[Senate Hearing 116-540]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-540
THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-243 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JONI ERNST, Iowa TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JONI ERNST, Iowa, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
September 17, 2019
Page
The Situation in Southeastern Europe............................. 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Joni Ernst.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Gary C. Peters.............................. 2
Witness Statements
Wilson, Mr. Damon M., Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council. 3
Shullman, Dr. David O., Senior Advisor, International Republican 8
Institute.
Bugajski, Mr. Janusz, Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy 16
Analysis.
Appendix A....................................................... 40
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2019
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joni Ernst
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee members present: Senators Ernst, Fischer,
Peters, and Shaheen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST
Senator Ernst. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meets this afternoon to receive testimony on the
situation in Southeastern Europe.
I just want to mention to our witnesses as well, at 3:30 we
do have a series of votes. Senator Peters and I will bounce
back and forth accordingly. Thank you for your patience with
us.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today. We have Mr.
Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council;
Dr. David Shullman, Senior Advisor at the International
Republican Institute (IRI); and Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Senior
Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
The Western Balkans is a region that sits at the crossroads
of history. The United States and the Department of Defense
(DOD) must not forget or ignore this fact as we adapt our
policy and strategy to a new era of strategic competition. The
National Defense Strategy (NDS) warns that revisionist powers
are increasing, ``efforts short of armed conflict by expanding
coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty,
exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines
between civil and military goals.''
That is exactly what Russia and China are doing in the
Western Balkans.
Russia's influence in the Western Balkans is historic and
longstanding. As we saw in the 2016 coupe attempt in
Montenegro, Vladimir Putin will use all of his tools and tricks
to prevent Western Balkan countries from taking the path of
Euro-Atlantic integration through membership in NATO [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the EU [European Union].
A more recent but equally troubling development in the
region is the influence of China. Through the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) and other efforts, Beijing is investing
heavily in infrastructure and technology projects, fueling
corruption, driving up debt, and corroding democracy. As we
have seen elsewhere throughout the world, Chinese
infrastructure investment could have serious security and
military implications in the Western Balkans and the wider
region.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about Russia
and China's objectives in the Western Balkans, their strategies
for achieving them, and how the United States can effectively
counter this malign influence and help our allies and partners
to build resiliency.
I am also looking forward to discussing regional security
topics. Fortunately, there is good news to report. I am happy
that the Senate will soon vote to ratify the accession protocol
for North Macedonia to join NATO. However, with the name issue
resolved and North Macedonia on its way to NATO membership,
there may be a temptation to think these events were somehow
inevitable. That would be a serious mistake. This took hard
work and political courage on both sides, and it has provided a
sign of hope that statesmanship can make the Western Balkans a
safer and more prosperous region.
That brings me to the next opportunity for statesmanship:
the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. I strongly support diplomatic
efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and I
welcome the President's decision to appoint a special
representative for the Western Balkans who will provide the
focus needed to help Kosovo and Serbia embrace this opportunity
for enduring peace and reconciliation. This will not be easy,
but the time for serious and intensive effort is now.
As the dialogue continues, the United States must maintain
its commitment to NATO's Kosovo force which plays an
indispensable role in protecting security and stability for the
region. We must also continue to support the Kosovo security
force's transition to a multi-ethnic army for the Republic of
Kosovo that is interoperable with NATO.
I am looking forward to discussing other topics as well,
including Bosnia, the EU's role in the Western Balkans, and
much more.
Once again, thanks to our witnesses for making yourselves
available to us today.
With that, I will turn it over to our ranking member,
Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR GARY C. PETERS
Senator Peters. Thank you, Chairman Ernst. Let me begin by
thanking you for holding this very important hearing on the
situation in Southeastern Europe.
These are frontline states, including some NATO allies in
the strategic competition with near-peer competitors, Russia
and China. The security interest and political stability of
this region needs to be better factored into our larger
strategic calculations.
Amongst the important trend in regional dynamics, we have
seen the proliferation of both Russian and Chinese hybrid
warfare and malign influence operations in the region. Russia
seeks shorter-term gains to keep countries in the region from
integrating with Western institutions such as NATO and the EU,
and China is seeking to lock countries into a longer-term state
capture road. They become beholden financially, leading to
changes in the nation's decision-making as well.
We have seen Russia deploy these tactics, including
information warfare campaigns and cybersecurity attacks, across
Southeastern Europe. A February report by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace deemed Russia one of the
major threats in these domains and concluded--and I quote from
their report--``with a potential land swap being discussed by
Kosovo and Serbia and NATO membership back on the horizon for
the newly renamed Republic of North Macedonia, malign actors
could use cyber tools and disinformation to try and to thwart
this process.''
China has also sought to capitalize on instability in the
region. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies assessed that the, ``Western Balkans
represent fertile soil characterized by economic stagnation,
weak governance, corruption, and high unemployment rates on
which the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese state-owned
companies can easily put down roots.''
While the tactics may differ slightly, both the Russia and
China models seek to take advantage of the fragility and
division inside and between these countries. The hybrid warfare
and malign influence operations have implications for our
political integrity and national security of the region, as
well as national security for the United States.
During today's testimony, I hope the witnesses will address
how China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability
inside and between these countries and what tools the United
States can leverage for building the capacity and resilience of
these nations to better counter these malign tactics.
Because these operations often occur below the threshold or
do occur below the threshold of conventional military activity,
I think it is important to explore how non-military tools, as
well as military tools, can be effectively leveraged in the
region.
I am also interested in the role that NATO and other
multinational institutions can play in helping to shape our
relationships in the region and counter the destabilizing
effects of both Russia and Chinese influence.
I would also like to thank the witnesses once again for
being here to share your expert insights in the region.
Again, Madam Chair, thank you for highlighting this very
important issue.
Senator Ernst. Thanks again for being here today.
We will start with opening statements. Mr. Wilson, we will
go ahead and start with you. If you would please try and keep
your comments to 5 minutes, and then we will open up for
questions. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAMON M. WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Ernst, Ranking
Member Peters, Senator Shaheen.
The National Defense Strategy articulates today's era of
great power competition clearly. That competition is playing
out in the Western Balkans, as both of you have just suggested.
In response, the United States should extend our alliances
and attract new partners in the region as a key component of
our strategy to compete effectively.
Russia seeks to disrupt reforms and enlargement in
Southeast Europe, complicating in turn the aspirations of
nations further to Europe's east to chart their own course and
pursue EU or NATO membership.
China's approach is more subtle, but its ambitions may be
more significant: to enter Europe through a region it views as
the continent's soft underbelly in order to prevent Europe from
siding with the United States in any emerging global
confrontation.
Since the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the West's
clarity that the region's future would be in the institutions
of Europe served as an incentive for reform. Despite great
progress over nearly 2 decades, the transatlantic community's
conviction in enlargement has waned, commensurate with
increased doubts within our own societies about our own
institutions. This ambivalence has provided an opening.
A revanchist Kremlin has acted to halt the democratic
advance, to undermine our post-Cold War gains, and to sow
mistrust within democratic societies. Russia began pursuing
this strategy perhaps less focused on maintaining its limited
influence in the region and more disrupting our influence by
disrupting the process of NATO and EU integration. Russia found
leverage in exploiting corruption and weak institutions. Moscow
has used its energy prowess, deployed its intelligence
services, waged disinformation campaigns, and manipulated the
Orthodox Church. In Serbia, Moscow has coupled these coercive
tools with its position on the UN [United Nations] Security
Council and its exaggerated historic ties to exert influence.
China is now among the top five markets for imports into
most of the countries in the region, while Russia enjoys that
status only in Serbia. China understood that its arrival in the
region would face little resistance from small states hungry
for investment and that a foothold would provide a bridgehead
into Europe. China has secured trade routes and market share
and diluted European solidarity on issues such as human rights
in China and Taiwan.
Ultimately, the Chinese Government aims to prevent Europe
from joining the United States in any effort to check China's
global influence. China has used easy money to gain influence
rapidly, taking advantage of the poor investment climate to
provide loans ensuring long-term dependency. Beijing has
coupled its economic influence with soft power to shape a more
favorable narrative towards China through opening Confucius
Institutes, launching exchange programs, and deepening its
media presence.
The return of Russian influence and the arrival of Chinese
influence against the backdrop of great power competition
between a free world and autocratic, kleptocratic powers has
meant that the Balkans is back in play.
However, the United States in partnering with the European
Union, has good options.
First, we should be explicit that the National Defense
Strategy's call for strengthening alliances and attracting new
partners applies in the Western Balkans. Following through on
this would bolster our comparative advantage over near-peer
competitors. United States policy should be clear that as
nations in the region reform and are able to meet relevant
responsibilities, they will be welcomed into the transatlantic
community and its institutions. We need to compete for
influence and reach out to publics and engage at political
levels throughout the region, including with those with whom we
sometimes disagree.
Second, our immediate task should be to secure the gains
offered by the Prespa Agreement between Athens and Skopje. We
welcome the United States Senate and other allied parliaments
welcoming North Macedonia as NATO's 30th member as soon as
possible. We should also encourage our European friends to open
EU accession negotiations in October.
Third and most important is achieving a comprehensive
historic settlement between Kosovo and Serbia, which would
include normalization and mutual recognition, paving the way
for Serbia to advance its EU aspirations and allowing Kosovo to
join the United Nations and develop as a sovereign nation.
Without an agreement, Russia has leverage over Serbia and
therefore the region.
The absence of a deal fuels nationalist political debates
delaying the development of democracy in Serbia and allowing
Kosovo's leaders to avoid tough governance questions. A Serbia
moving more decisively towards Europe will provide the
guardrail we need for Bosnia.
Prospects are not great. Nonetheless, a window of
opportunity will open after Kosovo's elections next month until
next summer prior to Serbian elections. U.S. leadership is
critical to ensure progress, and we also welcome the
appointment of Matt Palmer as a special representative.
An often discussed land swap is not viable. However, the
United States and EU should promote economic integration as a
means to minimize the relevance of borders in the region. We
should conclude a free trade area among Western Balkan states
long before the EU common market arrives. The United States and
the EU will have to expand the incentives, including offering a
United States-Serbia strategic partnership, Partnership for
Peace entrance for Kosovo, and increased financial assistance
for both parties.
Fourth, the EU and United States should partner with
nations in the region to develop regional interconnections and
transportation, telecommunications, and energy. This means
creating the infrastructure of Europe in the region well before
EU membership arrives. We should help our partners pursue smart
development, including sometimes with Chinese financing,
without sacrificing their national security.
Finally, the United States and NATO allies should maintain
a permanent security presence based in Kosovo, coupled with a
growing security cooperation with Serbia. Our presence should
be part of our broader deterrent posture throughout Europe, and
it should also serve as a catalyst for regional capacity
building forging confidence among the militaries of the region
in each other. Ultimately United States support for historic
reconciliation in Europe following the end of the Second World
War and then the Cold War in which former adversaries became
allies is the right blueprint to secure our own interests in
the Western Balkans today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Damon M. Wilson
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Peters, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Southeast
Europe.
The United States National Defense Strategy articulates today's era
of great power competition clearly. That competition is playing out in
the Western Balkans. In response, the United States should extend our
alliances and attract new partners in this region as a key component of
our strategy to protect our interests and compete effectively.
Yet, in the past decade, the United States and the European Union
(EU) became more ambivalent about our commitments in the Western
Balkans. Moscow and Beijing, sensing an opening, have become more
determined in their efforts to gain influence and leverage in the
region.
Russia seeks to disrupt reforms and enlargement in Southeast
Europe, complicating in turn the aspirations of nations further in
Europe's East to chart their own course and pursue EU or NATO
membership.
China's approach is more subtle, but its ambitions may be more
significant: to enter Europe through a region it views as the
continent's soft underbelly in order to prevent Europe from siding with
the United States in any emerging global confrontation.
****
U.S. policy in the region today should be informed by how our
strategy has evolved.
In the summer of 2001, the United States set the tone for our
approach to enlargement when President Bush declared in Warsaw: ``We
should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we
can do to advance the cause of freedom.'' Two years later, EU leaders
declared in Thessaloniki, Greece that, ``the future of the Balkans is
within the European Union.''
These bold statements provided a North Star for a region still
reeling from the wars of the 1990s. Corruption remained endemic, rule
of law fragile, and democratic institutions weak, but there was a sense
of inevitable progress. The West's clarity served as incentive for
reform.
Indeed, less than a year after the Thessaloniki declaration,
Slovenia joined both NATO and the EU. In 2009, Croatia and Albania
joined NATO. It took another four years for Croatia to join the EU. In
2015, Montenegro joined NATO. And now, the United States Senate is
poised to welcome North Macedonia as our next ally.
Despite this progress, the transatlantic community's conviction in
enlargement has waned, commensurate with increased doubts within our
own societies about our institutions. As leaders are grappling with
divisions within NATO and differing visions for the future of the EU,
they are skeptical about further enlargement.
This ambivalence has provided an opening.
****
A revanchist Kremlin has acted to halt the democratic advance, to
undermine our post-Cold War gains, and to sow mistrust within our
societies. Russia began pursuing a strategy less focused on maintaining
its limited influence in the region, and more about disrupting our
influence--by disrupting the process of NATO and EU integration.
Whereas the integration process is designed to counter corruption,
bolster rule of law, and build national capabilities, Russia found
leverage in exploiting corruption and weak institutions. While Moscow's
strategy is effectively limited to one of disruption, we have seen in
places such as Ukraine and Georgia that, when Moscow senses success,
its ambitions grow.
Russia has used its energy prowess, deployed its intelligence
services, waged disinformation campaigns, and manipulated the Orthodox
Church to gain leverage over the region. In Serbia, Moscow has coupled
these coercive tools with its position on the UN Security Council and
its exaggerated historic ties to exert influence.
More recently, China has emerged as a serious actor in the region.
It is now among the top five markets for imports into most of the
countries in the region, while Russia enjoys that status only in
Serbia.
China understood its arrival in the region would face little
resistance from small states hungry for investment, and that a foothold
would provide a bridgehead into Europe. China has extended its Belt and
Road Initiative, secured trade routes and market share, and diluted
European solidarity on issues important to Beijing such as human rights
and Taiwan. Ultimately, the Chinese Government likely aims to prevent
Europe from joining the United States in any effort to check China's
global influence.
China has used easy money to gain influence rapidly, taking
advantage of the poor investment climate to provide loans ensuring
long-term dependency. Beijing has coupled its economic influence with
soft power to shape a more favorable narrative toward China through
opening Confucius Institutes, launching large-scale exchange programs,
and expanding its media presence.
The return of Russian influence and the arrival of Chinese
influence--against the backdrop of great power competition between a
free world and autocratic, kleptocratic powers--has meant the Balkans
is back in play.
To be fair, we should not overestimate the challenge. Russia after
all produces little of what the region imports, outside of energy.
Moscow is notorious for failing to follow through on loans and
investments.
And the Kremlin's heavy-handed tactics in the region have created a
backlash. While Russian disinformation remains potent, leaders in the
region do not trust Russia's intentions.
United States and now EU warnings of undue Chinese influence are
beginning to be heard in the region. But while skepticism of Russia has
grown, open attitudes toward China remain.
****
The United States, partnering with the EU, has good options for
advancing our own interests in a secure, democratic, and prosperous
Southeast Europe.
First, we should be explicit that the National Defense Strategy's
call for strengthening alliances and attracting new partners applies in
the Western Balkans. Following through on this would bolster our
comparative advantage over near-peer competitors. To this end, the
United States and the EU should return to first principles,
articulating a vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace that
includes all of Southeast Europe. U.S. policy should be clear that as
nations in the region reform and are able to meet relevant
responsibilities, they will be welcomed into the transatlantic
community and, if they desire, into its institutions.
As part of this effort, we need to compete for influence. This
means reaching out directly to publics and engaging at senior political
levels throughout the region, including with those with whom we
sometimes disagree. We do not want our disregard of local public
perceptions or isolation of certain leaders to leave them with few
options other than Moscow or Beijing.
Second, our immediate task should be to secure the gains offered by
the Prespa Agreement between Athens and Skopje. This means the United
States Senate and other allied parliaments should welcome North
Macedonia as NATO's 30th member as soon as possible. We should also
encourage our European friends to follow through and open EU accession
negotiations in October.
Third, and perhaps most important, is achieving a comprehensive,
historic settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. Such an agreement would
include normalization and mutual recognition, paving the way for Serbia
to advance its EU aspirations and allowing Kosovo to join the United
Nations and develop as a sovereign nation. Progress in the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue is the game-changer in the region.
Without an agreement, Russia has leverage over Serbia and therefore
the region. The absence of a deal fuels nationalist political debates,
delaying the development of democracy in Serbia and allowing Kosovo's
leaders to avoid tough governance questions. In contrast, a deal would
allow leaders to focus on how better to unlock the potential of their
citizens. Furthermore, a Serbia moving more decisively toward Europe
will provide the guardrail we need for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Prospects are not great. Kosovo is in the midst of elections that
could produce a government skeptical of a deal. Nonetheless, a window
of opportunity will open from this fall until next summer, prior to
Serbian parliamentary elections. With EU senior leadership positions
changing this fall, United States leadership is critical to ensure
progress. I therefore welcome the appointment of a seasoned diplomat,
Matt Palmer, as United States Special Representative for the Western
Balkans.
To convince both sides to return to the negotiations, United States
and EU diplomacy should advance reciprocal steps to achieve a status
quo ante: Kosovo would lift its 100 percent tariffs while Belgrade
would cease its derecognition campaign during the negotiations.
An often-discussed significant land swap is not viable, even if
there will need to be a modest border demarcation. However, the United
States and EU should promote economic integration as a means to
minimize the relevance of borders in the region. We should aim to agree
a free trade area among Western Balkans states long before the EU
common market arrives.
At the same time, the United States and the EU will have to expand
the incentives. For Serbia, this means the United States should offer
the prospect of a United States-Serbia Strategic Partnership to include
significant new security cooperation, an enhanced political dialogue, a
concerted strategy to promote investment and trade, and expanded
people-to-people ties. For Kosovo, this means the United States should
support its entrance into the Partnership for Peace and becoming a NATO
and EU aspirant.
Furthermore, the EU should be prepared to invest billions into
supporting a comprehensive agreement, and I would suggest that the
United States Congress should consider committing several hundred
million dollars to bolster such an historic deal.
Fourth, the EU and United States should partner with nations in the
region to develop regional interconnections in transportation,
telecommunications, and energy. This means creating the infrastructure
of Europe in the region well before EU membership becomes viable. We
should seek synergies between the Three Seas Initiative and the Berlin
Process to accelerate this goal. We should help our partners pursue
smart economic development, including with Chinese financing, without
sacrificing their national security.
Finally, to secure these gains for the future and to hedge against
Russian efforts to disrupt our interests or Chinese interests to
displace them, the United States and our NATO allies should maintain a
permanent security presence in the region, based in Kosovo, coupled
with growing security cooperation with Serbia. Our presence should be
part of our broader deterrent force posture throughout Europe. It
should also serve as a catalyst for regional capacity-building, forging
confidence among the militaries of the region in each other.
Ultimately, United States support for historic reconciliation in
Europe, following the end of the Second World War and then the Cold
War, in which former adversaries became allies, is the right long-term
blueprint for security and democratic and economic development in the
Western Balkans.
In an era of great power competition, the United States should
bolster and expand its alliances as a strategic comparative advantage
over our adversaries. In the Western Balkans, a little effort can reap
outsized dividends.
****
Damon Wilson is the executive vice president of the Atlantic
Council, home to the #BalkansForward Initiative. The views expressed in
this testimony are his own.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Dr. Shullman?
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID O. SHULLMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR,
INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Dr. Shullman. Thank you.
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Peters, Senator Shaheen,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this critical
topic.
China's primary goals in the Western Balkans are economic,
and Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative,
China's massive infrastructure and connectivity program, has
rapidly increased Beijing's economic influence in the region.
Given this economic focus, China benefits from regional
stability and, unlike Russia, does not seek to seed internal
division, undermine accession to the EU, or reduce confidence
in democratic systems.
That said, it is also true that as a result of China's
economic inroads in the Western Balkans, it is amassing
political leverage, bolstering illiberal leaders, and
threatening to undermine democratic development and pull
countries away from the United States and the EU.
To explain this seeming disconnect, I will focus my remarks
on China's means of economic influence in the region and their
effects.
The Western Balkans is of strategic economic importance to
China for several reasons. First, China sees the region as a
conduit to the broader European market and, to that end, is
financing infrastructure projects such as its high speed
railway connecting Belgrade with Budapest, which is currently
stalled. Individual Chinese state-owned enterprises also view
the Western Balkans as countries which offer opportunities for
high return investment, given that they face slow economic
growth, and have poor governance, transparency, and labor
regulations. Belt and Road projects in the non-EU countries of
the Western Balkans are not, of course, bound by EU standards,
making them attractive for these state-owned enterprises.
The differences in the EU and the Chinese approaches also
explain the appeal of Chinese loans to Western Balkan
Governments. Not only does China make no demands regarding
transparency or reforms, but Chinese funding, unlike that from
the EU, is dispersed quickly.
The slow path to EU accession for some Western Balkan
countries also plays into China's hands. As one local Serbian
businessman puts it, the EU is telling Serbia you will have
something tomorrow, but today you must starve while the Chinese
come with the money right away.
China's funding also can conveniently correlate with local
political cycles. The ability to secure financing quickly at
election times allows local politicians to promote themselves
to constituents as enablers of Chinese capital inflows.
Now, there are some undeniable positives for Western Balkan
countries from Chinese investment. For example, Chinese firms'
takeovers of a failing steel mill and the only copper mining
complex in Serbia arguably saved core elements of Serbia's
industrial capacity from collapse.
But China's investment and financing practices have
significant drawbacks for recipients. First, opacity is
inherent in the deals, and this is by design. Most of the
commercial contracts with Chinese entities are not available to
the public. Thus, there are no opportunities for screening or
for comment. It is also likely that Chinese policy banks insist
upon an opaque bidding process for projects and the ultimate
allocation of projects to Chinese state-owned enterprises, as
they do elsewhere all around the world. This lack of
transparency creates the potential for massive corruption,
inflated costs, and for Chinese lending to create unsustainable
debt burdens, as has occurred in Montenegro.
Through its economic deals in the region, China is gaining
political leverage in the non-EU countries in the 16 Plus 1
mechanism, or now the 17 Plus 1 initiated in 2012 to facilitate
Chinese engagement with Central and Eastern European countries.
China is also benefiting from and exacerbating
authoritarian trends in the region. The increasingly liberal
government in Serbia, for example, welcomes Chinese investment
as a boon to its political fortunes and uses its control over
the media to ensure a positive narrative about China. China, in
turn, is facilitating the country's authoritarian tilt by
bolstering the fortunes of leaders who use Chinese financing to
promote themselves as having delivered needed infrastructure
regardless of the secret financing terms involved.
The role of Chinese telecom and tech firms in the Serbian
market and in the country's surveillance ecosystem presents
another concern. The Serbian Interior Ministry has contracted
with Huawei to provide cameras and facial recognition software
for its Safe City project, with the planned installment of
1,000 cameras in 800 locations just in Belgrade. Such a
comprehensive facial recognition database has the potential to
deter Serbians from protesting their own government.
China's growing security ties in Serbia are also
concerning. Just last month, it was announced that officers
from China would join police patrols in certain Serbian cities.
The agreement, of course, is not public, so it is unclear
exactly what it entails, but such cooperation could import
authoritarian tactics used in China against protestors,
dissidents, and minorities. News this month that China will
sell armed drones to Serbia indicates the countries' security
ties will continue to grow.
How can the U.S. respond?
China will not change its approach unless recipient
countries demand it. Washington, therefore, should focus on
bolstering Western Balkan countries' resilience to the
potential malign effects of China's growing role. This can be
accomplished through two complementary efforts.
First, the United States, in partnership with European and
multilateral institutions, should offer Western Balkan nations
both more easily attainable alternatives to Chinese financing
and investment and technical assistance on project negotiation
and evaluation.
Second, the United States must dedicate resources to
bolstering the capacity of government officials, civil society,
political parties, and independent media. China offers better
deals when recipient countries have better governance. In the
Western Balkans in particular, local partners need greater
knowledge about the Chinese Communist Party and the ways it
exerts influence. Above all, transparency is critical,
permitting broader public debate about how to deal with China
in a way that benefits a country and protects its interests.
For our part, the International Republican Institute is
already working directly with partners in Serbia to shine a
spotlight on China's influence efforts and give them the tools
to protect their democracy, and IRI is set to expand such
efforts across the Western Balkans over the coming year.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Shullman follows:]
Prepared Statement by David Shullman
introduction
Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Peters, distinguished members of
this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Thank you, also, for organizing a hearing on this topic critical to
United States interests and the future of democratic governance in the
Western Balkans.
china's means of influence in developing countries
China's economic influence is growing in the Western Balkans,
saddling some countries with unsustainable debt and exacerbating
governance problems. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is
amassing potential political leverage and bolstering China-friendly
illiberal leaders, threatening to undermine democratic development and
pulling countries away from the United States and the European Union
(EU).
These effects are largely consistent with China's tactics and their
effects in developing countries around the world. I therefore would
like to begin my testimony today with a description of China's
expanding interests and influence efforts across the developing world,
and then turn to their application in the Western Balkans in
particular.
China for decades has gradually increased engagement with countries
throughout the developing world, seeking critical resource inputs and
new markets for its rapidly growing economy as well as portraying
itself as a leader of developing country interests on the global stage.
However, today, we see China pursuing an unprecedented level of
influence in developing countries, with decidedly mixed results for the
recipients of China's attention.
This uptick can be attributed to China's desire to advance an
expanding set of interests in the developing world. First, China is
trading and investing more in the developing world than ever before.
The overseas component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's
ambitious infrastructure and connectivity program, has significantly
expanded Beijing's investment footprint abroad despite its small size
relative to China's domestic economy.
There is an expectation of economic benefit for Chinese companies--
typically state-owned enterprises (SOEs)--and their workers engaging in
debt-financed BRI projects in numerous developing countries.
The CCP also seeks to legitimize its autocratic system of
governance and development. Chinese leaders recognize that Beijing must
expand its normative power abroad to achieve China's rise and
rejuvenation as a great power. They also recognize that to achieve
global legitimacy as a responsible great power without democratizing--a
prospect not welcomed by the developed West--they must first popularize
China's model in the developing world. \1\
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\1\ At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Chinese President
Xi Jinping left no doubt that he regards China's illiberal concepts of
political and economic order as superior to so-called Western models,
and that we are ``in an era that sees China moving closer to center
stage and making greater contributions to mankind.'' See Xinhua. ``Full
Text of Xi Jinping's Report at 19th CPC National Congress.''
ChinaDaily.com.cn, updated 4 Nov. 2017, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content--34115212.htm.
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Given these growing interests, it is not surprising that the CCP is
using multiple means of influence to advance them, in the process
undermining governance, prosperity and open discourse in a way that
encourages democratic backsliding in many countries.
I will focus my remarks on China's means of influence in two key
domains, the economic and the informational, and their impact on
democracies. I will then describe how China is using these tactics in
the Western Balkans in particular, examining the case of Serbia, and
conclude with some thoughts on how the United States can best counter
such influence.
Economic Influence
Much of China's growing global influence can be ascribed to its
leverage as a $14 trillion economy and the world's largest commodity
importer. Beijing is expanding trade and investment with countries
hungry for both. However, there are malign aspects to China's growing
economic engagement that render its influence harmful for many
developing countries. In most every case China's economic investments
involve opaque deals that ensure China lends and is repaid at a premium
to hire Chinese companies and workers for infrastructure and energy
projects. BRI projects frequently saddle countries with debt and few
alternatives to dependence on China to continue financing those debts.
This lack of transparency sets a foundation for rampant corruption.
Corruption and elite capture is not a ``bug'' of BRI but an inherent
feature of the initiative, with the goal of ensuring subsidized Chinese
SOEs undercut their competition and secure contracts with highly
favorable terms to carry out projects financed by Chinese policy banks.
The CCP cultivates ``friends'' among elites in many countries who are
only too willing to sign up to opaque investment deals that undermine
their country's long-term prosperity in return for personal enrichment.
Influence over Information
Such elite capture through corruption also facilitates the CCP's
ability to exert influence in a second area, the information space.
Beijing's foreign propaganda and censorship efforts have traditionally
focused on promoting China's political and economic system while
suppressing coverage of its domestic human rights abuses and religious
persecution. But the Chinese Government and its proxies increasingly
are attempting to tilt other countries' internal debates about their
relationships with China, including by suppressing criticism of Chinese
activities within their borders. Many governments, including our own,
engage in vigorous public diplomacy campaigns, but the CCP's methods
are frequently covert, coercive and harmful to democratic institutions.
China's manipulation of the information environment in countries
around the world, which the National Endowment for Democracy has termed
``sharp power,'' is critical to the Party's ability to protect its
growing investments and legitimize China's authoritarian development
model abroad. Ensuring the presentation of a positive ``China story,''
as Chinese President Xi Jinping has put it, helps to smooth the path
for investments that benefit China's economy. \2\
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\2\ Xinhua. ``President Xi Urges New Media Outlet to `Tell China
Stories Well.' '' CCTV.com, 31 Dec. 2016, english.cctv.com/2016/12/31/
ARTIdbvXHYpQnQ35nWBGttZg161231.shtml.
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The CCP recognizes that a more positive perception of China heads
off criticism of Chinese investments and corruption of a country's
elites. Through media cooperation agreements with BRI countries,
Beijing advances information sharing intended to influence foreign
journalists covering the BRI, including through conferences sponsored
by the state-affiliated All-China Journalists Association.
The CCP has a large and growing set of tools it uses to advance its
narrative abroad and to quiet critics, including pervasive but overt
official propaganda, investment in foreign media outlets, and funding
of research and academic institutions. The CCP's more aggressive use of
so-called ``united front work'' abroad includes more covert efforts to
cultivate China-friendly elites and squelch anti-China narratives by
``enemy forces'' abroad. These efforts are conducted through numerous
Party bodies, including the increasingly powerful United Front Work
Department (UFWD).
negative consequences for democracies
The CCP's use of these different means of influence simultaneously
has a pernicious effect on developing democracies. Beijing's
manipulation of the information space and discourse ensures the
neutering of institutions such as an independent media and civil
society which, in a healthy democracy, would expose the negative
consequences for a country of China's opaque deal making and corrupt
practices.
Beijing's influence plays a clear role in encouraging democratic
backsliding in certain Western Balkan countries, most notably Serbia.
\3\ China's efforts bolster the fortunes of illiberal actors eager to
take credit for delivering Chinese investment in much-needed
infrastructure projects, no matter the long-term costs of deals signed
behind closed doors. The Party also offers increasingly sophisticated
surveillance and monitoring technology to governments looking to
control their populations and is increasing cooperation on domestic
policing and security. \4\ Taken together, these activities lend
credence to illiberal actors' claims that they can deliver economic
development, security and stability through increasingly authoritarian
policies.
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\3\ Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism.
Freedom House, 2018, freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-
2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism#fotn18-section-china-remakes-the-
world-in-its-techno-dystopian-image.
\4\ This relates to the more fundamental question of whether and
how China is now proactively exporting authoritarianism to achieve
acceptance of the CCP's model of governance. See Friedberg, Alan F. The
Authoritarian Challenge: China, Russia and the Threat to the Liberal
International Order. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Aug. 2017,
www.spf.org/jpus-j/img/investigation/The--Authoritarian--Challenge.pdf;
Brands, Hal. ``China's Master Plan: Exporting an Ideology.'' Bloomberg,
11 June 2018, www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-11/china-s-
master-plan-exporting-an-ideology.
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China's influence tactics and their effects are remarkably diverse
across different countries, even those within the same region. For
example, Chinese financing and SOE practices are less consistent with
accepted international standards in countries with looser regulation
practices, public procurement rules and labor regulations.
Understanding the nature of CCP influence in a certain environment is
therefore critical to understanding the threat to a country and the
ways in which it can be mitigated. To that end, I will now offer a case
study on China's particular approach in Serbia.
case study: ccp influence efforts in serbia
Chinese leaders view the Western Balkans as a key door to Europe's
broader market, and Serbia as the geographic and strategic heart of
this critical region. Analysis of China's approach to influence in
Serbia is therefore uniquely instructive. \5\ China is investing
rapidly in Serbia, leveraging a close relationship with Serbia's
increasingly illiberal leadership. \6\
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\5\ Research on China's influence in Serbia was led by Vuk
Vuksanovic, a PhD researcher in international relations at the London
School of Economics, and is included in the International Republican
Institute's recent report on China's malign influence and the corrosion
of democracies around the world. See China's Malign Influence and the
Corrosion of Democracy: An Assessment of Chinese Interference in
Thirteen Key Countries, edited by David Shullman, International
Republican Institute, 2019, www.iri.org/sites/default/files/chinese--
malign--influence--report.pdf.
\6\ Serbia's minister of infrastructure recently lauded the
country's receipt of $5.6 billion in new investment financing from
China while promising a new influx of funds. See Vasovic, Aleksandar.
``Serbia Wants Billions in Foreign Loans to Invest in Infrastructure.''
Reuters, 12 July 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-investment-
china/serbia-wants-billions-in-foreign-loans-to-invest-in-
infrastructure-minister-idUSKCN1U71VG.
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The CCP leadership views the current governance in Serbia as
presenting an ideal opportunity to enhance China's influence. The
Serbian Government, led by President Aleksandar Vucic, welcomes Chinese
investment as a boon to its political fortunes and controls the media
narrative about the bilateral relationship. Vucic and his Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS) increasingly control government agencies, the
national security apparatus and the media.
The CCP also benefits from the fact that it, and China generally,
remains little understood in Serbia. The public maintains a mostly
positive view of China, based on Chinese investment in Serbia's
development and a lack of knowledge about the opaque terms of such
deals. The public also is largely uninformed about the CCP and how it
exerts influence abroad.
Rapidly Increasing Economic Influence
China's economic engagement with Serbia has grown steadily in
response to Serbia's dire need for financing and infrastructure
improvement and China's drive for strategic investments in the Balkans.
China's engagement with Serbia was limited before 2009, when the two
countries signed a strategic partnership agreement. The relationship
transformed beginning in the mid-2010s, when Serbia began receiving
significant Chinese financing for infrastructure projects. The Export-
Import Bank of China financed the construction of the Pupin Bridge
across the Danube River in Belgrade.
China's BRI ushered in a major influx of Chinese financing in
Serbia, particularly following Xi's historic visit to Serbia in June
2016. Chinese companies now play a significant role in Serbia's
industrial sector, having taken over or acquired significant stakes in
major steel and copper complexes. \7\ One opposition politician has
claimed that ``the entire Serbian mining industry was sold to the
Chinese for free.'' \8\
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\7\ China's Hesteel Group took over a steel mill based in the city
of Smederevo that was previously owned by U.S. Steel. In August 2018,
the Chinese mining company Zijin Mining acquired a 63 percent stake in
debt-ridden RTB Bor, the only copper mining complex in Serbia. See
Sekularac, Ivana. ``China's Xi Sees Serbia as Milestone on New `Silk
Road.' '' Reuters, 19 June 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-
china/chinas-xi-sees-serbia-as-milestone-on-new-silk-road-
idUSKCN0Z50DV; Vasovic, Aleksandar. ``UPDATE 1--China's Zijin Mining to
Take Stake in Serbian Copper Complex.'' Reuters, 31 Aug. 2018,
www.reuters.com/article/serbia-copper/update-1-chinas-zijin-mining-to-
take-stake-in-serbian-copper-complex-idUSL8N1VM2K6.
\8\ China's Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy.
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In September 2018, Vucic met Xi at the World Economic Forum in
Beijing (their fifth meeting in as many years) to sign commercial
agreements worth $3 billion, including a deal for the purchase of
Chinese military drones by Serbia. \9\ Chinese Government and SOE
engagement with Serbia has raised hopes of improved local
infrastructure and employment opportunities. However, the opacity of
these deals has raised concerns among private enterprise, civil society
and others that Chinese lending could create unmanageable debt loads
and future Chinese leverage over the country.
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\9\ Zivanovic, Maya. ``$3bn Economic Agreements Boost China's Role
in Serbia.'' BIRN, Balkan Insight, 18 Sept. 2018, balkaninsight.com/
2018/09/18/new-agreements-boost-china-role-in-serbia-09-18-2018/.
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Most of the commercial contracts with Chinese entities are not
available to the public, with little opportunity for public review and
comment. \10\ According to a local businessman who has worked on
projects involving Chinese SOEs, Chinese officials in some cases insist
upon a nontransparent bidding process for projects and the ultimate
allocation of projects to Chinese SOEs. Unlike in many other BRI
countries, Chinese SOEs in Serbia have not insisted on using only
construction material imported from China, probably due in part to
Serbian Government conditions. \11\ However, Chinese SOEs have employed
predominantly Chinese machinery and workers, reducing the benefits of
projects to local employment and the economy.
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\10\ Vladisavljev, Stefan. ``Oversight and Control of Agreements,
between China and Serbia.'' BFPE, 6 Nov. 2018, en.bfpe.org/oversight-
and-control-of-agreements-between-china-and-serbia/.
\11\ For instance, the contract for the construction of the Pupin
Bridge mandated that 45 percent of the construction material originate
from Serbia. See www.beograd.rs/index.php
?kat=beoinfo&lang=cir&sub=1363983%3f (in Serbian).
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The most prominent Chinese project in Serbia is the high-speed
railway connecting Belgrade with Budapest, Hungary, inked in 2013.
However, little progress has been made on implementation, raising
questions about the project's utility and feasibility. The railway
nevertheless has been touted as ``the signature project of the 16+1
framework,'' a grouping established by China to facilitate engagement
between itself and Central and Eastern European countries, including
Serbia, and increase its influence across the region. \12\
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\12\ Ferchen, Matt. ``China's Troubled Hungary-Serbia Railway
Project: A Case Study.'' Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 12
Dec. 2018, carnegietsinghua.org/2018/12/12/china-s-troubled-hungary-
serbia-railway-project-case-study-pub-78100.
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Serbian demand for infrastructure financing from China is
reinforced by delays in Serbia's progress toward EU accession. China
also gains relative advantage in Serbia because Chinese funding, unlike
that from the EU, is disbursed quickly. As one local businessman with a
history of engagement with Chinese SOEs argued, Serbia's economic
urgency plays into China's hands: ``The EU is telling Serbia you will
have something tomorrow, but today you must starve, while the Chinese
come with the money right away.'' \13\
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\13\ China's Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy.
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China's ability to ensure such funding correlates with Serbian
political cycles offers opportunities for corruption and enhances
China's influence with elites. \14\ Serbian politicians able to secure
Chinese financing around election time can promote themselves to their
constituents as enablers of Chinese capital inflows. Many of those same
politicians and elites find the lack of transparency in Chinese funding
appealing, creating rent-seeking opportunities.
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\14\ Makocki, Michal. ``China in the Balkans: The Battle of
Principles.'' European Council on Foreign Relations, 6 July 2017,
www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary--china--in--the--balkans--the--battle--
of--principles--7210.
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Thriving in a Controlled Media Space
The CCP goes to great lengths in many countries to shape the
information space to ensure a positive view of China's engagement. In
today's Vucic-led Serbia, however, China has not needed to aggressively
influence debate about its impact on Serbia. This is because China's
activities are perceived as largely benign by the Serbian public, and
the government--led by Vucic, who has called the friendship with China
one ``made of steel''--ensures this positive view of China through its
control over the information and media sphere. \15\
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\15\ ``Vucic: Serbia-China Friendship Made of Steel.'' B92, 12 Mar.
2018, www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=03&dd=12&nav--
id=103685.
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Government-friendly media does not report news that critically
examines China's role in the country. The Serbian media, echoing the
country's political leadership, typically (and incorrectly) presents
Chinese financing as ``gifts,'' not loans. Consequently, China can rest
assured that under the Vucic administration relatively little critical
information on Chinese activities will surface in outlets that
influence Serbian public opinion. \16\
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\16\ Those programs that do appear on Serbian media concerning
China are typically overwhelmingly positive. In 2017, the national
broadcaster Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) ran a series of Chinese
Government-produced television documentaries on China, including one on
the Silk Road. See www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/rtspredstavlja/story/267/
najnovije/2919597/najbolji-kineski-dokumentarci---utorkom-na-
drugom.html (in Serbian).
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The CCP has sought to further enhance this positive view by
cultivating ties with cultural and political elites (including the
political opposition) and establishing institutions that could help
shape the narrative about China in the future. China supports the
Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD),
a think tank led by a former Serbian foreign minister and opposition
politician Vuk Jeremic, which holds events and releases publications
about the benefits of BRI and the expanding China-Serbia relationship.
CIRSD is partly funded through CEFC China Energy, a CCP-linked
conglomerate marred in corruption scandals. \17\
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\17\ Briefing Paper IV: External Influence in the Cultural &
Religious Sphere. Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Non-
Democratic External Influence Activities, www.balkan crossroads.com/bp-
iv-culture-religion; Zhang, Shu and Chen Aizhu. ``China CEFC Founder Ye
Named in Corruption Case--State Media.'' Reuters, 12 Oct. 2018,
www.reuters.com/article/china-corruption-cefc/chinas-cefc-founder-ye-
named-in-corruption-case-state-media-idUSL4N1WS26I.
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Additionally, Serbia hosts two Chinese Government-sponsored
Confucius Institutes promoting Chinese culture--and official government
viewpoints--at prominent universities in Serbia, and China is investing
45 million euros to build a cultural center on the site of the Chinese
Embassy building destroyed during the NATO air campaign in 1999. \18\
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\18\ Xinhua News Agency. ``Confucius Institute in Belgrade, Serbia,
Celebrates Its 10th Anniversary of Establishment.'' Hanban, 25 Oct.
2016, english.hanban.org/article/2016-10/25/content--661564.htm.
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Benefiting from--and Exacerbating--Authoritarian Trends
The authoritarian tilt of Serbian politics, characterized by
Vucic's growing domination of the political scene and its institutions
since 2012, has facilitated China's integration into the Serbian
economic and political landscape. Vucic and SNS Government control
allows for one point of focus for Chinese SOEs' and government lobbying
resources. Serbia's ``soft autocracy'' provides few roadblocks to
Chinese influence, with very few institutional or societal checks on
China's influence or insistence on greater transparency in negotiations
with Serbian officials. The lack of Serbian expertise in both academic
and policy circles on China and the CCP's means of influence ensure
limited public debate about the risks of opaque Chinese investment
deals and growing coziness with the ruling government.
China's influence, in turn, has facilitated Serbia's tilt toward
soft authoritarianism by bolstering the fortunes of illiberal Serbian
leaders who use the influx of Chinese investment to promote themselves
domestically as those who can deliver needed infrastructure
development.
The growing role of Chinese technology firms in Serbia,
particularly in the country's surveillance ecosystem, presents another
avenue of potential CCP influence in the country and a means of
bolstering government control over the Serbian populace. Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei has a cooperation contract with Serbian
telecommunications company Telekom Srbija, and the Serbian Government
has signed a contract that would allow Huawei equipment to be used for
traffic surveillance. \19\
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\19\ ``Serbia and China Sign Several Important Documents.'' B92, 18
Sept. 2018, www.b92.net/eng/news/
business.php?yyyy=2018&mm=09&dd=18&nav--id=105087.
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The Serbian Interior Ministry has contracted with Huawei to provide
cameras and facial recognition software for its ``Safe City'' project
and announced the planned installment of a thousand cameras in 800
locations in Belgrade. \20\ The Ministry did not, however, explicitly
cite Huawei as a supplier, possibly to avoid attention given the
sensitivity surrounding the company and its ties to the Chinese
Government. \21\
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\20\ China's Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy.
\21\ China's Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy.
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China's growing security ties to Serbia also have the potential to
exacerbate authoritarian trends. In August 2019, Serbia's Interior
Minister announced that officers from China would join police patrols
in certain Serbian cities, ostensibly in an effort to help Serbian
police officers in their interactions with growing numbers of Chinese
workers and tourists. \22\ It is impossible at this point to know
exactly what the agreement entails because it is not available to the
public--a troubling indicator by itself. This police-to-police
cooperation nevertheless could import authoritarian tactics used in
China against protesters, political dissidents, and ethnic and
religious minorities to Serbia and other countries in the region.
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\22\ The visa regime between Serbia and China was liberalized in
2017, contributing to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese
tourists. See ``Visa Regime for Entering Serbia.'' Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, mfa.gov.rs/en/consular-affairs/
entry-serbia/visa-regime/81-consular-foreigners-to-serbia/11411-china-
for-cons.
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The CCP's increasingly tight relationship with the current Serbian
Government points toward potentially negative consequences for Serbia's
increasingly fragile democracy. The SNS-led government appears inclined
to pursue even closer ties with China. In 2017, the Serbian Government
established the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with
the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, led by a
former Serbian president. This new government office may represent yet
another channel of potential influence for the CCP going forward.
recommendations for countering china's malign influence
Despite China's growing influence in Serbia and the Western Balkans
generally, a nascent but increasing awareness of the risks of
expanding, under-scrutinized economic deals with Chinese entities and
CCP cultivation of elites provide a foundation for resilience to
China's influence. Greater knowledge of China's influence tactics and
the capacity to counter them across civil society and independent media
in Western Balkan nations is critical to better protect the region's
democracies.
The CCP's approach will not change unless it sees fewer benefits to
aggressively acquiring influence in developing countries. Chinese
officials and companies take a harder line in countries where
governance, transparency and the rule of law are lacking. On the other
hand, there are increasing indicators that China moderates its
influence efforts in the face of pushback by recipient governments.
The United States and its partners therefore must invest resources
in inoculating targeted countries against the malign effects of China's
influence. This can be accomplished through two complementary efforts:
1) offering countries alternatives to Chinese investment and assistance
on how to negotiate and structure future deals with China; and 2)
building the resilience of developing democracies to the malign effects
of CCP influence.
First, the United States and partners in Europe should offer
Western Balkan countries both alternatives to China's investment and
financing practices and technical assistance on project evaluation and
negotiation. The administration and Congress have taken some important
steps, including the passage of the Better Utilization of Investments
Leading to Development (BUILD) Act creating the new U.S. Development
Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC must not be viewed as directly
competing with a massive state-financed infrastructure initiative like
the BRI. Instead, through targeted support for private enterprise in
critical countries limited in their financing choices, the United
States can help establish higher common standards for transparency and
sustainability that both regional government officials and their
publics may increasingly demand over time.
The United States should work closely with likeminded partners and
allies to offer such training and alternatives. Wherever possible, the
United States should work with multilateral development banks and
partners such as the EU to offer infrastructure alternatives to
developing countries.
Second, the United States must dedicate resources to bolstering the
capacity of civil society, political parties and independent media in
developing countries. These democratic institutions are critical to
recipient countries' ability to monitor and evaluate Chinese project
implementation practices, expose and prevent instances of elite
capture, and promote the rule of law. Transparency and investigative
journalism are essential to ensuring the resilience of recipients of
Chinese financing, particularly in countries with leaders happy to
conclude deals behind closed doors.
The availability of accurate information permits broad public
debate about how to engage China amongst business, civil society,
government officials and local communities affected by infrastructure
projects. In so doing, national interests are protected and equitable
benefits assured across a society.
In addition, host governments at the central and local level should
be encouraged to build greater transparency into economic deals with
China. Washington should prioritize assistance for government and
nongovernment actors in Western Balkan countries like Montenegro that
are deemed particularly vulnerable to CCP influence as a result of
significant debt owed to China.
The United States should also work with its country partners to
raise awareness of CCP influence efforts in think tanks, universities,
NGOs and media where impartial expertise on China and the nature of the
Party and its tactics is lacking.
None of these efforts to counter the malign aspects of China's
influence in the Western Balkans will be easy or achievable without a
sustained U.S. dedication to working with and assisting fragile
democracies across the region. There is no alternative, however, if
Washington hopes to prevent the spread of authoritarianism in the
region and preserve the region's ties to the democratic West. The
United States must recommit to the hard work of defending democracy
around the world.
Senator Ernst. Finally, Mr. Bugajski. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Ernst, Ranking
Member Peters, and all members of the subcommittee.
I must commend the committee on the timing of this hearing.
There are a lot of anniversaries this year, but today is the
80th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in alliance
with Hitler's Germany to carve up central Eastern Europe. And
80 years later, Vladimir Putin's Russia is still carving. One
of its targets, as we are speaking today, is the Balkan
Peninsula. For Moscow, Southeast Europe provides an opportunity
to undermine Western unity and extend Russia's influences.
China, as we have heard, is also pursuing a strategy of
influence expansion by exploiting Balkan volatility, poor
economic performance, and limited Western integration. While
Russia remains the main near-term adversary of the West, China
is developing into a more formidable long-term threat. Russia
is a revisionist aggressor, but its capabilities will decline
in the midst of economic stagnation and a potential succession
crisis. In contrast, China is a steadily growing global
competitor with a strong economy and a more durable strategy
designed to surpass Europe and America.
At present, China and Russia are strategic partners intent
on weakening Western cohesion, and Beijing benefits from
Moscow's disruptive actions that distract the United States
from China's ascendancy, while Chinese economic leverage can
undermine NATO's collective response to Russia's attacks.
Moscow's strategic objective is to reverse the
transformations of the post-Cold War era during which it
forfeited its regional predominance. A key element of Russia's
strategy is to expand what they call a Eurasian pole of power
to ensure primary influence in neighboring states and in
regions where Russia has been historically active. It seeks to
weaken NATO, divide the EU, and split the United States from
its European allies. As we have heard, it deploys a broad
arsenal of political, financial, economic, and informational
tools to achieve its objectives.
The Balkan Peninsula is NATO's internal frontier. The
Kremlin views the Western Balkans as Europe's weakest flank
where competition with the U.S. can be intensified, conflicts
manipulated, new allies found, and economic opportunities
exploited. Let me just outline five main inroads that Russia
has in the region. I developed this in the actual testimony I
submitted.
One, promoting local nationalism to undermine support for
NATO and to stir conflicts between rival nationalist projects.
Two, corrupting politicians and businessmen to enable
greater state penetration.
Three, leveraging energy dependence to gain economic and
political advantages.
Four, conducting propaganda offenses through local media
and social networks to enhance Russia's position and undermine
Western institutions.
And five, forging inter-societal ties that increase
Moscow's influence. These include Orthodox churches, political
parties, cultural organizations, and so forth.
Beijing has three main goals in Southeast Europe. We have
heard this. Let me just reiterate.
Expanding China's economic reach through its Belt and Road
Initiative. Here the Balkan Peninsula is a focal point for
maritime and overland routes into Europe. Balkan Governments
welcome investments that rescue declining industries, but then
become vulnerable to predatory lending and the surrender of
national infrastructure.
Two, turning economic penetration into political influence.
In exchange for financial investment, Beijing seeks diplomatic
support for its policies or to neutralize criticisms of its
policies in international institutions.
And three, diminishing United States and EU influence.
China and Russia have developed convergence in such areas as
anti-democracy promotion, diplomatic offensives, and
disinformation campaigns.
Regarding flashpoints--we can talk about this a little bit
more maybe in questions and answers, but the deadlock in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, obviously, and the standoff between Serbia
and Kosovo. Those are the two main areas we should be looking
at. If the crises escalate, this could pull in neighboring
countries. I will not talk too much about this at the moment.
But let me just finish with U.S. national interests. What
are our interests? I would say this:
An unstable and conflictive Balkans undermines United
States national security, and a diplomatic retreat
would be viewed as a major American defeat. If you
remember, we have invested over the past 20 to 30 years
enormous diplomatic, political, and military capital in
the region. For us to sustain any sort of major defeat,
a new war particularly in Bosnia or between Kosovo and
Serbia, would be a major disaster. Russia and China
would not only gain from this, but they would also use
that new momentum to subvert other European states.
To prevent this, Washington must focus on four objectives
in Southeast Europe. I will be very quick, my last points.
One, reinforcing security by including the entire peninsula
inside NATO. I do believe eventually Serbia itself will want to
be a member.
Two, resolving the Kosovo-Serbia and inter-Bosnian disputes
that we can talk about in more detail.
Three, containing China, as we have heard, limiting its
investment and increasing ours.
And four, reversing Russia's influences throughout Europe.
I have submitted to the committee a recent report I
published for the Baltic Defense University on conducting an
extensive strategic offensive against Moscow rather than simply
playing a static defense. It is entitled ``Winning the Shadow
War with Russia,'' (please see Appendix A).
Last point. Moscow's subversion of the Balkans in the wider
Europe is not simply malign, as I often hear. It is
destabilizing and it is very dangerous.
I will stop there. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Janusz Bugajski
russia and china fomenting instability in southeast europe and
undermining united states national interests
Chairman Joni Ernst, Ranking Member Gary Peters, and members of the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today about the escalating threats from
Russia and China in Southeastern Europe.
I must commend the committee on the timing of this hearing. Today
is the 80th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in an alliance
with Hitler's Germany to carve up Central-Eastern Europe. 80 years
later Vladimir Putin's Russia is still carving and one of its targets
is the Balkan peninsula. For Moscow, southeastern Europe provide an
opportunity to undermine Western unity and extend Russia's influence.
China is also pursuing a strategy of expansion by exploiting Balkan
volatility, poor economic performance, and limited Western integration.
While Russia remains the main near-term adversary of the West,
China is developing into a more formidable long-term threat. Russia is
a revisionist aggressor trying to subvert the trans-Atlantic world but
its capabilities will decline in the midst of internal turmoil and a
looming succession crisis. In contrast, China is a steadily growing
global competitor with a strong economy and a durable strategy designed
to surpass Europe and America.
russia-china anti-western axis
1. China and Russia are strategic partners intent on weakening
Western cohesion. Beijing benefits from Moscow's disruptive actions
that distract the United States from China's ascendancy, and Chinese
economic leverage can undermine NATO's collective response to a Russian
attack. In a worst-case scenario, both states may coordinate a
simultaneous military offensive against neighbors--for instance,
Ukraine and Taiwan respectively--calculating that this would disperse
and dilute America's reaction.
2. Although predatory powers such as Russia and China may
cooperate against a third party they are always mindful of competition
and encroachment on each other's domains. This can turn partners into
rivals, especially where the weaker party becomes economically or
militarily dependent. Russia's capabilities will diminish and China
will present a major threat to Moscow's Eurasian aspirations by
reorienting Central Asia away from its orbit and challenging Russia's
territorial integrity in Siberia and the Pacific Coast where the
Chinese population is growing.
3. Washington should not be distracted by China's rising ambitions
by failing to tackle Russia's current shadow war against Western
integrity. To secure its national security and defend its allies and
partners, the United States needs to develop a strategy of leverage
that promotes discord and division between Russia and China, its two
major adversaries. A strategy of ``divide and rule'' is long overdue in
American foreign policy.
russia's strategy and objectives
1. Moscow's broad strategic objective is to reverse the
transformations of the post-Cold War era during which Russia lost its
satellites, forfeited its regional predominance, and relinquished its
global role. A key element of Russia's strategy is to expand a Eurasian
``pole of power'' to ensure its primary influence in neighboring states
and in regions where it was historically active.
2. Moscow's strategic objective necessitates weakening NATO's
security posture throughout Europe, dividing and fracturing the
European Union, splitting the United States from its European allies,
and eroding America's global influence by undermining its political
system and discrediting its leadership role.
3. To compensate for its military and economic weakness vis-a-vis
the West, Moscow deploys a broad arsenal of political, financial,
economic, and informational tools to achieve its objectives. It
systematically capitalizes on Western vulnerabilities, whether through
cyber attacks, disinformation, corruption, blackmail, social
disruption, or other ``soft power'' weapons.
russia's offensives in the western balkans
The Balkan peninsula is NATO's internal frontier where Moscow can
challenge United States and European interests and project its Eurasian
agenda. The Kremlin views the Western Balkans as Europe's weakest flank
and a subversion zone where competition with NATO and the United States
can be increased, latent conflicts manipulated, potential new allies
found, and economic opportunities exploited. Russia pursues five main
inroads in the region.
1. Promoting local nationalisms to undermine support for NATO, the
United States and the EU, to mobilize backing for Moscow, and to stir
conflicts between rival nationalist projects enabling the Kremlin to
offer targeted assistance.
2. Corrupting national politicians and local businessmen to favor
Russian economic interests, enable greater societal penetration, to
support Moscow's foreign agenda, and oppose Western policies such as
sanctions against Russia.
3. Fostering energy dependence by tying Balkan countries into gas
projects controlled by Gazprom, and buying into local pipelines,
refineries, and other energy facilities. Energy dependence is exploited
to gain diplomatic and political leverage. Other economic sectors where
Moscow seeks influence include metallurgy, arms supplies, banking, and
real estate.
4. Launching propaganda offensives through local media, internet,
and social networks to enhance Russia's position and undermine Western
institutions. Various messages are intended to appeal either to anti-
globalist, Euro-skeptic, and anti-American sentiments or to ultra-
conservative and religious orthodox constituencies in which Russia
poses as the defender of traditional values and the EU and United
States are depicted as immoral and deviant.
5. Forging numerous inter-societal connections that increase
Moscow's political influences. These include Orthodox Churches,
political parties, cultural organizations, historical societies, sports
clubs, and lifestyle groups, including bikers clubs, gun lobbies, and
paramilitary survivalist groups.
The Kremlin benefits from frozen conflicts and frozen states. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina it encourages the Serbian entity to keep the country
divided and question its future as a single state. In Kosova, Russian
officials claim the Serbian population is repressed in order to
undermine Kosova's independence and raise the specter of partition.
Kosova is blocked from entering the UN, primarily by Russia's
opposition. Unresolved conflicts and disputed states enable the Kremlin
to claim that NATO has failed to stabilize the region and slow down
West Balkan progress toward EU integration. This benefits Moscow by
forestalling the implementation of the Union's legal standards and
facilitating the corruption of national leaders.
The promotion of Balkan instability distracts attention from
Moscow's offensives elsewhere. Intensifying disputes can preoccupy
Western diplomacy and give the Kremlin a freer hand to pursue its neo-
imperial objectives in the former Soviet Union. However, Moscow has
also suffered several significant Balkan defeats, including Kosova's
independence, Montenegro's NATO membership, the resolution of the
Macedonian-Greek dispute, and North Macedonia's pending entry into
NATO. Much of this progress is driven by a consistent U.S. policy to
bring the entire peninsula into a secure Western alliance.
china's penetration of southeast europe
The Chinese regime has no design to capture territory or impose its
system of government on states outside its immediate sphere of
influence. Instead, it has three main goals as demonstrated in its
policy toward southeast Europe.
1. Expanding China's economic reach to affect global standards for
trade and investment that favor Beijing over its competitors. Beijing's
Belt and Road Initiative linking China with Europe envisages the Balkan
Peninsula as a focal point for maritime and overland routes into
Europe. Chinese companies purchase cargo terminals and finance roads
and railways throughout southeast Europe. Its investments ignore EU
procurement regulations and its loans and export credits are debt traps
often tied to the employment of Chinese companies and labor. Although
Balkan Governments welcome investments that rescue declining
industries, they are vulnerable to predatory lending and the surrender
of national infrastructure.
2. Leveraging economic penetration into political influence. In
exchange for financial investments, Beijing seeks Balkan diplomatic
support for its policies or muted criticism in international
institutions. Its investments in the Greek port of Piraeus help ensure
that Athens dilutes EU condemnations of China's human rights record and
its ambitions in the South China Sea. This formula is repeated across
Europe with Beijing aiming to divide Europe from the U.S. and prevent
the emergence of an anti-China front.
3. Diminishing United States influence and undercutting EU
enlargement. China and Russia have developed significant convergence in
such areas as anti-democracy promotion, diplomatic offensives, and
disinformation campaigns. China's ambitions are also evident in
expanding intelligence activities and cyber hacking.
balkan flashpoints
Several flashpoints in the Western Balkans could precipitate a
wider crisis and are fuelled by a number of destabilizing factors.
1. Danger that the deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina may spiral into
a more menacing conflict. Bosnia's status quo is not indefinite and the
ingredients are present for another violent implosion. There is no
functioning central government between election cycles, the Serbian
entity threatens to secede, Croat nationalists are demanding a third
entity, and Bosniaks are caught frustrated in the middle as the economy
stagnates. In one scenario, Bosnian Serb leaders may reject key reforms
that stitch the country together, withdraw representatives from the
central government, and announce a referendum on independence. Such
moves could trigger renewed violence.
2. The Kosova-Serbia dialogue has stalemated and a process of
normalization is needed that can lead to bilateral recognition. If the
current standoff is not resolved it may encourage nationalist and
irredentist forces on both sides. Belgrade and Prishtina should take
steps to de-escalate their disputes. For instance, Prishtina can lift
its tariffs against Serbia and Belgrade can lift its blockage of Kosova
in entering international institutions. The question of territorial
exchanges can contribute to domestic and inter-state disputes if its
feasibility is not openly debated. The new United States Special
Representative can reinvigorate the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue, but he
will face stiff local resistance, weak EU leadership, and Russian
sabotage.
3. The region confronts persistent corroding influences, including
corruption, clientalism, and partisan polarization. These are flawed
democracies, whereby a party that wins elections gains control of all
institutions and unmonitored access to state funds that benefit party
loyalists. Youth unemployment and out-migration remains high and public
frustration with corrupt and incompetent governments is rising.
Conversely, economic growth is contingent on political legitimacy, the
rule of law, social stability, and investor confidence, all of which
are lacking in much of the region.
4. Blockage in EU membership contributes to regional instability.
EU entry is widely supported because of the benefits it bestows,
including accession funds and investments. Although several states are
EU candidates, the Union has decided on a prolonged pause in its Balkan
enlargement. The six aspirant states confront an indefinite limbo that
can discourage reform, stimulate EU skepticism, and boost nationalist
sentiments. This in turn would provide ammunition for EU politicians
who oppose further expansion.
5. Moscow continues to undermine regional stability and prevent
Western integration. Russian diplomats, local agents, and
disinformation activists can engage in various provocations,
conspiracies, and influence operations. They will encourage
intransigence in Belgrade and Bosnia's Serb entity and probe for new
opportunities to create mayhem and test Washington's resolve.
impact on u.s. policy
An unstable and conflictive Balkans undermines United States
national interests and NATO's future as a provider of collective
security. Washington has invested substantial diplomatic, economic, and
military capital in the region and has registered major success in
ending two wars, building legitimate states, and including new allies
in NATO. A diplomatic retreat would be viewed as a major American
defeat and could pull the West into another violent conflict in the
years ahead. Russia and China would capitalize on any United States
failures and gain fresh momentum to subvert other European states. The
U.S. National Defense Strategy specifies that strengthening America's
alliances and attracting new partners is crucial for an effective
strategy. By working with allies and partners Washington can focus on
four objectives in southeast Europe:
1. Reinforcing security by assimilating the entire peninsula
inside NATO, including North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and
Serbia. Serbian leaders and military officers will eventually calculate
that NATO is the most effective force to enhance Serbia's military
modernization.
2. Resolving the Kosova-Serbia and intra-Bosnian disputes through
intense negotiations and the offer of concrete incentives and
disincentives. The appointment of a U.S. Special Representative is an
important step forward, as long as he has the authority to make key
decisions.
3. Containing China by implementing policies that limit Chinese
investments but without damaging the economic development of affected
countries. Western competiveness in foreign markets needs to be boosted
and alternative sources of infrastructure financing made available.
China's investments must be made more transparent, adhere to
international standards, and not push governments into becoming
indentured debtors.
4. Reversing Russia's influences in Europe through an intensive
and extensive strategic offensive. Moscow's presence is not simply
malign, but destabilizing and dangerous. I am submitting to the
committee a recent report I published with the Baltic Defense
University on conducting a multi-pronged offensive against Moscow
rather than simply playing a static defense. Entitled ``Winning the
Shadow War with Russia'' it details six major arenas: Exposing
Influence Operations; Countering Informational Offensives; Cyber
Defense and Counter-Attack; Economic and Financial Penalties; Military
and Security Instruments; and Managing Russia's Dissolution.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much to our witnesses.
Many of you did mention Russia's disruptive actions in the
Balkans, but we really would like to shed some more light on
what China has been up to. I will start with my line of
questioning there.
Dr. Shullman, what are China's political and security
objectives in the Western Balkans?
Dr. Shullman. China's political and security objectives in
the Western Balkans can be seen as kind of a subset of China's
broader goals in Europe. Some of these have already been
covered, but I would say: First is to ensure that there is a
wedge overall in the transatlantic alliance and that there is
not a unified European and American approach to China, which
serves China's interests long-term, whether it is on issues
such as trade and economics, whether it is on technological
issues, or whether it is on human rights. That is the first.
Secondly, there is a goal on the part of the Chinese
leadership to peel off individual countries as it comes to
Chinese core interest issues, such as the South China Sea, such
as what happens at the UN Human Rights Council, whether that is
individual countries representing themselves or to prevent
there from being a unified European approach, as happened with
Greece, as has happened with Hungary, given Chinese influence
in those countries.
Lastly, I think I should just underline that there really
is a normative aspect to this. China is globally trying to
legitimize its rise as a great power under a Leninist political
system, and at the heart of this, they need to break down the
assumption that there needs to be a connection between
democracy and development. The Chinese have been going around
now--Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Chinese Party Congress in
October was very explicit about the fact that there should be
an acceptance of the authoritarian path to development. If
there is not a unified European and United States response to
this, if there is acceptance in countries in the Western
Balkans and other developing nations within Europe of the
Chinese mode of development, that gets China a long ways
towards its goals.
Senator Ernst. Can you talk about some of those strategies
as well? What tools and techniques is China using then to drive
that wedge between some of these countries to peel them off?
What would you say some of those are?
Dr. Shullman. I have not seen in my research evidence yet
of the fact that China is using the massive amounts of economic
leverage that it has now built up in some of these countries,
Serbia being one, Montenegro being one, potentially also
Bosnia, to use that to achieve political goals against what the
EU intends or what the United States intends. But the ability
is there. I think the fact that we see in a country like Serbia
China bolstering the leadership and bolstering its illiberal
trends is an indication that China has goals that tend to peel
these countries away from the democratic West.
I would say too, some of the tactics that China is using in
the information domain in other countries around the developing
world they do not have to use in some of these countries
because they are basically pushing on an open door. In a
country like Serbia, which as I mentioned in my remarks, the
leadership controls the information space, China does not need
to use what the National Endowment for Democracy has termed
``sharp power'' because the leadership is doing it for it. This
is the case in Bosnia and, I would argue, in a couple other
countries as well.
That does not mean that they are not building up the
potential to use that. We have seen China cultivating friends
throughout--to use Serbia again--Serbian research institutions,
funding them, also using, potentially, corruption to achieve
elite capture in some of these countries and ensure that when
decisions are made, they will go in China's direction.
There are some of these tools that they have the potential
to use but which they have not had to use generally in the
Western Balkans as they have in Asia, Africa, and other places.
Senator Ernst. Right. Certainly.
Mr. Wilson, as we are looking at the DOD's China Military
Power report for 2019, they warned that China's advancement of
projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, will probably
drive military overseas basing through a perceived need to
provide security for those projects.
Should the United States be concerned about security
implications of Chinese infrastructure in the Western Balkans?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, I think we should be. I think we have seen
this trend develop first closer to China, as we saw in the
Indo-Pacific region in South Asia, continuing along the Horn of
Africa, as we saw in Djibouti as well. We have seen the
infrastructure of Belt and Road be followed by an
infrastructure supported through military support for that.
We have seen the investments that China has made in Europe,
whether it is in the Balkans or as far north as the Nordics in
port facilities. We have also noticed at times very concerning
strategic decisions of the Chinese to secure locations that
provide proximity to United States forces, oversight of United
States forces, whether it has been in Djibouti or in the north
of Europe.
I think part of what we are facing is a long game, a long-
term game by Beijing that is, first, looking at how to
neutralize European hostility to Chinese interests, whether
Taiwan or human rights, to over time begin to split Europe from
the United States in any potential confrontation we may have
and I think, as Dr. Shullman said, ultimately to help make the
world safe for autocracy and kleptocracy. They lead with the
economic side, and we have seen a track record of following
through with military infrastructure to support that.
Senator Ernst. Right. Thank you.
My time has expired. We will probably do several rounds
here, but at this time, we will go to Senator Peters for his
questioning.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Shullman, I want to pick up on something that you
mentioned in your opening comments and talk about how China
wants to support illiberal governments and authoritarian type
governments that may exist in these fragile democracies.
One area that I have always been particularly concerned
about is the advance of technology and technology to provide
surveillance. You mentioned the Safe City initiative, the
ability for governments now to perhaps exercise influence,
malign influence, over their populations through the use of
technology, through social media, through cyber techniques, but
particularly the Safe City which is going to have facial
recognition opportunities, to be able to see where the people
are. You mentioned that people may be afraid to protest the
government to exercise basic government freedoms.
Expand on how you see the use of this type of technology to
undermine Western liberal type principles in these countries,
and what is it that you are most concerned about?
Dr. Shullman. Thank you for that question.
What we have seen globally but also obviously now in Serbia
and other countries in the Western Balkans is a dynamic where
China is trying to export surveillance tools. It is also
sharing these kind of tactics that come with the Huawei Safe
Cities program, which advances surveillance capabilities. Part
and parcel of that in many countries is also training on
cybersecurity in the Chinese fashion, in addition to ensuring
that countries are trained on how to use the surveillance
technology to enable them to best control their populaces.
In a lot of these countries where you have trends that are
going in an illiberal direction and you have a leader who is in
power, not only do you have China bolstering that direction by
funding them and by investing, but by giving them the tools to
ensure that they are able to maintain that power and to monitor
their populace and their citizens, much in the way that China
and the Chinese Communist Party do at home.
This is not quite what we have seen in western China in
Xinjiang, which is really an Orwellian state of affairs out
there and shows how bad it could get, but the fact that China
is exporting these technologies to these countries and giving
them the training indicates that we could be going in a
direction in some of these countries ensuring that autocrats
not only come to power but then stay in power for a significant
amount of time.
Senator Peters. Well, the Chinese are pushing and helping
autocrats in these countries.
What should the United States be doing to help pro-
democracy groups within these countries and to strengthen
democratic institutions? Probably I would like to give it to
all three of you. We can start with you, Mr. Shullman, because
you started this, but then if we can get the other two
witnesses. Should the United States be more actively involved
in pro-democracy groups within those countries? Are we doing
enough? Should we be doing more? What is your assessment?
Dr. Shullman. I absolutely think we should be doing more to
help them both understand the nature of the Chinese Communist
Party and how it exerts influence to give them the tools to
expose what China is doing, to expose what their own officials
are doing in their name with China, whether it is through these
opaque deals or in signing up to things like this Huawei deal
which, by the way, was actually referred to as a confidential
deal when Serbian citizens had the temerity to actually ask for
the details of what had happened. Giving them the tools to know
and to expose what is happening in their own country and then
giving them also the ability to have a strong civil society
push to make sure that there is a wide conversation and a
debate about the wisdom of going down a certain path with
China.
As I said in my remarks, it is not the case that China's
approach in every country under the sun is the same, and China
behaves better--not perfectly, but better--in countries where
there is transparency, where there is good governance, and
where their actions are exposed in sunlight.
Senator Peters. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that question.
I would agree that we should continue our support and step
that up for democratic institutions, for civil society, for a
free media. But I think we need a more structural strategic
response because what we are seeing is the mixture of what has
been traditional endemic patronage networks where political
forces in the Balkans control their populations through jobs
and other opportunities and now that being fueled by the advent
of new technologies and potential financing from other
autocratic powers like China itself.
The challenge we face is that for so long our incentive
that as you reform at home, you gain access to our markets and
you will join our clubs of NATO and the EU, is being outweighed
through the short-term gains that can be offered through easy
financing, easy cash from China. I think this is going to take
a little bit more of a strategic play of the United States and
the European Union together to use some of the leverage we
have.
If we look at the real numbers, the region is exporting 72
percent to the EU and 3 percent to Russia, less than 1 percent
to China. The real economic weight of Europe and the real
security presence of the United States do outweigh the presence
of Chinese and Russian forces, and I think we need to use that
leverage most importantly I think to reestablish the sense of
movement strategically towards the transatlantic community.
This is why for me the number one priority is the Kosovo-
Serbia deal. In the absence of that deal, retrograde forces,
nationalist forces remain somewhat emboldened with a deal that
drains the oxygen from them, and I think it allows us to
actually invest more in Serbian democracy and Kosovo civil
society.
Senator Peters [presiding]. My time is up. I am going to
hold off because we are in a vote. I am going to let Senator
Shaheen go. But I want your answer later. We will hold off that
later. But Senator Shaheen will go next. I am sure she will
want to go vote.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson, I just wanted to follow up on what you were
saying because I very much agree with that, and I agree that a
settlement between Kosovo and Serbia is very important.
But I am still back on North Macedonia and making sure that
it gets entered into NATO. You mentioned in your opening
remarks how important that is. Because that is being held up in
the Senate by a small group of people, can you talk how
important it is for us to get that done and get it done
expeditiously?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Senator. I think this is a number one
priority. There would be no easier strategic defeat for our
interests and victory for particularly Russian interests than
for us to trip up on failing to move forward rapidly with the
ratification of North Macedonia as the 30th member. We went
through this a little bit on Montenegro. In the wake of a
Russian-backed coupe attempt, the greatest strategic win for
Russia would be for us to lose the confidence in moving forward
with NATO enlargement to anchor in countries that have made
tough choices--in this case, North Macedonia. I think that is a
first order strategic imperative to show confidence in
ourselves, in our institution, and in the reforms that have
fueled North Macedonia to join.
Senator Shaheen. I totally agree with that, and I think
both the leadership in North Macedonia and Greece deserve a lot
of credit for approving the Prespa Agreement and for moving
forward at a time when it was not clear that their populations
fully supported those decisions. I think they deserve a lot of
credit, and it is important for us and for the rest of the NATO
countries to approve those agreements as quickly as possible.
That leads to the second part of that question, which is
accession negotiations with the EU, which again I know that
that is an ongoing issue with Serbia in terms of getting some
agreement with the EU. Having the ability for North Macedonia
to enter into accession negotiations I think is very important.
Can you talk about what the challenge is with the EU and
their willingness to continue to move forward with that process
for both Serbia and North Macedonia and for other countries?
Mr. Wilson. Certainly. I think this is a top strategic
issue. The challenge is in Paris a little bit and The Hague.
There were expectations that the EU could have moved forward
already with opening accession talks certainly with North
Macedonia, potentially with Albania. That decision in deference
to some German parliamentary maneuvers, as well as French
political concerns, has been punted till October.
I think the only one sitting on the sidelines sort of
waiting and cheering to see this trip up would be those sitting
in Moscow, that after the extraordinary political capital and
political courage demonstrated both in Athens and Skopje to
come to a deal on North Macedonia, an opportunity to overcome
some stagnation that resulted from the failure to move forward
in 2008 at the Bucharest summit, both closing the NATO deal and
opening accession talks with the European Union are key ways to
give oxygen to those that are progressive reformers in the
region. If we want to see kleptocratic networks, authoritarian
regimes, patronage networks develop, we just need to pull back
from those that are taking some of those tough decisions. This
comes to a head right now here in the Senate, but also in the
EU as it approaches a decision in October for Albania and North
Macedonia and albeit this is to open accession negotiations,
which is a very long and tedious process, which serves the
interests of the EU to bolster rule of law, democratic
institutions, and prepare them economically for integration
over years.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree. Given the challenges
that the EU is going through right now and some of the foreign
policy challenges we have in the United States, developing that
coordinated strategy that you talked about is very challenging
I think.
I have got a limited amount of time, but I wanted to just
raise a question--and I do not know who wants to address that--
around the messaging campaigns, the disinformation campaigns
that Russia is engaged in and that they are doing all across
the Western Balkans and what we should be doing to counter
that, what more we should be doing. So Mr. Bugajski. Right?
Mr. Bugajski. Very good, absolutely, yes.
Russian disinformation campaigns--we had a lot of
disinformation campaigns during Soviet times. Now Russia has
become I think very skilled at, let us say, lower level
messages to particular populations, to particular ethnic
groups, to particular political constituencies. The idea on
their side is basically to divide and rule, to divide societies
against each other in the Balkans so they can have more
inroads, but also to divide these countries from the West, from
Western institutions, from the European Union, from NATO, from
the United States. They are very systematic because this is not
just social media. This is not just Russian outlets, but it is
also the social networks. It is using local proxies. You know,
we talk about proxies, fighting proxies in Ukraine, but they
also have media proxies throughout the Balkans.
How to counter this? First of all, we have to expose, as
much as possible, what is disinformation and what is the
purpose of that disinformation. Secondly, we have to send
messages that are true whether they are positive or negative.
In other words, we cannot play their games in conducting
disinformation.
But the report I actually submitted to the committee also
talks about another element that I think we could introduce.
The Russian population itself is not monolithic. The Russian
population is not Putin. We keep talking about Russia. We get
drawn into this. But the Russian population is not Putin. We
have seen this in the past few weeks. We have seen the
demonstrations against election manipulation, against regime
autocracy. We have seen this in the regions of Russia which
oppose Moscow's policy.
We should be looking at how we get our messages across to
the Russian public through social networks. I am not talking
about disinformation. I am talking about real information about
what is going on in Russia because most people in Russia do not
obtain real information from their governments or from official
sources. This is why I talk about more of a strategic offense
in information influence rather than simply playing defense.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst [presiding]. Thank you.
I would like to go back quickly. We were talking about the
DOD's China Military Power report for 2019, and we just really
started on that discussion of the security implications of
Chinese infrastructure and investment, of course. I would like
to follow on just a little bit for any of the witnesses that
would like to answer.
How significant is Serbia's decision to welcome Chinese
police on its territory to provide security for the growing
numbers of Chinese workers and tourists? Anyone that would like
to jump in, please.
Dr. Shullman. Thank you for that question. I will address
that.
As I said in my remarks, it is hard to know at this point
because the details of the agreement are purposely not public.
But I would say what we have seen in terms of Chinese
assistance in other countries, in Asia for internal security
forces, this is a troubling sign and a potential that it could
get much worse in some of these countries, in Serbia and other
countries in the Balkans.
That said, the ostensible purpose is to protect the growing
number of Chinese tourists and workers in Serbia. There are a
growing number of Chinese tourists and workers. The visa regime
was liberalized in 2017, and there are a lot of workers there.
But I think we absolutely have reason to be concerned that some
of the ways in which, as I said, China controls its population
at home and prevents protests from dissidents, minorities, and
other troubling elements that the government does not want to
hear from, that is something that I think we should watch very
closely and see whether the fact that there is a training and a
cooperative engagement now with the police could push things in
that direction in Serbia.
Senator Ernst. That is the very long arm of the law.
Dr. Shullman. Yes.
Senator Ernst. Mr. Wilson, please.
Mr. Wilson. I just wanted to add to that. We are seeing a
fundamental strategy of Belgrade to hedge. In the absence of a
deal looking for leverage over Kosovo, the Serbian authorities
have flirted too much with Russia and begun to do so with
China, most concerningly played out with security presence now
of Chinese police, prior to that Russian members of the
emergency ministry that has been known to carry out some
nefarious activities being based in a humanitarian center in
the south of Serbia.
At the same time, we have been able to work quietly and try
to put markers on that. We have been very clear not to provide
diplomatic status to those Russian forces in southern Serbia,
and Belgrade has complied.
In competing for influence, we need to, by pushing
diplomatically, get to a deal on Kosovo, remove the incentive
for Serbia to hedge and play this game with China, first Russia
and now China. I think we need to propose an alternative, a
United States-Serbia strategic partnership that points to more
security cooperation on issues like law enforcement that has a
commercial and economic component and that begins to answer one
of the great geostrategic questions in Europe, will Serbia
anchor itself in the West. If you look at the economy, the
answer is almost inevitable. If you talk to any mother in the
countryside, they want their child to work for a Western
company where there is meritocracy and be educated in the West.
Our hand is strong. We have to close this deal and remove the
oxygen that the Chinese and Russians have in Serbia today.
Dr. Shullman. Apologies. If I could just add an addendum to
my comment.
I think given that you are talking about the National
Defense Strategy and China's overarching security approach as
it relates to the Belt and Road, I think Mr. Wilson covered
well the fact that we have China now with its first overseas
military base in Djibouti. We do see China, in part in response
to internal pressures--the population saying you need to better
defend Chinese interests and Chinese workers and Chinese
citizens abroad. We do see China now looking more at overseas
logistics facilities not just for military strategic purposes,
although that certainly is there, but also to better protect
their citizens.
I think when we look at this police cooperation agreement,
that is not the obvious and first thought that we think of when
we see this, but I think that there is also probably an aspect
of China without establishing a facility in the Balkans, which
would be a lot more sensitive than where they have established
it already in Djibouti, having a way in which they can monitor
and say that they are making sure that their growing number of
citizens in the region are protected. It is something we are
going to see more in Serbia, in the region, and I would say in
Europe generally.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Mr. Bugajski?
Mr. Bugajski. I just wanted to add a couple of points on
the China nexus in the region.
It is important to bear in mind that China is not just
active amongst countries that are not EU members. I mean, the
Belt and Road Initiative includes also EU and NATO members. One
also needs to look at places such as Greece or Hungary that may
be more inclined not to criticize China internationally because
of the investments that are coming in Port of Piraeus, for
instance, infrastructure in Hungary.
I do not think it should simply be focused on the Balkans.
I think it should be a wider EU approach in trying to monitor,
control, and correct the kind of Chinese investment that is
destabilizing domestically but could also threaten the unity,
the integrity of both the European Union and NATO.
The second point is Russia and China, which I sort of
mentioned. We also need to monitor very closely where China and
Russia are actually cooperating. I believe there are points of
convergence between them, although there are also points of
potential conflict that we should exploit. But the convergence
is in terms of disinformation, anti-democracy. It is almost
like Russia is trying to piggyback on China because China has
the economic clout and Russia is basically stagnating in terms
of its economic development.
I just wanted to add those two points.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Wilson, in your discussion on that topic, you started
going into ways that we can develop resiliency within some of
those countries, and I would like all of our witnesses to maybe
touch on that a little bit more. When we are trying to push
back against the Chinese malign influence in the Western
Balkans, then we talked about a number of ways that we can
insert ourselves or others can insert themselves into the
situation to push back against that malign influence and offer
different types of support to those countries in the Balkans.
If you could touch on some of the ideas, things that we should
be doing maybe as the U.S. Government or various partnerships
between businesses, schools, educational facilities, things
like that with those countries in the Balkans.
Mr. Wilson. Sure, I can start with that excellent question.
I think focusing on the resilience of societies in wider
Europe, whether in the Western Balkans, Europe's east is a key
priority. We have to help these societies resist this
penetration and manipulation from external forces.
It also is related to how to provide alternatives and some
of the tools. You know, it is easy for folks to point to
Piraeus Port in Greece, and yet we need to remember that in a
time of economic crisis, the IMF [International Monetary Fund]
and others pressed Greece to sell off assets, to privatize, and
there were really no Western investors to pick this up. China
showed up at Piraeus and took a port in the top 20 and turned
it into a top 2 port in Europe.
How do we provide an alternative?
One, some of the tools that we have been developing in the
European Union should be extended to those aspirant countries
in the Western Balkans. The EU is finally developing a CFIUS
[The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States]-like
procedure to do some reviews of foreign investment in sensitive
strategic assets. If you aspire to be a member of the EU, we
should be working with the Balkan countries to develop that
capacity to mirror image the procedures that the EU will
develop, modeled after our CFIUS model, for example, to provide
that technical expertise, that advice, to help navigate where
to take acceptable financing and where there is a more
strategic risk.
Second, on the resiliency piece, we need to show up in the
game. There is something called the Berlin Process where the
European Union has focused on infrastructure in the region. The
Trump administration has been interested in the Three Seas
Initiative of how to build some of the infrastructure in
Central and Eastern Europe the seas of the Adriatic, Black Sea,
Baltic. We should be intentionally building the infrastructure
of Europe to include the Western Balkans in that
infrastructure, energy, transportation, digital, long before
the reality of the EU membership exists so that we are helping
to bolster their resiliency and provide those alternatives.
Finally on the information front, which is first and
foremost Russian, but now increasingly Chinese, we need to help
identify, expose, and analyze this disinformation, essentially
over time how to develop more resilient societies so that they
are more inoculated to this manipulation of the information
environment and to be able, again, I think to provide the
positive contrast of what we have to offer.
Senator Ernst. Very good.
Any other thoughts on that, on that area?
Dr. Shullman. I will just add. I agree entirely with what
Mr. Wilson said.
Number one, on the alternatives, just in my experience
traveling to the region--I was in Warsaw last week for a
conference on Chinese influence, and the response that you get
from people--and again, it is not just a Balkans question. It
is a European question, but it is also a Central/Eastern
European, 16/17 Plus 1 question.
We talk about the negatives of Chinese investment and the
dangers and the risks that come along with it. Then the answer
is, okay, what is the alternative? Are you bringing the
alternative? Are the Europeans bringing the alternative? That
really is a critical element to this because if you do not have
an answer to that, then you are kind of just left saying watch
out and then people are left without any answers.
Secondly, I completely agree. I think the way to build
resilience is to bolster the level of knowledge about how
China--specifically I will focus on China--but also Russia are
exerting influence in these countries. In certain countries in
the Western Balkans, the level of understanding about China,
the level of understanding about the Chinese Communist Party
and how it exerts influence is virtually nil. You have to have
that basic level of understanding before you can then go in and
talk about how what China is doing, both in terms of its
economic deals but also its exertion of information
manipulation, is different than what Western countries do
regularly through soft power. This is not soft power. That
understanding is critical. Then you can move on to giving them
the tools to have investigative journalism, to have a robust
civil society that, as I mentioned earlier, really keep their
own officials honest but also monitor what China is doing and
ensure that it is in the best interest of the country.
Then lastly, on the Russia-China bit, you know, I think it
is really important to understand that what Russia and China
are doing is different. Their tactics are different, but that
in combination, in a lot of these countries, they are really
damaging to democracy. Russia will come in with the divisive
tactics with the disinformation, and then you have China
bringing money that is untied to any requirements about
governance reforms, undermining what the EU and the United
States are trying to do, and bolstering autocrats, not to
mention having this model of the second largest economy in the
world which got there through autocratic means, which can be
very attractive to those who want to believe that that is an
alternative.
What the United States and the Europeans need to do in
order to push back on this in some ways is very simple. It is
to make the case for democracy and continue to stand up for the
notion that the best way to develop a country and to achieve
economic growth is through democratic means and through
democratic institutions.
Senator Ernst. Wonderful. Thank you.
Yes, go ahead, Mr. Bugajski, and then I will turn it over
to Mr. Peters for his next question. Go ahead.
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you. I just wanted to add very briefly.
In terms of resilience, if you really want to build permanent
resilience or long-term resilience in the region, you need
stable states with strong institutions. That is why, going back
to what in particular Damon was saying, the Serbia, Kosovo, and
internal Bosnian disputes have to be resolved to build to
functioning states that can then consolidate their institutions
and do all the right things to move towards both NATO and the
EU.
I would say there is one thing I heard today, which is a
bit disturbing. We have appointed a special envoy, special
representative for the Balkans, which I think is extremely
important. But now there are moves not only to appoint EU
special representatives but also a Russian special
representative in the Balkans. To me, that is like putting the
bear in charge of the beehives. It is going to undermine our
position. It is going to undermine any kind of an agreement,
and it is going to further destabilize the region. This is
something I think we should be pushing back on. Just one point.
Senator Ernst. Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Bugajski, we did not get a chance to get your answer on
the question that I had when I was running out of time about--
you mentioned how we have to stabilize these areas, work with
small ``D'' democratic institutions. What should the United
States be doing specifically? Are we doing enough? What is your
assessment?
Mr. Bugajski. It is sort of in a bit of the follow-up to
consolidating and building resilience. Some of the factors have
been mentioned. The question is how exactly do we do it. The
big problem in the region, as has been pointed out, is the
nexus between politics and business, corruption, clientelism,
nepotism, the spoil system, in other words, the winner takes
all whenever they get elected. Then we see this in Albania. The
other side, the other party leaves the institutions when it
does not get into government.
How do we resolve this sort of polarization-corruption
nexus in these countries?
We need to build stronger institutions particularly in
terms of rule of law, police forces, better transparency in
terms of any kind of government contracts. They started in
Albania to investigate each parliamentarian to make sure that
they are not involved in any corrupt deals. I think this needs
to be extended. This needs to be expanded.
Secondly, I would say the young people. One of the worst
things that has happened in the Balkans is how many well
educated, talented young people are leaving for Western Europe
or for the United States. It is good for Western Europe and the
United States, but it is not good for the neighborhood. It is
not good for these countries.
How do we make sure they stay? How do we make sure these
countries are attractive? Education, opportunity, investment,
integration into the EU--I mean, all these are extremely
important.
One can go into more detail. I just wanted to outline a
couple of key questions.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
A February report from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Studies cites fake websites targeting U.S.
voters in the 2016 election--and I quote them--that were traced
to domain registration and trolls in Albania, although site
proprietors denied any kind of Russian sponsorship. This tactic
and others obviously give Moscow an opportunity to outsource
disinformation campaigns that they are engaged in not just
against the United States but in other European states as well
and certainly can have a real impact on our democracy and
certainly can have a potential impact on the alliance as well.
I would like to have each of the witnesses, if you could
kind of elaborate as to how you see these kinds of operations,
these warfare operations, elaborate on how they are being
conducted, how you are concerned about it, and maybe give us
some idea of how we could work with the Albanians and others to
break some of these links with Russians that may be engaged in
these activities. Mr. Wilson, do you want to take the first
stab at it?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir, for that question.
This has been a fundamental element of Russian strategy for
some time. We have seen an intense chapter in this now,
facilitated with digital technology, often focused in sowing
doubt rather than just pushing particular narratives, sometimes
muddying the waters and instrumentalizing others to do this
business, most effective when buying into certain cleavages in
our own democratic societies and leaning in on those cleavages.
I think part of what we need to do as an alliance and with
our countries that aspire to be our allies is a more
coordinated effort on facilitating digital resilience. This is
not always the effort of governments. For example, at the
Atlantic Council, we run something called the Digital Forensics
Research Lab that has researchers across Europe that are
looking at identifying, exposing, and analyzing Russian
disinformation in a dispassionate way to bring that to light
and in doing so, achieving two things: one, building the
capability of local partners and in civil society to do this so
that we are building the capability of open source research to
compete and challenge the authoritarian practice here, not
depending on the functionality of the Albanian Government but
on a proliferation of civil society groups and investigative
journalists as a network of them across the region as part of
the best defense. We call this creating digital Sherlocks to
facilitate digital resilience. You do not want to control and
limit that to government means, but empower many actors to do
this to expose and to challenge what we see coming from Russian
state actors.
We have put digital research units in many of these regions
themselves, working with the governments and civil societies to
develop that capacity. I think this is part of where we are. It
is part of the new challenge.
We also need to work with the governments to develop what
we have called democratic defense against disinformation. We do
not mirror image. We do not use their tactics. We think through
our response to countering disinformation in a way that builds
democratic habits and practices in fragile democracies in the
Western Balkans, strategies we are developing in our own
country with the European Union, bringing that to our partners
in the region so they have a democratic capability of defending
against disinformation.
Again, I think finally going on offense to expose this as
the Russian strategy. There has been a backlash in the region
to heavy-handed Russian tactics. It has not worked all that
well where people in the region, better than here, understand
the tools that Russia has used, whether it is the GRU [Russia's
Main Intelligence Directorate] or disinformation. I think we
need to help people know about that and come to their own
conclusion about where they want to see their society develop.
Senator Peters. Dr. Shullman, do you want to add anything
to that?
Dr. Shullman. Well, I would not add anything on the
specifics of the Albanian and Russian case, although I would
say in terms of what China is doing in its disinformation
efforts as it relates to Hong Kong, as it has been doing for a
long time vis-a-vis Taiwan, this is evidence that China has the
capacity to do this and probably can do it, if it wanted to, at
a level at or exceeding what Russia is doing globally. It
behooves us to keep a close eye on how China is doing this in
those domains to see whether or not we are going to see more of
that in a global sense. But I have not seen that yet in the
Western Balkans.
I mentioned earlier that there is a certain level of
information control in the countries in which China is exerting
influence so it does not have to do what it does elsewhere. But
it is using so-called united front tactics in a lot of these
countries' seemingly soft power tactics, but were actually
Chinese Communist Party-backed institutions and entities to
push the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda line, to
cultivate friends, and to capture elites in these countries. I
think that is something that we need to watch very closely
going forward in the Western Balkans and in Europe generally.
Senator Peters. Mr. Bugajski?
Mr. Bugajski. I just want to add a couple of points on this
Russia-Albania question.
Albanian societies have traditionally been not as
penetrable for Russian influence operations, but I have noticed
over the past year or so, less in Kosovo, how a very large
Russian embassy with an enormous staff, which is much bigger
than it was during Soviet times, as well as many Russian
diplomats and tourists and others coming into the country, have
become more active to try and penetrate Albanian society.
How they try to do it is particularly through money, in
other words, through corruption, through buying certain
politicians, through working with young people. For instance,
they have a program now to attract young people annually to
come to Sochi to better understand the Russian world. To some
poor Albanians, this is quite attractive. It is a little bit
like the tactics that the Salafists were engaging in or
continue to engage in in the past in the Balkans. Penetrating
political parties, penetrating media, penetrating business in
Albania, penetrating criminal networks.
These things I think we need to very carefully watch. We
have assumed I think for too long that Albania, other Albanian
majority regions of the Balkans are not penetrable by Russia.
We need to think again because they will either do it directly
or they can do it through third parties and also use, as you
mentioned at the beginning in the question, those third parties
against us where we would least expect it.
Senator Peters. You mentioned it is more difficult to
penetrate Albania. I have had the opportunity to travel to
Albania and have a very active Albanian diaspora in Michigan as
well.
But one thing that struck me when I traveled to Albania,
there were so many homes there that were flying both the
Albanian flag and the United States flag. The feeling of good
will towards the United States was indeed very strong, which
may be why you are saying most folks think it is impenetrable.
From what I hear from your testimony, we should be
concerned not to look at it that way, and is there something in
particular we need to do to make sure we continue to harbor
those great feelings that I think apparently exist there for
the United States?
Mr. Bugajski. Well, absolutely, but working both with
Albania and Kosovo. Remember the Albanian population looks up
to the United States in a way as helping to create two
countries, helping the defend their freedoms, their
independence. We cannot walk away. We must continue to be
active. This is actually an important time where there is a
crisis, a political crisis, in Albania because of the
polarization of the two major parties and one of the parties is
actually boycotting parliament. We need to be much more active,
and hopefully the special representative will also engage in
this to bring these two parties together, maybe to come up with
some sort of coalition government in the future to prevent
Albania from sliding into what is the sort of recurrent crisis
every few years.
As you said, they show the flag. We need to show the flag
as well.
Senator Peters. Great.
Well, you brought up the special representative. I think
each of you have as well. If you could talk about what you
think his priorities should be, what should we be looking for
coming out of his office. Mr. Wilson, if you want to start.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that.
I might just first say it is remarkable how pro-American
Albania is, and we are grateful. We should be so proud that we
welcomed Albania into the alliance a decade ago. It was the
right thing to do even as people questioned NATO enlargement.
We can be proud of what they have contributed.
What we can do now to help Albania is ensure that its
institutions, its democracy works. Russia will never convince
Albanians to think poorly of the United States, but it can
incentivize dysfunctionality in the country that leads the NATO
ally to trip up. Strategically right now, it could lead to a
decision on the EU to pass over opening accession negotiations
with Tirana, something that we need to help Albania present a
strong case to the EU, and we need to weigh in with our
European friends to underscore the strategic imperative of
keeping the process of accessions moving forward for Albania.
For the special representative, Matt Palmer, it is terrific
to have a seasoned diplomat named to this position. I think it
is important to give the United States a little bit more heft
and weight in what is unfolding.
I would say his top priority is to ensure a Kosovo-Serbia
deal. We want to see North Macedonia come into NATO. We want to
see EU accession open for Albania, North Macedonia. He should
work on those issues. The top priority is to be a singular
focus on getting the two parties back to the table, to remove
the tariffs, and to stop the derecognition campaign so that we
can have a serious negotiation that can lead to a historic
deal. There are not many issues in the world today where we can
have a true win. We are going to mitigate or manage problems
around the world. Kosovo-Serbia is one where with a little bit
of United States muscle with Congress and the administration
actually perhaps seeing eye to eye, the United States and EU
actually seeing somewhat eye to eye despite other divisions--
this is where we can have a historic win and where his energy
is best spent.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Dr. Shullman, your thoughts on it?
Dr. Shullman. Well, I will defer to the Balkan experts on
the Balkan dynamics of this.
But I will say in the China aspect, part of the problem
with the influence that China has been able to build in the
region is a product of simple diplomatic attention. I think
Chinese President Xi Jinping I believe has had at least five
meetings with President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia since 2016.
Senator Peters. Dr. Shullman, I am sorry to interrupt. We
are in the midst of a vote. I am going to have to run to vote.
But I want your answer for our transcript. So I will not be
sitting here, but I will be reading the transcript. I think
Senator Ernst will be back as well. But if you would continue
to answer that for the transcript. Sir, if you will do the
same. But I will leave and you will see the chairwoman back
here shortly. I apologize for our running back and forth. I
appreciate your indulgences.
Dr. Shullman. President Xi Jinping and Aleksandar Vucic I
believe have had five meetings since the historic meeting they
had in 2016. There are plans in the works for President Xi to
go to Serbia again. The Chinese have paid a significant amount
of attention to Eastern Europe and to the Western Balkans in
particular. Of course, the 17 Plus 1 mechanism is a sign of
that. The fact that we now have the special envoy and the fact
that it represents an increased level of attention from the
United States Government to this region I think is very much to
the good and demonstrates that the United States is paying
attention.
Part of the problem in the Western Balkans is that there is
a perception that the greatest amount of investment in the
country comes from China and also from Russia, that they are in
the top spots in terms of investment when in fact four of the
top five biggest investors in Serbia hail from the European
Union. This perception is very important. I think the more
attention that the United States and our Western European
allies can pay to the region, the better.
Senator Ernst. Mr. Bugajski, any closing thoughts?
Mr. Bugajski. The question that was asked by the ranking
member was the role of the U.S. special envoy, what
particularly he should be dealing with.
One other thing I would add, of course, is Bosnia-
Herzegovina has not been mentioned very much. This I think is
the major flashpoint. I cannot imagine, for instance, a Serbia-
Kosovo armed conflict, particularly with Camp Bondsteel and a
NATO presence in Kosovo and the restraints that are placed upon
Serbia. But I can imagine a renewed armed conflict within
Bosnia. Again, I do not think at this point the Serbian
leadership in the Republika Srpska would want that, but they
are playing. They are toying with the idea of separation. They
are toying with the idea of a dysfunctional or failed state.
Banja Luka has become actually the biggest inroad, I would say,
for Russia. They are probably bigger than Belgrade into the
region because why? Because President Dodic is funded by
Russia. Putin visits. They promise all sorts of things. There
are all sorts of cultural and social and religious
intermingling. The possibility that at some point--they have
been waiting I think in Banja Luka for us to weaken our resolve
to, let us say, making this a functional state.
I think we have to now double that commitment to that
country. I think actually the special rep will be more involved
in this Bosnia crisis than Kosovo-Serbia.
Whether he can do the two simultaneously I am not sure. One
has to be extremely careful, as I mentioned earlier, not to
allow a Russian voice in trying to resolve something that they
do not want to resolve in the first place.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
I am going to ask just one final question, and then we will
close out the hearing. I want to thank all of you so very much
for participating.
But as we are talking about Kosovo and Serbia, many folks
know--I make no secret about it--I am very proud of this
relationship. But Iowa and Kosovo are partners in the National
Guard State Partnership program, and I wanted to take a minute
to talk through some of those issues and to better understand
the dynamics between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as what you
just spoke to, the Russian influence that exists in that
regard.
If we could, the question is, how would a comprehensive
agreement between Kosovo and Serbia that achieves mutual
recognition support United States national security interests?
Mr. Bugajski, if I could start with you, please.
Mr. Bugajski. I would say absolutely supports U.S. national
security interests. We have invested enormous resources and
time and diplomacy in trying to stabilize the region. Remember,
this was the first major NATO land operation in its history
when we helped to liberate Kosovo from a very brutal regime,
the Milosevic regime that was trying to slaughter or expel the
majority of the people. We helped build a state.
But if that state is questioned, if that state is not
accepted in international institutions, if that state continues
to be destabilized not only by a neighbor but also a power that
is trying to destabilize an even broader region, that has a
very, let us say, negative approach to the West, wants to
undermine the West, wants to disassemble the West, it is
incumbent on us to make sure that Kosovo succeeds as a state,
that it enters international institutions, that it becomes
eventually an EU member, as well as a NATO member--and
unfortunately, the EU has not treated Kosovo in the way it
should. Visa liberalization. Remember, the one country that
still does not have that visa liberalization, even if Georgia
and Ukraine do, is Kosovo, which is in the middle of the
Balkans.
Five countries, remember, and the European Union still do
not recognize Kosovo. This is where we should be paying
attention also. Remember, two of those countries are countries
that we helped to free themselves from Soviet overlordship,
Slovakia and Romania. We should be working much more closely
with these countries. Can you imagine their recognition? What a
positive boost that would send to Kosovo and to finally
resolving this dispute.
I think it is resolvable. Actually there is an article I
did for CEPA [The Center for European Policy Analysis] on steps
that could be taken, confidence building steps. Both sides have
to surrender certain things. Both sides have to offer certain
things. But ultimately Kosovo's status cannot be questioned,
which some of the Serb leadership does. Its status is final.
The question is to accept it. How do you move towards that
acceptance?
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you so much.
Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
I do want to echo your kudos. These National Guard programs
have a fundamental impact in the countries where they operate.
Kudos to Iowa for doing this with Kosovo. It is very important.
What I would say is that right now in the absence of an
agreement between Belgrade and Pristina is the open wound in
the region that holds back the country's regional development,
economic development. It also provides oxygen for whether they
are mafia, corrupt powers locally, or autocratic corrupt powers
internationally, to play a different game than ours. The
absence of agreement enables politicians to continue to play
the drip of the nationalist card and be less accountable to
delivering for their citizens economic development and other
opportunities.
If we could help shepherd an agreement through--an
agreement will only be shepherded through in my view if the
United States is heavily engaged and driving this forward--it
helps resolve one of the fundamental open geostrategic
questions in Europe. Will Serbia find its place in Europe and
in the West or not? An agreement will help remove the albatross
around Serbia's neck, which keeps it trapped by its past and
which allows the Russians leverage to manipulate the country.
An agreement will allow Kosovo itself to begin to develop its
own potential, not just to join Interpol but to join the United
Nations and to become part of the Partnership for Peace and
ultimately NATO and the European Union in a way that it can
unlock the potential of its own people. When you travel through
the region today, too many of the brightest people, as my
colleague had said, are trying to find their future outside
their borders. That is not how this region is going to succeed,
and I think our leadership and a place where we have a lot of
political, moral, and security influence to secure a deal in
our interests can continue our tradition of helping transform
former adversaries into partners and ultimately allies in a way
that is good for U.S. interests.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Dr. Shullman, final words from you.
Dr. Shullman. Thank you.
I agree with all of that, and I would just add in the
context of the Chinese and Russian influence topic that we have
discussed and have been discussing today, I think this would
support United States national security interests because it
removes a key weapon for Russia but also for China in its
relations in the region.
China, like Russia, does not recognize Kosovo's statehood,
and I know from my travels in Serbia, every conversation, no
matter what the topic is, eventually, even if you are talking
about China, will get back to, and you know, China gained
strategic advantage here because of the way they approach the
Kosovo question.
I think that this is really going to be a key advantage to
the United States if such an agreement is signed. China opposed
Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence. It is based not only
on the possible consequences that they feel recognizing
Kosovo's sovereignty might have on delicate issues inside China
such as Tibet and Xinjiang and separatism there, but also as I
have said, because they recognize the strategic value. This
would go a long way towards bolstering the United States
position and taking away a weapon from China and from Russia.
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you so much to our witnesses.
Again, a very, very healthy discussion about Chinese influence,
as well as Russian influence in the Western Balkans. It is
something that we do need to pay attention to. I am glad to
have that conversation with the three of you today. Again,
thank you for attending today's subcommittee hearing on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
With that, we will close out today's hearing.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX A
REVERSING MOSCOW'S OFFENSIVE
A STRATEGY FOR WINNING THE SHADOW WAR WITH PUTIN'S RUSSIA
Janusz Bugajski, May 2019
Western governments have tried and failed in applying various
remedies to curtail Moscow's neo-imperialist ambitions. Containment,
appeasement, and engagement have not cured Russia from its imperial
designs. Indeed, each approach has simply reinforced Kremlin
perceptions that the West is weak, divided, and incapable of preventing
Russia's restoration as a major global power. The absence of a
coherent, dynamic, and offensive Western strategy has encouraged Moscow
to intensify its anti-Western Shadow War to dismantle the NATO
alliance, limit American influence in Europe, and further fracture the
European Union.
But despite its escalating anti-Atlanticist offensive, Russia is
facing growing domestic problems on several fronts: economic,
demographic, social, regional, and ethnic. This provides Western
governments with a unique opportunity not only to defend against
Moscow's attacks but also to devise a strategy that reinforces Russia's
decline while managing the international consequences of its
prospective dissolution. Such a strategy needs to be multi-dimensional,
combining the informational, cyber, economic, diplomatic, and military
domains. Russia pursues a strategy that integrates all elements of
state power, from ``hard'' military campaigns to ``soft'' psychological
operations. Washington and its NATO allies will also need to adopt a
comprehensive approach to capitalize on Russia's vulnerabilities. \1\
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\1\ Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and
Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, Washington
DC, November 2018, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/
providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf
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decline wrapped in aggression inside a crisis
To adapt Winston Churchill's memorable insight at the outset of
World War Two--that Russia's actions are ``a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma''--Vladimir Putin's Russia is a declining
state, donning the camouflage of external aggression to disguise its
increasing fragility. Nonetheless, a declining Russian state can prove
more threatening than a rising power because its leaders calculate that
time is working against them and may take more risks to pursue their
objectives. Moscow disguises its decline by projecting itself as the
key power in Eurasia, mobilizing imperial sentiments among its
citizens, and engaging in external revisionist offensives against its
neighbors. The Kremlin's strategic objective necessitates undermining
NATO's security posture throughout Europe, fracturing the EU, splitting
the United States from its European allies, and eroding America's
global influence by undermining its political system and discrediting
its leadership role.
Russia's external offensives cloak its internal infirmities.
Through a combination of low fossil fuel prices, failed economic
diversification, infrastructural decay, pervasive corruption, and
Western financial sanctions, state revenues are declining, living
standards falling, social program diminishing, incomes contracting,
social conflicts intensifying, and regional disquiet mounting. Russia's
economy is stagnating. According to World Bank statistics in 2017, its
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranks 60th in the world. \2\
The poverty rate is rising sharply and a growing numbers of citizens
face destitution. Increased defense spending to project Russia's power
has come at the expense of education, health care, and infrastructure.
But even military expansion is slowing down as the defense budget is
shrinking and over the coming decade Russia's armed forces will fall
further behind that of the United States and China. According to data
from 2017, Russia's military spending is almost one quarter that of
China's and only a tenth of the United States military budget. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?year_high_desc=true
\3\ Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman,
and T. Siemon, ``Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017,''
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2018, https://
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's longer-term prospects look even bleaker. Demographic
indicators underscore a shrinking population with high mortality, low
fertility, and rising emigration of the best educated. Russia's
population has dipped from about 148 million after the breakup of the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s to only 144 million in 2018. Various
agencies estimate that this total will fall to around 128 million by
2050 and a steadily increasing percentage will be neither ethnic
Russian nor Orthodox Christian. \4\ Life expectancy among Russian males
stands at about 60 years, or 15 years less than the norm in
industrialized states and lower than in many African countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For a valuable synopsis with detailed statistics see the World
Population Review, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/russia-
population/
Also check https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-
demographics-perfect-storm
According to the CIA factbook, 78% of the population is estimated
to be ethnic Russian, although that proportion is steadily declining.
See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
rs.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's economic performance alone is insufficient to measure
susceptibility to decline and potential fracture, as evident in the
collapse of the Soviet Union nearly three decades ago. Numerous
additional factors must be examined, particularly the extent of social,
ethnic, and regional tensions. The unwieldy Russian Federation consists
of 85 ``federal subjects,'' of which 22 are republics representing non-
Russian ethnicities and numerous regions with distinct identities that
are becoming increasingly estranged from Moscow. Instead of pursuing
decentralization to accommodate their aspirations, the Russian
government is downgrading their autonomy. This is evident in the
recently introduced language law designed to promote Russification and
plans to merge and eliminate several autonomous regions and republics.
\5\ Pressure is mounting across the country, with growing public anger
at local governors appointed by the Kremlin and resentment that Moscow
appropriates regional resources but cannot guarantee stable living
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Paul Goble, ``Putin's Language Law Radicalizing Russians and
Non-Russians,'' Window on Eurasia--New Series, August 1, 2018, http://
windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/08/putins-language-law-
radicalizing.html and Neil Hauer, ``Putin's Plan to Russify the
Caucasus: How Russia's New Language Law Could Backfire,'' August 1,
2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2018-08-01/
putins-plan-russify-caucasus
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To compensate for its military inferiority and economic weakness
vis-a-vis the West, Moscow deploys a wide assortment of both open and
clandestine political, financial, economic, cyber, and propaganda tools
to achieve its objectives. It capitalizes on the vulnerabilities of
targeted countries, whether through cyber attacks, psychological
offensives, energy dominance, state corruption, political blackmail, or
numerous other ``soft power'' tools.
For the West, a reactive defense toward a declining Russia is
insufficient to deter Moscow's ambitions. Instead, a broad offense is
needed to divert Moscow's attention away from external aggression and
toward its own internal protection. While the Kremlin has opened
several fronts in Europe and the United States, Russia itself is
afflicted by many more economic, social, political, cyber, ethnic,
religious, and regional vulnerabilities than its adversaries. These
deficiencies and potential pressure points need to be thoroughly
assessed and exploited.
The new United States National Security Strategy issued in 2017
affirms that Russia is a rival and competitor that aims to weaken
Washington's international influence and divide the U.S. from its
allies and partners. \6\ Given this astute geopolitical assessment,
policies need to be developed to capitalize on Moscow's weaknesses. The
minimum Western objective would be to curtail Moscow's subversive
assault against the United States and its allies. The intermediate
objective would be to deflect Russia's external aggression into
internal turmoil that the Kremlin becomes increasingly focused on
pacifying. The maximum and long-term objective would be to fracture the
Russian Federation and manage the country's dissolution, thus
significantly curtailing if not fully eliminating Moscow's geopolitical
ambitions. A wide assortment of tools can be deployed to achieve this
range of goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
exposing influence operations
The Russian state is engaged in systematic informational warfare to
undermine Western cohesion and promote Moscow's expansionist
enterprise. This informational subversion is designed to steer the
Western media, implant the Kremlin narrative, infect public opinion,
and influence decision-makers. Moscow's espionage penetration and media
disinformation networks are supplemented by modern-day ``fellow
travellers,'' whether duped, manipulated, or complicit, including
politicians, businessmen, diplomats, academics, lobbyists, and policy
analysts. \7\ These human assets fall into several categories,
including those working for the Kremlin but who do not make their
affiliations public, those who are avowedly independent but support
Russia's foreign policies, and those who become co-opted and obligated
through financial and other payments from sources tied to the Putin
administration and become a conduit for Kremlin disinformation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Kateryna Smagliy, Hybrid Analytica: Pro-Kremlin Expert
Propaganda in Moscow, Europe, and the US: A Case Study on Think Tanks
and Universities, Research Paper, October 2018, Institute of Modern
Russia, https://imrussia.org. Kremlin-sponsored foundations have
established several centers of Russian studies at European and American
universities to broaden the network of Kremlin sympathizers within
Western academia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of initiatives could bring significant success in
combating Moscow's penetration of American and European societies. Law
enforcement bodies and investigative journalists need to probe and
expose the wide array of Russian state influence operations. In the
United States, this would include several former members of Congress
and the administration, lobbyists, public relations firms, policy
institutes, and various NGOs receiving funding directly or indirectly
from Kremlin sources or from oligarchs and foundations working on
behest of the Russian government, such as Russkiy Mir and Gorchakov. In
the U.S., campaign-financing laws are inadequate to stymie the flow of
foreign donations designed to influence national policy. \8\ Urgently
needed is anti-money laundering (AML) legislation so that hostile
actors identified by intelligence services or law-enforcement can be
blocked or apprehended. At the same time, politicians and major funders
must be required to make full disclosures regarding the source of their
revenues and assets as well as tax returns and other financial
documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Neil Barnett and Alastair Sloan, Democracy in the Crosshairs:
How Political Money Laundering Threatens the Democratic Process,
Atlantic Council, Eurasia Center, September 2018, https://issuu.com/
atlanticcouncil/docs/democracy_in_the_crosshairs_
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the United States, lax regulations enable lobbyists to operate
on Moscow's behalf and the Foreign Agent's Registration Act (FARA) is
insufficiently enforced. The focus must also encompass Putin's
supporters in the media and academia who receive finances or favors
from the Russian state. Funding sources, often channeled through shell
companies or third parties, should also be investigated for potential
U.S. sanctions busting or financial crimes such as money laundering and
tax avoidance. To retain credibility, universities and NGOs in the West
need to screen and investigate their funding sources and whether these
are connected with Kremlin influence operations or with financial
crimes perpetrated by Putin's oligarchs. PR campaigns by lobbyists
seeking to lift sanctions against Russian oligarchs and business
entities engaged in implementing the Kremlin's revisionist foreign
policy need to be exposed, particularly those individuals and entities
already sanctioned by the United States and the EU. One recent example
has been the attempt by lobbyists to influence the United States
Justice Department in easing sanctions against Oleg Deripaska, one of
President Putin's key oligarchic accomplices.
Benefiting from the extensive evidence unearthed by United States
Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation, the FBI needs to
conduct probes of all Kremlin-connected business deals and bank use in
the United States. As of December 2018, Mueller has issued indictments
against 29 Russian entities and extracted six guilty pleas and a
conviction. The findings of the Mueller probe, once it discloses all
the connections between Kremlin agencies, Russian oligarchs, Western
businessmen, social networks, and American collaborators during
Moscow's attack on the 2016 United States elections, would be a victory
in defense of American democracy and sovereignty. This would send an
important signal to the Kremlin that any future penetration would be
more effectively combated.
countering informational offensives
Information warfare is a systematic attempt to weaken and defeat
the morale and resistance of one's adversary. State-sponsored
information offensives are designed to undermine governments, divide
societies, debilitate decision makers, weaken national security, and
strengthen the position of the aggressor state. Compared to its Soviet
predecessor, the contemporary Russian disinformation offensive directed
at Western states and societies transmits a broader diversity of
messages and employs a wider assortment of methods.
Although Moscow's overriding strategic objective is similar to
Soviet times--to defeat the West--it has several supplementary goals:
to confuse and frighten citizens in Europe and America, to delegitimize
and disrupt Western democracies, to corrupt and corrode state
institutions, to undermine the credibility of legitimate news sources,
and to strengthen nationalists and populists who may favor Russia's
policies. Kremlin disinformation focuses on gullible sectors of the
Western public to depict Russia as a fully independent state founded on
traditional values. Such a message has appeal across the political and
social spectrum in the West--from leftist and rightist anti-American
Europeans to American nationalists, conservatives, and evangelicals.
Regarding the means of attack, modern disinformation has a much
wider and faster assortment of channels for distribution than during
Soviet times. In addition to standard media outlets, fabricated stories
can be disseminated through social internet platforms and rapidly reach
millions of consumers. As with village gossip, many people fail to
check the source before further spreading fabricated stories.
Repetitive electronic methods increase the reach of disinformation and
even infect the more credible mass media with bogus items. To win the
information war against the Kremlin a multi-national counter-propaganda
strategy is needed containing several defensive and offensive elements.
On the defensive front, social internet companies must provide
greater transparency and data protection from Russian trolls spreading
disinformation among American and European citizens. \9\ These
companies can intensify their efforts to eliminate fake accounts that
spread propaganda. Twitter and Facebook purges of Russian-linked
accounts have reduced the effectiveness of Moscow's disinformation.
However, the U.S. Congress should pass the Honest Ads Act, requiring
political advertising on social channels to have the same level of
transparency as on television and radio by revealing the funding
sources of sponsored content. Tech companies must also do more to
protect the private data of users, as this can be exploited to
manipulate public opinion or even blackmail and recruit foreign agents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ James Lamond, ``The Origins of Russia's Broad Political Assault
on the United States,'' Center for American Progress,
www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/10/03/458841/
origins-russias-broad-political-assault-united-states
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's state or oligarch-funded media outlets, including
television, radio, internet, and print media should not be presented as
legitimate media sources but as propaganda arms of the Kremlin. This
does not mean that they should be outlawed or banned but closely
monitored, exposed for the most egregious falsehoods, and where
possible labeled as spreading fabricated news or propaganda.
Simultaneously, media literacy among Western publics has to be
enhanced, or at least the capability to distinguish between credible
and fraudulent media sources.
Anti-disinformation initiatives can be more substantially funded
and expanded both in the United States and Europe. The Polygraph
initiative launched by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty serves as a valuable means to verify the increasing volume of
disinformation. \10\ In order to expose the most blatant political
fabrications, VOA and RFE/RL journalists research and analyze
statements and reports distributed by government officials, government-
sponsored media, and other high-profile individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ https://www.polygraph.info/p/5981.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Europe, an EU team StratCom East documents disinformation
originating from Russian sources and issues a weekly bulletin
highlighting numerous distortions, as well as a Twitter feed called EU
Mythbusters. Ukraine's StopFake is a valuable resource reporting on
Moscow's disinformation tactics. MythDetector tracks and debunks anti-
Western disinformation. Digital Sherlocks expose and explain
disinformation at the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic. Prague has
established a specialist unit dealing with fake news spread by websites
supported by Moscow. The Czech interior ministry Center Against
Terrorism and Hybrid Threats scrutinizes disinformation and counters it
via social internet platforms. An informal internet army of Lithuanians
``elves'' counters hate speech and pro-Moscow propaganda. They patrol
social platforms, coordinate their actions through Facebook and Skype
to expose fake accounts, and post blogs to discredit conspiracy
theories. At the same time, the European Commission has called upon
social platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Mozilla, to
do more to block Russian trolls from disrupting European elections.
Exposure of Russian disinformation is vital, but to be more
effective in countering disruptive attacks Western governments and NGOs
need to undertake an informational offensive targeted at public and
political opinion inside Russia. Such a psychological operation should
be geared toward two core objectives: alienating the Russian public
from the regime and provoking power struggles inside the ruling
stratum. Detailed revelations about financial abuse among officials
while living standards for the masses continue to plunge can help fuel
social, ethnic, regional, and religious unrest. Western sources can
disseminate poignant information for Russian citizens that is avoided
by the state media, including economic decline due to government
corruption; the country's neglected and crumbling infrastructure;
Russia's looming demographic catastrophe; and growing regional unrest.
Western intelligence services can acquire, leak, and dump kompromat
material about Putin and his inner circle. A key component would be to
disseminate official Russian communications, with a focus on the
Kremlin, government ministries, parliament, key businesses, and
subservient political parties, as well as private correspondence
between officials, particularly at local level, which negatively affect
the lives of ordinary citizens. Potentially incendiary information can
be circulated through the internet and various social platforms.
The objective would be to disclose the most provocative scandals of
Russia's state and local officials and the extent of their corrupt
governance, opulent lifestyles, public lies, and contempt for ordinary
citizens. Especially valuable would be messages that reveal the
willingness of state officials, oligarchs, and bureaucrats to betray
the country for personal gain from the Russian budget. Humor, irony,
and satire are also valuable assets in addressing Kremlin propaganda
and the nature of the Putinist system.
Disclosures about conflicts within the ruling elite can generate
uncertainty and anxiety in government circles and expose the regime's
political vulnerabilities. The promotion of internal power struggles
may not precipitate Putin's downfall, but it can help divert the
Kremlin from its unchallenged information war against Western
democracies. By spreading suspicion and distrust between officials and
raising fears of political purges or state expropriation of oligarchs,
factional infighting can be aggravated to endanger Putin's presidency.
Participation in social internet platforms has soared among
Russia's younger generation in recent years. The West needs to target
sectors of Russian society, including young people, the unemployed,
nationalists, ethnic and religious minorities, regionalists,
separatists, and numerous other groups to help sow discord and inspire
the emergence of anti-Kremlin movements. Russia itself may not be
immune from the anti-establishment populism that has swept through
Europe and the United States in recent years and from which the Kremlin
has tried to benefit in disassembling the West. \11\ This populist
boomerang, outraged by failing living standards, the yawning gap
between rich and poor, and rampant official corruption, may be manifest
in street protests and even violent acts against state property or
government officials, as there is no effective political outlet for
mass grievances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Paul Goble, ``Anti-Establishment Wave like Those in UK and US
May Engulf Russia, Minchenko Consulting Says,'' Windows on Eurasia--New
Series, October 26, 2018, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/
10/anti-establishment-wave-like-those-in.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some Western policy makers will caution that informational
offensives against Moscow would be too provocative and could escalate
bilateral disputes. However, from the Kremlin's perspective, the lack
of an effective United States response to its own interference in
Western societies is perceived as a major vulnerability that invites
further intervention. The attacks continue primarily because Moscow
faces an inadequate defense and a tepid counter-attack. Although the
EU's East StratCom, NATO's StratCom, and the newly established national
StratComs in Europe can be effective tools, they still lack sufficient
resources and coordination to combat and counter Kremlin-directed
disinformation. \12\ Since officials in Moscow will in any case accuse
the United States of interfering in its domestic affairs, Washington
together with its allies should make sure that their involvement is
politically consequential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Donald N. Jensen and Peter B. Doran, Chaos as a Strategy:
Putin's ``Promethean'' Gamble, Center for European Policy Analysis
(CEPA), November 2018, https://www.cepa.org/chaos-as-a-strategy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cyber defense and counter-attack
Cyber attacks on the West can include systematic assaults and
denial of service attacks on government sites by Kremlin agencies or
hired hackers. It can also entail the monitoring of telecommunications,
infecting targeted networks with viruses, or disabling entire systems.
Such attacks can affect critical infrastructure and the defense
industrial base, including power stations and grids, transportation and
telecommunication networks, banking and financial services, as well as
law enforcement and national security systems. An internal U.S.
Department of Defense report released in December 2018 enumerated
various gaps in cyber security, including failure to encrypt classified
flash drives or place physical locks on critical computer servers, that
have left the country vulnerable to missile attacks. \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cybersecurity-failures-
raise-threat-deadly-missile-attacks-pentagon-watchdog-says-n949176
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measures must be taken to better protect vital infrastructure,
including national defense systems, in case Moscow escalates its cyber
probing into an actual attack. Lessons learned from European countries
that have been targeted by the Kremlin must also be incorporated in the
United States response, including Ukraine where a major Russian attack
(NotPetya) in June 2017 disabled about 10% of all computer systems and
affected airports, banks, electrical networks, and communications
services. Critical infrastructure among NATO allies needs better
protection from cyber attacks. \14\ Key measures should include state
funding of public utilities and commercial providers to upgrade their
systems; contingency plans to ensure a rapid response and coordination
among NATO members; better public information and preparation for
cyber-related disruptions of vital supplies; and modernization of
emergency services to handle large-scale emergencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Central European Futures: Five Scenarios for 2025, Visegrad
Insight, Special Edition 1(12)/2018, https://visegradinsight.eu
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stricter sanctioning against cyber attackers needs to be pursued.
In June 2018, the United States Treasury imposed sanctions on five
Russian entities and three individuals, including a firm that is
controlled by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), in response to
Russian cyber attacks on the United States and its allies, including
the NotPetya cyber attack and cyber intrusions of America's energy
grid. The United States Cyber Command, established in 2009, has
targeted Russian operatives to deter them from spreading disinformation
in United States elections. \15\ American operatives inform them they
have been identified, that their work is being monitored, and they
could be indicted or sanctioned. This is a useful first step but may
not dissuade the broad array of Kremlin-affiliated hackers and trolls.
To pursue a more potent offensive, an example should be made by
releasing personal information about pro-Moscow cyber offenders and
pursuing ways to neutralize their online operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Julian E. Barnes, ``U.S. Begins First Cyberoperation Against
Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections,'' The New York Times, October 23,
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Cyber Command defends military networks but has also
developed offensive capabilities. In September 2018, the Pentagon
issued a comprehensive cyber strategy document focusing on Russia and
China as the chief adversaries and calling for ``confronting threats
before they reach U.S. networks.'' \16\ U.S. Cyber Command has been
tasked with defending the country against attacks. However, this
approach needs to be more assertive and extensive, particularly as
there is consensus that lower-level malicious campaigns pose a major,
cumulative risk to the U.S. The strategy also makes more explicit the
Defense Department's role in deterring or defeating cyber operations
targeting U.S. critical infrastructure that is likely to cause a
significant ``cyber incident.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Department of Defense, Cyber Strategy 2018, https://
media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/
CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. and its allies need to develop and deploy its offensive
cyber capabilities to deter and attack aggressors. In September 2018,
President Trump signed the National Security Presidential Memorandum
13, a directive that enables offensive U.S. cyber operations. \17\ It
allows the military and other U.S. agencies to undertake cyber
operations intended to protect their systems and the country's critical
networks. Washington must make it clear that it is prepared to use all
available tools, including cyber offensives, against state-sponsored
assailants. In deterring and defeating cyber adversaries, a Cyber Force
should also be established that can work more closely with allies and
partners. \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The Washington Post, 20 September 2018, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-authorizes-
offensive-cyber-operations-to-deter-foreign-adversaries-bolton-says/
2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-
0773aa1e33da_story.html?utm_term=.72cb3af80304
\18\ Seth G. Jones, ``Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to
Combat Russian Information Warfare, CSIS Briefs,'' October 1, 2018,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive-us-strategy-combat-
russian-information-warfare
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Moscow's reaction to a United States cyber attack will prove
instructive, given that America has superior electronic capabilities
and can take down critical infrastructure in Russia itself. As a
warning, Washington could demonstrate its cyber capabilities vis-a-vis
third parties that have attacked U.S. systems. A resolute action is
more likely to deter Moscow's attacks than repetitive warnings and
fruitless admonitions.
economic and financial penalties
The Kremlin uses a number of economic tools to enmesh specific
states in a web of financial ties that buttress its political
penetration. It tries to influence European governments through
ownership of strategic economic sectors, particularly in energy,
banking, and telecommunications. Russian company ownership of key
energy infrastructure, such as pipelines, refineries, and storage
sites, enables Moscow to exert political leverage. The supply of energy
and other strategic resources can be decreased or severed at important
junctures to exert pressure on particular capitals, or their price can
be lowered or raised to gain political concessions. Russia's business
penetration also fosters corruption, non-transparency, money
laundering, tax evasion, and links with international organized crime.
To undercut Moscow's financial offensive several initiatives can
prove beneficial. Financial sanctions should be extended on Russian
government officials and Kremlin connected oligarchs, including
freezing their international bank accounts, investment funds, and safe
deposit boxes, denying access to credit cards and the SWIFT banking
network, and seizing their real estate, investment funds, planes, cars,
boats, and other properties in the West. Putin himself can be included
in the expanded list of targets, together with major energy companies
and other Kremlin-linked businesses. Thus far the ``sectoral
sanctions'' imposed on Russian companies have had a limited impact. To
be more effective ``blocking sanctions'' are needed that freeze all
Russian transactions via the U.S. financial system. \19\ This could be
replicated in Europe's financial system. An asset freeze on Russian
banks can be combined with a suspension of any new trade and investment
with Moscow.
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\19\ Michael Carpenter, ``How to Make Sanctions on Russia Work,''
The American Interest, December 18, 2018, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2018/12/18/how-to-make-sanctions-on-russia-work/
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Current money laundering regulations in Western countries are
inadequate and insufficiently enforced; they must be significantly
tightened and the sources of cash flows investigated. The bi-partisan
2018 Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act needs to
be passed and implemented by Congress. \20\ This legislation expands
financial sanctions on new Russian sovereign debt, against investment
in state-owned energy projects, and on key political and business
figures who facilitate the Kremlin's subversive activities.
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\20\ https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s3336/text
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Additional measures can be taken to reverse Russian state
penetration of Western economies. This can include counter-intelligence
and law enforcement investigations of all Kremlin-connected business
and banking deals; bans on purchases of Russian sovereign and state
corporation bonds; embargos on the transfer of dual use technologies;
countering Russia's monopolistic energy schemes by suspending support
and financing for the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline under the
Baltic Sea as well as Moscow's other politically-motivated energy
projects; and the imposition of sanctions on all companies investing in
Russian-controlled infrastructure and which contribute to undermining
Western democracies and alliances.
military and security instruments
Russia's new military doctrine signed by President Vladimir Putin
in December 2014 describes an increasingly threatening international
environment that can generate problems at home. \21\ It claims that
intensifying ``global competition'' from NATO and the United States in
particular constitutes a direct threat to Russia. In disguising its own
neo-imperial aspirations, Moscow asserts that it will counter Western
attempts to gain strategic superiority by deploying strategic missile
defense systems. \22\ It also reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
in response to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction
against Russia or its allies, and even in case of an ``aggression''
against Russia with conventional weapons that would endanger the
existence of the state. The threat of nuclear strikes against NATO
members is intended to terrorize citizens and convince Western
governments that they need to negotiate and acquiesce to Moscow's
demands.
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\21\ Paul Goble, ``Putin's New Military Doctrine Says Russia Faces
More Threats Abroad--and at Home,'' Windows on Eurasia--New Series,
December 27, 2014, http://windowone urasia2.blogspot.com/2014/12/
window-on-eurasia-putins-new-military.html; and news.kremlin. ru/media/
events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.
\22\ Pavel Podvig, ``New Version of the Military Doctrine,''
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2014, http://
russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/new_version_of_the_military_do.shtml
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The Kremlin employs an assortment of tools to undermine the
security of its neighbors and prevent them from acting in unison to
defend their national interests. These include persistent military
threats, dangerous military encounters and other provocations,
intimidating exercises, nuclear blackmail, unconventional offensives,
proxy wars, sponsorship and funding of separatist militias,
conventional military intervention, territorial fragmentation, and the
creation and manipulation of ``frozen'' or unresolved conflicts.
Western states and NATO can pursue a number of counter-measures to
impair Russia's offensives and dent its ambitions. All aspirant states
in the Western Balkans should gain membership in NATO in the quickest
possible time once they fulfill basic conditions for accession,
particularly Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosova. Membership
Action Plans (MAPs) on route to NATO entry should be provided to
Ukraine and Georgia. MAPs should also be offered to Serbia, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and whichever NATO Partnership for Peace
(PfP) countries request accession and commit themselves to qualifying
for membership.
Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries facing a direct Russian armed
assault must be effectively armed with whatever weapons they need to
inflict heavy losses on invading Russian forces and their proxies. In
the Black Sea and Azov Sea the U.S. and NATO need to dispatch naval
vessels to Ukrainian ports to demonstrate the validity of Freedom of
Navigation Operations and underscore that these are not Moscow's lakes.
This will also highlight the fact that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has
positively intensified NATO-Ukraine relations--precisely the outcome
that the Kremlin aimed to prevent. \23\ NATO members along the eastern
flank from the Baltic to the Black Sea regions confronting an assertive
Russia must be more intensively assisted in developing their maritime
and territorial defensive capabilities.
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\23\ Stephen Blank, ``Why is the Sea of Azov so Important?''
Atlantic Council, November 6, 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/ukrainealert/why-is-the-sea-of-azov-so-important
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NATO military drills should be regularly staged in different zones
close to Russia's borders with minimal prior warning. All states
neighboring NATO should be invited to participate in such exercises,
including Belarus and Moldova. Numerous scenarios can be simulated in
the drills, including repulsing indirect or direct military invasions
and territorial seizure by foreign forces. Such maneuvers could help
disrupt Moscow's military planning and disperse Russian forces along
its long borders with NATO states.
NATO planners also need to prepare contingences for opening
alternative fronts and conflict zones for Moscow in the event of a
Russian military attack on any part of NATO territory. The aim would be
to convince the Kremlin that the Western alliance is capable of
creating and exploiting potentially destabilizing scenarios inside
Russia and along its borders if Moscow intervenes in a NATO state. In
addition to strengthening conventional military forces to deter a
Russian assault, NATO can also prepare plans for special operations on
Russian territory or missions whereby it can draw Moscow into internal
or external conflicts that backfire politically. Such moves are more
likely to place the Kremlin on the defensive rather than allowing it to
maintain the initiative in its attacks on the West.
managing russia's dissolution
The United States and NATO need to return to core principles in
dealing with Putin's Russia by applying and adapting policies that
hastened the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. This should be anchored in supporting
political pluralism, minority rights, genuine federalism,
administrative decentralization, and self-determination among Russia's
disparate regions and numerous ethnic groups. The impending
fragmentation of the Russian Federation may not be as peaceful as the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the West needs to start planning
for a range of scenarios that will affect several of Russia's European
neighbors, NATO allies, and EU members. The basis for such a strategy
would be a comprehensive assessment of each federal unit, ethnic group,
and regional identity to reveal all of Russia's vulnerabilities and
determine the opportunities for resistance, protest, sovereignty, and
secession.
Russia has failed to develop into a nation state with a distinct
ethnic or civic identity but remains an essentially imperial construct.
In order to retain its state integrity, Russia needs to operate along
more inclusive lines to manage disparate domestic interests. The
country's increasingly stifling authoritarianism, much like Soviet
communism, will eventually fragment the country. Russia's numerous
nationalities are in effect trapped within a colonial federation that
only benefits a narrow elite of security personnel, bureaucrats,
oligarchs, and politicians tied to the Kremlin. Moscow extracts maximum
resources from the federal regions while disbursing and investing as
little as possible. Without local self-determination and regional
autonomy, the federal structure will become increasingly unmanageable
with the prospect of violent collapse.
While Moscow seeks to divide the West and fracture the EU and NATO
by supporting nationalist, populist, separatist, anti-American, and
anti-EU parties throughout Europe, Washington and its Allies can
counteract by promoting regional and ethnic autonomy inside the Russian
Federation and eventual independence from Moscow. \24\ The rationale
for such a strategy should be logically framed: in order to survive
Russia needs a federal democracy and a robust economy; with no
democratization on the horizon and economic conditions deteriorating
the federal structure will become increasingly ungovernable; to manage
the process of dissolution and lessen the likelihood of conflict that
spills over state borders the West needs to establish links with
Russia's diverse regions and promote their efforts for a peaceful
transition toward statehood.
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\24\ The argument that Russia must be kept intact because it
possesses nuclear weapons is flawed; similar assertions were made about
the Soviet Union before its collapse. Any emerging Muscovite state
ruled from the Kremlin will inherit the nuclear arsenal just as Russia
inherited that of the Soviet Union.
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In the West's information offensive against the Putin regime,
Russia's fake federalism should be contrasted with the genuine
federalism of the United States system and other federal states in
Europe and elsewhere. Western governments can diplomatically support
self-determination and federalization inside Russia in key
international institutions. As during the Cold War, when Washington
backed the ``captive nations,'' including Ukrainians, Lithuanians,
Estonians, and Latvians, Western services can both openly or covertly
assist autonomist and independence movements throughout the Russian
Federation--from Kaliningrad and Karelia, through the Middle Volga and
the North Caucasus to Tuva and Sakha in Siberia and the Far East.
Indeed, Western leaders need to underscore that regions such as Sakha
and Magadan, with their substantial mineral wealth, could develop into
successful independent states without Moscow's political control and
economic exploitation.
Governors of Russia's federal units appointed by the Kremlin may be
faced with a stark choice as public disaffection mounts. They can
either continue to implement Moscow's repressive and exploitative
policies and face growing domestic opposition and even violent revolt,
or they can transform themselves into genuine leaders pushing for the
interests of their republics and resist pressures from the Kremlin.
Recent public protests in Ingushetia against a land exchange deal with
Chechnya that favors Grozny and was backed by the Kremlin indicates
that the power and policies of local governors will come under
increasing question at the same time that Moscow has diminishing
financial resources to support the poorest republics. \25\
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\25\ Tony Wesolowski, ``Land Grab? Why the Ingush are Furious with
Chechnya,'' Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, October 10, 2018, https:/
/www.rferl.org/a/explainer-ingush-chechen-land-swap/29536507.html
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Demands for authentic autonomy among Russia's diverse regions can
be boosted through foreign economic connections. Local populations in
several regions will benefit from forging closer trading contacts with
neighboring states rather than depending on Moscow, whose federal
budget is drastically shrinking. The Russian government has been
calling for the richer regions to help subsidize the poorer ones, thus
further aggravating their relations with the Center. Collapsing
infrastructure means that residents of enormous regions such as Siberia
and the Russian Far East will become even more separated from Moscow
and European Russia, a trend that encourages regionalist or even
independence movements. Siberia has also been hit particularly hard by
international financial sanctions, as some of the major sanctioned
oligarchs operate large enterprises in the region employing tens of
thousands of workers.
It will be important to base Western policy on the calculation that
the Russian Federation may not disintegrate simply along ethnic lines,
as regional identities and grievances are growing even among Russian
ethnics in Siberia and the Far East who may favor separation and
statehood. Simultaneously, separatist sentiments among non-Russians can
be encouraged through an information campaign underscoring Kremlin
plans to downgrade the distinctiveness of ethnic republics, absorbing
them into Russian-majority regions, or eliminating them altogether.
This is evident in Moscow's plans to amalgamate and reduce the number
of federal units, as well as the recently enacted language law designed
to promote Russification and curtail native languages. \26\
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\26\ Paul Goble, ``Putin's Language Policies `a Bomb Under the
Russian Federation,' Experts Say,'' Windows on Eurasia, December 22,
2018, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/12/putins-language-
policies-bomb-under.html and ``Declining Trust in Government at All
Levels Becoming Problem in Majority of Federal Subjects, Grashchenkov
Says,'' December 23, 2018, Windows on Eurasia, December 23, 2018,
https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/12/putins-language-policies-
bomb-under.html
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Support for autonomist and independence movements will also send a
strong signal that the West can react to Moscow's aggression against
NATO states by intensifying its backing for Russia's rupture. Indeed,
NATO should prepare contingencies for both the dangers and the
opportunities that Russia's fragmentation may present. This would
involve a twin-track approach. First, Russia's European neighbors must
be provided with sufficient security in terms of weapons systems and
NATO military support to shield themselves from the most destabilizing
scenarios emanating from Russia's dissolution. Plans can also be drawn
up for handling refugee outflows, cross-border military spillovers, and
other incidents that can negatively impact on nearby states.
Second, detailed plans should be drafted for engaging with the new
entities emerging from a splintering Russian federation. New aspiring
states may not necessarily be based on ethnic principles but on
regional multi-ethnic identities amidst increasing local estrangement
from Moscow even among Russian populations. Some regions could join
existing countries such as Finland, Ukraine, China, and Japan, from
whom Moscow has forcefully appropriated territories in the past. Other
republics and territories in the North Caucasus, Middle Volga, Siberia,
and the Far East could become fully independent states and forge
bilateral relations with China, Japan, the United States, and Europe.
russia's escalating failures
Russia is infected with terminal maladies that will have widespread
domestic reverberations and impact on United States and Allied
interests from Europe to East Asia. Instead of assuming that Russia
will transform itself into a stable and internationally constructive
polity, it is time to acknowledge that the Russian Federation has
failed to develop into a national state with a binding ethnic or civic
identity and into a regional power without neo-imperial ambitions.
Under the Putinist system, Russia has become a brittle centralized
federation that will only become post-imperial through its dissolution.
Neglecting Russia's impending fragmentation may prove more damaging
to Western interests than making preparations to manage its
international repercussions. To avoid sudden geopolitical jolts and
possible military confrontations, Washington and its European allies
need to monitor and encourage a peaceful rupture and establish links
with the entities that emerge from Russia's convulsions. The sudden
collapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a lesson that far-reaching
transformations occur regardless of the Kremlin's disinformation
campaigns or the West's shortsighted adherence to a transient status
quo.
_______________________________________________________________________
Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European
Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC and author of 20 books on
Europe, Russia, and trans-Atlantic relations. His most recent book is
co-authored with Margarita Assenova and entitled Eurasian Disunion:
Russia's Vulnerable Flanks, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016.
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