    [Senate Hearing 116-510]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                          S. Hrg. 116-510

                     MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND
                                      PROGRAMS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 27, 2019

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                  __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    46-157 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2021

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

     J JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman	JACK REED, Rhode Island
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    JONI ERNST, Iowa			TIM KAINE, Virginia
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida			TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee		DOUG JONES, Alabama
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

       		 John Bonsell, Staff Director
                Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

    _________________________________________________________________

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairwoman	MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		 DOUG JONES, Alabama
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 March 27, 2019

                                                                       Page

    Military Space Operations, Policy, and Programs..................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     1

    Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich.............................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Rapuano, Honorable Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for     2
      Homeland Defense and Global Security.

    Thompson, Lieutenant General John F., USAF, Commander, Space and      9
      Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command.

    Thompson, General David D., USAF, Vice Commander, Air Force Space    17
      Command.

    Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing            25
      Management,
      Government Accountability Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    74

                                     (iii)

                MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 2019

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
    room SR 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Cramer, King, Heinrich, Manchin, and Jones.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Hearing will come to order.
        I'd like to welcome everyone to the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee's first open hearing of the 116th Congress.
        We meet today to receive testimony on the national security
    space enterprise. Appearing before the Subcommittee, we have
    General David Thompson, Vice Commander of Air Force Space
    Command; General John Thompson, Commander of the Space and
    Missile Systems Center; Mr. Ken--is it----
        Secretary Rapuano. Rapuano.
        Senator Fischer.--Rapuano, the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; and Ms.
    Cristina Chaplain, who directs the Government Accountability
    Office's work on military space programs.
        Thank you all for your service and for being here today.
        We meet at a time of increased focus on the space domain.
    In the last few years, we have seen a significant evolution in
    our approach to space. It's now widely recognized that space is
    a warfighting domain. It is also a domain in which adversaries
    are increasingly active and upon which our Nation increasingly
    depends. Accordingly, we must ensure that our military space
    operations, policies, and programs are keeping pace with the
    changing environment, and we look forward to the testimony from
    our witnesses about the Department's effort in this regard.
    Their testimony today will help the Subcommittee make informed
    decisions as we continue to craft the defense authorization
    bill for fiscal year 2020.
        I would also like to note for my colleagues that the full
    committee will be holding a hearing on April 11th to discuss
    the Department's proposal to establish a Space Force. With that
    in mind, it is my intention to use my time today to talk about
    some of the other key equities in the national security space
    portfolio.
        And, with that, I would turn to my colleague and Ranking
    Member, Senator Heinrich, for any comments.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

        Senator Heinrich. Well, first, let me thank Chairwoman
    Fischer for holding today's hearing. This is our first
    together, and I look forward to future interactions on this
    Subcommittee.
        Let me also thank our witnesses for taking the time to
    testify today. Between this Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal
    year 2020 budget proposal and the full committee hearing on the
    proposed Space Force, there will be much to talk about,
    relative to space, in the coming weeks.
        At today's hearing, I want to concentrate on the threat we
    face in space, the budget submission to counter these threats,
    and organizational proposals to train and equip our space
    personnel.
        The idea of a Space Force is not new. The House proposed an
    almost identical concept in its fiscal year 2018 defense
    authorization bill. It was dropped in conference. The Pentagon
    leadership opposed it, as did several of our Senate colleagues.
    Having said that, it's no secret that the space domain is
    critical to our military operations, to our economy, and our
    way of life.
        As our adversaries become increasingly active in space, we
    certainly can't sit idly by. We must, instead, move with a
    greater sense of urgency and purpose. As an engineer, I
    continue to prioritize research and development, and cannot
    stress enough the importance of fostering a culture of
    innovation and rapid acquisition within the space domain.
    Whether it's the creation of a Space Development Agency (SDA)
    or any larger reorganization, we also should not reinvent the
    wheel nor move pieces around for the sake of saying we did so.
    We could always strive for our government to be better stewards
    of taxpayer dollars and for our military to operate more
    effectively, and I look forward to hearing how we may be able
    to do so.
        Again, thank you all for coming today, and I look forward
    to hearing all of your testimony.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        We will begin with opening statements. I would remind our
    witnesses today that your full statement will be included in
    the record.
        Mr. Secretary, if we could start with you, please.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
          OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

        Secretary Rapuano. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
    Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is
    a pleasure to appear before you today, along with Lieutenant
    General ``DT'' Thompson, Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson,
    and Ms. Cristina Chaplain.
        Space is a vital national interest. It underpins our
    economy and way of life, supporting our academia, agricultural,
    banking, and travel sectors, among others. Moreover, the
    rapidly growing commercial space sector offers enormous promise
    for the prosperity of Americans and our global partners.
    Commercial entities led by the United States are developing and
    delivering new space technologies and capabilities at a speed
    never seen before. Space is also crucial to the defense of the
    United States and our allies and partners.
        As outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), long-
    term strategic competition is the central challenge to the U.S.
    prosperity and national security. Space is key to this
    competition. China and Russia are developing military
    capabilities, doctrine, and organizations intended to place
    United States space systems at risk. They are developing a
    suite of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), including ground-launch
    missiles and directed-energy weapons, and continue to launch
    experimental satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit
    activities to advance their counterspace capabilities. Many of
    these systems could be employed in the gray zone, that is,
    activities below the threshold of armed conflict in a manner
    designed to hold U.S., allied, and partner capabilities at risk
    and limit our response options.
        The emergence of new major state actors in space, and the
    pace of the technological development, are changing the
    character of warfare, presenting new challenges and
    opportunities to military space forces. No longer do space
    systems simply enable terrestrial forces to fight and win wars.
    Actions in space also will directly contribute to the outcome
    of future conflicts. In order to preserve peace and deter
    aggression, the Department of Defense (DOD) must adapt. Without
    change, the United States is at risk of losing its comparative
    advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space would
    undermine our Nation's prosperity and erode the ability of the
    Joint Force to deter aggression, protect critical national
    defense and economic functions, assure our allies and partners,
    and project power globally. While the United States would
    prefer that space remain conflict-free, we must recognize
    rising challenges, and overcome them. The Department must do
    more to accelerate its response to the changing dynamics of
    space by adapting our organizations, policies, doctrine,
    capabilities, and Joint Force employment to more effectively
    deter aggression, protect our interests, and enhance our
    lethality.
        Earlier this month, the Department provided Congress with a
    legislative proposal for the establishment of the U.S. Space
    Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces. If authorized, the
    Space Force will transform our approach to space by providing
    singular focus to maintaining and increasing our advantage in
    countering current and future threats. Establishing a sixth
    branch of our military with dedicated leadership will unify
    focus and accelerate the development of space doctrine,
    capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats,
    institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further
    build space warfighting culture. The role of providing Joint
    Force employment of space capabilities lies with the United
    States Space Command (SPACECOM), a Unified Combatant Command
    focused on planning and executing joint space warfighting
    operations. Establishing U.S. SPACECOM will bring full-time
    operational focus to securing the space domain and streamline
    command and control for time-sensitive operations.
        Additionally, the Department of Defense has undertaken a
    series of space acquisition reforms. These reforms, such as
    Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) 2.0, will continue to
    mature with the establishment of a Joint Space Development
    Agency dedicated to rapidly developing and fielding next-
    generation military space capabilities. The SDA will be
    empowered to go fast, and would be pursuing a development of a
    transformational new architecture that leverages the investment
    taking place in the commercial sector.
        The Department looks forward to working closely with this
    committee and all of Congress to ensure that we maintain our
    freedom of operation in space to support our national security,
    our economic prosperity, and our way of life.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rapuano follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Secretary Kenneth Rapuano
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
    along with General Jay Raymond, Commander of Air Force Space Command
    and U.S. Strategic Command Joint Force Space Component Commander;
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, Commander, Space and Missile Systems
    Center; and Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
    Management at the Government Accountability Office. I serve as the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
    Security. In this capacity I oversee and guide the development and
    implementation of the Department of Defense's strategy and policy to
    achieve its space mission.
        Space is integral to the U.S. way of life and the U.S. way of war.
    Although United States space systems have historically maintained a
    technological advantage over those of our potential adversaries, those
    potential adversaries are now advancing their space capabilities and
    actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis or
    conflict. Without change, the United States is at risk of losing its
    comparative advantage in space. A loss of freedom to operate in space
    would undermine our Nation's prosperity and would erode the ability of
    the joint force to deter aggression, to defend the Homeland from
    attack, and to project power abroad.
        While the U.S. would prefer that the space domain remain free of
    conflict, we must recognize rising challenges, and be prepared to meet
    and overcome them. The Department must accelerate, and is accelerating,
    its response to the changing dynamics of space. We are adapting our
    organizations, policies, doctrine, and capabilities to more effectively
    deter aggression and protect our interests.
        Earlier this month the Department provided Congress with a
    legislative proposal for the establishment of the United States Space
    Force as a new branch of our armed forces. If authorized, the Space
    Force would transform our approach to space, increasing our
    responsiveness in this warfighting domain. The proposal maximizes
    warfighting capacity and advocacy for space, while minimizing
    bureaucracy and potential risks. Establishing a sixth branch of our
    military with dedicated leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate
    the development of space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to
    outpace future threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities;
    and further build space warfighting culture.
        The Department looks forward to working closely with this committee
    and all of Congress on ensuring we maintain our freedom of operation in
    space in order to support our national security and our economic
    prosperity.
             national security strategy & national defense strategy
        The Department's approach to space is aligned and nested within our
    broader national strategies. Space is a warfighting domain, and just as
    in air, land, sea, and cyberspace, the Department of Defense must
    ensure it is prepared to address threats to our national security in
    the space domain.
        The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy
    recognize space as a priority domain and an operating area from which
    capabilities are employed and forces are enabled, and recognizes the
    potential for conflict to extend into space. These strategies direct
    that we compete as necessary to deter potential adversaries and, when
    necessary, win any conflict that begins in or extends into space. Our
    ability to operate and leverage space to advance scientific knowledge,
    promote prosperity, and secure the freedoms of our citizens and allies
    and partners must remain unimpeded. We will compete, we will deter,
    and, if called upon to fight, we will win.
        The National Security Strategy, published in December 2017,
    provides a plan to (1) protect the American people, the Homeland, and
    the American way of life; (2) promote American prosperity; (3) preserve
    peace through strength; and (4) advance American influence. Each aspect
    of this plan is fortified and supported by the advantages our Nation
    gains from space capabilities.
        Our 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) charts the course for how
    DOD will contribute to each of the National Security Strategy's four
    national interests. Under the NDS, long-term strategic competitions
    with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department,
    and because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to United States
    security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to
    increase in the future, require both sustained focus and investment.
    Space is a key arena in which this competition is occurring. Addressing
    the challenges posed to our preeminence as a space power is fundamental
    to our efforts.
        To meet the challenge of great power competition, the Department is
    broadly pursuing three lines of effort--increasing the lethality of our
    forces, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and reforming the
    Department to ensure affordability and delivery of capabilities at the
    speed of relevance. These approaches are as applicable to the space
    domain as they are to any other Department endeavor.
                             strategic environment
        Space underpins the U.S. way of life and U.S. way of war. Space
    provides an unparalleled vantage point and medium for rapid, global
    information collection and dissemination. Space-based capabilities
    facilitate the flow of people and goods worldwide, while guiding
    military forces to their positions and weapons to their targets.
    Satellites enable individuals worldwide to communicate from remote
    corners of the globe and allow national authorities to command and
    control forces in multiple theaters simultaneously. Small businesses
    and multinational corporations alike rely on space-based imagery and
    other sensing to plan their daily operations, while military commanders
    understand the security environment through information gathered by
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.
        Our nation's interests in space are expanding. New investments and
    new technology are fueling opportunities for an expanding ecosystem of
    space systems and services. Advanced technologies are revolutionizing
    accessibility to space and space-derived capabilities at dramatically
    reduced costs. Technology continues to progress rapidly in areas such
    as 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, while
    advances in electronics are enabling ever-smaller form factors. Space
    system developers are leveraging all of these trends. Many of
    yesterday's cutting-edge technologies are mere commodities today,
    greatly reducing the economic barriers to entry into space. Significant
    amounts of private financing is pouring into commercial space, fueling
    a growing space industry. We are witnessing advances in high-throughput
    communication satellites and the development of commercial plans for
    mega-constellations offering new capabilities in low-Earth orbit. The
    commercial sector, enabled by traditional aerospace companies as well
    as entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, is driving down the cost of
    access to space through the development of re-usable launch vehicles
    and other techniques. These developments together are planting the
    seeds from which future economic and commercial opportunities may grow.
        This growth demonstrates that space is no longer the purview of
    only superpowers or even a handful of nations; participation in space
    activities is growing more diverse. Space-derived information services
    such as imagery, weather, communications, and intelligence,
    traditionally reserved to the governments of just a few space-faring
    nations, are becoming more attainable to non-State entities, companies,
    and individuals. This presents new challenges for the Department as new
    States, non-State actors, and commercial entities, both foreign and
    domestic, are able to provide services and capabilities once only
    available to the U.S. Government and a few other space-faring nations.
    The pace of technological expansion and growing accessibility are
    forcing our military to think and plan differently, as potential
    adversaries leverage increased capabilities to observe our force
    movements, track our activities, and communicate with their own forces
    at efficiencies, data rates, and levels of security not previously
    available.
        The United States also faces serious and growing challenges to its
    freedom to operate in space. China and Russia have studied how the
    United States joint force operates and have embarked on major efforts
    to develop, test, and field counter-space capabilities in order to
    destroy or disrupt U.S. and allied space capabilities in a crisis or
    conflict. These strategic competitors view space as an area where they
    could weaken our advantages and cause cascading impacts on our sea,
    air, land, and cyber systems that rely on space-based capabilities.
    Both have reorganized their militaries in 2015, emphasizing the
    importance of space operations, and making denial of space advantages
    are key components of their strategy. As a result, the United States no
    longer enjoys the freedom to develop and leverage space systems without
    deliberate regard to other nations' counterspace capabilities.
        These same countries, recognizing the value of space capabilities,
    are also expanding their use of space to support the lethality and
    effectiveness of their military forces in other domains. As noted in a
    recent Defense Intelligence Agency report ``Both [China and Russia]
    have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are
    making improvements to existing systems, including space launch
    vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. These capabilities
    provide their militaries with the ability to command and control their
    forces worldwide and also with enhanced situational awareness, enabling
    them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces.'' \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Challenges to Security in Space, Defense Intelligence Agency,
    February 2019
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These emerging threats, in and from space, place our nation's
    security at ever-increasing risk and drive the U.S. imperative to
    strengthen its space posture and integration and synchronization of
    combat power across multiple domains. This includes both the ability to
    assure and defend our space-based capabilities from attack and the
    ability to protect our terrestrial forces from space-enabled attacks.
                           space strategy and posture
        This new environment highlights the role of space in changing the
    character of warfare and presents new challenges and opportunities to
    military space forces. No longer do space systems simply support
    terrestrial forces to fight and win wars; actions in space also will
    directly contribute to the outcome of future crises or conflicts. In
    order to preserve peace and deter aggression, the Department of Defense
    (DOD) must adapt. The DOD must be prepared to assure freedom of
    operation in space, to deter attacks, and, when necessary, to defeat
    space and counterspace threats to the national security interests of
    the United States and its allies and partners.
    Policy and Strategy
        In addition to the National Security Strategy and the National
    Defense Strategy, the Department's efforts for Space are guided by the
    National Strategy for Space, which was signed by the President in March
    2018. The National Strategy for Space builds on the other strategies by
    emphasizing peace through strength, and maintaining U.S. leadership,
    preeminence, and freedom of operation in the space domain. The space
    strategy encompasses all aspects of our nation's space interest. It is
    composed of a strategic framework and implementation plan outlining
    four key strategic objectives. The first is to strengthen the safety,
    stability, and sustainability of space activities. The second is to
    deter and, when necessary, defeat adversary space and counterspace
    threats used for purposes hostile to the national security interests of
    the United States and its allies and partners. The third is to maintain
    U.S. commercial industry as the leading provider of traditional and
    innovative space technologies, goods, and services on the international
    space market while limiting potential adversaries' access to critical
    technologies and capabilities. The fourth is to maintain and extend
    U.S. human presence and robotic exploration beyond Earth to transform
    knowledge of ourselves, our planet, our solar system, and our universe.
    The implementation plan describes four lines of effort: mission
    assurance; deterrence and warfighting; organizational support; and
    creating conducive domestic and international environments for U.S.
    space objectives. The lines of effort represent the key priorities of
    the strategy and, along with the supporting tasks, describe the ways
    and means necessary to achieve our strategic objectives.
        The first line of effort focuses on mission assurance. We are
    accelerating the transformation of our space architecture by
    deliberately moving systems from the research and development phase to
    the actual fielding of capabilities. As a result, our space systems
    will be more resilient and more defendable. We are also looking to
    expand the ability to reconstitute space capabilities to reestablish
    lost functionality and we are exploring on-orbit satellite servicing
    capabilities. Fundamental to our strategy is our mission to deter,
    prepare for, and, if directed, prevail in any conflict, in any
    environment, against any threat.
        The second line of effort focuses on deterrence and warfighting.
    Our strategy recognizes that--due to actions by our competitors and
    potential adversaries--the space domain is not a sanctuary. This line
    of effort seeks to develop options to deter potential adversaries from
    aggression, including extending conflict into space. It entails a
    refocus of strategic guidance and doctrine; operational plans,
    authorities, capabilities, and culture; and rules of engagement to
    prepare most effectively for space as a warfighting domain.
        The third and fourth lines of effort focus on organizational
    support and fostering a conducive environment. We will pursue improved
    foundational capabilities, structures, security classification
    guidance, and processes in order to enable more effective space
    operations and will foster a conducive environment both at home and
    abroad. Domestically, this includes streamlining the regulatory
    environment to leverage and support U.S. industry more effectively,
    taking into account national security and public safety.
    Internationally, this includes promoting burden-sharing and marshalling
    cooperation against threatening adversary actions.
        The United States does not fight alone. Cooperation and partnership
    in the space domain are essential, just as cooperation and partnership
    benefit our military on land and sea and in the air and in cyberspace.
    Our defense strategy depends on sustaining and building international
    alliances and partnerships. The work in this area is critical to
    advance our common and shared strategic and operational interests of
    deterrence and lethality. U.S. allies and partners provide an
    asymmetrical advantage that no competitor can match. We are developing
    partnerships with the aim to develop and deploy more capable, more
    assured space architectures and, where appropriate and mutually
    beneficial, develop a combined operational capacity.
        For several years we have had a Combined Space Operations (CSpO)
    initiative including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
    Australia, and New Zealand. CSpO is identifying operational and
    programmatic cooperation opportunities, as well as common approaches to
    understanding and addressing threats in space. Last month we invited
    France and Germany to join this initiative. In 2018, our annual
    Schriever Wargame, examining conflict extending to space ten years into
    the future included robust participation from all the CSpO partners,
    plus France, Germany and Japan. As a result of wargames such as
    Schriever, our allies have come to understand the real and significant
    threats to their space infrastructure and are galvanized along with the
    U.S. to ensure our collective freedom of action in space.
        We will leverage past successes and achieve new ones, such as cost-
    sharing agreements, hosting U.S. national security payloads on foreign
    systems, and data-sharing arrangements to bolster shared space
    situational awareness. The Department of Defense, working with the
    Department of State, strengthens our leadership and international
    relationship through participation in international governing bodies
    and with multilateral and bilateral arrangements.
        To achieve these strategic objectives and secure our vital interest
    of unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space, the Department
    must fundamentally transform its approach to space from a support
    function to a warfighting domain--one in which we are prepared for a
    domain of competition and potential conflict. Space superiority is
    something to be gained and maintained, and cannot be taken for granted
    in future crisis or conflict.
    Posture and Organization
        The President's $14 billion budget request for space in fiscal year
    2020, outlined in Major Force Program-12, puts the Department on a
    course to build a more lethal force. It advances the lines of effort
    captured in the National Strategy for Space and integrates space into a
    multi-domain approach designed to deter potential adversaries and
    defeat hostile activity should deterrence fail. This request, sustains
    our on-going space operations and support to the joint force while
    developing and fielding critical capabilities.
        The current organization of space within the DOD has enabled the
    United States to maintain its position as the most lethal force in the
    world. These structures, however, must evolve with the changing
    environment. No branch of the Armed Forces has been created since the
    U.S. Air Force was established in 1947--over 70 years ago. The world
    has changed significantly in that time. If authorized by Congress, a
    new Armed Force dedicated to space will develop space forces prepared
    to meet emerging security challenges.
        The trends and threats we face demand a new approach in order to
    outpace potential adversaries. This requires an approach that that DOD
    institutionally elevate space consistent with its role in national
    security; unify, consolidate, and integrate space forces from across
    the DOD; increase focus in leadership, expertise, personnel, culture,
    and capabilities for a distinct domain; accelerate our posture to space
    as a warfighting domain; and deliver dominant warfighting capacity for
    space while minimizing bureaucracy and cost.
        Space Policy Directive 4 was signed by the President in February
    2019, and outlines the policy approach to establishment of the U.S.
    Space Force. Under the proposal, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and the
    U.S. Air Force (USAF) would exist within one Military Department while
    organizing, training, and equipping their forces for two distinct
    warfighting domains and mission sets. The Secretary of the Air Force
    would be responsible for organizing, training, and equipping two
    separate Military Services: the USSF and USAF, each with a uniformed
    Military Service Chief with equal membership on the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff (JCS). This model is similar to how the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine
    Corps exist within the Department of the Navy. Additionally, a new
    Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, to be known as the Under
    Secretary for Space, will provide dedicated civilian supervision of the
    USSF, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
    the Air Force.
        The vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and
    budget authority--would be transferred from the existing Military
    Services. The stand-up of the Space Force would be phased over five
    years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024--and would require $72
    million in fiscal year 2020 to establish the headquarters with
    approximately 200 people.
        Over the following years, as missions are transferred to the Space
    Force, existing personnel and budget authority will transfer into the
    Space Force from the existing Military Services. By the end of the
    transition period, more than 95 percent of the Space Force annual
    budget is estimated to consist of resources that will have been
    transferred from existing DOD budget accounts, along with an estimated
    15,000 transferred personnel. Additional resources will be dedicated to
    building out the Space Force headquarters and establishing and
    maintaining new support elements such as education, training, doctrine,
    and personnel management centers.
        Once the Space Force is fully established, these additive costs are
    estimated to be $500 million annually, which would represent
    approximately 0.07 percent of the annual DOD budget. The total
    additional cost growth over the next five years is estimated to be less
    than $2 billion, or approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for
    the same period. Because of the lean implementation and modest total
    costs, the Future Years Defense Program topline is sufficient to fully
    fund the U.S. Space Force.
        Complementing a Military Service focused on developing space
    forces, is a space warfighting command focused on employing the joint
    force. Consistent with U.S. law, DOD is taking steps to establish a
    United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command
    focused on planning and executing space warfighting operations to
    protect U.S. national interests, and those of our allies and partners.
    Establishing USSPACECOM will bring full-time operational focus to
    securing the space domain, and will streamline command and control for
    time-sensitive operations.
        Additionally, the DOD has undertaken a series of space acquisition
    reforms to ensure the joint forces has the capabilities necessary to
    deter and defeat threats. This includes the Space and Missile Systems
    Center (SMC), ``SMC 2.0'' initiatives, which have begun to remove
    bureaucracy and empower new program executive officers to acquire space
    capabilities more efficiently and effectively. Rapid acquisition
    prototyping authorities have been aggressively leveraged with the Space
    Rapid Capabilities Office, which initiated several new programs in the
    past year. These acquisition reforms will continue with the
    establishment of a joint Space Development Agency dedicated to rapidly
    developing, acquiring, and fielding next-generation military space
    capabilities. This organization will have a development mindset and
    will be focused on experimentation, prototyping, and accelerating
    fielding, as well as leveraging commercial technologies and services.
    These entities will transition to the Space Force, if authorized by
    Congress, to strengthen the foundation for space acquisition.
                                   conclusion
        Space is a warfighting domain--albeit a nascent and evolving one.
    It is no longer a question of whether the character of warfare is
    changing, but rather how the United States should strategically re-
    orient itself to deter aggression and be prepared to fight and win
    future wars.
        The Department has a plan to maintain U.S. leadership in this key
    domain of competition and potential warfare. The Department asks for
    your support, including our legislative proposal, so we can move out in
    this critical domain.
        The Department's partnership with Congress is and will remain
    absolutely critical to our success. To that end, I remain grateful for
    this committee's strong support and interest in this vital area, and
    its advocacy to deter aggression and ensure a lethal and effective
    force with the unmatched ability to prevail in, from, and through the
    ultimate high ground.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General ``JT'' Thompson, welcome.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN F. THOMPSON, USAF,
     COMMANDER, SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER, AIR FORCE SPACE
                                COMMAND

        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I am Lieutenant General
    ``JT'' Thompson, and I am honored to appear before you today in
    my capacity as the Commander of Air Force Space and Missile
    Systems Center and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for
    Space.
        First of all, I'd like to apologize to you on behalf of the
    United States Air Force. Today, we provided two witnesses for
    the same hearing, both named Thompson, both lieutenant generals
    in leadership positions within Air Force Space Command. Since
    my primary duty location is Los Angeles Air Force Base in Los
    Angeles, California, and my fellow witness, Lieutenant General
    ``DT'' Thompson's duty location is here in the national capital
    region, feel free to refer to me as ``West Coast Thompson'' and
    ``DT'' as ``East Coast Thompson.'' That's exactly what
    leadership does in the Pentagon.
        At SMC, I am honored to lead the 6,000 dedicated men and
    women, military, government civilians, and contractors, who
    collectively have over 100,000 years of national security space
    acquisition experience. The SMC workforce is dedicated to
    providing premier national security space assets to support
    joint and allied forces for our Nation.
        While America is absolutely the best in space, our
    adversaries have recognized the extent to which our space
    capabilities provide a strategic advantage, and are working to
    deny the use of our capabilities with asymmetric advantages of
    their own. The space acquisition enterprise must adapt to
    deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In order to meet
    the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force
    is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and
    operations.
        The Air Force space enterprise has greatly benefited from
    acquisition reforms instituted by the Congress. However, in
    order to truly address the threat, we must go farther.
    Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow, making
    it difficult to respond to the latest threats, we are changing
    the way we do business to get capability from the lab to the
    warfighter faster and smarter.
        Specifically, to speed up the pace of acquisitions, we're
    utilizing alternative congressionally approved acquisition
    approaches, like other transaction authorities and rapid
    prototyping, which were granted under section 804 of the Fiscal
    Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
        SMC is also benefiting from the delegation of authority for
    some major defense acquisition programs down to the service
    acquisition level. With the help of Congress, the Air Force
    stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO,
    which will continue to work in close concert with SMC to
    rapidly develop and acquire critical capabilities. Further, I
    delegated acquisition authorities for acquisition category-3
    programs down to the executive level within SMC simply to speed
    decisionmaking. And finally, with the support of the Secretary
    of the Air Force and the Acting Secretary of Defense, SMC is
    undergoing a full transformation on how we operate, known as
    SMC 2.0.
        Although we have a strong history with partnerships with
    numerous DOD and intelligence community space activities,
    including the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Air Force
    Research Lab, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    (NASA), and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
    Administration (NOAA), under SMC 2.0, one of our principal
    tenets is to grow even greater partnerships with our allies,
    our sister civil and intelligence agencies, and commercial
    industry to speed up the pace of acquisition and our Nation's
    legacy as the dominant space power.
        I am grateful for the support of this committee and the
    Congress as we transition our space assets to meet and outpace
    the threat posed by near-peer adversaries.
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss and defend the
    vital programs that SMC acquires to enable warfighting
    capabilities across the globe. I look forward to your
    questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General ``JT'' Thompson
    follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General John F. Thompson
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before this committee
    in my capacity as Commander of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems
    Center (SMC) and the Air Force Program Executive Officer (PEO) for
    Space. As the SMC Commander and PEO for Space, I have the unique
    position of providing both organize, train, and equip functions to the
    Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Commander and acquisition experience
    and oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition,
    Technology & Logistics), Dr. Will Roper. In order to carry out these
    unique responsibilities, I am privileged to lead and represent 6,000
    dedicated men and women of SMC, who have over 100,000 years of National
    Security Space Acquisition experience and excellence. The SMC workforce
    is dedicated to providing premier National Security Space assets to
    support Joint and Allied forces and our Nation.
        To echo Lieutenant General David Thompson's statements, our space
    forces must operate in an increasingly competitive environment. I have
    served as a PEO or Deputy PEO in four previous assignments including
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Strategic Systems,
    Joint Strike Fighter, and Tanker. In each of those mission areas, I had
    the luxury of building on America's significant asymmetric advantage
    over our adversaries. This is not the case in my current role. While
    America is absolutely the best in space, our adversaries have
    recognized the extent to which our space capabilities provide a
    strategic advantage and are working to deny the use of our capabilities
    with asymmetric advantages of their own; the space acquisition
    enterprise must adapt to deliver capabilities to outpace the threat. In
    order to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air
    Force is prioritizing investments in resilience, reconstitution, and
    operations. Thanks to the support of Congress, the Air Force space
    enterprise has experienced an unprecedented year following significant
    changes proposed by the Air Force in the fiscal year 2019 budget. The
    Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget request will expand upon the
    foundations laid in the previous year with nearly $14 billion in
    proposed investment in the space portfolio (including procurement,
    research and development, personnel, and sustainment funding). This
    budget request supports our warfighting approach to the space domain
    and changes to how we prototype and field innovative space technologies
    in order to stay ahead of our competitors.
        A 2016 Government Accountability Office report released titled,
    ``Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes
    Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight,''
    authored by my fellow witness, Ms. Christina Chaplain, highlighted the
    following: ``fragmentation and overlap in Department of Defense (DOD)
    space acquisition management and oversight contributed to program
    delays and cancellations, cost increase, and inefficient operations.''
    Over the past few National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress enabled
    the Department to leverage new authorities in order to procure weapons
    systems faster and smarter. The Air Force, and the space enterprise as
    a whole, has embraced many of these authorities, such as rapid
    prototyping and delegation of Milestone Decision Authority from the
    Defense Acquisition Executive to the Service level. The Air Force space
    enterprise has benefited from those acquisition reforms instituted by
    Congress; however, in order to truly address the threat, we must go
    farther. Recognizing the pace of space acquisitions was too slow and
    often unable to respond to the latest threats, we are changing the way
    we do business to get capability from the lab to the warfighter faster
    and smarter.
          acquiring the nation's space capabilities faster and smarter
        In my capacity as the SMC Commander and the Air Force PEO for
    Space, I directed several changes within the organization to shorten
    decision timelines and radically change the often old-fashioned ways in
    which we acquired space capabilities. One of my first acts upon
    assuming command of SMC in May 2017, was to delegate acquisition
    authorities for Acquisition Category (ACAT) III programs down to the
    execution level. This is similar to the benefits SMC had from the
    delegation of authority over acquisition programs down to the Service
    Acquisition Executive for some of our Major Defense Acquisition
    Programs. Additionally, we are utilizing alternative acquisition
    approaches like Other Transaction Authorities and those granted under
    section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2016 for rapid prototyping. With the help of Congress, the Air Force
    stood up the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO), which much like
    the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, will acquire critical
    capabilities by utilizing unique approaches and oversight structures.
    Finally, with the support of the Secretary of the Air Force and Acting
    Secretary of Defense, SMC is undergoing a full transformation of how we
    operate, known as SMC 2.0.
    Delegating Acquisition Authorities
        SMC executes approximately 36 unclassified ACAT I-III level and 6
    rapid prototyping programs, which represents over $7 billion in
    Research, Development, Test & Evaluation and Procurement funding each
    fiscal year. Upon taking command, I delegated authority for 19 ACAT III
    and Services Category programs under $100 million, accounting for 37
    percent of the total PEO for Space portfolio, to SMC System Program
    Directors. Those Program Directors are fully qualified acquisition
    professionals, averaging 20 years of experience each; the programs in
    their portfolios represent critical capabilities like the Ground Based
    Optical Sensor System (GBOSS), a vital space situational awareness
    capability. GBOSS provides global search, tracking of non-cooperative
    launches, and discrimination between closely spaced objects. With this
    delegation, System Program Directors and their teams are now
    responsible for all facets of program execution, from milestone
    decisions to source selection and beyond. This delegation and other
    process improvement initiatives resulted in a reduction of acquisition
    timelines by 65 percent from the first acquisition event to contract
    award in fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018. By reducing the
    amount of time it takes a program manager to reach a decision maker,
    SMC is not only saving time and taxpayer money, but also empowering the
    next generation of acquisition professionals.
        For SMC's larger programs, we have seen similar impacts from
    delegation of Milestone Decision Authority for Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) from the DOD level to the Air Force level,
    allowing faster access to the decision maker. In 2017, the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment delegated
    authority for seven of nine major national security space programs to
    the Air Force. The Air Force is projected to accelerate the delivery of
    warfighting capabilities for these seven programs by an average of 24
    months. One example of significant time saved is with the Global
    Positioning System III Follow-On Production Program (GPS IIIF). With
    GPS IIIF, the Air Force will introduce increased resiliency in the form
    of the Regional Military Protection capability to ensure the warfighter
    has a protected Position, Navigation, and Timing signal when and where
    they need it most. Additionally, the GPS IIIF program will use planned
    technology insertions throughout its development and production phases
    to ensure a long-term, viable constellation, able to bring forth new
    capabilities faster. The Air Force awarded the GPS IIIF contract in
    September 2018 after a full and open competition, saving approximately
    $1.6 billion over the life of the contract while taking advantage of
    delegated authority to reduce decision times by six months over a
    traditional DOD-level acquisition program.
    Alternative Acquisition Approaches
        Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2016 authorizes Middle Tier Acquisitions to rapidly develop
    operational prototypes and field production quantities of new or
    upgraded systems with minimal development required within five years.
    So far, six programs executed by SMC have been designated as 804
    programs to tailor documentation and reviews within the Department,
    flatten access to decision authorities, and in some cases, deploy novel
    approaches to program execution, yielding several years in time saved
    over a traditional DOD acquisition. An example of one of our 804
    programs is the Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications system
    (ESS). ESS is our next-generation protected, strategic satellite
    communications system, which will provide the President and other
    national leaders with protected, anti-jam communications capabilities
    through all levels of conflict, to include the nuclear environment. The
    program approach for ESS focuses on maturing the payload to meet new
    requirements and strategic scenarios by creating competition, driving
    innovation, and increasing affordability. The Air Force plans to
    deliver this next-generation, resilient, Nuclear Command, Control and
    Communications (NC3) capability with an estimated time savings of at
    least two years.
        SMC is also executing five other 804 programs in the Overhead
    Persistent Infrared (OPIR), Protected Satellite Communications, and
    Position, Navigation, and Timing mission areas with over 16 years in
    projected time savings for fielding new capability over traditional
    acquisition methods. As we continue to recapitalize systems across the
    space enterprise in order to make them more resilient and responsive to
    the current threat environment, the Air Force will request 804
    designations for more programs, when practicable, to deliver capability
    to the warfighter faster and smarter. It is also important the Air
    Force maintains transparency and oversight with DOD and congressional
    stakeholders, which is achieved through tri-annual reports delivered by
    the Secretary to both entities.
    Space Rapid Capabilities Office
        In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
    Congress created the Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS),
    chartered to respond to U.S. Strategic Command-validated urgent needs
    and develop enabler technology. As Lieutenant General David Thompson
    stated, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,
    renamed ORS as the Space Rapid Capabilities Office. Although the SpRCO
    is not an organization for which I have oversight, it remains an
    important mission partner and collaboration between SMC and the SpRCO
    is vital for providing the best possible capabilities to the warfighter
    as an integrated space architecture. In collaboration with General
    Raymond and AFSPC, my team supported the stand up and definition of the
    organization, which is now undoubtedly poised to meet the Committee's
    expectations.
    Other Transaction Authorities
        Other Transaction Authority agreements, generally referred to as
    OTAs, are another non-traditional acquisition authority, which allows
    the Air Force to acquire and field more resilient, responsive, and
    agile space capabilities. The Air Force utilized OTAs in our efforts to
    transition off the Atlas V, with the Russian-built RD-180 rocket
    propulsion system, to domestically sourced launch capabilities
    leveraging the innovation of the United States' robust launch industry.
    In 2016, the Air Force awarded four OTAs under the Rocket Propulsion
    Systems effort to re-invigorate the domestic rocket propulsion
    industrial base and mitigate risk for future launch vehicles. In 2018,
    the Air Force awarded three OTAs under the Launch Service Agreements
    effort to develop at least two domestic, commercially viable launch
    systems to provide Assured Access to Space. These public-private
    partnerships ensure emerging, innovative commercial launch systems meet
    all National Security Space Launch requirements.
        The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC OTA) was awarded in November
    2017 to provide a forum for rapid development of next generation space-
    related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's vision of a more capable,
    resilient, and affordable enterprise. The objectives of the SpEC are:
    minimize barriers to entry for small business and non-traditional
    vendors to do business with the Air Force and U.S. Government; identify
    and realize teaming opportunities among entities to promote integrated
    research and prototyping efficiencies; and reduce the cost of prototype
    development under a competitive environment. SpEC is popular with SMC
    industry partners and new companies join the consortium frequently. As
    of early March 2019, the SpEC is comprised of approximately 264
    companies, 81 percent of which are considered non-traditional defense
    contractors. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA prototyping efforts exceeding
    $207 million in total value. The timeline for a solicitation-to-award
    averages 90 days, with some variation based on the complexity of the
    effort, or approximately half the time of a traditional solicitation.
    Mission partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air
    Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Through the
    SpEC OTA, MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile
    Defense Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC
    OTA has been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to
    satisfy critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile
    warning to protected satellite communications to position, navigation
    and timing.
       re-architecting the air force space acquisition enterpise: smc 2.0
        The efforts to push decisions down to the lowest practicable levels
    and utilize innovative acquisition strategies have resulted in years of
    time saved and faster delivery of capabilities. However, to truly
    effect change, we must move fast to stay competitive and we must
    fundamentally transform what we buy, how we buy it, and who we buy it
    from. Under SMC 2.0 we are re-architecting SMC to manage as an
    enterprise by optimizing resource allocation, enhancing collaboration,
    accelerating decision making and developing a more innovative
    workforce. SMC 2.0 represents a total shift in the way SMC does
    business, focusing on the principles of an enterprise-wide approach,
    fostering partnerships with Allies, commercial companies, and other
    federal agencies, innovation in both how the Air Force does business
    and how technology is developed, a culture change to move away from
    bureaucracy and empower innovative ideas, all to enable speed.
    Together, these principles form the core of our message for SMC 2.0--to
    promote EPIC Speed. I declared Initial Operating Capability of SMC 2.0
    on 15 October 2018, with the goal of achieving Full Operational
    Capability by the end of 2019.
    The New SMC 2.0 Organization
        SMC 2.0 encourages us to operate more as an integrated enterprise.
    Under the previous organizational construct, space capabilities were
    developed in separate mission area directorates; there was a
    directorate focused on providing military satellite communications, GPS
    capabilities, remote sensing, etc. This construct resulted in stove-
    piped organizations within SMC with limited cross-flow of ideas and
    innovation. In order to increase the flow of information and remove
    layers of bureaucracy, SMC is transitioning from a mission area-
    specific directorate structure to a Corps structure based upon where a
    program is in the acquisition process. With SMC 2.0, SMC will be
    divided into four main Corps: Development, Production, Enterprise, and
    Atlas along with a Portfolio Architect to integrate across programs,
    combat stove-piped development, and deliver resilient capabilities
    faster.
        The Development Corps will focus on technology maturation and
    prototyping critical capabilities for the next generation of systems.
    Once a technology is matured, the capability will be transitioned to
    the Production Corps where the focus is on efficient delivery,
    capitalizing on cross-cutting opportunities, like standardized space
    vehicles and components. The Enterprise Corps will provide common
    services, such as space launch activities, and management of
    sustainment activities. The Atlas Corps provides the Center's critical
    business functions, such as contracting, manpower, and financial
    management, to facilitate the acquisition of the systems developed and
    produced by the other Corps. In order to flatten the organization and
    accelerate the pace of decision making, the Air Force has distributed
    the space portfolio of programs and delegated PEO authority to three
    new PEOs to increase the number of decision makers and link each
    program manager directly to their PEO. These fully qualified PEOs have
    acquisition authority over the programs within the Development,
    Production, and Enterprise Corps. The crosscutting nature of this
    framework reduces duplication, identifies commonalities among missions,
    and drives enterprise integration leading to higher resiliency across
    many platforms and systems.
        The SMC Portfolio Architect drives the space enterprise strategy
    and framework to inform and prioritize what SMC acquires. The SMC
    Portfolio Architect works closely with the Air Force Space Command
    Enterprise Architect, ensuring space operators and space acquirers
    remain in lock step to provide the most resilient and agile
    capabilities for the warfighter.
    Strengthening Partnerships
        SMC is working with Allies, sister agencies, and industry to
    satisfy warfighting capability gaps quicker and cheaper while
    developing a more robust coalition space enterprise. This year SMC will
    establish agreements in Europe, the Pacific, and at home to expand our
    space capabilities via technology development and demonstration as well
    as development of operational capability by leveraging friendships and
    resources across the globe. I recently returned from a multi-nation
    trip, which included stops in Japan and Australia, to reinforce and
    grow our alliances and partnerships with the international community.
        The Chief Partnership Office, within the Portfolio Architect team,
    is tasked with growing partnerships between SMC and related agencies,
    Allies, and industry. As mentioned in Lieutenant General David
    Thompson's testimony, our highest profile mission partnership is the
    collaborative effort with the National Reconnaissance Office known as
    Silentbarker. Silentbarker will provide the primary layer of critical
    space-based space situational awareness to the warfighter. The system
    will rapidly detect, identify, track, and collect data on resident
    space objects in deep-space orbits on the short timelines required to
    conduct indications and warning of threats against U.S. high-value
    assets. The Air Force contributes to this effort through the Space-
    Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program. By pursuing this
    collaborative effort with a key mission partner, the Air Force
    estimates there will be approximately $400 million in overall cost
    avoidance over a traditional acquisition.
        The Air Force is also working to expand its relationships with key
    Allies in order to strengthen existing alliances and grow partnerships
    with new nations. For example, the Air Force is partnering with Space
    Norway on a hosted payload solution for a protected satellite
    communications capability in the North Polar Region known as the
    Enhanced Polar System-Recapitalization (EPS-R). EPS-R provides assured,
    anti-jam, and low-probability-of-detection and intercept satellite
    communications for tactical users north of 65 degrees latitude. This
    capability provides a 26-fold increase in capacity over the legacy,
    Interim Polar System through our partnership with Space Norway. The Air
    Force is projected to close a two year capability gap to provide
    critical warfighter support sooner than a traditional acquisition of a
    free-flyer satellite and save significant costs through partnering.
        In addition to forging stronger ties with our international and
    mission partners, SMC is working to strengthen our partnerships with
    both aerospace and innovative technology industries. Throughout the SMC
    2.0 transformation, we have held industry days and panels to solicit
    feedback from our defense industry partners. Additionally, we are
    working with our partners in the private sector to employ commercial
    best practices for how we acquire space systems and open the door for
    non-traditional defense companies and universities. The Air Force's
    Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially Hosted (REACH) program
    is a space weather and space situational awareness project
    demonstrating the viability and effectiveness of a commercially hosted,
    disaggregated space situational awareness architecture. REACH payload
    sensors provide an unprecedented amount of space weather measurements
    for more rapid satellite anomaly attribution. Earlier this year, the
    REACH program successfully completed its eighth and final launch. A
    total of 32 REACH payloads were launched into orbit in under 24 months.
    The successful launch of these payloads and the critical data they
    provide are a key example of SMC 2.0 in action, finding innovative ways
    to partner with industry to rapidly field new capabilities while
    reducing cost and schedule.
    Fostering Innovation
        As the space domain transitions from an uncontested environment to
    one which is more unpredictable, complex, and competitive, it is
    important to collapse traditional lengthy requirements, development,
    testing and fielding processes. Today, SMC must shift to a construct
    prioritizing flexibility and speed, to enable effective adaptation to
    rapidly evolving technologies and unpredictable competitors. The
    partnership pilot program between SMC Mission Innovation, the AFRL
    Space Vehicles Directorate, and the 14th Air Force Combat Development
    Division (CDD) shows how our acquisition community is not only
    capitalizing on commercial development, but becoming the premier Multi-
    domain Enterprise Global Node. Our collaboration efforts pivot to
    support this rapidly evolving technological landscape while finding
    non-traditional methods to provide lethal and practical tools to better
    support the warfighter. The efforts of this combined team is narrowing
    the gap between operator and engineer, addressing operator-driven pain
    points and developing a solution in a faster, more streamlined manner.
        A good example of this partnership, was the 460th Space Wing's
    Combat Development Division AFWERX accelerator activity. A recent pilot
    program activity was able to produce prototypes for space operator
    visualization known as Space Cockpit and a defensive cyber operations
    tool, going from concept to prototype in only three months. Not only
    was turnaround quick, but operators were immediately able to
    demonstrate the product and provide feedback and corrective actions
    earlier in the product's life cycle than ever before. SMC is
    trailblazing this new style of space acquisitions in concert with the
    Combat Development Division through our Space Commercially Augmented
    Mission Platform (CAMP) and Enterprise Space Battle Management Command
    & Control (ESBMC2) efforts, which are already pulling third party
    developers ``off the street'' to deliver new products specifically
    requested by operators. These tactics are the exact type of innovation
    and collaboration we are striving to implement across the Air Force.
        To provide timely ESBMC2 capabilities to the warfighter, the Air
    Force has transitioned the effort and the remainder of the legacy Joint
    Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) into a new
    development effort known as Space Command and Control (C2). The Space
    C2 effort takes the lessons learned from previous software development
    programs and institutes a more iterative and operator-focused approach.
    Instead of building software and writing code for multiple years that
    could result in an end product which does not meet evolving mission
    requirements, the Space C2 initiative is centered on 90-day Program
    Increment cycles. The Program Increment offers a predictable and timely
    delivery to users as well as an opportunity to receive direct feedback
    from the operators to immediately correct user issues. A Retrospective
    and Planning document is generated at the conclusion of an increment.
    This codifies the progress made during the previous Program Increment,
    the expected end-state of the entering Program Increment, money spent
    to date, and the return on investment, as well as other successes or
    issues to be addressed. ESBMC2 follows this 90-day Program Increment
    cadence to develop, integrate, and deliver capabilities, operating on
    four 3-week sprints per increment, enabling ESBMC2 to continuously
    deliver capabilities. The first Program Increment was delivered to and
    accepted by the warfighter at the end of January 2019.
        The AFWERX accelerator activity is just one point in which SMC and
    AFSPC are achieving greater collaboration between the operators who use
    the capabilities and the acquirers. In concert with Space Cadre
    development efforts spearheaded by General Raymond, SMC is working to
    ensure we have space operators in our acquisition program offices.
    AFSPC and SMC are working to ensure we have a crossflow of officers
    between the acquisition and the space operations career fields. Right
    now SMC has approximately 100 acquirers with space operations
    experience across the Center, with plans to double that number. I
    believe this crossflow develops better acquisition officers who can
    fully understand the operational domain of the warfighting customer.
    SMC 2.0 Pacesetter Programs
        It is important to remember the Air Force is working to not only
    acquire capability faster, but also smarter. As part of the SMC 2.0
    approach, nine ``pacesetter'' programs have been designated to validate
    rapid acquisition strategies outlined above and provide a model for
    future acquisitions to follow. These pacesetter programs serve as both
    a means to pave the way for alternative acquisition approaches and as a
    litmus test to ensure the changes implemented under SMC 2.0 are viable
    and can be applied to a broad range of missions. Under the Portfolio
    Architect, there are two pacesetter initiatives, international
    partnerships and a prototype project for disaggregated architectures.
    The SMC pacesetter effort, known as CASINO, will expand the efforts of
    the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency project known as
    Blackjack, to increase resilience by disaggregating various mission
    capabilities using large, Low Earth Orbit constellations.
        The Development Corps' key pacesetter programs are two section 804
    programs, the Next Generation OPIR program to replace the legacy Space
    Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the Protected Tactical Satellite
    Communications (PTS) program to replace the tactical capabilities of
    the existing Advanced Extremely High Frequency and MILSTAR
    constellations. The PTS program will be a constellation of distributed,
    hosted payloads and free-flying satellites which provide increased
    anti-jam performance to tactical users currently using wideband
    communications satellites. The program received section 804 designation
    from Dr. Roper in November 2018, and was directed to develop two
    hostable payloads to be launched in fiscal year 2024. The payloads will
    leverage the government-owned, fully processed Protected Tactical
    Waveform to provide anti-jam, protected tactical satellite
    communications to joint warfighters in anti-access/area denial
    environments. By utilizing the previously mentioned SpEC OTA in
    addition to section 804 authorities, the Air Force will deliver
    critical, tactical satellite communications capabilities to the
    warfighter three years sooner than a traditional DOD 5000 series
    acquisition.
        The Production Corps' key pacesetter efforts consist of a pilot for
    satellite commonality for spacecraft in order to drive affordability
    across SMC programs, and the commercial procurement of the Wideband
    Global Satellite Communications System through innovative business
    practices. Our commonality effort is driving efficiencies across three
    of our major programs: AEHF, SBIRS, and GPS. For example, we are
    establishing common standards for parts qualification, system testing
    and review processes. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,
    Congress appropriated $600 million for two additional space vehicles
    for the Air Force's wideband communications system, known as WGS. The
    Air Force is working with the WGS prime contractor to acquire the
    congressionally-directed spacecraft. The Air Force will leverage
    commercial best practices to accelerate spacecraft delivery.
        Under the Enterprise Corps, SMC is working to institute enterprise-
    wide Defensive Cyber Operations, procure the Enterprise Ground Services
    program using agile development and rapid fielding of a common
    satellite C2 infrastructure, and has created a multi-mission
    manifesting office to provide flexible access to space for all types of
    payloads and satellites. SMC created the Mission Manifest Office to
    enable rapid, resilient and responsive launch capabilities to meet
    National Security Space objectives. As the front door for operational
    launch, the Mission Manifest Office analyzes current and planned
    National Security Space launches to determine potential multi-manifest
    missions. As a result, the Air Force maximizes on-orbit capability,
    ensures little excess space for each launch mission and lowers cost to
    the DOD by reducing overall launch service procurements. The Mission
    Manifest Office identifies DOD, Civil, and Intelligence Community
    launch opportunities to enable and execute these multi-manifest mission
    designs. As one of the SMC 2.0 pacesetters, the Mission Manifest Office
    will be integrating National Security Space payloads on the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Landsat-9 launch mission in
    fiscal year 2021, setting a valuable Interagency Agreement and
    collaboration for many years to come.
        The way ahead set by these pacesetter efforts is already paying
    off. Nine additional space programs have used the techniques proven by
    the pacesetters to save an additional 19 years in acquisition time from
    their original schedules. SMC is making great strides in achieving EPIC
    Speed in areas outside the pacesetters previously outlined. Our Space
    C2 program is breaking government software development paradigms by
    working with the DOD to create a new acquisition program type and more
    effectively acquire agile software systems. Just last month, the
    program office established a new development-to-operations (DevOps)
    environment located in a commercial business space. The new environment
    encourages partnerships with a variety of software vendors for extreme
    programming agile software development.
        None of the efforts to speed up the pace of space acquisition would
    be possible without the men and women who make up the workforce of SMC.
    To ensure our workforce understands the current space operating
    environment, I directed all military and civilian employees of the
    Center, to receive a threat brief at each employee's appropriate
    security clearance level. We will continue that initiative this year,
    and invite our contractor employees to participate. As a step towards
    institutionalizing the change in culture, and the other EPIC Speed
    tenets from the ground up, SMC launched an innovative effort to
    inspire, energize, and uniquely develop our junior acquisition corps.
    In the coming months, we will take a dramatic step forward in ensuring
    our civilian workforce is poised to execute the tenets of SMC 2.0.
    Furthermore, as we continue to work towards achieving Full Operational
    Capability for SMC 2.0, later this year, we will continue to adjust
    course to meet the threat.
                                 the way ahead
        Since taking command in May 2017, SMC has undergone rapid and
    significant change, and we are making progress in speeding up the pace
    of the acquisition of the Nation's vital space capabilities. Although a
    lot of progress has been made, the men and women of SMC understand that
    despite a history of remarkable achievement, we must get even faster
    and smarter about how we deliver space warfighting capability; and we
    must continue to invoke the principles of EPIC Speed to meet and
    outpace the adversary threat. None of the changes implemented under the
    SMC 2.0 construct would be possible without the support of our Air
    Force Space Command team and the support of senior leaders within the
    Air Force, the DOD, and the Administration. Most importantly, none of
    these changes would be possible without the continued support of
    Congress. We are using the new authorities given to us by Congress to
    ensure we transparently acquire the premier space capabilities to
    enable space operators. The Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget builds
    off considerable gains the space investment portfolio has seen in
    recent years with a proposed 17 percent increase over fiscal year 2019.
    This request supports SMC's re-architecture and the key missions of the
    National Defense Strategy while also supporting the drive towards the
    Air Force We Need.
        Finally, I thank the Committee for its continued leadership,
    oversight, and support of the men and women of SMC and the national
    security space enterprise.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Next we have General ``DT'' Thompson. And I believe you are
    referred to now as ``East Coast.'' But, General, welcome.

     STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USAF, VICE
                   COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm honored to appear
    before you along with these distinguished colleagues today.
        Today, I represent our commander, General ``Jay'' Raymond,
    the Commander of Air Force Space Command. I'm privileged to be
    one of the 26,000 men and women of that Command who serve under
    General Raymond's leadership. These men and women remain the
    best in the world at developing, fielding, operating, and
    sustaining vital space capabilities that serve our national
    leaders, our Joint Forces, allies, and partners, and the world,
    in general. The asymmetric advantage these capabilities provide
    ensure that our Armed Forces have no equal.
        Today, there is unprecedented agreement among the Nation's
    leadership that space is a warfighting domain, just like air,
    land, sea, and cyberspace. The National Security Strategy and
    National Defense Strategy reflect this reality, emphasizing
    peace through strength while demanding that we maintain U.S.
    leadership and freedom of action in the space domain.
        Accepting that potential adversaries have made space a
    warfighting domain, we are now dealing with the implications.
    We are driving tremendous change in order to sustain our
    leadership and that freedom to operate in space. With your
    strong support, we are making significant advances to ensure
    the national security space enterprise is prepared to play its
    role in military operations under all conditions.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on our efforts over the
    past 2 years, proposing a 17 percent increase in space funding
    over 2019, and a $14 billion investment overall. With my
    posture statement on the record, I'd like to summarize a few of
    its key points:
        First of all, we're increasing the lethality and readiness
    of our force as we continue to invest in and accelerate
    defendable space. Among that includes new, more defendable
    systems and architectures, the space domain awareness and
    command and control needed to operate in a contested domain,
    and an operational training infrastructure to develop space
    warfighters to the need. All of this enables us to sustain
    superiority in space so that we ensure we support joint
    warfighters operating in all domains around the globe.
        Second, we are enhancing and expanding partnerships with
    the intelligence community, allies and partners, and industry.
    This includes joint programs with the National Reconnaissance
    Office, hosted payloads with several of our allies and
    partners, and operations, training, exercises, and wargames
    with allies that are building a coalition of like-minded
    nations.
        Finally, we're capitalizing on innovative business
    practices, including the rearchitecting of Space and Missile
    Systems Center that ``West Coast Thompson'' mentioned and is
    leading, establishing a Space Rapid Capabilities Office,
    pursuing special practices and innovative agreements that drive
    those innovative activities across the broader commercial and
    industry base, and, finally, adopting open architectures and
    standards to strengthen integration in multidomain command and
    control and with the operations of the rest of the Joint Force.
        Let me close by reiterating that we do not want war to
    extend to space. But, the best way to deter that from happening
    is to prepare to fight and win, should deterrence fail. With
    your support, that's exactly what we're doing.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General David
    Thompson follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David D. Thompson
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich and distinguished Members
    of the Committee, I'm honored to appear before you today in my capacity
    as Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). With General Jay
    Raymond in command, we have the distinct privilege to lead and
    represent the 26,200 dedicated men and women of AFSPC who underpin
    successful operations for our joint force and the Nation. In the past
    year we have seen tremendous change and progress in the National
    Security Space arena with the Nation's on-going efforts to address the
    reality that strategic competitors have made space a warfighting
    domain. Among these initiatives are the President's issuance of four
    Space Policy Directives, direction to establish a space-focused
    combatant command--U.S. Space Command, and the Department of Defense
    proposal for a new branch of the armed forces--the U.S. Space Force. We
    expect this next year will be equally full of progress across these and
    other National Security Space endeavors.
                              strategic situation
        Today, great power competition from a revisionist China and Russia
    continues to be the primary challenge to United States and global
    security. Both of these nations seek to challenge peace, stability and
    U.S. superiority in all domains: land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space.
    In the space domain in particular, these competitors are seeking to
    deny the U.S. and its Allies freedom of action, while also developing
    their own space capabilities to enable power projection and enhance
    military strength.
        Fortunately, this comes at a time when our National Security
    Strategy, National Defense Strategy, national and military leadership,
    and Air Force Space Command plans, programs and operations are in
    unprecedented alignment. The National Security Strategy mandates we
    must maintain leadership and freedom of action in space, while
    advancing space as a priority domain. It also declares unfettered
    access and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Our
    National Defense Strategy establishes five priority missions: (1)
    defend the Homeland, (2) provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent, (3) defeat a powerful conventional enemy, while we (4) deter
    opportunistic aggression, and (5) disrupt violent extremists in a cost-
    effective manner. Our space capabilities play a vital role in each one
    of the missions, supporting our joint warfighters and our allies and
    partners around the globe. Our national and military leadership declare
    in unison that space is a warfighting domain, like land, sea, and air.
    Our goal remains to deter conflict from extending to space, and the
    best way we know how to do this is to be prepared to fight and win a
    conflict that extends to space should deterrence fail. My testimony
    will focus on how our activities are aligned with Department of Defense
    (DOD) priorities to build a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and
    attract new partners, and reform the Department's business practices.
                           build a more lethal force
        We are increasing the combat readiness of Space Operators to
    increase joint warfighter lethality by investing to build multi-domain
    Airmen to fight and win as part of the Joint Force.
    Developing our Warfighters
        Foundational to building a more lethal force is the development of
    joint warfighters. The Air Force is transforming the way we develop our
    space combat tacticians and acquisition professionals, and laying the
    foundation for a trained, ready crew force. We have taken a number of
    actions to do so. For example, we directed a significant increase in
    rigor and content in the initial training of our space operators, known
    as Undergraduate Space Training, to meet the demands of current and
    emerging challenges to national security space. This revised ``UST
    Next'' is on track to start on 1 October 2019 and includes an
    additional 34 training days to cover evolving space threats and U.S.
    responses in greater depth. We have also expanded our Operational
    Training Infrastructure to produce a more relevant training
    environment, which allows weapon systems and operators to interact in a
    highly dynamic, threat-representative, realistic manner, including
    aspects of multi-domain command and control. The Air Force has approved
    $74.8 million in funding to advance our space training simulators along
    these lines.
        Additionally, AFSPC and the Air Force Weapons School established an
    Enlisted Space Warfighter Advanced Instructor Course and have selected
    the first class of students. This new course, held at Nellis Air Force
    Base, will provide advanced academic and tactical training for enlisted
    space professionals, and is a stepping stone for incorporating our
    enlisted operators into the existing Air Force Weapons School.
    Advanced Space Operations School Re-designated as the 319th Combat
            Training Squadron
        Air Force Space Command re-designated the Advance Space Operations
    School as the 319th Combat Training Squadron (319 CTS) on 28 August
    2018 in an effort to normalize the squadron with the Air Force's 16
    other combat training squadrons that have similar training missions. As
    a combat training squadron, this unit will prepare space professionals
    for real-world operations in an increasingly contested space domain
    through exercises such as Space Flag. The 319 CTS will provide training
    to tactical units with the purpose of developing critically-thinking
    operators who have mastered their weapon system to a degree such that
    they are able to fight through all levels of conflict.
    Schriever Scholars
        The Air Force is growing a cadre of strategic space leaders through
    the Schriever Scholars program at Air Command and Staff College. This
    new space concentration program for field grade officers consists of a
    demanding curriculum spanning space history, policy, strategy, and
    doctrine. The program also provides unique opportunities for engagement
    with senior DOD leadership and unprecedented access to top-level
    policymakers, including representatives at the White House, State
    Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, and
    NASA. This initial class of thirteen students graduate in June and will
    be prepared to ensure American advantage in the space domain for
    decades to come.
    Space Flag
        Space Flag is AFSPC's premier in-domain space protection exercise.
    This year we have expanded this advanced training to three times a
    year, providing space operators the experience of planning and
    executing space operations in a contested, degraded, and operationally-
    limited environment against a thinking adversary. In August 2019, we
    plan to incorporate our coalition partners in Space Flag for the first
    time.
                 strengthen alliances and attract new partners
        AFSPC has made significant progress in expanding interagency,
    commercial, and international partnerships that enhance our position
    across the national security space portfolio. Recognizing that it is
    impossible to accomplish our mission alone, AFSPC is committed to
    identifying new partners and solidifying existing relationships as a
    core activity.
    Joint Space Operations Center to Combined Space Operations Center
        This year we have accelerated our efforts and increased our
    coalition footprint to conduct combined space operations. On 18 July
    2018, the Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) transitioned the
    Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to a Combined Space Operations
    Center (CSpOC). The transition formalized our ongoing, decade-long
    effort to integrate Allied and partner nation personnel and
    capabilities into our space enterprise. We have also established
    persistent connectivity with partner space operations centers in
    Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and together we are working
    to identify additional tools to improve information sharing between our
    respective centers. In late 2019, we plan on expanding more classified
    operations and planning efforts with our FVEY partners through the
    establishment of a Combined Technical Operations Cell (CTOC).
    Schriever Wargame
        AFSPC annually conducts the Schriever Wargame, a scenario-based
    wargame designed to explore critical space issues in depth, investigate
    military utility of new space systems, identify solutions to common
    challenges shared by all participants, and advance space doctrine to
    better align with and support air, land, sea, and cyberspace doctrine.
    This annual wargame also helps increase international cooperation and
    integration among space-faring allies. This year's wargame included our
    FVEY partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom)
    along with France, Germany, and, for the first time, Japan. The
    outcomes of the Schriever Wargame Series continue to inform future
    AFSPC requirements, examine organizational constructs, and provide a
    venue for advancing space operational concepts and procedures. For
    example, it was the first time the participants employed a combined
    command and control (C2) cell for Special Access Programs (SAP). As
    previously mentioned, it is through this effort that participants
    agreed to stand up the first ever CTOC, the real world SAP C2 cell at
    the CSpOC, by the end of this year.
        As a related effort, the Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC)
    Office at Vandenberg Air Force Base provides the means for direct
    dialog with multiple international partners extending beyond combined
    space operations, supporting strategic engagement objectives via
    bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Eight countries were
    initially invited to participate: Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
    Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom.
    The MSC office currently includes liaisons from three partner nations:
    France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and MOUs are pending with
    Italy, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
    Allies in Training
        In coordination with Air Education and Training Command, AFSPC is
    working to increase coalition participation in its space courses. This
    fiscal year, AFSPC will offer Space 100 (foundational level space) to a
    growing coalition audience including: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
    Colombia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, NATO, New
    Zealand, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.
    Space 200 (operational level space) is now open to New Zealand, and
    participation from the other FVEY partners has doubled with 20 allied
    personnel scheduled to attend this year. Space 200 will also open to
    France, Germany, and Japan with mobile classes available in 2019 and
    in-residence classes available in 2020. Finally, Space 300 (strategic
    level space) will have its first FVEY partner course in April 2019 with
    Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom personnel in attendance.
    Hosted Payloads and Future Allied Partnerships
        The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is leveraging new
    business practices and methodologies to more rapidly field critical
    capabilities by placing hosted payloads on Allied satellites.
    Specifically, Norway will integrate Enhanced Polar System
    Recapitalization (EPS-R) payloads on two space vehicles and launch both
    satellites into a highly elliptical orbit in December 2022. EPS-R will
    provide protected communications for military tactical and strategic
    forces, as well as other users in support of Joint and Allied Force
    operations above 65 degrees north longitude.
        Under the leadership of the Air Force Chief of Staff, we will host
    an international Air Chiefs Space Conference at the Space Symposium in
    Colorado this April. With 12 countries expected to participate, this
    inaugural event represents the first-ever global meeting of Air Chiefs
    to discuss partnering in the space domain. This demonstrates our
    commitment to pursue international relationships that promote common
    values and at the same time send a clear message to strategic
    competitors that cooperation between space-faring nations will
    complicate any pursuit of hostile action.
    U.S. Government Partnering
        Our partnering focus includes efforts within the United States
    government as well. Our teaming relationship with the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has never been stronger; we have worked
    together across a spectrum of projects, to include development of a
    strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities, shared Concepts
    of Operations (CONOPS) to realize that strategy, and partnerships on an
    enterprise space architecture and individual programs for mutual
    benefit. An example of the latter is our collaborative work on the
    space-based space surveillance effort called Silent Barker. While the
    Space-Based Space Surveillance Follow-On program remains under Air
    Force Service Acquisition Executive authority and control, it
    contributes funding and personnel to the NRO for executing Silent
    Barker. Silent Barker, with Air Force support, increases mission
    capability and is more cost-effective. The Air Force and the NRO will
    mutually invest in non-recurring engineering costs, enabling the
    potential for a larger initial constellation buy and lowering unit
    costs. The Air Force is requesting an increase in funding across the
    Future Years Defense Program for expanded coverage across the
    geosynchronous belt and updating mission data processing and scheduling
    for the ground segment to leverage the full capability of the National
    Space Defense Center (NSDC).
        In accordance with the President's direction in Space Policy
    Directive 3, we are teaming with the Department of Commerce to transfer
    the responsibilities for space traffic management (STM) to that
    Department. Together we will strengthen STM for all, while improving
    space situational awareness (SSA) data interoperability and enabling
    greater SSA data sharing.
                   reform the department's business practices
        AFSPC has embraced an atmosphere of profound change, bringing forth
    business reforms that govern how we procure critical space assets in
    concert with our industry partners. This represents a culture change
    that is more agile and less risk-averse. To achieve our goals we must
    be willing to break down bureaucracy and embrace smart risk in order to
    accelerate capabilities development to meet the threat.
    COMSATCOM Procurement Authority Transfer
        To comply with the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act,
    responsibilities for DOD procurement of commercial satellite
    communications (COMSATCOM) services transferred from the Defense
    Information Services Agency to AFSPC on 11 December 2018. Beginning on
    20 December 2018, AFSPC started to bring together both government and
    industry partners to chart a way forward to both enhance satellite
    communications (SATCOM) provisioning and our ability to provide SATCOM
    in a contested environment. We are using this transfer as a mechanism
    to improve military and commercial SATCOM support across the board and
    the AFSPC team is finalizing the first of a series of concepts and
    strategy documents that will shape our SATCOM investments.
    Space and Missile Systems Center 2.0
        The Space and Missile Systems Center has embarked on a
    transformation to deliver resilient, war-winning space capabilities
    more quickly. SMC 2.0 removes layers of bureaucracy, linking program
    leadership directly to acquisition decision authorities in order to
    speed decision making. The strategic outcome of SMC 2.0 will be to
    dominate with superior lethality throughout the space domain,
    aggressively deliver warfighter needs from a resilient, integrated
    enterprise, and drive innovation in a way that outpaces adversarial
    threats.
    Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO)
        The SpRCO was created through the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA), with subsequent authorities defined in the
    fiscal year 2019 NDAA. The office is governed by a Board of Directors,
    chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force, and consists of the Air
    Force Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the AFSPC Commander, and
    USSTRATCOM/JFSCC Commander, with authorities and processes outlined in
    an approved charter. AFSPC continues to grow the SpRCO and make
    progress with AFSPC's ability to rapidly field space capabilities. The
    Board of Directors signed the governing charter on 1 November 2018 and
    USSTRATCOM validated five SpRCO programs through the JFSCC. The
    initiation of three out of the five programs was formalized by the
    Board of Directors on 31 January 2019. Acquisition, security, and
    contracting authorities have all been codified and infrastructure,
    personnel, and security resources are in place to initiate these
    programs. Interim acquisition and security authorities are being
    provided by Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office Director; authorities
    will transition to the newly hired SpRCO Director by April 2019.
    Prototyping: Space Enterprise Consortium
        The Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC) is a team of industry
    leaders, academic research institutions, and innovative early-stage and
    start-up companies working together to develop next generation space
    technologies. Prototyping awards now broadly represent many of our most
    critical warfighter requirements, to include protected satellite
    communications, missile warning, missile defense, space situational
    awareness, and standardized satellites, payload and commanding
    interfaces.
                          a resilient space enterprise
        AFSPC has made significant progress across all mission areas that
    span the breadth of our space capabilities. Execution of the
    Department's strategy to protect and defend our space capabilities is
    persistent, ongoing, and present across all mission areas.
    Command and Control
        For operational level C2, Enterprise Space Battle Management
    Command and Control (ESBMC2) provides the C2 and SSA capabilities to
    gain and maintain space superiority. It also serves as the Air Force
    space system element of Air Force Multi-Domain Command and Control
    efforts. Our early ESBMC2 prototypes have demonstrated initial
    interoperability with Air Combat Command (ACC), the Intelligence
    Community, and the Missile Defense Agency to synchronize operations. We
    continue to support Air Force efforts to advance interoperability with
    ACC's Airborne Battle Management System.
        One of the more important aspects of ESBMC2 is its open
    architecture. ESBMC2 uses Open Missions Standards (OMS) as its
    architecture standard and the Universal C2 Interface (UCI) as its
    communication standard to enable interoperability amongst the entire
    DOD space portfolio. We have seen success of this approach in early
    ESBMC2 prototypes allowing integrated C2 on timelines that the JSpOC
    Mission System could never have provided. This open approach also
    encourages companies to develop applications and compete in an
    environment in order to foster innovation. The price of entry for
    commercial companies to develop applications for ESBMC2 is simply to
    adhere to OMS and UCI specifications.
    Space Situational Awareness
        SSA is the foundation upon which the Department maintains
    spaceflight safety, provides warning, assesses intentions, and
    attributes adversary actions towards U.S., Allies, and commercial
    partner satellites. Coupled with operational intelligence to complete
    the SSA operating picture, competency in this area is critical in
    protecting our space assets, informing the design of future
    architectures, and fostering access and responsible use of space for
    all space-faring nations. The following key efforts represent SSA
    capabilities necessary to protect U.S. Government satellites and
    interests in space.
        The new Space Fence is an S-Band radar designed for space
    surveillance located on the Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of Marshall
    Islands, 2,100 nautical miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. It is
    expected to increase the number of tracked objects in space from 23,000
    to more than 60,000, as well as increase the accuracy of orbit
    predictions, and improve our ability to characterize previously
    untracked objects and conduct collision avoidance analysis for all
    objects in space. Expected to achieve initial operational capability
    (IOC) within the next year, Space Fence will be the largest dedicated
    space surveillance radar operated by AFSPC.
    The National Space Defense Center
        The NSDC continues to mature its partnership between the DOD and
    Intelligence Community as we push to improve our nation's ability to
    rapidly detect, characterize, attribute, warn and defend against
    threats to our nation's vital space systems. In January 2018, the NSDC
    transitioned from an experimentation-focused entity to limited 24/7
    operations. The fiscal year 2020 budget request supports efforts to
    leverage the full capability of the NSDC and I am pleased to report
    that the NSDC has continued to mature throughout the year and has now
    taken on all Protect and Defend responsibilities previously executed by
    the CSpOC.
        The Air Force Research Lab has been working to deliver a Joint
    Emerging Operational Need (JEON) effort for the NSDC to provide
    capabilities to integrate systems and information at a ``system high''
    level. By operating at the highest security levels throughout the
    operations center, the NSDC will become a singular center for the full
    picture of space activities. The completion of JEON-associated work in
    June 2019 will mark the delivery of a functioning prototype capability
    and then transition to an initial operational capability by year's end.
    Position, Navigation, and Timing
        The first Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite was
    successfully launched in December 2018 on the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.
    Ultimately, GPS III will provide signals that are three times more
    accurate and provide up to eight times more anti-jam resilience for the
    warfighter than previous generations. The GPS Next-Generation
    Operational Control System (OCX) Block 0 supported GPS III Space
    Vehicle (SV) 01 launch and the team is completing early orbit checkout
    without issue. The OCX program addresses cyber vulnerabilities through
    a robust information assurance architecture and is on-track to deliver
    its full capability by April 2022.
        The GPS III program is preparing GPS III SV 02 to support a summer
    2019 launch and continues to assemble, test, and integrate the
    remaining eight satellites. In addition, SMC awarded the GPS III
    Follow-on (GPS IIIF) contract for 22 satellites in September 2018. This
    year's budget request includes full funding for SV 13 and continued
    incremental RDT&E funding for GPS IIIF SVs 11 and 12.
    Missile Warning
        In the fiscal year 2019 budget request, the Air Force took the bold
    step to stop procurement of Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
    vehicles 7 and 8 in acknowledgement of their inability to survive in
    today's contested space environment. The Next-Generation Overhead
    Persistent Infrared system will succeed the current SBIRS system by
    providing improved missile warning, missile defense, battlespace
    awareness, and technical intelligence capabilities that are more
    survivable against emerging adversary threats. The Air Force is
    applying acquisition authorities (per section 804 of the fiscal year
    2016 NDAA) to manage the program's largest risks through competitive
    prototyping, and to significantly improve execution speed. Using these
    authorities, and with funding support from Congress, the program let
    two prime contracts within three months, posturing the Air Force to
    reduce the time to IOC by three and a half years. This pace setter
    proves that a five year acquisition timeline to deliver resilient
    missile warning capability, versus a ten or fifteen year timeline, is
    possible. Additionally, the Air Force has aligned the fiscal year 2020
    budget request to support program execution and as expected deliver the
    first resilient geosynchronous satellite to meet warfighter needs by
    2025.
    Environmental Monitoring
        Every DOD operational mission begins with a weather briefing;
    either space weather, terrestrial weather, or both. Although the data
    required to generate forecasts for our warfighters is largely dependent
    on complex models, approximately 95 percent of the data that feeds
    these models comes from either space-borne assets or ground-based
    observatories looking at space. Our ground-based infrastructure
    consists of unique assets strategically situated around the globe to
    observe the sun and the ionosphere from below and collect the data we
    need to complement the space-borne information. The data required for
    DOD missions is often unique and necessitates 24/7 global ability to
    forecast weather in austere and denied environments.
        Weather is also a partnership business. We continue to leverage the
    outstanding contributions of NOAA, NASA, our European EUMETSAT
    colleagues, and Japan. As an example, we will also soon accept a NOAA
    geostationary satellite, repurposed for our DOD mission, and relocate
    it over the Indian Ocean.
        We are currently updating the space piece of the overarching Air
    Force weather strategy for both terrestrial and space weather support.
    Our long term vision, in addition to the avenues we already have, is to
    determine how commercial ventures could add to and diversify our
    ability to collect our required data from space. This is a very new and
    potentially beneficial partnership, which we will be able to more
    completely characterize after we do some investigation and development
    of their abilities.
    Satellite Communications
        The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
    constellation provides protected tactical and strategic, nuclear-
    hardened communications for the President and other decision makers.
    With three operational satellites on orbit, a fourth is undergoing on-
    orbit checkout and will be operational in July 2019. The final two
    satellites are scheduled to launch in fiscal years 2019 and 2020
    respectively. Ongoing Space Modernization Initiative efforts include
    AEHF expanded spacecraft resilience features and enhanced ground cyber
    protection. The Air Force is currently pursuing the next generation of
    protected, strategic communications with the acquisition of the Evolved
    Strategic SATCOM system which utilizes section 804 authorities to
    deliver capability two years sooner than a traditional acquisition. The
    Air Force is currently preparing the release of a request for proposal
    for rapid prototyping for this next generation of protected strategic
    communications.
        The Protected Tactical Enterprise Service effort has been enabled
    by section 804 authorities to deliver prototype capability for two Navy
    carrier strike groups 18 months early. This ground system will provide
    worldwide, anti-jam, Low Probability of Intercept communications for
    tactical warfighters. The Protected Tactical Satellite Communications
    (PTS) effort will save about 36 months of schedule by implementing
    rapid acquisition via section 804 authorities. PTS will provide
    advanced tactical SATCOM capabilities to enable tactical operations in
    anti-access/area denial environments. PTS awarded 13 prototyping
    projects using SpEC Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to help design
    and reduce risk of critical technologies.
        Enhanced Polar System (EPS) hosted payloads launched in 2015 and
    2017 and will provide tactical protected communications in the North
    Polar Region; EPS will achieve full operational capability in late
    fiscal year 2019. However, the need for tactical communication
    capabilities in the North Polar Region is anticipated to expand as U.S.
    and allied military and commercial needs continue to grow. As
    previously mentioned, the Enhanced Polar System--Recapitalization (EPS-
    R) is the protected SATCOM follow-on to the EPS, providing a 24/7
    protected SATCOM capability to the North Polar Region. EPS-R payloads
    on two separate Space Norway spacecraft remain on track for a dual
    launch in fiscal year 2023 and will provide continuity of protected
    satellite communications services and bridges the gap between the
    current system and EPS at a significantly reduced cost.
        Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) Communications SVs 8 and 9 entered
    operations in 2017 and SV 10 successfully launched on 15 March 2019. As
    the primary wideband satellite communications capability for DOD, SV 10
    will extend functional availability to 2028. Per the Consolidated
    Appropriations Act of 2018, the Air Force is acquiring and further
    developing a funding plan for launch and operation and maintenance
    activities for a modernized WGS satellite with a digital payload
    comprising twice the capacity of the current version.
    Assured Access to Space
        For the first time in 20 years, the Air Force is prepared to meet
    all national security launch needs through competition among multiple
    viable launch providers. With unprecedented mission success in placing
    National Security Space (NSS) assets into orbit, the National Security
    Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, provides assured access to space for our
    most important national security satellites, while demonstrating good
    stewardship of launch funds. Our priority remains to ensure the Air
    Force can launch all NSS payloads when and where we need to, utilizing
    launch services from certified domestic, commercial launch providers in
    a viable competitive market.
        As the Air Force moves to recapitalize the NSSL program and end the
    use of the Russian-built RD-180 engine, AFSPC has entered into public-
    private partnerships, the best way to ensure emerging commercial launch
    solutions meet our most stressing NSS launch requirements. The SMC
    Enterprise Directorate awarded three Launch Service Agreements to
    develop domestic, commercially viable launch systems. The three
    agreements went to Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket, Northrop Grumman's
    OmegA rocket, and United Launch Alliance's Vulcan rocket. These
    partnerships leverage commercial launch industry investment to deliver
    launch capabilities ahead of the RD-180 procurement deadline of 2022.
    NSSL Phase 2 launch contracts will facilitate full and open competition
    to procure launch services from fiscal year 2020 through 2024 for
    launch starting in 2022.
        Last year Congress recognized the prospect of cost savings
    associated with launch vehicle reusability; the Air Force has embraced
    this concept and is actively evaluating the risks, benefits, and
    potential costs or savings from reusable launch vehicles for future
    missions. With launch service providers demonstrating success at a
    rapid pace, reusable launch systems could offer higher reliability,
    increased responsiveness, and greater flexibility in support of NSS
    missions. In an effort to lean forward on reusing hardware for launch,
    SMC and SpaceX completed a contract modification allowing the reuse of
    the Falcon Heavy side core boosters for the Air Force's Space Test
    Program-2 mission. This first mission with a re-used booster further
    demonstrates our commitment to balance risk with increased
    responsiveness and flexibility.
        In 2019, the DOD Space Test Program partnered with SMC's Enterprise
    Corps and Defense Innovation Unit to pursue the first launch of a
    venture-class small launch service through the Rapid Agile Launch
    Initiative (RALI). Under this partnership, the Air Force procured five
    small launch services through venture-class launch service providers
    using OTA agreements. RALI demonstrates rapid procurement and the
    responsiveness of commercial launch, dedicated launch for small
    payloads to militarily-relevant orbits, on-demand responsiveness, and
    increased operational tempo over legacy national launch architecture.
    RALI leverages an expanding commercial market and launch opportunities
    to increase DOD's access to space.
        AFSPC places a high priority on streamlining space launch
    operations and identifying opportunities to improve our speed,
    innovation and resiliency to improve efficiency, satisfy national
    security needs, and increase safety. This includes an architecture
    transformation across both launch ranges that started in 2019 and will
    continue through 2023. Changes in flight and ground systems will put us
    on a path to support a 2025 implementation of the Autonomous Flight
    Safety System for all commercial space launches. This enables us to
    increase the pace of launch, reduce costly infrastructure, and maintain
    public safety.
    Cyberspace Defense of the Space Enterprise
        To protect our space enterprise from cyber threats, Headquarters
    AFSPC and SMC, together with our federally funded research development
    centers, will implement a full lifecycle effort for space and
    associated ground systems, applying robust cyberspace and defensive
    security protocols that will include adaptable, upgradable, hardened
    products and other best practices ``baked in'' at the time of product
    delivery. AFSPC is leading the Air Force, implementing a Defensive
    Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) strategy and organizational
    construct across a tiered defense posture to execute cyber defense in
    depth for space mission assurance.
        Air Force Space Command is working with U.S. Cyber Command, joint
    partners, the Intelligence Community, research labs, and industry to
    develop and deploy cyberspace security and defense solutions to protect
    the space enterprise from cyber threats. AFSPC continues to develop and
    educate cyber protection and defense personnel who work alongside space
    mission system operators to detect and respond to system
    vulnerabilities and adversarial activity. To rapidly enable DCO-S
    capabilities, AFSPC is executing a rapid acquisition approach to
    prototype and field improved technologies that will protect critical
    systems, investigate cyber events, respond to cyber incidents, and
    accomplish cyberspace security and defense objectives across the space
    enterprise.
                                 the way ahead
        The fiscal year 2020 budget request strengthens the considerable
    gains AFSPC has made over the previous fiscal year with a proposed $14
    billion investment in our space portfolio, a 17 percent increase over
    our fiscal year 2019 budget. This budget request supports our
    warfighting approach to the space domain and supports changes to how we
    prototype and field innovative space technologies in order to stay
    ahead of our competitors.
        I thank the Committee for your leadership and support; together we
    will build a resilient and ready National Security Space enterprise
    that will continue to serve as the foundation to our desire to maintain
    our military advantage and promote American prosperity.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Next, Ms. Chaplain. Welcome.

     STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
         SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich,
    and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
    today to discuss DOD's space programs.
        Space is at a pivotal point right now. In the face of
    growing threats and lengthy development cycles, DOD is
    embracing new approaches to help speed up acquisition of space
    systems, establish better partnerships with the commercial
    sector to increase innovation, and change its acquisition
    culture. There is also a proposal before Congress on
    strengthening leadership for space.
        Bringing about this broad span of change will be
    challenging, to say the least, and not without some risk. More
    specifically, while DOD is undertaking this change, it will
    need to concurrently focus on completing older programs that
    are still struggling. The ground system for Global Positioning
    System (GPS), known as Next Generation Operational Control
    System (OCX), for example, is nearly 5 years late. And, while
    the contractor has improved the pace of building and testing
    the software, we still see a lot of schedule risk in that
    program. The Air Force also recently stopped development work
    on Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS),
    a ground system for processing space situational-awareness
    data, because it didn't deliver as expected. We're also still
    faced with long gaps between the delivery of satellites and
    ground systems needed to make use of their capabilities.
        Moreover, there's a myriad of challenges facing space
    programs that are just getting underway:
        First, even with the new Space Force proposal, there are
    still a lot of open questions about leadership. For example, at
    this time, it appears there will be a number of space
    acquisition activities outside of the Space Force, including
    the Missile Defense Agency, the NRO, and some military space
    service activities, but, so far, it's uncertain what the
    overall governance structure will be. If there are conflicts in
    requirements, funding, or priorities among agencies that are
    not under the Space Force, who resolves them and makes a final
    decision? There is also a new entity being rolled out, the
    Space Development Agency, which has very worthwhile goals of
    developing or adopting innovative technologies for space, but,
    at this time, it's unclear how it will mesh with other similar
    agencies, and also still unclear who's in charge of future
    architectures for space. These questions may well be resolved
    as details for the Space Force and SDA get worked out, but new
    programs will be operating with uncertainty for the time being.
        Second, while streamlining might help speed up programs and
    change the culture, we know, from past efforts to streamline,
    that there's also risk of inviting programs to move too quickly
    and disregard the engineering and acquisition discipline that
    is so very important to space. Keep in mind that space is
    different than other types of weapons. You cannot easily fix
    satellites once they're in orbit. We consistently see programs
    suffer major setbacks because one quality procedure wasn't
    followed or one small flaw in one small part was not detected.
    This does not mean streamlining cannot be done, or should not
    be done. It just means we should heed lessons from the past,
    maintain good insight, oversight, and expertise, and be
    prepared to cancel programs that falter.
        There's a question about DOD's capacity to manage multiple
    new programs concurrently. Yes, there's a healthy increase
    being proposed for space, but consider at least nine
    significant programs are getting underway. They will likely
    require heavy investments up front and then DOD will also be
    seeking money for a new Space Force, for space protection, for
    a Space Development Agency, and a new missile-defense space
    layer, as well as for priorities outside of space, such as the
    nuclear triad.
        There are also questions about workforce capacity. We
    recently reported that just tracking who's in the space
    acquisition workforce is a challenge, and there are also gaps
    in technical expertise that will be stretched with multiple new
    programs.
        Moreover, all of the programs will be software-intensive--
    these new programs--but DOD has challenges managing software.
    We recently found that space software programs struggle to
    effectively engage system users, which is critical to their
    success. We understand that many new programs are attempting to
    be more agile and to use more modern tools, but it remains to
    be seen how successful DOD can be in adopting these new ways.
        Again, good things are happening in space. There's
    attention from highest levels of government, more resources,
    and a recognition that different approaches and culture are
    needed. What's key to making this happen is not to lose focus
    on improving acquisition management and oversight, building
    capacity as we speed up programs, and continuing to reduce
    fragmentation.
        Thank you. This concludes my statement, and I'm happy to
    answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you all for your opening statements. We'll begin
    questioning for the first round.
        I have a question for General Thompson, West Coast. As I'm
    sure you're aware, arguments are being made in the press
    against the way the Air Force has structured its efforts to
    replace the RD-180 and develop the next generation of launch
    systems. And I know that the terms of phase 2 have not been
    finalized as of yet, so we have to be careful to keep our
    discussion very general. But, I would ask that you talk us
    through some of the tradeoffs that we need to keep in mind when
    we hear arguments against down-selecting the two providers or
    questioning the intent to split launches on that 60-40 between
    them. So, help us understand some of the original thinking
    behind the way that this was structured, please.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Thank you, Chairman.
    That's a fantastic question.
        You know, 5 years ago, the Congress challenged us to get
    off Russian-made RD-180s and assure access to space using two
    domestic launch providers capable of launching to our most
    stressing national security space orbits. The Air Force rose to
    that challenge, competitively awarding technology maturation,
    rocket propulsion system and launch vehicle service agreements
    to mature commercial technologies and capabilities for national
    security space assets. Industry rose to that challenge, as
    well.
        We are ready to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
    launch service procurements. All potential offerors have
    sufficient maturity, and we expect a full and open and robust
    competition. Award is anticipated in the spring of 2020.
    Offerors will be able to update their proposals throughout the
    evaluation period if they have technological maturities or
    design review completions. We're confident we're on the right
    path for our Nation's warfighting capability, and that we're
    being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.
        Madam Chairman, when you referenced the 60-40 split, the
    60-40 split is really essential for us, for three reasons.
    Number one is, it gives us flexibility on the manifest to be
    able to move some of our Nation's most important satellites
    from provider to provider. Number two, it's almost like a
    block-buy concept, where we're able to take advantage of
    competition and savings while still rewarding the best offeror.
    And then, finally, which is something that I really need to
    articulate to everyone, is that 60-40 is a two-way split. A
    number of folks have asked us if it's possible to split it
    three ways. Our launch manifest that we need to purchase
    between 2020 and 2024 simply does not support three offerors in
    that trade space at the same time. None of the offerors'
    business cases would close if we tried to open it up to three
    different offerors.
        Now, as we move forward, after we take a look at the
    proposals and have details based on those proposals and what
    the technical approaches are, after we've assessed those risks,
    when we make the award next spring, then my guess is that we'll
    have an opportunity to discuss, for those offerors that did not
    receive awards, how we will keep them in the game so that they
    can compete for phase 3, which would be our next launch service
    procurement (LSP) in the future.
        Senator Fischer. If I'm hearing you correctly, sir, are you
    saying that, due to the amount of business that would be
    available, having three companies might not be sustainable, and
    it would be, in your view, better to have two companies that
    are healthy and able to move forward through this process?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, that's
    absolutely correct, from the standpoint of the national
    security space portfolio. There are also commercial kinds of
    activities that other offerors could participate in. Whether or
    not the commercial industrial base in that time period will
    support three launch providers, I would have to take for the
    record and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The decision to competitively award two National Security
    Space (NSS) launch service procurement contracts is based upon
    comprehensive market analysis. This analysis considered
    warfighter requirements, statutory limitations, independent
    market research, and 6 years of industry engagement. The
    Government will select for award the two offerors that, when
    combined, represent the overall best value to the Government.
    The current launch manifest requires 35 NSS launch service
    procurements, or about 7 launches per year split between two
    providers (3 or 4 launches per provider per year), over the
    fiscal year2020-fiscal year 2024 Phase 2 ordering period. Since
    2014 the government has solicited, via formal and informal
    means, industry feedback to determine the number of NSS
    missions each would require to close their business case. Based
    on this information, the Air Force determined that Phase 2
    launch services procurement requirements cannot support more
    than two providers. In order to maintain 100 percent mission
    success, the Air Force implements a robust Government Mission
    Assurance process that depends on in depth launch systems
    knowledge. Retaining more than two launch systems dilutes this
    critical mission assurance function increasing risk of failure.
    Additionally, National Security Space Launch-class satellites
    are very complex and require extensive integration with the
    launch vehicles. Maintaining more than two launch systems sub
    optimizes the satellite ability to fulfill its mission. The
    Secretary of the Air Force has asked us to independently assess
    the commercial launch market, using a Federally Funded Research
    and Development Center. We expect interim results in June 2019
    with a final report delivered in early November 2019.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you. That will be helpful. Thank
    you.
        Also, General, the Air Force has talked about the
    development of the next-generation----
        I'm going to hold this question till the next round. I see
    I'm out of time. Thank you. Senator Heinrich. I'm not going to
    abuse my power.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Heinrich. We'll save that for another day.
        Senator Fischer. Another day.
        Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General ``JT'' Thompson, you
    used the term ``block buy'' in reference to the 60-40 split.
    So, that begs the question, I think, to you, Ms. Chaplain--the
    Air Force has a long history of launch block buys. Can you
    describe those and what issues you saw in them, in terms of
    pricing and competition, that we should be thinking about?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Like you say, it's been a long history.
    When they were about to do their last set of block buys, we
    reported on a lot of issues, in terms of the knowledge not
    being there that they needed--pricing, cost, manifest, things
    of that nature. Those emanated from the nature of Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and how it started as a
    commercial-like acquisition, that you couldn't obtain certain
    pieces of knowledge under the contracts that they had. But,
    when you neck down to one provider, that became an issue. The
    Air Force did listen to our recommendations at the time,
    regrouped, got the knowledge it needed to make that block buy.
    But, there's always a risk, going forward, if you're going to
    be awarding fixed-price contracts with limited information, and
    you somehow end up with one provider again, that you might be
    back in that same situation, in terms of having the right
    insight.
        One concern we have with the approach, going forward, is,
    there may not be enough commercial launches for three
    providers, there might not be enough to sustain two. So, that's
    a question, given the demand on the DOD side and what
    assumptions we have about the commercial sector, and how hard
    it is just to predict what's going to happen in the commercial
    sector.
        Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Thompson--``JT''
    Thompson, give us some insight into how you're confident that
    it will support two. And then, are you also confident that,
    that these long-term blocks will be cost-competitive?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, Senator, in terms of
    why we're confident that we will be able to support two is, we
    know, essentially, the manifest that we have to support in the
    2020 through 2024 timeframe, in terms of when we would purchase
    the rockets, or when we would purchase the services--and then
    from 2022 to 2026, when those rocket services would actually
    launch. We know that we have anticipated what the costs would
    be, and we're confident that we can support two, with a 60-40
    split, through the National Security Space Launch Program.
        Senator Heinrich. In followup to that--I'm trying to
    understand something that happened last week, on March 20th.
    The Air Force released a Notice of Intent for early integration
    studies.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. All four contractors competing for launch
    services were listed, including SpaceX. Does that study reopen
    the opportunity for SpaceX or the next down-selected to compete
    for Federal funding? Or what is the impact of that early
    integration study as to all four contractors?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, the early
    integration studies are, basically, a standard operating
    procedure that we use 3 years before we award a satellite
    launch. It's, essentially, low-dollar study money for vendors
    to be able to begin working with satellite providers to
    understand the satellites that are on the manifest that year
    and what the interface requirements and technical terms are
    between the rocket and the satellite, the launch vehicle and
    the satellite vehicle.
        Senator Heinrich. Let me switch to Space RCO. Obviously,
    what we used to call Operationally Responsive Space, now Space
    RCO, was really designed by Congress to be disruptive. And, in
    fact, Congress had to fight the Department from terminating the
    office, in my view, for most of a decade, because it was so
    disruptive. Today, it seems that leaders in the Pentagon really
    value that disruption. So, Lieutenant General ``DT'' Thompson,
    I want to ask you, if Space RCO were provided the appropriate
    resources, would it be able to conduct missions, like building
    a network of small satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) with a
    mix of communications, gear, and sensors designed to detect
    hypersonic weapons?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator Heinrich,
    first of all, thank you for that question. I would say, up
    front, yes, that acquisition organization, and any other
    organization with the right resources, would be able to pursue
    that activity.
        I'd like a few minutes to talk a little bit more about
    Space RCO. First of all, as you noted, with the help of
    Congress, we have succeeded in turning the Operationally
    Responsive Space office into a true rapid acquisition
    organization. In addition, with the change
    directed by Congress, we rearchitected and reresourced the
    entire office. It is now focused on what I will call space
    superiority programs that don't have a home anywhere else in
    the acquisition enterprise today, but are urgently needed to
    help us with our defend-and-protect missions. We've got the
    people we need, we have resources. It is crafted and shaped
    after the Air Force RCO model, with an Air Force Board of
    Directors led by the Secretary of the Air Force, streamlined
    authorities, streamlined decisionmaking processes. So, it is up
    and running, effective, and helping us with our most urgent
    defend-and-protect priorities.
        But, yes, it could also take on other responsibilities, in
    that sense, if appropriately resourced.
        Senator Heinrich. Madam Chair, I apologize. Now I've abused
    my time.
        Senator Fischer. Never. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        For General ``JT'' Thompson, first of all, how many RD-180
    motors do we have in hand right now?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. I believe the number is
    12. I can confirm that, for the record, for you, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, and as amended by the fiscal
    year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAAs, authorizes the Department
    of Defense to procure up to 18 Russian RD-180 engines (via
    launch services contracts) before 31 December 2022. To date,
    the Air Force has procured 6 of these 18 authorized RD-180s
    leaving 12 available for order.

        Senator Rounds. How many do you intend to purchase?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. There were 15, but, in
    our most recent source selection, we awarded 3. So, there's 12
    remaining, out of the 18 that we're authorized for the National
    Security Space Launch Program.
        Senator Rounds. So, we had a total of 18 that we had
    authorized. You've currently used six of them. So--okay.
        General ``DT'' Thompson, with regard to the command and
    control and the need for your cyber operations to be integrated
    within this, where is the responsibility for the cybersecurity
    laid? Is that within a separate order, or are you finding that
    within the cyber mission forces that we have today?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator there's elements
    of both. First of all, inside of Air Force Space Command,
    inside of our operational squadrons today that are operating
    the satellite, there is a requirement for what we call mission
    defense teams organic to the squadrons. They live and work on
    the cyber terrain, the command-and-control systems that we use
    to command and control the satellites today. They understand
    those systems deeply, they have special cyber training and
    special understanding of the systems to be what we would call
    ``the beat cops'' and the first line of defense under an
    initiative we call Defensive Cyber Operations for Space. That's
    the Air Force Space Command responsibility.
        Then the next tier comes from the cyber mission forces that
    are organized under the Air Force today under Air Combat
    Command, but directed by U.S. Cyber Command. They take a
    broader look. They look at the threats out there. They work
    with those sorts of persistent threats, and they are also a
    resource we can bring in to help us when further expertise is
    needed or capabilities that they don't have. So, it's a layered
    approach.
        Senator Rounds. I know, within your discussion points in
    your statements, there is clear evidence of the understanding
    of the multiple domains that we have: air, land, sea, cyber,
    and space. We're prepared today, and we assume that we're in a
    position to defend within, as an example, the air domain or the
    land domain or the sea domain. We know what that means, in that
    we have weapons capabilities, we have defense capabilities.
    Offensively and defensively, we're there. When you move into
    cyber, we have offensive and defensive capabilities. What does
    it mean in space? Are we in a position where we are now
    acknowledging that, as a domain, we have to have the same types
    of capabilities, both offensive and defensive capabilities, or
    are we restricting ourselves right now to defensive
    capabilities only?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, I would
    say, very clearly, we have acknowledged, with space as a
    warfighting domain, we have a special need to defend and
    protect the capabilities we have. Because we have those
    capabilities, we are so much better at using them and
    integrating them, and they provide us such an advantage, we
    know that, first and foremost, we need to protect them, because
    an adversary is going to try and take those away from, in
    conflict.
        What I would say is, we also recognize we need to deny the
    use of space to an adversary. We will not restrict ourselves,
    and we do not restrict ourselves, to any specific instrument or
    tool or medium. We need to be able to respond at the time,
    place, and in the manner of our choosing. And we have a lot of
    instruments in that regard. Certainly, I believe that probably
    the Nation needs more discussion about what that might mean in
    the space domain itself.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Ms. Chaplain, I'm just curious. You laid out a series of
    challenges that the Air Force has with regard to the operations
    within space, some in which we're being successful, some in
    which we're not and we're recognizing, in those where we have
    shut down some systems and so forth. Could you share just a
    little bit with regard to what you see as our capabilities for
    defending our space capabilities and the challenges that we
    have today? I recognize this is not a classified setting, but
    is there a way that you can share with us what our needs are or
    what you see as areas that we're lacking today?
        Ms. Chaplain. I can share a little bit. We recently did a
    review of cyber protection for weapon systems as a whole, and
    found that, for weapons in development, they can be easily
    hacked in the testing process. A lot of that goes to pretty
    simple things, like password management, cyber hygiene,
    patching systems. And there were some space systems included in
    our review. So, while, on one hand, there's a lot of attention
    being devoted to cyber, a lot of resources, the Department
    understands the priority and has taken a lot of good steps now.
    I think there's a lot in the culture that needs to come a ways
    to just do the basic things that everybody has to do to protect
    their systems. They're not expensive, and it would put the
    Department in a much better place.
        Senator Rounds. I would note that the Navy most recently
    had a similar review, and came up with some surprising things,
    as well.
        Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. Very surprising.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I don't want to be argumentative, but I'm skeptical. I want
    somebody to explain to me why we need a Space Force,
    particularly when it's not going to include NRO, NASA, Office
    of Space Commerce (OSC), the private launch companies, or
    missile defense. I mean, it strikes me as a solution in search
    of a problem. You really can't manage this now, under the
    auspices of the Air Force? I'm not anti-, but I'm skeptical, I
    guess.
        Secretary Rapuano. So, Senator, I'll take a first shot at
    that.
        Fundamentally, we are concerned about the risk of losing
    our advantage in space.
        Senator King. So, how does an organizational change of
    moving the boxes around affect that, one way or the other?
        Secretary Rapuano. Well, I would just go further in saying
    that, historically, we have operated in space in a permissive
    environment. We have tremendous dependencies and capabilities
    that are space-based or space-enabled. We now have adversaries,
    peer-level potential adversaries, who are quite focused. In
    fact, in 2015, China and Russia reorganized their military for
    increased focus on their space capabilities. And they're
    looking at how they can negate our advantages in space.
        Senator King. Well, I certainly understand that. And
    today's headline is, ``India Successfully Tests Satellite
    Killer.'' I mean, that's this morning. I understand the change
    in the dynamic and offensive and defensive capabilities. I just
    don't understand how creating a new box with a new name within
    the Air Force increases our ability to deal with these issues.
    That's what I'm troubled by. I understand the challenge, and I
    understand the importance of meeting it, but this is not
    comprehensive. There's a lot of the space infrastructure that's
    not included in this new entity.
        Perhaps I ought to ask your office. What does this gain us,
    in terms of capability? It just seems to me it's drawing new
    boxes and having new people.
        Ms. Chaplain. Sure. I think there's two sides to it. One is
    the threat side and needing to really focus people on that and
    prioritize it.
        Senator King. Are we not focused now? The Air Force isn't
    paying attention to this now?
        Ms. Chaplain. It's part of U.S. Strategic Command's
    (STRATCOM) mission to defend space, and the person running that
    mission has a lot of other priorities. So, there's one thought
    to segment space in the defense of space to one individual, one
    organization. The other thought is just on the acquisition
    side. What we reported on is, there are a lot of players
    involved in space, there's a lot of fragmentation, and you find
    that really affects the ability to get capability out quickly.
    There seems to be a lot of disconnects that happen just because
    of the way----
        Senator King. But, it seems to me that's a management
    challenge. Do you have an estimate of the incremental cost of
    creating this entity, over and above current expenditures for
    all of these purposes?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yeah, I think DOD has done its cost estimate.
        Senator King. What's the number?
        Secretary Rapuano. So, the first year of the Space Force
    would be $72 million. At the end of the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP), at the end of fiscal year 2024, it would be up
    to $500 million annually. You're talking about $2 billion total
    over the next 5 years.
        Senator King. So, $500 million a year, half a billion
    dollars a year, in organizational change. I mean, are you
    coming before us, saying, ``We can't manage this now, and we
    need to spend half a billion dollars a year''? You understand
    what I'm asking, I'm sure. Convince me that this makes some
    sense, that it's worth $500 million a year.
        Secretary Rapuano. Again, the transition from operating in
    space in a permissive environment, with all of the capabilities
    and dependencies, to a warfighting environment really requires
    a focused approach. We're doing it at three legs of the triad,
    essentially. The first is the U.S. Space Command. That's the
    operational employment of the Joint Force on a day-to-day
    basis.
        Senator King. Is that going to go away under this proposal?
        Secretary Rapuano. No. In fact, it was recently directed by
    the President, and the confirmation of the Commander of U.S.
    Space Command is pending with the Senate. I believe it arrived
    this week. So, that's the employment of the force.
        The critical organize, train, and equip component is the
    service component. And that really is the doctrine, the
    training, the plans, the personnel development. It is the
    unified and singular focus on space as a warfighting domain
    that is very difficult to achieve unless you have that unified,
    sole responsibility and custody----
        Senator King. I'm out of time, but I--I'd appreciate it if
    you could supply, for the record, a 1- or 2-page justification
    for the incremental cost of the organizational change, and
    outline what the tangible benefits will be of this change.
        Secretary Rapuano. Yes, I will, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Rapuano. The establishment of the Space Force
    would be phased over five years--fiscal year 2020 to fiscal
    year 2024. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests
    $72.4 million of initial resources necessary to establish a
    Space Force headquarters with approximately 200 personnel.
    Establishing a sixth branch of our military with dedicated
    leadership will elevate, unify, and focus the development of
    space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future
    threats; institutionalize advocacy of space priorities; and
    further build space warfighting culture.
        Over the next five years, the Department would methodically
    grow the Space Force. The total additional cost growth over
    those five years is estimated to be less than $2 billion, or
    approximately 0.05 percent of the DOD budget for the same
    period. During that time, as missions are transferred to the
    Space Force, existing personnel and budget authority would
    transfer into the Space Force from the other Military Services.
    By the end of the transition period, more than 95 percent of
    the Space Force annual budget is estimated to consist of
    resources that would have been transferred from existing DOD
    budget accounts, along with an estimated 15,000 transferred
    personnel.
        Additional resources would be dedicated to building out the
    Space Force headquarters and establishing and maintaining
    investments in space-specific personnel development, including
    space training and education centers, a warfare center for
    space, a space personnel center, and a space doctrine
    development center. These functions would further develop the
    unique expertise, culture, and ethos necessary for the complex
    warfighting domain of space. Once the Space Force is fully
    established, these additive costs are estimated to be $500
    million annually, which would represent approximately 0.07
    percent of the DOD annual budget. A breakdown of the estimated
    additive costs is as follows:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          $ in Millions
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Estimated Additive Funding..............                     $500

      Headquarters................................                     $300
      Education and Training......................                     $110
      Warfare Center for Space....................                      $20
      Space Personnel Center......................                      $50
      Doctrine Development Center.................                      $20
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Through the organizational change of standing up a Space
    Force, the Department will experience many tangible benefits.
    First, a space training and education center would provide
    focused military education for space specialists. Next, a
    warfare center for space would help to develop the tactics,
    techniques, and procedures for space operations in a contested
    domain. A space personnel center would ensure that our space
    cadre is recruited, retained, and managed to develop the skills
    we need in a space-focused force. Lastly, a space doctrine
    development center would elevate space doctrine for a distinct
    warfighting domain on par with air, land, and maritime
    doctrine. All of these investments would have significant
    impacts on ensuring we are prepared to maintain our leadership
    and to defend our interests in space.

        Senator King. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. General Thompson, at one point, you looked
    like you wanted to jump into this conversation. I think Senator
    King's looking for an answer, if you'd like to respond.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Thank you, Madam
    Chairwoman.
        Senator King, I would like to add a little bit, if I can.
    Certainly, there are aspects of the need to fix some of the
    problems when you talk about the number of organizations and
    agencies and activities inside the Department today that are
    focused on acquisition, that are focused on architecture, and
    focused on some of them. We certainly need to unify those, give
    them the right purpose and synchronization and direction in a
    unifying step.
        The second is, as Secretary Rapuano mentioned, the specific
    focus of a service staff whose responsibility is to organize
    the forces, train them, equip them, and present them for the
    warfighting purpose that, in this case the U.S. Space Command,
    would operate.
        But, I would also look at it as not just a ``Are we trying
    to fix a problem?'' It's a question of, ``Is the Nation
    prepared? And are we organized to accept and take on the
    challenge that comes with space as a warfighting domain?'' And
    I would use as an example, 1947 and the formation of the United
    States Air Force. The War Department and the Army had done a
    tremendous job creating air capabilities that won World War
    II--strategic bombardment, air superiority, tactical support,
    and military transport. No one could argue that the War
    Department had not done a tremendous job in creating a space
    arm, but the Nation decided that, at that time, as we looked to
    the future, as the needs and the requirements and expectations
    that we expected of airpower, it needed a separate service, it
    needed a proponent, it needed a four-star advocate on the
    equivalent scale with the other Services. I would argue, now's
    the opportunity for the Nation to look at that, have that
    conversation, and decide, if we're in a similar position, to
    ensure that we're organized and structured appropriately to
    meet the challenges of the future. So, it's not just a matter
    of, ``Are we trying to fix problems?'' Is this the right
    structure for the Nation, going forward, to address these
    challenges?
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, which nation's armed forces
    depend most on space?
        Secretary Rapuano. So, the United States leverages space
    more than any country in the world. Our partners and allies,
    working with us, in terms of those alliances and partnerships,
    have their own developed capabilities, and we leverage and use
    them to force-multiply our capabilities. So, the Five Eyes--
    France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States--and
    a number of other partners have space-based capabilities, as
    well. The South Koreans have some space capability. And it's
    multiplying. And, as noted earlier, the commercial sector has
    exploded, in terms of scope and scale of the activities and the
    speed of the development of capabilities. So, you're seeing a
    proliferation of that technology now spreading much more
    rapidly than ever before.
        Senator Cotton. So, it's all good with our allies, but,
    ultimately, that comes back to the central position that space
    plays a role in the way we fight wars. What about our
    adversaries, Russia and China? How dependent are they upon
    space for their armed forces?
        Secretary Rapuano. China has expanded by orders of
    magnitude. The Russians have grabbed back, they have newly
    invested in space, and have developed some relatively exquisite
    capabilities. But, the scale of the Chinese investment is the
    lead, in terms of everyone else out there, including Russia.
    They have more rocket launches this year than the United
    States. They're the lead rocket-launch nation in the world.
        Senator Cotton. How much of that Chinese investment is
    designed specifically to counteract the advantage that we had
    enjoyed in space over the years?
        Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned that they are making
    significant investments to do that.
        Senator Cotton. There's no way to avoid space being central
    to our way of war, is there? I mean, some of it is a legacy
    based on our technological advantages, going back to the early
    days of the space era, but it's also just the fact that we live
    in the new world, and they all live in Eurasia, and we have to
    project power across a global scale, which depends on space.
    Secondarily, we have made the choice, over the last 30-to-35
    years, to fight information-centric warfare. I don't just mean
    long-range precision strikes or fancy cyberattacks. What does
    it mean to a private on the ground with a rifle if we lose
    dominance in space?
        Secretary Rapuano. It's pivotal. Our targeting, our
    communications, positioning, timing, location for GPS, and then
    all of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    capabilities, in terms of surveillance and reconnaissance that
    we get from space, realtime situational awareness of
    adversaries' locations and activities. To lose those
    capabilities would be very significant. And that is why we are
    so focused on defending and protecting them.
        Senator Cotton. Let's talk about defending them. Where are
    we today versus, say, where we were a year ago in our space
    assets? Are we more or less vulnerable to, say, a kinetic
    strike from an anti-satellite missile?
        Secretary Rapuano. So, we are improving our capabilities
    from investments that started several years ago. In fact, even
    late in the Obama Administration, there were some significant
    investments, as you're aware, from this committee and others.
    In terms of the details of those activities, we could discuss
    that in a closed hearing.
        Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to cyberattack,
    both in orbit and on the ground?
        Secretary Rapuano. As noted earlier, we're very focused on
    the cyber piece, so we don't know what we don't know, in some
    respects, in terms of what an adversary may be doing, but we
    are hardening the entry points, and there are fewer entry
    points in space--some space systems versus other systems that
    are more connected and networked. We're making progress there.
    But, it's a priority, and we are continuing to approach it
    quite urgently.
        Senator Cotton. More or less vulnerable to the kind of
    laser attacks that might dazzle or destroy a satellite system?
        Secretary Rapuano. We are concerned about ground-based
    effects on satellites, and we are seeing potential adversaries
    invest in them.
        Senator Cotton. I raise these questions knowing that you
    can't get into the greatest detail in this open forum, but just
    to highlight the vulnerabilities of our space systems, both our
    sensors, but also the critical systems on which everyone in our
    military depends, to include that private out on the ground. We
    may not want to have a space race. We may not want to weaponize
    space or have weapons in space. But, if our adversaries are
    competing there, we don't really get a choice whether we
    compete. We only get a choice whether we win or lose.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Secretary Rapuano. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you all for being here. Sorry, I was in another
    committee meeting before I got here, so I think this was
    covered, but I'm not sure. I wanted to ask.
        General John Thompson, I know there are two acquisition
    programs and reforms as part of the Space and Missile Systems
    Center. I think you mentioned 65 percent savings in the
    timeline that you laid out, which sounded good on the surface.
    Was that correct, in your statement?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, I'm sorry, could I
    ask you to rephrase the question?
        Senator Manchin. The 65 percent savings in timeline which
    was laid out----
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Oh, sure. Sure. Thank you
    very much.
        Senator Manchin. Okay.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. So, what you're referring
    to is a rearchitecture that we've done to the Space and Missile
    Systems Center, called the SMC 2.0. When I arrived at SMC,
    about 2 years ago, what I found was a bunch of outstanding
    people that really knew the space acquisition business, but
    they were organized very hierarchically and in stovepipes by
    mission area. There was very little crosstalk among major
    programs of record. Decisions took a long time to make, because
    the decision packages had to fight their way up through the
    staff.
        What we have entertained now is an SMC 2.0 construct, which
    turns our--what I would refer to as an Industrial Age business-
    model kind of organization into a new, modern corporation,
    something like that you might see in Silicon Valley. So, a much
    flatter organization. We've delegated authority down to senior
    civilians and senior military officers who know what they're
    doing. We've added three new program executive officers, in
    addition to me, and put them closer to the program offices so
    that they can make decisions faster. Making decisions faster--
    in many cases, what we've seen on major program-of-record
    milestone decisions is, we've been able to save 60 to 70
    percent of the time required by eliminating layers of the
    bureaucracy and getting those decisionmakers closer to the
    program offices.
        Senator Manchin. Any one of you all--with so many agencies
    out there, I'm concerned, because, on the cyber end of it,
    espionage and things that are happening, there are so many
    smaller contractors. We don't seem to have good oversight or
    good controls of the main contract with its security clearances
    and also the programs it is using. That's where I think an
    awful lot of espionage has gone on, and a lot of cybertheft is
    going on. And I don't see anybody changing that or going after
    that total control. If you have an RFP, and you have a main
    contractor, that person should be held accountable and
    responsible for anybody and everybody they bring onboard. And
    we're finding that's not the case.
        Secretary Rapuano. Senator, thank you for that question.
        We are highly focused on the defense industrial base, all
    of those companies who support the development of Department of
    Defense----
        Senator Manchin. I understand. We found out that there
    could be four or five subcontractors all from the Department of
    Defense that go in to the main contractor. By the time that
    contractor goes down to subcontractors, they're all trying to
    protect their domain to give them a competitive edge and make
    money. It's all fine. But, you want to know why China's been
    able to ramp up so quick? This is loosey-goosey down here. They
    can almost pick up anything, and no one's tightening that up.
        Secretary Rapuano. We are in the process of tightening that
    up. And part of that are the contract requirements that need to
    be modified to ensure that those who are performing on DOD
    contracts are required by the contract stipulations to ensure
    that cybersecurity----
        Senator Manchin. I'm told that some of the smaller
    subcontractors don't have the wherewithals. So, the prime
    should be held totally responsible to make sure that they have
    the wherewithals, or they don't work with the subcontractor
    that doesn't. Nobody's holding anybody accountable, because the
    prime can say, ``That's a subcontract,'' or, ``That was subbed
    out to another sub.'' Does that make sense?
        Secretary Rapuano. That is part of the challenge.
    Absolutely.
        Senator Manchin. You all do recognize that that's a big
    problem.
        You recognize that China's rapid advancement has been
    because they've been able to tap into some of our most
    strategic and confidential and high-security information,
    they've been able to get fairly rapidly, fairly easily?
        Secretary Rapuano. We see it as a vulnerability, and we are
    focused on addressing it.
        Senator Manchin. Anybody else want to comment on this?
    Please do.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, that is a
    fantastic question, and we agree 100 percent with you.
        Sir, General ``DT'' Thompson and I happen to work with
    General ``Jay'' Raymond, who is the current Air Force Space
    Command Commander, and he has made it abundantly clear, to both
    ``DT'' and me, in a very forceful manner, that the situation
    that you state is unsatisfactory. We have a number of
    initiatives underway to battle exfiltrations of our weapon
    systems data from our cleared defense contractors. And holding
    the primes accountable to ensure that their subs, whether
    they're one level down, two levels down, or three levels down,
    is one of the principal----
        Senator Manchin. We're finding out that some of the primes
    have no idea, third and fourth and fifth in the chain, who they
    are.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Sir, in the acquisition
    domain, specifically in the space portfolio, we are working
    after that. I would ask you to let me submit something in the
    record that gives you the details of that plan.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has not been
    made aware of classified weapon system information being
    compromised by foreign adversaries. Controlled unclassified
    information (CUI) on space mission systems is being exfiltrated
    from Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs) at an alarming rate.
    CDC networks tend to be easily breached permitting propagation
    and exfiltration of data relating to the development and
    operation of space mission systems. Contracts awarded before
    November 2016 generally do not include clauses stipulating:
    encryption of DOD information; network traffic monitoring;
    prompt system patching; no posting of DOD information to public
    websites; etc. Newer contracts conform with the more recent
    Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System (DFARS) clause
    for cybersecurity compliance and National Institute of
    Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and safeguarding
    requirements for CUI, but these minimums may not be sufficient
    to safeguard information. Recent DFARS clauses establish the
    minimum standard for basic cybersecurity requirements, but SMC
    is taking additional, multiple steps to better secure our
    controlled unclassified information on cleared defense
    contractors' networks. To quickly attack this issue, SMC hired
    an experienced Federally Funded Research and Development Center
    (FFRDC) to rapidly scan and establish exposure levels for three
    prioritized weapon systems: Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Space Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) and to develop a methodology to assess
    the remainder of SMC's portfolio of contracts. The most
    significant takeaway is the need to mandate cybersecurity
    requirements above existing Defense Federal Acquisition
    Regulation Supplements and information management control plans
    from prime to subcontractors and specify these requirements in
    contract language for all future contracts. Working with the
    Air Force Inspector General and the Air Force Office of Special
    Investigations, SMC is conducting compliance audits to identify
    industry best practices to better strengthen corporate networks
    where CUI is stored or processed. With assistance from the
    Defense Cyber Crime Center, SMC will begin advanced adversary
    emulation to assess the vulnerability of CDC networks and
    identify weaknesses in corporate cyber security posture. SMC
    continues to investigate ways to cooperatively and proactively
    monitor CDC networks where our CUI will exist in an effort to
    shorten the response time from compromise to recovery. Knowing
    that no network will ever be 100 percent secure, SMC is
    implementing advanced data obfuscation on every future contract
    to further complicate and stress adversaries' cyber activities.
    To prevent our CUI riding on weak CDC networks, SMC is testing
    requiring companies to submit a vulnerability scan of their
    network with their responses to our Request for Proposals.
    Finally, SMC is implementing changes to incentive plans to
    encourage CDCs to be more proactive in their cyber security
    efforts, and, if positive incentives do not work, SMC will
    explore negative incentives. SMC understands the importance of
    continuing to protect sensitive weapon system information on
    cleared defense contractors' information systems. We are
    working with industry partners and across the Air Force and
    Department of Defense to ensure we can adapt to threats now and
    into the future. We look forward to working with Congress as we
    work to ensure our sensitive data and our weapons systems are
    protected from adversary threats.

        Senator Manchin. Happy to.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Then, perhaps, if you're
    interested, we could go to another forum and talk about it in
    classified setting.
        Senator Manchin. Senator Rounds and myself have a
    Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, and we're getting into
    procurement. This is a big thing with us right now, because you
    just have to look back not that far to find out how China and
    others have been so successful at rapidly deploying and getting
    up to speed at a much quicker rate. You know, they say, except
    for the second engine, their F-35 mimics ours to a tee. There's
    no way to do that, except being able to get all the pertinent
    information needed.
        Madam Chairman, we just have a terrific problem, here. And
    it goes into procurement, and it goes all the way down the
    chain. We don't hold the prime, which is the big boy
    accountable--and a subcontractor does not get a contract from
    them, because they're not large enough to do it on their own,
    so they end up being a sub, and they're held hostage by the
    prime. The prime is not held accountable to the sub and what
    the sub's doing and how it secures its systems. It goes down to
    second, third, and four tier, you've really got a problem. And
    I think they realize it. It's been out there for quite some
    time. With your Subcommittee and our Subcommittee working
    together, hopefully we can make some major changes.
        Senator Fischer. Hopefully, General Thompson will get that
    information to you and to all of us, Senator Manchin, and then
    maybe we can follow up and do a classified so we can get in
    more to the details on it, if that would be helpful.
        Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to something you said to
    Senator Cotton. You said that China has expanded its
    capabilities in space by orders of magnitude. I just wanted to
    dig into that a little bit more. The Defense Intelligence
    Agency (DIA) produced an unclassified report this past January,
    ``Challenges to Space Security,'' in which it described a
    number of disturbing patterns of our competitors. China, it
    appears, is directing an Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
    Organization. I'd note that the rotating membership includes
    nations like Iran and Pakistan. Russia, this report says, has
    the largest foreign network of ground-based optical space
    surveillance sensors in its Keldysh Institute of Applied
    Mathematics, coordinates sensor tasking and fuses information
    from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors on 40
    observatories spread across 16 countries. Is it fair to say
    that China and Russia have a coordinated international effort
    to threaten the United States in and from space?
        Secretary Rapuano. With regard to complicity between China
    and Russia, less clear, but, in terms of the objectives of
    individually, China and Russia, absolutely. They are looking to
    asymmetrically undermine our space capabilities.
        Senator Hawley. This is a top priority for them, is it fair
    to say?
        Secretary Rapuano. Fair to say.
        Senator Hawley. The expenditures that you were detailing
    earlier, both from the Chinese and the Russian Government side,
    show a renewed emphasis for both of them on a modern-day space
    race. Is that fair to say?
        Secretary Rapuano. That is fair.
        Senator Hawley. Let me come back to something you said to
    Senator King. You were talking about the triad to approach this
    issue. You talked about U.S. Space Command, you talked about
    the service component. You didn't get to the third piece.
        Secretary Rapuano. Yes, thank you. Thank you for asking.
        The third piece is really about the development. And that's
    where the space development piece comes in, in terms of SDA. It
    is about, really, leveraging innovation, it's about leveraging
    commercial practices and capabilities that are developed on the
    commercial side, and it's really looking at the
    transformational capability set. So, one of the areas that SDA
    will be focused on is a massively distributed sensor
    communications architecture in LEO to be more resilient,
    degrade more gracefully under attack, and provide us more
    reliability, as well as reconstitution if we lose assets. That
    would be a critical capability fill, in terms of operating in a
    warfighting environment, where we have adversaries who are
    looking to get at our assets.
        Senator Hawley. Understood. Let me just ask you a budget
    question. Do you think your request for a 56 percent increase
    in the space situational awareness part of the budget is
    sufficient to meet the threat that we're seeing from our
    adversaries?
        Secretary Rapuano. We are comfortable with the President's
    $14 billion request for the next fiscal year. We believe that
    it covers our major requirement areas.
        Senator Hawley. General David Thompson, let me ask you
    about another piece of the budget. It includes a request for a
    115 percent increase in science and technology, which seems
    very wise, given the scale of the challenge that we're facing.
    I just wonder, Who have been your biggest partners in this
    effort, particularly in the research, private-sector, and
    startup communities?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. So, Senator, thank you.
    I would say right now what we're trying to focus on most is
    recognizing and understanding what's out in the commercial
    sector, the innovation that's there in the commercial market,
    the emerging commercial market. There are lots of companies
    there that are looking at, for example, large-scale
    constellations that might be fielded cheaply, with tremendous
    capability.
        So, we're currently looking for a couple of opportunities.
    One is the technology that goes with a low-cost space
    capability, the actual mission performance, whether it be
    remote sensing or it be satellite communications or things like
    that, but the third thing we're looking at is opportunities to
    partner with them for things like hosted payloads and other
    things that we might be able to use mission capability with.
    So, it's especially focused on the investment you see in the
    burgeoning commercial space sector.
        Senator Hawley. Have you encountered any particular
    difficulties in working with the private sector along these
    lines?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. We have not. They are
    certainly welcome and open to investment. Really, what is the
    challenge on our part is twofold. First is picking the right
    places to invest for strategic purposes. Then, as you talked
    about, there is certainly an investment there, but there are
    always more opportunities and needs than there are investment
    dollars. So, making smart use of our investment dollar.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Senator, just as a quick
    addition to that, we've tried to create lower boundaries for
    entry for a lot of our commercial partners, our nondefense-
    oriented, nontraditional partners that are bringing new,
    innovative things to the table. One of our most successful
    vehicles is called the Space Enterprise Consortium. It's a
    consortium where we've invited and had join about 270 different
    contractors, small businesses, and large businesses. About 80
    percent of them are nontraditional--in other words,
    commercial--space companies. We've been able to utilize that
    vehicle to do a lot of prototyping. We have over $200 million
    on contract for 37 different space prototyping efforts, and
    many of those--in fact, most of those--have a nontraditional
    component to them. So, we're reaching out to the private
    sector, looking for those innovative opportunities, going into
    the future.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        General Thompson, I'm going to follow up with a question I
    was going to ask you earlier. We are going to do a second
    round, here.
        The Air Force has really touted its development of the next
    generation of infrared early-warning satellites as an example
    of its ability to rapidly acquire space capabilities in
    response to those warfighting demands. When announcing changes
    to the program last year, the Air Force stated its intention to
    cut 4 years off the procurement process. Can you talk about the
    progress you've made in meeting that ambitious goal?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, relative to the
    help that the Congress has provided us, the rapid prototyping
    authorities that we receive through section 804 have been a
    godsend. Using those rapid prototyping authorities from section
    804, we were able to put both layers, if you will, of our Next-
    Generation Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) on contract
    within 6 months, saving at least a year of time, from the
    standpoint of what we'd have had to do if we were conducting a
    traditional source selection.
        The process that we went through was simple, but also
    rigorous. In other words, we don't want to lose the oversight
    in our section 804 prototyping efforts, similar to what Ms.
    Chaplain said earlier. We want to make sure that the rigor and
    the robustness of the oversight that we're providing our
    contractors is there from the get-go. We also want to make sure
    that our board of directors, the Congress, is kept fully
    apprised of what we're doing in our section 804 rapid-
    prototyping endeavors.
        On Next-Gen OPIR, we have a quarterly requirement to come
    over here. And I will tell you right now, if you want us to
    come more often than that, we will. We have triennial reports
    that we're submitting on all of our section 804s, including
    Next-Gen OPIR, and our goal, from Dr. Will Roper, who is the
    service acquisition executive, is to offer so much transparency
    to the Hill on our 804 programs that you'll actually ask us,
    ``Why are you doing this by the DOD 5000 series? We want some
    more of that 804 kind of execution.''
        Senator Fischer. Yeah. Well, I appreciate your attention to
    the OPIR. It's an extremely important program, and I'm happy to
    see that it's advancing. Do you believe that the budget that's
    been presented is going to support that aggressive schedule
    that you're on right now?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Chairman, the requirement
    is, for 2025, to have an initial launch capability. We
    originally envisioned being able to go as fast as 2023.
    However, the costs in the budget were just not able to make us
    to that gold-medal level. So, we still consider the fact that
    we've accelerated the program a little over 2 years, at this
    point, and we believe that the fiscal year 2020 budget and out
    years fully supports that. However, there are two above-
    threshold reprogrammings that we have been trying to work
    through the Department and over here on the Hill, one for
    fiscal year 2018 and one for fiscal year 2019. Obviously, we
    missed the President's budget before we had the requirement to
    accelerate to 2025. So, we're still looking for about $600
    million worth of above-threshold reprogrammings that we're
    working very closely on with the Department and the Hill. The
    fiscal year 2018 Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) was
    approved by the Hill. Thank you for that. But, not all the
    sources were. So, we're trying to get the sources in line, and
    then a $400 million above-threshold reprogramming in 2019 is
    still required to meet the 2025 need date.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        Ms. Chaplain, I understand that the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed an assessment of
    the Department's space acquisition workforce, and see that some
    of your findings are described in your testimony. If you could
    just, in the remaining time, talk a little bit about the
    difficulty in tracking and identifying acquisition
    professionals working on space programs? This isn't really a
    clear and distinct group of people, is it? You kind of
    referenced that in your opening remarks.
        Ms. Chaplain. Right. I think the Department's pretty good
    at tracking acquisition professionals in certain lines of
    effort, like program management, and certain types of
    engineering. What the Department as a whole doesn't do is track
    acquisition professionals tied to certain missions, like space.
    So, the fact that they couldn't do this for space isn't
    unusual. It's sort of an issue across the Department. But, we
    believe that maybe we do want to add some fields to the
    databases that track people so that we can help identify who is
    in space, especially if we're going to move together some
    organizations.
        Also in our review, we came across comments and concerns
    about gaps in expertise in certain areas for space, mostly in
    the technical things, and trying to keep people on for long
    periods of time and get professionals in at the mid-level.
    Those are persistent concerns that we've reported on over the
    years. I know there's been a lot of effort to strengthen the
    workforce, but it's still an issue for space.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. One of you mentioned space situational
    awareness a few minutes ago, and that, in conjunction with the
    open-source reporting that Senator King mentioned about India
    and its ASAT test today, got me thinking: I think it was 2007
    when we went through the initial Chinese effort at this, that
    scattered junk all over low-Earth orbit and made a mess for
    everyone. What do we know at this point that you can share in
    this environment on the Indian story? More importantly, do we
    need some sort of international structure--a space code of
    conduct, for example--to make sure that, if nations are going
    to test, they're going to do it in a way that doesn't create
    the kind of enormous problems, which led, in many cases, to the
    kind of funding that we have to put into space situational
    awareness today?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator Heinrich, thank
    you.
        I'll talk to you a little bit about the Indian ASAT test
    that did occur this morning. First of all, we were aware that
    it was coming, because of some flight bans that India had
    announced and some information they had published previously.
    But, the launch occurred at 1:39 a.m., Eastern Time. First of
    all, let me say clearly, it was detected and characterized and
    reported by Air Force systems--missile warning systems and our
    airmen at Buckley Air Force Base.
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Immediately after the
    ASAT struck the target vehicle--the Joint Space Operation
    Center and the Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron began
    collecting information about the breakup of the vehicle.
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Currently, they're
    tracking about 270 different objects in the debris field.
    Likely, that number is going to grow as the debris field
    spreads out and we collect more sensor information.
        Senator Heinrich. Do we know what the elevation of that
    debris field was at the breakup?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Senator, we do, but I'm
    going to ask to pass that in different channels. I'm not
    convinced I know that that's an unclassified fact.
        Senator Heinrich. Okay.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. But, we do know the
    altitude at which it occurred. We immediately started providing
    public notice on our Space Track website, and will provide
    direct notification to satellite operators if those satellites
    are under threat. I will also say, at this point in time, the
    International Space Station is not at risk. That's another
    thing that we do, and provide warning routinely. But, that's
    just an example of how no other nation, no other military
    force, no other civil or other body could have detected,
    characterized, and begun warning and providing the world the
    way we do with Air Force and other joint assets. So, that
    represents a tremendous capability, but we have more investment
    to turn that from what I'll call a matter of routine
    spaceflight safety approach to searching and finding and
    detecting threats who are attempting to hide from us, as well.
        Senator Heinrich. Do you want to touch on the issue of
    whether or not we need to engage in some sort of multilateral
    effort to ensure that someone doesn't make the kind of mistake
    that China made back in 2007? Do we need some parameters where
    people agree to, for example, not test at very high altitudes?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. I would say--certainly,
    in a broad sense. And this will be a specific example. There's
    a lot of work to do with the rest of the world on what are
    established norms of behavior, rules of engagement, and the
    code of conduct in space. And I know that's a matter that the
    State Department and the Department of Defense, led by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is working with the
    rest of the world. It's certainly a need that we all need to
    address.
        I don't know if Mr. Rapuano wants to add more in that
    regard, but it's a need.
        Secretary Rapuano. We are involved with discussions
    internationally, and we have participated in nonbinding
    confidence-building measures associated with activities in
    space. We are certainly proponents of safe and sustainable
    space and minimization of space debris. So, that is an active
    and ongoing conversation.
        Senator Heinrich. Okay.
        I'm getting close to the end, here. And given that I went
    over earlier, I'm not going to make that mistake twice. So,
    thank you Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. I just want to reiterate the point that
    Senator Manchin was making. I've been in numerous hearings, and
    every single Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Secretary of State,
    whoever, is sitting where you're sitting, when you say, ``How's
    your cyber protection?'' says, ``We're good. We're safe.'' None
    of them know that. So, I want to urge you, if you go to one of
    your prime contractors and say, ``How's it going?'' or if you
    get a contractual assurance, don't believe it. My suggestion is
    Red Teaming them. There's nothing like a skull and crossbones
    that appears on the CEO's computer screen that says,
    ``Congratulations, you've been hacked by the U.S. Air Force.
    Your award is the termination of your contract.'' I mean, we've
    got to be aggressive about this, because, to accept assurances
    everybody gives you those assurances. They don't really know,
    and they don't know until they've been tested. And you have the
    capability of doing that. The Pentagon has done bug bounty
    programs and Red Teams. I urge you to do this.
        The intellectual property theft via subcontractors, as
    Senator Manchin was talking about, is the new frontier. It just
    came up this morning in a hearing with the Navy. We've had it
    with Secretaries of State. We've had it with CEOs of utilities.
    The Wall Street Journal just had a major story about a third-
    generation sub for a utility, who was a headhunter or
    something, and got up into the control system of the utility.
    So, I urge you to not take assurances, but to be aggressive
    about this. I think a Red Team approach is one that could,
    maybe, put the fear in them.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
        I'd like thank my colleagues for their attendance and their
    good questions today, and thank the panel for the information
    you've provided. If Members do have questions, I hope that you
    will respond in writing and be able to get those to us in a
    timely manner.
        With that, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                  space force
        1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the House proposed a Space
    Force or Corps in its Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) modeled after the Marine Corps. Do you agree that the Space
    Force proposal submitted with the President's budget is pretty close to
    what was proposed by the House in 2017?
        Secretary Rapuano. Both the Department's Space Force proposal and
    the House proposal would have established a sixth branch of the Armed
    Forces within the Department of the Air Force. The Department's
    proposal includes an Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space to
    provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space Force. It also
    consolidates existing DOD space forces from across the Air Force, Army,
    and Navy. While DOD has identified a number of technical legislative
    changes needed for the new Space Force to function properly, the major
    concept is generally the same in both the DOD and House proposals to
    establish a new Armed Force within the Department of the Air Force.

        2. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what has changed since when
    Secretary Mattis, Secretary Wilson and Chairman Dunford opposed the
    idea of a Space Force or Space Corps the first time?
        Secretary Rapuano. Mindsets across the Department, including my
    own, shifted when we dug deeper into this problem. Over the last nine
    months, we have put a tremendous amount of effort and analytical rigor
    into understanding the current and future risks to our space missions
    and capabilities, and analyzed options in order to identify the most
    effective solution to address these problems. We have come to more
    fully appreciate the degree to which the world is changing and the
    Department must adapt accordingly in order to maintain U.S. leadership
    in space.

        3. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, if
    established, the total Space Force Active Duty would be roughly 10,500.
    Compare that to the Army, which has roughly 476,000 Active Duty
    members. Does it make sense to have an entire Service with that few
    Active Duty members?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. If enacted by Congress, the
    initial size of the Space Force would be 15,000 to 20,000 people, with
    the vast majority of initial Space Force resources--personnel and
    budget authority--transferred from the existing Military Services.
    Space is a unique operating environment with special needs and
    requirements; we believe it best served by a dedicated branch of
    service inside the Department of the Air Force. I believe the DOD
    proposal is sized to maximize warfighting capacity and advocacy for
    space while minimizing bureaucracy. That said, it is important to note
    this will be an ongoing process as the new ``protect and defend''
    missions will grow the U.S. Space Force over time. While applying the
    inherent advantages of a separate service inside the national security
    enterprise, we also have the opportunity to design it from a 21st
    Century perspective.

        4. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, when adding civilians and
    headquarters, the Space Force would have a total of around 16,000
    people. In terms of overhead, how does this compare to other
    organizations and Services?
        Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the personnel requirements for a
    Space Force. However, in May 2019, the Congressional Budget Office
    reported on its assessment of the personnel requirements and costs
    associated with standing up new DOD space organizations, including a
    military service within the Department of the Air Force. \1\ In its
    assessment, the Congressional Budget Office made comparisons to other
    military organizations and estimated a new space service could include
    27,000 to 29,700 personnel (based on full time equivalent positions)--
    22,900 of these positions (10,800 for space operations and 12,100 for
    support functions like management, acquisitions, and training) would
    transfer from existing space-related positions, and an additional 4,100
    to 6,800 positions would be new for overhead and management. By
    contrast, according to an Office of Personnel Management website, the
    largest federal agencies, including the military departments, have more
    than 150,000 civilian personnel.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Congressional Budget Office, The Personnel Requirements and
    Costs of New Military Space Organizations, https://www.cbo.gov/
    publication/55178, (Washington, DC: May 2019).

        5. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the legislative proposal to
    stand up the Space Force will give the Department authority to transfer
    civilian employees on a ``on a voluntary or involuntary basis'' and
    ``is not subject to any other provision of law that provides appellate
    rights or procedures for civilian employees of the Department of
    Defense.'' This authority seems overly broad. How are you going to be
    able to attract and retain a workforce if its work conditions are dealt
    with in such an arbitrary way?
        Secretary Rapuano. We would like to work with Congress on the right
    personnel authorities to meet our needs. The Space Force would require
    highly technical talent. Our objective was to provide flexibility and
    enable greater streamlining and competitiveness with the private
    sector. To that end, the Department has seen great success with Title
    10 excepted service alternate personnel systems, including the ability
    to attract and retain its workforce while upholding merit system
    principles and safeguarding against prohibited personnel practices. The
    precise system we proposed was modeled on the Defense Civilian
    Intelligence Personnel System used by the National Reconnaissance
    Office and other DOD intelligence agencies. We can adapt this proven
    model to the Space Force. Transfers of civilian personnel would not
    occur arbitrarily. Civilian employees would transfer in place to the
    Space Force with the realignment of the mission and billet to which the
    employee was assigned, with no loss in pay. Employees could also
    volunteer to transfer to vacant Space Force excepted service positions
    for which they qualify.
     rocket systems launch program--tactically responsive launch operations
        6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, the
    fiscal year 2019 budget included multiple initiatives to improve space
    resilience, including a new dedicated Air Force procurement line for
    small launch services called the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP).
    Can you speak to how the Air Force is leveraging tactically responsive
    capabilities for contingency small launch requirements, including
    expanding these capabilities to include more diverse payload
    configurations and launch systems, including air-launched space launch?
        Secretary Rapuano. The Department of Defense is exploring new space
    launch capabilities, such as the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP),
    to ensure access to space and improve the resilience of our space
    architecture. Although I defer to the Air Force on the specifics of
    RSLP, the Department supports flexible and fast acquisition programs to
    supplement our more traditional National Security Space Launch (NSSL)
    programs.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The RSLP funding identified in
    fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental
    satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch
    program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program
    with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare
    services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space
    vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions,
    AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple
    emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019,
    Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three
    technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson The RSLP funding identified in
    fiscal year 2019 is planned to deliver a variety of small experimental
    satellites in support of the Space Test Program (STP). The small launch
    program complements the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program
    with multiple options to acquire dedicated spacelift and rideshare
    services for developmental, demonstration, and small operational space
    vehicles. In the course of providing space access for these missions,
    AFSPC is leveraging a rapid acquisition approach across multiple
    emerging small launch service providers. For example, on 5 May 2019,
    Rocket Lab successfully launched an Electron rocket carrying three
    technology demonstration satellites for the AF Space Test Program.
        Ms. Chaplain. We have not assessed the Air Force's dedicated
    procurement line for small launch services. However, in 2017, we found
    that several U.S. companies were developing launch vehicles and related
    technologies to provide low- and medium-weight payload launch
    capabilities on the commercial market. \2\ Some of these companies
    began conducting test flights in 2017 with plans to begin carrying
    commercial payloads as early as 2018. We found that these emerging
    companies were implementing schedule flexibility as a key component of
    their business strategies to meet the demands of small to medium
    payload customers. These companies could potentially provide launch
    services to the government through the Air Force's Rocket System Launch
    Program. Moreover, in 2015, we found that DOD did not have a
    consolidated plan for developing a responsive launch capability
    primarily because of a lack of formal requirements for responsive
    launch, that is, no existing space program had them. \3\ However, we
    have not assessed DOD's plans more recently nor reviewed or assessed
    the criteria related to launch vehicle certification or mission
    assurance, for example, that the Air Force may have for these vehicles.
    This would be a good topic for future review, given trends in the
    launch vehicle market and the increased need for resiliency.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Surplus Missile Motors: Sale Price Drives Potential
    Effects on DOD and Commercial Launch Providers, GAO-17-609 (Washington,
    DC: Aug. 16, 2017).
        \3\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive
    Launch Report, GAO-16-156R (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2015).

        7. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, today, nearly all U.S.
    national security satellites are launched from fixed coastal U.S.
    launch sites that could easily be disrupted. Is the Department of
    Defense (DOD) developing more diverse launch sites using new commercial
    tactically responsive launch capabilities, including the use of
    existing military installations to support resilient polar and
    equatorial launch?
        Secretary Rapuano. Section 1618 of the John S. McCain National
    Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 provides that ``the
    Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with a
    federally funded research and development center to conduct a study on
    space launch locations, including with respect to the development and
    capacity of existing and new locations.'' The Department has entered
    into a contract with the RAND Corporation to conduct that study, which
    should address the issues raised in this question.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force is investing in
    spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to
    support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30
    million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in
    Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year
    (FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of
    supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements
    include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber
    security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of
    liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover
    the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch
    vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage
    emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include
    non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is investing in
    spaceport enhancements at two separate space launch facilities to
    support responsive small launch capabilities. A combined total of $30
    million has been provided to the Mid-Atlantic Region Spaceport in
    Virginia and the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Alaska from fiscal year
    (FY) 2016 to fiscal year 2019. These spaceports are capable of
    supporting equatorial and polar launch respectively. These enhancements
    include telemetry and command destruct upgrades, physical and cyber
    security enhancements, fuel production plants to handle the demands of
    liquid fueled rockets, and new payload processing facilities to cover
    the needs of processing DOD payloads and newer classes of small launch
    vehicles at these facilities. The Air Force will continue to encourage
    emerging commercial launch capability and spaceport options, to include
    non-coastal regions, complementing future responsive launch needs.

        8. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, do you support
    integration and execution of commercial air-launched space launch
    operations and services on additional military installations,
    specifically, operationally relevant demonstrations and/or pilot
    programs on Guam, in support of U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and DOD-wide tactically responsive
    launch requirements?
        Secretary Rapuano. I defer to the Air Force for specifics on the
    use of PACAF installations, but in general, the Department of Defense
    is supportive of new technological developments by the commercial space
    sector to improve and expand space launch capabilities.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively
    facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
    launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have
    utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove
    successful.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, the AF is actively
    facilitating use of infrastructure at Guam to support commercial air-
    launch operations. The AF recognizes these types of operations may have
    utility in meeting future military requirements should they prove
    successful.
                            space development agency
        9. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, it is my
    understanding that if we create a Space Force, a Space Development
    Agency (SDA) will be moved where the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
    (RCO) resides, or in another scenario, located at or near the Pentagon
    headquarters. Congress previously enacted language prohibiting a co-
    location of the Space RCO (formerly Operationally Responsive Space) in
    order to preserve the disruptive advantages that come with being
    separate. Shouldn't we, as a general rule, avoid reinventing the wheel,
    and are you at all worried that the Space RCO will be merged and
    diluted from its
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The location of Space
    Development Agency is still being determined by the Department of
    Defense, therefore I will refer any discussion as to its location to
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Leaders across the Department
    have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile
    delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development
    Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance
    Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and
    Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all
    represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal.
    Space RCO is conducting rapid prototyping and acquisition in
    significant ``protect and defend'' capabilities that no other agency is
    pursuing. It has initiated several new programs in the past year and it
    is our expectation this important work will continue unaffected in a
    Space Force. Meanwhile, we remain committed to improving the rapid
    delivery of warfighter capabilities while minimizing duplication of
    effort and eliminating non-value-added processes and procedures in all
    DOD space acquisition organization.
                         national reconnaissance office
        10. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, the White
    House's legislative proposal currently excludes the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from the legislative proposal. As a member
    of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I understand the NRO's value, and
    I don't believe we should try to fix something that isn't broken. Do
    you agree that NRO should continue to be excluded from the Space Force?
    Please explain why or why not.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The DOD's current legislative
    proposal does not include the NRO as part of the Space Force. While the
    DOD and NRO have separate mission sets, we have a shared strategy,
    concept of operations, programs, and sit together at the National Space
    Defense Center conducting operations. Beyond that, Space Policy
    Directive 4 tasks the DOD and Intelligence Community to further improve
    our relationship, organizational constructs, and integrated support to
    global joint combined operations. I agree with this approach.

        11. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in your
    testimony you mentioned that ``[o]ur teaming relationship with the
    National Reconnaissance Office has never been stronger.'' In your view,
    is there any reason to believe that this partnership cannot continue
    and grow stronger still?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. I do believe the Air Force-NRO
    relationship has never been stronger and that it will continue to grow
    and strengthen. The two examples provided in my testimony, the Silent
    Barker program and partnership in the National Space Defense Center,
    involve collaboration on strategy, acquisition, personnel, mission data
    processing, and funding for the space domain awareness mission.
    Additionally, we are committed to an ongoing dialogue to identify areas
    of increased cooperation, improved interactions, shared resources, and
    expanded partnerships aimed at enhancing national space interests as
    tasked in Space Policy Directive 4. These discussions include future
    changes to the organization and management of space (roles and
    responsibilities), mission assurance (resiliency and OPIR),
    collaboration (S&T, international and commercial), and assured access
    to space (range support infrastructure).

        12. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, the NRO is a civilian
    agency and the DOD is military, if there is a conflict in space how
    will you resolve the unity of command issue?
        Secretary Rapuano. As documented in Department of Defense Directive
    5105.23, ``National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),'' the NRO is a Defense
    Agency, and the Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction,
    and control over it. Furthermore, the NRO works in close coordination
    with other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) to be ready for
    unified action in space, as detailed in U.S. Strategic Command's
    Concept of Operations for Warfighting in the Space Domain, May 18,
    2018.
        The DOD and NRO have successfully operated for the past 50 years in
    a unity of effort construct during peacetime and conflict. This process
    is described in Joint Publication 3-14, ``Space Operations,'' April 10,
    2018. Further, Space Policy Directive-4 on the Establishment of the
    United States Space Force, emphasized the continuation and improvement
    of the unity of effort construct and directs the Secretary of Defense
    and Director of National Intelligence to ``create and enhance
    mechanisms for collaboration between the DOD and IC in order to
    increase unity of effort and the effectiveness of space operations.''
    That report, due to the President of the United States in August, 2019,
    will highlight the robust and collaborative foundation that the IC and
    DOD have already established, and will include plans to grow and mature
    the unity of effort and partnership necessary to persevere during a
    conflict in space.
        Over the past several years, DOD and IC leaders have strengthened
    partnerships and collaboration that have laid a solid foundation for
    unity of effort. These include the Joint Space Warfighting Forum
    partnership between the U.S. Strategic Command and the NRO; the Space
    Enterprise Vision partnership between Air Force Space Command and the
    NRO; the National Space Defense Center partnership between U.S.
    Strategic Command, the NRO and the broader IC; and joint acquisition
    programs focused on space protection and situational awareness.
    Additionally, the DOD and IC have participated in an ongoing campaign
    of wargames and experiments to continue to forge and mature this
    critical partnership.
                       accountability--space acquisition
        13. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, thank you as always for
    appearing--you are a steadfast hand helping the Senate Armed Services
    Committee (SASC) out in its oversight duties. Section 804 of the fiscal
    year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the acquisition
    checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
    The Air Force is proposing to use this authority to accelerate many
    space programs, including the Next Generation Overhead Persistent
    Infrared (OPIR) satellite program, which will cost in excess of $5
    billion. Are you at all concerned about using this authority with such
    a large developmental program?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Section 804 programs, like Next Generation
    Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR), are exempted from the acquisition
    and requirements processes defined by DOD Directive 5000.01 and the
    Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Instead, program
    managers are encouraged to use a tailored, streamlined approach to
    documentation and oversight to enable them to demonstrate new
    technologies or field new or updated systems within 2 to 5 years. In
    June 2019, we found that DOD had yet to fully determine how it would
    oversee these programs, including what information should be required
    to ensure informed decisions about program selection and how to measure
    program performance. \4\ Without consistent oversight, DOD is not well
    positioned to ensure that these programs are likely to meet
    expectations for delivering prototypes or capability to the warfighter
    quickly. GAO and others have highlighted lessons learned from DOD's
    past efforts to streamline that diminished its capability to lead and
    manage the space acquisition process, magnifying problems related to
    unstable requirements, poor cost estimating and systems engineering,
    and poor contractor performance. In response to a provision in the
    Conference Report to a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 115-863), we plan to initiate a review of
    DOD's OPIR acquisition efforts this summer.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, DOD Acquisition Reform: Leadership Attention Needed to
    Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight, GAO-19-439
    (Washington, DC: June 5, 2019).

        14. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
    describe what parameters bound your use of section 804 programs?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities
    emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most
    critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the
    current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested
    domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter,
    section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are
    trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to
    ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more
    aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the
    overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery
    with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can
    innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability.
    This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the
    greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters
    user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or
    technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
    subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
    prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
    section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure.
    All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis,
    rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific
    needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs
    (MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804
    programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper,
    will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three
    times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD.
    As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with
    congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address
    concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr.
    Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed
    under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series
    program.

        15. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
    give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and
    those that might?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of
    space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:

          Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
    production protected tactical waveform capability in current
    operational SATCOM terminals.
          Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload
    adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing
    scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space
    for operational as well as scientific, research and development
    payloads.
          Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1
    production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided
    a roduction viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production
    procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by
    preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies
    allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for
    operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing
    capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication
    Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected
    Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting,
    produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated
    integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M
    will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in
    current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband
    Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a
    similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air
    Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and
    Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented
    Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III
    program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:

            Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload
    competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and
    production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space
    segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most
    capability to include a non-flight demonstration.
            Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using
    Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the
    Navy as an early use prototype.
            Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload,
    ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally
    deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
            Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen
    OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development,
    and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
            Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc
    2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and
    ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes. The above
    programs qualified as section 804 by building operational capability
    that addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what
    works in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver
    the operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the
    example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that
    significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and
    service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the
    payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real
    data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule
    constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
    subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
    prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
    section 804.
                emerging small launch providers (osp-4 contract)
        16. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, aside from
    larger national security space launch, there are a number of emerging
    commercial providers eager to play a role in delivering small payloads
    into low-earth orbit (LEO) as needed. The Orbital Services Program
    (OSP-4) contract was designed to be the on-ramp for all emerging
    dedicated small-satellite launch providers. Yet, it is my understanding
    the Air Force has not issued a single award. What is the status of this
    contract vehicle, availability of funding, and does the Air Force
    intend to use the contract?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Since 2013 the Orbital Services
    Program-3 (OSP-3) contract has awarded 6 missions to include Discover,
    STP-2, and NROL-129. The OSP-3 ordering period will close in Nov 2019.
    The AF will expand on this effort with the Orbital Services Program-4
    (OSP-4) contract to provide small launch services using a Multiple
    Award Contract-Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract.
    With a low barrier to entry and future on-ramp opportunities, OSP-4 is
    intended to be the main contract vehicle for small orbital launches
    greater than 400 pounds. The IDIQ contract Request for Proposal will be
    released in July 2019. The first mission RFP (STP-S28) using Rocket
    Systems Launch Program procurement funds will be released shortly after
    the overarching OSP-4 RFP. Market research indicates that the small
    launch industry is ready to support National Security Space missions
    and we project approximately 20 missions to be awarded between fiscal
    year 2020-fiscal year 2029.
                          leveraging commercial space
        17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, I've met
    with a number of people in-and-outside of the military who have said
    that if the United States does not start to buy the emerging commercial
    offerings in terms of small satellite capabilities, and soon, then
    those commercial capacities are inevitably going to migrate elsewhere.
    How is the Air Force budgeting specifically toward procuring (or even
    experimenting with) emerging commercial capabilities?
        Secretary Rapuano. The National Defense Strategy recognizes the
    immense potential of emerging commercial space capabilities and the
    need for streamlined approaches for identifying promising commercial
    technologies, applying them to military systems, and regularly
    refreshing their electronics and software to facilitate continuous
    capability upgrades. The establishment of the Space Development Agency
    (SDA) was intended, in part, to be able to rapidly develop and field
    new space capabilities that leverage commercial space technology and
    access in support of warfighters. In addition, the Department has
    established a Space Rapid Capabilities Office to leverage existing
    technology development and operational capabilities to expedite
    development and fielding of select, critical space capabilities and
    systems. The SDA and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office will
    complement existing space research and development activities such as
    the Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office and the Space and Missile
    Systems Center to leverage more fully the potential of the commercial
    space industry.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses
    the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and
    process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial
    capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to
    warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center
    Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the
    SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense
    contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the
    Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems
    Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps
    located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA,
    the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop
    next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's
    vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage
    commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA
    prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission
    partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force
    Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA,
    MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense
    Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has
    been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy
    critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to
    protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing.
    Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial
    rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small
    satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats
    to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial
    capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from
    contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
    traditional members have received government funds through awards which
    helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission
    partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May,
    the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies
    that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements.
    Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research
    (SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be
    further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For
    example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to
    provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies
    and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR
    funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies
    and concepts with military applications.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Specifically, the Air Force uses
    the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and
    process to identify, experiment with, and test emerging commercial
    capabilities to determine whether they can be adapted for or applied to
    warfighter requirements and needs. The Space and Missile Systems Center
    Space Enterprise Consortium Other Transaction Authority, known as the
    SpEC OTA, provides a way for traditional and non-traditional defense
    contractors, as well as universities and labs, to work with the
    Government. The SpEC OTA is managed by the Space and Missile Systems
    Center's Innovation and Prototyping branch in the Development Corps
    located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Through the SpEC OTA,
    the Air Force and its mission partners have a forum to rapidly develop
    next generation space-related prototypes to achieve the Air Force's
    vision of a more resilient and affordable enterprise and leverage
    commercial industry's capabilities. SMC has awarded 37 SpEC OTA
    prototyping efforts exceeding $228 million in total value. Mission
    partners like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force
    Research Laboratory (AFRL) have also utilized SpEC. Using the SpEC OTA,
    MDA was able to award nine prototype projects for its Missile Defense
    Tracking System Phase 1 effort in April 2018. To date, the SpEC OTA has
    been utilized for prototypes across the space enterprise to satisfy
    critical warfighter requirements for everything from missile warning to
    protected satellite communications to position, navigation and timing.
    Through the SpEC OTA, the Air Force was able to highlight commercial
    rapid fielding techniques with the acquisition of the Tetra small
    satellite which acts as an on-orbit experiment to demonstrate threats
    to U.S. space assets. The Air Force leveraged an existing commercial
    capability and will be able to field the small satellite in a year from
    contract award to delivery. To date, 14 percent of the SpEC OTA's non-
    traditional members have received government funds through awards which
    helps to drive innovation and allows the Air Force and key mission
    partners to procure emerging commercial capabilities. As of early May,
    the SpEC has 295 members, 228 of which are non-traditional companies
    that can propose commercial solutions to meet Air Force requirements.
    Resources are also budgeted for Small Business Innovative Research
    (SBIR) annually and allow emerging commercial capabilities to be
    further developed and demonstrated for military applications. For
    example, AFRL is preparing to award for the development of a CubeSat to
    provide terrestrial weather to warfighters in a partnership with allies
    and industry. SMC plans to host a pitch day in the fall using SBIR
    funds to engage industry for multiple awards to innovative technologies
    and concepts with military applications.
        Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted focused work in this area.
    However, our ongoing review of DOD's Wideband Communications Services
    Analysis of Alternatives will describe some of DOD's efforts to
    consider emerging commercial satellite communications capabilities. We
    expect to issue a report on this review this fall.

        18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, Lieutenant General John Thompson, and Ms. Chaplain, in what
    ways is the Air Force engaging small satellite providers and component
    manufacturers?
        Secretary Rapuano. The Department is paying close attention to the
    innovation, energy, and investments in the Small Satellite (SmallSat)
    industry, and the opportunity to integrate those technologies into a
    holistic architecture to address current and emerging needs in support
    of our National Defense Strategy. To accelerate the investment,
    development, and deployment of small satellite capabilities, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, led by the Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), has established
    the Small Satellite Coordination Activity (SSCA). The function of the
    SSCA is to coordinate and synchronize critical technology information,
    activities, and investments pertaining to SmallSats that are employed
    in support of national security missions. In addition, the Space
    Development Agency (SDA) seeks to leverage commercially-derived, mass-
    produced small satellites, payloads, and ground equipment to build the
    next-generation national security space architectures, far more rapidly
    and much more affordably than would otherwise be possible.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space
    Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to
    expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage
    domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with
    incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense
    technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both
    internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators,
    to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees
    will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up
    accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air
    Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
    ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and
    actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share
    innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are
    not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as
    subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and
    analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on
    a critical role in actively engaging our international partners
    (government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange
    information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit.
    The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace
    industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is
    necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain
    America's superiority in space.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Beyond the efforts of the Space
    Enterprise Consortium and its members, the Air Force continues to
    expand the use of Small Business Innovative Research to encourage
    domestic small 8 businesses to engage in research and development with
    incentive for commercialization and profit to help mitigate defense
    technology gaps. The Air Force is utilizing accelerator programs, both
    internally managed and through partnering with commercial accelerators,
    to rapidly identify and build up capabilities that the USAF foresees
    will be vital for our warfighters. As an example, commercial start-up
    accelerators, like Starburst and Techstars, are working with the Air
    Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to grow aerospace start-
    ups in the greater Los Angeles area and across the United States, and
    actively expanding in the global arena as well to exploit and share
    innovation with our international partners. The start-up companies are
    not limited to new-entrant satellite builders, others such as
    subcomponent vendors and manufacturers and specialty services and
    analytics providers are also highly valued. The Air Force is taking on
    a critical role in actively engaging our international partners
    (government and commercial) to utilize, expand, and exchange
    information, technologies, and capabilities that are of mutual benefit.
    The Air Force wants to ensure the health of the entire aerospace
    industrial base (domestic and foreign) for decades to come, and it is
    necessary to do so, with help from our allies, just to maintain
    America's superiority in space.
        Ms. Chaplain. GAO has not conducted work in this area in recent
    years. In the past we have reported on challenges regarding DOD's
    engagement with small providers such as meeting DOD's unique
    requirements, obtaining security clearances, and breaking through what
    was perceived as an insular culture of space system acquisitions.
                        spaceflight testing environment
        19. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin are
    now flying low-cost commercial reusable suborbital vehicles that
    regularly access the spaceflight testing environment. How is the Air
    Force planning to utilize these new capabilities to test new
    technologies and reduce technical risks for future DOD space systems?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch
    Program provides suborbital launch services through the recently
    awarded Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/
    Indefinite Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-
    ramp opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year
    mark, to provide responsive access to space in order to test new space
    technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the
    Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five
    upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch
    providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental
    and Air Force small satellites.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Rocket Systems Launch Program
    provides suborbital launch services through the recently awarded
    Sounding Rocket Program-4 (SRP-4) Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite
    Quantity contract. SRP-4 was awarded in Nov 2018, with on-ramp
    opportunities for new providers at approximately the two-year mark, to
    provide responsive access to space in order to test new space
    technologies and reduce technical risk of DOD systems. Through the
    Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, the Air Force has five
    upcoming venture-class launches in 2019 with three emerging launch
    providers. These launches will provide space access for experimental
    and Air Force small satellites.
                space acquisition--section 804 rapid acquisition
        20. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804
    of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA gave broad authority to bypass many of the
    acquisition checks and balances in place for Major Defense Acquisition
    Programs. Can you describe what parameters bound your use of section
    804 programs?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Utilizing section 804 authorities
    emphasizes building operational capability that addresses the most
    critical developmental risk to determine what works in practice. In the
    current space domain, the transition from a benign to a contested
    domain has driven us to acquire space systems faster and smarter,
    section 804 authorities are just one of the means by which we are
    trying to go faster in space. The Air Force is taking great care to
    ensure we are pursuing section 804 authorities in order to have more
    aggressive and faster acquisition timelines in a small portion of the
    overall Air Force space portfolio. By emphasizing capability delivery
    with shortened time horizons and sometimes constrained costs, we can
    innovate more rapidly by delivering minimum viable products/capability.
    This allows programs two benefits: 1) Selecting the contractor with the
    greatest potential to achieve the result with real data and 2) fosters
    user feedback on early capability to inform requirements and/or
    technology evolution. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
    subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
    prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
    section 804. This bounds the Air Force's financial risk and exposure.
    All of the Air Force's section 804 programs apply the same analysis,
    rigor, and documentation--albeit in formats tailored to the specific
    needs of the programs--as do Major Defense Acquisition Programs
    (MDAPs). To ensure transparency of our MDAP-equivalent section 804
    programs the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Dr. Will Roper,
    will provide Congress a Selected Acquisition Report-like report three
    times a year. In addition, we provide quarterly 804 reporting to OSD.
    As the SMC Commander, I execute quarterly visits to meet with
    congressional stakeholders in order to make myself available to address
    concerns regarding all of the programs in my portfolio. It is Dr.
    Roper's goal that Congress have more insight into programs executed
    under section 804 authorities than under a traditional 5000 series
    program.

        21. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, can you
    give examples of space programs that don't qualify for section 804 and
    those that might?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The following are examples of
    space programs that didn't qualify for section 804:

          Air Force and Army Anti-jam Modem (A3M)--Field pre-
    production protected tactical waveform capability in current
    operational SATCOM terminals .
          Long Duration Propulsive Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) Standard Payload Adapter (ESPA) (LDPE)--Provides payload
    adapter to host auxiliary payloads as a rideshare on an existing
    scheduled spacelift mission, which provides affordable access to space
    for operational as well as scientific, research and development
    payloads.
          Global Positioning System IIIF--Based on previous Phase 1
    production readiness feasibility assessment, all participants provided
    a production viable design enabling a 22 space vehicle production
    procurement. The above programs didn't qualify as they were enabled by
    preceding activities that matured or prototyped the technologies
    allowing these programs to continue maturing the technologies for
    operational use/fielding. For example, the A3M program is utilizing
    capability proved out in a Protected Tactical Satellite Communication
    Field Demonstration (PTSFD). The demonstration proved the Protected
    Tactical Waveform (PTW) performed in an integrated system setting,
    produced prototype PTW modems (with crypto) and demonstrated
    integration into existing Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) terminals. A3M
    will mature the prototyped PTW modems and field the capability in
    current operational terminals (such as the Air Force Ground Multiband
    Terminals and the Army Satellite Transportable Terminals). LDPE is a
    similar example where the capability was proved out with the Air
    Force's Space Test Program-1, NASA's Lunar Crater Observation and
    Sensing Satellite, and Air Force Research Lab ESPA Augmented
    Geostationary Laboratory Experiment before becoming an ACAT III
    program. The following are examples of section 804 space programs:

            Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)--Creating a payload
    competitive environment to promote innovation, affordability and
    production timelines to deliver the next-generation, resilient space
    segment by FY30 using a constrained budget and schedule to get the most
    capability to include a non-flight demonstration .
            Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)--Using
    Agile Program Management to deliver a minimum viable product to the
    Navy as an early use prototype.
            Protected Tactical SATCOM (PTS)--Prototyping payload,
    ground and gateway segments, allows program to being incrementally
    deploying capabilities to the warfighter in fiscal year 2024.
            Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen
    OPIR)--Using competitive prototyping for dual-path design, development,
    and test, resulting in sensor prototyping.
            Modernized GPS User Equipment Increment 2 (MGUE Inc
    2)--Competitive prototype miniature serial interface receiver card and
    ASIC design, development and manufacturing processes The above programs
    qualified as section 804 by building operational capability that
    addresses the most critical developmental risk to determine what works
    in practice. This also allows us to innovate rapidly and deliver the
    operational community minimum viable products/capability. In the
    example of ESS, it is meeting a new strategic scenario that
    significantly increases the number of worldwide strategic users and
    service requests up to twice the current capability. Prototyping the
    payload under section 804 authorities informs the Air Force with real
    data to make requirements trades based on cost and schedule
    constraints. After we have proven out section 804 prototype, a
    subsequent acquisition decision will be made to transition the
    prototypes to traditional acquisitions or the rapid fielding statue of
    section 804.
                               launch block buys
        22. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, the Air Force has a long
    history of launch block buys. Can you describe them and what issues you
    saw with them in terms of pricing and competition?
        Ms. Chaplain. There have been 2 primary block buys under the
    National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle--EELV) program. In 1998, DOD competitively awarded firm-
    fixed price contracts, one each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin, for a
    combined total of 28 Delta IV and Atlas V launch services under the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions governing commercial
    items. Under these contracts, DOD had limited insight into contractor
    costs because certified cost or pricing data is not required in the
    acquisition of commercial items. \5\ At the time of award, the launch
    services contracts had a combined value of about $2 billion. The launch
    service contract prices were based on the assumption of a robust
    commercial launch market in which DOD would be one of many launch
    service customers. The robust commercial launch market did not
    materialize.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ These firm-fixed-price launch services contracts were awarded
    under the FAR provisions governing commercial items--FAR Part 12. As a
    result of procuring the launch services as commercial items, under the
    FAR, the Air Force could not request certified cost or pricing data
    from the contractor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2005, the Air Force revised the EELV acquisition strategy to
    reflect the changes in the commercial market and the new role of the
    government as the primary EELV customer. This revised strategy provided
    two contracts each to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. One, called the EELV
    launch services (ELS), was a fixed-price contract that covered the
    launch vehicle hardware and labor directly associated with building and
    assembling the launch vehicles. The second contract, called the EELV
    launch capability (ELC), was cost-reimbursable and covered the cost of
    maintaining the ability to launch when needed and funded. items such as
    overhead on launch pads and engineering support. These contracts were
    negotiated under FAR Part 15, which allowed the contracting officer to
    obtain data, including cost data, from DOD-approved contractor business
    systems, data previously unavailable for this program.
        Also in 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to form a
    joint venture that would combine the production, engineering, test, and
    launch operations associated with U.S. government launches of Boeing's
    Delta IV and Lockheed Martin's Atlas V launch vehicles. According to
    both contractors, the joint venture, named the United Launch Alliance
    (ULA), would gain efficiencies and provide the government with assured
    access to space at the lowest possible cost by operating independently
    as a single company and providing launches on both Atlas V and Delta IV
    vehicles. ULA officially began operations in December 2006 as the sole-
    source contractor for EELV. The Air Force continued to obtain cost and
    performance data from ULA through both the 2005 contracts awarded to
    Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and through new contracts awarded to ULA.
    It was, however, unable to get these data for some of the hardware
    items that Boeing had purchased while it was under the prior commercial
    contract arrangement. In addition, it took ULA many years to set up its
    business systems to report the data and to get them approved by DOD. As
    a result, there were years where the Air Force had rights to the data
    but the data were from an unapproved system, and thus were not
    considered reliable.
        In late 2009, projected increases in EELV program costs prompted
    the Air Force to reconsider the EELV business model. After studying the
    approach to buying government launches, the Air Force developed a new
    acquisition strategy. The strategy was designed to maintain mission
    success and incentivize price reductions in part through long-term
    commitments and steady production rates. Under the strategy, the Air
    Force combined its prior ELS and ELC contracts into one contract with
    ULA, called the Phase 1 contract, which was awarded in 2013 and commits
    the government to ordering 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-
    year ordering period (provided available launch funds and a valid
    requirement), and pays for the capability to launch eight launches per
    year. According to the Air Force, this contract saved about $4.4
    billion over the prior Air Force-estimated cost of launch for this
    period. In addition, this contract retained for the Air Force the same
    levels of cost insight as in the previous ELC/ELS contract arrangement.
        The advent of re-introducing competition in the launch program in
    2015 has resulted in overall lower launch service costs for some
    launches. However, we have not conducted work to assess the extent of
    such savings.

        23. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Chaplain, do you worry at all about the
    Launch Service Agreement (LSA) program underway which will again move
    towards long term block buys of launch between two providers?
        Ms. Chaplain. While we have not conducted a review of the Air
    Force's new launch service procurement acquisition strategy, our
    primary, longstanding concern has been whether DOD has gained the
    knowledge it needs to make sound decisions before committing to an
    expensive, long-term block buy, including the health of the launch
    industrial base for sustaining more than one launch provider.
    Specifically, we found in our 2011 review of the Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle program that DOD did not have some of the information it
    needed to make informed decisions in developing the new acquisition
    strategy for the program. \6\ Some of the knowledge gaps were in areas
    such as the launch industrial base, mission assurance and rocket engine
    costs, and future national security launch demand. Among other things,
    we recommended the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent
    assessment of the health of the U.S. launch industrial base, paying
    special attention to engine manufacturers; assess the block buy
    contract length given the additional knowledge DOD is gaining as it
    finalizes its new acquisition strategy; refrain from waiving Federal
    Acquisition Regulation requirements for contractor and subcontractor
    certified cost and pricing data; ensure launch mission assurance
    activities are sufficient and not excessive, and identify ways to
    incentivize the prime contractor to implement efficiencies without
    affecting mission success; and examine how broader launch issues, such
    as greater coordination across federal agencies, can be factored into
    future launch acquisitions to increase efficiencies and cost savings.
    DOD agreed with our recommendations. In 2012, we found DOD had
    incorporated or planned to incorporate most of the recommendations. \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New
    Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GAO-11-641
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).
        \7\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing
    Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-12-822 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 26, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2015, we assessed the risks the Air Force faced as it planned
    for future launch acquisitions. \8\ At that time, the Air Force was
    beginning its approach to using full and open competition procedures in
    a commercial item acquisition to increase the potential to keep more
    than one launch company viable and avoid repeating past mistakes that
    led to cost growth. We recommended that the Air Force should take an
    incremental approach to planning the next acquisition phase to avoid
    making decisions without sufficient knowledge. In 2016, we found that
    the Air Force was gathering and analyzing information on the global
    launch market to help ensure multiple U.S.-based launch providers could
    remain viable to compete for future launches. \9\ However, history has
    proven that it is difficult to reliably predict growth in the demand
    for launch services. Many factors influence the quantity, size, and
    frequency of satellite launches for both government and commercial use.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to
    Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable
    Incorporation of Lessons Learned, GAO-15-623 (Washington, D.C.: August
    11, 2015).
        \9\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD is Assessing Data
    on Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-16-
    661R (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         space rco reporting structure
        24. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in the
    fiscal year 2018 NDAA we renamed the Operationally Responsive Space
    Program the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, or Space RCO, and moved it
    from the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to report to the
    Commander of Air Force Space Command. Can you explain to the committee
    the merits of this new construct?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The SpRCO uses rapid acquisition
    authorities and streamlined reporting/oversight to meet critical
    requirements as directed by the SpRCO Board of Directors. The SpRCO
    transitions resulting products and capabilities to a partner program
    office for long-term production and sustainment, as well as to
    operational units to conduct operations. The SpRCO is aligned as a
    direct reporting unit to the Commander of Air Force Space Command,
    which enables a more agile and streamlined approach to requirements
    development and approval, and ensures that the SpRCO is assigned the
    most critical warfighting projects. This alignment also helps to ensure
    that the SpRCO has a direct and robust linkage with the Space
    Warfighting Community throughout the development of their assigned
    projects, enabling a smooth transition of capabilities during the
    operations phase.
                                  space fence
        25. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, space is becoming more congested and
    contested especially in LEO as plans for large constellations
    containing thousands of satellites come to market. In order to protect
    the United States' commercial interest as well as our military
    interests, how will the Air Force ensure timely, resilient, cyber-
    hardened, precision data is available to prevent collisions and protect
    our Nation's assets?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. [Deleted.]

        26. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, our warfighters depend on our
    satellites in all orbital regimes, especially geosynchronous earth
    orbit (GEO), for actionable battle management information. There are
    several ways to track satellites in GEO including the use of telescopes
    and radars, both space-based and ground-based. How is the Air Force
    addressing the growing adversarial threat at GEO in the USINDOPACOM
    region to ensure the United States can protect its critical assets in a
    persistent, all-weather environment within a critical five year
    timeline?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. With an architecture designed to
    leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best
    suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and
    discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the
    foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and
    change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting
    clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and
    ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform
    persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including
    threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to
    protecting assets.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. With an architecture designed to
    leverage the types of systems you describe for the roles they are best
    suited to accomplish. Ground based telescopes to search for and
    discover objects and perform routine monitoring. They provide the
    foundation and maintain the background to enable threat custody and
    change detection by maintaining the background objects and supporting
    clutter discrimination/differentiation. Space Based telescopes and
    ground based radars work in concert to maintain custody and perform
    persistent tracking of objects of interest or concern, including
    threats. These assets are allocated to enable warning, key to
    protecting assets.

        27. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson,he Committee understands that the test
    program for the first Space Fence radar site is underway in the
    Marshall Islands and will deliver an initial operational capability
    (IOC) in late 2019. The Space Fence program will dramatically improve
    the identification and tracking of space objects in all orbital
    regimes. Can the Air Force describe the plans and timeline to field the
    second radar site in Australia that will provide the full operational
    capability (FOC), ensuring better space situational awareness and
    battle management knowledge for the warfighter in the critical
    USINDOPACOM region?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal
    year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being
    weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to
    lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to
    field the second radar site in Australia.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Space Fence Site-2 is an fiscal
    year 2021 Program Objective Memorandum consideration and is being
    weighed against all other AFSPC priorities. At this time and due to
    lack of funding, there are no specific plans or timelines in place to
    field the second radar site in Australia.
                           space software development
        28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
    Thompson, DOD acknowledged the need to more quickly develop, deploy,
    and update software that works for user mission needs. However, the
    Defense Innovation Board recently noted that despite countless studies
    on DOD software acquisition deficiencies, little seems to be changing.
    What is your perspective on the reasons that DOD continues to struggle
    to implement newer approaches and tools and deliver more frequent
    software releases to users?
        Secretary Rapuano. The Defense Innovation Board's ``SWAP Study''
    (Software Acquisition and Practices) determined that the current
    approach to software development is broken and is a leading source of
    risk to DOD: it takes too long, is too expensive, and exposes the
    warfighters to unacceptable risk of not having capabilities when
    needed. The reasons for this are many, but we must focus on the need to
    reform our approach to software and acquisition more broadly. Our
    acquisition system was designed to develop and procure industrial-age
    capabilities. Although there have been process improvements along the
    way, our approach to acquiring capabilities continues to reflect this
    hardware-centric heritage. The capabilities we rely on today and,
    increasingly, in the future are basically computers. We need an
    acquisition system designed for the information age and the
    institutional willingness to make the necessary changes to get there.
    Our effort to establish a Space Development Agency (SDA), which is
    designed primarily to address the growing threat to our space
    enterprise, is also intended to begin transforming our acquisition
    system to one more-suited to produce the capabilities we will need for
    the future. The SDA intends to pursue agile approaches and incorporate
    other best practices from industry to put in place critical software
    builds on short timelines, including consolidated battle management and
    alternate navigation capabilities.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The DOD's acquisition process is
    serial and centered on delivering hardware. Hence, culture and process
    are the two major impediments to an agile implementation. The
    Department has begun implementing the necessary changes to deliver
    meaningful software releases to users faster than we have historically
    demonstrated. Specifically, the Space and Missile Systems Center is
    making profound cultural changes to influence adoption of software
    centric processes such as Test Driven Development, User Centric Design,
    and providing the user with a Minimum Viable Product to be
    incrementally improved upon. Using these methods, the Kobyashi Maru
    (the name for the agile software acquisition factory for Space C2)
    team, working on the Air Force's Space Command and Control (C2)
    program, recently delivered an accredited application, dubbed Metroid,
    to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the Protected Tactical Enterprise
    Service (PTES), that just awarded its prime contract in November,
    implemented agile techniques into its contract and will be delivering
    functioning, tested code every two weeks, with operators connected
    directly to the test environment for rapid feedback into the
    development.

        29. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, studies from the Comptroller General
    (GAO), DOD, and industry have found that user involvement is critical
    to the success of software development. Newer development approaches--
    such as Agile and DevOps--are based on integrating users into
    development. However, DOD programs have struggled to involve users
    early and continuously, and to incorporate user feedback into
    development. What are the barriers to user engagement, and do you think
    that DOD programs can develop software ``hand in hand'' with users?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes
    have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final
    product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers
    to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a
    static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus
    allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current
    needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery
    windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing
    the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to
    its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space
    Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an
    accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the
    Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning,
    tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that
    users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to
    experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide
    direct feedback to the developer.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Waterfall acquisition processes
    have left the user doubtful that their inputs influence the final
    product. A long and serial acquisition process drove Program Managers
    to avoid ``requirement creep'' as they were judged based on meeting a
    static set of requirements evaluated at the end of the process, versus
    allowing the users to incrementally adjust requirement to meet current
    needs. Efforts such as Kessel Run have proven that shorter delivery
    windows combined with User Centered Design is essential to providing
    the user with viable products. The user is presented with changes to
    its recommendation in a matter of days instead of years. The Space
    Command and Control program team utilized combat coders to deliver an
    accredited application to the user in 57 days. Additionally, the
    Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES) is delivering functioning,
    tested code into a cloud-based integration and test environment that
    users can reach from wherever they work. This allows users to
    experiment with the system, without impacting operations, and provide
    direct feedback to the developer.

        30. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, officials from Defense Digital
    Service, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense
    Innovation Board, and DOD leadership have all said that rapid
    development of software using newer software practices does not fit
    within the DOD acquisition process, or with DOD culture. To what extent
    do you agree these are software challenges, and what are the best ways
    for addressing them?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a
    challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these
    challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD
    5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a
    shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices
    not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the
    challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new
    acquisition category for software-centric agile program management.
    Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations
    account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet
    the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords
    program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more
    efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example,
    the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a
    two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The
    software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically
    tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
    in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can
    provide rapid feedback to development.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Software acquisition does pose a
    challenge to the traditional DOD acquisition process, to overcome these
    challenges, there has been a resurgence of prototyping and tailored DOD
    5000 acquisition strategies within the Air Force. This indicates a
    shift in leaderships' support for new software development practices
    not traditionally implemented in the DOD. One strategy to address the
    challenges associated with software acquisition is a potential new
    acquisition category for software-centric agile program management.
    Other options include the potential for an alternative appropriations
    account focused on software development with unique authorities to meet
    the needs of software development. Increased flexibility affords
    program managers the opportunity to explore unique alternatives to more
    efficiently and effectively, develop and deliver software. For example,
    the Protected Tactical Enterprise System software factory runs on a
    two-week delivery cycle, producing functioning, tested software. The
    software is developed in a contractor lab and new code is automatically
    tested and integrated into the codebase immediately when it is checked-
    in, at which point users are exposed to the updated software and can
    provide rapid feedback to development.

        31. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, the DOD is currently undertaking a
    number of initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps
    pathfinder efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software.
    What is the status of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD)
    and the Air Force's pilot efforts?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force
    are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development
    appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2)
    as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center
    offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground
    Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new
    software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software
    intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under
    this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations
    for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be
    combined into the single software appropriation.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Both the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Air Force
    are each pursuing an initiative for a new agile software development
    appropriation. USD(A&S) selected Space Command and Control (Space C2)
    as one of their pilot programs and the Space and Missile Systems Center
    offered the Space C2 [formerly JMS Inc 2] and Enterprise Ground
    Services (EGS) as pilot programs for the Air Force initiative. A new
    software appropriation could be used to obtain anything a software
    intensive program needs (e.g. manpower, equipment, services). Under
    this potential new appropriation, a program's existing appropriations
    for development, procurement, or operations and sustainment would be
    combined into the single software appropriation.

        32. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what extent has OSD or the Air
    Force considered potential challenges in the process steps in the DODI
    5000.02 in meeting the Agile or DevSecOps goals of these programs?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have
    spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how
    it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals
    regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile
    software program designation being considered. These would help move
    the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes
    necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial
    constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of
    these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by
    Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help
    programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)
    streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype
    capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of
    DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons
    are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force and the DOD have
    spent considerable time addressing challenges with DODI 5000.02 and how
    it is conducive to Agile or DevSecOps. As a result, there are proposals
    regarding a software appropriation account and a new major agile
    software program designation being considered. These would help move
    the Department towards the culture, flexibility, and processes
    necessary for agile software to occur and away from the artificial
    constraints that DODI 5000.02 imposes. One potential mitigation of
    these challenges is the section 804 authorities granted to the DOD by
    Congress. The Air Force has leveraged section 804 authorities to help
    programs like the Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES)
    streamline the traditional acquisition process to deliver prototype
    capabilities faster. This has led to lessons learned on what aspects of
    DODI 5000.02 do not mesh well with Agile and DevOps and those lessons
    are being fed into the DODI 5000.02 update process.

        33. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General David Thompson and
    Lieutenant General John Thompson, how do we know programs claiming to
    be agile, truly are?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage
    of the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense.
    Based upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly
    progressing through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the
    typical DOD acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-
    3 years from requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO
    is on track to complete this process within 8 months. Additionally,
    SpRCO is leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned
    into a full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners
    are identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO
    authorities are used through initial operational production, then
    transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate
    production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there
    are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some
    hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of
    development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily
    into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the
    developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen
    overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical
    Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise
    Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure
    coherence to an agile construct.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. SpRCO is taking full advantage of
    the authorities provided by Congress and Department of Defense. Based
    upon the first three assigned programs, SpRCO is rapidly progressing
    through Milestone A and contract award much faster than the typical DOD
    acquisition timelines. Typically, it takes most programs 2-3 years from
    requirements validation to contract award, whereas SpRCO is on track to
    complete this process within 8 months. Additionally, SpRCO is
    leveraging mature technology that is able to be transitioned into a
    full program at a more rapid pace. Finally, transition partners are
    identified for each of program at initiation to ensure SpRCO
    authorities are used through initial operational production, then
    transfers the programs to transition partners to execute full rate
    production and technical insertion. Every program is unique and there
    are numerous methods for implementing Agile, but there are some
    hallmarks of a truly agile program. Two key markers are rapid cycles of
    development, testing and delivery of functioning code (not necessarily
    into an ops environment); and end-users directly integrated with the
    developer. The Agile movement is a cultural change and will not happen
    overnight. However, some SMC programs, like the Protected Tactical
    Enterprise Service, Space Command and Control, and the Enterprise
    Ground Services, have already initiated finding ways to measure
    coherence to an agile construct.
                        dod space acquisition workforce
        34. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, GAO issued a report on
    March 14, 2019, that examines what DOD knows about its space
    acquisition workforce and basically found that DOD does not know much.
    GAO gathered its own data and found that at the end of 2017, there were
    over 8,000 military, civilian, contractor, and Federally Funding
    Research and Development Center (FFRDC) personnel supporting space
    acquisition programs at over 50 locations across the United States. The
    report highlighted two very basic pieces of information that DOD
    doesn't know, which until they are addressed, will hinder DOD's efforts
    to stand-up a Space Force: DOD (1) has not identified all of its space
    acquisition programs; and (2) does not know how many military,
    civilians, contractors, and FFRDC personnel support space acquisitions.
    GAO made recommendations that DOD identify its space acquisition
    programs and start collecting data on personnel supporting those
    programs. GAO indicated that the military departments had the most
    trouble identifying space programs in the user segment, such as radios
    or terminals that are needed by the warfighter to use a space-based
    capability. How will the department address this problem?
        Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted
    to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department
    identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the
    Space Force. Each of the Military Services identified the personnel
    currently performing the space missions and functions required to
    develop, field, operate, and sustain space missions.
        This data has served as the foundation for identifying which forces
    and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they would
    transfer. These transfers would be very methodical and time-phased to
    avoid risk to mission execution.

        35. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, what steps will DOD be
    taking to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are needed
    for Space Force?
        Secretary Rapuano. As part of the analysis the Department conducted
    to develop the legislative proposal for the Space Force, the Department
    identified space missions and functions that would transfer into the
    Space Force--including acquisition missions and functions. Using this
    data, the Department is continuing to refine our analysis of which
    forces and functions would transfer into the Space Force and when they
    would transfer.

        36. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, how will DOD determine
    which acquisition personnel should be transitioned to Space Force to
    ensure that it has the most qualified personnel with space acquisition
    expertise?
        Secretary Rapuano. Space acquisition personnel would transfer into
    the Space Force with the transfer of their mission or function. The
    space acquisition billets that the Department would transfer into the
    Space Force from the existing Military Services have specific
    acquisition qualification requirements.

        37. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano, are there certain
    functions, such as cyber security, that DOD would like to increase its
    in-house capability to perform instead of relying heavily on
    contractors and FFRDCs for that support? If so, what actions do you
    plan to take to attract people for those positions?
        Secretary Rapuano. For any discipline, the Department uses a
    requirements determination process to identify the numbers and types of
    personnel needed to perform the missions, tasks, and functions. The
    Department has always experienced challenges attracting and retaining
    talent in highly technical and high-demand areas such as cyber, space,
    engineering, and artificial intelligence. To enhance civilian
    opportunities to serve in these roles, the Department is actively
    seeking to recruit talent through traditional and innovative methods,
    hiring directly for critical skills, and utilizing enhanced recruitment
    incentives and pay to meet market demands. For military personnel, the
    Department plans to maximize the use of special accession authority for
    officers such as lateral career entry processes.
        synchronization of satellites, ground control systems, and user
                                   terminals
        38. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
    Thompson, programs like the Global Positioning Satellites and their
    ground segment and user equipment, protected communications satellites
    and user terminals, and missile warning satellites and associated
    ground process system capabilities have experienced significant
    synchronization issues resulting in expensive satellite capabilities
    being underutilized. What efforts is DOD undertaking to minimize these
    alignment issues and avoid them in the future?
        Secretary Rapuano. Keeping the segments of a major space program
    aligned can be a significant challenge, particularly with multi-service
    or joint programs such as GPS. Section 1603 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 established a ``Council on
    Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and
    Timing Enterprise,'' which we are using to help identify, elevate, and
    mitigate alignment issues before they become major problems. In
    addition, we acknowledge Congress's efforts to provide consistent
    program funding, which is essential to maintaining schedules and
    keeping segments synchronized.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. As part of the re-architecture of
    the Space and Missile Systems Center known as SMC 2.0, I recently made
    several key organizational changes to ensure synchronization across all
    aspects of the space enterprise. The SMC Portfolio Architect works
    across the SMC portfolio and in conjunction with the Air Force Space
    Command Enterprise Architect and other DOD space stakeholders. In
    concert with the SMC Portfolio Architect, I appointed senior military
    and civilian leaders to ensure the synchronization among all components
    of each space mission area. For example, for Positioning, Navigation,
    and Timing (PNT) under which GPS falls, we have a graduated Senior
    Materiel Leader (the highest level of certification for DOD acquisition
    professionals) who acts as the overall mission integrator for PNT. This
    Air Force colonel is backed up by a GS-15 Director Mission Integration,
    a GS-15 System of Systems Engineer, and another graduated Senior
    Materiel Leader serving as the Chief Architect. Together, this team of
    seasoned acquisition and operational experts track progress of space,
    ground, and control segments to avoid divergence of capabilities or
    delivery schedule. A similar construct exists for all other National
    Security Space mission areas such as Missile Warning, Satellite
    Communications, and Weather. The mission integrator will chair a
    mission configuration control board to approve any changes to all
    programs within the PNT mission area. Additionally, the Systems of
    Systems Engineer and the SMC Portfolio Architect will chair an
    enterprise configuration control board across missions to ensure no one
    mission change adversely affects another (e.g. launch mission changes
    driving unacceptable costs into the space segment, or vice versa).
    Lastly, the Chief Architect conducts modeling, simulation, and analysis
    to ensure mission needs are accurately captured and Program Executive
    Officers understand the requirements for the programs within their
    acquisition portfolio.

        39. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
    Thompson, as DOD considers making more space systems resilient, through
    approaches like disaggregation or using hosted payloads, what could be
    done to ensure all segments of the system (e.g., satellites, ground
    systems, and user terminals) are synchronized so the warfighter can
    take full advantage of the capabilities provided as they are fielded?
        Secretary Rapuano. In order to leverage innovative approaches like
    disaggregation or hosted payloads, we must relearn how to build,
    deploy, operate, and innovate rapidly, all at substantially lower cost.
    This requires a shift in mindset from how we have traditionally
    acquired space capabilities. A key component of DOD's space
    transformation is the Space Development Agency (SDA). The SDA's role is
    to define and monitor the Department's future threat-driven space
    architecture and to accelerate the development and fielding of new
    military space capabilities necessary to ensure our technological and
    military advantage in space for national defense. A feature of this
    architecture is a proliferated space transport layer, which leverages
    commercial networking standards and protocols. This will help
    ameliorate some of the synchronization issues we have today, which are
    a consequence of legacy, proprietary interfaces.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to how the Space and
    Missile Systems Center (SMC) will maintain schedule and performance
    alignment within mission areas by using senior, experienced leaders as
    mission area integrators, the Chief Architect will use modeling,
    simulation, and analysis to help Air Force Space Command refine and
    clearly articulate warfighter requirements that require materiel
    solutions. The SMC Chief Architect and the mission area integrators
    will remain actively engaged in the acquisition programs continually
    refining and assessing new technology or modernization initiatives to
    achieve the most effective mission performance at prudent costs.
    Resilience of satellites crosses multiple areas and the Chief Architect
    will use industry standards, like model-based systems engineering and
    digital twins, to trade performance and costs. Ultimately, the Chief
    Architect and the Systems of Systems Engineer will design and maintain
    standards (i.e. data standards, interface control documents, etc.) to
    ensure that SMC weapon systems are interoperable to the maximum extent
    practical. Additionally, continued investment in enterprise tools such
    as Enterprise Space Battle Management Command & Control (ESBMC2) and
    Enterprise Ground Services (EGS) will continue to prosecute the vision
    for flexibility in space to counter threats and leverage the advantage
    that space assets bring.

        40. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Rapuano and Lieutenant General John
    Thompson, to what extent will user equipment programs be integrated
    into the Space Force? If they are not, how do you plan to better
    synchronize them? Won't we continue to have disconnects?
        Secretary Rapuano. Most user equipment programs will remain within
    their respective Military Services because it is vital that these
    terminals be integrated with the weapon systems they support. The
    Department recognizes the need to synchronize across the Military
    Services more effectively, which is one of the main reasons an Under
    Secretary of the Air Force for Space was included in the proposal. This
    individual would provide dedicated civilian supervision of the Space
    Force and look across the Department, not only to synchronize our user
    equipment programs, but also to provide advocacy for the Space budget
    at the highest levels and to oversee our space architecture development
    going forward.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. As Congress considers the
    Department's legislative proposal to stand up a Space Force, the Space
    and Missile Systems Center remains focused on delivering the premier
    space capabilities to the Joint and Allied Force. SMC will work with
    leadership within the Department, the Air Force, and if stood-up, the
    Space Force, to ensure user equipment programs, and all other segments
    of critical space capabilities, are integrated across the spectrum to
    ensure consistent and reliable warfighter support.
                                launch schedule
        41. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the Air
    Force announced LSA awards to three companies in October 2018. The
    purpose of these awards was to: ``to quickly transition from the use of
    non-allied space launch engines, implement sustainable competition for
    National Security Space (NSS) launch services, and maintain assured
    access to space.'' However, recent indications suggest that the program
    as structured may fail to achieve some or all of these goals. A key
    program objective was to have certified launch vehicles ready to send
    critical national security satellites to space by April 2022. However,
    within weeks of the LSA award announcement, all three winners disclosed
    significant schedule delays. What is the current schedule toward
    certification for each of the three LSA award winners?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service
    Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch
    capability by April 2022. The selected offerors remain consistent with
    what was briefed to the Congressional committee staffs shortly after
    award. The Air Force updated its requirements dates based on actual
    changes to the projected National Security Space Launch manifest during
    the solicitation, and requested updated schedules that optimized
    development progress and risk based on these need dates.

        42. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, is the Air
    Force aware of further delays to the schedule announced in October
    2018?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. All three Launch Service
    Agreements participants are still on track to provide initial launch
    capability by April 2022, per their original schedules. The Air Force
    is working closely with industry through development challenges that
    are a normal part of a complex rocket development program, as an
    expected part of the National Security Space Launch strategy.

        43. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why didn't
    the Air Force know in October of 2018--just 5 months ago--when you made
    these awards that schedules were already slipping?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Launch Service Agreements (LSA)
    schedule dates remain consistent with what was briefed to the
    Congressional committee staffs shortly after award. The Air Force
    updated the LSA Request for Proposal (RFP) to reflect initial launch
    capability need dates based on the actual launch manifest. This allowed
    our industry partners to optimize development planning and saved cost.
    Through the solicitation process, the Air Force worked closely with all
    LSA offerors to understand both technical and schedule risk
    developments.

        44. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, did you
    independently assess the schedule representations made to your by the
    bidders?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Yes, as part of the source
    selection evaluation process, the Launch Service Agreement (LSA)
    Request for Proposal (RFP) requested Integrated Master Schedules from
    all bidders. The Air Force assessed each of these schedules, and
    assigned a schedule risk rating that was used as part of the award
    decision per the LSA RFP.

        45. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, will the
    Air Force award a block of the next roughly 10 years of missions this
    year to launch vehicles that have never flown?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force is not awarding a
    10 year block of missions. The Phase 2 competition will procure launch
    services for the five-year ordering period from fiscal year 2020
    through fiscal year 2024, corresponding to launch services from fiscal
    year 2022 through fiscal year 2027. The Air Force is investing in new
    launch vehicles with confidence they will meet the Initial Launch
    Capability (ILC) dates for the Phase 2 ordering period.

        46. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, if these
    new rockets are not ready, are you going to request access to more
    Russian rocket engines, or are you going to leverage existing,
    available, certified systems?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force does not anticipate
    needing to request access to more Russian rocket engines than already
    prescribed in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
    The Air Force is confident the domestic launch systems in development
    will be able to meet National Security Space Launch requirements. To
    mitigate the risk of unforeseen development delays, the Air Force will
    permit Launch Service Procurement contract awardees to offer secondary
    launch vehicles (leveraging certified systems) for the first two years
    of the contract.

        47. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, why is it
    important that the both winners of LSP/Phase 2 be able to launch
    Category C missions?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Phase 2 strategy ensures
    space launch operations meet requirements for Assured Access to Space
    (AATS) codified in 10 U.S. Code 2273. The statute specifies the U.S.
    will sustain the availability of at least two space launch vehicles (or
    families of space launch vehicles) capable of delivering into space
    national security payloads. It is critical that two providers be able
    to meet all national security space launch requirements, which includes
    Category C missions, with the flexibility to respond to the evolving
    manifest requirements associated with mission planning. Finally, if the
    Air Force allows offerers' to be selective in the orbits they service,
    the DOD could have sub-optimal launch vehicles, an unwanted sole-source
    environment for specific mission sets, or worst case, no capability to
    meet the most stressing National Security Space (NSS) orbits. (Without
    DOD partnership no company's business case would lead them to pursue a
    launch system that supports the robust requirements needed for future
    NSS missions).
                family of beyond line of sight-terminals (fab-t)
        48. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, the FAB-T
    Force Element Terminals (FET) subprogram is intended to provide
    survivable and protected satellite communications capabilities for
    several aircraft, including the B-52 and RC-135 platforms. The Air
    Force has indicated that it plans to develop the FET subprogram using
    tailored acquisition approaches and fiscal year 2016 NDAA section 804
    authorities. Has the Air Force made a final determination as to the
    number and type of platforms that will receive the FET?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force intends to produce
    76 Force Element Terminals for the B-52 and 17 for the RC-135. 479
    Force Element Terminals for the KC-135 and KC-46 tankers remain as a
    development objective if a future requirement is identified.

        49. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
    extent has the Air Force identified acquisition risks related to
    developing and fielding a terminal for multiple aircraft platforms, and
    what steps is the Air Force taking to address these risks?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has ongoing risk
    reduction contracts with the Force Element Terminal manufacturer to
    study system requirements, architecture, and platform integration.
    There are additional risk reduction contracts ongoing and planned with
    the B-52 and RC-135 platform prime contractors to study additional
    integration and installation requirements. These studies will burn down
    risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.

        50. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what
    progress has the Air Force made toward its planned contract award for
    FET development in fiscal year 2019?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal
    Acquisition Strategy was approved by the Milestone Decision Authority
    in February of 2019. The program remains on track to award a
    development contract in fiscal year 2019.

        51. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, how will
    the Air Force avoid the development problems that caused multi-year
    delays to the Command Post Terminals subprogram and ensure that this
    new subprogram meets the five-year timeline as a proposed section 804
    acquisition?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Force Element Terminal
    subprogram leverages technology from existing AEHF terminal product
    lines, to include the Command Post Terminal, Very Important Person
    Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM) Protected SATCOM (VPS), and Worldwide
    EHF Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (WEB-T) to meet the required five-
    year timeline. In addition, early risk reduction contracts will allow
    the program office to identify developmental challenges and burn down
    risk early in the development of the Force Element Terminal.

        52. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, FAB-T and
    the related PNVC system are expected to provide the President and
    senior leaders secure and survivable voice conferencing capabilities
    using the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) space system.
    However, AEHF already has four of a planned six satellites on orbit and
    the earliest AEHF satellites will be nearing the end of their projected
    service life by the time FAB-T and the Presidential and National Voice
    Conferencing (PNVC) system are fully operational. How will the Air
    Force ensure that systems like FAB-T and PNVC are compatible with the
    space system(s) that replaces the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    (AEHF) system?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS),
    the planned replacement for AEHF, includes a requirement for backwards
    compatibility with existing AEHF and NC3 architecture and
    interoperability with XDR user terminals. In addition, the FAB-T
    program office regularly participates in the MILSATCOM Control Board
    and associated technical working groups to ensure that satellite and
    terminal development are properly synchronized.
                    overhead persistent infrared satellites
        53. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, section 804
    authorities give the services permission to waive the burdensome
    requirements process for systems that need to be fielded in 3 to 5
    years. The Air Force designated the follow-on to the Space Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) missile warning constellation--known as Next-
    Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared, or Next-Gen OPIR--as the
    ``pacesetting'' program that will guide future efforts. To what extent
    is the Air Force confident the program can succeed in launching the
    first Next-Gen OPIR satellite in 2023, 2 years ahead of a schedule it
    presented less than a year ago?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force accepted that
    challenge, knowing that there were two prerequisites which would start
    the clock for the program manager to deliver success to launch the
    first Next Gen Geosynchronous (GEO) satellite by calendar year 2023:
    (1) Getting on contract and (2) Securing the required funding. A
    focused effort by the team at SMC, and the Air Force's embrace of the
    use of section 804 authorities allowed the program manager to get on
    contract with both the Next Gen GEO (Lockheed Martin Space) and Next
    Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems) satellite prime
    contractors within 3 months, and to complete payload selection within 6
    months. While SMC and Lockheed Martin (Next Gen GEO) moved out at a
    pace to meet a calendar year 2023 launch, we were unable to secure the
    funding necessary to sustain this speed. The schedule acceleration was
    underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required
    funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs
    largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The
    Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into
    fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold
    reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. OSD submitted an ATR to
    reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while
    Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232
    million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an
    associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The
    fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and
    approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the
    program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took
    this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year
    2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program.
    SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the
    program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing
    the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.

        54. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what are
    the primary reasons that the planned date for the full system to become
    operational in 2029 have not changed given the acceleration in
    schedule?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force chose to accelerate
    the Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellite program while holding the
    Next Generation Polar program satellites steady. Given the program
    strategy to maintain large reuse in payload design between the GEO and
    Polar satellites, accelerating the payload design efforts through
    competitive prototyping burns down early program risk for both efforts.
    The current Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program baseline for initial launch
    capability (ILC) are GEO-1 (fiscal year 2025); GEO-2 (fiscal year
    2027); Polar-1 (fiscal year 2027); GEO-3 (fiscal year 2028); and Polar-
    2 (fiscal year 2029). After the launch of each Next Gen OPIR satellite
    into its intended GEO or Polar orbit, it can take approximately 12 or
    more months to complete ground system and on-orbit satellite checkout
    activities; as well as, sensor-tuning activities before the satellites
    are ready to transition to operations.

        55. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
    extent is the decision to speed up the Next-Gen OPIR schedule and build
    in advanced sensors and resiliency features requiring a major shift in
    cost estimates and how is this affecting the program?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The schedule acceleration was
    underpinned by a need to simultaneously accelerate the required
    funding, allowing the program to move quickly to address the programs
    largest risks, payload development and early systems engineering. The
    Air Force prepared to accelerate $744 million in funding forward into
    fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 in two above threshold
    reprogramming (ATR) requests to Congress. The Department submitted an
    ATR to reprogram $344 million in fiscal year 2018 funds, however, while
    Congress supported the full $344 million requirement it denied $232
    million in sources, resulting in a shortfall in early funding and an
    associated re-plan of the program to deliver in fiscal year 2025. The
    fiscal year 2020 President's Budget Request assumes the processing and
    approval of an fiscal year 2019 ATR to secure $632 million to put the
    program on solid footing to deliver by fiscal year 2025, our Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council-validated need date. The Air Force took
    this strategy (vice including the additional funds in the fiscal year
    2020 President's Budget, because delaying funding delays the program.
    SMC is keeping the program's focus on competitively prototyping the
    program's largest risk area, the main mission payload, while posturing
    the program to ``pull to the left'' if early funding becomes available.

        56. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, what due
    diligence did the Air Force perform to estimate the potential cost of
    the program?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force executing due
    diligence by completing a program office estimate and three (3)
    independent cost estimates at the Center, Air Force, and Office of the
    Secretary of Defense levels. The Air Force developed a program office
    estimate using a parametric cost model and acquiring information from
    multiple sources including historical data from similar programs; and
    estimates were independently validated by the financial management
    function at the Space and Missile Systems Center. Additionally, the Air
    Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) independently developed a Non-
    Advocacy Cost Assessment of the program. Lastly, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE)
    office is conducting a separate Independent Cost Estimate which will
    support Air Force and OSD budget planning.

        57. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
    extent will having sole-sourced contracts allow single suppliers to
    dominate the market, thereby limiting the government's ability to find
    an alternative contractor should unforeseen issues with a current
    vendor arise?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. While the Air Force is executing
    the Next Gen OPIR Block 0 program using two sole-source contracts, it
    has taken direct action to foster and enable a competitive environment.
    The Next Gen OPIR Geosynchronous satellites were awarded sole source to
    the incumbent contractor after the government determined through
    extensive market research that they were the only provider that was
    postured to meet the aggressive delivery date of fiscal year 2025. In
    order to foster competition and increase the industrial base
    capabilities to support an open competition for the subsequent Block 1
    program, the Air Force awarded the Next Gen OPIR Polar satellite
    contract to a separate prime contractor. In order to mitigate the
    program's highest risks in the main mission payload, the Air Force
    required the satellite prime contractors to execute a payload
    competition and carry up to two payload vendors to provide for
    alternate paths. The prime contractors are also utilizing this
    ``alternate source'' strategy on multiple other components as needed to
    mitigate program risk.

        58. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, to what
    extent is the Air Force monitoring sub-tier suppliers for this program?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force has created strong
    working relationships with the prime contractors and subcontractors by
    conducting shoulder-to-shoulder working groups that meet several times
    a week throughout all levels of the program's planning and execution
    activities. For example, the Air Force required the Next Gen GEO
    (Lockheed Martin Space) and Next Gen Polar (Northrop Grumman Aerospace
    Systems) satellite prime contractors to conduct subcontractor
    competitions for the mission payload (MPL) with Government insight and
    oversight. Both Next Gen OPIR prime contractors are currently carrying
    two MPL subcontractors until a Government-approved down-select
    decision, maintaining a competitive environment among MPL suppliers
    while leveraging this critical path risk mitigation to reduce the
    highest risk on the program schedule. Beyond the MPL, the Government is
    also monitoring subcontractor performance, in concert with the prime
    contractors, at key suppliers guided by program risk assessments.

        59. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General John Thompson, SBIRS GEO
    satellites 5 and 6 were to be derivatives of GEO satellite 4, with
    limited design changes to capitalize on the use of previously procured
    engineering and parts. Yet, technical challenges and manufacturing
    issues have arisen that have caused schedule delays. Please explain why
    the Air Force is confident in the Next Gen OPIR acquisition cycle time
    when a lower risk, more understood.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are in
    production as technology refreshed equivalents of SBIRS GEO-3/4
    satellites and are intended as replenishments for SBIRS GEO-1/2
    satellites. SBIRS GEO-5/6 satellites are being built on Lockheed
    Martin's modernized LM 2100 satellite bus through the technical refresh
    contract change in 2015 and is on track to meet the September 2020
    contractual delivery date to enable the current planned initial launch
    capability in January 2021 and January 2022, respectively. Though the
    SBIRS GEO-5/6 program has experienced some manufacturing challenges,
    this is not unexpected with the integration of a first article, tech
    refreshed satellite. Lockheed Martin Space has worked closely with the
    Air Force to resolve and close all issues to date. As a result, the Air
    Force is confident the acquisition cycle is achievable because Next Gen
    OPIR GEO-1/2/3 satellites will leverage the LM 2100 common satellite
    bus that is used across multiple Lockheed Martin programs and mission
    areas. The LM 2100 has recently been enhanced to add capabilities that
    benefit multiple mission areas to include OPIR. Bus enhancements
    include elimination of obsolescence and insertion of modern electronics
    in multiple subsystems, as well as increased resiliency capabilities
    that are all applicable to the Next Gen OPIR mission. While SBIRS
    provided ``leading edge'' capabilities with new technologies, Next Gen
    OPIR uses mature technologies based on decades of Air Force and
    Industry lessons learned: (1) Next Gen OPIR intends to use a single,
    simplified onboard sensor--SBIRS has both a scanner and starrer; (2) By
    taking advantage of advancements in technology, Next Gen OPIR is able
    to save payload weight and power--allows reallocation of the Size,
    Weight, and Power savings to resilience capabilities; (3) Requirements
    are simplified to focus on strategically survivable missile warning;
    (4) The acquisition is streamlined; and (5) The program office is using
    2016 National Defense Authorization Act section 804 authorities,
    allowing rapid delivery of capabilities to keep missile warning ahead
    of adversary efforts. To reduce schedule and technical program risks,
    Lockheed Martin has two mission payload subcontractors (Raytheon & the
    Northrop Grumman-Ball Aerospace Team) designing, developing, and
    prototyping missile warning sensors in a competitive environment to
    maximize the use of parallel design, development, and test processes.
    The two suppliers were selected in September 2018 just 45 days after
    Next Gen OPIR's start, further embracing the program's rapid
    acquisition requirements. The recent successful completion of the Next
    Gen OPIR GEO System Requirements Review and mission payload System
    Design Reviews demonstrated a solid understanding of the mission,
    requirements, current design, risks and plans for work moving forward,
    enabling the Next Gen OPIR GEO program to proceed with preliminary
    design activities. The program remains on track to achieve a GEO space
    vehicle delivery by fiscal year 2025.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                            military space programs
        60. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, the fiscal year 2020
    budget request includes nearly $50 million to pursue the development of
    non-kinetic and kinetic options for space-based missile defense
    interception. In 2016, former Missile Defense Agency Director Adm.
    James Syring told the House Armed Services Committee the following: ``I
    have serious concerns about the technical feasibility of interceptors
    in space, and I have serious concerns about the long-term affordability
    of a program like that.'' Do you agree with Adm. Syring? If not, why
    not? Please provide an unclassified explanation.
        Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that
    the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a
    space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
    This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of
    2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other
    requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
        As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based
    missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate
    objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the
    capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of
    the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in
    today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible
    information with which to make the most informed decisions.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that it will be
    challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
    based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will
    always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However,
    we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully
    rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in
    orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile
    upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S.
    industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and
    proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing
    of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead
    Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
    satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the
    uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the
    Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the
    Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense
    against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that it will be
    challenging, but believe technology is advancing in ways that space-
    based interceptors are becoming viable. Space-based interceptors will
    always be technically challenging due to closing velocities. However,
    we've demonstrated solutions to closure speeds problems by successfully
    rendezvousing in Low Earth Orbit. The steps to rendezvous and dock in
    orbit are similar to the steps needed to intercept ballistic missile
    upper stages and high altitude hypersonic threats. Since 2016, U.S.
    industry has made significant advances in autonomous rendezvous and
    proximity operations (RPO). Work is being done on tipping and queueing
    of interceptors as well as decoy detection. Advances in Overhead
    Persistent Infrared sensor focal planes, onboard processing, and inter-
    satellite links show great promise in reducing or eliminating the
    uncertainty of space-based interceptors. The Air Force, especially the
    Space and Missile Systems Center, remains tightly coupled with the
    Missile Defense Agency on their space-based kill assessment, defense
    against hypersonic weapons, and space sensor layer efforts.

        61. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, former Missile Defense
    Agency Director Adm. James Syring observed in 2016 that the ``basic
    feasibility'' of an operational space-based interceptor layer ``has not
    yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the
    compressed engagement timelines required. Essential space-based
    interceptor technologies have been worked only sporadically over the
    years and consequently are not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate
    in the near- to mid-term.'' Do you agree or disagree? Please provide an
    unclassified explanation.
        Secretary Rapuano. The 2019 Missile Defense Review requested that
    the Missile Defense Agency study the development and fielding of a
    space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
    This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of
    2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other
    requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
        As with all programs, affordability will help shape space-based
    missile defenses. Affordability begins by setting appropriate
    objectives for space-based missile defense and then assessing the
    capabilities and limitations of potential architectures. The purpose of
    the study is to better understand more fully the feasibility drivers in
    today's environment so that the leadership has the best possible
    information with which to make the most informed decisions.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end
    interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the
    technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats
    are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking
    two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and
    rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has
    demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial
    companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space
    Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic
    feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense
    Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to
    assess the technological readiness for the US to field space-based
    interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include
    responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of
    detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while
    mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. I agree that no end-to-end
    interceptor concept has been demonstrated in space. However, the
    technologies required for space-based interception of incoming threats
    are similar to what is required for autonomous rendezvous and docking
    two objects in space: detection, tracking, orbital phasing, and
    rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). U.S. industry has
    demonstrated great advances in autonomous RPO, as seen when commercial
    companies' rockets make flawless approaches to the International Space
    Station. While cooperative RPO is done at lower speeds, the basic
    feasibility of RPO and interception are the same. The Missile Defense
    Agency's work on the space-based kill assessment has been valuable to
    assess the technological readiness for the U.S. to field space-based
    interceptors. Additional work will need to be done, to include
    responsible on-orbit demonstrations to exercise the kill chain of
    detecting, tracking, targeting, and discrimination of threats while
    mitigating debris and danger to other space objects.

        62. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, if Russia or China were
    to move to establish missile defense interceptors in space, how would
    you advise the Secretary of Defense to respond? Please provide an
    unclassified explanation.
        Secretary Rapuano. Russia and China have substantial missile
    defense programs and other military capabilities intended to threaten
    space. The defensive actions the United States is taking to improve
    space-based missile defense sensor systems and to explore space-based
    interceptor concepts are fully consistent with our obligations under
    relevant international law, including the United Nations Charter and
    the Outer Space Treaty.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Similar to the discussions
    surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based
    interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since
    it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that
    threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
    maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal
    sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot
    capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object
    Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely
    important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their
    performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of
    action across the spectrum of military operations.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Similar to the discussions
    surrounding ballistic missile defense systems, a space-based
    interceptor system would appear to make the world a safer place since
    it seems to negate the first-strike advantage. However, a system that
    threatens assured retaliation might invoke an arms race in supra-
    maneuverable weapons or encourage countries to increase their arsenal
    sizes in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary's magazine depth or shot
    capacity. Space situational awareness (SSA) and Space Object
    Surveillance and Identification (SOSI) systems become supremely
    important to find/fix the orbital interceptors, assess their
    performance limitations, and offer U.S. decision makers courses of
    action across the spectrum of military operations.

        63. Senator Warren. Secretary Rapuano, Lieutenant General David
    Thompson, and Lieutenant General John Thompson, what historical
    evidence is available to demonstrate that space-based missile defense
    has been affordable and effective for the United States? Please provide
    an unclassified explanation.
        Secretary Rapuano. The conceptual benefits of engaging missile
    threats from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long
    been recognized, as have the critical technical and operational issues
    that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful and
    affordable capability.
        Given the significant advantages of space-based missile defenses,
    the 2019 Missile Defense Review tasked the Missile Defense Agency to
    study the development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept
    layer capable of boost-phase defense. This report is scheduled to be
    completed between July and the end of 2019, and will identify the
    technologies, schedule, cost, and other requirements for a space-based
    defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a
    key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include
    multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing
    interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the
    purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA
    leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical
    examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have
    seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile
    defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors,
    advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and
    proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit
    demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect
    these various functions while minimizing debris.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Air Force Space Command plays a
    key role in the Department's missile warning architecture to include
    multi-domain command and control efforts aimed at enhancing
    interoperability. However, space-based missile defense falls under the
    purview of the Missile Defense Agency and as such I would defer to MDA
    leadership for funding and operational details. There are no historical
    examples of space-based missile defense. However, recent years have
    seen clear demonstrations of the various aspects of space-based missile
    defense, such as increased performance of space-based infrared sensors,
    advances in onboard data processing, autonomous rendezvous and
    proximity operations, and research into decoy discernment. On-orbit
    demonstrations would have to be conducted responsibility to connect
    these various functions while minimizing debris.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph Manchin
                             acquisition timelines
        64. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General John Thompson, in the
    testimony provided you highlight a 65 percent savings on acquisition
    timelines based on the implementation of the SMC 2.0 initiative. Ms.
    Chaplain in her testimony though highlighted some significant delays
    such as a 3.5 year delay in the AEHF satellite program's first launch
    and a 4 year delay in the Global Positioning System III (GPS III)
    program. Are these delays symptomatic of problems not addressed by the
    SMC 2.0 enterprise or is this a sign of the new processes attempting to
    catch up to and correct old problems?
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. Over the last 4 years, the Space
    and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has taken a multi-faceted approach to
    reduce the pre-contract award timelines and has seen a 65 percent
    reduction. SMC 2.0 29 continues to reduce this timeline by delegating
    acquisition authority to the lowest level possible and reduces/
    streamlines the documentation development and review timelines. To
    address the program execution timelines, we are using 804 authorities
    to critically think about the operational requirement and develop an
    acquisition strategy to burn down the developmental risk. Although the
    Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of DODI 5000.02
    was meant to ``prototype'' and mature technology, the cost of space
    programs limited lengthy technical reviews with multiple contractors.
    As a result, programs were not performing true prototyping, but rather
    they matured the technology at the piece part level with limited
    vendor(s), restricting the program's vendor options in the Engineering,
    Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase. By emphasizing capability
    delivery with constrained costs and shortened time horizons, our
    negotiation leverage shifts away from industry partners and back to
    SMC. Rather than locking SMC into decades-long contracts, we can award
    short term contracts and/or agreements with less requirement
    specificity, forcing industry to prove what capability can be delivered
    the fastest. Programs can then select the contractor(s) with the
    greatest potential with real data and not a concept or paper design.
    This will drive our programs to uncover critical component issues,
    hardware/software integrations risks, and/or software development risks
    earlier.
                            agency responsibilities
        65. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, in February
    Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson wrote a memo to Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin, in
    which she detailed why she believed the SDA was replicating duties
    already directed by Congress to the Air Force and that the agency
    lacked a ``uniquely identifiable mission''. She also highlighted that
    the Air Force had already stood up its Space RCO to complement its
    existing Rapid RCO with a space focus. Given the growing number of
    space focused research and acquisition agencies to include SDA, Space
    RCO, SMC and DARPA, has the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
    Department of the Air Force clearly outlined responsibilities and
    deconflicted lines of effort to maximize growth while minimizing waste?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. Leaders across the Department
    have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile
    delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development
    Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance
    Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and
    Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all
    represent distinct and important lines of effort toward that goal. The
    Department's initial vision of SDA's role is to leverage industry
    investment and commercial capabilities for the next generation space
    architecture. Further, Department and Service acquisition organizations
    continue to improve the rapid delivery of warfighter capabilities while
    minimizing duplication of effort and eliminating non-value-added
    processes and procedures.
                 acquisition strategy for space launch vehicles
        66. Senator Manchin. Ms. Chaplain, generally fully open, head-to-
    head competition provides benefit in quality and price of products
    delivered. Has GAO conducted any sort of cost assessment since the
    Space Vehicle Launch competition was opened up in 2015 to assess the
    value of the program to date?
        Ms. Chaplain. We agree competition is the cornerstone of a sound
    acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return
    on investment for taxpayers. However, we have not assessed the cost or
    value of the National Security Space Launch (formerly known as Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle) program since the Air Force amended its
    acquisition strategy to allow for competitive launch service
    procurements. This would be another topic worthy of a future review
    given the changing nature of the launch market.
                            assured access to space
        67. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General David Thompson, Lieutenant
    General John Thompson and Ms. Chaplain, the assured access to space
    policy is critical to ensure we are always able to provide the ability
    to reach and operate from space. I've become aware that the LSA
    companies' products share significant commonality across many systems,
    to include engines. Is our Defense Industrial Base adequately
    diversified under these agreements in order to provide continual access
    to space if a critical failure of any similar or common component is
    discovered?
        Lieutenant General David Thompson. The Air Force selected the best
    portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide
    effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does
    include some commonality between launch systems, this does not
    inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by
    demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air
    Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components
    across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the
    Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet
    Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
        Lieutenant General John Thompson. The Air Force selected the best
    portfolio of providers to ensure assured access to space and provide
    effective competition for Phase 2 Procurement. While the portfolio does
    include some commonality between launch systems, this does not
    inherently drive a higher risk, and can often reduce risk by
    demonstrating higher reliability across multiple applications. The Air
    Force has a strong history of effectively managing common components
    across the U.S. industrial base, as evidenced by the Atlas and the
    Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles use of the common Aerojet
    Rocketdyne RL-10 engine.
        Ms. Chaplain. We have not reviewed each LSA companies' launch
    system development efforts and plans, but we are aware of instances of
    commonality among the systems. Some commonality is also present between
    the Delta IV and Atlas V launch families, and issues with common
    components have resulted in or raised risk of launch delays for both
    families until the issues were resolved. Ultimately, it is the Air
    Force's responsibility to assess the sufficiency of its space launch
    industrial base and any potential impacts on assured access to space.

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