[Senate Hearing 116-510]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-510
MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND
PROGRAMS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 27, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-157 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
J JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JONI ERNST, Iowa TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairwoman MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 27, 2019
Page
Military Space Operations, Policy, and Programs.................. 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 1
Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich............................. 2
Witness Statements
Rapuano, Honorable Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 2
Homeland Defense and Global Security.
Thompson, Lieutenant General John F., USAF, Commander, Space and 9
Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command.
Thompson, General David D., USAF, Vice Commander, Air Force Space 17
Command.
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 25
Management,
Government Accountability Office.
Questions for the Record......................................... 74
(iii)
MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 2019
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Cramer, King, Heinrich, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Hearing will come to order.
I'd like to welcome everyone to the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee's first open hearing of the 116th Congress.
We meet today to receive testimony on the national security
space enterprise. Appearing before the Subcommittee, we have
General David Thompson, Vice Commander of Air Force Space
Command; General John Thompson, Commander of the Space and
Missile Systems Center; Mr. Ken--is it----
Secretary Rapuano. Rapuano.
Senator Fischer.--Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; and Ms.
Cristina Chaplain, who directs the Government Accountability
Office's work on military space programs.
Thank you all for your service and for being here today.
We meet at a time of increased focus on the space domain.
In the last few years, we have seen a significant evolution in
our approach to space. It's now widely recognized that space is
a warfighting domain. It is also a domain in which adversaries
are increasingly active and upon which our Nation increasingly
depends. Accordingly, we must ensure that our military space
operations, policies, and programs are keeping pace with the
changing environment, and we look forward to the testimony from
our witnesses about the Department's effort in this regard.
Their testimony today will help the Subcommittee make informed
decisions as we continue to craft the defense authorization
bill for fiscal year 2020.
I would also like to note for my colleagues that the full
committee will be holding a hearing on April 11th to discuss
the Department's proposal to establish a Space Force. With that
in mind, it is my intention to use my time today to talk about
some of the other key equities in the national security space
portfolio.
And, with that, I would turn to my colleague and Ranking
Member, Senator Heinrich, for any comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
Senator Heinrich. Well, first, let me thank Chairwoman
Fischer for holding today's hearing. This is our first
together, and I look forward to future interactions on this
Subcommittee.
Let me also thank our witnesses for taking the time to
testify today. Between this Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal
year 2020 budget proposal and the full committee hearing on the
proposed Space Force, there will be much to talk about,
relative to space, in the coming weeks.
At today's hearing, I want to concentrate on the threat we
face in space, the budget submission to counter these threats,
and organizational proposals to train and equip our space
personnel.
The idea of a Space Force is not new. The House proposed an
almost identical concept in its fiscal year 2018 defense
authorization bill. It was dropped in conference. The Pentagon
leadership opposed it, as did several of our Senate colleagues.
Having said that, it's no secret that the space domain is
critical to our military operations, to our economy, and our
way of life.
As our adversaries become increasingly active in space, we
certainly can't sit idly by. We must, instead, move with a
greater sense of urgency and purpose. As an engineer, I
continue to prioritize research and development, and cannot
stress enough the importance of fostering a culture of
innovation and rapid acquisition within the space domain.
Whether it's the creation of a Space Development Agency (SDA)
or any larger reorganization, we also should not reinvent the
wheel nor move pieces around for the sake of saying we did so.
We could always strive for our government to be better stewards
of taxpayer dollars and for our military to operate more
effectively, and I look forward to hearing how we may be able
to do so.
Again, thank you all for coming today, and I look forward
to hearing all of your testimony.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
We will begin with opening statements. I would remind our
witnesses today that your full statement will be included in
the record.
Mr. Secretary, if we could start with you, please.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
Secretary Rapuano. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is
a pleasure to appear before you today, along with Lieutenant
General ``DT'' Thompson, Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson,
and Ms. Cristina Chaplain.
Space is a vital national interest. It underpins our
economy and way of life, supporting our academia, agricultural,
banking, and travel sectors, among others. Moreover, the
rapidly growing commercial space sector offers enormous promise
for the prosperity of Americans and our global partners.
Commercial entities led by the United States are developing and
delivering new space technologies and capabilities at a speed
never seen before. Space is also crucial to the defense of the
United States and our allies and partners.
As outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), long-
term strategic competition is the central challenge to the U.S.
prosperity and national security. Space is key to this
competition. China and Russia are developing military
capabilities, doctrine, and organizations intended to place
United States space systems at risk. They are developing a
suite of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), including ground-launch
missiles and directed-energy weapons, and continue to launch
experimental satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit
activities to advance their counterspace capabilities. Many of
these systems could be employed in the gray zone, that is,
activities below the threshold of armed conflict in a manner
designed to hold U.S., allied, and partner capabilities at risk
and limit our response options.
The emergence of new major state actors in space, and the
pace of the technological development, are changing the
character of warfare, presenting new challenges and
opportunities to military space forces. No longer do space
systems simply enable terrestrial forces to fight and win wars.
Actions in space also will directly contribute to the outcome
of future conflicts. In order to preserve peace and deter
aggression, the Department of Defense (DOD) must adapt. Without
change, the United States is at risk of losing its comparative
advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space would
undermine our Nation's prosperity and erode the ability of the
Joint Force to deter aggression, protect critical national
defense and economic functions, assure our allies and partners,
and project power globally. While the United States would
prefer that space remain conflict-free, we must recognize
rising challenges, and overcome them. The Department must do
more to accelerate its response to the changing dynamics of
space by adapting our organizations, policies, doctrine,
capabilities, and Joint Force employment to more effectively
deter aggression, protect our interests, and enhance our
lethality.
Earlier this month, the Department provided Congress with a
legislative proposal for the establishment of the U.S. Space
Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces. If authorized, the
Space Force will transform our approach to space by providing
singular focus to maintaining and increasing our advantage in
countering current and future threats. Establishing a sixth
branch of our military with dedicated leadership will unify
focus and accelerate the development of space doctrine,
capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats,
institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further
build space warfighting culture. The role of providing Joint
Force employment of space capabilities lies with the United
States Space Command (SPACECOM), a Unified Combatant Command
focused on planning and executing joint space warfighting
operations. Establishing U.S. SPACECOM will bring full-time
operational focus to securing the space domain and streamline
command and control for time-sensitive operations.
Additionally, the Department of Defense has undertaken a
series of space acquisition reforms. These reforms, such as
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) 2.0, will continue to
mature with the establishment of a Joint Space Development
Agency dedicated to rapidly developing and fielding next-
generation military space capabilities. The SDA will be
empowered to go fast, and would be pursuing a development of a
transformational new architecture that leverages the investment
taking place in the commercial sector.
The Department looks forward to working closely with this
committee and all of Congress to ensure that we maintain our
freedom of operation in space to support our national security,
our economic prosperity, and our way of life.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary Kenneth Rapuano
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
along with General Jay Raymond, Commander of Air Force Space Command
and U.S. Strategic Command Joint Force Space Component Commander;
Lieutenant General John Thompson, Commander, Space and Missile Systems
Center; and Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management at the Government Accountability Office. I serve as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security. In this capacity I oversee and guide the development and
implementation of the Department of Defense's strategy and policy to
achieve its space mission.
Space is integral to the U.S. way of life and the U.S. way of war.
Although United States space systems have historically maintained a
technological advantage over those of our potential adversaries, those
potential adversaries are now advancing their space capabilities and
actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis or
conflict. Without change, the United States is at risk of losing its
comparative advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space
would undermine our Nation's prosperity and would erode the ability of
the joint force to deter aggression, to defend the Homeland from
attack, and to project power abroad.
While the U.S. would prefer that the space domain remain free of
conflict, we must recognize rising challenges, and be prepared to meet
and overcome them. The Department must accelerate, and is accelerating,
its response to the changing dynamics of space. We are adapting our
organizations, policies, doctrine, and capabilities to more effectively
deter aggression and protect our interests.
Earlier this month the Department provided Congress with a
legislative proposal for the establishment of the United States Space
Force as a new branch of our armed forces. If authorized, the Space
Force would transform our approach to space, increasing our
responsiveness in this warfighting domain. The proposal maximizes
warfighting capacity and advocacy for space, while minimizing
bureaucracy and potential risks. Establishing a sixth branch of our
military with dedicated leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate
the development of space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to
outpace future threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities;
and further build space warfighting culture.
The Department looks forward to working closely with this committee
and all of Congress on ensuring we maintain our freedom of operation in
space in order to support our national security and our economic
prosperity.
national security strategy & national defense strategy
The Department's approach to space is aligned and nested within our
broader national strategies. Space is a warfighting domain, and just as
in air, land, sea, and cyberspace, the Department of Defense must
ensure it is prepared to address threats to our national security in
the space domain.
The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy
recognize space as a priority domain and an operating area from which
capabilities are employed and forces are enabled, and recognizes the
potential for conflict to extend into space. These strategies direct
that we compete as necessary to deter potential adversaries and, when
necessary, win any conflict that begins in or extends into space. Our
ability to operate and leverage space to advance scientific knowledge,
promote prosperity, and secure the freedoms of our citizens and allies
and partners must remain unimpeded. We will compete, we will deter,
and, if called upon to fight, we will win.
The National Security Strategy, published in December 2017,
provides a plan to (1) protect the American people, the Homeland, and
the American way of life; (2) promote American prosperity; (3) preserve
peace through strength; and (4) advance American influence. Each aspect
of this plan is fortified and supported by the advantages our Nation
gains from space capabilities.
Our 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) charts the course for how
DOD will contribute to each of the National Security Strategy's four
national interests. Under the NDS, long-term strategic competitions
with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department,
and because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to United States
security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to
increase in the future, require both sustained focus and investment.
Space is a key arena in which this competition is occurring. Addressing
the challenges posed to our preeminence as a space power is fundamental
to our efforts.
To meet the challenge of great power competition, the Department is
broadly pursuing three lines of effort--increasing the lethality of our
forces, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and reforming the
Department to ensure affordability and delivery of capabilities at the
speed of relevance. These approaches are as applicable to the space
domain as they are to any other Department endeavor.
strategic environment
Space underpins the U.S. way of life and U.S. way of war. Space
provides an unparalleled vantage point and medium for rapid, global
information collection and dissemination. Space-based capabilities
facilitate the flow of people and goods worldwide, while guiding
military forces to their positions and weapons to their targets.
Satellites enable individuals worldwide to communicate from remote
corners of the globe and allow national authorities to command and
control forces in multiple theaters simultaneously. Small businesses
and multinational corporations alike rely on space-based imagery and
other sensing to plan their daily operations, while military commanders
understand the security environment through information gathered by
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.
Our nation's interests in space are expanding. New investments and
new technology are fueling opportunities for an expanding ecosystem of
space systems and services. Advanced technologies are revolutionizing
accessibility to space and space-derived capabilities at dramatically
reduced costs. Technology continues to progress rapidly in areas such
as 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, while
advances in electronics are enabling ever-smaller form factors. Space
system developers are leveraging all of these trends. Many of
yesterday's cutting-edge technologies are mere commodities today,
greatly reducing the economic barriers to entry into space. Significant
amounts of private financing is pouring into commercial space, fueling
a growing space industry. We are witnessing advances in high-throughput
communication satellites and the development of commercial plans for
mega-constellations offering new capabilities in low-Earth orbit. The
commercial sector, enabled by traditional aerospace companies as well
as entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, is driving down the cost of
access to space through the development of re-usable launch vehicles
and other techniques. These developments together are planting the
seeds from which future economic and commercial opportunities may grow.
This growth demonstrates that space is no longer the purview of
only superpowers or even a handful of nations; participation in space
activities is growing more diverse. Space-derived information services
such as imagery, weather, communications, and intelligence,
traditionally reserved to the governments of just a few space-faring
nations, are becoming more attainable to non-State entities, companies,
and individuals. This presents new challenges for the Department as new
States, non-State actors, and commercial entities, both foreign and
domestic, are able to provide services and capabilities once only
available to the U.S. Government and a few other space-faring nations.
The pace of technological expansion and growing accessibility are
forcing our military to think and plan differently, as potential
adversaries leverage increased capabilities to observe our force
movements, track our activities, and communicate with their own forces
at efficiencies, data rates, and levels of security not previously
available.
The United States also faces serious and growing challenges to its
freedom to operate in space. China and Russia have studied how the
United States joint force operates and have embarked on major efforts
to develop, test, and field counter-space capabilities in order to
destroy or disrupt U.S. and allied space capabilities in a crisis or
conflict. These strategic competitors view space as an area where they
could weaken our advantages and cause cascading impacts on our sea,
air, land, and cyber systems that rely on space-based capabilities.
Both have reorganized their militaries in 2015, emphasizing the
importance of space operations, and making denial of space advantages
are key components of their strategy. As a result, the United States no
longer enjoys the freedom to develop and leverage space systems without
deliberate regard to other nations' counterspace capabilities.
These same countries, recognizing the value of space capabilities,
are also expanding their use of space to support the lethality and
effectiveness of their military forces in other domains. As noted in a
recent Defense Intelligence Agency report ``Both [China and Russia]
have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are
making improvements to existing systems, including space launch
vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. These capabilities
provide their militaries with the ability to command and control their
forces worldwide and also with enhanced situational awareness, enabling
them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces.'' \1\
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\1\ Challenges to Security in Space, Defense Intelligence Agency,
February 2019
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These emerging threats, in and from space, place our nation's
security at ever-increasing risk and drive the U.S. imperative to
strengthen its space posture and integration and synchronization of
combat power across multiple domains. This includes both the ability to
assure and defend our space-based capabilities from attack and the
ability to protect our terrestrial forces from space-enabled attacks.
space strategy and posture
This new environment highlights the role of space in changing the
character of warfare and presents new challenges and opportunities to
military space forces. No longer do space systems simply support
terrestrial forces to fight and win wars; actions in space also will
directly contribute to the outcome of future crises or conflicts. In
order to preserve peace and deter aggression, the Department of Defense
(DOD) must adapt. The DOD must be prepared to assure freedom of
operation in space, to deter attacks, and, when necessary, to defeat
space and counterspace threats to the national security interests of
the United States and its allies and partners.
Policy and Strategy
In addition to the National Security Strategy and the National
Defense Strategy, the Department's efforts for Space are guided by the
National Strategy for Space, which was signed by the President in March
2018. The National Strategy for Space builds on the other strategies by
emphasizing peace through strength, and maintaining U.S. leadership,
preeminence, and freedom of operation in the space domain. The space
strategy encompasses all aspects of our nation's space interest. It is
composed of a strategic framework and implementation plan outlining
four key strategic objectives. The first is to strengthen the safety,
stability, and sustainability of space activities. The second is to
deter and, when necessary, defeat adversary space and counterspace
threats used for purposes hostile to the national security interests of
the United States and its allies and partners. The third is to maintain
U.S. commercial industry as the leading provider of traditional and
innovative space technologies, goods, and services on the international
space market while limiting potential adversaries' access to critical
technologies and capabilities. The fourth is to maintain and extend
U.S. human presence and robotic exploration beyond Earth to transform
knowledge of ourselves, our planet, our solar system, and our universe.
The implementation plan describes four lines of effort: mission
assurance; deterrence and warfighting; organizational support; and
creating conducive domestic and international environments for U.S.
space objectives. The lines of effort represent the key priorities of
the strategy and, along with the supporting tasks, describe the ways
and means necessary to achieve our strategic objectives.
The first line of effort focuses on mission assurance. We are
accelerating the transformation of our space architecture by
deliberately moving systems from the research and development phase to
the actual fielding of capabilities. As a result, our space systems
will be more resilient and more defendable. We are also looking to
expand the ability to reconstitute space capabilities to reestablish
lost functionality and we are exploring on-orbit satellite servicing
capabilities. Fundamental to our strategy is our mission to deter,
prepare for, and, if directed, prevail in any conflict, in any
environment, against any threat.
The second line of effort focuses on deterrence and warfighting.
Our strategy recognizes that--due to actions by our competitors and
potential adversaries--the space domain is not a sanctuary. This line
of effort seeks to develop options to deter potential adversaries from
aggression, including extending conflict into space. It entails a
refocus of strategic guidance and doctrine; operational plans,
authorities, capabilities, and culture; and rules of engagement to
prepare most effectively for space as a warfighting domain.
The third and fourth lines of effort focus on organizational
support and fostering a conducive environment. We will pursue improved
foundational capabilities, structures, security classification
guidance, and processes in order to enable more effective space
operations and will foster a conducive environment both at home and
abroad. Domestically, this includes streamlining the regulatory
environment to leverage and support U.S. industry more effectively,
taking into account national security and public safety.
Internationally, this includes promoting burden-sharing and marshalling
cooperation against threatening adversary actions.
The United States does not fight alone. Cooperation and partnership
in the space domain are essential, just as cooperation and partnership
benefit our military on land and sea and in the air and in cyberspace.
Our defense strategy depends on sustaining and building international
alliances and partnerships. The work in this area is critical to
advance our common and shared strategic and operational interests of
deterrence and lethality. U.S. allies and partners provide an
asymmetrical advantage that no competitor can match. We are developing
partnerships with the aim to develop and deploy more capable, more
assured space architectures and, where appropriate and mutually
beneficial, develop a combined operational capacity.
For several years we have had a Combined Space Operations (CSpO)
initiative including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. CSpO is identifying operational and
programmatic cooperation opportunities, as well as common approaches to
understanding and addressing threats in space. Last month we invited
France and Germany to join this initiative. In 2018, our annual
Schriever Wargame, examining conflict extending to space ten years into
the future included robust participation from all the CSpO partners,
plus France, Germany and Japan. As a result of wargames such as
Schriever, our allies have come to understand the real and significant
threats to their space infrastructure and are galvanized along with the
U.S. to ensure our collective freedom of action in space.
We will leverage past successes and achieve new ones, such as cost-
sharing agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads on foreign
systems, and data-sharing arrangements to bolster shared space
situational awareness. The Department of Defense, working with the
Department of State, strengthens our leadership and international
relationship through participation in international governing bodies
and with multilateral and bilateral arrangements.
To achieve these strategic objectives and secure our vital interest
of unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space, the Department
must fundamentally transform its approach to space from a support
function to a warfighting domain--one in which we are prepared for a
domain of competition and potential conflict. Space superiority is
something to be gained and maintained, and cannot be taken for granted
in future crisis or conflict.
Posture and Organization
The President's $14 billion budget request for space in fiscal year
2020, outlined in Major Force Program-12, puts the Department on a
course to build a more lethal force. It advances the lines of effort
captured in the National Strategy for Space and integrates space into a
multi-domain approach designed to deter potential adversaries and
defeat hostile activity should deterrence fail. This request, sustains
our on-going space operations and support to the joint force while
developing and fielding critical capabilities.
The current organization of space within the DOD has enabled the
United States to maintain its position as the most lethal force in the
world. These structures, however, must evolve with the changing
environment. No branch of the Armed Forces has been created since the
U.S. Air Force was established in 1947--over 70 years ago. The world
has changed significantly in that time. If authorized by Congress, a
new Armed Force dedicated to space will develop space forces prepared
to meet emerging security challenges.
The trends and threats we face demand a new approach in order to
outpace potential adversaries. This requires an approach that that DOD
institutionally elevate space consistent with its role in national
security; unify, consolidate, and integrate space forces from across
the DOD; increase focus in leadership, expertise, personnel, culture,
and capabilities for a distinct domain; accelerate our posture to space
as a warfighting domain; and deliver dominant warfighting capacity for
space while minimizing bureaucracy and cost.
Space Policy Directive 4 was signed by the President in February
2019, and outlines the policy approach to establishment of the U.S.
Space Force. Under the proposal, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and the
U.S. Air Force (USAF) would exist within one Military Department while
organizing, training, and equipping their forces for two distinct
warfighting domains and mission sets. The Secretary of the Air Force
would be responsible for organizing, training, and equipping two
separate Military Services: the USSF and USAF, each with a uniformed
Military Service Chief with equal membership on the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS). This model is similar to how the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine
Corps exist within the Department of the Navy. Additionally, a new
Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, to be known as the Under
Secretary for Space, will provide dedicated civilian supervision of the
USSF, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
the Air Force.
The vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and
budget authority--would be transferred from the existing Military
Services. The stand-up of the Space Force would be phased over five
years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024--and would require $72
million in fiscal year 2020 to establish the headquarters with
approximately 200 people.
Over the following years, as missions are transferred to the Space
Force, existing personnel and budget authority will transfer into the
Space Force from the existing Military Services. By the end of the
transition period, more than 95 percent of the Space Force annual
budget is estimated to consist of resources that will have been
transferred from existing DOD budget accounts, along with an estimated
15,000 transferred personnel. Additional resources will be dedicated to
building out the Space Force headquarters and establishing and
maintaining new support elements such as education, training, doctrine,
and personnel management centers.
Once the Space Force is fully established, these additive costs are
estimated to be $500 million annually, which would represent
approximately 0.07 percent of the annual DOD budget. The total
additional cost growth over the next five years is estimated to be less
than $2 billion, or approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for
the same period. Because of the lean implementation and modest total
costs, the Future Years Defense Program topline is sufficient to fully
fund the U.S. Space Force.
Complementing a Military Service focused on developing space
forces, is a space warfighting command focused on employing the joint
force. Consistent with U.S. law, DOD is taking steps to establish a
United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command
focused on planning and executing space warfighting operations to
protect U.S. national interests, and those of our allies and partners.
Establishing USSPACECOM will bring full-time operational focus to
securing the space domain, and will streamline command and control for
time-sensitive operations.
Additionally, the DOD has undertaken a series of space acquisition
reforms to ensure the joint forces has the capabilities necessary to
deter and defeat threats. This includes the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC), ``SMC 2.0'' initiatives, which have begun to remove
bureaucracy and empower new program executive officers to acquire space
capabilities more efficiently and effectively. Rapid acquisition
prototyping authorities have been aggressively leveraged with the Space
Rapid Capabilities Office, which initiated several new programs in the
past year. These acquisition reforms will continue with the
establishment of a joint Space Development Agency dedicated to rapidly
developing, acquiring, and fielding next-generation military space
capabilities. This organization will have a development mindset and
will be focused on experimentation, prototyping, and accelerating
fielding, as well as leveraging commercial technologies and services.
These entities will transition to the Space Force, if authorized by
Congress, to strengthen the foundation for space acquisition.
conclusion
Space is a warfighting domain--albeit a nascent and evolving one.
It is no longer a question of whether the character of warfare is
changing, but rather how the United States should strategically re-
orient itself to deter aggression and be prepared to fight and win
future wars.
The Department has a plan to maintain U.S. leadership in this key
domain of competition and potential warfare. The Department asks for
your support, including our legislative proposal, so we can move out in
this critical domain.
The Department's partnership with Congress is and will remain
absolutely critical to our success. To that end, I remain grateful for
this committee's strong support and interest in this vital area, and
its advocacy to deter aggression and ensure a lethal and effective
force with the unmatched ability to prevail in, from, and through the
ultimate high ground.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General ``JT'' Thompson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN F. THOMPSON, USAF,
COMMANDER, SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER, AIR FORCE SPACE
COMMAND
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am Lieutenant General
``JT'' Thompson, and I am honored to appear before you today in
my capacity as the Commander of Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for
Space.
First of all, I'd like to apologize to you on behalf of the
United States Air Force. Today, we provided two witnesses for
the same hearing, both named Thompson, both lieutenant generals
in leadership positions within Air Force Space Command. Since
my primary duty location is Los Angeles Air Force Base in Los
Angeles, California, and my fellow witness, Lieutenant General
``DT'' Thompson's duty location is here in the national capital
region, feel free to refer to me as ``West Coast Thompson'' and
``DT'' as ``East Coast Thompson.'' That's exactly what
leadership does in the Pentagon.
At SMC, I am honored to lead the 6,000 dedicated men and
women, military, government civilians, and contractors, who
collectively have over 100,000 years of national security space
acquisition experience. The SMC workforce is dedicated to
providing premier national security space assets to support
joint and allied forces for our Nation.
While America is absolutely the best in space, our
adversaries have recognized the extent to which our space
capabilities provide a strategic advantage, and are working to
deny the use of our capabilities with asymmetric advantages of
their own. The space acquisition enterprise must adapt to
deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In order to meet
the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force
is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and
operations.
The Air Force space enterprise has greatly benefited from
acquisition reforms instituted by the Congress. However, in
order to truly address the threat, we must go farther.
Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow, making
it difficult to respond to the latest threats, we are changing
the way we do business to get capability from the lab to the
warfighter faster and smarter.
Specifically, to speed up the pace of acquisitions, we're
utilizing alternative congressionally approved acquisition
approaches, like other transaction authorities and rapid
prototyping, which were granted under section 804 of the Fiscal
Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
SMC is also benefiting from the delegation of authority for
some major defense acquisition programs down to the service
acquisition level. With the help of Congress, the Air Force
stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO,
which will continue to work in close concert with SMC to
rapidly develop and acquire critical capabilities. Further, I
delegated acquisition authorities for acquisition category-3
programs down to the executive level within SMC simply to speed
decisionmaking. And finally, with the support of the Secretary
of the Air Force and the Acting Secretary of Defense, SMC is
undergoing a full transformation on how we operate, known as
SMC 2.0.
Although we have a strong history with partnerships with
numerous DOD and intelligence community space activities,
including the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Air Force
Research Lab, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), under SMC 2.0, one of our principal
tenets is to grow even greater partnerships with our allies,
our sister civil and intelligence agencies, and commercial
industry to speed up the pace of acquisition and our Nation's
legacy as the dominant space power.
I am grateful for the support of this committee and the
Congress as we transition our space assets to meet and outpace
the threat posed by near-peer adversaries.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss and defend the
vital programs that SMC acquires to enable warfighting
capabilities across the globe. I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General ``JT'' Thompson
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General John F. Thompson
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before this committee
in my capacity as Commander of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) and the Air Force Program Executive Officer (PEO) for
Space. As the SMC Commander and PEO for Space, I have the unique
position of providing both organize, train, and equip functions to the
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Commander and acquisition experience
and oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics), Dr. Will Roper. In order to carry out these
unique responsibilities, I am privileged to lead and represent 6,000
dedicated men and women of SMC, who have over 100,000 years of National
Security Space Acquisition experience and excellence. The SMC workforce
is dedicated to providing premier National Security Space assets to
support Joint and Allied forces and our Nation.
To echo Lieutenant General David Thompson's statements, our space
forces must operate in an increasingly competitive environment. I have
served as a PEO or Deputy PEO in four previous assignments including
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Strategic Systems,
Joint Strike Fighter, and Tanker. In each of those mission areas, I had
the luxury of building on America's significant asymmetric advantage
over our adversaries. This is not the case in my current role. While
America is absolutely the best in space, our adversaries have
recognized the extent to which our space capabilities provide a
strategic advantage and are working to deny the use of our capabilities
with asymmetric advantages of their own; the space acquisition
enterprise must adapt to deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In
order to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air
Force is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and
operations. Thanks to the support of Congress, the Air Force space
enterprise has experienced an unprecedented year following significant
changes proposed by the Air Force in the fiscal year 2019 budget. The
Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget request will expand upon the
foundations laid in the previous year with nearly $14 billion in
proposed investment in the space portfolio (including procurement,
research and development, personnel, and sustainment funding). This
budget request supports our warfighting approach to the space domain
and changes to how we prototype and field innovative space technologies
in order to stay ahead of our competitors.
A 2016 Government Accountability Office report released titled,
``Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes
Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight,''
authored by my fellow witness, Ms. Christina Chaplain, highlighted the
following: ``fragmentation and overlap in Department of Defense (DOD)
space acquisition management and oversight contributed to program
delays and cancellations, cost increase, and inefficient operations.''
Over the past few National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress enabled
the Department to leverage new authorities in order to procure weapons
systems faster and smarter. The Air Force, and the space enterprise as
a whole, has embraced many of these authorities, such as rapid
prototyping and delegation of Milestone Decision Authority from the
Defense Acquisition Executive to the Service level. The Air Force space
enterprise has benefited from those acquisition reforms instituted by
Congress; however, in order to truly address the threat, we must go
farther. Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow and
often unable to respond to the latest threats, we are changing the way
we do business to get capability from the lab to the warfighter faster
and smarter.
acquiring the nation's space capabilities faster and smarter
In my capacity as the SMC Commander and the Air Force PEO for
Space, I directed several changes within the organization to shorten
decision timelines and radically change the often old-fashioned ways in
which we acquired space capabilities. One of my first acts upon
assuming command of SMC in May 2017, was to delegate acquisition
authorities for Acquisition Category (ACAT) III programs down to the
execution level. This is similar to the benefits SMC had from the
delegation of authority over acquisition programs down to the Service
Acquisition Executive for some of our Major Defense Acquisition
Programs. Additionally, we are utilizing alternative acquisition
approaches like Other Transaction Authorities and those granted under
section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016 for rapid prototyping. With the help of Congress, the Air Force
stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO), which much like
the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, will acquire critical
capabilities by utilizing unique approaches and oversight structures.
Finally, with the support of the Secretary of the Air Force and Acting
Secretary of Defense, SMC is undergoing a full transformation of how we
operate, known as SMC 2.0.
Delegating Acquisition Authorities
SMC executes approximately 36 unclassified ACAT I-III level and 6
rapid prototyping programs, which represents over $7 billion in
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation and Procurement funding each
fiscal year. Upon taking command, I delegated authority for 19 ACAT III
and Services Category programs under $100 million, accounting for 37
percent of the total PEO for Space portfolio, to SMC System Program
Directors. Those Program Directors are fully qualified acquisition
professionals, averaging 20 years of experience each; the programs in
their portfolios represent critical capabilities like the Ground Based
Optical Sensor System (GBOSS), a vital space situational awareness
capability. GBOSS provides global search, tracking of non-cooperative
launches, and discrimination between closely spaced objects. With this
delegation, System Program Directors and their teams are now
responsible for all facets of program execution, from milestone
decisions to source selection and beyond. This delegation and other
process improvement initiatives resulted in a reduction of acquisition
timelines by 65 percent from the first acquisition event to contract
award in fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018. By reducing the
amount of time it takes a program manager to reach a decision maker,
SMC is not only saving time and taxpayer money, but also empowering the
next generation of acquisition professionals.
For SMC's larger programs, we have seen similar impacts from
delegation of Milestone Decision Authority for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) from the DOD level to the Air Force level,
allowing faster access to the decision maker. In 2017, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment delegated
authority for seven of nine major national security space programs to
the Air Force. The Air Force is projected to accelerate the delivery of
warfighting capabilities for these seven programs by an average of 24
months. One example of significant time saved is with the Global
Positioning System III Follow-On Production Program (GPS IIIF). With
GPS IIIF, the Air Force will introduce increased resiliency in the form
of the Regional Military Protection capability to ensure the warfighter
has a protected Position, Navigation, and Timing signal when and where
they need it most. Additionally, the GPS IIIF program will use planned
technology insertions throughout its development and production phases
to ensure a long-term, viable constellation, able to bring forth new
capabilities faster. The Air Force awarded the GPS IIIF contract in
September 2018 after a full and open competition, saving approximately
$1.6 billion over the life of the contract while taking advantage of
delegated authority to reduce decision times by six months over a
traditional DOD-level acquisition program.
Alternative Acquisition Approaches
Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016 authorizes Middle Tier Acquisitions to rapidly develop
operational prototypes and field production quantities of new or
upgraded systems with minimal development required within five years.
So far, six programs executed by SMC have been designated as 804
programs to tailor documentation and reviews within the Department,
flatten access to decision authorities, and in some cases, deploy novel
approaches to program execution, yielding several years in time saved
over a traditional DOD acquisition. An example of one of our 804
programs is the Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications system
(ESS). ESS is our next-generation protected, strategic satellite
communications system, which will provide the President and other
national leaders with protected, anti-jam communications capabilities
through all levels of conflict, to include the nuclear environment. The
program approach for ESS focuses on maturing the payload to meet new
requirements and strategic scenarios by creating competition, driving
innovation, and increasing affordability. The Air Force plans to
deliver this next-generation, resilient, Nuclear Command, Control and
Communications (NC3) capability with an estimated time savings of at
least two years.
SMC is also executing five other 804 programs in the Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR), Protected Satellite Communications, and
Position, Navigation, and Timing mission areas with over 16 years in
projected time savings for fielding new capability over traditional
acquisition methods. As we continue to recapitalize systems across the
space enterprise in order to make them more resilient and responsive to
the current threat environment, the Air Force will request 804
designations for more programs, when practicable, to deliver capability
to the warfighter faster and smarter. It is also important the Air
Force maintains transparency and oversight with DOD and congressional
stakeholders, which is achieved through tri-annual reports delivered by
the Secretary to both entities.
Space Rapid Capabilities Office
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Congress created the Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS),
chartered to respond to U.S. Strategic Command-validated urgent needs
and develop enabler technology. As Lieutenant General David Thompson
stated, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,
renamed ORS as the Space Rapid Capabilities Office. Although the SpRCO
is not an organization for which I have oversight, it remains an
important mission partner and collaboration between SMC and the SpRCO
is vital for providing the best possible capabilities to the warfighter
as an integrated space architecture. In collaboration with General
Raymond and AFSPC, my team supported the stand up and definition of the
organization, which is now undoubtedly poised to meet the Committee's
expectations.
Other Transaction Authorities
Other Transaction Authority agreements, generally referred to as
OTAs, are another non-traditional acquisition authority, which allows
the Air Force to acquire and field more resilient, responsive, and
agile space capabilities. The Air Force utilized OTAs in our efforts to
transition off the Atlas V, with the Russian-built RD-180 rocket
propulsion system, to domestically sourced launch capabilities
leveraging the innovation of the United States' robust launch industry.
In 2016, the Air Force awarded four OTAs under the Rocket Propulsion
Systems effort to re-invigorate the domestic rocket propulsion
industrial base and mitigate risk for future launch vehicles. In 2018,
the Air Force awarded three OTAs under the Launch Service Agreements
effort to develop at least two domestic, commercially viable launch
systems to provide Assured Access to Space. These public-private
partnerships ensure emerging, innovative commercial launch systems meet
all National Security Space Launch requirements.
The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC OTA) was awarded in November
2017 to provide a forum for rapid development of next generation space-
related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's vision of a more capable,
resilient, and affordable enterprise. The objectives of the SpEC are:
minimize barriers to entry for small business and non-traditional
vendors to do business with the Air Force and U.S. Government; identify
and realize teaming opportunities among entities to promote integrated
research and prototyping efficiencies; and reduce the cost of prototype
development under a competitive environment. SpEC is popular with SMC
industry partners and new companies join the consortium frequently. As
of early March 2019, the SpEC is comprised of approximately 264
companies, 81 percent of which are considered non-traditional defense
contractors. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA prototyping efforts exceeding
$207 million in total value. The timeline for a solicitation-to-award
averages 90 days, with some variation based on the complexity of the
effort, or approximately half the time of a traditional solicitation.
Mission partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Through the
SpEC OTA, MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile
Defense Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC
OTA has been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to
satisfy critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile
warning to protected satellite communications to position, navigation
and timing.
re-architecting the air force space acquisition enterpise: smc 2.0
The efforts to push decisions down to the lowest practicable levels
and utilize innovative acquisition strategies have resulted in years of
time saved and faster delivery of capabilities. However, to truly
effect change, we must move fast to stay competitive and we must
fundamentally transform what we buy, how we buy it, and who we buy it
from. Under SMC 2.0 we are re-architecting SMC to manage as an
enterprise by optimizing resource allocation, enhancing collaboration,
accelerating decision making and developing a more innovative
workforce. SMC 2.0 represents a total shift in the way SMC does
business, focusing on the principles of an enterprise-wide approach,
fostering partnerships with Allies, commercial companies, and other
federal agencies, innovation in both how the Air Force does business
and how technology is developed, a culture change to move away from
bureaucracy and empower innovative ideas, all to enable speed.
Together, these principles form the core of our message for SMC 2.0--to
promote EPIC Speed. I declared Initial Operating Capability of SMC 2.0
on 15 October 2018, with the goal of achieving Full Operational
Capability by the end of 2019.
The New SMC 2.0 Organization
SMC 2.0 encourages us to operate more as an integrated enterprise.
Under the previous organizational construct, space capabilities were
developed in separate mission area directorates; there was a
directorate focused on providing military satellite communications, GPS
capabilities, remote sensing, etc. This construct resulted in stove-
piped organizations within SMC with limited cross-flow of ideas and
innovation. In order to increase the flow of information and remove
layers of bureaucracy, SMC is transitioning from a mission area-
specific directorate structure to a Corps structure based upon where a
program is in the acquisition process. With SMC 2.0, SMC will be
divided into four main Corps: Development, Production, Enterprise, and
Atlas along with a Portfolio Architect to integrate across programs,
combat stove-piped development, and deliver resilient capabilities
faster.
The Development Corps will focus on technology maturation and
prototyping critical capabilities for the next generation of systems.
Once a technology is matured, the capability will be transitioned to
the Production Corps where the focus is on efficient delivery,
capitalizing on cross-cutting opportunities, like standardized space
vehicles and components. The Enterprise Corps will provide common
services, such as space launch activities, and management of
sustainment activities. The Atlas Corps provides the Center's critical
business functions, such as contracting, manpower, and financial
management, to facilitate the acquisition of the systems developed and
produced by the other Corps. In order to flatten the organization and
accelerate the pace of decision making, the Air Force has distributed
the space portfolio of programs and delegated PEO authority to three
new PEOs to increase the number of decision makers and link each
program manager directly to their PEO. These fully qualified PEOs have
acquisition authority over the programs within the Development,
Production, and Enterprise Corps. The crosscutting nature of this
framework reduces duplication, identifies commonalities among missions,
and drives enterprise integration leading to higher resiliency across
many platforms and systems.
The SMC Portfolio Architect drives the space enterprise strategy
and framework to inform and prioritize what SMC acquires. The SMC
Portfolio Architect works closely with the Air Force Space Command
Enterprise Architect, ensuring space operators and space acquirers
remain in lock step to provide the most resilient and agile
capabilities for the warfighter.
Strengthening Partnerships
SMC is working with Allies, sister agencies, and industry to
satisfy warfighting capability gaps quicker and cheaper while
developing a more robust coalition space enterprise. This year SMC will
establish agreements in Europe, the Pacific, and at home to expand our
space capabilities via technology development and demonstration as well
as development of operational capability by leveraging friendships and
resources across the globe. I recently returned from a multi-nation
trip, which included stops in Japan and Australia, to reinforce and
grow our alliances and partnerships with the international community.
The Chief Partnership Office, within the Portfolio Architect team,
is tasked with growing partnerships between SMC and related agencies,
Allies, and industry. As mentioned in Lieutenant General David
Thompson's testimony, our highest profile mission partnership is the
collaborative effort with the National Reconnaissance Office known as
Silentbarker. Silentbarker will provide the primary layer of critical
space-based space situational awareness to the warfighter. The system
will rapidly detect, identify, track, and collect data on resident
space objects in deep-space orbits on the short timelines required to
conduct indications and warning of threats against U.S. high-value
assets. The Air Force contributes to this effort through the Space-
Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program. By pursuing this
collaborative effort with a key mission partner, the Air Force
estimates there will be approximately $400 million in overall cost
avoidance over a traditional acquisition.
The Air Force is also working to expand its relationships with key
Allies in order to strengthen existing alliances and grow partnerships
with new nations. For example, the Air Force is partnering with Space
Norway on a hosted payload solution for a protected satellite
communications capability in the North Polar Region known as the
Enhanced Polar System-Recapitalization (EPS-R). EPS-R provides assured,
anti-jam, and low-probability-of-detection and intercept satellite
communications for tactical users north of 65 degrees latitude. This
capability provides a 26-fold increase in capacity over the legacy,
Interim Polar System through our partnership with Space Norway. The Air
Force is projected to close a two year capability gap to provide
critical warfighter support sooner than a traditional acquisition of a
free-flyer satellite and save significant costs through partnering.
In addition to forging stronger ties with our international and
mission partners, SMC is working to strengthen our partnerships with
both aerospace and innovative technology industries. Throughout the SMC
2.0 transformation, we have held industry days and panels to solicit
feedback from our defense industry partners. Additionally, we are
working with our partners in the private sector to employ commercial
best practices for how we acquire space systems and open the door for
non-traditional defense companies and universities. The Air Force's
Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially Hosted (REACH) program
is a space weather and space situational awareness project
demonstrating the viability and effectiveness of a commercially hosted,
disaggregated space situational awareness architecture. REACH payload
sensors provide an unprecedented amount of space weather measurements
for more rapid satellite anomaly attribution. Earlier this year, the
REACH program successfully completed its eighth and final launch. A
total of 32 REACH payloads were launched into orbit in under 24 months.
The successful launch of these payloads and the critical data they
provide are a key example of SMC 2.0 in action, finding innovative ways
to partner with industry to rapidly field new capabilities while
reducing cost and schedule.
Fostering Innovation
As the space domain transitions from an uncontested environment to
one which is more unpredictable, complex, and competitive, it is
important to collapse traditional lengthy requirements, development,
testing and fielding processes. Today, SMC must shift to a construct
prioritizing flexibility and speed, to enable effective adaptation to
rapidly evolving technologies and unpredictable competitors. The
partnership pilot program between SMC Mission Innovation, the AFRL
Space Vehicles Directorate, and the 14th Air Force Combat Development
Division (CDD) shows how our acquisition community is not only
capitalizing on commercial development, but becoming the premier Multi-
domain Enterprise Global Node. Our collaboration efforts pivot to
support this rapidly evolving technological landscape while finding
non-traditional methods to provide lethal and practical tools to better
support the warfighter. The efforts of this combined team is narrowing
the gap between operator and engineer, addressing operator-driven pain
points and developing a solution in a faster, more streamlined manner.
A good example of this partnership, was the 460th Space Wing's
Combat Development Division AFWERX accelerator activity. A recent pilot
program activity was able to produce prototypes for space operator
visualization known as Space Cockpit and a defensive cyber operations
tool, going from concept to prototype in only three months. Not only
was turnaround quick, but operators were immediately able to
demonstrate the product and provide feedback and corrective actions
earlier in the product's life cycle than ever before. SMC is
trailblazing this new style of space acquisitions in concert with the
Combat Development Division through our Space Commercially Augmented
Mission Platform (CAMP) and Enterprise Space Battle Management Command
& Control (ESBMC2) efforts, which are already pulling third party
developers ``off the street'' to deliver new products specifically
requested by operators. These tactics are the exact type of innovation
and collaboration we are striving to implement across the Air Force.
To provide timely ESBMC2 capabilities to the warfighter, the Air
Force has transitioned the effort and the remainder of the legacy Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) into a new
development effort known as Space Command and Control (C2). The Space
C2 effort takes the lessons learned from previous software development
programs and institutes a more iterative and operator-focused approach.
Instead of building software and writing code for multiple years that
could result in an end product which does not meet evolving mission
requirements, the Space C2 initiative is centered on 90-day Program
Increment cycles. The Program Increment offers a predictable and timely
delivery to users as well as an opportunity to receive direct feedback
from the operators to immediately correct user issues. A Retrospective
and Planning document is generated at the conclusion of an increment.
This codifies the progress made during the previous Program Increment,
the expected end-state of the entering Program Increment, money spent
to date, and the return on investment, as well as other successes or
issues to be addressed. ESBMC2 follows this 90-day Program Increment
cadence to develop, integrate, and deliver capabilities, operating on
four 3-week sprints per increment, enabling ESBMC2 to continuously
deliver capabilities. The first Program Increment was delivered to and
accepted by the warfighter at the end of January 2019.
The AFWERX accelerator activity is just one point in which SMC and
AFSPC are achieving greater collaboration between the operators who use
the capabilities and the acquirers. In concert with Space Cadre
development efforts spearheaded by General Raymond, SMC is working to
ensure we have space operators in our acquisition program offices.
AFSPC and SMC are working to ensure we have a crossflow of officers
between the acquisition and the space operations career fields. Right
now SMC has approximately 100 acquirers with space operations
experience across the Center, with plans to double that number. I
believe this crossflow develops better acquisition officers who can
fully understand the operational domain of the warfighting customer.
SMC 2.0 Pacesetter Programs
It is important to remember the Air Force is working to not only
acquire capability faster, but also smarter. As part of the SMC 2.0
approach, nine ``pacesetter'' programs have been designated to validate
rapid acquisition strategies outlined above and provide a model for
future acquisitions to follow. These pacesetter programs serve as both
a means to pave the way for alternative acquisition approaches and as a
litmus test to ensure the changes implemented under SMC 2.0 are viable
and can be applied to a broad range of missions. Under the Portfolio
Architect, there are two pacesetter initiatives, international
partnerships and a prototype project for disaggregated architectures.
The SMC pacesetter effort, known as CASINO, will expand the efforts of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency project known as
Blackjack, to increase resilience by disaggregating various mission
capabilities using large, Low Earth Orbit constellations.
The Development Corps' key pacesetter programs are two section 804
programs, the Next Generation OPIR program to replace the legacy Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the Protected Tactical Satellite
Communications (PTS) program to replace the tactical capabilities of
the existing Advanced Extremely High Frequency and MILSTAR
constellations. The PTS program will be a constellation of distributed,
hosted payloads and free-flying satellites which provide increased
anti-jam performance to tactical users currently using wideband
communications satellites. The program received section 804 designation
from Dr. Roper in November 2018, and was directed to develop two
hostable payloads to be launched in fiscal year 2024. The payloads will
leverage the government-owned, fully processed Protected Tactical
Waveform to provide anti-jam, protected tactical satellite
communications to joint warfighters in anti-access/area denial
environments. By utilizing the previously mentioned SpEC OTA in
addition to section 804 authorities, the Air Force will deliver
critical, tactical satellite communications capabilities to the
warfighter three years sooner than a traditional DOD 5000 series
acquisition.
The Production Corps' key pacesetter efforts consist of a pilot for
satellite commonality for spacecraft in order to drive affordability
across SMC programs, and the commercial procurement of the Wideband
Global Satellite Communications System through innovative business
practices. Our commonality effort is driving efficiencies across three
of our major programs: AEHF, SBIRS, and GPS. For example, we are
establishing common standards for parts qualification, system testing
and review processes. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,
Congress appropriated $600 million for two additional space vehicles
for the Air Force's wideband communications system, known as WGS. The
Air Force is working with the WGS prime contractor to acquire the
congressionally-directed spacecraft. The Air Force will leverage
commercial best practices to accelerate spacecraft delivery.
Under the Enterprise Corps, SMC is working to institute enterprise-
wide Defensive Cyber Operations, procure the Enterprise Ground Services
program using agile development and rapid fielding of a common
satellite C2 infrastructure, and has created a multi-mission
manifesting office to provide flexible access to space for all types of
payloads and satellites. SMC created the Mission Manifest Office to
enable rapid, resilient and responsive launch capabilities to meet
National Security Space objectives. As the front door for operational
launch, the Mission Manifest Office analyzes current and planned
National Security Space launches to determine potential multi-manifest
missions. As a result, the Air Force maximizes on-orbit capability,
ensures little excess space for each launch mission and lowers cost to
the DOD by reducing overall launch service procurements. The Mission
Manifest Office identifies DOD, Civil, and Intelligence Community
launch opportunities to enable and execute these multi-manifest mission
designs. As one of the SMC 2.0 pacesetters, the Mission Manifest Office
will be integrating National Security Space payloads on the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Landsat-9 launch mission in
fiscal year 2021, setting a valuable Interagency Agreement and
collaboration for many years to come.
The way ahead set by these pacesetter efforts is already paying
off. Nine additional space programs have used the techniques proven by
the pacesetters to save an additional 19 years in acquisition time from
their original schedules. SMC is making great strides in achieving EPIC
Speed in areas outside the pacesetters previously outlined. Our Space
C2 program is breaking government software development paradigms by
working with the DOD to create a new acquisition program type and more
effectively acquire agile software systems. Just last month, the
program office established a new development-to-operations (DevOps)
environment located in a commercial business space. The new environment
encourages partnerships with a variety of software vendors for extreme
programming agile software development.
None of the efforts to speed up the pace of space acquisition would
be possible without the men and women who make up the workforce of SMC.
To ensure our workforce understands the current space operating
environment, I directed all military and civilian employees of the
Center, to receive a threat brief at each employee's appropriate
security clearance level. We will continue that initiative this year,
and invite our contractor employees to participate. As a step towards
institutionalizing the change in culture, and the other EPIC Speed
tenets from the ground up, SMC launched an innovative effort to
inspire, energize, and uniquely develop our junior acquisition corps.
In the coming months, we will take a dramatic step forward in ensuring
our civilian workforce is poised to execute the tenets of SMC 2.0.
Furthermore, as we continue to work towards achieving Full Operational
Capability for SMC 2.0, later this year, we will continue to adjust
course to meet the threat.
the way ahead
Since taking command in May 2017, SMC has undergone rapid and
significant change, and we are making progress in speeding up the pace
of the acquisition of the Nation's vital space capabilities. Although a
lot of progress has been made, the men and women of SMC understand that
despite a history of remarkable achievement, we must get even faster
and smarter about how we deliver space warfighting capability; and we
must continue to invoke the principles of EPIC Speed to meet and
outpace the adversary threat. None of the changes implemented under the
SMC 2.0 construct would be possible without the support of our Air
Force Space Command team and the support of senior leaders within the
Air Force, the DOD, and the Administration. Most importantly, none of
these changes would be possible without the continued support of
Congress. We are using the new authorities given to us by Congress to
ensure we transparently acquire the premier space capabilities to
enable space operators. The Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget builds
off considerable gains the space investment portfolio has seen in
recent years with a proposed 17 percent increase over fiscal year 2019.
This request supports SMC's re-architecture and the key missions of the
National Defense Strategy while also supporting the drive towards the
Air Force We Need.
Finally, I thank the Committee for its continued leadership,
oversight, and support of the men and women of SMC and the national
security space enterprise.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Next we have General ``DT'' Thompson. And I believe you are
referred to now as ``East Coast.'' But, General, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USAF, VICE
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear
before you along with these distinguished colleagues today.
Today, I represent our commander, General ``Jay'' Raymond,
the Commander of Air Force Space Command. I'm privileged to be
one of the 26,000 men and women of that Command who serve under
General Raymond's leadership. These men and women remain the
best in the world at developing, fielding, operating, and
sustaining vital space capabilities that serve our national
leaders, our Joint Forces, allies, and partners, and the world,
in general. The asymmetric advantage these capabilities provide
ensure that our Armed Forces have no equal.
Today, there is unprecedented agreement among the Nation's
leadership that space is a warfighting domain, just like air,
land, sea, and cyberspace. The National Security Strategy and
National Defense Strategy reflect this reality, emphasizing
peace through strength while demanding that we maintain U.S.
leadership and freedom of action in the space domain.
Accepting that potential adversaries have made space a
warfighting domain, we are now dealing with the implications.
We are driving tremendous change in order to sustain our
leadership and that freedom to operate in space. With your
strong support, we are making significant advances to ensure
the national security space enterprise is prepared to play its
role in military operations under all conditions.
The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on our efforts over the
past 2 years, proposing a 17 percent increase in space funding
over 2019, and a $14 billion investment overall. With my
posture statement on the record, I'd like to summarize a few of
its key points:
First of all, we're increasing the lethality and readiness
of our force as we continue to invest in and accelerate
defendable space. Among that includes new, more defendable
systems and architectures, the space domain awareness and
command and control needed to operate in a contested domain,
and an operational training infrastructure to develop space
warfighters to the need. All of this enables us to sustain
superiority in space so that we ensure we support joint
warfighters operating in all domains around the globe.
Second, we are enhancing and expanding partnerships with
the intelligence community, allies and partners, and industry.
This includes joint programs with the National Reconnaissance
Office, hosted payloads with several of our allies and
partners, and operations, training, exercises, and wargames
with allies that are building a coalition of like-minded
nations.
Finally, we're capitalizing on innovative business
practices, including the rearchitecting of Space and Missile
Systems Center that ``West Coast Thompson'' mentioned and is
leading, establishing a Space Rapid Capabilities Office,
pursuing special practices and innovative agreements that drive
those innovative activities across the broader commercial and
industry base, and, finally, adopting open architectures and
standards to strengthen integration in multidomain command and
control and with the operations of the rest of the Joint Force.
Let me close by reiterating that we do not want war to
extend to space. But, the best way to deter that from happening
is to prepare to fight and win, should deterrence fail. With
your support, that's exactly what we're doing.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General David
Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David D. Thompson
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich and distinguished Members
of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before you today in my capacity
as Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). With General Jay
Raymond in command, we have the distinct privilege to lead and
represent the 26,200 dedicated men and women of AFSPC who underpin
successful operations for our joint force and the Nation. In the past
year we have seen tremendous change and progress in the National
Security Space arena with the Nation's on-going efforts to address the
reality that strategic competitors have made space a warfighting
domain. Among these initiatives are the President's issuance of four
Space Policy Directives, direction to establish a space-focused
combatant command--U.S. Space Command, and the Department of Defense
proposal for a new branch of the armed forces--the U.S. Space Force. We
expect this next year will be equally full of progress across these and
other National Security Space endeavors.
strategic situation
Today, great power competition from a revisionist China and Russia
continues to be the primary challenge to United States and global
security. Both of these nations seek to challenge peace, stability and
U.S. superiority in all domains: land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space.
In the space domain in particular, these competitors are seeking to
deny the U.S. and its Allies freedom of action, while also developing
their own space capabilities to enable power projection and enhance
military strength.
Fortunately, this comes at a time when our National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, national and military leadership,
and Air Force Space Command plans, programs and operations are in
unprecedented alignment. The National Security Strategy mandates we
must maintain leadership and freedom of action in space, while
advancing space as a priority domain. It also declares unfettered
access and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Our
National Defense Strategy establishes five priority missions: (1)
defend the Homeland, (2) provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent, (3) defeat a powerful conventional enemy, while we (4) deter
opportunistic aggression, and (5) disrupt violent extremists in a cost-
effective manner. Our space capabilities play a vital role in each one
of the missions, supporting our joint warfighters and our allies and
partners around the globe. Our national and military leadership declare
in unison that space is a warfighting domain, like land, sea, and air.
Our goal remains to deter conflict from extending to space, and the
best way we know how to do this is to be prepared to fight and win a
conflict that extends to space should deterrence fail. My testimony
will focus on how our activities are aligned with Department of Defense
(DOD) priorities to build a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and
attract new partners, and reform the Department's business practices.
build a more lethal force
We are increasing the combat readiness of Space Operators to
increase joint warfighter lethality by investing to build multi-domain
Airmen to fight and win as part of the Joint Force.
Developing our Warfighters
Foundational to building a more lethal force is the development of
joint warfighters. The Air Force is transforming the way we develop our
space combat tacticians and acquisition professionals, and laying the
foundation for a trained, ready crew force. We have taken a number of
actions to do so. For example, we directed a significant increase in
rigor and content in the initial training of our space operators, known
as Undergraduate Space Training, to meet the demands of current and
emerging challenges to national security space. This revised ``UST
Next'' is on track to start on 1 October 2019 and includes an
additional 34 training days to cover evolving space threats and U.S.
responses in greater depth. We have also expanded our Operational
Training Infrastructure to produce a more relevant training
environment, which allows weapon systems and operators to interact in a
highly dynamic, threat-representative, realistic manner, including
aspects of multi-domain command and control. The Air Force has approved
$74.8 million in funding to advance our space training simulators along
these lines.
Additionally, AFSPC and the Air Force Weapons School established an
Enlisted Space Warfighter Advanced Instructor Course and have selected
the first class of students. This new course, held at Nellis Air Force
Base, will provide advanced academic and tactical training for enlisted
space professionals, and is a stepping stone for incorporating our
enlisted operators into the existing Air Force Weapons School.
Advanced Space Operations School Re-designated as the 319th Combat
Training Squadron
Air Force Space Command re-designated the Advance Space Operations
School as the 319th Combat Training Squadron (319 CTS) on 28 August
2018 in an effort to normalize the squadron with the Air Force's 16
other combat training squadrons that have similar training missions. As
a combat training squadron, this unit will prepare space professionals
for real-world operations in an increasingly contested space domain
through exercises such as Space Flag. The 319 CTS will provide training
to tactical units with the purpose of developing critically-thinking
operators who have mastered their weapon system to a degree such that
they are able to fight through all levels of conflict.
Schriever Scholars
The Air Force is growing a cadre of strategic space leaders through
the Schriever Scholars program at Air Command and Staff College. This
new space concentration program for field grade officers consists of a
demanding curriculum spanning space history, policy, strategy, and
doctrine. The program also provides unique opportunities for engagement
with senior DOD leadership and unprecedented access to top-level
policymakers, including representatives at the White House, State
Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, and
NASA. This initial class of thirteen students graduate in June and will
be prepared to ensure American advantage in the space domain for
decades to come.
Space Flag
Space Flag is AFSPC's premier in-domain space protection exercise.
This year we have expanded this advanced training to three times a
year, providing space operators the experience of planning and
executing space operations in a contested, degraded, and operationally-
limited environment against a thinking adversary. In August 2019, we
plan to incorporate our coalition partners in Space Flag for the first
time.
strengthen alliances and attract new partners
AFSPC has made significant progress in expanding interagency,
commercial, and international partnerships that enhance our position
across the national security space portfolio. Recognizing that it is
impossible to accomplish our mission alone, AFSPC is committed to
identifying new partners and solidifying existing relationships as a
core activity.
Joint Space Operations Center to Combined Space Operations Center
This year we have accelerated our efforts and increased our
coalition footprint to conduct combined space operations. On 18 July
2018, the Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) transitioned the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to a Combined Space Operations
Center (CSpOC). The transition formalized our ongoing, decade-long
effort to integrate Allied and partner nation personnel and
capabilities into our space enterprise. We have also established
persistent connectivity with partner space operations centers in
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and together we are working
to identify additional tools to improve information sharing between our
respective centers. In late 2019, we plan on expanding more classified
operations and planning efforts with our FVEY partners through the
establishment of a Combined Technical Operations Cell (CTOC).
Schriever Wargame
AFSPC annually conducts the Schriever Wargame, a scenario-based
wargame designed to explore critical space issues in depth, investigate
military utility of new space systems, identify solutions to common
challenges shared by all participants, and advance space doctrine to
better align with and support air, land, sea, and cyberspace doctrine.
This annual wargame also helps increase international cooperation and
integration among space-faring allies. This year's wargame included our
FVEY partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom)
along with France, Germany, and, for the first time, Japan. The
outcomes of the Schriever Wargame Series continue to inform future
AFSPC requirements, examine organizational constructs, and provide a
venue for advancing space operational concepts and procedures. For
example, it was the first time the participants employed a combined
command and control (C2) cell for Special Access Programs (SAP). As
previously mentioned, it is through this effort that participants
agreed to stand up the first ever CTOC, the real world SAP C2 cell at
the CSpOC, by the end of this year.
As a related effort, the Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC)
Office at Vandenberg Air Force Base provides the means for direct
dialog with multiple international partners extending beyond combined
space operations, supporting strategic engagement objectives via
bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Eight countries were
initially invited to participate: Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom.
The MSC office currently includes liaisons from three partner nations:
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and MOUs are pending with
Italy, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Allies in Training
In coordination with Air Education and Training Command, AFSPC is
working to increase coalition participation in its space courses. This
fiscal year, AFSPC will offer Space 100 (foundational level space) to a
growing coalition audience including: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, NATO, New
Zealand, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.
Space 200 (operational level space) is now open to New Zealand, and
participation from the other FVEY partners has doubled with 20 allied
personnel scheduled to attend this year. Space 200 will also open to
France, Germany, and Japan with mobile classes available in 2019 and
in-residence classes available in 2020. Finally, Space 300 (strategic
level space) will have its first FVEY partner course in April 2019 with
Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom personnel in attendance.
Hosted Payloads and Future Allied Partnerships
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is leveraging new
business practices and methodologies to more rapidly field critical
capabilities by placing hosted payloads on Allied satellites.
Specifically, Norway will integrate Enhanced Polar System
Recapitalization (EPS-R) payloads on two space vehicles and launch both
satellites into a highly elliptical orbit in December 2022. EPS-R will
provide protected communications for military tactical and strategic
forces, as well as other users in support of Joint and Allied Force
operations above 65 degrees north longitude.
Under the leadership of the Air Force Chief of Staff, we will host
an international Air Chiefs Space Conference at the Space Symposium in
Colorado this April. With 12 countries expected to participate, this
inaugural event represents the first-ever global meeting of Air Chiefs
to discuss partnering in the space domain. This demonstrates our
commitment to pursue international relationships that promote common
values and at the same time send a clear message to strategic
competitors that cooperation between space-faring nations will
complicate any pursuit of hostile action.
U.S. Government Partnering
Our partnering focus includes efforts within the United States
government as well. Our teaming relationship with the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has never been stronger; we have worked
together across a spectrum of projects, to include development of a
strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities, shared Concepts
of Operations (CONOPS) to realize that strategy, and partnerships on an
enterprise space architecture and individual programs for mutual
benefit. An example of the latter is our collaborative work on the
space-based space surveillance effort called Silent Barker. While the
Space-Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program remains under Air
Force Service Acquisition Executive authority and control, it
contributes funding and personnel to the NRO for executing Silent
Barker. Silent Barker, with Air Force support, increases mission
capability and is more cost-effective. The Air Force and the NRO will
mutually invest in non-recurring engineering costs, enabling the
potential for a larger initial constellation buy and lowering unit
costs. The Air Force is requesting an increase in funding across the
Future Years Defense Program for expanded coverage across the
geosynchronous belt and updating mission data processing and scheduling
for the ground segment to leverage the full capability of the National
Space Defense Center (NSDC).
In accordance with the President's direction in Space Policy
Directive 3, we are teaming with the Department of Commerce to transfer
the responsibilities for space traffic management (STM) to that
Department. Together we will strengthen STM for all, while improving
space situational awareness (SSA) data interoperability and enabling
greater SSA data sharing.
reform the department's business practices
AFSPC has embraced an atmosphere of profound change, bringing forth
business reforms that govern how we procure critical space assets in
concert with our industry partners. This represents a culture change
that is more agile and less risk-averse. To achieve our goals we must
be willing to break down bureaucracy and embrace smart risk in order to
accelerate capabilities development to meet the threat.
COMSATCOM Procurement Authority Transfer
To comply with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act,
responsibilities for DOD procurement of commercial satellite
communications (COMSATCOM) services transferred from the Defense
Information Services Agency to AFSPC on 11 December 2018. Beginning on
20 December 2018, AFSPC started to bring together both government and
industry partners to chart a way forward to both enhance satellite
communications (SATCOM) provisioning and our ability to provide SATCOM
in a contested environment. We are using this transfer as a mechanism
to improve military and commercial SATCOM support across the board and
the AFSPC team is finalizing the first of a series of concepts and
strategy documents that will shape our SATCOM investments.
Space and Missile Systems Center 2.0
The Space and Missile Systems Center has embarked on a
transformation to deliver resilient, war-winning space capabilities
more quickly. SMC 2.0 removes layers of bureaucracy, linking program
leadership directly to acquisition decision authorities in order to
speed decision making. The strategic outcome of SMC 2.0 will be to
dominate with superior lethality throughout the space domain,
aggressively deliver warfighter needs from a resilient, integrated
enterprise, and drive innovation in a way that outpaces adversarial
threats.
Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO)
The SpRCO was created through the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), with subsequent authorities defined in the
fiscal year 2019 NDAA. The office is governed by a Board of Directors,
chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force, and consists of the Air
Force Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the AFSPC Commander, and
USSTRATCOM/JFSCC Commander, with authorities and processes outlined in
an approved charter. AFSPC continues to grow the SpRCO and make
progress with AFSPC's ability to rapidly field space capabilities. The
Board of Directors signed the governing charter on 1 November 2018 and
USSTRATCOM validated five SpRCO programs through the JFSCC. The
initiation of three out of the five programs was formalized by the
Board of Directors on 31 January 2019. Acquisition, security, and
contracting authorities have all been codified and infrastructure,
personnel, and security resources are in place to initiate these
programs. Interim acquisition and security authorities are being
provided by Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office Director; authorities
will transition to the newly hired SpRCO Director by April 2019.
Prototyping: Space Enterprise Consortium
The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC) is a team of industry
leaders, academic research institutions, and innovative early-stage and
start-up companies working together to develop next generation space
technologies. Prototyping awards now broadly represent many of our most
critical warfighter requirements, to include protected satellite
communications, missile warning, missile defense, space situational
awareness, and standardized satellites, payload and commanding
interfaces.
a resilient space enterprise
AFSPC has made significant progress across all mission areas that
span the breadth of our space capabilities. Execution of the
Department's strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities is
persistent, ongoing, and present across all mission areas.
Command and Control
For operational level C2, Enterprise Space Battle Management
Command and Control (ESBMC2) provides the C2 and SSA capabilities to
gain and maintain space superiority. It also serves as the Air Force
space system element of Air Force Multi-Domain Command and Control
efforts. Our early ESBMC2 prototypes have demonstrated initial
interoperability with Air Combat Command (ACC), the Intelligence
Community, and the Missile Defense Agency to synchronize operations. We
continue to support Air Force efforts to advance interoperability with
ACC's Airborne Battle Management System.
One of the more important aspects of ESBMC2 is its open
architecture. ESBMC2 uses Open Missions Standards (OMS) as its
architecture standard and the Universal C2 Interface (UCI) as its
communication standard to enable interoperability amongst the entire
DOD space portfolio. We have seen success of this approach in early
ESBMC2 prototypes allowing integrated C2 on timelines that the JSpOC
Mission System could never have provided. This open approach also
encourages companies to develop applications and compete in an
environment in order to foster innovation. The price of entry for
commercial companies to develop applications for ESBMC2 is simply to
adhere to OMS and UCI specifications.
Space Situational Awareness
SSA is the foundation upon which the Department maintains
spaceflight safety, provides warning, assesses intentions, and
attributes adversary actions towards U.S., Allies, and commercial
partner satellites. Coupled with operational intelligence to complete
the SSA operating picture, competency in this area is critical in
protecting our space assets, informing the design of future
architectures, and fostering access and responsible use of space for
all space-faring nations. The following key efforts represent SSA
capabilities necessary to protect U.S. Government satellites and
interests in space.
The new Space Fence is an S-Band radar designed for space
surveillance located on the Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of Marshall
Islands, 2,100 nautical miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. It is
expected to increase the number of tracked objects in space from 23,000
to more than 60,000, as well as increase the accuracy of orbit
predictions, and improve our ability to characterize previously
untracked objects and conduct collision avoidance analysis for all
objects in space. Expected to achieve initial operational capability
(IOC) within the next year, Space Fence will be the largest dedicated
space surveillance radar operated by AFSPC.
The National Space Defense Center
The NSDC continues to mature its partnership between the DOD and
Intelligence Community as we push to improve our nation's ability to
rapidly detect, characterize, attribute, warn and defend against
threats to our nation's vital space systems. In January 2018, the NSDC
transitioned from an experimentation-focused entity to limited 24/7
operations. The fiscal year 2020 budget request supports efforts to
leverage the full capability of the NSDC and I am pleased to report
that the NSDC has continued to mature throughout the year and has now
taken on all Protect and Defend responsibilities previously executed by
the CSpOC.
The Air Force Research Lab has been working to deliver a Joint
Emerging Operational Need (JEON) effort for the NSDC to provide
capabilities to integrate systems and information at a ``system high''
level. By operating at the highest security levels throughout the
operations center, the NSDC will become a singular center for the full
picture of space activities. The completion of JEON-associated work in
June 2019 will mark the delivery of a functioning prototype capability
and then transition to an initial operational capability by year's end.
Position, Navigation, and Timing
The first Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite was
successfully launched in December 2018 on the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.
Ultimately, GPS III will provide signals that are three times more
accurate and provide up to eight times more anti-jam resilience for the
warfighter than previous generations. The GPS Next-Generation
Operational Control System (OCX) Block 0 supported GPS III Space
Vehicle (SV) 01 launch and the team is completing early orbit checkout
without issue. The OCX program addresses cyber vulnerabilities through
a robust information assurance architecture and is on-track to deliver
its full capability by April 2022.
The GPS III program is preparing GPS III SV 02 to support a summer
2019 launch and continues to assemble, test, and integrate the
remaining eight satellites. In addition, SMC awarded the GPS III
Follow-on (GPS IIIF) contract for 22 satellites in September 2018. This
year's budget request includes full funding for SV 13 and continued
incremental RDT&E funding for GPS IIIF SVs 11 and 12.
Missile Warning
In the fiscal year 2019 budget request, the Air Force took the bold
step to stop procurement of Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
vehicles 7 and 8 in acknowledgement of their inability to survive in
today's contested space environment. The Next-Generation Overhead
Persistent Infrared system will succeed the current SBIRS system by
providing improved missile warning, missile defense, battlespace
awareness, and technical intelligence capabilities that are more
survivable against emerging adversary threats. The Air Force is
applying acquisition authorities (per section 804 of the fiscal year
2016 NDAA) to manage the program's largest risks through competitive
prototyping, and to significantly improve execution speed. Using these
authorities, and with funding support from Congress, the program let
two prime contracts within three months, posturing the Air Force to
reduce the time to IOC by three and a half years. This pace setter
proves that a five year acquisition timeline to deliver resilient
missile warning capability, versus a ten or fifteen year timeline, is
possible. Additionally, the Air Force has aligned the fiscal year 2020
budget request to support program execution and as expected deliver the
first resilient geosynchronous satellite to meet warfighter needs by
2025.
Environmental Monitoring
Every DOD operational mission begins with a weather briefing;
either space weather, terrestrial weather, or both. Although the data
required to generate forecasts for our warfighters is largely dependent
on complex models, approximately 95 percent of the data that feeds
these models comes from either space-borne assets or ground-based
observatories looking at space. Our ground-based infrastructure
consists of unique assets strategically situated around the globe to
observe the sun and the ionosphere from below and collect the data we
need to complement the space-borne information. The data required for
DOD missions is often unique and necessitates 24/7 global ability to
forecast weather in austere and denied environments.
Weather is also a partnership business. We continue to leverage the
outstanding contributions of NOAA, NASA, our European EUMETSAT
colleagues, and Japan. As an example, we will also soon accept a NOAA
geostationary satellite, repurposed for our DOD mission, and relocate
it over the Indian Ocean.
We are currently updating the space piece of the overarching Air
Force weather strategy for both terrestrial and space weather support.
Our long term vision, in addition to the avenues we already have, is to
determine how commercial ventures could add to and diversify our
ability to collect our required data from space. This is a very new and
potentially beneficial partnership, which we will be able to more
completely characterize after we do some investigation and development
of their abilities.
Satellite Communications
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
constellation provides protected tactical and strategic, nuclear-
hardened communications for the President and other decision makers.
With three operational satellites on orbit, a fourth is undergoing on-
orbit checkout and will be operational in July 2019. The final two
satellites are scheduled to launch in fiscal years 2019 and 2020
respectively. Ongoing Space Modernization Initiative efforts include
AEHF expanded spacecraft resilience features and enhanced ground cyber
protection. The Air Force is currently pursuing the next generation of
protected, strategic communications with the acquisition of the Evolved
Strategic SATCOM system which utilizes section 804 authorities to
deliver capability two years sooner than a traditional acquisition. The
Air Force is currently preparing the release of a request for proposal
for rapid prototyping for this next generation of protected strategic
communications.
The Protected Tactical Enterprise Service effort has been enabled
by section 804 authorities to deliver prototype capability for two Navy
carrier strike groups 18 months early. This ground system will provide
worldwide, anti-jam, Low Probability of Intercept communications for
tactical warfighters. The Protected Tactical Satellite Communications
(PTS) effort will save about 36 months of schedule by implementing
rapid acquisition via section 804 authorities. PTS will provide
advanced tactical SATCOM capabilities to enable tactical operations in
anti-access/area denial environments. PTS awarded 13 prototyping
projects using SpEC Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to help design
and reduce risk of critical technologies.
Enhanced Polar System (EPS) hosted payloads launched in 2015 and
2017 and will provide tactical protected communications in the North
Polar Region; EPS will achieve full operational capability in late
fiscal year 2019. However, the need for tactical communication
capabilities in the North Polar Region is anticipated to expand as U.S.
and allied military and commercial needs continue to grow. As
previously mentioned, the Enhanced Polar System--Recapitalization (EPS-
R) is the protected SATCOM follow-on to the EPS, providing a 24/7
protected SATCOM capability to the North Polar Region. EPS-R payloads
on two separate Space Norway spacecraft remain on track for a dual
launch in fiscal year 2023 and will provide continuity of protected
satellite communications services and bridges the gap between the
current system and EPS at a significantly reduced cost.
Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) Communications SVs 8 and 9 entered
operations in 2017 and SV 10 successfully launched on 15 March 2019. As
the primary wideband satellite communications capability for DOD, SV 10
will extend functional availability to 2028. Per the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2018, the Air Force is acquiring and further
developing a funding plan for launch and operation and maintenance
activities for a modernized WGS satellite with a digital payload
comprising twice the capacity of the current version.
Assured Access to Space
For the first time in 20 years, the Air Force is prepared to meet
all national security launch needs through competition among multiple
viable launch providers. With unprecedented mission success in placing
National Security Space (NSS) assets into orbit, the National Security
Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, provides assured access to space for our
most important national security satellites, while demonstrating good
stewardship of launch funds. Our priority remains to ensure the Air
Force can launch all NSS payloads when and where we need to, utilizing
launch services from certified domestic, commercial launch providers in
a viable competitive market.
As the Air Force moves to recapitalize the NSSL program and end the
use of the Russian-built RD-180 engine, AFSPC has entered into public-
private partnerships, the best way to ensure emerging commercial launch
solutions meet our most stressing NSS launch requirements. The SMC
Enterprise Directorate awarded three Launch Service Agreements to
develop domestic, commercially viable launch systems. The three
agreements went to Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket, Northrop Grumman's
OmegA rocket, and United Launch Alliance's Vulcan rocket. These
partnerships leverage commercial launch industry investment to deliver
launch capabilities ahead of the RD-180 procurement deadline of 2022.
NSSL Phase 2 launch contracts will facilitate full and open competition
to procure launch services from fiscal year 2020 through 2024 for
launch starting in 2022.
Last year Congress recognized the prospect of cost savings
associated with launch vehicle reusability; the Air Force has embraced
this concept and is actively evaluating the risks, benefits, and
potential costs or savings from reusable launch vehicles for future
missions. With launch service providers demonstrating success at a
rapid pace, reusable launch systems could offer higher reliability,
increased responsiveness, and greater flexibility in support of NSS
missions. In an effort to lean forward on reusing hardware for launch,
SMC and SpaceX completed a contract modification allowing the reuse of
the Falcon Heavy side core boosters for the Air Force's Space Test
Program-2 mission. This first mission with a re-used booster further
demonstrates our commitment to balance risk with increased
responsiveness and flexibility.
In 2019, the DOD Space Test Program partnered with SMC's Enterprise
Corps and Defense Innovation Unit to pursue the first launch of a
venture-class small launch service through the Rapid Agile Launch
Initiative (RALI). Under this partnership, the Air Force procured five
small launch services through venture-class launch service providers
using OTA agreements. RALI demonstrates rapid procurement and the
responsiveness of commercial launch, dedicated launch for small
payloads to militarily-relevant orbits, on-demand responsiveness, and
increased operational tempo over legacy national launch architecture.
RALI leverages an expanding commercial market and launch opportunities
to increase DOD's access to space.
AFSPC places a high priority on streamlining space launch
operations and identifying opportunities to improve our speed,
innovation and resiliency to improve efficiency, satisfy national
security needs, and increase safety. This includes an architecture
transformation across both launch ranges that started in 2019 and will
continue through 2023. Changes in flight and ground systems will put us
on a path to support a 2025 implementation of the Autonomous Flight
Safety System for all commercial space launches. This enables us to
increase the pace of launch, reduce costly infrastructure, and maintain
public safety.
Cyberspace Defense of the Space Enterprise
To protect our space enterprise from cyber threats, Headquarters
AFSPC and SMC, together with our federally funded research development
centers, will implement a full lifecycle effort for space and
associated ground systems, applying robust cyberspace and defensive
security protocols that will include adaptable, upgradable, hardened
products and other best practices ``baked in'' at the time of product
delivery. AFSPC is leading the Air Force, implementing a Defensive
Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) strategy and organizational
construct across a tiered defense posture to execute cyber defense in
depth for space mission assurance.
Air Force Space Command is working with U.S. Cyber Command, joint
partners, the Intelligence Community, research labs, and industry to
develop and deploy cyberspace security and defense solutions to protect
the space enterprise from cyber threats. AFSPC continues to develop and
educate cyber protection and defense personnel who work alongside space
mission system operators to detect and respond to system
vulnerabilities and adversarial activity. To rapidly enable DCO-S
capabilities, AFSPC is executing a rapid acquisition approach to
prototype and field improved technologies that will protect critical
systems, investigate cyber events, respond to cyber incidents, and
accomplish cyberspace security and defense objectives across the space
enterprise.
the way ahead
The fiscal year 2020 budget request strengthens the considerable
gains AFSPC has made over the previous fiscal year with a proposed $14
billion investment in our space portfolio, a 17 percent increase over
our fiscal year 2019 budget. This budget request supports our
warfighting approach to the space domain and supports changes to how we
prototype and field innovative space technologies in order to stay
ahead of our competitors.
I thank the Committee for your leadership and support; together we
will build a resilient and ready National Security Space enterprise
that will continue to serve as the foundation to our desire to maintain
our military advantage and promote American prosperity.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Next, Ms. Chaplain. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich,
and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
today to discuss DOD's space programs.
Space is at a pivotal point right now. In the face of
growing threats and lengthy development cycles, DOD is
embracing new approaches to help speed up acquisition of space
systems, establish better partnerships with the commercial
sector to increase innovation, and change its acquisition
culture. There is also a proposal before Congress on
strengthening leadership for space.
Bringing about this broad span of change will be
challenging, to say the least, and not without some risk. More
specifically, while DOD is undertaking this change, it will
need to concurrently focus on completing older programs that
are still struggling. The ground system for Global Positioning
System (GPS), known as Next Generation Operational Control
System (OCX), for example, is nearly 5 years late. And, while
the contractor has improved the pace of building and testing
the software, we still see a lot of schedule risk in that
program. The Air Force also recently stopped development work
on Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS),
a ground system for processing space situational-awareness
data, because it didn't deliver as expected. We're also still
faced with long gaps between the delivery of satellites and
ground systems needed to make use of their capabilities.
Moreover, there's a myriad of challenges facing space
programs that are just getting underway:
First, even with the new Space Force proposal, there are
still a lot of open questions about leadership. For example, at
this time, it appears there will be a number of space
acquisition activities outside of the Space Force, including
the Missile Defense Agency, the NRO, and some military space
service activities, but, so far, it's uncertain what the
overall governance structure will be. If there are conflicts in
requirements, funding, or priorities among agencies that are
not under the Space Force, who resolves them and makes a final
decision? There is also a new entity being rolled out, the
Space Development Agency, which has very worthwhile goals of
developing or adopting innovative technologies for space, but,
at this time, it's unclear how it will mesh with other similar
agencies, and also still unclear who's in charge of future
architectures for space. These questions may well be resolved
as details for the Space Force and SDA get worked out, but new
programs will be operating with uncertainty for the time being.
Second, while streamlining might help speed up programs and
change the culture, we know, from past efforts to streamline,
that there's also risk of inviting programs to move too quickly
and disregard the engineering and acquisition discipline that
is so very important to space. Keep in mind that space is
different than other types of weapons. You cannot easily fix
satellites once they're in orbit. We consistently see programs
suffer major setbacks because one quality procedure wasn't
followed or one small flaw in one small part was not detected.
This does not mean streamlining cannot be done, or should not
be done. It just means we should heed lessons from the past,
maintain good insight, oversight, and expertise, and be
prepared to cancel programs that falter.
There's a question about DOD's capacity to manage multiple
new programs concurrently. Yes, there's a healthy increase
being proposed for space, but consider at least nine
significant programs are getting underway. They will likely
require heavy investments up front and then DOD will also be
seeking money for a new Space Force, for space protection, for
a Space Development Agency, and a new missile-defense space
layer, as well as for priorities outside of space, such as the
nuclear triad.
There are also questions about workforce capacity. We
recently reported that just tracking who's in the space
acquisition workforce is a challenge, and there are also gaps
in technical expertise that will be stretched with multiple new
programs.
Moreover, all of the programs will be software-intensive--
these new programs--but DOD has challenges managing software.
We recently found that space software programs struggle to
effectively engage system users, which is critical to their
success. We understand that many new programs are attempting to
be more agile and to use more modern tools, but it remains to
be seen how successful DOD can be in adopting these new ways.
Again, good things are happening in space. There's
attention from highest levels of government, more resources,
and a recognition that different approaches and culture are
needed. What's key to making this happen is not to lose focus
on improving acquisition management and oversight, building
capacity as we speed up programs, and continuing to reduce
fragmentation.
Thank you. This concludes my statement, and I'm happy to
answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for your opening statements. We'll begin
questioning for the first round.
I have a question for General Thompson, West Coast. As I'm
sure you're aware, arguments are being made in the press
against the way the Air Force has structured its efforts to
replace the RD-180 and develop the next generation of launch
systems. And I know that the terms of phase 2 have not been
finalized as of yet, so we have to be careful to keep our
discussion very general. But, I would ask that you talk us
through some of the tradeoffs that we need to keep in mind when
we hear arguments against down-selecting the two providers or
questioning the intent to split launches on that 60-40 between
them. So, help us understand some of the original thinking
behind the way that this was structured, please.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, Chairman.
That's a fantastic question.
You know, 5 years ago, the Congress challenged us to get
off Russian-made RD-180s and assure access to space using two
domestic launch providers capable of launching to our most
stressing national security space orbits. The Air Force rose to
that challenge, competitively awarding technology maturation,
rocket propulsion system and launch vehicle service agreements
to mature commercial technologies and capabilities for national
security space assets. Industry rose to that challenge, as
well.
We are ready to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
launch service procurements. All potential offerors have
sufficient maturity, and we expect a full and open and robust
competition. Award is anticipated in the spring of 2020.
Offerors will be able to update their proposals throughout the
evaluation period if they have technological maturities or
design review completions. We're confident we're on the right
path for our Nation's warfighting capability, and that we're
being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.
Madam Chairman, when you referenced the 60-40 split, the
60-40 split is really essential for us, for three reasons.
Number one is, it gives us flexibility on the manifest to be
able to move some of our Nation's most important satellites
from provider to provider. Number two, it's almost like a
block-buy concept, where we're able to take advantage of
competition and savings while still rewarding the best offeror.
And then, finally, which is something that I really need to
articulate to everyone, is that 60-40 is a two-way split. A
number of folks have asked us if it's possible to split it
three ways. Our launch manifest that we need to purchase
between 2020 and 2024 simply does not support three offerors in
that trade space at the same time. None of the offerors'
business cases would close if we tried to open it up to three
different offerors.
Now, as we move forward, after we take a look at the
proposals and have details based on those proposals and what
the technical approaches are, after we've assessed those risks,
when we make the award next spring, then my guess is that we'll
have an opportunity to discuss, for those offerors that did not
receive awards, how we will keep them in the game so that they
can compete for phase 3, which would be our next launch service
procurement (LSP) in the future.
Senator Fischer. If I'm hearing you correctly, sir, are you
saying that, due to the amount of business that would be
available, having three companies might not be sustainable, and
it would be, in your view, better to have two companies that
are healthy and able to move forward through this process?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, that's
absolutely correct, from the standpoint of the national
security space portfolio. There are also commercial kinds of
activities that other offerors could participate in. Whether or
not the commercial industrial base in that time period will
support three launch providers, I would have to take for the
record and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The decision to competitively award two National Security
Space (NSS) launch service procurement contracts is based upon
comprehensive market analysis. This analysis considered
warfighter requirements, statutory limitations, independent
market research, and 6 years of industry engagement. The
Government will select for award the two offerors that, when
combined, represent the overall best value to the Government.
The current launch manifest requires 35 NSS launch service
procurements, or about 7 launches per year split between two
providers (3 or 4 launches per provider per year), over the
fiscal year2020-fiscal year 2024 Phase 2 ordering period. Since
2014 the government has solicited, via formal and informal
means, industry feedback to determine the number of NSS
missions each would require to close their business case. Based
on this information, the Air Force determined that Phase 2
launch services procurement requirements cannot support more
than two providers. In order to maintain 100 percent mission
success, the Air Force implements a robust Government Mission
Assurance process that depends on in depth launch systems
knowledge. Retaining more than two launch systems dilutes this
critical mission assurance function increasing risk of failure.
Additionally, National Security Space Launch-class satellites
are very complex and require extensive integration with the
launch vehicles. Maintaining more than two launch systems sub
optimizes the satellite ability to fulfill its mission. The
Secretary of the Air Force has asked us to independently assess
the commercial launch market, using a Federally Funded Research
and Development Center. We expect interim results in June 2019
with a final report delivered in early November 2019.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. That will be helpful. Thank
you.
Also, General, the Air Force has talked about the
development of the next-generation----
I'm going to hold this question till the next round. I see
I'm out of time. Thank you. Senator Heinrich. I'm not going to
abuse my power.
[Laughter.]
Senator Heinrich. We'll save that for another day.
Senator Fischer. Another day.
Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson, you
used the term ``block buy'' in reference to the 60-40 split.
So, that begs the question, I think, to you, Ms. Chaplain--the
Air Force has a long history of launch block buys. Can you
describe those and what issues you saw in them, in terms of
pricing and competition, that we should be thinking about?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Like you say, it's been a long history.
When they were about to do their last set of block buys, we
reported on a lot of issues, in terms of the knowledge not
being there that they needed--pricing, cost, manifest, things
of that nature. Those emanated from the nature of Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and how it started as a
commercial-like acquisition, that you couldn't obtain certain
pieces of knowledge under the contracts that they had. But,
when you neck down to one provider, that became an issue. The
Air Force did listen to our recommendations at the time,
regrouped, got the knowledge it needed to make that block buy.
But, there's always a risk, going forward, if you're going to
be awarding fixed-price contracts with limited information, and
you somehow end up with one provider again, that you might be
back in that same situation, in terms of having the right
insight.
One concern we have with the approach, going forward, is,
there may not be enough commercial launches for three
providers, there might not be enough to sustain two. So, that's
a question, given the demand on the DOD side and what
assumptions we have about the commercial sector, and how hard
it is just to predict what's going to happen in the commercial
sector.
Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Thompson--``JT''
Thompson, give us some insight into how you're confident that
it will support two. And then, are you also confident that,
that these long-term blocks will be cost-competitive?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, Senator, in terms of
why we're confident that we will be able to support two is, we
know, essentially, the manifest that we have to support in the
2020 through 2024 timeframe, in terms of when we would purchase
the rockets, or when we would purchase the services--and then
from 2022 to 2026, when those rocket services would actually
launch. We know that we have anticipated what the costs would
be, and we're confident that we can support two, with a 60-40
split, through the National Security Space Launch Program.
Senator Heinrich. In followup to that--I'm trying to
understand something that happened last week, on March 20th.
The Air Force released a Notice of Intent for early integration
studies.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. All four contractors competing for launch
services were listed, including SpaceX. Does that study reopen
the opportunity for SpaceX or the next down-selected to compete
for Federal funding? Or what is the impact of that early
integration study as to all four contractors?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, the early
integration studies are, basically, a standard operating
procedure that we use 3 years before we award a satellite
launch. It's, essentially, low-dollar study money for vendors
to be able to begin working with satellite providers to
understand the satellites that are on the manifest that year
and what the interface requirements and technical terms are
between the rocket and the satellite, the launch vehicle and
the satellite vehicle.
Senator Heinrich. Let me switch to Space RCO. Obviously,
what we used to call Operationally Responsive Space, now Space
RCO, was really designed by Congress to be disruptive. And, in
fact, Congress had to fight the Department from terminating the
office, in my view, for most of a decade, because it was so
disruptive. Today, it seems that leaders in the Pentagon really
value that disruption. So, Lieutenant General ``DT'' Thompson,
I want to ask you, if Space RCO were provided the appropriate
resources, would it be able to conduct missions, like building
a network of small satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) with a
mix of communications, gear, and sensors designed to detect
hypersonic weapons?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator Heinrich,
first of all, thank you for that question. I would say, up
front, yes, that acquisition organization, and any other
organization with the right resources, would be able to pursue
that activity.
I'd like a few minutes to talk a little bit more about
Space RCO. First of all, as you noted, with the help of
Congress, we have succeeded in turning the Operationally
Responsive Space office into a true rapid acquisition
organization. In addition, with the change
directed by Congress, we rearchitected and reresourced the
entire office. It is now focused on what I will call space
superiority programs that don't have a home anywhere else in
the acquisition enterprise today, but are urgently needed to
help us with our defend-and-protect missions. We've got the
people we need, we have resources. It is crafted and shaped
after the Air Force RCO model, with an Air Force Board of
Directors led by the Secretary of the Air Force, streamlined
authorities, streamlined decisionmaking processes. So, it is up
and running, effective, and helping us with our most urgent
defend-and-protect priorities.
But, yes, it could also take on other responsibilities, in
that sense, if appropriately resourced.
Senator Heinrich. Madam Chair, I apologize. Now I've abused
my time.
Senator Fischer. Never. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
For General ``JT'' Thompson, first of all, how many RD-180
motors do we have in hand right now?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. I believe the number is
12. I can confirm that, for the record, for you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, and as amended by the fiscal
year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAAs, authorizes the Department
of Defense to procure up to 18 Russian RD-180 engines (via
launch services contracts) before 31 December 2022. To date,
the Air Force has procured 6 of these 18 authorized RD-180s
leaving 12 available for order.
Senator Rounds. How many do you intend to purchase?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. There were 15, but, in
our most recent source selection, we awarded 3. So, there's 12
remaining, out of the 18 that we're authorized for the National
Security Space Launch Program.
Senator Rounds. So, we had a total of 18 that we had
authorized. You've currently used six of them. So--okay.
General ``DT'' Thompson, with regard to the command and
control and the need for your cyber operations to be integrated
within this, where is the responsibility for the cybersecurity
laid? Is that within a separate order, or are you finding that
within the cyber mission forces that we have today?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator there's elements
of both. First of all, inside of Air Force Space Command,
inside of our operational squadrons today that are operating
the satellite, there is a requirement for what we call mission
defense teams organic to the squadrons. They live and work on
the cyber terrain, the command-and-control systems that we use
to command and control the satellites today. They understand
those systems deeply, they have special cyber training and
special understanding of the systems to be what we would call
``the beat cops'' and the first line of defense under an
initiative we call Defensive Cyber Operations for Space. That's
the Air Force Space Command responsibility.
Then the next tier comes from the cyber mission forces that
are organized under the Air Force today under Air Combat
Command, but directed by U.S. Cyber Command. They take a
broader look. They look at the threats out there. They work
with those sorts of persistent threats, and they are also a
resource we can bring in to help us when further expertise is
needed or capabilities that they don't have. So, it's a layered
approach.
Senator Rounds. I know, within your discussion points in
your statements, there is clear evidence of the understanding
of the multiple domains that we have: air, land, sea, cyber,
and space. We're prepared today, and we assume that we're in a
position to defend within, as an example, the air domain or the
land domain or the sea domain. We know what that means, in that
we have weapons capabilities, we have defense capabilities.
Offensively and defensively, we're there. When you move into
cyber, we have offensive and defensive capabilities. What does
it mean in space? Are we in a position where we are now
acknowledging that, as a domain, we have to have the same types
of capabilities, both offensive and defensive capabilities, or
are we restricting ourselves right now to defensive
capabilities only?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, I would
say, very clearly, we have acknowledged, with space as a
warfighting domain, we have a special need to defend and
protect the capabilities we have. Because we have those
capabilities, we are so much better at using them and
integrating them, and they provide us such an advantage, we
know that, first and foremost, we need to protect them, because
an adversary is going to try and take those away from, in
conflict.
What I would say is, we also recognize we need to deny the
use of space to an adversary. We will not restrict ourselves,
and we do not restrict ourselves, to any specific instrument or
tool or medium. We need to be able to respond at the time,
place, and in the manner of our choosing. And we have a lot of
instruments in that regard. Certainly, I believe that probably
the Nation needs more discussion about what that might mean in
the space domain itself.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Ms. Chaplain, I'm just curious. You laid out a series of
challenges that the Air Force has with regard to the operations
within space, some in which we're being successful, some in
which we're not and we're recognizing, in those where we have
shut down some systems and so forth. Could you share just a
little bit with regard to what you see as our capabilities for
defending our space capabilities and the challenges that we
have today? I recognize this is not a classified setting, but
is there a way that you can share with us what our needs are or
what you see as areas that we're lacking today?
Ms. Chaplain. I can share a little bit. We recently did a
review of cyber protection for weapon systems as a whole, and
found that, for weapons in development, they can be easily
hacked in the testing process. A lot of that goes to pretty
simple things, like password management, cyber hygiene,
patching systems. And there were some space systems included in
our review. So, while, on one hand, there's a lot of attention
being devoted to cyber, a lot of resources, the Department
understands the priority and has taken a lot of good steps now.
I think there's a lot in the culture that needs to come a ways
to just do the basic things that everybody has to do to protect
their systems. They're not expensive, and it would put the
Department in a much better place.
Senator Rounds. I would note that the Navy most recently
had a similar review, and came up with some surprising things,
as well.
Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. Very surprising.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I don't want to be argumentative, but I'm skeptical. I want
somebody to explain to me why we need a Space Force,
particularly when it's not going to include NRO, NASA, Office
of Space Commerce (OSC), the private launch companies, or
missile defense. I mean, it strikes me as a solution in search
of a problem. You really can't manage this now, under the
auspices of the Air Force? I'm not anti-, but I'm skeptical, I
guess.
Secretary Rapuano. So, Senator, I'll take a first shot at
that.
Fundamentally, we are concerned about the risk of losing
our advantage in space.
Senator King. So, how does an organizational change of
moving the boxes around affect that, one way or the other?
Secretary Rapuano. Well, I would just go further in saying
that, historically, we have operated in space in a permissive
environment. We have tremendous dependencies and capabilities
that are space-based or space-enabled. We now have adversaries,
peer-level potential adversaries, who are quite focused. In
fact, in 2015, China and Russia reorganized their military for
increased focus on their space capabilities. And they're
looking at how they can negate our advantages in space.
Senator King. Well, I certainly understand that. And
today's headline is, ``India Successfully Tests Satellite
Killer.'' I mean, that's this morning. I understand the change
in the dynamic and offensive and defensive capabilities. I just
don't understand how creating a new box with a new name within
the Air Force increases our ability to deal with these issues.
That's what I'm troubled by. I understand the challenge, and I
understand the importance of meeting it, but this is not
comprehensive. There's a lot of the space infrastructure that's
not included in this new entity.
Perhaps I ought to ask your office. What does this gain us,
in terms of capability? It just seems to me it's drawing new
boxes and having new people.
Ms. Chaplain. Sure. I think there's two sides to it. One is
the threat side and needing to really focus people on that and
prioritize it.
Senator King. Are we not focused now? The Air Force isn't
paying attention to this now?
Ms. Chaplain. It's part of U.S. Strategic Command's
(STRATCOM) mission to defend space, and the person running that
mission has a lot of other priorities. So, there's one thought
to segment space in the defense of space to one individual, one
organization. The other thought is just on the acquisition
side. What we reported on is, there are a lot of players
involved in space, there's a lot of fragmentation, and you find
that really affects the ability to get capability out quickly.
There seems to be a lot of disconnects that happen just because
of the way----
Senator King. But, it seems to me that's a management
challenge. Do you have an estimate of the incremental cost of
creating this entity, over and above current expenditures for
all of these purposes?
Ms. Chaplain. Yeah, I think DOD has done its cost estimate.
Senator King. What's the number?
Secretary Rapuano. So, the first year of the Space Force
would be $72 million. At the end of the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP), at the end of fiscal year 2024, it would be up
to $500 million annually. You're talking about $2 billion total
over the next 5 years.
Senator King. So, $500 million a year, half a billion
dollars a year, in organizational change. I mean, are you
coming before us, saying, ``We can't manage this now, and we
need to spend half a billion dollars a year''? You understand
what I'm asking, I'm sure. Convince me that this makes some
sense, that it's worth $500 million a year.
Secretary Rapuano. Again, the transition from operating in
space in a permissive environment, with all of the capabilities
and dependencies, to a warfighting environment really requires
a focused approach. We're doing it at three legs of the triad,
essentially. The first is the U.S. Space Command. That's the
operational employment of the Joint Force on a day-to-day
basis.
Senator King. Is that going to go away under this proposal?
Secretary Rapuano. No. In fact, it was recently directed by
the President, and the confirmation of the Commander of U.S.
Space Command is pending with the Senate. I believe it arrived
this week. So, that's the employment of the force.
The critical organize, train, and equip component is the
service component. And that really is the doctrine, the
training, the plans, the personnel development. It is the
unified and singular focus on space as a warfighting domain
that is very difficult to achieve unless you have that unified,
sole responsibility and custody----
Senator King. I'm out of time, but I--I'd appreciate it if
you could supply, for the record, a 1- or 2-page justification
for the incremental cost of the organizational change, and
outline what the tangible benefits will be of this change.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, I will, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Rapuano. The establishment of the Space Force
would be phased over five years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal
year 2024. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests
$72.4 million of initial resources necessary to establish a
Space Force headquarters with approximately 200 personnel.
Establishing a sixth branch of our military with dedicated
leadership will elevate, unify, and focus the development of
space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future
threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities; and
further build space warfighting culture.
Over the next five years, the Department would methodically
grow the Space Force. The total additional cost growth over
those five years is estimated to be less than $2 billion, or
approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for the same
period. During that time, as missions are transferred to the
Space Force, existing personnel and budget authority would
transfer into the Space Force from the other Military Services.
By the end of the transition period, more than 95 percent of
the Space Force annual budget is estimated to consist of
resources that would have been transferred from existing DOD
budget accounts, along with an estimated 15,000 transferred
personnel.
Additional resources would be dedicated to building out the
Space Force headquarters and establishing and maintaining
investments in space-specific personnel development, including
space training and education centers, a warfare center for
space, a space personnel center, and a space doctrine
development center. These functions would further develop the
unique expertise, culture, and ethos necessary for the complex
warfighting domain of space. Once the Space Force is fully
established, these additive costs are estimated to be $500
million annually, which would represent approximately 0.07
percent of the DOD annual budget. A breakdown of the estimated
additive costs is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ in Millions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Estimated Additive Funding.............. $500
Headquarters................................ $300
Education and Training...................... $110
Warfare Center for Space.................... $20
Space Personnel Center...................... $50
Doctrine Development Center................. $20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through the organizational change of standing up a Space
Force, the Department will experience many tangible benefits.
First, a space training and education center would provide
focused military education for space specialists. Next, a
warfare center for space would help to develop the tactics,
techniques, and procedures for space operations in a contested
domain. A space personnel center would ensure that our space
cadre is recruited, retained, and managed to develop the skills
we need in a space-focused force. Lastly, a space doctrine
development center would elevate space doctrine for a distinct
warfighting domain on par with air, land, and maritime
doctrine. All of these investments would have significant
impacts on ensuring we are prepared to maintain our leadership
and to defend our interests in space.
Senator King. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. General Thompson, at one point, you looked
like you wanted to jump into this conversation. I think Senator
King's looking for an answer, if you'd like to respond.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Thank you, Madam
Chairwoman.
Senator King, I would like to add a little bit, if I can.
Certainly, there are aspects of the need to fix some of the
problems when you talk about the number of organizations and
agencies and activities inside the Department today that are
focused on acquisition, that are focused on architecture, and
focused on some of them. We certainly need to unify those, give
them the right purpose and synchronization and direction in a
unifying step.
The second is, as Secretary Rapuano mentioned, the specific
focus of a service staff whose responsibility is to organize
the forces, train them, equip them, and present them for the
warfighting purpose that, in this case the U.S. Space Command,
would operate.
But, I would also look at it as not just a ``Are we trying
to fix a problem?'' It's a question of, ``Is the Nation
prepared? And are we organized to accept and take on the
challenge that comes with space as a warfighting domain?'' And
I would use as an example, 1947 and the formation of the United
States Air Force. The War Department and the Army had done a
tremendous job creating air capabilities that won World War
II--strategic bombardment, air superiority, tactical support,
and military transport. No one could argue that the War
Department had not done a tremendous job in creating a space
arm, but the Nation decided that, at that time, as we looked to
the future, as the needs and the requirements and expectations
that we expected of airpower, it needed a separate service, it
needed a proponent, it needed a four-star advocate on the
equivalent scale with the other Services. I would argue, now's
the opportunity for the Nation to look at that, have that
conversation, and decide, if we're in a similar position, to
ensure that we're organized and structured appropriately to
meet the challenges of the future. So, it's not just a matter
of, ``Are we trying to fix problems?'' Is this the right
structure for the Nation, going forward, to address these
challenges?
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, which nation's armed forces
depend most on space?
Secretary Rapuano. So, the United States leverages space
more than any country in the world. Our partners and allies,
working with us, in terms of those alliances and partnerships,
have their own developed capabilities, and we leverage and use
them to force-multiply our capabilities. So, the Five Eyes--
France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States--and
a number of other partners have space-based capabilities, as
well. The South Koreans have some space capability. And it's
multiplying. And, as noted earlier, the commercial sector has
exploded, in terms of scope and scale of the activities and the
speed of the development of capabilities. So, you're seeing a
proliferation of that technology now spreading much more
rapidly than ever before.
Senator Cotton. So, it's all good with our allies, but,
ultimately, that comes back to the central position that space
plays a role in the way we fight wars. What about our
adversaries, Russia and China? How dependent are they upon
space for their armed forces?
Secretary Rapuano. China has expanded by orders of
magnitude. The Russians have grabbed back, they have newly
invested in space, and have developed some relatively exquisite
capabilities. But, the scale of the Chinese investment is the
lead, in terms of everyone else out there, including Russia.
They have more rocket launches this year than the United
States. They're the lead rocket-launch nation in the world.
Senator Cotton. How much of that Chinese investment is
designed specifically to counteract the advantage that we had
enjoyed in space over the years?
Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned that they are making
significant investments to do that.
Senator Cotton. There's no way to avoid space being central
to our way of war, is there? I mean, some of it is a legacy
based on our technological advantages, going back to the early
days of the space era, but it's also just the fact that we live
in the new world, and they all live in Eurasia, and we have to
project power across a global scale, which depends on space.
Secondarily, we have made the choice, over the last 30-to-35
years, to fight information-centric warfare. I don't just mean
long-range precision strikes or fancy cyberattacks. What does
it mean to a private on the ground with a rifle if we lose
dominance in space?
Secretary Rapuano. It's pivotal. Our targeting, our
communications, positioning, timing, location for GPS, and then
all of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities, in terms of surveillance and reconnaissance that
we get from space, realtime situational awareness of
adversaries' locations and activities. To lose those
capabilities would be very significant. And that is why we are
so focused on defending and protecting them.
Senator Cotton. Let's talk about defending them. Where are
we today versus, say, where we were a year ago in our space
assets? Are we more or less vulnerable to, say, a kinetic
strike from an anti-satellite missile?
Secretary Rapuano. So, we are improving our capabilities
from investments that started several years ago. In fact, even
late in the Obama Administration, there were some significant
investments, as you're aware, from this committee and others.
In terms of the details of those activities, we could discuss
that in a closed hearing.
Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to cyberattack,
both in orbit and on the ground?
Secretary Rapuano. As noted earlier, we're very focused on
the cyber piece, so we don't know what we don't know, in some
respects, in terms of what an adversary may be doing, but we
are hardening the entry points, and there are fewer entry
points in space--some space systems versus other systems that
are more connected and networked. We're making progress there.
But, it's a priority, and we are continuing to approach it
quite urgently.
Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to the kind of
laser attacks that might dazzle or destroy a satellite system?
Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned about ground-based
effects on satellites, and we are seeing potential adversaries
invest in them.
Senator Cotton. I raise these questions knowing that you
can't get into the greatest detail in this open forum, but just
to highlight the vulnerabilities of our space systems, both our
sensors, but also the critical systems on which everyone in our
military depends, to include that private out on the ground. We
may not want to have a space race. We may not want to weaponize
space or have weapons in space. But, if our adversaries are
competing there, we don't really get a choice whether we
compete. We only get a choice whether we win or lose.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you all for being here. Sorry, I was in another
committee meeting before I got here, so I think this was
covered, but I'm not sure. I wanted to ask.
General John Thompson, I know there are two acquisition
programs and reforms as part of the Space and Missile Systems
Center. I think you mentioned 65 percent savings in the
timeline that you laid out, which sounded good on the surface.
Was that correct, in your statement?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, I'm sorry, could I
ask you to rephrase the question?
Senator Manchin. The 65 percent savings in timeline which
was laid out----
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Oh, sure. Sure. Thank you
very much.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, what you're referring
to is a rearchitecture that we've done to the Space and Missile
Systems Center, called the SMC 2.0. When I arrived at SMC,
about 2 years ago, what I found was a bunch of outstanding
people that really knew the space acquisition business, but
they were organized very hierarchically and in stovepipes by
mission area. There was very little crosstalk among major
programs of record. Decisions took a long time to make, because
the decision packages had to fight their way up through the
staff.
What we have entertained now is an SMC 2.0 construct, which
turns our--what I would refer to as an Industrial Age business-
model kind of organization into a new, modern corporation,
something like that you might see in Silicon Valley. So, a much
flatter organization. We've delegated authority down to senior
civilians and senior military officers who know what they're
doing. We've added three new program executive officers, in
addition to me, and put them closer to the program offices so
that they can make decisions faster. Making decisions faster--
in many cases, what we've seen on major program-of-record
milestone decisions is, we've been able to save 60 to 70
percent of the time required by eliminating layers of the
bureaucracy and getting those decisionmakers closer to the
program offices.
Senator Manchin. Any one of you all--with so many agencies
out there, I'm concerned, because, on the cyber end of it,
espionage and things that are happening, there are so many
smaller contractors. We don't seem to have good oversight or
good controls of the main contract with its security clearances
and also the programs it is using. That's where I think an
awful lot of espionage has gone on, and a lot of cybertheft is
going on. And I don't see anybody changing that or going after
that total control. If you have an RFP, and you have a main
contractor, that person should be held accountable and
responsible for anybody and everybody they bring onboard. And
we're finding that's not the case.
Secretary Rapuano. Senator, thank you for that question.
We are highly focused on the defense industrial base, all
of those companies who support the development of Department of
Defense----
Senator Manchin. I understand. We found out that there
could be four or five subcontractors all from the Department of
Defense that go in to the main contractor. By the time that
contractor goes down to subcontractors, they're all trying to
protect their domain to give them a competitive edge and make
money. It's all fine. But, you want to know why China's been
able to ramp up so quick? This is loosey-goosey down here. They
can almost pick up anything, and no one's tightening that up.
Secretary Rapuano. We are in the process of tightening that
up. And part of that are the contract requirements that need to
be modified to ensure that those who are performing on DOD
contracts are required by the contract stipulations to ensure
that cybersecurity----
Senator Manchin. I'm told that some of the smaller
subcontractors don't have the wherewithals. So, the prime
should be held totally responsible to make sure that they have
the wherewithals, or they don't work with the subcontractor
that doesn't. Nobody's holding anybody accountable, because the
prime can say, ``That's a subcontract,'' or, ``That was subbed
out to another sub.'' Does that make sense?
Secretary Rapuano. That is part of the challenge.
Absolutely.
Senator Manchin. You all do recognize that that's a big
problem.
You recognize that China's rapid advancement has been
because they've been able to tap into some of our most
strategic and confidential and high-security information,
they've been able to get fairly rapidly, fairly easily?
Secretary Rapuano. We see it as a vulnerability, and we are
focused on addressing it.
Senator Manchin. Anybody else want to comment on this?
Please do.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, that is a
fantastic question, and we agree 100 percent with you.
Sir, General ``DT'' Thompson and I happen to work with
General ``Jay'' Raymond, who is the current Air Force Space
Command Commander, and he has made it abundantly clear, to both
``DT'' and me, in a very forceful manner, that the situation
that you state is unsatisfactory. We have a number of
initiatives underway to battle exfiltrations of our weapon
systems data from our cleared defense contractors. And holding
the primes accountable to ensure that their subs, whether
they're one level down, two levels down, or three levels down,
is one of the principal----
Senator Manchin. We're finding out that some of the primes
have no idea, third and fourth and fifth in the chain, who they
are.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, in the acquisition
domain, specifically in the space portfolio, we are working
after that. I would ask you to let me submit something in the
record that gives you the details of that plan.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has not been
made aware of classified weapon system information being
compromised by foreign adversaries. Controlled unclassified
information (CUI) on space mission systems is being exfiltrated
from Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs) at an alarming rate.
CDC networks tend to be easily breached permitting propagation
and exfiltration of data relating to the development and
operation of space mission systems. Contracts awarded before
November 2016 generally do not include clauses stipulating:
encryption of DOD information; network traffic monitoring;
prompt system patching; no posting of DOD information to public
websites; etc. Newer contracts conform with the more recent
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System (DFARS) clause
for cybersecurity compliance and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and safeguarding
requirements for CUI, but these minimums may not be sufficient
to safeguard information. Recent DFARS clauses establish the
minimum standard for basic cybersecurity requirements, but SMC
is taking additional, multiple steps to better secure our
controlled unclassified information on cleared defense
contractors' networks. To quickly attack this issue, SMC hired
an experienced Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) to rapidly scan and establish exposure levels for three
prioritized weapon systems: Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) and to develop a methodology to assess
the remainder of SMC's portfolio of contracts. The most
significant takeaway is the need to mandate cybersecurity
requirements above existing Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplements and information management control plans
from prime to subcontractors and specify these requirements in
contract language for all future contracts. Working with the
Air Force Inspector General and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, SMC is conducting compliance audits to identify
industry best practices to better strengthen corporate networks
where CUI is stored or processed. With assistance from the
Defense Cyber Crime Center, SMC will begin advanced adversary
emulation to assess the vulnerability of CDC networks and
identify weaknesses in corporate cyber security posture. SMC
continues to investigate ways to cooperatively and proactively
monitor CDC networks where our CUI will exist in an effort to
shorten the response time from compromise to recovery. Knowing
that no network will ever be 100 percent secure, SMC is
implementing advanced data obfuscation on every future contract
to further complicate and stress adversaries' cyber activities.
To prevent our CUI riding on weak CDC networks, SMC is testing
requiring companies to submit a vulnerability scan of their
network with their responses to our Request for Proposals.
Finally, SMC is implementing changes to incentive plans to
encourage CDCs to be more proactive in their cyber security
efforts, and, if positive incentives do not work, SMC will
explore negative incentives. SMC understands the importance of
continuing to protect sensitive weapon system information on
cleared defense contractors' information systems. We are
working with industry partners and across the Air Force and
Department of Defense to ensure we can adapt to threats now and
into the future. We look forward to working with Congress as we
work to ensure our sensitive data and our weapons systems are
protected from adversary threats.
Senator Manchin. Happy to.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Then, perhaps, if you're
interested, we could go to another forum and talk about it in
classified setting.
Senator Manchin. Senator Rounds and myself have a
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, and we're getting into
procurement. This is a big thing with us right now, because you
just have to look back not that far to find out how China and
others have been so successful at rapidly deploying and getting
up to speed at a much quicker rate. You know, they say, except
for the second engine, their F-35 mimics ours to a tee. There's
no way to do that, except being able to get all the pertinent
information needed.
Madam Chairman, we just have a terrific problem, here. And
it goes into procurement, and it goes all the way down the
chain. We don't hold the prime, which is the big boy
accountable--and a subcontractor does not get a contract from
them, because they're not large enough to do it on their own,
so they end up being a sub, and they're held hostage by the
prime. The prime is not held accountable to the sub and what
the sub's doing and how it secures its systems. It goes down to
second, third, and four tier, you've really got a problem. And
I think they realize it. It's been out there for quite some
time. With your Subcommittee and our Subcommittee working
together, hopefully we can make some major changes.
Senator Fischer. Hopefully, General Thompson will get that
information to you and to all of us, Senator Manchin, and then
maybe we can follow up and do a classified so we can get in
more to the details on it, if that would be helpful.
Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to something you said to
Senator Cotton. You said that China has expanded its
capabilities in space by orders of magnitude. I just wanted to
dig into that a little bit more. The Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) produced an unclassified report this past January,
``Challenges to Space Security,'' in which it described a
number of disturbing patterns of our competitors. China, it
appears, is directing an Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization. I'd note that the rotating membership includes
nations like Iran and Pakistan. Russia, this report says, has
the largest foreign network of ground-based optical space
surveillance sensors in its Keldysh Institute of Applied
Mathematics, coordinates sensor tasking and fuses information
from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors on 40
observatories spread across 16 countries. Is it fair to say
that China and Russia have a coordinated international effort
to threaten the United States in and from space?
Secretary Rapuano. With regard to complicity between China
and Russia, less clear, but, in terms of the objectives of
individually, China and Russia, absolutely. They are looking to
asymmetrically undermine our space capabilities.
Senator Hawley. This is a top priority for them, is it fair
to say?
Secretary Rapuano. Fair to say.
Senator Hawley. The expenditures that you were detailing
earlier, both from the Chinese and the Russian Government side,
show a renewed emphasis for both of them on a modern-day space
race. Is that fair to say?
Secretary Rapuano. That is fair.
Senator Hawley. Let me come back to something you said to
Senator King. You were talking about the triad to approach this
issue. You talked about U.S. Space Command, you talked about
the service component. You didn't get to the third piece.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, thank you. Thank you for asking.
The third piece is really about the development. And that's
where the space development piece comes in, in terms of SDA. It
is about, really, leveraging innovation, it's about leveraging
commercial practices and capabilities that are developed on the
commercial side, and it's really looking at the
transformational capability set. So, one of the areas that SDA
will be focused on is a massively distributed sensor
communications architecture in LEO to be more resilient,
degrade more gracefully under attack, and provide us more
reliability, as well as reconstitution if we lose assets. That
would be a critical capability fill, in terms of operating in a
warfighting environment, where we have adversaries who are
looking to get at our assets.
Senator Hawley. Understood. Let me just ask you a budget
question. Do you think your request for a 56 percent increase
in the space situational awareness part of the budget is
sufficient to meet the threat that we're seeing from our
adversaries?
Secretary Rapuano. We are comfortable with the President's
$14 billion request for the next fiscal year. We believe that
it covers our major requirement areas.
Senator Hawley. General David Thompson, let me ask you
about another piece of the budget. It includes a request for a
115 percent increase in science and technology, which seems
very wise, given the scale of the challenge that we're facing.
I just wonder, Who have been your biggest partners in this
effort, particularly in the research, private-sector, and
startup communities?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, thank you.
I would say right now what we're trying to focus on most is
recognizing and understanding what's out in the commercial
sector, the innovation that's there in the commercial market,
the emerging commercial market. There are lots of companies
there that are looking at, for example, large-scale
constellations that might be fielded cheaply, with tremendous
capability.
So, we're currently looking for a couple of opportunities.
One is the technology that goes with a low-cost space
capability, the actual mission performance, whether it be
remote sensing or it be satellite communications or things like
that, but the third thing we're looking at is opportunities to
partner with them for things like hosted payloads and other
things that we might be able to use mission capability with.
So, it's especially focused on the investment you see in the
burgeoning commercial space sector.
Senator Hawley. Have you encountered any particular
difficulties in working with the private sector along these
lines?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. We have not. They are
certainly welcome and open to investment. Really, what is the
challenge on our part is twofold. First is picking the right
places to invest for strategic purposes. Then, as you talked
about, there is certainly an investment there, but there are
always more opportunities and needs than there are investment
dollars. So, making smart use of our investment dollar.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, just as a quick
addition to that, we've tried to create lower boundaries for
entry for a lot of our commercial partners, our nondefense-
oriented, nontraditional partners that are bringing new,
innovative things to the table. One of our most successful
vehicles is called the Space Enterprise Consortium. It's a
consortium where we've invited and had join about 270 different
contractors, small businesses, and large businesses. About 80
percent of them are nontraditional--in other words,
commercial--space companies. We've been able to utilize that
vehicle to do a lot of prototyping. We have over $200 million
on contract for 37 different space prototyping efforts, and
many of those--in fact, most of those--have a nontraditional
component to them. So, we're reaching out to the private
sector, looking for those innovative opportunities, going into
the future.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
General Thompson, I'm going to follow up with a question I
was going to ask you earlier. We are going to do a second
round, here.
The Air Force has really touted its development of the next
generation of infrared early-warning satellites as an example
of its ability to rapidly acquire space capabilities in
response to those warfighting demands. When announcing changes
to the program last year, the Air Force stated its intention to
cut 4 years off the procurement process. Can you talk about the
progress you've made in meeting that ambitious goal?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, relative to the
help that the Congress has provided us, the rapid prototyping
authorities that we receive through section 804 have been a
godsend. Using those rapid prototyping authorities from section
804, we were able to put both layers, if you will, of our Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) on contract
within 6 months, saving at least a year of time, from the
standpoint of what we'd have had to do if we were conducting a
traditional source selection.
The process that we went through was simple, but also
rigorous. In other words, we don't want to lose the oversight
in our section 804 prototyping efforts, similar to what Ms.
Chaplain said earlier. We want to make sure that the rigor and
the robustness of the oversight that we're providing our
contractors is there from the get-go. We also want to make sure
that our board of directors, the Congress, is kept fully
apprised of what we're doing in our section 804 rapid-
prototyping endeavors.
On Next-Gen OPIR, we have a quarterly requirement to come
over here. And I will tell you right now, if you want us to
come more often than that, we will. We have triennial reports
that we're submitting on all of our section 804s, including
Next-Gen OPIR, and our goal, from Dr. Will Roper, who is the
service acquisition executive, is to offer so much transparency
to the Hill on our 804 programs that you'll actually ask us,
``Why are you doing this by the DOD 5000 series? We want some
more of that 804 kind of execution.''
Senator Fischer. Yeah. Well, I appreciate your attention to
the OPIR. It's an extremely important program, and I'm happy to
see that it's advancing. Do you believe that the budget that's
been presented is going to support that aggressive schedule
that you're on right now?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, the requirement
is, for 2025, to have an initial launch capability. We
originally envisioned being able to go as fast as 2023.
However, the costs in the budget were just not able to make us
to that gold-medal level. So, we still consider the fact that
we've accelerated the program a little over 2 years, at this
point, and we believe that the fiscal year 2020 budget and out
years fully supports that. However, there are two above-
threshold reprogrammings that we have been trying to work
through the Department and over here on the Hill, one for
fiscal year 2018 and one for fiscal year 2019. Obviously, we
missed the President's budget before we had the requirement to
accelerate to 2025. So, we're still looking for about $600
million worth of above-threshold reprogrammings that we're
working very closely on with the Department and the Hill. The
fiscal year 2018 Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) was
approved by the Hill. Thank you for that. But, not all the
sources were. So, we're trying to get the sources in line, and
then a $400 million above-threshold reprogramming in 2019 is
still required to meet the 2025 need date.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Chaplain, I understand that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed an assessment of
the Department's space acquisition workforce, and see that some
of your findings are described in your testimony. If you could
just, in the remaining time, talk a little bit about the
difficulty in tracking and identifying acquisition
professionals working on space programs? This isn't really a
clear and distinct group of people, is it? You kind of
referenced that in your opening remarks.
Ms. Chaplain. Right. I think the Department's pretty good
at tracking acquisition professionals in certain lines of
effort, like program management, and certain types of
engineering. What the Department as a whole doesn't do is track
acquisition professionals tied to certain missions, like space.
So, the fact that they couldn't do this for space isn't
unusual. It's sort of an issue across the Department. But, we
believe that maybe we do want to add some fields to the
databases that track people so that we can help identify who is
in space, especially if we're going to move together some
organizations.
Also in our review, we came across comments and concerns
about gaps in expertise in certain areas for space, mostly in
the technical things, and trying to keep people on for long
periods of time and get professionals in at the mid-level.
Those are persistent concerns that we've reported on over the
years. I know there's been a lot of effort to strengthen the
workforce, but it's still an issue for space.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. One of you mentioned space situational
awareness a few minutes ago, and that, in conjunction with the
open-source reporting that Senator King mentioned about India
and its ASAT test today, got me thinking: I think it was 2007
when we went through the initial Chinese effort at this, that
scattered junk all over low-Earth orbit and made a mess for
everyone. What do we know at this point that you can share in
this environment on the Indian story? More importantly, do we
need some sort of international structure--a space code of
conduct, for example--to make sure that, if nations are going
to test, they're going to do it in a way that doesn't create
the kind of enormous problems, which led, in many cases, to the
kind of funding that we have to put into space situational
awareness today?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator Heinrich, thank
you.
I'll talk to you a little bit about the Indian ASAT test
that did occur this morning. First of all, we were aware that
it was coming, because of some flight bans that India had
announced and some information they had published previously.
But, the launch occurred at 1:39 a.m., Eastern Time. First of
all, let me say clearly, it was detected and characterized and
reported by Air Force systems--missile warning systems and our
airmen at Buckley Air Force Base.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Immediately after the
ASAT struck the target vehicle--the Joint Space Operation
Center and the Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron began
collecting information about the breakup of the vehicle.
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Currently, they're
tracking about 270 different objects in the debris field.
Likely, that number is going to grow as the debris field
spreads out and we collect more sensor information.
Senator Heinrich. Do we know what the elevation of that
debris field was at the breakup?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator, we do, but I'm
going to ask to pass that in different channels. I'm not
convinced I know that that's an unclassified fact.
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. But, we do know the
altitude at which it occurred. We immediately started providing
public notice on our Space Track website, and will provide
direct notification to satellite operators if those satellites
are under threat. I will also say, at this point in time, the
International Space Station is not at risk. That's another
thing that we do, and provide warning routinely. But, that's
just an example of how no other nation, no other military
force, no other civil or other body could have detected,
characterized, and begun warning and providing the world the
way we do with Air Force and other joint assets. So, that
represents a tremendous capability, but we have more investment
to turn that from what I'll call a matter of routine
spaceflight safety approach to searching and finding and
detecting threats who are attempting to hide from us, as well.
Senator Heinrich. Do you want to touch on the issue of
whether or not we need to engage in some sort of multilateral
effort to ensure that someone doesn't make the kind of mistake
that China made back in 2007? Do we need some parameters where
people agree to, for example, not test at very high altitudes?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. I would say--certainly,
in a broad sense. And this will be a specific example. There's
a lot of work to do with the rest of the world on what are
established norms of behavior, rules of engagement, and the
code of conduct in space. And I know that's a matter that the
State Department and the Department of Defense, led by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is working with the
rest of the world. It's certainly a need that we all need to
address.
I don't know if Mr. Rapuano wants to add more in that
regard, but it's a need.
Secretary Rapuano. We are involved with discussions
internationally, and we have participated in nonbinding
confidence-building measures associated with activities in
space. We are certainly proponents of safe and sustainable
space and minimization of space debris. So, that is an active
and ongoing conversation.
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
I'm getting close to the end, here. And given that I went
over earlier, I'm not going to make that mistake twice. So,
thank you Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King.
Senator King. I just want to reiterate the point that
Senator Manchin was making. I've been in numerous hearings, and
every single Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Secretary of State,
whoever, is sitting where you're sitting, when you say, ``How's
your cyber protection?'' says, ``We're good. We're safe.'' None
of them know that. So, I want to urge you, if you go to one of
your prime contractors and say, ``How's it going?'' or if you
get a contractual assurance, don't believe it. My suggestion is
Red Teaming them. There's nothing like a skull and crossbones
that appears on the CEO's computer screen that says,
``Congratulations, you've been hacked by the U.S. Air Force.
Your award is the termination of your contract.'' I mean, we've
got to be aggressive about this, because, to accept assurances
everybody gives you those assurances. They don't really know,
and they don't know until they've been tested. And you have the
capability of doing that. The Pentagon has done bug bounty
programs and Red Teams. I urge you to do this.
The intellectual property theft via subcontractors, as
Senator Manchin was talking about, is the new frontier. It just
came up this morning in a hearing with the Navy. We've had it
with Secretaries of State. We've had it with CEOs of utilities.
The Wall Street Journal just had a major story about a third-
generation sub for a utility, who was a headhunter or
something, and got up into the control system of the utility.
So, I urge you to not take assurances, but to be aggressive
about this. I think a Red Team approach is one that could,
maybe, put the fear in them.
Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
I'd like thank my colleagues for their attendance and their
good questions today, and thank the panel for the information
you've provided. If Members do have questions, I hope that you
will respond in writing and be able to get those to us in a
timely manner.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
space force
1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the House proposed a Space
Force or Corps in its Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) modeled after the Marine Corps. Do you agree that the Space
Force proposal submitted with the President's budget is pretty close to
what was proposed by the House in 2017?
Secretary Rapuano. Both the Department's Space Force proposal and
the House proposal would have established a sixth branch of the Armed
Forces within the Department of the Air Force. The Department's
proposal includes an Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space to
provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space Force. It also
consolidates existing DOD space forces from across the Air Force, Army,
and Navy. While DOD has identified a number of technical legislative
changes needed for the new Space Force to function properly, the major
concept is generally the same in both the DOD and House proposals to
establish a new Armed Force within the Department of the Air Force.
2. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what has changed since when
Secretary Mattis, Secretary Wilson and Chairman Dunford opposed the
idea of a Space Force or Space Corps the first time?
Secretary Rapuano. Mindsets across the Department, including my
own, shifted when we dug deeper into this problem. Over the last nine
months, we have put a tremendous amount of effort and analytical rigor
into understanding the current and future risks to our space missions
and capabilities, and analyzed options in order to identify the most
effective solution to address these problems. We have come to more
fully appreciate the degree to which the world is changing and the
Department must adapt accordingly in order to maintain U.S. leadership
in space.
3. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, if
established, the total Space Force Active Duty would be roughly 10,500.
Compare that to the Army, which has roughly 476,000 Active Duty
members. Does it make sense to have an entire Service with that few
Active Duty members?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. If enacted by Congress, the
initial size of the Space Force would be 15,000 to 20,000 people, with
the vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and
budget authority--transferred from the existing Military Services.
Space is a unique operating environment with special needs and
requirements; we believe it best served by a dedicated branch of
service inside the Department of the Air Force. I believe the DOD
proposal is sized to maximize warfighting capacity and advocacy for
space while minimizing bureaucracy. That said, it is important to note
this will be an ongoing process as the new ``protect and defend''
missions will grow the U.S. Space Force over time. While applying the
inherent advantages of a separate service inside the national security
enterprise, we also have the opportunity to design it from a 21st
Century perspective.
4. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, when adding civilians and
headquarters, the Space Force would have a total of around 16,000
people. In terms of overhead, how does this compare to other
organizations and Services?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the personnel requirements for a
Space Force. However, in May 2019, the Congressional Budget Office
reported on its assessment of the personnel requirements and costs
associated with standing up new DOD space organizations, including a
military service within the Department of the Air Force. \1\ In its
assessment, the Congressional Budget Office made comparisons to other
military organizations and estimated a new space service could include
27,000 to 29,700 personnel (based on full time equivalent positions)--
22,900 of these positions (10,800 for space operations and 12,100 for
support functions like management, acquisitions, and training) would
transfer from existing space-related positions, and an additional 4,100
to 6,800 positions would be new for overhead and management. By
contrast, according to an Office of Personnel Management website, the
largest federal agencies, including the military departments, have more
than 150,000 civilian personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congressional Budget Office, The Personnel Requirements and
Costs of New Military Space Organizations, https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/55178, (Washington, DC: May 2019).
5. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the legislative proposal to
stand up the Space Force will give the Department authority to transfer
civilian employees on a ``on a voluntary or involuntary basis'' and
``is not subject to any other provision of law that provides appellate
rights or procedures for civilian employees of the Department of
Defense.'' This authority seems overly broad. How are you going to be
able to attract and retain a workforce if its work conditions are dealt
with in such an arbitrary way?
Secretary Rapuano. We would like to work with Congress on the right
personnel authorities to meet our needs. The Space Force would require
highly technical talent. Our objective was to provide flexibility and
enable greater streamlining and competitiveness with the private
sector. To that end, the Department has seen great success with Title
10 excepted service alternate personnel systems, including the ability
to attract and retain its workforce while upholding merit system
principles and safeguarding against prohibited personnel practices. The
precise system we proposed was modeled on the Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System used by the National Reconnaissance
Office and other DOD intelligence agencies. We can adapt this proven
model to the Space Force. Transfers of civilian personnel would not
occur arbitrarily. Civilian employees would transfer in place to the
Space Force with the realignment of the mission and billet to which the
employee was assigned, with no loss in pay. Employees could also
volunteer to transfer to vacant Space Force excepted service positions
for which they qualify.
rocket systems launch program--tactically responsive launch operations
6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, the
fiscal year 2019 budget included multiple initiatives to improve space
resilience, including a new dedicated Air Force procurement line for
small launch services called the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP).
Can you speak to how the Air Force is leveraging tactically responsive
capabilities for contingency small launch requirements, including
expanding these capabilities to include more diverse payload
configurations and launch systems, including air-launched space launch?
Secretary Rapuano. The Department of Defense is exploring new space
launch capabilities, such as the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP),
to ensure access to space and improve the resilience of our space
architecture. Although I defer to the Air Force on the specifics of
RSLP, the Department supports flexible and fast acquisition programs to
supplement our more traditional National Security Space Launch (NSSL)
programs.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The RSLP funding identified in
fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental
satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch
program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program
with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare
services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space
vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions,
AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple
emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019,
Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three
technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
Lieutenant General John Thompson The RSLP funding identified in
fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental
satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch
program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program
with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare
services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space
vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions,
AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple
emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019,
Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three
technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the Air Force's dedicated
procurement line for small launch services. However, in 2017, we found
that several U.S. companies were developing launch vehicles and related
technologies to provide low- and medium-weight payload launch
capabilities on the commercial market. \2\ Some of these companies
began conducting test flights in 2017 with plans to begin carrying
commercial payloads as early as 2018. We found that these emerging
companies were implementing schedule flexibility as a key component of
their business strategies to meet the demands of small to medium
payload customers. These companies could potentially provide launch
services to the government through the Air Force's Rocket System Launch
Program. Moreover, in 2015, we found that DOD did not have a
consolidated plan for developing a responsive launch capability
primarily because of a lack of formal requirements for responsive
launch, that is, no existing space program had them. \3\ However, we
have not assessed DOD's plans more recently nor reviewed or assessed
the criteria related to launch vehicle certification or mission
assurance, for example, that the Air Force may have for these vehicles.
This would be a good topic for future review, given trends in the
launch vehicle market and the increased need for resiliency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Surplus Missile Motors: Sale Price Drives Potential
Effects on DOD and Commercial Launch Providers, GAO-17-609 (Washington,
DC: Aug. 16, 2017).
\3\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive
Launch Report, GAO-16-156R (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2015).
7. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, today, nearly all U.S.
national security satellites are launched from fixed coastal U.S.
launch sites that could easily be disrupted. Is the Department of
Defense (DOD) developing more diverse launch sites using new commercial
tactically responsive launch capabilities, including the use of
existing military installations to support resilient polar and
equatorial launch?
Secretary Rapuano. Section 1618 of the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 provides that ``the
Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with a
federally funded research and development center to conduct a study on
space launch locations, including with respect to the development and
capacity of existing and new locations.'' The Department has entered
into a contract with the RAND Corporation to conduct that study, which
should address the issues raised in this question.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force is investing in
spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to
support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30
million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in
Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year
(FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of
supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements
include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber
security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of
liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover
the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch
vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage
emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include
non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is investing in
spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to
support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30
million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in
Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year
(FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of
supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements
include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber
security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of
liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover
the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch
vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage
emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include
non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.
8. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, do you support
integration and execution of commercial air-launched space launch
operations and services on additional military installations,
specifically, operationally relevant demonstrations and/or pilot
programs on Guam, in support of U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and DOD-wide tactically responsive
launch requirements?
Secretary Rapuano. I defer to the Air Force for specifics on the
use of PACAF installations, but in general, the Department of Defense
is supportive of new technological developments by the commercial space
sector to improve and expand space launch capabilities.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively
facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have
utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove
successful.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively
facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have
utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove
successful.
space development agency
9. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, it is my
understanding that if we create a Space Force, a Space Development
Agency (SDA) will be moved where the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
(RCO) resides, or in another scenario, located at or near the Pentagon
headquarters. Congress previously enacted language prohibiting a co-
location of the Space RCO (formerly Operationally Responsive Space) in
order to preserve the disruptive advantages that come with being
separate. Shouldn't we, as a general rule, avoid reinventing the wheel,
and are you at all worried that the Space RCO will be merged and
diluted from its
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The location of Space
Development Agency is still being determined by the Department of
Defense, therefore I will refer any discussion as to its location to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Leaders across the Department
have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile
delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development
Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance
Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and
Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all
represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal.
Space RCO is conducting rapid prototyping and acquisition in
significant ``protect and defend'' capabilities that no other agency is
pursuing. It has initiated several new programs in the past year and it
is our expectation this important work will continue unaffected in a
Space Force. Meanwhile, we remain committed to improving the rapid
delivery of warfighter capabilities while minimizing duplication of
effort and eliminating non-value-added processes and procedures in all
DOD space acquisition organization.
national reconnaissance office
10. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, the White
House's legislative proposal currently excludes the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from the legislative proposal. As a member
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I understand the NRO's value, and
I don't believe we should try to fix something that isn't broken. Do
you agree that NRO should continue to be excluded from the Space Force?
Please explain why or why not.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The DOD's current legislative
proposal does not include the NRO as part of the Space Force. While the
DOD and NRO have separate mission sets, we have a shared strategy,
concept of operations, programs, and sit together at the National Space
Defense Center conducting operations. Beyond that, Space Policy
Directive 4 tasks the DOD and Intelligence Community to further improve
our relationship, organizational constructs, and integrated support to
global joint combined operations. I agree with this approach.
11. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in your
testimony you mentioned that ``[o]ur teaming relationship with the
National Reconnaissance Office has never been stronger.'' In your view,
is there any reason to believe that this partnership cannot continue
and grow stronger still?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. I do believe the Air Force-NRO
relationship has never been stronger and that it will continue to grow
and strengthen. The two examples provided in my testimony, the Silent
Barker program and partnership in the National Space Defense Center,
involve collaboration on strategy, acquisition, personnel, mission data
processing, and funding for the space domain awareness mission.
Additionally, we are committed to an ongoing dialogue to identify areas
of increased cooperation, improved interactions, shared resources, and
expanded partnerships aimed at enhancing national space interests as
tasked in Space Policy Directive 4. These discussions include future
changes to the organization and management of space (roles and
responsibilities), mission assurance (resiliency and OPIR),
collaboration (S&T, international and commercial), and assured access
to space (range support infrastructure).
12. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the NRO is a civilian
agency and the DOD is military, if there is a conflict in space how
will you resolve the unity of command issue?
Secretary Rapuano. As documented in Department of Defense Directive
5105.23, ``National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),'' the NRO is a Defense
Agency, and the Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction,
and control over it. Furthermore, the NRO works in close coordination
with other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) to be ready for
unified action in space, as detailed in U.S. Strategic Command's
Concept of Operations for Warfighting in the Space Domain, May 18,
2018.
The DOD and NRO have successfully operated for the past 50 years in
a unity of effort construct during peacetime and conflict. This process
is described in Joint Publication 3-14, ``Space Operations,'' April 10,
2018. Further, Space Policy Directive-4 on the Establishment of the
United States Space Force, emphasized the continuation and improvement
of the unity of effort construct and directs the Secretary of Defense
and Director of National Intelligence to ``create and enhance
mechanisms for collaboration between the DOD and IC in order to
increase unity of effort and the effectiveness of space operations.''
That report, due to the President of the United States in August, 2019,
will highlight the robust and collaborative foundation that the IC and
DOD have already established, and will include plans to grow and mature
the unity of effort and partnership necessary to persevere during a
conflict in space.
Over the past several years, DOD and IC leaders have strengthened
partnerships and collaboration that have laid a solid foundation for
unity of effort. These include the Joint Space Warfighting Forum
partnership between the U.S. Strategic Command and the NRO; the Space
Enterprise Vision partnership between Air Force Space Command and the
NRO; the National Space Defense Center partnership between U.S.
Strategic Command, the NRO and the broader IC; and joint acquisition
programs focused on space protection and situational awareness.
Additionally, the DOD and IC have participated in an ongoing campaign
of wargames and experiments to continue to forge and mature this
critical partnership.
accountability--space acquisition
13. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, thank you as always for
appearing--you are a steadfast hand helping the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) out in its oversight duties. Section 804 of the fiscal
year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the acquisition
checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
The Air Force is proposing to use this authority to accelerate many
space programs, including the Next Generation Overhead Persistent
Infrared (OPIR) satellite program, which will cost in excess of $5
billion. Are you at all concerned about using this authority with such
a large developmental program?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Section 804 programs, like Next Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR), are exempted from the acquisition
and requirements processes defined by DOD Directive 5000.01 and the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Instead, program
managers are encouraged to use a tailored, streamlined approach to
documentation and oversight to enable them to demonstrate new
technologies or field new or updated systems within 2 to 5 years. In
June 2019, we found that DOD had yet to fully determine how it would
oversee these programs, including what information should be required
to ensure informed decisions about program selection and how to measure
program performance. \4\ Without consistent oversight, DOD is not well
positioned to ensure that these programs are likely to meet
expectations for delivering prototypes or capability to the warfighter
quickly. GAO and others have highlighted lessons learned from DOD's
past efforts to streamline that diminished its capability to lead and
manage the space acquisition process, magnifying problems related to
unstable requirements, poor cost estimating and systems engineering,
and poor contractor performance. In response to a provision in the
Conference Report to a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 115-863), we plan to initiate a review of
DOD's OPIR acquisition efforts this summer.
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\4\ GAO, DOD Acquisition Reform: Leadership Attention Needed to
Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight, GAO-19-439
(Washington, DC: June 5, 2019).
14. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
describe what parameters bound your use of section 804 programs?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities
emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most
critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the
current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested
domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter,
section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are
trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to
ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more
aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the
overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery
with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can
innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability.
This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the
greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters
user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or
technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure.
All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis,
rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific
needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804
programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper,
will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three
times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD.
As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with
congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address
concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr.
Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed
under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series
program.
15. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and
those that might?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of
space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:
Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
production protected tactical waveform capability in current
operational SATCOM terminals.
Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload
adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing
scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space
for operational as well as scientific, research and development
payloads.
Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1
production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided
a roduction viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production
procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by
preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies
allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for
operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing
capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication
Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected
Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting,
produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated
integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M
will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in
current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband
Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a
similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air
Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and
Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented
Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III
program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:
Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload
competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and
production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space
segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most
capability to include a non-flight demonstration.
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using
Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the
Navy as an early use prototype.
Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload,
ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally
deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen
OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development,
and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc
2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and
ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes. The above
programs qualified as section 804 by building operational capability
that addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what
works in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver
the operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the
example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that
significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and
service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the
payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real
data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule
constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
section 804.
emerging small launch providers (osp-4 contract)
16. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, aside from
larger national security space launch, there are a number of emerging
commercial providers eager to play a role in delivering small payloads
into low-earth orbit (LEO) as needed. The Orbital Services Program
(OSP-4) contract was designed to be the on-ramp for all emerging
dedicated small-satellite launch providers. Yet, it is my understanding
the Air Force has not issued a single award. What is the status of this
contract vehicle, availability of funding, and does the Air Force
intend to use the contract?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Since 2013 the Orbital Services
Program-3 (OSP-3) contract has awarded 6 missions to include Discover,
STP-2, and NROL-129. The OSP-3 ordering period will close in Nov 2019.
The AF will expand on this effort with the Orbital Services Program-4
(OSP-4) contract to provide small launch services using a Multiple
Award Contract-Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract.
With a low barrier to entry and future on-ramp opportunities, OSP-4 is
intended to be the main contract vehicle for small orbital launches
greater than 400 pounds. The IDIQ contract Request for Proposal will be
released in July 2019. The first mission RFP (STP-S28) using Rocket
Systems Launch Program procurement funds will be released shortly after
the overarching OSP-4 RFP. Market research indicates that the small
launch industry is ready to support National Security Space missions
and we project approximately 20 missions to be awarded between fiscal
year 2020-fiscal year 2029.
leveraging commercial space
17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, I've met
with a number of people in-and-outside of the military who have said
that if the United States does not start to buy the emerging commercial
offerings in terms of small satellite capabilities, and soon, then
those commercial capacities are inevitably going to migrate elsewhere.
How is the Air Force budgeting specifically toward procuring (or even
experimenting with) emerging commercial capabilities?
Secretary Rapuano. The National Defense Strategy recognizes the
immense potential of emerging commercial space capabilities and the
need for streamlined approaches for identifying promising commercial
technologies, applying them to military systems, and regularly
refreshing their electronics and software to facilitate continuous
capability upgrades. The establishment of the Space Development Agency
(SDA) was intended, in part, to be able to rapidly develop and field
new space capabilities that leverage commercial space technology and
access in support of warfighters. In addition, the Department has
established a Space Rapid Capabilities Office to leverage existing
technology development and operational capabilities to expedite
development and fielding of select, critical space capabilities and
systems. The SDA and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office will
complement existing space research and development activities such as
the Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office and the Space and Missile
Systems Center to leverage more fully the potential of the commercial
space industry.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses
the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and
process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial
capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to
warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center
Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the
SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense
contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the
Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems
Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps
located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA,
the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop
next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's
vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage
commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA
prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission
partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA,
MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense
Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has
been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy
critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to
protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing.
Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial
rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small
satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats
to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial
capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from
contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
traditional members have received government funds through awards which
helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission
partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May,
the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies
that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements.
Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be
further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For
example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to
provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies
and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR
funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies
and concepts with military applications.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses
the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and
process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial
capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to
warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center
Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the
SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense
contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the
Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems
Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps
located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA,
the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop
next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's
vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage
commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA
prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission
partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA,
MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense
Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has
been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy
critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to
protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing.
Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial
rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small
satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats
to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial
capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from
contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
traditional members have received government funds through awards which
helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission
partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May,
the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies
that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements.
Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be
further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For
example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to
provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies
and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR
funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies
and concepts with military applications.
Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted focused work in this area.
However, our ongoing review of DOD's Wideband Communications Services
Analysis of Alternatives will describe some of DOD's efforts to
consider emerging commercial satellite communications capabilities. We
expect to issue a report on this review this fall.
18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, in what
ways is the Air Force engaging small satellite providers and component
manufacturers?
Secretary Rapuano. The Department is paying close attention to the
innovation, energy, and investments in the Small Satellite (SmallSat)
industry, and the opportunity to integrate those technologies into a
holistic architecture to address current and emerging needs in support
of our National Defense Strategy. To accelerate the investment,
development, and deployment of small satellite capabilities, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, led by the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), has established
the Small Satellite Coordination Activity (SSCA). The function of the
SSCA is to coordinate and synchronize critical technology information,
activities, and investments pertaining to SmallSats that are employed
in support of national security missions. In addition, the Space
Development Agency (SDA) seeks to leverage commercially-derived, mass-
produced small satellites, payloads, and ground equipment to build the
next-generation national security space architectures, far more rapidly
and much more affordably than would otherwise be possible.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space
Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to
expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage
domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with
incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense
technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both
internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators,
to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees
will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up
accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and
actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share
innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are
not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as
subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and
analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on
a critical role in actively engaging our international partners
(government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange
information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit.
The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace
industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is
necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain
America's superiority in space.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space
Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to
expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage
domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with
incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense
technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both
internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators,
to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees
will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up
accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and
actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share
innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are
not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as
subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and
analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on
a critical role in actively engaging our international partners
(government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange
information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit.
The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace
industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is
necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain
America's superiority in space.
Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted work in this area in recent
years. In the past we have reported on challenges regarding DOD's
engagement with small providers such as meeting DOD's unique
requirements, obtaining security clearances, and breaking through what
was perceived as an insular culture of space system acquisitions.
spaceflight testing environment
19. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are
now flying low-cost commercial reusable suborbital vehicles that
regularly access the spaceflight testing environment. How is the Air
Force planning to utilize these new capabilities to test new
technologies and reduce technical risks for future DOD space systems?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch
Program provides suborbital launch services through the recently
awarded Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/
Indefinite Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-
ramp opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year
mark, to provide responsive access to space in order to test new space
technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the
Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five
upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch
providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental
and Air Force small satellites.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch Program
provides suborbital launch services through the recently awarded
Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite
Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-ramp
opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year mark, to
provide responsive access to space in order to test new space
technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the
Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five
upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch
providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental
and Air Force small satellites.
space acquisition--section 804 rapid acquisition
20. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804
of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the
acquisition checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs. Can you describe what parameters bound your use of section
804 programs?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities
emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most
critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the
current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested
domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter,
section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are
trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to
ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more
aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the
overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery
with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can
innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability.
This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the
greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters
user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or
technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure.
All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis,
rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific
needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804
programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper,
will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three
times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD.
As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with
congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address
concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr.
Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed
under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series
program.
21. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and
those that might?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of
space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:
Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
production protected tactical waveform capability in current
operational SATCOM terminals .
Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload
adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing
scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space
for operational as well as scientific, research and development
payloads.
Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1
production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided
a production viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production
procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by
preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies
allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for
operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing
capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication
Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected
Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting,
produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated
integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M
will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in
current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband
Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a
similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air
Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and
Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented
Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III
program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:
Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload
competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and
production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space
segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most
capability to include a non-flight demonstration .
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using
Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the
Navy as an early use prototype.
Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload,
ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally
deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen
OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development,
and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc
2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and
ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes The above programs
qualified as section 804 by building operational capability that
addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what works
in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver the
operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the
example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that
significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and
service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the
payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real
data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule
constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
section 804.
launch block buys
22. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, the Air Force has a long
history of launch block buys. Can you describe them and what issues you
saw with them in terms of pricing and competition?
Ms. Chaplain. There have been 2 primary block buys under the
National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle--EELV) program. In 1998, DOD competitively awarded firm-
fixed price contracts, one each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin, for a
combined total of 28 Delta IV and Atlas V launch services under the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions governing commercial
items. Under these contracts, DOD had limited insight into contractor
costs because certified cost or pricing data is not required in the
acquisition of commercial items. \5\ At the time of award, the launch
services contracts had a combined value of about $2 billion. The launch
service contract prices were based on the assumption of a robust
commercial launch market in which DOD would be one of many launch
service customers. The robust commercial launch market did not
materialize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ These firm-fixed-price launch services contracts were awarded
under the FAR provisions governing commercial items--FAR Part 12. As a
result of procuring the launch services as commercial items, under the
FAR, the Air Force could not request certified cost or pricing data
from the contractor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2005, the Air Force revised the EELV acquisition strategy to
reflect the changes in the commercial market and the new role of the
government as the primary EELV customer. This revised strategy provided
two contracts each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. One, called the EELV
launch services (ELS), was a fixed-price contract that covered the
launch vehicle hardware and labor directly associated with building and
assembling the launch vehicles. The second contract, called the EELV
launch capability (ELC), was cost-reimbursable and covered the cost of
maintaining the ability to launch when needed and funded. items such as
overhead on launch pads and engineering support. These contracts were
negotiated under FAR Part 15, which allowed the contracting officer to
obtain data, including cost data, from DOD-approved contractor business
systems, data previously unavailable for this program.
Also in 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to form a
joint venture that would combine the production, engineering, test, and
launch operations associated with U.S. government launches of Boeing's
Delta IV and Lockheed Martin's Atlas V launch vehicles. According to
both contractors, the joint venture, named the United Launch Alliance
(ULA), would gain efficiencies and provide the government with assured
access to space at the lowest possible cost by operating independently
as a single company and providing launches on both Atlas V and Delta IV
vehicles. ULA officially began operations in December 2006 as the sole-
source contractor for EELV. The Air Force continued to obtain cost and
performance data from ULA through both the 2005 contracts awarded to
Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and through new contracts awarded to ULA.
It was, however, unable to get these data for some of the hardware
items that Boeing had purchased while it was under the prior commercial
contract arrangement. In addition, it took ULA many years to set up its
business systems to report the data and to get them approved by DOD. As
a result, there were years where the Air Force had rights to the data
but the data were from an unapproved system, and thus were not
considered reliable.
In late 2009, projected increases in EELV program costs prompted
the Air Force to reconsider the EELV business model. After studying the
approach to buying government launches, the Air Force developed a new
acquisition strategy. The strategy was designed to maintain mission
success and incentivize price reductions in part through long-term
commitments and steady production rates. Under the strategy, the Air
Force combined its prior ELS and ELC contracts into one contract with
ULA, called the Phase 1 contract, which was awarded in 2013 and commits
the government to ordering 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-
year ordering period (provided available launch funds and a valid
requirement), and pays for the capability to launch eight launches per
year. According to the Air Force, this contract saved about $4.4
billion over the prior Air Force-estimated cost of launch for this
period. In addition, this contract retained for the Air Force the same
levels of cost insight as in the previous ELC/ELS contract arrangement.
The advent of re-introducing competition in the launch program in
2015 has resulted in overall lower launch service costs for some
launches. However, we have not conducted work to assess the extent of
such savings.
23. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, do you worry at all about the
Launch Service Agreement (LSA) program underway which will again move
towards long term block buys of launch between two providers?
Ms. Chaplain. While we have not conducted a review of the Air
Force's new launch service procurement acquisition strategy, our
primary, longstanding concern has been whether DOD has gained the
knowledge it needs to make sound decisions before committing to an
expensive, long-term block buy, including the health of the launch
industrial base for sustaining more than one launch provider.
Specifically, we found in our 2011 review of the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle program that DOD did not have some of the information it
needed to make informed decisions in developing the new acquisition
strategy for the program. \6\ Some of the knowledge gaps were in areas
such as the launch industrial base, mission assurance and rocket engine
costs, and future national security launch demand. Among other things,
we recommended the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent
assessment of the health of the U.S. launch industrial base, paying
special attention to engine manufacturers; assess the block buy
contract length given the additional knowledge DOD is gaining as it
finalizes its new acquisition strategy; refrain from waiving Federal
Acquisition Regulation requirements for contractor and subcontractor
certified cost and pricing data; ensure launch mission assurance
activities are sufficient and not excessive, and identify ways to
incentivize the prime contractor to implement efficiencies without
affecting mission success; and examine how broader launch issues, such
as greater coordination across federal agencies, can be factored into
future launch acquisitions to increase efficiencies and cost savings.
DOD agreed with our recommendations. In 2012, we found DOD had
incorporated or planned to incorporate most of the recommendations. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New
Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GAO-11-641
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).
\7\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing
Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-12-822 (Washington,
D.C.: July 26, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, we assessed the risks the Air Force faced as it planned
for future launch acquisitions. \8\ At that time, the Air Force was
beginning its approach to using full and open competition procedures in
a commercial item acquisition to increase the potential to keep more
than one launch company viable and avoid repeating past mistakes that
led to cost growth. We recommended that the Air Force should take an
incremental approach to planning the next acquisition phase to avoid
making decisions without sufficient knowledge. In 2016, we found that
the Air Force was gathering and analyzing information on the global
launch market to help ensure multiple U.S.-based launch providers could
remain viable to compete for future launches. \9\ However, history has
proven that it is difficult to reliably predict growth in the demand
for launch services. Many factors influence the quantity, size, and
frequency of satellite launches for both government and commercial use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to
Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable
Incorporation of Lessons Learned, GAO-15-623 (Washington, D.C.: August
11, 2015).
\9\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD is Assessing Data
on Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-16-
661R (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
space rco reporting structure
24. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in the
fiscal year 2018 NDAA we renamed the Operationally Responsive Space
Program the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO, and moved it
from the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to report to the
Commander of Air Force Space Command. Can you explain to the committee
the merits of this new construct?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The SpRCO uses rapid acquisition
authorities and streamlined reporting/oversight to meet critical
requirements as directed by the SpRCO Board of Directors. The SpRCO
transitions resulting products and capabilities to a partner program
office for long-term production and sustainment, as well as to
operational units to conduct operations. The SpRCO is aligned as a
direct reporting unit to the Commander of Air Force Space Command,
which enables a more agile and streamlined approach to requirements
development and approval, and ensures that the SpRCO is assigned the
most critical warfighting projects. This alignment also helps to ensure
that the SpRCO has a direct and robust linkage with the Space
Warfighting Community throughout the development of their assigned
projects, enabling a smooth transition of capabilities during the
operations phase.
space fence
25. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, space is becoming more congested and
contested especially in LEO as plans for large constellations
containing thousands of satellites come to market. In order to protect
the United States' commercial interest as well as our military
interests, how will the Air Force ensure timely, resilient, cyber-
hardened, precision data is available to prevent collisions and protect
our Nation's assets?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General John Thompson. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, our warfighters depend on our
satellites in all orbital regimes, especially geosynchronous earth
orbit (GEO), for actionable battle management information. There are
several ways to track satellites in GEO including the use of telescopes
and radars, both space-based and ground-based. How is the Air Force
addressing the growing adversarial threat at GEO in the USINDOPACOM
region to ensure the United States can protect its critical assets in a
persistent, all-weather environment within a critical five year
timeline?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. With an architecture designed to
leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best
suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and
discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the
foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and
change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting
clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and
ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform
persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including
threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to
protecting assets.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. With an architecture designed to
leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best
suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and
discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the
foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and
change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting
clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and
ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform
persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including
threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to
protecting assets.
27. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson,he Committee understands that the test
program for the first Space Fence radar site is underway in the
Marshall Islands and will deliver an initial operational capability
(IOC) in late 2019. The Space Fence program will dramatically improve
the identification and tracking of space objects in all orbital
regimes. Can the Air Force describe the plans and timeline to field the
second radar site in Australia that will provide the full operational
capability (FOC), ensuring better space situational awareness and
battle management knowledge for the warfighter in the critical
USINDOPACOM region?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal
year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being
weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to
lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to
field the second radar site in Australia.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal
year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being
weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to
lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to
field the second radar site in Australia.
space software development
28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
Thompson, DOD acknowledged the need to more quickly develop, deploy,
and update software that works for user mission needs. However, the
Defense Innovation Board recently noted that despite countless studies
on DOD software acquisition deficiencies, little seems to be changing.
What is your perspective on the reasons that DOD continues to struggle
to implement newer approaches and tools and deliver more frequent
software releases to users?
Secretary Rapuano. The Defense Innovation Board's ``SWAP Study''
(Software Acquisition and Practices) determined that the current
approach to software development is broken and is a leading source of
risk to DOD: it takes too long, is too expensive, and exposes the
warfighters to unacceptable risk of not having capabilities when
needed. The reasons for this are many, but we must focus on the need to
reform our approach to software and acquisition more broadly. Our
acquisition system was designed to develop and procure industrial-age
capabilities. Although there have been process improvements along the
way, our approach to acquiring capabilities continues to reflect this
hardware-centric heritage. The capabilities we rely on today and,
increasingly, in the future are basically computers. We need an
acquisition system designed for the information age and the
institutional willingness to make the necessary changes to get there.
Our effort to establish a Space Development Agency (SDA), which is
designed primarily to address the growing threat to our space
enterprise, is also intended to begin transforming our acquisition
system to one more-suited to produce the capabilities we will need for
the future. The SDA intends to pursue agile approaches and incorporate
other best practices from industry to put in place critical software
builds on short timelines, including consolidated battle management and
alternate navigation capabilities.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The DOD's acquisition process is
serial and centered on delivering hardware. Hence, culture and process
are the two major impediments to an agile implementation. The
Department has begun implementing the necessary changes to deliver
meaningful software releases to users faster than we have historically
demonstrated. Specifically, the Space and Missile Systems Center is
making profound cultural changes to influence adoption of software
centric processes such as Test Driven Development, User Centric Design,
and providing the user with a Minimum Viable Product to be
incrementally improved upon. Using these methods, the Kobyashi Maru
(the name for the agile software acquisition factory for Space C2)
team, working on the Air Force's Space Command and Control (C2)
program, recently delivered an accredited application, dubbed Metroid,
to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the Protected Tactical Enterprise
Service (PTES), that just awarded its prime contract in November,
implemented agile techniques into its contract and will be delivering
functioning, tested code every two weeks, with operators connected
directly to the test environment for rapid feedback into the
development.
29. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, studies from the Comptroller General
(GAO), DOD, and industry have found that user involvement is critical
to the success of software development. Newer development approaches--
such as Agile and DevOps--are based on integrating users into
development. However, DOD programs have struggled to involve users
early and continuously, and to incorporate user feedback into
development. What are the barriers to user engagement, and do you think
that DOD programs can develop software ``hand in hand'' with users?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes
have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final
product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers
to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a
static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus
allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current
needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery
windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing
the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to
its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space
Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an
accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning,
tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that
users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to
experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide
direct feedback to the developer.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes
have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final
product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers
to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a
static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus
allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current
needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery
windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing
the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to
its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space
Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an
accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the
Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning,
tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that
users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to
experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide
direct feedback to the developer.
30. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, officials from Defense Digital
Service, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense
Innovation Board, and DOD leadership have all said that rapid
development of software using newer software practices does not fit
within the DOD acquisition process, or with DOD culture. To what extent
do you agree these are software challenges, and what are the best ways
for addressing them?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a
challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these
challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD
5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a
shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices
not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the
challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new
acquisition category for software-centric agile program management.
Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations
account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet
the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords
program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more
efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example,
the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a
two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The
software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically
tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can
provide rapid feedback to development.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a
challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these
challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD
5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a
shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices
not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the
challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new
acquisition category for software-centric agile program management.
Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations
account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet
the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords
program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more
efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example,
the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a
two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The
software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically
tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can
provide rapid feedback to development.
31. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, the DOD is currently undertaking a
number of initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps
pathfinder efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software.
What is the status of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD)
and the Air Force's pilot efforts?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force
are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development
appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2)
as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center
offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground
Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new
software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software
intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under
this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations
for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be
combined into the single software appropriation.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force
are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development
appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2)
as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center
offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground
Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new
software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software
intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under
this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations
for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be
combined into the single software appropriation.
32. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what extent has OSD or the Air
Force considered potential challenges in the process steps in the DODI
5000.02 in meeting the Agile or DevSecOps goals of these programs?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have
spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how
it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals
regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile
software program designation being considered. These would help move
the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes
necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial
constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of
these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by
Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help
programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)
streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype
capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of
DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons
are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have
spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how
it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals
regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile
software program designation being considered. These would help move
the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes
necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial
constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of
these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by
Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help
programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)
streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype
capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of
DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons
are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.
33. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
Lieutenant General John Thompson, how do we know programs claiming to
be agile, truly are?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage
of the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense.
Based upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly
progressing through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the
typical DOD acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-
3 years from requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO
is on track to complete this process within 8 months. Additionally,
SpRCO is leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned
into a full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners
are identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO
authorities are used through initial operational production, then
transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate
production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there
are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some
hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of
development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily
into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the
developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen
overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical
Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise
Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure
coherence to an agile construct.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage of
the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense. Based
upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly progressing
through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the typical DOD
acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-3 years from
requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO is on track to
complete this process within 8 months. Additionally, SpRCO is
leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned into a
full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners are
identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO
authorities are used through initial operational production, then
transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate
production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there
are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some
hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of
development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily
into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the
developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen
overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical
Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise
Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure
coherence to an agile construct.
dod space acquisition workforce
34. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, GAO issued a report on
March 14, 2019, that examines what DOD knows about its space
acquisition workforce and basically found that DOD does not know much.
GAO gathered its own data and found that at the end of 2017, there were
over 8,000 military, civilian, contractor, and Federally Funding
Research and Development Center (FFRDC) personnel supporting space
acquisition programs at over 50 locations across the United States. The
report highlighted two very basic pieces of information that DOD
doesn't know, which until they are addressed, will hinder DOD's efforts
to stand-up a Space Force: DOD (1) has not identified all of its space
acquisition programs; and (2) does not know how many military,
civilians, contractors, and FFRDC personnel support space acquisitions.
GAO made recommendations that DOD identify its space acquisition
programs and start collecting data on personnel supporting those
programs. GAO indicated that the military departments had the most
trouble identifying space programs in the user segment, such as radios
or terminals that are needed by the warfighter to use a space-based
capability. How will the department address this problem?
Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted
to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department
identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the
Space Force. Each of the Military Services identified the personnel
currently performing the space missions and functions required to
develop, field, operate, and sustain space missions.
This data has served as the foundation for identifying which forces
and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they would
transfer. These transfers would be very methodical and time-phased to
avoid risk to mission execution.
35. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what steps will DOD be
taking to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are needed
for Space Force?
Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted
to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department
identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the
Space Force--including acquisition missions and functions. Using this
data, the Department is continuing to refine our analysis of which
forces and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they
would transfer.
36. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, how will DOD determine
which acquisition personnel should be transitioned to Space Force to
ensure that it has the most qualified personnel with space acquisition
expertise?
Secretary Rapuano. Space acquisition personnel would transfer into
the Space Force with the transfer of their mission or function. The
space acquisition billets that the Department would transfer into the
Space Force from the existing Military Services have specific
acquisition qualification requirements.
37. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, are there certain
functions, such as cyber security, that DOD would like to increase its
in-house capability to perform instead of relying heavily on
contractors and FFRDCs for that support? If so, what actions do you
plan to take to attract people for those positions?
Secretary Rapuano. For any discipline, the Department uses a
requirements determination process to identify the numbers and types of
personnel needed to perform the missions, tasks, and functions. The
Department has always experienced challenges attracting and retaining
talent in highly technical and high-demand areas such as cyber, space,
engineering, and artificial intelligence. To enhance civilian
opportunities to serve in these roles, the Department is actively
seeking to recruit talent through traditional and innovative methods,
hiring directly for critical skills, and utilizing enhanced recruitment
incentives and pay to meet market demands. For military personnel, the
Department plans to maximize the use of special accession authority for
officers such as lateral career entry processes.
synchronization of satellites, ground control systems, and user
terminals
38. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
Thompson, programs like the Global Positioning Satellites and their
ground segment and user equipment, protected communications satellites
and user terminals, and missile warning satellites and associated
ground process system capabilities have experienced significant
synchronization issues resulting in expensive satellite capabilities
being underutilized. What efforts is DOD undertaking to minimize these
alignment issues and avoid them in the future?
Secretary Rapuano. Keeping the segments of a major space program
aligned can be a significant challenge, particularly with multi-service
or joint programs such as GPS. Section 1603 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 established a ``Council on
Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Enterprise,'' which we are using to help identify, elevate, and
mitigate alignment issues before they become major problems. In
addition, we acknowledge Congress's efforts to provide consistent
program funding, which is essential to maintaining schedules and
keeping segments synchronized.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. As part of the re-architecture of
the Space and Missile Systems Center known as SMC 2.0, I recently made
several key organizational changes to ensure synchronization across all
aspects of the space enterprise. The SMC Portfolio Architect works
across the SMC portfolio and in conjunction with the Air Force Space
Command Enterprise Architect and other DOD space stakeholders. In
concert with the SMC Portfolio Architect, I appointed senior military
and civilian leaders to ensure the synchronization among all components
of each space mission area. For example, for Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing (PNT) under which GPS falls, we have a graduated Senior
Materiel Leader (the highest level of certification for DOD acquisition
professionals) who acts as the overall mission integrator for PNT. This
Air Force colonel is backed up by a GS-15 Director Mission Integration,
a GS-15 System of Systems Engineer, and another graduated Senior
Materiel Leader serving as the Chief Architect. Together, this team of
seasoned acquisition and operational experts track progress of space,
ground, and control segments to avoid divergence of capabilities or
delivery schedule. A similar construct exists for all other National
Security Space mission areas such as Missile Warning, Satellite
Communications, and Weather. The mission integrator will chair a
mission configuration control board to approve any changes to all
programs within the PNT mission area. Additionally, the Systems of
Systems Engineer and the SMC Portfolio Architect will chair an
enterprise configuration control board across missions to ensure no one
mission change adversely affects another (e.g. launch mission changes
driving unacceptable costs into the space segment, or vice versa).
Lastly, the Chief Architect conducts modeling, simulation, and analysis
to ensure mission needs are accurately captured and Program Executive
Officers understand the requirements for the programs within their
acquisition portfolio.
39. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
Thompson, as DOD considers making more space systems resilient, through
approaches like disaggregation or using hosted payloads, what could be
done to ensure all segments of the system (e.g., satellites, ground
systems, and user terminals) are synchronized so the warfighter can
take full advantage of the capabilities provided as they are fielded?
Secretary Rapuano. In order to leverage innovative approaches like
disaggregation or hosted payloads, we must relearn how to build,
deploy, operate, and innovate rapidly, all at substantially lower cost.
This requires a shift in mindset from how we have traditionally
acquired space capabilities. A key component of DOD's space
transformation is the Space Development Agency (SDA). The SDA's role is
to define and monitor the Department's future threat-driven space
architecture and to accelerate the development and fielding of new
military space capabilities necessary to ensure our technological and
military advantage in space for national defense. A feature of this
architecture is a proliferated space transport layer, which leverages
commercial networking standards and protocols. This will help
ameliorate some of the synchronization issues we have today, which are
a consequence of legacy, proprietary interfaces.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to how the Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) will maintain schedule and performance
alignment within mission areas by using senior, experienced leaders as
mission area integrators, the Chief Architect will use modeling,
simulation, and analysis to help Air Force Space Command refine and
clearly articulate warfighter requirements that require materiel
solutions. The SMC Chief Architect and the mission area integrators
will remain actively engaged in the acquisition programs continually
refining and assessing new technology or modernization initiatives to
achieve the most effective mission performance at prudent costs.
Resilience of satellites crosses multiple areas and the Chief Architect
will use industry standards, like model-based systems engineering and
digital twins, to trade performance and costs. Ultimately, the Chief
Architect and the Systems of Systems Engineer will design and maintain
standards (i.e. data standards, interface control documents, etc.) to
ensure that SMC weapon systems are interoperable to the maximum extent
practical. Additionally, continued investment in enterprise tools such
as Enterprise Space Battle Management Command & Control (ESBMC2) and
Enterprise Ground Services (EGS) will continue to prosecute the vision
for flexibility in space to counter threats and leverage the advantage
that space assets bring.
40. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
Thompson, to what extent will user equipment programs be integrated
into the Space Force? If they are not, how do you plan to better
synchronize them? Won't we continue to have disconnects?
Secretary Rapuano. Most user equipment programs will remain within
their respective Military Services because it is vital that these
terminals be integrated with the weapon systems they support. The
Department recognizes the need to synchronize across the Military
Services more effectively, which is one of the main reasons an Under
Secretary of the Air Force for Space was included in the proposal. This
individual would provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space
Force and look across the Department, not only to synchronize our user
equipment programs, but also to provide advocacy for the Space budget
at the highest levels and to oversee our space architecture development
going forward.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. As Congress considers the
Department's legislative proposal to stand up a Space Force, the Space
and Missile Systems Center remains focused on delivering the premier
space capabilities to the Joint and Allied Force. SMC will work with
leadership within the Department, the Air Force, and if stood-up, the
Space Force, to ensure user equipment programs, and all other segments
of critical space capabilities, are integrated across the spectrum to
ensure consistent and reliable warfighter support.
launch schedule
41. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the Air
Force announced LSA awards to three companies in October 2018. The
purpose of these awards was to: ``to quickly transition from the use of
non-allied space launch engines, implement sustainable competition for
National Security Space (NSS) launch services, and maintain assured
access to space.'' However, recent indications suggest that the program
as structured may fail to achieve some or all of these goals. A key
program objective was to have certified launch vehicles ready to send
critical national security satellites to space by April 2022. However,
within weeks of the LSA award announcement, all three winners disclosed
significant schedule delays. What is the current schedule toward
certification for each of the three LSA award winners?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service
Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch
capability by April 2022. The selected offerors remain consistent with
what was briefed to the Congressional committee staffs shortly after
award. The Air Force updated its requirements dates based on actual
changes to the projected National Security Space Launch manifest during
the solicitation, and requested updated schedules that optimized
development progress and risk based on these need dates.
42. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, is the Air
Force aware of further delays to the schedule announced in October
2018?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service
Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch
capability by April 2022, per their original schedules. The Air Force
is working closely with industry through development challenges that
are a normal part of a complex rocket development program, as an
expected part of the National Security Space Launch strategy.
43. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why didn't
the Air Force know in October of 2018--just 5 months ago--when you made
these awards that schedules were already slipping?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Launch Service Agreements (LSA)
schedule dates remain consistent with what was briefed to the
Congressional committee staffs shortly after award. The Air Force
updated the LSA Request for Proposal (RFP) to reflect initial launch
capability need dates based on the actual launch manifest. This allowed
our industry partners to optimize development planning and saved cost.
Through the solicitation process, the Air Force worked closely with all
LSA offerors to understand both technical and schedule risk
developments.
44. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, did you
independently assess the schedule representations made to your by the
bidders?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, as part of the source
selection evaluation process, the Launch Service Agreement (LSA)
Request for Proposal (RFP) requested Integrated Master Schedules from
all bidders. The Air Force assessed each of these schedules, and
assigned a schedule risk rating that was used as part of the award
decision per the LSA RFP.
45. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, will the
Air Force award a block of the next roughly 10 years of missions this
year to launch vehicles that have never flown?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is not awarding a
10 year block of missions. The Phase 2 competition will procure launch
services for the five-year ordering period from fiscal year 2020
through fiscal year 2024, corresponding to launch services from fiscal
year 2022 through fiscal year 2027. The Air Force is investing in new
launch vehicles with confidence they will meet the Initial Launch
Capability (ILC) dates for the Phase 2 ordering period.
46. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, if these
new rockets are not ready, are you going to request access to more
Russian rocket engines, or are you going to leverage existing,
available, certified systems?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force does not anticipate
needing to request access to more Russian rocket engines than already
prescribed in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
The Air Force is confident the domestic launch systems in development
will be able to meet National Security Space Launch requirements. To
mitigate the risk of unforeseen development delays, the Air Force will
permit Launch Service Procurement contract awardees to offer secondary
launch vehicles (leveraging certified systems) for the first two years
of the contract.
47. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why is it
important that the both winners of LSP/Phase 2 be able to launch
Category C missions?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Phase 2 strategy ensures
space launch operations meet requirements for Assured Access to Space
(AATS) codified in 10 U.S. Code 2273. The statute specifies the U.S.
will sustain the availability of at least two space launch vehicles (or
families of space launch vehicles) capable of delivering into space
national security payloads. It is critical that two providers be able
to meet all national security space launch requirements, which includes
Category C missions, with the flexibility to respond to the evolving
manifest requirements associated with mission planning. Finally, if the
Air Force allows offerers' to be selective in the orbits they service,
the DOD could have sub-optimal launch vehicles, an unwanted sole-source
environment for specific mission sets, or worst case, no capability to
meet the most stressing National Security Space (NSS) orbits. (Without
DOD partnership no company's business case would lead them to pursue a
launch system that supports the robust requirements needed for future
NSS missions).
family of beyond line of sight-terminals (fab-t)
48. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the FAB-T
Force Element Terminals (FET) subprogram is intended to provide
survivable and protected satellite communications capabilities for
several aircraft, including the B-52 and RC-135 platforms. The Air
Force has indicated that it plans to develop the FET subprogram using
tailored acquisition approaches and fiscal year 2016 NDAA section 804
authorities. Has the Air Force made a final determination as to the
number and type of platforms that will receive the FET?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force intends to produce
76 Force Element Terminals for the B-52 and 17 for the RC-135. 479
Force Element Terminals for the KC-135 and KC-46 tankers remain as a
development objective if a future requirement is identified.
49. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
extent has the Air Force identified acquisition risks related to
developing and fielding a terminal for multiple aircraft platforms, and
what steps is the Air Force taking to address these risks?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has ongoing risk
reduction contracts with the Force Element Terminal manufacturer to
study system requirements, architecture, and platform integration.
There are additional risk reduction contracts ongoing and planned with
the B-52 and RC-135 platform prime contractors to study additional
integration and installation requirements. These studies will burn down
risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.
50. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what
progress has the Air Force made toward its planned contract award for
FET development in fiscal year 2019?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal
Acquisition Strategy was approved by the Milestone Decision Authority
in February of 2019. The program remains on track to award a
development contract in fiscal year 2019.
51. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, how will
the Air Force avoid the development problems that caused multi-year
delays to the Command Post Terminals subprogram and ensure that this
new subprogram meets the five-year timeline as a proposed section 804
acquisition?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal
subprogram leverages technology from existing AEHF terminal product
lines, to include the Command Post Terminal, Very Important Person
Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) Protected SATCOM (VPS), and Worldwide
EHF Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (WEB-T) to meet the required five-
year timeline. In addition, early risk reduction contracts will allow
the program office to identify developmental challenges and burn down
risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.
52. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, FAB-T and
the related PNVC system are expected to provide the President and
senior leaders secure and survivable voice conferencing capabilities
using the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) space system.
However, AEHF already has four of a planned six satellites on orbit and
the earliest AEHF satellites will be nearing the end of their projected
service life by the time FAB-T and the Presidential and National Voice
Conferencing (PNVC) system are fully operational. How will the Air
Force ensure that systems like FAB-T and PNVC are compatible with the
space system(s) that replaces the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) system?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS),
the planned replacement for AEHF, includes a requirement for backwards
compatibility with existing AEHF and NC3 architecture and
interoperability with XDR user terminals. In addition, the FAB-T
program office regularly participates in the MILSATCOM Control Board
and associated technical working groups to ensure that satellite and
terminal development are properly synchronized.
overhead persistent infrared satellites
53. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804
authorities give the services permission to waive the burdensome
requirements process for systems that need to be fielded in 3 to 5
years. The Air Force designated the follow-on to the Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) missile warning constellation--known as Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared, or Next-Gen OPIR--as the
``pacesetting'' program that will guide future efforts. To what extent
is the Air Force confident the program can succeed in launching the
first Next-Gen OPIR satellite in 2023, 2 years ahead of a schedule it
presented less than a year ago?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force accepted that
challenge, knowing that there were two prerequisites which would start
the clock for the program manager to deliver success to launch the
first Next Gen Geosynchronous (GEO) satellite by calendar year 2023:
(1) Getting on contract and (2) Securing the required funding. A
focused effort by the team at SMC, and the Air Force's embrace of the
use of section 804 authorities allowed the program manager to get on
contract with both the Next Gen GEO (Lockheed Martin Space) and Next
Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems) satellite prime
contractors within 3 months, and to complete payload selection within 6
months. While SMC and Lockheed Martin (Next Gen GEO) moved out at a
pace to meet a calendar year 2023 launch, we were unable to secure the
funding necessary to sustain this speed. The schedule acceleration was
underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required
funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs
largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The
Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold
reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. OSD submitted an ATR to
reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while
Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232
million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an
associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and
approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the
program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint
Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took
this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year
2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program.
SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the
program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing
the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.
54. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what are
the primary reasons that the planned date for the full system to become
operational in 2029 have not changed given the acceleration in
schedule?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force chose to accelerate
the Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellite program while holding the
Next Generation Polar program satellites steady. Given the program
strategy to maintain large reuse in payload design between the GEO and
Polar satellites, accelerating the payload design efforts through
competitive prototyping burns down early program risk for both efforts.
The current Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program baseline for initial launch
capability (ILC) are GEO-1 (fiscal year 2025); GEO-2 (fiscal year
2027); Polar-1 (fiscal year 2027); GEO-3 (fiscal year 2028); and Polar-
2 (fiscal year 2029). After the launch of each Next Gen OPIR satellite
into its intended GEO or Polar orbit, it can take approximately 12 or
more months to complete ground system and on-orbit satellite checkout
activities; as well as, sensor-tuning activities before the satellites
are ready to transition to operations.
55. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
extent is the decision to speed up the Next-Gen OPIR schedule and build
in advanced sensors and resiliency features requiring a major shift in
cost estimates and how is this affecting the program?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The schedule acceleration was
underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required
funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs
largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The
Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold
reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. The Department submitted an
ATR to reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while
Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232
million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an
associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and
approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the
program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint
Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took
this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year
2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program.
SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the
program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing
the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.
56. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what due
diligence did the Air Force perform to estimate the potential cost of
the program?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force executing due
diligence by completing a program office estimate and three (3)
independent cost estimates at the Center, Air Force, and Office of the
Secretary of Defense levels. The Air Force developed a program office
estimate using a parametric cost model and acquiring information from
multiple sources including historical data from similar programs; and
estimates were independently validated by the financial management
function at the Space and Missile Systems Center. Additionally, the Air
Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) independently developed a Non-
Advocacy Cost Assessment of the program. Lastly, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE)
office is conducting a separate Independent Cost Estimate which will
support Air Force and OSD budget planning.
57. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
extent will having sole-sourced contracts allow single suppliers to
dominate the market, thereby limiting the government's ability to find
an alternative contractor should unforeseen issues with a current
vendor arise?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. While the Air Force is executing
the Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program using two sole-source contracts, it
has taken direct action to foster and enable a competitive environment.
The Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellites were awarded sole source to
the incumbent contractor after the government determined through
extensive market research that they were the only provider that was
postured to meet the aggressive delivery date of fiscal year 2025. In
order to foster competition and increase the industrial base
capabilities to support an open competition for the subsequent Block 1
program, the Air Force awarded the Next Gen OPIR Polar satellite
contract to a separate prime contractor. In order to mitigate the
program's highest risks in the main mission payload, the Air Force
required the satellite prime contractors to execute a payload
competition and carry up to two payload vendors to provide for
alternate paths. The prime contractors are also utilizing this
``alternate source'' strategy on multiple other components as needed to
mitigate program risk.
58. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
extent is the Air Force monitoring sub-tier suppliers for this program?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has created strong
working relationships with the prime contractors and subcontractors by
conducting shoulder-to-shoulder working groups that meet several times
a week throughout all levels of the program's planning and execution
activities. For example, the Air Force required the Next Gen GEO
(Lockheed Martin Space) and Next Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace
Systems) satellite prime contractors to conduct subcontractor
competitions for the mission payload (MPL) with Government insight and
oversight. Both Next Gen OPIR prime contractors are currently carrying
two MPL subcontractors until a Government-approved down-select
decision, maintaining a competitive environment among MPL suppliers
while leveraging this critical path risk mitigation to reduce the
highest risk on the program schedule. Beyond the MPL, the Government is
also monitoring subcontractor performance, in concert with the prime
contractors, at key suppliers guided by program risk assessments.
59. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, SBIRS GEO
satellites 5 and 6 were to be derivatives of GEO satellite 4, with
limited design changes to capitalize on the use of previously procured
engineering and parts. Yet, technical challenges and manufacturing
issues have arisen that have caused schedule delays. Please explain why
the Air Force is confident in the Next Gen OPIR acquisition cycle time
when a lower risk, more understood.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are in
production as technology refreshed equivalents of SBIRS GEO-3/4
satellites and are intended as replenishments for SBIRS GEO-1/2
satellites. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are being built on Lockheed
Martin's modernized LM 2100 satellite bus through the technical refresh
contract change in 2015 and is on track to meet the September 2020
contractual delivery date to enable the current planned initial launch
capability in January 2021 and January 2022, respectively. Though the
SBIRS GEO-5/6 program has experienced some manufacturing challenges,
this is not unexpected with the integration of a first article, tech
refreshed satellite. Lockheed Martin Space has worked closely with the
Air Force to resolve and close all issues to date. As a result, the Air
Force is confident the acquisition cycle is achievable because Next Gen
OPIR GEO-1/2/3 satellites will leverage the LM 2100 common satellite
bus that is used across multiple Lockheed Martin programs and mission
areas. The LM 2100 has recently been enhanced to add capabilities that
benefit multiple mission areas to include OPIR. Bus enhancements
include elimination of obsolescence and insertion of modern electronics
in multiple subsystems, as well as increased resiliency capabilities
that are all applicable to the Next Gen OPIR mission. While SBIRS
provided ``leading edge'' capabilities with new technologies, Next Gen
OPIR uses mature technologies based on decades of Air Force and
Industry lessons learned: (1) Next Gen OPIR intends to use a single,
simplified onboard sensor--SBIRS has both a scanner and starrer; (2) By
taking advantage of advancements in technology, Next Gen OPIR is able
to save payload weight and power--allows reallocation of the Size,
Weight, and Power savings to resilience capabilities; (3) Requirements
are simplified to focus on strategically survivable missile warning;
(4) The acquisition is streamlined; and (5) The program office is using
2016 National Defense Authorization Act section 804 authorities,
allowing rapid delivery of capabilities to keep missile warning ahead
of adversary efforts. To reduce schedule and technical program risks,
Lockheed Martin has two mission payload subcontractors (Raytheon & the
Northrop Grumman-Ball Aerospace Team) designing, developing, and
prototyping missile warning sensors in a competitive environment to
maximize the use of parallel design, development, and test processes.
The two suppliers were selected in September 2018 just 45 days after
Next Gen OPIR's start, further embracing the program's rapid
acquisition requirements. The recent successful completion of the Next
Gen OPIR GEO System Requirements Review and mission payload System
Design Reviews demonstrated a solid understanding of the mission,
requirements, current design, risks and plans for work moving forward,
enabling the Next Gen OPIR GEO program to proceed with preliminary
design activities. The program remains on track to achieve a GEO space
vehicle delivery by fiscal year 2025.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
military space programs
60. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, the fiscal year 2020
budget request includes nearly $50 million to pursue the development of
non-kinetic and kinetic options for space-based missile defense
interception. In 2016, former Missile Defense Agency Director Adm.
James Syring told the House Armed Services Committee the following: ``I
have serious concerns about the technical feasibility of interceptors
in space, and I have serious concerns about the long-term affordability
of a program like that.'' Do you agree with Adm. Syring? If not, why
not? Please provide an unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that
the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a
space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based
missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate
objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the
capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of
the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in
today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible
information with which to make the most informed decisions.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that it will be
challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will
always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However,
we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully
rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in
orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile
upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S.
industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and
proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing
of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead
Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the
uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the
Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the
Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense
against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that it will be
challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will
always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However,
we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully
rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in
orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile
upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S.
industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and
proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing
of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead
Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the
uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the
Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the
Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense
against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.
61. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, former Missile Defense
Agency Director Adm. James Syring observed in 2016 that the ``basic
feasibility'' of an operational space-based interceptor layer ``has not
yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the
compressed engagement timelines required. Essential space-based
interceptor technologies have been worked only sporadically over the
years and consequently are not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate
in the near- to mid-term.'' Do you agree or disagree? Please provide an
unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that
the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a
space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based
missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate
objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the
capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of
the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in
today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible
information with which to make the most informed decisions.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end
interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the
technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats
are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking
two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has
demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial
companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space
Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic
feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense
Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to
assess the technological readiness for the US to field space-based
interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include
responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of
detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while
mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end
interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the
technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats
are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking
two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has
demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial
companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space
Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic
feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense
Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to
assess the technological readiness for the U.S. to field space-based
interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include
responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of
detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while
mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.
62. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, if Russia or China were
to move to establish missile defense interceptors in space, how would
you advise the Secretary of Defense to respond? Please provide an
unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rapuano. Russia and China have substantial missile
defense programs and other military capabilities intended to threaten
space. The defensive actions the United States is taking to improve
space-based missile defense sensor systems and to explore space-based
interceptor concepts are fully consistent with our obligations under
relevant international law, including the United Nations Charter and
the Outer Space Treaty.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Similar to the discussions
surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based
interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since
it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that
threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal
sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot
capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object
Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely
important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their
performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of
action across the spectrum of military operations.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to the discussions
surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based
interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since
it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that
threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal
sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot
capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object
Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely
important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their
performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of
action across the spectrum of military operations.
63. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, what historical
evidence is available to demonstrate that space-based missile defense
has been affordable and effective for the United States? Please provide
an unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rapuano. The conceptual benefits of engaging missile
threats from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long
been recognized, as have the critical technical and operational issues
that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful and
affordable capability.
Given the significant advantages of space-based missile defenses,
the 2019 Missile Defense Review tasked the Missile Defense Agency to
study the development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept
layer capable of boost-phase defense. This report is scheduled to be
completed between July and the end of 2019, and will identify the
technologies, schedule, cost, and other requirements for a space-based
defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a
key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include
multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing
interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the
purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA
leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical
examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have
seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile
defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors,
advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and
proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit
demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect
these various functions while minimizing debris.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a
key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include
multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing
interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the
purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA
leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical
examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have
seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile
defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors,
advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and
proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit
demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect
these various functions while minimizing debris.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph Manchin
acquisition timelines
64. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General John Thompson, in the
testimony provided you highlight a 65 percent savings on acquisition
timelines based on the implementation of the SMC 2.0 initiative. Ms.
Chaplain in her testimony though highlighted some significant delays
such as a 3.5 year delay in the AEHF satellite program's first launch
and a 4 year delay in the Global Positioning System III (GPS III)
program. Are these delays symptomatic of problems not addressed by the
SMC 2.0 enterprise or is this a sign of the new processes attempting to
catch up to and correct old problems?
Lieutenant General John Thompson. Over the last 4 years, the Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has taken a multi-faceted approach to
reduce the pre-contract award timelines and has seen a 65 percent
reduction. SMC 2.0 29 continues to reduce this timeline by delegating
acquisition authority to the lowest level possible and reduces/
streamlines the documentation development and review timelines. To
address the program execution timelines, we are using 804 authorities
to critically think about the operational requirement and develop an
acquisition strategy to burn down the developmental risk. Although the
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of DODI 5000.02
was meant to ``prototype'' and mature technology, the cost of space
programs limited lengthy technical reviews with multiple contractors.
As a result, programs were not performing true prototyping, but rather
they matured the technology at the piece part level with limited
vendor(s), restricting the program's vendor options in the Engineering,
Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase. By emphasizing capability
delivery with constrained costs and shortened time horizons, our
negotiation leverage shifts away from industry partners and back to
SMC. Rather than locking SMC into decades-long contracts, we can award
short term contracts and/or agreements with less requirement
specificity, forcing industry to prove what capability can be delivered
the fastest. Programs can then select the contractor(s) with the
greatest potential with real data and not a concept or paper design.
This will drive our programs to uncover critical component issues,
hardware/software integrations risks, and/or software development risks
earlier.
agency responsibilities
65. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in February
Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson wrote a memo to Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin, in
which she detailed why she believed the SDA was replicating duties
already directed by Congress to the Air Force and that the agency
lacked a ``uniquely identifiable mission''. She also highlighted that
the Air Force had already stood up its Space RCO to complement its
existing Rapid RCO with a space focus. Given the growing number of
space focused research and acquisition agencies to include SDA, Space
RCO, SMC and DARPA, has the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Air Force clearly outlined responsibilities and
deconflicted lines of effort to maximize growth while minimizing waste?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. Leaders across the Department
have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile
delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development
Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance
Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and
Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all
represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal. The
Department's initial vision of SDA's role is to leverage industry
investment and commercial capabilities for the next generation space
architecture. Further, Department and Service acquisition organizations
continue to improve the rapid delivery of warfighter capabilities while
minimizing duplication of effort and eliminating non-value-added
processes and procedures.
acquisition strategy for space launch vehicles
66. Senator Manchin. Ms. Chaplain, generally fully open, head-to-
head competition provides benefit in quality and price of products
delivered. Has GAO conducted any sort of cost assessment since the
Space Vehicle Launch competition was opened up in 2015 to assess the
value of the program to date?
Ms. Chaplain. We agree competition is the cornerstone of a sound
acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return
on investment for taxpayers. However, we have not assessed the cost or
value of the National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle) program since the Air Force amended its
acquisition strategy to allow for competitive launch service
procurements. This would be another topic worthy of a future review
given the changing nature of the launch market.
assured access to space
67. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, Lieutenant
General John Thompson and Ms. Chaplain, the assured access to space
policy is critical to ensure we are always able to provide the ability
to reach and operate from space. I've become aware that the LSA
companies' products share significant commonality across many systems,
to include engines. Is our Defense Industrial Base adequately
diversified under these agreements in order to provide continual access
to space if a critical failure of any similar or common component is
discovered?
Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force selected the best
portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide
effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does
include some commonality between launch systems, this does not
inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by
demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air
Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components
across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the
Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet
Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force selected the best
portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide
effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does
include some commonality between launch systems, this does not
inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by
demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air
Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components
across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the
Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet
Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
Ms. Chaplain. We have not reviewed each LSA companies' launch
system development efforts and plans, but we are aware of instances of
commonality among the systems. Some commonality is also present between
the Delta IV and Atlas V launch families, and issues with common
components have resulted in or raised risk of launch delays for both
families until the issues were resolved. Ultimately, it is the Air
Force's responsibility to assess the sufficiency of its space launch
industrial base and any potential impacts on assured access to space.
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