[Senate Hearing 116-513]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-513
THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A UNITED STATES
SPACE FORCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 11, 2019
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-163 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JONI ERNST, Iowa TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
April 11, 2019
Page
The Proposal to Establish a United States Space Force............ 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 2
Witness Statements
Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint 5
Chiefs of Staff.
Shanahan, Honorable Patrick M., Acting Secretary of Defense...... 6
Wilson, Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force......... 12
Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic 13
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 54
(iii)
THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
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THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer,
McSally, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meeting will come to order.
We want to welcome our witnesses: Secretary Shanahan,
Acting Secretary of Defense; Secretary Heather Wilson,
Secretary of the Air Force; General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General John Hyten, Commander of
the U.S. Strategic Command.
Before we begin today's hearing, I'd like to provide
special recognition to Secretary Wilson. Today is likely her
last appearance before this committee, as she's transitioning
to her new position of president of the University of Texas--El
Paso. I spent about 20 years of my life down there, so I know
what you're in for. We'll miss you dearly. Your service to our
country has been commendable--first serving in the United
States Air Force from 1982 on, and as Congresswoman from 1998
to 2009, and culminating as the 24th Secretary of the Air
Force. We appreciate all of your service. We will miss you.
I've got to applaud and thank both President Trump and Vice
President Pence for their renewed focus and cohesive approach
to America's resurgence in the space domain and the support to
our National Defense Strategy, this document here, which is our
blueprint.
The reestablishment of the National Space Council, chaired
by the Vice President, has provided multiple Space Policy
Directives, including the establishment of the Unified
Combatant Command and U.S. Space Command, as well as standing
up the Space Development Agency and providing us with the
United States Space Force proposal we are discussing today.
Space is a warfighting domain, and future conflicts with
Russia and China will invoke attacks from, in, and through
space. This would profoundly disrupt our society, which is
heavily dependent upon satellite communications, positioning,
navigation, and timing, and other vital space-based technology.
We must restore our margin of dominance in space over our
adversaries. The President's leadership and continued attention
to this space domain protects the freedom of action these
great-power competitors would like to disturb. The unwavering
presidential support we have received ensures our warfighters
we have the technology and ability to bring America back to
greatness in space.
Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to
continue to gather facts, to fully explore the proposal, as
presented to us. It was only 4 weeks ago, if you remember. That
was right after our budget discussion. And talking with Members
of the Committee and their Military Legislative Assistants
(MLAs), we're all openminded on the plan, but are wrestling
with different aspects of it. And this is one of those rare
times when we're having a hearing where people haven't already
made up their minds. So, we look forward to that.
When we first heard about the proposal, I asked two simple
questions. What will the organization fix? And how much will it
cost? Now, I was going to say, I have yet to get satisfactory
answers on either one of these, but it's come out of the
Administration that this is going to be a $2 billion program.
So, for my purposes, I'm going to assume that's right, but I'm
still waiting for the answer for the first question. So, I look
forward to talking about the options, the considerations.
Another option could be making the National Reconnaissance
Office, the NRO, the space office. I consider that would be a
viable alternative. We'll be discussing these alternatives in
the time to come.
Senator Reed and I have concluded that, since this is such
a high visibility and that there's so much interest in this,
instead of 5-minute rounds, we're going to have 6-minute
rounds. And we look forward to dealing with our Committee
Members.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing to discuss the Department's proposal to
establish a United States Space Force.
Again, I think that the timing is appropriate. The
Administration understands the different challenging demands in
space that have evolved very quickly over the last 2 years, and
their proposal gives us something to work with. And I thank
them for that.
Let me welcome our distinguished witnesses and join the
Chairman in saluting and thanking Secretary Wilson for her
distinguished service. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
All of us would agree that space is essential to the
security and progress of the United States. It is a critical
component of almost every aspect of everyday life, from
communications, financial transactions, and navigation, to the
weather. For decades, the United States enjoyed unfettered
access to space. However, as near-peer competitors increase
their space presence, space is becoming contested. Eventually,
it could be a warfighting domain, and we must prepare
accordingly. The question is how.
There are legitimate concerns that the Department of
Defense (DOD) is not effectively organized to address the
threats posed by our near-peer adversaries in space. Congress
has grappled with how to address these concerns. In fact, in
2017, we debated a House proposal on whether or not to create a
Space Corps. Ultimately, due to strong opposition in the Senate
and questions from senior officials within the Department of
Defense, Congress did not create a Space Corps. But, we did
strengthen the space cadre and space acquisition authorities
within the Air Force, and specifically within the Air Force
Space Command. Last year, Congress took an additional step and
created a sub-unified command for space reporting to the U.S.
Strategic Command. This year, the Administration has proposed
to establish the U.S. Space Force as a new military service
within the Air Force responsible for organizing, training, and
equipping all forces who will fight in the space domain.
The proposal is essentially the same House proposal we
debated in 2017. I fully agree that the threat is real and that
changes need to be made to better address the threat. However,
creating a new branch of the Armed Forces for the first time in
70 years is not a decision Congress should make lightly. Such a
major reorganization would have long-lasting consequences, both
intended and unintended, for how our forces will fight, the
decades into the future.
While the Department's proposal appears comprehensive,
there are areas where I have questions and concerns that I hope
we can discuss during today's hearing.
My first area of concern is the creation of what seems to
be a very topheavy bureaucracy. According to initial estimates,
the Space Force will be a military service of approximately
16,500 people. Roughly 1,000 personnel will serve in
headquarters positions. Presently, the smallest force is the
Marine Corps, with a total force of 246,000 military and
civilian personnel, and a headquarters staff of 1,200. This
Space Force would be in the Department of the Air Force,
similar to the Navy/Marine Corps model. However, this proposal
creates an Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space; whereas,
the Marine Corps does not have a separate Under Secretary.
The proposal also creates two new four-star general
officers in Space Force, one for the Chief of Staff and the
other for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Space Force. The Chief
of Staff of the Space Force would be a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I hope our witnesses will explain why the
Space Force requires a separate and dedicated Under Secretary,
unlike the Marine Corps, and whether such a topheavy
bureaucracy is necessary for such a small fighting force.
The Department states that a new military service will
significantly increase focus in leadership, expertise,
personnel, and culture. With regard to the personnel actions
requested, I have some concerns that this proposal may actually
have the opposite effect. Of the 16,500 members of this force,
10,500 would be Active Duty servicemembers almost exclusively
from the Air Force, and a significant number of Space Force
general officers would be drawn largely from the Air Force.
Therefore, the future pool of officers from which the Space
Force would grow field-grade and general officers would be
small compared to other Services, and predominantly from one
Service. This raises question about the depth, breadth,
diversity, and long-term quality of the officer corps.
While predominantly made up of Air Force personnel, the
proposal seeks to consolidate much of the space activities of
the other services into Space Force. The Department is
specifically requesting authority for the Secretary of Defense
to transfer military and civilian personnel, both voluntarily
and involuntarily, and their associated budgets and billets to
the Space Force. While it's possible all these transfers could
be done voluntarily, I believe that scenario is highly
unlikely. The connection a servicemember has to their
individual military branch is often deeply rooted and a part of
their identity. Furthermore, the Department has not yet decided
on what role the Guard and Reserve will play in this new
service.
This proposal would authorize a new civilian personnel
system exclusive to the Space Force that would be exempted from
the statutory rules and protections applicable to most other
Federal employees, including antidiscrimination laws and
whistleblower protections. Most notably, the proposal would
create a statutory exemption from collective bargaining rights
for this workforce and would authorize the Department to
involuntarily transfer civilian employees, stripping him of
their collective bargaining rights in the process.
The Department's initial cost estimate for Space Force in
fiscal year 2020 is $72 million. However, the Department has
provided only notional budget numbers for out-of-year budgets,
with an estimate that Space Force will require approximately
$1.6 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
based on a flat $500 million recurring cost for personnel. It
is highly unlikely that the bureaucracy of the Space Force will
remain flat over time. I think providing the DOD with wide
legislative authority to create a new bureaucracy without more
robust budget details is risky.
On a final point, the National Reconnaissance Office is
responsible for our Nation's intelligence collection in space.
It is a joint organization between DOD and the intelligence
community. Clearly, it will play a critical role in space as a
warfighting domain, yet it is not yet part of this proposal in
any way. I understand there are difficult issues to address in
both the Administration and Congress on any changes to the
status quo, but I'm interested why this obvious seam in the
organization of space was not addressed. And I'm interested in
hearing from the witnesses on this issue.
Again, the threats we face in space are real and clear;
they require action. I commend the Administration and the
Department for taking such action. We will consider this issue
very, very carefully.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Well, we have four witnesses. All four will have opening
statements. And we will ask you to try to keep your opening
statement down around 5 minutes, because we have a lot of
members here, and we're going to have 6-minute rounds, so it's
going to take awhile.
So, we'll start with you, General Dunford. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thanks for the
opportunity to join Secretary Shanahan, Secretary Wilson, and
General Hyten here today.
Last month, I testified before you that China and Russia
have developed capabilities to contest our ability to operate
across all domains. This includes space, which is now a fully
contested warfighting domain, along with sea, air, land, and
cyberspace.
As you know, we have conducted joint military net
assessments, each in the last 2 years, to determine our
readiness to execute the National Defense and Military
Strategies. At the unclassified level, our assessment includes
several observations that are relevant to our discussion this
morning and highlight that our competitive advantage in space
has eroded.
China and Russia have taken significant steps to challenge
our traditional dominance in space. They have reorganized their
armed forces and developed robust space capabilities, to
include space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. These steps provide the ability to more
effectively target United States and allied forces. China and
Russia are also capable of searching, tracking, and
characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits in support of
space and counterspace operations. Their counterspace
capabilities include jamming, cyberoperations, directed-energy
weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based anti-satellite
missiles. China and Russia clearly recognize the implications
of space from both an economic and a warfighting perspective,
and, as a result, they are adapting.
As Secretary Shanahan has in his written statement,
Secretary Wilson has addressed, and both the Chairman and the
Ranking Member have mentioned, space is no longer a sanctuary.
Traditionally, the Air Force has been the principal driver of
our efforts in space. And, because of airmen like John Hyten,
who joins us here today, our capabilities today are second to
none. But, our current organizational construct was developed
before space was a contested domain. As a result of our
analysis over the last few years, I have become convinced that
we need change to maintain our competitive edge.
In the past, we have often effected change in the wake of
failure. Today, we have an opportunity and, I would argue, an
imperative, to change based on our ability to anticipate. We
have an opportunity to look to the future and posture ourselves
to seize and hold the high ground of space. We've already acted
to establish United States Space Command, which will ensure we
can most effectively operate in and from space. Taking a next
step to create a Space Force will allow us to develop and
maintain a singular focus on developing the people, the
capabilities, the doctrine, and the culture we'll need to
maintain our competitive advantage in space. Together, I
believe these steps will accelerate our efforts to develop,
field, and operate the capabilities we'll need for joint
warfighting in the future.
Thank you, Chairman. And I look forward to taking
questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Secretary Shanahan.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PATRICK M. SHANAHAN, ACTING SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Shanahan. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify in support of the Department of Defense's U.S. Space
Force proposal.
Before we begin, let me pay my respects to the families of
the United States marines we lost this week in Afghanistan.
While we will discuss elements of national security here today,
we know it is America's young men and women who ultimately
deliver that security for us and our families each and every
day.
Let me open my comments on the Space Force by expressing my
admiration for our U.S. Air Force. Because of our airmen, and
Secretary Wilson's leadership, in particular, we are the best
in space. This proposal is about maintaining the margin of
dominance they have given us and accelerating the capabilities
we need in this increasingly competitive domain. Establishing
the Space Force within the Air Force lets us do just that.
It is all the more vital now, because our $19 trillion
economy, our American way of life, and our American way of war
all depend on space. Sixteen months ago, at your direction, in
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2018 , I began a review to, quote, ``identify and--a
recommended organizational and management structure for the
national security space components,'' end quote. We are here to
respond to that direction, to address the problems Congress,
multiple bipartisan commissions, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and others have all characterized. DOD's space
efforts are disaggregated, resulting in a slow bureaucratic
approach. Today, DOD has five Senate-confirmed officials who
are responsible for more than ten organizations developing
bespoke space capabilities in a very federated fashion, failing
to integrate across DOD and to capture the cost synergies of
standards. The current approach has served its purpose. We are
at an inflection point. Threats are increasing, and the
importance of and the opportunities in space are growing.
Both China and Russia have weaponized space, with the
intent to hold American capabilities at risk. Every member of
this committee has access to the classified threat picture, but
the bottom line is, the next major conflict may be won or lost
in space. At the same time, an explosion in commercial space
innovation is adding thousands of satellites and a new range of
capabilities, unlocking a trillion dollars in economic
opportunity.
There is widespread agreement the status quo is not
sufficient. Change is required to stay ahead. Approached
correctly, this is an opportunity for a generational
improvement. Future space capabilities should be system-
engineered from the start, to include launch, commercial
innovation, the network, the satellite, the ground segment,
user equipment, and cybersecurity. Our military is organized
around physical domains--Army on land, Navy on sea, Air Force
in the air. Given the significant change confronting us, we now
need a military service dedicated to space. Instead of
coordinating across more than ten organizations, we will
consolidate and concentrate into the Space Force so that we
have clear lines of accountability and responsibility.
Two elements of the Space Force organize, train, and equip
mission are worth elaborating on:
First, today's space personnel go through a professional
military education system focused on air, land, or sea. Space
is an add-on. The Space Force will build a professional
development system that recruits technical talent, educating
our people in space from the beginning to produce the quantity
and quality of leaders we need.
Second, organizing and equipping includes force design and
force development. This means understanding the domain, the
technology, and warfare deeply enough to design and deliver
future capabilities, ensuring space power today and in the
future.
The Space Force has two related components. First, a
Unified Combatant Command for space, with a full-time commander
focused on space operations. Second, the Space Development
Agency will develop and deliver the next generation of space-
based communications and Earth observation while existing
organizations continue current efforts.
The status quo is not sufficient. We need to outpace
threats in space, not simply keep up with them. Because our
current system isn't organized to move fast enough, the Space
Force will consolidate, elevate, and focus our efforts for
results. Our partnership with Congress is critical. Our
proposal responds to your Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA direction. And
we stand ready to work with you and resolve any questions or
details. We ask your support in making the strategic initiative
to establish the U.S. Space Force in fiscal year 2020 NDAA.
America has enduring interests in space. And, just as the U.S.
Navy ensures freedom of navigation of the seas, America's Space
Force must now ensure the freedom to navigate the stars.
Thank you. I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Shanahan and General
Dunford follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan and General
Joseph F. Dunford
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of the
Department's U.S. Space Force proposal. Aligned within the National
Security Strategy (NSS) and our National Defense Strategy (NDS), this
is our roadmap to expand our margin of dominance in space to protect
the American people, our $19 trillion economy, and the systems our
military operates to keep our Nation safe. This mission is no different
than that of our U.S. Navy which as early as 1801 served to protect
U.S. trade and commerce, and also took action against Barbary pirates.
Since our nation's earliest days, America's economy has always relied
on freedom of navigation--whether on sea, land, air and now, space. In
short, economic security is national security.
Through the centuries, we have successfully guarded that freedom
and security from the malign intent of global adversaries, regional
hegemons, and the occasional non-state actor. However, as highlighted
in the NSS and NDS, we have reached a strategic inflection point in an
era of renewed great power competition. We have retained much of our
mercantile roots, and as such we are now fully dependent on space for
our economic well-being and national security. Having carefully
observed our dependencies on space, China and Russia have developed new
technologies, strategies, tactics, and asymmetric capabilities
specifically intended to deny our freedom of operation in space. While
we would prefer space remain free from conflict, they have made space a
warfighting domain. In 2007, the Chinese tested an anti-satellite
missile by kinetically destroying a Fengyun series polar orbit
satellite. Furthermore, since 2014, Moscow has been experimenting with
the orbital maneuvering of military spacecraft. We currently maintain
an advantage relative to these competitors, but our space enterprise
was built for a strategic environment that no longer exists and our
margin of dominance is quickly shrinking.
We are in another interwar innovation period, and we can either
remain stagnant or evolve to the changing operating environment. We
have unmatched human capital and resources; our challenge now is to get
the systems engineering right and accelerate transformation of our
posture to space as a warfighting domain. The Department's Space Force
proposal is one of our proposed reorganizations to achieve greater
integration, overcome paralysis of risk aversion, leverage our new
technology base, and ultimately align our diverse space elements within
the Department around strategic outcomes.
This is a complex and enduring undertaking; the transformation
required to achieve it is a significant, multi-faceted endeavor. As
unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space is a vital
national interest, it demands a corresponding level of priority and
focus.
Establishing the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed
Forces will fundamentally transform our approach to space from a combat
support function to a warfighting domain of competition and potential
conflict. This action will institutionally elevate space relative to
its role in national security; unify space missions, capabilities, and
forces with clear responsibilities and authorities; and focus on the
development and fielding of the personnel, culture, doctrine, and
capabilities for a distinct, yet integrated, domain. The proposed U.S.
Space Force within the Department of the Air Force, along with the
associated elements of U.S. Space Command and the Space Development
Agency, allows us to work on these challenges at speed, maximizing
warfighting effectiveness while minimizing bureaucracy and additional
costs.
strategic environment
Space is essential to the American way of life; it also underpins
the American way of war. From global communications networks to the
physical movement of people and materials, space-based capabilities
have allowed our economy to thrive and our military to project force
with significant competitive advantage. Today, commercial entities
worldwide are delivering new space technologies and capabilities at
speeds never before seen. This rapid innovation also lowers the cost of
accessing space and enables new services.
Strategic competitors China and Russia have observed the
asymmetrical advantages afforded us by space over the last two decades.
They now perceive space as a viable target to nullify our asymmetric
advantages in other domains and gain a strategic foothold for future
competition. Following this perception, they have adjusted their
military strategies and organizations to neutralize the Joint Force's
ability to project power: China and Russia have developed, tested, and
fielded counterspace capabilities to deny U.S. and Allied use of space-
based systems during crises and conflicts. As a result, the United
States cannot afford to develop or leverage space systems today without
addressing vulnerabilities from our competitors' counterspace
capabilities. As a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report notes:
Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view
space as important to modern warfare and view counterspace
capabilities as a means to reduce United States and allied
military effectiveness . . . Both states are developing jamming
and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit
capabilities, and ground-based anti-satellite missiles that can
achieve a range of reversible to nonreversible effects. \1\
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\1\ Challenges to Security in Space, Defense Intelligence Agency,
February 2019.
This new environment highlights the critical role of space in the
changing character of warfare and presents new challenges and
opportunities for our military forces.
Space systems do not simply support terrestrial forces--actions in
space can also directly affect the outcome of future crises or
conflicts. Space is also the connective tissue holding the other
domains (land, air, sea) together in an era of multi-domain warfare.
Therefore, the Department of Defense (DOD) must also be prepared to
assure freedom of operation in space to deter attacks, and, when
necessary, to decisively defeat space and counterspace threats.
challenges
The United States currently possesses a competitive advantage in
space, but our existing Defense architecture is not designed to do so
in a contested space environment. China and Russia are actively seeking
to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities and are directly challenging
us in areas of long-held strength. We must adapt our approach from one
that views space principally as a support function to one optimized for
a distinct warfighting domain.
The DOD space enterprise largely reflects strategic conditions
created after 1991, when Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the
asymmetrical advantages of space capabilities applied to conventional
warfare and the Soviet Union's collapse halted the only credible threat
to United States space systems. Space missions, capabilities, and units
proliferated across the Joint Force as each Military Service sought to
enhance its core missions through space. Absent an extant threat,
advances in mission performance of space systems were prioritized over
defensive capabilities or warfighting doctrine to protect them.
Consequently, few DOD space forces--across all Military Services--were
designed or intended to gain and maintain space superiority in a
contested environment. A U.S. Space Force would prioritize development
of appropriate defensive and offensive capabilities and doctrine to
match the current and future military threats in space, as well as
enhancing resilience of our space capabilities.
Today, organizing, training, and equipping of space forces is
spread across the Military Services as they enhance and enable
operations for their respective domains. In short, the current
organization of forces lacks sufficient unity of command, a fundamental
principle of military organization and warfighting. If we do not
correct this organizational fragmentation, nascent warfighting
capacity, and insufficient doctrine now, America's post-Cold War
complacency in space will become the catalyst for our possible defeat
in a future conflict with a peer competitor.
The post-Cold War environment also gave rise to certain
assumptions, which shaped the DOD space enterprise: space was a
sanctuary; space superiority was assumed; gaining and maintaining space
dominance was a logistical rather than a warfighting function; space
capabilities and operations were strictly in support of the terrestrial
fight; and space-based enablement and airpower were inextricably linked
and could therefore be integrated under one doctrinal construct. These
assumptions no longer reflect reality.
The erroneous assumption that space would remain uncontested
resulted in processes and structures that have propagated multiple
problems in the space enterprise. These problems have been documented
for years. \2\ While some corrective action has been taken, the lack of
institutionalized and centralized advocacy for the space domain has
resulted in fragmented responsibilities within DOD; nascent space
warfighting doctrine, expertise, and culture; and undue risk aversion
resulting in laborious decision cycles in system acquisitions and
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Notably--Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization, January 2001;
Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the
Organization and Management of National Security Space, July 2008;
Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes
Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight
(Government Accountability Office Publication GAO-16-592R), July 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than attempt to address each issue in isolation, DOD
recognizes the need for a paradigm shift based on a new set of
assumptions that more closely reflect today's realities: space is not a
sanctuary--it is now a warfighting domain, similar to the air, land,
and sea domains; space superiority is a condition that must be gained
and maintained via a range of options, including resilient
architectures, offensive and defensive operations; space doctrine,
capabilities, and expertise must be designed to gain and maintain space
superiority, and support operations in other domains; and spacepower
and airpower doctrine and operating concepts are as distinct from one
another as the air domain is from the land, and as the land domain is
from the sea.
Separating spacepower from airpower and elevating this new
warfighting domain allows for the independent development and
advancement of strategies and doctrine for two physically and
strategically distinct domains. In no uncertain terms, the U.S. Air
Force (USAF)--and its current leadership in particular--have driven
America's efforts in space and delivered capabilities second to none.
The USAF is the best in the world at organizing, training, and
equipping for the air domain and advancing airpower for the Nation. DOD
needs the USAF to retain that primacy to ensure the United States is
postured to project airpower while deterring and defeating threats to
the air domain posed by other great powers. The U.S. Space Force will
do the same for space.
solution--a new approach
Our challenges in space require dedicated leadership, advocacy,
doctrine, equipment, and expertise. While our Military Departments and
Services develop domain-centric doctrine, equipment, personnel and
infrastructure necessary to attend to unique warfighting elements, no
existing Military Service treats space as its number one priority.
Our reorganization will ensure the U.S. Space Force provides the
dedicated leadership and advocacy that develops space forces capable of
addressing our emerging security challenges. These forces will be
presented to U.S. Space Command, which will bring day-to-day
operational focus to competition and conflict in space, as well as to
regional combatant commands. As these entities are established, the
Space Development Agency will accelerate development and fielding of
distinct space capabilities.
The United States Space Force
The U.S. Space Force would develop and field doctrine, equipment,
and personnel with the responsibilities and authorities commensurate to
the space domain's needs, rather than conforming to another domain's
structures and processes. This will institutionally elevate space
advocacy commensurate with its role in national security; unify DOD
space forces to vest authority, accountability, and responsibility for
organizing, training, and equipping in a single service; and focus on
the development of doctrine, expertise, capabilities and culture for
space as a distinct warfighting domain. A Military Service focused on
generating and developing forces for the future is the right and
necessary organizational construct to organize, train, and equip space
forces.
To maximize warfighting effectiveness while minimizing cost and
bureaucracy, the proposal establishes U.S. Space Force as a separate
armed force within the Department of the Air Force, similar to how the
U.S. Marine Corps is housed within the Department of the Navy. We
assess this will enable the U.S. Space Force to focus on building space
warfighting capacity without having to divest resources for non-space
centric support functions. The U.S. Space Force will leverage existing
support functions resident in the Air Force that are not directly
related to the space domain (e.g., medical corps, chaplaincy, staff
judge advocates, etc.), effectively minimizing overhead and cost. This
will allow the new Service to prioritize limited resources and develop
a lean and focused infrastructure.
DOD envisions consolidating the preponderance of existing military
space missions and authorities under the U.S. Space Force, with those
space capabilities, forces, and units that do not uniquely and
exclusively support a single Military Service's core domain-specific
mission transitioning to the new Military Service. Current Service-
specific entities that provide global space capabilities would become
part of the U.S. Space Force. For example, the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center, the Navy Mobile User Objective System, and the
Army's operations of wide and narrow band global satellite
communications would all become part of the Space Force. As necessary,
DOD Components would retain organic space capabilities uniquely
required to support the core mission of that Military Service or
Defense Agency.
Senior leadership is required to ensure that space is adequately
prioritized within the Department. Establishing an Under Secretary of
the Air Force for Space will ensure focused civilian oversight,
advocacy for space resources, and alignment and integration of space
program investments. A 4-star Chief of Staff of the Space Force, with
full membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will elevate the mission,
strengthen the requirements process and drive spacepower advocacy and
coordination with the Joint Force.
The Department is postured such that, should Congress grant its
approval, the 200-member Initial Space Force Staff can be stood up
within 90 days of enactment. The transition as a whole will take about
five years. As the U.S. Space Force is established, the Department
intends to build a lean headquarters with responsibility for
developing, presenting, and advocating for space budgeting in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.
Additional organizations to deliberately build and advance space
warfighting capacity and enhance professional development would also be
required to focus on areas such as space education and training;
operational testing and evaluation, tactics development, and threat
replication; and space doctrine development; and promotions and
assignments. The vast majority of initial Space Force resources--
personnel and budget authority--would be transferred from the existing
Military Services. We anticipate the standing up of U.S. Space Force
would be phased over five years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024--
and would require $72 million in fiscal year 2020 to establish the
headquarters.
As missions are transferred, existing personnel and budget
authority for the aforementioned missions and forces would transfer
into the Space Force from the existing Military Services. Here it is
critical to note: this transfer does not necessarily mean physical
movement of personnel and capabilities to a different geographic
location. Rather, it means changing reporting, identifying clear roles
and responsibilities, and establishing avenues for greater
accountability for space missions.
At the conclusion of the transition period, more than 95 percent of
the Space Force annual budget is estimated to consist of resources that
will have been transferred from existing DOD budget accounts, along
with an estimated 15,000 personnel. Additional resources will be
dedicated to developing the Space Force headquarters and establishing
and maintaining new support elements such as education, training,
doctrine, and personnel management centers.
Once fully established, additive costs for U.S. Space Force are
estimated to be $500 million annually. Approximately $300 million would
be applied toward the military space staff and civilian personnel at
headquarters responsible for organizing, training, and equipping; $200
million would be directed for developing space-specific education,
training, doctrine and distinct space personnel management of the
force. These costs come to approximately 0.07 percent of DOD's annual
budget. Total additional cost growth over the next five years is
estimated to be less than $2 billion, or approximately 0.05 percent of
DOD's budget for the same period. Lean implementation costs mean the
Future Years Defense Program topline is sufficient to fully fund the
U.S. Space Force.
U.S. Space Command and Space Development Agency
Establishing a unified combatant command dedicated to space will
focus joint warfighting on this vital domain. U.S. Space Command will
plan and conduct space operations and employ space forces to deter, and
if necessary, defeat threats to secure U.S. national interests.
Establishing U.S. Space Command will bring full-time operational focus
to securing the space domain and streamline command and control for
operationally relevant timelines. While basing decisions have not yet
been made, it is anticipated that initial personnel will be drawn from
existing combatant commands and services that focus on space.
To fulfill its mission, U.S. Space Command will require doctrine
and forces optimized to operate in a contested environment. The role of
U.S. Space Force in developing and presenting that doctrine, equipment,
and trained personnel is essential to the ultimate success of U.S.
Space Command.
The Department is also establishing the Space Development Agency
(SDA) to outpace our potential adversaries by streamlining development
and fielding of advanced space systems and architectures that meet the
demands of a dynamic warfighting domain. The new agency will be
complimentary to ongoing space efforts within the Department and, where
applicable, leverage emerging commercial technologies to field enhanced
space capabilities on an accelerated timeline. SDA will deliver the
advanced systems integration essential for activities such as
artificial intelligence, which will enable low-latency data movement to
connect sensor-to-shooter and otherwise enhance exquisite capabilities.
The SDA will ultimately transition to the U.S. Space Force in support
of its ``equip'' function.
Given the roughly 2,500 active satellites in orbit today, the
thousands more projected, and the fact that potential adversaries have
nearly doubled their space presence in recent years--China's ISR and
remote sensing fleet alone contains more than 120 systems, second only
to the United States--the imperative for an agency that can outpace the
threat and leverage the astounding advances of the private sector is
obvious. Absent the SDA, our departmental inertia will perpetuate
development of bespoke space-based capabilities and architecture by
multiple DOD organizations. That resulting complexity expands our cyber
vulnerabilities along the seams of those capabilities; it also drives
up costs unnecessarily. The SDA is our opportunity to recapitalize our
Department's space architecture and integrate new solutions at scale.
conclusion
The threat posed by China and Russia in space demands department-
level action. For years, careful observers of our processes--including
Congress, independent commissions, and even our peer competitors--have
pointed out the limitations of our current approach. We must not wait
until we experience conflict in space to adapt our posture. As other
great powers become more competent and capable in space, America
burdens increased risk because we will not have sufficient time to
``hammer out'' what will be needed and how to do it if contingencies
arise. Rather than react to their disruptive behavior, we should seize
the initiative now to anticipate and influence changes in the character
of warfare and deter potential adversaries' aggression by establishing
a Space Force that operates on doctrine created by fully trained space
cadre members and equipped with resources and capability to defend the
American way of life and U.S. national security.
Thanks to President Trump's leadership and Vice President Pence's
consistent advocacy, this Department has identified a plan to maintain
U.S. leadership in this key domain of competition and potential
warfare. The Department's partnership with Congress is and will remain
absolutely critical to our success. We ask for your support in
authorizing the establishment of the United States Space Force in the
Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act so we can move out
in this critical domain. As we proceed, we remain committed to the
efficient and cost-effective enactment of our proposals in close
partnership with this committee and Congress as a whole.
America has enduring interests in space. So does humankind. The
world has benefitted from American leadership in space these past
decades far more than it can expect to benefit from coercive Chinese or
Russian disturbance of the domain. Just as the U.S. Navy ensures
freedom of navigation of the seas, America must now ensure the freedom
to navigate the stars.
To that end, we encourage this committee's strong support for this
proposal to ensure our Nation's military remains the most advanced and
lethal in the world and above it.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wilson.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
and Ranking Member Reed and this committee for this hearing and
for your service.
I would just highlight a couple of points very briefly, in
addition to what's already been said.
The United States is the best in the world at space. And
our adversaries know it. And they are seeking to develop the
capability to deny us the use of space in crisis or in war. Our
responsibility is to make sure that doesn't happen.
Second, I would say that it is absolutely imperative that
we change the system of acquisition that is modeled more for
the Cold War. We have to buy things faster and smarter. The
authorities that you have given to the Air Force and to the
other Services and to the Department of Defense over the last 3
years are in the midst of being implemented, and we are
stripping time out of programs, and increasing the performance
of those programs. In respect to that, the on-time budget this
year was absolutely critical, and the fiscal year 2020 budget
proposal will be the third consecutive year of double-digit
percentage increases proposed by the President and, I hope,
supported by the Congress.
The third thing I would say is that the Air Force has stood
up a planning cell underneath the Air Force that includes all
of the Services and the relevant Defense Department agencies to
do the detailed planning necessary so that, within 90 days of
legislation, we would stand up the initial element of a Space
Force. That planning cell is led by a two-star general and, as
I mentioned, includes all members of the different Services. We
want to be able to move out smartly when legislation is passed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
General Hyten.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Hyten. Thank you very much, Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee Members. It is an
honor to be here today, and a continuing privilege to represent
the 162,000 Americans accomplishing the mission of U.S.
Strategic Command.
I want to begin by thanking the committee for, rightly,
approaching space as a warfighting challenge. And I very much
appreciate the President weighing in, confirming space as a
warfighting domain. Now we have to make sure we're ready for
that challenge.
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is a global warfighting
command. Success in all our missions require us to maintain
freedom of operations in space. And today, as the Secretary
just said, I sit here fully confident in our Nation's
superiority in space. Although we have a distinct advantage
today, I fear that this will not continue unless we take action
immediately, before our superiority begins to erode.
Space is fundamental to our economic vitality and the
American way of life, including how we conduct warfare.
Certainly, our adversaries understand this, and they're
actively building and deploying weapons to threaten us in
space. We must take these actions seriously.
As the Commander of us USSTRATCOM, I am responsible for
space operations in our military today, and I have been in
space my entire career. It is my passion. And, as much as I'd
like to focus on space, my priorities are, first, strategic
deterrent; second, nuclear command and control. And space can
never be higher than my third priority. So, the most important
thing we can do in the near term is create a lean, new unified
command, U.S. Space Command, separate from my command,
STRATCOM, focused solely on warfighting in space. And we need a
four-star commander to do that. It's that important. The
Department's already taken a step, as well as the President, to
nominate General ``Jay'' Raymond for this position. He is the
right person for that job, and I encourage the Senate to take
up his nomination as soon as possible.
The second piece is to stand up a new Space Force inside
the Air Force, focusing on organizing, training, and equipping
forces for this Space Command and for the Joint Forces at
large. This is the pathway that best gets us there. The
President said we need a structure inside the Pentagon focused
on space all the time, inside the Air Force, and I support this
model. The force needs to be streamlined from inception. I
understand your concerns about inefficiencies. I believe the
creation of Space Force within the Air Force is the best way to
reduce redundancies and bureaucracies by focusing on the most
essential tasks. So, I pledge to continue to work with the
Congress to develop the most efficient warfighting
organizational structure possible.
So, thank you, again, for allowing me to be here today. I
look forward to your questions, as well.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Hyten.
Now, we are going to have 6-minute rounds, and we're going
to try to stay within that timeframe, I tell my fellow
Senators. In my opening statement, I talked about a couple of
questions that never have been answered to my satisfaction.
Forgetting about the cost thing, because we've pretty much
established at least an opinion as to what it's going to cost,
I have, essentially, the same question, worded a little bit
differently, to have each one of our witness answer. So, I'd
like to ask you to respond to this question.
First of all, Secretary Shanahan, I agree with when you
often say the United States' margin of dominance in space is
diminishing. But, my question to you is, how will establishing
a Space Force help the United States reassert its warfighting
dominance? Yes, sir.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure. Thank you, Chairman.
The fix you're really speaking to is, you know, How do we
expand that margin? Our proposal addresses all of the changes
that are occurring simultaneously in space. And maybe just to
set up the answer, these are the significant changes we have to
address. The environment is contested. We are about to, for the
first time in about 30 years, modernize the Department. So, how
do we incorporate all the modernization and address this very
different environment, which is a binary change from the past?
And as we broke down the problem, we said the fastest way to do
this--and it's all about speed to expand our margin--is to
compartmentalize the problem into three areas. The first was,
make sure we have warfighting operations so that we can operate
in a contested environment.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, quickly, now.
Secretary Shanahan. The second was, make sure that we have
the doctrine and the training so that we can equip our forces
with the right space cadre.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
Secretary Shanahan. And lastly, how do we acquire and
develop the right system?
Chairman Inhofe. So, you assume that we're going to do a
better job with a Space Force than we're doing right now in
those three areas.
Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Secretary Wilson, given your experience--which is vast--can
you provide your assessment as to how the proposal will better
organize, train, and equip space forces, compared to the
present mission of the Air Force Command today?
Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I agree with General Hyten,
that the most important step that Congress has already taken
and the President has put into action, is a Unified Combatant
Command for warfighting. But, I do think that there is an
opportunity to align defense space programs in a Space Force
underneath the Air Force, including acquisition. And I think
that that alignment will help.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. That's a good answer.
General Hyten, through your role as Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, you are currently the Nation's most
qualified expert in space warfighting. Can you differentiate
between the mission of the U.S. Space Command, a Unified Combat
Command--and the service mission, as proposed in the hearing
today?
General Hyten. Yes, Chairman. The structure is, basically,
built around the same structure we have in all our combatant
commands. The way our military is organized is, we have
combatant commands that fight our forces. They fight our
battles, they win our wars, they conduct strategic deterrence.
All the missions are executed through our combatant commands.
The new U.S. Space Command will execute the space mission
through the combatant command of U.S. Space Command. But, the
Services organize, train, and equip forces for those commands.
So, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines builds, organize,
trains, and equip forces for the unified combatant commanders.
The Space Force will do that for the Space Command and for the
Joint Force at large.
Chairman Inhofe. I see.
General Hyten. That's the difference between the two.
Chairman Inhofe. All right. Well, that's a very good,
specific answer.
General Dunford, you're a warfighting marine, so you have a
different perspective than some of the rest of them do on this
panel. Do you believe establishing a Space Force will
contribute to the development of a space warfighting ethos and
culture that does not exist already today?
General Dunford. Chairman, first, I'd say I think we do
have a good culture in the Air Force. And again, we are the
best at space. But, I also believe that an organization that
has a leadership team and people that are singularly focused on
a single core competency--that being space--will contribute to
culture, but, more importantly, will contribute to a focus in
those areas that Secretary Shanahan, Secretary Wilson, and
General Hyten highlighted.
Chairman Inhofe. That's good.
Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank the witnesses.
Secretary Shanahan, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
basically the Space Corps is roughly 16,500 personnel. What you
will create is a 1,000-person, sort of, overhead. That is the
highest overhead-to-operation ratio within the Military
Services, by a great deal. For example, the Air Force has 2,300
personnel in its headquarters, and 320,000 airmen and airwomen.
How do we avoid that? Why didn't we think harder about coming
with a leaner structure?
Secretary Shanahan. Sir, let me start with--
philosophically, as we consolidate, there should be a reduction
in cost. That's how I'm approaching this. The basic proposal
has been formulated from an Air Force estimate based on
traditional constructs. And what I'd like to do is ask
Secretary Wilson to speak to how that proposal was derived.
Senator Reed. Madam Secretary?
Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When the Department went through this whole evaluation, we
looked at a whole range of options, everything from a kind of
Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps/medical corps model to a
completely independent, standalone department, and a lot of
things in between. Where we landed was a Space Force underneath
the Air Force so that you don't have to duplicate all the
acquisition, budgeting, finance, personnel kinds of functions,
but with a member of the Joint Chiefs.
Now, if somebody's going to be a Joint Chief, and they're
going to have the credibility in the building and be able to
operate, they need to have the support of a member of the Joint
Chiefs. Of the additional personnel, which I think is about
1,200, half of those are in the headquarters, which makes for a
quite small headquarters for a member of the Joint Chiefs. The
other half was proposed to be what is a professional
development element to get after the business of developing
people. So, it is recruitment, professional development,
doctrine center kinds of things, which is not really a
headquarters element. We did that costing, and that would be
the concept.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
And, Madam Secretary, your thinking about this proposal has
matured over the last couple of years. In 2017, I think you
raised some opposition to a Space Force. One of the points you
made, which I thought was compelling, was you need a joint
warfighting team, and this Space Force would, in your terms, be
counterproductive in that respect. It would be, not a joint
enterprise, but, essentially, an Air Force enterprise, given
the distribution of officers and the fact it would be placed
under the Air Force. I see a value to the jointness in
everything we do. And are you concerned that we might lose
that, that this might be more siloed out than a joint
enterprise?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, each of our Services has our own
identity, but we contribute to a joint team. I think that one
of the most important things in standing up a separate Space
Force will be to establish a warfighting culture within that
organization that's part of a Joint Force.
One of the things that really has surprised me when I came
back to the Service, having been away--having served as a young
officer, is just how much more joint operations really are
today than they were 20 years ago, when I was a young officer.
And it's a real tribute to the decisions made under Goldwater-
Nichols.
Senator Reed. Again, I think--this is an issue that we'll
return to again and again, but there is this tension between
creating a separate service, separate identity, and this notion
of jointness, which I think you correctly stated emanated from
Goldwater-Nichols and has been, I think, a very effective way
to organize our military efforts.
One of the issues that has been mentioned several times,
Secretary Shanahan, is the sense that, well, now we're unifying
our entire effort in space under the Space Corps, but actually
we have the National Reconnaissance Office, which has a great
role in space, and we also have military intelligence programs
that have roles in space, and they're outside this proposal,
and there is no, at this point, explicit linkage to them, other
than informal communications. So, are we missing something,
here? I think, again, the intent that we suggested in setting
up the unified command was it would be an agency that had all
services focused on space and with active participation with
the civilian agencies that are in that realm, too. Can you
comment?
Maybe one good analogy would be U.S. Cyber Command.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure. The bias in the proposal is
toward speed. The proposal we submit really represents the
stakeholders that we have control of. Early discussions were
with the NRO. I continue to have discussions with Sue Gordon,
principally at the technical level as we start to evolve these
new architectures so that we can provision, at one point in
time, to do the integration that, technically, I think, will be
aligned from the start. The challenge, organizationally, is
that when we look at the many stakeholders, there's real work
to be done there to negotiate. So, we thought of it as a multi-
step process, that eventually there would be more alignment and
integration, but not in the first phase.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shanahan, if I could just follow up on the NRO a
little bit. Are you saying that, at the onset, now, of the
Space Force, you didn't feel a need to have that included, but,
possibly down the line, you would? Did I understand that
correctly?
Secretary Shanahan. There is a need. It was an issue of
timing. So, if we could do it all concurrently, that would be
ideal. I don't think we can move that quickly. So, rather than
delay, we said, ``This is what we can do immediately, provision
for that integration and realignment in time.''
Senator Fischer. Will that affect the need to unify the
national security space activities? Do you see that as possibly
a detriment in trying to unify? We keep hearing about
unification. Obviously, you don't think of that will be a
detriment.
Secretary Shanahan. Well, I'd rather do more, sooner. I
mean, this is really about, How do we move out quick--the
proposal we've put together is really a threat-driven proposal,
so as quickly as we can get after the threat, we want to move.
If we could do more, we'd like to do that. I think this is
really more about how to organize the equities of stakeholders.
If we could resolve some of those more quickly, we would
incorporate more.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
Secretary Wilson and General Hyten, can you offer your
views on the NRO and Space Force?
Madam Secretary, if we could start with you, please.
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the National Reconnaissance
Office was a secret program established between the Air Force
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a long time ago. In
1992, its existence was acknowledged. But, while it was a black
program, it was headed by the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
who was simultaneously the head of the NRO. That ended in 1992,
and the NRO had its own director, who was not the Under
Secretary of the Air Force. There remains a very deep
connection between the Air Force and the NRO. About 40 percent
of the people in the NRO are airmen. The rest are civilians or
CIA employees. So, there is a deep organic connection there.
And we have deepened the already close connection between
military space and space elements of the intelligence community
over the last several years. And that's because many of the
things we'll have to protect are actually NRO assets. So,
deepening that connection is important. It may not require
actual structural change in the organizational chart. And we'd
be happy to work with you on kinds of things that might
continue to deepen that already very close connection between
the Air Force and the NRO.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Hyten, do you have anything to add?
General Hyten. Yes, ma'am, just a couple of things.
I think, first of all, we should recognize that right now
the partnership between the National Reconnaissance Office and
the Air Force is as strong as it's ever been. And I've been
working with the National Reconnaissance Office for well over
30 years. And it's very strong.
The second piece is that there's no doubt that the Space
Force of the future will have to have a very strong
relationship with the National Reconnaissance Office. The
administration recognized this in Space Policy Directive 4 that
gave us 180 days, which I think is out to the middle of August,
to come back with a report that said this is how we would
partner with the National Reconnaissance Office and the broader
intelligence community in the future. I hope we can do that
faster than August, because that partnership is very important
to the future.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
General Dunford, there's a tension between the desire for a
streamlined effort unified under one roof and the desire for a
joint integrated approach, here. This was Admiral Rogers'
concern and the reason he actually opposed the creation of a
separate force for cyber. In our attempt to unify space
activities, are we running the risk of creating another silo,
here? We're going to surround it with a silo, and we're going
to distance it from other services? How do we make sure that
space is going to remain integrated?
General Dunford. Thanks, Senator.
You know, Senator, in my assignment, what I've kind of come
to learn is that the real strength of jointness is actually
diversity of perspective brought by different Services and
organizations. But, what's key is to leverage that diversity of
perspective in processes that make sure we have coherent force
development, force design, command and control, and planning. I
think those three areas are how we bring the joint team
together.
But, I'm not at all concerned about a silo of space. The
key is to have individuals that are singly focused on space,
and make sure we incorporate that perspective, that very
healthy perspective, into the outcome, which is a Joint Force
that can fight.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you.
In Maine, there are certain basic principles of life. One
is, you don't drive on the ice after April 15th. Second is, you
hate the Yankees. Third is, if it ain't broke, don't fix it. My
impression is, you all are doing a good job. We are getting the
data that we need, we're getting the support from the Air
Force, we're working together with the NRO and other agencies,
and, as I think many of you, or all of you, have testified,
we're dominant in space right now. I understand the threat, and
I understand our adversaries are moving forward, but I don't
understand how adding a box to an organizational chart is going
to give us some kind of qualitative military edge, to use a
term that we've heard in this committee.
General Hyten, I'm like the Chairman, I'm genuinely
undecided, although, as you can tell, I'm skeptical. I don't
think it's broken. I think you're doing a good job. Why are we
going to fix it?
General Hyten. So, Senator, I think we have been doing a
good job, but we've been doing a good job in an environment
where space has not been contested. What is changing is, we
have adversaries that are building significant capabilities
that can challenge us in space.
Senator King. I understand that, but I don't understand how
putting a new box in an organizational chart is going to help
us to respond to the new challenge that we face.
General Hyten. Well, there's two problems we have to fix.
One, we have to have a commander focused on it all the time
from an operational perspective. That's the Space Command issue
we talked about.
Senator King. I agree, I think that's the answer, frankly.
General Hyten. The second piece, Senator, is, we have to
have somebody in the Pentagon that focuses their total
attention on space all the time. I've known every Chief of
Staff of the Air Force for the last 20 or 30 years, and they've
all carried space effectively into the tank. They've all cared
about space. But, it is a secondary issue. As they've cared
about space in the tank, the Pentagon has built a structure
around them with dozens and dozens of people and organizations
that are all in charge of space in many ways. I had one Chief
of Staff tell me--well, I won't share the exact words that he
told me, but----
[Laughter.]
General Hyten.--it was very difficult to walk around the
Pentagon and not bump into somebody who said they were in
charge of space. So, the goal is to put one person in charge of
space, a four-star Chief of Staff----
Senator King. And I understand that, too, but one of the
problems with this proposal is, it doesn't put one person in
charge of space, because we've got NRO, we've got the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), we've got the
private sector, which is very active in space--and, by the way,
I am not suggesting that NRO and those other agencies--the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)--should be
absorbed into this. That's the last thing I want to propose.
But, again, if the argument is, we need a centralized
authority, we don't have it here.
The other piece that I don't understand is, you talk about
a Space Force. That implies people. Nobody's going to go up and
fight in space. We're not talking about soldiers, here. We're
talking about acquisition, design, and placement of hardware.
That's an important function, but I just don't understand why
this has to be in a particular special box. I think Space
Command makes sense. I understand that. But, to create a new
bureaucracy that's going to cost us half-a-billion dollars a
year, I've got to be convinced that there's some incremental
value there.
Mr. Secretary, you want to tackle that?
Secretary Shanahan. I'd love to, thank you.
If the environment we're going to be in is the same as it
is today, going forward, I'd say don't fix it. I've studied
this problem for 18 months, so it's not as though someone
passed me a report. I've spent a lot of time on this subject.
And the focus has been, what is changing? Do we have the
capacity and the ability to make that change? When I break the
problem down, the first is, How do we set up Space Command so
we have operations that now can compete in a contested
environment? So, that was one problem, and you need a dedicated
leader whose attention is that.
Senator King. But, isn't that the combatant commander of
the Space Command?
Secretary Shanahan. Correct. So, that's one.
Then the second piece--and this is where I think you were
headed--is, Why does that new box, called the Space Force,
create a lot of value? There's two major changes that we have
to get after. One is, How do we professionalize the generation
of this cadre of space specialists? Today, it isn't a formal
training and development program, a recruiting program----
Senator King. But, again, couldn't that take place in the
context of the Space Command? It's a combatant command. It's
going not have personnel and a mission.
Secretary Shanahan. It could. It could. This is what the
Space Force is intended to do--man, train, and equip, like the
other Services. The equipping part is the other major
component, here. So, as we look to modernize across the
Department--and this is an area where the Department has
struggled over time, and this is the most significant
modernization in 30 years--do we have the bandwidth and
capacity, the focus, and the accountability to drive that?
That's what this really gets after, so that, when we do
modernize, we execute to the schedule, we execute to the
budget, but, more importantly, we deliver the technical
capability at a department whole, not by Service.
Senator King. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Thank you all. Thank you for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you for your appearance today and for
your work on this very important problem.
I want to share the sentiments of several Members of this
Committee who say that space is, unfortunately, now a contested
domain, and our enemies are putting weapons in space and
they're targeting our assets in space, and that we don't really
get a choice to whether we want to fight in space. We only get
a choice of whether we want to win or lose in space. I know
you've all put a lot of effort into thinking through that
problem. As to the Members of this Committee, I think you'll
see it's not really a partisan matter, either. But, it's a
major question, and I think we're all committed to getting it
right, not getting it fast.
I do want to continue on the line of questioning that
Senator King started. And I want to start with your perspective
on this, General Hyten, as a combatant commander. You said,
rightly so, that space can never be more than your third
priority, given your priorities of our nuclear strategic
forces. You can imagine a world in which those nuclear
strategic forces would have been their own service, you know,
where we would have put our missiles and our ballistic missile
submarines and our strategic bombers, in addition to our
command-and-control functions, into a separate nuclear forces,
if you will. We didn't do that. We have Strategic Command to do
that. Can you explain why we need to put all space assets,
space forces, into a separate service, as opposed to a
combatant command?
General Hyten. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
When you look back at the history of our nuclear forces,
the three basic capabilities are the submarine-launch ballistic
missiles, the Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), and the bombers. If you look at how those systems
operate, the submarine clearly operates in the maritime domain.
The bombers and the ICBMs operate in the air domain. So, the
expertise you need to operate those weapon systems come from
the domain expertise you achieve from the Air Force and from
the Navy. When you look at the space capabilities that we
operate--satellites, rockets to get us into space--the
capabilities there require expertise in the space domain.
That's the difference between the legacy of Strategic Command,
which then took domain-focused capabilities and put it together
into one unified command, and a Space Force that will take
another domain capability together and put it into another
unified command.
Senator Cotton. Those capabilities, though do seem pretty
Air Force-centric. I understand that the Marine Corps and the
Army use space assets a lot to fight. It's critical to our way
of fighting. But, unless, as Senator King said, we're going to
have a large number of actual soldiers in space fighting, and
they need a different set of skills, this is primarily going to
be about technology and acquisitions and so forth. So, I think
what a lot of us on the committee are trying to figure out is,
What's the incremental advantage of having a separate Space
Force, like the Marine Corps is to the Navy, within the Air
Force, as opposed to, say, the Air Force having the training
and equipping function that the five services have for a
combatant command like yours, for the geographical commands,
and the Central Command or European Command or so forth?
Secretary Wilson, that may be a question for you to take.
Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Senator.
I would just add one thing to what General Hyten mentioned,
which is the importance of the development of space
professionals. I think that that's an important thing for the
committee to consider, particularly the potential advantage of
separating out promotions for Space Force members, and
particularly Space Force operators, that that would be a
benefit, and to be able to promote to need rather than just
take the chance that you will get the right numbers of people.
That's particularly important for small career fields.
I also think that continuing to strengthen professional
development around space and space warfighting is important.
Obviously, we're moving forward with this, irrespective of what
decision is made by the Congress and the Administration on
formal structures. But, the shift to warfighting, things like
we've established the Schriever Scholars this year, which is a
specific area of professional military education on space,
opening undergraduate space training to allies, going to 4
months on the floor operating systems to 4 months of training
in combat operations for a space operator. So, that shift of a
culture to warfighting and professional development is actually
an important element for your consideration.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Shanahan, I see you're reaching
for your button. You can respond, if you'd like. I had one
question for General Dunford before the Chairman gavels me
down. But, if you'd like to respond----
Secretary Shanahan. Five years from now is going to look
much different. I think sometimes we look through the lens of
today, and we extrapolate going forward. But, there's going to
be, literally, an explosion of thousands of satellites. You
think of just the growth in space. You think about this
contested environment, and then how quickly we need to be able
to adapt commercial innovation, and then, the Army's going to
modernize its command and control (C2) system, the Navy's going
to modernize its C2 system. We have all this modernization
going on concurrently. So, how do we organize ourselves to be
able to accomplish this amount of change in an environment
that's getting increasingly dangerous? That's really what we've
tried to do, here, so we could dedicate the skill and the
resources to be able to move quickly instead of
bureaucratically trying to organize ourselves across so many
different organizations.
Senator Cotton. General Dunford, you look like you're about
to push your button.
General Dunford. I was waiting for you.
Senator Cotton. Well, I think the Chairman's going to gavel
me down.
I will say this, though, before my time expires. Bob Gates,
who I think is one of the finest Secretaries of Defense that
we've had, wrote, in his most recent book, ``Passion for
Leadership,'' that normally when you face a bureaucratic
challenge, moving boxes around is not the right solution. That
doesn't mean it's the wrong solution here, but he said that
normally what you need is a cultural change from your
leadership. Whatever happens in this year's National Defense
Authorization Act, I want to commend you, Secretary Shanahan,
General Dunford, Secretary Wilson, General Hyten, for the
cultural change you've driven inside the Department to
recognize that we need to significantly increase the level of
our capabilities in space, given what we face in Russia and
China, because your leadership on this has been very strong.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for all of your testimony today.
I just want to concur with what I'm hearing from my
colleagues. I don't think there's any disagreement from folks
on this committee that space is something that we need to focus
a great deal on, that it is now a contested domain in ways that
simply didn't exist in the past, and we need to do a better job
of coordinating and integrating space into our overall defense
strategy. But, I think our question is that this approach that
we're looking at is just going add a whole lot more cost. At a
time when the Department of Defense needs to be a whole lot
more nimble, has to be a whole lot more innovative, and has to
be able to do more with less, because we can't just keep
throwing money after dollars after dollars, when there are so
many other needs that we have in our economy, here. But, I
would like to have folks coming to the committee, saying, ``We
can do this, and we can do it more efficiently, and we can have
more lethality, and we'll be able to defend American interests,
and do it in a cost-effective way.'' And I'm not hearing that.
Secretary Wilson, I hate doing this, but I think it's
important, because I think you said this best of anyone. In
2017, after a meeting with the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee talking about the Space Force you said, ``The
Pentagon is complicated enough. This will make it more complex,
add more boxes to the organization chart, and cost more money.
If I had more money, I would put it into lethality, not
bureaucracy.'' Secretary Wilson, I think that's profound. I
agree.
The Air Force Chief of Staff went a step further and
stated, ``If you're saying the word 'separate' and 'space' in
the same sentence, I would offer you're moving in the wrong
direction. That's why the Secretary and I are focused on how we
integrate space. Every mission that we perform in the U.S.
military is dependent on space. Now is not the time to build
seams and segregate and separate. It's time to integrate.''
I couldn't agree more with those statements. I haven't
heard any kind of refuting of those very strong statements.
If I think about growth of bureaucracy, all we have to do
is look at the past of agencies. Inevitably, folks come and
say, ``We're going to do this efficiently, and it's going to be
different this time.'' I'm the Ranking Member on the Homeland
Security and Government Affairs Committee, which, of course
oversees the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and when we
stood up that Department--I mean, just look at what has
happened in that Department over the years. Since 2005, the
DHS's department management operations staff responsible for
functions, including legislative affairs, public affairs,
general counsel, has grown at a very large rate. What started
at 723 employees now is close to 2,600 employees. Bureaucratic
organizations always grow. I've never seen a bureaucratic
organization that actually shrinks. And this one is
particularly rank-heavy, which usually has its own bureaucracy
that comes as ranks increase. Essentially, the proposal would
have two 4-star generals and an Under Secretary in charge of
the organization the size of a marine expeditionary brigade,
which is usually commanded, as you know, General Dunford, by a
brigadier general who is conducting operations in both the air
and land domains, very complex, contested environments. And
we're going to be adding an incredible number of folks in what
is being done officially in other places around the Department
of Defense now.
So, my question is, What would happen to the end strength
of the existing Services if personnel are transferred to the
Space Force? Would the Air Force, Navy, and Army backfill those
positions, or are we looking to reduce the end strengths of
those forces as we create this new bureaucracy?
Secretary Shanahan?
Secretary Shanahan. We would not backfill the end strength.
It would be net zero.
Senator Peters. So, we would see a reduction.
In those other areas, because we're removing them.
Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
Senator Peters. We've talked about--and Senator Reed
brought it up, which I think is important--the jointness
factor. That certainly was one of the important and, I think,
paramount achievements of Goldwater-Nichols, to make sure that
we're fighting jointly. That's why I concur with some of the
comments I've heard from my colleagues on having the joint
command structure. But, if the creation of the Space Force is
approved and we consolidate all of the Service space equities
into one branch, the unified U.S. Space Command will only have
one Service as a force provider, is my understanding.
General Dunford, how does this proposal fit into Goldwater-
Nichols? How do you propose senior officers in the Space Force
would broaden and gain joint experience if we're consolidating
all space equities into a single Service providing force for a
single functional combatant command?
General Dunford. No, Senator, I think it's a great
question. For clarity, I would envision that each of the
Services would still have expertise at the staff planning level
to employ space capabilities, and then also the necessary tools
to take advantage of space. So, ground systems, staff planners,
and those kind of things would be in the other Services. But,
Senator, from where I sit now, particularly as a former Joint
Force commander, operational, and as the Chairman, I mentioned,
a minute ago, the diversity of perspective actually brings
strengths to the Joint Force. So, I don't have concerns about
Space Command being a cylinder of excellence, if you will,
because it's largely a single Service. I think it's imperative,
on the Joint Force, to make sure that, in force development,
force design, in command and control, and on our planning, we
leverage that diversity that each of the Services brings.
My perspective is--and I was probably where many Members of
the Committee are today, 2 years ago: skeptical that we're
moving in the right direction. At the end of the day, I asked
the question--we have a space domain now. It is a warfighting
domain. What is the optimal organizational construct to make
sure that we're positioned to fight in space? And that's where
I've landed now on the Space Force. So, I do believe that the
framework within which we develop joint capabilities will allow
us to leverage both Space Command, the operational element
here, as well as Space Force, the train, organize, and equip
organization.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me just say, to all of you, thank you for
your service to our country. I most certainly appreciate all of
the expertise that you provide.
Once again, Secretary Wilson, it has been truly an honor
and a privilege to be able to work with you, and we're going to
miss you.
I have to share with you all. I guess I'm openminded as to
whether or not this is a good idea. But, at the same time, I
think all of us have an obligation to come in, in a sense, to
be skeptical, because as you've all indicated, we have the best
with regards to our approach right now to space, compared to
our near-peer competitors. What we're trying to do is to make
improvements for the long term based upon the issues that we
see that we're not able to do as well as we would like to.
Having learned a lot from previous projects and so forth, the
Air Force, right now, has a B-21 project which is not only on
time, it's on budget. It would appear to me that there are
acquisition processes within the Air Force right now that are
showing improvement, that we're actually seeing that work its
way through. I'm wondering what it is within the space
processes that would be different, and why it is that space is
a challenge.
I'm also trying to figure out what happens when we start
talking about this new bureaucracy. We've actually considered
the fact that we would actually have a general officer, a Chief
of Staff, who would be a four-star, responsible for the Space
Force, but we would also have another individual who would
serve as commander of the U.S. Space Command.
Let me just start with this. Any possibility that we could
follow the same guidelines as we found within U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM), where we have a dual-hatted position? Has
that been considered as one way to perhaps promote some
efficiencies in this proposal?
I'll start with Secretary Shanahan, and if you'd like to
pass that off, you're welcome to, sir.
Secretary Shanahan. No, let me start there, and add on to
your comments about the B-21.
The first is, let's say we did have the dual hat, and you
just look at the work that that individual would be accountable
to deliver. It's too much work. If it were General Raymond, it
would be too much work, given what's taking place across the
Department. So, it's just a bandwidth issue. If we were to
compare acquisition processes to the B-21, in our situation we
have the opportunity to take advantage of innovation that's
taking place in the commercial sector. The B-21 is really
indigenous. We're going to have to make changes to our
acquisition processes in order to be able to take advantage of
all of this new technology and innovation.
Senator Rounds. Would not a Space Force have the same
unfortunate bureaucratic problems that the Air Force has to
deal with today?
Secretary Shanahan. That was the nature of the Space
Development Agency. Carve the development portion out so that
we can address the bureaucratic red tape of acquisition so we
can really leverage the commercial innovation and the fact that
how we design is going to be fundamentally different because
it's now a contested environment.
Senator Rounds. You know, this wouldn't be the first time
that we've made a change like this. I mean, this has gone
through processes in the past. There is no such thing as a
perfect layout. The one we have today is clearly not perfect.
It could be improved upon.
And, General Dunford, I see that you were looking over as
though you may have something to add to that particular
thought.
General Dunford. Senator, do you mind if I address the
dual-hat issue?
Senator Rounds. Yes, sir.
Go ahead.
General Dunford. When I look at General Nakasone, the
benefit of the dual-hat arrangement up there is, he's able to
combine intelligence with cyber capabilities to quickly execute
operations. We saw, combined with authorities, the benefit and
the power of that last fall in protecting our democracy.
In the case of Space Command and Space Force, Space Command
will be singularly focused on integrating the Joint Force for
operations, so integrating capabilities and integrating across
capabilities to conduct operations. The four-star which Space
Force really is, in a train, organize, and equip world--and I
see the benefit of having somebody singularly focused on
developing the human capital, the doctrine, the capabilities,
and the culture of a Space Force. But, that same individual, I
don't believe, can also be the one we count on day-to-day to
conduct operations.
Senator Rounds. Let me just ask a couple of real quick
questions. General Hyten, I'm going to come right to you with
this, because clearly you have a number of these items under
your responsibility right now, but let me just run this by.
Satellites are going to be separate right now, in terms of
maintaining the NRO separate, number one. Number two, what
about hypersonics? Whose role is this going to play, and how
does that fit into this whole process? Are we going to find
that under a Space Force or a Space Command, or is that going
to remain separated out?
General Hyten. Well, you'll organize the structure of the
weapons that we're building and the capabilities that we're
building based on the organization with the best expertise. I
think the Space Force structure will likely build the sensors
that will see hypersonics. But, I think the other Services will
more likely build the hypersonic capabilities, because they
will operate in their domains. The hypersonic capabilities
we're talking about right now are not space capabilities, they
operate from the sea, from the land, from the air, through the
air. That structure makes sense to go through there.
If I could just build on a little bit to the previous
discussion, though, because I think it's important for the
committee to understand that--well, just look at the uniform
I'm wearing. I am an airman at heart. When I bleed, I bleed
blue. I love my Air Force, and I love the history of the Air
Force in space. I mean, the term aerospace was created at this
committee in 1958 by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to
talk about the integration of air and space. I love that
background. But, every physical domain we have, when it becomes
contested, we create a military service to deal with that.
So, we're going to have a Space Force someday. I think what
the committee has to decide is, When is that going to happen? I
think now is the time to go to what the Chairman said, Do you
want to get ahead of the problem, not trail it, not come in the
response to a catastrophe, but get ahead of the problem?
But, I hope everybody understands, I love the uniform that
I wear.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
I hope you can understand that, while this committee seems
to be open to this idea, we're still seeing a lot of
generalities after being studied for awhile, and we're having a
hard time grasping. Candidly, unlike some colleagues, my needle
may be a little bit more inclined to create a Space Force, but
I still got questions.
For instance, Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, there
was a statement that you issued that said, ``Current service-
specific entities that provide global space capabilities would
become part of the U.S. Space Force. For example, the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center, the Navy Mobile User
Objective System, and the Army's Operations of Wide and Narrow
Band Global Satellite Communications all become part of the
Space Force.'' But, then you go on to say, ``As necessary, DOD
components would retain organic space capabilities uniquely
required to support the core mission of that military service
or defense agency.''
So, what, exactly, would and wouldn't become part of the
Space Force? Do you have a list of the entities that would
have, and do we have that list, or can you get that list to us?
Go ahead, General.
General Dunford. Senator, I can start, and just give you an
example. In my own Service, the Marine Corps, we don't have
space capabilities in the Marine Corps. We do have personnel
that are trained in capabilities to take advantage of space.
Where I see us going is that the preponderance of space
capabilities would be in that single Service, the Space Force,
but each of the Services, because space is integral to their
warfighting capability, is going to have to have expertise
inside those Services to make sure that space is properly
integrated into their warfighting capability, and then they're
going to have to have some capabilities to take advantage of
ground systems and so forth. But, this would move on order of
95 percent-plus of the capabilities in the department of space
into a single force. So, what would be residual in the other
Services would be minimal, and it would be designed
specifically and only to make sure they can take advantage of
space.
Senator Jones. Okay.
Secretary, you want to add anything?
Secretary Shanahan. Oh, absolutely. Senator, we can come
brief you. We've done the architectural and programmatic
analysis, service and agency, for over the Future Years Defense
Program. So, I could show you where, today, we have ten
different organizations working on similar architectures. This
is really not about the systems that we have in place.
Wholesale, they stay in place. But, the Department is about to
embark on new command and control for all the Services. We have
an opportunity here to have all domain command and control at
the Department of Defense level. That's never been an
opportunity. And why that's such a big deal--and that's what
the Space Development Agency represents--is, we're going to
have common ground stations, common terminals. The
infrastructure that's necessary to really be able to strip out
cost and be able to upgrade capability will finally have a
baseline that'll allow us to do it. I think this is where
Senator Peters was. Where does this come from? Ten efforts to
one. There's real cost, real schedule, real capability that
gets delivered in a much more effective fashion. That's what
this proposal is about.
I'd trade 500 people, in a heartbeat, to implement this
proposal. If that's where the negotiation is, I think we have a
winner, here. The real benefit is delivering capability at a
much lower cost, and those dollars are in the billions.
Senator Jones. All right. Just to bring it home to Alabama,
is the Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) at
Redstone Arsenal going to be part of the Space Force? Do you
know, or do you want to get back to me?
Secretary Shanahan. No, actually, it depends which part,
because when we think of some of the critical roles in the
SMDC, some of that will be aligned with the Space Force as we
do Army modernization. Some of the existing resources that
support ongoing, I'll call them, legacy Army operations,
they'll stay in their current capacity and in their current
alignment.
Senator Jones. All right.
Secretary Wilson, I'm just going to ask it in a different
way, this question about the need for this. Because I've read
statements of yours in the past, where you have talked about
the need for a Space Command versus Space Force, maybe not
both. I get it about acquisition. But, I sometimes think that
that could be done within the Air Force. Let me just put it
this way. Had the President of the United States not issued an
order about creating this--and you have been the Secretary now
for a couple of years--would this be something that you would
be coming to the Senate Armed Services Committee, recommending,
after having served 2 years as Secretary of the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, I think the President of the
United States has done us a service by elevating this
conversation and making the challenge we face in space a
kitchen-table conversation. When I came here to be confirmed in
front of you 2 years ago, I was told, by a holdover from the
folks who were still kind of in the previous Administration or
holding over or whatnot--that I had to take out the words
``space'' and ``warfighting'' in the same sentence. And look at
where we are today. The President has proposed, and you all
have supported, 2 consecutive years of double-digit percentage
increases in the space budget, and there's another one before
you today in the fiscal year 2020 budget. We're having a
hearing on how America needs to dominate in space. And I think
we need to give him credit for that.
Senator Jones. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for that answer Secretary Wilson.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks, to all of our witnesses today, for being here.
This is obviously very important to all of us, but making
sure that the structure is right is also very important. I
think we've determined that it's a necessity. It's just how we
establish the forces.
So, I hope we can get this sorted out. I know we've talked
about this so many times over, in so many different ways. We've
given a lot of different examples of different types of
structures of organizations within our military. I guess we
need some convincing that there is a necessity for a sixth
branch within our armed services.
We do have the United States Special Operations Command,
SOCOM, and its components. They were stood up to organize,
train, and equip our Nation's special operators, and they were
established to address a gap in our warfighting construct
without standing up a separate branch of service. So, with
that, we have Naval Special Warfare, we have U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), we have U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC), and we've got U.S. Air
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), all of our branches
represented within SOCOM. So, why is that not a great example,
then, of what we could do for a Space Command instead of a
Space Force? Could somebody address that?
Secretary Shanahan. I'd be happy to do that. In my previous
life, I did weapon system development for SOCOM, and I've done
weapon systems development for space, and then also the Missile
Defense Agency. So, a full spectrum of different classes of
engineering and different levels of complexity. The SOCOM model
is very much different than what we're proposing. And that's
what you're recognizing.
In the SOCOM model, the very advanced engineering is
actually done by the Service. In this model, it would be the
same. The advanced capability would be done by the Space Force.
So, there's similarity. The actual research and development
that's done by SOCOM today, if we just looked at the budget, is
about $600 million. If we look at what's in the Air Force
today, it's about $11 billion in acquisition. It's about $8
billion in research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E).
It's a different scale, and the complexity of the engineering
and the complication is just a different class. So, I would
just argue, it's different missions and different scales. I
think it would be much more difficult to manage in that
environment, given the amount of acquisition we're going to do
as a Department, going forward.
Senator Ernst. I understand the acquisition challenges. I
would say that right now, as well, we also have challenges with
personnel, simply, to move into a Space Force, and what those
requirements might be.
Secretary, I know we had spoken, just several weeks ago,
about maybe some of the challenges. Because anytime we do stand
up--even if it's a brand-new unit, whether it's a company or a
battalion, you're trying to field new positions. Could you
address for me the challenges with pulling a lot of talent,
primarily from our Air Force, but also from some of our other
service branches, and the implications of what that might do to
hollow out some of the other forces with that talent, and just
some of the challenges we'll face in filling some of those
topheavy slots?
Secretary, can you address that, maybe?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, with respect to the people, I
think part of this has to do with at what timescale. How do we
develop our people, and then how do we gradually promote them
and get them ready to take on positions of responsibility? I
think you've identified one of the issues that will be one of
the hard parts we're dealing with in the working group, the
task force that's been set up under a two-star general to look
at how do we make sure we have the right expertise, and on what
timescale could that Space Force grow into a fully robust
support for a member of the Joint Chiefs?
Senator Ernst. Again, understanding that these are
decisions that will be made along the way--but, what kind of
timeline will it take to fully establish a Space Force rather
than a Space Command?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the concept that is in the draft
working group paper that was finished by the end of March and
is currently being refined is that, within 90 days of passage
of legislation, we would stand up the cell of a Space Force
staff inside the Air Force, and then it will move on to two
other phases, one to initial operating capability, and then
full operating capability. Each of those phases are conditions-
based, but the concept is that it would be fully operational in
the window of 2023-2024 timeframe.
Senator Ernst. Okay. That sounds very fast, actually, to
stand up a whole separate branch of service, but it is
something that we'll continue to look at, as Congress.
I appreciate the input that you've all provided here today.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks, to the witnesses.
I have appreciated my colleagues' questioning. I think
they've addressed a lot of the questions I have. And I want to
take it in a different direction--I would say, take it to
30,000 feet, but we're talking about a Space Force, so I should
probably call it a low-Earth orbit--and talk about problems in
space and how we're going to deal with them. And maybe if we
talk about problems, then we could work backward to structure.
So, here's a recent one that I was interested in. Just in
the last couple of weeks, March 27th, India announced that it
had successfully conducted a test of an anti-satellite weapon
(ASAT), so they had something in low-Earth orbit that used an
anti-satellite weapon to knock it down. And it resulted in, the
estimates right now, 400 pieces of debris, 24 of which are
large enough to potentially pose a threat to the International
Space Station. There have been other instances like this. There
was a Chinese similar effort in 2007 that led to 100,000
cataloged pieces of debris, many of which we are still
observing in debris fields that pose danger to other assets in
space. There was a collision in 2009 between a working U.S.
satellite and a sort of defunct Soviet-era satellite--a kind of
a fender bender that produced debris. Then this debris causes
challenges.
If we think that space is going to be more of a traffic
jam, more satellites for all kinds of purposes up there, what
should we be thinking about, as a Senate, in this committee or
in Foreign Relations, about the rules? What should the rules
environment be, and what should we be doing to try to promote
rules? India's an ally. We're not talking about an adversary
doing something. We're talking about them testing some
capacity. But, then that creates challenges for all kinds of
uses of space. How should we be solving problems like that?
General Hyten, you looked like you wanted to jump in.
General Hyten. So, Senator Kaine, the first lesson from the
Indian ASAT is just the simple question of, Why did they do
that? The answer should be simple, I think, to all the
committee looking at it, is that they did that because they're
concerned about threats to their nation from space. Therefore,
they feel they have to have the capability to defend themself
in space.
Senator Kaine. Can I just interrupt for a second? I think
they have a second concern, as well, that there's no rules
right now; there may one day be rules, and, often, when we
write rules about this, we benefit those who already have the
technology and say, ``Okay, you already have it, we'll
establish rules for you,'' but then we usually establish
nonproliferation for rules for everybody who doesn't. So, if
they're concerned about the weaponization of space, they want
to be able to get in there first so that, if the rules are
created, they're sort of grandfathered in. I think that's part
of the issue.
General Hyten. Well, the second issue, from my perspective,
is that--I've advocated, for a long time, for the development
of some kind of international norms of behavior in space. And
where those norms of behavior should begin, from my opinion, is
with debris. Because as the combatant commander responsible for
space today, I don't want more debris.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
General Hyten. But, we don't have any international
conditions that say that that's not a good thing.
Senator Kaine. And you would think that even our
adversaries would have the same concern about the debris effect
on their programs. So, that should be something where there
could be some international common ground and ability to find
rules of the road.
General Hyten. I think that's how it should be worked, in
an international perspective, to start walking down that path
to make sure that space can be used for future generations.
Because if we keep creating debris in space, eventually we're
going to get to the point where it's very difficult to find a
place to launch, very difficult to find a place to put a
satellite, to operate a satellite without having to maneuver
all the time to keep it away from debris. All those kind of
things are very complicated. But, it has to be worked in an
international perspective. And I hope we get there----
Senator Kaine. What is the international forum, or what is
the international group that could do something like this?
General Hyten. The place where that's debated now is in the
United Nations in a Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
That's where that is debated, mostly. And the United Nations is
a good place. But, I would like to think the United States
could take a leadership role in that, working with our allies
to define what we believe are the proper norms of behavior in
space, and then bring that into the broader international
community. It's very difficult, if you try to work something
like this in the broad context. And that's clearly a State
Department-led function. Others in the government will lead
that. But, from a military perspective, it's important that we
have those structures.
Senator Kaine. I mean, there is some concern that
adversaries create debris intentionally, too. If they create
debris fields, that can then prohibit access to portions of
space. One of the most scintillating Federal publications is
NASA's Debris Quarterly NASA has an office whose job is to
monitor debris so that those of us putting up satellites so we
can get Sirius in our car are not going to be affected by that.
So this is an issue that really needs some rules.
I think, Secretary Shanahan, you were about to say
something.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, I was just going to add on to
your comment when you said, ``What are some of the areas that
we should be spending more time as a committee or a body?''
Space is clearly one. Cyber is another one of those domains
that needs a better rule set. Artificial intelligence (AI) and
autonomy, all these new technologies are going to unlock
enormous, very positive capabilities, but there's also a
downside, and we need to really be investing time to think
about those so we can, to the earlier point, set some rules or
establish some norms so that someone doesn't take an advantage
or leverage----
Senator Kaine. I hope we will play a leadership role in
that. I think treaties have kind of gone out of fashion in the
Senate. We don't ratify treaties much anymore. But, treaties
are necessary. I mean, the notion that we could just have our
own set of rules, and a treaty is a bad thing because it
involves some incursion into sovereignty--if we don't have some
rules about space, it's going to affect our ability--we create
a Space Force like that, and it's perfect, but we find a lot of
the domain is a domain that we really can't adequately invest
in because of debris fields or other things, it's going to be
to our detriment.
Very helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the witnesses testifying today.
I also appreciate, from the President and Secretary and
Chairman, the $750 billion DOD request. I hope we can move on
that, and appreciate the President putting this idea forward.
You can tell that we're all wrestling with it. We're kind of
struggling with it, to be honest. It's pretty clear that,
watching some of your evolutions, that you've struggled with
it, as well, and wrestled with it. And I think that's okay.
That's what this committee's supposed to be trying to address.
General Dunford, your statement on the fact that reform
usually comes after some kind of disaster, that we can try to
be preemptive or in front of this, actually, I think, is a very
powerful one.
And, General Hyten, I think what you're talking about,
saying, ``This is going to happen at some time in the future,''
I think you're probably right about that.
My questions actually relate to this issue of timing. And
let me give you a concern that I have. It relates to readiness
of the entire force. So, I commend all of you and everybody
else at the Pentagon for working on this readiness. A lot of
people forget, 2010 to 2016, the Department of Defense budget
was cut by 25 percent, an amount that was almost close to $540
billion, which is an entire DOD budget here. We all know that
readiness plummeted. I chair the Subcommittee on Readiness, and
I've held numerous hearings and readiness in the force
plummeted, period. What we've all been trying to do--and I
commend you and the President and everybody else in this
committee, and the Chairman, Ranking Member--is get the
readiness of our five current Services back up to the level
that the American people expect from all of us and from all of
you. That is a hugely important mission.
And here's been one of my overriding concerns with regard
to the Space Force. Not that it is not important, not that it
might not even be a good idea, but I'm concerned that--is it
prudent to take on what would be a fairly disruptive element of
a new aspect of the Services in the United States military,
when the current five Services, let's face it, are not up to
the level of readiness that they need to be? Do any of you
think that we are at the level of readiness that we should be
right now?
General Dunford?
General Dunford. Senator, I'll start. No. And, as you
know----
Senator Sullivan. So, isn't that a concern, then? I mean, I
know you'd think we can walk and chew gum, but shouldn't we try
to get to the level of readiness that we all really think we
need and then turn to this?
General Dunford.Sir--let me tell you how I think about
this. I don't look at it as, ``it's either space or
readiness.'' I actually look at making sure that we have a
singular focus on the interdependencies of the Joint Force on
space as a readiness issue. We can generate all the squadron
and battalion readiness we want, and, if we're not capable of
defending ourselves in space and taking full advantage of space
from a command-and-control and intelligence-surveillance-
reconnaissance perspective, precision munitions, timing of our
systems--if we can't take full advantage of that and we can't
protect ourselves in space, battalion or squadron readiness
will amount to naught. I view this issue, actually, from my
perspective, which is why my evolution on the issue has taken
the direction it has, I actually now have come to much better
appreciate, as a result of our analytic work, the
interdependencies on space and the fact that this whole issue
of Space Force really is, in my judgment, related to readiness.
Senator Sullivan. So, in your professional judgment, which
I respect immensely, you do not think this is going to take
away what I believe is the most important mission everybody
here should be doing, is getting our five current Services back
up to the readiness that are demanded by the American people.
General Dunford. Whatever direction the committee decides
to go, this should be addressed as a joint warfighting
readiness issue. That's what it is. It's not an organizational
issue. It's a joint warfighting readiness issue.
Senator Sullivan. Let me be a little bit more specific as
it relates to a readiness concern. This committee, and all of
you, have made, all of us, together, significant progress with
regard to building up our Nation's missile defense. And, Mr.
Secretary, you recently said, in testimony, that was vital. I
agree with that. I think the whole committee does. It's been
very bipartisan. One of the elements, General Hyten, you have
mentioned that's actually critical to our Nation's missile
defense, is having and deploying as soon as possible space-
based sensors that can look at both hypersonics and the
ballistic missile threats coming to our Nation. I think it's
your number-one unfunded requirement. Again, I think the
committee agrees that that's critical. My understanding is that
the space sensor layer system is being shifted from MDA, the
Missile Defense Agency, to the Space Development Agency, which
hasn't even been stood up yet.
General Hyten, doesn't something like that almost
automatically, in your mind, indicate that we're going to have
a delay in deploying a space-based sensor system, which you and
others and we all agree is critical to missile defense, when
you're taking it out of the Missile Defense Agency into a new
agency that hasn't even been stood up yet? How can that help
with regard to readiness on missile defense? I'm very concerned
about that topic.
General Hyten. So, I think there's a number of interesting
observations. I would say that the Secretaries to my right will
probably have an interesting perspective on where they live.
Where I live, as the combatant commander, I have a requirement
for a space-sensor layer that will see the threats that will
enable our deterrent and enable our defense.
Senator Sullivan. How quickly can we deploy that?
General Hyten. That's the question. We need that by the
mid-2020s. That's what the threat requirements are showing us.
Therefore, we have to go fast in order to do that. I've
testified in front of this committee before for that issue.
We've pushed that. There are so many people that are involved
in space now, it makes it difficult. So, it was going to be the
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), then the Missile
Defense Agency. The Space Development Agency is focused on
that. The Space Development Agency is supposed to look at
revolutionary, not evolutionary, concepts. This is a good place
for them to do that. They have the right ability to go fast.
But, the key, from a combatant commander perspective, is,
that's my requirement. I need that requirement, and we need it
filled by the middle of the next decade.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I understand it, under its current organization, the Air
Force does not have a good track record of being able to
effectively manage the prioritization of its missions in both
air and space. Space frequently falls to a lower priority or
lacks a consistent seat at the table. I contrast this with the
U.S. Navy, which has successfully managed to prioritize its own
air, surface, and submarine missions, to include the
establishment of separate training, acquisitions, and doctrinal
development centers across these very different domains. Why
has this been such a problem for the Air Force under its
current structure? And what role does a new U.S. Space Command
play in helping prioritize space across departments? And how
does that differ or duplicate the intent of the proposed Space
Force?
Madam Secretary or General, do you want to address that?
Secretary Wilson. Happy to. Senator, the biggest shift that
we are seeing is the shift from an uncontested domain to a
contested domain. Over the last 3 years, including the budget
that you have before you, the President's budget includes
double-digit-percentage increases in the budget that are driven
by an analysis of the threat, the strategy to meet that threat,
the concepts of operations, and the programs to support it. I
think what you're seeing in the difference between what you
described with the Navy is that the Navy has been operating in
a contested domain for hundreds of years. The Air Force, in
space, has been operating in a contested domain for a much
shorter period of time. We have set up the National Space
Defense Center. We have schoolhouses and specific focus on
space, most of which have been set up in the last decade.
You're seeing, in the Air Force, that focus.
I would also say that, for the missions and the
requirements of the combatant commander, the United States Air
Force has provided what the combatant commanders needed in an
uncontested environment. The Air Force built a glass house
before the invention of stones. We now have the invention of
stones, and, as ``Jay'' Raymond said just yesterday to a very
large audience, a year ago, the Air Force was in a 9G turn
toward space superiority, and he was wrong. It's a 12G turn.
I'm proud of the force that we're presenting.
Senator Duckworth. So, how will the U.S. Space Command help
prioritize across departments? And will it? And how does that
differ from intent or duplication, in terms of the proposed
Space Force? I mean, that is a very complex system. You're
saying you're standing up new training and--do you think you
will be just as capable, in the Air Force, to do multiple
things at once, the way the Navy can do it? How does this
differ between Space Command and Space Force?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, I was trying to explain why I
thought the Navy structures were different from the way the Air
Force evolved with respect to space. But, in the proposal
that's before you, there's the additive personnel. Some of it
is to support the four-star who will be a member of the Joint
Chiefs. The other large number of people is to set up a
Training and Doctrine Center specifically focused on the
challenges of space as a contested domain.
Senator Duckworth. So, then the Air Force will send your
people to their training programs? Is that what you're saying?
Or how does that work?
Secretary Wilson. That Training and Doctrine Center would
be primarily for members of the Space Force and other officers
to get joint experience, and, honestly, also our allied
officers. The Air Force has already opened up its Space 100,
200, and 300 programs to our allied officers, and we have
opened up and created a Combined Space Operations Center, this
last year, that includes our allies, in California.
Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
I also serve in the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, so I want to talk a bit about the intersection
of military and commercial space assets. As you're all aware,
this is an area where we don't yet widely have accepted norms.
And we've had that discussion here today already. The multipart
proposal we have here would likely increase complications even
further. In the realm of great-power competition, we see
countries like China, who are rapidly expanding their space
presence, but they don't have issues of deconfliction, because
their military and commercial assets are intermingled, and they
operate almost as a single unit. So, how does DOD and the
proposed Space Force plan to work with other Federal agencies
and our commercial sector to deconflict with these issues
before and while they're arising?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, let me take that one on.
The Space Development Agency, in its design, is intended to
undertake four different activities. The first is
consolidation, so that we can take all the requirements of the
Department, and then to do fundamental systems engineering, so
that we can take advantage of a space ecosystem, so everything
from launch to sustainment, and then, by design, tap into the
commercial space industry, where significant innovation has
occurred. But, for us to actually be able to incorporate that
technology, we have to accommodate or make corrections to our
acquisition system. Our rules and regulations won't allow us to
leverage that new innovation. And the Space Development Agency,
which is modeled after the Missile Defense Agency, allows us to
be able to take advantage of all those things. I think that's
what'll allow us to be able to develop capability more quickly,
and at a lower cost.
Senator Duckworth. But, I'm also concerned about security,
and how do you force the civilians to work closely with you in
security and share information? You've got people selling
tickets for tourism into space for crying out loud.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Duckworth. How do you deconflict that? Whereas, the
Chinese don't have these problems, because they have total
control over their commercial sector.
Secretary Shanahan. I mean we have procedures, protocols.
We have worked with commercial segments. You know, we have a
long, long history of doing that. That's really the intent of
standing up an organization like this, so we can really
leverage that commercial space.
Senator Duckworth. I'd love to explore this further, but
I'm out of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
I want to talk more about organizational transition. I
think the President was right to make this a target that we
need to achieve. So, to me, it's not a matter of whether we
should do it, it's how we should do it and when we should do
it.
Secretary Shanahan or Secretary Wilson, when you stand up
the force, a part of what you're doing is realigning current
operations into a more cohesive unit. So, if you're looking at
the end state of a Space Force, have you done the analysis to
determine how much of that is just realigning existing
commands, Training and Doctrine Center? In other words, if I'm
building a new enterprise, how much of the current enterprise
is simply being realigned, and then what is the net new? What
I'm specifically talking about is the underlying cost
associated with that. Because, in reality, you're not going to
get a whole lot more money. So, you're going to have to create
this force within current spending run rates, for the most
part. I'm trying to figure out, when General Hyten rightly
suggests that there's a capability he needs by the mid-2020s,
what potentially shifts to the right after we've already
quantified that net incremental cost, just for the overall
structure of a separate force?
Secretary Shanahan. Sir, the way we've been looking at this
is, how quickly can we respond to the threat? Then, behind all
this, how do we do it more effectively? Standing up the Space
Command is not an incrementally large change in cost, so I
would argue it's not really moving lines of boxes, it's
eliminating overhead and competing priorities so, 100 percent
of the time, the Space Command Commander can focus on the new
mission. It's not about just getting separation from STRATCOM,
it's 100-percent focused on the new mission, which is contested
space, and the authorities, the rules of engagement, and the
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and the technology
to support that.
The other piece of this was--and this is where the real
value is created--in the Space Development Agency, for
incremental capability that we're going to deploy and I'll use
Secretary Wilson's metaphor--given that we've been designing
glass houses, how do we quickly transition so we're no longer
building glass houses? That's the race. It's really not about
reorganizing for people and professional development. We can
pace that, based on how much change and cost we want to absorb.
But, the race to get out of building glass houses is where
we've looked at consolidation. How do we go from ten people
attempting to get out of that operation to one, and then
leveraging the infrastructure? Because we duplicate.
Senator Tillis. Right. I think this could represent an
opportunity for driving out efficiencies and coming to find out
that maybe there's a way to do this without any net incremental
cost. But, if you don't get that right, then you say, ``The
good news is, we have a very clear vision for a Space Force.
The bad news is, we need net incremental money that we don't
have today.'' And then the bad news we're likely to give you
is, ``We don't have anymore money, so what are you not going to
do?'' So, that's really my focus.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Tillis. Secretary Wilson?
Secretary Wilson. If I can--just to add on, here. Ninety
percent of the forces that we're talking about are currently in
the Air Force, in the design phase that we're in, with the task
force that we have stood up that includes all of the Services,
but is led by the Air Force, by a two-star general. We are in
the design phase now. One of the tasks in that design phase is
to recommend the preliminary macro-organizational design of
U.S. Space Force field units as well as subordinate
headquarters. So, that planning work is underway.
Senator Tillis. General Hyten, do you have anything to add
to that?
General Hyten. I think it's just important to emphasize
that the Space Force that is in our proposed legislation is
under the Air Force.
Senator Tillis. Right.
General Hyten. So, if the Space Force existed today, I
would be sitting next to the Service Secretary responsible for
space. That decision by the President and the Vice President to
put the Space Force under the Air Force was the big driver for
me, because that will allow us to drive efficiencies and fix
problems, and not focus on what is the song, what is the
recruiting structure, what is the personnel structure, what is
the basing structure?
Senator Tillis. When I saw that proposal, I felt a lot more
comfortable with the organizational concept. So, that's why I
said, to the points that General Dunford made in his opening
comments, I don't think it's a matter of whether or not we need
this focus, it's just the organizational construct. And I think
that what's been laid out, to this point, is a good one.
The last thing I'll leave you with, because I want to end
on time, in deference to my colleagues, is that while we're
taking a look at this organization evolution, I still think
that we need a lot of work done on the overall organizational
evolution of these operations that are now embedded within the
service lines that we should really take a look at to drive
efficiencies. Has nothing to do with the Space Command, but
there's one best practice for acquisition, there's one best
practice for a lot of these operations that are now siloed. And
my guess is, if you did that, you'd free up a lot of resources
within the current spending levels that could actually be made
to accelerate a lot of the things that I know are your top
priorities. So, that's something I'll look forward to speaking
with y'all about when we can do it in a more meaningful basis,
back over at the Pentagon.
So, thank you all for being here. Thank you for your
service.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Manchin's recognized.
Senator Reed, presiding.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all again for being here. I'm sorry, I've been
running back and forth to committee meetings.
I do have a few. This could be to anybody that would want
to answer--in the proposal delivered to Congress, there was
little reference to the Reserve component, other than to say
that it will be part of other 15,000 people in the Space Force.
What staff was told last week at a briefing was that the
Department was not really sure what the Reserve component's
role would be until we stood up the Active component, and that
it would take additional legislation to make clear what the
role of Space Force Guard and Reserve look like. If we vote on
this Space Force later this year--or in spring or early summer,
whenever--I'm being asked by the Department to vote on a
proposal that does not have a real plan for our National Guard
or Reserve, which is a big constituency base of mine. So, my
question would be, if total force is going to be as important
to the Space Force as it is to other branches, isn't it
important that we think critically about the Reserve
components?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, it's impossible for me to
imagine a Space Force without a Reserve component.
Senator Manchin. Because there's no plans I'm seeing.
You're moving without that in part of your plan right now, as
we see it.
Secretary Wilson. Well, I am very happy to work with you to
make that more specific.
Senator Manchin. You all do have it? You can get more
specific with that?
Secretary Wilson. We're happy to work with you on that.
There are, within the Air Force, some, particularly, Guard
units that have----
Senator Manchin. Very much so. I know that. But, I'm
saying, if you have something, we haven't seen it yet. I'm
sorry. But, if you could share that with us, it would be very
helpful. It can relieve a lot of tension.
Yes, sir, General.
General Dunford. Senator, if I could just talk about where
I think we are. So, there's a number of issues--and I've looked
through this and had some of the same concerns you have--
there's a number of issues unresolved. The real question before
the committee is, Do we stand up the organization and get that
four-star leader singularly focused on what the right
organizational construct is, or do we wait for the perfect
organizational construct to stand it up? Where I fell was to
move out and refine as we go. The committee will have plenty of
time to provide oversight. So, the initial first step to take
in this next fiscal year would be, stand up the organization,
get the leadership in place, and then begin to address these
very important issues, one of which you raised.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Let me go a little bit further. You talk about the culture.
This whole new Space Force is a culture, right? And you want to
diversify it. Well, I can tell you, the Army has a certain
culture. The Marines definitely have a certain culture--they're
in first, they're going with their guns in blazing. The Air
Force, basically, the culture has always been the same. This is
where the space professionals have come from. This has
basically been your bailiwick. How are you going to change that
culture, when everyone's still going to come from the Air
Force?
Or what culture do you think to diversify?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, our focus on changing culture is
to shift from providing a service to the combatant commanders,
with almost like a utility, to a warfighting ethos. We're doing
that within the space cadre of the Air Force today in the way
in which we train our people, the way in which we assign them.
Just as one example, we have people who operate satellite
systems at Schriever Air Force Base, in Colorado Springs. They
spend 4 months on the floor, operating their satellite systems
in a peacetime environment, and then 4 months in training for a
contested environment and how they would operate----
Senator Manchin. Secretary, I'm just having a real hard
time understanding why we need this other agency. You've got
everything at your disposal right now. It just doesn't make
any--I mean, I'm just having a hard time with it. I'm trying to
understand it, and Secretary was very patient with me, trying
to explain it. But, if I had everything you all have at your
disposal right now, and the Air Force has that expertise, and
there's some flaws in it, and you want more attention to it,
we'll give you what you need. Just doesn't make any sense to me
at all. I'm sorry.
Secretary, I know you want to take another shot at me?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I'm happy to take another shot at
it. I----
[Laughter.]
Secretary Shanahan. That's why I'm here.
Senator Manchin. I know.
Go ahead and give me your spiel again, because they might
want to hear why you think we need this other agency.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. The very short story is the
amount of change that's taking place in this environment, we're
not prepared to address.
Senator Manchin. The way you're set up now.
Secretary Shanahan. The way we're set up now.
Senator Manchin. But, can't you redirect what you have
within the Air Force right now, which is where most of the
culture is going to stay? It's not going to go over to the
Marines. It's not going to the Army.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Manchin. It's staying right over there.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Yeah. So, most of this is really
within the Air Force, and, as Senator Tillis was talking about,
restructuring. This is a fundamental shift that now treats
space as a domain. So, the culture is changed because the
mission has changed.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Secretary Shanahan. The leadership will change. The
prioritization of the resources will change. Then our approach
to developing capability will change.
Senator Manchin. I gotcha.
If I can lead into this back to Secretary Wilson.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
Senator Manchin. Secretary, you've also publicly stated
that you didn't think the Space Development Agency is a good
use of resources, citing the Air Force's own Space Rapid
Capabilities Office as an effective acquisition body. Can you
elaborate on why you think our money and effort is better
invested in processes and organizations that already exist,
which is the point I'm trying to make?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the Space Development Agency is
not part of the President's proposal or the legislation in
front of you. The first project that this agency is apparently
going to take on is actually funded by the Air Force and is in
our budget. It's, How do we use low-Earth orbit commercially-
based satellite constellations? It's in our budget at $140
million over 5 years, and is intended to----
Senator Manchin. It's in your purview also. I mean, that's
part of your bailiwick.
Secretary Wilson. That is. And we propose to do it with the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Question is
how best to buy them and whether we need a new agency to do so.
Senator Manchin. Do we need a new agency just to get into
lower orbit?
Are we justifying a new agency just to get into lower
orbit?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, what I'm saying here is not new.
My memorandum to the Secretary on this subject has been
reported on publicly.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Secretary Wilson. And I did not support it.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Senator Inhofe,
Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you, for being here. I've only been in
the Senate for, well, less than 4 months, but this is the most
fascinating 2 hours so far. So, thank you all for being as
prepared as you are.
I'm going to summarize a few things I've heard this morning
before I run out of time to do that, and then ask some
questions.
General Dunford, you said space is no longer a sanctuary. I
think, Secretary Wilson, you both said it's now contested.
Great points. Important points.
General Hyten, you said there will be a Space Force one
day. I'm going to hone in on that, because we hear a lot of
reluctance and a lot of questions about efficiencies, business
model. You've answered them all brilliantly--not necessarily
convincingly, maybe, to some, but I think you've answered those
questions very well.
Secretary Shanahan, you said something interesting. I want
to go through, maybe, a little history. You said the existing
forces are based on that place, on geography. I think it's an
important point that sometimes we're missing when we draw
parallels between this and other efforts and missions. As you
said that, I started thinking about the Air Force itself, that
the Air Force wasn't always the Air Force--it was once the Army
Air Force; and prior to that, it was the Army Air Corps; and
prior to that, there weren't airplanes--that, as new domains
became contested, we had to lead.
I was also thinking about some other proverbs, including
proverbs where it says that, without vision, the people perish.
I'm pretty sure it was a Minnesota Viking fan that said, ``The
logical conclusion of defense is defeat.'' Being second is not
a great place to be. I know we're first, but I just feel so
strongly that, if we're going to have a Space Force one day,
why wouldn't we start sooner rather than later? Why would we
let somebody else get there?
So, from a strategic standpoint--and I guess I'd ask the
Generals first about this--how important is it to have this
public kitchen-table-level discussion? I appreciate your
terminology, Secretary Wilson, when you said, ``The President
has elevated this topic to a kitchen-table level.'' I think
that's exactly right. But, our adversaries are watching.
They're probably watching this hearing right now. How did China
and Russia roll out their space forces or their space activity?
Did they do it in a real outward way, or did they try to do it
under the radar?
Maybe the Generals could answer that for me. Is it
important, by the way, that we send a message?
General Dunford. Senator, I don't mean to be flippant, but
the Russian military and the Chinese military are not typically
afforded the opportunity we have been afforded this morning, in
full transparency with initiatives like this.
General Hyten. And, Senator, the Chinese and the Russians
both look at space as a critical element of their defensive
capabilities, as their military. They've also organized
differently about space. The Chinese are integrating a lot of
their capabilities into a single command--space, counterspace--
those into a single command. They have an officer responsible
for space, an officer responsible for counterspace. I'll be
glad to talk to you, in a different setting, about what I think
they're doing, and what the strengths of what they're doing,
and the weaknesses, are. But, I really don't want to talk about
that in a public forum.
Senator Cramer. I appreciate both answers very much.
We've had a lot of discussion about cost and benefit. I
understand the concerns of a couple of years--or several years
of cutbacks that now have us in catchup mode on readiness and
lethalness and all those things that are important. I
appreciate the answer, Chairman Dunford, that this is probably
essential to readiness. But, maybe, Secretary Shanahan, is a
cost-benefit analysis, a literal cost-benefit analysis, is that
a possibility, here?
Secretary Shanahan. No, it is. And implicit in the Space
Development Agency is a cost-benefit analysis. It's a twofer.
More capability, sooner, at a lower cost. This is about moving
more quickly. This is a threat-driven response, and I think
what the Chairman's been highlighting here is, How do we get
ahead of things?
The other piece, here, and we've touched on it briefly, is,
we're about to usher in a new age of technology. We're on the
dawn of some major changes. If we adapt properly, we'll be able
to take advantage of it and, again, increase our dominance in
space.
Senator Cramer. Maybe just the last question, for Secretary
Wilson. With that in mind, are the increments important? I
appreciate what my colleagues are saying about why isn't this
in the plan, or why isn't that part of the proposal, and
whether it's the Guard or the Reserves or other things. Yet,
aren't the increments sort of an important part of the rollout?
In other words, we're not going from here to here, we're going
incrementally. Is that not an important part of the strategy?
Secretary Wilson. I'm not sure it's incremental. I do think
that what we have now is a set of programs that support a
strategy to dominate in space. We all prefer that space remains
peaceful, because everyone loses if war extends into space.
But, we are developing the capabilities to deter, and, if
necessary, to fight and win in the space domain, as we do in
all other domains, so that our adversaries will choose wisely
to deal with our diplomats and not with our warfighters. And
that's what this is about.
Senator Cramer. Beautifully said.
Thanks, to all of you. And I might just wrap up my comments
by saying, I just don't want to be sitting here 4 years from
now and have four people look at me and go, ``I wish we would
have started this 4 years ago.''
With that, I yield.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator
Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here, and for your
responses.
I totally agree with everything that you all have said in
your opening statements about the importance of space, the
competition for space that we have entered into. Space is the
next potential battleground. I may even be convinced, in the
future, that we need a new Space Command. I do appreciate
President Trump's focusing on space. I just have questions,
based on what I've heard and what I understand--and maybe I
need to know more--that we have not gotten there, in terms of
the planning and the commitment, and that, rather than spending
a lot of time debating and questioning which direction we're
going to go, we'd be better to continue to work on that and
focus on what we need to immediately do to address the
challenges that we're facing.
So, let me begin with that and ask--I share Senator
Manchin's concern about the failure to address Guard and
Reserve as part of any planning for a new Space Command. It's a
question, as you all alluded to--I guess it was you, General
Dunford or, Secretary Wilson--that many of our National Guard
folks are already doing work in space. So, I think they have a
question about what their future role might be in any new Space
Command. I think answering those questions is going to be very
important in order to ensure that there's support from States
who control the Guard.
But, I want to go on to the whole civilian side of this
question, because, as I understand, as space activity
increases, as our ability to detect debris improves--and right
now, my understanding is that DOD tracks more than 20,000
objects in space, and that number continues to grow, and that
we are making investments in situational awareness in space--I
had the opportunity to see some of that recently--to try and
track some of that space debris, and that the Space Policy
Directive of this Administration contemplates a larger role for
the Department of Commerce in space situational awareness and
space traffic management. We just had a hearing with the
Commerce Committee last week, where they were talking about
reorganizing all of the space elements in the Department of
Commerce into the Office of the Secretary. So, I'm trying to
figure out which functions would actually go to Commerce, and
which would stay in DOD, and how that responsibility gets
sorted out.
Secretary Wilson. Senator, I think I can take that one.
The Air Force has, really, since the late 1950s, taken on
the responsibility of warning people when a piece of debris
might hit their satellite. We do that out of Vandenberg Air
Force Base, in California. You're right that we currently track
about 24,000 pieces of debris that are larger than 10
centimeters, and we provide that information to every country
in the world.
We are also expanding our ability to know what is going on
in space. This year, we will go operational with something
called the Space Fence, out of Kwajalein, which is a space-
facing radar, and we will increase the number of pieces of
debris that we're tracking to probably over 100,000 with that
Space Fence, and it'll go out to geosynchronous orbit.
This shift to the Commerce Department is that they will
take over the responsibility of telling commercial companies
and deconfliction and those things. We're working very closely
with them. We're happy to transition that responsibility of
working on the commercial space, on space traffic management,
to the Commerce Department. They have had people out, working
alongside our folks at Vandenberg on how that would probably
work. As the military service, obviously, we would continue to
have to have space situational awareness and collect the data.
We would feed that over, likely, to the Commerce Department,
who would combine it with other sources of data and work with
industry.
Senator Shaheen. Would that be the plan in any new Space
Command that's operational?
Secretary Wilson. The concept is that Vandenberg would be
part of the Space Force, and the Combined Space Operations
Center is where we have all of the services, as well as our
allies and partners, that track space debris.
Senator Shaheen. But, we would continue to shift the
collection of that information to the Department of Commerce?
Secretary Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. General Hyten?
General Hyten. So, that mission today is accomplished by
airmen in the United States Air Force, but it's under my
command, U.S. Strategic Command. We provide that data, and we
have, today, 98 space situational awareness sharing agreements
with others. We have to do that, because we want to be able to
operate safely in space. But, it's not a military mission.
That's a civil mission. And the Department of Commerce is just
taking over that civil responsibility so we can focus on the
warfighting part.
But, I met with Secretary Ross this week. He is not going
to try to build all of the data and the sensors that we have in
order to do that. He'll take our sensors and our data, and he
will just become the face to the commercial sector and the face
to the world so the military doesn't have to do that. But, that
function that's in STRATCOM will transition to the U.S. Space
Command (SPACECOM).
Senator Shaheen. Will the personnel who are currently
working at STRATCOM transition to the Department of Commerce?
Is that the plan?
General Hyten. No, ma'am, the Department of Commerce will
have that front-facing piece. The airmen of the United States
Air Force today that would be in the Space Force in the future,
working for the Space Command, they still have to do that
mission so we can do our defense of mission and our space
control missions in the future. That's why we just fell into
the space traffic management business. We do it for defense.
Senator Shaheen. No, I'm just concerned about the expertise
that might be required in the Department of Commerce. And are
they going to have to hire that new? Are they going to take it
from the Air Force?
General Hyten. We're working very close with them to
understand what kind of personnel requirements they would have
to have, how they would do that. In the conversations I had
with Secretary Ross this week, what I pointed out is that, if
we do it right, most of the capabilities they need can actually
be automated and acquired through commercial agreements. They
wouldn't have to have this army of people doing that. They
could do it a whole lot better if we do it right from the
beginning, and we're working closely with them to make sure we
do it as efficiently as possible.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator
Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank each of you for being here today. I want to
thank you for the time that you've spent individually with us.
I may be the outlier on this panel, but I totally
appreciate why you need to have a Space Force. I get it. You
know, when you look at technological advancement, when you look
at 5G that is coming on, you look at the cyber pressures, you
look at that lower-orbit component, when you look at the
integration that is taking place in the new space economy, I
fully understand why you need to make this a priority, and why
you need to focus on this, why we, as a Nation, need to focus
on this, because 21st-century warfare is most likely, from what
I understand, going to be a good bit different than what we
have seen in times past. So, I appreciate that we are putting
an emphasis on this so that we're not left and caught
flatfooted at some point when we need to respond.
Secretary Wilson, I want to say all good wishes as you
leave. It truly is an honor to have you here, and we appreciate
the work you've done, whether you were wearing the uniform or
in the House or here. Of course, I thoroughly enjoyed serving
in the House and on Energy and Commerce with the Secretary. And
I know, because of that expertise, you do have an understanding
of the commercial side and also of the military side. It is a
unique perspective.
One of the things I do want to come to--and Secretary
Shanahan and I discussed this a little bit--as you look at this
new space economy that is growing--and Senator Duckworth talked
a little bit about the Chinese, and, of course, we've discussed
this. You don't know where their commercial sector and their
military sector end and begin, because they're one in the same.
That is a great-power competition. We want to make certain that
we are focused on what that means. So, are we doing enough to
encourage and leverage the dynamism of the commercial space
industry so that we are going to be able, as we conduct this
transition, to meet our national security needs? Secretary
Shanahan, I want to hear from you briefly on that.
Then, since we are near the end of this hearing, I would
like to just go down the dais, anything that you all want to
add that you haven't had the opportunity to add.
Secretary, to you first.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure. Thank you.
I think we're in a unique opportunity, given that now we
have to design and deliver capability that's more resilient,
that we can draw in the advances the commercial space industry
has developed. I mean, I think that's this unique point in
time. That's why it's so important that, when we do the
development and the acquisition, we start at a different place
than where we are today with our acquisition system.
There are two big opportunities. One is, we systems-
engineer the ecosystem to draw in launch, to draw in the ground
segment, to draw in 5G. It's not about, How do we procure a
microsatellite or a CubeSat? It's, How do we design the system
so we can ingest large volumes of data that we're going to----
Senator Blackburn. With a focus on interoperability and
cross-platform and integration of all the different agencies
that come under DOD.
Secretary Shanahan. No, absolutely.
Senator Blackburn. I think that is a very important point.
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you.
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Secretary Wilson, anything to add?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, with respect to architectural
design, the Air Force has just finished a 90-day study looking
at the threat, looking at the phases of conflict, looking at
all of our missions, and calculating and doing about--several
thousand iterations of wargames to figure out, What are the
best architectures, and how do we get there fastest to
defendable space? There are a few conclusions from that. One is
that different missions require different solutions, that an
increase in number of satellites, particularly large number of
commercial satellites, helps, but numbers alone are not enough
to prevail. We also found that the congressional direction to
consolidate all of space communications under the Air Force is
actually a tremendous step forward, and I can explain, in
classified session, why that would be. Then, the space missions
that are not well aligned with commercial low-Earth orbit
satellite systems should probably stay where they are, possibly
with changes in protection, but that using only commercial
space, so putting hundreds of small, cheap satellites into
orbit, does not work as a strategy. And it would mean that, in
combat, that low-Earth orbit system would be quite vulnerable
and would fail.
So, this is a complex problem. We've done some pretty good
wargaming, and we will be happy to come up and brief the
committee, at their convenience.
Senator Blackburn. Appreciate it.
General Hyten, anything to add?
General Hyten. Senator, I'll just say it's all about the
threat. How do we stay ahead of the threat? The threat right
now, especially in China, is going much faster than we are. We
have a significant advantage over them, but that's the
advantage of history and what we've built over the last few
years. We have to stay ahead of them. And I just thank this
committee, thank the Congress, for taking on the threat. When
it comes right down to it, that's what it's all about.
Senator Blackburn. General Dunford?
General Dunford. Senator, the only thing I'd say, in the
interest of time, would be that, we really have two choices,
either have a bias for action now and move out and establish an
organization, knowing that there's many questions to be
answered, or wait until we have all the questions answered
before we stand up the organization. My best military advice,
given the importance of space and the consequences of not doing
all we can to optimize the Department to move forward in space,
would be move out now, with what might be the 80-percent
solution, refine as we go, and the committee will have an
opportunity to provide oversight to address some of the issues
that have been raised this morning.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for the service.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Heinrich, please.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed.
I guess, first, I just want to say, as somebody who's
Ranking Member right now on Strategic Forces and sits on Intel
and obviously sits on this committee, and as somebody who has
oftentimes fought the Pentagon, over the last decade, about the
value of disaggregated space architecture and rapid
capabilities, I really appreciate the focus we have on space
right now. I think it is welcome. There are disagreements on--
or at least some skepticism about this construct at this point,
but I think all of us can agree that this is a conversation
that's been coming for a long time, and we need to have it.
I want to pivot from Space Force, real quick, to Space
Development Agency for a minute, and just ask Secretary
Shanahan and General Dunford--one of my concerns there is that
we aren't simply shifting money and missions around to do what
we're already doing at places like Space Rapid Capabilities
Office, Air Force Research Labs, SMC, and some of the things
that are working under the current construct. So, just what
assurances can you provide that we're not reinventing the
wheel, but we're adding value?
Secretary Shanahan. You know, I think there are two
domains, or two capabilities that the Department is going to
invest in, in its modernization, and it has to do with command-
and-control communications, and then Earth observation. Each of
the Services has its own plan. So, it's really more about the
systems engineering and the architecture, rather than the
technology that's being developed at the Space Rapid
Capabilities Office (RCO).
We do need to, when we look across all of the labs, start
to make decisions on what are the standards we want to employ--
not necessarily direct technology development, but, how do we
develop standards so integration becomes more seamless and less
costly?
Senator Heinrich. Yeah. I would not disagree. As we're
looking at this, I think there's some real value in looking at
colocating the new Space Development Agency (SDA) with some of
the existing ecosystem so that we get those economies of scale.
General Dunford, do you have anything to add to the
Secretary's comments there?
General Dunford. The only thing I'd say, Senator, is--I
mean, this makes sense to me as an initial step, and I think
the broader question you're asking about is, How do we make
sure that all the processes in the Department are aligned?
Senator Heinrich. Right.
General Dunford. And that's going to be the responsibility
of all of us, to ruthlessly drive alignment over time,
ruthlessly drive efficiencies over time, and get this thing
moving, and make the refinements that I know are going to come.
There's probably only one thing I'm 100 percent confident of as
I sit here this morning, and that is, 5 years from now, it's
going to look slightly different than it does today--or what we
propose today.
Senator Heinrich. Great.
Secretary, I want to talk a little bit about NRO.
Obviously, a lot of exposure to that on one of my other
committee assignments. They have a pretty unique role right
now, both under title 50 and under title 10. I think they're
working well. Is NRO in or out of the White House legislative
proposal right now? And what's the logic?
Secretary Shanahan. It's out.
Senator Heinrich. Good.
Secretary Shanahan. It's not out because there aren't
enormous synergies. It's really out because of organization and
agreement on timing and alignment. There are a lot of details.
This is General Dunford's point about how quickly can you move?
We can move out on the things we can control. It doesn't mean
that we couldn't move out in the integration with NRO.
To your earlier point around architectures and technology,
as we build out the future, we need to be provisioning with the
NRO, because that integration is going to take place in the
future. And if we do that, it makes the integration that much
easier in the future.
Senator Heinrich. I think that's probably the right answer.
I know there are some questions on this committee about where
that belongs, but I think that's the right approach.
Secretary Wilson, General Hyten, I wanted to ask you. I
know we talked, before, about the importance of leveraging
small space in commercial assets. Last week, you spoke about
Blackjack. But, I'm more interested in the issue around giving
small launch providers an opportunity to put some of these
small sats in place. Does this space proposal do anything more
to leverage that emerging industry to meet our national
security objectives? Is that one place where SDA might also
play a role?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the Air Force is responsible for
launch, but, as you know, we don't build rockets, we buy
launches.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Secretary Wilson. The biggest challenge is on the heavy
end. But, on the light end, we have a variety of things that
we're doing. General Hyten may be able to add to this some.
But, we have contracted, for example, with Virgin Galactic to
launch under the wing of a 747. We are working with a number of
very small, very innovative companies on different ways to
launch. And launch flexibility and reconstitution from
unexpected places is one of the ways in which we keep our
adversaries guessing.
Senator Heinrich. General.
General Hyten. Senator, we've made a lot of progress, in
the last few years, of taking advantage of that. I think one of
the strengths of the proposal that's before you, though, is,
the structure we're proposing will allow us to better leverage
all of industry that this country has to offer. We've struggled
a little bit with the commercial sector, in particular. We've
struggled with the smaller companies, figuring out how to do
that.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
General Hyten. The Air Force recently has made huge
progress in walking down that path. I think the Space
Development Agency can walk down to real commercial leverage.
So, I think the total of this proposal really gets after a lot
of the things you're talking about.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses, for being here. Thank you for
your diligent work on this important proposal and this
important topic. You've nearly made it to the end, here. So--
just 6 minutes to go.
I want to ask you about a few specific challenges. We've
talked a lot this morning about the space domain, the
importance of the space domain, in general. Let me ask you
about some of the challenges, as I understand them, that make
the space domain important. And you can tell me if my
understanding needs revision.
One of the major issues, as I understand it, that makes
space so important is our global Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that runs through space,
sort of the central nervous system of the Joint Force. We were
able to build that central nervous system in and through space
in years past because it was largely uncontested space. But,
now, as you've said over and over today, it's contested, it's
congested, it's competitive. And so, our C4ISR and precision,
navigation, timing networks are at risk.
So, what I want to ask you is, What are we doing to make
our global C4ISR networks and our positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT) networks more resilient and survivable? And how
will a Space Force contribute to that?
Absolutely, go ahead, General.
General Hyten. So, Senator, I think you described the space
challenge quite well. I think we have a significant element of
everything that we do that goes through space. There's not a
single military operation that exists on this planet that
doesn't involve space some way. And the C4 network that we
operate leverages space, especially because we operate away
from our homeland. We operate overseas. And when you do that,
you need to bring your communications, bring your ISR, bring
all those capabilities with you. And a significant amount of
those capabilities today come from space.
And so, as we look to the future, we have to make sure we
protect that and we defend that, and we can still provide those
capabilities. And our adversaries are seeing that, too. As
they've seen that, they are developing capabilities to counter
those. So, we have to adjust. We have to be able to build
different architectures that we can fight with more
effectively, that can guarantee that capability is always
there. We have to build the ability to defend ourselves and an
ability to deny an adversary the use of space, at a time and
place of our choosing, if we have to.
As the Secretary discussed earlier, we don't want conflict
to go into space, but, if it does, we have to----
Senator Hawley. And, in this setting, General, can you give
us some idea about what are some of the steps that we are
taking now, or that need to be taken, to make that
infrastructure, that C4 infrastructure, architecture, and our
PNT architecture, more resilient? What I'm driving at, as I
think you can see, is, What are the specific things we need to
be doing to meet this very pressing challenge? Then, how does
that tie into this large structural change that you've been
proposing here today?
General Hyten. So, the Secretary described, one of the big
challenges is the integration of satellite communications in
one place. As we move to a Space Command and a Space Force, the
benefits that we'll get from that unity of effort will be,
we'll have one command focused on operating satellite
communications, and we'll have one force looking at acquiring
the capabilities we need to. The integration of those two
capabilities will allow us to better defend ourselves and
operate in the future. You can apply that to positioning,
navigation, and timing. You can apply that to overhead weather,
missile warning. All the capabilities we have, you apply that
same concept. And we can talk, in a classified session, about
the specifics of what we're doing, but, in broad terms, that's
the structure.
Senator Hawley. Madam Secretary, you wanted to add to this.
Secretary Wilson. Senator, before the fiscal year 2019
budget that we brought up before your election, we did some
work on, What should our strategies be, and how do we shift our
programs to implement those strategies? We did a tabletop
exercise with many of the Members of the Committee to show what
the strategies were in the program shifts.
Those strategies really kind of revolve around five things,
in general:
The first is to protect and defend. So, defend our
satellites, think chaff and flares, but other kinds of things.
And it's different, mission by mission.
Second, be able to stop an attack. It's not good enough to
stand in the ring and dodge and weave and take punches. You
need to be able to swing back.
Third, proliferate. Now, proliferation, alone, does not
solve the problem, but it does complicate the problem for an
adversary.
Fourth, undermine the confidence of the adversary that they
really understand what's going on around them.
And fifth, all of this rests on a foundation of excellence
in our people.
So, those are the five lines of effort, and they're all
supported by programs and programmatic change that was
supported by the committee in the fiscal year 2019 budget.
Senator Hawley. Thank you. That's very helpful.
My set of questions around your proposal for this major
structural change, for the standing up of a Space Force,
relates to this line of questioning. What are the specific
pressing challenges we face in that domain? Will this new
structure help us meet those specific challenges? Or is there a
danger that we are too focused on the domain as a domain, and
we're not focusing enough on the specific challenges?
Mr. Secretary, before my time expires, let me just ask you
a somewhat related question: the relevance of AI and new
technologies. You touched on this briefly, I think, with
Senator Cramer, but tell us something about how Space Force may
help the whole Joint Force continue to develop the new
technologies, whether it's AI or otherwise, that we need to be
leaders, here, in the 21st century.
Secretary Shanahan. Right. So, the Space Development
Agency, in our modernization for the National Defense Strategy,
addresses building an integrated transport layer for the
Department of Defense so that we can ingest and move
significant volumes of data that facilitate artificial
intelligence. It's this buildout of the broader infrastructure.
It also includes the ground network that'll connect sensor and
shooter, and then all other decisionmakers. It's not just about
closing the fire-control loop, but we're trying to scale and
address latency. This is why we need fundamental systems
engineering as we approach this problem set.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you all for being here today, and thank you for your
service.
You know, I've been in and out as I've attended other
committee hearings, and I sort of feel like the most important
facts for us and the American people to understand are the
facts that haven't been said today. The reason why they haven't
been said is that they are largely classified. The reason
that's important is that the American people have no idea--
really no idea--about the immensity of the threat in space.
I've made this comment in a classified setting, that I wish the
American people could be present in this room--not this room,
but the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)--
because our adversaries know what they are doing, we know what
they are doing, they know we know what they are doing, but the
American people have no idea. So, this discussion and debate
will have very little interest in the American public. It's
carried on in a level of, forgive me, bureaucratic language
that most Americans would have trouble seeing an immediacy in
their daily lives. But, if they were privy to what we hear--and
you know it much better than we do, because you live it--I
think they'd be pretty alarmed. And this is not by way of
criticism of you, because you're living with the strictures of
what is classified, and not. But, I think we have a real
obligation to explain to the American people why space is a
domain that matters, why the threats there are real and urgent,
why they are growing in importance.
So, I think we all agree here that space is an important
domain. Undersea warfare is an important domain, but we don't
have a separate command for it. Cyber is an important domain,
as my colleague and friend, the late John McCain, used to say.
I found very persuasive, Secretary Wilson, what you said in
July of 2017--I know it's been quoted to you before this
morning--and others of you, the reasons for your opposition to
that separate domain, or the separate Command for the space
domain. But, I would like to ask, in terms of the personnel
issues that I think are of immediate concern to a lot of folks.
This proposal would exempt Space Force civilian personnel from
title 5 rules and protections. It would create a new, excepted
service that is separate from the Federal Government
competitive service or senior executive service. It would
create an alarming precedent, I think, that potentially could
erode the merit-based civil service within the Pentagon and
eliminate the rights of Space Force employees to participate in
collective bargaining, for example. There's currently no
civilian workforce that is statutorily exempt from collective
bargaining rights. Can you tell me, Secretary Shanahan, why
that is a part of your proposal?
Secretary Shanahan. The title 5 that you were referencing
was based on the discussion we were having earlier around
integration with the NRO. That's the model that they employ
there. And, as we think about the talent management practices
that we'll need in the future, we wanted a provision for that.
Much like in your reference to the undersea domain, our
approach to systems engineering is the same as the Navy's
undertaken. So, there are a lot of examples that we're trying
to draw from that have been successful. That was the nature of
that insertion.
Senator Blumenthal. Would there be protection for
whistleblowers in the same way there is throughout the rest of
the government?
Secretary Shanahan. The baseline that we're coming off of
is the existing personnel system. This was to incorporate the
ability to integrate with the NRO. So, I'd have to go back and
confirm that for you.
Senator Blumenthal. If you would, that would be
appreciated.
Secretary Shanahan. You bet.
Senator Blumenthal. Because, based on this proposal, the
Secretary of Defense could terminate any Space Force employee,
``in the interests of the United States,'', and, as drafted, it
says, ``notwithstanding any other law,'' which leads me to
think that they would be exempted from a lot of other
protections of law, and could simply be dismissed whenever you
determine it's in the interest of the United States.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Let me go back and confirm that
that's not our interpretation.
Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
But, I have a lot more, and I'm going to submit them for
the record--a lot more questions than answers, here. And, as
others have remarked, each of you has raised objections or
reservations or questions in the past--the very recent past--
about this idea, which I'm not sure have been fully addressed
here.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, we're here today to examine a proposal to set up a
Space Force within the Air Force. And, before we haul off and
authorize spending billions of dollars on this, I just want to
ask a couple of questions about what problem this Space Force
is supposed to solve.
So, let me start with you, Chairman Dunford. Is it correct
to say the Department of Defense has proposed a Space Force
because the United States is at risk of losing its competitive
advantage in space, and our space assets, including critical
satellites, are becoming increasingly vulnerable? Is that a
fair statement?
General Dunford. That is a fair statement, Senator. And
just a quick caveat, based on your opening comment. In the
organization that we have today is an organization that we
built when space was----
Senator Warren. No, I understand that. I understand that.
So, I want to think about, though, what the basis of the
problem is, then. A 2016 GAO report that examined our existing
space acquisition programs noted, ``We and others have
reported, for over two decades, that fragmentation and overlap
have contributed to program delays and cancellations, cost
increases, and inefficient operations.''
Secretary Shanahan, is it the DOD's view that unifying
space programs under a single service will address these
problems?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, unifying and aligning certain
programs under the Space Development Agency will address that
problem that you spoke to.
Senator Warren. So, you say the problems of delays and
cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations will
be solved if there is a separate branch of the military, but
still under the command of the Air Force. You know, this is
particularly surprising to me, since the proposal to leave the
Space Force headquartered under the Air Force would still leave
exactly one person responsible for acquiring hardware for both
the Space Force and the Air Force. So, it's not clear to me how
this solves anything. In fact, it's hard to see how that person
would be able to balance the competing needs of both Services
without a massive increase in overall spending.
So, Secretary Shanahan, let me ask. Obviously, DOD has not
been able to solve the problems identified by the GAO over the
last 20 years. Why do you think another layer of bureaucracy
will suddenly solve this problem?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, I think the Department solved a
lot of problems. I think we can point to a lot of programs,
where inefficiencies, delays in decisions, redundancies,
overlaps have been corrected. I think there's a----
Senator Warren. Well, I'm sorry, the report is from 2016,
from the GAO, saying you have not solved these problems.
Secretary Shanahan. And all I'm arguing is, we've made lots
of improvements, and we can point to----
Senator Warren. And how is having one person, as you have
now, in charge of the acquisitions for these two programs--
space program and the Air Force--how's that going to solve the
problems that were identified by the GAO?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, specifically, there are a set of
fragmented programs today that will be consolidated, and
they'll allow us to get at many of the issues identified in the
GAO report.
Senator Warren. There's just one person in charge right now
and you still haven't fixed this problem.
Secretary Shanahan. No, this isn't about one person. This
is about an organization, an organization that has certain
capabilities and decision rights.
Senator Warren. Well, look, I understand that DOD says that
unifying space acquisitions is going to help improve outcomes.
But, I'm concerned that it won't, because program delays and
cancellations, cost increases, and inefficient operations are
the rule, not the exception. And the entire defense acquisition
system already has this problem, and nothing in this proposal
makes it any better.
You know, none of the ideas I've heard today clearly spell
out how a Space Force leads to improved security in space.
Instead, all I see is how a new Space Force will create one
more organization to ask Congress for money. And there's no
reason to believe that adding an entirely new Space Force
bureaucracy, and pouring buckets more money into it, is going
to reduce our overall vulnerability in space. I just think the
taxpayers deserve better than this.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, let me thank the witnesses
for their testimony and declare that the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
reserve component
1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson, you stated that it is
``impossible for me to imagine a Space Force without a reserve
component.'' What roles do you see the National Guard and Reserve
performing in the Space Force and how, very generally, do you envision
current Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units transitioning
into the new Space Force?
Secretary Wilson. Today, both Reserve and National Guard units
provide strategic depth for U.S. space operations. They also recruit
and retain personnel with unique civilian experience across the space
enterprise. The Reserve and National Guard role in space will continue.
The DOD is currently conducting the detailed planning to determine how
this role will be implemented for the Space Force. The Space Force
Reserve Components will be shaped around the Active Component of the
Space Force. The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, and Chief,
National Guard Bureau, will determine the best organizational structure
for the Space Force Total Force and provide a legislative proposal for
consideration in a future National Defense Authorization Act.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
cooperation with allies
2. Senator Ernst. Secretary Shanahan, Secretary Wilson, General
Dunford, and General Hyten, one area that distinguishes our armed
forces from competitors is our network of strong military relationships
with our partners and allies. Given the variability of counterspace
weapons, it could be in our advantage to work with our allies to ensure
the integrity of the space ecosystem. Can you assess our current
engagement with allies regarding space operations, and discuss any
future goals?
Secretary Shanahan. The United States maintains strong and
burgeoning relationships, conducts close coordination and cooperates
with allies to compete, deter and win in space. U.S. allies directly
contribute to and support space surveillance operations as well as
conduct operational level command and control of coalition space forces
at the Combined Space Operations Center. U.S. Strategic Command manages
space situational awareness sharing agreements with international and
commercial partners and coordinates allied intelligence support to
space operations.
As allied space strategies and programs develop and mature, the
United States will seek opportunities for deeper integration, including
enhanced joint and coalition planning for space defense. A military
service dedicated to the space domain--with a separate 4-star Chief of
Staff as an equal member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--will ensure we
enhance a holistic approach to engagement with our allies regarding
space operations.
Secretary Wilson. I defer to the Secretary of Defense on this
question.
General Dunford. I defer to OUSD(P) to provide the appropriate
response to this question.
General Hyten. Our engagement with our Allies in space has never
been higher, and it enhances our national security objectives. We have
a rich history of cooperating with our closest Allies in space which
predates U.S. Strategic Command assuming responsibilities for Joint
space operations. For example, through our North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) partnership with Canada, we have partnered
together in the missile warning and space situational awareness mission
areas for decades. Similar relationships with Australia and the United
Kingdom have also seen decades-long partnerships in these same mission
areas. In July 2018, in recognition of these partnerships and the fact
that Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have contributed
capability into our Joint space enterprise, and had sent exchange
personnel to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg
AFB, California, we renamed the JSpOC into the Combined Space
Operations Center (CSpOC). Not only did this renaming highlight the
international partnerships we leverage every day in space, but it also
drove us to a higher level of integration through the assignment of
additional Allied personnel at the CSpOC (to include a Canadian officer
serving as the CSpOC Deputy Director), daily integration between the
CSpOC and the national space operations centers of the other three
countries, and the incremental improvement in the information sharing
systems we use to pass information in real time. In addition to the
formal designation of a CSpOC, we have also created the Multi-National
Space Collaboration (MSC) Office at Vandenberg AFB. This office allows
space-faring, like-minded Allies such as Germany and France, to send
liaison officers to work alongside our experts at Vandenberg AFB to
improve and enhance how we cooperate in space. To date, the MSC Office
has full-time liaison officers from Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom (even through the UK has personnel assigned to the CSpOC, they
also wanted to send a liaison office to explore even deeper space
relationships with the U.S.). Several other countries, such as Japan,
Italy, and South Korea, have also expressed an interest in sending
liaison officers to the MSC Office, and we are actively working the
necessary international agreements to do so. Over the past year, we
have evolved our space situational awareness (SSA) cooperation to a
daily activity. Our lead unit for SSA, the 18th Space Control Squadron,
holds daily engagements with a number of Allied nations to maintain
shared awareness of what is happening in space, and to use significant
space activities (such as last year's reentry into the Earth's
atmosphere of a Chinese space station) as practice opportunities to
improve our tactics, techniques, and procedures for cooperating in the
SSA mission area. Building on the success of the CSpOC, this fall we
plan to stand up a Combined Technical Operations Cell (CTOC) at
Vandenberg AFB. The CTOC, which was conceived at the most recent
Schriever Wargame, will allow Australia, Canada, UK, and the U.S. to
make available Special Technical Operations capabilities for use by our
Joint Space Enterprise. Planning to standup this capability is ongoing
at the CSpOC and within the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) working
groups today. Finally, we are moving toward executing a multi-national
named operations in space in the near future. Today, the U.S. Strategic
Command operation for conducting Joint space operations is known as
Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD). In late 2018, OOD was re-written to
be releasable to Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and
the UK. Additionally, these countries have been invited to join the
multi-national force which will execute OOD with the U.S. as the lead
nation and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the Multi-National
Force Commander (which will be delegable to the Joint Force Space
Component Commander). Australia, Canada, and the UK have all expressed
that they plan to join OOD in the near future, and all three are in the
midst of securing their national-level approvals to do so. In summary,
space operations are inherently Joint and Combined. Simply put, we
couldn't execute many of our space mission without the important
contributions of our Allies. We are stronger together, and soon we will
be executing daily operations together under the collective banner of
the multi-national OOD.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
civilian personnel and excepted service
3. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, why are you eliminating
the rights of Space Force employees to unionize?
Secretary Shanahan. The Space Force mission is similar to, and
interchangeable with, organizations with missions that are largely
exempt from collective bargaining by Executive Order for reasons of
national security. Many of the workforce authorities envisioned for the
Space Force are modeled on authorities currently used by the National
Reconnaissance Office. Due to the classified nature of the mission and
the work that would be performed by the Department of the Air Force
employees supporting the Space Force (also known as ``Space Force
employees''), the unionization of employees and collective bargaining
for the Space Force workforce would not be consistent with national
security considerations.
The Department proposes to exempt the Space Force workforce from
collective bargaining rights because the non-standard pay system the
Department envisions for the Space Force would require lengthy and
costly collective bargaining without such exemption. The Department has
determined workforce pay flexibility is a national security imperative
for the Space Force in order to maintain U.S. advantages in the space
warfighting domain. Since the Space Force would be competing for talent
in cutting edge fields, the Department has determined it is willing to
pay to meet market demands where needed.
Based upon planning assumptions and initial estimates, the
Department anticipates that the large majority (approximately two-
thirds) of current civilian employees who would be part of the Space
Force workforce are not in a union or are ineligible for union
representation.
4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you concerned that
this proposal would establish an employment system where ideology and
political affiliation--rather than merit and qualifications--would
influence hiring, compensation, and termination decisions?
Secretary Shanahan. No. Merit system principles would apply to the
Space Force. In addition, Space Force employees would be protected
against unlawful discrimination and prohibited personnel practices.
Space Force employees could file complaints alleging unlawful
discrimination with appropriate Equal Employment Opportunity offices
and could raise allegations of prohibited personnel practices to the
Air Force or Inspector General or the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.
Additionally, civilian employees who currently serve in title 5
competitive service positions and who become Space Force employees
would retain the right to appeal adverse actions to the Merit Systems
Protection Board. Civilian employees newly appointed to title 10 Space
Force positions may appeal within DOD.
5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, unions play an important
role in providing employee protections and sharing feedback on policy
changes throughout the implementation process. Why should the Space
Force be exempt from this kind of union input?
Secretary Shanahan. Union representation would not be consistent
with national security considerations due to the classified nature of
the Space Force mission and the work performed. Collective bargaining
would subject management decision making to review by arbitrators who
can overturn decisions and inject their own opinions on what is best
for mission accomplishment and national security. The Department would
establish regulations to ensure that Space Force employees have the
right to present administrative grievances or other concerns to the
appropriate Department of Defense authority for prompt and equitable
consideration. Space Force employees could present concerns to the
Office of Special Counsel as well. In addition, advance notice and
bargaining with labor unions over changes to conditions of employment
likely would delay implementation of changes needed to carry out the
Department's mission. An exemption from collective bargaining is
proposed because the non-standard pay system the Department envisions
for the Space Force would require lengthy and costly bargaining without
such exemption. U.S. Space Force implementation must be accomplished
without delay, including with regard to establishing a competitive pay
system.
culture of retaliation and whistleblower protections
6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, the proposal as drafted
requests these authorities ``notwithstanding any other law.'' Do you
intend to exempt the Space Force workforce from the American with
Disabilities Act, or other employment discrimination laws?
Secretary Shanahan. No. Space Force employees would not be exempted
from the Rehabilitation Act, the American with Disabilities Act, or
other employment discrimination laws applicable to Federal employees.
Space Force employees would be able to file complaints alleging
unlawful discrimination with relevant Equal Employment Opportunity
offices.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you concerned that
this proposal does not appropriately protect whistleblowers and all
employees from unjust termination? How would you suggest amending the
proposal to better protect all employees, including whistleblowers?
Secretary Shanahan. The appeal authorities included in the Space
Force legislative proposal are modeled after existing authorities for
the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS). The
Department has found that DCIPS employees are adequately protected, and
we do not believe the proposal needs to be amended. The same statutory
whistleblower protections afforded most Federal employees would apply
to Space Force employees. Space Force employees would be able to raise
concerns regarding alleged prohibited personnel practices, including
violations of law, rule, or regulation, or other gross mismanagement,
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or danger to public health or
safety, to the Air Force or Department of Defense Inspectors General or
the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. Employees would be protected from
retaliatory action for disclosure of alleged prohibited personnel
practices.
Space Force employees would also be protected from unjust
termination. Employees would have the right to appeal adverse and
performance-based actions and would be protected from prohibited
personnel practices, including unjust termination. The Department
anticipates that the need for the focused special termination
procedures exercised in the interest of the U.S. described in what
would be section 9384 of title 10, U.S.C., if the proposal is enacted
into law would be used sparingly and only to protect the Department
from serious national security breaches. This proposal is based upon
section 1609 of title 10, U.S.C., that governs DCIPS.
cost
8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you confident that
the budget requests includes all of the additional staff and annual
recurring costs?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes. The Department invested significant time
and effort in developing the personnel and cost estimates for the Space
Force. The additional recurring costs reflect what is required for the
Space Force headquarters, as well as additional resources to build a
space-specific expertise, culture, and ethos, such as education and
training, a warfare center for space, a space personnel center, and a
doctrine development center.
9. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, can you commit to
providing documentation to support this cost estimate?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes. The Air Force submitted the President's
Budget Operation and Maintenance, Space Force Volume 1 justification
exhibit with the President's Budget. This includes the 0-1, OP-32, and
PB-31R summary exhibits. In addition, the Department developed detailed
cost estimates of the additive costs of the Space Force over the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) and at full operational capability. A
Department-wide team led by the Air Force is currently refining those
estimates as they conduct the detailed planning to establish the Space
Force, if authorized by Congress. The Department is prepared to brief
you on the details of these estimates and planning to date.
10. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, last fall, you signed a
memo that estimated the cost of starting a Space Force Department and
U.S. Space Command would be about $13 billion over five years. I
understand that the current proposal differs from the original, but can
you explain why the cost estimate is drastically different now?
Secretary Wilson. In September 2018, the Air Force provided the
Deputy Secretary of Defense with a proposal for a Space Development
Agency and transition to a Department of the Space Force. Our previous
proposal included standing up a Service and a new Department, rather
than a Force within an existing Department. The previous approach would
be unable to leverage the staff of the existing Department of the Air
Force. The original AF cost estimate included additive costs of a
Department and U.S. Space Command that totaled $12.9B over five years.
The proposal did not include additive costs for a Space Development
Agency:
Establishing a fully independent Military Department for
Space ($4 billion over the FYDP)
Establishing U.S. Space Command ($1.6 billion over the
FYDP)
Additive manpower for the transition to operations in a
warfighting domain, as well as operational support activities for the
new department ($7.3 billion over the FYDP). The current DOD proposal
for the Space Force estimates the cost of a new Military Service within
the Department of the Air Force as 8$2 billion over the first five
years, with a steady-state cost of 8$500 million per year following
declaration of Full Operational Capability, projected in fiscal year
2024. This total does not include the cost of establishing U.S. Space
Command. It also does not include additive manpower for the transition
to operations in a warfighting domain, nor operational support
activities for the new Service consistent with the September 2018
proposal, the current estimate does not include additive costs for a
Space Development Agency.
organizational structure
11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, after you identified
the need for ``institutionalized and centralized advocacy'' for the
space warfighting domain, what other courses of action were considered?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department considered multiple models to
address the need, including: a combatant command-only model, a Space
Corps consisting of Air Force space only, a Space Force consolidating
space forces from all existing Military Services, and a Department of
the Space Force. When examining these organizational options, the
Department sought to address two interdependent issues: 1) the need to
focus the joint force on space defense and 2) the need to organize,
train, equip, and present space forces in a manner consistent with a
distinct warfighting domain.
The combatant command-only model was not the right solution because
it did not provide the complete structure necessary for a distinct
warfighting domain. Although the new combatant command would enhance
focus and prioritization on space for the joint force, the
organization, training, equipping, and presentation of space forces
would remain fragmented across DOD. Furthermore, there would continue
to be no independent advocate for space on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS). An Air Force-only Space Corps would be less optimal than the
proposed solution. By being composed of existing Air Force space forces
only, it would not unify space doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
across the Department. A Department of the Space Force could be most
effective in addressing the problem, but is significantly more resource
intensive than the proposed solution.
The Space Force within the Department of the Air Force is the right
solution now. It elevates space on par with the other warfighting
domains; creates dedicated advocacy for space with a 4-star Chief of
Staff who is a full member of the JCS; and unifies organize, train, and
equip functions for all space forces. By leveraging existing
infrastructure in the Department of the Air Force where appropriate
(e.g. General Counsel, Service Acquisition Executive, Installations,
Energy & Environment, etc.), the Space Force will be a lean
organization, focused on space combat and combat support. This solution
maximizes space warfighting capacity while minimizing bureaucracy.
12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what criteria were
evaluated in deciding on this particular proposal?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department had three priorities when
analyzing the options: maximum effectiveness to stay ahead of the
growing threat to space systems and operations, low risk to current
missions and ability to execute changes, and affordability of the
overall solution. The Department's proposal represents the optimal
balance between warfighting effectiveness, risk, and affordability.
13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, did you talk to
President Trump about this proposal? If so, what did you advise him?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I spoke to the President numerous times
about the options the Department was considering. I advised him that
creating the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force would
be the most effective and affordable solution for our armed forces.
14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you think that your
feedback was appropriately considered in policy discussions?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes. I presented the President multiple options
to address the problem, recommending a Space Force within the
Department of the Air Force. He agreed that it was the right solution
to maximize our warfighting capacity while minimizing bureaucracy.
national guard role
15. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, with the current proposal
of a separate Space Force service within the Department of the Air
Force, how do you plan on organizing the Air National Guard to serve
the new Organization of the Department of the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson. Today, both Reserve and National Guard units
provide strategic depth for U.S. space operations. They also recruit
and retain personnel with unique civilian experience across the space
enterprise. The Reserve and National Guard role in space will continue.
The DOD is currently conducting the detailed planning to determine how
this role will be implemented for the Space Force. The Space Force
Reserve Components will be shaped around the Active Component of the
Space Force. The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, and Chief,
National Guard Bureau, will determine the best organizational structure
for the Space Total Force and provide a legislative proposal for
consideration in a future National Defense Authorization Act.
16. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, do you envision a
separate Space National Guard to provide reserve support to the Space
Force?
Secretary Wilson. The Department envisions that the National Guard
role in space will continue. The DOD is currently conducting the
detailed planning to determine how this role will be implemented for
the Space Force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
university research
17. Senator Warren. Secretary Shanahan, what role will university
research programs and partnerships with universities play in the
activities of the Space Development Agency (SDA)?
Secretary Shanahan. The university research community will play a
potentially significant role in the activities of the Space Development
Agency (SDA). I established SDA with the explicit scope of
``foster[ing] growth in the U.S. space industrial base'' as part of an
overall approach to developing and fielding space capabilities much
faster and much more affordably. I have also given the Director, SDA
explicit authority to enter into transactions other than contracts,
cooperative agreements, and grants. These mechanisms will carry out
basic, applied, and advanced research projects as well as certain
prototype projects and activities authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2371b to
rapidly access the capabilities of the university research community,
including our national University Affiliated Research Centers.
18. Senator Warren. Secretary Shanahan, what are the key technical
areas that the university research community should be funded to work
on that will support the future space capability needs of the
Department of Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. The Space Development Agency (SDA) defined
architecture will be a major driver for future research. SDA is
refining its architecture, and its plans for acquiring those
capabilities, so it can move quickly once the Department receives its
Fiscal Year 2020 appropriation. As those efforts mature, SDA will
detail specific technical focus areas. Those research topics and others
will continually be proffered by the Deputy Director of Research &
Engineering for Research and Technology and the Undersecretary of
Defense for Research & Engineering Assistant Director for Space. I
recommend the university research community consider key technical
areas that support the eight capabilities described in the Department's
August 2018 Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the
National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense (the
``DOD Space Vision''). These capabilities include:
1. Persistent global surveillance for advanced missile targeting;
2. Indications, warning, targeting, and tracking for defense
against advanced missile threats;
3. Alternate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) for a GPS-
denied environment;
4. Global and near-real time space situational awareness;
5. Development of deterrent capability;
6. Responsive, resilient, common ground-based space support
infrastructure (e.g., ground stations and launch capability);
7. Cross-domain, networked, node-independent battle management
command, control, and communications (BMC3), including nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3), and;
8. Highly-scaled, low-latency, persistent, artificial-
intelligence-enabled global surveillance.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
organization of space science and technology and testing capabilities
19. Senator Peters. Secretary Shanahan, in your written testimony
you indicated that the Space Development Agency will ``will be
complimentary to ongoing space efforts within the Department and, where
applicable, leverage emerging commercial technologies to field enhanced
space capabilities on an accelerated timeline.'' The Department already
has significant activities in science and technology and test and
evaluation in the development of space capabilities, both in government
labs and test ranges, and through grants and contracts with
universities and industry. Do you plan to reorganize or realign any of
the current in-house or extramural space science and technology or test
and evaluation activities currently being executed by the Services,
DARPA, or other agencies, and if so what are the specific
reorganizations or realignments being considered, and what criteria are
being used to evaluate the benefits and costs of such changes?
Secretary Shanahan. No. I do not plan to realign those types of
activities into the Space Development Agency (SDA). SDA will address
emerging threats, allowing legacy organizations to focus on continuing
to acquire and deliver highly reliable space systems for enduring
missions, and aggressively pursue capability and efficiency
improvements to these systems. This approach will ensure SDA remains
complementary to legacy space acquisition organizations as well as
balance risk across the Department. Where appropriate, space science
and technology or test and evaluation activities currently being
executed by the Military Services will be realigned to the Space Force.
role of space development agency in s&t and t&e
20. Senator Peters. Secretary Shanahan, will the Space Development
Agency be responsible to ensure that space, science, and technology and
test and evaluation activities and infrastructure are adequately funded
by the Services and agencies to meet the needs of the Department of
Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. No. The USD(R&E) Assistant Director for Space
has overall responsibility for those activities across the Department
of Defense. The Space Development Agency (SDA) is charged with a subset
of those activities related to rapidly developing and deploying next-
generation space capabilities including rethinking how we do rapid
experimentation, prototyping, and innovating for space. SDA will work
with other agencies and the Military Services, to include the U.S.
Space Force when approved by Congress, to ensure the next generation
capability needs are met across the entire spectrum of the national
space community.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
space force manning
21. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, Secretary Wilson, General
Dunford and General Hyten, the estimates for personnel requirements in
the U.S. Space Force from the last information I received are
approximately 16,500 people. Approximately 14,550 of these will be
transfers from the Services. On top of this, there will be a
requirement for hundreds if not thousands eventually at the U.S. Space
Command headquarters once fully established. Many of the uniformed
Services already struggle to meet recruiting goals, especially in more
technical areas like space and cyber. The majority of these individuals
will have to come from the Services. Can you provide a more detailed
structure of where you are planning to move these personnel and the
predicted costs of doing so to the services?
Secretary Shanahan. Our goal is to create a lean Space Force with
minimal bureaucratic overhead. Almost all of the military and civilian
personnel who would be transferred to the Space Force are performing
space missions today in the existing military services. Unifying those
personnel into a single branch of the armed forces dedicated to space
would allow the current, limited space personnel to focus on building
the space doctrine, expertise, and capabilities we need for a
warfighting domain.
Secretary Wilson. I defer to the Secretary of Defense for this
answer.
General Dunford. I defer to OUSD(P) to provide the appropriate
response to this question.
General Hyten. I have to defer to the Services. I have not been
involved in these discussions.
ensuring quality control of personnel
22. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
Space Force proposal is very heavy at the top of the organization in
both numbers and rank. The required staff for the Space Force
headquarters reaches almost 7 percent of the total personnel. This is
contrasted with the current Air Force staff which is only about 0.7
percent of the total personnel. The number of general officers created
is also concerning. The Space Force will have two four-star generals at
the top. The Space force staff will also presumably have its own staff
directorates to accomplish the goals of truly focusing on space away
from the Air Force. Many of these directorates will be led by three-
star generals with two and one-star generals working underneath them.
Additionally, the U.S. Space Command will also have a similar command
and directorate structure as every other combatant command. This is a
significant requirement for a force that is less than 10 percent the
size of the U.S. Marine Corps to continuously populate with high
quality, qualified individuals. After the initial standup, where the
officers already exist and can be transferred, how do you plan on
developing your Space Force officers from the start to ensure that we
have quality officers at the top of the organization and don't end up
relying on a ``next in line'' mentality?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense is committed to
ensuring the Space Force maximizes warfighting efficiency while
minimizing bureaucracy. We recognize the Space Force will be small in
comparison to other Services. However, it will require seasoned, well-
trained, and educated leadership, with the technical and operational
expertise to acquire and operate complex warfighting capabilities in
the space domain. As such, the leadership structure will not mirror the
other manpower intensive branches of the military.
Creating the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force
leverages existing capability and expertise in the areas of logistics,
support, and acquisition to limit duplication and unnecessary growth.
As part of the on-going detailed planning for the Space Force, the
Department has estimated that the steady state Space Force would cost
$500M per year. To ensure we are recruiting, developing and training
the most qualified people for this challenging domain of operations,
$200M per year of this funding would support centers fully focused on
the unique demands for space education and training, personnel
management, doctrine, and space warfare. This will ensure the Space
Force develops the expertise, culture and ethos needed for the complex
warfighting domain of space.
General Dunford. I defer to the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide the appropriate response to this question.
acquisition alignment
23. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson and General Hyten, the need
to speed up acquisitions and unify a number of fractured development
and acquisition organizations has been cited multiple times as
rationale for establishing the Space Force. Already though there is the
example of the Space Sensor Layer being delayed due to its transfer
from the Missile Defense Agency to the Space Development Agency. While
I understand that the Space Development Agency is not a part of this
legislative proposal, this suggests that we could see more delays in
programs as we start to move around programs and responsibilities. Can
you explain in more detail what problems the current disaggregated
system presents and why it is not currently possible to better align
those practices within the established services and Department of
Defense constructs?
Secretary Wilson. The disaggregation of space program
responsibilities falls into two categories: disaggregation of space
program execution; and the disaggregation of authority and oversight
responsibility within the DOD. From a program execution perspective,
the Air Force is actively working to ensure space programs are aligned
under structures which most appropriately prioritize the integration of
ground, user, and space segments while accelerating defendable space
capabilities. These program execution structures are unified under Air
Force Space Command, and the Air Force is actively exploring ways to
further unify programs which are part of the space communications
architecture. From an authority and oversight perspective, the Air
Force stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, as directed by
Congress, with streamlined authorities for rapid acquisition and
fielding of new space capabilities across the Department of Defense
(NDAA 2019, Section 1602). The Air Force has assigned three classified
projects to this new office. The Space and Missile Systems Center has
just completed a major reorganization to streamline program oversight
and approval, to speed-up space acquisitions. This reorganization
stripped out three layers of bureaucracy. It has also established the
Space Enterprise Consortium, which has over 200 companies engaged, many
of them nontraditional companies which have never done business with
the Air Force. In the Consortium, the Air Force is averaging 90 days
between requests for proposal and contract award. The Air Force has
used the milestone delegation authority granted by Congress to remove
years from acquisition schedules. In May 2019, we surpassed 100 years
that the Air Force has taken out of acquisition; 21 years came out of
space programs alone.
General Hyten. The current disaggregated system has driven a
construct with dozens of stakeholders whose primary role is synergizing
the nation's space capabilities because there isn't a single
responsible organization. The result is layers of bureaucracy that can
tell a program manager ``no'' and stop a potentially innovative idea to
meet critical requirements before it has a chance to begin. It is
important to streamline the decision making process to ensure innovate
ideas have a better chance to be vetted and ultimately approved at the
appropriate level. Over the last few years, with the support of
Congress and Department leadership, a lot of work has been done to
delegate programmatic decisions down to lowest practical level for all
acquisition programs, to include national security space. A few
examples of this include the delegation of Milestone Decision Authority
to the Service Acquisition Executives from the Department of defense
level, the designation of middle tier acquisition authority in Section
804 of the FY16 NDAA, and broader use of alternative contracting to
include Other Transaction Authorities. So far, the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center has saved an estimated 16 years in acquisition
timelines on seven programs by utilizing Section 804 authorities.
Standing up SDA, initially under USD(R&E), allows for the proper
integration and streamlining of research, development, and acquisitions
across DOD. SDA is designed to move fast, cut red tape and focus on
rapid prototyping and experimentation and spearhead efforts to
accelerate the development and fielding of new military space
capabilities. SDA will also explore innovative concepts and alternative
architectures to provide a more robust and resilient space enterprise.
With the evolution of the space domain from a permissive to a contested
environment, it is imperative that the U.S. adjust to meet the peer-
level threat by having strong space leadership within the Department.
The creation of a Space Force, if supported by Congress, will allow for
a unified and singular focus on space as a warfighting domain that is
difficult to achieve without that unified, sole responsibility.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
space-based organization movements
24. Senator Jones. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, please
provide a listing of all current space-based organizations and indicate
the following: 1) which of these would immediately become part of the
Space Force, 2) which you would plan to move to the Space Force later,
and 3) which would be split, with an explanation of the split; and 4)
which would remain as they currently are.
Secretary Shanahan. I envision consolidating the preponderance of
existing military space capability under the Space Force. Other
Department of Defense components may retain organic space capabilities
uniquely required to support their core mission (e.g., terminals and
localized electronic warfare equipment).
The Department has set up a planning task force within the
Department of the Air Force that includes all of the Military Services
and relevant Defense Department agencies. The Department is currently
conducting detailed planning to determine the specific transfers to the
Space Force. I will make decisions on specific transfers in
consultation with affected Military Services.
General Dunford. I defer to OUSD (P) to provide the appropriate
response to this question.
spacecom location criteria
25. Senator Jones. Secretary Wilson and General Dunford, please
provide the criteria you will use to select the permanent home of U.S.
Space Command, as well as the timeline for your decision.
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force through their Strategic Basing
process will be responsible for selecting the permanent location for
U.S. Space Command. Site survey criteria include mission (alignment
with critical space force expertise, co-location with a United States
Space Command component or center, access to a C-17 capable airfield),
capacity (administrative building requirements, communications
connectivity, base operating support), environmental (air quality,
biological and cultural resources), and costs (one-time and recurring).
The Air Force anticipates having a final basing decision in late
summer/early fall 2019 timeframe.
General Dunford. I defer to the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide the appropriate response to this question.
[all]