[Senate Hearing 116-559]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 116-559

                 U.S. POLICY IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 24, 2020

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-608 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman        
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas                      CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
              Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director        
            Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        


                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

    Prepared Statement...........................................     3

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     4

    Prepared Statement...........................................     5

Hale, Hon. David, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     6
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

Abrams, Hon. Elliot, U.S. Special Representative for Iran and 
  Venezuela, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............    11
    Prepared Statement...........................................    12

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    43

The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for 
  the 
  Following Questions by Senator Robert Menendez.................    50

Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.....................................    51

The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for 
  the 
  Following Questions by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..............    52

Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Edward J. Markey.......................................    52

The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for 
  the 
  Following Questions by Senator Edward J. Markey................    53

Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Cory A. Booker.........................................    54

The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for 
  the 
  Following Questions by Senator Cory A. Booker..................    55

                                 (iii)



 
                 U.S. POLICY IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2020

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in 
room SD-G50 and videoconference, Dirksen Senate Office 
Building, Hon. James E. Risch, chairman of the committee, 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Gardner, Romney, 
Young, Cruz, Perdue, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, 
Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    The Chairman. This hearing of the United States Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here today to 
discuss recent events in the Middle East and the implications 
that they have for United States policy, which are significant.
    Since the end of the second war--the second World War, the 
Middle East has been dominated by intractable Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Today, however, much has changed. Former rivals have 
increasingly reached across the table to address the shared 
challenges posed by Iran, by radical extremism, by COVID-19, by 
struggling economies, and by other issues that they have.
    Regional dynamics have been further shaped by growing 
Chinese entanglement, Russian intervention, and regional 
responses to an expansionist Turkish foreign policy that is 
increasingly aligned with Russia. The United States interests 
have not changed; namely, regional stability, preventing 
terrorist threats against the United States, preserving stable 
international markets, and fostering governments that address 
the needs of their citizens.
    The historic signing of the Abraham Accords is a defining 
moment--it cannot be more important than it was--and has the 
potential to fundamentally improve the security, economic, and 
diplomatic environment in the Middle East.
    Israel took the important step of suspending plans to annex 
portions of the West Bank, which I hope will reinvigorate 
substantive engagement with the--from the Palestinian people. 
The Accords also have positive implications for Iran policy. 
For years, the Arab-Israeli conflict created regional discord 
that Iran used to press to its advantage. Iran's aggressive 
terrorist agenda has created this opportunity for Arab 
countries to publicly cooperate with Israel. It is my hope that 
other countries will normalize ties with Israel. Indeed, I am 
not alone in this. Much talk in this city of exactly that takes 
place every day.
    Additionally, the Accords have clear ramifications for 
regional security. Any potential arms sales must continue 
congressional consultations on meeting our obligation to retain 
Israel's qualitative military edge and satisfying the other 
requirements of the Arms Export Control Act. Let me be clear. 
The signing of the Abraham Accords did not occur by 
happenstance. These events were specifically enabled by the 
Trump administration's exit from the flawed JCPOA, its maximum 
pressure against the Iran regime, and the clear signals the 
Administration's plan for Middle East peace sent to the region.
    Anyone who suggests that the U.S. should reenter the 
nuclear deal with Iran is misguided at best, as that would only 
serve to isolate our ally, Israel, alienate our Gulf partners, 
and once again fund Iran's terror activities; and, most 
importantly, conduct a weak-kneed retreat from the hard-fought 
gains that we have made, and telegraph to our enemies and our 
allies, alike, a weakness sure to embolden Iran to move 
aggressively--to more aggressively pursue its malign activities 
and, thus, at the end of the day, hurt us badly.
    Our Iran policy must look forward. I applaud the 
reimposition of sanctions in the executive order this week 
implementing CAATSA and authorizing sanctions against those who 
would transfer arms to Iraq. Only continued economic and 
regional isolation have the potential to bring Iran to the 
negotiating table.
    Turning to our counterterrorism efforts, we have broken the 
Islamic State's grip on Iraq and Syria. According to our 
military commanders, success against the Islamic State has led 
to a reduction in U.S. troops resulting from our confidence in 
local forces' ability to operate with reduced levels of U.S. 
support. As the Department of Defense reduces its missions in 
the Middle East, it is incumbent on the State Department to 
build a lasting peace through disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration efforts. These efforts tied to necessary forms to 
reduce corruption and improve governance will ensure lasting 
stability.
    In Syria, we continue to face one of the world's worst 
humanitarian catastrophes and major contributor to regional 
instability. As we impose sanctions on the Assad regime 
authorized by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, we must 
continue with diplomatic and U.N. process towards a cease-fire, 
supporting the Constitutional Committee and free and fair 
elections. We must not repeat the mistakes of the previous 
Administration, where inaction opened the door to Russian 
intervention and let the civil war rage unabated.
    In Lebanon, we see the results of a corrupt patronage 
system and broken political process that opens the door to deep 
Iranian influence. Lebanon is a nation on the brink of 
collapse, yet remains an important link in--to regional 
stability. I remain skeptical of Lebanon's ability to form a 
new government, free from corruption of its political allies.
    Across the Middle East, there are unique opportunities to 
improve the region through continued normalization efforts 
linking economies, joining security efforts, and continued 
pressure on Iran. These are real possibilities that were 
unthinkable just a few short years ago, and may be once-in-a-
generation opportunities.
    I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony of these 
and related matters.
    [The prepared statement of Senator James. E. Risch 
follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Senator James E. Risch

    I thank our witnesses for appearing today to discuss recent events 
in the Middle East and the implications they have for United States 
policy.
    Since the end of the second World War, the Middle East has been 
dominated by an intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, however, much 
has changed. Former rivals have increasingly reached across the table 
to address the shared challenges posed by Iran, radical extremism, 
COVID-19, and struggling economies.
    The regional dynamics have been further shaped by growing Chinese 
entanglement, Russian intervention, and regional responses to an 
expansionist Turkish foreign policy that is increasingly aligned with 
Russia.
    The United States' interests have not changed--namely, regional 
stability, preventing terrorist threats against the U.S., preserving 
stable international markets, and fostering governments that address 
the needs of their citizens.
    The historic signing of the Abraham Accords is a defining moment 
and has the potential to fundamentally improve the security, economic, 
and diplomatic environment in the Middle East.
    Israel took the important step of suspending plans to annex 
portions of the West Bank, which I hope will reinvigorate substantive 
engagement from the Palestinian people.
    The Accords also have positive implications for Iran policy. For 
years the Arab-Israeli conflict created regional discord that Iran used 
to press its advantage. Iran's aggressive terrorist agenda has created 
this opportunity for Arab countries to publicly cooperate with Israel. 
It is my hope that other countries will normalize ties with Israel.
    Additionally, the Accords have clear ramifications for regional 
security. Any potential arms sales must continue Congressional 
consultations on meeting our obligation to retain Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge and satisfying the other requirements of the Arms Export 
Control Act.
    Let me be clear, the signing of the Abraham Accords did not occur 
by happenstance. These events were enabled by the Trump 
administration's exit from the flawed JCPOA, its maximum pressure 
against the Iranian regime, and the clear signals the Administration's 
plan for Middle East Peace sent to the region.
    Anyone who suggests that the U.S. should re-enter the nuclear deal 
with Iran is misguided at best, as that would only serve to isolate our 
ally Israel, alienate our Gulf partners, and once again fund Iran's 
terror activities.
    Our Iran policy must look forward. I applaud the re-imposition of 
sanctions and the executive order this week implementing CAATSA and 
authorizing sanctions against those who would transfer arms to Iran. 
Only continued economic and regional isolation have the potential to 
bring Iran to the negotiating table.
    Turning to our counterterrorism efforts--we have broken the Islamic 
State's grip on Iraq and Syria. According to our military commanders, 
success against the Islamic State has led to a reduction in U.S. troops 
due to our confidence in local forces' ability to operate with reduced 
levels of U.S. support.
    As the Department of Defense reduces its missions in the Middle 
East, it is incumbent on the State Department to build a lasting peace 
through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts. These 
efforts, tied to necessary reforms to reduce corruption and improve 
governance will ensure lasting stability.
    In Syria, we continue to face one of the world's worst humanitarian 
catastrophes and major contributor to regional instability. As we 
impose sanctions on the Assad regime authorized by the Caesar Syria 
Civilian Protection Act, we must continue the diplomatic and U.N. 
processes toward a ceasefire, supporting the constitutional committee, 
and free and fair elections. We must not repeat the mistakes of the 
previous Administration where inaction opened the door to Russian 
intervention and let the civil war rage unabated.
    In Lebanon, we see the results of a corrupt patronage system and 
broken political process that opens the door to deep Iranian influence. 
Lebanon is a nation on the brink of collapse, yet remains an important 
link to regional stability. However, I remain skeptical of Lebanon's 
ability to form a new government free from the corruption of its 
political elites.
    Across the Middle East, there are unique opportunities to improve 
the region. Through continued normalization efforts, linking economies, 
joining security efforts, and continued pressure on Iran, there are 
real possibilities that were unthinkable just a few short years ago.
    I look forward to our witnesses' testimony.

    The Chairman. With that, Senator Menendez.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to our witnesses, of both whom have spent 
decades in service to our country.
    The scope of this hearing could keep us here for days--
Israeli's changing diplomatic fortunes, Lebanon reeling with 
decades of malfeasance and a deadly explosion, Yemen facing the 
worst humanitarian crisis in the world--but, I will try to do 
my best to stay focused.
    While we have seen some recent positive developments over 
the course of the past 4 years--however, the Trump 
administration has only served, in my view, to create more 
chaos and uncertainty about our policies in the Middle East: 
showering autocrats with praise and, at least according to the 
President, ``saving'' one from Congress in the wake of ordering 
the slaughter of an American resident; drawing down, and now 
redeploying, troops to Syria; prioritizing arms sales in 
unilateral sanctions over the hard work of diligent diplomacy 
and strategic development. Today's hearing implies a Middle 
East changing for the better for U.S. interests and values. In 
some ways, that is true. I applaud the Administration for 
building on years of cooperation between Israel and some of its 
Arab Gulf neighbors. I think we can all agree that more 
regional cooperation serves the interests of all the people in 
the region, and of the United States, as well.
    While we should celebrate these historical achievements, 
let us not overlook the fact that Israel's core security issues 
remain unresolved, and it is still contending with threats from 
Hamas and Hezbollah nearly on a daily basis. Indeed, we have a 
responsibility to look beyond the headlines and into the 
details, particularly when it comes to peace declarations that 
come with the expectations, and perhaps even the promise, of 
significant arms sales.
    Let me be clear. Congress's role in arms sales is not 
something that I see changing anytime soon, to any country, in 
any region. While some things change, others stay the same, 
and, in some cases, get worse. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I think 
there can be little doubt that, with Iran, we are worse off now 
than we were 4 years ago.
    Now, to be clear, I bear no sentimentality about the JCPOA, 
but as one who has worked for decades helping to build a 
careful, calibrated, and, critically, an internationally 
supported sanctions regime to constrain Iran, I am seriously 
concerned that this Administration has completely lost sight of 
how to achieve even its own goals, let alone safeguard our 
national security.
    Over the past 4 years, Iran has increased its enrichment 
level and stockpile of enriched uranium, as well as advanced 
missile systems. It has continued its support for malign proxy 
actors throughout the region. Even in the wake of the killing 
of Qasem Soleimani and a declaration of ``deterrence 
restored,'' quote, against Iran, CENTCOM Commander, General 
McKenzie, said recently that, ``The level of attack on U.S. 
troops in Iraq from Iran-based militias have been higher.'' So, 
I ask you, is this your definition of ``deterrence restored''?
    This Administration refuses to acknowledge what those of us 
who have worked this file know: We cannot confront Iran alone. 
Indeed, we cannot achieve any of our policy goals in the Middle 
East or elsewhere alone, but this Administration has so 
alienated our allies and partners that Russia and China did not 
even need to use their vetoes at the U.N. Security Council, 
where the U.S., embarrassingly, could muster only one vote in 
support of reimposing the arms embargo against Iran. How can 
you honestly say that, in this context, sanctions have been 
snapback when our European allies and the Secretary General 
himself questioned the legitimacy of U.S. claims? While the 
Secretary rails against our historical partners, China and 
Russia are increasing their influence, not just in the region 
economically and militarily, but at international fora, as 
well, where previous administrations had been effective in 
advancing our Nation's interests.
    The executive order announced Monday could have been 
executed months ago, and will likely have no tangible impact on 
Iran's capacities. These announcements are simply a hollow echo 
of American leadership that once held commanding convening 
power and unquestioned global leadership, replacing it with a 
policy that seems to amount to ``talk loudly and carry no 
sticks.''
    So, while I intend to drill down some more during 
questions, I hope that you can provide us some level of 
explanation as to how it is that you believe you are actually 
achieving your goals in the Middle East, and perhaps you can 
even shed light onto exactly what those are.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Robert Menendez 
follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Senator Robert Menendez

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you to 
our witnesses, both of whom have spent decades in service to this 
country. The scope of this hearing could keep us here for days: 
Israel's changing diplomatic fortunes; Lebanon reeling with decades of 
malfeasance and a deadly explosion; Yemen facing the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world. But I'll do my best to stay focused.
    While we've seen some recent positive developments over the course 
of the past 4 years; however, the Trump administration has only served 
to create more chaos and uncertainty about our policies in the Middle 
East: showering autocrats with praise and, at least according to the 
President, ``saving'' one ``from Congress'' in the wake of ordering the 
slaughter of an American resident; drawing down and now redeploying 
troops to Syria; and prioritizing arms sales and unilateral sanctions 
over the hard work of diligent diplomacy and strategic development.
    Today's hearing implies a Middle East changing for the better for 
U.S. interests and values. And in some ways that is true. I applaud the 
Administration for building on years of cooperation between Israel and 
some of its Arab Gulf neighbors. I think we can all agree that more 
regional cooperation serves the interests of all the people in the 
region, and of the U.S. as well. But while we should celebrate these 
historical achievements, let's not overlook the fact that Israel's core 
security issues remain unresolved, and it is still contending with 
threats from Hamas and Hezbollah nearly on a daily basis.
    Indeed, we have a responsibility to look beyond the headlines and 
into the details, particularly when it comes to peace declarations that 
come with the expectation--and perhaps even the promise--of significant 
arms sales.
    Let me be clear: Congress' role in arms sales is not something that 
I see changing any time soon. To any country. In any region.
    And while some things change, others stay the same, and in some 
cases get worse.
    And in fact, Mr. Chairman, I think there can be little doubt that 
with Iran we are worse off now than we were 4 years ago.
    Now, to be clear, I bear no sentimentality about the JCPOA, but as 
one who has worked for decades helping to build a careful, calibrated, 
critically, and internationally supported sanctions regime to constrain 
Iran, I am seriously concerned that this Administration has completely 
lost sight of how to achieve even its own goals, let alone safeguard 
our national security.
    Over the past 4 years, Iran has increased its enrichment level and 
stockpile of enriched uranium as well as advanced missile systems. It 
has continued its support for malign proxy actors throughout the 
region. Even in the wake of the killing of Qasem Soleimani and a 
declaration of ``deterrence restored'' against Iran, CENTCOM Commander 
General McKenzie said recently that the ``level of attacks on U.S. 
troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias have been higher.'' Is this 
your definition of deterrence restored?
    This Administration refuses to acknowledge what those of us who 
have worked this file know: We cannot confront Iran alone. Indeed, we 
cannot achieve any of our policy goals in the Middle East or elsewhere 
alone.
    But this Administration has so alienated our allies and partners 
that Russia and China didn't even need to use their vetoes at the U.N. 
Security Council, where the U.S. embarrassingly could muster only one 
vote in support of reimposing the arms embargo against Iran. How can 
you honestly say that in this context sanctions have been ``snapped 
back'' when our European allies and the Secretary General himself 
questions the legitimacy of U.S. claims?
    While the Secretary rails against our historical partners, China 
and Russia are increasing their influence not just in the region 
economically and militarily, but at international fora as well, where 
previous administrations have been effective in advancing our nation's 
interests.
    The executive order announced Monday could have been executed 
months ago and will likely have no tangible impact on Iran's 
capacities. These announcements are simply a hollow echo of American 
leadership that once held commanding convening power and unquestioned 
global leadership, replacing it with a policy that seems to amount to: 
Talk loudly and carry no sticks.
    So while I intend to drill down some more during questions, I hope 
that you all can provide some level of explanation as to how it is you 
believe you are actually achieving your goals in the Middle East. And 
perhaps, you can even shed light onto exactly what those are.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    We will now hear from our witnesses. We will start with the 
Honorable David Hale, who has served as Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs since August 30th, 2018. 
Previously, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and U.S. 
Ambassador to Lebanon. He also has extensive experience on 
issues pertaining his--to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
having served as Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace from 
2011 to 2013, and Deputy Special Envoy from 2009 to 2011.
    Under Secretary Hale.

  STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HALE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL 
       AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ambassador Hale. Well, good morning, Chairman Risch and 
Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of the 
committee. It is an honor to appear before you with Special 
Representative Abrams to discuss the Middle East and Iran's 
malign influence.
    America is a force for good, and we are the partner of 
choice for those who seek security and prosperity. It is in our 
national security interest to strengthen those partnerships. 
Nothing has done more to demonstrate a commitment to 
cooperation than the signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration 
on September 15. As President Trump observed, these agreements 
mark the dawn of a new Middle East and send a strong message to 
malign actors, such as Iran, that their influence is waning.
    Ending Iran's malign influence is the Administration's top 
regional priority. Success will mean an independent and 
sovereign Iraq and Lebanon, and a chance for religious 
minorities to thrive again. It will mean Gulf States that no 
longer live in fear of Iranian aggression and violence. It will 
mean a more secure Israel reaping the benefits of regional 
cooperation. To this end, our maximum pressure campaign has 
constrained Iran by depriving the regime of over $70 billion in 
revenue. The sanctions are not solely an end unto themselves, 
they are merely one tool that we will deploy until the Iranian 
regime changes its behavior.
    The signing of the historic Abraham Accords, witnessed by 
many of you, normalizes relations between both the UAE and 
Bahrain with Israel, the first such agreement between Israel 
and an Arab country since 1994. This normalization will promote 
peace, security, and prosperity throughout the region. 
Affirmation of the Abraham Accords bolsters the 
Administration's Vision for Peace. Israel will suspend 
declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the Vision. We 
urge the Palestinians to come to the negotiating table. The 
only path to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through 
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting 
peace.
    Lebanon faces political gridlock and economic instability 
exacerbated by the horrific August 4 explosion at the Port of 
Beirut. America has, thus far, provided over $19 million in 
essential relief, and we stand with the Lebanese people as they 
recover from the devastation. The tragic explosion is a symptom 
of the systemic problems in Lebanon: decades of mismanagement, 
corruption, and the repeated failure to undertake meaningful 
reform. When we see Lebanese leaders committed to real change, 
in word and deed, America and its international partners will 
be ready to help with the assistance needed to accomplish true 
reform.
    Hezbollah cultivates and exploits Lebanon's corrupt 
``anything goes'' environment and undermines the interests of 
the Lebanese people through the accumulation of arms and 
destabilizing activities across the region. Before the maximum 
pressure campaign, Iran provided Hezbollah over $700 million of 
its approximately $1 billion annual budget. Our ability to 
constrain that funding is having an effect, and we will use all 
available tools to hold accountable those who facilitate 
Hezbollah's activities. This month, we sanctioned two former 
Lebanese Ministers for corruptly directing political and 
financial favors to Hezbollah, and we will continue to press 
our partners across the world to designate Hezbollah as a 
terrorist organization.
    The Gulf States are critical partners in our fight against 
terrorism and efforts to blunt Iranian influence. We have 
consistently pressed our partners in parallel with similar 
calls from Congress to end that rift.
    Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is rooted in robust 
security cooperation. It is a central component of our strategy 
to counter Iran and defeat extremist groups. We continue to 
have frank conversations with Riyadh on human rights, and we 
consistently tell Saudi leaders that success on the nation's 
reform agenda will require protection of human, and especially 
women's, rights.
    We support U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffiths as he 
negotiates a lasting peace in Yemen, and we are working closely 
with Saudi Arabia on de-escalating violence in Yemen, and 
welcome Riyadh's efforts to reconcile the Yemeni parties.
    The Houthis, armed by Iran, threaten regional security and 
stability through attacks against civilian targets.
    In Iraq, Iran-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization 
Forces are an immediate challenge to Iraq's stability, and we 
see the Iraqi people turning against Iranian interference in 
Iraqi affairs. The protest movement demonstrated the Iraqi 
people's aspiration for democratic governance, and Mustafa al-
Kadhimi, Iraq's new Prime Minister, has begun to restore Iraq's 
sovereignty.
    In Syria, our leadership of the Global Coalition will 
ensure ISIS's lasting defeat. Using the tools Congress provided 
in the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, we have imposed 
over 55 sanctions on the Assad regime.
    In Libya, we are supporting the U.N. as it brings together 
broad Libyan participation for the Libya political dialogue, 
which aims to prepare for elections, establish a lasting cease-
fire, and support of the oil sector.
    In surveying the region today, we have tangible 
opportunities to advance our objectives of peace, prosperity, 
and security, and our presence and relationships serve as a 
bulwark against efforts by Russia and China to extend their 
malign influence.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Hale follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Ambassador David Hale

    Good morning Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and 
distinguished members of the Committee. It's an honor to appear before 
you with Special Representative Abrams to discuss the Middle East and 
Iran's malign influence. America is a force for good throughout the 
region, and we are the partner of choice for those who seek security, 
stability, and prosperity. It is in our national security interests to 
strengthen those partnerships. As we have seen in recent weeks, our 
partners are moving away from conflicts and taboos of the past and are 
committed to cooperation across a broad range of fields. We are working 
hard to deepen this cooperation.
    Nothing has done more to demonstrate a commitment to cooperation 
than the signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration and related 
instruments on September 15. As President Trump observed, these 
agreements ``mark dawn of a new Middle East'' and send a strong message 
to malign actors like Iran that their influence is waning.
    Ending Iran's malign influence is the Administration's top regional 
priority. Success will provide vulnerable religious minorities, 
including Christians and Yezidis, the chance to thrive again. It will 
mean a sovereign Iraq that can defend its national interests and hold 
credible elections, fulfilling a key demand of protesters who want to 
end Iranian influence. It will mean Gulf states that no longer live in 
fear of Iranian threats and violence. It will prevent famine in Yemen 
and enable a political solution to the conflict. It will mean a more 
secure Israel, reaping the benefits of regional cooperation and 
integration. And it will mean an independent and sovereign Lebanon. To 
this end, our maximum pressure campaign has constrained Iran by 
depriving the regime of over $70 billion in revenue, which otherwise 
would have funded Iran's destabilizing activities. But sanctions are 
not an end unto themselves. They are merely one of a broad range of 
tools that we will deploy until the Iranian regime changes its 
behavior.
    The historic signing of the Abraham Accords Declaration on 
September 15, brokered by President Trump, normalizes relations between 
both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with Israel--the first such 
agreements between Israel and an Arab country since 1994. As President 
Trump observed, ``In Israel's entire history, there have previously 
been only two such agreements. Now we have achieved two in a single 
month . . . '' Together, with America as a strong and committed 
partner, we can advance regional peace and continue to counter Iran's 
malign influence. And we remain committed to helping Israel maintain 
its qualitative military edge, consistent with the law and longstanding 
policy.
    These agreements are historic. After decades of division and 
conflict, normalization of relations and peaceful diplomacy will 
promote greater peace and security in the region and widen 
opportunities for expanded economic growth and productivity. As 
President Trump noted, these agreements represent a major stride toward 
a future in which people of all faiths and backgrounds live together in 
peace and prosperity.
    The UAE's Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed echoed the President, 
noting that we are ``witnessing a change in the heart of the Middle 
East, a change that will send hope around the world.'' Bahrain's 
Foreign Minister Al Zayani declared that these agreements represent a 
``historic step on the road to genuine and lasting peace, security and 
prosperity across the region, and for all who live there regardless of 
religion, sect, ethnicity, or ideology.''
    Affirmation of the Abraham Accords Declaration bolsters the 
Administration's Vision for Peace, announced in January 2020. Israel 
will suspend declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the Vision 
for Peace and focus its efforts on expanding ties with other countries 
in the Arab and Muslim world. We urge the Palestinians to come to the 
negotiating table. Refusal to engage with Israel only delays 
fulfillment of the potential of the Palestinian people. We have 
repeatedly said that the only realistic path to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is through negotiations aimed at achieving a 
comprehensive and lasting peace.
    Lebanon faces political gridlock and economic instability, 
exacerbated by the August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut, which 
killed 180, wounded 6,500, and destroyed a wide swath of Beirut, 
Lebanon's economic and commercial center. America has thus far provided 
over $19 million in essential food, shelter, and medical relief, and we 
will continue to stand with the Lebanese people as they recover and 
rebuild from the devastation.
    The tragic explosion is a symptom of the systemic problems in 
Lebanon which have persisted for far too long: decades of 
mismanagement, corruption, and the repeated failure of Lebanese leaders 
to put aside their parochial interests and undertake meaningful, 
sustained reforms. The Lebanese people deserve better, and their 
demands for change could not be clearer. America stands in solidarity 
with those who have long called for tangible reforms and a government 
that respond to their longstanding and legitimate demands. When we see 
Lebanese leaders committed to real change in word and deed, America and 
its international partners will be ready to help with assistance needed 
to accomplish true reform.
    Hizballah cultivates and exploits Lebanon's corrupt, ``anything 
goes'' environment and undermines the interests of the Lebanese people 
through the accumulation of arms and destabilizing activities across 
the region. Hizballah has proven that the group answers to Tehran, not 
the Lebanese state and people. Before the maximum pressure campaign, 
Iran provided Hizballah over $700 million of its approximately $1 
billion budget. Our ability to constrain that funding is having an 
effect. Hassan Nasrallah has publicly called for financial 
contributions to make up the shortfall.
    America will use all available tools to hold accountable those who 
facilitate Hizballah's activities. This month, we sanctioned two former 
Lebanese ministers for corruptly directing political and financial 
favors to Hizballah, at the expense of the state. We also continue to 
press our partners across the region and the world to acknowledge 
reality and designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist 
organization and use their legal authorities to restrict the group from 
operating on their soil.
    The Gulf states are critical partners in our fight against 
terrorism and efforts to blunt Iranian influence. We are stronger when 
we stand together, and we have consistently pressed our partners--in 
parallel with similar calls from Congress--to end the Gulf rift. We are 
hopeful that they will resolve their differences and work with us to 
address our shared concerns.
    Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is rooted in robust bilateral 
security cooperation. It is a critical component of our strategy to 
counter Iran's destabilizing actions in the Gulf and deter, disrupt, 
and defeat ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other dangerous actors. Our security 
cooperation helps to protect over 160,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia and 
UAE from attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. We are working 
closely with Riyadh on de-escalating violence in Yemen and welcome the 
Saudis' attempts to reconcile the Yemeni parties.
    We continue to have frank conversations with Riyadh on human 
rights. This includes calling for the lifting of a travel ban on Dr. 
Walid Fitaihi and his family and the release of Salah Al-Haider and 
Badr Al-Ibrahim, all three of whom have been unjustly detained and 
whose cases undermine our otherwise strong partnership. We fully 
support the nation's reform initiatives, as articulated in Saudi 
Arabia's Vision 2030, to diversify the economy, reduce its reliance on 
oil revenues, and broaden Saudi women's economic and social engagement. 
But we have also consistently told the Saudi leadership that success 
will require protection of human and women's rights.
    Earlier this month, Secretary Pompeo hosted his Qatari counterpart 
for the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. We signed 11 significant 
agreements across a wide range of sectors, including: health security 
preparedness; Fulbright programs and academic exchanges; agreements 
with NASA and the Smithsonian Institution; and the 2021 U.S.-Qatar Year 
of Culture, which declares the U.S. and Qatari governments' intention 
to cooperate to enhance cultural and art exchanges and people-to-people 
connections. We are also excited about an MOU signed by Secretary 
Mnuchin and his Qatari counterpart to conduct an economic roadshow in 
the United States in 2021, which will target investment in more diverse 
sectors to maximize mutual economic benefit. In the coming months, we 
look forward to holding additional strategic dialogues with Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to each deepen our ties with our Gulf 
partners.
    In Yemen, we continue to support the diplomacy of U.N. Special 
Envoy Martin Griffiths as he works to bring the Republic of Yemen 
Government and the Houthis together to establish a lasting peace. The 
Houthis, armed by Iran, continue to threaten regional security and 
stability through attacks against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.
    We also work closely with the Republic of Yemen Government, the 
UAE, and Saudi Arabia to achieve further progress on the implementation 
of the Riyadh Agreement. We are deeply concerned about the humanitarian 
situation in Yemen and are working to get much-needed assistance to the 
Yemeni people. Nearly 80 percent of Yemenis rely on humanitarian aid to 
meet their basic needs. Houthi obstructionism and refusal to adhere to 
international principles have forced us to curtail some of our aid, 
though we try to ensure that life-saving and critical assistance still 
meets those in need. America is the largest humanitarian donor to Yemen 
this year, and we have provided more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian 
assistance since October 2018. With Congress's support, we have also 
provided nearly $18.7 million in funding to support COVID-19 response 
efforts to help refugees, vulnerable migrants, internally displaced 
persons, and host communities in Yemen. We continue to call on the 
Houthis to allow this humanitarian aid to flow to those in need.
    In Iraq, Iran-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces 
(PMF) are an immediate challenge to Iraq's prosperity and long-term 
stability. Iran-backed elements of the PMF routinely engage in 
widespread theft of state resources, targeted killings, and sectarian 
violence. They conduct attacks on Iraqi Government facilities and were 
responsible for the bulk of the violence against peaceful protesters 
and political activists over the last year.
    The Iraqi people are turning against Iran's interference in Iraqi 
internal affairs; against the Iran-backed militias and the politicians 
who enable them; and against the rampant corruption that Iran's 
influence promotes. The protest movement demonstrated the Iraqi 
people's aspiration for democratic, responsive governance that works on 
behalf of the interests of Iraqis, not Tehran, and it led to the 
designation of a former human rights activist, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, as 
Iraq's new prime minister. Kadhimi has already begun to take necessary 
steps to restore Iraq's sovereignty and re-establish rule-of-law. We 
welcome his commitment to ensure that Iraq's future is determined in 
Baghdad, Erbil, Basrah, and Ramadi, and not in Tehran.
    Our regular engagements with the Kadhimi government are paying 
dividends. After two successful rounds of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic 
Dialogue, on June 11 and August 19, and a meeting between Prime 
Minister Kadhimi and President Trump, we are preparing for a series of 
meetings to further define the details of our relationship. We will 
focus on humanitarian issues, internally displaced persons, the return 
of Yezidis and other minority groups, economic reforms, security sector 
reforms, and broadening our educational and cultural programming. These 
engagements have strengthened the Prime Minister's position within 
Iraq; reminded the Iraqi people that America is a force for good and 
our relations serve their interests; and put Iran on notice that the 
U.S.-Iraq relationship cannot be broken.
    In Syria, our leadership of the Global Coalition and work with 
increasingly capable local partners will ensure ISIS's lasting defeat. 
Using the tools Congress provided in the Caesar Syria Civilian 
Protection Act, the U.S. Government has imposed over 55 sanctions on 
those facilitating for the Assad regime to deny the regime the 
resources it uses to commit mass atrocities against the Syrian people 
and encourage a peaceful, political resolution of the Syrian conflict 
as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. In Libya, we are 
supporting the UN as it shepherds the intra-Libyan dialogue toward a 
potential cease-fire that holds the potential jumpstart the political 
process and reopen the oil sector. These efforts will be more effective 
now that the recently adopted UN mandate for the Libya mission includes 
our proposed language to create a UN Special Envoy position to focus 
exclusively on negotiations while leaving management of the UN mission 
in Libya to a special coordinator.
    In surveying the region today, we have tangible opportunities to 
advance our objectives of peace, prosperity, and security. Our presence 
and relationships serve as a bulwark against efforts by Russia and 
China to extend their malign influence into the Middle East.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    We will now hear from Elliot Abrams, who is U.S. Special 
Representative for Iran and Venezuela at the Department for 
State, and currently on leave from his position as Senior 
Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies and in the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant to the 
President and Deputy National Security Advisor in the U.S. 
Administration of President George W. Bush, where he supervised 
U.S. policy in the Middle East for the White House.
    Mr. Abrams.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT ABRAMS, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 FOR IRAN AND VENEZUELA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, 
                               DC

    Mr. Abrams. Thank you. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member 
Menendez, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me 
to testify today with Under Secretary Hale, and the opportunity 
to provide an update on our policy toward Iran. I will try to 
be brief, and I look forward to your questions.
    Our strategy to deal with the threats from Iran has two 
primary objectives. First, to deprive the Iranian regime of the 
money it needs to support its destabilizing activities. Second, 
to bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a 
comprehensive deal that must address four key areas: its 
nuclear program, its ballistic missile development and 
proliferation, its support for terror groups and proxies, and 
its wrongful detention of U.S. citizens.
    Our efforts to disrupt the regime's malicious agenda have 
met with real success. By any measure, we believe the Iranian 
regime is weaker today than when President Trump took office. 
The regime faces unprecedented and worsening economic and 
political crises.
    U.S. sanctions have denied Iran more than 90 percent of its 
oil export revenue, depriving the regime access to well over 
$70 billion in income that could otherwise have gone to fund 
terror operations. The consequence of this economic pressure is 
a change in Iran's malign behavior, willing or not. Iran's 
partners and proxies, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are under 
austerity plans to deal with a lack of funds from Iran. As a 
result, the lives of enumerable Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, 
Yemenis, and other innocent civilians in the regime's 
crosshairs have been saved.
    In addition to our economic pressure, we have enlisted many 
partners in the effort to confront the threats from Iran. Since 
the beginning of 2019, for example, nations such as Germany, 
the U.K., Argentina, and others, have taken far-reaching 
actions against Hezbollah. Many other nations have now banned 
Mahan Air, Iran's terror airline.
    We are further isolating Iran by brokering the peace 
agreements with Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain as part of the 
historic Abraham Accords. There is a reason that those Accords 
were orchestrated by the United States and signed in 
Washington. Nations in the Middle East have renewed confidence 
in the United States because we are standing up to Iran.
    Our negotiations with Iran have already shown dividends. 
Our model of how the United States ought to approach the regime 
by starting from a principled position of strength, we have 
brought back two Americans, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, back 
to the United States from Iranian detention. There was no 
payment for them, no sanctions relief granted, no pallets of 
cash. We will not rest until every American wrongfully detained 
in Iran is free.
    The fact that Americans can end up in Iran's jails to be 
used as political pawns is another demonstration of the 
regime's daily mockery of justice that Iranians know too well. 
Just recently, the regime brutally tortured and then shamefully 
executed champion wrestler Navid Afkari to send to its own 
people an unmistakable message of intimidation. The U.S. is 
committed to holding accountable those who deny freedom and 
justice to people of Iran. Later today, the United States will 
announce sanctions on several Iranian officials and entities, 
including the judge who sentenced Navid Afkari to death. I look 
forward, as you all do, to the day that Iranians enjoy the 
freedom and dignity they so deeply deserve.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, and other members of 
the committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify 
today.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Elliott Abrams

    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today with Under 
Secretary Hale and for the opportunity to provide an update on our 
policy toward Iran.
    This Administration harbors no illusions about the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. It is the principal driver of instability and violence in the 
Middle East, and it remains the world's leading state sponsor of 
terrorism and anti-Semitism. It remains in power through brutal 
repression of the Iranian people.
    We have approached the threats from Iran with a strategy that has 
two primary objectives. First, to deprive the Iranian regime of the 
money it needs to support its destabilizing activities. Second, to 
bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a comprehensive deal, 
as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in May 2018.
    The legally binding agreement we seek with the Iranian regime must 
address four key areas: its nuclear program, its ballistic missile 
development and proliferation, its support to terror groups and 
proxies, and its wrongful detention of U.S. citizens, including Siamak 
and Baquer Namazi, and Morad Tahbaz. The United States is also calling 
on the Iranian regime to provide a full accounting of the fate of 
retired FBI agent Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007. 
The United States is open to negotiate with Iran and meet without 
preconditions. The regime need only meet our diplomacy with diplomacy, 
not with violence, bloodshed, and attempted extortions.
    Our efforts to disrupt the regime's ability to carry out its 
malicious agenda have met with real success. By any measure, the 
Iranian regime is weaker today than when President Trump took office. 
The regime faces unprecedented and worsening economic and political 
crises that are exacerbated by the poor choices the regime makes in an 
effort to advance its radical ideology.
    In response to the Islamic Republic's choice to pursue hostility 
and aggressive acts, this Administration has implemented the 
unprecedented Maximum Pressure Campaign. We have imposed the toughest 
sanctions ever against the corrupt leadership of the regime. Our 
sanctions are having a significant impact on the regime's ability to 
fund its malign activities and keep a stranglehold on the Iranian 
people.
    According to the IMF, Iran's economy contracted by 5.5 percent in 
2018 and 7.6 percent in 2019; the IMF expects it to shrink by another 6 
percent in 2020. Iran's budget deficit for 2020 is a staggering and 
unsustainable 26 percent of GDP, while its budget is based off an 
unrealistic oil exports projection of 1 million barrels per day at $50 
per barrel. Our sanctions have denied Iran more than 90 percent of its 
oil export revenue, depriving the regime access to well over $70 
billion in income that could have otherwise gone to fund terror 
operations. Going forward, our oil and petrochemical sanctions will 
continue to deprive the regime of as much as $50 billion annually. As a 
result, Iran is struggling to access foreign currency. You can see the 
impact of all this pressure by looking at the Iranian Rial, which has 
fallen in value on the open market from about 60,000 to the dollar in 
2018 to about 270,000 to the dollar today.
    The consequence of this economic pressure is a change in Iran's 
malign behavior, willing or not. Multiple Iranian state propaganda 
television channels have had to shut down in 2020 and others are on the 
verge of closure because they can no longer afford to pay the satellite 
providers. And that is because the government is running out of foreign 
currencies. Iranian proxies and partners in Syria and elsewhere are 
going unpaid, and the services they once relied upon are drying up. 
Iran-supported militants can no longer rely on steady and consistent 
Iranian support. Hizballah and Hamas are under ``austerity plans'' to 
deal with a lack of funds from Iran. As a result, we believe the lives 
of innumerable Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and other innocent 
civilians in the regime's crosshairs have been saved.
    The United States has not stood by idly in the face of Iran's 
malign activities. Working with our partners and allies, we have 
redoubled our commitment to preserving peace and stability in the 
region. We have shown Iran that if it chooses to threaten American 
lives, President Trump will not hesitate to take decisive action. Iran 
understands strength and the credible threat of military force.
    We can observe the same successes of deterrence at sea. In 2015 and 
2016, during the time that the conclusion and implementation of the 
JCPOA was to have allegedly moderated Iran's behavior, the U.S. Navy 
recorded 58 incidents of unsafe and unprofessional naval conduct by 
Iran, including the illegal detention of U.S. sailors. From the 
earliest days of this Administration, the United States made clear we 
would not tolerate Iranian naval harassment, leading to a sharp decline 
in Iran's provocative maritime behavior.
    In addition to our economic pressure and military deterrence, we 
have rallied the world to treat the regime as the pariah its actions 
have demonstrated it to be.
    We have called on nations to sanction or ban Iran's terrorist 
proxy, Hizballah as a terrorist organization, in its entirety. Since 
the beginning of 2019, nations such as Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Argentina, as well as many others, have taken far-reaching actions 
against Hizballah. We warned the world of Mahan Air, Iran's airline 
that ferries terrorist personnel, arms, and assets around the world. 
Germany, France, and Italy have joined many other nations in banning 
Mahan Air flights from landing at or taking off from their airports.
    Following the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, SWIFT de-
listed 33 Iranian banks. We continued to urge the international 
community to hold Iran accountable for its illicit financial 
activities, and in February 2020, the Paris-based Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) re-imposed full countermeasures on Iran for its failure to 
adhere to basic standards. Iran joined North Korea in ignominy as the 
only countries on FATF's ``blacklist.'' This powerful decision is 
isolating the regime's financial and banking sector.
    Most visibly, we are further isolating Iran by brokering the peace 
agreement between Israel and the UAE, and the Israel-Bahrain 
Declaration as part of the historic Abraham Accords. We are hopeful 
more nations will follow their courageous acts and embrace the 
opportunity of peace. There is a reason that these accords were 
orchestrated by the United States and signed in Washington. Nations in 
the Middle East have renewed confidence in the United States because we 
are standing up to Iran.
    This Administration will never hesitate to protect our national 
security and prevent Iran from endangering the world. Unfortunately, in 
August, the U.N. Security Council failed to uphold its stated mission 
to maintain international peace and security and did not extend the 
U.N. arms embargo on Iran, which has been in place in various forms for 
13 years. The Security Council's inaction would have paved the way for 
Iran to buy a wide array of conventional weapons on October 18. We have 
been clear that we would not permit this to happen. In accordance with 
our rights under U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, and in light of 
Iran's continued and significant non-performance of its JCPOA 
commitments, we initiated the snapback process to restore virtually all 
previously terminated U.N. sanctions on Iran, which includes removing 
the sunset provision on the arms embargo. These sanctions returned this 
past Saturday, September 19. Further, on September 21, this 
Administration took action to strengthen our domestic sanctions 
authorities to counter Iranian conventional arms activity.
    Because of the failures of the JCPOA, Iran is nearly 5 years closer 
to the expiration of restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment program 
and reprocessing-related activities, bringing it unacceptably close to 
a dangerous nuclear breakout capability. However, thanks to the 
snapback of U.N. sanctions, Iran is now obligated to suspend 
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water-related activities. The 
United States expects all U.N. Member States to fully comply with their 
obligations regarding re-imposed restrictions on Iran, as the U.N. 
Charter requires all Member States to do.
    The United States will never let the world's leading state sponsor 
of terror obtain the world's most deadly weapon. Iran would be wise not 
to repeat and expand its tactic of nuclear and military extortion to 
extract concessions. The regime's malign actions only steel our resolve 
and increase the regime's economic and diplomatic isolation. Instead, 
Iran should cease its violence and come to the negotiating table.
    If Iran is willing to put the needs and desires of its people ahead 
of its dangerous ideological ambitions, it has much to gain from 
negotiations. The people of the United States and Iran should have 
diplomatic ties again. Our embassies could be reopened so that the 
brightest minds of our countries could work together and solve the 
problems for our two peoples. We can end all sanctions, and instead 
work on trade deals and direct flights to Houston, New York, and Los 
Angeles. We are willing to reestablish diplomatic relations, help bring 
economic prosperity, and more if Iran is ready to behave like a country 
rather than a cause.
    Our negotiations with Iran have already shown dividends and are a 
model of how the United States ought to approach the regime. By 
starting from a principled position of strength, we have brought two 
Americans, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, back to the United States from 
Iranian detention. And there was no payment for the Americans, no 
sanctions relief granted, and no pallets of cash loaded on planes to 
the Iranian regime in exchange for their release.
    We are delighted that Xiyue Wang and Michael White are reunited 
with their families, and we are committed to bringing every American 
home who is wrongfully detained abroad. Our team works every single 
day--literally every single day--to make that happen.
    That Americans can end up in Iran's jails to be used as political 
pawns is just one demonstration of the regime's daily mockery of 
justice that Iranians know all too well. Just recently, the regime 
brutally tortured and shamefully executed champion wrestler Navid 
Afkari to send to its own people an unmistakable message of 
intimidation that protests will not be tolerated. The greatest victims 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran are the Iranian people, and they too 
are increasingly standing up to the regime.
    In response to widespread protests in November 2019 the regime 
executed a brutal crackdown, killing as many as 1,500 of its own 
citizens while jailing thousands more. In an attempt to hide its 
actions from the world, the regime simultaneously imposed a near-total 
shutdown of access to the internet.
    Every year, the regime loses the support of more and more Iranians. 
This year's legislative elections saw the lowest turnout of voters in 
the regime's history. Most Iranians boycotted the election, in which 
candidates were pre-approved by Supreme Leader Khamenei's cronies and 
clerics. The Iranian people are suffering under a corrupt and radical 
regime whose leaders care more about filling their own pockets and 
sending weapons and cash abroad than providing for their people.
    As President Trump has said, Iran is a country with enormous 
untapped potential. If Iran were to work alongside its neighbors to 
foster stability and welcome peace rather than drive conflict, the 
Iranian people would thrive and once again enjoy prosperity. I look 
forward, as you do, to the day that all Iranians enjoy the freedom and 
dignity they so deeply deserve.
    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other Members of the 
Committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you. 
I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    We will now enter a round of questioning.
    Before we do, I want to respond briefly to some of the 
remarks made by my friend and colleague, the Ranking Member.
    I understand that we have a different opinion of what is 
going on in the Middle East as a result of this 
Administration's activities, but I want to drill down very, 
very specifically, on the outside chance that the Iranians are 
monitoring this. I want to say clearly, deterrence has been 
restored. Soleimani is dead. His replacement is a weak, weak 
substitute for Soleimani. He does not have the influence, and 
he does not have the abilities to conduct the kind of warfare 
that Soleimani did.
    Since that happened, there have been no bombings of oil 
facilities, as they did prior--as Iran did prior to that. There 
has been no sabotaging of oil tankers, which they did prior to 
that. There has been no shooting down of our drones.
    Most importantly, what is happening on the ground in Iraq 
has changed dramatically. I have spoken directly with the 
military commanders on the ground. I have spoken with the 
policymakers in the Administration. They are laser focused on 
this. There has been no American killed. Let there be no 
mistake, Iran. If you wind up killing Americans in Iraq, there 
will be serious, serious consequences. That message was 
transmitted when Soleimani was taken out and killed. There will 
be consequences for that. So, any suggestion that somehow we 
are backing away from that, any suggestion that somehow we are 
weakening on that, any suggestion that the military commanders 
on the ground are not dedicated to protecting American troops 
and to do what is necessary if, indeed, Iraqi attacks take the 
life of American citizens, American soldiers, American men and 
women in Iraq, there will be serious, serious consequences.
    What happened when Soleimani was taken out was a clear 
message. Iran, listen to that message, because it is meant to 
transmit what American determination is in Iraq--on the ground 
in Iraq.
    With that, we will go to a series of questions. I will turn 
it over to the Ranking Member.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you.
    Representative Abrams, do you dispute what CENTCOM 
Commander General McKenzie said, when he said the level of 
attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias have 
been higher?
    Mr. Abrams. Higher than when? I guess that is the question, 
Senator. Right now, we are seeing Iran----
    Senator Menendez. Well, you--have you talked to General 
McKenzie, in terms of a statement?
    Mr. Abrams. I talked to General McKenzie yesterday about 
what is going on in Iraq.
    Senator Menendez. All right. So, did you dispute his 
statement with him?
    Mr. Abrams. I do not dispute the statement. I think it is a 
question of comparisons.
    Senator Menendez. Okay.
    Ambassador Hale, the Foreign Relations Committee has 
statutory authority over reviewing and approving arms sales, 
which are a critical tool of U.S. foreign policy that has to be 
considered in a wide context: our interests, the recipient 
country's needs and interests, their human rights record, and, 
of course, how they have treated U.S.-origin weapons in the 
past. We have seen a lot of conflicting reporting, and no clear 
answers, regarding the sale of 
F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. So, let me ask. What, 
precisely, has the U.S. agreed to, in terms of selling F-35 
aircraft to the UAE?
    Ambassador Hale. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    We are not at a point now where we have something to bring 
to the Senate, but we understand fully our obligations to 
notify Congress and make sure that we have met all of the 
requirements that exist.
    Senator Menendez. So, you are having conversations about 
sales of F-35s to the UAE.
    Ambassador Hale. We are having consultations about their 
security needs and what would it take in order to improve their 
security.
    Senator Menendez. Have they suggested to you how many and 
what timeline of delivery?
    Ambassador Hale. No, not to my knowledge.
    Senator Menendez. Has a formal letter of request been 
received by the UAE for these aircraft?
    Ambassador Hale. I do not know of any such letter.
    Senator Menendez. Could you check and get back to the----
    Ambassador Hale. Absolutely.
    Senator Menendez. Well, what specific threats to the UAE 
does the F-35 address that cannot be met by existing weapon 
systems and alternative sales?
    Ambassador Hale. I am not an expert on various weapon 
systems. What I would say is that is subject to our experts to 
engage on. Above all, it is important that we preserve Israel's 
QME, but also meet the legitimate security and defense needs of 
our partners in the Gulf.
    Senator Menendez. So, let us talk about what you clearly do 
know, which is the qualitative military edge that exists in law 
for Israel. I do not see how anyone can reasonably assert that 
a sale of F-35 aircraft will, in fact, not reduce Israel's 
qualitative military edge, based on the simple fact that right 
now Israel is the only country throughout the Middle East that 
has that aircraft. So, how are you going to deal with U.S. law 
as it relates to not reducing Israel's qualitative military 
edge?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, we consult with the Israelis on any 
sale prior to proceeding with it. Once we determine a 
particular course of action--and then I know that the Congress 
will also evaluate whether or not any proposed sale meets the 
standard of preserving QME.
    Senator Menendez. Well, let me just say that, with all due 
respect, I am a big fan of consulting with the Israelis, but I 
am talking about United States law. United States law is not 
subject to a foreign power deciding when it would be waived. 
So, again I ask you, how is it that you will deal with U.S. law 
as it relates to the qualitative military edge that U.S. law 
commits to the U.S.-Israel relationship?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, the same we do it all the time. I 
mean, we have a large group of people at the Pentagon and at 
the State Department to evaluate, based on technical criteria 
and assessments of security, and what it is that the Israelis 
have, and what it is that our partners need, and they will make 
a recommendation to the Secretary of State. Then we have a 
consultative process with Israel that occurs every year. There 
is as an executive session in which--it is a closed session in 
which we talk about these things.
    Senator Menendez. Well, with all----
    Ambassador Hale. First, we bring all of this to Congress.
    Senator Menendez. With all due respect, it is a rather--it 
does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that, if Israel 
is the only country in the Middle East that has F-35s, that 
selling it to someone else no longer produces that qualitative 
military edge in the air.
    Representative Abrams, I have to disagree with much of your 
characterization of the approach towards Iran. Continuing the 
U.S.--the U.N. arms embargo against Iran has been a bipartisan 
goal of Congress and one of our European allies. However, the 
U.S. efforts to renew the arms embargo of the Security Council 
were ineffective and definitely a how-to lesson in terrible 
diplomacy. How is it possible that the United States failed so 
utterly and completely to build international support for our 
position that a number of allies even chair?
    Mr. Abrams. It is a good question, Senator, about the 
behavior of the EU-3, in my view, all of whom told us privately 
that they thought the U.N. embargo should be extended, but they 
did not take any action to get it extended. We saw no activity 
on their part in the United Nations. We, therefore, took the 
one step that we were able to take unilaterally, which was 
snapback.
    Senator Menendez. Well--I know, but a snapback, when, in 
fact, I do not know you can sustain an arms embargo if the 
international community, including our European allies, refuse 
to enforce it.
    Mr. Abrams. Well, first, the EU has its own arms embargo, 
which extends another 3 years. Second, this is clearly true of 
all sanctions on Iran; ultimately, the decisions are not made 
in Foreign Ministries about complying with U.S. sanctions. They 
are made by 10,000 or 100,000 individuals--company officers, 
company lawyers, bankers, financiers--who will look at these 
sanctions and say, ``This is too dangerous. We are not going to 
do it.'' We heard this argument in 2018, that unilateral 
American sanctions will not work, but they do work.
    Senator Menendez. Well, I will just close by saying, our 
unilateral sanctions always clearly have a value, but the 
reason we created an international coalition originally that, 
first of all, brought Iran to the negotiating table, was the 
internationalization of our sanctions regime. There is no 
question that the dissipation of that internationalization of 
the sanctions regime has less consequences on Iran. Iran today 
is more advanced than it was in its nuclear program than 
before. That is, I think, a pretty much undisputed fact. That 
is concerning.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
    We have a number of people that are online with us. This is 
always awkward, going through this, but I am going to use 
seniority, as opposed to first-come/first-serve, because it is 
easier to do.
    The next one I have in seniority on the Republican side is, 
I have Senator Gardner, who I am told is with us online.
    Senator Gardner, are you with us?
    [Pause.]
    Senator Gardner. Senator Risch, I will defer to Senator 
Romney, I believe, who is--who came in before me.
    The Chairman. Senator Gardner has not responded.
    So, if Senator Romney, you are up.
    Senator Romney. Yes. I hope you can hear me, Mr. Chairman. 
I appreciate this opportunity to speak with these individuals 
about this critical part of the world.
    Mr. Abrams, how does our support for the Lebanese Armed 
Forces advance our strategic interests in that country? I know 
we continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. We are very 
concerned about stability there. We want to make sure that we 
do not see a resurgence of strength on the part of Hezbollah. 
I, for one, believe that our support of the Lebanese Armed 
Forces advances our--the position of our friends there, and it 
deters the growth of Hezbollah influence, but I am interested 
in your informed opinion.
    Mr. Abrams. I would ask, Senator, that Under Secretary Hale 
take that question, as Under Secretary, first, and as the 
former Ambassador of Lebanon.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Ambassador Hale. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your 
support for that program.
    It is of critical importance to our strategy to counter 
Hezbollah and Iranian malign influence in Lebanon. We have been 
supporting the Lebanese Army for a number of years. Our 
military experts believe that it has paid off. The Army is far 
more capable today than it was when we began to do the job of 
protecting Lebanon's borders and supporting UNIFIL in trying to 
make sure that the south is as quiet as it can be.
    We will continue this program. We believe that the Army has 
shown that it is capable of those tasks, and that it has a 
sterling end-user record; the equipment that we provide is all 
accounted for. If we were not building up the security arm of 
the State of Lebanon, Hezbollah would have even further ability 
to extend its sway over Lebanon. There would be no alternative 
to point to for the Lebanese people as the provider of 
security--the legitimate provider of security, which is the 
Army, and not a militia.
    Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Ambassador Hale, let me ask, also, with regards to the 
reports that China was going to invest some $400 billion in 
Iran--and I presume that would have been on a loan basis--but, 
clearly, China has its eyes on Iran and on the Middle East. Do 
you have a sense of what their objectives are in the Middle 
East and, particularly with regards to Iran, what their 
strategy appears to be? How is it that we might want to counter 
what they are doing, and whether we are already taking steps to 
do so?
    Mr. Abrams. Thanks, Senator. If you will allow, I will try 
to reply to that one.
    We saw the announcement of the $400 billion trade deal--25-
year deal. The annual rate would be ten times the current level 
of trade between China and Iran, which is really unrealistic. 
So, I think it is--that number is more of an announcement than 
it is a reality.
    We are concerned about China's presence in the Middle East. 
We are concerned about the potential for Chinese arms sales, 
not only for Iran, but other countries in the Middle East.
    China's interests, of course, start with oil. China's a big 
oil importer, and we are obviously trying to make sure they get 
the oil supplies that they are going to need, but they also 
want political influence.
    So, we are watching that very carefully. In all of the 
countries that are friends of ours, including Israel, we have 
conversations about the need to be very careful about the level 
of Chinese involvement, because the economic involvement very 
frequently becomes a source of difficulty, both economically 
and politically, for the countries that permit it.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Let me ask one more question. That is with regards to Iraq. 
I happen to be, I think, one of many who believe that Iraq is 
critical to our long-term interests in the Middle East, to 
stability in the Middle East, and can be a--an example of the 
potential of a democratically elected government, but it is 
obviously in a fragile position, given its neighbors. I do 
believe that, historically, our commitment of troops in Iraq 
has helped provide stability, obviously helped expel ISIS from 
territory in Iraq, but I would anticipate that ongoing troop 
presence is important to continue to provide those same 
benefits.
    Are American troop commitments there remaining critical to 
the objectives we have in Iraq, and, if so, why do we continue 
to reduce that level? To what level do you anticipate we 
should, or should not, go?
    Ambassador Hale. Thank you, Senator.
    I agree that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq is critical 
for achieving our goals. They are, as you described them, we 
are trying to increase the capacity and the resiliency of Iraqi 
Security Forces. We want to counter the instability and 
violence spewed by, not just ISIS, but Iranian-backed militias 
that were referenced earlier. We are very focused on that. I 
would defer to our military colleagues in defining how many 
troops are required in order to continue to perform those 
objectives.
    There is a transformation underway in Iraq. There is a 
strong popular demand for reform. We are talking to the new 
Iraqi Prime Minister, who met with President Trump just a 
couple of weeks ago here in Washington, in the context of a 
strategic dialogue, how he is going to address those urgent 
reform needs, which we agree on, that are essential to Iraq's 
stability.
    We also look to this leadership to protect our diplomatic 
and military facilities in Iraq, so we do not have to act on 
our own, although we will, as I think Chairman Risch so 
eloquently put it earlier.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I will return the time to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Romney.
    I now have indication Senator Cardin is on the line.
    Senator Cardin, are you with us?
    Senator Cardin. I am with you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 
much.
    Let me thank both of our witnesses.
    First, Mr. Abrams, let me just qualify this by saying I 
have a deep respect for your service to our country. You have 
really served our Nation well, but I strongly disagree with 
your assessment as to where we are in Iran by the U.S. policy 
that has isolated us from our allies. Let me just give you the 
background. Then I really want to get your response to this.
    My assessment is that the maximum pressure campaign has 
been to isolate the United States. We look at Iran today, and 
where they are. Without our allies' support, you indicate that 
our sanctions are working because we have companies that will 
respond to the U.S. sanctions. I acknowledge that, but then you 
said that our traditional allies wanted to help us in the 
United Nations, but they did not vote with us. The reality is 
that we have all had conversations with our European allies, 
our traditional allies, and yes, they recognize Iran as a 
serious--as a real threat, but they are absolutely against what 
the U.S. did in pulling out of the Iran nuclear agreement, and 
they are taking steps to counter what the United States has 
done in regards to the effect of sanctions against Iran, 
particularly now that we have announced that we are reimposing 
our sanctions.
    Then you talk about what China is doing. The United States 
has been isolated in its global politics so that China can be 
bolder in reaching out to Iran than they would before, when we 
had the unity of Europe. So, we are isolating America's 
effectiveness in global politics, and that is affecting how 
well we can isolate Iran. We have legitimated Iran in some 
quarters because of what we have done in violating and pulling 
out of the Iran nuclear agreement.
    So, when I look at Iran today, I see a very dangerous 
country. What Senator Menendez said is absolutely right, there 
is strong bipartisan support to take effective action to 
isolate Iran and to minimize their ability to cause the type of 
damage that they do, and to make sure they never become a 
nuclear-weapon state, but we do that by working with our 
allies. This Administration has isolated us.
    Now, I know your background, and I have a hard time 
believing that you really believe America is stronger when we 
act by ourselves and not with our allies. Tell me how we are 
stronger when America is alone rather than having our 
traditional allies on our side as we combat Iran.
    Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Senator.
    Sometimes we have to be alone. We have been alone about 40 
times in the United Nations, for example, in defense of Israel. 
Literally alone. That was the right thing to do in those votes.
    We are trying to maintain this coalition, as you rightly 
say. That is a strong coalition, both domestically here and in 
Europe. I will give you an example. This week, 2 days ago, 
Tuesday, there was a vote in the IAEA General Conference. Iran 
presented itself to be the chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole. It was defeated in a landslide. No other country voted 
for it, because countries do recognize, as the Senate does, and 
as this committee does, the danger that Iran presents. We are 
in continuing conversations with the British, the French, and 
the Germans. We did have one very big disagreement, which was 
about the JCPOA, which we regard as a very----
    Senator Cardin. I am going to just interrupt you for one 
second. We have had more than one disagreement with our 
traditional allies. Look at some of our trade policies, look at 
our climate positions. It is not just Iran. We have had major 
disagreements with our traditional allies. On NATO, we have had 
disagreements with our traditional allies.
    You are mentioning the IAEA. The only reason we have had 
those actions is because of the nuclear agreement.
    Mr. Abrams. In this case, the--what happened was that Iran 
presented itself to be chairman of the Committee of the Whole, 
and it was defeated in a landslide. This is unrelated to the 
JCPOA.
    On the question of Iran, I think there is very broad 
agreement within what I call the Western Alliance. I have been 
in touch with British, French, and German colleagues in the 
last few days, and it is clear to them, as it is clear to us, 
that we need to work together in the months and years ahead to 
deal with this terrible problem of Iran. Where we had a deep 
disagreement was, should we value retaining the JCPOA and 
allowing the arms embargo to go away, or should we say no, the 
arms embargo has to stay? On that one, I think, as you know, we 
were right, the arms embargo is critical, and the EU-3 really 
made a mistake here in thinking that they could allow it to 
disappear.
    Senator Cardin. My last point--I know I have run out of 
time--is that if we were still in the Iran nuclear agreement, 
our allies would have been with us at the United Nations on 
this vote. The only reason they are not with us is because of 
the action taken by the United States in withdrawing from the 
nuclear agreement.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
    We will now go to--the next one I have on my list is 
Senator Young, who is with us online, I believe.
    Senator Young.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. If not, we will try Senator Perdue.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. The next one I have on my list, we will now 
go to Senator Shaheen, who is here in person.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to both of you, for your service to the country 
and for being here today.
    I was pleased to see, this week, that Britain agreed to 
renew information-sharing with the United States with respect 
to bringing a case against the two terrorists known as ``the 
Beatles,'' who are suspected of being responsible for the 
killing of Americans James Foley, Peter Kassig, Steven Sotloff, 
and Kayla Mueller. I wonder if you--the goal is to bring those 
two terrorists back to the United States, to try them in a 
civilian court, to get justice for the families, and to send a 
signal to the rest of the world. Can you, Under Secretary Hale, 
speak to the message that that sends to terrorists around the 
world if we are able to do that?
    Ambassador Hale. Yes, it would be, I think, a very powerful 
message, Senator, that we will be relentless in pursuing 
justice on behalf of American citizens who have been killed or 
injured in any way by terrorist organizations. We simply will 
not rest until we are able to see justice done.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can you tell me, is the State 
Department supportive of that effort?
    Ambassador Hale. Absolutely.
    Senator Shaheen. Are you working with the Attorney General?
    Ambassador Hale. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Last month, the U.N.'s counterterrorism chief confirmed 
that 10,000 ISIS fighters remain active--obviously, the Beatles 
were ISIS fighters--and that attacks have significantly 
increased. We also have heard, from Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, who 
is the State Department's Envoy, expressing concern over ISIS 
regroupings and attacks. So, I wonder if you can speak to the 
reason we sent additional troops into Syria. They were speaking 
with respect to ISIS presence in Syria. I had a chance to visit 
Syria in 2018. I saw the difference that our presence in 
northeast Syria made to the Syrians to maintaining stability in 
northeast Syria, preventing the Russians and the Iranians from 
coming in, the Turks from coming in. The President 
precipitously withdrew those troops. Now we are sending troops 
back into northeast Syria. Can you speak to why we are doing 
that?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, we have had a continual presence. 
There has been a small adjustment downward, relatively minor, 
from, I think, 1,000 to 800 soldiers. Again, I defer to my 
military colleagues on assessing just who they need on the 
ground to complete the mission, but from your travel and your 
close work on this, that, while we have made great progress, we 
have not achieved our success yet in the enduring defeat of 
ISIS in Syria. We will continue to work with the Turks. We will 
continue to deconflict with the Russians. Job is not yet done.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate your saying that, 
because we have heard from a number of officials, including the 
President, that we have defeated ISIS in the Middle East. So, 
you would disagree with that statement? You believe that we 
still have work to do with respect to ISIS?
    Ambassador Hale. We have made tremendous progress, and we 
are very close to completing the task, but the task is not yet 
done.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Representative Abrams, I am concerned that the 
Administration has really lost the focus on our policy towards 
Iran. I share the concerns that you have heard from some of my 
colleagues here about our ability to contain Iran's nuclear 
ambitions without the JCPOA. So, can you talk about just what 
is most important as we think about how we address Iran's 
malign activities across the Middle East? What are we most 
focused on? How do we engage the international community, as 
Senator Cardin has suggested we need to do, in order to be 
successful?
    Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Senator.
    I would say two things. We are focused on Iran's nuclear 
program, and we are focused on its malign activities in the 
region--support for terrorism, primarily, its activities in 
Yemen, in Iraq, in Lebanon.
    Our view of the JCPOA, which some members of the committee 
shared when it was first introduced, is that it is really not a 
permanent obstacle for the Iranian nuclear program. It almost 
paves the way, because there are sunsets at 5 years first----
    Senator Shaheen. No, I appreciate that. I voted for it, so 
I understand the limitations that it had. However, it kept Iran 
from getting a nuclear weapon, and we do not have those same 
constraints today.
    Mr. Abrams. Well, in our view, the path ahead should be to 
negotiate a comprehensive agreement that is a permanent block 
for Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
    Senator Shaheen. Are we trying--excuse me for interrupting, 
but I am about----
    Mr. Abrams. Oh----
    Senator Shaheen. --to run out of time. Are we--what are we 
doing to bring Iran to the negotiating table? What hope do we 
have that that might happen sometime in the near future?
    Mr. Abrams. Obviously, Iran does not want to do it, does 
not want to give up the nuclear program, does not want to give 
up the support for terrorism. So, in our view, the only way to 
get them to do it is what we call a maximum pressure campaign. 
If you look at the Iranian economy, with--even now, this week, 
the rial falling to an all time low. Today, 290,000 to the 
dollar, which is an all time low. We think that, with that 
pressure, once our election is over, they will come to the 
negotiating table.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, can I have another minute to ask a question 
about ---
    The Chairman. Go ahead.
    Senator Shaheen. --Lebanon?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Shaheen. Under Secretary Hale, I know you 
understand what is happening in Lebanon, having served there, 
but one of the things that I have been concerned about is, as 
we look at the challenges facing Lebanon, we were very quick to 
respond to the humanitarian situation after the explosion, but 
now we have backed off somewhat. China has already offered a 
billion dollars to rebuild the port there. Russia is in there, 
angling for more influence for warm water ports south of 
Tartus. Can you speak to what more we are doing to try and help 
the Lebanese people who are really struggling at this time?
    Ambassador Hale. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we 
have contributed $19 billion to the immediate humanitarian 
crisis----
    Senator Shaheen. Billion, with a ``b,'' or million----
    Ambassador Hale. Million. The million--we are, I believe, 
the largest, or maybe second-largest donor, in response to this 
crisis. Over the years, we have provided $10 billion in support 
to Lebanon, both for the security services, on the one hand, 
and to private NGOs, on the other, for economic development and 
humanitarian support. No one else has contributed as much 
foreign assistance as we have.
    I have little faith that the Chinese will make good on 
these kinds of promises. I was in Beirut, days after the 
explosion. I met with all of the leaders. I met with a wide 
sector of activists and protesters--normal, common people. The 
level of anger is quite high, directed toward the political 
elite and their corruption. So, our focus is on that and 
getting in place a government that is going to be actually 
responsive to the needs of the people. If that occurs, and they 
are committed and acting upon reform, that will unlock our 
support and the support of the French and other donors, for 
several--I think $21 billion that has been put on the shelf of 
IMF, World Bank, and so-called CDR money, which is bilateral 
assistance, that can all be unlocked if the Lebanese leadership 
make the right decisions and break from the past.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    I--that is a good line of questioning. I think everybody is 
concerned about that situation in Lebanon. I do not know what 
the path forward is there, what it--where it is going to take 
everyone, but it is a serious, serious situation.
    Do I have any more members of the Majority online?
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. Okay. If not, the next one I have on the list 
that told me they are online is Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall, are you with us?
    Senator Udall. Yes.
    The Chairman. You are not online.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. It does not look like online, but could be. 
Welcome.
    Senator Udall, the floor is yours.
    Big enough room. You should be able to find a chair, 
Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for you and Senator 
Menendez calling this hearing, and, I think, very important 
subjects we are talking about today on the Middle East.
    After 20 years of uninterrupted war, the forever wars in 
the Middle East continue. Contrary to the Trump 
administration's pronouncements, we are even more entrenched in 
the region than before, and no closer to revoking the 2001 AUMF 
being used to justify wars that Congress never authorized.
    Just last week, instead of drawing down from a war in Syria 
that no one in Congress voted for, the Administration sent more 
troops to a country where no strategic U.S. interest exists and 
threats to American forces are everywhere. Maximum pressure is 
an abject failure. I agree with Senator Cardin on that. It has 
traded an agreement that placed limits on Iranian enrichment 
for bluster, increased enrichment, and threats of war, all 
enacted out of spite for the previous Administration's 
progress.
    Let us be clear. The United States left the Iran nuclear 
agreement, and now wants to be the arbiter of how it is 
enforced. That is ludicrous. As a result, the U.S. is now more 
isolated around the world.
    I want to reaffirm that neither--and this question is 
directed to both witnesses--that neither the 2001 nor 2002 AUMF 
give this President the authority to go to war or to enter into 
any hostilities with Iran. Iran has responded to the maximum 
pressure campaign by increasing its nuclear activities, and our 
allies are rejecting our approach. What is the next step? Do 
you expect the Iranian regime to collapse or give up? Or should 
the American people prep for more unconstitutional attacks on 
Iran that might precipitate a new war?
    Mr. Abrams. Thanks, Senator.
    The next step, we hope, would be a comprehensive 
negotiation----
    Senator Young. Hey. Should I direct the Yemen question at 
Mr. Abram?
    Senator Udall. Both witnesses.
    Mr. Abrams. Well, I will start.
    That is the goal. The goal of the maximum pressure campaign 
is to deny Iran the money with which the regime is doing the 
many things to which all of us object, and to get them to the 
table to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would deal 
with the nuclear program and its conduct in the region.
    Senator Udall. Mr. Hale.
    Ambassador Hale. Well, I might address your question about 
the use of AUMF. The Administration has not, to date, 
interpreted the 2002 AUMF as authorizing military force against 
Iran, except as may be necessary and appropriate to promote 
stability in Iraq and address terrorist threats emanating 
there.
    Senator Udall. Mr. Abrams, you have a lot of experience in 
Latin America with coups, authoritarians, and failed democratic 
transitions of power. Politico's morning newsletter asks a 
question: Is the United States turning into a banana republic 
under President Trump? President Trump, yesterday, said, and I 
quote, ``Well, we are going to have to see what happens. You 
know that I have been complaining very strongly at--about the 
ballots, and the ballots are a disaster. Let us get rid of the 
ballots, and we will have a very peaceful--and there will not 
be a transfer, frankly, there would be a continuation. The 
ballots are out of control. You know it, and you--and who knows 
it better than anybody else? The Democrats know it better than 
anybody else,'' That is the President of the United States 
talking about the election.
    Senator Romney replied to these comments by posting on 
social media that, ``Fundamental to democracy is the peaceful 
transition of power. Without that, there is Belarus. Any 
suggestion that a President might not respect this 
constitutional guarantee is both unthinkable and 
unacceptable.''
    As a high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department, 
which has a mission to promote democracy, who do you agree most 
with, and why?
    Mr. Abrams. Senator, I am not going to parse the 
President's remarks. I think we are all proud of American 
democracy, and we continue, in this Administration, as did our 
predecessors, to promote the expansion of democracy around the 
world.
    Senator Udall. Well, then some of you should be standing up 
and saying this is unacceptable, and tell him that he should 
not be talking and demeaning our democracy, and demeaning the 
peaceful transition of power.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
    We will now move to Senator Young, who I am told is joining 
us online.
    Senator Young. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We continue to witness the destabilizing effects of 
Iranian-backed proxies throughout the Middle East, but 
especially in Yemen, where the war and COVID-19 continue to 
ravage and decimate a people that have already endured 
unspeakable suffering. The Houthis continue to deflect 
humanitarian assistance, food deliveries, and medical 
assistance. The war is so complex in Yemen, with many different 
facets deserving blame, but Iran's role certainly cannot be 
overlooked.
    From a global commerce perspective, Iran regularly threats 
the--threatens the Straits of Hormuz. Now, through their Houthi 
proxies, they may be able to also gain control of the Bab al-
Mandab Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of 
Aden. If successful with gaining control over the key straits 
on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran would completely 
change our ability to access the region and alter how commerce 
is able to flow.
    Further, we are seeing Iran develop the Houthis into what 
some characterize as a Hezbollah-like entity within Yemen that 
could have an enduring effect and further prolong the conflict 
that has already inflicted unspeakable humanitarian costs.
    So, either Ambassador Abrams or Secretary Hale, could you 
address what we are doing to end the conflict in Yemen? I know 
you had some--you spoke to this at some length in your opening 
remarks, but maybe you could expand on that.
    Ambassador Hale. Yes, thank you, Senator.
    I think you described the situation quite accurately. You 
asked what we are doing about this. We have a multifaceted 
strategy. First, we are supporting the efforts of the U.N. 
Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, who has been tireless in 
trying to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict, because 
ultimately we do not believe that there is a military solution. 
I was out in Saudi Arabia late last year, and I met with the 
Yemeni leadership, I met with the U.N. leadership, I met with 
the Saudi leadership, and encouraged them to continue down that 
path.
    We are also doing our utmost to interdict the weapons flows 
from Iran that you have cited, and encouraging our allies to do 
likewise and disrupt the Iranian smuggling networks that are 
supplying these weapons and materiel to the Houthis.
    We are also doing our utmost to work with our partners to 
ensure that extremist groups are not using Yemen and its 
stateless areas as a safe haven from which to conduct attacks. 
We are trying to keep the aid moving on the humanitarian needs 
of the Yemeni people, but the Houthis have been interfering 
severely with that. We are doing our best, but there have been 
real gaps as a result of that.
    We share all of the concerns that you have. As I say, we 
are doing this so you--deploying this multi-pronged strategy in 
order to see that our interests are protected there.
    Thank you.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    Ambassador Abrams.
    Mr. Abrams. The only thing I would add, Senator, is that we 
are also clearly maintaining the level of military strength in 
the region that we think is necessary to protect those two 
chokepoints that you mentioned, the Strait of Hormuz and the 
Bab al-Mandab.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    Thank you both.
    How is the Administration preventing Iran from replicating 
the Hezbollah model in Yemen? You can expand that to address 
other geographies, as well.
    Ambassador Hale. Well, essentially, the tools that I 
outlined in my answer a moment ago. We believe that a political 
solution that is brought to bear as rapidly as possible can 
prevent the transformation of the Houthis into a Hezbollah-like 
asset for Iran. It is certainly essential. We have seen how 
Hezbollah grew from a relatively small, if potent, terrorist 
cell to what it is today, with its arms in every direction. We 
definitely want to prevent that from happening. So, we are 
doing our utmost to combat the Iranian influence. We have been 
encouraged that the Republic of Yemen Government has reached 
out to the Southern Transition Council and reached an agreement 
with the South, so that is beginning to put pressure from both 
directions on the Houthis, but there is a lot of work still 
ahead of us.
    Senator Young. Okay. We will continue to monitor that.
    I think I have about 90 seconds left, but I will go ahead 
and pivot to Turkey, Under Secretary Hale.
    Many have discussed how the Abraham Accords might influence 
Israel and Arab State efforts to counter the regional influence 
of Iran, but what about Turkey? Turkey and Iran have similar 
ambitions for recreating the empires that they once had, and 
both desire to lead the Muslim world. Clearly, Turkey is--has 
rapidly radicalized as--under Erdogan's regime. There are a lot 
of challenges and implications for the broader region. We have 
not seen any comparable actions taken by the Administration to 
help change Turkey's trajectory. I know this is very 
challenging. Turkey remains a member of NATO.
    Are you concerned that, under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey 
poses a greater--perhaps an even greater challenge to our 
security over the longer term?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, we have a complex relationship with 
Turkey, and there are many factors in play, here. Our interests 
in some areas overlap. Our interests differ in other areas. We 
try, obviously, to build on our areas of agreement and try to 
work out our areas of disagreement. They are a NATO ally. We 
count on that. Their geography means that they do have 
legitimate interests in the Middle East. That cannot be 
ignored, but it is important that they be channeled in the ways 
in which Turkey is supporting efforts to bring peace and 
stability, particularly through multilateral formats in places 
like Libya and in Syria, support of the political process 
there. So, we have a very extensive dialogue with the Turks to 
move them in that direction. That is our objective.
    Senator Young. Okay. I will follow up----
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator----
    Senator Young. --and inquire as to what action the 
Administration may have taken within NATO to send messages to 
Turkey.
    Thank you so much, both of you, for your appearance before 
the committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Young.
    Senator Murphy, you are up.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to both of you, for your service.
    I understand that, when Administration officials come 
before this committee or any committee, they try to put the 
best possible spin on the effect of their policies. Obama 
administration officials did it. We have come to expect it, but 
there are some times in which the case just does not pass the 
straight-face test. I will say, this argument that Iran is on 
the run, that they have less influence in the region because of 
our maximum pressure campaign, just does not pass the straight-
face test. They have closer relations with the Houthis than 
they did 4 years ago. They have closer relations with the 
Qataris than they did 4 years ago. Their proxy in Syria is 
closer to command over the majority of the country than 4 years 
ago. This narrative about Iraq is just not true. I mean, it is 
true that rocket attacks have increased from the first half of 
this year to the first half of last year. I do not know that 
there is any expert that would tell you that Iran has less 
influence in Iraq than they did at the end of the Obama 
administration. So, I think it is important for us all to be 
sober and realistic, because you cannot make good policy if you 
do not understand the consequences of your actions.
    That is a statement. Here are my two questions, both for 
you, Ambassador Hale.
    I think we also have an accountability crisis in the 
region. Part of the reason we are so weak right now in and 
around the Middle East is because our allies and our 
adversaries, generally do not believe that there is much 
consequence for taking action against the United States or 
taking action in contravention of U.S. interests. The, 
obviously, most high-profile example is the dismemberment of 
Jamal Khashoggi. There were no consequences of any serious 
nature against Saudi Arabia for that brutal murder, but the 
region is populated with other instances in which U.S. law has 
been violated, and there seemingly has been no accountability, 
which is just an invitation for our so-called allies in the 
region to continue to treat us shabbily. I think it has 
consequences for the next Administration, as well.
    So, Ambassador Hale, let me pose two of--two examples for 
you and ask for an update on whether there has been any 
accountability.
    The first is in UAE. We have talked about the potential 
pending sale. I have asked this question several times, but UAE 
admitted, about a year and a half ago, to taking U.S. weapons 
and transferring them to very dangerous Salafist militias that 
have interests on the ground in Yemen. This was not just 
reported. This was admitted to by UAE. For a year and a half, 
this committee has been told that it has been under 
investigation. So, my question is, What specific steps have 
been taken to hold UAE accountable for the illegal transfer of 
U.S. weapons to militia groups on the ground in the region?
    Second, in Egypt, on July 13, American citizen Mustafa 
Kassem died in an Egyptian prison. His death was entirely 
preventable. He had submitted the paperwork to renounce his 
citizenship so that he could be released to the United States. 
On February 26, Assistant Secretary Schenker said that the 
State Department's deliberations about what actions to take in 
consequence were a work in progress.
    So, let me ask you, Can you provide us an update? Has there 
been any public action--and I think public action is important, 
because if you do not--if the world does not see us engaging in 
accountability, then it is hard for it to have an effect--has 
there been any public accountability measures taken for the 
transfer of weapons in UAE or the killing of Mustafa Kassem in 
an Egyptian prison?
    Ambassador Hale. I would be happy to get you a full answer 
in writing to your two questions.
    What I have to say this morning is that we have had very 
serious conversations with both of those governments about 
those activities. In the case of the Emirates, I am confident 
that the Emirates understand exactly what is permitted and what 
is not, and how serious these allegations are about what 
happened, and that there can be nothing like that again, 
because it is jeopardizing our ability to meet their legitimate 
security needs.
    In the case of Egypt, again, we have a confidential 
dialogue with the Egyptians. I emphasize ``confidential'' 
because I think we are more likely to get results, in terms of 
protecting American citizens, relatives of American citizens 
who are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention and other 
forms of mistreatment there. We have had some success in 
getting them released, but we will continue to have those 
conversations with the Egyptians and to spell out how 
unacceptable this kind of abusive behavior is.
    Senator Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the Saudis, as a consequence 
of killing Jamal Khashoggi, got a smiling photo op with 
Secretary Pompeo. Apparently, from what we are hearing today, 
the Emirates and the Egyptians have gotten stern private 
conversations. That is not a recipe to send a message to the 
rest of the region and the world to obey U.S. law and to treat 
U.S. citizens well and to act in accordance with our interests. 
I think this is part and parcel of the reason why America is 
getting very little from our allies. Our interests are not 
advancing in the region, because nobody believes they will be 
held accountable if they--if their policies run crosscurrent to 
the United States.
    The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. I have got to say, I just heard the comments 
from my friend from Connecticut, and it is almost like we are 
living in parallel worlds. To say we are not getting anything 
significant in our ally--from our allies just rewrites history.
    I had the great joy of being at the White House last week 
for an historic peace deal, where, for the first time in three 
decades, an Arab country normalized relationships with Israel, 
the UAE did so, and, within a matter of weeks thereafter, 
Bahrain did so. Both of those were major diplomatic advances. 
They had not happened for decades. The Saudis, whom the Senator 
from Connecticut just cast aspersions at them, played a major 
role in brokering Middle East peace, including, for the first 
time, as allowing Israeli planes to overfly Saudi airspace. So, 
I understand that we are 41 days out from an election, and so 
everything has to be bad in foreign policy if your opponent is 
the incumbent, but I do think this committee deserves some 
acknowledgment and recognition of the historic events that are 
playing out right now, events that have made our allies safer, 
events that have made the Middle East safer, and events that 
have made America safe.
    Mr. Abrams, you are a longtime expert on the region. What 
are your thoughts on the historic peace deal that was just 
brokered by the President?
    Mr. Abrams. I am reminded, Senator, of the many people who 
said that this could not happen without an Israeli-Palestinian 
peace agreement, but the Administration thought that it would 
work in the other direction, that the first thing to try to do 
was to normalize relations between Israel and a number of Arab 
States, and then that might have an influence on Palestinian 
conduct and prove to be correct.
    Senator Cruz. Well, and I will tell you, it really proved 
right some conversations we had in 2017, in the first year of 
the Trump administration. As you know, there were vigorous 
debates within the Administration on a number of foreign policy 
questions. One question was whether or not to move our Embassy 
in Israel to Jerusalem. The Department where you work today, 
the State Department, opposed moving the Embassy. The Defense 
Department opposed moving the Embassy. I engaged vigorously in 
those debates directly with the President. The argument that 
State and Defense made, and the argument that some in the White 
House made, is that moving the Embassy to Jerusalem would 
enrage the enemies of Israel, it would enrage the enemies of 
America, and it would make peace in the Middle East harder to 
achieve.
    In my view, that was precisely backwards, that the reason 
peace has been so difficult to achieve, in part, has been the 
consistent ambiguity of U.S. policy, the wringing of hands, 
where the enemies of America and the enemies of Israel did not 
know where we stand. What I urged the President is, moving the 
Embassy will be heard crystal clear across the globe by 
America's friends and by America's enemies, that America stands 
resolutely and unshakeably alongside our friend, the State of 
Israel.
    I was there in Jerusalem the day the Embassy opened, a time 
of celebration and dancing in the streets. I do not believe it 
was coincidental that, within a week of the Embassy opening, 
the Administration announced what I think is the single most 
important foreign policy decision of the last 4 years, which is 
withdrawing from the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal. Both 
of those together, in my judgment, were the essential 
preconditions for the historic peace deal that rolled out 
within the last couple of weeks. That clarity--I can tell you, 
in the last couple of weeks, I have had conversations directly 
with the Ambassador from the UAE and the Ambassador from Saudi 
Arabia. Both of them told me, said the reason we are cutting 
this deal is because we want to be friends with America, we 
want to be closer friends with you. We know you care that we 
make nice with Israel. So, we are willing to do that, because 
we want a closer friendship and alliance with the United 
States. I think that is an incredible victory for clarity in 
foreign policy, and it is something worth learning from, 
celebrating, and emulating, going forward.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Well said. There are 
obviously two different views on this, and it is unfortunate 
that the political conditions in the country today get us 
there. The situation with Iran is serious. We obviously have 
differences with our allies on it. They are very squishy on it. 
We have all talked to them, but it has got to be dealt with.
    Senator Kaine, no doubt you have strong feelings on the 
matter.
    Senator Kaine. I do, Mr. Chair, but I do not like the 
suggestion that strong feelings and differences of opinion are 
just because of the political situation. Can there not be an 
intellectually respectable ground for difference of opinion 
that does not just get cast aside as being politically 
motivated?
    The Chairman. There can be, but there----
    Senator Kaine. Well, let----
    The Chairman. Go ahead.
    Senator Kaine. Let me jump in, because I want to pay a 
compliment. I am very willing to be critical when it is 
warranted. I have got some critical things to say, too. but I 
also feel like, to be fair-minded, I should pay a compliment. 
My top thing I wanted to say this morning was congratulations 
on the normalization of relations between Israel, UAE, Bahrain. 
I think this is a big, positive accomplishment. I tweeted out, 
immediately when I heard it, that it was a positive for Israel, 
that it was a positive for the U.S. I gave the Trump 
administration praise for their work in this. I think a lot of 
people should get praise. I think the Trump administration 
should. I hope you will take that back to the Secretary of 
State and the White House.
    I think Israeli leadership should. I think the Ambassador 
to the UAE, Yousef Al Otaiba, wrote a very powerful editorial 
in an Israeli paper, which was quite unusual, basically saying, 
``We are on a path toward normalization. Please do not annex 
territories on the West Bank. If you do that, you will blow up 
the opportunity for normalization. If you will not do that, we 
can open up a path to normalization.'' So, I give Yousef Al 
Otaiba and other leaders of these nations credit for being 
willing to put a bold proposal on the table, but also to ask 
something of Israel in exchange.
    I also give members of the Senate credit in this. When the 
new Israeli Government was formed, Bibi Netanyahu and Benny 
Gantz put out a public statement saying that they were going to 
annex territories, beginning on July 2, ``with American 
support.'' They made that public. ``We are going to do this 
with American support.'' Many of us in this body looked at that 
language and said, ``If you are going to say publicly you are 
doing annexation with American support, then we are going to 
publicly say, `Please do not do this.' '' We had a letter, that 
about a quarter of the Senate signed, to Israel, saying, ``We 
would view this as catastrophic to peace prospects. We would 
view it as violation of U.S. policy. We would view it, 
potentially, as a violation of international law, destabilizing 
in the region.'' I think the Israeli leadership looked at all 
of these things, ``Here is a path to peace and normalization, 
here is a path that could lead to strained relationships in the 
region, and potentially strained relationships in the United 
States,'' and they did a calculation that I think was the right 
calculation, for peace in the region and for their own 
security, which is to enter into this deal.
    So, I have no trouble saying thank you, and 
congratulations, to this Administration and to the Israelis and 
to UAE and the other nations, and also say to my Senate 
colleagues, who firmly stood up for the need for a peace 
dialogue and against unilateral action by the Israelis and an 
annexation, these stars aligned and produced something 
positive. That is a good thing. That is a good thing. That is a 
good thing.
    I do associate myself with comments by folks on this side 
of the aisle, and I do not think they are political. I believe 
them earnestly and sincerely, that the policy with respect to 
Iran has been a disaster, because there is not a single thing 
we could not have do not--this Administration could not have 
done, had they kept the Iran deal and pocket it and enforced 
the hell out of it, and then also utilize the fact that the 
JCPOA was only a narrow deal, dealing with the nuclear 
portfolio, that did not forbid the U.S. from engaging or 
imposing sanctions for ballistic missiles or sanctions for 
bellicose activity in the region, in Yemen or Bahrain or 
anywhere else.
    We had a huge suite of tools we could use against Iran. 
There is not a single thing this Administration has done to put 
pressure on Iran that we could not have done while pocketing 
the gains of that deal and imposing pressure on Iran to comply 
with it. Had we done that, we would not have been at odds with 
our allies. Had we done that, it would have been easier to find 
a nuclear deal with North Korea. As soon as the U.S. decided to 
blow up a deal that everybody said was being complied with, 
North Korea looked at our desire to find a nuclear deal, and 
basically said, ``Hold on a second. If we are going to do a 
deal, and the U.S. will just gladly walk out of it, even if it 
is being complied with''--it immediately made it much more 
difficult.
    So, I will associate myself with a lot of what Senator Cruz 
said on the first part of this, that this--these normalizations 
were very, very significant accomplishments. I agree with that, 
but I have to completely disagree with respect to Iran.
    I hope you will keep pressure on Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
has people in jail or under trial who are Virginia residents. 
Jamal Khashoggi, was a Virginia resident. There has been no 
accountability, and the President is bragging that he, 
basically, got Congress to back off and allow impunity for MBS. 
There are Aziza al-Yousef and other Virginians who have been in 
prison for women's rights activism in Saudi Arabia, are under 
trial for it. We have to keep the pressure on for them.
    Secretary Hale, you know the situation. So--well, I have 
seen you more in the Middle East than I have seen you in the 
United States. I mean, you know this situation so well. We have 
to keep the pressure on Saudi Arabia to advance human rights 
and not be one of the most egregious violators of human rights 
in the world. I have confidence that, to the extent you can, 
given the fact that the President wants to ``save MBS's ass,'' 
as he said--I am using his words--to the extent that you can, I 
am confident that you will.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. You discharge 
yourself well when you compliment the Administration for their 
success. We appreciate that.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. I agree with you that we should have the 
ability to have a----
    Your colleagues are not--are amused by the fact, I guess, 
that you have complimented the Administration on their success.
    In any event, the--you are right that we should have a 
legitimate discussion about Iran. One would sit around 
listening to this, with the Republicans on one side and the 
Democrats on the other, as if it is somebody in this room's 
fault. I think we all need to agree, all of this is the result 
of Iran's malign conduct. I agree with you that the--it would 
be really nice to sit down and make an agreement. The problem 
is--and I----
    One thing I disagree with you strongly on is that, ``Well, 
we should have stayed in the agreement, and then enforced the 
heck out of it, and everything would be all right.'' This is a 
country that is killing American men and women. You cannot do 
business like that and, on the one hand, with your left hand, 
be negotiating with them about doing good things, and, on the 
other hand, letting them get away with the most malign activity 
that is possible.
    So, again, I appreciate your view on this, but we ought to 
all start from the proposition that the problem here is Iran. 
It is not the Republicans or the Democrats or either one's 
policy towards Iran. It is Iran that is the problem. We are all 
Americans, and we are all of the frame of mind that these 
people have got to be contained from their malign activities.
    So, it is unfortunate we do have this division over this, 
but--in any event.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, if I could--I am not going to----
    The Chairman. Please.
    Senator Kaine. --take long, but----
    The Chairman. Please.
    Senator Kaine. We have had this discussion before.
    The Chairman. You and I have had, personally.
    Senator Kaine. We have had it personally. We had it in the 
committee. There is so much we can say about all that Iran has 
done bad, but you always have to look at the way they look at 
us. I have that conversation before. That does not mean that 
they are right, that does not mean that we have to take their 
side of it, but you know that I know some things that I am not 
at liberty to discuss right here, so you assert that as Iran--
has Iran killed Americans? The answer to that is yes. There are 
some things that I would like to say to complete the picture, 
that I am not able to say at a hearing like this.
    The only way to build out of historic distrust--and there 
is a deep historic distrust between the United States and Iran 
that goes back to the U.S. and the U.K. deposing a 
democratically elected Government of Iran in the 1950s--and 
then the things that Iran has done to us--the Embassy, the--
taking American hostages at the Embassy in 1979. This has been 
a back-and-forth for five or six decades. How do you get out of 
distrust? Because I think we would all agree it would be a good 
thing for the world if we could. Maybe it is impossible, but if 
we could get out of it, how do we get out of it? The answer is 
a tiny step at a time. Not overnight. No, no, not overnight. A 
tiny step at a time.
    That is what I am looking for. I am looking for 
acknowledging all of the bad, that you point out, but trying to 
figure out the tiny steps at a time that can lead us into a 
better place. I happen to believe that that is possible. There 
are some who believe it is impossible. I happen to believe it 
is possible. Maybe that is just me, but I know we will continue 
to have this discussion.
    The Chairman. I agree with that, Senator Kaine. I agree 
with you, I think it is baby steps at a time, but the fact that 
we were historical enemies--I mean, you look back at--look what 
happened with Germany and Japan, two of our closest allies 
right now, and the atrocities that they committed were just 
awful, but they stopped. That is a difference.
    The--what I always come back to with Iran is the--one of 
the great hopes is the demographics of that country, the 
significant population of young people in that country who do 
not buy on to what--where the Administration has been taking--
--
    So, this is a conversation we do need to continue, we have 
got to always remember, we are all on the same side of this. 
Now, how we get to where we want to go, we may have differences 
on, but we need to respect and----
    Thank you so much, Senator Kaine.
    We have Senator Merkley, who is online.
    Senator Merkley, the floor is yours.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
    I wanted to start with a question for David Hale. This 
goes--and I apologize if you have already addressed this in 
this gathering, because I was late to be able to tune in, due 
to another commitment, but the question is this. In a context 
of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia has shown 
interest in developing a nuclear cycle. The Wall Street Journal 
noted, in August of this year, that they had built a facility 
they had not disclosed to the world to extract yellowcake from 
uranium ore; essentially, the front end of a nuclear cycle. The 
conversations we have had with Saudi Arabia have not produced a 
commitment in the context of the future development of nuclear 
weapons.
    Obviously, this is relevant to the conversation we are 
having about Iran, because you have the two major powers of the 
Sunni world and the Shi'ite world who watch each other very 
carefully and are very concerned about what the other power 
within that Muslim spectrum does. So, bring us up to date on 
how forcefully--how determined is the Administration to insist 
on the gold standard for nuclear power in Saudi Arabia? The 
gold standard being the standard that says a country agrees to 
forego uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing to, 
basically, not build the infrastructure as a foundation for the 
development of nuclear weapons.
    Ambassador Hale. Well, thank you, Senator. We certainly 
share the concern that you have addressed.
    Our nonproliferation goals are global and regional and 
universal in their nature. We agree that there has to be 
commitment to a gold standard that you have described.
    I would say, though, that the most effective way in order 
to prevent those hypothetical scenarios from unfolding is to 
make sure that Saudi Arabia knows that we--together, our 
partners in defense of their security, and that we are 
addressing their legitimate security needs. This goes to issues 
that Elliot Abrams deals with on a daily basis. I think he has 
covered them pretty fully during the session this morning, but 
since you were absent, I might turn the microphone to him. It 
is all about Iran and making sure that Iran does not pose a 
nuclear threat, or other forms of threats, to--of an 
existential nature, to our Saudi partners.
    Elliot, would you like to expand?
    Mr. Abrams. Only to say that we do hope for the ability to 
negotiate what we would view as a comprehensive deal that would 
include a nuclear aspect, that would really prevent Iran from 
moving toward a nuclear weapon, something that we do not 
believe the JCPOA actually did.
    Senator Merkley. Well, I must say that the agreement did 
require Iran to forego its planned plutonium reactor, and 
dismantle it. It did require them to forego enrichment. It did 
require them to forego R&D on advanced centrifuges. It did 
require them to--an existing stock of enriched uranium. It did 
require them to move things out of the country. So, there were 
a whole series of provisions, while not eternal and not perfect 
and subject to future negotiation, certainly were very 
substantial, real on-the-ground changes.
    As Secretary Pompeo has said to me, ``Well, we did not need 
the agreement, because Iran had no intention of building a 
nuclear weapon.'' He noted that the--there was no foundation, 
in terms of our intelligence, that suggested that they had made 
that decision to build a nuclear weapon since--going back to 
2003. Well, fine, but still, we do not like the idea of the 
nuclear cycle producing the capability to do so. That is what 
was dismantled in that agreement.
    You said, Mr. Hale--and I think I am--can quote you--what 
you just said is, ``We will insist on the gold standard.'' That 
has not been the position of this Administration. Are you 
saying now this Administration's position is, ``We will insist, 
in our relationship with Saudi Arabia, on the gold standard''?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, I do not want to contradict 
statements that have been made by others, so I will have to get 
back to you on that if you discern any difference of opinion.
    As I said, we have a global policy. It is regional and it 
is universal. We do not want to see the--this kind of 
proliferation occurring. We are having serious--always have 
serious conversations anytime any country appears to be going 
in that direction.
    Again, I think that the real focus has to be making sure 
that it is an environment in the Gulf in which the Saudis do 
not feel that this path is one that they have to go down in 
order to defend their country.
    Senator Merkley. Well, it is so interesting you would say 
that, because the Saudis did not feel they had to, because we 
had an agreement that prevented Iran from doing that. Now we 
have dismantled that agreement, and now they are starting to 
build their nuclear cycle. I am asking you, are you confronting 
Saudi Arabia and telling them not to complete this facility for 
extracting yellowcake from uranium ore as the first stage or 
the front end of a nuclear cycle? Are you telling them that, 
for our relationship to be on solid ground, they cannot bypass 
that gold standard, and that, if they do, it completely 
undermines our credibility in getting Iran to bypass having 
that nuclear infrastructure?
    Ambassador Hale. I would really prefer to have this 
conversation with you in a different setting, rather than this 
public one, but I can assure you that I will be available, or 
make the appropriate people at the State Department available, 
to you to continue this conversation, if I may.
    The Chairman. I think that is----
    Senator Merkley. I must say that I think it would be very 
valuable for the Administration to be very publicly committed 
to the--that vision of Saudi Arabia not pursuing this, and to 
use some of the leverage that this Administration has built up 
with Saudi Arabia, built up in ways that I might have strongly 
disagreed with, in terms of the response to the assassination 
of an American resident. If you have that leverage, it makes 
sense to use it, and use it in a very public way. Right now, 
whatever polite conversations you might have in passing, in 
private, are having no impact. So, perhaps worth rethinking the 
approach.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
    We will go to Senator Markey. I am told he is online.
    Senator Markey. Hello. Yes. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Markey, welcome.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, so much.
    May I ask our witnesses about Saudi Arabia and its efforts 
to develop its own indigenous nuclear materials program and to 
have a missile program, as well, which clearly would be an 
enormously destabilizing element into the Middle East?
    So, if I may, could--would one or both of you answer the 
question about who--which of the countries, especially China, 
is providing materials to Saudi Arabia in order to develop an 
indigenous capacity within their country.
    Ambassador Hale. Senator, with much respect, I am not 
prepared, in this public setting, to offer that kind of 
information, but I am absolutely committed to answering all of 
your questions in a classified setting.
    Senator Markey. Why are you not prepared to answer the--
this fundamental national security question in public? What 
would be the reason why you would not be willing to do that?
    Ambassador Hale. Because I am concerned about the level of 
classification of the information.
    Senator Markey. My question is, why is it classified? In 
other words, if China is helping Saudi Arabia right now, the 
American people have a right to know that, especially a month 
before a presidential election. So, why would that not be 
something that the American people should know, that there is a 
potential nuclear weapons program inside of Saudi Arabia that 
is being built right now? I have--can you give me the reason--
you are saying it is classified. I would ask you, why is it 
classified?
    Ambassador Hale. Any information that I have seen about 
this topic has been classified. Therefore, I cannot really 
share it here in this room, but I am absolutely prepared to 
coming to you with the right people to answer any questions 
that you may have related to this set of issues.
    Senator Markey. Right. All right. Well, tell me this, then. 
What limits would the Administration place upon a potential 123 
Agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, particularly as 
press reports indicate they are progressing in other areas of 
their nuclear fuel cycle on ballistic missile technology?
    Ambassador Hale. I do not have the capacity to answer the 
question. It is somewhat hypothetical, and it is not my field 
of expertise. I am not trying to sidestep it, I just do not 
have answers for you.
    Senator Markey. Well, we are having a briefing on the 
Middle East, and I do not think there is anything more volatile 
than whether or not Saudi Arabia is trying to develop a nuclear 
weapons technology. Do you believe we should trust Saudi Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Salman when he stated, in 2018, that, ``If 
Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as 
possible''? Should we trust bin Salman not to be developing it 
right now?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, that goes to the point I have tried 
to make several times, which is, the most effective means to 
prevent this kind of proliferation and destabilizing activity 
would be to make sure that we are addressing the threats that 
Saudi Arabia faces, and providing it with the means of self-
defense.
    Senator Markey. Right. Well, ultimately, though, we wind up 
fueling it if we do not guarantee that Saudi Arabia understands 
that we are going to abide by a gold standard, which is why 
Senator Rubio and I introduced the Saudi Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act that requires Congress to affirmatively 
approve any 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia, and would hold 
them to the gold standard, requiring them to commit to forego 
any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing. I think that 
we should take a very serious pause before handing the Saudis, 
or anyone else, the tools with which to make a nuclear weapon 
and potentially kick off a nuclear arms race in the region.
    Is the goal of the Trump administration to negotiate a gold 
standard with Saudi Arabia? Is that your--is that the objective 
which the Trump administration has?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, our focus--is on what I have said, 
which is dealing with the threat posed by Iran--Elliot Abrams 
has gone in great detail over how we are dealing with that--and 
making sure that Saudi Arabia has the means of self-defense.
    I am not here today to talk about 123 Agreements or the 
nuclear program. I would be very happy to address this, as I 
have said, in a classified setting, at your convenience.
    Senator Markey. Well, again, this just goes back to whether 
or not the Iran deal was being violated by Iran--the Iran 
nuclear deal. It was not. It was under safeguards. The IAEA was 
in there. Right now, we know that there has been no breakout 
that actually brings Iran meaningfully closer to a nuclear 
weapons program. So, in that context, the Saudi breakout is on 
the Trump watch, and it is something that, because you will not 
testify to, you will not give us the information, in terms of 
what is going on with any relations with China or other 
countries, but that, in and of itself, is an indication that 
the Trump administration is actually leading to a fueling of 
the nuclear arms race in the Middle East, rather than trying to 
douse those flames.
    So, from my perspective, I am looking forward to getting 
the briefing on what is going on in Saudi Arabia. I would like 
to do so as soon as is possible, but I believe something very 
significant, historically, is right now unfolding in the Middle 
East, in Saudi Arabia. The last thing we need is an all-out 
nuclear arms race in that region. I am afraid the Trump 
administration policies are pointing us in that direction.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator----
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Do we have any other members online that have joined us?
    If not, I want to thank--Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me briefly, first, say, I was chuckling when you said 
Senator Kaine acquitted himself well, because you said he only 
acquitted himself while he was praising the Administration. I 
think Senator Kaine was acquitting himself well in his totality 
of his presentation. So, that is why I was chuckling.
    I would just note for the record that several members of 
this committee on both sides of the aisle, including myself, 
have a resolution recognizing the historic and important 
significance of the UAE-Bahrain agreement. So, it is not that 
we are not prone, because it is election time, not to recognize 
that which is, but as someone who is been working on Iran since 
I was with the House of Representatives when no one was paying 
attention to Iran, and I would say, ``Well, why are you not 
paying attention to Iran?''--a country that has huge oil and 
natural gas reserves and is seeking nuclear power--for what? 
Not because it needs it for nuclear domestic energy, but for 
its a design for nuclear weapons. I have called it as I have 
see it, and including in the last Administration, when I had 
strong disagreements, but that is not going to stop me now from 
having, when I believe, strong disagreements with this 
Administration.
    So, let me turn to a couple of questions I have in that 
regard.
    Special Representative Abrams--and maybe you can just give 
me a couple of quick yes-or-noes on these--do you agree that, 
over the past 2 years, Iran has moved closer to developing a 
nuclear weapon?
    Mr. Abrams. I would say they have moved a little bit 
closer----
    Senator Menendez. Okay.
    Mr. Abrams:--in the sense that they have got more fissile 
material.
    Senator Menendez. Has--that is what I was going to get to--
has Iran increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium?
    Mr. Abrams. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Has it increased its enrichment capacity?
    Mr. Abrams. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Okay. So, is Iran's breakdown time--
meaning the time Iran needs to produce enough weapon-grade 
uranium for a nuclear weapon--significantly shorter than it was 
in 2018?
    Mr. Abrams. I do not know if I would say it was 
significantly shorter.
    Senator Menendez. Is it shorter?
    Mr. Abrams. In principle, it has to be shorter.
    Senator Menendez. Yes. So, those are all the critical 
elements of when we are considering how Iran is doing, vis-a-
vis our policy, in terms of achieving the ultimate goal.
    Let me turn to Secretary Hale. I know we have been calling 
you ``Ambassador,'' which you will have for life, but right 
now, you are Under Secretary, so you deserve that title. I want 
to pick off on Senator Young's comments about Turkey, and your 
response.
    When Turkey ultimately intercedes in the internationally 
recognized territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus, a 
member of the European Union, is it promoting peace and 
stability in that region?
    Ambassador Hale. We have called that out. We definitely 
have--are seeking to de-escalate the situation in the eastern 
Mediterranean, working with the French and others. Secretary of 
State was in Cyprus recently, so we are working--it is very 
problematic, and we are working to de-escalate.
    Senator Menendez. Yes. The only person who is--the only 
country who is interceding in their international waters is 
Turkey. I mean, I love how we call on both sides. Well, one 
side is not doing anything.
    Same thing in Greece. Is Turkey promoting peace and 
stability when it intercedes in the territorial waters of----
    Ambassador Hale. I--no, I did not mean to suggest we are 
calling on all sides. What Turkey is doing is problematic, and 
we are trying to bring about de-escalation.
    Senator Menendez. Same thing in Greece. Is that not true? 
As it relates to its----
    Ambassador Hale. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Menendez. --territorial----
    When Turkey seeks to have Halkbank not be sanctioned under 
U.S. law, that is not promoting the national interests of the 
United States under U.S. law?
    Ambassador Hale. No.
    Senator Menendez. When Turkey is supporting the side in 
Yemen of which we totally do not recognize, it is not creating 
peace and stability.
    So, I appreciate our aspirations of what Turkey was, but it 
is not the--it is not the realities under Erdogan. I think, on 
that, it was--the Chairman and I would agree.
    Let me ask you two final quick questions.
    In the wake of the devastating explosion in Beirut, I was 
pleased that the Chairman and I introduced a bipartisan 
resolution in support of U.S. relief efforts and continued 
engagement with the Lebanese people and the international 
community to hold those responsible accountable. What more can 
the U.S. do to support those voices and actors in Lebanon who 
have proven to be good interlocutors?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, we meet with them, which is 
important, because it demonstrates that they have a legitimate 
voice in the country. We encourage them, we have trained many 
of their cadres on how to organize as NGOs. There is a lot 
going on at the grassroots level. We also engage the elite 
leadership of the country, many of whom are under--are feeling 
on the defensive, and finding out what they are planning to do 
to turn the situation around.
    I am struck, frankly, during my visit there, by how much 
Hezbollah is also suffering as a consequence of this. They are 
caught up in the same pool of people, of the public level, 
demanding that Hezbollah, as well, disarm, that they stop their 
own corrupt practices that are at the center of this problem. 
We strongly endorse that view, as well.
    We think that continued focus on reform is the right way. 
When I went out and met with some of the demonstrators and 
activists, they shouted to me, ``No bailout. Do not bail out 
this government.'' I said, ``We agree.'' We will provide 
humanitarian relief. We thank you for your support here in the 
Senate for that, but we have to be tough and make sure that our 
broader assistance is conditional on fundamental change.
    Senator Menendez. Well, I hope we can continue to make sure 
that our assistance goes to supporting and empowering people 
working on behalf of all the Lebanese people.
    Then, finally, I know that you are familiar with the U.S.-
Sudan claims agreement and the legislation that the State 
Department is asking Congress to pass to implement that 
international agreement. Let me be clear. Sudan is at a very 
fragile moment, and I have consistently indicated, for more 
than a year, that the Administration should do much more to 
support the fledgling democracy than it has done. I support a 
Sudan claims deal, but I also believe this deal falls short. I 
have some questions about how the Administration--whether or 
not it has a commitment to make it better. The legislation the 
State Department is seeking refers to ``fairness'' for U.S. 
victims, but is it fair that the State Department left 9/11 
families completely out in the cold in the Sudan negotiations? 
Is it fair that you intentionally excluded their claims from 
the Sudan deal, you conveniently did not share that fact with 
Congress, and then you pushed Congress to pass legislation that 
would have completely terminated all 9/11 claims against Sudan?
    So, I want to hear from you. That does not strike me as a 
``fair deal,'' and it is a slap in the face to our fellow 
citizens who lost loved ones in 9/11. So, speak to me about 
this concept of fairness that you seem to have? Not you, 
personally, but the State Department.
    Ambassador Hale. Well, the agreement addresses the existing 
claims from victims of the Cole bombing and the Embassy 
bombings that occurred in East Africa. Those claims are 
longstanding. They have been through the court system. We 
believe that this deal offers a fair basis, as do the victims, 
themselves, who have essentially accepted the deal.
    Subsequent to all this, there was the introduction of the 
possibility of 9/11 claimants. During the last round of 
negotiations on the continuing resolution, the Administration 
did send a letter up to the Hill, and we were prepared to offer 
compromises that would have, I--we think, provided a high level 
of protection for any future claims of 9/11 victims against 
Sudan that were--that achieved status in a U.S. court.
    I would be happy to--I do not have the specifics in front 
of me. It is very legalistic language. I would be happy to get 
that to you right away this morning.
    Senator Menendez. It is very legalistic, and I am familiar 
with it.
    Let me just say, I will oppose any Sudan legislation that 
fails to preserve and protect the 9/11 claims, to make sure 
that 9/11 families are not stomped upon by the Administration. 
I hope the State Department will reluctantly come along.
    I have not seen the text--Congress has not seen the text of 
the U.S.-Sudan agreement. Can you commit to sharing the text of 
the agreement with Congress by the end of the week?
    Ambassador Hale. Well, we sent a letter that described the 
nature of the agreement. I will go back to our legal advisor's 
office. I do not know that we have final--I have--in fact, I am 
confident we have not finalized the agreement, itself, so we do 
not have anything yet to share, but we did describe, in some 
detail, the essential elements of the agreement.
    Senator Menendez. Well, you cannot ask Congress, Mr. 
Secretary, it is like playing games here--you cannot ask 
Congress to pass implementing legislation for an international 
agreement, basically asking us to sign on the dotted line, let 
you--yet you will not let us see the agreement. That is absurd. 
So, I am not going to sign on to something that I cannot even 
see. So, until we get to that point, count me out. I think we 
may bring others along with us.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Abrams. Mr. Chairman, if I----
    The Chairman. Thank you----
    Mr. Abrams. --could just jump in for one second, I would 
just respond to something Senator Menendez said, in, of course, 
correctly, reminding us of your own comments about the Iranian 
nuclear program, decades ago. Those comments, those judgments, 
are still exactly correct, they are still behaving like a 
country that is looking for a nuclear weapon and has something 
to hide, even in 2020. The IAEA asked for access to two sites 
in January. It took 7 months to get access to one site. The 
IAEA has reported, this year, that it visited three sites that 
were clearly sanitized. We have the archive discovered by the 
Israelis that shows that they kept intact everything they had 
done on the development of a nuclear weapon, and the team that 
had done it under the same leadership. So, the--that same 
problem does exist, now decades later.
    Senator Menendez. We do not disagree.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Let me also confirm that the Ranking Member's view on 
Turkey, and my view, are absolutely congruent.
    So, with that, Senator Kaine, we promised a hard stop at 11 
o'clock. We have got a couple of minutes. We----
    Senator Kaine. I will honor that.
    The Chairman has one of the best, like, look-over-his-
glasses eye rolls when you try to do a second round, but thank 
goodness I am sitting so far away from you, and social 
distancing, that I could not read that queue. I am going to be 
quick.
    Secretary Hale, you are really an expert on Lebanon. There 
have been questions about the current situation in Lebanon. I 
have appreciated your answers--Senator Romney, Senator 
Menendez, Senator Shaheen, but I am sort of looking down the 
road. I really, really worry about Lebanon. I think it is an 
incredibly country. I think the U.S.-Lebanese relationship, 
especially military affairs, has been a positive one, but I 
think it is on the verge of failed-state status. Many Lebanese-
Americans believe that. Many people that I talk to in Lebanon 
believe that. I sometimes worry a little bit that we are--in 
our alliance with Israel, we are so worried about Iran that we 
do not talk enough about Lebanon, although there is obviously a 
connection, because of Iranian support for Hezbollah, but you 
want to see reform. You mention that, ``We have to see reform. 
We have to--to promote the reform, but as somebody who is a 
real expert on Lebanon because of positions both in Beirut and 
at--in the State Department, what is a reasonably optimistic--
not an unreasonably optimistic--but, what is a reasonably 
optimistic, sort of, path forward in Lebanon that you think 
could occur? What can the United States do to facilitate a 
reasonably optimistic path forward for that country?
    Ambassador Hale. The country is basically out of gas. I 
mean, prior to the explosion, they had a deep financial and 
economic crisis already. They have a burden of--a quarter of 
their population are refugees today, and COVID-19 has struck 
them heavily. Then they have a completely dysfunctional form of 
government that, Hezbollah, at the center of, exploits fully to 
their own advantage. This is the set of problems that we have.
    Now, one of the strategies that I think is important to 
bear in mind is that Hezbollah is in that position largely 
because of their monopoly of arms--so, that is why we are 
supporting the army--but also because they can call upon non-
Shia allies in government to at least get a parliamentary 
majority. Given the mood of anger that I detected anyway, I 
think that, if elections were held soon, there could be, 
potentially, very different results that would shift toward 
more reform-minded and moderate forces in Lebanon. So, I think 
that is an important goal.
    The French President is very active in trying to bring 
together agreement on a government. I think that the standard 
that we will apply to that government is, is it able to begin 
this reform process? We are not unrealistic. We realize that 
they cannot take on everything, but there are a few simple 
things that they can do. For example, in rebuilding the port, 
are they going to make sure that it is transparent and that 
Hezbollah and other factions do not have unfettered access to 
do whatever they want in that port? Is Customs going to stop 
being a source of illicit revenue for whoever can get their 
hands on it? That is a very simple and straightforward thing. 
With all eyes focused on the port, they ought to be able to do 
that. Then they need to be looking at the Central Bank, making 
sure that it is meeting the gold standard there at the Central 
Bank, and looking at banking reforms, which is the cornerstone 
of the Lebanese economy.
    None of this gets to the core problem, which is Hezbollah's 
distortion of Lebanon. We have got to do more there. The 
maximum pressure campaign on Iran is very much part of that, 
and we have deprived Hezbollah a lot--of a lot of resources, 
but we want to boost our allies so that they can be a 
counterforce against Hezbollah. That is our strategy in 
Lebanon.
    The Chairman. Yes, thank you, Senator Kaine. Very valid 
questions in a very worrisome situation, and thanks for 
bringing that up.
    With that, I want to thank both of our witnesses. You have 
been very generous with us today.
    For the information of the members of the committee, the 
record will remain open until the close of business on Friday. 
Would ask the witnesses to promptly respond to any questions.
    With that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


            Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Recent press reports have indicated that the UAE has in 
fact delivered a Letter of Request for the purchase of F-35s and armed 
Reaper drones. Please confirm whether or not this is the case along 
with the details of the Letter of Request, including:

   Date of delivery of the Letter of Request.

   Number F-35's were requested for purchase.

   Number of Reaper drones requested for purchase.

   Whether and what kind of F-35 variant was requested for 
        purchase.

   Total purchase price if one has either been proposed or 
        agreed upon.

   Whether and what kinds of threats were listed in the Letter 
        of Request to justify the sale.

    Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation 
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved 
arms sales to Congress.

    Question. Does the Administration commit to full formal and 
informal Congressional notification and approval processes for this 
sale?

    Answer. If a case along the lines suggested in your previous 
question is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to 
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a 
case.

    Question. Was this sale an Emirati condition for signing the 
Abraham Accords?

    Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation 
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved 
arms sales to Congress.

    Question. What specific threats to the UAE do the F-35s address 
that can't be met by existing weapons systems or alternative sales?

    Answer. We are committed to helping the United Arab Emirates and 
all American partners in the region meet their security requirements. 
As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation conversations with 
our partners as private until we notify any approved arms sales to 
Congress. As is the case for all sales, a detailed justification of the 
reasons necessitating the sale of such articles or services will be 
delineated via the Congressional Notification per AECA section 36(b).

    Question. Has a determination been made that the sale of this 
aircraft to the UAE will not jeopardize Israel's Qualitative Military 
Edge?

    Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are 
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these 
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to 
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a 
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of 
jurisdiction.

    Question. Has the U.S. interagency reviewed and determined what 
variant of the aircraft would be best to sell, in terms of protecting 
U.S. national security in the aircraft's technology, and in terms of 
protecting Israel's Qualitative Military Edge? If not, when will that 
review commence and how long might it take?

    Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are 
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these 
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to 
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a 
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of 
jurisdiction.
                               uae f-35s
    Question. How less capable will the F-35 aircraft be compared to 
Israeli aircraft?

    Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are 
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these 
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration will meet all 
statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a case and 
will provide the relevant determination to the committees of 
jurisdiction.

    Question. What steps is the Administration considering to safe-
guard these aircraft and their technology in the event of sale and 
delivery to the UAE, including security measures such as on-base 
continuous U.S. presence to monitor the security of the aircraft?

    Answer. If a case along these lines is approved by the Department, 
security agreements, which can include direct American oversight of 
materiel, may be taken into consideration. We will continue to assess 
the UAE's requirements and capacity to best determine the specific 
safeguard requirements necessary for any such potential sale.

    Question. How will the Administration compensate for the inevitable 
reduction in Israel's Qualitative Military Edge? Will the 
Administration shift from a Qualitative Military Edge to a Quantitative 
one, selling or providing more aircraft and munitions meant to 
overwhelm the heightened military threat to Israel?

    Answer. We are required by law to consider Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge (QME) for potential arms sales to the region, and we are 
committed to helping Israel maintain its QME. If a case along these 
lines is approved by the Department, the Administration commits to 
meeting all statutory requirements regarding the notification of such a 
case and will provide the relevant determination to the committees of 
jurisdiction.

    Question. The UAE is supporting General Khalifa Haftar, who is 
fighting against the internationally recognized and U.S.-backed 
Government of National Accord and has provided direct air support to 
Haftar's forces with airstrikes from Mirage warplanes and Chinese armed 
drones and has worked against stated U.S. goals and interests in Libya. 
The U.A.E. has also transferred U.S. origin MRAPs to a designated 
terrorist organization:
    What steps will the U.S. and UAE take to prevent the UAE from using 
these incredibly capable aircraft in conflicts against our national 
security interests, as it is doing in Libya?

    Answer. The Department continues to monitor any allegations 
regarding unauthorized transfers of American-origin materiel, including 
by the UAE, to any third parties. We are working closely with the UAE 
to ensure that it has a clear understanding of, and is committed to 
abiding by, all end use obligations and security requirements for all 
American materiel.

    Question. Are there sectors and avenues--like natural gas--where we 
can better support Lebanon's integration with other regional partners?

    Answer. America is working to broker an Israel-Lebanon Framework 
Agreement on Maritime Boundary Discussions. A final boundary 
demarcation agreement is the most significant opportunity for Lebanon 
to expand exploitation of national resources and trade with its land 
and maritime neighbors. Our goal is a framework to begin discussions, 
not an actual agreement delimiting boundaries or allocating potential 
resources. The purpose of these discussions is for the parties 
themselves to determine how they wish to proceed with the goal of 
delimitation of their maritime boundary and exploitation of potential 
resources in disputed areas.

    Question. How can we assure that continued assistance--which I 
believe is important--goes to supporting and empowering people who are 
working on behalf of all Lebanese and in pursuit of regional peace and 
stability?

    Answer. Throughout the planning, design, and implementation 
process, the American Government undertakes measures to assure that 
assistance resources are helping the Lebanese people and advancing our 
goals for regional peace and stability. American economic aid is not 
provided directly to the Lebanese government, but is implemented 
through vetted NGOs and proven international organizations. American 
security assistance is designed to benefit legitimate state 
institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security 
Forces. To ensure that recipient organizations are in good standing, 
all new assistance programs are approved by an interagency working 
group at the American Embassy in Beirut, whose employees regularly meet 
with local NGOs and civil society.
    Question. What is this Administration's definition of deterrence 
regarding Iran and its proxies if these attacks have not stopped?

    Answer. The strike on IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani 
demonstrated that if Iran threatens American personnel, facilities, or 
interests, the President's response will be decisive. Following the 
lethal March 11 rocket attack on American and coalition soldiers at 
Camp Taji, we again took decisive action, launching a series of 
precision strikes against Kata'ib Hizballah, Iran's most trusted 
partner in Iraq and the group responsible for the attack. Our actions 
have sent a clear and consistent message to the Iranian leadership that 
targeting Americans will not be tolerated and will result in grave 
consequences.

    Question. What steps has the Administration taken, either on its 
own or in cooperation with the Iraqi Government to stop these attacks?

    Answer. Our message has been consistent: if the Iraqi Government 
does not halt these attacks, it will not only affect our ability to 
implement assistance programs, but the private sector will consider 
Iraq too risky for investment.
    President Barham Salih, PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, COR Speaker Mohammed 
al-Halbousi, and Supreme Judicial Council Chief Judge Faiq Zaidan have 
condemned attacks on diplomatic missions, civilians, and military 
centers. PM Kadhimi has taken steps to investigate the attacks, 
including making arrests in June, increasing security measures within 
the International Zone, and placing Iran-backed militias under deeper 
scrutiny.

    Question. What steps is the State Department taking to properly 
administer economic and security assistance with this reduced 
footprint?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID are committed to properly 
administering American foreign assistance in Iraq. We use a variety of 
interventions, from in-country management of resources to third-party 
monitoring of projects and remote support of our projects from multiple 
locations around the world. Last year, USAID received authorization to 
increase its expatriate staff in Iraq from 8 to 13. The State 
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination manage 
programs entirely from Washington, engaging a third-party in-country 
monitoring team. The Department of State and USAID also maintain a 
network of staff based in regional offices outside of Iraq, who provide 
support to the Iraq mission. We remain committed to the prudent 
oversight and management of projects in a difficult security 
environment, further complicated by the global COVID-19 crisis.

    Question. How will the energy deals brokered with U.S. firms in 
southern Iraq be implemented with no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence 
in that part of the country?

    Answer. Energy is a critical pillar of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic 
Dialogue. Even as we work with the Iraqi Government to ensure the 
safety of our diplomatic facilities, we continue to support Iraq's 
efforts to eliminate its dependence upon imported energy from Iran by 
increasing domestic gas and electricity production, reducing wasteful 
gas flaring, and implementing energy market reforms. American companies 
are a critical partner in this effort, and the Departments of State, 
Energy, and Commerce are working to ensure the five energy deals signed 
with the Government of Iraq in August on the sidelines of our Strategic 
Dialogue move rapidly towards implementation.

    Question. How can we do this critical work with limited diplomatic 
presence? How are you working to ensure that all organizations we work 
with on the ground are properly vetted, and have transparent financial 
accountability mechanisms?

    Answer. The Department of State and USAID have faced security 
challenges that affect the Administration of assistance for many years. 
We have incorporated a number of measures to overcome these challenges, 
including vetting, third-party monitoring, and support from Washington-
based and regionally-based staff to supplement our mission in Iraq.

    Question. What further tools does Prime Minister al-Kadhimi need to 
marginalize these militias given their strength?

    Answer. We are working with PM Kadhimi's office to enhance his 
team's capacity for public messaging and public awareness campaigns, in 
order to take advantage of popular opinion turning against these 
militias. However, PM Kadhimi needs the support of religious 
authorities and political parties to make sustained progress against 
these militias. He needs police, investigators, and judges who are not 
afraid to follow the rule of law and implement justice. And he needs 
professional security forces that he and the public can trust. Kadhimi 
recently replaced the head of security for the International Zone with 
the aim of preventing attacks on the American Embassy and other 
diplomatic missions.
                           troop redeployment
    Last October, President Trump withdrew our troops from much of 
northeast Syria in an ill-thought out concession to President Erdogan. 
Now, less than a year later, we are sending troops, including Bradley 
fighting vehicles, back to Syria because Russian expansion has made our 
remaining forces less safe, just as many on both sides of Congress 
warned at the time. Yet on the same day that he ordered more troops in, 
President Trump declared that, other than protecting the oil fields 
there, the U.S. is ``out of Syria:''

    Question. Please articulate the U.S. mission in Syria.

    Answer. Our mission in Syria is to achieve the enduring defeat of 
ISIS and al-Qa'ida, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line 
with UNSCR 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-commanded forces from 
Syria. We are committed to the internationally-agreed roadmap, as 
outlined in UNSCR 2254, for a political transition through the drafting 
of a new constitution and free and fair elections that are administered 
by the United Nations and include the Syrian diaspora.

    Question. Are these new deployments meant to fight ISIS or to 
protect pre-existing troops from Russian and/or pro-regime forces?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to 
questions regarding American troop movements.

    Question. Is the redeployment of troops back to northeast Syria an 
admission by this Administration that last year's withdrawal endangered 
both U.S. interests and our remaining troops?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is best positioned to respond to 
specific questions regarding American troop movements.

    Question. What is the U.S. strategy to address this accountability 
gap? Beyond funding projects that catalog the crimes, and how are we 
advancing efforts to hold perpetrators of gross violations of 
international law accountable?

    Answer. We promote accountability for human rights abusers and 
corrupt officials by applying sanctions and visa restrictions, such as 
sanctions under the Global Magnitsky program and visa restrictions 
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the State Appropriations Act. We 
strongly support U.N. accountability mechanisms, including the recently 
created Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya; the efforts of the 
U.N. Investigative Team Against Da'esh (ISIS) (UNITAD) in Iraq; and the 
International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism (IIIM) in Syria, which 
collects and preserves evidence of atrocities that may amount to war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This evidence allows 
domestic law enforcement entities, including our own, to prepare cases 
for prosecution. The Department advances accountability through 
programming, such as supporting civil society to identify and 
investigate cases for prosecution, and to build dossiers on alleged 
perpetrators for use by the American Government, other foreign 
governments, and the U.N. for prosecutions, vetting, visa restrictions, 
sanctions, and public reporting.

    Question. Humanitarian actors providing life-saving assistance are 
increasingly being blocked by authorities, especially in Syria and 
Yemen. As you know, in the case of Syria, Russia and China recently 
blocked U.N. Security Council resolutions which would have allowed for 
cross-border access for the U.N. and NGOs into Syria. Now these crucial 
pipelines for aid into the country are blocked. At a time when Syria's 
COVID-19 cases are exploding, the closure of two vital crossings into 
northern Syria has meant that critically needed medicine and supplies 
are not being delivered through the most direct and efficient routes:
    Is the Administration working to secure United Nations Security 
Council re-authorization for the use of the additional crossings into 
northern Syria? How is the Administration working with U.N. 
humanitarian agencies and other partners to continue to provide aid to 
Syrian civilians?

    Answer. The Department's position, advanced in U.N. deliberations 
in July, reinforced the need for at least three crossings including in 
northeast Syria. We regularly communicate with like-minded countries on 
the Security Council to provide the rationale and evidence needed to 
support a forward-leaning and well-justified renewal resolution that 
looks to authorize additional crossings. We maintain regular contact 
with humanitarian organizations, both in capital and in New York, 
regarding developments on the ground. The Department and USAID are in 
constant contact with those providing cross-border humanitarian 
assistance to Syrians, including the U.N. and non-governmental 
organizations.

    Question. Driven by increasingly desperate economic circumstances 
and security concerns in the wake of the Beirut port explosion, a 
growing number of Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees are boarding 
smuggler's boats in Northern Lebanon for Cyprus via a perilous sea:
    What is the U.S. strategy for working with the United Nations, the 
European Union, and the governments in the region to address the 
drivers of this crisis so fewer people will be driven to make that 
dangerous crossing?

    Answer. Since 2010, America has provided more than $2.4 billion in 
bilateral foreign assistance to Lebanon to address both economic and 
security needs, in addition to $2.6 billion in humanitarian assistance 
since the start of the Syria crisis. This support includes life-saving 
assistance to help protect the physical health, psychological well-
being, and human rights of displaced Syrians and their host 
communities, as well as economic development programs that seek to help 
address the principal drivers of the current crisis in Lebanon. We are 
committed to ensuring international support for the 1.3 million Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon and are working with the international community to 
address the broader crisis in Lebanon.
         confronting atrocities and protecting forced migrants
    In June, I released a comprehensive report titled ``Global Forced 
Migration: The Political Crisis of Our Time'' that evaluated drivers 
and trends of forced migration across the globe. The report underscores 
that gross violations of human rights, and the absence of 
accountability for them resulted in millions of people being forced to 
flee their homes. Conflicts raging in the Middle East from Syria, 
Yemen, and Libya, are responsible for some of the worst atrocities and 
most severe humanitarian emergencies of a generation, forcing millions 
of innocent men, women and children to leave their countries. Recent 
efforts to resolve conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere in 
the region have largely failed. In the last 2 weeks alone U.N.-
established panels reported on widespread atrocities in both Yemen and 
Syria, suggesting that all parties to these conflicts have committed 
abuses that amount to war crimes. We are living in an age of impunity 
and witnessing a rampant accountability gap:

    Question. In Libya, thousands of refugees and migrants are 
arbitrarily detained in official facilities where they face torture, 
abuse, forced labor, trafficking, sexual exploitation, and death. More 
are held in unofficial facilities where they face similar risk and 
abuse. The United Nations has repeatedly called for an end to arbitrary 
detention for refugees and migrants in Libya. Without diplomatic 
support and effort from the United States and other allies, these calls 
will continue unheeded:
    What is the United States doing to close detention centers and 
provide safe, voluntary passage and protection to vulnerable refugees 
and migrants? What specific diplomatic steps is the United States 
taking with Government of National Accord (GNA) authorities to protect 
the human rights of refugees and migrants and to provide safe 
alternatives to detention?

    Answer. We advocate for the humane treatment and protection of 
IDPs, refugees, and other migrants in Libya in our engagement with 
Libyan authorities. We support efforts by U.N. agencies and Libyan 
authorities to facilitate the swift and orderly closure of migrant 
detention facilities. In FY 2020, we provided more than $23 million to 
UNHCR and other partners to provide cash support, medical assistance, 
and protection assessment services for refugees, asylum-seekers, and 
vulnerable migrants in Libya. Our support also funds efforts to extend 
assistance and services to help previously detained persons reintegrate 
safely into urban settings in Libya. From 2018 to present, America has 
resettled nearly 150 Unaccompanied Refugee Minors who had been 
evacuated out of Libya to America via the Refugee Admissions Program. 
We urge the Libyan Government to enhance protections for migrants and 
refugees in its territory, provide humanitarian organizations with 
access to populations of concern, and hold perpetrators of human rights 
violations accountable for their actions.

    Question. I am also deeply alarmed by the inhumane treatment of 
migrants and refugees across the region. Just last week, troubling 
reports emerged from Saudi Arabia that hundreds of emaciated and abused 
Ethiopian migrants are being held in heinous detention centers. In 
Yemen, thousands of stranded migrants are facing exclusion and 
violence:
    What is the U.S. strategy to and improve their living conditions? 
Specifically, what is the U.S. doing diplomatically to ensure that 
migrants are not detained and held in inhumane conditions?

    Answer. The State Department is advocating with regional 
authorities to ensure these foreign nationals, regardless of status, 
are being treated humanely, and that the basic needs of those in 
detention are addressed. The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) reported on a recent agreement to allow approximately 17,000 
Ethiopians to travel from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, from where they would 
be able to return to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government is working 
through the logistics to repatriate its citizens. The Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration provided $5,780,000 to IOM in 
Fiscal Year 2020 to address the needs of migrants in Yemen.

    Question. Yemen continues to experience the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world, with nearly 80 percent of the population reliant 
on some form of aid. U.N. agencies are playing a central role in the 
response. Unfortunately, these efforts are critically underfunded; the 
U.N.'s Yemen response plan for 2020 has only received 37 percent of the 
funds it requested. Of course, this is happening at a time when the 
COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have exacerbated food security 
challenges around the world. Millions are at risk of famine across the 
country. While the U.S. is the largest contributor to U.N. humanitarian 
relief operations in the world, more must be done. Unlike previous 
years, Gulf states have not contributed to the U.N.'s humanitarian 
response in Yemen, leaving a critical gap:
    How is the Administration working to address these funding 
challenges and ensure that lifesaving aid reaches the Yemeni people in 
a principled fashion?

    Answer. We share your concern about the dire humanitarian situation 
in Yemen and the constraints to the humanitarian operating environment. 
Deliberate Houthi obstruction of assistance causes needless suffering 
and undermines the international community's efforts. We are closely 
engaged with other donors and the United Nations in advocacy with the 
Houthis on compliance with international norms that are essential to 
ensure that American taxpayer-funded assistance reaches the vulnerable 
families for whom it is intended. Since the Administration's partial 
suspension of assistance went into effect in March, America has still 
provided significantly more humanitarian funding than any other donor 
in Yemen this year. We recently committed nearly $195 million in 
additional humanitarian aid for Yemen, bringing our total support so 
far this year to nearly $607 million, including support to the World 
Food Program for crucial food assistance and malnutrition prevention 
countrywide.
    Through ongoing bilateral and coordinated advocacy with other 
donors, the Saudis have begun to disburse some of their long-
outstanding pledges to U.N. Agencies operating in Yemen, and the 
Administration welcomed the UK, Sweden, Kuwait, and the EU's announced 
contributions to the Yemen appeal during the U.N. General Assembly. We 
continue to encourage additional funding contributions and full 
delivery on pledges already made.

    Question. What leverage do you believe the United States has in 
supporting the U.N.-led political process?

    Answer. The U.S. Government's goal is a sovereign, stable, secure, 
and unified Libya, free from foreign interference and capable of 
combatting terrorism. We are working with Libyans and the U.N. to align 
international efforts to support this objective. We engages 
stakeholders on all sides of the conflict--both Libyan and 
international--at the highest levels to encourage the removal of all 
foreign forces, and to advance an inclusive, negotiated political 
solution, and respect for the U.N. arms embargo. America co-chairs the 
Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL) 
Economic Working Group with Egypt and the EU through which we can 
demonstrate considerable leverage to help Libyans address economic 
issues that are core drivers of the Libyan conflict in support of the 
U.N.-facilitated process.

    Question. Why did the United States join Russia in vetoing a 
British-led initiative last April calling for a ceasefire in Libya? If 
the answer is ``because it wasn't going to work''--then what diplomatic 
steps could we have taken to increase leverage on all the players?

    Answer. We fully shared the United Kingdom's concerns last April 
about the urgent need to stabilize the situation in Tripoli, reach a 
lasting ceasefire, and help all Libyan parties return to the U.N. 
political process. The approach and timeline for a U.N. Security 
Council product on Libya, which was never submitted for a vote, would 
have proven counterproductive. We maintained that the key focus should 
be on direct engagement with external actors involved in the conflict 
in order to stabilize the situation in Tripoli and encourage all sides 
to urgently return to political dialogue. We have worked through the 
Berlin Process to engage external actors in Libya at the highest levels 
and align the international community in support of helping the Libyans 
agree to a lasting ceasefire and return to a U.N.-facilitated political 
process. We also worked with the United Kingdom to adopt U.N. Security 
Council resolution (UNSCR) 2510 (2020) in support of the Berlin 
Conclusions and UNSCR 2542 (2020) to renew the U.N. Support Mission in 
Libya's (UNSMIL) mandate for 12 months and create a new U.N. Special 
Envoy position.

    Question. Does the U.N. and UNSMIL have the capacity to promote a 
meaningful dialogue and solution?

    Answer. We welcome the U.N. Support Mission in Libya's (UNSMIL) 
resumption of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) by the end of 
October as testimony of the consensus among Libyans that an inclusive, 
negotiated political solution is the only means to end the conflict. We 
also commend Acting U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Williams's efforts to foster dialogue through several rounds of 
talks, culminating in Montreux, Switzerland, in September, and to 
create a political opening to put Libyans on a path towards national 
elections.
    On September 15, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of 
renewing the mandate of UNSMIL for an additional year, until September 
15, 2021. The updated mandate, which was a priority for America, 
provides for the creation of a U.N. Special Envoy for Libya and an 
UNSMIL Coordinator.
    This new structure will make for a stronger, more effective UNSMIL. 
A U.N. Special Envoy to lead UNSMIL will be better positioned to focus 
on mediation with Libyan and international actors to end the conflict 
and help Libyans reach a lasting political solution. Under the 
authority of the U.N. Special Envoy, the UNSMIL Coordinator will have 
responsibility for the day-to-day management and operations of the 
mission, whether overseeing the humanitarian response to the COVID-19 
crisis or human rights monitoring. Between these roles, there is a 
clear division of labor, as well as interdependence, close 
coordination, and a single reporting chain to the U.N. Secretary-
General.

    Question. Is it U.S. policy to continue to promote a civilian-led 
government in Libya?

    Answer. Yes, our policy promotes a civilian-led government in 
Libya. Supporting an inclusive, negotiated, political solution to the 
Libyan conflict remains a priority for the American Government. The 
U.N.'s plan to resume the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in October, 
which aims to establish a new transitional government and chart the 
path to national elections, is a testament to the current progress 
Libyans have made towards national political reconciliation. Our goal 
is a sovereign, stable, secure, and unified Libya, free from foreign 
interference and capable of combatting terrorism. We are working to 
align international efforts to support this objective.

    Question. What is your assessment of Sarraj's announcement to 
retire in October? Who is positioned to take his place?

    Answer. Prime Minister Sarraj's announcement of his intent to hand 
over power signals a willingness to set aside personal interests for 
the benefit of the Libyan people. It is for the Libyan people to decide 
who leads their government, and we will not interfere. The U.N.'s plan 
to resume the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) in October, which 
aims to establish a new transitional government and chart the path to 
national elections, is a testament to the current progress Libyans have 
made towards reconciliation. Prime Minister Sarraj's intent to transfer 
his responsibilities to the new interim authority demonstrates the 
seriousness and viability of the LPDF and the U.N. political process.
                                 ______
                                 

  The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the 
             Following Questions by Senator Robert Menendez

                             iran sanctions
    Question. What leverage does the United States have to prevent 
Russia and China from selling conventional arms to Iran if many of 
their companies do not interact with the U.S. financial system or they 
are already sanctioned?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Do you consider snapback sanctions to have been re-
imposed when none of the remaining participants in the JCPOA believe 
that the U.S. has any legal basis to impose snapback?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Do you consider the Iran arms embargo to be re-imposed 
when it was vetoed in the Security Council by Russia and China and not 
a single other member of the Security Council voted to extend it?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Have any of our allies expressed public support for the 
snapback of sanctions? If so, which countries?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. How effective will U.S. sanctions be if there is no buy-
in from our allies?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. How does the Administration plan to enforce these 
sanctions or the arms embargo without support from even our closest 
allies?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Will the U.S. sanction British, German and French 
companies that it deems to be in violation?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What specific examples do you have of Iran changing or 
moderating its nefarious behavior, either in its nuclear program or 
throughout the region, as a result of the re-imposition of U.S. 
sanctions?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What other steps, besides sanctions, is the 
Administration considering to bring Iran back to the negotiating table?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Earlier this week the President announced a new executive 
order, indicating it was somehow connected to the renewal of sanctions 
at the U.N.
    What new tools does this E.O. provide that the President previously 
didn't have?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What are the combined assets or financial impact of these 
sanctions on the new designees?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Is there any activity that could be sanctioned by this 
E.O. that was not previously sanctionable?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What is the delta that this E.O. covers that was not 
already covered under U.S. sanctions. Please be specific.

    [No Response Received]
                 iranian aggression and ``deterrence''
    Question. This Administration has repeatedly insisted that killing 
Qasem Soleimani had restored deterrence in the region generally and in 
Iraq in particular. Yet rocket attacks on the international zone near 
our embassy continued throughout the summer. General McKenzie, the 
commander of CENTCOM said recently that the level of attacks on U.S. 
troops in Iraq from Iran-backed militias ``have been higher'' and that 
the reason U.S. troops haven't been killed is simply because ``they're 
not hitting us.''
    What is this Administration's definition of deterrence regarding 
Iran and its proxies if these attacks have not stopped?

    [No Response Received]
                         u.n./iran/human rights
    Question. U.N. human rights mechanisms have been vocal in calling 
out abuses committed by the Iranian Government in recent months. In one 
recent report, the U.N. special rapporteur on Iran--a position 
originally created by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011 with strong 
U.S. backing--noted increasing restrictions on the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to freedom of 
association and assembly. The special rapporteur also found that 
Christian converts risk arbitrary arrests, detention, and interrogation 
about their faith and have faced specious charges. The special 
rapporteur has also been vocal in calling on Iran to release human 
rights defenders from prison due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Does the Administration support these statements?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Given that the Administration has decided to withhold 
assessed contributions from the U.N. Human Rights Office, how do you 
plan to support the work on Iran being carried out by the special 
rapporteur?

    [No Response Received]
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Despite growing concerns over food security and the 
impact of COVID-19, the U.N.'s Yemen response plan for 2020 has only 
received 37 percent of the funds it requested from member states. How 
is the Administration working with other donor countries--specifically 
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--to address these funding challenges?

    Answer. We share your concern for the dire humanitarian situation 
in Yemen. Deliberate Houthi obstruction of assistance is causing 
needless suffering among their fellow Yemenis, despite our continued 
calls on the Houthis to respect humanitarian principles. As long as the 
Houthis continue to obstruct assistance, America and other donors 
cannot guarantee that aid is reaching and benefiting the people for 
whom it is intended, and donors are unlikely to fully fund the U.N.'s 
Yemen Response Plan.
    Houthi obstruction forced USAID to partially suspend some 
assistance awards in Houthi-controlled areas in March 2020. America has 
still provided more funding than any other donor in Yemen this year. We 
recently committed nearly $195 million in additional humanitarian aid 
for Yemen, bringing our total support so far this year to nearly $607 
million, and we encourage other donors, including Gulf governments, to 
contribute additional funding and to fulfill pledges they have already 
made. Through ongoing bilateral and coordinated advocacy, the Saudis 
have begun to fulfill some of their long-standing pledges to U.N. 
agencies in Yemen, and the Administration was pleased that the UK, 
Sweden, Kuwait, and the EU announced contributions to the Yemen appeal 
during the U.N. General Assembly.

    Question. What challenges do implementing partners face in the 
provision of emergency food assistance to the civilian population of 
Yemen, where two-thirds of the population are hungry, 11.6 percent of 
the population is malnourished, and more than 1.6 percent of all 
children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition?

    Answer. Houthi interference--including blocking aid projects, 
seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, harassing aid workers, and 
most recently shutting down Sana'a airport--has prevented critical, 
life-saving aid from reaching millions of Yemenis. America, in 
cooperation with other donors and the U.N., identified seven conditions 
the Houthis must meet to ensure effective aid implementation in 
northern Yemen and agreed on benchmarks to gauge Houthi progress in 
addressing them. Meeting these minimum benchmarks is essential to 
ensure that Houthi leaders do not divert assistance away from 
vulnerable families and reward combatants and their own supporters. The 
Houthis have failed to follow through on their commitments to allow the 
World Food Program (WFP) to implement necessary procedures to ensure 
food is reaching the most vulnerable Yemenis, resulting in the WFP's 
difficult decision to recalibrate its assistance in northern Yemen. 
State and USAID remain closely engaged with other donors in joint 
advocacy with the Houthis on these issues. Donors plan to hold another 
high-level meeting in November to discuss next steps. We are also 
advocating for the Republic of Yemen Government to address access 
issues in the south.

    Question. In 2014, the U.N. Security Council authorized cross-
border assistance into Syria from neighboring states. However, since 
January, Russia--with support from China--has essentially forced the 
U.N. Security Council to close three border crossings into Syria, 
leaving only the Bab al-Hawa border crossing authorized for just the 
next 12 months. What has been the impact of these closures on the 
humanitarian crisis in northeast and northwest Syria?

    Answer. The transshipment of humanitarian assistance to Syria has 
continued, but costs and risks to partners have increased due to the 
required programmatic adaptations. U.N. convoys now face additional 
obstacles in the northwest: multiple lines of control, negotiating 
access with armed opposition groups, longer distances and deteriorating 
roads, and additional shipping delays and road closures due to ongoing 
hostilities. There is no other option if the Idlib ceasefire fails and 
the crossing at Bab al-Hawa is closed or congested. America, our 
European partners, and U.N. Secretary-General Guterres have all 
criticized the Russian push to close humanitarian corridors.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking at the U.N. 
Security Council to reopen now-closed border crossings?

    Answer. The Department continues to highlight our concerns 
regarding cross-border access during monthly meetings in the U.N. 
Security Council. To maintain pressure on China, Russia, and others, we 
plan to facilitate a roundtable discussion hosted by the United Nations 
in the coming months to allow survivors of abuses in Syria to discuss 
and document conditions, including interference with humanitarian aid 
and attacks on humanitarian workers. We will conduct two sets of 
bilateral consultations (technical and policy) with the new U.N. 
Security Council members for the 2021-2022 term (India, Ireland, Kenya, 
Mexico, and Norway), before the end of 2020, during which we will 
emphasize the need to extend and expand the humanitarian mechanism in 
Syria.

    Question. What are the implications of the limitations on cross-
border assistance in Syria?

    Answer. U.N. agencies and other international organizations provide 
life-saving services in northern Syria, including the monthly cross-
border delivery of: food assistance for 1.5 million people; water, 
sanitation and hygiene assistance for nearly 1 million people; and 
shelter and relief items for 247,000 people. The removal of Bab al-
Salaam limits U.N. access to an estimated 1.3 million people, including 
at least 800,000 IDPs. U.N. agencies could more effectively provide 
assistance if additional cross-border access points were available. Due 
to the non-re-authorization of the al-Yaroubia crossing in northeast 
Syria, for example, there is a significant gap in health assistance and 
capacity, which is especially hindering the region's COVID-19 response.
                                 ______
                                 

  The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the 
           Following Questions by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

                       iranian hostage diplomacy
    Question. U.S. citizen Siamak Namazi was taken hostage by the 
Iranian regime nearly 5 years ago, and his ailing father Baquer Namazi 
was similarly arrested and detained just months after Siamak. Although 
Baquer is now out of prison, he suffers from numerous serious health 
problems, but Iran refuses to let him leave the country to receive 
desperately needed medical treatment. Siamak has been denied furlough 
repeatedly despite meeting the legal requirements and being exposed to 
COVID-19 multiple times. Both are being unjustly held in Iran as part 
of its campaign to take foreign and dual nationals hostage to advance 
its foreign policy goals.
    What steps are you taking to bring home U.S. hostages in Iran?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What broader steps are being taken in collaboration with 
other world powers to end Iran's use of hostage diplomacy overall?

    [No Response Received]
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. What actions has the United States taken diplomatically 
to prevent the proliferation of missile equipment and technology, 
covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to countries 
in the Middle-East since 2017? Additionally, since 2017, has the 
President determined that a foreign person has knowingly exported, 
transferred or otherwise engaged in the trade of any MTCR equipment or 
technology to a country that is a non-MTCR adherent? If so, who were 
those foreign persons?

    Answer. The proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies poses a significant 
threat to international security. We continually work to prevent the 
proliferation of such technology to countries in the Middle East, given 
its potential to exacerbate regional instability and tension. We use a 
variety of nonproliferation tools, including collaboration with 
governments to interdict missile-related transfers to the region. We 
uses bilateral export control/nonproliferation dialogues and 
participation in multilateral fora such the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (HCOC) to raise awareness of missile development programs 
of concern in the Middle East and press countries to take steps to 
impede these programs' acquisition of missile technology.
    We use our sanctions authorities, as warranted, to address missile 
proliferation activities. On January 31, 2018, we imposed sanctions 
under the missile sanctions laws (Sections 73(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the 
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)(B) and (C), and Sections 
11B(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 
U.S.C. app. 2410b(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii)) on two North Korean entities, 
Chilsong Trading Corporation and Korea Kuryonggang Trading Corporation, 
because they engaged in the transfer of equipment and technology 
controlled under the MTCR Annex (control list) to entities in a non-
MTCR country. These sanctions were published in the Federal Register on 
January 31, 2018. Most recently, on September 23, 2020, we imposed 
sanctions under the Iran Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) against 
four entities for transferring missile technology to Iran.

    Question. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security 
and Nonproliferation, Christopher Ford, remarked on September 16, 2020 
that: ``we are also leading the global effort to solidify IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the AP, together, as the global 
standard for safeguards . . . '' In that spirit, what actions has the 
United States taken diplomatically since 2017 to press the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to ratify the Additional Protocol to its bilateral IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement?

    Answer. The Administration remains committed to leading global 
efforts to establish the combination of a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto standard for 
international safeguards, and to encourage all responsible suppliers to 
make the AP a condition for nuclear exports. The Administration has 
repeatedly urged Saudi Arabia to bring an AP into force, including 
throughout ongoing discussions regarding its planned civil nuclear 
power program. In this context, American experts have sought to clarify 
with Saudi counterparts the importance of the AP for nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts and to address Saudi questions and potential 
concerns about how the AP is implemented.
                                 ______
                                 

  The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the 
            Following Questions by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. Has Iran's breakout time--the time necessary to acquire 
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon--increased or decreased 
since the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
in May 2018? What is Iran's approximate breakout time as of September 
25, 2020, relying on publicly available information?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Between January 16, 2016 and May 7, 2018, how many 
attacks did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S. 
service members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition 
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Between May 8, 2018 and January 3, 2020, how many attacks 
did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S. service 
members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition 
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Between January 4, 2020 and September 25, 2020, how many 
attacks did Iran-linked forces carry out on facilities hosting U.S. 
service members and on U.S. convoys in Iraq? How many U.S. or coalition 
personnel were injured and killed in these attacks?

    [No Response Received]
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ambassador David Hale to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker

    Question. I want every country in the world to recognize Israel, 
but this last minute, brazenly political ultimatum is whipping up 
serious domestic challenges for an already fragile government that is 
facing significant challenges to its survivability. Has the Department 
added this requirement to the list of actions Sudan must take before it 
is delisted?

    Answer. We have engaged with the Sudanese Civilian-led Transitional 
Government on the potential normalization of relations with Israel and 
the benefits it would bring to Sudan's development and the broader 
region. We recognize that Sudan is undergoing a fragile transition and 
is engaging in internal deliberation on this sensitive, but important 
issue.
    Separately, we are discussing with Sudan the policy and statutory 
requirements for rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) 
designation. We have made significant progress on resolving outstanding 
terrorism claims.

    Question. What risks does the transitional government face and what 
U.S. assistance is being provided to help mitigate those risks?

    Answer. The transitional government's most significant challenges 
emanate from elements of the former regime and their political Islamist 
allies, who continue to seek ways to exploit the fragility of the 
transition to regain power. Between the dire economic situation facing 
the country, COVID-19, and the humanitarian crises caused by recent 
floods, the Sudanese transition remains exceptionally fragile. Should 
public support for the transitional government or the delicate 
civilian/military alliance behind it collapse, we would anticipate the 
outbreak of a Libya-like civil conflict, as different Sudanese power 
centers backed by foreign powers sought to assert control over the 
country. To avoid this, we are working closely with the civilian-led 
transitional government to implement comprehensive political and 
economic reforms.
    In addition to the anticipated rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor 
of Terrorism designation, which will facilitate Sudan's reintegration 
in to the global economy, U.S. assistance includes increased 
humanitarian support to the people of Sudan; support for peace 
agreement implementation in Darfur and the Two Areas; technical support 
to the civilian-led transitional government in the strengthening of 
democratic institutions; and engagement with international partners to 
increase International Financial Institution support to Sudan and pave 
the way for accelerated debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries program.

    Question. Given documented violations of the arms embargo by 
Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other actors, what 
concrete steps are you taking to act on these violations?

    Answer. We support Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016), which 
provides authorities for member states to limit the destabilizing flows 
of arms to and from Libya. The U.N. Security Council renewed these 
authorities most recently in June and reiterated this commitment in 
September through adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2542 
(2020). America supports a robust U.N. arms embargo and sanctions 
regime. EU Operation Irini and its predecessor, Operation Sophia, have 
interdicted vessels suspected of violating the embargo and shared 
information on alleged violations with the U.N. Security Council Libya 
Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts. We have made clear to all actors, 
publicly and privately, the need to respect the arms embargo.

    Question. Will you impose sanctions on companies and countries that 
violate the arms embargo?

    Answer. We have consistently promoted accountability for violations 
of the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. Individuals and entities that have 
participated in efforts to send arms to Libya have faced U.N. sanctions 
and criminal prosecution. Sanctions discourage violations, and we 
consider their targeted use when appropriate. We continue to press our 
partners to do the same and to respect the U.N. arms embargo they 
committed to uphold in Berlin. We also support international efforts 
for more effective compliance with the U.N. arms embargo, including 
efforts by the EU.

    Question. Will you halt weapons transfers to the UAE? What concrete 
steps are you taking with Emirati officials to hold them accountable 
for civilian deaths?

    Answer. As a matter of policy, we treat security cooperation 
conversations with our partners as private until we notify any approved 
arms sales to Congress.
    Consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
(CAT), all arms transfers to foreign partners are subject to case-by-
case comprehensive consideration of American interests--including risks 
related to human rights abuses, terrorism, mass atrocities, or 
transnational organized crime. The Department will continue to conduct 
its reviews of foreign military sales and direct commercial sales 
consistent with this policy and all applicable statutory requirements.

    Question. Why is this situation so different? Why have the State 
Department and USAID decided to put millions of innocent Yemenis at 
risk of COVID-19, cholera, dengue fever, and starvation?

    Answer. Houthi obstruction in Yemen has included blocking aid 
projects, seeking to profit from humanitarian funding, and harassing 
and detaining aid workers. Under the partial suspension in effect since 
March, we continue to support the most critical life-saving activities 
in northern Yemen, including support to international NGO partners for 
programs to treat malnutrition, provide clean water, and help prevent 
cholera, COVID-19, and other communicable diseases. USAID and State 
also continue to support U.N. partners countrywide. America is the 
single largest donor to Yemen, providing nearly $607 million in FY 2020 
in humanitarian aid to all parts of Yemen. In FY 2020, State and USAID 
have provided nearly $19 million in funding to support COVID-19 
response efforts throughout Yemen.

    Question. What plans does the Department have in place to resume 
aid to those in need other than waiting for the Houthi rebels to agree 
to stop diverting our assistance?

    Answer. The Administration stands ready to resume full programming 
in Yemen, but only when programs can be implemented properly to ensure 
aid reaches those for whom it is intended. America, in cooperation with 
other donors and the U.N., identified seven conditions and benchmarks 
that need to be met for effective aid implementation in northern Yemen. 
Meeting these minimum conditions is essential to ensure Houthi leaders 
do not divert assistance away from the most vulnerable families and 
reward combatants and their own supporters. We have seen partial, but 
insufficient, progress on this front, and progress on accountability 
benchmarks has stalled. The Administration will remain closely engaged 
with other donors in joint advocacy with the Houthis on these issues.
                                 ______
                                 

  The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Elliott Abrams for the 
             Following Questions by Senator Cory A. Booker

                  u.s.'s diplomatic isolation on iran
    Question. President Macron has called ``maximum pressure'' a 
failure. Not only is the United States more isolated on the world 
stage, but Iran today is closer to a nuclear weapon than it was when 
the United States was party to the JCPOA. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) recently confirmed that Iran has ten times the 
amount of enriched uranium it did when President Trump assumed office.
    How can the United States lead the world if our closest allies 
won't stand by us on one of our most important national security 
interests?

    [No Response Received]
                      lack of middle east strategy
    Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy argued for a shift to 
focusing on great power competition, namely with China, and for a more 
limited approach to the Middle East. And yet, the U.S. pulled out of 
the JCPOA without the backing of our allies, abandoned the Kurds, our 
stalwart allies in Iraq, ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani 
with conflicting justifications--though no one here mourns his death--
putting the lives of our service members deployed across the Middle 
East in jeopardy.
    Can you explain why this Administration at turn after turn, takes 
reckless actions that risk plunging this country into dangerous 
confrontations, if not war, while not fulfilling its own national 
security mandate to invest in effective competition with China?

    [No Response Received]

                                  [all]