could
    provide the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Communist Party-led,
    authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or
    weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide
    technological advances to the PRC's military forces.

        Question. What is the Administration doing to counter this spread?

        Answer. The Administration is taking strong action at home and
    abroad to confront this challenge. Domestically, President Trump signed
    an executive order on May 15, 2019 entitled ``Securing the Information
    and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain'' and a
    national emergency continuation notice on May 13, 2020. The executive
    order empowers the U.S. Department of Commerce to prohibit transactions
    involving information and communications technology or services
    designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by,
    controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
    adversary and that pose an undue risk of sabotage or subversion to U.S.
    information and communications technology and services.
        Abroad, the Administration is implementing a coordinated set of
    measures to: (1) encourage countries to put in place risk-based
    security measures that prohibit the use of untrusted vendors like
    Huawei and ZTE in 5G and other next generation networks and (2) level
    the playing field for trusted vendors to compete and win.

        Question. Have our efforts to pressure countries to not use Huawei
    products been successful in light of the fact that so many countries
    continue to integrate their technologies into their infrastructure?

        Answer. Yes, we are seeing the tide turn against Huawei and
    untrusted technology vendors as additional countries put in place
    restrictions and a growing list of carriers choose to procure from
    trusted vendors. Australia and Japan were two of the earliest countries
    to put in place security measures to protect their 5G networks.
    Recently, a growing number of countries have likewise put in place
    strong security measures to protect their networks against untrusted
    vendors, including: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia,
    Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK. In addition, some of the largest
    telecom companies around the globe are also becoming ``Clean Telcos''
    by choosing to work only with trusted vendors. We've seen this with
    Orange in France, Jio in India, Telstra in Australia, SK and KT in
    South Korea, NTT in Japan, and O2 in the UK. In June, the big three
    telecommunications companies in Canada decided to partner with
    Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung.

        Question. How will a Chinese centric 5G ecosystem affect U.S. and
    allied security?

        Answer. The risks from a People's Republic of China (PRC) 5G
    ecosystem to the security of the United States and our allies and
    partners are numerous, including espionage, disruption, and/or
    manipulation of networks enabling critical infrastructure and services.
    Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could provide the
    PRC's Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the capability and
    opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and
    infrastructure or provide technological advances to the PRC's military
    forces.

        Question. I'd like to ask about your knowledge of the events
    regarding the plight of Uyghurs in Xinjiang as described in Ambassador
    John Bolton's new book. The former National Security Advisor alleges
    that that the President of the United States gave an explicit approval
    to the President of China to ``go ahead'' with concentration camps
    estimated to be holding more than 1 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang, giving
    a green light to one of the most horrific gross human rights abuses on
    the planet today. This is extraordinarily startling and disturbing. If
    true, such a message would make a mockery of many of the public
    statements regarding the situation in Xinjiang that you and other
    members of the Trump administration have made over the past several
    years. Did the President of the United States give a green light to the
    President of China to build his concentration camps?

        Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in
    Xinjiang speak volumes, and the President himself has personally heard
    from those affected, including Jewher Ilham, the daughter of prominent
    Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti who was given a life sentence in 2014. More
    than any other government, the United States has taken concrete action
    to combat the People's Republic of China's campaign of repression in
    Xinjiang, to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export
    restrictions, import restrictions, and the release of a business
    advisory. We have also joined with like-minded partners in publicly
    condemning these human rights abuses.

        Question. I remain deeply concerned with China's pattern of
    aggression in territorial disputes with India. From the 2017 Doklam
    standoff, to the recent violence along the borders in Sikkim and
    Ladakh, to China's new claims to Bhutanese territory, the Chinese
    Government has sought to redraw the map of South Asia without
    respecting the region's people or governments. That aggression resulted
    in the tragic violence along the Line of Actual Control last month, and
    the international community must be clear that such behavior is
    unacceptable. The U.S.-India partnership can play a vital role in
    responding to Chinese aggression, and it is especially important that
    this partnership rest on the democratic values that the Chinese
    government lacks. How has the Department engaged with the Indian
    Government to develop a diplomatic strategy against Chinese efforts to
    violate the sovereignty of countries in South Asia?

        Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the People's
    Republic of China's (PRC) continued pattern of aggressive actions along
    the Line of Actual Control with India. These actions mirror the PRC
    behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Our growing
    defense ties and regular high-level engagements with India, including
    the Quad, State-DoD 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, calls with senior Indian
    officials to discuss the border situation, and engagements by our
    ambassador in New Delhi, reinforce our shared commitment to a free and
    prosperous South Asia. In addition, Deputy Secretary of State Biegun's
    COVID-19 coordination calls with Indo-Pacific counterparts, including
    Indian Foreign Secretary Shringla, have fostered likeminded cooperation
    on supporting South Asian countries vulnerable to Chinese debt and
    economic pressure. We will continue to use upcoming dialogues,
    including our anticipated fall 2+2, to discuss the challenges that
    China poses to India and the region and to offer U.S. support to India
    and other South Asia nations that find their sovereignty and security
    at risk as a result of China's continued aggression.

        Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads
    into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud
    the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and
    Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which
    I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter
    BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to
    counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key
    capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its
    component parts?

        Answer. Our strategy is rooted in robust and continuous engagement
    with the EU, EU member states, and other European countries. Our
    strategy emphasizes the risks of dealing with Beijing while
    highlighting attractive U.S.-led alternatives.
        Beijing's One Belt, One Road strategy, also known as the Belt and
    Road Initiative, is designed to promote the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) industrial policies at the expense of foreign nations and foreign
    competitors. PRC state-owned firms made inroads in Europe after the
    European debt crisis of 2010, when Beijing scoured the continent for
    distressed assets. The Department of State, in coordination with the
    Treasury Department and other CFIUS member agencies, has conducted
    outreach with EU and other European partners to highlight potential
    vulnerabilities from PRC involvement in critical infrastructure and to
    encourage the adoption of strong, transparent, and national-security
    focused investment screening systems. Partly resulting from these
    robust efforts, the EU established an investment review framework that
    will become operational in October 2020, while 15 European governments
    are pursuing national-level investment review mechanisms to keep
    predatory state-led investments in check.
        At the same time, we are also rolling out new initiatives and
    financing to amplify private sector-led investments. We are working
    with our interagency partners at the Development Finance Corporation
    (DFC) and U.S. EXIM Bank to create sustainable opportunities that
    foster competition and benefit all parties.

        Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring
    Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That
    might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with
    whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the
    logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned that the Chinese Communist Party
    (CCP)'s malign behavior harms vital U.S. interests and undermines the
    sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world,
    and we will continue to pursue a wide range of options to address these
    concerns. In my speech at the Nixon Library in July, I explained that
    we have to keep in mind that the CCP is a Marxist-Leninist regime and
    that General Secretary Xi Jinping is a true believer in that bankrupt
    totalitarian ideology. I will not speculate on possible future actions,
    but will note that we will continue to highlight our concerns with the
    CCP's behavior and consider policies that would demonstrate our resolve
    on this issue.

        Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads
    into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud
    the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and
    Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which
    I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter
    BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to
    counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key
    capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its
    component parts?

        Answer. Our strategy is rooted in robust and continuous engagement
    with the EU, EU member states, and other European countries. Our
    strategy emphasizes the risks of dealing with Beijing while
    highlighting attractive U.S.-led alternatives.
        Beijing's One Belt, One Road strategy, also known as the Belt and
    Road Initiative, is designed to promote the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) industrial policies at the expense of foreign nations and foreign
    competitors. PRC state-owned firms made inroads in Europe after the
    European debt crisis of 2010, when Beijing scoured the continent for
    distressed assets. The Department of State, in coordination with the
    Treasury Department and other CFIUS member agencies, has conducted
    outreach with EU and other European partners to highlight potential
    vulnerabilities from PRC involvement in critical infrastructure and to
    encourage the adoption of strong, transparent, and national-security
    focused investment screening systems. Partly resulting from these
    robust efforts, the EU established an investment review framework that
    will become operational in October 2020, while 15 European governments
    are pursuing national-level investment review mechanisms to keep
    predatory state-led investments in check.
        At the same time, we are also rolling out new initiatives and
    financing to amplify private sector-led investments. We are working
    with our interagency partners at the Development Finance Corporation
    (DFC) and U.S. EXIM Bank to create sustainable opportunities that
    foster competition and benefit all parties.

        Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring
    Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That
    might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with
    whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the
    logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned that the Chinese Communist Party
    (CCP)'s malign behavior harms vital American interests and undermines
    the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the
    world, and we will continue to pursue a wide range of options to
    address these concerns. In my speech at the Nixon Library in July, I
    explained that we have to keep in mind that the CCP is a Marxist-
    Leninist regime and that General Secretary Xi Jinping is a true
    believer in that bankrupt totalitarian ideology. I will not speculate
    on possible future actions, but will note that we will continue to
    highlight our concerns with the CCP's behavior and consider policies
    that would demonstrate our resolve on this issue.

        Question. Ambassador Lighthizer commented the other day that he has
    no idea what the end game is on China with this Administration's trade
    policy. Do you? And if so, what is it?

        Answer. The United States is committed to rebalancing the U.S.-
    China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports
    fair trade, advances United States competitiveness, promotes U.S.
    exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to U.S. investment.

        Question. Aside from words of condemnation and economic sanctions,
    what other tools does the Trump administration have to counterbalance
    China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious
    regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?

        Answer. We continue to increase pressure on the People's Republic
    of China (PRC) government and take action to protect U.S. interests and
    values by imposing costs on malign PRC conduct. These costs are applied
    through visa restrictions, financial sanctions, and policy
    announcements, among other tools. We remain committed to supporting
    meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improving respect for their human
    rights, and helping to preserve their unique religious, cultural, and
    linguistic identity as well promoting access to Tibetan areas through
    the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act. Additionally, the Department of
    State continuously engages with our partners and allies around the
    world to encourage them to take similar steps.

        Question. China and Iran are reportedly discussing a multi-billion-
    dollar trade and security deal. As you rightly pointed out at the
    hearing, there have long been reports about this kind of arrangement
    and nothing is set in stone. However, Chinese companies have helped
    Iran evade international and U.S. sanctions for years, and Chinese and
    Iranian leaders both employ repressive governing techniques. The
    Administration has repeatedly touted the success of its ``maximum
    pressure campaign'' as evidenced by Iran's economic decline. Do you see
    this economic devastation as making a partnership with China more
    appealing to Iranian leaders?

        Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is
    born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely weakened, in
    part by U.S. sanctions, but also through its own mismanagement and
    corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for the Iranian
    people as long as the regime gains access to much needed capital. The
    regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the agreement
    for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they are
    rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

        Question. What are your current bilateral and multilateral
    engagements with China regarding its potential investments and
    cooperation with Iran?

        Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year
    agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese
    investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism; however, Chinese
    entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime,
    including through the continued sanctionable purchases of Iranian
    petroleum, petrochemicals, and metals. We have made clear to the
    Chinese Government that we will continue to vigorously enforce our
    sanctions regime on Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities
    that engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to
    conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the People's
    Republic of China is undermining its own stated goal of promoting
    stability in the Middle East.

        Question. Does an increased security relationship between Iran and
    China help or hinder American interests in both the Middle East and
    Asia?

        Answer. We are closely monitoring the increasing security
    cooperation and deepening partnership between Iran and the People's
    Republic of China. We continue to work closely with allies and partners
    in the Middle East and Asia to safeguard U.S. interests and promote
    regional stability.

        Question. The continuing clampdown by the Chinese Government on the
    religious freedom of the Tibetan people is a matter of the utmost
    concern. What is the U.S. Government position on the right of Tibetan
    Buddhists in selecting a future Dalai Lama without the interference of
    any government, and what is the plan to push back against the planned
    interference of the Chinese Government?

        Answer. The United States prioritizes the promotion and protection
    of religious freedom, particularly in China, where people of all faiths
    face severe repression and discrimination. I remain concerned by the
    PRC's interference in the selection, education, and veneration of
    Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The U.S. Government believes
    Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all faith communities, must be able
    to select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders in accordance
    with their beliefs and without government interference. The succession
    or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas, including the Dalai Lama,
    should be decided by Tibetan Buddhists without any government
    interference.

        Question. President Trump has not once publicly raised the issue of
    Tibet. Since 1997, all U.S. Presidents have publicly challenged the
    sitting Chinese President to negotiate with the Dalai Lama or his
    representative to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue. Would
    you recommend and make sure that President Trump calls publicly on the
    Chinese President to address the legitimate grievances of the Tibetan
    people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

        Answer. The United States remains deeply committed to Tibetans'
    human rights and fundamental freedoms. Our long-standing policy is to
    encourage meaningful and direct dialogue between the Government of the
    People's Republic of China and His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, or his
    representatives, without preconditions, to seek a settlement that
    resolves differences. The U.S. Government believes that a negotiated
    resolution that leads to meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and ensures
    they are able to practice freely their religion, and to preserve their
    culture and language provides the best hope for long-term stability in
    the region. We continue to meet with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as a
    religious and spiritual leader revered by Tibetans and many around the
    world.

        Question. At a time when the relationship is facing increasing
    friction and when the risk of conflict is rising, do we need such a
    process?

        Answer. The Administration sees no value in engaging with Beijing
    in formal high-level dialogues when the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) offers no prospects for tangible results or constructive
    outcomes. We remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement
    and cooperation with the PRC Government where our interests align, even
    as we continue to compete vigorously when necessary.

        Question. Secretary Tillerson proposed a good framework at the
    beginning of the Administration, but obviously it has been abandoned.
    Why?

        Answer. While we no longer conduct dialogues for the sake of
    dialogue, we do continue to engage with People's Republic of China
    leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner on a wide range of
    issues, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments. This is
    particularly evident in our push for reciprocity in the U.S.-China
    bilateral relationship.

        Question. Given China and Russia's opposition to extending the UN
    arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire in a few short months, how
    do you see increased bilateral tension with China impacting its posture
    towards extending the arms embargo at the Security Council?

        Answer. We were disappointed by the People's Republic of China`s
    (PRC) recent decision to join Russia in voting against the resolution
    to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran due to the Islamic Republic of
    Iran's destabilizing behavior. As historical arms suppliers to Iran,
    both nations clearly have financial motives to end the embargo. The
    Islamic Republic has done nothing to merit the lifting of the embargo
    and continues to send weapons to armed groups all across the region in
    Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran's actions drive instability and
    exacerbate human suffering across the Middle East. Every country ought
    to have an interest in combating Iranian malign influence in order to
    foster regional stability and safeguard the free flow of commerce.
    Allowing Iran to purchase and proliferate even deadlier weapons would
    be an abdication of the UN Security Council's responsibility to
    maintain international peace and security.

        Question. During recent UN Security Council negotiations over
    extending cross border humanitarian aid to Syria, Russia and China
    worked diligently to deny the humanitarian access to support the people
    of Syria. While it's clear Russia was leading this effort on behalf of
    its client in Damascus, China was only too happy to join. What are you
    doing to combat Chinese and Russian influence at the UN Security
    Council regarding Syria?

        Answer. Working with our partners and the UN in support of the
    Syrian people, the United States is combating People's Republic of
    China (PRC) and Russian malign influence at the UN Security Council on
    Syria in a multitude of ways and on two different fronts: political and
    humanitarian. The vote on cross-border assistance demonstrated that the
    Council was largely united in its support for the Syrian people and in
    the process we and our allies are isolating both Russia and the PRC in
    their support of the Assad regime. The United States worked with an
    overwhelming majority of the Security Council to overcome Russian and
    PRC intransigence and adopt a UN Security Council resolution to enable
    humanitarian assistance to reach many of those in need in Syria.

        Question. China has made significant investments into Arab Gulf
    countries with whom the United States has significant security
    relationships. Last month, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated:
    ``We see China moving in, principally economically--but not
    completely--to establish a beachhead.'' What are the implications of
    increased Chinese investment in critical infrastructure projects in the
    Arab Gulf States?

        Answer. Chinese investment in the Gulf is focused on satisfying
    Beijing's domestic economic priorities, including its demand for energy
    and search for new export markets. In 2015, China became the biggest
    global importer of crude oil, with almost half of its supply coming
    from the Middle East. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the International
    Energy Agency had predicted that Chinese imports from the Gulf region
    would double by 2035. China also views the region as a market for
    construction, finance, and telecom infrastructure investments. While
    many of these projects may be benign, the lack of transparency in
    Chinese bids, Beijing's tendency to undermine free market dynamics
    through its heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises, and the routine
    inclusion of Chinese tech companies subject to the People's Republic of
    China's draconian national security laws as part of nearly every major
    infrastructure investment all raise red flags. In response, we are
    working with partners in the region to enhance tools to counter malign
    economic activity, such as investment screening capabilities.

        Question. Please describe your engagement with relevant leaders in
    these [Arab Gulf] countries regarding Chinese investment.

        Answer. Our engagement emphasizes that China's agenda in the Middle
    East is all about advancing China's interests--it is not about shared
    values, institution-building, or improving access to capital. Private
    investment that flows from the United States and Europe to the Middle
    East is consistent over time, far larger in terms of foreign direct
    investment stock, and is a stronger force for job creation, human
    capital cultivation, and regional economic development. While we do not
    ask our partners to turn away Chinese investment on principle, we have
    advocated for appropriate screening of investments that take the form
    of controlling stakes in critical infrastructure or dual-use
    technologies, while remaining vigilant for any malign People's Republic
    of China activities.

        Question. In what areas do you see Chinese investment as presenting
    direct threats to U.S. interests or equities?

        Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) uses its One Belt, One
    Road initiative to reshape international norms, standards, and networks
    while creating leverage Beijing uses to extract political concessions
    from other countries, including U.S. partners and allies. PRC
    investments can provide Beijing with control of critical third-country
    infrastructure and key supply chains. PRC-controlled communications
    infrastructure is a threat to global data privacy and information
    security. The United States Government will continue working to
    mitigate these risks through a whole-of-government approach to
    investment screening, outreach to like-minded partners, and efforts to
    provide high-quality, sustainable alternatives to Chinese investment.

        Question. Chinese weapons, including armed drones have been
    repeatedly used by warring parties in the Yemen and Libya conflicts.
    Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed or unarmed
    drones, been used by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in
    the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have any of those uses resulted
    in civilian casualties?

        Answer. China has sold multiple weapons systems to Saudi Arabia,
    the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, including armed drones to Saudi
    Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Available reporting suggests that Saudi
    Arabia employed its China-origin drones in Yemen, and the UAE used them
    in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia has also reportedly employed Chinese
    artillery pieces in Yemen. We cannot establish if any of these reported
    drone or artillery strikes resulted in civilian casualties.

        Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed
    drones, been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
    Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have
    any of those uses resulted in civilian casualties?

        Answer. We have no unclassified reporting to indicate that Chinese-
    origin weapons have been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia,
    the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya.

        Question. What steps has the U.S. taken to prevent the purchase of
    Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed drones by countries
    included in the NEA bureau?

        Answer. The United States has urged countries to beware of
    unscrupulous actors like China offering deceptively cut-price defense
    systems and equipment. Such acquisitions are no bargain and are often
    accompanied by: the loss of sovereignty; resource extraction or debt-
    trap diplomacy; the signing away of rights to critical physical or IT
    infrastructure; or the exploitation of intellectual property due to
    espionage or outright theft. We have emphasized to our partners
    globally that acquiring these systems does not strengthen their
    security, but rather undermines their interoperability with U.S. forces
    and should rightly be avoided. The United States will continue to offer
    assistance to allies and partners in need, and we will do so without
    those harmful strings attached.

        Question. I am deeply troubled by the letter on July 12 signed by
    several Muslim-majority countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
    Egypt, Algeria and Qatar that praises China for its ``remarkable
    achievements in the field of human rights'' while characterizing the
    detention and torture of Muslim Uighers as ``a series of counter-
    terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting
    up vocational education and training centers.' What steps did the U.S.
    take to try to prevent these and other countries from signing such a
    letter whitewashing China's crimes against its own Uighur population?

        Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) human rights abuses
    in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups
    are horrific. The Trump administration has led the global effort to
    spotlight and impose concrete costs on the PRC's continuous campaign of
    repression, which includes mass arbitrary detention, intrusive
    surveillance, forced labor, forced population control, and involuntary
    collection of biometric data. I will continue to call on all countries
    to join the United States in condemning these heinous human rights
    abuses.

        Question. What steps will the U.S. take to push these countries to
    recant their signatures and prevent future letters from being signed?

        Answer. The People's Republic of China's human rights abuses in
    Xinjiang against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups
    are horrific. I will continue to call on all countries to join the
    United States in condemning these abuses.

        Question. What initiatives are we going to propose at the upcoming
    G-7 meeting? How are we leading at the United Nations?

        Answer. The President has been clear that the WHO needs to get its
    act together. That begins with making substantive improvements to its
    ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks
    with transparency and accountability. Through the G7, UN, and
    likeminded partners, the United States will continue its efforts to
    reform the WHO and other international organizations to ensure they
    operate with transparency, fulfill their mandates, and hold governments
    accountable for their commitments under international law. There is
    shared recognition among the G7 of the WHO's failures during the
    current pandemic response. There is also significant common ground
    about how to address those problems and reform the organization so we
    can avoid a repeat of the COVID-19 disaster in the future.
        The President's priorities are to safeguard the health and safety
    of the American people and save lives around the world. As we redirect
    foreign assistance funding to other deserving global health
    organizations and urgent needs around the world, the United States has
    generously allocated more than $20.5 billion that will benefit the
    global COVID-19 pandemic response.

        Question. Has the Department issued a directive encouraging the use
    of the scientific term for COVID-19, and discouraging the use of any
    other non-scientific names? If so, when? To whom was that guidance
    sent?

        Answer. The Department issued a notice to all diplomatic posts in
    March that included the February announcement of ``COVID-19'' as the
    official name for the coronavirus disease 2019. The Department advised
    diplomatic posts to use the ``COVID-19'' acronym, including in public-
    facing materials. The notice also clarified that ``COVID-19'' is not
    synonymous with ``coronavirus'' or ``novel coronavirus'' and advised
    posts to avoid using the term ``coronavirus'' to refer to the general
    category/type of virus.

        Question. What other steps is the Department taking to reduce the
    social stigma and discrimination associated with COVID-19?

        Answer. I have informed all Department employees of the importance
    of preventing stigma and discrimination, promoting resiliency and
    mental health, and supporting each other through COVID-19 with the goal
    of raising awareness about the potential for stigma during the pandemic
    and setting the tone for what I expect from Department leadership. This
    includes the importance of practicing inclusion remotely to avoid
    isolating or stigmatizing team members. In June, we also launched
    TalentCare. TalentCare integrates the Department's workforce resilience
    initiatives so employees have a single touchpoint to access programs
    and resources that enhance health and well-being.

        Question. How will you hold officials accountable at the Department
    who do not use the WHO and CDC-recommended term COVID-19?

        Answer. On February 11, 2020, the International Committee on
    Taxonomy of Viruses formalized the etiologic agent as the ``severe
    acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2'', or SARS-CoV-2, and the name
    of the disease COVID-19. The Department has consistently used those
    conventions across the enterprise since they were introduced by the
    WHO.

        Question. COVID-19 is currently ``spreading like wildfire'' in
    South Africa and The Wall Street Journal reported that the virus ``is
    overpowering hospitals and has caused a dramatic increase in deaths''
    in the country. The impacts of COVID-19 are straining the already weak
    health care systems in Africa. It is essential to aid low-income
    countries to help them control the pandemic as we wait for a vaccine.
    As one example, the Global Fund is helping countries respond to COVID-
    19 and is uniquely positioned to shore up fragile health systems,
    protect health care workers with PPE, and make diagnostics and
    treatments available. What is the State Department doing to mitigate
    the effects of the pandemic in Africa by working through effective
    international partnerships, such as the Global Fund, which is already
    helping countries respond to COVID-19?

        Answer. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the State Department and
    USAID have invested more than $468 million in Africa in health and
    humanitarian assistance specifically aimed at helping governments,
    international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations fight
    the pandemic. Additionally, our whole-of-government approach is helping
    confront the pandemic through American private businesses, non-profit
    groups, and individuals. PEPFAR coordinates with the Global Fund to
    Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to ensure our efforts remain
    complementary. Over the last 17 years, PEPFAR has established labs and
    surveillance systems to help address the HIV pandemic that are now
    being leveraged to support diagnostics for COVID-19.

        Question. How will U.S. international funding to its partnerships
    provide life-saving services in Africa and protect Africa's most
    vulnerable peoples?

        Answer. The United States has a longstanding commitment to
    supporting life-saving services in Africa. Since the outbreak of COVID-
    19, the U.S. Government has invested more than $468 million in Africa
    in health and humanitarian assistance to respond to the pandemic,
    including to protect the health of vulnerable people. We continue
    partnering with countries across Africa through global health security
    programs; responses to specific diseases like Ebola, polio, malaria,
    TB, and now COVID-19; and building national capacity to strengthen
    health systems to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease
    threats. PEPFAR continues to deliver lifesaving HIV prevention and
    treatment services and made significant progress toward controlling the
    HIV pandemic.

        Question. With Africa's CDC (Africa Centres for Disease Control and
    Prevention) observing an increase of 100,000 new cases weekly in
    Africa, COVID-19 is having a large impact on the epidemics of HIV,
    tuberculosis (TB), and malaria, which continue to be widespread across
    the continent. The Imperial College London issued a report stating that
    ``in high burden settings, HIV, TB, and malaria related deaths over 5
    years may be increased by up to 10, 2, and 36 percent, respectively''
    due to COVID-19. Without decisive action, COVID-19 could wipe out
    nearly two decades of progress in combating these three diseases. The
    Global Fund is now working to address this through its COVID-19
    Response Mechanism and working to mitigate the risks the pandemic poses
    to HIV, TB, and malaria outcomes. Given the rapidly increasing rates of
    COVID-19 in Africa and the enormous challenges that the pandemic places
    on HIV, TB, and malaria progress, how can the Office of the Global AIDS
    Coordinator help to ensure responses to COVID-19 globally are
    sufficiently prioritizing impacts on other epidemics like AIDS, TB, and
    malaria, and that programs supported through the President's Emergency
    Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are not disrupted or otherwise
    compromised by the COVID-19 response?

        Answer. PEPFAR, the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the
    Global Accelerator to End Tuberculosis funded by USAID continue to
    deliver life-saving prevention and treatment in the context of the
    COVID-19 pandemic, including in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Since the
    onset of COVID-19, the U.S. Government has developed responses to
    ensure we preserve our gains in the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, and
    malaria as well as to address maternal and child health and voluntary
    family planning while continuing to serve, support, and protect our
    clients, communities, staff, health care workers, and partners around
    the world. The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) in
    the Department of State continues to coordinate the U.S. response with
    PMI and the TB Accelerator by engaging the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
    TB, and malaria to ensure our respective efforts remain complementary,
    especially during the evolving pandemic.

        Question. Figures estimated by UNAIDS point to half a million
    deaths from AIDS-related illnesses in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020 and
    2021 due to possible disruptions of ARTs. When South Africa implemented
    a lockdown to slow the rate of COVID-19 infections, the lockdown caused
    enormous consequences for continued healthcare services and resources.
    A recent survey by the Global Fund shows widespread service disruptions
    in AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria responses as a result of COVID-
    19, impacting approximately three-quarters of HIV, TB, and malaria
    programs. What specific actions can the State Department take to ensure
    that COVID-19's health and economic impacts--both direct and indirect--
    on already overstretched health systems in vulnerable areas? What
    actions are you taking to work with international partners to mitigate
    these particular impacts of COVID-19?

        Answer. PEPFAR invests more than $900 million annually to support
    health infrastructure and capacity in partner countries, including by
    strengthening surveillance, laboratories, epidemiology, and public
    health interventions. These funds complement the healthcare investments
    of other programs in global health funded by USAID, such as the
    President's Malaria Initiative, the Global Accelerator to End
    Tuberculosis, maternal and child health and voluntary family planning.
    Over the last 17 years, PEPFAR has established 3,000 clinical
    laboratories and 28 national reference laboratories in sub-Saharan
    Africa. PEPFAR and USAID have established laboratories and surveillance
    to address HIV/AIDS and other diseases. The U.S. Government and our
    partners have leveraged these resources to support diagnostics for
    COVID-19 to help ensure people who are living with HIV and other
    conditions continue to receive care. Multiple health programs funded by
    the U.S. Government have adapted their delivery of care, medications,
    and immunizations during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, PEPFAR
    expanded the multi-month dispensation of anti-retroviral (ARVs) drugs
    and decentralized the delivery of ARVs by allowing non-clinical
    institutions to serve as distribution points, saving costs and reducing
    the frequency of patient visits to health facilities.

        Question. Sudan is currently experiencing widespread violence in
    Darfur, and there have been recent violent incidents in South Kordofan
    and Kassala. Conflict in these regions will impede Sudan's transition
    to a civilian-led, democratic government. What is the Administration
    doing to prevent further violence and improve civilian security in
    Sudan?

        Answer. The United States is supporting the Sudan Peace Process
    between the Sudanese civilian-led transitional government and armed
    opposition groups so both groups can reach a sustainable peace
    agreement. We have repeatedly raised our concerns about violence in
    Darfur, the Two Areas, and other areas; and we will continue to engage
    the government on human rights, security sector reform, and protection
    of civilians. The United States also supports UNAMID and the new
    special political mission in Sudan, UNITAMS, in their efforts to
    support Sudan in protecting civilians, to monitor human rights, to
    promote justice, and to assist the Sudanese Government to develop and
    implement a credible and sustainable Protection of Civilians strategy.

        Question. The dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the
    Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project and management of the
    Nile waters has caused serious tensions in the Horn of Africa. Despite
    the sensitive diplomatic negotiations involved in the dispute, which
    would typically fall under the purview of the State Department, the
    Treasury Department is the lead agency handling this issue. What are
    the regional implications should the GERD negotiations fail, and how
    will that impact U.S. interests in the region? What role are you
    playing in the GERD negotiations? What role have you advocated for the
    State Department writ large in the GERD negotiations?

        Answer. The on-going GERD negotiations hold the promise of greater
    cooperation and sound management of the Blue Nile for power,
    agriculture, industry, and other uses that could improve the lives of
    the more than 250 million people of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The
    Treasury Department plays the lead role in the U.S. Government's
    participation in the GERD negotiations. The State Department is in
    close contact with the Treasury Department to ensure a unified U.S.
    policy. Secretary Mnuchin and I regularly discuss policy and
    negotiation developments, and I have spoken repeatedly with senior
    officials from all three countries on this issue. The State Department
    is engaged through U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa, Cairo, Khartoum, and
    Pretoria and the U.S. Mission to the African Union.

        Question. Foreign Policy reported that, ``several U.S. officials
    said that the Trump administration could move forward with aid cuts to
    Ethiopia if negotiations hit another impasse and the sides can't reach
    a final deal.'' Do you support the current aid freeze on Ethiopia to
    induce its cooperation on the GERD negotiations?

        Answer. The Department is committed to leveraging all available
    tools to promote outcomes that advance our interests around the world.
    As of July 30, no funding already obligated for Ethiopia has been
    affected by these considerations. The State Department will consult and
    notify Congress before reprogramming funds previously notified or
    justified bilaterally for Ethiopia, consistent with applicable
    requirements.

        Question. Ethiopia's transition to an inclusive representative
    democracy is in jeopardy. There are alarming signs of backsliding
    including mass arrests, disappearances, arrest of opposition
    politicians and an internet blackout. Elections, scheduled for this
    year have been delayed indefinitely. What actions have you taken in the
    wake of your visit to help ensure Ethiopia succeeds in its democratic
    transition, specifically with regards to calling out actions that close
    political space and violate human rights?

        Answer. Despite intermittent challenges, our assessment continues
    to be that Prime Minister Abiy's administration remains committed to
    the reforms they championed when he came to power in 2018. We continue
    to engage diplomatically with the Ethiopian Government to assure them
    of our support and to urge them to continue to uphold the rule of law,
    respect basic democratic principles, and work towards free and fair
    elections. Department leadership meets regularly with senior officials
    from the Ethiopian Government to reiterate our concerns regarding
    troubling reports of human rights abuses and restrictions on basic
    freedoms.

        Question. However, the transition remains extremely fragile, and
    could even fail without strong support. What specific programmatic
    activities to support the transition in Ethiopia will the FY 2021
    request support? What specific programs will the U.S. undertake to
    target youth in marginalized communities? What specific geographic
    areas will we target through such programs?

        Answer. The FY 2021 budget request includes funding for robust
    interagency support for Ethiopia's economic, security, and democratic
    reforms as well as efforts to strengthen constructive civic engagement
    and mitigate conflict. U.S. Government programming is inclusive of all
    Ethiopians, including a growing youth population throughout the
    country. The FY 2021 budget request includes programs for outreach and
    events in every region of Ethiopia, aligning with our assessment of
    where challenges are the greatest. The Department continues to assess
    the impact COVID-19 will have on our programming.

        Question. Last May, the White House announced the United States is
    undertaking a comprehensive review of its assistance programs to South
    Sudan to ensure our assistance does not contribute to, or prolong the
    conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior. When will the
    review be complete? What impact has it had on the FY 2021 budget
    request?

        Answer. The comprehensive review of assistance programs is being
    led by the National Security Council in conjunction with the
    interagency. The Department of State remains committed to ensuring our
    foreign assistance programs do not contribute to, prolong, or
    facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior in South Sudan and that these
    programs have sufficient safeguards in place, including robust
    monitoring and evaluation. The review has not had an impact on the FY
    2021 budget request.

        Question. Conflict between the Government of Cameroon and
    Anglophone separatists has killed thousands. What actions is the
    Administration taking to address ongoing violence and to foster a
    sustainable settlement between the government and Anglophone
    separatists?

        Answer. Coordinating closely with likeminded partners, Department
    of State officials continue to call for the government as well as the
    separatist groups to cease violence and engage in dialogue without
    preconditions, to ensure humanitarian workers can access the affected
    regions, and to allow for independent investigations of human rights
    violations and abuses, such as the February 14 killings in Ngarbuh,
    Northwest Region. We significantly reduced security assistance to
    Cameroon and removed eligibility for Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
    benefits due to credible allegations of human rights violations by
    security forces. We believe the Swiss initiative is the most promising
    effort leading toward dialogue and will continue to support it.

        Question. The Pentagon's review of troop deployments in Africa has
    unnerved our allies who rely on U.S. military support in the Sahel.
    What is the State Department doing to reassure our allies of the U.S.
    commitment to continuing engagement in support of counterterrorism
    efforts in the Sahel? Do you support drawing down our military
    deployment in the Sahel or other parts of sub-Saharan Africa?

        Answer. The Department of State funds the majority of peace and
    security assistance in Africa. The Department of Defense's Blank Slate
    Review does not change my commitment to reduce threats and advance
    mutual interests with our African partners. Between Fiscal Years 2010
    and 2019, the Department of State obligated approximately $4.7 billion
    in bilateral security assistance to Africa, a significant portion of
    which assisted Sahel countries. The majority of the State Department's
    security assistance does not depend on Department of Defense for
    implementation or oversight. I remain committed to maintaining this
    engagement, recognizing that some programs may require review and
    adjustment in light of reduced Department of Defense oversight and
    implementation capacity.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

        Question. [Question for the Record Submitted is classified.]

        Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security
    interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission
    Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is
    prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.

        Question. Is the State Department aware of any Russian officials
    currently in the U.S. who have overstayed their visas? If so, will you
    work to ensure they are repatriated to Russia?

        Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security
    interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission
    Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is
    prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.

        Question. How is the State Department working to address the
    imbalance between U.S. personnel in Russia and Russian personnel in the
    U.S.?

        Answer. I remain committed to protecting U.S. national security
    interests and supporting the safety and security of U.S. Mission
    Russia. My team is working with the interagency on these matters and is
    prepared to brief you or members of your staff in a classified setting.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson

        Question. You have been a strong voice for internet freedom and
    recently tweeted that ``the United States will not tolerate government
    imposed internet shutdowns and other forms of censorship.'' Is it the
    policy of the Department of State to support development and
    distribution of the tools needed to circumvent the internet censors of
    the Chinese Government? If so, what is the plan for doing so, and do
    you have the funding you need to achieve that goal?

        Answer. The Department of State supports the Administration's
    policy to protect and promote internet freedom as articulated in the
    U.S. National Cyber Strategy. As reflected in the Strategy, the United
    States takes a principled stand on protecting an open, interoperable,
    reliable, and secure internet and works to ensure that the U.S.
    approach to an open internet is the international standard. Department
    programs funded through Section 7065(a) of the 2019 SFOAA contribute to
    the Administration's strategic efforts by providing civil society and
    human rights defenders in China and other repressive environments with
    tailored and context-specific support that includes development,
    deployment, and support for technologies that counter censorship and/or
    enable secure communications. The Department will continue to optimize
    the use of available funds on programs best designed to protect and
    promote internet freedom.
                                     ______

              Responses of Secretary Michael Pompeo to Questions
                    Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

        Question. How have the events that triggered recent protests around
    our country--and the government's response--hindered our ability to
    promote human rights and democratic principles abroad?

        Answer. There is no change to the Department of State's work
    overseas promoting human rights and democratic principles. The
    discussions taking place in the United States, amplified by a free and
    independent media and our respect for fundamental freedoms such as
    freedom of association and peaceful assembly, demonstrate our robust
    democracy, our vigorous debates, and our constant striving to be
    better.
        The charges filed against the four Minnesota police officers for
    George Floyd's tragic death illustrate accountability, due process, and
    rule of law. The United States continues to serve as an example of our
    commitment to democratic principles through dedication to
    accountability at home and respect for fundamental freedoms.

        Question. What is the impact of the President's perceived affinity
    for authoritarian leaders on our human rights efforts around the globe?

        Answer. The United States is firmly committed to using its voice
    and position on the world stage to draw attention to human rights
    violations and abuses and promote accountability for human rights
    violators and abusers. I raise a wide range of human rights issues and
    concerns with leaders from around the world. The Department of State
    engages privately and publicly at all levels to promote the importance
    of democratic processes, rule of law, and respect for human rights and
    fundamental freedoms to ensuring freedom, security, and prosperity. The
    United States will continue to stand up and speak out on human rights
    violations and abuses--wherever and by whomever they are committed.

        Question. Do you believe that other countries still regard the
    United States as a leader on human rights? If so, what examples of our
    leadership can you provide?

        Answer. Yes. During the current global health crisis, the United
    States is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to promote
    upholding democracy, human rights, and good governance as a critical
    component of responding effectively to the pandemic. For example, in
    May, the United States led a statement by the Freedom Online
    Coalition--a group of like-minded states seeking to advance internet
    freedom--on the human rights implications of certain measures
    introduced by governments in response to the COVID-19 crisis, such as
    the use of arbitrary or unlawful surveillance practices, network
    shutdowns, and censorship. This was the first time a group of
    governments took a public position promoting access to information
    online during this crisis.

        Question. You recently said that, ``[o]ur dedication to unalienable
    rights doesn't mean we have the capacity to tackle all human rights
    violations everywhere and at all times.'' In your view, which human
    rights violations should the United States focus on and which should we
    ignore? Do you consider women's rights and LGBTQ rights to be equally
    as important as the right to religious freedom?

        Answer. Any realistic foreign policy--including the promotion of
    human rights--must acknowledge the constraints imposed by finite
    resources and limited capacity. As the Commission on Unalienable Rights
    notes in its draft report, ``[W]hile it is important in principle to
    affirm the interdependence of all rights that pertain to human dignity,
    U.S. foreign policy can and should, consistent with the [Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights], determine which rights most accord with
    national principles, priorities, and interests at any given time. Such
    judgments must take into consideration both the distinctive U.S.
    contributions to the human rights project and also prudential judgments
    about current conditions, threats, and opportunities.'' As the report
    affirms throughout, human rights are the rights inherent in all
    persons. The Administration is committed to promoting human rights as a
    national security priority, and leads by example in our public
    commitments to the worldwide decriminalization of LGBTQ and in
    promoting the economic and societal empowerment of women.

        Question. Does the premise that internationally recognized human
    rights are subject to interpretation based on individual nation's
    traditions and values empower countries like China or Russia in their
    efforts to delegitimize human rights?

        Answer. No. While each state decides how rights are implemented
    domestically, human rights are still universal. Unfortunately, some
    nations simply ignore the universality of human rights. The Chinese
    Government represses members of religious and ethnic minority groups in
    Xinjiang, Tibet, and elsewhere, and undermines the freedoms guaranteed
    to Hong Kongers under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic
    Law. The Russian Government severely limits the exercise of human
    rights at home, including through growing restrictions and reprisals on
    individuals who exercise their freedom of expression, members of the
    political opposition, and certain religious minorities. We continue to
    work in multilateral fora and with like-minded partners to press
    countries such as China, Russia, and others to respect universal human
    rights and fundamental freedoms.

        Question. As you have stated, the Commission's draft report is not
    a statement of policy. How will you ensure that the report is not used
    in official State Department business?

        Answer. The report is meant to inform policymaking; to serve as a
    reference for NGOs, teachers, and students; to assist in clarifying
    conceptual and terminological confusion; and to stimulate discussion
    regarding the promotion of human rights across the world. The report
    states: ``As elaborated by the Secretary, the Commission's instructions
    were to focus on principle, not policy formulation.'' Further, it
    notes, ``Recognizing that foreign policy must be tailored to changing
    circumstances and must necessarily consider many other factors along
    with human rights, the Commission did not seek to enter into debates
    about the application of human rights principles to particular current
    controversies.''

        Question. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
    Discrimination against Women guarantees women's rights ``to decide
    freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and
    to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them
    to exercise these rights.'' Do you acknowledge that access to
    reproductive health and family planning are human rights?

        Answer. I am committed to advancing the health and well-being of
    women and girls globally. The United States plays a leading role in
    supporting the rights of women and girls around the world, working to
    strengthen democratic, transparent, representative, and responsive
    governance that includes the voices of women and marginalized
    communities. The United States continues to provide more foreign
    assistance for women's and girls' health than any other country in the
    world, and we will continue to be a leading funder of (voluntary)
    family planning, child and maternal health, HIV/AIDS, cancer research
    and treatment, and other programs that address the life-long health
    needs of women and girls.

        Question. Do you think that providing women the tools and
    information they need to prevent unintended pregnancies is a worthy
    public health goal?

        Answer. The Administration is a strong defender of programs to
    improve the health, life, dignity, and well-being of women. The United
    States is the world's largest bilateral donor for essential health
    care, including voluntary and informed family planning.
        The Administration supports the empowerment of women and efforts to
    promote their access to health care across the lifespan, whether or not
    they are mothers. This includes maternal health and promoting the
    healthy timing and spacing of pregnancy through access to voluntary
    family planning. It also includes the prevention and treatment of
    sexually transmitted infections and their complications including HIV,
    the prevention and treatment of fistula and female genital mutilation
    and cutting, and other interventions to address health-care needs
    specific to women and girls, excluding abortion as a method of family
    planning.

        Question. Will U.S.-funded programs continue to support and supply
    a full range of (modern) contraceptive methods in order to ensure that
    women have access to the information, counseling, and methods best
    suited to their needs?

        Answer. As the world's largest bilateral donor of family-planning
    assistance, the United States remains committed to helping women and
    their children thrive. Preventing child and maternal deaths remains a
    priority for this Administration. Access to voluntary family planning
    is a key intervention for achieving the healthy timing and spacing of
    pregnancy, preventing child and maternal deaths, and for helping
    communities progress along the Journey to Self-Reliance.
        We know women need access to a range of contraceptive options over
    their reproductive years, as their fertility intentions will change
    over time. We best serve women when we provide them with access to a
    broad range of modern contraceptive options--from fertility-awareness
    methods, to short- and long-acting reversible methods, to voluntary
    permanent methods, as well as high-quality counseling so women can make
    their own informed decisions. We also are committed to supporting the
    development, introduction, and scale-up of a wide range of
    contraceptive methods to meet the voluntary family-planning needs of
    women and couples so they can time and space their families in the
    healthiest way possible.

        Question. You recently stated that, ``Even as we continue our
    robust COVID-19 response, the United States must start preparing for
    the next outbreak today.'' With 70 percent of the world still
    underprepared to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats,
    it is critical that the U.S. lead efforts to strengthen global pandemic
    preparedness. Looking ahead, how can we apply lessons learned from this
    pandemic to bolster future global pandemic preparedness?

        Answer. Achieving global health security and bolstering pandemic
    preparedness remain policy priorities of the Department of State. The
    COVID-19 outbreak reiterated three key themes that emerged from
    previous outbreaks of Zika and Ebola: the U.S. Government, our
    bilateral partners, and multilateral organizations must be better
    organized to rapidly respond to infectious disease threats and
    pandemics; we must strengthen transparent and trusted early warning
    systems and connect critical data sources; and we must think
    holistically about preparedness and build accountability into the
    international system. We will continue to leverage U.S. Government
    successes, including our whole-of-government support to the Global
    Health Security Agenda, to build country-level capacities and help
    partner countries fill gaps identified in their Joint External
    Evaluations and National Action Plans for Health Security. We are
    currently reviewing options to expand efforts in these areas.

        Question. What efforts is the State Department undertaking to
    prevent future infectious disease threats from spreading and to work
    with our allies to coordinate best practices?

        Answer. Global health security is a global responsibility and
    requires a transparent, trusted, and coordinated international
    approach. U.S. diplomacy is key to this effort. Our diplomatic outreach
    fosters collaboration between governments, nongovernmental
    organizations, the private sector, and other partners to encourage
    multisectoral approaches to bolster global health security. The
    Department of State continues to engage bilaterally, in multilateral
    fora, and through initiatives like the Global Health Security Agenda,
    to coordinate with allies and partners to strengthen the ability of
    countries around the world to better prevent, detect, and respond to
    infectious disease threats.

        Question. How can we hope to protect Americans from pandemic
    disease and other global health challenges without participating in a
    multilateral coordinating authority like the WHO?

        Answer. The Administration is examining ways to use the expertise
    of key U.S. Government departments and agencies and the U.S. non-
    governmental and private sectors to protect U.S. citizens and deliver
    essential support rapidly to other countries to prevent, detect, and
    respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at their source. Political
    pressure by the PRC and other malign actors has degraded the capability
    of the World Health Organization and left its leaders and scientists
    reluctant to speak out about the PRC's and other governments' refusal
    to report transparently on outbreaks of dangerous pathogens. The United
    States will continue to work with countries to develop tools to address
    infectious diseases and fill gaps created by the WHO's inaction.

        Question. Is the State Department concerned that a U.S. withdraw
    from the WHO will further strengthen China's role at the organization
    and other multilateral bodies?

        Answer. The United States remains an indispensable, committed
    partner of the international community, including the UN and its
    associated bodies by continuing to be the largest financial contributor
    to international organizations, providing over $12.2 billion in fiscal
    year 2019. The United States continuously works to ensure the U.S.
    values of universality of human rights, the dignity and worth of
    individuals, peaceful resolution of conflict, sustainable economic
    prosperity, national sovereignty, transparency, and the rule of law are
    protected and upheld at the UN and related international institutions.
        The Department of State proactively supports these values, the core
    pillars of the UN Charter--peace and security, sustainable development,
    and human rights--and advances the reforms the UN and its organizations
    require to be transparent, effective, and accountable institutions of
    the 21st century. The United States' demonstrated commitment to the UN
    and related agencies is critical to accomplishing the UN mission,
    maintaining its integrity and impartial role of serving all its
    members, and rejecting the efforts of the PRC to harness the UN to
    accomplish its own authoritarian goals.

        Question. Do you believe that a bilateral approach to complex and
    far-reaching global health crises is the most effective and efficient
    way to spend tax payer dollars?

        Answer. The United States leads the world in health and
    humanitarian aid in an ``All-of-America'' effort: our assistance
    accounts for more than 40 percent of total global health funding, or
    more than $140 billion since 2001. Similarly, the Administration is
    committed to ensuring our generosity directly reaches people around the
    world, while supporting the health-security priorities of the United
    States. The U.S. provides an average of $10 billion per year in global
    health funding--and this year, those funds will double as we surge to
    respond to the pandemic of COVID-19 around the world. The vast majority
    of these funds will be implemented bilaterally, allowing us to work
    closely with each country as they pursue their journey to self-
    reliance. The Department works through and with multilateral
    organizations such as the Global Fund and Gavi. In addition, the United
    States has allocated more than $20.5 billion toward the global response
    to the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond our generous funding, the U.S.
    Government actively engages with our domestic and international
    partners to support a coordinated and coherent international response
    so we can direct U.S. funding and technical expertise to the areas of
    greatest need.

        Question. How does the Administration plan to allocate funding that
    would otherwise be obligated to WHO, especially in countries like
    Venezuela and Yemen, in which U.S. implementers have particular
    difficulty operating?

        Answer. On May 29, 2020, the President announced that the United
    States will be terminating its relationship with the WHO and
    redirecting WHO-related funding to other deserving and urgent global
    health organizations and needs around the world. While the United
    States was by far the leading contributor to the WHO, those
    contributions represented a small fraction--just 4 percent--of total
    U.S. funding to global health assistance every year. There is a wide
    range of excellent implementing partners available to us, partners that
    value transparency and are better able to provide value for U.S.
    taxpayers. In many cases, our teams in the field and here in Washington
    have already identified alternate implementers in challenging
    environments, such as World Vision in Afghanistan, the International
    Medical Corps in Iraq, the International Rescue Committee in Syria, and
    in environments where we do not discuss the names of our partners due
    to safety and operational considerations.

        Question. As you may be aware, the Republican HEALS Act would only
    provide approximately $4 billion for a contribution to The Gavi Vaccine
    Alliance and for distribution of a future COVID-19 vaccine abroad. Is
    this funding level adequate?

        Answer. The nature of a future COVID-19 vaccine remains to be seen.
    The funding needed to deploy a COVID-19 vaccine globally will be a
    global challenge requiring the entire international donor community. As
    we learn more, the Department of State will work with our partners to
    refine the estimates for anticipated global costs. The U.S. Government
    has already allocated $20.5 billion in funding to support the
    international response to the pandemic and is the global leader in
    health and humanitarian assistance. We just recently announced a
    commitment of $1.16 billion over FY 2020-2023 to Gavi, further
    reflecting our leadership in this area.
        The Department of State will continue to work with OMB and other
    departments and agencies to assess whether and to what extent
    additional U.S. Government funding will be needed.

        Question. To effectively respond to COVID-19 and the pandemic's
    secondary effects overseas, how much additional funding will the State
    Department and USAID need?

        Answer. Congress has appropriated a total of $2.3 billion to the
    Department of State and USAID to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic
    through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
    Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123) and the Coronavirus Aid,
    Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136).
        Ongoing needs are likely to include mitigating the pandemic's
    continuing impact on fee revenues that support consular services both
    domestically and abroad. The Department will work with Congress and OMB
    on any further requests for funding to support the Department of
    State's response to COVID-19 around the globe.

        Question. If Congress is to appropriate additional funding for the
    international COVID-19 response, can you commit to expending new
    resources in an expeditious and transparent manner?

        Answer. Yes. The Department of State and USAID commit to expending
    funds appropriated for COVID-19 response in an expeditious and
    transparent manner, consistent with applicable congressional
    notification procedures and other requirements.

        Question. Rates of COVID-19 are increasing rapidly in Africa and
    posing enormous challenges to progress on other health challenges like
    HIV, TB, and malaria on the continent. How can Congress ensure that
    even as the U.S. responds to COVID-19 globally, we are also
    sufficiently prioritizing impacts on other epidemics like AIDS, TB and
    malaria?

        Answer. With the bipartisan support of Congress, PEPFAR continues
    to deliver lifesaving HIV prevention and treatment services and advance
    global progress toward controlling the HIV pandemic in the context of
    the COVID-19 pandemic, including in Africa. PEPFAR has taken decisive
    action since the onset of COVID-19 to confront the unique challenges it
    poses, ensuring we preserve our gains in the fight against HIV/AIDS and
    continue to serve, support, and protect our clients, communities,
    staff, health care workers, and partners around the world. PEPFAR
    coordinates closely with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
    and Malaria to ensure our respective efforts remain complementary,
    especially during the evolving COVID-19 pandemic.

        Question. Is the State Department considering launching a Grand
    Challenge to advance innovations to fight coronavirus as it did during
    the Ebola and Zika global health emergencies? If so, what resources are
    needed from Congress to support this work?

        Answer. As the Department of State and USAID have now committed or
    obligated nearly all of the COVID-19 supplemental resources provided by
    Congress, we are reviewing all available options to continue to
    mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 and better prepare for future
    pandemics. We are currently reviewing all of our resources and
    investments to consider how to utilize available funding sources such
    as prior year resources. The Department of State and USAID will
    continue to engage with Congress as those discussions progress.

        Question. What policy actions does the State Department intend to
    take to push back against negative trends in democracy and human rights
    that are tied to government responses to COVID-19?

        Answer. I have underscored that democracies are better equipped to
    address pandemics than authoritarian regimes. The Department of State
    is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to promote
    democracy, human rights, and good governance as key to an effective
    response to COVID-19. We are also closely monitoring concerning trends
    related to some governments' responses to the pandemic, including
    growing authoritarianism, crackdowns on fundamental freedoms, expanded
    use of surveillance tools, and targeting of vulnerable groups. We are
    leveraging bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and other foreign
    policy tools to promote democratic, rights-respecting responses and to
    counter authoritarian responses to the pandemic.

        Question. Russia's increasingly authoritarian governance under
    President Putin is deeply concerning. When President Trump seemingly
    ignores Russia's malign activities and expresses a desire to pursue
    cooperation with Russia on a range of issues, even calling for its
    inclusion in the G7, what message does it send to other countries--both
    our allies and our adversaries?

        Answer. We and the other members of the G7 have been clear: Russia
    must live up to its international commitments and accept responsibility
    for its destabilizing actions. The Administration will continue to
    impose costs on Russia and its proxies until Russia ends its aggression
    against Ukraine and ceases its efforts to undermine our democratic
    processes. The Administration has also been clear that the door to
    dialogue is open, should Russia choose to take credible steps toward a
    constructive path. Any change to G7 membership would require
    consultation with and consensus among members.

        Question. What is the Administration's ``redline'' with Russia?
    Russia has already attempted to interfere in our elections and faced
    little consequence, so there is reason to believe they would do so
    again. At what point will the White House more forcefully address
    malign Russian actions in the U.S.?

        Answer. The Administration has launched an unprecedented election
    security effort working on a whole-of-government basis to ensure the
    security of our elections. The Administration has been clear with the
    Russians that efforts to interfere will be met with consequences. We
    continue to maintain sanctions against Russians responsible for U.S.
    election interference and we continue to increase pressure on Russian
    oligarch and Internet Research Agency financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin. The
    Department's approach is to steadily raise the costs of Russia's
    ongoing malign actions until Vladimir Putin chooses a less
    confrontational foreign policy, while keeping the door open for
    dialogue that advances our national interests.

        Question. In addition to imposing robust sanctions against
    officials responsible for politically motivated imprisonment, how else
    can the U.S. Government ensure accountability for perpetrators of human
    rights abuses in Russia?

        Answer. The U.S. Government's commitment to democracy and civil
    society in Russia remains firm. We will continue to promote
    accountability for those responsible for human rights abuses,
    especially in cases where we can demonstrate that an individual's
    conduct meets the legal threshold for specific action. For example, the
    Department's July designation of Ramzan Kadyrov and members of his
    immediate family under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State,
    Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, was
    an important step that signaled our concern about the appalling human
    rights situation in Chechnya. We will continue to work with allies and
    partners through bilateral channels and at multilateral fora to condemn
    human rights abuses in Russia and press for accountability for
    perpetrators.

        Question. How can the United States combat Russia's weaponization
    of corruption? How can we be more proactive in engaging in anti-
    corruption diplomacy?

        Answer. Our response to Russia's weaponization of corruption to
    achieve its political objectives continues to be rooted in democratic
    principles of transparency, accountability, and integrity. The United
    States will continue to proactively identify and publicly address
    Russian corruption and speedily impose sanctions on Russian officials,
    or those working on their behalf, who have engaged in corruption. We
    will also continue to work with our allies to press Russia to uphold
    its anticorruption obligations and defend against attempts by Russia to
    distort the international anticorruption framework or by Russian
    individuals and entities who are engaged in illegal activities
    including unlawful transfers of money into the United States.

        Question. On July 27, Germany, the current head of the G7's
    rotating presidency, rejected the suggestion that Russia be permitted
    to rejoin. What is the perceived benefit of rewarding Russia for its
    destabilizing behavior while alienating our allies?

        Answer. We and the other members of the G7 have been clear: Russia
    must live up to is international commitments and accept responsibility
    for its destabilizing actions. The Administration will continue to
    impose costs on Russia and its proxies until it ends its aggression
    against Ukraine and ceases its efforts to undermine our democratic
    processes. The Administration has also been clear that the door to
    dialogue is open, should Russia choose to take credible steps toward a
    constructive path. Any change to G7 membership would require
    consultation with and consensus among members.

        Question. Putin's successful manipulation of Russia's constitution
    last month may permit him to remain President, in effect, for life.
    What risks do you foresee in normalizing his anti-democratic
    tendencies?

        Answer. Russian President Vladimir Putin orchestrated a carefully
    manipulated vote on constitutional amendments in June and July that
    gives him the option to remain president through 2036. Putin's eroding
    public support drives his reliance on repression not only in the form
    of harsh treatment of perceived critics of the Kremlin, but also
    against groups such as religious and other minorities, civil society
    actors, rule of law advocates, and independent media outlets and
    journalists. The Russian people, like people everywhere, deserve a
    government that supports an open marketplace of ideas, transparent and
    accountable governance, equal treatment under the law, and the ability
    to exercise their rights without fear of retribution.

        Question. After the Administration ordered the Chinese Consulate in
    Houston closed on July 24, Beijing retaliated by ordering the closure
    of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. What immediate and long-term impacts
    will the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu have on U.S.
    diplomatic engagement in China?

        Answer. We were troubled and disappointed by the PRC's decision to
    withdraw consent for the operations of U.S. Consulate General Chengdu,
    which--unlike its counterpart in Houston--was not engaged in malign
    activities. The consulate had stood at the center of our relations with
    the people of southwest China, including Tibet, for 35 years. While
    this unfortunate decision will no doubt make efforts to engage
    diplomatically and represent U.S. interests across southwest China more
    difficult, we will strive to continue our outreach to the people of
    this important region through our other diplomatic posts in China.

        Question. What are the three top priority policy areas that the
    United States should be pursuing over the next 4 years to advance our
    competitive position vis-a-vis China, and how does the Administration's
    budget request reflect these priorities?

        Answer. As outlined in the U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's
    Republic of China (PRC), released in May, we seek to improve the
    resiliency of our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail
    against the challenges the PRC presents. Through diplomatic engagement
    and foreign assistance, the United States is building cooperative
    partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies,
    partners, and international organizations to support the shared
    principles of a free and open global order. We aim to compel Beijing to
    cease or reduce actions harmful to our national interests, as well as
    those of our allies and partners. We seek cooperation where our
    interests align, and strategic competition need not lead to
    confrontation or conflict. The Administration's budget request supports
    the strategic approach, including shoring up transparent and
    competitive markets globally.

        Question. What joint interests exist between China and the United
    States where cooperation is necessary?

        Answer. Strategic competition with the PRC need not lead to
    confrontation or conflict. The Department seeks cooperation where our
    interests align. We remain committed to achieving progress on a range
    of topics, such as implementing the Phase One trade deal, achieving
    DPRK denuclearization, and stemming the flow of fentanyl into the
    United States. However, we are willing to tolerate greater friction in
    the bilateral relationship, as we remain committed to our overarching
    goal of protecting U.S. vital national interests from malign PRC
    conduct.

        Question. How does the State Department assess risks to U.S.
    citizens arising from the imposition of national security legislation
    in Hong Kong? What are the most serious risks for U.S. citizens living
    in or visiting Hong Kong? What are the risks for U.S. citizens living
    elsewhere?

        Answer. Hong Kong's new National Security Law (NSL) poses a unique
    threat to U.S. citizens, both resident in Hong Kong and elsewhere. The
    NSL's provisions include several troubling components, including
    provisions stating that acts performed by the Office for Safeguarding
    National Security are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong
    Special Administrative Region, and provisions giving the Standing
    Committee of the National People's Congress the power to interpret the
    law, among others. Article 38 of the NSL states the law applies to
    offenses committed outside the region by a person who is not a
    permanent resident of Hong Kong. This could potentially affect U.S.
    citizens who support freedom of expression and democracy in Hong Kong,
    even if they do so from the United States or elsewhere.

        Question. What unintended consequences may result from the new
    policy the U.S. is pursuing by deeming China's South China Sea land
    reclamation illegal? Are there additional resources you believe the
    United States needs to achieve its goals in the South China Sea?

        Answer. The decision to clarify our public position on PRC South
    China Sea claims was not taken lightly. With the new policy, the United
    States clearly stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in
    upholding their sovereign rights and interests, consistent with
    international law. We stand with the international community in defense
    of freedom of the seas, respect for sovereignty, and rejection of any
    push to impose ``might makes right'' in the South China Sea or the
    wider region.
        The United States continues to carefully monitor ongoing
    developments in the South China Sea, and continues to invest in our own
    maritime capabilities and strengthen security cooperation with
    Southeast Asian claimants, as well as Taiwan.

        Question. What specific strategy is the State Department following
    to broaden relations with Taiwan? How has this strategy changed in the
    wake of the most recent tensions?

        Answer. The United States is strengthening our unofficial
    relationship with Taiwan as a key partner in our vision for the Indo-
    Pacific region. For decades, the United States has supported Taiwan's
    ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, and we will
    continue to support an effective deterrence capability for Taiwan. The
    United States is also taking a stand against PRC coercion and pressure
    to restrict Taiwan's international space. Through the American
    Institute in Taiwan, we are working to highlight Taiwan's strengths as
    a partner through Global Cooperation and Training Framework programs
    focused on issues including public health, women's empowerment, media
    disinformation, and the digital economy.

        Question. You have expressed outrage over Beijing's treatment of
    Uighurs in Western China, despite President Trump having taken no
    action when notified of resettlement camps in Xinjiang as early as
    2017. What has changed between 2017 and this year?

        Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in
    Xinjiang speak volumes. The President has personally heard from those
    affected, including Jewher Ilham, the daughter of imprisoned prominent
    Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. The United States has taken concrete action
    to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, including visa
    restrictions on officials, financial sanctions (on the Xinjiang
    Production and Construction Corps and Politburo member Chen Quanguo),
    export restrictions, import restrictions, the release of a business
    advisory, and outreach to universities and businesses about the risks
    of doing business in Xinjiang. We have also joined with like-minded
    partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses.

        Question. What is your Department's plan to effectively counter
    China's culture of high-tech authoritarianism that has been brought to
    bear in Xinjiang and serves as a model for other authoritarian states?

        Answer. I have paid particular attention to Beijing's use of
    digital technologies to support repressive rule--particularly in
    Xinjiang. There are reports of pervasive, arbitrary high-tech
    surveillance and involuntary collection of personal data. The
    Department of State has conducted outreach to companies with business
    in Xinjiang to urge them to implement safeguards to ensure that their
    commercial activities do not contribute to these human rights abuses.
    Department of State initiatives also aim to address trends of digital
    illiberalism, both through measures to impose costs on repressive
    governments and complicit corporations and through efforts to promote
    the development and adoption of best practices to support digital
    freedom.

        Question. Congress has consistently appropriated aid to the
    Northern Triangle to address the root causes of migration, which has
    led to a reduction in homicides in El Salvador and Honduras and a
    strengthening of Guatemala's economy. Last year, however, the
    Administration cut off foreign assistance to the region. Do you think
    U.S. assistance focused on long-term priorities is a worthy investment
    in the Northern Triangle?

        Answer. Ongoing U.S. foreign assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, and
    El Salvador supports programs to continue and further our joint efforts
    to deter illegal immigration to the United States by working to
    strengthen governance and rule of law, improve civilian security, and
    augment private sector efforts to create economic opportunity in the
    region. Addressing the root causes of illegal immigration to the United
    States through this programming is a worthwhile investment to make the
    region more secure and prosperous, a key U.S. policy interest.

        Question. As you are aware, the U.S. has signed Asylum Cooperative
    Agreements with Northern Triangle countries to accept deportees for the
    United States, despite these countries' lack of capacity to process
    asylum seekers or to keep them safe. Is the Department tracking
    outcomes for deported migrants?

        Answer. Implementation of the U.S.-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative
    Agreement (ACA) has been paused since mid-March due to the COVID-19
    pandemic. From November 15, 2019, to March 16, 2020, DHS transferred to
    Guatemala 948 Salvadoran and Honduran nationals who expressed an intent
    to seek protection in the United States. Through our international
    organization partners, the Department of State is tracking outcomes of
    ACA transferees who applied for asylum and those who requested
    assistance to voluntarily return to their home countries.
    Implementation of the U.S.-Honduras ACA has yet to begin due to COVID-
    19. The U.S.-El Salvador ACA has not yet entered into force.

        Question. How many migrants have been killed or assaulted after
    being deported from the U.S.?

        Answer. The Department of State does not track individual cases of
    deportees removed by the United States. We defer to the Department of
    Homeland Security for additional information on deportation.

        Question. How can we expect countries that are unable to care for
    their own citizens to provide economic and physical security for asylum
    seekers?

        Answer. The Department of State and USAID continue to provide
    economic, security, and governance assistance in El Salvador, Honduras,
    and Guatemala. Through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
    Migration, we support international organization partners to provide
    humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, refugees, and other vulnerable
    migrants. Through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
    Enforcement Affairs, we support capacity building to address key
    challenges to civilian security. The Department of State also continues
    to engage diplomatically with these governments to help create a more
    transparent enabling economic environment that attracts private sector
    investment, thereby creating more economic opportunities for
    individuals.

        Question. If conditions in their home countries have not changed
    and migrants are sent back to the region from which they fled, what
    makes the Department think that they will not leave to seek asylum in
    the U.S. again?

        Answer. The Asylum Cooperative Agreements allow the United States
    to transfer individuals who express an intent or interest in seeking
    protection in the United States to a partner country where the
    Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have determined they will
    have the opportunity to file a protection claim with that government.

        Question. ICE has deported hundreds of migrants who tested positive
    for COVID-19, despite multiple requests by countries to halt
    deportation flights and to conduct better health screenings. Is the
    U.S. risking a public health crisis by deporting individuals with
    COVID-19?

        Answer. Sustained cooperation on removal flights remains important,
    even with the present challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Every
    government has an international legal obligation to accept the return
    of its nationals whom another state seeks to expel, remove, or deport.
    The Department of State is aware some deportees have tested positive
    for COVID-19 after being removed by the U.S. Government. We refer you
    to the Department of Homeland Security for additional information on
    U.S. removal flight policies and procedures.
        Since mid-March, the U.S. Government has committed more than $137
    million in supplemental health, humanitarian, and economic assistance
    to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America and the Caribbean.

        Question. What could be the impact of deporting individuals with
    COVID-19 to Haiti, a country with just 60 ventilators for its 11
    million people?

        Answer. As of July 29, Haiti has 7,371 confirmed cases of COVID-19
    with 158 deaths. Haiti's COVID-19 Scientific Task Force has affirmed
    its satisfaction with the management of the pandemic in Haiti, and the
    WHO has cited the community-based homecare model in Haiti's West
    Department as a successful approach to managing the pandemic. We have
    provided $13.2 million in emergency health and humanitarian assistance
    to support Haiti's COVID-19 efforts.
        As agreed to by the Government of Haiti, all individuals manifested
    for removal to Haiti are tested by DHS and Customs Enforcement for
    COVID-19 within 72 hours prior to their departure from the United
    States; those who test positive are not removed. For additional details
    on ICE's removal procedures, we refer you to DHS.

        Question. How has the U.S.'s refusal to halt deportations, despite
    requests from multiple governments, impacted our bilateral relations
    with receiving countries?

        Answer. Every government has an international legal obligation to
    accept the return of its nationals whom another state seeks to expel,
    remove, or deport. Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean
    continue to receive their nationals. The United States Government
    supports our allies by remaining the largest contributor to global
    public health and continue to help friends and allies through an ``All
    of America'' effort that includes government, multilateral, business,
    faith-based, and other NGO aid.

        Question. The Administration's immigration policies have caused
    tens of thousands of non-Mexican citizens to spend months in Mexican
    border cities awaiting U.S. asylum hearings. There, most are subjected
    to substandard housing, are exposed to severe violence, and are
    vulnerable to COVID-19. As long as the Administration maintains
    ``Remain in Mexico,'' metering, and other policies that keep asylum
    seekers in Mexico, is there any plan to provide assistance to Mexico to
    minimize the danger and suffering that these fleeing migrants face?

        Answer. The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population,
    Refugees, and Migration (PRM) since the start of FY 2019 has provided
    more than $133 million in migration and refugee assistance (MRA)
    through our international partners in Mexico, including more than $2
    million in COVID-19-specific assistance to limit the spread of COVID-19
    among vulnerable migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Other ongoing
    PRM programming supports asylum seekers, refugees, and other vulnerable
    migrants, including individuals subject to the Migrant Protection
    Protocols (MPP), through activities to promote access to asylum and
    local integration opportunities, support for private and government-run
    shelters, and direct humanitarian assistance, including support to
    return home safely for individuals who wish to do so voluntarily.

        Question. Is there any plan to increase support for UNHCR to help
    Mexico process its increased flow of asylum seekers from Central
    America?

        Answer. The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population,
    Refugees, and Migration (PRM), has significantly scaled up humanitarian
    funding in Mexico. Since fiscal year 2019, in response to the increased
    numbers of asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants arriving at the U.S.
    southern border, PRM contributed more than $98 million to UNHCR's
    operations in Mexico. This includes support for direct emergency
    assistance, capacity building for Mexico's refugee agency (COMAR), and
    support for refugee integration. With this support, COMAR has expanded
    its field presence and increased its adjudication rate, and UNHCR
    helped more than 42,000 people through direct assistance.

        Question. In December of this year, Venezuela will hold a new round
    of legislative elections that will determine the makeup of the National
    Assembly and, in turn, the opposition coalition. In the face of the
    waning support and efforts by the Maduro government to delegitimize the
    opposition, it is likely that these elections will not be free or fair
    and that the Guaido-led opposition will lose its majority in the
    National Assembly. Does the U.S. Government plan to continue to
    recognize the Guaido government regardless of the results of December's
    election?

        Answer. Yes, we will continue to recognize Interim President
    Guaido's leadership regardless of the results of the December 6
    electoral event, which we, and many other countries, have assessed,
    will not be free and fair. The illegitimate Maduro regime continues to
    undermine the legitimacy of the democratic process, to include naming a
    new, regime-aligned National Electoral Council contrary to Venezuelan
    law, handing over the legal rights to parties to regime-allied figures,
    and the continued detention of hundreds of political prisoners. Twenty-
    seven political parties intend to boycott the December 6 process based
    on their determination that it cannot be free and fair given these and
    other abuses. The recent Joint Declaration signed by over thirty
    countries, including members of the Lima Group and multiple EU member
    states, called for an inclusive transitional government and noted
    National Assembly elections alone do not present a political solution.

        Question. If not, what alternative options is the State Department
    considering?

        Answer. The Department of State will maintain its recognition of
    Interim President Guaido following the December 6 sham elections.
    Because the elections are already destined to be illegitimate, the
    United States and other countries do not intend to lend any credence to
    their results. U.S. recognition of Guaido is based on his status as the
    legitimate interim president pursuant to the Venezuelan constitution,
    which persists in the absence of a legitimate National Assembly. We do
    not accept the legitimate interim government can be removed through
    cheating, intimidation, and violence. We will continue to work towards
    a peaceful, democratic transition in line with the wishes of the
    Venezuelan people and in accordance with the internationally supported
    Democratic Transition Framework.

        Question. Since the signing of the Colombian peace accord in 2016,
    hundreds of social leaders have been assassinated. According to the
    Colombian think tank INDEPAZ, 166 such leaders were murdered in 2020 so
    far, with a disproportionate number belonging to indigenous
    communities. What are you doing to guarantee that the perpetrators of
    these crimes are brought to justice?

        Answer. Protecting Colombia's community leaders is a priority of
    U.S. diplomatic engagement and a focus of foreign assistance
    programming. The Colombian Government provides physical protection
    through its National Protection Unit (NPU) to over 5,000 community
    leaders under threat. The U.S. Government helped found the NPU in 2011,
    and continues to support Colombia's efforts to strengthen protection,
    bring perpetrators to justice, and prevent future violence. Foreign
    assistance programs, law enforcement, military, intelligence, and
    judicial cooperation all play a role in our joint efforts to strengthen
    Colombia's ability to dismantle criminal groups, reduce narcotics
    trafficking, and protect human rights.

        Question. How are you guaranteeing that the human rights conditions
    linked to U.S. military assistance are being fully implemented in
    Colombia?

        Answer. The Department of State works closely with U.S. interagency
    partners, and the Colombian Government, to ensure we direct all U.S.
    assistance to human rights-respecting security forces in an effective
    manner, in accordance with U.S. law. Under the Leahy law, we vet
    recipients to ensure assistance and equipment are only provided to
    security forces that meet our human rights standards. The Department of
    State's Colombia Foreign Military Financing and International Military
    Education and Training programs have dedicated resources for education
    and training that focuses on human rights, rule of law, and civilian
    control of the military.

        Question. Earlier this year, the Colombian press revealed that
    Colombian military intelligence was illegally spying on over 130
    members of the political opposition, journalists (including from U.S.
    news outlets), civil society, and others. Was U.S. assistance misused
    in any of these incidents?

        Answer. The Department can confirm that no U.S. assistance managed
    by the Department of State, including from security assistance
    accounts, was misused in these incidents. The Department affirms our
    unequivocal support for freedom of the press and condemn any arbitrary
    or unlawful interference with the privacy of journalists, including
    U.S. citizen journalists. We welcome the steps Colombian authorities
    have taken to investigate the alleged illegal acts and look forward to
    the just resolution of these allegations.

        Question. How will you work with Colombia to guarantee that
    commanders involved in this scandal are held accountable for these
    troubling incidents and to ensure they are not repeated?

        Answer. The Department expects our Colombian partners to meet the
    highest standards of conduct. President Duque has also made clear that
    he has zero tolerance for human rights abuses committed by security
    forces. We welcome the steps Colombian authorities have already taken
    to investigate the recent allegations, and note that Colombia has
    dismissed 12 implicated army officials. The Department of State will
    continue to closely follow Colombia's investigations in both the
    ordinary and military justice systems, and will continue to emphasize
    the importance of accountability for any abuses, including criminal
    accountability for any violations of law.

        Question. In the last year, the governments of Guatemala and
    Honduras ended two anti-corruption bodies: the MACCIH in Honduras and
    the CICIG in Guatemala. Despite this, the State Department certified
    that Honduras and Guatemala as meeting requirements to advance anti-
    corruption efforts. Can you provide further insight into decision-
    making behind these certifications?

        Answer. While the Governments of Guatemala and Honduras have faced
    challenges in several of the certification criteria, they have made
    progress and thus, the Department of State has determined that they met
    each criterion. In January, Guatemalan President Giammattei created an
    anti-corruption commission within the executive branch, and U.S.
    foreign assistance programs are helping to build the capacity of this
    commission. While the Department of State was disappointed the Honduran
    Government chose not to renew the mandate of MACCIH, a newly created
    anti-corruption unit within the public ministry (UFERCO) is a positive
    step. UFERCO has taken over MACCIH's investigations and is receiving
    U.S. assistance funding.

        Question. The Administration's maximum pressure campaign appears to
    have steered Iran more firmly into China's orbit. How effective can the
    Administration's campaign be if Iran and China have now publicly
    deepened their economic and security partnership?

        Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year
    agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese
    investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. For the Iranian
    regime, a closer partnership with China is a partnership born of
    desperation. Because the regime has been severely weakened, in part by
    U.S. sanctions, but also through its own mismanagement and corruption,
    it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for the Iranian people as long as
    the regime gains access to much-needed capital. The regime has been
    reluctant to publicly share details of the agreement for this very
    reason. The Iranian people know this, and they are rightly outraged by
    this hypocrisy.

        Question. Despite your appearance before the UN Security Council in
    June to urge an extension of the arms embargo on Iran; Britain,
    Germany, and France have continued to resist the U.S. approach. How
    important is multilateral pressure in seeking behavioral changes from
    Tehran? What is the State Department's plan to achieve consensus with
    our allies and partners on how to deal with Iran's destabilizing
    activities?

        Answer. The UK, France, and Germany have all expressed opposition
    to Iranian actions to advance its nuclear program beyond JCPOA limits.
    They share our concern regarding Iran's continued proliferation of
    weaponry to arm proxies and partners. Cooperation with European allies
    and partners to address the range of threats posed by Iran remains
    robust and we are in regular communication with our allies and partners
    regarding our Iran policy and how to raise the costs on Iran for its
    destabilizing activities.

        Question. Had the Administration not unilaterally abandoned the
    JCPOA agreement negotiated with the P5+1, would you have had more
    success last month addressing the UN Arms Embargo with our allies in
    the UN Security Council?

        Answer. No one can argue that Iran's behavior merits the lifting of
    the UN arms embargo, which Iran has continuously and flagrantly
    violated since it was imposed under UNSCR 1747 (2007) and UNSCR 1929
    (2010).

        Question. You have repeatedly expressed the Administration's
    solidarity with the people of Iran. What is the Administration doing to
    mitigate the harmful unintended consequences of its sanctions policy on
    the Iranian people?

        Answer. We have repeatedly called on the Iranian Government to
    focus on their people's welfare, and our policy is aimed at depriving
    the regime of the funds to support their malign behavior. As a general
    matter, the United States does not use sanctions to target bona fide
    humanitarian-related trade, assistance, or activity and in the case of
    Iran, has publicized the availability of exceptions and authorizations
    that allow humanitarian trade and assistance. Furthermore, the Swiss
    Humanitarian Trade Arrangement, which has already facilitated
    transactions for the delivery of cancer and transplant drugs to Iran,
    is an additional mechanism for companies to export humanitarian goods
    to Iran.

        Question. You have spoken about an overlap in U.S. and Russian
    strategic goals in Afghanistan. However, it was reported in late June
    that Russia has been offering bounties to Taliban fighters in exchange
    for killing U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Is Russia committed to a stable
    and peaceful Afghanistan?

        Answer. We take any threat against U.S. citizens seriously and have
    repeatedly warned Russia not to endanger U.S. citizens or interests in
    Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world. Russian involvement in
    Afghanistan in ways that are adverse to or undermine U.S. objectives
    precedes this Administration. The Department has repeatedly noted and
    objected to their behavior.
        Of note, the specific allegation regarding bounties allegedly
    occurred before the U.S.-Taliban agreement was signed on February 29,
    2020. The Taliban committed not to threaten the security of the United
    States or our allies as part of the agreement and since the agreement,
    no attack against U.S. or Coalition forces has occurred. Facilitating a
    durable negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan requires
    acknowledging the role of influential countries in the region,
    including Russia, in order to dissuade behavior that endangers Afghan
    stability.

        Question. You said in a July press conference that the U.S. has
    told Russia for more than a decade to stop selling small arms in
    Afghanistan that put Americans at risk. Why is Russia not facing
    pressure campaigns similar to our approach to China and Iran?

        Answer. We take any threat against U.S. citizens seriously and have
    warned Russia repeatedly not to endanger U.S. citizens or interests in
    Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world. The United States currently
    has a significant pressure campaign against Russia, including an
    unprecedented sanctions campaign. We do share interests with Russia in
    Afghanistan, including on some counterterrorism and counternarcotics
    activities, while in other areas our interests diverge. It is in our
    interest to work together where possible to facilitate a negotiated
    political settlement that ends the war and ensures international
    terrorists cannot launch attacks from Afghanistan.

        Question. How can we ensure that human rights, including the rights
    of women and girls, are a key consideration in peace negotiations? How
    are we ensuring women are present in all levels of negotiations?

        Answer. Upholding human rights, including the rights of women and
    girls, is an important U.S. foreign policy priority. In Afghanistan,
    our significant civilian assistance in support of health, education,
    and economic empowerment, as well as our sustained policy advocacy for
    women and girls illustrate the importance the United States attaches to
    this priority. Intra-Afghan negotiations on the country's political
    future will take place among Afghans. Four of the 21 members of the
    team representing the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are women. We
    have made clear to all parties that we expect women to play a
    meaningful role throughout the negotiations. While the future of
    Afghanistan is for Afghans to decide, we strongly support the
    preservation and advancement of the social, economic, and political
    gains made since 2001. These gains include Afghanistan's democratic
    development and the protection and expansion of the human rights of all
    Afghans, including women, children, and minorities. We have also
    consistently shared the message that the decisions and conduct of both
    parties to intra-Afghan negotiations will impact the size and scope of
    future U.S. assistance.

        Question. How does the Administration's requested assistance for
    Afghanistan support, complement, or otherwise relate to ongoing U.S.
    military efforts and ``a peaceful resolution to the conflict?''

        Answer. Efforts to achieve peace, stability, and self-reliance in
    Afghanistan, including through the provision of security assistance,
    are designed to facilitate a durable, negotiated political settlement
    to the conflict in Afghanistan and to ensure that international
    terrorists can never use Afghanistan to threaten the security of the
    United States or its allies. U.S.-provided assistance aims to support
    effective governance, spur private sector investment, encourage
    tangible actions to combat corruption, protect the gains made over the
    last 19 years to advance the rights of all Afghans (and particularly
    the rights of women, children, and minorities), and to address emerging
    development opportunities and humanitarian needs, all of which help
    create an environment that supports a peaceful resolution to the
    conflict. As preparations for negotiations to end the conflict in
    Afghanistan move forward, we are also identifying areas where our
    assistance could be repurposed to boost prospects for an inclusive and
    sustainable peace settlement.

        Question. The Administration stated in its budget request that it
    is seeking to draw down activities in Iraq and Afghanistan previously
    supported via Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. Please
    identify activities in Afghanistan you are seeking to scale down or
    eliminate, and discuss the strategic rationale for doing so.

        Answer. The Department of State assesses that the request for
    Afghanistan for FY 2021 would provide sufficient resources to support
    key priorities, including those that help to create conditions for an
    inclusive and sustainable peace settlement. We are also working with
    other donors to support Afghan government programs, spur private sector
    investment, protect the rights of all Afghans (particularly women,
    girls, and minorities), and address emerging development and
    humanitarian needs.

        Question. The Trump administration suspended most U.S. assistance
    to Yemen due to concerns about Houthi interference in humanitarian
    efforts, but OCHA head Mark Lowcock told the UN Security Council in a
    briefing on July 28 that ``overall, efforts to improve the operating
    environment in the north, where we have had most problems, are
    progressing.'' Do you agree with that assessment of progress?

        Answer. The U.S. Government has not suspended most aid to Yemen.
    The U.S. Government is the leading humanitarian donor to Yemen this
    year, despite suspending $50 million in humanitarian assistance and $23
    million in development funding. This suspension was undertaken in
    cooperation with other donor countries and the UN. A technical
    monitoring group of experts meets monthly to evaluate the Houthis'
    progress. That group has found major areas of concern yet to be
    addressed. Among these, the Houthis have not allowed the World Food
    Programme's biometric registration pilot to move forward and have
    blocked independent needs assessments. Without these, we are concerned
    Houthi leaders could steer assistance away from the most vulnerable
    families to reward combatants and their own supporters.

        Question. What benchmarks must be met before the Administration
    will lift the Yemen aid suspension?

        Answer. The United States, in cooperation with the UN and other
    donors, identified seven benchmarks that need to be met in northern
    Yemen and agreed on 16 benchmarks to gauge progress in addressing
    these. Among the benchmarks that have not been met, the Houthis have
    still not allowed the World Food Programme's biometric registration
    pilot to move forward, established standard operating procedures for
    NGOs to operate in their areas, or established procedures to allow
    independent needs assessments and project monitoring to move forward.
    Without these, we and other donors are concerned Houthi leaders will
    steer assistance away from the most vulnerable families to reward
    combatants and their own supporters.

        Question. How is the Administration ensuring that the suspension of
    most U.S. aid to Yemen in the midst of COVID-19 does not further
    exacerbate what was already the worst humanitarian crisis in the world?

        Answer. The U.S. Government has not suspended most aid to Yemen. In
    addition to the more than $1.1 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance
    funding to Yemen since October 2018, we have also provided nearly $16.7
    million in additional funding to support COVID-19 response efforts in
    Yemen. USAID has provided nearly $39 million and $33 million in
    dedicated health and WASH funding since FY 2019, to reduce the spread
    of communicable diseases like COVID-19 and cholera. We also continue to
    provide significant financial and diplomatic support for the safety and
    security of UN and other relief organizations in Yemen. Despite this
    crisis, the Houthis have not only failed to end their longstanding
    obstruction of aid, they also have refused to acknowledge that COVID-19
    is widespread in areas under their control or to take steps to prevent
    its spread.

        Question. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been
    parties to the conflict in Yemen that has caused this man-made
    humanitarian catastrophe. Indeed, Saudi and UAE airstrikes are
    responsible for the majority of civilian casualties over the past 5-
    plus years of war. Meanwhile, these countries are failing to provide
    sufficient funding to address the most basic humanitarian needs of
    Yemen's people. What is the Administration doing to press Saudi Arabia
    and the United Arab Emirates to contribute sufficient funding to the UN
    humanitarian response for Yemen?

        Answer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have provided significant
    humanitarian support to Yemen since the conflict began, providing
    nearly $1.5 billion to the UN humanitarian response in 2019 alone.
    COVID-19 has had significant economic effects on the Gulf countries,
    especially for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, we continue to engage
    with all donors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to ask they
    enhance their support for assistance needs in Yemen and for all
    assistance to be provided according to humanitarian principles. The
    United States cannot meet the humanitarian needs in Yemen alone. We
    also continue to support the peace process and to push for other means
    of addressing the humanitarian situation.

        Question. I believe a two-state solution, resulting from direct
    negotiations between the two sides, is the only way end the Israeli-
    Palestinian conflict. Does this Administration support a two-state
    solution?

        Answer. The Administration supports the U.S. Vision for Peace,
    which we believe is the best and most realistic framework to inform
    negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The plan outlines a
    clear path to a realistic two-state solution in which a secure and
    prosperous Palestinian state lives peacefully alongside a secure and
    prosperous State of Israel.

        Question. I believe that the Trump Peace Plan would make it more
    difficult for Israel and Palestine to return to direct negotiations and
    would hamper the ability of the United States to reclaim its role as an
    honest broker. Do you think a peace plan that does not include feedback
    from both parties can be successful?

        Answer. The Administration understands that Palestinian leaders do
    not like parts of President Trump's Vision for Peace, which is why the
    Administration has asked them to negotiate with Israel and present
    their objections within the context of direct talks based on the
    Vision. The Administration also encourages key regional and European
    partners to urge the Palestinians to bring their concerns to the
    negotiating table. The U.S. Vision for Peace is the most comprehensive
    and realistic framework to inform negotiations between Israel and the
    Palestinians.

        Question. Has the Administration expressed support for unilateral
    annexation of territory in the West Bank? How does unilateral
    annexation help get both sides of the conflict back to the negotiating
    table?

        Answer. As a result of the diplomatic breakthrough achieved through
    the Abraham Accords, and at the request of President Trump with the
    support of the United Arab Emirates, Israel will suspend declaring
    sovereignty over areas outlined in the President's Vision for Peace.
    Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has stated as recently as
    July that he is ready to engage in negotiations with Israel if it halts
    any actions to extend its sovereignty. Now that extension of
    sovereignty is on hold, the Department encourages the Palestinians to
    live up to this commitment and bring their concerns to the negotiating
    table within the context of direct talks based on the Vision. The only
    realistic path to end this conflict is through negotiations aimed at
    achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.

        Question. According to the findings of a GAO report titled, ``State
    Department: Additional steps are needed to identify potential barriers
    to diversity,'' close to 80 percent of Foreign Service officers and 60
    percent of Civil Service staff are white, and of 189 ambassadors, only
    three are African-American and four are Latino career diplomats. What
    can you do in the coming months to increase the number of racial and
    ethnic career diplomats in ambassadorships, the senior executive
    service, the Foreign Service, and mid-level careers to at least 20
    percent?

        Answer. The Department of State is currently undertaking a number
    of efforts to ensure leaders foster a culture of inclusion and help us
    retain and develop diverse talent. To achieve diversity at all levels,
    the Deputy Secretary and the Director General, along with other
    department leaders, have joined me in encouraging promising leaders
    from historically underrepresented backgrounds to put themselves
    forward for leadership positions. The Department also supports
    requiring all hiring managers and members of selection and promotion
    panels to receive formal training in mitigating unconscious bias in
    order to identify and mitigate potential for bias in the hiring and
    promotion processes.

        Question. What tools and mechanisms exist for State Department
    employees to express concerns about possible discrimination without
    fear of reprisal? Are these means adequate?

        Answer. The Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR) is a neutral, central
    office that manages the EEO process, as well as harassment inquiries.
    Employees may file EEO complaints, including those based on
    retaliation, to seek resolution/remedies. Retaliation is prohibited by
    law and is a disciplinable violation of Department of State policy.
    Employees may report concerns to ``Responsible Department Officials''
    (e.g., supervisors, HR, Security Officers, etc.), who are mandated to
    report to S/OCR when they observe, are informed of, or reasonably
    suspect incidents of possible harassment and can be disciplined for
    failing to do so. Employees are informed of S/OCR's programs via
    mandatory No FEAR, leadership, and onsite trainings and Department
    Notices, cables, and bulletin boards worldwide.

        Question. The State Department has seen massive losses since the
    start of the Trump administration, losing significant diplomatic
    expertise as those in senior leadership have resigned or been removed.
    This, coupled with high numbers of unfilled leadership positions, has
    resulted in job satisfaction among State Department employees reaching
    their lowest levels in over a decade. How would you characterize the
    current level of morale in your Department? What could the State
    Department do better to improve morale and retention?

        Answer. The Department of State has a highly engaged workforce,
    evidenced by our 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Employee
    Engagement score. Our employees are committed to the organization and
    mission, and that allegiance manifests in the results we achieve.
    Consistent with our One Team One Mission Professional Ethos, we want
    all of our employees to feel empowered to create and sustain a
    workplace that encourages high morale and job satisfaction; but this
    responsibility is shared. Department leadership is committed to
    ensuring the Department of State remains an agency where all employees
    can have satisfying careers; and we will continue to partner with our
    employees throughout the agency and hold each other accountable in
    pursuit of that goal.

        Question. In 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency to
    complete $8 billion in military sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
    states. State Department Inspector General Steve Linick, fired on your
    recommendation, was reportedly investigating the State Department's
    role in this sale. As the world's oldest democracy and largest arms
    exporter, would you agree that the human rights standards the U.S. sets
    on arms transfers have global ramifications? Has your position on this
    claim changed during your tenure as Secretary?

        Answer. Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer
    (CAT) Policy, all arms transfers to foreign partners of the United
    States are subject to a comprehensive, case-by-case consideration of
    U.S. interests--including any risk the transfer may contribute to human
    rights abuses, including acts of gender-based violence, violence
    against children, violations of international humanitarian law,
    terrorism, mass atrocities, or transnational organized crime. For the
    first time, U.S. CAT Policy requires the U.S. Government to aid
    partners in reducing the risk of harm to civilians during military
    operations. The Department will continue to consider human rights
    alongside other factors when reviewing Foreign Military Sales and
    Direct Commercial Sales.

        Question. In June, Trump reportedly considered whether to end the
    system of congressional notification for foreign military sales. Do you
    support the right of Congress to review, and if necessary to block,
    weapons sales to foreign governments? What accountability exists for
    these sales if Congress is out of the loop and State Inspectors General
    reviewing the sales fear retribution?

        Answer. The Department of State's engagement with Congress on
    pending arms transfers is an essential element of executing our
    respective statutory duties under the Arms Export Control Act. The
    Department remains firmly committed to our collaboration and commit my
    team to continuing the conversation with committee staff on how we can
    more effectively further our shared objectives in support of U.S.
    national and economic security.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                   Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons

        Question. What is the Trump administration's policy toward foreign
    intervention in Libya?

        Answer. The Administration supports an immediate end to external
    interference and the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the
    conflict, and urge all sides to return to a UN-facilitated political
    process. Department officials have told involved countries they must
    stop fueling the conflict, respect the UN arms embargo, and uphold
    commitments made at the Berlin Conference on Libya in January. There is
    no durable military solution to the Libyan conflict. Ultimately, the
    Libyan people must resolve this crisis through political negotiations.
    The United States supports the UN Support Mission in Libya's work to
    facilitate a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.

        Question. What is the State Department communicating to those
    foreign governments involved in Libya, especially to Turkey, Egypt, and
    the United Arab Emirates?

        Answer. The Department's message to these governments, and to all
    others fueling the conflict in Libya is the same: now is the time to
    wind this conflict down. Libya is not the place for foreign governments
    to fight battles in pursuit of their own agendas.
        The Department is urging foreign parties to the conflict to leave
    Libya and support a ceasefire and a return to the UN-led political
    process. We press countries to use their influence to support all
    Libyan parties' participation in the UN-facilitated security talks as a
    first step toward securing a sustainable ceasefire. We have made clear
    there is no military solution and are urging Libyan leadership and the
    external backers to support a political settlement to this conflict.

        Question. In December 2019, Congress provided $75 million in FY
    2020 appropriations for humanitarian assistance to the West Bank and
    Gaza. When do you expect those dollars to be obligated?

        Answer. The FY 2020 section 653(a) report includes $75 million in
    Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza, consistent
    with section 7019 of the FY 2020 appropriations act and the ESF table
    in the accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement. The Administration
    continues to ensure foreign assistance funds are used in accordance
    with U.S. national interests, applicable legal requirements, and are
    providing value to the U.S. taxpayer. U.S. foreign assistance is not
    the only tool available to unleash the economic potential of the
    Palestinian people and empower them to build a prosperous, vibrant
    society. The Administration's Vision for Peace includes the potential
    to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over 10 years,
    much of it from non-U.S. sources.

        Question. How do the Trump administration's decisions to end
    funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
    Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and for humanitarian assistance to
    the West Bank and Gaza affect stability in the West Bank and Gaza and
    Israel's security?

        Answer. The Administration made it clear when we provided our final
    contribution of $60 million in 2018 that the United States would no
    longer bear a disproportionate share of UNRWA's costs, and other
    countries must step up and do their part to advance regional security
    and stability. UNRWA continues to operate with an unsustainable
    business model, tied to an expanding community of beneficiaries. We
    continue to work closely with Israel and key regional partners on ways
    to improve economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Hamas is
    primarily responsible for those conditions, having put its own
    interests above those of Gaza's residents.

        Question. Public reporting indicates that the Trump administration
    has suspended the process for Ethiopia to receive support from the new
    Development Finance Corporation, suspended the Millennium Challenge
    Corporation threshold process for Ethiopia, that USAID is under
    pressure to cancel all non-humanitarian assistance contracts for
    Ethiopia, and that the Trump administration is pressing the World Bank
    not to move programs forward for Ethiopia. Is it true that the United
    States is withholding or at any point threatened to withhold assistance
    to Ethiopia? If so, what was communicated to Ethiopia about why the
    assistance was withheld?

        Answer. As of July 30, no funding already obligated for Ethiopia
    has been affected by considerations related to the Grand Ethiopian
    Renaissance Dam (GERD). Department officials are in regular contact
    with the Ethiopian, Egyptian, and Sudanese governments to stress the
    importance of reaching agreement on the GERD without delay.

        Question. Does withholding assistance support the democratic
    transition in Ethiopia and advance U.S. interests in East Africa? If
    so, how?

        Answer. Ethiopia is one of our strongest partners on the continent
    and we look forward to continuing to support the development of the
    nation's democracy and economy through a number of pre-existing
    programs, activities, and continued diplomatic engagement with the
    Ethiopian Government.

        Question. What public and private actions has the State Department
    taken to address the root causes of ethnic violence Ethiopia?

        Answer. The Department continues to engage all stakeholders and
    monitor the situation in Ethiopia very closely. The Department's Bureau
    for Conflict Stabilization (CSO) implements programming to provide data
    on drivers of tension across ethnic groups and assistance to support
    former armed groups' transition into viable political parties to
    contest national elections and prevent a return to hostilities. A CSO
    polling project will shed light on drivers of violence as well as
    potential resiliencies at the community level. The State Department's
    Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is supporting a
    program to address hate speech online, partnering with influencers,
    including in Oromia, at risk for ethnic violence. USAID also has
    several conflict mitigation and peacebuilding activities that seek to
    reduce ethnic tensions. We also continue to engage diplomatically with
    the government and Ethiopia's nascent civil society.

        Question. What public and private actions has the State Department
    taken to ensure elections are held in Ethiopia? What is the State
    Department's posture and strategy if elections are not held before the
    constitutionally-mandated October 2020 deadline?

        Answer. The State Department supports a number of initiatives aimed
    at facilitating free and fair elections in Ethiopia. USAID promotes
    competitive and representative multiparty political systems by
    assisting political parties to build inclusive internal structures,
    develop organizing strategies, and communicate on issue-based policies.
    Under this program, we also offer voter outreach and capacity building
    for party officials. Ethiopia's electoral commission has already
    indicated that elections will not be held until well after the country
    has recovered from COVID-19.

        Question. The Global Fragility Act of 2019 (division J, title V of
    Public Law 116-94) authorized the creation of a new Prevention and
    Stabilization Fund to replace the Relief and Recovery Fund in order to
    support the stabilization of conflict-affected areas and prevent global
    fragility. Contrary to the law and congressional intent, the State
    Department continues to use the Relief and Recovery Fund rather than
    the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, citing a lack of clarity in the
    legislation.
        Do you commit to working with the Congress to resolve this
    discrepancy and utilizing the Prevention and Stabilization Fund as
    authorized by the Global Fragility Act?

        Answer. The Department is committed to continuing to work with
    Congress in connection with the implementation of the Global Fragility
    Act. The Department seeks to harmonize provisions in the Act and the
    annual appropriations act related to the Prevention and Stabilization
    Fund, which we anticipate could potentially serve as an important tool
    for aligning policy and programmatic interventions under the Global
    Fragility Strategy.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                         Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

        Question. In November 2019, you announced that the United States
    would ``no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se inconsistent
    with international law'' and rescinded a 1978 legal opinion that then-
    Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell provided to Congress reaching a contrary
    conclusion. The media has reported that this legal view is rooted in a
    40-page written opinion assembled by Ambassador Friedman and a team of
    attorneys led by then-Legal Adviser Jennifer Newstead, but it has not
    been released or provided to Congress. The media also reported that at
    a July 28 event to relaunch the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus, you
    cited telling ``the truth that Israeli civilian settlements in the West
    Bank are not per se inconsistent with international law'' as one of the
    Trump administration's accomplishments in the U.S.-Israel relationship.
    Will you provide this legal opinion in unclassified form to myself and
    other Members of the Committee so that it may be provided to the public
    to understand the Administration's rationale for overturning decades of
    bipartisan legal precedent on this issue?

        Answer. As Secretary Pompeo stated in November 2019, after
    carefully studying all sides of the legal debate and recognizing that
    U.S. public statements on settlement activities have been inconsistent
    over decades, it is the position of the U.S. Government that the
    establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not
    per se inconsistent with international law. Legal conclusions relating
    to individual cases of settlement activity must depend on an assessment
    of specific facts and circumstances surrounding the activity in
    question. Consistent with the long-standing practice of both Republican
    and Democratic administrations, the Department is not in a position to
    provide the legal advice prepared at the time as part of our internal
    review of this question.

        Question. Due to the Administration's termination of humanitarian
    aid to the West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA is in dire financial straits. For
    2020 to date, UNRWA has received funding and pledges that can cover
    less than 50 percent of its main budget and 60 percent of its planned
    COVID-19 response. It has received even less for its emergency budgets
    to respond to the acute humanitarian needs in Syria and Gaza, where
    Palestine refugees often live in abject poverty. The Agency's
    Commissioner-General said this month that absent additional funding, he
    will have to seek guidance on the programs that the Agency must
    prioritize over others. Does the Administration believe that if UNRWA
    stops feeding a million Gazans and assisting 400,000 Palestinians in
    Syria, turns half a million kids away from their schools, and closes
    its health network, the region will be more stable? As part of its
    response to address the COVID-19 pandemic globally, will the
    Administration restart U.S. humanitarian assistance to Palestinians,
    including UNRWA?

        Answer. The Administration announced in 2018 that the United States
    will no longer provide financial contributions to UNRWA. That has not
    changed. UNRWA's business model remains unsustainable and Palestinians
    deserve better than a service provision model that operates in
    permanent crisis mode.
        The United States is leading the world's humanitarian and health
    assistance response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Through USAID, we are
    providing $5 million in support of immediate, life-saving needs for
    Palestinian hospitals and households in the West Bank for Palestinians
    battling the COVID-19 pandemic. This decision does not prejudge future
    decisions about U.S. assistance in the West Bank and Gaza. We continue
    to assess how U.S. assistance can best be used to advance U.S. foreign
    policy and provide value to U.S. taxpayers.

        Question. I continued to be dismayed by Saudi Arabia's jailing of
    women's rights defenders, many who have been subject to torture
    including solitary confinement, electric shocks, flogging and sexual
    assault. This includes Virginia constituent Aziza al-Youssef who has
    been released from prison, but placed on a travel ban, and her son,
    Salah al-Haidar who remains in jail. I understand that the Saudi regime
    is now charging Salah, after more than a year in prison, on trumped up
    and baseless grounds under its ``anti-terrorism law'' that allows
    authorities to prosecute peaceful dissents with harsh penalties as
    ``terrorist crimes.'' The regime is asking that Salah receive a
    sentence of between 9 and 33 years in total. Please provide me with an
    update on your personal engagement--as well as the work of other U.S.
    Government officials--to secure the release and dropping of all charges
    against Saudi women's rights defenders, particularly Aziza al-Youssef
    and her son Salah al-Haidar, and your efforts to facilitate their safe
    return to Virginia.

        Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than
    assisting U.S. citizens overseas. The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia;
    the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; the Assistant
    Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs; the Bureau of Democracy, Human
    Rights and Labor; and the Office of Global Women's Issues all engage on
    Ms. Yousef's and Mr. Haidar's cases. We have assessed that Mr. Haidar
    and Badr Al-Ibrahim (a U.S. citizen who was arrested at the same time)
    are wrongfully detained and have voiced our disappointment to Saudi
    Arabia for not dropping the baseless charges. We conduct regular
    consular visits and will continue to press for their release at our
    upcoming bilateral strategic dialogue and at every possible
    opportunity.

        Question. Following the 2016 killing of Berta Caceres, I remain
    concerned about human rights violations against Honduras's indigenous
    groups. In 2019, Honduras was the most dangerous country per capita for
    land and environmental defenders. Lethal attacks were particularly
    prevalent against women and against members of the Garifuna minority
    group--16 of whom were killed for defending their land. Most recently,
    five Garifuna land rights activists were abducted from their homes by
    heavily armed gunmen in police uniforms, leading to protests around the
    country. This follows the murder of a Garifuna leader weeks ago. What
    is the State Department doing to address the abduction of these five
    missing Garifuna activists? Additionally, please detail what the State
    Department is doing to protect environmental defenders and to hold the
    Government of Honduras accountable for its human rights violations.

        Answer. Officials from U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa meet regularly with
    top Honduran officials to advocate on human rights issues. This
    includes urging movement in the case of David Castillo, the ninth
    defendant accused in the Berta Caceres case; expressing concern over
    the Garifuna abductions and urging a transparent, expeditious, and
    thorough investigation; pushing for progress on the Guapinol Case, the
    mining and indigenous land rights dispute; and advocating for Honduras
    to implement the recommendations in the 2020 Trafficking In Persons
    Report. Additionally, we plan to virtually host the seventh Bilateral
    Human Rights Working Group dialogue with Honduras in October.

        Question. On July 30, a Spanish court found Victor Stemberger, a
    77-year old Virginian, guilty of drug smuggling and sentenced him to 7
    years in prison, rejecting his defense that he was duped. Mr.
    Stemberger's family believes that he was targeted by Nigerian based
    drug-traffickers as part of a sophisticated scheme that takes advantage
    of elderly American citizens. These traffickers frequently target
    individuals who have suffered from significant health challenges that
    limit their cognitive abilities. Mr. Stemberger suffered a brain
    aneurysm in 2005 that greatly diminished his logic and decision-making
    abilities, which a medical expert testified to at his trial. In a
    letter and memorandum regarding Mr. Stemberger's case dated October 28,
    2019, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that he was
    ``fraudulently deceived by members of a narcotics trafficking network
    into unwittingly transporting concealed controlled substances.'' Given
    Mr. Stemberger's age and the significant risk to his health from COVID-
    19 in prison, I urge the State Department to engage with the Spanish
    Government to ask that every consideration be made toward the
    compassionate and humanitarian release of Mr. Stemberger for his return
    to the United States in accordance with Spanish laws and regulations. I
    understand that the DOJ has requested that Mr. Stemberger be returned
    to the U.S. to help prosecution of those who victimized him and others.
    Please detail what next steps the State Department will take in regards
    to Mr. Stemberger's case and to secure a humanitarian release.

        Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than the
    safety and welfare of U.S. citizens abroad. Our embassy in Madrid
    continues to conduct regular consular visits to monitor Mr.
    Stemberger's health and welfare. Stemberger's attorney is pursuing
    humanitarian release within the Spanish judicial system. Options to
    appeal the lower court's decision remain available to Stemberger. We
    will continue to monitor Stemberger's welfare and case and remain in
    close contact with his family and legal representation. We defer to the
    DOJ on any questions concerning U.S. criminal investigations and
    prosecutions.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                       Submitted by Senator Edward Markey

        Question. Two weeks ago, in a deeply disturbing speech, you
    unveiled the draft report of your Commission on Unalienable Rights. By
    specifically elevating religious freedom and property rights, you are
    upending decades of human rights practice and civil rights victories.
    It also appears you and the commissioners are weaponizing religious
    liberty in order to curb human rights protections for vulnerable
    communities like women, girls and LGBTQI+ people--and encourage other
    countries to do the same. Do you believe that organizations and
    individuals should be able to promote stigma and discrimination in
    their communities by refusing to provide services to women, girls, and
    LGBTQI+ people based on so-called ``religious freedom''?

        Answer. The speech did not ``specifically elevate'' religious
    freedom and property rights above all other rights; it made a
    historical, descriptive claim about the importance America's founders
    attached to those two unalienable rights. Neither the speech nor the
    Commission's draft report ``upended decades of human rights practices
    and civil rights victories.'' Similarly, neither ``weaponized religious
    liberty in order to curb human rights protections.''

        Question. Did you recently send an email to the State Department,
    directing employees to use this report in their decision making? You
    have said that this commission report is not a statement of policy, so
    how will you ensure that the report is not being used in the official
    business of our foreign policy?

        Answer. On July 20, I emailed the State Department encouraging all
    employees to read the report thoroughly. I emphasized the report is a
    statement of principle, not policy, and it is highly relevant to our
    daily work. I indicated it should be used as a reference for every
    State Department employee involved in the difficult, complex questions
    surrounding the promotion and protection of human rights in our foreign
    policy.

        Question. How will the State Department ensure all of its COVID-19
    aid response is conflict sensitive and integrated into sectors
    including health? Will COVID-19 aid incorporate peacebuilding and a
    trauma-informed approach in order to reduce further violence and
    advance effective recovery for the long-term?

        Answer. In April, in collaboration with the interagency, the
    Department of State released the U.S. Government Action Plan to Support
    the International Response to COVID-19--``SAFER''--a comprehensive
    package of services to support our international partners around the
    world in combatting COVID-19. A key component of the SAFER package was
    to create tailored strategies in complex humanitarian crises, extremely
    fragile states, conflict zones, and high-density population centers and
    prioritize the most vulnerable, including those in ongoing pre-COVID-19
    humanitarian crises. This is a reflection of our existing commitment to
    use conflict as a lens for our existing work. With the COVID
    supplemental assistance provided by Congress we have also focused on
    providing support for WASH; food security; protection and security of
    children, orphans, displaced persons, and refugees; prevention of
    sexual abuse and exploitation; basic health care, including primary
    care; and coordination of humanitarian assistance in specific settings.
    The impacts of COVID-19 on communities impacted by conflict will
    continue, and the Department will continue to assess how we can
    mitigate or address them with available resources going forward.

        Question. How will the State Department ensure that COVID-19
    support is reaching the most vulnerable populations, including women,
    children, marginalized groups, and the poor?

        Answer. Given the unprecedented economic, health, and humanitarian
    impact of COVID-19, the Department of State and USAID utilized an All-
    of-America approach, leveraging the unique expertise, capacities, and
    mechanisms of various U.S. Government departments and agencies to
    rapidly deploy and deliver essential support when, where, and to whom
    it is most critically needed. We have provided assistance to more than
    120 countries since the beginning of the U.S. response to COVID-19.
        We appreciate the supplemental funding that was provided by
    Congress to respond to the pandemic, including $908 million for
    International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugee Assistance.
    Specifically, we prioritized critical assistance in 63 countries that
    were in conflict or fragile before the pandemic. For example, USAID
    issued guidance for partners engaging in COVID-19 humanitarian response
    that outlines cross-cutting requirements for gender sensitivities,
    accountability to affected populations, and protection from sexual
    exploitation and abuse. We also recognize the impact that the COVID-19
    pandemic will have on women and girls, and we are supporting efforts to
    ensure survivors of gender-based violence have access to emergency
    assistance and improved protections. The impacts of COVID-19 on
    vulnerable individuals and communities will require a concerted,
    coordinated long-term recovery strategy between governments,
    multilateral financial institutions, humanitarian and development
    actors, and the private sector.

        Question. How does the State Department plan to address governments
    using COVID-19 as opportunity to infringe on human rights by closing
    civic space, cracking down against free speech and dissent, increased
    surveillance, and other methods?

        Answer. The Department has underscored that democracies are better
    equipped to address pandemics than authoritarian regimes. The
    Department is leading multilateral and multi-stakeholder efforts to
    promote democracy, human rights, and good governance as key to an
    effective response to COVID-19. We are also closely monitoring
    concerning trends related to some governments' responses to the
    pandemic, including growing authoritarianism, crackdowns on fundamental
    freedoms, expanded use of surveillance tools, and targeting of
    vulnerable groups. We are leveraging bilateral and multilateral
    diplomacy and other foreign policy tools to promote democratic, rights-
    respecting responses and to counter authoritarian responses to the
    pandemic.

        Question. How do you justify the Administration's broad use of
    religious refusals in the context of foreign, development, and economic
    assistance when organizations and individuals use these excuses to
    endanger and discriminate against women, girls, and LGBTQI+ people in
    the provision of services provided with U.S. funds?

        Answer. Protecting and defending the human rights and fundamental
    freedoms of all people--including women, girls, and LGBTI persons--has
    long been and remains the foreign policy of the United States. In this
    regard, the United States continues to invest in the social, economic,
    and political empowerment of women and girls around the world and
    advances efforts to protect LGBTI persons from violence,
    criminalization, discrimination, and stigma.

        Question. How is the State Department tracking partners who refuse
    to provide services to individuals because of their sex, sexual
    orientation, gender identity, or sex characteristics?

        Answer. The Department integrates inclusion and nondiscrimination
    principles into its policies and programming, and advances inclusion
    and nondiscrimination through programs that address the specific needs
    of historically marginalized and vulnerable populations. The Department
    continues to enforce its nondiscrimination policies for access to
    services to beneficiaries, which help ensure that no recipient of U.S.
    assistance discriminates against any beneficiary for any reason,
    including discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, gender
    identity, or sex characteristics.

        Question. The U.S. has historically used its unique power to
    sanction countries and people for wrongdoing in many forms including
    mass human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, and trafficking in
    drugs or humans. We use this power to respond and deter criminality.
    Yet the recent Executive Order directed at the ICC--an international
    judicial institution where American lawyers work--could target judicial
    professionals. Virtually all of our allies have judicial personnel that
    work at the highest levels of the Court. Has the Administration
    considered any options other than sanctioning allied nationals and/or
    an international tribunal working to hold alleged mass criminals
    accountable under the law?

        Answer. There has been longstanding bipartisan concern about
    illegitimate attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
    exercise jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Events of the past several
    months have only exacerbated our concerns about the ICC. More than 300
    members of Congress, Republican and Democrat, recently signed letters
    expressing outrage over the ICC's efforts to target the United States
    and Israel, which likewise does not consent to its jurisdiction.
        In response, we have imposed a series of escalating consequences in
    response to the ICC's actions. In 2019, the Department announced a
    policy to deny entry into the United States to those most responsible
    for launching the investigation. We authorized imposition of additional
    sanctions only after it was apparent that less confrontational measures
    would not succeed.
        The United States fully shares the concerns the ICC was initially
    created to address, extending into prevention and mitigation of such
    mass atrocities, not only accountability after the fact. The ICC, a
    politicized and ineffective institution, had not contributed to that
    effort and has set out on a reckless path when it comes to the United
    States.

        Question. Have you evaluated what the impacts of sanctions would be
    on efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for crimes in places like
    Myanmar, Libya, Sudan, DRC, Mali, Central African Republic, Georgia,
    Venezuela, and the Philippines where there are few or no options for
    justice for atrocities that the United States has condemned, and if so
    what are they?

        Answer. No country has made greater lasting contributions to the
    cause of justice and accountability in armed conflict than the United
    States. We have consistently provided training on the rule of law and
    assistance to scores of partners and allies around the globe to help
    bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice. We do not need a
    corrupt and politicized international body in order to continue to
    advance U.S. longstanding efforts to hold those responsible for
    atrocities accountable.

        Question. North Korea continues to produce fissile material and to
    test and develop its ballistic missile systems. In an August 27, 2019
    speech, you said ``Americanism'' means ``telling the truth about the
    challenges we face'' and that ``we recognized that North Korea's rogue
    behavior could not be ignored.'' Even as North Korea repeatedly tested
    shorter-range missiles in violation of UN Security Council resolutions,
    and in a way that helps North Korea advance long-range missile
    technology according to the UN Panel of Experts, President Trump says
    he has ``no problem'' with the missile tests. What has the State
    Department done to counteract the President's statement that he has
    ``no problem'' with shorter-range missile tests by the Kim regime?

        Answer. We call on North Korea to cease provocations, abide by UN
    Security Council resolutions, and return to sustained and substantive
    negotiations to achieve complete denuclearization. We continue to work
    with the international community to reinforce the need for full
    sanctions implementation. These tests underscore why we work to prevent
    transfers of equipment and technology that could support the DPRK's
    missile development efforts. The international community continues to
    send a strong signal that provocative behavior only exacerbates
    isolation and hinders progress in securing a bright future for all
    North Koreans.

        Question. The Chinese Government has now clearly broken its promise
    of autonomy for Hong Kong, but there are still a wide range of
    escalatory steps that Beijing can take to bring restrictions on Hong
    Kong's freedom in line with the repressive restrictions on the
    mainland. What is the State Department's strategy for addressing and
    publicizing further encroachments on human rights and democracy in Hong
    Kong?

        Answer. The Department of State and Consulate General Hong Kong
    consistently and vocally advocate for increased individual freedoms and
    protection of human rights in Hong Kong, especially following the
    imposition of the National Security Law (NSL). On August 7, the
    Departments of State and Treasury announced sanctions on 11 officials
    who were involved in the development, passage, or implementation of the
    NSL. The State Department also suspended three agreements with the
    Government of Hong Kong and encouraged like-minded countries to
    consider doing the same. We continue to engage political and civic
    leaders in Hong Kong and globally regarding our concerns over the NSL,
    and have spoken out publicly at the highest levels. We released a joint
    statement on August 9 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.

        Question. How do you propose to balance U.S. support for Burma's
    democratic transition, while intensively pursuing accountability for
    crimes committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in
    Burma?

        Answer. The United States must maintain its policy of principled
    engagement with Burma to move the country towards democratic civilian
    rule. That includes strengthening the capacity of civil society
    organizations, political parties, women and youth activists, and ethnic
    groups to more effectively engage in the democratic process; empowering
    public servants to be responsive to their constituents; strengthening
    the rule of law; and encouraging responsible investment and business
    practices to shrink the space for corruption.
        Promoting the rule of law, respecting, and protecting the rights of
    members of minority groups are critical to Burma's democratic
    transition. As such the United States will continue to take targeted
    actions against those responsible for serious human rights abuses,
    promote justice and accountability for victims, and defend human
    rights, including religious freedom. These actions, including the
    designation of the most senior Burmese military officials under the
    Global Magnitsky sanctions program, are consistent with our decades of
    support to the people of Burma. They also marginalize military leaders
    and empower the civilian government as it continues to pursue much-
    needed reforms.

        Question. The U.S. Government has leveraged some sanctions against
    top Burmese military commanders, recognizing their role in the
    atrocities committed against the Rohingya. Given continued impunity and
    ongoing violence, it seems imperative to continue to build pressure.
    What other increased costs can the U.S. Government impose on the senior
    Burmese military command, to change their thinking and behavior? Do you
    agree that this should include sanctioning military-owned enterprises,
    noting that many of their owners and directors are the same senior
    leadership that we think should be sanctioned, and that likely it would
    impose a more powerful real world economic cost to them? How are you
    working with allies such as the European Union, the United Kingdom,
    Canada, and Australia to urge further targeted sanctions and other
    forms of pressure on Burma to change its thinking and behavior?

        Answer. Reforming the Burmese military, ending its decades of
    impunity, and placing it under civilian control is essential for the
    long-term success of Burma. The United States designated the Burmese
    military's Commander-in-Chief (CINC), deputy CINC, and seven other
    senior officers and two security force units under the Global Magnitsky
    sanctions program; designated the Commander-in-Chief, deputy CINC, and
    four other officers for involvement in gross violations of human rights
    under Section 7031(c) of the State Appropriations Act; and has strongly
    supported UN investigation mechanisms. We have worked with
    international allies and partners to expand targeted sanctions and will
    continue to support efforts to pursue justice and accountability. All
    policy tools remain under consideration to promote accountability for
    abuses, including, additional sanctions.
        We continue to support reforms that support Burma's democratic
    transition and economic transformation. We support inclusive economic
    growth and facilitation of responsible trade and investment, which in
    turn promote broad-based development and limit the influence of the
    military's economic interests. Promoting international trade and
    investment best practices is the surest way to shrink the operating
    space for military-owned businesses while supporting economic reforms.

        Question. What is the status of payments of U.S. arrears to
    international organizations in general, especially institutions
    critical to the global fight against COVID-19, including the World
    Health Organization?

        Answer. The most recent report to Congress on arrears at
    international organizations indicated approximately $625 million in
    U.S. arrears from CY 2017, 2018, and 2019 as of March 31, 2020, not
    including UN peacekeeping arrears and arrears at UNESCO. Of the
    approximately $625 million in arrears, the Department has since paid
    approximately $350 million, leaving a balance of approximately $275
    million. Roughly $80 million of the $275 million balance is arrears at
    WHO, and $160 million is arrears for the UN regular budget.

        Question. Given the Administration's determination to withdraw from
    the World Health Organization, how are you ensuring continued U.S.
    engagement with the WHO in the meantime, as the United States remains a
    full member at this time.

        Answer. The United States deposited its notice of withdrawal from
    the World Health Organization (WHO), effective on July 6, 2021. In the
    time before our withdrawal becomes effective, we are continuing to
    engage the WHO on priority areas, such as the WHO's Independent Panel
    on Pandemic Preparedness Response (IPPR), a body created at the request
    of the United States and WHO Member States to evaluate the WHO-
    coordinated COVID-19 response. Further, the Administration is examining
    ways to leverage the expertise of key U.S. Government Departments,
    agencies, and the U.S. private sector and civil society to protect
    Americans and deliver essential support rapidly to other countries to
    prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases at
    their source.

        Question. Does the State Department have adequate PPE stocks to
    protect employees across all posts, domestic and overseas? Do you
    forecast any shortfalls or urgent needs in the next 6 months to a year?

        Answer. The Bureau of Medical Services (MED) follows Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) strategies to optimize the supply
    of PPE. The CDC recommends reserving PPE use to healthcare personnel
    (HCP) to protect themselves, patients, and others when providing care.
    MED procures and distributes PPE to Department HCP involved in direct
    patient care and testing, both domestically and at our overseas
    missions. Supplies include N-95 masks, isolation gowns, eye protection,
    gloves, and face shields. All overseas missions have a baseline level
    of supplies, with the ability to replenish PPE as needed. MED does not
    anticipate shortfalls or urgent and unmet requirements at this time.

        Question. Why has the State Department moved Washington, DC area
    facilities to phase 2, when your own criteria show the metro area does
    not yet qualify to proceed to phase 2, as the 24 day caseload average
    is not decreasing, public schools, daycares, and elder care options are
    not available to employees and their families, etc.? Why has the State
    Department ceased to track COVID-19 cases in their domestic facilities?

        Answer. While Diplomacy Strong provides a framework for mitigating
    COVID-19 risk, other factors also informed the decision to move
    Washington, DC-area facilities to Phase 2 by June 12 (Northern
    Virginia), June 19 (Maryland), and June 22 (the District of Columbia).
    In this case, the decision was informed by availability of robust
    contact tracing and rapid testing capability, as well as data
    indicating a decline in positive test cases among employees and the
    general public. The Department has not stopped tracking COVID-19 cases
    in domestic facilities. Telework flexibilities are still being
    encouraged given local conditions. Department leadership continues to
    monitor operational conditions and prioritize the safety and security
    of our people and assets.

        Question. On July 29, 2020, President Trump was asked by a member
    of the press about ``bringing China in'' to ``formal negotiations with
    Russia on arms control.'' He said in response to that question: ``We'll
    talk about that later. We're going to work on this first and we'll see.
    China right now is a much lesser nuclear power--you understand than
    Russia.'' Do you agree with the President that discussions about
    ``bringing in China'' should occur after U.S. formal arms control
    negotiations with Russia?

        Answer. The United States is moving forward with the mandate
    President Trump gave us and will not allow China to exercise a veto
    over our relationship with Russia. We seek a new arms control treaty
    that covers all nuclear warheads, includes a strengthened verification
    regime, and limits China's unconstrained nuclear build-up. President
    Trump has made clear that the next arms control treaty entered in by
    the United States must be multilateral--it must include China. Our goal
    is to thwart a three-way nuclear arms race, and the most effective way
    to do that is a trilateral treaty.

        Question. You signaled in your Senate Foreign Relations Committee
    (SFRC) testimony that the United States would attempt to snap-back UN
    Security Council sanctions that were relieved pursuant to UN Security
    Council 2231 if a U.S. led effort in the Council to extend the
    conventional arms embargo on Iran past October 2020 is not successful.
    Will the United States pursue a snap-back of UN Security Council
    sanctions if it is opposed by one or more U.S. allies on the Council?

        Answer. While we would prefer to see the UN Security Council take
    collective action, we have been clear that absent collective action the
    United States would have no choice but to initiate the snapback of UN
    sanctions on Iran in order to prevent it from obtaining and
    proliferating deadly weapons throughout the region.

        Question. Short of a snap-back of those sanctions, what statutory
    tools does the United States currently have at its disposal to
    designate actors who do trade in conventional arms with Iran?

        Answer. Section 107 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through
    Sanctions Act of 2017 provides an authority to designate for sanctions
    any person who knowingly engages in any activity that materially
    contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or indirectly to
    or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle
    tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat
    aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.
    Additionally, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
    provides for penalties on entities and individuals for the transfer to
    or from Iran of equipment and technology, including conventional arms,
    controlled under multilateral control lists.

        Question. If UN Security Council sanctions are re-imposed and Iran
    moves to no longer be bound by any limitations under the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what is the State Department's
    strategy to ensure that Iran's ``breakout'' time to a nuclear weapon
    does not shorten?

        Answer. The Iranian regime uses its nuclear program to extort the
    international community and threaten regional and international
    security. For over a year, Iran has taken steps to move well beyond the
    limitations under the JCPOA, and in January 2020, Iranian officials
    announced that their nuclear program ``no longer faces any operational
    restrictions'' under the JCPOA. President Trump has made clear that we
    will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon. Nuclear brinksmanship
    will not strengthen Iran's position, but instead lead to further
    international isolation and pressure. We will continue imposing maximum
    pressure on the Iranian regime until it ceases its destabilizing
    activities and negotiates a comprehensive deal.

        Question. Can you explain the Administration's decision to end
    support for the Nagorno Karabakh landmine removal program, a decision
    that politicizes demining by selectively picking and choosing which
    civilians ``deserve'' to be protected from landmine deaths and
    injuries. Why are we playing games with humanitarian demining, and with
    the lives of innocent civilians in Nagorno Karabakh?

        Answer. In 2018, The HALO Trust reported it had cleared nearly 98
    percent of all landmines in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
    Oblast. Current contamination is light and predominantly in sparsely
    populated and largely inaccessible areas or outside the territory
    bounded by the former Oblast where the United States provided funding.
    Although three demining technicians died tragically in March 2018, no
    civilian mine deaths have been reported since 2015. After nearly 20
    years and with the vast majority of mines cleared, more forward-looking
    priorities, including those aimed at preparing the populations for
    peace, provide the most effective use of taxpayer dollars and the best
    hope for long-term peace and prosperity in the region.
                                     ______

          Responses of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Questions
                         Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

        Question. In June, I along with Senator Shaheen and others,
    sponsored S. 3897, the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
    Clarification Act of 2020 (PEESCA), that amends the Protecting Europe's
    Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA) and leaves no room for uncertainty
    about the scope and intention of the sanctions mandated by PEESA. It
    clarifies that facilitating and insuring vessels for pipelaying
    activities, including support activities like digging trenches and rock
    laying, are indeed subject to mandatory sanctions pursuant to PEESA. It
    also includes expanded sanctions on port activities and certification
    of the pipeline for activation. It will be passed as part of this
    year's NDAA. However, in the meantime, there is still confusion among
    some of our global partners and those in the corporate world about
    whether pipelaying activities and insurance are subject to existing,
    mandatory PEESA sanctions. What is the Administration's view on the
    mandates and authorities it was given by Congress last year in PEESA?

        Answer. PEESA provides the United States with the authority to
    advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by
    addressing Russian pipeline projects that threaten Europe's energy
    security, and consequently Europe's political and economic security.
    PEESA targets vessels engaged in pipe-laying at depths of 100 feet or
    more below sea level for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
    project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a
    successor to either such project. PEESA refers to the scope of persons
    to be sanctioned, including those that have ``provided those vessels
    for the construction of such a project.'' The Department intends to
    provide PEESA guidance shortly that will clarify and broaden our
    interpretation to cover foreign firms or persons who provide services
    or goods necessary or essential to the provision or operation of a
    vessel engaged in the process of pipe-laying for such projects. This
    may include, but is not limited to, providing services or facilities
    for upgrades or installation of equipment for those vessels, or funding
    for upgrades or installation of equipment for those vessels.
                                     ______

          Diplomacy in Crisis: The Trump Administration's Decimation
                  of the State Department, Dated July 28, 2020

    [Editor's note.--This report can also be found at:
    https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
    Diplomacy%20in%20Crisis%20--%20SFRC%20Democratic%20Staff%20Report.pdf
    and a Committee Print of this report can be found at:
    https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-116SPRT42925/pdf/CPRT-
    116SPRT42925.pdf ]

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                                     ______

     Columns From the Washington Post, Indy Star, and NBC News Concerning
      Peter Kassig and Three Other Americans Who Lost Their Lives at the
                                 Hands of ISIS

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