[Senate Hearing 116-510]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 116-510

                 MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND  
                                  PROGRAMS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                            STRATEGIC FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 27, 2019

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

 J JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman	JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JONI ERNST, Iowa			TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida			TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee		DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri             
                                    
   		 John Bonsell, Staff Director
            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director


_________________________________________________________________

                    Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairwoman	MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		 DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                

                                  (ii)

                            C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

                             March 27, 2019

                                                                   Page

Military Space Operations, Policy, and Programs..................     1

                           Member Statements

Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     1

Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich.............................     2

                           Witness Statements

Rapuano, Honorable Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for     2
  Homeland Defense and Global Security.

Thompson, Lieutenant General John F., USAF, Commander, Space and      9
  Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command.

Thompson, General David D., USAF, Vice Commander, Air Force Space    17
  Command.

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing            25
  Management,
  Government Accountability Office.

Questions for the Record.........................................    74

                                 (iii)


 
            MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 2019

                      United States Senate,
                  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in 
room SR 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb 
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, 
Rounds, Cramer, King, Heinrich, Manchin, and Jones.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

    Senator Fischer. Hearing will come to order.
    I'd like to welcome everyone to the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee's first open hearing of the 116th Congress.
    We meet today to receive testimony on the national security 
space enterprise. Appearing before the Subcommittee, we have 
General David Thompson, Vice Commander of Air Force Space 
Command; General John Thompson, Commander of the Space and 
Missile Systems Center; Mr. Ken--is it----
    Secretary Rapuano. Rapuano.
    Senator Fischer.--Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; and Ms. 
Cristina Chaplain, who directs the Government Accountability 
Office's work on military space programs.
    Thank you all for your service and for being here today.
    We meet at a time of increased focus on the space domain. 
In the last few years, we have seen a significant evolution in 
our approach to space. It's now widely recognized that space is 
a warfighting domain. It is also a domain in which adversaries 
are increasingly active and upon which our Nation increasingly 
depends. Accordingly, we must ensure that our military space 
operations, policies, and programs are keeping pace with the 
changing environment, and we look forward to the testimony from 
our witnesses about the Department's effort in this regard. 
Their testimony today will help the Subcommittee make informed 
decisions as we continue to craft the defense authorization 
bill for fiscal year 2020.
    I would also like to note for my colleagues that the full 
committee will be holding a hearing on April 11th to discuss 
the Department's proposal to establish a Space Force. With that 
in mind, it is my intention to use my time today to talk about 
some of the other key equities in the national security space 
portfolio.
    And, with that, I would turn to my colleague and Ranking 
Member, Senator Heinrich, for any comments.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

    Senator Heinrich. Well, first, let me thank Chairwoman 
Fischer for holding today's hearing. This is our first 
together, and I look forward to future interactions on this 
Subcommittee.
    Let me also thank our witnesses for taking the time to 
testify today. Between this Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal 
year 2020 budget proposal and the full committee hearing on the 
proposed Space Force, there will be much to talk about, 
relative to space, in the coming weeks.
    At today's hearing, I want to concentrate on the threat we 
face in space, the budget submission to counter these threats, 
and organizational proposals to train and equip our space 
personnel.
    The idea of a Space Force is not new. The House proposed an 
almost identical concept in its fiscal year 2018 defense 
authorization bill. It was dropped in conference. The Pentagon 
leadership opposed it, as did several of our Senate colleagues. 
Having said that, it's no secret that the space domain is 
critical to our military operations, to our economy, and our 
way of life.
    As our adversaries become increasingly active in space, we 
certainly can't sit idly by. We must, instead, move with a 
greater sense of urgency and purpose. As an engineer, I 
continue to prioritize research and development, and cannot 
stress enough the importance of fostering a culture of 
innovation and rapid acquisition within the space domain. 
Whether it's the creation of a Space Development Agency (SDA) 
or any larger reorganization, we also should not reinvent the 
wheel nor move pieces around for the sake of saying we did so. 
We could always strive for our government to be better stewards 
of taxpayer dollars and for our military to operate more 
effectively, and I look forward to hearing how we may be able 
to do so.
    Again, thank you all for coming today, and I look forward 
to hearing all of your testimony.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    We will begin with opening statements. I would remind our 
witnesses today that your full statement will be included in 
the record.
    Mr. Secretary, if we could start with you, please.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
      OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

    Secretary Rapuano. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member 
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is 
a pleasure to appear before you today, along with Lieutenant 
General ``DT'' Thompson, Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson, 
and Ms. Cristina Chaplain.
    Space is a vital national interest. It underpins our 
economy and way of life, supporting our academia, agricultural, 
banking, and travel sectors, among others. Moreover, the 
rapidly growing commercial space sector offers enormous promise 
for the prosperity of Americans and our global partners. 
Commercial entities led by the United States are developing and 
delivering new space technologies and capabilities at a speed 
never seen before. Space is also crucial to the defense of the 
United States and our allies and partners.
    As outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), long-
term strategic competition is the central challenge to the U.S. 
prosperity and national security. Space is key to this 
competition. China and Russia are developing military 
capabilities, doctrine, and organizations intended to place 
United States space systems at risk. They are developing a 
suite of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), including ground-launch 
missiles and directed-energy weapons, and continue to launch 
experimental satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit 
activities to advance their counterspace capabilities. Many of 
these systems could be employed in the gray zone, that is, 
activities below the threshold of armed conflict in a manner 
designed to hold U.S., allied, and partner capabilities at risk 
and limit our response options.
    The emergence of new major state actors in space, and the 
pace of the technological development, are changing the 
character of warfare, presenting new challenges and 
opportunities to military space forces. No longer do space 
systems simply enable terrestrial forces to fight and win wars. 
Actions in space also will directly contribute to the outcome 
of future conflicts. In order to preserve peace and deter 
aggression, the Department of Defense (DOD) must adapt. Without 
change, the United States is at risk of losing its comparative 
advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space would 
undermine our Nation's prosperity and erode the ability of the 
Joint Force to deter aggression, protect critical national 
defense and economic functions, assure our allies and partners, 
and project power globally. While the United States would 
prefer that space remain conflict-free, we must recognize 
rising challenges, and overcome them. The Department must do 
more to accelerate its response to the changing dynamics of 
space by adapting our organizations, policies, doctrine, 
capabilities, and Joint Force employment to more effectively 
deter aggression, protect our interests, and enhance our 
lethality.
    Earlier this month, the Department provided Congress with a 
legislative proposal for the establishment of the U.S. Space 
Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces. If authorized, the 
Space Force will transform our approach to space by providing 
singular focus to maintaining and increasing our advantage in 
countering current and future threats. Establishing a sixth 
branch of our military with dedicated leadership will unify 
focus and accelerate the development of space doctrine, 
capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats, 
institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further 
build space warfighting culture. The role of providing Joint 
Force employment of space capabilities lies with the United 
States Space Command (SPACECOM), a Unified Combatant Command 
focused on planning and executing joint space warfighting 
operations. Establishing U.S. SPACECOM will bring full-time 
operational focus to securing the space domain and streamline 
command and control for time-sensitive operations.
    Additionally, the Department of Defense has undertaken a 
series of space acquisition reforms. These reforms, such as 
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) 2.0, will continue to 
mature with the establishment of a Joint Space Development 
Agency dedicated to rapidly developing and fielding next-
generation military space capabilities. The SDA will be 
empowered to go fast, and would be pursuing a development of a 
transformational new architecture that leverages the investment 
taking place in the commercial sector.
    The Department looks forward to working closely with this 
committee and all of Congress to ensure that we maintain our 
freedom of operation in space to support our national security, 
our economic prosperity, and our way of life.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Secretary Kenneth Rapuano
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you 
along with General Jay Raymond, Commander of Air Force Space Command 
and U.S. Strategic Command Joint Force Space Component Commander; 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, Commander, Space and Missile Systems 
Center; and Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management at the Government Accountability Office. I serve as the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global 
Security. In this capacity I oversee and guide the development and 
implementation of the Department of Defense's strategy and policy to 
achieve its space mission.
    Space is integral to the U.S. way of life and the U.S. way of war. 
Although United States space systems have historically maintained a 
technological advantage over those of our potential adversaries, those 
potential adversaries are now advancing their space capabilities and 
actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis or 
conflict. Without change, the United States is at risk of losing its 
comparative advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space 
would undermine our Nation's prosperity and would erode the ability of 
the joint force to deter aggression, to defend the Homeland from 
attack, and to project power abroad.
    While the U.S. would prefer that the space domain remain free of 
conflict, we must recognize rising challenges, and be prepared to meet 
and overcome them. The Department must accelerate, and is accelerating, 
its response to the changing dynamics of space. We are adapting our 
organizations, policies, doctrine, and capabilities to more effectively 
deter aggression and protect our interests.
    Earlier this month the Department provided Congress with a 
legislative proposal for the establishment of the United States Space 
Force as a new branch of our armed forces. If authorized, the Space 
Force would transform our approach to space, increasing our 
responsiveness in this warfighting domain. The proposal maximizes 
warfighting capacity and advocacy for space, while minimizing 
bureaucracy and potential risks. Establishing a sixth branch of our 
military with dedicated leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate 
the development of space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to 
outpace future threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities; 
and further build space warfighting culture.
    The Department looks forward to working closely with this committee 
and all of Congress on ensuring we maintain our freedom of operation in 
space in order to support our national security and our economic 
prosperity.
         national security strategy & national defense strategy
    The Department's approach to space is aligned and nested within our 
broader national strategies. Space is a warfighting domain, and just as 
in air, land, sea, and cyberspace, the Department of Defense must 
ensure it is prepared to address threats to our national security in 
the space domain.
    The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy 
recognize space as a priority domain and an operating area from which 
capabilities are employed and forces are enabled, and recognizes the 
potential for conflict to extend into space. These strategies direct 
that we compete as necessary to deter potential adversaries and, when 
necessary, win any conflict that begins in or extends into space. Our 
ability to operate and leverage space to advance scientific knowledge, 
promote prosperity, and secure the freedoms of our citizens and allies 
and partners must remain unimpeded. We will compete, we will deter, 
and, if called upon to fight, we will win.
    The National Security Strategy, published in December 2017, 
provides a plan to (1) protect the American people, the Homeland, and 
the American way of life; (2) promote American prosperity; (3) preserve 
peace through strength; and (4) advance American influence. Each aspect 
of this plan is fortified and supported by the advantages our Nation 
gains from space capabilities.
    Our 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) charts the course for how 
DOD will contribute to each of the National Security Strategy's four 
national interests. Under the NDS, long-term strategic competitions 
with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, 
and because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to United States 
security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to 
increase in the future, require both sustained focus and investment. 
Space is a key arena in which this competition is occurring. Addressing 
the challenges posed to our preeminence as a space power is fundamental 
to our efforts.
    To meet the challenge of great power competition, the Department is 
broadly pursuing three lines of effort--increasing the lethality of our 
forces, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and reforming the 
Department to ensure affordability and delivery of capabilities at the 
speed of relevance. These approaches are as applicable to the space 
domain as they are to any other Department endeavor.
                         strategic environment
    Space underpins the U.S. way of life and U.S. way of war. Space 
provides an unparalleled vantage point and medium for rapid, global 
information collection and dissemination. Space-based capabilities 
facilitate the flow of people and goods worldwide, while guiding 
military forces to their positions and weapons to their targets. 
Satellites enable individuals worldwide to communicate from remote 
corners of the globe and allow national authorities to command and 
control forces in multiple theaters simultaneously. Small businesses 
and multinational corporations alike rely on space-based imagery and 
other sensing to plan their daily operations, while military commanders 
understand the security environment through information gathered by 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.
    Our nation's interests in space are expanding. New investments and 
new technology are fueling opportunities for an expanding ecosystem of 
space systems and services. Advanced technologies are revolutionizing 
accessibility to space and space-derived capabilities at dramatically 
reduced costs. Technology continues to progress rapidly in areas such 
as 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, while 
advances in electronics are enabling ever-smaller form factors. Space 
system developers are leveraging all of these trends. Many of 
yesterday's cutting-edge technologies are mere commodities today, 
greatly reducing the economic barriers to entry into space. Significant 
amounts of private financing is pouring into commercial space, fueling 
a growing space industry. We are witnessing advances in high-throughput 
communication satellites and the development of commercial plans for 
mega-constellations offering new capabilities in low-Earth orbit. The 
commercial sector, enabled by traditional aerospace companies as well 
as entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, is driving down the cost of 
access to space through the development of re-usable launch vehicles 
and other techniques. These developments together are planting the 
seeds from which future economic and commercial opportunities may grow.
    This growth demonstrates that space is no longer the purview of 
only superpowers or even a handful of nations; participation in space 
activities is growing more diverse. Space-derived information services 
such as imagery, weather, communications, and intelligence, 
traditionally reserved to the governments of just a few space-faring 
nations, are becoming more attainable to non-State entities, companies, 
and individuals. This presents new challenges for the Department as new 
States, non-State actors, and commercial entities, both foreign and 
domestic, are able to provide services and capabilities once only 
available to the U.S. Government and a few other space-faring nations. 
The pace of technological expansion and growing accessibility are 
forcing our military to think and plan differently, as potential 
adversaries leverage increased capabilities to observe our force 
movements, track our activities, and communicate with their own forces 
at efficiencies, data rates, and levels of security not previously 
available.
    The United States also faces serious and growing challenges to its 
freedom to operate in space. China and Russia have studied how the 
United States joint force operates and have embarked on major efforts 
to develop, test, and field counter-space capabilities in order to 
destroy or disrupt U.S. and allied space capabilities in a crisis or 
conflict. These strategic competitors view space as an area where they 
could weaken our advantages and cause cascading impacts on our sea, 
air, land, and cyber systems that rely on space-based capabilities. 
Both have reorganized their militaries in 2015, emphasizing the 
importance of space operations, and making denial of space advantages 
are key components of their strategy. As a result, the United States no 
longer enjoys the freedom to develop and leverage space systems without 
deliberate regard to other nations' counterspace capabilities.
    These same countries, recognizing the value of space capabilities, 
are also expanding their use of space to support the lethality and 
effectiveness of their military forces in other domains. As noted in a 
recent Defense Intelligence Agency report ``Both [China and Russia] 
have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are 
making improvements to existing systems, including space launch 
vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. These capabilities 
provide their militaries with the ability to command and control their 
forces worldwide and also with enhanced situational awareness, enabling 
them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Challenges to Security in Space, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
February 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These emerging threats, in and from space, place our nation's 
security at ever-increasing risk and drive the U.S. imperative to 
strengthen its space posture and integration and synchronization of 
combat power across multiple domains. This includes both the ability to 
assure and defend our space-based capabilities from attack and the 
ability to protect our terrestrial forces from space-enabled attacks.
                       space strategy and posture
    This new environment highlights the role of space in changing the 
character of warfare and presents new challenges and opportunities to 
military space forces. No longer do space systems simply support 
terrestrial forces to fight and win wars; actions in space also will 
directly contribute to the outcome of future crises or conflicts. In 
order to preserve peace and deter aggression, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) must adapt. The DOD must be prepared to assure freedom of 
operation in space, to deter attacks, and, when necessary, to defeat 
space and counterspace threats to the national security interests of 
the United States and its allies and partners.
Policy and Strategy
    In addition to the National Security Strategy and the National 
Defense Strategy, the Department's efforts for Space are guided by the 
National Strategy for Space, which was signed by the President in March 
2018. The National Strategy for Space builds on the other strategies by 
emphasizing peace through strength, and maintaining U.S. leadership, 
preeminence, and freedom of operation in the space domain. The space 
strategy encompasses all aspects of our nation's space interest. It is 
composed of a strategic framework and implementation plan outlining 
four key strategic objectives. The first is to strengthen the safety, 
stability, and sustainability of space activities. The second is to 
deter and, when necessary, defeat adversary space and counterspace 
threats used for purposes hostile to the national security interests of 
the United States and its allies and partners. The third is to maintain 
U.S. commercial industry as the leading provider of traditional and 
innovative space technologies, goods, and services on the international 
space market while limiting potential adversaries' access to critical 
technologies and capabilities. The fourth is to maintain and extend 
U.S. human presence and robotic exploration beyond Earth to transform 
knowledge of ourselves, our planet, our solar system, and our universe. 
The implementation plan describes four lines of effort: mission 
assurance; deterrence and warfighting; organizational support; and 
creating conducive domestic and international environments for U.S. 
space objectives. The lines of effort represent the key priorities of 
the strategy and, along with the supporting tasks, describe the ways 
and means necessary to achieve our strategic objectives.
    The first line of effort focuses on mission assurance. We are 
accelerating the transformation of our space architecture by 
deliberately moving systems from the research and development phase to 
the actual fielding of capabilities. As a result, our space systems 
will be more resilient and more defendable. We are also looking to 
expand the ability to reconstitute space capabilities to reestablish 
lost functionality and we are exploring on-orbit satellite servicing 
capabilities. Fundamental to our strategy is our mission to deter, 
prepare for, and, if directed, prevail in any conflict, in any 
environment, against any threat.
    The second line of effort focuses on deterrence and warfighting. 
Our strategy recognizes that--due to actions by our competitors and 
potential adversaries--the space domain is not a sanctuary. This line 
of effort seeks to develop options to deter potential adversaries from 
aggression, including extending conflict into space. It entails a 
refocus of strategic guidance and doctrine; operational plans, 
authorities, capabilities, and culture; and rules of engagement to 
prepare most effectively for space as a warfighting domain.
    The third and fourth lines of effort focus on organizational 
support and fostering a conducive environment. We will pursue improved 
foundational capabilities, structures, security classification 
guidance, and processes in order to enable more effective space 
operations and will foster a conducive environment both at home and 
abroad. Domestically, this includes streamlining the regulatory 
environment to leverage and support U.S. industry more effectively, 
taking into account national security and public safety. 
Internationally, this includes promoting burden-sharing and marshalling 
cooperation against threatening adversary actions.
    The United States does not fight alone. Cooperation and partnership 
in the space domain are essential, just as cooperation and partnership 
benefit our military on land and sea and in the air and in cyberspace. 
Our defense strategy depends on sustaining and building international 
alliances and partnerships. The work in this area is critical to 
advance our common and shared strategic and operational interests of 
deterrence and lethality. U.S. allies and partners provide an 
asymmetrical advantage that no competitor can match. We are developing 
partnerships with the aim to develop and deploy more capable, more 
assured space architectures and, where appropriate and mutually 
beneficial, develop a combined operational capacity.
    For several years we have had a Combined Space Operations (CSpO) 
initiative including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. CSpO is identifying operational and 
programmatic cooperation opportunities, as well as common approaches to 
understanding and addressing threats in space. Last month we invited 
France and Germany to join this initiative. In 2018, our annual 
Schriever Wargame, examining conflict extending to space ten years into 
the future included robust participation from all the CSpO partners, 
plus France, Germany and Japan. As a result of wargames such as 
Schriever, our allies have come to understand the real and significant 
threats to their space infrastructure and are galvanized along with the 
U.S. to ensure our collective freedom of action in space.
    We will leverage past successes and achieve new ones, such as cost-
sharing agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads on foreign 
systems, and data-sharing arrangements to bolster shared space 
situational awareness. The Department of Defense, working with the 
Department of State, strengthens our leadership and international 
relationship through participation in international governing bodies 
and with multilateral and bilateral arrangements.
    To achieve these strategic objectives and secure our vital interest 
of unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space, the Department 
must fundamentally transform its approach to space from a support 
function to a warfighting domain--one in which we are prepared for a 
domain of competition and potential conflict. Space superiority is 
something to be gained and maintained, and cannot be taken for granted 
in future crisis or conflict.
Posture and Organization
    The President's $14 billion budget request for space in fiscal year 
2020, outlined in Major Force Program-12, puts the Department on a 
course to build a more lethal force. It advances the lines of effort 
captured in the National Strategy for Space and integrates space into a 
multi-domain approach designed to deter potential adversaries and 
defeat hostile activity should deterrence fail. This request, sustains 
our on-going space operations and support to the joint force while 
developing and fielding critical capabilities.
    The current organization of space within the DOD has enabled the 
United States to maintain its position as the most lethal force in the 
world. These structures, however, must evolve with the changing 
environment. No branch of the Armed Forces has been created since the 
U.S. Air Force was established in 1947--over 70 years ago. The world 
has changed significantly in that time. If authorized by Congress, a 
new Armed Force dedicated to space will develop space forces prepared 
to meet emerging security challenges.
    The trends and threats we face demand a new approach in order to 
outpace potential adversaries. This requires an approach that that DOD 
institutionally elevate space consistent with its role in national 
security; unify, consolidate, and integrate space forces from across 
the DOD; increase focus in leadership, expertise, personnel, culture, 
and capabilities for a distinct domain; accelerate our posture to space 
as a warfighting domain; and deliver dominant warfighting capacity for 
space while minimizing bureaucracy and cost.
    Space Policy Directive 4 was signed by the President in February 
2019, and outlines the policy approach to establishment of the U.S. 
Space Force. Under the proposal, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and the 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) would exist within one Military Department while 
organizing, training, and equipping their forces for two distinct 
warfighting domains and mission sets. The Secretary of the Air Force 
would be responsible for organizing, training, and equipping two 
separate Military Services: the USSF and USAF, each with a uniformed 
Military Service Chief with equal membership on the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS). This model is similar to how the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine 
Corps exist within the Department of the Navy. Additionally, a new 
Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, to be known as the Under 
Secretary for Space, will provide dedicated civilian supervision of the 
USSF, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of 
the Air Force.
    The vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and 
budget authority--would be transferred from the existing Military 
Services. The stand-up of the Space Force would be phased over five 
years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024--and would require $72 
million in fiscal year 2020 to establish the headquarters with 
approximately 200 people.
    Over the following years, as missions are transferred to the Space 
Force, existing personnel and budget authority will transfer into the 
Space Force from the existing Military Services. By the end of the 
transition period, more than 95 percent of the Space Force annual 
budget is estimated to consist of resources that will have been 
transferred from existing DOD budget accounts, along with an estimated 
15,000 transferred personnel. Additional resources will be dedicated to 
building out the Space Force headquarters and establishing and 
maintaining new support elements such as education, training, doctrine, 
and personnel management centers.
    Once the Space Force is fully established, these additive costs are 
estimated to be $500 million annually, which would represent 
approximately 0.07 percent of the annual DOD budget. The total 
additional cost growth over the next five years is estimated to be less 
than $2 billion, or approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for 
the same period. Because of the lean implementation and modest total 
costs, the Future Years Defense Program topline is sufficient to fully 
fund the U.S. Space Force.
    Complementing a Military Service focused on developing space 
forces, is a space warfighting command focused on employing the joint 
force. Consistent with U.S. law, DOD is taking steps to establish a 
United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command 
focused on planning and executing space warfighting operations to 
protect U.S. national interests, and those of our allies and partners. 
Establishing USSPACECOM will bring full-time operational focus to 
securing the space domain, and will streamline command and control for 
time-sensitive operations.
    Additionally, the DOD has undertaken a series of space acquisition 
reforms to ensure the joint forces has the capabilities necessary to 
deter and defeat threats. This includes the Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC), ``SMC 2.0'' initiatives, which have begun to remove 
bureaucracy and empower new program executive officers to acquire space 
capabilities more efficiently and effectively. Rapid acquisition 
prototyping authorities have been aggressively leveraged with the Space 
Rapid Capabilities Office, which initiated several new programs in the 
past year. These acquisition reforms will continue with the 
establishment of a joint Space Development Agency dedicated to rapidly 
developing, acquiring, and fielding next-generation military space 
capabilities. This organization will have a development mindset and 
will be focused on experimentation, prototyping, and accelerating 
fielding, as well as leveraging commercial technologies and services. 
These entities will transition to the Space Force, if authorized by 
Congress, to strengthen the foundation for space acquisition.
                               conclusion
    Space is a warfighting domain--albeit a nascent and evolving one. 
It is no longer a question of whether the character of warfare is 
changing, but rather how the United States should strategically re-
orient itself to deter aggression and be prepared to fight and win 
future wars.
    The Department has a plan to maintain U.S. leadership in this key 
domain of competition and potential warfare. The Department asks for 
your support, including our legislative proposal, so we can move out in 
this critical domain.
    The Department's partnership with Congress is and will remain 
absolutely critical to our success. To that end, I remain grateful for 
this committee's strong support and interest in this vital area, and 
its advocacy to deter aggression and ensure a lethal and effective 
force with the unmatched ability to prevail in, from, and through the 
ultimate high ground.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    General ``JT'' Thompson, welcome.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN F. THOMPSON, USAF, 
 COMMANDER, SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER, AIR FORCE SPACE 
                            COMMAND

    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, ma'am.
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am Lieutenant General 
``JT'' Thompson, and I am honored to appear before you today in 
my capacity as the Commander of Air Force Space and Missile 
Systems Center and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for 
Space.
    First of all, I'd like to apologize to you on behalf of the 
United States Air Force. Today, we provided two witnesses for 
the same hearing, both named Thompson, both lieutenant generals 
in leadership positions within Air Force Space Command. Since 
my primary duty location is Los Angeles Air Force Base in Los 
Angeles, California, and my fellow witness, Lieutenant General 
``DT'' Thompson's duty location is here in the national capital 
region, feel free to refer to me as ``West Coast Thompson'' and 
``DT'' as ``East Coast Thompson.'' That's exactly what 
leadership does in the Pentagon.
    At SMC, I am honored to lead the 6,000 dedicated men and 
women, military, government civilians, and contractors, who 
collectively have over 100,000 years of national security space 
acquisition experience. The SMC workforce is dedicated to 
providing premier national security space assets to support 
joint and allied forces for our Nation.
    While America is absolutely the best in space, our 
adversaries have recognized the extent to which our space 
capabilities provide a strategic advantage, and are working to 
deny the use of our capabilities with asymmetric advantages of 
their own. The space acquisition enterprise must adapt to 
deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In order to meet 
the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force 
is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and 
operations.
    The Air Force space enterprise has greatly benefited from 
acquisition reforms instituted by the Congress. However, in 
order to truly address the threat, we must go farther. 
Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow, making 
it difficult to respond to the latest threats, we are changing 
the way we do business to get capability from the lab to the 
warfighter faster and smarter.
    Specifically, to speed up the pace of acquisitions, we're 
utilizing alternative congressionally approved acquisition 
approaches, like other transaction authorities and rapid 
prototyping, which were granted under section 804 of the Fiscal 
Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
    SMC is also benefiting from the delegation of authority for 
some major defense acquisition programs down to the service 
acquisition level. With the help of Congress, the Air Force 
stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO, 
which will continue to work in close concert with SMC to 
rapidly develop and acquire critical capabilities. Further, I 
delegated acquisition authorities for acquisition category-3 
programs down to the executive level within SMC simply to speed 
decisionmaking. And finally, with the support of the Secretary 
of the Air Force and the Acting Secretary of Defense, SMC is 
undergoing a full transformation on how we operate, known as 
SMC 2.0.
    Although we have a strong history with partnerships with 
numerous DOD and intelligence community space activities, 
including the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Air Force 
Research Lab, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), under SMC 2.0, one of our principal 
tenets is to grow even greater partnerships with our allies, 
our sister civil and intelligence agencies, and commercial 
industry to speed up the pace of acquisition and our Nation's 
legacy as the dominant space power.
    I am grateful for the support of this committee and the 
Congress as we transition our space assets to meet and outpace 
the threat posed by near-peer adversaries.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss and defend the 
vital programs that SMC acquires to enable warfighting 
capabilities across the globe. I look forward to your 
questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General ``JT'' Thompson 
follows:]

       Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General John F. Thompson
                              introduction
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before this committee 
in my capacity as Commander of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC) and the Air Force Program Executive Officer (PEO) for 
Space. As the SMC Commander and PEO for Space, I have the unique 
position of providing both organize, train, and equip functions to the 
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Commander and acquisition experience 
and oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics), Dr. Will Roper. In order to carry out these 
unique responsibilities, I am privileged to lead and represent 6,000 
dedicated men and women of SMC, who have over 100,000 years of National 
Security Space Acquisition experience and excellence. The SMC workforce 
is dedicated to providing premier National Security Space assets to 
support Joint and Allied forces and our Nation.
    To echo Lieutenant General David Thompson's statements, our space 
forces must operate in an increasingly competitive environment. I have 
served as a PEO or Deputy PEO in four previous assignments including 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Strategic Systems, 
Joint Strike Fighter, and Tanker. In each of those mission areas, I had 
the luxury of building on America's significant asymmetric advantage 
over our adversaries. This is not the case in my current role. While 
America is absolutely the best in space, our adversaries have 
recognized the extent to which our space capabilities provide a 
strategic advantage and are working to deny the use of our capabilities 
with asymmetric advantages of their own; the space acquisition 
enterprise must adapt to deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In 
order to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air 
Force is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and 
operations. Thanks to the support of Congress, the Air Force space 
enterprise has experienced an unprecedented year following significant 
changes proposed by the Air Force in the fiscal year 2019 budget. The 
Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget request will expand upon the 
foundations laid in the previous year with nearly $14 billion in 
proposed investment in the space portfolio (including procurement, 
research and development, personnel, and sustainment funding). This 
budget request supports our warfighting approach to the space domain 
and changes to how we prototype and field innovative space technologies 
in order to stay ahead of our competitors.
    A 2016 Government Accountability Office report released titled, 
``Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes 
Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight,'' 
authored by my fellow witness, Ms. Christina Chaplain, highlighted the 
following: ``fragmentation and overlap in Department of Defense (DOD) 
space acquisition management and oversight contributed to program 
delays and cancellations, cost increase, and inefficient operations.'' 
Over the past few National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress enabled 
the Department to leverage new authorities in order to procure weapons 
systems faster and smarter. The Air Force, and the space enterprise as 
a whole, has embraced many of these authorities, such as rapid 
prototyping and delegation of Milestone Decision Authority from the 
Defense Acquisition Executive to the Service level. The Air Force space 
enterprise has benefited from those acquisition reforms instituted by 
Congress; however, in order to truly address the threat, we must go 
farther. Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow and 
often unable to respond to the latest threats, we are changing the way 
we do business to get capability from the lab to the warfighter faster 
and smarter.
      acquiring the nation's space capabilities faster and smarter
    In my capacity as the SMC Commander and the Air Force PEO for 
Space, I directed several changes within the organization to shorten 
decision timelines and radically change the often old-fashioned ways in 
which we acquired space capabilities. One of my first acts upon 
assuming command of SMC in May 2017, was to delegate acquisition 
authorities for Acquisition Category (ACAT) III programs down to the 
execution level. This is similar to the benefits SMC had from the 
delegation of authority over acquisition programs down to the Service 
Acquisition Executive for some of our Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs. Additionally, we are utilizing alternative acquisition 
approaches like Other Transaction Authorities and those granted under 
section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016 for rapid prototyping. With the help of Congress, the Air Force 
stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO), which much like 
the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, will acquire critical 
capabilities by utilizing unique approaches and oversight structures. 
Finally, with the support of the Secretary of the Air Force and Acting 
Secretary of Defense, SMC is undergoing a full transformation of how we 
operate, known as SMC 2.0.
Delegating Acquisition Authorities
    SMC executes approximately 36 unclassified ACAT I-III level and 6 
rapid prototyping programs, which represents over $7 billion in 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation and Procurement funding each 
fiscal year. Upon taking command, I delegated authority for 19 ACAT III 
and Services Category programs under $100 million, accounting for 37 
percent of the total PEO for Space portfolio, to SMC System Program 
Directors. Those Program Directors are fully qualified acquisition 
professionals, averaging 20 years of experience each; the programs in 
their portfolios represent critical capabilities like the Ground Based 
Optical Sensor System (GBOSS), a vital space situational awareness 
capability. GBOSS provides global search, tracking of non-cooperative 
launches, and discrimination between closely spaced objects. With this 
delegation, System Program Directors and their teams are now 
responsible for all facets of program execution, from milestone 
decisions to source selection and beyond. This delegation and other 
process improvement initiatives resulted in a reduction of acquisition 
timelines by 65 percent from the first acquisition event to contract 
award in fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018. By reducing the 
amount of time it takes a program manager to reach a decision maker, 
SMC is not only saving time and taxpayer money, but also empowering the 
next generation of acquisition professionals.
    For SMC's larger programs, we have seen similar impacts from 
delegation of Milestone Decision Authority for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) from the DOD level to the Air Force level, 
allowing faster access to the decision maker. In 2017, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment delegated 
authority for seven of nine major national security space programs to 
the Air Force. The Air Force is projected to accelerate the delivery of 
warfighting capabilities for these seven programs by an average of 24 
months. One example of significant time saved is with the Global 
Positioning System III Follow-On Production Program (GPS IIIF). With 
GPS IIIF, the Air Force will introduce increased resiliency in the form 
of the Regional Military Protection capability to ensure the warfighter 
has a protected Position, Navigation, and Timing signal when and where 
they need it most. Additionally, the GPS IIIF program will use planned 
technology insertions throughout its development and production phases 
to ensure a long-term, viable constellation, able to bring forth new 
capabilities faster. The Air Force awarded the GPS IIIF contract in 
September 2018 after a full and open competition, saving approximately 
$1.6 billion over the life of the contract while taking advantage of 
delegated authority to reduce decision times by six months over a 
traditional DOD-level acquisition program.
Alternative Acquisition Approaches
    Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2016 authorizes Middle Tier Acquisitions to rapidly develop 
operational prototypes and field production quantities of new or 
upgraded systems with minimal development required within five years. 
So far, six programs executed by SMC have been designated as 804 
programs to tailor documentation and reviews within the Department, 
flatten access to decision authorities, and in some cases, deploy novel 
approaches to program execution, yielding several years in time saved 
over a traditional DOD acquisition. An example of one of our 804 
programs is the Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications system 
(ESS). ESS is our next-generation protected, strategic satellite 
communications system, which will provide the President and other 
national leaders with protected, anti-jam communications capabilities 
through all levels of conflict, to include the nuclear environment. The 
program approach for ESS focuses on maturing the payload to meet new 
requirements and strategic scenarios by creating competition, driving 
innovation, and increasing affordability. The Air Force plans to 
deliver this next-generation, resilient, Nuclear Command, Control and 
Communications (NC3) capability with an estimated time savings of at 
least two years.
    SMC is also executing five other 804 programs in the Overhead 
Persistent Infrared (OPIR), Protected Satellite Communications, and 
Position, Navigation, and Timing mission areas with over 16 years in 
projected time savings for fielding new capability over traditional 
acquisition methods. As we continue to recapitalize systems across the 
space enterprise in order to make them more resilient and responsive to 
the current threat environment, the Air Force will request 804 
designations for more programs, when practicable, to deliver capability 
to the warfighter faster and smarter. It is also important the Air 
Force maintains transparency and oversight with DOD and congressional 
stakeholders, which is achieved through tri-annual reports delivered by 
the Secretary to both entities.
Space Rapid Capabilities Office
    In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Congress created the Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS), 
chartered to respond to U.S. Strategic Command-validated urgent needs 
and develop enabler technology. As Lieutenant General David Thompson 
stated, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 
renamed ORS as the Space Rapid Capabilities Office. Although the SpRCO 
is not an organization for which I have oversight, it remains an 
important mission partner and collaboration between SMC and the SpRCO 
is vital for providing the best possible capabilities to the warfighter 
as an integrated space architecture. In collaboration with General 
Raymond and AFSPC, my team supported the stand up and definition of the 
organization, which is now undoubtedly poised to meet the Committee's 
expectations.
Other Transaction Authorities
    Other Transaction Authority agreements, generally referred to as 
OTAs, are another non-traditional acquisition authority, which allows 
the Air Force to acquire and field more resilient, responsive, and 
agile space capabilities. The Air Force utilized OTAs in our efforts to 
transition off the Atlas V, with the Russian-built RD-180 rocket 
propulsion system, to domestically sourced launch capabilities 
leveraging the innovation of the United States' robust launch industry. 
In 2016, the Air Force awarded four OTAs under the Rocket Propulsion 
Systems effort to re-invigorate the domestic rocket propulsion 
industrial base and mitigate risk for future launch vehicles. In 2018, 
the Air Force awarded three OTAs under the Launch Service Agreements 
effort to develop at least two domestic, commercially viable launch 
systems to provide Assured Access to Space. These public-private 
partnerships ensure emerging, innovative commercial launch systems meet 
all National Security Space Launch requirements.
    The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC OTA) was awarded in November 
2017 to provide a forum for rapid development of next generation space-
related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's vision of a more capable, 
resilient, and affordable enterprise. The objectives of the SpEC are: 
minimize barriers to entry for small business and non-traditional 
vendors to do business with the Air Force and U.S. Government; identify 
and realize teaming opportunities among entities to promote integrated 
research and prototyping efficiencies; and reduce the cost of prototype 
development under a competitive environment. SpEC is popular with SMC 
industry partners and new companies join the consortium frequently. As 
of early March 2019, the SpEC is comprised of approximately 264 
companies, 81 percent of which are considered non-traditional defense 
contractors. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA prototyping efforts exceeding 
$207 million in total value. The timeline for a solicitation-to-award 
averages 90 days, with some variation based on the complexity of the 
effort, or approximately half the time of a traditional solicitation. 
Mission partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air 
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Through the 
SpEC OTA, MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile 
Defense Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC 
OTA has been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to 
satisfy critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile 
warning to protected satellite communications to position, navigation 
and timing.
   re-architecting the air force space acquisition enterpise: smc 2.0
    The efforts to push decisions down to the lowest practicable levels 
and utilize innovative acquisition strategies have resulted in years of 
time saved and faster delivery of capabilities. However, to truly 
effect change, we must move fast to stay competitive and we must 
fundamentally transform what we buy, how we buy it, and who we buy it 
from. Under SMC 2.0 we are re-architecting SMC to manage as an 
enterprise by optimizing resource allocation, enhancing collaboration, 
accelerating decision making and developing a more innovative 
workforce. SMC 2.0 represents a total shift in the way SMC does 
business, focusing on the principles of an enterprise-wide approach, 
fostering partnerships with Allies, commercial companies, and other 
federal agencies, innovation in both how the Air Force does business 
and how technology is developed, a culture change to move away from 
bureaucracy and empower innovative ideas, all to enable speed. 
Together, these principles form the core of our message for SMC 2.0--to 
promote EPIC Speed. I declared Initial Operating Capability of SMC 2.0 
on 15 October 2018, with the goal of achieving Full Operational 
Capability by the end of 2019.
The New SMC 2.0 Organization
    SMC 2.0 encourages us to operate more as an integrated enterprise. 
Under the previous organizational construct, space capabilities were 
developed in separate mission area directorates; there was a 
directorate focused on providing military satellite communications, GPS 
capabilities, remote sensing, etc. This construct resulted in stove-
piped organizations within SMC with limited cross-flow of ideas and 
innovation. In order to increase the flow of information and remove 
layers of bureaucracy, SMC is transitioning from a mission area-
specific directorate structure to a Corps structure based upon where a 
program is in the acquisition process. With SMC 2.0, SMC will be 
divided into four main Corps: Development, Production, Enterprise, and 
Atlas along with a Portfolio Architect to integrate across programs, 
combat stove-piped development, and deliver resilient capabilities 
faster.
    The Development Corps will focus on technology maturation and 
prototyping critical capabilities for the next generation of systems. 
Once a technology is matured, the capability will be transitioned to 
the Production Corps where the focus is on efficient delivery, 
capitalizing on cross-cutting opportunities, like standardized space 
vehicles and components. The Enterprise Corps will provide common 
services, such as space launch activities, and management of 
sustainment activities. The Atlas Corps provides the Center's critical 
business functions, such as contracting, manpower, and financial 
management, to facilitate the acquisition of the systems developed and 
produced by the other Corps. In order to flatten the organization and 
accelerate the pace of decision making, the Air Force has distributed 
the space portfolio of programs and delegated PEO authority to three 
new PEOs to increase the number of decision makers and link each 
program manager directly to their PEO. These fully qualified PEOs have 
acquisition authority over the programs within the Development, 
Production, and Enterprise Corps. The crosscutting nature of this 
framework reduces duplication, identifies commonalities among missions, 
and drives enterprise integration leading to higher resiliency across 
many platforms and systems.
    The SMC Portfolio Architect drives the space enterprise strategy 
and framework to inform and prioritize what SMC acquires. The SMC 
Portfolio Architect works closely with the Air Force Space Command 
Enterprise Architect, ensuring space operators and space acquirers 
remain in lock step to provide the most resilient and agile 
capabilities for the warfighter.
Strengthening Partnerships
    SMC is working with Allies, sister agencies, and industry to 
satisfy warfighting capability gaps quicker and cheaper while 
developing a more robust coalition space enterprise. This year SMC will 
establish agreements in Europe, the Pacific, and at home to expand our 
space capabilities via technology development and demonstration as well 
as development of operational capability by leveraging friendships and 
resources across the globe. I recently returned from a multi-nation 
trip, which included stops in Japan and Australia, to reinforce and 
grow our alliances and partnerships with the international community.
    The Chief Partnership Office, within the Portfolio Architect team, 
is tasked with growing partnerships between SMC and related agencies, 
Allies, and industry. As mentioned in Lieutenant General David 
Thompson's testimony, our highest profile mission partnership is the 
collaborative effort with the National Reconnaissance Office known as 
Silentbarker. Silentbarker will provide the primary layer of critical 
space-based space situational awareness to the warfighter. The system 
will rapidly detect, identify, track, and collect data on resident 
space objects in deep-space orbits on the short timelines required to 
conduct indications and warning of threats against U.S. high-value 
assets. The Air Force contributes to this effort through the Space-
Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program. By pursuing this 
collaborative effort with a key mission partner, the Air Force 
estimates there will be approximately $400 million in overall cost 
avoidance over a traditional acquisition.
    The Air Force is also working to expand its relationships with key 
Allies in order to strengthen existing alliances and grow partnerships 
with new nations. For example, the Air Force is partnering with Space 
Norway on a hosted payload solution for a protected satellite 
communications capability in the North Polar Region known as the 
Enhanced Polar System-Recapitalization (EPS-R). EPS-R provides assured, 
anti-jam, and low-probability-of-detection and intercept satellite 
communications for tactical users north of 65 degrees latitude. This 
capability provides a 26-fold increase in capacity over the legacy, 
Interim Polar System through our partnership with Space Norway. The Air 
Force is projected to close a two year capability gap to provide 
critical warfighter support sooner than a traditional acquisition of a 
free-flyer satellite and save significant costs through partnering.
    In addition to forging stronger ties with our international and 
mission partners, SMC is working to strengthen our partnerships with 
both aerospace and innovative technology industries. Throughout the SMC 
2.0 transformation, we have held industry days and panels to solicit 
feedback from our defense industry partners. Additionally, we are 
working with our partners in the private sector to employ commercial 
best practices for how we acquire space systems and open the door for 
non-traditional defense companies and universities. The Air Force's 
Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially Hosted (REACH) program 
is a space weather and space situational awareness project 
demonstrating the viability and effectiveness of a commercially hosted, 
disaggregated space situational awareness architecture. REACH payload 
sensors provide an unprecedented amount of space weather measurements 
for more rapid satellite anomaly attribution. Earlier this year, the 
REACH program successfully completed its eighth and final launch. A 
total of 32 REACH payloads were launched into orbit in under 24 months. 
The successful launch of these payloads and the critical data they 
provide are a key example of SMC 2.0 in action, finding innovative ways 
to partner with industry to rapidly field new capabilities while 
reducing cost and schedule.
Fostering Innovation
    As the space domain transitions from an uncontested environment to 
one which is more unpredictable, complex, and competitive, it is 
important to collapse traditional lengthy requirements, development, 
testing and fielding processes. Today, SMC must shift to a construct 
prioritizing flexibility and speed, to enable effective adaptation to 
rapidly evolving technologies and unpredictable competitors. The 
partnership pilot program between SMC Mission Innovation, the AFRL 
Space Vehicles Directorate, and the 14th Air Force Combat Development 
Division (CDD) shows how our acquisition community is not only 
capitalizing on commercial development, but becoming the premier Multi-
domain Enterprise Global Node. Our collaboration efforts pivot to 
support this rapidly evolving technological landscape while finding 
non-traditional methods to provide lethal and practical tools to better 
support the warfighter. The efforts of this combined team is narrowing 
the gap between operator and engineer, addressing operator-driven pain 
points and developing a solution in a faster, more streamlined manner.
    A good example of this partnership, was the 460th Space Wing's 
Combat Development Division AFWERX accelerator activity. A recent pilot 
program activity was able to produce prototypes for space operator 
visualization known as Space Cockpit and a defensive cyber operations 
tool, going from concept to prototype in only three months. Not only 
was turnaround quick, but operators were immediately able to 
demonstrate the product and provide feedback and corrective actions 
earlier in the product's life cycle than ever before. SMC is 
trailblazing this new style of space acquisitions in concert with the 
Combat Development Division through our Space Commercially Augmented 
Mission Platform (CAMP) and Enterprise Space Battle Management Command 
& Control (ESBMC2) efforts, which are already pulling third party 
developers ``off the street'' to deliver new products specifically 
requested by operators. These tactics are the exact type of innovation 
and collaboration we are striving to implement across the Air Force.
    To provide timely ESBMC2 capabilities to the warfighter, the Air 
Force has transitioned the effort and the remainder of the legacy Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) into a new 
development effort known as Space Command and Control (C2). The Space 
C2 effort takes the lessons learned from previous software development 
programs and institutes a more iterative and operator-focused approach. 
Instead of building software and writing code for multiple years that 
could result in an end product which does not meet evolving mission 
requirements, the Space C2 initiative is centered on 90-day Program 
Increment cycles. The Program Increment offers a predictable and timely 
delivery to users as well as an opportunity to receive direct feedback 
from the operators to immediately correct user issues. A Retrospective 
and Planning document is generated at the conclusion of an increment. 
This codifies the progress made during the previous Program Increment, 
the expected end-state of the entering Program Increment, money spent 
to date, and the return on investment, as well as other successes or 
issues to be addressed. ESBMC2 follows this 90-day Program Increment 
cadence to develop, integrate, and deliver capabilities, operating on 
four 3-week sprints per increment, enabling ESBMC2 to continuously 
deliver capabilities. The first Program Increment was delivered to and 
accepted by the warfighter at the end of January 2019.
    The AFWERX accelerator activity is just one point in which SMC and 
AFSPC are achieving greater collaboration between the operators who use 
the capabilities and the acquirers. In concert with Space Cadre 
development efforts spearheaded by General Raymond, SMC is working to 
ensure we have space operators in our acquisition program offices. 
AFSPC and SMC are working to ensure we have a crossflow of officers 
between the acquisition and the space operations career fields. Right 
now SMC has approximately 100 acquirers with space operations 
experience across the Center, with plans to double that number. I 
believe this crossflow develops better acquisition officers who can 
fully understand the operational domain of the warfighting customer.
SMC 2.0 Pacesetter Programs
    It is important to remember the Air Force is working to not only 
acquire capability faster, but also smarter. As part of the SMC 2.0 
approach, nine ``pacesetter'' programs have been designated to validate 
rapid acquisition strategies outlined above and provide a model for 
future acquisitions to follow. These pacesetter programs serve as both 
a means to pave the way for alternative acquisition approaches and as a 
litmus test to ensure the changes implemented under SMC 2.0 are viable 
and can be applied to a broad range of missions. Under the Portfolio 
Architect, there are two pacesetter initiatives, international 
partnerships and a prototype project for disaggregated architectures. 
The SMC pacesetter effort, known as CASINO, will expand the efforts of 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency project known as 
Blackjack, to increase resilience by disaggregating various mission 
capabilities using large, Low Earth Orbit constellations.
    The Development Corps' key pacesetter programs are two section 804 
programs, the Next Generation OPIR program to replace the legacy Space 
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the Protected Tactical Satellite 
Communications (PTS) program to replace the tactical capabilities of 
the existing Advanced Extremely High Frequency and MILSTAR 
constellations. The PTS program will be a constellation of distributed, 
hosted payloads and free-flying satellites which provide increased 
anti-jam performance to tactical users currently using wideband 
communications satellites. The program received section 804 designation 
from Dr. Roper in November 2018, and was directed to develop two 
hostable payloads to be launched in fiscal year 2024. The payloads will 
leverage the government-owned, fully processed Protected Tactical 
Waveform to provide anti-jam, protected tactical satellite 
communications to joint warfighters in anti-access/area denial 
environments. By utilizing the previously mentioned SpEC OTA in 
addition to section 804 authorities, the Air Force will deliver 
critical, tactical satellite communications capabilities to the 
warfighter three years sooner than a traditional DOD 5000 series 
acquisition.
    The Production Corps' key pacesetter efforts consist of a pilot for 
satellite commonality for spacecraft in order to drive affordability 
across SMC programs, and the commercial procurement of the Wideband 
Global Satellite Communications System through innovative business 
practices. Our commonality effort is driving efficiencies across three 
of our major programs: AEHF, SBIRS, and GPS. For example, we are 
establishing common standards for parts qualification, system testing 
and review processes. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, 
Congress appropriated $600 million for two additional space vehicles 
for the Air Force's wideband communications system, known as WGS. The 
Air Force is working with the WGS prime contractor to acquire the 
congressionally-directed spacecraft. The Air Force will leverage 
commercial best practices to accelerate spacecraft delivery.
    Under the Enterprise Corps, SMC is working to institute enterprise-
wide Defensive Cyber Operations, procure the Enterprise Ground Services 
program using agile development and rapid fielding of a common 
satellite C2 infrastructure, and has created a multi-mission 
manifesting office to provide flexible access to space for all types of 
payloads and satellites. SMC created the Mission Manifest Office to 
enable rapid, resilient and responsive launch capabilities to meet 
National Security Space objectives. As the front door for operational 
launch, the Mission Manifest Office analyzes current and planned 
National Security Space launches to determine potential multi-manifest 
missions. As a result, the Air Force maximizes on-orbit capability, 
ensures little excess space for each launch mission and lowers cost to 
the DOD by reducing overall launch service procurements. The Mission 
Manifest Office identifies DOD, Civil, and Intelligence Community 
launch opportunities to enable and execute these multi-manifest mission 
designs. As one of the SMC 2.0 pacesetters, the Mission Manifest Office 
will be integrating National Security Space payloads on the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Landsat-9 launch mission in 
fiscal year 2021, setting a valuable Interagency Agreement and 
collaboration for many years to come.
    The way ahead set by these pacesetter efforts is already paying 
off. Nine additional space programs have used the techniques proven by 
the pacesetters to save an additional 19 years in acquisition time from 
their original schedules. SMC is making great strides in achieving EPIC 
Speed in areas outside the pacesetters previously outlined. Our Space 
C2 program is breaking government software development paradigms by 
working with the DOD to create a new acquisition program type and more 
effectively acquire agile software systems. Just last month, the 
program office established a new development-to-operations (DevOps) 
environment located in a commercial business space. The new environment 
encourages partnerships with a variety of software vendors for extreme 
programming agile software development.
    None of the efforts to speed up the pace of space acquisition would 
be possible without the men and women who make up the workforce of SMC. 
To ensure our workforce understands the current space operating 
environment, I directed all military and civilian employees of the 
Center, to receive a threat brief at each employee's appropriate 
security clearance level. We will continue that initiative this year, 
and invite our contractor employees to participate. As a step towards 
institutionalizing the change in culture, and the other EPIC Speed 
tenets from the ground up, SMC launched an innovative effort to 
inspire, energize, and uniquely develop our junior acquisition corps. 
In the coming months, we will take a dramatic step forward in ensuring 
our civilian workforce is poised to execute the tenets of SMC 2.0. 
Furthermore, as we continue to work towards achieving Full Operational 
Capability for SMC 2.0, later this year, we will continue to adjust 
course to meet the threat.
                             the way ahead
    Since taking command in May 2017, SMC has undergone rapid and 
significant change, and we are making progress in speeding up the pace 
of the acquisition of the Nation's vital space capabilities. Although a 
lot of progress has been made, the men and women of SMC understand that 
despite a history of remarkable achievement, we must get even faster 
and smarter about how we deliver space warfighting capability; and we 
must continue to invoke the principles of EPIC Speed to meet and 
outpace the adversary threat. None of the changes implemented under the 
SMC 2.0 construct would be possible without the support of our Air 
Force Space Command team and the support of senior leaders within the 
Air Force, the DOD, and the Administration. Most importantly, none of 
these changes would be possible without the continued support of 
Congress. We are using the new authorities given to us by Congress to 
ensure we transparently acquire the premier space capabilities to 
enable space operators. The Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget builds 
off considerable gains the space investment portfolio has seen in 
recent years with a proposed 17 percent increase over fiscal year 2019. 
This request supports SMC's re-architecture and the key missions of the 
National Defense Strategy while also supporting the drive towards the 
Air Force We Need.
    Finally, I thank the Committee for its continued leadership, 
oversight, and support of the men and women of SMC and the national 
security space enterprise.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
    Next we have General ``DT'' Thompson. And I believe you are 
referred to now as ``East Coast.'' But, General, welcome.

 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USAF, VICE 
               COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear 
before you along with these distinguished colleagues today.
    Today, I represent our commander, General ``Jay'' Raymond, 
the Commander of Air Force Space Command. I'm privileged to be 
one of the 26,000 men and women of that Command who serve under 
General Raymond's leadership. These men and women remain the 
best in the world at developing, fielding, operating, and 
sustaining vital space capabilities that serve our national 
leaders, our Joint Forces, allies, and partners, and the world, 
in general. The asymmetric advantage these capabilities provide 
ensure that our Armed Forces have no equal.
    Today, there is unprecedented agreement among the Nation's 
leadership that space is a warfighting domain, just like air, 
land, sea, and cyberspace. The National Security Strategy and 
National Defense Strategy reflect this reality, emphasizing 
peace through strength while demanding that we maintain U.S. 
leadership and freedom of action in the space domain.
    Accepting that potential adversaries have made space a 
warfighting domain, we are now dealing with the implications. 
We are driving tremendous change in order to sustain our 
leadership and that freedom to operate in space. With your 
strong support, we are making significant advances to ensure 
the national security space enterprise is prepared to play its 
role in military operations under all conditions.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on our efforts over the 
past 2 years, proposing a 17 percent increase in space funding 
over 2019, and a $14 billion investment overall. With my 
posture statement on the record, I'd like to summarize a few of 
its key points:
    First of all, we're increasing the lethality and readiness 
of our force as we continue to invest in and accelerate 
defendable space. Among that includes new, more defendable 
systems and architectures, the space domain awareness and 
command and control needed to operate in a contested domain, 
and an operational training infrastructure to develop space 
warfighters to the need. All of this enables us to sustain 
superiority in space so that we ensure we support joint 
warfighters operating in all domains around the globe.
    Second, we are enhancing and expanding partnerships with 
the intelligence community, allies and partners, and industry. 
This includes joint programs with the National Reconnaissance 
Office, hosted payloads with several of our allies and 
partners, and operations, training, exercises, and wargames 
with allies that are building a coalition of like-minded 
nations.
    Finally, we're capitalizing on innovative business 
practices, including the rearchitecting of Space and Missile 
Systems Center that ``West Coast Thompson'' mentioned and is 
leading, establishing a Space Rapid Capabilities Office, 
pursuing special practices and innovative agreements that drive 
those innovative activities across the broader commercial and 
industry base, and, finally, adopting open architectures and 
standards to strengthen integration in multidomain command and 
control and with the operations of the rest of the Joint Force.
    Let me close by reiterating that we do not want war to 
extend to space. But, the best way to deter that from happening 
is to prepare to fight and win, should deterrence fail. With 
your support, that's exactly what we're doing.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General David 
Thompson follows:]

       Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David D. Thompson
                              introduction
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich and distinguished Members 
of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before you today in my capacity 
as Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). With General Jay 
Raymond in command, we have the distinct privilege to lead and 
represent the 26,200 dedicated men and women of AFSPC who underpin 
successful operations for our joint force and the Nation. In the past 
year we have seen tremendous change and progress in the National 
Security Space arena with the Nation's on-going efforts to address the 
reality that strategic competitors have made space a warfighting 
domain. Among these initiatives are the President's issuance of four 
Space Policy Directives, direction to establish a space-focused 
combatant command--U.S. Space Command, and the Department of Defense 
proposal for a new branch of the armed forces--the U.S. Space Force. We 
expect this next year will be equally full of progress across these and 
other National Security Space endeavors.
                          strategic situation
    Today, great power competition from a revisionist China and Russia 
continues to be the primary challenge to United States and global 
security. Both of these nations seek to challenge peace, stability and 
U.S. superiority in all domains: land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space. 
In the space domain in particular, these competitors are seeking to 
deny the U.S. and its Allies freedom of action, while also developing 
their own space capabilities to enable power projection and enhance 
military strength.
    Fortunately, this comes at a time when our National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, national and military leadership, 
and Air Force Space Command plans, programs and operations are in 
unprecedented alignment. The National Security Strategy mandates we 
must maintain leadership and freedom of action in space, while 
advancing space as a priority domain. It also declares unfettered 
access and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Our 
National Defense Strategy establishes five priority missions: (1) 
defend the Homeland, (2) provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
deterrent, (3) defeat a powerful conventional enemy, while we (4) deter 
opportunistic aggression, and (5) disrupt violent extremists in a cost-
effective manner. Our space capabilities play a vital role in each one 
of the missions, supporting our joint warfighters and our allies and 
partners around the globe. Our national and military leadership declare 
in unison that space is a warfighting domain, like land, sea, and air. 
Our goal remains to deter conflict from extending to space, and the 
best way we know how to do this is to be prepared to fight and win a 
conflict that extends to space should deterrence fail. My testimony 
will focus on how our activities are aligned with Department of Defense 
(DOD) priorities to build a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and 
attract new partners, and reform the Department's business practices.
                       build a more lethal force
    We are increasing the combat readiness of Space Operators to 
increase joint warfighter lethality by investing to build multi-domain 
Airmen to fight and win as part of the Joint Force.
Developing our Warfighters
    Foundational to building a more lethal force is the development of 
joint warfighters. The Air Force is transforming the way we develop our 
space combat tacticians and acquisition professionals, and laying the 
foundation for a trained, ready crew force. We have taken a number of 
actions to do so. For example, we directed a significant increase in 
rigor and content in the initial training of our space operators, known 
as Undergraduate Space Training, to meet the demands of current and 
emerging challenges to national security space. This revised ``UST 
Next'' is on track to start on 1 October 2019 and includes an 
additional 34 training days to cover evolving space threats and U.S. 
responses in greater depth. We have also expanded our Operational 
Training Infrastructure to produce a more relevant training 
environment, which allows weapon systems and operators to interact in a 
highly dynamic, threat-representative, realistic manner, including 
aspects of multi-domain command and control. The Air Force has approved 
$74.8 million in funding to advance our space training simulators along 
these lines.
    Additionally, AFSPC and the Air Force Weapons School established an 
Enlisted Space Warfighter Advanced Instructor Course and have selected 
the first class of students. This new course, held at Nellis Air Force 
Base, will provide advanced academic and tactical training for enlisted 
space professionals, and is a stepping stone for incorporating our 
enlisted operators into the existing Air Force Weapons School.
Advanced Space Operations School Re-designated as the 319th Combat 
        Training Squadron
    Air Force Space Command re-designated the Advance Space Operations 
School as the 319th Combat Training Squadron (319 CTS) on 28 August 
2018 in an effort to normalize the squadron with the Air Force's 16 
other combat training squadrons that have similar training missions. As 
a combat training squadron, this unit will prepare space professionals 
for real-world operations in an increasingly contested space domain 
through exercises such as Space Flag. The 319 CTS will provide training 
to tactical units with the purpose of developing critically-thinking 
operators who have mastered their weapon system to a degree such that 
they are able to fight through all levels of conflict.
Schriever Scholars
    The Air Force is growing a cadre of strategic space leaders through 
the Schriever Scholars program at Air Command and Staff College. This 
new space concentration program for field grade officers consists of a 
demanding curriculum spanning space history, policy, strategy, and 
doctrine. The program also provides unique opportunities for engagement 
with senior DOD leadership and unprecedented access to top-level 
policymakers, including representatives at the White House, State 
Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, and 
NASA. This initial class of thirteen students graduate in June and will 
be prepared to ensure American advantage in the space domain for 
decades to come.
Space Flag
    Space Flag is AFSPC's premier in-domain space protection exercise. 
This year we have expanded this advanced training to three times a 
year, providing space operators the experience of planning and 
executing space operations in a contested, degraded, and operationally-
limited environment against a thinking adversary. In August 2019, we 
plan to incorporate our coalition partners in Space Flag for the first 
time.
             strengthen alliances and attract new partners
    AFSPC has made significant progress in expanding interagency, 
commercial, and international partnerships that enhance our position 
across the national security space portfolio. Recognizing that it is 
impossible to accomplish our mission alone, AFSPC is committed to 
identifying new partners and solidifying existing relationships as a 
core activity.
Joint Space Operations Center to Combined Space Operations Center
    This year we have accelerated our efforts and increased our 
coalition footprint to conduct combined space operations. On 18 July 
2018, the Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) transitioned the 
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to a Combined Space Operations 
Center (CSpOC). The transition formalized our ongoing, decade-long 
effort to integrate Allied and partner nation personnel and 
capabilities into our space enterprise. We have also established 
persistent connectivity with partner space operations centers in 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and together we are working 
to identify additional tools to improve information sharing between our 
respective centers. In late 2019, we plan on expanding more classified 
operations and planning efforts with our FVEY partners through the 
establishment of a Combined Technical Operations Cell (CTOC).
Schriever Wargame
    AFSPC annually conducts the Schriever Wargame, a scenario-based 
wargame designed to explore critical space issues in depth, investigate 
military utility of new space systems, identify solutions to common 
challenges shared by all participants, and advance space doctrine to 
better align with and support air, land, sea, and cyberspace doctrine. 
This annual wargame also helps increase international cooperation and 
integration among space-faring allies. This year's wargame included our 
FVEY partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) 
along with France, Germany, and, for the first time, Japan. The 
outcomes of the Schriever Wargame Series continue to inform future 
AFSPC requirements, examine organizational constructs, and provide a 
venue for advancing space operational concepts and procedures. For 
example, it was the first time the participants employed a combined 
command and control (C2) cell for Special Access Programs (SAP). As 
previously mentioned, it is through this effort that participants 
agreed to stand up the first ever CTOC, the real world SAP C2 cell at 
the CSpOC, by the end of this year.
    As a related effort, the Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC) 
Office at Vandenberg Air Force Base provides the means for direct 
dialog with multiple international partners extending beyond combined 
space operations, supporting strategic engagement objectives via 
bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Eight countries were 
initially invited to participate: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. 
The MSC office currently includes liaisons from three partner nations: 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and MOUs are pending with 
Italy, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Allies in Training
    In coordination with Air Education and Training Command, AFSPC is 
working to increase coalition participation in its space courses. This 
fiscal year, AFSPC will offer Space 100 (foundational level space) to a 
growing coalition audience including: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, NATO, New 
Zealand, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. 
Space 200 (operational level space) is now open to New Zealand, and 
participation from the other FVEY partners has doubled with 20 allied 
personnel scheduled to attend this year. Space 200 will also open to 
France, Germany, and Japan with mobile classes available in 2019 and 
in-residence classes available in 2020. Finally, Space 300 (strategic 
level space) will have its first FVEY partner course in April 2019 with 
Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom personnel in attendance.
Hosted Payloads and Future Allied Partnerships
    The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is leveraging new 
business practices and methodologies to more rapidly field critical 
capabilities by placing hosted payloads on Allied satellites. 
Specifically, Norway will integrate Enhanced Polar System 
Recapitalization (EPS-R) payloads on two space vehicles and launch both 
satellites into a highly elliptical orbit in December 2022. EPS-R will 
provide protected communications for military tactical and strategic 
forces, as well as other users in support of Joint and Allied Force 
operations above 65 degrees north longitude.
    Under the leadership of the Air Force Chief of Staff, we will host 
an international Air Chiefs Space Conference at the Space Symposium in 
Colorado this April. With 12 countries expected to participate, this 
inaugural event represents the first-ever global meeting of Air Chiefs 
to discuss partnering in the space domain. This demonstrates our 
commitment to pursue international relationships that promote common 
values and at the same time send a clear message to strategic 
competitors that cooperation between space-faring nations will 
complicate any pursuit of hostile action.
U.S. Government Partnering
    Our partnering focus includes efforts within the United States 
government as well. Our teaming relationship with the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has never been stronger; we have worked 
together across a spectrum of projects, to include development of a 
strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities, shared Concepts 
of Operations (CONOPS) to realize that strategy, and partnerships on an 
enterprise space architecture and individual programs for mutual 
benefit. An example of the latter is our collaborative work on the 
space-based space surveillance effort called Silent Barker. While the 
Space-Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program remains under Air 
Force Service Acquisition Executive authority and control, it 
contributes funding and personnel to the NRO for executing Silent 
Barker. Silent Barker, with Air Force support, increases mission 
capability and is more cost-effective. The Air Force and the NRO will 
mutually invest in non-recurring engineering costs, enabling the 
potential for a larger initial constellation buy and lowering unit 
costs. The Air Force is requesting an increase in funding across the 
Future Years Defense Program for expanded coverage across the 
geosynchronous belt and updating mission data processing and scheduling 
for the ground segment to leverage the full capability of the National 
Space Defense Center (NSDC).
    In accordance with the President's direction in Space Policy 
Directive 3, we are teaming with the Department of Commerce to transfer 
the responsibilities for space traffic management (STM) to that 
Department. Together we will strengthen STM for all, while improving 
space situational awareness (SSA) data interoperability and enabling 
greater SSA data sharing.
               reform the department's business practices
    AFSPC has embraced an atmosphere of profound change, bringing forth 
business reforms that govern how we procure critical space assets in 
concert with our industry partners. This represents a culture change 
that is more agile and less risk-averse. To achieve our goals we must 
be willing to break down bureaucracy and embrace smart risk in order to 
accelerate capabilities development to meet the threat.
COMSATCOM Procurement Authority Transfer
    To comply with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, 
responsibilities for DOD procurement of commercial satellite 
communications (COMSATCOM) services transferred from the Defense 
Information Services Agency to AFSPC on 11 December 2018. Beginning on 
20 December 2018, AFSPC started to bring together both government and 
industry partners to chart a way forward to both enhance satellite 
communications (SATCOM) provisioning and our ability to provide SATCOM 
in a contested environment. We are using this transfer as a mechanism 
to improve military and commercial SATCOM support across the board and 
the AFSPC team is finalizing the first of a series of concepts and 
strategy documents that will shape our SATCOM investments.
Space and Missile Systems Center 2.0
    The Space and Missile Systems Center has embarked on a 
transformation to deliver resilient, war-winning space capabilities 
more quickly. SMC 2.0 removes layers of bureaucracy, linking program 
leadership directly to acquisition decision authorities in order to 
speed decision making. The strategic outcome of SMC 2.0 will be to 
dominate with superior lethality throughout the space domain, 
aggressively deliver warfighter needs from a resilient, integrated 
enterprise, and drive innovation in a way that outpaces adversarial 
threats.
Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO)
    The SpRCO was created through the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), with subsequent authorities defined in the 
fiscal year 2019 NDAA. The office is governed by a Board of Directors, 
chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force, and consists of the Air 
Force Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the AFSPC Commander, and 
USSTRATCOM/JFSCC Commander, with authorities and processes outlined in 
an approved charter. AFSPC continues to grow the SpRCO and make 
progress with AFSPC's ability to rapidly field space capabilities. The 
Board of Directors signed the governing charter on 1 November 2018 and 
USSTRATCOM validated five SpRCO programs through the JFSCC. The 
initiation of three out of the five programs was formalized by the 
Board of Directors on 31 January 2019. Acquisition, security, and 
contracting authorities have all been codified and infrastructure, 
personnel, and security resources are in place to initiate these 
programs. Interim acquisition and security authorities are being 
provided by Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office Director; authorities 
will transition to the newly hired SpRCO Director by April 2019.
Prototyping: Space Enterprise Consortium
    The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC) is a team of industry 
leaders, academic research institutions, and innovative early-stage and 
start-up companies working together to develop next generation space 
technologies. Prototyping awards now broadly represent many of our most 
critical warfighter requirements, to include protected satellite 
communications, missile warning, missile defense, space situational 
awareness, and standardized satellites, payload and commanding 
interfaces.
                      a resilient space enterprise
    AFSPC has made significant progress across all mission areas that 
span the breadth of our space capabilities. Execution of the 
Department's strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities is 
persistent, ongoing, and present across all mission areas.
Command and Control
    For operational level C2, Enterprise Space Battle Management 
Command and Control (ESBMC2) provides the C2 and SSA capabilities to 
gain and maintain space superiority. It also serves as the Air Force 
space system element of Air Force Multi-Domain Command and Control 
efforts. Our early ESBMC2 prototypes have demonstrated initial 
interoperability with Air Combat Command (ACC), the Intelligence 
Community, and the Missile Defense Agency to synchronize operations. We 
continue to support Air Force efforts to advance interoperability with 
ACC's Airborne Battle Management System.
    One of the more important aspects of ESBMC2 is its open 
architecture. ESBMC2 uses Open Missions Standards (OMS) as its 
architecture standard and the Universal C2 Interface (UCI) as its 
communication standard to enable interoperability amongst the entire 
DOD space portfolio. We have seen success of this approach in early 
ESBMC2 prototypes allowing integrated C2 on timelines that the JSpOC 
Mission System could never have provided. This open approach also 
encourages companies to develop applications and compete in an 
environment in order to foster innovation. The price of entry for 
commercial companies to develop applications for ESBMC2 is simply to 
adhere to OMS and UCI specifications.
Space Situational Awareness
    SSA is the foundation upon which the Department maintains 
spaceflight safety, provides warning, assesses intentions, and 
attributes adversary actions towards U.S., Allies, and commercial 
partner satellites. Coupled with operational intelligence to complete 
the SSA operating picture, competency in this area is critical in 
protecting our space assets, informing the design of future 
architectures, and fostering access and responsible use of space for 
all space-faring nations. The following key efforts represent SSA 
capabilities necessary to protect U.S. Government satellites and 
interests in space.
    The new Space Fence is an S-Band radar designed for space 
surveillance located on the Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of Marshall 
Islands, 2,100 nautical miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. It is 
expected to increase the number of tracked objects in space from 23,000 
to more than 60,000, as well as increase the accuracy of orbit 
predictions, and improve our ability to characterize previously 
untracked objects and conduct collision avoidance analysis for all 
objects in space. Expected to achieve initial operational capability 
(IOC) within the next year, Space Fence will be the largest dedicated 
space surveillance radar operated by AFSPC.
The National Space Defense Center
    The NSDC continues to mature its partnership between the DOD and 
Intelligence Community as we push to improve our nation's ability to 
rapidly detect, characterize, attribute, warn and defend against 
threats to our nation's vital space systems. In January 2018, the NSDC 
transitioned from an experimentation-focused entity to limited 24/7 
operations. The fiscal year 2020 budget request supports efforts to 
leverage the full capability of the NSDC and I am pleased to report 
that the NSDC has continued to mature throughout the year and has now 
taken on all Protect and Defend responsibilities previously executed by 
the CSpOC.
    The Air Force Research Lab has been working to deliver a Joint 
Emerging Operational Need (JEON) effort for the NSDC to provide 
capabilities to integrate systems and information at a ``system high'' 
level. By operating at the highest security levels throughout the 
operations center, the NSDC will become a singular center for the full 
picture of space activities. The completion of JEON-associated work in 
June 2019 will mark the delivery of a functioning prototype capability 
and then transition to an initial operational capability by year's end.
Position, Navigation, and Timing
    The first Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite was 
successfully launched in December 2018 on the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. 
Ultimately, GPS III will provide signals that are three times more 
accurate and provide up to eight times more anti-jam resilience for the 
warfighter than previous generations. The GPS Next-Generation 
Operational Control System (OCX) Block 0 supported GPS III Space 
Vehicle (SV) 01 launch and the team is completing early orbit checkout 
without issue. The OCX program addresses cyber vulnerabilities through 
a robust information assurance architecture and is on-track to deliver 
its full capability by April 2022.
    The GPS III program is preparing GPS III SV 02 to support a summer 
2019 launch and continues to assemble, test, and integrate the 
remaining eight satellites. In addition, SMC awarded the GPS III 
Follow-on (GPS IIIF) contract for 22 satellites in September 2018. This 
year's budget request includes full funding for SV 13 and continued 
incremental RDT&E funding for GPS IIIF SVs 11 and 12.
Missile Warning
    In the fiscal year 2019 budget request, the Air Force took the bold 
step to stop procurement of Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) 
vehicles 7 and 8 in acknowledgement of their inability to survive in 
today's contested space environment. The Next-Generation Overhead 
Persistent Infrared system will succeed the current SBIRS system by 
providing improved missile warning, missile defense, battlespace 
awareness, and technical intelligence capabilities that are more 
survivable against emerging adversary threats. The Air Force is 
applying acquisition authorities (per section 804 of the fiscal year 
2016 NDAA) to manage the program's largest risks through competitive 
prototyping, and to significantly improve execution speed. Using these 
authorities, and with funding support from Congress, the program let 
two prime contracts within three months, posturing the Air Force to 
reduce the time to IOC by three and a half years. This pace setter 
proves that a five year acquisition timeline to deliver resilient 
missile warning capability, versus a ten or fifteen year timeline, is 
possible. Additionally, the Air Force has aligned the fiscal year 2020 
budget request to support program execution and as expected deliver the 
first resilient geosynchronous satellite to meet warfighter needs by 
2025.
Environmental Monitoring
    Every DOD operational mission begins with a weather briefing; 
either space weather, terrestrial weather, or both. Although the data 
required to generate forecasts for our warfighters is largely dependent 
on complex models, approximately 95 percent of the data that feeds 
these models comes from either space-borne assets or ground-based 
observatories looking at space. Our ground-based infrastructure 
consists of unique assets strategically situated around the globe to 
observe the sun and the ionosphere from below and collect the data we 
need to complement the space-borne information. The data required for 
DOD missions is often unique and necessitates 24/7 global ability to 
forecast weather in austere and denied environments.
    Weather is also a partnership business. We continue to leverage the 
outstanding contributions of NOAA, NASA, our European EUMETSAT 
colleagues, and Japan. As an example, we will also soon accept a NOAA 
geostationary satellite, repurposed for our DOD mission, and relocate 
it over the Indian Ocean.
    We are currently updating the space piece of the overarching Air 
Force weather strategy for both terrestrial and space weather support. 
Our long term vision, in addition to the avenues we already have, is to 
determine how commercial ventures could add to and diversify our 
ability to collect our required data from space. This is a very new and 
potentially beneficial partnership, which we will be able to more 
completely characterize after we do some investigation and development 
of their abilities.
Satellite Communications
    The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite 
constellation provides protected tactical and strategic, nuclear-
hardened communications for the President and other decision makers. 
With three operational satellites on orbit, a fourth is undergoing on-
orbit checkout and will be operational in July 2019. The final two 
satellites are scheduled to launch in fiscal years 2019 and 2020 
respectively. Ongoing Space Modernization Initiative efforts include 
AEHF expanded spacecraft resilience features and enhanced ground cyber 
protection. The Air Force is currently pursuing the next generation of 
protected, strategic communications with the acquisition of the Evolved 
Strategic SATCOM system which utilizes section 804 authorities to 
deliver capability two years sooner than a traditional acquisition. The 
Air Force is currently preparing the release of a request for proposal 
for rapid prototyping for this next generation of protected strategic 
communications.
    The Protected Tactical Enterprise Service effort has been enabled 
by section 804 authorities to deliver prototype capability for two Navy 
carrier strike groups 18 months early. This ground system will provide 
worldwide, anti-jam, Low Probability of Intercept communications for 
tactical warfighters. The Protected Tactical Satellite Communications 
(PTS) effort will save about 36 months of schedule by implementing 
rapid acquisition via section 804 authorities. PTS will provide 
advanced tactical SATCOM capabilities to enable tactical operations in 
anti-access/area denial environments. PTS awarded 13 prototyping 
projects using SpEC Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to help design 
and reduce risk of critical technologies.
    Enhanced Polar System (EPS) hosted payloads launched in 2015 and 
2017 and will provide tactical protected communications in the North 
Polar Region; EPS will achieve full operational capability in late 
fiscal year 2019. However, the need for tactical communication 
capabilities in the North Polar Region is anticipated to expand as U.S. 
and allied military and commercial needs continue to grow. As 
previously mentioned, the Enhanced Polar System--Recapitalization (EPS-
R) is the protected SATCOM follow-on to the EPS, providing a 24/7 
protected SATCOM capability to the North Polar Region. EPS-R payloads 
on two separate Space Norway spacecraft remain on track for a dual 
launch in fiscal year 2023 and will provide continuity of protected 
satellite communications services and bridges the gap between the 
current system and EPS at a significantly reduced cost.
    Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) Communications SVs 8 and 9 entered 
operations in 2017 and SV 10 successfully launched on 15 March 2019. As 
the primary wideband satellite communications capability for DOD, SV 10 
will extend functional availability to 2028. Per the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2018, the Air Force is acquiring and further 
developing a funding plan for launch and operation and maintenance 
activities for a modernized WGS satellite with a digital payload 
comprising twice the capacity of the current version.
Assured Access to Space
    For the first time in 20 years, the Air Force is prepared to meet 
all national security launch needs through competition among multiple 
viable launch providers. With unprecedented mission success in placing 
National Security Space (NSS) assets into orbit, the National Security 
Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, provides assured access to space for our 
most important national security satellites, while demonstrating good 
stewardship of launch funds. Our priority remains to ensure the Air 
Force can launch all NSS payloads when and where we need to, utilizing 
launch services from certified domestic, commercial launch providers in 
a viable competitive market.
    As the Air Force moves to recapitalize the NSSL program and end the 
use of the Russian-built RD-180 engine, AFSPC has entered into public-
private partnerships, the best way to ensure emerging commercial launch 
solutions meet our most stressing NSS launch requirements. The SMC 
Enterprise Directorate awarded three Launch Service Agreements to 
develop domestic, commercially viable launch systems. The three 
agreements went to Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket, Northrop Grumman's 
OmegA rocket, and United Launch Alliance's Vulcan rocket. These 
partnerships leverage commercial launch industry investment to deliver 
launch capabilities ahead of the RD-180 procurement deadline of 2022. 
NSSL Phase 2 launch contracts will facilitate full and open competition 
to procure launch services from fiscal year 2020 through 2024 for 
launch starting in 2022.
    Last year Congress recognized the prospect of cost savings 
associated with launch vehicle reusability; the Air Force has embraced 
this concept and is actively evaluating the risks, benefits, and 
potential costs or savings from reusable launch vehicles for future 
missions. With launch service providers demonstrating success at a 
rapid pace, reusable launch systems could offer higher reliability, 
increased responsiveness, and greater flexibility in support of NSS 
missions. In an effort to lean forward on reusing hardware for launch, 
SMC and SpaceX completed a contract modification allowing the reuse of 
the Falcon Heavy side core boosters for the Air Force's Space Test 
Program-2 mission. This first mission with a re-used booster further 
demonstrates our commitment to balance risk with increased 
responsiveness and flexibility.
    In 2019, the DOD Space Test Program partnered with SMC's Enterprise 
Corps and Defense Innovation Unit to pursue the first launch of a 
venture-class small launch service through the Rapid Agile Launch 
Initiative (RALI). Under this partnership, the Air Force procured five 
small launch services through venture-class launch service providers 
using OTA agreements. RALI demonstrates rapid procurement and the 
responsiveness of commercial launch, dedicated launch for small 
payloads to militarily-relevant orbits, on-demand responsiveness, and 
increased operational tempo over legacy national launch architecture. 
RALI leverages an expanding commercial market and launch opportunities 
to increase DOD's access to space.
    AFSPC places a high priority on streamlining space launch 
operations and identifying opportunities to improve our speed, 
innovation and resiliency to improve efficiency, satisfy national 
security needs, and increase safety. This includes an architecture 
transformation across both launch ranges that started in 2019 and will 
continue through 2023. Changes in flight and ground systems will put us 
on a path to support a 2025 implementation of the Autonomous Flight 
Safety System for all commercial space launches. This enables us to 
increase the pace of launch, reduce costly infrastructure, and maintain 
public safety.
Cyberspace Defense of the Space Enterprise
    To protect our space enterprise from cyber threats, Headquarters 
AFSPC and SMC, together with our federally funded research development 
centers, will implement a full lifecycle effort for space and 
associated ground systems, applying robust cyberspace and defensive 
security protocols that will include adaptable, upgradable, hardened 
products and other best practices ``baked in'' at the time of product 
delivery. AFSPC is leading the Air Force, implementing a Defensive 
Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) strategy and organizational 
construct across a tiered defense posture to execute cyber defense in 
depth for space mission assurance.
    Air Force Space Command is working with U.S. Cyber Command, joint 
partners, the Intelligence Community, research labs, and industry to 
develop and deploy cyberspace security and defense solutions to protect 
the space enterprise from cyber threats. AFSPC continues to develop and 
educate cyber protection and defense personnel who work alongside space 
mission system operators to detect and respond to system 
vulnerabilities and adversarial activity. To rapidly enable DCO-S 
capabilities, AFSPC is executing a rapid acquisition approach to 
prototype and field improved technologies that will protect critical 
systems, investigate cyber events, respond to cyber incidents, and 
accomplish cyberspace security and defense objectives across the space 
enterprise.
                             the way ahead
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request strengthens the considerable 
gains AFSPC has made over the previous fiscal year with a proposed $14 
billion investment in our space portfolio, a 17 percent increase over 
our fiscal year 2019 budget. This budget request supports our 
warfighting approach to the space domain and supports changes to how we 
prototype and field innovative space technologies in order to stay 
ahead of our competitors.
    I thank the Committee for your leadership and support; together we 
will build a resilient and ready National Security Space enterprise 
that will continue to serve as the foundation to our desire to maintain 
our military advantage and promote American prosperity.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
    Next, Ms. Chaplain. Welcome.

 STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND 
     SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, 
and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 
today to discuss DOD's space programs.
    Space is at a pivotal point right now. In the face of 
growing threats and lengthy development cycles, DOD is 
embracing new approaches to help speed up acquisition of space 
systems, establish better partnerships with the commercial 
sector to increase innovation, and change its acquisition 
culture. There is also a proposal before Congress on 
strengthening leadership for space.
    Bringing about this broad span of change will be 
challenging, to say the least, and not without some risk. More 
specifically, while DOD is undertaking this change, it will 
need to concurrently focus on completing older programs that 
are still struggling. The ground system for Global Positioning 
System (GPS), known as Next Generation Operational Control 
System (OCX), for example, is nearly 5 years late. And, while 
the contractor has improved the pace of building and testing 
the software, we still see a lot of schedule risk in that 
program. The Air Force also recently stopped development work 
on Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS), 
a ground system for processing space situational-awareness 
data, because it didn't deliver as expected. We're also still 
faced with long gaps between the delivery of satellites and 
ground systems needed to make use of their capabilities.
    Moreover, there's a myriad of challenges facing space 
programs that are just getting underway:
    First, even with the new Space Force proposal, there are 
still a lot of open questions about leadership. For example, at 
this time, it appears there will be a number of space 
acquisition activities outside of the Space Force, including 
the Missile Defense Agency, the NRO, and some military space 
service activities, but, so far, it's uncertain what the 
overall governance structure will be. If there are conflicts in 
requirements, funding, or priorities among agencies that are 
not under the Space Force, who resolves them and makes a final 
decision? There is also a new entity being rolled out, the 
Space Development Agency, which has very worthwhile goals of 
developing or adopting innovative technologies for space, but, 
at this time, it's unclear how it will mesh with other similar 
agencies, and also still unclear who's in charge of future 
architectures for space. These questions may well be resolved 
as details for the Space Force and SDA get worked out, but new 
programs will be operating with uncertainty for the time being.
    Second, while streamlining might help speed up programs and 
change the culture, we know, from past efforts to streamline, 
that there's also risk of inviting programs to move too quickly 
and disregard the engineering and acquisition discipline that 
is so very important to space. Keep in mind that space is 
different than other types of weapons. You cannot easily fix 
satellites once they're in orbit. We consistently see programs 
suffer major setbacks because one quality procedure wasn't 
followed or one small flaw in one small part was not detected. 
This does not mean streamlining cannot be done, or should not 
be done. It just means we should heed lessons from the past, 
maintain good insight, oversight, and expertise, and be 
prepared to cancel programs that falter.
    There's a question about DOD's capacity to manage multiple 
new programs concurrently. Yes, there's a healthy increase 
being proposed for space, but consider at least nine 
significant programs are getting underway. They will likely 
require heavy investments up front and then DOD will also be 
seeking money for a new Space Force, for space protection, for 
a Space Development Agency, and a new missile-defense space 
layer, as well as for priorities outside of space, such as the 
nuclear triad.
    There are also questions about workforce capacity. We 
recently reported that just tracking who's in the space 
acquisition workforce is a challenge, and there are also gaps 
in technical expertise that will be stretched with multiple new 
programs.
    Moreover, all of the programs will be software-intensive--
these new programs--but DOD has challenges managing software. 
We recently found that space software programs struggle to 
effectively engage system users, which is critical to their 
success. We understand that many new programs are attempting to 
be more agile and to use more modern tools, but it remains to 
be seen how successful DOD can be in adopting these new ways.
    Again, good things are happening in space. There's 
attention from highest levels of government, more resources, 
and a recognition that different approaches and culture are 
needed. What's key to making this happen is not to lose focus 
on improving acquisition management and oversight, building 
capacity as we speed up programs, and continuing to reduce 
fragmentation.
    Thank you. This concludes my statement, and I'm happy to 
answer any questions you have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
      
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      

    Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
    Thank you all for your opening statements. We'll begin 
questioning for the first round.
    I have a question for General Thompson, West Coast. As I'm 
sure you're aware, arguments are being made in the press 
against the way the Air Force has structured its efforts to 
replace the RD-180 and develop the next generation of launch 
systems. And I know that the terms of phase 2 have not been 
finalized as of yet, so we have to be careful to keep our 
discussion very general. But, I would ask that you talk us 
through some of the tradeoffs that we need to keep in mind when 
we hear arguments against down-selecting the two providers or 
questioning the intent to split launches on that 60-40 between 
them. So, help us understand some of the original thinking 
behind the way that this was structured, please.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, Chairman. 
That's a fantastic question.
    You know, 5 years ago, the Congress challenged us to get 
off Russian-made RD-180s and assure access to space using two 
domestic launch providers capable of launching to our most 
stressing national security space orbits. The Air Force rose to 
that challenge, competitively awarding technology maturation, 
rocket propulsion system and launch vehicle service agreements 
to mature commercial technologies and capabilities for national 
security space assets. Industry rose to that challenge, as 
well.
    We are ready to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the 
launch service procurements. All potential offerors have 
sufficient maturity, and we expect a full and open and robust 
competition. Award is anticipated in the spring of 2020. 
Offerors will be able to update their proposals throughout the 
evaluation period if they have technological maturities or 
design review completions. We're confident we're on the right 
path for our Nation's warfighting capability, and that we're 
being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.
    Madam Chairman, when you referenced the 60-40 split, the 
60-40 split is really essential for us, for three reasons. 
Number one is, it gives us flexibility on the manifest to be 
able to move some of our Nation's most important satellites 
from provider to provider. Number two, it's almost like a 
block-buy concept, where we're able to take advantage of 
competition and savings while still rewarding the best offeror. 
And then, finally, which is something that I really need to 
articulate to everyone, is that 60-40 is a two-way split. A 
number of folks have asked us if it's possible to split it 
three ways. Our launch manifest that we need to purchase 
between 2020 and 2024 simply does not support three offerors in 
that trade space at the same time. None of the offerors' 
business cases would close if we tried to open it up to three 
different offerors.
    Now, as we move forward, after we take a look at the 
proposals and have details based on those proposals and what 
the technical approaches are, after we've assessed those risks, 
when we make the award next spring, then my guess is that we'll 
have an opportunity to discuss, for those offerors that did not 
receive awards, how we will keep them in the game so that they 
can compete for phase 3, which would be our next launch service 
procurement (LSP) in the future.
    Senator Fischer. If I'm hearing you correctly, sir, are you 
saying that, due to the amount of business that would be 
available, having three companies might not be sustainable, and 
it would be, in your view, better to have two companies that 
are healthy and able to move forward through this process?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, that's 
absolutely correct, from the standpoint of the national 
security space portfolio. There are also commercial kinds of 
activities that other offerors could participate in. Whether or 
not the commercial industrial base in that time period will 
support three launch providers, I would have to take for the 
record and get back to you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The decision to competitively award two National Security 
Space (NSS) launch service procurement contracts is based upon 
comprehensive market analysis. This analysis considered 
warfighter requirements, statutory limitations, independent 
market research, and 6 years of industry engagement. The 
Government will select for award the two offerors that, when 
combined, represent the overall best value to the Government. 
The current launch manifest requires 35 NSS launch service 
procurements, or about 7 launches per year split between two 
providers (3 or 4 launches per provider per year), over the 
fiscal year2020-fiscal year 2024 Phase 2 ordering period. Since 
2014 the government has solicited, via formal and informal 
means, industry feedback to determine the number of NSS 
missions each would require to close their business case. Based 
on this information, the Air Force determined that Phase 2 
launch services procurement requirements cannot support more 
than two providers. In order to maintain 100 percent mission 
success, the Air Force implements a robust Government Mission 
Assurance process that depends on in depth launch systems 
knowledge. Retaining more than two launch systems dilutes this 
critical mission assurance function increasing risk of failure. 
Additionally, National Security Space Launch-class satellites 
are very complex and require extensive integration with the 
launch vehicles. Maintaining more than two launch systems sub 
optimizes the satellite ability to fulfill its mission. The 
Secretary of the Air Force has asked us to independently assess 
the commercial launch market, using a Federally Funded Research 
and Development Center. We expect interim results in June 2019 
with a final report delivered in early November 2019.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you. That will be helpful. Thank 
you.
    Also, General, the Air Force has talked about the 
development of the next-generation----
    I'm going to hold this question till the next round. I see 
I'm out of time. Thank you. Senator Heinrich. I'm not going to 
abuse my power.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Heinrich. We'll save that for another day.
    Senator Fischer. Another day.
    Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson, you 
used the term ``block buy'' in reference to the 60-40 split. 
So, that begs the question, I think, to you, Ms. Chaplain--the 
Air Force has a long history of launch block buys. Can you 
describe those and what issues you saw in them, in terms of 
pricing and competition, that we should be thinking about?
    Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Like you say, it's been a long history. 
When they were about to do their last set of block buys, we 
reported on a lot of issues, in terms of the knowledge not 
being there that they needed--pricing, cost, manifest, things 
of that nature. Those emanated from the nature of Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and how it started as a 
commercial-like acquisition, that you couldn't obtain certain 
pieces of knowledge under the contracts that they had. But, 
when you neck down to one provider, that became an issue. The 
Air Force did listen to our recommendations at the time, 
regrouped, got the knowledge it needed to make that block buy. 
But, there's always a risk, going forward, if you're going to 
be awarding fixed-price contracts with limited information, and 
you somehow end up with one provider again, that you might be 
back in that same situation, in terms of having the right 
insight.
    One concern we have with the approach, going forward, is, 
there may not be enough commercial launches for three 
providers, there might not be enough to sustain two. So, that's 
a question, given the demand on the DOD side and what 
assumptions we have about the commercial sector, and how hard 
it is just to predict what's going to happen in the commercial 
sector.
    Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Thompson--``JT'' 
Thompson, give us some insight into how you're confident that 
it will support two. And then, are you also confident that, 
that these long-term blocks will be cost-competitive?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, Senator, in terms of 
why we're confident that we will be able to support two is, we 
know, essentially, the manifest that we have to support in the 
2020 through 2024 timeframe, in terms of when we would purchase 
the rockets, or when we would purchase the services--and then 
from 2022 to 2026, when those rocket services would actually 
launch. We know that we have anticipated what the costs would 
be, and we're confident that we can support two, with a 60-40 
split, through the National Security Space Launch Program.
    Senator Heinrich. In followup to that--I'm trying to 
understand something that happened last week, on March 20th. 
The Air Force released a Notice of Intent for early integration 
studies.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. All four contractors competing for launch 
services were listed, including SpaceX. Does that study reopen 
the opportunity for SpaceX or the next down-selected to compete 
for Federal funding? Or what is the impact of that early 
integration study as to all four contractors?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, the early 
integration studies are, basically, a standard operating 
procedure that we use 3 years before we award a satellite 
launch. It's, essentially, low-dollar study money for vendors 
to be able to begin working with satellite providers to 
understand the satellites that are on the manifest that year 
and what the interface requirements and technical terms are 
between the rocket and the satellite, the launch vehicle and 
the satellite vehicle.
    Senator Heinrich. Let me switch to Space RCO. Obviously, 
what we used to call Operationally Responsive Space, now Space 
RCO, was really designed by Congress to be disruptive. And, in 
fact, Congress had to fight the Department from terminating the 
office, in my view, for most of a decade, because it was so 
disruptive. Today, it seems that leaders in the Pentagon really 
value that disruption. So, Lieutenant General ``DT'' Thompson, 
I want to ask you, if Space RCO were provided the appropriate 
resources, would it be able to conduct missions, like building 
a network of small satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) with a 
mix of communications, gear, and sensors designed to detect 
hypersonic weapons?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator Heinrich, 
first of all, thank you for that question. I would say, up 
front, yes, that acquisition organization, and any other 
organization with the right resources, would be able to pursue 
that activity.
    I'd like a few minutes to talk a little bit more about 
Space RCO. First of all, as you noted, with the help of 
Congress, we have succeeded in turning the Operationally 
Responsive Space office into a true rapid acquisition 
organization. In addition, with the change
directed by Congress, we rearchitected and reresourced the 
entire office. It is now focused on what I will call space 
superiority programs that don't have a home anywhere else in 
the acquisition enterprise today, but are urgently needed to 
help us with our defend-and-protect missions. We've got the 
people we need, we have resources. It is crafted and shaped 
after the Air Force RCO model, with an Air Force Board of 
Directors led by the Secretary of the Air Force, streamlined 
authorities, streamlined decisionmaking processes. So, it is up 
and running, effective, and helping us with our most urgent 
defend-and-protect priorities.
    But, yes, it could also take on other responsibilities, in 
that sense, if appropriately resourced.
    Senator Heinrich. Madam Chair, I apologize. Now I've abused 
my time.
    Senator Fischer. Never. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    For General ``JT'' Thompson, first of all, how many RD-180 
motors do we have in hand right now?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. I believe the number is 
12. I can confirm that, for the record, for you, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, and as amended by the fiscal 
year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAAs, authorizes the Department 
of Defense to procure up to 18 Russian RD-180 engines (via 
launch services contracts) before 31 December 2022. To date, 
the Air Force has procured 6 of these 18 authorized RD-180s 
leaving 12 available for order.

    Senator Rounds. How many do you intend to purchase?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. There were 15, but, in 
our most recent source selection, we awarded 3. So, there's 12 
remaining, out of the 18 that we're authorized for the National 
Security Space Launch Program.
    Senator Rounds. So, we had a total of 18 that we had 
authorized. You've currently used six of them. So--okay.
    General ``DT'' Thompson, with regard to the command and 
control and the need for your cyber operations to be integrated 
within this, where is the responsibility for the cybersecurity 
laid? Is that within a separate order, or are you finding that 
within the cyber mission forces that we have today?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator there's elements 
of both. First of all, inside of Air Force Space Command, 
inside of our operational squadrons today that are operating 
the satellite, there is a requirement for what we call mission 
defense teams organic to the squadrons. They live and work on 
the cyber terrain, the command-and-control systems that we use 
to command and control the satellites today. They understand 
those systems deeply, they have special cyber training and 
special understanding of the systems to be what we would call 
``the beat cops'' and the first line of defense under an 
initiative we call Defensive Cyber Operations for Space. That's 
the Air Force Space Command responsibility.
    Then the next tier comes from the cyber mission forces that 
are organized under the Air Force today under Air Combat 
Command, but directed by U.S. Cyber Command. They take a 
broader look. They look at the threats out there. They work 
with those sorts of persistent threats, and they are also a 
resource we can bring in to help us when further expertise is 
needed or capabilities that they don't have. So, it's a layered 
approach.
    Senator Rounds. I know, within your discussion points in 
your statements, there is clear evidence of the understanding 
of the multiple domains that we have: air, land, sea, cyber, 
and space. We're prepared today, and we assume that we're in a 
position to defend within, as an example, the air domain or the 
land domain or the sea domain. We know what that means, in that 
we have weapons capabilities, we have defense capabilities. 
Offensively and defensively, we're there. When you move into 
cyber, we have offensive and defensive capabilities. What does 
it mean in space? Are we in a position where we are now 
acknowledging that, as a domain, we have to have the same types 
of capabilities, both offensive and defensive capabilities, or 
are we restricting ourselves right now to defensive 
capabilities only?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, I would 
say, very clearly, we have acknowledged, with space as a 
warfighting domain, we have a special need to defend and 
protect the capabilities we have. Because we have those 
capabilities, we are so much better at using them and 
integrating them, and they provide us such an advantage, we 
know that, first and foremost, we need to protect them, because 
an adversary is going to try and take those away from, in 
conflict.
    What I would say is, we also recognize we need to deny the 
use of space to an adversary. We will not restrict ourselves, 
and we do not restrict ourselves, to any specific instrument or 
tool or medium. We need to be able to respond at the time, 
place, and in the manner of our choosing. And we have a lot of 
instruments in that regard. Certainly, I believe that probably 
the Nation needs more discussion about what that might mean in 
the space domain itself.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Ms. Chaplain, I'm just curious. You laid out a series of 
challenges that the Air Force has with regard to the operations 
within space, some in which we're being successful, some in 
which we're not and we're recognizing, in those where we have 
shut down some systems and so forth. Could you share just a 
little bit with regard to what you see as our capabilities for 
defending our space capabilities and the challenges that we 
have today? I recognize this is not a classified setting, but 
is there a way that you can share with us what our needs are or 
what you see as areas that we're lacking today?
    Ms. Chaplain. I can share a little bit. We recently did a 
review of cyber protection for weapon systems as a whole, and 
found that, for weapons in development, they can be easily 
hacked in the testing process. A lot of that goes to pretty 
simple things, like password management, cyber hygiene, 
patching systems. And there were some space systems included in 
our review. So, while, on one hand, there's a lot of attention 
being devoted to cyber, a lot of resources, the Department 
understands the priority and has taken a lot of good steps now. 
I think there's a lot in the culture that needs to come a ways 
to just do the basic things that everybody has to do to protect 
their systems. They're not expensive, and it would put the 
Department in a much better place.
    Senator Rounds. I would note that the Navy most recently 
had a similar review, and came up with some surprising things, 
as well.
    Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. Very surprising.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I don't want to be argumentative, but I'm skeptical. I want 
somebody to explain to me why we need a Space Force, 
particularly when it's not going to include NRO, NASA, Office 
of Space Commerce (OSC), the private launch companies, or 
missile defense. I mean, it strikes me as a solution in search 
of a problem. You really can't manage this now, under the 
auspices of the Air Force? I'm not anti-, but I'm skeptical, I 
guess.
    Secretary Rapuano. So, Senator, I'll take a first shot at 
that.
    Fundamentally, we are concerned about the risk of losing 
our advantage in space.
    Senator King. So, how does an organizational change of 
moving the boxes around affect that, one way or the other?
    Secretary Rapuano. Well, I would just go further in saying 
that, historically, we have operated in space in a permissive 
environment. We have tremendous dependencies and capabilities 
that are space-based or space-enabled. We now have adversaries, 
peer-level potential adversaries, who are quite focused. In 
fact, in 2015, China and Russia reorganized their military for 
increased focus on their space capabilities. And they're 
looking at how they can negate our advantages in space.
    Senator King. Well, I certainly understand that. And 
today's headline is, ``India Successfully Tests Satellite 
Killer.'' I mean, that's this morning. I understand the change 
in the dynamic and offensive and defensive capabilities. I just 
don't understand how creating a new box with a new name within 
the Air Force increases our ability to deal with these issues. 
That's what I'm troubled by. I understand the challenge, and I 
understand the importance of meeting it, but this is not 
comprehensive. There's a lot of the space infrastructure that's 
not included in this new entity.
    Perhaps I ought to ask your office. What does this gain us, 
in terms of capability? It just seems to me it's drawing new 
boxes and having new people.
    Ms. Chaplain. Sure. I think there's two sides to it. One is 
the threat side and needing to really focus people on that and 
prioritize it.
    Senator King. Are we not focused now? The Air Force isn't 
paying attention to this now?
    Ms. Chaplain. It's part of U.S. Strategic Command's 
(STRATCOM) mission to defend space, and the person running that 
mission has a lot of other priorities. So, there's one thought 
to segment space in the defense of space to one individual, one 
organization. The other thought is just on the acquisition 
side. What we reported on is, there are a lot of players 
involved in space, there's a lot of fragmentation, and you find 
that really affects the ability to get capability out quickly. 
There seems to be a lot of disconnects that happen just because 
of the way----
    Senator King. But, it seems to me that's a management 
challenge. Do you have an estimate of the incremental cost of 
creating this entity, over and above current expenditures for 
all of these purposes?
    Ms. Chaplain. Yeah, I think DOD has done its cost estimate.
    Senator King. What's the number?
    Secretary Rapuano. So, the first year of the Space Force 
would be $72 million. At the end of the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP), at the end of fiscal year 2024, it would be up 
to $500 million annually. You're talking about $2 billion total 
over the next 5 years.
    Senator King. So, $500 million a year, half a billion 
dollars a year, in organizational change. I mean, are you 
coming before us, saying, ``We can't manage this now, and we 
need to spend half a billion dollars a year''? You understand 
what I'm asking, I'm sure. Convince me that this makes some 
sense, that it's worth $500 million a year.
    Secretary Rapuano. Again, the transition from operating in 
space in a permissive environment, with all of the capabilities 
and dependencies, to a warfighting environment really requires 
a focused approach. We're doing it at three legs of the triad, 
essentially. The first is the U.S. Space Command. That's the 
operational employment of the Joint Force on a day-to-day 
basis.
    Senator King. Is that going to go away under this proposal?
    Secretary Rapuano. No. In fact, it was recently directed by 
the President, and the confirmation of the Commander of U.S. 
Space Command is pending with the Senate. I believe it arrived 
this week. So, that's the employment of the force.
    The critical organize, train, and equip component is the 
service component. And that really is the doctrine, the 
training, the plans, the personnel development. It is the 
unified and singular focus on space as a warfighting domain 
that is very difficult to achieve unless you have that unified, 
sole responsibility and custody----
    Senator King. I'm out of time, but I--I'd appreciate it if 
you could supply, for the record, a 1- or 2-page justification 
for the incremental cost of the organizational change, and 
outline what the tangible benefits will be of this change.
    Secretary Rapuano. Yes, I will, Senator.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Rapuano. The establishment of the Space Force 
would be phased over five years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal 
year 2024. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests 
$72.4 million of initial resources necessary to establish a 
Space Force headquarters with approximately 200 personnel. 
Establishing a sixth branch of our military with dedicated 
leadership will elevate, unify, and focus the development of 
space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future 
threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities; and 
further build space warfighting culture.
    Over the next five years, the Department would methodically 
grow the Space Force. The total additional cost growth over 
those five years is estimated to be less than $2 billion, or 
approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for the same 
period. During that time, as missions are transferred to the 
Space Force, existing personnel and budget authority would 
transfer into the Space Force from the other Military Services. 
By the end of the transition period, more than 95 percent of 
the Space Force annual budget is estimated to consist of 
resources that would have been transferred from existing DOD 
budget accounts, along with an estimated 15,000 transferred 
personnel.
    Additional resources would be dedicated to building out the 
Space Force headquarters and establishing and maintaining 
investments in space-specific personnel development, including 
space training and education centers, a warfare center for 
space, a space personnel center, and a space doctrine 
development center. These functions would further develop the 
unique expertise, culture, and ethos necessary for the complex 
warfighting domain of space. Once the Space Force is fully 
established, these additive costs are estimated to be $500 
million annually, which would represent approximately 0.07 
percent of the DOD annual budget. A breakdown of the estimated 
additive costs is as follows:

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      $ in Millions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Estimated Additive Funding..............                     $500
 
  Headquarters................................                     $300
  Education and Training......................                     $110
  Warfare Center for Space....................                      $20
  Space Personnel Center......................                      $50
  Doctrine Development Center.................                      $20
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Through the organizational change of standing up a Space 
Force, the Department will experience many tangible benefits. 
First, a space training and education center would provide 
focused military education for space specialists. Next, a 
warfare center for space would help to develop the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for space operations in a contested 
domain. A space personnel center would ensure that our space 
cadre is recruited, retained, and managed to develop the skills 
we need in a space-focused force. Lastly, a space doctrine 
development center would elevate space doctrine for a distinct 
warfighting domain on par with air, land, and maritime 
doctrine. All of these investments would have significant 
impacts on ensuring we are prepared to maintain our leadership 
and to defend our interests in space.

    Senator King. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. General Thompson, at one point, you looked 
like you wanted to jump into this conversation. I think Senator 
King's looking for an answer, if you'd like to respond.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Thank you, Madam 
Chairwoman.
    Senator King, I would like to add a little bit, if I can. 
Certainly, there are aspects of the need to fix some of the 
problems when you talk about the number of organizations and 
agencies and activities inside the Department today that are 
focused on acquisition, that are focused on architecture, and 
focused on some of them. We certainly need to unify those, give 
them the right purpose and synchronization and direction in a 
unifying step.
    The second is, as Secretary Rapuano mentioned, the specific 
focus of a service staff whose responsibility is to organize 
the forces, train them, equip them, and present them for the 
warfighting purpose that, in this case the U.S. Space Command, 
would operate.
    But, I would also look at it as not just a ``Are we trying 
to fix a problem?'' It's a question of, ``Is the Nation 
prepared? And are we organized to accept and take on the 
challenge that comes with space as a warfighting domain?'' And 
I would use as an example, 1947 and the formation of the United 
States Air Force. The War Department and the Army had done a 
tremendous job creating air capabilities that won World War 
II--strategic bombardment, air superiority, tactical support, 
and military transport. No one could argue that the War 
Department had not done a tremendous job in creating a space 
arm, but the Nation decided that, at that time, as we looked to 
the future, as the needs and the requirements and expectations 
that we expected of airpower, it needed a separate service, it 
needed a proponent, it needed a four-star advocate on the 
equivalent scale with the other Services. I would argue, now's 
the opportunity for the Nation to look at that, have that 
conversation, and decide, if we're in a similar position, to 
ensure that we're organized and structured appropriately to 
meet the challenges of the future. So, it's not just a matter 
of, ``Are we trying to fix problems?'' Is this the right 
structure for the Nation, going forward, to address these 
challenges?
    Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, which nation's armed forces 
depend most on space?
    Secretary Rapuano. So, the United States leverages space 
more than any country in the world. Our partners and allies, 
working with us, in terms of those alliances and partnerships, 
have their own developed capabilities, and we leverage and use 
them to force-multiply our capabilities. So, the Five Eyes--
France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States--and 
a number of other partners have space-based capabilities, as 
well. The South Koreans have some space capability. And it's 
multiplying. And, as noted earlier, the commercial sector has 
exploded, in terms of scope and scale of the activities and the 
speed of the development of capabilities. So, you're seeing a 
proliferation of that technology now spreading much more 
rapidly than ever before.
    Senator Cotton. So, it's all good with our allies, but, 
ultimately, that comes back to the central position that space 
plays a role in the way we fight wars. What about our 
adversaries, Russia and China? How dependent are they upon 
space for their armed forces?
    Secretary Rapuano. China has expanded by orders of 
magnitude. The Russians have grabbed back, they have newly 
invested in space, and have developed some relatively exquisite 
capabilities. But, the scale of the Chinese investment is the 
lead, in terms of everyone else out there, including Russia. 
They have more rocket launches this year than the United 
States. They're the lead rocket-launch nation in the world.
    Senator Cotton. How much of that Chinese investment is 
designed specifically to counteract the advantage that we had 
enjoyed in space over the years?
    Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned that they are making 
significant investments to do that.
    Senator Cotton. There's no way to avoid space being central 
to our way of war, is there? I mean, some of it is a legacy 
based on our technological advantages, going back to the early 
days of the space era, but it's also just the fact that we live 
in the new world, and they all live in Eurasia, and we have to 
project power across a global scale, which depends on space. 
Secondarily, we have made the choice, over the last 30-to-35 
years, to fight information-centric warfare. I don't just mean 
long-range precision strikes or fancy cyberattacks. What does 
it mean to a private on the ground with a rifle if we lose 
dominance in space?
    Secretary Rapuano. It's pivotal. Our targeting, our 
communications, positioning, timing, location for GPS, and then 
all of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities, in terms of surveillance and reconnaissance that 
we get from space, realtime situational awareness of 
adversaries' locations and activities. To lose those 
capabilities would be very significant. And that is why we are 
so focused on defending and protecting them.
    Senator Cotton. Let's talk about defending them. Where are 
we today versus, say, where we were a year ago in our space 
assets? Are we more or less vulnerable to, say, a kinetic 
strike from an anti-satellite missile?
    Secretary Rapuano. So, we are improving our capabilities 
from investments that started several years ago. In fact, even 
late in the Obama Administration, there were some significant 
investments, as you're aware, from this committee and others. 
In terms of the details of those activities, we could discuss 
that in a closed hearing.
    Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to cyberattack, 
both in orbit and on the ground?
    Secretary Rapuano. As noted earlier, we're very focused on 
the cyber piece, so we don't know what we don't know, in some 
respects, in terms of what an adversary may be doing, but we 
are hardening the entry points, and there are fewer entry 
points in space--some space systems versus other systems that 
are more connected and networked. We're making progress there. 
But, it's a priority, and we are continuing to approach it 
quite urgently.
    Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to the kind of 
laser attacks that might dazzle or destroy a satellite system?
    Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned about ground-based 
effects on satellites, and we are seeing potential adversaries 
invest in them.
    Senator Cotton. I raise these questions knowing that you 
can't get into the greatest detail in this open forum, but just 
to highlight the vulnerabilities of our space systems, both our 
sensors, but also the critical systems on which everyone in our 
military depends, to include that private out on the ground. We 
may not want to have a space race. We may not want to weaponize 
space or have weapons in space. But, if our adversaries are 
competing there, we don't really get a choice whether we 
compete. We only get a choice whether we win or lose.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Secretary Rapuano. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you all for being here. Sorry, I was in another 
committee meeting before I got here, so I think this was 
covered, but I'm not sure. I wanted to ask.
    General John Thompson, I know there are two acquisition 
programs and reforms as part of the Space and Missile Systems 
Center. I think you mentioned 65 percent savings in the 
timeline that you laid out, which sounded good on the surface. 
Was that correct, in your statement?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, I'm sorry, could I 
ask you to rephrase the question?
    Senator Manchin. The 65 percent savings in timeline which 
was laid out----
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Oh, sure. Sure. Thank you 
very much.
    Senator Manchin. Okay.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, what you're referring 
to is a rearchitecture that we've done to the Space and Missile 
Systems Center, called the SMC 2.0. When I arrived at SMC, 
about 2 years ago, what I found was a bunch of outstanding 
people that really knew the space acquisition business, but 
they were organized very hierarchically and in stovepipes by 
mission area. There was very little crosstalk among major 
programs of record. Decisions took a long time to make, because 
the decision packages had to fight their way up through the 
staff.
    What we have entertained now is an SMC 2.0 construct, which 
turns our--what I would refer to as an Industrial Age business-
model kind of organization into a new, modern corporation, 
something like that you might see in Silicon Valley. So, a much 
flatter organization. We've delegated authority down to senior 
civilians and senior military officers who know what they're 
doing. We've added three new program executive officers, in 
addition to me, and put them closer to the program offices so 
that they can make decisions faster. Making decisions faster--
in many cases, what we've seen on major program-of-record 
milestone decisions is, we've been able to save 60 to 70 
percent of the time required by eliminating layers of the 
bureaucracy and getting those decisionmakers closer to the 
program offices.
    Senator Manchin. Any one of you all--with so many agencies 
out there, I'm concerned, because, on the cyber end of it, 
espionage and things that are happening, there are so many 
smaller contractors. We don't seem to have good oversight or 
good controls of the main contract with its security clearances 
and also the programs it is using. That's where I think an 
awful lot of espionage has gone on, and a lot of cybertheft is 
going on. And I don't see anybody changing that or going after 
that total control. If you have an RFP, and you have a main 
contractor, that person should be held accountable and 
responsible for anybody and everybody they bring onboard. And 
we're finding that's not the case.
    Secretary Rapuano. Senator, thank you for that question.
    We are highly focused on the defense industrial base, all 
of those companies who support the development of Department of 
Defense----
    Senator Manchin. I understand. We found out that there 
could be four or five subcontractors all from the Department of 
Defense that go in to the main contractor. By the time that 
contractor goes down to subcontractors, they're all trying to 
protect their domain to give them a competitive edge and make 
money. It's all fine. But, you want to know why China's been 
able to ramp up so quick? This is loosey-goosey down here. They 
can almost pick up anything, and no one's tightening that up.
    Secretary Rapuano. We are in the process of tightening that 
up. And part of that are the contract requirements that need to 
be modified to ensure that those who are performing on DOD 
contracts are required by the contract stipulations to ensure 
that cybersecurity----
    Senator Manchin. I'm told that some of the smaller 
subcontractors don't have the wherewithals. So, the prime 
should be held totally responsible to make sure that they have 
the wherewithals, or they don't work with the subcontractor 
that doesn't. Nobody's holding anybody accountable, because the 
prime can say, ``That's a subcontract,'' or, ``That was subbed 
out to another sub.'' Does that make sense?
    Secretary Rapuano. That is part of the challenge. 
Absolutely.
    Senator Manchin. You all do recognize that that's a big 
problem.
    You recognize that China's rapid advancement has been 
because they've been able to tap into some of our most 
strategic and confidential and high-security information, 
they've been able to get fairly rapidly, fairly easily?
    Secretary Rapuano. We see it as a vulnerability, and we are 
focused on addressing it.
    Senator Manchin. Anybody else want to comment on this? 
Please do.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, that is a 
fantastic question, and we agree 100 percent with you.
    Sir, General ``DT'' Thompson and I happen to work with 
General ``Jay'' Raymond, who is the current Air Force Space 
Command Commander, and he has made it abundantly clear, to both 
``DT'' and me, in a very forceful manner, that the situation 
that you state is unsatisfactory. We have a number of 
initiatives underway to battle exfiltrations of our weapon 
systems data from our cleared defense contractors. And holding 
the primes accountable to ensure that their subs, whether 
they're one level down, two levels down, or three levels down, 
is one of the principal----
    Senator Manchin. We're finding out that some of the primes 
have no idea, third and fourth and fifth in the chain, who they 
are.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, in the acquisition 
domain, specifically in the space portfolio, we are working 
after that. I would ask you to let me submit something in the 
record that gives you the details of that plan.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has not been 
made aware of classified weapon system information being 
compromised by foreign adversaries. Controlled unclassified 
information (CUI) on space mission systems is being exfiltrated 
from Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs) at an alarming rate. 
CDC networks tend to be easily breached permitting propagation 
and exfiltration of data relating to the development and 
operation of space mission systems. Contracts awarded before 
November 2016 generally do not include clauses stipulating: 
encryption of DOD information; network traffic monitoring; 
prompt system patching; no posting of DOD information to public 
websites; etc. Newer contracts conform with the more recent 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System (DFARS) clause 
for cybersecurity compliance and National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and safeguarding 
requirements for CUI, but these minimums may not be sufficient 
to safeguard information. Recent DFARS clauses establish the 
minimum standard for basic cybersecurity requirements, but SMC 
is taking additional, multiple steps to better secure our 
controlled unclassified information on cleared defense 
contractors' networks. To quickly attack this issue, SMC hired 
an experienced Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC) to rapidly scan and establish exposure levels for three 
prioritized weapon systems: Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) and to develop a methodology to assess 
the remainder of SMC's portfolio of contracts. The most 
significant takeaway is the need to mandate cybersecurity 
requirements above existing Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplements and information management control plans 
from prime to subcontractors and specify these requirements in 
contract language for all future contracts. Working with the 
Air Force Inspector General and the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations, SMC is conducting compliance audits to identify 
industry best practices to better strengthen corporate networks 
where CUI is stored or processed. With assistance from the 
Defense Cyber Crime Center, SMC will begin advanced adversary 
emulation to assess the vulnerability of CDC networks and 
identify weaknesses in corporate cyber security posture. SMC 
continues to investigate ways to cooperatively and proactively 
monitor CDC networks where our CUI will exist in an effort to 
shorten the response time from compromise to recovery. Knowing 
that no network will ever be 100 percent secure, SMC is 
implementing advanced data obfuscation on every future contract 
to further complicate and stress adversaries' cyber activities. 
To prevent our CUI riding on weak CDC networks, SMC is testing 
requiring companies to submit a vulnerability scan of their 
network with their responses to our Request for Proposals. 
Finally, SMC is implementing changes to incentive plans to 
encourage CDCs to be more proactive in their cyber security 
efforts, and, if positive incentives do not work, SMC will 
explore negative incentives. SMC understands the importance of 
continuing to protect sensitive weapon system information on 
cleared defense contractors' information systems. We are 
working with industry partners and across the Air Force and 
Department of Defense to ensure we can adapt to threats now and 
into the future. We look forward to working with Congress as we 
work to ensure our sensitive data and our weapons systems are 
protected from adversary threats.

    Senator Manchin. Happy to.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Then, perhaps, if you're 
interested, we could go to another forum and talk about it in 
classified setting.
    Senator Manchin. Senator Rounds and myself have a 
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, and we're getting into 
procurement. This is a big thing with us right now, because you 
just have to look back not that far to find out how China and 
others have been so successful at rapidly deploying and getting 
up to speed at a much quicker rate. You know, they say, except 
for the second engine, their F-35 mimics ours to a tee. There's 
no way to do that, except being able to get all the pertinent 
information needed.
    Madam Chairman, we just have a terrific problem, here. And 
it goes into procurement, and it goes all the way down the 
chain. We don't hold the prime, which is the big boy 
accountable--and a subcontractor does not get a contract from 
them, because they're not large enough to do it on their own, 
so they end up being a sub, and they're held hostage by the 
prime. The prime is not held accountable to the sub and what 
the sub's doing and how it secures its systems. It goes down to 
second, third, and four tier, you've really got a problem. And 
I think they realize it. It's been out there for quite some 
time. With your Subcommittee and our Subcommittee working 
together, hopefully we can make some major changes.
    Senator Fischer. Hopefully, General Thompson will get that 
information to you and to all of us, Senator Manchin, and then 
maybe we can follow up and do a classified so we can get in 
more to the details on it, if that would be helpful.
    Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to something you said to 
Senator Cotton. You said that China has expanded its 
capabilities in space by orders of magnitude. I just wanted to 
dig into that a little bit more. The Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) produced an unclassified report this past January, 
``Challenges to Space Security,'' in which it described a 
number of disturbing patterns of our competitors. China, it 
appears, is directing an Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization. I'd note that the rotating membership includes 
nations like Iran and Pakistan. Russia, this report says, has 
the largest foreign network of ground-based optical space 
surveillance sensors in its Keldysh Institute of Applied 
Mathematics, coordinates sensor tasking and fuses information 
from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors on 40 
observatories spread across 16 countries. Is it fair to say 
that China and Russia have a coordinated international effort 
to threaten the United States in and from space?
    Secretary Rapuano. With regard to complicity between China 
and Russia, less clear, but, in terms of the objectives of 
individually, China and Russia, absolutely. They are looking to 
asymmetrically undermine our space capabilities.
    Senator Hawley. This is a top priority for them, is it fair 
to say?
    Secretary Rapuano. Fair to say.
    Senator Hawley. The expenditures that you were detailing 
earlier, both from the Chinese and the Russian Government side, 
show a renewed emphasis for both of them on a modern-day space 
race. Is that fair to say?
    Secretary Rapuano. That is fair.
    Senator Hawley. Let me come back to something you said to 
Senator King. You were talking about the triad to approach this 
issue. You talked about U.S. Space Command, you talked about 
the service component. You didn't get to the third piece.
    Secretary Rapuano. Yes, thank you. Thank you for asking.
    The third piece is really about the development. And that's 
where the space development piece comes in, in terms of SDA. It 
is about, really, leveraging innovation, it's about leveraging 
commercial practices and capabilities that are developed on the 
commercial side, and it's really looking at the 
transformational capability set. So, one of the areas that SDA 
will be focused on is a massively distributed sensor 
communications architecture in LEO to be more resilient, 
degrade more gracefully under attack, and provide us more 
reliability, as well as reconstitution if we lose assets. That 
would be a critical capability fill, in terms of operating in a 
warfighting environment, where we have adversaries who are 
looking to get at our assets.
    Senator Hawley. Understood. Let me just ask you a budget 
question. Do you think your request for a 56 percent increase 
in the space situational awareness part of the budget is 
sufficient to meet the threat that we're seeing from our 
adversaries?
    Secretary Rapuano. We are comfortable with the President's 
$14 billion request for the next fiscal year. We believe that 
it covers our major requirement areas.
    Senator Hawley. General David Thompson, let me ask you 
about another piece of the budget. It includes a request for a 
115 percent increase in science and technology, which seems 
very wise, given the scale of the challenge that we're facing. 
I just wonder, Who have been your biggest partners in this 
effort, particularly in the research, private-sector, and 
startup communities?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, thank you. 
I would say right now what we're trying to focus on most is 
recognizing and understanding what's out in the commercial 
sector, the innovation that's there in the commercial market, 
the emerging commercial market. There are lots of companies 
there that are looking at, for example, large-scale 
constellations that might be fielded cheaply, with tremendous 
capability.
    So, we're currently looking for a couple of opportunities. 
One is the technology that goes with a low-cost space 
capability, the actual mission performance, whether it be 
remote sensing or it be satellite communications or things like 
that, but the third thing we're looking at is opportunities to 
partner with them for things like hosted payloads and other 
things that we might be able to use mission capability with. 
So, it's especially focused on the investment you see in the 
burgeoning commercial space sector.
    Senator Hawley. Have you encountered any particular 
difficulties in working with the private sector along these 
lines?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. We have not. They are 
certainly welcome and open to investment. Really, what is the 
challenge on our part is twofold. First is picking the right 
places to invest for strategic purposes. Then, as you talked 
about, there is certainly an investment there, but there are 
always more opportunities and needs than there are investment 
dollars. So, making smart use of our investment dollar.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, just as a quick 
addition to that, we've tried to create lower boundaries for 
entry for a lot of our commercial partners, our nondefense-
oriented, nontraditional partners that are bringing new, 
innovative things to the table. One of our most successful 
vehicles is called the Space Enterprise Consortium. It's a 
consortium where we've invited and had join about 270 different 
contractors, small businesses, and large businesses. About 80 
percent of them are nontraditional--in other words, 
commercial--space companies. We've been able to utilize that 
vehicle to do a lot of prototyping. We have over $200 million 
on contract for 37 different space prototyping efforts, and 
many of those--in fact, most of those--have a nontraditional 
component to them. So, we're reaching out to the private 
sector, looking for those innovative opportunities, going into 
the future.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    General Thompson, I'm going to follow up with a question I 
was going to ask you earlier. We are going to do a second 
round, here.
    The Air Force has really touted its development of the next 
generation of infrared early-warning satellites as an example 
of its ability to rapidly acquire space capabilities in 
response to those warfighting demands. When announcing changes 
to the program last year, the Air Force stated its intention to 
cut 4 years off the procurement process. Can you talk about the 
progress you've made in meeting that ambitious goal?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, relative to the 
help that the Congress has provided us, the rapid prototyping 
authorities that we receive through section 804 have been a 
godsend. Using those rapid prototyping authorities from section 
804, we were able to put both layers, if you will, of our Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) on contract 
within 6 months, saving at least a year of time, from the 
standpoint of what we'd have had to do if we were conducting a 
traditional source selection.
    The process that we went through was simple, but also 
rigorous. In other words, we don't want to lose the oversight 
in our section 804 prototyping efforts, similar to what Ms. 
Chaplain said earlier. We want to make sure that the rigor and 
the robustness of the oversight that we're providing our 
contractors is there from the get-go. We also want to make sure 
that our board of directors, the Congress, is kept fully 
apprised of what we're doing in our section 804 rapid-
prototyping endeavors.
    On Next-Gen OPIR, we have a quarterly requirement to come 
over here. And I will tell you right now, if you want us to 
come more often than that, we will. We have triennial reports 
that we're submitting on all of our section 804s, including 
Next-Gen OPIR, and our goal, from Dr. Will Roper, who is the 
service acquisition executive, is to offer so much transparency 
to the Hill on our 804 programs that you'll actually ask us, 
``Why are you doing this by the DOD 5000 series? We want some 
more of that 804 kind of execution.''
    Senator Fischer. Yeah. Well, I appreciate your attention to 
the OPIR. It's an extremely important program, and I'm happy to 
see that it's advancing. Do you believe that the budget that's 
been presented is going to support that aggressive schedule 
that you're on right now?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, the requirement 
is, for 2025, to have an initial launch capability. We 
originally envisioned being able to go as fast as 2023. 
However, the costs in the budget were just not able to make us 
to that gold-medal level. So, we still consider the fact that 
we've accelerated the program a little over 2 years, at this 
point, and we believe that the fiscal year 2020 budget and out 
years fully supports that. However, there are two above-
threshold reprogrammings that we have been trying to work 
through the Department and over here on the Hill, one for 
fiscal year 2018 and one for fiscal year 2019. Obviously, we 
missed the President's budget before we had the requirement to 
accelerate to 2025. So, we're still looking for about $600 
million worth of above-threshold reprogrammings that we're 
working very closely on with the Department and the Hill. The 
fiscal year 2018 Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) was 
approved by the Hill. Thank you for that. But, not all the 
sources were. So, we're trying to get the sources in line, and 
then a $400 million above-threshold reprogramming in 2019 is 
still required to meet the 2025 need date.
    Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
    Ms. Chaplain, I understand that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed an assessment of 
the Department's space acquisition workforce, and see that some 
of your findings are described in your testimony. If you could 
just, in the remaining time, talk a little bit about the 
difficulty in tracking and identifying acquisition 
professionals working on space programs? This isn't really a 
clear and distinct group of people, is it? You kind of 
referenced that in your opening remarks.
    Ms. Chaplain. Right. I think the Department's pretty good 
at tracking acquisition professionals in certain lines of 
effort, like program management, and certain types of 
engineering. What the Department as a whole doesn't do is track 
acquisition professionals tied to certain missions, like space. 
So, the fact that they couldn't do this for space isn't 
unusual. It's sort of an issue across the Department. But, we 
believe that maybe we do want to add some fields to the 
databases that track people so that we can help identify who is 
in space, especially if we're going to move together some 
organizations.
    Also in our review, we came across comments and concerns 
about gaps in expertise in certain areas for space, mostly in 
the technical things, and trying to keep people on for long 
periods of time and get professionals in at the mid-level. 
Those are persistent concerns that we've reported on over the 
years. I know there's been a lot of effort to strengthen the 
workforce, but it's still an issue for space.
    Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. One of you mentioned space situational 
awareness a few minutes ago, and that, in conjunction with the 
open-source reporting that Senator King mentioned about India 
and its ASAT test today, got me thinking: I think it was 2007 
when we went through the initial Chinese effort at this, that 
scattered junk all over low-Earth orbit and made a mess for 
everyone. What do we know at this point that you can share in 
this environment on the Indian story? More importantly, do we 
need some sort of international structure--a space code of 
conduct, for example--to make sure that, if nations are going 
to test, they're going to do it in a way that doesn't create 
the kind of enormous problems, which led, in many cases, to the 
kind of funding that we have to put into space situational 
awareness today?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator Heinrich, thank 
you.
    I'll talk to you a little bit about the Indian ASAT test 
that did occur this morning. First of all, we were aware that 
it was coming, because of some flight bans that India had 
announced and some information they had published previously. 
But, the launch occurred at 1:39 a.m., Eastern Time. First of 
all, let me say clearly, it was detected and characterized and 
reported by Air Force systems--missile warning systems and our 
airmen at Buckley Air Force Base.
    Senator Heinrich. Right.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Immediately after the 
ASAT struck the target vehicle--the Joint Space Operation 
Center and the Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron began 
collecting information about the breakup of the vehicle.
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Currently, they're 
tracking about 270 different objects in the debris field. 
Likely, that number is going to grow as the debris field 
spreads out and we collect more sensor information.
    Senator Heinrich. Do we know what the elevation of that 
debris field was at the breakup?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator, we do, but I'm 
going to ask to pass that in different channels. I'm not 
convinced I know that that's an unclassified fact.
    Senator Heinrich. Okay.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. But, we do know the 
altitude at which it occurred. We immediately started providing 
public notice on our Space Track website, and will provide 
direct notification to satellite operators if those satellites 
are under threat. I will also say, at this point in time, the 
International Space Station is not at risk. That's another 
thing that we do, and provide warning routinely. But, that's 
just an example of how no other nation, no other military 
force, no other civil or other body could have detected, 
characterized, and begun warning and providing the world the 
way we do with Air Force and other joint assets. So, that 
represents a tremendous capability, but we have more investment 
to turn that from what I'll call a matter of routine 
spaceflight safety approach to searching and finding and 
detecting threats who are attempting to hide from us, as well.
    Senator Heinrich. Do you want to touch on the issue of 
whether or not we need to engage in some sort of multilateral 
effort to ensure that someone doesn't make the kind of mistake 
that China made back in 2007? Do we need some parameters where 
people agree to, for example, not test at very high altitudes?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. I would say--certainly, 
in a broad sense. And this will be a specific example. There's 
a lot of work to do with the rest of the world on what are 
established norms of behavior, rules of engagement, and the 
code of conduct in space. And I know that's a matter that the 
State Department and the Department of Defense, led by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is working with the 
rest of the world. It's certainly a need that we all need to 
address.
    I don't know if Mr. Rapuano wants to add more in that 
regard, but it's a need.
    Secretary Rapuano. We are involved with discussions 
internationally, and we have participated in nonbinding 
confidence-building measures associated with activities in 
space. We are certainly proponents of safe and sustainable 
space and minimization of space debris. So, that is an active 
and ongoing conversation.
    Senator Heinrich. Okay.
    I'm getting close to the end, here. And given that I went 
over earlier, I'm not going to make that mistake twice. So, 
thank you Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. I just want to reiterate the point that 
Senator Manchin was making. I've been in numerous hearings, and 
every single Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Secretary of State, 
whoever, is sitting where you're sitting, when you say, ``How's 
your cyber protection?'' says, ``We're good. We're safe.'' None 
of them know that. So, I want to urge you, if you go to one of 
your prime contractors and say, ``How's it going?'' or if you 
get a contractual assurance, don't believe it. My suggestion is 
Red Teaming them. There's nothing like a skull and crossbones 
that appears on the CEO's computer screen that says, 
``Congratulations, you've been hacked by the U.S. Air Force. 
Your award is the termination of your contract.'' I mean, we've 
got to be aggressive about this, because, to accept assurances 
everybody gives you those assurances. They don't really know, 
and they don't know until they've been tested. And you have the 
capability of doing that. The Pentagon has done bug bounty 
programs and Red Teams. I urge you to do this.
    The intellectual property theft via subcontractors, as 
Senator Manchin was talking about, is the new frontier. It just 
came up this morning in a hearing with the Navy. We've had it 
with Secretaries of State. We've had it with CEOs of utilities. 
The Wall Street Journal just had a major story about a third-
generation sub for a utility, who was a headhunter or 
something, and got up into the control system of the utility. 
So, I urge you to not take assurances, but to be aggressive 
about this. I think a Red Team approach is one that could, 
maybe, put the fear in them.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
    I'd like thank my colleagues for their attendance and their 
good questions today, and thank the panel for the information 
you've provided. If Members do have questions, I hope that you 
will respond in writing and be able to get those to us in a 
timely manner.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                              space force
    1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the House proposed a Space 
Force or Corps in its Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) modeled after the Marine Corps. Do you agree that the Space 
Force proposal submitted with the President's budget is pretty close to 
what was proposed by the House in 2017?
    Secretary Rapuano. Both the Department's Space Force proposal and 
the House proposal would have established a sixth branch of the Armed 
Forces within the Department of the Air Force. The Department's 
proposal includes an Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space to 
provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space Force. It also 
consolidates existing DOD space forces from across the Air Force, Army, 
and Navy. While DOD has identified a number of technical legislative 
changes needed for the new Space Force to function properly, the major 
concept is generally the same in both the DOD and House proposals to 
establish a new Armed Force within the Department of the Air Force.

    2. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what has changed since when 
Secretary Mattis, Secretary Wilson and Chairman Dunford opposed the 
idea of a Space Force or Space Corps the first time?
    Secretary Rapuano. Mindsets across the Department, including my 
own, shifted when we dug deeper into this problem. Over the last nine 
months, we have put a tremendous amount of effort and analytical rigor 
into understanding the current and future risks to our space missions 
and capabilities, and analyzed options in order to identify the most 
effective solution to address these problems. We have come to more 
fully appreciate the degree to which the world is changing and the 
Department must adapt accordingly in order to maintain U.S. leadership 
in space.

    3. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, if 
established, the total Space Force Active Duty would be roughly 10,500. 
Compare that to the Army, which has roughly 476,000 Active Duty 
members. Does it make sense to have an entire Service with that few 
Active Duty members?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. If enacted by Congress, the 
initial size of the Space Force would be 15,000 to 20,000 people, with 
the vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and 
budget authority--transferred from the existing Military Services. 
Space is a unique operating environment with special needs and 
requirements; we believe it best served by a dedicated branch of 
service inside the Department of the Air Force. I believe the DOD 
proposal is sized to maximize warfighting capacity and advocacy for 
space while minimizing bureaucracy. That said, it is important to note 
this will be an ongoing process as the new ``protect and defend'' 
missions will grow the U.S. Space Force over time. While applying the 
inherent advantages of a separate service inside the national security 
enterprise, we also have the opportunity to design it from a 21st 
Century perspective.

    4. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, when adding civilians and 
headquarters, the Space Force would have a total of around 16,000 
people. In terms of overhead, how does this compare to other 
organizations and Services?
    Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the personnel requirements for a 
Space Force. However, in May 2019, the Congressional Budget Office 
reported on its assessment of the personnel requirements and costs 
associated with standing up new DOD space organizations, including a 
military service within the Department of the Air Force. \1\ In its 
assessment, the Congressional Budget Office made comparisons to other 
military organizations and estimated a new space service could include 
27,000 to 29,700 personnel (based on full time equivalent positions)--
22,900 of these positions (10,800 for space operations and 12,100 for 
support functions like management, acquisitions, and training) would 
transfer from existing space-related positions, and an additional 4,100 
to 6,800 positions would be new for overhead and management. By 
contrast, according to an Office of Personnel Management website, the 
largest federal agencies, including the military departments, have more 
than 150,000 civilian personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Congressional Budget Office, The Personnel Requirements and 
Costs of New Military Space Organizations, https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/55178, (Washington, DC: May 2019).

    5. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the legislative proposal to 
stand up the Space Force will give the Department authority to transfer 
civilian employees on a ``on a voluntary or involuntary basis'' and 
``is not subject to any other provision of law that provides appellate 
rights or procedures for civilian employees of the Department of 
Defense.'' This authority seems overly broad. How are you going to be 
able to attract and retain a workforce if its work conditions are dealt 
with in such an arbitrary way?
    Secretary Rapuano. We would like to work with Congress on the right 
personnel authorities to meet our needs. The Space Force would require 
highly technical talent. Our objective was to provide flexibility and 
enable greater streamlining and competitiveness with the private 
sector. To that end, the Department has seen great success with Title 
10 excepted service alternate personnel systems, including the ability 
to attract and retain its workforce while upholding merit system 
principles and safeguarding against prohibited personnel practices. The 
precise system we proposed was modeled on the Defense Civilian 
Intelligence Personnel System used by the National Reconnaissance 
Office and other DOD intelligence agencies. We can adapt this proven 
model to the Space Force. Transfers of civilian personnel would not 
occur arbitrarily. Civilian employees would transfer in place to the 
Space Force with the realignment of the mission and billet to which the 
employee was assigned, with no loss in pay. Employees could also 
volunteer to transfer to vacant Space Force excepted service positions 
for which they qualify.
 rocket systems launch program--tactically responsive launch operations
    6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, the 
fiscal year 2019 budget included multiple initiatives to improve space 
resilience, including a new dedicated Air Force procurement line for 
small launch services called the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP). 
Can you speak to how the Air Force is leveraging tactically responsive 
capabilities for contingency small launch requirements, including 
expanding these capabilities to include more diverse payload 
configurations and launch systems, including air-launched space launch?
    Secretary Rapuano. The Department of Defense is exploring new space 
launch capabilities, such as the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP), 
to ensure access to space and improve the resilience of our space 
architecture. Although I defer to the Air Force on the specifics of 
RSLP, the Department supports flexible and fast acquisition programs to 
supplement our more traditional National Security Space Launch (NSSL) 
programs.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The RSLP funding identified in 
fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental 
satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch 
program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program 
with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare 
services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space 
vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions, 
AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple 
emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019, 
Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three 
technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson The RSLP funding identified in 
fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental 
satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch 
program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program 
with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare 
services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space 
vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions, 
AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple 
emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019, 
Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three 
technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
    Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the Air Force's dedicated 
procurement line for small launch services. However, in 2017, we found 
that several U.S. companies were developing launch vehicles and related 
technologies to provide low- and medium-weight payload launch 
capabilities on the commercial market. \2\ Some of these companies 
began conducting test flights in 2017 with plans to begin carrying 
commercial payloads as early as 2018. We found that these emerging 
companies were implementing schedule flexibility as a key component of 
their business strategies to meet the demands of small to medium 
payload customers. These companies could potentially provide launch 
services to the government through the Air Force's Rocket System Launch 
Program. Moreover, in 2015, we found that DOD did not have a 
consolidated plan for developing a responsive launch capability 
primarily because of a lack of formal requirements for responsive 
launch, that is, no existing space program had them. \3\ However, we 
have not assessed DOD's plans more recently nor reviewed or assessed 
the criteria related to launch vehicle certification or mission 
assurance, for example, that the Air Force may have for these vehicles. 
This would be a good topic for future review, given trends in the 
launch vehicle market and the increased need for resiliency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO, Surplus Missile Motors: Sale Price Drives Potential 
Effects on DOD and Commercial Launch Providers, GAO-17-609 (Washington, 
DC: Aug. 16, 2017).
    \3\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive 
Launch Report, GAO-16-156R (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2015).

    7. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, today, nearly all U.S. 
national security satellites are launched from fixed coastal U.S. 
launch sites that could easily be disrupted. Is the Department of 
Defense (DOD) developing more diverse launch sites using new commercial 
tactically responsive launch capabilities, including the use of 
existing military installations to support resilient polar and 
equatorial launch?
    Secretary Rapuano. Section 1618 of the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 provides that ``the 
Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with a 
federally funded research and development center to conduct a study on 
space launch locations, including with respect to the development and 
capacity of existing and new locations.'' The Department has entered 
into a contract with the RAND Corporation to conduct that study, which 
should address the issues raised in this question.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force is investing in 
spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to 
support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30 
million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in 
Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year 
(FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of 
supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements 
include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber 
security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of 
liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover 
the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch 
vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage 
emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include 
non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is investing in 
spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to 
support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30 
million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in 
Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year 
(FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of 
supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements 
include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber 
security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of 
liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover 
the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch 
vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage 
emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include 
non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.

    8. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, do you support 
integration and execution of commercial air-launched space launch 
operations and services on additional military installations, 
specifically, operationally relevant demonstrations and/or pilot 
programs on Guam, in support of U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and DOD-wide tactically responsive 
launch requirements?
    Secretary Rapuano. I defer to the Air Force for specifics on the 
use of PACAF installations, but in general, the Department of Defense 
is supportive of new technological developments by the commercial space 
sector to improve and expand space launch capabilities.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively 
facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have 
utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove 
successful.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively 
facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have 
utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove 
successful.
                        space development agency
    9. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, it is my 
understanding that if we create a Space Force, a Space Development 
Agency (SDA) will be moved where the Space Rapid Capabilities Office 
(RCO) resides, or in another scenario, located at or near the Pentagon 
headquarters. Congress previously enacted language prohibiting a co-
location of the Space RCO (formerly Operationally Responsive Space) in 
order to preserve the disruptive advantages that come with being 
separate. Shouldn't we, as a general rule, avoid reinventing the wheel, 
and are you at all worried that the Space RCO will be merged and 
diluted from its
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The location of Space 
Development Agency is still being determined by the Department of 
Defense, therefore I will refer any discussion as to its location to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Leaders across the Department 
have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile 
delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development 
Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance 
Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and 
Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all 
represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal. 
Space RCO is conducting rapid prototyping and acquisition in 
significant ``protect and defend'' capabilities that no other agency is 
pursuing. It has initiated several new programs in the past year and it 
is our expectation this important work will continue unaffected in a 
Space Force. Meanwhile, we remain committed to improving the rapid 
delivery of warfighter capabilities while minimizing duplication of 
effort and eliminating non-value-added processes and procedures in all 
DOD space acquisition organization.
                     national reconnaissance office
    10. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, the White 
House's legislative proposal currently excludes the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from the legislative proposal. As a member 
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I understand the NRO's value, and 
I don't believe we should try to fix something that isn't broken. Do 
you agree that NRO should continue to be excluded from the Space Force? 
Please explain why or why not.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The DOD's current legislative 
proposal does not include the NRO as part of the Space Force. While the 
DOD and NRO have separate mission sets, we have a shared strategy, 
concept of operations, programs, and sit together at the National Space 
Defense Center conducting operations. Beyond that, Space Policy 
Directive 4 tasks the DOD and Intelligence Community to further improve 
our relationship, organizational constructs, and integrated support to 
global joint combined operations. I agree with this approach.

    11. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in your 
testimony you mentioned that ``[o]ur teaming relationship with the 
National Reconnaissance Office has never been stronger.'' In your view, 
is there any reason to believe that this partnership cannot continue 
and grow stronger still?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. I do believe the Air Force-NRO 
relationship has never been stronger and that it will continue to grow 
and strengthen. The two examples provided in my testimony, the Silent 
Barker program and partnership in the National Space Defense Center, 
involve collaboration on strategy, acquisition, personnel, mission data 
processing, and funding for the space domain awareness mission. 
Additionally, we are committed to an ongoing dialogue to identify areas 
of increased cooperation, improved interactions, shared resources, and 
expanded partnerships aimed at enhancing national space interests as 
tasked in Space Policy Directive 4. These discussions include future 
changes to the organization and management of space (roles and 
responsibilities), mission assurance (resiliency and OPIR), 
collaboration (S&T, international and commercial), and assured access 
to space (range support infrastructure).

    12. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the NRO is a civilian 
agency and the DOD is military, if there is a conflict in space how 
will you resolve the unity of command issue?
    Secretary Rapuano. As documented in Department of Defense Directive 
5105.23, ``National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),'' the NRO is a Defense 
Agency, and the Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, 
and control over it. Furthermore, the NRO works in close coordination 
with other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) to be ready for 
unified action in space, as detailed in U.S. Strategic Command's 
Concept of Operations for Warfighting in the Space Domain, May 18, 
2018.
    The DOD and NRO have successfully operated for the past 50 years in 
a unity of effort construct during peacetime and conflict. This process 
is described in Joint Publication 3-14, ``Space Operations,'' April 10, 
2018. Further, Space Policy Directive-4 on the Establishment of the 
United States Space Force, emphasized the continuation and improvement 
of the unity of effort construct and directs the Secretary of Defense 
and Director of National Intelligence to ``create and enhance 
mechanisms for collaboration between the DOD and IC in order to 
increase unity of effort and the effectiveness of space operations.'' 
That report, due to the President of the United States in August, 2019, 
will highlight the robust and collaborative foundation that the IC and 
DOD have already established, and will include plans to grow and mature 
the unity of effort and partnership necessary to persevere during a 
conflict in space.
    Over the past several years, DOD and IC leaders have strengthened 
partnerships and collaboration that have laid a solid foundation for 
unity of effort. These include the Joint Space Warfighting Forum 
partnership between the U.S. Strategic Command and the NRO; the Space 
Enterprise Vision partnership between Air Force Space Command and the 
NRO; the National Space Defense Center partnership between U.S. 
Strategic Command, the NRO and the broader IC; and joint acquisition 
programs focused on space protection and situational awareness. 
Additionally, the DOD and IC have participated in an ongoing campaign 
of wargames and experiments to continue to forge and mature this 
critical partnership.
                   accountability--space acquisition
    13. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, thank you as always for 
appearing--you are a steadfast hand helping the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) out in its oversight duties. Section 804 of the fiscal 
year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the acquisition 
checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 
The Air Force is proposing to use this authority to accelerate many 
space programs, including the Next Generation Overhead Persistent 
Infrared (OPIR) satellite program, which will cost in excess of $5 
billion. Are you at all concerned about using this authority with such 
a large developmental program?
    Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Section 804 programs, like Next Generation 
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR), are exempted from the acquisition 
and requirements processes defined by DOD Directive 5000.01 and the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Instead, program 
managers are encouraged to use a tailored, streamlined approach to 
documentation and oversight to enable them to demonstrate new 
technologies or field new or updated systems within 2 to 5 years. In 
June 2019, we found that DOD had yet to fully determine how it would 
oversee these programs, including what information should be required 
to ensure informed decisions about program selection and how to measure 
program performance. \4\ Without consistent oversight, DOD is not well 
positioned to ensure that these programs are likely to meet 
expectations for delivering prototypes or capability to the warfighter 
quickly. GAO and others have highlighted lessons learned from DOD's 
past efforts to streamline that diminished its capability to lead and 
manage the space acquisition process, magnifying problems related to 
unstable requirements, poor cost estimating and systems engineering, 
and poor contractor performance. In response to a provision in the 
Conference Report to a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 115-863), we plan to initiate a review of 
DOD's OPIR acquisition efforts this summer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ GAO, DOD Acquisition Reform: Leadership Attention Needed to 
Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight, GAO-19-439 
(Washington, DC: June 5, 2019).

    14. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you 
describe what parameters bound your use of section 804 programs?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities 
emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most 
critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the 
current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested 
domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter, 
section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are 
trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to 
ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more 
aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the 
overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery 
with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can 
innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability. 
This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the 
greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters 
user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or 
technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a 
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the 
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of 
section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure. 
All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis, 
rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific 
needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804 
programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper, 
will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three 
times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD. 
As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with 
congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address 
concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr. 
Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed 
under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series 
program.

    15. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you 
give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and 
those that might?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of 
space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:

      Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
production protected tactical waveform capability in current 
operational SATCOM terminals.
      Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload 
adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing 
scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space 
for operational as well as scientific, research and development 
payloads.
      Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1 
production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided 
a roduction viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production 
procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by 
preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies 
allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for 
operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing 
capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication 
Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected 
Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting, 
produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated 
integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M 
will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in 
current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband 
Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a 
similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air 
Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and 
Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented 
Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III 
program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:

        Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload 
competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and 
production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space 
segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most 
capability to include a non-flight demonstration.
        Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using 
Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the 
Navy as an early use prototype.
        Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload, 
ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally 
deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
        Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen 
OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development, 
and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
        Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc 
2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and 
ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes. The above 
programs qualified as section 804 by building operational capability 
that addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what 
works in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver 
the operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the 
example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that 
significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and 
service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the 
payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real 
data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule 
constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a 
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the 
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of 
section 804.
            emerging small launch providers (osp-4 contract)
    16. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, aside from 
larger national security space launch, there are a number of emerging 
commercial providers eager to play a role in delivering small payloads 
into low-earth orbit (LEO) as needed. The Orbital Services Program 
(OSP-4) contract was designed to be the on-ramp for all emerging 
dedicated small-satellite launch providers. Yet, it is my understanding 
the Air Force has not issued a single award. What is the status of this 
contract vehicle, availability of funding, and does the Air Force 
intend to use the contract?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Since 2013 the Orbital Services 
Program-3 (OSP-3) contract has awarded 6 missions to include Discover, 
STP-2, and NROL-129. The OSP-3 ordering period will close in Nov 2019. 
The AF will expand on this effort with the Orbital Services Program-4 
(OSP-4) contract to provide small launch services using a Multiple 
Award Contract-Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract. 
With a low barrier to entry and future on-ramp opportunities, OSP-4 is 
intended to be the main contract vehicle for small orbital launches 
greater than 400 pounds. The IDIQ contract Request for Proposal will be 
released in July 2019. The first mission RFP (STP-S28) using Rocket 
Systems Launch Program procurement funds will be released shortly after 
the overarching OSP-4 RFP. Market research indicates that the small 
launch industry is ready to support National Security Space missions 
and we project approximately 20 missions to be awarded between fiscal 
year 2020-fiscal year 2029.
                      leveraging commercial space
    17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, I've met 
with a number of people in-and-outside of the military who have said 
that if the United States does not start to buy the emerging commercial 
offerings in terms of small satellite capabilities, and soon, then 
those commercial capacities are inevitably going to migrate elsewhere. 
How is the Air Force budgeting specifically toward procuring (or even 
experimenting with) emerging commercial capabilities?
    Secretary Rapuano. The National Defense Strategy recognizes the 
immense potential of emerging commercial space capabilities and the 
need for streamlined approaches for identifying promising commercial 
technologies, applying them to military systems, and regularly 
refreshing their electronics and software to facilitate continuous 
capability upgrades. The establishment of the Space Development Agency 
(SDA) was intended, in part, to be able to rapidly develop and field 
new space capabilities that leverage commercial space technology and 
access in support of warfighters. In addition, the Department has 
established a Space Rapid Capabilities Office to leverage existing 
technology development and operational capabilities to expedite 
development and fielding of select, critical space capabilities and 
systems. The SDA and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office will 
complement existing space research and development activities such as 
the Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office and the Space and Missile 
Systems Center to leverage more fully the potential of the commercial 
space industry.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses 
the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and 
process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial 
capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to 
warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center 
Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the 
SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense 
contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the 
Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems 
Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps 
located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA, 
the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop 
next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's 
vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage 
commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA 
prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission 
partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA, 
MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense 
Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has 
been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy 
critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to 
protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing. 
Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial 
rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small 
satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats 
to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial 
capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from 
contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
traditional members have received government funds through awards which 
helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission 
partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May, 
the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies 
that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements. 
Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research 
(SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be 
further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For 
example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to 
provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies 
and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR 
funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies 
and concepts with military applications.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses 
the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and 
process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial 
capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to 
warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center 
Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the 
SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense 
contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the 
Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems 
Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps 
located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA, 
the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop 
next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's 
vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage 
commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA 
prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission 
partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA, 
MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense 
Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has 
been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy 
critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to 
protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing. 
Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial 
rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small 
satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats 
to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial 
capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from 
contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
traditional members have received government funds through awards which 
helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission 
partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May, 
the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies 
that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements. 
Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research 
(SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be 
further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For 
example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to 
provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies 
and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR 
funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies 
and concepts with military applications.
    Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted focused work in this area. 
However, our ongoing review of DOD's Wideband Communications Services 
Analysis of Alternatives will describe some of DOD's efforts to 
consider emerging commercial satellite communications capabilities. We 
expect to issue a report on this review this fall.

    18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, in what 
ways is the Air Force engaging small satellite providers and component 
manufacturers?
    Secretary Rapuano. The Department is paying close attention to the 
innovation, energy, and investments in the Small Satellite (SmallSat) 
industry, and the opportunity to integrate those technologies into a 
holistic architecture to address current and emerging needs in support 
of our National Defense Strategy. To accelerate the investment, 
development, and deployment of small satellite capabilities, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, led by the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), has established 
the Small Satellite Coordination Activity (SSCA). The function of the 
SSCA is to coordinate and synchronize critical technology information, 
activities, and investments pertaining to SmallSats that are employed 
in support of national security missions. In addition, the Space 
Development Agency (SDA) seeks to leverage commercially-derived, mass-
produced small satellites, payloads, and ground equipment to build the 
next-generation national security space architectures, far more rapidly 
and much more affordably than would otherwise be possible.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space 
Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to 
expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage 
domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with 
incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense 
technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both 
internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators, 
to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees 
will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up 
accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and 
actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share 
innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are 
not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as 
subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and 
analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on 
a critical role in actively engaging our international partners 
(government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange 
information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit. 
The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace 
industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is 
necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain 
America's superiority in space.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space 
Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to 
expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage 
domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with 
incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense 
technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both 
internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators, 
to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees 
will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up 
accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and 
actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share 
innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are 
not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as 
subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and 
analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on 
a critical role in actively engaging our international partners 
(government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange 
information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit. 
The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace 
industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is 
necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain 
America's superiority in space.
    Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted work in this area in recent 
years. In the past we have reported on challenges regarding DOD's 
engagement with small providers such as meeting DOD's unique 
requirements, obtaining security clearances, and breaking through what 
was perceived as an insular culture of space system acquisitions.
                    spaceflight testing environment
    19. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are 
now flying low-cost commercial reusable suborbital vehicles that 
regularly access the spaceflight testing environment. How is the Air 
Force planning to utilize these new capabilities to test new 
technologies and reduce technical risks for future DOD space systems?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch 
Program provides suborbital launch services through the recently 
awarded Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/
Indefinite Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-
ramp opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year 
mark, to provide responsive access to space in order to test new space 
technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the 
Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five 
upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch 
providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental 
and Air Force small satellites.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch Program 
provides suborbital launch services through the recently awarded 
Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-ramp 
opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year mark, to 
provide responsive access to space in order to test new space 
technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the 
Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five 
upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch 
providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental 
and Air Force small satellites.
            space acquisition--section 804 rapid acquisition
    20. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804 
of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the 
acquisition checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs. Can you describe what parameters bound your use of section 
804 programs?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities 
emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most 
critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the 
current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested 
domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter, 
section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are 
trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to 
ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more 
aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the 
overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery 
with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can 
innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability. 
This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the 
greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters 
user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or 
technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a 
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the 
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of 
section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure. 
All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis, 
rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific 
needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804 
programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper, 
will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three 
times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD. 
As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with 
congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address 
concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr. 
Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed 
under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series 
program.

    21. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you 
give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and 
those that might?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of 
space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:

      Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
production protected tactical waveform capability in current 
operational SATCOM terminals .
      Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload 
adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing 
scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space 
for operational as well as scientific, research and development 
payloads.
      Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1 
production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided 
a production viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production 
procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by 
preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies 
allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for 
operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing 
capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication 
Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected 
Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting, 
produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated 
integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M 
will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in 
current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband 
Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a 
similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air 
Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and 
Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented 
Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III 
program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:

        Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload 
competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and 
production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space 
segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most 
capability to include a non-flight demonstration .
        Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using 
Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the 
Navy as an early use prototype.
        Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload, 
ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally 
deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
        Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen 
OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development, 
and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
        Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc 
2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and 
ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes The above programs 
qualified as section 804 by building operational capability that 
addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what works 
in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver the 
operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the 
example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that 
significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and 
service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the 
payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real 
data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule 
constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a 
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the 
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of 
section 804.
                           launch block buys
    22. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, the Air Force has a long 
history of launch block buys. Can you describe them and what issues you 
saw with them in terms of pricing and competition?
    Ms. Chaplain. There have been 2 primary block buys under the 
National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle--EELV) program. In 1998, DOD competitively awarded firm-
fixed price contracts, one each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin, for a 
combined total of 28 Delta IV and Atlas V launch services under the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions governing commercial 
items. Under these contracts, DOD had limited insight into contractor 
costs because certified cost or pricing data is not required in the 
acquisition of commercial items. \5\ At the time of award, the launch 
services contracts had a combined value of about $2 billion. The launch 
service contract prices were based on the assumption of a robust 
commercial launch market in which DOD would be one of many launch 
service customers. The robust commercial launch market did not 
materialize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ These firm-fixed-price launch services contracts were awarded 
under the FAR provisions governing commercial items--FAR Part 12. As a 
result of procuring the launch services as commercial items, under the 
FAR, the Air Force could not request certified cost or pricing data 
from the contractor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2005, the Air Force revised the EELV acquisition strategy to 
reflect the changes in the commercial market and the new role of the 
government as the primary EELV customer. This revised strategy provided 
two contracts each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. One, called the EELV 
launch services (ELS), was a fixed-price contract that covered the 
launch vehicle hardware and labor directly associated with building and 
assembling the launch vehicles. The second contract, called the EELV 
launch capability (ELC), was cost-reimbursable and covered the cost of 
maintaining the ability to launch when needed and funded. items such as 
overhead on launch pads and engineering support. These contracts were 
negotiated under FAR Part 15, which allowed the contracting officer to 
obtain data, including cost data, from DOD-approved contractor business 
systems, data previously unavailable for this program.
    Also in 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to form a 
joint venture that would combine the production, engineering, test, and 
launch operations associated with U.S. government launches of Boeing's 
Delta IV and Lockheed Martin's Atlas V launch vehicles. According to 
both contractors, the joint venture, named the United Launch Alliance 
(ULA), would gain efficiencies and provide the government with assured 
access to space at the lowest possible cost by operating independently 
as a single company and providing launches on both Atlas V and Delta IV 
vehicles. ULA officially began operations in December 2006 as the sole-
source contractor for EELV. The Air Force continued to obtain cost and 
performance data from ULA through both the 2005 contracts awarded to 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and through new contracts awarded to ULA. 
It was, however, unable to get these data for some of the hardware 
items that Boeing had purchased while it was under the prior commercial 
contract arrangement. In addition, it took ULA many years to set up its 
business systems to report the data and to get them approved by DOD. As 
a result, there were years where the Air Force had rights to the data 
but the data were from an unapproved system, and thus were not 
considered reliable.
    In late 2009, projected increases in EELV program costs prompted 
the Air Force to reconsider the EELV business model. After studying the 
approach to buying government launches, the Air Force developed a new 
acquisition strategy. The strategy was designed to maintain mission 
success and incentivize price reductions in part through long-term 
commitments and steady production rates. Under the strategy, the Air 
Force combined its prior ELS and ELC contracts into one contract with 
ULA, called the Phase 1 contract, which was awarded in 2013 and commits 
the government to ordering 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-
year ordering period (provided available launch funds and a valid 
requirement), and pays for the capability to launch eight launches per 
year. According to the Air Force, this contract saved about $4.4 
billion over the prior Air Force-estimated cost of launch for this 
period. In addition, this contract retained for the Air Force the same 
levels of cost insight as in the previous ELC/ELS contract arrangement.
    The advent of re-introducing competition in the launch program in 
2015 has resulted in overall lower launch service costs for some 
launches. However, we have not conducted work to assess the extent of 
such savings.

    23. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, do you worry at all about the 
Launch Service Agreement (LSA) program underway which will again move 
towards long term block buys of launch between two providers?
    Ms. Chaplain. While we have not conducted a review of the Air 
Force's new launch service procurement acquisition strategy, our 
primary, longstanding concern has been whether DOD has gained the 
knowledge it needs to make sound decisions before committing to an 
expensive, long-term block buy, including the health of the launch 
industrial base for sustaining more than one launch provider. 
Specifically, we found in our 2011 review of the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle program that DOD did not have some of the information it 
needed to make informed decisions in developing the new acquisition 
strategy for the program. \6\ Some of the knowledge gaps were in areas 
such as the launch industrial base, mission assurance and rocket engine 
costs, and future national security launch demand. Among other things, 
we recommended the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent 
assessment of the health of the U.S. launch industrial base, paying 
special attention to engine manufacturers; assess the block buy 
contract length given the additional knowledge DOD is gaining as it 
finalizes its new acquisition strategy; refrain from waiving Federal 
Acquisition Regulation requirements for contractor and subcontractor 
certified cost and pricing data; ensure launch mission assurance 
activities are sufficient and not excessive, and identify ways to 
incentivize the prime contractor to implement efficiencies without 
affecting mission success; and examine how broader launch issues, such 
as greater coordination across federal agencies, can be factored into 
future launch acquisitions to increase efficiencies and cost savings. 
DOD agreed with our recommendations. In 2012, we found DOD had 
incorporated or planned to incorporate most of the recommendations. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New 
Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GAO-11-641 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).
    \7\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing 
Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-12-822 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 26, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2015, we assessed the risks the Air Force faced as it planned 
for future launch acquisitions. \8\ At that time, the Air Force was 
beginning its approach to using full and open competition procedures in 
a commercial item acquisition to increase the potential to keep more 
than one launch company viable and avoid repeating past mistakes that 
led to cost growth. We recommended that the Air Force should take an 
incremental approach to planning the next acquisition phase to avoid 
making decisions without sufficient knowledge. In 2016, we found that 
the Air Force was gathering and analyzing information on the global 
launch market to help ensure multiple U.S.-based launch providers could 
remain viable to compete for future launches. \9\ However, history has 
proven that it is difficult to reliably predict growth in the demand 
for launch services. Many factors influence the quantity, size, and 
frequency of satellite launches for both government and commercial use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to 
Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable 
Incorporation of Lessons Learned, GAO-15-623 (Washington, D.C.: August 
11, 2015).
    \9\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD is Assessing Data 
on Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-16-
661R (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     space rco reporting structure
    24. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in the 
fiscal year 2018 NDAA we renamed the Operationally Responsive Space 
Program the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO, and moved it 
from the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to report to the 
Commander of Air Force Space Command. Can you explain to the committee 
the merits of this new construct?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The SpRCO uses rapid acquisition 
authorities and streamlined reporting/oversight to meet critical 
requirements as directed by the SpRCO Board of Directors. The SpRCO 
transitions resulting products and capabilities to a partner program 
office for long-term production and sustainment, as well as to 
operational units to conduct operations. The SpRCO is aligned as a 
direct reporting unit to the Commander of Air Force Space Command, 
which enables a more agile and streamlined approach to requirements 
development and approval, and ensures that the SpRCO is assigned the 
most critical warfighting projects. This alignment also helps to ensure 
that the SpRCO has a direct and robust linkage with the Space 
Warfighting Community throughout the development of their assigned 
projects, enabling a smooth transition of capabilities during the 
operations phase.
                              space fence
    25. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, space is becoming more congested and 
contested especially in LEO as plans for large constellations 
containing thousands of satellites come to market. In order to protect 
the United States' commercial interest as well as our military 
interests, how will the Air Force ensure timely, resilient, cyber-
hardened, precision data is available to prevent collisions and protect 
our Nation's assets?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. [Deleted.]
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. [Deleted.]

    26. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, our warfighters depend on our 
satellites in all orbital regimes, especially geosynchronous earth 
orbit (GEO), for actionable battle management information. There are 
several ways to track satellites in GEO including the use of telescopes 
and radars, both space-based and ground-based. How is the Air Force 
addressing the growing adversarial threat at GEO in the USINDOPACOM 
region to ensure the United States can protect its critical assets in a 
persistent, all-weather environment within a critical five year 
timeline?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. With an architecture designed to 
leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best 
suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and 
discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the 
foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and 
change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting 
clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and 
ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform 
persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including 
threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to 
protecting assets.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. With an architecture designed to 
leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best 
suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and 
discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the 
foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and 
change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting 
clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and 
ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform 
persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including 
threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to 
protecting assets.

    27. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson,he Committee understands that the test 
program for the first Space Fence radar site is underway in the 
Marshall Islands and will deliver an initial operational capability 
(IOC) in late 2019. The Space Fence program will dramatically improve 
the identification and tracking of space objects in all orbital 
regimes. Can the Air Force describe the plans and timeline to field the 
second radar site in Australia that will provide the full operational 
capability (FOC), ensuring better space situational awareness and 
battle management knowledge for the warfighter in the critical 
USINDOPACOM region?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal 
year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being 
weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to 
lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to 
field the second radar site in Australia.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal 
year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being 
weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to 
lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to 
field the second radar site in Australia.
                       space software development
    28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John 
Thompson, DOD acknowledged the need to more quickly develop, deploy, 
and update software that works for user mission needs. However, the 
Defense Innovation Board recently noted that despite countless studies 
on DOD software acquisition deficiencies, little seems to be changing. 
What is your perspective on the reasons that DOD continues to struggle 
to implement newer approaches and tools and deliver more frequent 
software releases to users?
    Secretary Rapuano. The Defense Innovation Board's ``SWAP Study'' 
(Software Acquisition and Practices) determined that the current 
approach to software development is broken and is a leading source of 
risk to DOD: it takes too long, is too expensive, and exposes the 
warfighters to unacceptable risk of not having capabilities when 
needed. The reasons for this are many, but we must focus on the need to 
reform our approach to software and acquisition more broadly. Our 
acquisition system was designed to develop and procure industrial-age 
capabilities. Although there have been process improvements along the 
way, our approach to acquiring capabilities continues to reflect this 
hardware-centric heritage. The capabilities we rely on today and, 
increasingly, in the future are basically computers. We need an 
acquisition system designed for the information age and the 
institutional willingness to make the necessary changes to get there. 
Our effort to establish a Space Development Agency (SDA), which is 
designed primarily to address the growing threat to our space 
enterprise, is also intended to begin transforming our acquisition 
system to one more-suited to produce the capabilities we will need for 
the future. The SDA intends to pursue agile approaches and incorporate 
other best practices from industry to put in place critical software 
builds on short timelines, including consolidated battle management and 
alternate navigation capabilities.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The DOD's acquisition process is 
serial and centered on delivering hardware. Hence, culture and process 
are the two major impediments to an agile implementation. The 
Department has begun implementing the necessary changes to deliver 
meaningful software releases to users faster than we have historically 
demonstrated. Specifically, the Space and Missile Systems Center is 
making profound cultural changes to influence adoption of software 
centric processes such as Test Driven Development, User Centric Design, 
and providing the user with a Minimum Viable Product to be 
incrementally improved upon. Using these methods, the Kobyashi Maru 
(the name for the agile software acquisition factory for Space C2) 
team, working on the Air Force's Space Command and Control (C2) 
program, recently delivered an accredited application, dubbed Metroid, 
to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the Protected Tactical Enterprise 
Service (PTES), that just awarded its prime contract in November, 
implemented agile techniques into its contract and will be delivering 
functioning, tested code every two weeks, with operators connected 
directly to the test environment for rapid feedback into the 
development.

    29. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, studies from the Comptroller General 
(GAO), DOD, and industry have found that user involvement is critical 
to the success of software development. Newer development approaches--
such as Agile and DevOps--are based on integrating users into 
development. However, DOD programs have struggled to involve users 
early and continuously, and to incorporate user feedback into 
development. What are the barriers to user engagement, and do you think 
that DOD programs can develop software ``hand in hand'' with users?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes 
have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final 
product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers 
to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a 
static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus 
allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current 
needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery 
windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing 
the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to 
its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space 
Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an 
accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the 
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning, 
tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that 
users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to 
experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide 
direct feedback to the developer.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes 
have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final 
product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers 
to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a 
static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus 
allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current 
needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery 
windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing 
the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to 
its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space 
Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an 
accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the 
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning, 
tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that 
users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to 
experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide 
direct feedback to the developer.

    30. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, officials from Defense Digital 
Service, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense 
Innovation Board, and DOD leadership have all said that rapid 
development of software using newer software practices does not fit 
within the DOD acquisition process, or with DOD culture. To what extent 
do you agree these are software challenges, and what are the best ways 
for addressing them?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a 
challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these 
challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD 
5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a 
shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices 
not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the 
challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new 
acquisition category for software-centric agile program management. 
Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations 
account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet 
the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords 
program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more 
efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example, 
the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a 
two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The 
software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically 
tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can 
provide rapid feedback to development.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a 
challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these 
challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD 
5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a 
shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices 
not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the 
challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new 
acquisition category for software-centric agile program management. 
Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations 
account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet 
the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords 
program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more 
efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example, 
the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a 
two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The 
software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically 
tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can 
provide rapid feedback to development.

    31. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, the DOD is currently undertaking a 
number of initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps 
pathfinder efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. 
What is the status of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) 
and the Air Force's pilot efforts?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force 
are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development 
appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2) 
as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center 
offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground 
Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new 
software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software 
intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under 
this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations 
for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be 
combined into the single software appropriation.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force 
are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development 
appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2) 
as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center 
offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground 
Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new 
software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software 
intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under 
this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations 
for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be 
combined into the single software appropriation.

    32. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what extent has OSD or the Air 
Force considered potential challenges in the process steps in the DODI 
5000.02 in meeting the Agile or DevSecOps goals of these programs?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have 
spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how 
it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals 
regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile 
software program designation being considered. These would help move 
the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes 
necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial 
constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of 
these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by 
Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help 
programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) 
streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype 
capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of 
DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons 
are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have 
spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how 
it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals 
regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile 
software program designation being considered. These would help move 
the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes 
necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial 
constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of 
these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by 
Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help 
programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) 
streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype 
capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of 
DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons 
are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.

    33. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and 
Lieutenant General John Thompson, how do we know programs claiming to 
be agile, truly are?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage 
of the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense. 
Based upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly 
progressing through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the 
typical DOD acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-
3 years from requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO 
is on track to complete this process within 8 months. Additionally, 
SpRCO is leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned 
into a full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners 
are identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO 
authorities are used through initial operational production, then 
transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate 
production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there 
are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some 
hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of 
development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily 
into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the 
developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen 
overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical 
Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise 
Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure 
coherence to an agile construct.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage of 
the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense. Based 
upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly progressing 
through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the typical DOD 
acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-3 years from 
requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO is on track to 
complete this process within 8 months. Additionally, SpRCO is 
leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned into a 
full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners are 
identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO 
authorities are used through initial operational production, then 
transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate 
production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there 
are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some 
hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of 
development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily 
into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the 
developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen 
overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical 
Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise 
Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure 
coherence to an agile construct.
                    dod space acquisition workforce
    34. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, GAO issued a report on 
March 14, 2019, that examines what DOD knows about its space 
acquisition workforce and basically found that DOD does not know much. 
GAO gathered its own data and found that at the end of 2017, there were 
over 8,000 military, civilian, contractor, and Federally Funding 
Research and Development Center (FFRDC) personnel supporting space 
acquisition programs at over 50 locations across the United States. The 
report highlighted two very basic pieces of information that DOD 
doesn't know, which until they are addressed, will hinder DOD's efforts 
to stand-up a Space Force: DOD (1) has not identified all of its space 
acquisition programs; and (2) does not know how many military, 
civilians, contractors, and FFRDC personnel support space acquisitions. 
GAO made recommendations that DOD identify its space acquisition 
programs and start collecting data on personnel supporting those 
programs. GAO indicated that the military departments had the most 
trouble identifying space programs in the user segment, such as radios 
or terminals that are needed by the warfighter to use a space-based 
capability. How will the department address this problem?
    Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted 
to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department 
identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the 
Space Force. Each of the Military Services identified the personnel 
currently performing the space missions and functions required to 
develop, field, operate, and sustain space missions.
    This data has served as the foundation for identifying which forces 
and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they would 
transfer. These transfers would be very methodical and time-phased to 
avoid risk to mission execution.

    35. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what steps will DOD be 
taking to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are needed 
for Space Force?
    Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted 
to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department 
identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the 
Space Force--including acquisition missions and functions. Using this 
data, the Department is continuing to refine our analysis of which 
forces and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they 
would transfer.

    36. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, how will DOD determine 
which acquisition personnel should be transitioned to Space Force to 
ensure that it has the most qualified personnel with space acquisition 
expertise?
    Secretary Rapuano. Space acquisition personnel would transfer into 
the Space Force with the transfer of their mission or function. The 
space acquisition billets that the Department would transfer into the 
Space Force from the existing Military Services have specific 
acquisition qualification requirements.

    37. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, are there certain 
functions, such as cyber security, that DOD would like to increase its 
in-house capability to perform instead of relying heavily on 
contractors and FFRDCs for that support? If so, what actions do you 
plan to take to attract people for those positions?
    Secretary Rapuano. For any discipline, the Department uses a 
requirements determination process to identify the numbers and types of 
personnel needed to perform the missions, tasks, and functions. The 
Department has always experienced challenges attracting and retaining 
talent in highly technical and high-demand areas such as cyber, space, 
engineering, and artificial intelligence. To enhance civilian 
opportunities to serve in these roles, the Department is actively 
seeking to recruit talent through traditional and innovative methods, 
hiring directly for critical skills, and utilizing enhanced recruitment 
incentives and pay to meet market demands. For military personnel, the 
Department plans to maximize the use of special accession authority for 
officers such as lateral career entry processes.
    synchronization of satellites, ground control systems, and user 
                               terminals
    38. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John 
Thompson, programs like the Global Positioning Satellites and their 
ground segment and user equipment, protected communications satellites 
and user terminals, and missile warning satellites and associated 
ground process system capabilities have experienced significant 
synchronization issues resulting in expensive satellite capabilities 
being underutilized. What efforts is DOD undertaking to minimize these 
alignment issues and avoid them in the future?
    Secretary Rapuano. Keeping the segments of a major space program 
aligned can be a significant challenge, particularly with multi-service 
or joint programs such as GPS. Section 1603 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 established a ``Council on 
Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing Enterprise,'' which we are using to help identify, elevate, and 
mitigate alignment issues before they become major problems. In 
addition, we acknowledge Congress's efforts to provide consistent 
program funding, which is essential to maintaining schedules and 
keeping segments synchronized.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. As part of the re-architecture of 
the Space and Missile Systems Center known as SMC 2.0, I recently made 
several key organizational changes to ensure synchronization across all 
aspects of the space enterprise. The SMC Portfolio Architect works 
across the SMC portfolio and in conjunction with the Air Force Space 
Command Enterprise Architect and other DOD space stakeholders. In 
concert with the SMC Portfolio Architect, I appointed senior military 
and civilian leaders to ensure the synchronization among all components 
of each space mission area. For example, for Positioning, Navigation, 
and Timing (PNT) under which GPS falls, we have a graduated Senior 
Materiel Leader (the highest level of certification for DOD acquisition 
professionals) who acts as the overall mission integrator for PNT. This 
Air Force colonel is backed up by a GS-15 Director Mission Integration, 
a GS-15 System of Systems Engineer, and another graduated Senior 
Materiel Leader serving as the Chief Architect. Together, this team of 
seasoned acquisition and operational experts track progress of space, 
ground, and control segments to avoid divergence of capabilities or 
delivery schedule. A similar construct exists for all other National 
Security Space mission areas such as Missile Warning, Satellite 
Communications, and Weather. The mission integrator will chair a 
mission configuration control board to approve any changes to all 
programs within the PNT mission area. Additionally, the Systems of 
Systems Engineer and the SMC Portfolio Architect will chair an 
enterprise configuration control board across missions to ensure no one 
mission change adversely affects another (e.g. launch mission changes 
driving unacceptable costs into the space segment, or vice versa). 
Lastly, the Chief Architect conducts modeling, simulation, and analysis 
to ensure mission needs are accurately captured and Program Executive 
Officers understand the requirements for the programs within their 
acquisition portfolio.

    39. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John 
Thompson, as DOD considers making more space systems resilient, through 
approaches like disaggregation or using hosted payloads, what could be 
done to ensure all segments of the system (e.g., satellites, ground 
systems, and user terminals) are synchronized so the warfighter can 
take full advantage of the capabilities provided as they are fielded?
    Secretary Rapuano. In order to leverage innovative approaches like 
disaggregation or hosted payloads, we must relearn how to build, 
deploy, operate, and innovate rapidly, all at substantially lower cost. 
This requires a shift in mindset from how we have traditionally 
acquired space capabilities. A key component of DOD's space 
transformation is the Space Development Agency (SDA). The SDA's role is 
to define and monitor the Department's future threat-driven space 
architecture and to accelerate the development and fielding of new 
military space capabilities necessary to ensure our technological and 
military advantage in space for national defense. A feature of this 
architecture is a proliferated space transport layer, which leverages 
commercial networking standards and protocols. This will help 
ameliorate some of the synchronization issues we have today, which are 
a consequence of legacy, proprietary interfaces.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to how the Space and 
Missile Systems Center (SMC) will maintain schedule and performance 
alignment within mission areas by using senior, experienced leaders as 
mission area integrators, the Chief Architect will use modeling, 
simulation, and analysis to help Air Force Space Command refine and 
clearly articulate warfighter requirements that require materiel 
solutions. The SMC Chief Architect and the mission area integrators 
will remain actively engaged in the acquisition programs continually 
refining and assessing new technology or modernization initiatives to 
achieve the most effective mission performance at prudent costs. 
Resilience of satellites crosses multiple areas and the Chief Architect 
will use industry standards, like model-based systems engineering and 
digital twins, to trade performance and costs. Ultimately, the Chief 
Architect and the Systems of Systems Engineer will design and maintain 
standards (i.e. data standards, interface control documents, etc.) to 
ensure that SMC weapon systems are interoperable to the maximum extent 
practical. Additionally, continued investment in enterprise tools such 
as Enterprise Space Battle Management Command & Control (ESBMC2) and 
Enterprise Ground Services (EGS) will continue to prosecute the vision 
for flexibility in space to counter threats and leverage the advantage 
that space assets bring.

    40. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John 
Thompson, to what extent will user equipment programs be integrated 
into the Space Force? If they are not, how do you plan to better 
synchronize them? Won't we continue to have disconnects?
    Secretary Rapuano. Most user equipment programs will remain within 
their respective Military Services because it is vital that these 
terminals be integrated with the weapon systems they support. The 
Department recognizes the need to synchronize across the Military 
Services more effectively, which is one of the main reasons an Under 
Secretary of the Air Force for Space was included in the proposal. This 
individual would provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space 
Force and look across the Department, not only to synchronize our user 
equipment programs, but also to provide advocacy for the Space budget 
at the highest levels and to oversee our space architecture development 
going forward.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. As Congress considers the 
Department's legislative proposal to stand up a Space Force, the Space 
and Missile Systems Center remains focused on delivering the premier 
space capabilities to the Joint and Allied Force. SMC will work with 
leadership within the Department, the Air Force, and if stood-up, the 
Space Force, to ensure user equipment programs, and all other segments 
of critical space capabilities, are integrated across the spectrum to 
ensure consistent and reliable warfighter support.
                            launch schedule
    41. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the Air 
Force announced LSA awards to three companies in October 2018. The 
purpose of these awards was to: ``to quickly transition from the use of 
non-allied space launch engines, implement sustainable competition for 
National Security Space (NSS) launch services, and maintain assured 
access to space.'' However, recent indications suggest that the program 
as structured may fail to achieve some or all of these goals. A key 
program objective was to have certified launch vehicles ready to send 
critical national security satellites to space by April 2022. However, 
within weeks of the LSA award announcement, all three winners disclosed 
significant schedule delays. What is the current schedule toward 
certification for each of the three LSA award winners?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service 
Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch 
capability by April 2022. The selected offerors remain consistent with 
what was briefed to the Congressional committee staffs shortly after 
award. The Air Force updated its requirements dates based on actual 
changes to the projected National Security Space Launch manifest during 
the solicitation, and requested updated schedules that optimized 
development progress and risk based on these need dates.

    42. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, is the Air 
Force aware of further delays to the schedule announced in October 
2018?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service 
Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch 
capability by April 2022, per their original schedules. The Air Force 
is working closely with industry through development challenges that 
are a normal part of a complex rocket development program, as an 
expected part of the National Security Space Launch strategy.

    43. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why didn't 
the Air Force know in October of 2018--just 5 months ago--when you made 
these awards that schedules were already slipping?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Launch Service Agreements (LSA) 
schedule dates remain consistent with what was briefed to the 
Congressional committee staffs shortly after award. The Air Force 
updated the LSA Request for Proposal (RFP) to reflect initial launch 
capability need dates based on the actual launch manifest. This allowed 
our industry partners to optimize development planning and saved cost. 
Through the solicitation process, the Air Force worked closely with all 
LSA offerors to understand both technical and schedule risk 
developments.

    44. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, did you 
independently assess the schedule representations made to your by the 
bidders?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, as part of the source 
selection evaluation process, the Launch Service Agreement (LSA) 
Request for Proposal (RFP) requested Integrated Master Schedules from 
all bidders. The Air Force assessed each of these schedules, and 
assigned a schedule risk rating that was used as part of the award 
decision per the LSA RFP.

    45. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, will the 
Air Force award a block of the next roughly 10 years of missions this 
year to launch vehicles that have never flown?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is not awarding a 
10 year block of missions. The Phase 2 competition will procure launch 
services for the five-year ordering period from fiscal year 2020 
through fiscal year 2024, corresponding to launch services from fiscal 
year 2022 through fiscal year 2027. The Air Force is investing in new 
launch vehicles with confidence they will meet the Initial Launch 
Capability (ILC) dates for the Phase 2 ordering period.

    46. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, if these 
new rockets are not ready, are you going to request access to more 
Russian rocket engines, or are you going to leverage existing, 
available, certified systems?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force does not anticipate 
needing to request access to more Russian rocket engines than already 
prescribed in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. 
The Air Force is confident the domestic launch systems in development 
will be able to meet National Security Space Launch requirements. To 
mitigate the risk of unforeseen development delays, the Air Force will 
permit Launch Service Procurement contract awardees to offer secondary 
launch vehicles (leveraging certified systems) for the first two years 
of the contract.

    47. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why is it 
important that the both winners of LSP/Phase 2 be able to launch 
Category C missions?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Phase 2 strategy ensures 
space launch operations meet requirements for Assured Access to Space 
(AATS) codified in 10 U.S. Code 2273. The statute specifies the U.S. 
will sustain the availability of at least two space launch vehicles (or 
families of space launch vehicles) capable of delivering into space 
national security payloads. It is critical that two providers be able 
to meet all national security space launch requirements, which includes 
Category C missions, with the flexibility to respond to the evolving 
manifest requirements associated with mission planning. Finally, if the 
Air Force allows offerers' to be selective in the orbits they service, 
the DOD could have sub-optimal launch vehicles, an unwanted sole-source 
environment for specific mission sets, or worst case, no capability to 
meet the most stressing National Security Space (NSS) orbits. (Without 
DOD partnership no company's business case would lead them to pursue a 
launch system that supports the robust requirements needed for future 
NSS missions).
            family of beyond line of sight-terminals (fab-t)
    48. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the FAB-T 
Force Element Terminals (FET) subprogram is intended to provide 
survivable and protected satellite communications capabilities for 
several aircraft, including the B-52 and RC-135 platforms. The Air 
Force has indicated that it plans to develop the FET subprogram using 
tailored acquisition approaches and fiscal year 2016 NDAA section 804 
authorities. Has the Air Force made a final determination as to the 
number and type of platforms that will receive the FET?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force intends to produce 
76 Force Element Terminals for the B-52 and 17 for the RC-135. 479 
Force Element Terminals for the KC-135 and KC-46 tankers remain as a 
development objective if a future requirement is identified.

    49. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what 
extent has the Air Force identified acquisition risks related to 
developing and fielding a terminal for multiple aircraft platforms, and 
what steps is the Air Force taking to address these risks?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has ongoing risk 
reduction contracts with the Force Element Terminal manufacturer to 
study system requirements, architecture, and platform integration. 
There are additional risk reduction contracts ongoing and planned with 
the B-52 and RC-135 platform prime contractors to study additional 
integration and installation requirements. These studies will burn down 
risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.

    50. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what 
progress has the Air Force made toward its planned contract award for 
FET development in fiscal year 2019?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal 
Acquisition Strategy was approved by the Milestone Decision Authority 
in February of 2019. The program remains on track to award a 
development contract in fiscal year 2019.

    51. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, how will 
the Air Force avoid the development problems that caused multi-year 
delays to the Command Post Terminals subprogram and ensure that this 
new subprogram meets the five-year timeline as a proposed section 804 
acquisition?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal 
subprogram leverages technology from existing AEHF terminal product 
lines, to include the Command Post Terminal, Very Important Person 
Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) Protected SATCOM (VPS), and Worldwide 
EHF Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (WEB-T) to meet the required five-
year timeline. In addition, early risk reduction contracts will allow 
the program office to identify developmental challenges and burn down 
risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.

    52. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, FAB-T and 
the related PNVC system are expected to provide the President and 
senior leaders secure and survivable voice conferencing capabilities 
using the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) space system. 
However, AEHF already has four of a planned six satellites on orbit and 
the earliest AEHF satellites will be nearing the end of their projected 
service life by the time FAB-T and the Presidential and National Voice 
Conferencing (PNVC) system are fully operational. How will the Air 
Force ensure that systems like FAB-T and PNVC are compatible with the 
space system(s) that replaces the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF) system?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS), 
the planned replacement for AEHF, includes a requirement for backwards 
compatibility with existing AEHF and NC3 architecture and 
interoperability with XDR user terminals. In addition, the FAB-T 
program office regularly participates in the MILSATCOM Control Board 
and associated technical working groups to ensure that satellite and 
terminal development are properly synchronized.
                overhead persistent infrared satellites
    53. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804 
authorities give the services permission to waive the burdensome 
requirements process for systems that need to be fielded in 3 to 5 
years. The Air Force designated the follow-on to the Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) missile warning constellation--known as Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared, or Next-Gen OPIR--as the 
``pacesetting'' program that will guide future efforts. To what extent 
is the Air Force confident the program can succeed in launching the 
first Next-Gen OPIR satellite in 2023, 2 years ahead of a schedule it 
presented less than a year ago?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force accepted that 
challenge, knowing that there were two prerequisites which would start 
the clock for the program manager to deliver success to launch the 
first Next Gen Geosynchronous (GEO) satellite by calendar year 2023: 
(1) Getting on contract and (2) Securing the required funding. A 
focused effort by the team at SMC, and the Air Force's embrace of the 
use of section 804 authorities allowed the program manager to get on 
contract with both the Next Gen GEO (Lockheed Martin Space) and Next 
Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems) satellite prime 
contractors within 3 months, and to complete payload selection within 6 
months. While SMC and Lockheed Martin (Next Gen GEO) moved out at a 
pace to meet a calendar year 2023 launch, we were unable to secure the 
funding necessary to sustain this speed. The schedule acceleration was 
underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required 
funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs 
largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The 
Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into 
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold 
reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. OSD submitted an ATR to 
reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while 
Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232 
million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an 
associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The 
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and 
approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the 
program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took 
this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year 
2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program. 
SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the 
program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing 
the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.

    54. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what are 
the primary reasons that the planned date for the full system to become 
operational in 2029 have not changed given the acceleration in 
schedule?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force chose to accelerate 
the Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellite program while holding the 
Next Generation Polar program satellites steady. Given the program 
strategy to maintain large reuse in payload design between the GEO and 
Polar satellites, accelerating the payload design efforts through 
competitive prototyping burns down early program risk for both efforts. 
The current Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program baseline for initial launch 
capability (ILC) are GEO-1 (fiscal year 2025); GEO-2 (fiscal year 
2027); Polar-1 (fiscal year 2027); GEO-3 (fiscal year 2028); and Polar-
2 (fiscal year 2029). After the launch of each Next Gen OPIR satellite 
into its intended GEO or Polar orbit, it can take approximately 12 or 
more months to complete ground system and on-orbit satellite checkout 
activities; as well as, sensor-tuning activities before the satellites 
are ready to transition to operations.

    55. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what 
extent is the decision to speed up the Next-Gen OPIR schedule and build 
in advanced sensors and resiliency features requiring a major shift in 
cost estimates and how is this affecting the program?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The schedule acceleration was 
underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required 
funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs 
largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The 
Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into 
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold 
reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. The Department submitted an 
ATR to reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while 
Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232 
million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an 
associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The 
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and 
approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the 
program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took 
this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year 
2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program. 
SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the 
program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing 
the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.

    56. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what due 
diligence did the Air Force perform to estimate the potential cost of 
the program?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force executing due 
diligence by completing a program office estimate and three (3) 
independent cost estimates at the Center, Air Force, and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense levels. The Air Force developed a program office 
estimate using a parametric cost model and acquiring information from 
multiple sources including historical data from similar programs; and 
estimates were independently validated by the financial management 
function at the Space and Missile Systems Center. Additionally, the Air 
Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) independently developed a Non-
Advocacy Cost Assessment of the program. Lastly, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) 
office is conducting a separate Independent Cost Estimate which will 
support Air Force and OSD budget planning.

    57. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what 
extent will having sole-sourced contracts allow single suppliers to 
dominate the market, thereby limiting the government's ability to find 
an alternative contractor should unforeseen issues with a current 
vendor arise?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. While the Air Force is executing 
the Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program using two sole-source contracts, it 
has taken direct action to foster and enable a competitive environment. 
The Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellites were awarded sole source to 
the incumbent contractor after the government determined through 
extensive market research that they were the only provider that was 
postured to meet the aggressive delivery date of fiscal year 2025. In 
order to foster competition and increase the industrial base 
capabilities to support an open competition for the subsequent Block 1 
program, the Air Force awarded the Next Gen OPIR Polar satellite 
contract to a separate prime contractor. In order to mitigate the 
program's highest risks in the main mission payload, the Air Force 
required the satellite prime contractors to execute a payload 
competition and carry up to two payload vendors to provide for 
alternate paths. The prime contractors are also utilizing this 
``alternate source'' strategy on multiple other components as needed to 
mitigate program risk.

    58. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what 
extent is the Air Force monitoring sub-tier suppliers for this program?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has created strong 
working relationships with the prime contractors and subcontractors by 
conducting shoulder-to-shoulder working groups that meet several times 
a week throughout all levels of the program's planning and execution 
activities. For example, the Air Force required the Next Gen GEO 
(Lockheed Martin Space) and Next Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace 
Systems) satellite prime contractors to conduct subcontractor 
competitions for the mission payload (MPL) with Government insight and 
oversight. Both Next Gen OPIR prime contractors are currently carrying 
two MPL subcontractors until a Government-approved down-select 
decision, maintaining a competitive environment among MPL suppliers 
while leveraging this critical path risk mitigation to reduce the 
highest risk on the program schedule. Beyond the MPL, the Government is 
also monitoring subcontractor performance, in concert with the prime 
contractors, at key suppliers guided by program risk assessments.

    59. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, SBIRS GEO 
satellites 5 and 6 were to be derivatives of GEO satellite 4, with 
limited design changes to capitalize on the use of previously procured 
engineering and parts. Yet, technical challenges and manufacturing 
issues have arisen that have caused schedule delays. Please explain why 
the Air Force is confident in the Next Gen OPIR acquisition cycle time 
when a lower risk, more understood.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are in 
production as technology refreshed equivalents of SBIRS GEO-3/4 
satellites and are intended as replenishments for SBIRS GEO-1/2 
satellites. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are being built on Lockheed 
Martin's modernized LM 2100 satellite bus through the technical refresh 
contract change in 2015 and is on track to meet the September 2020 
contractual delivery date to enable the current planned initial launch 
capability in January 2021 and January 2022, respectively. Though the 
SBIRS GEO-5/6 program has experienced some manufacturing challenges, 
this is not unexpected with the integration of a first article, tech 
refreshed satellite. Lockheed Martin Space has worked closely with the 
Air Force to resolve and close all issues to date. As a result, the Air 
Force is confident the acquisition cycle is achievable because Next Gen 
OPIR GEO-1/2/3 satellites will leverage the LM 2100 common satellite 
bus that is used across multiple Lockheed Martin programs and mission 
areas. The LM 2100 has recently been enhanced to add capabilities that 
benefit multiple mission areas to include OPIR. Bus enhancements 
include elimination of obsolescence and insertion of modern electronics 
in multiple subsystems, as well as increased resiliency capabilities 
that are all applicable to the Next Gen OPIR mission. While SBIRS 
provided ``leading edge'' capabilities with new technologies, Next Gen 
OPIR uses mature technologies based on decades of Air Force and 
Industry lessons learned: (1) Next Gen OPIR intends to use a single, 
simplified onboard sensor--SBIRS has both a scanner and starrer; (2) By 
taking advantage of advancements in technology, Next Gen OPIR is able 
to save payload weight and power--allows reallocation of the Size, 
Weight, and Power savings to resilience capabilities; (3) Requirements 
are simplified to focus on strategically survivable missile warning; 
(4) The acquisition is streamlined; and (5) The program office is using 
2016 National Defense Authorization Act section 804 authorities, 
allowing rapid delivery of capabilities to keep missile warning ahead 
of adversary efforts. To reduce schedule and technical program risks, 
Lockheed Martin has two mission payload subcontractors (Raytheon & the 
Northrop Grumman-Ball Aerospace Team) designing, developing, and 
prototyping missile warning sensors in a competitive environment to 
maximize the use of parallel design, development, and test processes. 
The two suppliers were selected in September 2018 just 45 days after 
Next Gen OPIR's start, further embracing the program's rapid 
acquisition requirements. The recent successful completion of the Next 
Gen OPIR GEO System Requirements Review and mission payload System 
Design Reviews demonstrated a solid understanding of the mission, 
requirements, current design, risks and plans for work moving forward, 
enabling the Next Gen OPIR GEO program to proceed with preliminary 
design activities. The program remains on track to achieve a GEO space 
vehicle delivery by fiscal year 2025.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                        military space programs
    60. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, the fiscal year 2020 
budget request includes nearly $50 million to pursue the development of 
non-kinetic and kinetic options for space-based missile defense 
interception. In 2016, former Missile Defense Agency Director Adm. 
James Syring told the House Armed Services Committee the following: ``I 
have serious concerns about the technical feasibility of interceptors 
in space, and I have serious concerns about the long-term affordability 
of a program like that.'' Do you agree with Adm. Syring? If not, why 
not? Please provide an unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that 
the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a 
space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense. 
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of 
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other 
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
    As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based 
missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate 
objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the 
capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of 
the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in 
today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible 
information with which to make the most informed decisions.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that it will be 
challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will 
always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However, 
we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully 
rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in 
orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile 
upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S. 
industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and 
proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing 
of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead 
Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the 
uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the 
Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the 
Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense 
against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that it will be 
challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will 
always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However, 
we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully 
rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in 
orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile 
upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S. 
industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and 
proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing 
of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead 
Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the 
uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the 
Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the 
Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense 
against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.

    61. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, former Missile Defense 
Agency Director Adm. James Syring observed in 2016 that the ``basic 
feasibility'' of an operational space-based interceptor layer ``has not 
yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the 
compressed engagement timelines required. Essential space-based 
interceptor technologies have been worked only sporadically over the 
years and consequently are not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate 
in the near- to mid-term.'' Do you agree or disagree? Please provide an 
unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that 
the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a 
space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense. 
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of 
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other 
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
    As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based 
missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate 
objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the 
capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of 
the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in 
today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible 
information with which to make the most informed decisions.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end 
interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the 
technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats 
are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking 
two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and 
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has 
demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial 
companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space 
Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic 
feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense 
Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to 
assess the technological readiness for the US to field space-based 
interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include 
responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of 
detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while 
mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end 
interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the 
technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats 
are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking 
two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and 
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has 
demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial 
companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space 
Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic 
feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense 
Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to 
assess the technological readiness for the U.S. to field space-based 
interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include 
responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of 
detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while 
mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.

    62. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, if Russia or China were 
to move to establish missile defense interceptors in space, how would 
you advise the Secretary of Defense to respond? Please provide an 
unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rapuano. Russia and China have substantial missile 
defense programs and other military capabilities intended to threaten 
space. The defensive actions the United States is taking to improve 
space-based missile defense sensor systems and to explore space-based 
interceptor concepts are fully consistent with our obligations under 
relevant international law, including the United Nations Charter and 
the Outer Space Treaty.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Similar to the discussions 
surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based 
interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since 
it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that 
threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal 
sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot 
capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object 
Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely 
important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their 
performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of 
action across the spectrum of military operations.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to the discussions 
surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based 
interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since 
it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that 
threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal 
sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot 
capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object 
Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely 
important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their 
performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of 
action across the spectrum of military operations.

    63. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David 
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, what historical 
evidence is available to demonstrate that space-based missile defense 
has been affordable and effective for the United States? Please provide 
an unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rapuano. The conceptual benefits of engaging missile 
threats from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long 
been recognized, as have the critical technical and operational issues 
that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful and 
affordable capability.
    Given the significant advantages of space-based missile defenses, 
the 2019 Missile Defense Review tasked the Missile Defense Agency to 
study the development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept 
layer capable of boost-phase defense. This report is scheduled to be 
completed between July and the end of 2019, and will identify the 
technologies, schedule, cost, and other requirements for a space-based 
defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a 
key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include 
multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing 
interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the 
purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA 
leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical 
examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have 
seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile 
defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors, 
advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and 
proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit 
demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect 
these various functions while minimizing debris.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a 
key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include 
multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing 
interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the 
purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA 
leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical 
examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have 
seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile 
defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors, 
advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and 
proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit 
demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect 
these various functions while minimizing debris.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph Manchin
                         acquisition timelines
    64. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General John Thompson, in the 
testimony provided you highlight a 65 percent savings on acquisition 
timelines based on the implementation of the SMC 2.0 initiative. Ms. 
Chaplain in her testimony though highlighted some significant delays 
such as a 3.5 year delay in the AEHF satellite program's first launch 
and a 4 year delay in the Global Positioning System III (GPS III) 
program. Are these delays symptomatic of problems not addressed by the 
SMC 2.0 enterprise or is this a sign of the new processes attempting to 
catch up to and correct old problems?
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. Over the last 4 years, the Space 
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has taken a multi-faceted approach to 
reduce the pre-contract award timelines and has seen a 65 percent 
reduction. SMC 2.0 29 continues to reduce this timeline by delegating 
acquisition authority to the lowest level possible and reduces/
streamlines the documentation development and review timelines. To 
address the program execution timelines, we are using 804 authorities 
to critically think about the operational requirement and develop an 
acquisition strategy to burn down the developmental risk. Although the 
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of DODI 5000.02 
was meant to ``prototype'' and mature technology, the cost of space 
programs limited lengthy technical reviews with multiple contractors. 
As a result, programs were not performing true prototyping, but rather 
they matured the technology at the piece part level with limited 
vendor(s), restricting the program's vendor options in the Engineering, 
Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase. By emphasizing capability 
delivery with constrained costs and shortened time horizons, our 
negotiation leverage shifts away from industry partners and back to 
SMC. Rather than locking SMC into decades-long contracts, we can award 
short term contracts and/or agreements with less requirement 
specificity, forcing industry to prove what capability can be delivered 
the fastest. Programs can then select the contractor(s) with the 
greatest potential with real data and not a concept or paper design. 
This will drive our programs to uncover critical component issues, 
hardware/software integrations risks, and/or software development risks 
earlier.
                        agency responsibilities
    65. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in February 
Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson wrote a memo to Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin, in 
which she detailed why she believed the SDA was replicating duties 
already directed by Congress to the Air Force and that the agency 
lacked a ``uniquely identifiable mission''. She also highlighted that 
the Air Force had already stood up its Space RCO to complement its 
existing Rapid RCO with a space focus. Given the growing number of 
space focused research and acquisition agencies to include SDA, Space 
RCO, SMC and DARPA, has the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Department of the Air Force clearly outlined responsibilities and 
deconflicted lines of effort to maximize growth while minimizing waste?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. Leaders across the Department 
have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile 
delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development 
Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance 
Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and 
Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all 
represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal. The 
Department's initial vision of SDA's role is to leverage industry 
investment and commercial capabilities for the next generation space 
architecture. Further, Department and Service acquisition organizations 
continue to improve the rapid delivery of warfighter capabilities while 
minimizing duplication of effort and eliminating non-value-added 
processes and procedures.
             acquisition strategy for space launch vehicles
    66. Senator Manchin. Ms. Chaplain, generally fully open, head-to-
head competition provides benefit in quality and price of products 
delivered. Has GAO conducted any sort of cost assessment since the 
Space Vehicle Launch competition was opened up in 2015 to assess the 
value of the program to date?
    Ms. Chaplain. We agree competition is the cornerstone of a sound 
acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return 
on investment for taxpayers. However, we have not assessed the cost or 
value of the National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle) program since the Air Force amended its 
acquisition strategy to allow for competitive launch service 
procurements. This would be another topic worthy of a future review 
given the changing nature of the launch market.
                        assured access to space
    67. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, Lieutenant 
General John Thompson and Ms. Chaplain, the assured access to space 
policy is critical to ensure we are always able to provide the ability 
to reach and operate from space. I've become aware that the LSA 
companies' products share significant commonality across many systems, 
to include engines. Is our Defense Industrial Base adequately 
diversified under these agreements in order to provide continual access 
to space if a critical failure of any similar or common component is 
discovered?
    Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force selected the best 
portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide 
effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does 
include some commonality between launch systems, this does not 
inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by 
demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air 
Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components 
across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the 
Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet 
Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
    Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force selected the best 
portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide 
effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does 
include some commonality between launch systems, this does not 
inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by 
demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air 
Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components 
across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the 
Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet 
Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
    Ms. Chaplain. We have not reviewed each LSA companies' launch 
system development efforts and plans, but we are aware of instances of 
commonality among the systems. Some commonality is also present between 
the Delta IV and Atlas V launch families, and issues with common 
components have resulted in or raised risk of launch delays for both 
families until the issues were resolved. Ultimately, it is the Air 
Force's responsibility to assess the sufficiency of its space launch 
industrial base and any potential impacts on assured access to space.

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