[Senate Hearing 116-559]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-559
U.S. POLICY IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-608 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Prepared Statement........................................... 3
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Hale, Hon. David, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Abrams, Hon. Elliot, U.S. Special Representative for Iran and
Venezuela, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............ 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 43
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for
the
Following Questions by Senator Robert Menendez................. 50
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..................................... 51
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for
the
Following Questions by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.............. 52
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 52
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for
the
Following Questions by Senator Edward J. Markey................ 53
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by
Senator Cory A. Booker......................................... 54
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for
the
Following Questions by Senator Cory A. Booker.................. 55
(iii)
U.S. POLICY IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in
room SD-G50 and videoconference, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Hon. James E. Risch, chairman of the committee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Gardner, Romney,
Young, Cruz, Perdue, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy,
Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. This hearing of the United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here today to
discuss recent events in the Middle East and the implications
that they have for United States policy, which are significant.
Since the end of the second war--the second World War, the
Middle East has been dominated by intractable Arab-Israeli
conflict. Today, however, much has changed. Former rivals have
increasingly reached across the table to address the shared
challenges posed by Iran, by radical extremism, by COVID-19, by
struggling economies, and by other issues that they have.
Regional dynamics have been further shaped by growing
Chinese entanglement, Russian intervention, and regional
responses to an expansionist Turkish foreign policy that is
increasingly aligned with Russia. The United States interests
have not changed; namely, regional stability, preventing
terrorist threats against the United States, preserving stable
international markets, and fostering governments that address
the needs of their citizens.
The historic signing of the Abraham Accords is a defining
moment--it cannot be more important than it was--and has the
potential to fundamentally improve the security, economic, and
diplomatic environment in the Middle East.
Israel took the important step of suspending plans to annex
portions of the West Bank, which I hope will reinvigorate
substantive engagement with the--from the Palestinian people.
The Accords also have positive implications for Iran policy.
For years, the Arab-Israeli conflict created regional discord
that Iran used to press to its advantage. Iran's aggressive
terrorist agenda has created this opportunity for Arab
countries to publicly cooperate with Israel. It is my hope that
other countries will normalize ties with Israel. Indeed, I am
not alone in this. Much talk in this city of exactly that takes
place every day.
Additionally, the Accords have clear ramifications for
regional security. Any potential arms sales must continue
congressional consultations on meeting our obligation to retain
Israel's qualitative military edge and satisfying the other
requirements of the Arms Export Control Act. Let me be clear.
The signing of the Abraham Accords did not occur by
happenstance. These events were specifically enabled by the
Trump administration's exit from the flawed JCPOA, its maximum
pressure against the Iran regime, and the clear signals the
Administration's plan for Middle East peace sent to the region.
Anyone who suggests that the U.S. should reenter the
nuclear deal with Iran is misguided at best, as that would only
serve to isolate our ally, Israel, alienate our Gulf partners,
and once again fund Iran's terror activities; and, most
importantly, conduct a weak-kneed retreat from the hard-fought
gains that we have made, and telegraph to our enemies and our
allies, alike, a weakness sure to embolden Iran to move
aggressively--to more aggressively pursue its malign activities
and, thus, at the end of the day, hurt us badly.
Our Iran policy must look forward. I applaud the
reimposition of sanctions in the executive order this week
implementing CAATSA and authorizing sanctions against those who
would transfer arms to Iraq. Only continued economic and
regional isolation have the potential to bring Iran to the
negotiating table.
Turning to our counterterrorism efforts, we have broken the
Islamic State's grip on Iraq and Syria. According to our
military commanders, success against the Islamic State has led
to a reduction in U.S. troops resulting from our confidence in
local forces' ability to operate with reduced levels of U.S.
support. As the Department of Defense reduces its missions in
the Middle East, it is incumbent on the State Department to
build a lasting peace through disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration efforts. These efforts tied to necessary forms to
reduce corruption and improve governance will ensure lasting
stability.
In Syria, we continue to face one of the world's worst
humanitarian catastrophes and major contributor to regional
instability. As we impose sanctions on the Assad regime
authorized by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, we must
continue with diplomatic and U.N. process towards a cease-fire,
supporting the Constitutional Committee and free and fair
elections. We must not repeat the mistakes of the previous
Administration, where inaction opened the door to Russian
intervention and let the civil war rage unabated.
In Lebanon, we see the results of a corrupt patronage
system and broken political process that opens the door to deep
Iranian influence. Lebanon is a nation on the brink of
collapse, yet remains an important link in--to regional
stability. I remain skeptical of Lebanon's ability to form a
new government, free from corruption of its political allies.
Across the Middle East, there are unique opportunities to
improve the region through continued normalization efforts
linking economies, joining security efforts, and continued
pressure on Iran. These are real possibilities that were
unthinkable just a few short years ago, and may be once-in-a-
generation opportunities.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony of these
and related matters.
[The prepared statement of Senator James. E. Risch
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator James E. Risch
I thank our witnesses for appearing today to discuss recent events
in the Middle East and the implications they have for United States
policy.
Since the end of the second World War, the Middle East has been
dominated by an intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, however, much
has changed. Former rivals have increasingly reached across the table
to address the shared challenges posed by Iran, radical extremism,
COVID-19, and struggling economies.
The regional dynamics have been further shaped by growing Chinese
entanglement, Russian intervention, and regional responses to an
expansionist Turkish foreign policy that is increasingly aligned with
Russia.
The United States' interests have not changed--namely, regional
stability, preventing terrorist threats against the U.S., preserving
stable international markets, and fostering governments that address
the needs of their citizens.
The historic signing of the Abraham Accords is a defining moment
and has the potential to fundamentally improve the security, economic,
and diplomatic environment in the Middle East.
Israel took the important step of suspending plans to annex
portions of the West Bank, which I hope will reinvigorate substantive
engagement from the Palestinian people.
The Accords also have positive implications for Iran policy. For
years the Arab-Israeli conflict created regional discord that Iran used
to press its advantage. Iran's aggressive terrorist agenda has created
this opportunity for Arab countries to publicly cooperate with Israel.
It is my hope that other countries will normalize ties with Israel.
Additionally, the Accords have clear ramifications for regional
security. Any potential arms sales must continue Congressional
consultations on meeting our obligation to retain Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge and satisfying the other requirements of the Arms Export
Control Act.
Let me be clear, the signing of the Abraham Accords did not occur
by happenstance. These events were enabled by the Trump
administration's exit from the flawed JCPOA, its maximum pressure
against the Iranian regime, and the clear signals the Administration's
plan for Middle East Peace sent to the region.
Anyone who suggests that the U.S. should re-enter the nuclear deal
with Iran is misguided at best, as that would only serve to isolate our
ally Israel, alienate our Gulf partners, and once again fund Iran's
terror activities.
Our Iran policy must look forward. I applaud the re-imposition of
sanctions and the executive order this week implementing CAATSA and
authorizing sanctions against those who would transfer arms to Iran.
Only continued economic and regional isolation have the potential to
bring Iran to the negotiating table.
Turning to our counterterrorism efforts--we have broken the Islamic
State's grip on Iraq and Syria. According to our military commanders,
success against the Islamic State has led to a reduction in U.S. troops
due to our confidence in local forces' ability to operate with reduced
levels of U.S. support.
As the Department of Defense reduces its missions in the Middle
East, it is incumbent on the State Department to build a lasting peace
through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts. These
efforts, tied to necessary reforms to reduce corruption and improve
governance will ensure lasting stability.
In Syria, we continue to face one of the world's worst humanitarian
catastrophes and major contributor to regional instability. As we
impose sanctions on the Assad regime authorized by the Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act, we must continue the diplomatic and U.N.
processes toward a ceasefire, supporting the constitutional committee,
and free and fair elections. We must not repeat the mistakes of the
previous Administration where inaction opened the door to Russian
intervention and let the civil war rage unabated.
In Lebanon, we see the results of a corrupt patronage system and
broken political process that opens the door to deep Iranian influence.
Lebanon is a nation on the brink of collapse, yet remains an important
link to regional stability. However, I remain skeptical of Lebanon's
ability to form a new government free from the corruption of its
political elites.
Across the Middle East, there are unique opportunities to improve
the region. Through continued normalization efforts, linking economies,
joining security efforts, and continued pressure on Iran, there are
real possibilities that were unthinkable just a few short years ago.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony.
The Chairman. With that, Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses, of both whom have spent
decades in service to our country.
The scope of this hearing could keep us here for days--
Israeli's changing diplomatic fortunes, Lebanon reeling with
decades of malfeasance and a deadly explosion, Yemen facing the
worst humanitarian crisis in the world--but, I will try to do
my best to stay focused.
While we have seen some recent positive developments over
the course of the past 4 years--however, the Trump
administration has only served, in my view, to create more
chaos and uncertainty about our policies in the Middle East:
showering autocrats with praise and, at least according to the
President, ``saving'' one from Congress in the wake of ordering
the slaughter of an American resident; drawing down, and now
redeploying, troops to Syria; prioritizing arms sales in
unilateral sanctions over the hard work of diligent diplomacy
and strategic development. Today's hearing implies a Middle
East changing for the better for U.S. interests and values. In
some ways, that is true. I applaud the Administration for
building on years of cooperation between Israel and some of its
Arab Gulf neighbors. I think we can all agree that more
regional cooperation serves the interests of all the people in
the region, and of the United States, as well.
While we should celebrate these historical achievements,
let us not overlook the fact that Israel's core security issues
remain unresolved, and it is still contending with threats from
Hamas and Hezbollah nearly on a daily basis. Indeed, we have a
responsibility to look beyond the headlines and into the
details, particularly when it comes to peace declarations that
come with the expectations, and perhaps even the promise, of
significant arms sales.
Let me be clear. Congress's role in arms sales is not
something that I see changing anytime soon, to any country, in
any region. While some things change, others stay the same,
and, in some cases, get worse. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I think
there can be little doubt that, with Iran, we are worse off now
than we were 4 years ago.
Now, to be clear, I bear no sentimentality about the JCPOA,
but as one who has worked for decades helping to build a
careful, calibrated, and, critically, an internationally
supported sanctions regime to constrain Iran, I am seriously
concerned that this Administration has completely lost sight of
how to achieve even its own goals, let alone safeguard our
national security.
Over the past 4 years, Iran has increased its enrichment
level and stockpile of enriched uranium, as well as advanced
missile systems. It has continued its support for malign proxy
actors throughout the region. Even in the wake of the killing
of Qasem Soleimani and a declaration of ``deterrence
restored,'' quote, against Iran, CENTCOM Commander, General
McKenzie, said recently that, ``The level of attack on U.S.
troops in Iraq from Iran-based militias have been higher.'' So,
I ask you, is this your definition of ``deterrence restored''?
This Administration refuses to acknowledge what those of us
who have worked this file know: We cannot confront Iran alone.
Indeed, we cannot achieve any of our policy goals in the Middle
East or elsewhere alone, but this Administration has so
alienated our allies and partners that Russia and China did not
even need to use their vetoes at the U.N. Security Council,
where the U.S., embarrassingly, could muster only one vote in
support of reimposing the arms embargo against Iran. How can
you honestly say that, in this context, sanctions have been
snapback when our European allies and the Secretary General
himself questioned the legitimacy of U.S. claims? While the
Secretary rails against our historical partners, China and
Russia are increasing their influence, not just in the region
economically and militarily, but at international fora, as
well, where previous administrations had been effective in
advancing our Nation's interests.
The executive order announced Monday could have been
executed months ago, and will likely have no tangible impact on
Iran's capacities. These announcements are simply a hollow echo
of American leadership that once held commanding convening
power and unquestioned global leadership, replacing it with a
policy that seems to amount to ``talk loudly and carry no
sticks.''
So, while I intend to drill down some more during
questions, I hope that you can provide us some level of
explanation as to how it is that you believe you are actually
achieving your goals in the Middle East, and perhaps you can
even shed light onto exactly what those are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Robert Menendez
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Robert Menendez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you to
our witnesses, both of whom have spent decades in service to this
country. The scope of this hearing could keep us here for days:
Israel's changing diplomatic fortunes; Lebanon reeling with decades of
malfeasance and a deadly explosion; Yemen facing the worst humanitarian
crisis in the world. But I'll do my best to stay focused.
While we've seen some recent positive developments over the course
of the past 4 years; however, the Trump administration has only served
to create more chaos and uncertainty about our policies in the Middle
East: showering autocrats with praise and, at least according to the
President, ``saving'' one ``from Congress'' in the wake of ordering the
slaughter of an American resident; drawing down and now redeploying
troops to Syria; and prioritizing arms sales and unilateral sanctions
over the hard work of diligent diplomacy and strategic development.
Today's hearing implies a Middle East changing for the better for
U.S. interests and values. And in some ways that is true. I applaud the
Administration for building on years of cooperation between Israel and
some of its Arab Gulf neighbors. I think we can all agree that more
regional cooperation serves the interests of all the people in the
region, and of the U.S. as well. But while we should celebrate these
historical achievements, let's not overlook the fact that Israel's core
security issues remain unresolved, and it is still contending with
threats from Hamas and Hezbollah nearly on a daily basis.
Indeed, we have a responsibility to look beyond the headlines and
into the details, particularly when it comes to peace declarations that
come with the expectation--and perhaps even the promise--of significant
arms sales.
Let me be clear: Congress' role in arms sales is not something that
I see changing any time soon. To any country. In any region.
And while some things change, others stay the same, and in some
cases get worse.
And in fact, Mr. Chairman, I think there can be little doubt that
with Iran we are worse off now than we were 4 years ago.
Now, to be clear, I bear no sentimentality about the JCPOA, but as
one who has worked for decades helping to build a careful, calibrated,
critically, and internationally supported sanctions regime to constrain
Iran, I am seriously concerned that this Administration has completely
lost sight of how to achieve even its own goals, let alone safeguard
our national security.
Over the past 4 years, Iran has increased its enrichment level and
stockpile of enriched uranium as well as advanced missile systems. It
has continued its support for malign proxy actors throughout the
region. Even in the wake of the killing of Qasem Soleimani and a
declaration of ``deterrence restored'' against Iran, CENTCOM Commander
General McKenzie said recently that the ``level of attacks on U.S.
troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias have been higher.'' Is this
your definition of deterrence restored?
This Administration refuses to acknowledge what those of us who
have worked this file know: We cannot confront Iran alone. Indeed, we
cannot achieve any of our policy goals in the Middle East or elsewhere
alone.
But this Administration has so alienated our allies and partners
that Russia and China didn't even need to use their vetoes at the U.N.
Security Council, where the U.S. embarrassingly could muster only one
vote in support of reimposing the arms embargo against Iran. How can
you honestly say that in this context sanctions have been ``snapped
back'' when our European allies and the Secretary General himself
questions the legitimacy of U.S. claims?
While the Secretary rails against our historical partners, China
and Russia are increasing their influence not just in the region
economically and militarily, but at international fora as well, where
previous administrations have been effective in advancing our nation's
interests.
The executive order announced Monday could have been executed
months ago and will likely have no tangible impact on Iran's
capacities. These announcements are simply a hollow echo of American
leadership that once held commanding convening power and unquestioned
global leadership, replacing it with a policy that seems to amount to:
Talk loudly and carry no sticks.
So while I intend to drill down some more during questions, I hope
that you all can provide some level of explanation as to how it is you
believe you are actually achieving your goals in the Middle East. And
perhaps, you can even shed light onto exactly what those are.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We will now hear from our witnesses. We will start with the
Honorable David Hale, who has served as Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs since August 30th, 2018.
Previously, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon. He also has extensive experience on
issues pertaining his--to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
having served as Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace from
2011 to 2013, and Deputy Special Envoy from 2009 to 2011.
Under Secretary Hale.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HALE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Hale. Well, good morning, Chairman Risch and
Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of the
committee. It is an honor to appear before you with Special
Representative Abrams to discuss the Middle East and Iran's
malign influence.
America is a force for good, and we are the partner of
choice for those who seek security and prosperity. It is in our
national security interest to strengthen those partnerships.
Nothing has done more to demonstrate a commitment to
cooperation than the signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration
on September 15. As President Trump observed, these agreements
mark the dawn of a new Middle East and send a strong message to
malign actors, such as Iran, that their influence is waning.
Ending Iran's malign influence is the Administration's top
regional priority. Success will mean an independent and
sovereign Iraq and Lebanon, and a chance for religious
minorities to thrive again. It will mean Gulf States that no
longer live in fear of Iranian aggression and violence. It will
mean a more secure Israel reaping the benefits of regional
cooperation. To this end, our maximum pressure campaign has
constrained Iran by depriving the regime of over $70 billion in
revenue. The sanctions are not solely an end unto themselves,
they are merely one tool that we will deploy until the Iranian
regime changes its behavior.
The signing of the historic Abraham Accords, witnessed by
many of you, normalizes relations between both the UAE and
Bahrain with Israel, the first such agreement between Israel
and an Arab country since 1994. This normalization will promote
peace, security, and prosperity throughout the region.
Affirmation of the Abraham Accords bolsters the
Administration's Vision for Peace. Israel will suspend
declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the Vision. We
urge the Palestinians to come to the negotiating table. The
only path to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting
peace.
Lebanon faces political gridlock and economic instability
exacerbated by the horrific August 4 explosion at the Port of
Beirut. America has, thus far, provided over $19 million in
essential relief, and we stand with the Lebanese people as they
recover from the devastation. The tragic explosion is a symptom
of the systemic problems in Lebanon: decades of mismanagement,
corruption, and the repeated failure to undertake meaningful
reform. When we see Lebanese leaders committed to real change,
in word and deed, America and its international partners will
be ready to help with the assistance needed to accomplish true
reform.
Hezbollah cultivates and exploits Lebanon's corrupt
``anything goes'' environment and undermines the interests of
the Lebanese people through the accumulation of arms and
destabilizing activities across the region. Before the maximum
pressure campaign, Iran provided Hezbollah over $700 million of
its approximately $1 billion annual budget. Our ability to
constrain that funding is having an effect, and we will use all
available tools to hold accountable those who facilitate
Hezbollah's activities. This month, we sanctioned two former
Lebanese Ministers for corruptly directing political and
financial favors to Hezbollah, and we will continue to press
our partners across the world to designate Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization.
The Gulf States are critical partners in our fight against
terrorism and efforts to blunt Iranian influence. We have
consistently pressed our partners in parallel with similar
calls from Congress to end that rift.
Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is rooted in robust
security cooperation. It is a central component of our strategy
to counter Iran and defeat extremist groups. We continue to
have frank conversations with Riyadh on human rights, and we
consistently tell Saudi leaders that success on the nation's
reform agenda will require protection of human, and especially
women's, rights.
We support U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffiths as he
negotiates a lasting peace in Yemen, and we are working closely
with Saudi Arabia on de-escalating violence in Yemen, and
welcome Riyadh's efforts to reconcile the Yemeni parties.
The Houthis, armed by Iran, threaten regional security and
stability through attacks against civilian targets.
In Iraq, Iran-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization
Forces are an immediate challenge to Iraq's stability, and we
see the Iraqi people turning against Iranian interference in
Iraqi affairs. The protest movement demonstrated the Iraqi
people's aspiration for democratic governance, and Mustafa al-
Kadhimi, Iraq's new Prime Minister, has begun to restore Iraq's
sovereignty.
In Syria, our leadership of the Global Coalition will
ensure ISIS's lasting defeat. Using the tools Congress provided
in the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, we have imposed
over 55 sanctions on the Assad regime.
In Libya, we are supporting the U.N. as it brings together
broad Libyan participation for the Libya political dialogue,
which aims to prepare for elections, establish a lasting cease-
fire, and support of the oil sector.
In surveying the region today, we have tangible
opportunities to advance our objectives of peace, prosperity,
and security, and our presence and relationships serve as a
bulwark against efforts by Russia and China to extend their
malign influence.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hale follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David Hale
Good morning Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and
distinguished members of the Committee. It's an honor to appear before
you with Special Representative Abrams to discuss the Middle East and
Iran's malign influence. America is a force for good throughout the
region, and we are the partner of choice for those who seek security,
stability, and prosperity. It is in our national security interests to
strengthen those partnerships. As we have seen in recent weeks, our
partners are moving away from conflicts and taboos of the past and are
committed to cooperation across a broad range of fields. We are working
hard to deepen this cooperation.
Nothing has done more to demonstrate a commitment to cooperation
than the signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration and related
instruments on September 15. As President Trump observed, these
agreements ``mark dawn of a new Middle East'' and send a strong message
to malign actors like Iran that their influence is waning.
Ending Iran's malign influence is the Administration's top regional
priority. Success will provide vulnerable religious minorities,
including Christians and Yezidis, the chance to thrive again. It will
mean a sovereign Iraq that can defend its national interests and hold
credible elections, fulfilling a key demand of protesters who want to
end Iranian influence. It will mean Gulf states that no longer live in
fear of Iranian threats and violence. It will prevent famine in Yemen
and enable a political solution to the conflict. It will mean a more
secure Israel, reaping the benefits of regional cooperation and
integration. And it will mean an independent and sovereign Lebanon. To
this end, our maximum pressure campaign has constrained Iran by
depriving the regime of over $70 billion in revenue, which otherwise
would have funded Iran's destabilizing activities. But sanctions are
not an end unto themselves. They are merely one of a broad range of
tools that we will deploy until the Iranian regime changes its
behavior.
The historic signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration on
September 15, brokered by President Trump, normalizes relations between
both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with Israel--the first such
agreements between Israel and an Arab country since 1994. As President
Trump observed, ``In Israel's entire history, there have previously
been only two such agreements. Now we have achieved two in a single
month . . . '' Together, with America as a strong and committed
partner, we can advance regional peace and continue to counter Iran's
malign influence. And we remain committed to helping Israel maintain
its qualitative military edge, consistent with the law and longstanding
policy.
These agreements are historic. After decades of division and
conflict, normalization of relations and peaceful diplomacy will
promote greater peace and security in the region and widen
opportunities for expanded economic growth and productivity. As
President Trump noted, these agreements represent a major stride toward
a future in which people of all faiths and backgrounds live together in
peace and prosperity.
The UAE's Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed echoed the President,
noting that we are ``witnessing a change in the heart of the Middle
East, a change that will send hope around the world.'' Bahrain's
Foreign Minister Al Zayani declared that these agreements represent a
``historic step on the road to genuine and lasting peace, security and
prosperity across the region, and for all who live there regardless of
religion, sect, ethnicity, or ideology.''
Affirmation of the Abraham Accords Declaration bolsters the
Administration's Vision for Peace, announced in January 2020. Israel
will suspend declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the Vision
for Peace and focus its efforts on expanding ties with other countries
in the Arab and Muslim world. We urge the Palestinians to come to the
negotiating table. Refusal to engage with Israel only delays
fulfillment of the potential of the Palestinian people. We have
repeatedly said that the only realistic path to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is through negotiations aimed at achieving a
comprehensive and lasting peace.
Lebanon faces political gridlock and economic instability,
exacerbated by the August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut, which
killed 180, wounded 6,500, and destroyed a wide swath of Beirut,
Lebanon's economic and commercial center. America has thus far provided
over $19 million in essential food, shelter, and medical relief, and we
will continue to stand with the Lebanese people as they recover and
rebuild from the devastation.
The tragic explosion is a symptom of the systemic problems in
Lebanon which have persisted for far too long: decades of
mismanagement, corruption, and the repeated failure of Lebanese leaders
to put aside their parochial interests and undertake meaningful,
sustained reforms. The Lebanese people deserve better, and their
demands for change could not be clearer. America stands in solidarity
with those who have long called for tangible reforms and a government
that respond to their longstanding and legitimate demands. When we see
Lebanese leaders committed to real change in word and deed, America and
its international partners will be ready to help with assistance needed
to accomplish true reform.
Hizballah cultivates and exploits Lebanon's corrupt, ``anything
goes'' environment and undermines the interests of the Lebanese people
through the accumulation of arms and destabilizing activities across
the region. Hizballah has proven that the group answers to Tehran, not
the Lebanese state and people. Before the maximum pressure campaign,
Iran provided Hizballah over $700 million of its approximately $1
billion budget. Our ability to constrain that funding is having an
effect. Hassan Nasrallah has publicly called for financial
contributions to make up the shortfall.
America will use all available tools to hold accountable those who
facilitate Hizballah's activities. This month, we sanctioned two former
Lebanese ministers for corruptly directing political and financial
favors to Hizballah, at the expense of the state. We also continue to
press our partners across the region and the world to acknowledge
reality and designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist
organization and use their legal authorities to restrict the group from
operating on their soil.
The Gulf states are critical partners in our fight against
terrorism and efforts to blunt Iranian influence. We are stronger when
we stand together, and we have consistently pressed our partners--in
parallel with similar calls from Congress--to end the Gulf rift. We are
hopeful that they will resolve their differences and work with us to
address our shared concerns.
Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is rooted in robust bilateral
security cooperation. It is a critical component of our strategy to
counter Iran's destabilizing actions in the Gulf and deter, disrupt,
and defeat ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other dangerous actors. Our security
cooperation helps to protect over 160,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia and
UAE from attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. We are working
closely with Riyadh on de-escalating violence in Yemen and welcome the
Saudis' attempts to reconcile the Yemeni parties.
We continue to have frank conversations with Riyadh on human
rights. This includes calling for the lifting of a travel ban on Dr.
Walid Fitaihi and his family and the release of Salah Al-Haider and
Badr Al-Ibrahim, all three of whom have been unjustly detained and
whose cases undermine our otherwise strong partnership. We fully
support the nation's reform initiatives, as articulated in Saudi
Arabia's Vision 2030, to diversify the economy, reduce its reliance on
oil revenues, and broaden Saudi women's economic and social engagement.
But we have also consistently told the Saudi leadership that success
will require protection of human and women's rights.
Earlier this month, Secretary Pompeo hosted his Qatari counterpart
for the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. We signed 11 significant
agreements across a wide range of sectors, including: health security
preparedness; Fulbright programs and academic exchanges; agreements
with NASA and the Smithsonian Institution; and the 2021 U.S.-Qatar Year
of Culture, which declares the U.S. and Qatari governments' intention
to cooperate to enhance cultural and art exchanges and people-to-people
connections. We are also excited about an MOU signed by Secretary
Mnuchin and his Qatari counterpart to conduct an economic roadshow in
the United States in 2021, which will target investment in more diverse
sectors to maximize mutual economic benefit. In the coming months, we
look forward to holding additional strategic dialogues with Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to each deepen our ties with our Gulf
partners.
In Yemen, we continue to support the diplomacy of U.N. Special
Envoy Martin Griffiths as he works to bring the Republic of Yemen
Government and the Houthis together to establish a lasting peace. The
Houthis, armed by Iran, continue to threaten regional security and
stability through attacks against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.
We also work closely with the Republic of Yemen Government, the
UAE, and Saudi Arabia to achieve further progress on the implementation
of the Riyadh Agreement. We are deeply concerned about the humanitarian
situation in Yemen and are working to get much-needed assistance to the
Yemeni people. Nearly 80 percent of Yemenis rely on humanitarian aid to
meet their basic needs. Houthi obstructionism and refusal to adhere to
international principles have forced us to curtail some of our aid,
though we try to ensure that life-saving and critical assistance still
meets those in need. America is the largest humanitarian donor to Yemen
this year, and we have provided more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian
assistance since October 2018. With Congress's support, we have also
provided nearly $18.7 million in funding to support COVID-19 response
efforts to help refugees, vulnerable migrants, internally displaced
persons, and host communities in Yemen. We continue to call on the
Houthis to allow this humanitarian aid to flow to those in need.
In Iraq, Iran-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF) are an immediate challenge to Iraq's prosperity and long-term
stability. Iran-backed elements of the PMF routinely engage in
widespread theft of state resources, targeted killings, and sectarian
violence. They conduct attacks on Iraqi Government facilities and were
responsible for the bulk of the violence against peaceful protesters
and political activists over the last year.
The Iraqi people are turning against Iran's interference in Iraqi
internal affairs; against the Iran-backed militias and the politicians
who enable them; and against the rampant corruption that Iran's
influence promotes. The protest movement demonstrated the Iraqi
people's aspiration for democratic, responsive governance that works on
behalf of the interests of Iraqis, not Tehran, and it led to the
designation of a former human rights activist, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, as
Iraq's new prime minister. Kadhimi has already begun to take necessary
steps to restore Iraq's sovereignty and re-establish rule-of-law. We
welcome his commitment to ensure that Iraq's future is determined in
Baghdad, Erbil, Basrah, and Ramadi, and not in Tehran.
Our regular engagements with the Kadhimi government are paying
dividends. After two successful rounds of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic
Dialogue, on June 11 and August 19, and a meeting between Prime
Minister Kadhimi and President Trump, we are preparing for a series of
meetings to further define the details of our relationship. We will
focus on humanitarian issues, internally displaced persons, the return
of Yezidis and other minority groups, economic reforms, security sector
reforms, and broadening our educational and cultural programming. These
engagements have strengthened the Prime Minister's position within
Iraq; reminded the Iraqi people that America is a force for good and
our relations serve their interests; and put Iran on notice that the
U.S.-Iraq relationship cannot be broken.
In Syria, our leadership of the Global Coalition and work with
increasingly capable local partners will ensure ISIS's lasting defeat.
Using the tools Congress provided in the Caesar Syria Civilian
Protection Act, the U.S. Government has imposed over 55 sanctions on
those facilitating for the Assad regime to deny the regime the
resources it uses to commit mass atrocities against the Syrian people
and encourage a peaceful, political resolution of the Syrian conflict
as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. In Libya, we are
supporting the UN as it shepherds the intra-Libyan dialogue toward a
potential cease-fire that holds the potential jumpstart the political
process and reopen the oil sector. These efforts will be more effective
now that the recently adopted UN mandate for the Libya mission includes
our proposed language to create a UN Special Envoy position to focus
exclusively on negotiations while leaving management of the UN mission
in Libya to a special coordinator.
In surveying the region today, we have tangible opportunities to
advance our objectives of peace, prosperity, and security. Our presence
and relationships serve as a bulwark against efforts by Russia and
China to extend their malign influence into the Middle East.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Elliot Abrams, who is U.S. Special
Representative for Iran and Venezuela at the Department for
State, and currently on leave from his position as Senior
Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies and in the Council on Foreign
Relations. Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant to the
President and Deputy National Security Advisor in the U.S.
Administration of President George W. Bush, where he supervised
U.S. policy in the Middle East for the White House.
Mr. Abrams.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT ABRAMS, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR IRAN AND VENEZUELA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Abrams. Thank you. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Menendez, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
to testify today with Under Secretary Hale, and the opportunity
to provide an update on our policy toward Iran. I will try to
be brief, and I look forward to your questions.
Our strategy to deal with the threats from Iran has two
primary objectives. First, to deprive the Iranian regime of the
money it needs to support its destabilizing activities. Second,
to bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a
comprehensive deal that must address four key areas: its
nuclear program, its ballistic missile development and
proliferation, its support for terror groups and proxies, and
its wrongful detention of U.S. citizens.
Our efforts to disrupt the regime's malicious agenda have
met with real success. By any measure, we believe the Iranian
regime is weaker today than when President Trump took office.
The regime faces unprecedented and worsening economic and
political crises.
U.S. sanctions have denied Iran more than 90 percent of its
oil export revenue, depriving the regime access to well over
$70 billion in income that could otherwise have gone to fund
terror operations. The consequence of this economic pressure is
a change in Iran's malign behavior, willing or not. Iran's
partners and proxies, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are under
austerity plans to deal with a lack of funds from Iran. As a
result, the lives of enumerable Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis,
Yemenis, and other innocent civilians in the regime's
crosshairs have been saved.
In addition to our economic pressure, we have enlisted many
partners in the effort to confront the threats from Iran. Since
the beginning of 2019, for example, nations such as Germany,
the U.K., Argentina, and others, have taken far-reaching
actions against Hezbollah. Many other nations have now banned
Mahan Air, Iran's terror airline.
We are further isolating Iran by brokering the peace
agreements with Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain as part of the
historic Abraham Accords. There is a reason that those Accords
were orchestrated by the United States and signed in
Washington. Nations in the Middle East have renewed confidence
in the United States because we are standing up to Iran.
Our negotiations with Iran have already shown dividends.
Our model of how the United States ought to approach the regime
by starting from a principled position of strength, we have
brought back two Americans, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, back
to the United States from Iranian detention. There was no
payment for them, no sanctions relief granted, no pallets of
cash. We will not rest until every American wrongfully detained
in Iran is free.
The fact that Americans can end up in Iran's jails to be
used as political pawns is another demonstration of the
regime's daily mockery of justice that Iranians know too well.
Just recently, the regime brutally tortured and then shamefully
executed champion wrestler Navid Afkari to send to its own
people an unmistakable message of intimidation. The U.S. is
committed to holding accountable those who deny freedom and
justice to people of Iran. Later today, the United States will
announce sanctions on several Iranian officials and entities,
including the judge who sentenced Navid Afkari to death. I look
forward, as you all do, to the day that Iranians enjoy the
freedom and dignity they so deeply deserve.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, and other members of
the committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Elliott Abrams
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today with Under
Secretary Hale and for the opportunity to provide an update on our
policy toward Iran.
This Administration harbors no illusions about the Islamic Republic
of Iran. It is the principal driver of instability and violence in the
Middle East, and it remains the world's leading state sponsor of
terrorism and anti-Semitism. It remains in power through brutal
repression of the Iranian people.
We have approached the threats from Iran with a strategy that has
two primary objectives. First, to deprive the Iranian regime of the
money it needs to support its destabilizing activities. Second, to
bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a comprehensive deal,
as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in May 2018.
The legally binding agreement we seek with the Iranian regime must
address four key areas: its nuclear program, its ballistic missile
development and proliferation, its support to terror groups and
proxies, and its wrongful detention of U.S. citizens, including Siamak
and Baquer Namazi, and Morad Tahbaz. The United States is also calling
on the Iranian regime to provide a full accounting of the fate of
retired FBI agent Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007.
The United States is open to negotiate with Iran and meet without
preconditions. The regime need only meet our diplomacy with diplomacy,
not with violence, bloodshed, and attempted extortions.
Our efforts to disrupt the regime's ability to carry out its
malicious agenda have met with real success. By any measure, the
Iranian regime is weaker today than when President Trump took office.
The regime faces unprecedented and worsening economic and political
crises that are exacerbated by the poor choices the regime makes in an
effort to advance its radical ideology.
In response to the Islamic Republic's choice to pursue hostility
and aggressive acts, this Administration has implemented the
unprecedented Maximum Pressure Campaign. We have imposed the toughest
sanctions ever against the corrupt leadership of the regime. Our
sanctions are having a significant impact on the regime's ability to
fund its malign activities and keep a stranglehold on the Iranian
people.
According to the IMF, Iran's economy contracted by 5.5 percent in
2018 and 7.6 percent in 2019; the IMF expects it to shrink by another 6
percent in 2020. Iran's budget deficit for 2020 is a staggering and
unsustainable 26 percent of GDP, while its budget is based off an
unrealistic oil exports projection of 1 million barrels per day at $50
per barrel. Our sanctions have denied Iran more than 90 percent of its
oil export revenue, depriving the regime access to well over $70
billion in income that could have otherwise gone to fund terror
operations. Going forward, our oil and petrochemical sanctions will
continue to deprive the regime of as much as $50 billion annually. As a
result, Iran is struggling to access foreign currency. You can see the
impact of all this pressure by looking at the Iranian Rial, which has
fallen in value on the open market from about 60,000 to the dollar in
2018 to about 270,000 to the dollar today.
The consequence of this economic pressure is a change in Iran's
malign behavior, willing or not. Multiple Iranian state propaganda
television channels have had to shut down in 2020 and others are on the
verge of closure because they can no longer afford to pay the satellite
providers. And that is because the government is running out of foreign
currencies. Iranian proxies and partners in Syria and elsewhere are
going unpaid, and the services they once relied upon are drying up.
Iran-supported militants can no longer rely on steady and consistent
Iranian support. Hizballah and Hamas are under ``austerity plans'' to
deal with a lack of funds from Iran. As a result, we believe the lives
of innumerable Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and other innocent
civilians in the regime's crosshairs have been saved.
The United States has not stood by idly in the face of Iran's
malign activities. Working with our partners and allies, we have
redoubled our commitment to preserving peace and stability in the
region. We have shown Iran that if it chooses to threaten American
lives, President Trump will not hesitate to take decisive action. Iran
understands strength and the credible threat of military force.
We can observe the same successes of deterrence at sea. In 2015 and
2016, during the time that the conclusion and implementation of the
JCPOA was to have allegedly moderated Iran's behavior, the U.S. Navy
recorded 58 incidents of unsafe and unprofessional naval conduct by
Iran, including the illegal detention of U.S. sailors. From the
earliest days of this Administration, the United States made clear we
would not tolerate Iranian naval harassment, leading to a sharp decline
in Iran's provocative maritime behavior.
In addition to our economic pressure and military deterrence, we
have rallied the world to treat the regime as the pariah its actions
have demonstrated it to be.
We have called on nations to sanction or ban Iran's terrorist
proxy, Hizballah as a terrorist organization, in its entirety. Since
the beginning of 2019, nations such as Germany, the United Kingdom,
Argentina, as well as many others, have taken far-reaching actions
against Hizballah. We warned the world of Mahan Air, Iran's airline
that ferries terrorist personnel, arms, and assets around the world.
Germany, France, and Italy have joined many other nations in banning
Mahan Air flights from landing at or taking off from their airports.
Following the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, SWIFT de-
listed 33 Iranian banks. We continued to urge the international
community to hold Iran accountable for its illicit financial
activities, and in February 2020, the Paris-based Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) re-imposed full countermeasures on Iran for its failure to
adhere to basic standards. Iran joined North Korea in ignominy as the
only countries on FATF's ``blacklist.'' This powerful decision is
isolating the regime's financial and banking sector.
Most visibly, we are further isolating Iran by brokering the peace
agreement between Israel and the UAE, and the Israel-Bahrain
Declaration as part of the historic Abraham Accords. We are hopeful
more nations will follow their courageous acts and embrace the
opportunity of peace. There is a reason that these accords were
orchestrated by the United States and signed in Washington. Nations in
the Middle East have renewed confidence in the United States because we
are standing up to Iran.
This Administration will never hesitate to protect our national
security and prevent Iran from endangering the world. Unfortunately, in
August, the U.N. Security Council failed to uphold its stated mission
to maintain international peace and security and did not extend the
U.N. arms embargo on Iran, which has been in place in various forms for
13 years. The Security Council's inaction would have paved the way for
Iran to buy a wide array of conventional weapons on October 18. We have
been clear that we would not permit this to happen. In accordance with
our rights under U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, and in light of
Iran's continued and significant non-performance of its JCPOA
commitments, we initiated the snapback process to restore virtually all
previously terminated U.N. sanctions on Iran, which includes removing
the sunset provision on the arms embargo. These sanctions returned this
past Saturday, September 19. Further, on September 21, this
Administration took action to strengthen our domestic sanctions
authorities to counter Iranian conventional arms activity.
Because of the failures of the JCPOA, Iran is nearly 5 years closer
to the expiration of restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment program
and reprocessing-related activities, bringing it unacceptably close to
a dangerous nuclear breakout capability. However, thanks to the
snapback of U.N. sanctions, Iran is now obligated to suspend
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water-related activities. The
United States expects all U.N. Member States to fully comply with their
obligations regarding re-imposed restrictions on Iran, as the U.N.
Charter requires all Member States to do.
The United States will never let the world's leading state sponsor
of terror obtain the world's most deadly weapon. Iran would be wise not
to repeat and expand its tactic of nuclear and military extortion to
extract concessions. The regime's malign actions only steel our resolve
and increase the regime's economic and diplomatic isolation. Instead,
Iran should cease its violence and come to the negotiating table.
If Iran is willing to put the needs and desires of its people ahead
of its dangerous ideological ambitions, it has much to gain from
negotiations. The people of the United States and Iran should have
diplomatic ties again. Our embassies could be reopened so that the
brightest minds of our countries could work together and solve the
problems for our two peoples. We can end all sanctions, and instead
work on trade deals and direct flights to Houston, New York, and Los
Angeles. We are willing to reestablish diplomatic relations, help bring
economic prosperity, and more if Iran is ready to behave like a country
rather than a cause.
Our negotiations with Iran have already shown dividends and are a
model of how the United States ought to approach the regime. By
starting from a principled position of strength, we have brought two
Americans, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, back to the United States from
Iranian detention. And there was no payment for the Americans, no
sanctions relief granted, and no pallets of cash loaded on planes to
the Iranian regime in exchange for their release.
We are delighted that Xiyue Wang and Michael White are reunited
with their families, and we are committed to bringing every American
home who is wrongfully detained abroad. Our team works every single
day--literally every single day--to make that happen.
That Americans can end up in Iran's jails to be used as political
pawns is just one demonstration of the regime's daily mockery of
justice that Iranians know all too well. Just recently, the regime
brutally tortured and shamefully executed champion wrestler Navid
Afkari to send to its own people an unmistakable message of
intimidation that protests will not be tolerated. The greatest victims
of the Islamic Republic of Iran are the Iranian people, and they too
are increasingly standing up to the regime.
In response to widespread protests in November 2019 the regime
executed a brutal crackdown, killing as many as 1,500 of its own
citizens while jailing thousands more. In an attempt to hide its
actions from the world, the regime simultaneously imposed a near-total
shutdown of access to the internet.
Every year, the regime loses the support of more and more Iranians.
This year's legislative elections saw the lowest turnout of voters in
the regime's history. Most Iranians boycotted the election, in which
candidates were pre-approved by Supreme Leader Khamenei's cronies and
clerics. The Iranian people are suffering under a corrupt and radical
regime whose leaders care more about filling their own pockets and
sending weapons and cash abroad than providing for their people.
As President Trump has said, Iran is a country with enormous
untapped potential. If Iran were to work alongside its neighbors to
foster stability and welcome peace rather than drive conflict, the
Iranian people would thrive and once again enjoy prosperity. I look
forward, as you do, to the day that all Iranians enjoy the freedom and
dignity they so deeply deserve.
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other Members of the
Committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you.
I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will now enter a round of questioning.
Before we do, I want to respond briefly to some of the
remarks made by my friend and colleague, the Ranking Member.
I understand that we have a different opinion of what is
going on in the Middle East as a result of this
Administration's activities, but I want to drill down very,
very specifically, on the outside chance that the Iranians are
monitoring this. I want to say clearly, deterrence has been
restored. Soleimani is dead. His replacement is a weak, weak
substitute for Soleimani. He does not have the influence, and
he does not have the abilities to conduct the kind of warfare
that Soleimani did.
Since that happened, there have been no bombings of oil
facilities, as they did prior--as Iran did prior to that. There
has been no sabotaging of oil tankers, which they did prior to
that. There has been no shooting down of our drones.
Most importantly, what is happening on the ground in Iraq
has changed dramatically. I have spoken directly with the
military commanders on the ground. I have spoken with the
policymakers in the Administration. They are laser focused on
this. There has been no American killed. Let there be no
mistake, Iran. If you wind up killing Americans in Iraq, there
will be serious, serious consequences. That message was
transmitted when Soleimani was taken out and killed. There will
be consequences for that. So, any suggestion that somehow we
are backing away from that, any suggestion that somehow we are
weakening on that, any suggestion that the military commanders
on the ground are not dedicated to protecting American troops
and to do what is necessary if, indeed, Iraqi attacks take the
life of American citizens, American soldiers, American men and
women in Iraq, there will be serious, serious consequences.
What happened when Soleimani was taken out was a clear
message. Iran, listen to that message, because it is meant to
transmit what American determination is in Iraq--on the ground
in Iraq.
With that, we will go to a series of questions. I will turn
it over to the Ranking Member.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Representative Abrams, do you dispute what CENTCOM
Commander General McKenzie said, when he said the level of
attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias have
been higher?
Mr. Abrams. Higher than when? I guess that is the question,
Senator. Right now, we are seeing Iran----
Senator Menendez. Well, you--have you talked to General
McKenzie, in terms of a statement?
Mr. Abrams. I talked to General McKenzie yesterday about
what is going on in Iraq.
Senator Menendez. All right. So, did you dispute his
statement with him?
Mr. Abrams. I do not dispute the statement. I think it is a
question of comparisons.
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Ambassador Hale, the Foreign Relations Committee has
statutory authority over reviewing and approving arms sales,
which are a critical tool of U.S. foreign policy that has to be
considered in a wide context: our interests, the recipient
country's needs and interests, their human rights record, and,
of course, how they have treated U.S.-origin weapons in the
past. We have seen a lot of conflicting reporting, and no clear
answers, regarding the sale of
F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. So, let me ask. What,
precisely, has the U.S. agreed to, in terms of selling F-35
aircraft to the UAE?
Ambassador Hale. Thank you for the question, Senator.
We are not at a point now where we have something to bring
to the Senate, but we understand fully our obligations to
notify Congress and make sure that we have met all of the
requirements that exist.
Senator Menendez. So, you are having conversations about
sales of F-35s to the UAE.
Ambassador Hale. We are having consultations about their
security needs and what would it take in order to improve their
security.
Senator Menendez. Have they suggested to you how many and
what timeline of delivery?
Ambassador Hale. No, not to my knowledge.
Senator Menendez. Has a formal letter of request been
received by the UAE for these aircraft?
Ambassador Hale. I do not know of any such letter.
Senator Menendez. Could you check and get back to the----
Ambassador Hale. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Well, what specific threats to the UAE
does the F-35 address that cannot be met by existing weapon
systems and alternative sales?
Ambassador Hale. I am not an expert on various weapon
systems. What I would say is that is subject to our experts to
engage on. Above all, it is important that we preserve Israel's
QME, but also meet the legitimate security and defense needs of
our partners in the Gulf.
Senator Menendez. So, let us talk about what you clearly do
know, which is the qualitative military edge that exists in law
for Israel. I do not see how anyone can reasonably assert that
a sale of F-35 aircraft will, in fact, not reduce Israel's
qualitative military edge, based on the simple fact that right
now Israel is the only country throughout the Middle East that
has that aircraft. So, how are you going to deal with U.S. law
as it relates to not reducing Israel's qualitative military
edge?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we consult with the Israelis on any
sale prior to proceeding with it. Once we determine a
particular course of action--and then I know that the Congress
will also evaluate whether or not any proposed sale meets the
standard of preserving QME.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me just say that, with all due
respect, I am a big fan of consulting with the Israelis, but I
am talking about United States law. United States law is not
subject to a foreign power deciding when it would be waived.
So, again I ask you, how is it that you will deal with U.S. law
as it relates to the qualitative military edge that U.S. law
commits to the U.S.-Israel relationship?
Ambassador Hale. Well, the same we do it all the time. I
mean, we have a large group of people at the Pentagon and at
the State Department to evaluate, based on technical criteria
and assessments of security, and what it is that the Israelis
have, and what it is that our partners need, and they will make
a recommendation to the Secretary of State. Then we have a
consultative process with Israel that occurs every year. There
is as an executive session in which--it is a closed session in
which we talk about these things.
Senator Menendez. Well, with all----
Ambassador Hale. First, we bring all of this to Congress.
Senator Menendez. With all due respect, it is a rather--it
does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that, if Israel
is the only country in the Middle East that has F-35s, that
selling it to someone else no longer produces that qualitative
military edge in the air.
Representative Abrams, I have to disagree with much of your
characterization of the approach towards Iran. Continuing the
U.S.--the U.N. arms embargo against Iran has been a bipartisan
goal of Congress and one of our European allies. However, the
U.S. efforts to renew the arms embargo of the Security Council
were ineffective and definitely a how-to lesson in terrible
diplomacy. How is it possible that the United States failed so
utterly and completely to build international support for our
position that a number of allies even chair?
Mr. Abrams. It is a good question, Senator, about the
behavior of the EU-3, in my view, all of whom told us privately
that they thought the U.N. embargo should be extended, but they
did not take any action to get it extended. We saw no activity
on their part in the United Nations. We, therefore, took the
one step that we were able to take unilaterally, which was
snapback.
Senator Menendez. Well--I know, but a snapback, when, in
fact, I do not know you can sustain an arms embargo if the
international community, including our European allies, refuse
to enforce it.
Mr. Abrams. Well, first, the EU has its own arms embargo,
which extends another 3 years. Second, this is clearly true of
all sanctions on Iran; ultimately, the decisions are not made
in Foreign Ministries about complying with U.S. sanctions. They
are made by 10,000 or 100,000 individuals--company officers,
company lawyers, bankers, financiers--who will look at these
sanctions and say, ``This is too dangerous. We are not going to
do it.'' We heard this argument in 2018, that unilateral
American sanctions will not work, but they do work.
Senator Menendez. Well, I will just close by saying, our
unilateral sanctions always clearly have a value, but the
reason we created an international coalition originally that,
first of all, brought Iran to the negotiating table, was the
internationalization of our sanctions regime. There is no
question that the dissipation of that internationalization of
the sanctions regime has less consequences on Iran. Iran today
is more advanced than it was in its nuclear program than
before. That is, I think, a pretty much undisputed fact. That
is concerning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
We have a number of people that are online with us. This is
always awkward, going through this, but I am going to use
seniority, as opposed to first-come/first-serve, because it is
easier to do.
The next one I have in seniority on the Republican side is,
I have Senator Gardner, who I am told is with us online.
Senator Gardner, are you with us?
[Pause.]
Senator Gardner. Senator Risch, I will defer to Senator
Romney, I believe, who is--who came in before me.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner has not responded.
So, if Senator Romney, you are up.
Senator Romney. Yes. I hope you can hear me, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this opportunity to speak with these individuals
about this critical part of the world.
Mr. Abrams, how does our support for the Lebanese Armed
Forces advance our strategic interests in that country? I know
we continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. We are very
concerned about stability there. We want to make sure that we
do not see a resurgence of strength on the part of Hezbollah.
I, for one, believe that our support of the Lebanese Armed
Forces advances our--the position of our friends there, and it
deters the growth of Hezbollah influence, but I am interested
in your informed opinion.
Mr. Abrams. I would ask, Senator, that Under Secretary Hale
take that question, as Under Secretary, first, and as the
former Ambassador of Lebanon.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Ambassador Hale. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your
support for that program.
It is of critical importance to our strategy to counter
Hezbollah and Iranian malign influence in Lebanon. We have been
supporting the Lebanese Army for a number of years. Our
military experts believe that it has paid off. The Army is far
more capable today than it was when we began to do the job of
protecting Lebanon's borders and supporting UNIFIL in trying to
make sure that the south is as quiet as it can be.
We will continue this program. We believe that the Army has
shown that it is capable of those tasks, and that it has a
sterling end-user record; the equipment that we provide is all
accounted for. If we were not building up the security arm of
the State of Lebanon, Hezbollah would have even further ability
to extend its sway over Lebanon. There would be no alternative
to point to for the Lebanese people as the provider of
security--the legitimate provider of security, which is the
Army, and not a militia.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Ambassador Hale, let me ask, also, with regards to the
reports that China was going to invest some $400 billion in
Iran--and I presume that would have been on a loan basis--but,
clearly, China has its eyes on Iran and on the Middle East. Do
you have a sense of what their objectives are in the Middle
East and, particularly with regards to Iran, what their
strategy appears to be? How is it that we might want to counter
what they are doing, and whether we are already taking steps to
do so?
Mr. Abrams. Thanks, Senator. If you will allow, I will try
to reply to that one.
We saw the announcement of the $400 billion trade deal--25-
year deal. The annual rate would be ten times the current level
of trade between China and Iran, which is really unrealistic.
So, I think it is--that number is more of an announcement than
it is a reality.
We are concerned about China's presence in the Middle East.
We are concerned about the potential for Chinese arms sales,
not only for Iran, but other countries in the Middle East.
China's interests, of course, start with oil. China's a big
oil importer, and we are obviously trying to make sure they get
the oil supplies that they are going to need, but they also
want political influence.
So, we are watching that very carefully. In all of the
countries that are friends of ours, including Israel, we have
conversations about the need to be very careful about the level
of Chinese involvement, because the economic involvement very
frequently becomes a source of difficulty, both economically
and politically, for the countries that permit it.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Let me ask one more question. That is with regards to Iraq.
I happen to be, I think, one of many who believe that Iraq is
critical to our long-term interests in the Middle East, to
stability in the Middle East, and can be a--an example of the
potential of a democratically elected government, but it is
obviously in a fragile position, given its neighbors. I do
believe that, historically, our commitment of troops in Iraq
has helped provide stability, obviously helped expel ISIS from
territory in Iraq, but I would anticipate that ongoing troop
presence is important to continue to provide those same
benefits.
Are American troop commitments there remaining critical to
the objectives we have in Iraq, and, if so, why do we continue
to reduce that level? To what level do you anticipate we
should, or should not, go?
Ambassador Hale. Thank you, Senator.
I agree that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq is critical
for achieving our goals. They are, as you described them, we
are trying to increase the capacity and the resiliency of Iraqi
Security Forces. We want to counter the instability and
violence spewed by, not just ISIS, but Iranian-backed militias
that were referenced earlier. We are very focused on that. I
would defer to our military colleagues in defining how many
troops are required in order to continue to perform those
objectives.
There is a transformation underway in Iraq. There is a
strong popular demand for reform. We are talking to the new
Iraqi Prime Minister, who met with President Trump just a
couple of weeks ago here in Washington, in the context of a
strategic dialogue, how he is going to address those urgent
reform needs, which we agree on, that are essential to Iraq's
stability.
We also look to this leadership to protect our diplomatic
and military facilities in Iraq, so we do not have to act on
our own, although we will, as I think Chairman Risch so
eloquently put it earlier.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will return the time to you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Romney.
I now have indication Senator Cardin is on the line.
Senator Cardin, are you with us?
Senator Cardin. I am with you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much.
Let me thank both of our witnesses.
First, Mr. Abrams, let me just qualify this by saying I
have a deep respect for your service to our country. You have
really served our Nation well, but I strongly disagree with
your assessment as to where we are in Iran by the U.S. policy
that has isolated us from our allies. Let me just give you the
background. Then I really want to get your response to this.
My assessment is that the maximum pressure campaign has
been to isolate the United States. We look at Iran today, and
where they are. Without our allies' support, you indicate that
our sanctions are working because we have companies that will
respond to the U.S. sanctions. I acknowledge that, but then you
said that our traditional allies wanted to help us in the
United Nations, but they did not vote with us. The reality is
that we have all had conversations with our European allies,
our traditional allies, and yes, they recognize Iran as a
serious--as a real threat, but they are absolutely against what
the U.S. did in pulling out of the Iran nuclear agreement, and
they are taking steps to counter what the United States has
done in regards to the effect of sanctions against Iran,
particularly now that we have announced that we are reimposing
our sanctions.
Then you talk about what China is doing. The United States
has been isolated in its global politics so that China can be
bolder in reaching out to Iran than they would before, when we
had the unity of Europe. So, we are isolating America's
effectiveness in global politics, and that is affecting how
well we can isolate Iran. We have legitimated Iran in some
quarters because of what we have done in violating and pulling
out of the Iran nuclear agreement.
So, when I look at Iran today, I see a very dangerous
country. What Senator Menendez said is absolutely right, there
is strong bipartisan support to take effective action to
isolate Iran and to minimize their ability to cause the type of
damage that they do, and to make sure they never become a
nuclear-weapon state, but we do that by working with our
allies. This Administration has isolated us.
Now, I know your background, and I have a hard time
believing that you really believe America is stronger when we
act by ourselves and not with our allies. Tell me how we are
stronger when America is alone rather than having our
traditional allies on our side as we combat Iran.
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Senator.
Sometimes we have to be alone. We have been alone about 40
times in the United Nations, for example, in defense of Israel.
Literally alone. That was the right thing to do in those votes.
We are trying to maintain this coalition, as you rightly
say. That is a strong coalition, both domestically here and in
Europe. I will give you an example. This week, 2 days ago,
Tuesday, there was a vote in the IAEA General Conference. Iran
presented itself to be the chairman of the Committee of the
Whole. It was defeated in a landslide. No other country voted
for it, because countries do recognize, as the Senate does, and
as this committee does, the danger that Iran presents. We are
in continuing conversations with the British, the French, and
the Germans. We did have one very big disagreement, which was
about the JCPOA, which we regard as a very----
Senator Cardin. I am going to just interrupt you for one
second. We have had more than one disagreement with our
traditional allies. Look at some of our trade policies, look at
our climate positions. It is not just Iran. We have had major
disagreements with our traditional allies. On NATO, we have had
disagreements with our traditional allies.
You are mentioning the IAEA. The only reason we have had
those actions is because of the nuclear agreement.
Mr. Abrams. In this case, the--what happened was that Iran
presented itself to be chairman of the Committee of the Whole,
and it was defeated in a landslide. This is unrelated to the
JCPOA.
On the question of Iran, I think there is very broad
agreement within what I call the Western Alliance. I have been
in touch with British, French, and German colleagues in the
last few days, and it is clear to them, as it is clear to us,
that we need to work together in the months and years ahead to
deal with this terrible problem of Iran. Where we had a deep
disagreement was, should we value retaining the JCPOA and
allowing the arms embargo to go away, or should we say no, the
arms embargo has to stay? On that one, I think, as you know, we
were right, the arms embargo is critical, and the EU-3 really
made a mistake here in thinking that they could allow it to
disappear.
Senator Cardin. My last point--I know I have run out of
time--is that if we were still in the Iran nuclear agreement,
our allies would have been with us at the United Nations on
this vote. The only reason they are not with us is because of
the action taken by the United States in withdrawing from the
nuclear agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
We will now go to--the next one I have on my list is
Senator Young, who is with us online, I believe.
Senator Young.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. If not, we will try Senator Perdue.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. The next one I have on my list, we will now
go to Senator Shaheen, who is here in person.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to both of you, for your service to the country
and for being here today.
I was pleased to see, this week, that Britain agreed to
renew information-sharing with the United States with respect
to bringing a case against the two terrorists known as ``the
Beatles,'' who are suspected of being responsible for the
killing of Americans James Foley, Peter Kassig, Steven Sotloff,
and Kayla Mueller. I wonder if you--the goal is to bring those
two terrorists back to the United States, to try them in a
civilian court, to get justice for the families, and to send a
signal to the rest of the world. Can you, Under Secretary Hale,
speak to the message that that sends to terrorists around the
world if we are able to do that?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, it would be, I think, a very powerful
message, Senator, that we will be relentless in pursuing
justice on behalf of American citizens who have been killed or
injured in any way by terrorist organizations. We simply will
not rest until we are able to see justice done.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can you tell me, is the State
Department supportive of that effort?
Ambassador Hale. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. Are you working with the Attorney General?
Ambassador Hale. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Last month, the U.N.'s counterterrorism chief confirmed
that 10,000 ISIS fighters remain active--obviously, the Beatles
were ISIS fighters--and that attacks have significantly
increased. We also have heard, from Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, who
is the State Department's Envoy, expressing concern over ISIS
regroupings and attacks. So, I wonder if you can speak to the
reason we sent additional troops into Syria. They were speaking
with respect to ISIS presence in Syria. I had a chance to visit
Syria in 2018. I saw the difference that our presence in
northeast Syria made to the Syrians to maintaining stability in
northeast Syria, preventing the Russians and the Iranians from
coming in, the Turks from coming in. The President
precipitously withdrew those troops. Now we are sending troops
back into northeast Syria. Can you speak to why we are doing
that?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we have had a continual presence.
There has been a small adjustment downward, relatively minor,
from, I think, 1,000 to 800 soldiers. Again, I defer to my
military colleagues on assessing just who they need on the
ground to complete the mission, but from your travel and your
close work on this, that, while we have made great progress, we
have not achieved our success yet in the enduring defeat of
ISIS in Syria. We will continue to work with the Turks. We will
continue to deconflict with the Russians. Job is not yet done.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate your saying that,
because we have heard from a number of officials, including the
President, that we have defeated ISIS in the Middle East. So,
you would disagree with that statement? You believe that we
still have work to do with respect to ISIS?
Ambassador Hale. We have made tremendous progress, and we
are very close to completing the task, but the task is not yet
done.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Representative Abrams, I am concerned that the
Administration has really lost the focus on our policy towards
Iran. I share the concerns that you have heard from some of my
colleagues here about our ability to contain Iran's nuclear
ambitions without the JCPOA. So, can you talk about just what
is most important as we think about how we address Iran's
malign activities across the Middle East? What are we most
focused on? How do we engage the international community, as
Senator Cardin has suggested we need to do, in order to be
successful?
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Senator.
I would say two things. We are focused on Iran's nuclear
program, and we are focused on its malign activities in the
region--support for terrorism, primarily, its activities in
Yemen, in Iraq, in Lebanon.
Our view of the JCPOA, which some members of the committee
shared when it was first introduced, is that it is really not a
permanent obstacle for the Iranian nuclear program. It almost
paves the way, because there are sunsets at 5 years first----
Senator Shaheen. No, I appreciate that. I voted for it, so
I understand the limitations that it had. However, it kept Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon, and we do not have those same
constraints today.
Mr. Abrams. Well, in our view, the path ahead should be to
negotiate a comprehensive agreement that is a permanent block
for Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
Senator Shaheen. Are we trying--excuse me for interrupting,
but I am about----
Mr. Abrams. Oh----
Senator Shaheen. --to run out of time. Are we--what are we
doing to bring Iran to the negotiating table? What hope do we
have that that might happen sometime in the near future?
Mr. Abrams. Obviously, Iran does not want to do it, does
not want to give up the nuclear program, does not want to give
up the support for terrorism. So, in our view, the only way to
get them to do it is what we call a maximum pressure campaign.
If you look at the Iranian economy, with--even now, this week,
the rial falling to an all time low. Today, 290,000 to the
dollar, which is an all time low. We think that, with that
pressure, once our election is over, they will come to the
negotiating table.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, can I have another minute to ask a question
about ---
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Shaheen. --Lebanon?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Under Secretary Hale, I know you
understand what is happening in Lebanon, having served there,
but one of the things that I have been concerned about is, as
we look at the challenges facing Lebanon, we were very quick to
respond to the humanitarian situation after the explosion, but
now we have backed off somewhat. China has already offered a
billion dollars to rebuild the port there. Russia is in there,
angling for more influence for warm water ports south of
Tartus. Can you speak to what more we are doing to try and help
the Lebanese people who are really struggling at this time?
Ambassador Hale. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we
have contributed $19 billion to the immediate humanitarian
crisis----
Senator Shaheen. Billion, with a ``b,'' or million----
Ambassador Hale. Million. The million--we are, I believe,
the largest, or maybe second-largest donor, in response to this
crisis. Over the years, we have provided $10 billion in support
to Lebanon, both for the security services, on the one hand,
and to private NGOs, on the other, for economic development and
humanitarian support. No one else has contributed as much
foreign assistance as we have.
I have little faith that the Chinese will make good on
these kinds of promises. I was in Beirut, days after the
explosion. I met with all of the leaders. I met with a wide
sector of activists and protesters--normal, common people. The
level of anger is quite high, directed toward the political
elite and their corruption. So, our focus is on that and
getting in place a government that is going to be actually
responsive to the needs of the people. If that occurs, and they
are committed and acting upon reform, that will unlock our
support and the support of the French and other donors, for
several--I think $21 billion that has been put on the shelf of
IMF, World Bank, and so-called CDR money, which is bilateral
assistance, that can all be unlocked if the Lebanese leadership
make the right decisions and break from the past.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I--that is a good line of questioning. I think everybody is
concerned about that situation in Lebanon. I do not know what
the path forward is there, what it--where it is going to take
everyone, but it is a serious, serious situation.
Do I have any more members of the Majority online?
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Okay. If not, the next one I have on the list
that told me they are online is Senator Udall.
Senator Udall, are you with us?
Senator Udall. Yes.
The Chairman. You are not online.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. It does not look like online, but could be.
Welcome.
Senator Udall, the floor is yours.
Big enough room. You should be able to find a chair,
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for you and Senator
Menendez calling this hearing, and, I think, very important
subjects we are talking about today on the Middle East.
After 20 years of uninterrupted war, the forever wars in
the Middle East continue. Contrary to the Trump
administration's pronouncements, we are even more entrenched in
the region than before, and no closer to revoking the 2001 AUMF
being used to justify wars that Congress never authorized.
Just last week, instead of drawing down from a war in Syria
that no one in Congress voted for, the Administration sent more
troops to a country where no strategic U.S. interest exists and
threats to American forces are everywhere. Maximum pressure is
an abject failure. I agree with Senator Cardin on that. It has
traded an agreement that placed limits on Iranian enrichment
for bluster, increased enrichment, and threats of war, all
enacted out of spite for the previous Administration's
progress.
Let us be clear. The United States left the Iran nuclear
agreement, and now wants to be the arbiter of how it is
enforced. That is ludicrous. As a result, the U.S. is now more
isolated around the world.
I want to reaffirm that neither--and this question is
directed to both witnesses--that neither the 2001 nor 2002 AUMF
give this President the authority to go to war or to enter into
any hostilities with Iran. Iran has responded to the maximum
pressure campaign by increasing its nuclear activities, and our
allies are rejecting our approach. What is the next step? Do
you expect the Iranian regime to collapse or give up? Or should
the American people prep for more unconstitutional attacks on
Iran that might precipitate a new war?
Mr. Abrams. Thanks, Senator.
The next step, we hope, would be a comprehensive
negotiation----
Senator Young. Hey. Should I direct the Yemen question at
Mr. Abram?
Senator Udall. Both witnesses.
Mr. Abrams. Well, I will start.
That is the goal. The goal of the maximum pressure campaign
is to deny Iran the money with which the regime is doing the
many things to which all of us object, and to get them to the
table to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would deal
with the nuclear program and its conduct in the region.
Senator Udall. Mr. Hale.
Ambassador Hale. Well, I might address your question about
the use of AUMF. The Administration has not, to date,
interpreted the 2002 AUMF as authorizing military force against
Iran, except as may be necessary and appropriate to promote
stability in Iraq and address terrorist threats emanating
there.
Senator Udall. Mr. Abrams, you have a lot of experience in
Latin America with coups, authoritarians, and failed democratic
transitions of power. Politico's morning newsletter asks a
question: Is the United States turning into a banana republic
under President Trump? President Trump, yesterday, said, and I
quote, ``Well, we are going to have to see what happens. You
know that I have been complaining very strongly at--about the
ballots, and the ballots are a disaster. Let us get rid of the
ballots, and we will have a very peaceful--and there will not
be a transfer, frankly, there would be a continuation. The
ballots are out of control. You know it, and you--and who knows
it better than anybody else? The Democrats know it better than
anybody else,'' That is the President of the United States
talking about the election.
Senator Romney replied to these comments by posting on
social media that, ``Fundamental to democracy is the peaceful
transition of power. Without that, there is Belarus. Any
suggestion that a President might not respect this
constitutional guarantee is both unthinkable and
unacceptable.''
As a high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department,
which has a mission to promote democracy, who do you agree most
with, and why?
Mr. Abrams. Senator, I am not going to parse the
President's remarks. I think we are all proud of American
democracy, and we continue, in this Administration, as did our
predecessors, to promote the expansion of democracy around the
world.
Senator Udall. Well, then some of you should be standing up
and saying this is unacceptable, and tell him that he should
not be talking and demeaning our democracy, and demeaning the
peaceful transition of power.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
We will now move to Senator Young, who I am told is joining
us online.
Senator Young. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We continue to witness the destabilizing effects of
Iranian-backed proxies throughout the Middle East, but
especially in Yemen, where the war and COVID-19 continue to
ravage and decimate a people that have already endured
unspeakable suffering. The Houthis continue to deflect
humanitarian assistance, food deliveries, and medical
assistance. The war is so complex in Yemen, with many different
facets deserving blame, but Iran's role certainly cannot be
overlooked.
From a global commerce perspective, Iran regularly threats
the--threatens the Straits of Hormuz. Now, through their Houthi
proxies, they may be able to also gain control of the Bab al-
Mandab Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of
Aden. If successful with gaining control over the key straits
on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran would completely
change our ability to access the region and alter how commerce
is able to flow.
Further, we are seeing Iran develop the Houthis into what
some characterize as a Hezbollah-like entity within Yemen that
could have an enduring effect and further prolong the conflict
that has already inflicted unspeakable humanitarian costs.
So, either Ambassador Abrams or Secretary Hale, could you
address what we are doing to end the conflict in Yemen? I know
you had some--you spoke to this at some length in your opening
remarks, but maybe you could expand on that.
Ambassador Hale. Yes, thank you, Senator.
I think you described the situation quite accurately. You
asked what we are doing about this. We have a multifaceted
strategy. First, we are supporting the efforts of the U.N.
Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, who has been tireless in
trying to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict, because
ultimately we do not believe that there is a military solution.
I was out in Saudi Arabia late last year, and I met with the
Yemeni leadership, I met with the U.N. leadership, I met with
the Saudi leadership, and encouraged them to continue down that
path.
We are also doing our utmost to interdict the weapons flows
from Iran that you have cited, and encouraging our allies to do
likewise and disrupt the Iranian smuggling networks that are
supplying these weapons and materiel to the Houthis.
We are also doing our utmost to work with our partners to
ensure that extremist groups are not using Yemen and its
stateless areas as a safe haven from which to conduct attacks.
We are trying to keep the aid moving on the humanitarian needs
of the Yemeni people, but the Houthis have been interfering
severely with that. We are doing our best, but there have been
real gaps as a result of that.
We share all of the concerns that you have. As I say, we
are doing this so you--deploying this multi-pronged strategy in
order to see that our interests are protected there.
Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Ambassador Abrams.
Mr. Abrams. The only thing I would add, Senator, is that we
are also clearly maintaining the level of military strength in
the region that we think is necessary to protect those two
chokepoints that you mentioned, the Strait of Hormuz and the
Bab al-Mandab.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Thank you both.
How is the Administration preventing Iran from replicating
the Hezbollah model in Yemen? You can expand that to address
other geographies, as well.
Ambassador Hale. Well, essentially, the tools that I
outlined in my answer a moment ago. We believe that a political
solution that is brought to bear as rapidly as possible can
prevent the transformation of the Houthis into a Hezbollah-like
asset for Iran. It is certainly essential. We have seen how
Hezbollah grew from a relatively small, if potent, terrorist
cell to what it is today, with its arms in every direction. We
definitely want to prevent that from happening. So, we are
doing our utmost to combat the Iranian influence. We have been
encouraged that the Republic of Yemen Government has reached
out to the Southern Transition Council and reached an agreement
with the South, so that is beginning to put pressure from both
directions on the Houthis, but there is a lot of work still
ahead of us.
Senator Young. Okay. We will continue to monitor that.
I think I have about 90 seconds left, but I will go ahead
and pivot to Turkey, Under Secretary Hale.
Many have discussed how the Abraham Accords might influence
Israel and Arab State efforts to counter the regional influence
of Iran, but what about Turkey? Turkey and Iran have similar
ambitions for recreating the empires that they once had, and
both desire to lead the Muslim world. Clearly, Turkey is--has
rapidly radicalized as--under Erdogan's regime. There are a lot
of challenges and implications for the broader region. We have
not seen any comparable actions taken by the Administration to
help change Turkey's trajectory. I know this is very
challenging. Turkey remains a member of NATO.
Are you concerned that, under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey
poses a greater--perhaps an even greater challenge to our
security over the longer term?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we have a complex relationship with
Turkey, and there are many factors in play, here. Our interests
in some areas overlap. Our interests differ in other areas. We
try, obviously, to build on our areas of agreement and try to
work out our areas of disagreement. They are a NATO ally. We
count on that. Their geography means that they do have
legitimate interests in the Middle East. That cannot be
ignored, but it is important that they be channeled in the ways
in which Turkey is supporting efforts to bring peace and
stability, particularly through multilateral formats in places
like Libya and in Syria, support of the political process
there. So, we have a very extensive dialogue with the Turks to
move them in that direction. That is our objective.
Senator Young. Okay. I will follow up----
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Young. --and inquire as to what action the
Administration may have taken within NATO to send messages to
Turkey.
Thank you so much, both of you, for your appearance before
the committee.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Young.
Senator Murphy, you are up.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to both of you, for your service.
I understand that, when Administration officials come
before this committee or any committee, they try to put the
best possible spin on the effect of their policies. Obama
administration officials did it. We have come to expect it, but
there are some times in which the case just does not pass the
straight-face test. I will say, this argument that Iran is on
the run, that they have less influence in the region because of
our maximum pressure campaign, just does not pass the straight-
face test. They have closer relations with the Houthis than
they did 4 years ago. They have closer relations with the
Qataris than they did 4 years ago. Their proxy in Syria is
closer to command over the majority of the country than 4 years
ago. This narrative about Iraq is just not true. I mean, it is
true that rocket attacks have increased from the first half of
this year to the first half of last year. I do not know that
there is any expert that would tell you that Iran has less
influence in Iraq than they did at the end of the Obama
administration. So, I think it is important for us all to be
sober and realistic, because you cannot make good policy if you
do not understand the consequences of your actions.
That is a statement. Here are my two questions, both for
you, Ambassador Hale.
I think we also have an accountability crisis in the
region. Part of the reason we are so weak right now in and
around the Middle East is because our allies and our
adversaries, generally do not believe that there is much
consequence for taking action against the United States or
taking action in contravention of U.S. interests. The,
obviously, most high-profile example is the dismemberment of
Jamal Khashoggi. There were no consequences of any serious
nature against Saudi Arabia for that brutal murder, but the
region is populated with other instances in which U.S. law has
been violated, and there seemingly has been no accountability,
which is just an invitation for our so-called allies in the
region to continue to treat us shabbily. I think it has
consequences for the next Administration, as well.
So, Ambassador Hale, let me pose two of--two examples for
you and ask for an update on whether there has been any
accountability.
The first is in UAE. We have talked about the potential
pending sale. I have asked this question several times, but UAE
admitted, about a year and a half ago, to taking U.S. weapons
and transferring them to very dangerous Salafist militias that
have interests on the ground in Yemen. This was not just
reported. This was admitted to by UAE. For a year and a half,
this committee has been told that it has been under
investigation. So, my question is, What specific steps have
been taken to hold UAE accountable for the illegal transfer of
U.S. weapons to militia groups on the ground in the region?
Second, in Egypt, on July 13, American citizen Mustafa
Kassem died in an Egyptian prison. His death was entirely
preventable. He had submitted the paperwork to renounce his
citizenship so that he could be released to the United States.
On February 26, Assistant Secretary Schenker said that the
State Department's deliberations about what actions to take in
consequence were a work in progress.
So, let me ask you, Can you provide us an update? Has there
been any public action--and I think public action is important,
because if you do not--if the world does not see us engaging in
accountability, then it is hard for it to have an effect--has
there been any public accountability measures taken for the
transfer of weapons in UAE or the killing of Mustafa Kassem in
an Egyptian prison?
Ambassador Hale. I would be happy to get you a full answer
in writing to your two questions.
What I have to say this morning is that we have had very
serious conversations with both of those governments about
those activities. In the case of the Emirates, I am confident
that the Emirates understand exactly what is permitted and what
is not, and how serious these allegations are about what
happened, and that there can be nothing like that again,
because it is jeopardizing our ability to meet their legitimate
security needs.
In the case of Egypt, again, we have a confidential
dialogue with the Egyptians. I emphasize ``confidential''
because I think we are more likely to get results, in terms of
protecting American citizens, relatives of American citizens
who are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention and other
forms of mistreatment there. We have had some success in
getting them released, but we will continue to have those
conversations with the Egyptians and to spell out how
unacceptable this kind of abusive behavior is.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the Saudis, as a consequence
of killing Jamal Khashoggi, got a smiling photo op with
Secretary Pompeo. Apparently, from what we are hearing today,
the Emirates and the Egyptians have gotten stern private
conversations. That is not a recipe to send a message to the
rest of the region and the world to obey U.S. law and to treat
U.S. citizens well and to act in accordance with our interests.
I think this is part and parcel of the reason why America is
getting very little from our allies. Our interests are not
advancing in the region, because nobody believes they will be
held accountable if they--if their policies run crosscurrent to
the United States.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. I have got to say, I just heard the comments
from my friend from Connecticut, and it is almost like we are
living in parallel worlds. To say we are not getting anything
significant in our ally--from our allies just rewrites history.
I had the great joy of being at the White House last week
for an historic peace deal, where, for the first time in three
decades, an Arab country normalized relationships with Israel,
the UAE did so, and, within a matter of weeks thereafter,
Bahrain did so. Both of those were major diplomatic advances.
They had not happened for decades. The Saudis, whom the Senator
from Connecticut just cast aspersions at them, played a major
role in brokering Middle East peace, including, for the first
time, as allowing Israeli planes to overfly Saudi airspace. So,
I understand that we are 41 days out from an election, and so
everything has to be bad in foreign policy if your opponent is
the incumbent, but I do think this committee deserves some
acknowledgment and recognition of the historic events that are
playing out right now, events that have made our allies safer,
events that have made the Middle East safer, and events that
have made America safe.
Mr. Abrams, you are a longtime expert on the region. What
are your thoughts on the historic peace deal that was just
brokered by the President?
Mr. Abrams. I am reminded, Senator, of the many people who
said that this could not happen without an Israeli-Palestinian
peace agreement, but the Administration thought that it would
work in the other direction, that the first thing to try to do
was to normalize relations between Israel and a number of Arab
States, and then that might have an influence on Palestinian
conduct and prove to be correct.
Senator Cruz. Well, and I will tell you, it really proved
right some conversations we had in 2017, in the first year of
the Trump administration. As you know, there were vigorous
debates within the Administration on a number of foreign policy
questions. One question was whether or not to move our Embassy
in Israel to Jerusalem. The Department where you work today,
the State Department, opposed moving the Embassy. The Defense
Department opposed moving the Embassy. I engaged vigorously in
those debates directly with the President. The argument that
State and Defense made, and the argument that some in the White
House made, is that moving the Embassy to Jerusalem would
enrage the enemies of Israel, it would enrage the enemies of
America, and it would make peace in the Middle East harder to
achieve.
In my view, that was precisely backwards, that the reason
peace has been so difficult to achieve, in part, has been the
consistent ambiguity of U.S. policy, the wringing of hands,
where the enemies of America and the enemies of Israel did not
know where we stand. What I urged the President is, moving the
Embassy will be heard crystal clear across the globe by
America's friends and by America's enemies, that America stands
resolutely and unshakeably alongside our friend, the State of
Israel.
I was there in Jerusalem the day the Embassy opened, a time
of celebration and dancing in the streets. I do not believe it
was coincidental that, within a week of the Embassy opening,
the Administration announced what I think is the single most
important foreign policy decision of the last 4 years, which is
withdrawing from the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal. Both
of those together, in my judgment, were the essential
preconditions for the historic peace deal that rolled out
within the last couple of weeks. That clarity--I can tell you,
in the last couple of weeks, I have had conversations directly
with the Ambassador from the UAE and the Ambassador from Saudi
Arabia. Both of them told me, said the reason we are cutting
this deal is because we want to be friends with America, we
want to be closer friends with you. We know you care that we
make nice with Israel. So, we are willing to do that, because
we want a closer friendship and alliance with the United
States. I think that is an incredible victory for clarity in
foreign policy, and it is something worth learning from,
celebrating, and emulating, going forward.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Well said. There are
obviously two different views on this, and it is unfortunate
that the political conditions in the country today get us
there. The situation with Iran is serious. We obviously have
differences with our allies on it. They are very squishy on it.
We have all talked to them, but it has got to be dealt with.
Senator Kaine, no doubt you have strong feelings on the
matter.
Senator Kaine. I do, Mr. Chair, but I do not like the
suggestion that strong feelings and differences of opinion are
just because of the political situation. Can there not be an
intellectually respectable ground for difference of opinion
that does not just get cast aside as being politically
motivated?
The Chairman. There can be, but there----
Senator Kaine. Well, let----
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Kaine. Let me jump in, because I want to pay a
compliment. I am very willing to be critical when it is
warranted. I have got some critical things to say, too. but I
also feel like, to be fair-minded, I should pay a compliment.
My top thing I wanted to say this morning was congratulations
on the normalization of relations between Israel, UAE, Bahrain.
I think this is a big, positive accomplishment. I tweeted out,
immediately when I heard it, that it was a positive for Israel,
that it was a positive for the U.S. I gave the Trump
administration praise for their work in this. I think a lot of
people should get praise. I think the Trump administration
should. I hope you will take that back to the Secretary of
State and the White House.
I think Israeli leadership should. I think the Ambassador
to the UAE, Yousef Al Otaiba, wrote a very powerful editorial
in an Israeli paper, which was quite unusual, basically saying,
``We are on a path toward normalization. Please do not annex
territories on the West Bank. If you do that, you will blow up
the opportunity for normalization. If you will not do that, we
can open up a path to normalization.'' So, I give Yousef Al
Otaiba and other leaders of these nations credit for being
willing to put a bold proposal on the table, but also to ask
something of Israel in exchange.
I also give members of the Senate credit in this. When the
new Israeli Government was formed, Bibi Netanyahu and Benny
Gantz put out a public statement saying that they were going to
annex territories, beginning on July 2, ``with American
support.'' They made that public. ``We are going to do this
with American support.'' Many of us in this body looked at that
language and said, ``If you are going to say publicly you are
doing annexation with American support, then we are going to
publicly say, `Please do not do this.' '' We had a letter, that
about a quarter of the Senate signed, to Israel, saying, ``We
would view this as catastrophic to peace prospects. We would
view it as violation of U.S. policy. We would view it,
potentially, as a violation of international law, destabilizing
in the region.'' I think the Israeli leadership looked at all
of these things, ``Here is a path to peace and normalization,
here is a path that could lead to strained relationships in the
region, and potentially strained relationships in the United
States,'' and they did a calculation that I think was the right
calculation, for peace in the region and for their own
security, which is to enter into this deal.
So, I have no trouble saying thank you, and
congratulations, to this Administration and to the Israelis and
to UAE and the other nations, and also say to my Senate
colleagues, who firmly stood up for the need for a peace
dialogue and against unilateral action by the Israelis and an
annexation, these stars aligned and produced something
positive. That is a good thing. That is a good thing. That is a
good thing.
I do associate myself with comments by folks on this side
of the aisle, and I do not think they are political. I believe
them earnestly and sincerely, that the policy with respect to
Iran has been a disaster, because there is not a single thing
we could not have do not--this Administration could not have
done, had they kept the Iran deal and pocket it and enforced
the hell out of it, and then also utilize the fact that the
JCPOA was only a narrow deal, dealing with the nuclear
portfolio, that did not forbid the U.S. from engaging or
imposing sanctions for ballistic missiles or sanctions for
bellicose activity in the region, in Yemen or Bahrain or
anywhere else.
We had a huge suite of tools we could use against Iran.
There is not a single thing this Administration has done to put
pressure on Iran that we could not have done while pocketing
the gains of that deal and imposing pressure on Iran to comply
with it. Had we done that, we would not have been at odds with
our allies. Had we done that, it would have been easier to find
a nuclear deal with North Korea. As soon as the U.S. decided to
blow up a deal that everybody said was being complied with,
North Korea looked at our desire to find a nuclear deal, and
basically said, ``Hold on a second. If we are going to do a
deal, and the U.S. will just gladly walk out of it, even if it
is being complied with''--it immediately made it much more
difficult.
So, I will associate myself with a lot of what Senator Cruz
said on the first part of this, that this--these normalizations
were very, very significant accomplishments. I agree with that,
but I have to completely disagree with respect to Iran.
I hope you will keep pressure on Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
has people in jail or under trial who are Virginia residents.
Jamal Khashoggi, was a Virginia resident. There has been no
accountability, and the President is bragging that he,
basically, got Congress to back off and allow impunity for MBS.
There are Aziza al-Yousef and other Virginians who have been in
prison for women's rights activism in Saudi Arabia, are under
trial for it. We have to keep the pressure on for them.
Secretary Hale, you know the situation. So--well, I have
seen you more in the Middle East than I have seen you in the
United States. I mean, you know this situation so well. We have
to keep the pressure on Saudi Arabia to advance human rights
and not be one of the most egregious violators of human rights
in the world. I have confidence that, to the extent you can,
given the fact that the President wants to ``save MBS's ass,''
as he said--I am using his words--to the extent that you can, I
am confident that you will.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back to you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. You discharge
yourself well when you compliment the Administration for their
success. We appreciate that.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I agree with you that we should have the
ability to have a----
Your colleagues are not--are amused by the fact, I guess,
that you have complimented the Administration on their success.
In any event, the--you are right that we should have a
legitimate discussion about Iran. One would sit around
listening to this, with the Republicans on one side and the
Democrats on the other, as if it is somebody in this room's
fault. I think we all need to agree, all of this is the result
of Iran's malign conduct. I agree with you that the--it would
be really nice to sit down and make an agreement. The problem
is--and I----
One thing I disagree with you strongly on is that, ``Well,
we should have stayed in the agreement, and then enforced the
heck out of it, and everything would be all right.'' This is a
country that is killing American men and women. You cannot do
business like that and, on the one hand, with your left hand,
be negotiating with them about doing good things, and, on the
other hand, letting them get away with the most malign activity
that is possible.
So, again, I appreciate your view on this, but we ought to
all start from the proposition that the problem here is Iran.
It is not the Republicans or the Democrats or either one's
policy towards Iran. It is Iran that is the problem. We are all
Americans, and we are all of the frame of mind that these
people have got to be contained from their malign activities.
So, it is unfortunate we do have this division over this,
but--in any event.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, if I could--I am not going to----
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Kaine. --take long, but----
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Kaine. We have had this discussion before.
The Chairman. You and I have had, personally.
Senator Kaine. We have had it personally. We had it in the
committee. There is so much we can say about all that Iran has
done bad, but you always have to look at the way they look at
us. I have that conversation before. That does not mean that
they are right, that does not mean that we have to take their
side of it, but you know that I know some things that I am not
at liberty to discuss right here, so you assert that as Iran--
has Iran killed Americans? The answer to that is yes. There are
some things that I would like to say to complete the picture,
that I am not able to say at a hearing like this.
The only way to build out of historic distrust--and there
is a deep historic distrust between the United States and Iran
that goes back to the U.S. and the U.K. deposing a
democratically elected Government of Iran in the 1950s--and
then the things that Iran has done to us--the Embassy, the--
taking American hostages at the Embassy in 1979. This has been
a back-and-forth for five or six decades. How do you get out of
distrust? Because I think we would all agree it would be a good
thing for the world if we could. Maybe it is impossible, but if
we could get out of it, how do we get out of it? The answer is
a tiny step at a time. Not overnight. No, no, not overnight. A
tiny step at a time.
That is what I am looking for. I am looking for
acknowledging all of the bad, that you point out, but trying to
figure out the tiny steps at a time that can lead us into a
better place. I happen to believe that that is possible. There
are some who believe it is impossible. I happen to believe it
is possible. Maybe that is just me, but I know we will continue
to have this discussion.
The Chairman. I agree with that, Senator Kaine. I agree
with you, I think it is baby steps at a time, but the fact that
we were historical enemies--I mean, you look back at--look what
happened with Germany and Japan, two of our closest allies
right now, and the atrocities that they committed were just
awful, but they stopped. That is a difference.
The--what I always come back to with Iran is the--one of
the great hopes is the demographics of that country, the
significant population of young people in that country who do
not buy on to what--where the Administration has been taking--
--
So, this is a conversation we do need to continue, we have
got to always remember, we are all on the same side of this.
Now, how we get to where we want to go, we may have differences
on, but we need to respect and----
Thank you so much, Senator Kaine.
We have Senator Merkley, who is online.
Senator Merkley, the floor is yours.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
I wanted to start with a question for David Hale. This
goes--and I apologize if you have already addressed this in
this gathering, because I was late to be able to tune in, due
to another commitment, but the question is this. In a context
of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia has shown
interest in developing a nuclear cycle. The Wall Street Journal
noted, in August of this year, that they had built a facility
they had not disclosed to the world to extract yellowcake from
uranium ore; essentially, the front end of a nuclear cycle. The
conversations we have had with Saudi Arabia have not produced a
commitment in the context of the future development of nuclear
weapons.
Obviously, this is relevant to the conversation we are
having about Iran, because you have the two major powers of the
Sunni world and the Shi'ite world who watch each other very
carefully and are very concerned about what the other power
within that Muslim spectrum does. So, bring us up to date on
how forcefully--how determined is the Administration to insist
on the gold standard for nuclear power in Saudi Arabia? The
gold standard being the standard that says a country agrees to
forego uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing to,
basically, not build the infrastructure as a foundation for the
development of nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Hale. Well, thank you, Senator. We certainly
share the concern that you have addressed.
Our nonproliferation goals are global and regional and
universal in their nature. We agree that there has to be
commitment to a gold standard that you have described.
I would say, though, that the most effective way in order
to prevent those hypothetical scenarios from unfolding is to
make sure that Saudi Arabia knows that we--together, our
partners in defense of their security, and that we are
addressing their legitimate security needs. This goes to issues
that Elliot Abrams deals with on a daily basis. I think he has
covered them pretty fully during the session this morning, but
since you were absent, I might turn the microphone to him. It
is all about Iran and making sure that Iran does not pose a
nuclear threat, or other forms of threats, to--of an
existential nature, to our Saudi partners.
Elliot, would you like to expand?
Mr. Abrams. Only to say that we do hope for the ability to
negotiate what we would view as a comprehensive deal that would
include a nuclear aspect, that would really prevent Iran from
moving toward a nuclear weapon, something that we do not
believe the JCPOA actually did.
Senator Merkley. Well, I must say that the agreement did
require Iran to forego its planned plutonium reactor, and
dismantle it. It did require them to forego enrichment. It did
require them to forego R&D on advanced centrifuges. It did
require them to--an existing stock of enriched uranium. It did
require them to move things out of the country. So, there were
a whole series of provisions, while not eternal and not perfect
and subject to future negotiation, certainly were very
substantial, real on-the-ground changes.
As Secretary Pompeo has said to me, ``Well, we did not need
the agreement, because Iran had no intention of building a
nuclear weapon.'' He noted that the--there was no foundation,
in terms of our intelligence, that suggested that they had made
that decision to build a nuclear weapon since--going back to
2003. Well, fine, but still, we do not like the idea of the
nuclear cycle producing the capability to do so. That is what
was dismantled in that agreement.
You said, Mr. Hale--and I think I am--can quote you--what
you just said is, ``We will insist on the gold standard.'' That
has not been the position of this Administration. Are you
saying now this Administration's position is, ``We will insist,
in our relationship with Saudi Arabia, on the gold standard''?
Ambassador Hale. Well, I do not want to contradict
statements that have been made by others, so I will have to get
back to you on that if you discern any difference of opinion.
As I said, we have a global policy. It is regional and it
is universal. We do not want to see the--this kind of
proliferation occurring. We are having serious--always have
serious conversations anytime any country appears to be going
in that direction.
Again, I think that the real focus has to be making sure
that it is an environment in the Gulf in which the Saudis do
not feel that this path is one that they have to go down in
order to defend their country.
Senator Merkley. Well, it is so interesting you would say
that, because the Saudis did not feel they had to, because we
had an agreement that prevented Iran from doing that. Now we
have dismantled that agreement, and now they are starting to
build their nuclear cycle. I am asking you, are you confronting
Saudi Arabia and telling them not to complete this facility for
extracting yellowcake from uranium ore as the first stage or
the front end of a nuclear cycle? Are you telling them that,
for our relationship to be on solid ground, they cannot bypass
that gold standard, and that, if they do, it completely
undermines our credibility in getting Iran to bypass having
that nuclear infrastructure?
Ambassador Hale. I would really prefer to have this
conversation with you in a different setting, rather than this
public one, but I can assure you that I will be available, or
make the appropriate people at the State Department available,
to you to continue this conversation, if I may.
The Chairman. I think that is----
Senator Merkley. I must say that I think it would be very
valuable for the Administration to be very publicly committed
to the--that vision of Saudi Arabia not pursuing this, and to
use some of the leverage that this Administration has built up
with Saudi Arabia, built up in ways that I might have strongly
disagreed with, in terms of the response to the assassination
of an American resident. If you have that leverage, it makes
sense to use it, and use it in a very public way. Right now,
whatever polite conversations you might have in passing, in
private, are having no impact. So, perhaps worth rethinking the
approach.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
We will go to Senator Markey. I am told he is online.
Senator Markey. Hello. Yes. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey, welcome.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, so much.
May I ask our witnesses about Saudi Arabia and its efforts
to develop its own indigenous nuclear materials program and to
have a missile program, as well, which clearly would be an
enormously destabilizing element into the Middle East?
So, if I may, could--would one or both of you answer the
question about who--which of the countries, especially China,
is providing materials to Saudi Arabia in order to develop an
indigenous capacity within their country.
Ambassador Hale. Senator, with much respect, I am not
prepared, in this public setting, to offer that kind of
information, but I am absolutely committed to answering all of
your questions in a classified setting.
Senator Markey. Why are you not prepared to answer the--
this fundamental national security question in public? What
would be the reason why you would not be willing to do that?
Ambassador Hale. Because I am concerned about the level of
classification of the information.
Senator Markey. My question is, why is it classified? In
other words, if China is helping Saudi Arabia right now, the
American people have a right to know that, especially a month
before a presidential election. So, why would that not be
something that the American people should know, that there is a
potential nuclear weapons program inside of Saudi Arabia that
is being built right now? I have--can you give me the reason--
you are saying it is classified. I would ask you, why is it
classified?
Ambassador Hale. Any information that I have seen about
this topic has been classified. Therefore, I cannot really
share it here in this room, but I am absolutely prepared to
coming to you with the right people to answer any questions
that you may have related to this set of issues.
Senator Markey. Right. All right. Well, tell me this, then.
What limits would the Administration place upon a potential 123
Agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, particularly as
press reports indicate they are progressing in other areas of
their nuclear fuel cycle on ballistic missile technology?
Ambassador Hale. I do not have the capacity to answer the
question. It is somewhat hypothetical, and it is not my field
of expertise. I am not trying to sidestep it, I just do not
have answers for you.
Senator Markey. Well, we are having a briefing on the
Middle East, and I do not think there is anything more volatile
than whether or not Saudi Arabia is trying to develop a nuclear
weapons technology. Do you believe we should trust Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman when he stated, in 2018, that, ``If
Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as
possible''? Should we trust bin Salman not to be developing it
right now?
Ambassador Hale. Well, that goes to the point I have tried
to make several times, which is, the most effective means to
prevent this kind of proliferation and destabilizing activity
would be to make sure that we are addressing the threats that
Saudi Arabia faces, and providing it with the means of self-
defense.
Senator Markey. Right. Well, ultimately, though, we wind up
fueling it if we do not guarantee that Saudi Arabia understands
that we are going to abide by a gold standard, which is why
Senator Rubio and I introduced the Saudi Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act that requires Congress to affirmatively
approve any 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia, and would hold
them to the gold standard, requiring them to commit to forego
any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing. I think that
we should take a very serious pause before handing the Saudis,
or anyone else, the tools with which to make a nuclear weapon
and potentially kick off a nuclear arms race in the region.
Is the goal of the Trump administration to negotiate a gold
standard with Saudi Arabia? Is that your--is that the objective
which the Trump administration has?
Ambassador Hale. Well, our focus--is on what I have said,
which is dealing with the threat posed by Iran--Elliot Abrams
has gone in great detail over how we are dealing with that--and
making sure that Saudi Arabia has the means of self-defense.
I am not here today to talk about 123 Agreements or the
nuclear program. I would be very happy to address this, as I
have said, in a classified setting, at your convenience.
Senator Markey. Well, again, this just goes back to whether
or not the Iran deal was being violated by Iran--the Iran
nuclear deal. It was not. It was under safeguards. The IAEA was
in there. Right now, we know that there has been no breakout
that actually brings Iran meaningfully closer to a nuclear
weapons program. So, in that context, the Saudi breakout is on
the Trump watch, and it is something that, because you will not
testify to, you will not give us the information, in terms of
what is going on with any relations with China or other
countries, but that, in and of itself, is an indication that
the Trump administration is actually leading to a fueling of
the nuclear arms race in the Middle East, rather than trying to
douse those flames.
So, from my perspective, I am looking forward to getting
the briefing on what is going on in Saudi Arabia. I would like
to do so as soon as is possible, but I believe something very
significant, historically, is right now unfolding in the Middle
East, in Saudi Arabia. The last thing we need is an all-out
nuclear arms race in that region. I am afraid the Trump
administration policies are pointing us in that direction.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Do we have any other members online that have joined us?
If not, I want to thank--Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me briefly, first, say, I was chuckling when you said
Senator Kaine acquitted himself well, because you said he only
acquitted himself while he was praising the Administration. I
think Senator Kaine was acquitting himself well in his totality
of his presentation. So, that is why I was chuckling.
I would just note for the record that several members of
this committee on both sides of the aisle, including myself,
have a resolution recognizing the historic and important
significance of the UAE-Bahrain agreement. So, it is not that
we are not prone, because it is election time, not to recognize
that which is, but as someone who is been working on Iran since
I was with the House of Representatives when no one was paying
attention to Iran, and I would say, ``Well, why are you not
paying attention to Iran?''--a country that has huge oil and
natural gas reserves and is seeking nuclear power--for what?
Not because it needs it for nuclear domestic energy, but for
its a design for nuclear weapons. I have called it as I have
see it, and including in the last Administration, when I had
strong disagreements, but that is not going to stop me now from
having, when I believe, strong disagreements with this
Administration.
So, let me turn to a couple of questions I have in that
regard.
Special Representative Abrams--and maybe you can just give
me a couple of quick yes-or-noes on these--do you agree that,
over the past 2 years, Iran has moved closer to developing a
nuclear weapon?
Mr. Abrams. I would say they have moved a little bit
closer----
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Mr. Abrams:--in the sense that they have got more fissile
material.
Senator Menendez. Has--that is what I was going to get to--
has Iran increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Has it increased its enrichment capacity?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Okay. So, is Iran's breakdown time--
meaning the time Iran needs to produce enough weapon-grade
uranium for a nuclear weapon--significantly shorter than it was
in 2018?
Mr. Abrams. I do not know if I would say it was
significantly shorter.
Senator Menendez. Is it shorter?
Mr. Abrams. In principle, it has to be shorter.
Senator Menendez. Yes. So, those are all the critical
elements of when we are considering how Iran is doing, vis-a-
vis our policy, in terms of achieving the ultimate goal.
Let me turn to Secretary Hale. I know we have been calling
you ``Ambassador,'' which you will have for life, but right
now, you are Under Secretary, so you deserve that title. I want
to pick off on Senator Young's comments about Turkey, and your
response.
When Turkey ultimately intercedes in the internationally
recognized territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus, a
member of the European Union, is it promoting peace and
stability in that region?
Ambassador Hale. We have called that out. We definitely
have--are seeking to de-escalate the situation in the eastern
Mediterranean, working with the French and others. Secretary of
State was in Cyprus recently, so we are working--it is very
problematic, and we are working to de-escalate.
Senator Menendez. Yes. The only person who is--the only
country who is interceding in their international waters is
Turkey. I mean, I love how we call on both sides. Well, one
side is not doing anything.
Same thing in Greece. Is Turkey promoting peace and
stability when it intercedes in the territorial waters of----
Ambassador Hale. I--no, I did not mean to suggest we are
calling on all sides. What Turkey is doing is problematic, and
we are trying to bring about de-escalation.
Senator Menendez. Same thing in Greece. Is that not true?
As it relates to its----
Ambassador Hale. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Menendez. --territorial----
When Turkey seeks to have Halkbank not be sanctioned under
U.S. law, that is not promoting the national interests of the
United States under U.S. law?
Ambassador Hale. No.
Senator Menendez. When Turkey is supporting the side in
Yemen of which we totally do not recognize, it is not creating
peace and stability.
So, I appreciate our aspirations of what Turkey was, but it
is not the--it is not the realities under Erdogan. I think, on
that, it was--the Chairman and I would agree.
Let me ask you two final quick questions.
In the wake of the devastating explosion in Beirut, I was
pleased that the Chairman and I introduced a bipartisan
resolution in support of U.S. relief efforts and continued
engagement with the Lebanese people and the international
community to hold those responsible accountable. What more can
the U.S. do to support those voices and actors in Lebanon who
have proven to be good interlocutors?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we meet with them, which is
important, because it demonstrates that they have a legitimate
voice in the country. We encourage them, we have trained many
of their cadres on how to organize as NGOs. There is a lot
going on at the grassroots level. We also engage the elite
leadership of the country, many of whom are under--are feeling
on the defensive, and finding out what they are planning to do
to turn the situation around.
I am struck, frankly, during my visit there, by how much
Hezbollah is also suffering as a consequence of this. They are
caught up in the same pool of people, of the public level,
demanding that Hezbollah, as well, disarm, that they stop their
own corrupt practices that are at the center of this problem.
We strongly endorse that view, as well.
We think that continued focus on reform is the right way.
When I went out and met with some of the demonstrators and
activists, they shouted to me, ``No bailout. Do not bail out
this government.'' I said, ``We agree.'' We will provide
humanitarian relief. We thank you for your support here in the
Senate for that, but we have to be tough and make sure that our
broader assistance is conditional on fundamental change.
Senator Menendez. Well, I hope we can continue to make sure
that our assistance goes to supporting and empowering people
working on behalf of all the Lebanese people.
Then, finally, I know that you are familiar with the U.S.-
Sudan claims agreement and the legislation that the State
Department is asking Congress to pass to implement that
international agreement. Let me be clear. Sudan is at a very
fragile moment, and I have consistently indicated, for more
than a year, that the Administration should do much more to
support the fledgling democracy than it has done. I support a
Sudan claims deal, but I also believe this deal falls short. I
have some questions about how the Administration--whether or
not it has a commitment to make it better. The legislation the
State Department is seeking refers to ``fairness'' for U.S.
victims, but is it fair that the State Department left 9/11
families completely out in the cold in the Sudan negotiations?
Is it fair that you intentionally excluded their claims from
the Sudan deal, you conveniently did not share that fact with
Congress, and then you pushed Congress to pass legislation that
would have completely terminated all 9/11 claims against Sudan?
So, I want to hear from you. That does not strike me as a
``fair deal,'' and it is a slap in the face to our fellow
citizens who lost loved ones in 9/11. So, speak to me about
this concept of fairness that you seem to have? Not you,
personally, but the State Department.
Ambassador Hale. Well, the agreement addresses the existing
claims from victims of the Cole bombing and the Embassy
bombings that occurred in East Africa. Those claims are
longstanding. They have been through the court system. We
believe that this deal offers a fair basis, as do the victims,
themselves, who have essentially accepted the deal.
Subsequent to all this, there was the introduction of the
possibility of 9/11 claimants. During the last round of
negotiations on the continuing resolution, the Administration
did send a letter up to the Hill, and we were prepared to offer
compromises that would have, I--we think, provided a high level
of protection for any future claims of 9/11 victims against
Sudan that were--that achieved status in a U.S. court.
I would be happy to--I do not have the specifics in front
of me. It is very legalistic language. I would be happy to get
that to you right away this morning.
Senator Menendez. It is very legalistic, and I am familiar
with it.
Let me just say, I will oppose any Sudan legislation that
fails to preserve and protect the 9/11 claims, to make sure
that 9/11 families are not stomped upon by the Administration.
I hope the State Department will reluctantly come along.
I have not seen the text--Congress has not seen the text of
the U.S.-Sudan agreement. Can you commit to sharing the text of
the agreement with Congress by the end of the week?
Ambassador Hale. Well, we sent a letter that described the
nature of the agreement. I will go back to our legal advisor's
office. I do not know that we have final--I have--in fact, I am
confident we have not finalized the agreement, itself, so we do
not have anything yet to share, but we did describe, in some
detail, the essential elements of the agreement.
Senator Menendez. Well, you cannot ask Congress, Mr.
Secretary, it is like playing games here--you cannot ask
Congress to pass implementing legislation for an international
agreement, basically asking us to sign on the dotted line, let
you--yet you will not let us see the agreement. That is absurd.
So, I am not going to sign on to something that I cannot even
see. So, until we get to that point, count me out. I think we
may bring others along with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Chairman, if I----
The Chairman. Thank you----
Mr. Abrams. --could just jump in for one second, I would
just respond to something Senator Menendez said, in, of course,
correctly, reminding us of your own comments about the Iranian
nuclear program, decades ago. Those comments, those judgments,
are still exactly correct, they are still behaving like a
country that is looking for a nuclear weapon and has something
to hide, even in 2020. The IAEA asked for access to two sites
in January. It took 7 months to get access to one site. The
IAEA has reported, this year, that it visited three sites that
were clearly sanitized. We have the archive discovered by the
Israelis that shows that they kept intact everything they had
done on the development of a nuclear weapon, and the team that
had done it under the same leadership. So, the--that same
problem does exist, now decades later.
Senator Menendez. We do not disagree.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me also confirm that the Ranking Member's view on
Turkey, and my view, are absolutely congruent.
So, with that, Senator Kaine, we promised a hard stop at 11
o'clock. We have got a couple of minutes. We----
Senator Kaine. I will honor that.
The Chairman has one of the best, like, look-over-his-
glasses eye rolls when you try to do a second round, but thank
goodness I am sitting so far away from you, and social
distancing, that I could not read that queue. I am going to be
quick.
Secretary Hale, you are really an expert on Lebanon. There
have been questions about the current situation in Lebanon. I
have appreciated your answers--Senator Romney, Senator
Menendez, Senator Shaheen, but I am sort of looking down the
road. I really, really worry about Lebanon. I think it is an
incredibly country. I think the U.S.-Lebanese relationship,
especially military affairs, has been a positive one, but I
think it is on the verge of failed-state status. Many Lebanese-
Americans believe that. Many people that I talk to in Lebanon
believe that. I sometimes worry a little bit that we are--in
our alliance with Israel, we are so worried about Iran that we
do not talk enough about Lebanon, although there is obviously a
connection, because of Iranian support for Hezbollah, but you
want to see reform. You mention that, ``We have to see reform.
We have to--to promote the reform, but as somebody who is a
real expert on Lebanon because of positions both in Beirut and
at--in the State Department, what is a reasonably optimistic--
not an unreasonably optimistic--but, what is a reasonably
optimistic, sort of, path forward in Lebanon that you think
could occur? What can the United States do to facilitate a
reasonably optimistic path forward for that country?
Ambassador Hale. The country is basically out of gas. I
mean, prior to the explosion, they had a deep financial and
economic crisis already. They have a burden of--a quarter of
their population are refugees today, and COVID-19 has struck
them heavily. Then they have a completely dysfunctional form of
government that, Hezbollah, at the center of, exploits fully to
their own advantage. This is the set of problems that we have.
Now, one of the strategies that I think is important to
bear in mind is that Hezbollah is in that position largely
because of their monopoly of arms--so, that is why we are
supporting the army--but also because they can call upon non-
Shia allies in government to at least get a parliamentary
majority. Given the mood of anger that I detected anyway, I
think that, if elections were held soon, there could be,
potentially, very different results that would shift toward
more reform-minded and moderate forces in Lebanon. So, I think
that is an important goal.
The French President is very active in trying to bring
together agreement on a government. I think that the standard
that we will apply to that government is, is it able to begin
this reform process? We are not unrealistic. We realize that
they cannot take on everything, but there are a few simple
things that they can do. For example, in rebuilding the port,
are they going to make sure that it is transparent and that
Hezbollah and other factions do not have unfettered access to
do whatever they want in that port? Is Customs going to stop
being a source of illicit revenue for whoever can get their
hands on it? That is a very simple and straightforward thing.
With all eyes focused on the port, they ought to be able to do
that. Then they need to be looking at the Central Bank, making
sure that it is meeting the gold standard there at the Central
Bank, and looking at banking reforms, which is the cornerstone
of the Lebanese economy.
None of this gets to the core problem, which is Hezbollah's
distortion of Lebanon. We have got to do more there. The
maximum pressure campaign on Iran is very much part of that,
and we have deprived Hezbollah a lot--of a lot of resources,
but we want to boost our allies so that they can be a
counterforce against Hezbollah. That is our strategy in
Lebanon.
The Chairman. Yes, thank you, Senator Kaine. Very valid
questions in a very worrisome situation, and thanks for
bringing that up.
With that, I want to thank both of our witnesses. You have
been very generous with us today.
For the information of the members of the committee, the
record will remain open until the close of business on Friday.
Would ask the witnesses to promptly respond to any questions.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Recent press reports have indicated that the UAE has in
fact delivered a Letter of Request for the purchase of F-35s and armed
Reaper drones. Please confirm whether or not this is the case along
with the details of the Letter of Request, including:
Date of delivery of the Letter of Request.
Number F-35's were requested for purchase.
Number of Reaper drones requested for purchase.
Whether and what kind of F-35 variant was requested for
purchase.
Total purchase price if one has either been proposed or
agreed upon.
Whether and what kinds of threats were listed in the Letter
of Request to justify the sale.
Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved
arms sales to Congress.
Question. Does the Administration commit to full formal and
informal Congressional notification and approval processes for this
sale?
Answer. If a case along the lines suggested in your previous
question is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a
case.
Question. Was this sale an Emirati condition for signing the
Abraham Accords?
Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved
arms sales to Congress.
Question. What specific threats to the UAE do the F-35s address
that can't be met by existing weapons systems or alternative sales?
Answer. We are committed to helping the United Arab Emirates and
all American partners in the region meet their security requirements.
As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation conversations with
our partners as private until we notify any approved arms sales to
Congress. As is the case for all sales, a detailed justification of the
reasons necessitating the sale of such articles or services will be
delineated via the Congressional Notification per AECA section 36(b).
Question. Has a determination been made that the sale of this
aircraft to the UAE will not jeopardize Israel's Qualitative Military
Edge?
Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of
jurisdiction.
Question. Has the U.S. interagency reviewed and determined what
variant of the aircraft would be best to sell, in terms of protecting
U.S. national security in the aircraft's technology, and in terms of
protecting Israel's Qualitative Military Edge? If not, when will that
review commence and how long might it take?
Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of
jurisdiction.
uae f-35s
Question. How less capable will the F-35 aircraft be compared to
Israeli aircraft?
Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration will meet all
statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a case and
will provide the relevant determination to the committees of
jurisdiction.
Question. What steps is the Administration considering to safe-
guard these aircraft and their technology in the event of sale and
delivery to the UAE, including security measures such as on-base
continuous U.S. presence to monitor the security of the aircraft?
Answer. If a case along these lines is approved by the Department,
security agreements, which can include direct American oversight of
materiel, may be taken into consideration. We will continue to assess
the UAE's requirements and capacity to best determine the specific
safeguard requirements necessary for any such potential sale.
Question. How will the Administration compensate for the inevitable
reduction in Israel's Qualitative Military Edge? Will the
Administration shift from a Qualitative Military Edge to a Quantitative
one, selling or providing more aircraft and munitions meant to
overwhelm the heightened military threat to Israel?
Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of
jurisdiction.
Question. The UAE is supporting General Khalifa Haftar, who is
fighting against the internationally recognized and U.S.-backed
Government of National Accord and has provided direct air support to
Haftar's forces with airstrikes from Mirage warplanes and Chinese armed
drones and has worked against stated U.S. goals and interests in Libya.
The U.A.E. has also transferred U.S. origin MRAPs to a designated
terrorist organization:
What steps will the U.S. and UAE take to prevent the UAE from using
these incredibly capable aircraft in conflicts against our national
security interests, as it is doing in Libya?
Answer. The Department continues to monitor any allegations
regarding unauthorized transfers of American-origin materiel, including
by the UAE, to any third parties. We are working closely with the UAE
to ensure that it has a clear understanding of, and is committed to
abiding by, all end use obligations and security requirements for all
American materiel.
Question. Are there sectors and avenues--like natural gas--where we
can better support Lebanon's integration with other regional partners?
Answer. America is working to broker an Israel-Lebanon Framework
Agreement on Maritime Boundary Discussions. A final boundary
demarcation agreement is the most significant opportunity for Lebanon
to expand exploitation of national resources and trade with its land
and maritime neighbors. Our goal is a framework to begin discussions,
not an actual agreement delimiting boundaries or allocating potential
resources. The purpose of these discussions is for the parties
themselves to determine how they wish to proceed with the goal of
delimitation of their maritime boundary and exploitation of potential
resources in disputed areas.
Question. How can we assure that continued assistance--which I
believe is important--goes to supporting and empowering people who are
working on behalf of all Lebanese and in pursuit of regional peace and
stability?
Answer. Throughout the planning, design, and implementation
process, the American Government undertakes measures to assure that
assistance resources are helping the Lebanese people and advancing our
goals for regional peace and stability. American economic aid is not
provided directly to the Lebanese government, but is implemented
through vetted NGOs and proven international organizations. American
security assistance is designed to benefit legitimate state
institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security
Forces. To ensure that recipient organizations are in good standing,
all new assistance programs are approved by an interagency working
group at the American Embassy in Beirut, whose employees regularly meet
with local NGOs and civil society.
Question. What is this Administration's definition of deterrence
regarding Iran and its proxies if these attacks have not stopped?
Answer. The strike on IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani
demonstrated that if Iran threatens American personnel, facilities, or
interests, the President's response will be decisive. Following the
lethal March 11 rocket attack on American and coalition soldiers at
Camp Taji, we again took decisive action, launching a series of
precision strikes against Kata'ib Hizballah, Iran's most trusted
partner in Iraq and the group responsible for the attack. Our actions
have sent a clear and consistent message to the Iranian leadership that
targeting Americans will not be tolerated and will result in grave
consequences.
Question. What steps has the Administration taken, either on its
own or in cooperation with the Iraqi Government to stop these attacks?
Answer. Our message has been consistent: if the Iraqi Government
does not halt these attacks, it will not only affect our ability to
implement assistance programs, but the private sector will consider
Iraq too risky for investment.
President Barham Salih, PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, COR Speaker Mohammed
al-Halbousi, and Supreme Judicial Council Chief Judge Faiq Zaidan have
condemned attacks on diplomatic missions, civilians, and military
centers. PM Kadhimi has taken steps to investigate the attacks,
including making arrests in June, increasing security measures within
the International Zone, and placing Iran-backed militias under deeper
scrutiny.
Question. What steps is the State Department taking to properly
administer economic and security assistance with this reduced
footprint?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are committed to properly
administering American foreign assistance in Iraq. We use a variety of
interventions, from in-country management of resources to third-party
monitoring of projects and remote support of our projects from multiple
locations around the world. Last year, USAID received authorization to
increase its expatriate staff in Iraq from 8 to 13. The State
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination manage
programs entirely from Washington, engaging a third-party in-country
monitoring team. The Department of State and USAID also maintain a
network of staff based in regional offices outside of Iraq, who provide
support to the Iraq mission. We remain committed to the prudent
oversight and management of projects in a difficult security
environment, further complicated by the global COVID-19 crisis.
Question. How will the energy deals brokered with U.S. firms in
southern Iraq be implemented with no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence
in that part of the country?
Answer. Energy is a critical pillar of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic
Dialogue. Even as we work with the Iraqi Government to ensure the
safety of our diplomatic facilities, we continue to support Iraq's
efforts to eliminate its dependence upon imported energy from Iran by
increasing domestic gas and electricity production, reducing wasteful
gas flaring, and implementing energy market reforms. American companies
are a critical partner in this effort, and the Departments of State,
Energy, and Commerce are working to ensure the five energy deals signed
with the Government of Iraq in August on the sidelines of our Strategic
Dialogue move rapidly towards implementation.
Question. How can we do this critical work with limited diplomatic
presence? How are you working to ensure that all organizations we work
with on the ground are properly vetted, and have transparent financial
accountability mechanisms?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID have faced security
challenges that affect the Administration of assistance for many years.
We have incorporated a number of measures to overcome these challenges,
including vetting, third-party monitoring, and support from Washington-
based and regionally-based staff to supplement our mission in Iraq.
Question. What further tools does Prime Minister al-Kadhimi need to
marginalize these militias given their strength?
Answer. We are working with PM Kadhimi's office to enhance his
team's capacity for public messaging and public awareness campaigns, in
order to take advantage of popular opinion turning against these
militias. However, PM Kadhimi needs the support of religious
authorities and political parties to make sustained progress against
these militias. He needs police, investigators, and judges who are not
afraid to follow the rule of law and implement justice. And he needs
professional security forces that he and the public can trust. Kadhimi
recently replaced the head of security for the International Zone with
the aim of preventing attacks on the American Embassy and other
diplomatic missions.
troop redeployment
Last October, President Trump withdrew our troops from much of
northeast Syria in an ill-thought out concession to President Erdogan.
Now, less than a year later, we are sending troops, including Bradley
fighting vehicles, back to Syria because Russian expansion has made our
remaining forces less safe, just as many on both sides of Congress
warned at the time. Yet on the same day that he ordered more troops in,
President Trump declared that, other than protecting the oil fields
there, the U.S. is ``out of Syria:''
Question. Please articulate the U.S. mission in Syria.
Answer. Our mission in Syria is to achieve the enduring defeat of
ISIS and al-Qa'ida, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line
with UNSCR 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-commanded forces from
Syria. We are committed to the internationally-agreed roadmap, as
outlined in UNSCR 2254, for a political transition through the drafting
of a new constitution and free and fair elections that are administered
by the United Nations and include the Syrian diaspora.
Question. Are these new deployments meant to fight ISIS or to
protect pre-existing troops from Russian and/or pro-regime forces?
Answer. The Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to
questions regarding American troop movements.
Question. Is the redeployment of troops back to northeast Syria an
admission by this Administration that last year's withdrawal endangered
both U.S. interests and our remaining troops?
Answer. The Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to
specific questions regarding American troop movements.
Question. What is the U.S. strategy to address this accountability
gap? Beyond funding projects that catalog the crimes, and how are we
advancing efforts to hold perpetrators of gross violations of
international law accountable?
Answer. We promote accountability for human rights abusers and
corrupt officials by applying sanctions and visa restrictions, such as
sanctions under the Global Magnitsky program and visa restrictions
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the State Appropriations Act. We
strongly support U.N. accountability mechanisms, including the recently
created Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya; the efforts of the
U.N. Investigative Team Against Da'esh (ISIS) (UNITAD) in Iraq; and the
International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism (IIIM) in Syria, which
collects and preserves evidence of atrocities that may amount to war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This evidence allows
domestic law enforcement entities, including our own, to prepare cases
for prosecution. The Department advances accountability through
programming, such as supporting civil society to identify and
investigate cases for prosecution, and to build dossiers on alleged
perpetrators for use by the American Government, other foreign
governments, and the U.N. for prosecutions, vetting, visa restrictions,
sanctions, and public reporting.
Question. Humanitarian actors providing life-saving assistance are
increasingly being blocked by authorities, especially in Syria and
Yemen. As you know, in the case of Syria, Russia and China recently
blocked U.N. Security Council resolutions which would have allowed for
cross-border access for the U.N. and NGOs into Syria. Now these crucial
pipelines for aid into the country are blocked. At a time when Syria's
COVID-19 cases are exploding, the closure of two vital crossings into
northern Syria has meant that critically needed medicine and supplies
are not being delivered through the most direct and efficient routes:
Is the Administration working to secure United Nations Security
Council re-authorization for the use of the additional crossings into
northern Syria? How is the Administration working with U.N.
humanitarian agencies and other partners to continue to provide aid to
Syrian civilians?
Answer. The Department's position, advanced in U.N. deliberations
in July, reinforced the need for at least three crossings including in
northeast Syria. We regularly communicate with like-minded countries on
the Security Council to provide the rationale and evidence needed to
support a forward-leaning and well-justified renewal resolution that
looks to authorize additional crossings. We maintain regular contact
with humanitarian organizations, both in capital and in New York,
regarding developments on the ground. The Department and USAID are in
constant contact with those providing cross-border humanitarian
assistance to Syrians, including the U.N. and non-governmental
organizations.
Question. Driven by increasingly desperate economic circumstances
and security concerns in the wake of the Beirut port explosion, a
growing number of Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees are boarding
smuggler's boats in Northern Lebanon for Cyprus via a perilous sea:
What is the U.S. strategy for working with the United Nations, the
European Union, and the governments in the region to address the
drivers of this crisis so fewer people will be driven to make that
dangerous crossing?
Answer. Since 2010, America has provided more than $2.4 billion in
bilateral foreign assistance to Lebanon to address both economic and
security needs, in addition to $2.6 billion in humanitarian assistance
since the start of the Syria crisis. This support includes life-saving
assistance to help protect the physical health, psychological well-
being, and human rights of displaced Syrians and their host
communities, as well as economic development programs that seek to help
address the principal drivers of the current crisis in Lebanon. We are
committed to ensuring international support for the 1.3 million Syrian
refugees in Lebanon and are working with the international community to
address the broader crisis in Lebanon.
confronting atrocities and protecting forced migrants
In June, I released a comprehensive report titled ``Global Forced
Migration: The Political Crisis of Our Time'' that evaluated drivers
and trends of forced migration across the globe. The report underscores
that gross violations of human rights, and the absence of
accountability for them resulted in millions of people being forced to
flee their homes. Conflicts raging in the Middle East from Syria,
Yemen, and Libya, are responsible for some of the worst atrocities and
most severe humanitarian emergencies of a generation, forcing millions
of innocent men, women and children to leave their countries. Recent
efforts to resolve conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere in
the region have largely failed. In the last 2 weeks alone U.N.-
established panels reported on widespread atrocities in both Yemen and
Syria, suggesting that all parties to these conflicts have committed
abuses that amount to war crimes. We are living in an age of impunity
and witnessing a rampant accountability gap:
Question. In Libya, thousands of refugees and migrants are
arbitrarily detained in official facilities where they face torture,
abuse, forced labor, trafficking, sexual exploitation, and death. More
are held in unofficial facilities where they face similar risk and
abuse. The United Nations has repeatedly called for an end to arbitrary
detention for refugees and migrants in Libya. Without diplomatic
support and effort from the United States and other allies, these calls
will continue unheeded:
What is the United States doing to close detention centers and
provide safe, voluntary passage and protection to vulnerable refugees
and migrants? What specific diplomatic steps is the United States
taking with Government of National Accord (GNA) authorities to protect
the human rights of refugees and migrants and to provide safe
alternatives to detention?
Answer. We advocate for the humane treatment and protection of
IDPs, refugees, and other migrants in Libya in our engagement with
Libyan authorities. We support efforts by U.N. agencies and Libyan
authorities to facilitate the swift and orderly closure of migrant
detention facilities. In FY 2020, we provided more than $23 million to
UNHCR and other partners to provide cash support, medical assistance,
and protection assessment services for refugees, asylum-seekers, and
vulnerable migrants in Libya. Our support also funds efforts to extend
assistance and services to help previously detained persons reintegrate
safely into urban settings in Libya. From 2018 to present, America has
resettled nearly 150 Unaccompanied Refugee Minors who had been
evacuated out of Libya to America via the Refugee Admissions Program.
We urge the Libyan Government to enhance protections for migrants and
refugees in its territory, provide humanitarian organizations with
access to populations of concern, and hold perpetrators of human rights
violations accountable for their actions.
Question. I am also deeply alarmed by the inhumane treatment of
migrants and refugees across the region. Just last week, troubling
reports emerged from Saudi Arabia that hundreds of emaciated and abused
Ethiopian migrants are being held in heinous detention centers. In
Yemen, thousands of stranded migrants are facing exclusion and
violence:
What is the U.S. strategy to and improve their living conditions?
Specifically, what is the U.S. doing diplomatically to ensure that
migrants are not detained and held in inhumane conditions?
Answer. The State Department is advocating with regional
authorities to ensure these foreign nationals, regardless of status,
are being treated humanely, and that the basic needs of those in
detention are addressed. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) reported on a recent agreement to allow approximately 17,000
Ethiopians to travel from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, from where they would
be able to return to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government is working
through the logistics to repatriate its citizens. The Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration provided $5,780,000 to IOM in
Fiscal Year 2020 to address the needs of migrants in Yemen.
Question. Yemen continues to experience the worst humanitarian
crisis in the world, with nearly 80 percent of the population reliant
on some form of aid. U.N. agencies are playing a central role in the
response. Unfortunately, these efforts are critically underfunded; the
U.N.'s Yemen response plan for 2020 has only received 37 percent of the
funds it requested. Of course, this is happening at a time when the
COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have exacerbated food security
challenges around the world. Millions are at risk of famine across the
country. While the U.S. is the largest contributor to U.N. humanitarian
relief operations in the world, more must be done. Unlike previous
years, Gulf states have not contributed to the U.N.'s humanitarian
response in Yemen, leaving a critical gap:
How is the Administration working to address these funding
challenges and ensure that lifesaving aid reaches the Yemeni people in
a principled fashion?
Answer. We share your concern about the dire humanitarian situation
in Yemen and the constraints to the humanitarian operating environment.
Deliberate Houthi obstruction of assistance causes needless suffering
and undermines the international community's efforts. We are closely
engaged with other donors and the United Nations in advocacy with the
Houthis on compliance with international norms that are essential to
ensure that American taxpayer-funded assistance reaches the vulnerable
families for whom it is intended. Since the Administration's partial
suspension of assistance went into effect in March, America has still
provided significantly more humanitarian funding than any other donor
in Yemen this year. We recently committed nearly $195 million in
additional humanitarian aid for Yemen, bringing our total support so
far this year to nearly $607 million, including support to the World
Food Program for crucial food assistance and malnutrition prevention
countrywide.
Through ongoing bilateral and coordinated advocacy with other
donors, the Saudis have begun to disburse some of their long-
outstanding pledges to U.N. Agencies operating in Yemen, and the
Administration welcomed the UK, Sweden, Kuwait, and the EU's announced
contributions to the Yemen appeal during the U.N. General Assembly. We
continue to encourage additional funding contributions and full
delivery on pledges already made.
Question. What leverage do you believe the United States has in
supporting the U.N.-led political process?
Answer. The U.S. Government's goal is a sovereign, stable, secure,
and unified Libya, free from foreign interference and capable of
combatting terrorism. We are working with Libyans and the U.N. to align
international efforts to support this objective. We engages
stakeholders on all sides of the conflict--both Libyan and
international--at the highest levels to encourage the removal of all
foreign forces, and to advance an inclusive, negotiated political
solution, and respect for the U.N. arms embargo. America co-chairs the
Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL)
Economic Working Group with Egypt and the EU through which we can
demonstrate considerable leverage to help Libyans address economic
issues that are core drivers of the Libyan conflict in support of the
U.N.-facilitated process.
Question. Why did the United States join Russia in vetoing a
British-led initiative last April calling for a ceasefire in Libya? If
the answer is ``because it wasn't going to work''--then what diplomatic
steps could we have taken to increase leverage on all the players?
Answer. We fully shared the United Kingdom's concerns last April
about the urgent need to stabilize the situation in Tripoli, reach a
lasting ceasefire, and help all Libyan parties return to the U.N.
political process. The approach and timeline for a U.N. Security
Council product on Libya, which was never submitted for a vote, would
have proven counterproductive. We maintained that the key focus should
be on direct engagement with external actors involved in the conflict
in order to stabilize the situation in Tripoli and encourage all sides
to urgently return to political dialogue. We have worked through the
Berlin Process to engage external actors in Libya at the highest levels
and align the international community in support of helping the Libyans
agree to a lasting ceasefire and return to a U.N.-facilitated political
process. We also worked with the United Kingdom to adopt U.N. Security
Council resolution (UNSCR) 2510 (2020) in support of the Berlin
Conclusions and UNSCR 2542 (2020) to renew the U.N. Support Mission in
Libya's (UNSMIL) mandate for 12 months and create a new U.N. Special
Envoy position.
Question. Does the U.N. and UNSMIL have the capacity to promote a
meaningful dialogue and solution?
Answer. We welcome the U.N. Support Mission in Libya's (UNSMIL)
resumption of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) by the end of
October as testimony of the consensus among Libyans that an inclusive,
negotiated political solution is the only means to end the conflict. We
also commend Acting U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Williams's efforts to foster dialogue through several rounds of
talks, culminating in Montreux, Switzerland, in September, and to
create a political opening to put Libyans on a path towards national
elections.
On September 15, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of
renewing the mandate of UNSMIL for an additional year, until September
15, 2021. The updated mandate, which was a priority for America,
provides for the creation of a U.N. Special Envoy for Libya and an
UNSMIL Coordinator.
This new structure will make for a stronger, more effective UNSMIL.
A U.N. Special Envoy to lead UNSMIL will be better positioned to focus
on mediation with Libyan and international actors to end the conflict
and help Libyans reach a lasting political solution. Under the
authority of the U.N. Special Envoy, the UNSMIL Coordinator will have
responsibility for the day-to-day management and operations of the
mission, whether overseeing the humanitarian response to the COVID-19
crisis or human rights monitoring. Between these roles, there is a
clear division of labor, as well as interdependence, close
coordination, and a single reporting chain to the U.N. Secretary-
General.
Question. Is it U.S. policy to continue to promote a civilian-led
government in Libya?
Answer. Yes, our policy promotes a civilian-led government in
Libya. Supporting an inclusive, negotiated, political solution to the
Libyan conflict remains a priority for the American Government. The
U.N.'s plan to resume the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in October,
which aims to establish a new transitional government and chart the
path to national elections, is a testament to the current progress
Libyans have made towards national political reconciliation. Our goal
is a sovereign, stable, secure, and unified Libya, free from foreign
interference and capable of combatting terrorism. We are working to
align international efforts to support this objective.
Question. What is your assessment of Sarraj's announcement to
retire in October? Who is positioned to take his place?
Answer. Prime Minister Sarraj's announcement of his intent to hand
over power signals a willingness to set aside personal interests for
the benefit of the Libyan people. It is for the Libyan people to decide
who leads their government, and we will not interfere. The U.N.'s plan
to resume the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) in October, which
aims to establish a new transitional government and chart the path to
national elections, is a testament to the current progress Libyans have
made towards reconciliation. Prime Minister Sarraj's intent to transfer
his responsibilities to the new interim authority demonstrates the
seriousness and viability of the LPDF and the U.N. political process.
______
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the
Following Questions by Senator Robert Menendez
iran sanctions
Question. What leverage does the United States have to prevent
Russia and China from selling conventional arms to Iran if many of
their companies do not interact with the U.S. financial system or they
are already sanctioned?
[No Response Received]
Question. Do you consider snapback sanctions to have been re-
imposed when none of the remaining participants in the JCPOA believe
that the U.S. has any legal basis to impose snapback?
[No Response Received]
Question. Do you consider the Iran arms embargo to be re-imposed
when it was vetoed in the Security Council by Russia and China and not
a single other member of the Security Council voted to extend it?
[No Response Received]
Question. Have any of our allies expressed public support for the
snapback of sanctions? If so, which countries?
[No Response Received]
Question. How effective will U.S. sanctions be if there is no buy-
in from our allies?
[No Response Received]
Question. How does the Administration plan to enforce these
sanctions or the arms embargo without support from even our closest
allies?
[No Response Received]
Question. Will the U.S. sanction British, German and French
companies that it deems to be in violation?
[No Response Received]
Question. What specific examples do you have of Iran changing or
moderating its nefarious behavior, either in its nuclear program or
throughout the region, as a result of the re-imposition of U.S.
sanctions?
[No Response Received]
Question. What other steps, besides sanctions, is the
Administration considering to bring Iran back to the negotiating table?
[No Response Received]
Question. Earlier this week the President announced a new executive
order, indicating it was somehow connected to the renewal of sanctions
at the U.N.
What new tools does this E.O. provide that the President previously
didn't have?
[No Response Received]
Question. What are the combined assets or financial impact of these
sanctions on the new designees?
[No Response Received]
Question. Is there any activity that could be sanctioned by this
E.O. that was not previously sanctionable?
[No Response Received]
Question. What is the delta that this E.O. covers that was not
already covered under U.S. sanctions. Please be specific.
[No Response Received]
iranian aggression and ``deterrence''
Question. This Administration has repeatedly insisted that killing
Qasem Soleimani had restored deterrence in the region generally and in
Iraq in particular. Yet rocket attacks on the international zone near
our embassy continued throughout the summer. General McKenzie, the
commander of CENTCOM said recently that the level of attacks on U.S.
troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias ``have been higher'' and that
the reason U.S. troops haven't been killed is simply because ``they're
not hitting us.''
What is this Administration's definition of deterrence regarding
Iran and its proxies if these attacks have not stopped?
[No Response Received]
u.n./iran/human rights
Question. U.N. human rights mechanisms have been vocal in calling
out abuses committed by the Iranian Government in recent months. In one
recent report, the U.N. special rapporteur on Iran--a position
originally created by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011 with strong
U.S. backing--noted increasing restrictions on the right to freedom of
expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to freedom of
association and assembly. The special rapporteur also found that
Christian converts risk arbitrary arrests, detention, and interrogation
about their faith and have faced specious charges. The special
rapporteur has also been vocal in calling on Iran to release human
rights defenders from prison due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Does the Administration support these statements?
[No Response Received]
Question. Given that the Administration has decided to withhold
assessed contributions from the U.N. Human Rights Office, how do you
plan to support the work on Iran being carried out by the special
rapporteur?
[No Response Received]
______
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Despite growing concerns over food security and the
impact of COVID-19, the U.N.'s Yemen response plan for 2020 has only
received 37 percent of the funds it requested from member states. How
is the Administration working with other donor countries--specifically
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--to address these funding challenges?
Answer. We share your concern for the dire humanitarian situation
in Yemen. Deliberate Houthi obstruction of assistance is causing
needless suffering among their fellow Yemenis, despite our continued
calls on the Houthis to respect humanitarian principles. As long as the
Houthis continue to obstruct assistance, America and other donors
cannot guarantee that aid is reaching and benefiting the people for
whom it is intended, and donors are unlikely to fully fund the U.N.'s
Yemen Response Plan.
Houthi obstruction forced USAID to partially suspend some
assistance awards in Houthi-controlled areas in March 2020. America has
still provided more funding than any other donor in Yemen this year. We
recently committed nearly $195 million in additional humanitarian aid
for Yemen, bringing our total support so far this year to nearly $607
million, and we encourage other donors, including Gulf governments, to
contribute additional funding and to fulfill pledges they have already
made. Through ongoing bilateral and coordinated advocacy, the Saudis
have begun to fulfill some of their long-standing pledges to U.N.
agencies in Yemen, and the Administration was pleased that the UK,
Sweden, Kuwait, and the EU announced contributions to the Yemen appeal
during the U.N. General Assembly.
Question. What challenges do implementing partners face in the
provision of emergency food assistance to the civilian population of
Yemen, where two-thirds of the population are hungry, 11.6 percent of
the population is malnourished, and more than 1.6 percent of all
children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition?
Answer. Houthi interference--including blocking aid projects,
seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, harassing aid workers, and
most recently shutting down Sana'a airport--has prevented critical,
life-saving aid from reaching millions of Yemenis. America, in
cooperation with other donors and the U.N., identified seven conditions
the Houthis must meet to ensure effective aid implementation in
northern Yemen and agreed on benchmarks to gauge Houthi progress in
addressing them. Meeting these minimum benchmarks is essential to
ensure that Houthi leaders do not divert assistance away from
vulnerable families and reward combatants and their own supporters. The
Houthis have failed to follow through on their commitments to allow the
World Food Program (WFP) to implement necessary procedures to ensure
food is reaching the most vulnerable Yemenis, resulting in the WFP's
difficult decision to recalibrate its assistance in northern Yemen.
State and USAID remain closely engaged with other donors in joint
advocacy with the Houthis on these issues. Donors plan to hold another
high-level meeting in November to discuss next steps. We are also
advocating for the Republic of Yemen Government to address access
issues in the south.
Question. In 2014, the U.N. Security Council authorized cross-
border assistance into Syria from neighboring states. However, since
January, Russia--with support from China--has essentially forced the
U.N. Security Council to close three border crossings into Syria,
leaving only the Bab al-Hawa border crossing authorized for just the
next 12 months. What has been the impact of these closures on the
humanitarian crisis in northeast and northwest Syria?
Answer. The transshipment of humanitarian assistance to Syria has
continued, but costs and risks to partners have increased due to the
required programmatic adaptations. U.N. convoys now face additional
obstacles in the northwest: multiple lines of control, negotiating
access with armed opposition groups, longer distances and deteriorating
roads, and additional shipping delays and road closures due to ongoing
hostilities. There is no other option if the Idlib ceasefire fails and
the crossing at Bab al-Hawa is closed or congested. America, our
European partners, and U.N. Secretary-General Guterres have all
criticized the Russian push to close humanitarian corridors.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking at the U.N.
Security Council to reopen now-closed border crossings?
Answer. The Department continues to highlight our concerns
regarding cross-border access during monthly meetings in the U.N.
Security Council. To maintain pressure on China, Russia, and others, we
plan to facilitate a roundtable discussion hosted by the United Nations
in the coming months to allow survivors of abuses in Syria to discuss
and document conditions, including interference with humanitarian aid
and attacks on humanitarian workers. We will conduct two sets of
bilateral consultations (technical and policy) with the new U.N.
Security Council members for the 2021-2022 term (India, Ireland, Kenya,
Mexico, and Norway), before the end of 2020, during which we will
emphasize the need to extend and expand the humanitarian mechanism in
Syria.
Question. What are the implications of the limitations on cross-
border assistance in Syria?
Answer. U.N. agencies and other international organizations provide
life-saving services in northern Syria, including the monthly cross-
border delivery of: food assistance for 1.5 million people; water,
sanitation and hygiene assistance for nearly 1 million people; and
shelter and relief items for 247,000 people. The removal of Bab al-
Salaam limits U.N. access to an estimated 1.3 million people, including
at least 800,000 IDPs. U.N. agencies could more effectively provide
assistance if additional cross-border access points were available. Due
to the non-re-authorization of the al-Yaroubia crossing in northeast
Syria, for example, there is a significant gap in health assistance and
capacity, which is especially hindering the region's COVID-19 response.
______
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the
Following Questions by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
iranian hostage diplomacy
Question. U.S. citizen Siamak Namazi was taken hostage by the
Iranian regime nearly 5 years ago, and his ailing father Baquer Namazi
was similarly arrested and detained just months after Siamak. Although
Baquer is now out of prison, he suffers from numerous serious health
problems, but Iran refuses to let him leave the country to receive
desperately needed medical treatment. Siamak has been denied furlough
repeatedly despite meeting the legal requirements and being exposed to
COVID-19 multiple times. Both are being unjustly held in Iran as part
of its campaign to take foreign and dual nationals hostage to advance
its foreign policy goals.
What steps are you taking to bring home U.S. hostages in Iran?
[No Response Received]
Question. What broader steps are being taken in collaboration with
other world powers to end Iran's use of hostage diplomacy overall?
[No Response Received]
______
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. What actions has the United States taken diplomatically
to prevent the proliferation of missile equipment and technology,
covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to countries
in the Middle-East since 2017? Additionally, since 2017, has the
President determined that a foreign person has knowingly exported,
transferred or otherwise engaged in the trade of any MTCR equipment or
technology to a country that is a non-MTCR adherent? If so, who were
those foreign persons?
Answer. The proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies poses a significant
threat to international security. We continually work to prevent the
proliferation of such technology to countries in the Middle East, given
its potential to exacerbate regional instability and tension. We use a
variety of nonproliferation tools, including collaboration with
governments to interdict missile-related transfers to the region. We
uses bilateral export control/nonproliferation dialogues and
participation in multilateral fora such the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC) to raise awareness of missile development programs
of concern in the Middle East and press countries to take steps to
impede these programs' acquisition of missile technology.
We use our sanctions authorities, as warranted, to address missile
proliferation activities. On January 31, 2018, we imposed sanctions
under the missile sanctions laws (Sections 73(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)(B) and (C), and Sections
11B(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50
U.S.C. app. 2410b(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii)) on two North Korean entities,
Chilsong Trading Corporation and Korea Kuryonggang Trading Corporation,
because they engaged in the transfer of equipment and technology
controlled under the MTCR Annex (control list) to entities in a non-
MTCR country. These sanctions were published in the Federal Register on
January 31, 2018. Most recently, on September 23, 2020, we imposed
sanctions under the Iran Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) against
four entities for transferring missile technology to Iran.
Question. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation, Christopher Ford, remarked on September 16, 2020
that: ``we are also leading the global effort to solidify IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the AP, together, as the global
standard for safeguards . . . '' In that spirit, what actions has the
United States taken diplomatically since 2017 to press the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to ratify the Additional Protocol to its bilateral IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement?
Answer. The Administration remains committed to leading global
efforts to establish the combination of a Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto standard for
international safeguards, and to encourage all responsible suppliers to
make the AP a condition for nuclear exports. The Administration has
repeatedly urged Saudi Arabia to bring an AP into force, including
throughout ongoing discussions regarding its planned civil nuclear
power program. In this context, American experts have sought to clarify
with Saudi counterparts the importance of the AP for nuclear
nonproliferation efforts and to address Saudi questions and potential
concerns about how the AP is implemented.
______
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the
Following Questions by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Has Iran's breakout time--the time necessary to acquire
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon--increased or decreased
since the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
in May 2018? What is Iran's approximate breakout time as of September
25, 2020, relying on publicly available information?
[No Response Received]
Question. Between January 16, 2016 and May 7, 2018, how many
attacks did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S.
service members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?
[No Response Received]
Question. Between May 8, 2018 and January 3, 2020, how many attacks
did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S. service
members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?
[No Response Received]
Question. Between January 4, 2020 and September 25, 2020, how many
attacks did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S.
service members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?
[No Response Received]
______
Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. I want every country in the world to recognize Israel,
but this last minute, brazenly political ultimatum is whipping up
serious domestic challenges for an already fragile government that is
facing significant challenges to its survivability. Has the Department
added this requirement to the list of actions Sudan must take before it
is delisted?
Answer. We have engaged with the Sudanese Civilian-led Transitional
Government on the potential normalization of relations with Israel and
the benefits it would bring to Sudan's development and the broader
region. We recognize that Sudan is undergoing a fragile transition and
is engaging in internal deliberation on this sensitive, but important
issue.
Separately, we are discussing with Sudan the policy and statutory
requirements for rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST)
designation. We have made significant progress on resolving outstanding
terrorism claims.
Question. What risks does the transitional government face and what
U.S. assistance is being provided to help mitigate those risks?
Answer. The transitional government's most significant challenges
emanate from elements of the former regime and their political Islamist
allies, who continue to seek ways to exploit the fragility of the
transition to regain power. Between the dire economic situation facing
the country, COVID-19, and the humanitarian crises caused by recent
floods, the Sudanese transition remains exceptionally fragile. Should
public support for the transitional government or the delicate
civilian/military alliance behind it collapse, we would anticipate the
outbreak of a Libya-like civil conflict, as different Sudanese power
centers backed by foreign powers sought to assert control over the
country. To avoid this, we are working closely with the civilian-led
transitional government to implement comprehensive political and
economic reforms.
In addition to the anticipated rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor
of Terrorism designation, which will facilitate Sudan's reintegration
in to the global economy, U.S. assistance includes increased
humanitarian support to the people of Sudan; support for peace
agreement implementation in Darfur and the Two Areas; technical support
to the civilian-led transitional government in the strengthening of
democratic institutions; and engagement with international partners to
increase International Financial Institution support to Sudan and pave
the way for accelerated debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries program.
Question. Given documented violations of the arms embargo by
Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other actors, what
concrete steps are you taking to act on these violations?
Answer. We support Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016), which
provides authorities for member states to limit the destabilizing flows
of arms to and from Libya. The U.N. Security Council renewed these
authorities most recently in June and reiterated this commitment in
September through adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2542
(2020). America supports a robust U.N. arms embargo and sanctions
regime. EU Operation Irini and its predecessor, Operation Sophia, have
interdicted vessels suspected of violating the embargo and shared
information on alleged violations with the U.N. Security Council Libya
Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts. We have made clear to all actors,
publicly and privately, the need to respect the arms embargo.
Question. Will you impose sanctions on companies and countries that
violate the arms embargo?
Answer. We have consistently promoted accountability for violations
of the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. Individuals and entities that have
participated in efforts to send arms to Libya have faced U.N. sanctions
and criminal prosecution. Sanctions discourage violations, and we
consider their targeted use when appropriate. We continue to press our
partners to do the same and to respect the U.N. arms embargo they
committed to uphold in Berlin. We also support international efforts
for more effective compliance with the U.N. arms embargo, including
efforts by the EU.
Question. Will you halt weapons transfers to the UAE? What concrete
steps are you taking with Emirati officials to hold them accountable
for civilian deaths?
Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved
arms sales to Congress.
Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
(CAT), all arms transfers to foreign partners are subject to case-by-
case comprehensive consideration of American interests--including risks
related to human rights abuses, terrorism, mass atrocities, or
transnational organized crime. The Department will continue to conduct
its reviews of foreign military sales and direct commercial sales
consistent with this policy and all applicable statutory requirements.
Question. Why is this situation so different? Why have the State
Department and USAID decided to put millions of innocent Yemenis at
risk of COVID-19, cholera, dengue fever, and starvation?
Answer. Houthi obstruction in Yemen has included blocking aid
projects, seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, and harassing
and detaining aid workers. Under the partial suspension in effect since
March, we continue to support the most critical life-saving activities
in northern Yemen, including support to international NGO partners for
programs to treat malnutrition, provide clean water, and help prevent
cholera, COVID-19, and other communicable diseases. USAID and State
also continue to support U.N. partners countrywide. America is the
single largest donor to Yemen, providing nearly $607 million in FY 2020
in humanitarian aid to all parts of Yemen. In FY 2020, State and USAID
have provided nearly $19 million in funding to support COVID-19
response efforts throughout Yemen.
Question. What plans does the Department have in place to resume
aid to those in need other than waiting for the Houthi rebels to agree
to stop diverting our assistance?
Answer. The Administration stands ready to resume full programming
in Yemen, but only when programs can be implemented properly to ensure
aid reaches those for whom it is intended. America, in cooperation with
other donors and the U.N., identified seven conditions and benchmarks
that need to be met for effective aid implementation in northern Yemen.
Meeting these minimum conditions is essential to ensure Houthi leaders
do not divert assistance away from the most vulnerable families and
reward combatants and their own supporters. We have seen partial, but
insufficient, progress on this front, and progress on accountability
benchmarks has stalled. The Administration will remain closely engaged
with other donors in joint advocacy with the Houthis on these issues.
______
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the
Following Questions by Senator Cory A. Booker
u.s.'s diplomatic isolation on iran
Question. President Macron has called ``maximum pressure'' a
failure. Not only is the United States more isolated on the world
stage, but Iran today is closer to a nuclear weapon than it was when
the United States was party to the JCPOA. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) recently confirmed that Iran has ten times the
amount of enriched uranium it did when President Trump assumed office.
How can the United States lead the world if our closest allies
won't stand by us on one of our most important national security
interests?
[No Response Received]
lack of middle east strategy
Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy argued for a shift to
focusing on great power competition, namely with China, and for a more
limited approach to the Middle East. And yet, the U.S. pulled out of
the JCPOA without the backing of our allies, abandoned the Kurds, our
stalwart allies in Iraq, ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani
with conflicting justifications--though no one here mourns his death--
putting the lives of our service members deployed across the Middle
East in jeopardy.
Can you explain why this Administration at turn after turn, takes
reckless actions that risk plunging this country into dangerous
confrontations, if not war, while not fulfilling its own national
security mandate to invest in effective competition with China?
[No Response Received]
[all]